Reference Tables
Unemployment Rates for the Civilian Labor Force Over Age 16, 1947–
2019 (data displayed graphically in Figure 2.2 on p. 30)
Year
Rate
Year
Rate
1947
3.9
1981
7.6
1948
3.8
1982
9.7
1949
5.9
1983
9.6
1950
5.3
1984
7.5
1951
3.3
1985
7.2
1952
3.0
1986
7.0
1953
2.9
1987
6.2
1954
5.5
1988
5.5
1955
4.4
1989
5.3
1956
4.1
1990
5.6
1957
4.3
1991
6.8
1958
6.8
1992
7.5
1959
5.5
1993
6.9
1960
5.5
†
1994
6.1
1961
6.7
1995
†
5.6
1962
5.5
1996
†
5.4
1963
5.7
1997
†
4.9
1964
5.2
1998
†
4.5
1965
4.5
1999
†
4.2
1966
3.8
2000
†
4.0
1967
3.8
2001
†
4.7
1968
3.6
2002
†
5.8
1969
3.5
2003
†
6.0
1970
4.9
2004
†
5.5
1971
5.9
2005
†
5.1
1972
5.6
2006
†
4.6
(Continued)
ii
Reference Tables
(Continued)
Year
Rate
Year
1973
4.9
1974
Rate
†
2007
4.6
5.6
2008
†
5.8
1975
8.5
2009
†
9.3
1976
7.7
2010
†
9.6
1977
7.1
2011
†
8.9
1978
6.1
2012
†
8.1
1979
5.8
2013
†
7.4
1980
7.1
2014
†
6.2
2015
†
5.3
2016
†
4.9
2017†
4.4
2018†
3.9
2019†
3.7
Source: 1947–1966: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings 13 (January 1967, Table A-1. 1967–1974: U.S. President, Economic
Report of the President (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
February 2016), Table B-12. 1975–2019: U.S. President, Economic Report of
the President (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February
2020), Table B.
† In 1994, changes were made in the Current Population Survey, on which
estimates of unemployment are based, that increased the reported unemployment rate by 0.5 percent. Increases were especially noticeable among
women, teenagers, and elderly people. Definitions did not change, but
the new questionnaire apparently led more respondents to report that
they were actively engaged in searching for a job or were on layoff status.
Thus, data for 1994 and beyond are not directly comparable to those for
earlier years.
iii
Reference Tables
Employment Distribution by Major Nonfarm Sector, 1954–2019 (data
displayed graphically in Figure 2.3 on p. 32)
Year
Goods-producing
industries*(%)
Nongovernment
services (%)
Government
services (%)
1954
37.7
48.3
14.0
1964
33.8
49.6
16.6
1974
29.8
52.0
18.2
1984
24.9
58.1
17.0
1994
19.9
63.2
16.9
2004
16.6
67.0
16.4
2014
13.8
70.6
15.6
2019
13.9
71.2
14.9
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Employment
Situation Summary,” Table B-1, at www.bls.gov
* These industries include manufacturing, construction, and mining.
Table 2.1 Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender, 1950–2020
Year
Total (%)
Men (%)
Women (%)
1950
59.9
86.8
33.9
1960
60.2
84.0
37.8
1970
61.3
80.6
43.4
1980
64.2
77.9
51.6
1990
66.5
76.4
57.5
2000
67.2
74.7
60.2
2010 (February) 64.8
71.0
58.9
2020 (February) 63.4
69.3
57.8
Sources: 1950–1980: U.S. President, Employment and Training Report of the
President, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), transmitted
to the Congress 1981, Table A-1.
1990: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings 45 (February 1998), Tables A-1 and A-2.
2000: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation (News Release,
October 2001), Table A-1.
2010 and 2020: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Situation, Table
A-1. Data are available online at http://www.bls.gov.
iv
Reference Tables
Table 2.2 Nominal and Real Hourly Earnings, U.S. Production and
Nonsupervisory Employees in the Private Sector, 1980–2019
1980
1990
2000
2010
2019
Average Hourly
Earnings (current
dollars)
$6.84 $10.20 $14.02 $19.05 $23.48
Consumer price index
(CPI), using
1982–1984 as a base
82.4
Average hourly
earnings, 2019 dollars
(using CPI)
130.7
172.2
218.1
255.7
$21.22 $19.96 $20.82 $22.33 $23.48
Average hourly earn$14.79 $15.33 $17.52 $20.60 $23.48
ings, 2019 dollars
(using CPI inflation less
0.9 percent per year)
Source: U.S. President, Economic Report of the President (Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2020), Table B30-; and U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Archived Consumer Price
Index Supplemental Files, Historical CPI-U (May 2020),at www.bls.gov/cpi
/supplemental-files.
Modern Labor Economics
Modern Labor Economics: Theory and Public Policy, now in its fourteenth
edition, continues to be the leading text for one-semester courses in labor
economics at the undergraduate and graduate levels.
It offers a thorough overview of the modern theory of labor market
behavior and reveals how this theory is used to analyze public policy. Designed
for students who may not have extensive backgrounds in economics, the text
balances theoretical coverage with examples of practical applications that
allow students to see concepts in action.
The authors believe that showing students the social implications of the
concepts discussed in the course will enhance their motivation to learn.
Consequently, this text presents numerous examples of policy decisions that
have been affected by the ever-shifting labor market.
This new edition continues to offer the following:
•
a balance of relevant, contemporary examples
•
coverage of the current economic climate
•
an introduction to basic methodological techniques and problems
•
tools for review and further study
This fourteenth edition presents updated data throughout and a wealth
of new examples, such as the impact of COVID-19 lockdowns, gig work,
nudges, monopsony power in the technology industry, and the effect of
machine learning on inequality.
Supplementary materials for students and instructors are available on the
book’s companion website.
Ronald G. Ehrenberg is the Irving M. Ives Professor of Industrial and
Labor Relations and Economics at Cornell University. He has been honored for his teaching by receiving Cornell’s highest university-wide award:
the Stephen H. Weiss Presidential Fellowship “for effective, inspiring, and
distinguished teaching of undergraduate students and for outstanding contributions to undergraduate education.”
Robert S. Smith is Professor of Economics at Cornell University. He has
been honored for his teaching by receiving Cornell’s highest university-wide
award: the Stephen H. Weiss Presidential Fellowship “for effective, inspiring,
and distinguished teaching of undergraduate students and for outstanding
contributions to undergraduate education.”
Kevin F. Hallock is President and Professor of Economics at the ­University
of Richmond. He previously served as Dean of the Cornell SC Johnson College of Business, Dean of the School of Industrial and Labor Relations, the
Joseph R. Rich ’80 Professor of Economics and Human Resource Studies,
and Director of the Institute for Compensation Studies at Cornell University.
Modern Labor
Economics
Theory and Public Policy
Fourteenth Edition
Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Robert
S. Smith, and Kevin F.
Hallock
Fourteenth edition published 2023
by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
and by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2023 Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Robert S. Smith, and Kevin F. Hallock
The right of Ronald G. Ehrenberg, Robert S. Smith, and Kevin F. Hallock to be
identified as authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with
sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised
in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or
hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information
storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered
trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to
infringe.
First edition published by Scott Foresman 1982
Thirteenth edition published by Routledge 2018
ISBN: 978-0-367-34697-3 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-0-367-34698-0 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-0-429-32720-9 (ebk)
Typeset in Galliard
by Apex CoVantage, LLC
Access the companion website: www.routledge.com/cw/ehrenberg
Not for distribution in North America
Contents
Reference Tables
Preface
Acknowledgments
1
i
xx
xxiv
Introduction
1
The Labor Market 1
Labor Economics: Some Basic Concepts 2
Positive Economics 3
The Models and Predictions of Positive Economics 4
EXAMPLE 1.1 Positive Economics: What Does It Mean to “Understand”
Behavior? 5
Normative Economics 7
EXAMPLE 1.2 Do We Need “Nudges” to Make the Right Decisions for
Ourselves? 9
Normative Economics and Government Policy 11
Efficiency Versus Equity 12
Plan of the Text 13
Review Questions 14
Problems 15
Selected Readings 16
APPENDIX 1A 17
Statistical Testing of Labor Market Hypotheses 17
A Univariate Test 17
Multiple Regression Analysis 20
The Problem of Omitted Variables 21
Notes 24
2
Overview of the Labor Market
The Labor Market: Definitions, Facts, and Trends 27
The Labor Force and Unemployment 28
EXAMPLE 2.1 The Unemployment Consequences of the Sudden
COVID-19 Lockdown in March 2020 30
Industries and Occupations: Adapting to Change 31
The Earnings of Labor 32
EXAMPLE 2.2 Real Wages Across Countries and Time: Big Macs per
Hour Worked 35
How the Labor Market Works 37
The Demand for Labor 38
The Supply of Labor 42
The Determination of the Wage 44
26
x
Contents
EXAMPLE 2.3 The Black Death and the Wages of Labor 47
EXAMPLE 2.4 Prosecuting Workers Who Leave Their Employers 49
Applications of the Theory 50
Who Is Underpaid and Who Is Overpaid? 50
Unemployment and Responses to Technological Change Across
Countries 53
EMPIRICAL STUDY 2.1 PAY LEVELS AND THE SUPPLY OF MILITARY
OFFICERS: OBTAINING SAMPLE VARIATION FROM CROSSSECTION DATA 54
Review Questions 55
Problems 57
Notes 58
Selected Readings 61
3
The Demand for Labor
62
Profit Maximization 62
Marginal Income From an Additional Unit of Input 64
EXAMPLE 3.1 The Marginal Revenue Product of College Football
Stars 64
Marginal Expense of an Added Input 65
The Short-Run Demand for Labor When Both Product and Labor Markets Are
Competitive 66
A Critical Assumption: Declining MPL 66
From Profit Maximization to Labor Demand 67
The Demand for Labor in Competitive Markets When Other Inputs Vary 72
Labor Demand in the Long Run 72
EXAMPLE 3.2 Coal Mining Wages and Capital Substitution 74
More Than Two Inputs 75
Labor Demand When the Product Market Is Not Competitive 76
Maximizing Monopoly Profits 77
Do Monopolies Pay Higher Wages? 77
Policy Application: The Labor Market Effects of Employer Payroll Taxes and
Wage Subsidies 78
Who Bears the Burden of a Payroll Tax? 78
Employment Subsidies as a Device to Help Unemployed People 81
EMPIRICAL STUDY 3.1 DO WOMEN PAY FOR EMPLOYER-FUNDED
MATERNITY BENEFITS? USING CROSS-SECTION DATA OVER TIME
TO ANALYZE “DIFFERENCES IN DIFFERENCES” 82
Review Questions 83
Problems 85
Notes 87
Selected Readings 88
APPENDIX 3A Graphical Derivation of a Firm’s
Labor Demand Curve 89
The Production Function 89
Demand for Labor in the Short Run 90
Demand for Labor in the Long Run 92
Conditions for Cost Minimization 92
The Substitution Effect 94
The Scale Effect 94
Notes 96
xi
4
Contents
Labor Demand Elasticities
97
The Own-Wage Elasticity of Demand 97
The Hicks–Marshall Laws of Derived Demand 99
Estimates of Own-Wage Labor Demand Elasticities 102
Applying the Laws of Derived Demand: Inferential Analysis 104
EXAMPLE 4.1 Why Are Union Wages So Different in Two Parts of the
Trucking Industry? 105
The Cross-Wage Elasticity of Demand 106
Can the Laws of Derived Demand Be Applied to Cross-Elasticities? 107
Estimates Relating to Cross-Elasticities 109
Policy Application: Effects of Minimum-Wage Laws 110
History and Description 110
Employment Effects: Theoretical Analysis 110
Employment Effects: Empirical Estimates 115
EXAMPLE 4.2 The Employment Effects of the First U.S. Federal
Minimum Wage 115
Does the Minimum Wage Fight Poverty? 116
“Living Wage” Laws 117
Applying Concepts of Labor Demand Elasticity to the Issue of Technological
Change 118
EXAMPLE 4.3 Do Robots and Online Hiring Platforms Create or Destroy
Jobs? 120
EMPIRICAL STUDY 4.1 ESTIMATING THE LABOR DEMAND CURVE:
TIME SERIES DATA AND COPING WITH “SIMULTANEITY” 124
Review Questions 126
Problems 128
Notes 130
Selected Readings 135
5
Frictions in the Labor Market
136
Frictions on the Employee Side of the Market 137
The Law of One Price 137
Monopsonistic Labor Markets: A Definition 139
Profit Maximization Under Monopsonistic Conditions 140
EXAMPLE 5.1 Monopsony Power in Labor Markets: The Case of
Antitrust in the High-Tech Industry 144
How Do Monopsonistic Firms Respond to Shifts in the Supply Curve? 145
Monopsonistic Conditions and the Employment Response to MinimumWage Legislation 148
Job-Search Costs and Other Labor Market Outcomes 149
Monopsonistic Conditions and the Relevance of the Competitive
Model 151
Frictions on the Employer Side of the Market 152
Categories of Quasi-fixed Costs 152
EXAMPLE 5.2 Does Employment-Protection Legislation Protect
Workers? 153
The Employment/Hours Trade-Off 156
EXAMPLE 5.3 “Renting” Workers as a Way of Coping With Hiring
Costs 157
Training Investments 159
The Training Decision of Employers 159
xii
Contents
The Types of Training 160
EXAMPLE 5.4 General Training and Training Contracts 161
Training and Post-Training Wage Increases 162
Employer Training Investments and Recessionary Layoffs 164
Hiring Investments 165
The Use of Credentials 165
Internal Labor Markets 165
How Can the Employer Recoup Its Hiring Investments? 166
EMPIRICAL STUDY 5.1 WHAT EXPLAINS WAGE DIFFERENCES FOR
WORKERS WHO APPEAR SIMILAR? USING PANEL DATA TO DEAL
WITH UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY 167
Review Questions 168
Problems 170
Notes 173
Selected Readings 178
6
Supply of Labor to the Economy: The Decision to Work
179
Trends in Labor Force Participation and Hours of Work 179
Labor Force Participation Rates 179
Hours of Work 182
EXAMPLE 6.1 Gig Work and the Choice of Working Hours 183
A Theory of the Decision to Work 184
Some Basic Concepts 184
Analysis of the Labor/Leisure Choice 188
EXAMPLE 6.2 The Labor Supply of New York City Taxi Drivers 188
EXAMPLE 6.3 Do Large Inheritances Induce Labor Force
Withdrawal? 195
Empirical Findings on the Income and Substitution Effects 202
EXAMPLE 6.4 Daily Labor Supply at the Ballpark 202
EXAMPLE 6.5 Labor Supply Effects of Income Tax Cuts 204
Policy Applications 205
Budget Constraints With “Spikes” 205
EXAMPLE 6.6 Staying Around One’s Kentucky Home: Workers’
Compensation Benefits and the Return to Work 207
Programs With Net Wage Rates of Zero 208
Subsidy Programs With Positive Net Wage Rates 211
EXAMPLE 6.7 Wartime Food Requisitions and Agricultural Work
Incentives 214
EMPIRICAL STUDY 6.1 ESTIMATING THE INCOME EFFECT AMONG
LOTTERY WINNERS: THE SEARCH FOR “EXOGENEITY” 215
Review Questions 217
Problems 219
Notes 220
Selected Readings 226
7 Labor Supply Household Production, the Family, and the
Life Cycle
A Labor Supply Model That Incorporates Household Production 227
The Basic Model for an Individual: Similarities With the
Labor-Leisure Model 228
The Basic Model for an Individual: Some New Implications 230
227
xiii
Contents
EXAMPLE 7.1 Obesity and the Household Production Model 231
Joint Labor Supply Decisions in the Household 233
Specialization of Function 234
Do Both Partners Work for Pay? 235
The Joint Decision and Interdependent Productivity at Home 236
Labor Supply in Recessions: The “Discouraged” Versus the “Added”
Worker 236
EXAMPLE 7.2 Child Labor in Poor Countries 238
Life Cycle Aspects of Labor Supply 240
The Substitution Effect and When to Work Over a Lifetime 240
EXAMPLE 7.3 How Does Labor Supply Respond to Housing
Subsidies? 241
The Choice of Retirement Age 242
EXAMPLE 7.4 Inducing Earlier Retirement in the 1930s 246
Policy Application: Childcare and Labor Supply 247
Childcare Subsidies 247
Child Support Assurance 250
EMPIRICAL STUDY 7.1 THE EFFECTS OF WAGE INCREASES ON
LABOR SUPPLY (AND SLEEP): TIME-USE DIARY DATA AND SAMPLE
SELECTION BIAS 252
Review Questions 254
Problems 256
Notes 258
Selected Readings 263
8
Compensating Wage Differentials and Labor Markets
264
Job Matching: The Role of Worker Preferences and Information 264
Individual Choice and Its Outcomes 265
Assumptions and Predictions 267
Empirical Tests for Compensating Wage Differentials 269
EXAMPLE 8.1 Working on the Railroad: Making a Bad Job Good 270
Hedonic Wage Theory and the Risk of Injury 271
Employee Considerations 271
Employer Considerations 273
The Matching of Employers and Employees 274
EXAMPLE 8.2 Parenthood, Occupational Choice, and Risk 276
EXAMPLE 8.3 Indentured Servitude and Compensating
Differentials 278
Normative Analysis: Occupational Safety and Health Regulation 279
Hedonic Wage Theory and Employee Benefits 284
Employee Preferences 284
Employer Preferences 285
The Joint Determination of Wages and Benefits 287
Policy EXAMPLE: Employer-Provided Healthcare Benefits 289
EMPIRICAL STUDY 8.1 HOW RISKY ARE ESTIMATES OF
COMPENSATING WAGE DIFFERENTIALS FOR RISK? THE “ERRORS
IN VARIABLES” PROBLEM 290
Review Questions 292
Problems 293
Notes 295
Selected Readings 300
xiv
Contents
APPENDIX 8A Compensating Wage Differentials and Layoffs 300
Unconstrained Choice of Work Hours 301
Constrained Hours of Work 302
The Effects of Uncertain Layoffs 302
The Observed Wage–Layoff Relationship 304
Notes 304
9
Investments in Human Capital Education and Training
306
EXAMPLE 9.1 War and Human Capital 306
Human Capital Investments: The Basic Model 308
The Concept of Present Value 308
Modeling the Human Capital Investment Decision 310
The Demand for a College Education 311
Weighing the Costs and Benefits of College 311
Predictions of the Theory 313
EXAMPLE 9.2 Can Language Affect Investment Behavior? 315
EXAMPLE 9.3 Did the G.I. Bill Increase Educational Attainment for
Returning World War II Veterans? 316
EXAMPLE 9.4 When Investments in Human Capital Are Less Risky Than
Investments in Physical Assets 318
Market Responses to Changes in College Attendance 319
Education, Earnings, and Post-Schooling Investments in Human Capital 319
Average Earnings and Educational Level 320
On-the-Job Training and the Concavity of Age–Earnings Profiles 321
The Fanning Out of Age–Earnings Profiles 322
Women and the Acquisition of Human Capital 323
Is Education a Good Investment? 326
Is Education a Good Investment for Individuals? 326
EXAMPLE 9.5 Valuing a Human Asset: The Case of the Divorcing
Doctor 327
Is Education a Good Social Investment? 329
EXAMPLE 9.6 The Socially Optimal Level of Educational
Investment 334
Is Public Sector Training a Good Social Investment? 336
EMPIRICAL STUDY 9.1 ESTIMATING THE RETURNS TO EDUCATION
BY USING A SAMPLE OF TWINS: COPING WITH THE PROBLEM OF
UNOBSERVED DIFFERENCES IN ABILITY 337
Review Questions 339
Problems 340
Notes 341
Selected Readings 352
APPENDIX 9A A “Cobweb” Model of Labor Market Adjustment 353
An Example of “Cobweb” Adjustments 353
Adaptive Expectations 355
Rational Expectations 355
Notes 356
10
Worker Mobility: Migration, Immigration, and Turnover
The Determinants of Worker Mobility 358
Geographic Mobility 359
The Direction of Migratory Flows 359
357
xv
Contents
EXAMPLE 10.1 The Great Migration: U.S. Southern Black People
Move North 360
Personal Characteristics of Migrants 360
The Role of Distance 361
The Earnings Distribution in Sending Countries and International
Migration 362
EXAMPLE 10.2 Migration and One’s Time Horizon 362
The Returns to International and Domestic Migration 363
Policy Application: Restricting Immigration 366
U.S. Immigration History 366
Naive Views of Immigration 369
An Analysis of the Gainers and Losers 371
Do the Overall Gains From Immigration Exceed the Losses? 375
EXAMPLE 10.3 Illegal Immigrants, Personal Discount Rates, and
Crime 377
EXAMPLE 10.4 Immigrants and Labor Mobility in the United
States 379
Employee Turnover 380
Age Effects 380
Wage Effects 380
Effects of Employer Size 380
Cyclical Effects 381
Employer Location 381
Is More Mobility Better? 382
EMPIRICAL STUDY 10.1 DO POLITICAL REFUGEES INVEST MORE IN
HUMAN CAPITAL THAN ECONOMIC IMMIGRANTS DO? THE USE OF
SYNTHETIC COHORTS 383
Review Questions 384
Problems 386
Notes 387
Selected Readings 394
11
Pay and Productivity Wage Determination Within the Firm 395
EXAMPLE 11.1 The Wide Range of Possible Productivities: The Case of
the Factory that Could Not Cut Output 395
Motivating Workers: An Overview of the Fundamentals 396
The Employment Contract 397
Coping With Information Asymmetries 397
Motivating Workers 400
EXAMPLE 11.2 Calorie Consumption and Type of Pay 401
Motivating the Individual in a Group 402
EXAMPLE 11.3 The Effects of Low Relative Pay on Worker
Satisfaction 402
Compensation Plans: Overview and Guide to the Rest of the Chapter 404
Productivity and the Basis of Yearly Pay 404
Employee Preferences 404
Employer Considerations 406
EXAMPLE 11.4 Poor Group Incentives Doom the Shakers 407
Productivity and the Level of Pay 411
Why Higher Pay Might Increase Worker Productivity 411
Efficiency Wages 412
xvi
Contents
EXAMPLE 11.5 Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages? 412
Productivity and the Sequencing of Pay 413
Underpayment Followed by Overpayment 414
Promotion Tournaments 417
EXAMPLE 11.6 The “Rat Race” in Law Firms 418
Career Concerns and Productivity 420
Applications of the Theory: Explaining Two Puzzles 421
Why Do Earnings Increase With Job Tenure? 421
Why Do Large Firms Pay More? 423
EMPIRICAL STUDY 11.1 ARE WORKERS WILLING TO PAY FOR
FAIRNESS? USING LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS TO STUDY
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 424
Review Questions 426
Problems 427
Notes 428
Selected Readings 438
12
Gender, Race, and Ethnicity in the Labor Market
439
Measured and Unmeasured Sources of Earnings Differences 440
Earnings Differences by Gender 441
EXAMPLE 12.1 Bias in the Selection of Musicians by Symphony
Orchestras 443
EXAMPLE 12.2 Does Gig Work Eliminate the Gender Pay Gap? 450
Earnings Differences Between Black Americans and White Americans 450
EXAMPLE 12.3 Race Discrimination Might “Strike” When Few Are
Looking: The Case of Umpires in Major League Baseball 454
Earnings Differences by Ethnicity 455
Theories of Market Discrimination 457
Personal-Prejudice Models: Employer Discrimination 457
Personal-Prejudice Models: Customer Discrimination 463
Personal-Prejudice Models: Employee Discrimination 463
EXAMPLE 12.4 Fear and Lathing in the Michigan Furniture
Industry 464
Statistical Discrimination 465
EXAMPLE 12.5 “Ban the Box” and Statistical Discrimination 466
Noncompetitive Models of Discrimination 467
A Final Word on the Theories of Discrimination 471
Federal Programs to End Discrimination 471
Equal Pay Act of 1963 472
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 472
EXAMPLE 12.6 Comparable Worth and the University 474
The Federal Contract Compliance Program 476
Effectiveness of Federal Antidiscrimination Programs 477
EMPIRICAL STUDY 12.1 CAN WE CATCH DISCRIMINATORS IN THE
ACT? THE USE OF FIELD EXPERIMENTS IN IDENTIFYING LABOR
MARKET DISCRIMINATION 478
Review Questions 480
Problems 482
Notes 484
Selected Readings 495
xvii
Contents
APPENDIX 12A Estimating Comparable-Worth Earnings Gaps: An
Application of Regression Analysis 497
APPENDIX 12B Estimating the Gender Pay Gap in a Large
International Company 500
Notes 500
13
Unions and the Labor Market
502
Union Structure and Membership 502
International Comparisons of Unionism 503
The Legal Structure of Unions in the United States 505
Constraints on the Achievement of Union Objectives 508
EXAMPLE 13.1 A Downward-Sloping Demand Curve for Football
Players 509
The Monopoly-Union Model 510
The Efficient-Contracts Model 512
The Activities and Tools of Collective Bargaining 516
Union Membership: An Analysis of Demand and Supply 516
EXAMPLE 13.2 The Effects of Deregulation on Trucking and
Airlines 519
Union Actions to Alter the Labor Demand Curve 521
Bargaining and the Threat of Strikes 522
EXAMPLE 13.3 Permanent Replacement of Strikers 525
Bargaining in the Public Sector: The Threat of Arbitration 527
The Effects of Unions 530
The Theory of Union Wage Effects 530
Evidence of Union Wage Effects 533
Evidence of Union Total Compensation Effects 535
The Effects of Unions on Employment 535
The Effects of Unions on Productivity and Profits 536
Normative Analyses of Unions 537
EMPIRICAL STUDY 13.1 WHAT IS THE GAP BETWEEN UNION PAY
AND NONUNION PAY? THE IMPORTANCE OF REPLICATION IN
PRODUCING CREDIBLE ESTIMATES 539
Review Questions 541
Problems 542
Notes 544
Selected Readings 554
APPENDIX 13A Arbitration and the Bargaining Contract Zone 555
Notes 558
14
Unemployment
559
A Stock-Flow Model of the Labor Market 561
Duration of Unemployment 562
Paths to Unemployment 562
Rates of Flow Affect Unemployment Levels 563
Frictional Unemployment 566
The Theory of Job Search 567
EXAMPLE 14.1 How Discerning Should Unemployed People Be in the
Search for Work? 569
Effects of Unemployment Insurance Benefits 571
Structural Unemployment 573
xviii
Contents
Occupational and Regional Unemployment Rate Differences 574
EXAMPLE 14.2 Structural Unemployment as a Threat to Social WellBeing 575
International Differences in Long-Term Unemployment 576
Whether Efficiency Wages Cause Structural Unemployment 577
Demand-Deficient (Cyclical) Unemployment 579
Downward Wage Rigidity 580
EXAMPLE 14.3 Nominal Wage Cuts for Construction Workers in the
Great Recession 581
EXAMPLE 14.4 Recessions and Worker Effort 584
Financing U.S. Unemployment Compensation 584
Seasonal Unemployment 586
EXAMPLE 14.5 Unemployment Insurance and Seasonal
Unemployment: A Historical Perspective 587
When Do We Have Full Employment? 588
Defining the Natural Rate of Unemployment 588
Unemployment and Demographic Characteristics 589
What Is the Natural Rate? 590
EMPIRICAL STUDY 14.1 DO RE-EMPLOYMENT BONUSES REDUCE
UNEMPLOYMENT? THE RESULTS OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTS 590
Review Questions 592
Problems 593
Notes 595
Selected Readings 605
15
Inequality in Earnings
607
Measuring Inequality 607
Earnings Inequality Since 1980: Some Descriptive Data 610
EXAMPLE 15.1 Differences in Earnings Inequality Across Developed
Countries 614
The Increased Returns of Higher Education 615
EXAMPLE 15.2 Changes in the Premium to Education at the Beginning
of the Twentieth Century 616
Growth of Earnings Dispersion in Human-Capital Groups 617
The Underlying Causes of Growing Inequality 618
Changes in Supply 618
Changes in Demand: Technological Change 620
EXAMPLE 15.3 Will Machine Learning Increase Earnings
Inequality? 621
EXAMPLE 15.4 Are Early Childhood Programs a Vehicle for Reducing
Earnings Inequality? 623
Changes in Institutional Forces 626
Is Inequality Inherited? 627
EMPIRICAL STUDY 15.1 DO PARENTS’ EARNINGS DETERMINE
THE EARNINGS OF THEIR CHILDREN? THE USE OF
INTERGENERATIONAL DATA IN STUDYING ECONOMIC
MOBILITY 628
Review Questions 630
Problems 631
Notes 633
Selected Readings 638
xix
Contents
APPENDIX 15A Lorenz Curves and Gini Coefficients
Notes 642
639
16 The Labor Market Effects of International Trade and
Production Sharing
643
Why Does Trade Take Place? 644
Trade Between Individuals and the Principle of Comparative
Advantage 644
The Incentives for Trade Across Different Countries 646
EXAMPLE 16.1 The Growth Effects of the Openness to Trade: Japan’s
Sudden Move to Openness in 1859 650
Effects of Trade on the Demand for Labor 651
Product Demand Shifts 651
Shifts in the Supply of Alternative Factors of Production 653
The Net Effect on Labor Demand 655
EXAMPLE 16.2 Could a Quarter of U.S. Jobs Be Offshored? Might Your
Future Job Be Among Them? 656
Will Wages Converge Across Countries? 659
Policy Issues 660
Subsidizing Human-Capital Investments 661
Income Support Programs 662
Subsidized Employment 663
How Narrowly Should We Target Compensation? 663
EMPIRICAL STUDY 16.1 EVALUATING EUROPEAN ACTIVE LABOR
MARKET POLICIES: THE USE OF META-ANALYSIS 665
Summary 667
Review Questions 667
Problems 668
Notes 669
Selected Readings 673
Answers to Odd-Numbered Review Questions and Problems
Index
675
725
Preface
Modern Labor Economics: Theory and Public Policy has grown out of decades
of experience in teaching labor market economics and conducting research
aimed at influencing public policy. Our text develops the modern theory
of labor market behavior, summarizes empirical evidence that supports or
contradicts each hypothesis, and illustrates in detail the usefulness of the
theory for public policy analysis. We believe that showing students the social
implications of concepts enhances the motivation to learn them and that
using the concepts of each chapter in an analytic setting allows students to
see the concepts in action. The extensive use of detailed policy applications
constitutes a major contribution of this text.
If, as economists believe, passing “the market test” is the ultimate criterion for judging the success of an innovation, launching this fourteenth
edition of Modern Labor Economics is an endeavor that we have approached
with both satisfaction and enthusiasm. We believe that economic analysis has
become more widely accepted and valued in the area of policy analysis and
evaluation and that labor economics has become an ever-more-vibrant and
ever-more-vigorous field in economics. Modern Labor Economics was first
published about a decade after the neoclassical analysis of the labor market
replaced institutional treatment as the dominant paradigm, and in the intervening decades, this paradigm has grown increasingly sophisticated in its
treatment of labor market issues and the institutions that affect them. This
period has been an exciting and rewarding time to be a labor economist,
and our enthusiasm for bringing this field to the student remains unabated.
New to This Edition
Modern Labor Economics, often known as “Ehrenberg and Smith,” welcomes a
third author to this fourteenth edition: Kevin F. Hallock. Professor Hallock is
the president of the University of Richmond, and has served as the dean of the
Cornell SC Johnson College of Business at Cornell University, the Kenneth F.
Kahn ’69 dean of the School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell, and
the Joseph R. Rich ’80 professor of economics and human resource studies at
the School of Industrial and Labor Relations. He has written extensively in the
areas of compensation, unemployment, discrimination, and measurement, and
he was the founding director of Cornell’s Institute of Compensation Studies.
•
This fourteenth edition of Modern Labor Economics has been thoroughly
updated to include the latest descriptive data pertaining to the labor
xxi
Preface
market and the latest references to professional literature. Through
these updates, our goal is to make our textbook a comprehensive reference for critical factual information about the labor market and to
reflect the professional literature in labor economics.
•
Boxed examples, which illustrate the applicability of economic concepts
to the understanding of both daily life and historical developments, have
been key characteristics of Modern Labor Economics in its previous 13
editions. In this fourteenth edition, we have added 14 new boxed examples, including three on the effects of unemployment (including that
created by the COVID-19 lockdowns) and two on gig work. Other
new boxed examples address “nudges,” monopsony power in the hightech sector, “ban-the-box” legislation, the introduction of robots, the
effects of machine learning on inequality, and the human-capital topics
of early childhood education, general-training contracts that workers
sign, and educational investments among populations victimized by
forced migration.
•
Another feature of Modern Labor Economics has long been the presence
of several chapter appendices, which allow professors and students to
delve more deeply into more-technical topics if they are so inclined.
This fourteenth edition contains eight such appendices, including a new
one on the empirical issues of analyzing the gender pay gap in a large
international company.
Overview of the Text
Modern Labor Economics is designed for one-semester or one-quarter
courses in labor economics at the undergraduate or graduate level for students who may not have extensive backgrounds in economics. Since 1974,
two of us have taught such courses at the School of Industrial and Labor
Relations at Cornell University; the other of us has been teaching about
labor markets since 1995. The undergraduate course requires only principles of economics as a prerequisite, and the graduate course (for students
in a professional program akin to a master of business administration program) has no prerequisites. We have found that being highly technical in
one’s presentation is not necessary to convey important concepts and that
students with limited backgrounds in economics can comprehend a great
deal of material in a single course. However, for students who have taken
intermediate microeconomics, we have included eight chapter appendixes
that discuss more-advanced material or develop technical concepts in much
greater detail than the text discussion permits.
Labor economics has always been an “applied” branch of study, and a
thorough grounding in the field requires at least an acquaintance with basic
methodological techniques and problems. Appendix 1A in Chapter 1 presents a brief overview of regression analysis. Then, each succeeding chapter
ends with an “empirical study”—relevant to that chapter’s content—that
introduces students to different methodological issues faced by economists
xxii
conducting applied research. We hope that this unique feature of the textbook will both enlighten students about and interest them in the challenges
of empirical research.
After the book’s introduction to basic economic concepts in Chapter 1,
Chapter 2 presents a quick overview of demand and supply in labor markets
so that students can see from the outset the interrelationship of the major
forces at work shaping labor market behavior. This chapter can be skipped
or skimmed by students with strong backgrounds in economics or by students in one-quarter courses. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are concerned primarily
with the demand for labor, and Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 focus on labor
supply issues.
Beginning with Chapter 11, the concepts of economics are used to analyze several topics of special interest to students of labor markets. The relationship between pay and productivity is analyzed in Chapter 11, and the
earnings of women and underrepresented minority groups—encompassing issues of discrimination—are the subjects of Chapter 12. Chapter 13
uses economic concepts to analyze collective bargaining and labor unions
in the private and public sectors, and Chapter 14 discusses the issue of
unemployment.
Chapters 15 and 16 analyze two issues of major policy importance over
the past two or three decades: the growth in earnings inequality (Chapter 15) and the effects of greater international trade and production sharing
(Chapter 16). Both chapters serve a dual role: analyzing important policy
issues while reviewing and using key concepts presented in earlier chapters.
In addition to the use of public policy examples, the inclusion of technical
appendixes, and our end-of-chapter discussions of methodological issues,
the text has a number of other important pedagogical features. First, each
chapter contains boxed examples that illustrate an application of that chapter’s theory in a nontraditional, historical, business, or cross-cultural setting.
Second, each chapter contains a number of discussion or review questions
that allow students to apply what they have learned to specific policy issues.
To enhance student mastery, we provide answers to the odd-numbered
questions at the back of the book. Third, lists of selected readings at the end
of chapters refer students to more-advanced sources of study. Fourth, the
footnotes in the text have been updated to cite the most recent literature on
each topic; they are intended as references for students and professors alike
who may want to delve more deeply into a given issue.
Accompanying Supplements
The book is supported by a comprehensive companion website, featuring a
study guide, quizzes, quantitative and econometric exercises, chapter introductions, review questions and problems, applications, PowerPoint lectures, case studies, web links, and an instructor’s manual. These materials
have been thoroughly updated for the fourteenth edition and are available at
www.routledge.com/cw/ehrenberg.
Preface
xxiii
The publishers thank Elizabeth Wheaton for providing the quantitative
and econometric exercises; Leonie Stone for providing the instructor’s manual, PowerPoint lectures, and study guide; and Richard Haskell for providing the case studies.
Preface
Acknowledgments
Enormous debts are owed to four groups of people. First are those instrumental in teaching us the concepts and social relevance of labor economics
when we were students or young professionals: Orley Ashenfelter, Frank
Brechling, David Card, George Delehanty, Dale Mortensen, John Pencavel,
Orme Phelps, and Mel Reder. Second are the generations of undergraduate and graduate students who sat through the lectures that preceded the
publication of each new edition of Modern Labor Economics and, by their
questions and responses, forced us to make ourselves clear. Third, we are
indebted to all the reviewers who, over many years, have provided valuable
feedback on the prospect of new editions. Fourth, many of our colleagues in
the labor economics group at Cornell, along with Tim Schmidle, and Dara
Gocheski have contributed both formally and informally to this fourteenth
edition. Finally, we are grateful to Emily Chase and Louisa Heywood for
research assistance on this fourteenth edition. They are the kind of students
who make working at Cornell and Richmond such a privilege.
Ronald G. Ehrenberg
Robert S. Smith
Kevin F. Hallock
CHAPTER
1
Introduction
Economic theory provides powerful, and surprising, insights into individual
and social behavior. These insights help us understand important aspects
of our lives. Beyond this, however, government, business, labor, and other
groups have increasingly come to understand the usefulness of the concepts
and thought processes of economists in formulating social policy.
This book presents an application of economic analysis to the behavior of
and relationships between employers and employees. The aggregate compensation received by U.S. employees from their employers was $11.5 trillion in the year 2019, whereas all other forms of personal income for that
year—from investments, self-employment, pensions, and various government assistance programs—amounted to $7.2 trillion. The employment relationship, then, is one of the most fundamental relationships in our lives, so
it attracts a good deal of legislative attention. Knowing the fundamentals
of labor economics is thus essential to an understanding of a huge array of
social problems and programs, both in the United States and elsewhere.
As economists who have been actively involved in the analysis and evaluation of public policies, we obviously believe that labor economics is useful
in understanding the effects of these programs. Perhaps more importantly,
we also believe that policy analysis can be useful in teaching the fundamentals of labor economics. We have therefore incorporated such analyses into
each chapter, with two purposes in mind. First, we believe that seeing the
relevance and social implications of concepts studied enhances the student’s
motivation to learn. Second, using the concepts of each chapter in an analytical setting reinforces understanding by helping the student to see them
“in action.”
The Labor Market
There is a rumor that a former U.S. secretary of labor attempted to abolish
the term labor market from departmental publications. He believed that it
demeaned workers to regard labor as being bought and sold like so much
grain, oil, or steel. True, labor is unique in several ways. Labor services can
2
Chapter 1 Introduction
only be rented; workers themselves cannot be bought and sold. Further,
because labor services cannot be separated from workers, the conditions
under which such services are rented are often as important as the price.
Indeed, nonpecuniary factors—such as work environment, the risk of injury,
the personalities of managers, the perceptions of fair treatment, and the flexibility of work hours—loom larger in employment transactions than they do
in markets for commodities and other goods. Finally, a host of institutions
and pieces of legislation that influence the employment relationship do not
exist in other markets.
Nevertheless, the circumstances under which employers rent and
employees rent out labor services clearly constitute a market, for several
reasons. First, institutions such as job boards and employment agencies
have been developed to facilitate contacts between buyers and sellers of
labor services. Second, once a contact has been arranged, information
about price and quality is exchanged in employment applications and
interviews. Third, when an agreement has been reached, some kind of
contract, whether formal or informal, is executed, covering compensation,
conditions of work, job security, and even the duration of the job. These
contracts typically (but not exclusively—more on that in Chapter 11) call
for employers to compensate employees for their time and not for what
they produce. This form of compensation requires that employers give
careful attention to worker motivation and dependability in the selection
and employment process.
The end result of employer–employee transactions in the labor market is,
of course, the placement of people in jobs at certain rates of pay. This allocation of labor serves not only the personal needs of individuals but the needs
of the larger society as well. Through the labor market, our most important
national resource—labor—is allocated to firms, industries, occupations, and
regions.1
Labor Economics: Some Basic
Concepts
Labor economics is the study of the workings and outcomes of the market
for labor. More specifically, labor economics is concerned primarily with the
behavior of employers and employees in response to the general incentives of
wages, prices, profits, and nonpecuniary aspects of the employment relationship, such as working conditions. These incentives serve both to motivate
and to limit individual choice. The focus in economics is on inducements for
behavior that are impersonal and apply to a wide range of people.
In this book, we examine, for example, the relationship between wages
and employment opportunities; the interactions between wages, income,
and the decision to work; the way that general market incentives affect
occupational choice; the relationship between wages and undesirable job
characteristics; the incentives for and effects of educational and training
investments; and the effects of unions on wages, productivity, and turnover.
In the process, we analyze the employment and wage effects of such social
3
Chapter 1 Introduction
policies as the minimum wage, overtime legislation, safety and health regulations, welfare reform, payroll taxes, unemployment insurance, immigration
policies, and antidiscrimination laws.
Our study of labor economics is conducted on two levels. Most of the
time, we use economic theory to analyze “what is”; that is, we explain people’s behavior by using a mode of analysis called positive economics. Less
commonly, we use normative economic analysis to judge “what should be.”
Positive Economics
Positive economics is a theory of behavior in which people are typically
assumed to respond favorably to benefits and negatively to costs. In this
regard, positive economics closely resembles Skinnerian psychology, which
views behavior as shaped by rewards and punishments. The rewards in economic theory are pecuniary and nonpecuniary gains (benefits), whereas the
punishments are forgone opportunities and the training needed to become
certified to do the job (costs). For example, a person motivated to become
a surgeon because of the earnings and status that surgeons command must
give up the opportunity to become a lawyer and must be available for emergency work around the clock. Both the benefits and the costs must be considered in making this career choice.
Scarcity The pervasive assumption underlying economic theory is that
of resource scarcity. According to this assumption, individuals and society
alike do not have the resources to meet all of their wants. Thus, any resource
devoted to satisfying one set of desires could have been used to satisfy
another set, which means that there is a cost (sometimes called an opportunity cost) to any decision or action. The real cost of using labor hired by a
government contractor to build a road, for example, is the production lost
by not devoting this labor to the production of some other good or service.
Thus, in popular terms, “there is no such thing as a free lunch,” and we
must always make choices and live with the rewards and costs that these
choices bring us. Moreover, we are always constrained in our choices by the
resources available to us.
Rationality A second basic assumption of positive economics is that
people are rational: they have an objective and pursue it in a reasonably consistent fashion. When considering people, economists assume that the objective being pursued is utility maximization; that is, people are assumed to
strive toward the goal of making themselves as happy as they can (given their
limited resources). Note that this is not necessarily income maximization.
Utility, of course, is generated by both pecuniary dimensions and nonpecuniary dimensions of employment.
When considering the behavior of firms, which are inherently nonpersonal entities, economists assume that the goal of behavior is profit maximization. Profit maximization is really just a special case of utility maximization
in which pecuniary gain is paramount and nonpecuniary factors are ignored.
4
Chapter 1 Introduction
The assumption of rationality implies a consistency of response to general
economic incentives and an adaptability of behavior when those incentives
change. These two characteristics of behavior underlie predictions about
how workers and firms will respond to various incentives.2
The Models and Predictions of
Positive Economics
Behavioral predictions in economics flow more or less directly from the two
fundamental assumptions of scarcity and rationality. Workers must continually make choices, such as whether to look for other jobs, accept overtime, move to another area, or acquire more education. Employers must
also make choices concerning, for example, the level of output and the mix
of machines and labor to use in production. Economists usually assume that
when making these choices, employees and employers are guided by their
desires to maximize utility or profit, respectively. However, what is more
important to the economic theory of behavior is not the particular goal of
either employees or employers; rather, it is that economic actors weigh the
costs and benefits of various alternative transactions in the context of achieving some goal or another.
One might object that these assumptions are unrealistic and that people
are not nearly as calculating, as well informed about alternatives, or as amply
endowed with choices as economists assume. Economists are likely to reply
that if people are not calculating, are totally uninformed, or do not have any
choices, then most predictions suggested by economic theory will not be
supported by real-world evidence. They thus argue that the theory underlying positive economics should be judged on the basis of its predictions, not
its assumptions.
The reason we need to make assumptions and create a relatively simple theory of behavior is that the actual workings of the labor market are
almost inconceivably complex. Millions of workers and employers interact
daily, all with their own sets of motivations, preferences, information, and
perceptions of self-interest. What we need to discover are general principles
that provide useful insights into the labor market. We hope to show in this
text that a few forces are so basic to labor market behavior that they alone
can predict or explain many of the outcomes and behaviors observed in the
labor market.
Any time that we attempt to explain a complex set of behaviors and
outcomes by using a few fundamental influences, we have created a model.
Models are not intended to capture every complexity of behavior; instead,
they are created to strip away random and idiosyncratic factors, to focus
on general principles. An analogy from the physical sciences may make the
nature of models and their relationship to actual behavior clearer.
A Physical Model Using simple calculations of velocity and gravitational pull, physicists can predict where a ball will land if it is kicked with
a certain force at a given angle to the ground. The actual point of landing
5
Chapter 1 Introduction
may vary from the predicted point because of wind currents and any spin
that the ball might have—factors ignored in basic calculations. If a hundred
balls are kicked, none may ever land exactly on the predicted spot, although
they will tend to cluster around it. The accuracy of the model, although not
perfect, may be good enough to enable a football coach to decide whether
to attempt a field goal. The point is that for policy purposes, we usually
just need to know the average tendencies of outcomes. To estimate these
tendencies, we need to know the important forces at work, but we must
confine ourselves to few enough influences so that calculating estimates
remains feasible. (A further comparison of physics and positive economics is
in Example 1.1.)
EXAMPLE 1.1
Positive Economics: What Does It Mean to
“Understand” Behavior?
The purpose of positive economic analysis is to analyze, or understand, the behavior of
people as they respond to market incentives. But in a world that is extremely complex, just
what does it mean to “understand” behavior? One theoretical physicist put it the following
way:
We can imagine that this complicated array of moving things which constitutes “the
world” is something like a great chess game being played by the gods, and we are
observers of the game. We do not know what the rules of the game are; all we are
allowed to do is to watch the playing. Of course, if we watch long enough, we may
eventually catch on to a few of the rules. The rules of the game are what we mean
by fundamental physics. Even if we know every rule, however, . . . what we really
can explain in terms of those rules is very limited, because almost all situations are so
enormously complicated that we cannot follow the plays of the game using the rules,
much less tell what is going to happen next. We must, therefore, limit ourselves to the
more basic question of the rules of the game. If we know the rules, we consider that we
“understand” the world.a
If the behavior of nature, which does not have a will, is so difficult to analyze,
understanding the behavior of people is even more of a challenge. Since people’s behaviors
do not mechanistically follow a set of rules, the goal of positive economics is most
realistically stated as trying to discover people’s behavioral tendencies.
Source: The Feynman Lectures on Physics by Richard P. Feynman, 2011. Reprinted by permission of
Basic Books, a member of the Perseus Books Group
An Economic Model To really grasp the assumptions and predictions of economic models, we consider a concrete example. Suppose we
begin by asserting that being subject to resource scarcity, workers will prefer
high-paying jobs to low-paying ones if all other job characteristics are the
same in each job. Thus, they will quit lower-paying jobs to take higher-paying
6
Chapter 1 Introduction
ones if they believe sufficient improvement is likely. This principle does not
imply that workers care only about wages or that all are equally likely to quit.
Workers obviously care about a number of employment characteristics, and
improvement in any of these on their current job makes turnover less likely.
Likewise, some workers are more receptive to change than other workers
are. Nevertheless, if we hold other factors constant and increase only wages,
we should clearly observe that the probability of quitting will fall.
On the employer side of the market, we can consider a similar prediction. Firms need to make a profit to survive. If they have high turnover,
their costs will be higher than otherwise, because of the need to search
for, hire, and train replacements. With high turnover, they will be less
able, therefore, to afford to pay higher wages. However, if they could
reduce turnover (and the costs of turnover) enough by paying increasing
wages, it might well be worth incurring the added wage costs. Thus, both
the u
­ tility-maximizing behavior of employees and the profit-maximizing
behavior of firms lead us to expect lower turnover to be associated with
higher wages, and higher turnover with lower wages, other things being
equal.
We note three important facets about the foregoing predictions:
1. The predictions emerge directly from the twin assumptions of scarcity
and rationality. Employees and employers, both mindful of their scarce
resources, are assumed to be on the lookout for chances to improve
their well-being. The predictions are also based on the assumptions that
employees are aware of, or can learn about, alternative jobs and that these
alternatives are open to them.
2. We made the prediction of a negative relationship between wages and
voluntary turnover by holding other things equal. The theory does not
deny that job characteristics other than wages matter to employees or
that employers can lower turnover by varying policies other than the
wage rate (for example, by improving working conditions). However,
in keeping these other factors constant, our model predicts a negative
relationship if the basic assumptions are valid.
3. The assumptions of the theory concern the individual behavior of
employers and employees, but the predictions are about an aggregate
relationship between wages and turnover. The prediction is not that all
employees will remain in their jobs if their wages are increased but that
enough will remain for turnover to be cut by raising wages. The test of
the prediction thus lies in finding out whether the predicted relationship
between wages and turnover exists by using aggregate data from firms or
industries.
Careful statistical studies support the hypothesis that higher pay reduces
voluntary turnover. One study, for example, estimated that a 10 percent
increase in wages, holding worker characteristics constant, reduced the quit
rate by 1 percent.3 (The statistical technique commonly used by economists
to test hypotheses is introduced in Appendix 1A.)
7
Chapter 1 Introduction
Normative Economics
Understanding normative economics begins with learning about two kinds
of economic transactions. One kind is entered into voluntarily, because all
parties to the transaction gain. If Sally is willing to create blueprints for
$20 per hour, for example, and Ace Engineering Services is willing to pay
someone up to $22 per hour to do the job, both gain by agreeing to Sally’s appointment at an hourly wage between $20 and $22; such a transaction is mutually beneficial. The role of the labor market is to facilitate these
voluntary, mutually advantageous transactions. If the market is successful
in facilitating all possible mutually beneficial transactions, it can be said to
have produced a condition that economists call Pareto (or “economic”) efficiency.4 (The word efficiency is used by economists in a specialized sense to
denote a condition in which all mutually beneficial transactions have been
concluded. This definition of the word is more comprehensive than definitions of cost minimization.) If Pareto efficiency were actually attained, no
more transactions would be undertaken voluntarily, because they would not
be mutually advantageous.
The second kind of transaction is one in which one or more parties lose.
These transactions often involve the redistribution of income, from which
some gain at the expense of others. Transactions that are explicitly redistributional, for example, are not entered into voluntarily unless motivated
by charity (in which case the donors gain nonpecuniary satisfaction); otherwise, redistributional transactions are mandated by government through
tax and expenditure policies. Thus, whereas markets facilitate voluntary
transactions, the government’s job is often to make certain transactions
mandatory.
Any normative statement—a statement about what ought to exist—is
based on some underlying value. Government policies affecting the labor
market are often based on the widely shared, but not universally agreed
on, value that society should try to make the distribution of income more
equal. Social welfare programs, minimum-wage laws, and restrictions on
immigration are examples of policies based on distributional considerations.
Other labor market policies are intended either to change or to overrule
the choices that workers make in maximizing their utility. The underlying
value in these cases is frequently that workers should not be allowed to place
themselves or their families at risk of physical or financial harm. The wearing
of such personal protective devices as hard hats, earplugs, and face masks,
for example, is seen as so meritorious in certain settings that it is required of
workers even if they would choose otherwise.
Policies seeking to redistribute income or force the consumption of meritorious goods are often controversial because some workers will feel worse
off when the policies are adopted. These transactions must be governmentally mandated because they will not be entered into voluntarily.
Markets and Values Economic theory, however, reminds us that
one class of transactions has no losers. Policies or transactions from which
8
Chapter 1 Introduction
all affected parties gain can be said to be Pareto improving because they
promote Pareto efficiency. These policies or transactions can be justified on
the grounds that they unambiguously enhance social welfare; therefore, they
can be unanimously supported. Policies with this justification are of special interest to economists because economics is largely the study of market
behavior—voluntary transactions in the pursuit of self-interest.
A transaction can be unanimously supported when one of the following
three scenarios occurs:
1. All parties who are affected by the transaction gain.
2. Some parties gain, and no one else loses.
3. Some parties gain and some lose from the transaction, but the gainers
fully compensate the losers.
When the compensation in 3 takes place, case 3 is converted to case 2.
In practice, economists often judge a transaction by whether the gains of
the beneficiaries exceed the costs borne by the losers, thus making possible
that there would be no losers. However, when the compensation of losers
is possible but does not take place, some individuals are in fact worse off.
Many economists, therefore, argue that compensation must take place for
a government policy to be justified on the grounds that it promotes Pareto
efficiency.
As noted earlier, the role of the labor market is to facilitate voluntary,
mutually advantageous transactions. Hardly anyone would argue against at
least some kind of government intervention in the labor market if the market
is failing to promote such transactions. But why do markets fail?
Market Failure: Ignorance Critical to the accomplishment of
mutually beneficial transactions is that the parties to the transaction be well
informed of its consequences. A worker who smokes, for example, may take
a job in an asbestos-processing plant not knowing that the combination of
smoking and inhaling asbestos dust substantially increases the risk of lung
disease. Had the worker known this, they probably would have stopped
smoking or changed jobs, but both transactions were blocked by ignorance.
Although ignorance is often rooted in the lack of access to information,
it can also be caused by human fallibility in the processing of available information. People may have prejudices, fears, or instincts that inhibit information processing, leading them to make decisions that do not advance their
respective long-run self-interests.5 Example 1.2 illustrates one such instinct
(inertia) and steps that might be taken to deal with it.
Market Failure: Transaction Barriers Also, some barrier might
hinder the completion of a transaction that could be mutually beneficial.
Often, such a barrier is created by laws that prohibit certain transactions.
For example, as recently as three or four decades ago, many U.S. states
prohibited employers from hiring women to work more than 40 hours a
week. As a consequence, firms that wanted to hire workers for more than
40 hours a week could not transact with those women who wanted to work
9
Chapter 1 Introduction
overtime—to the detriment of both parties. Society as a whole thus suffers losses when transactions that are mutually beneficial are prohibited by
government.
Another barrier to mutually beneficial transactions may be the expense of
completing the transactions. Lower-skilled workers facing limited opportunities in one region might desire to move to take better jobs. Alternatively, they
might want to enter job-training programs. In either case, they might lack the
funds to finance the desired transactions. A further cost of completing a transaction that might serve a worker’s long-run self-interest is making the effort to
overcome the inertia mentioned in Example 1.2; many of us tend to procrastinate and put off to the last minute doing difficult things we know we should
do (such as seeking job retraining or searching for a job if we are unemployed).
EXAMPLE 1.2
Do We Need “Nudges” to Make the Right Decisions for
Ourselves?
One cost of completing a transaction is overcoming one’s inertia. Alex may want to eat
healthily but in a cafeteria line be drawn to take a dessert rather than a salad because
desserts are closer and salads are across the room. Casey may want to save for the future
but postpones signing up for an employer-sponsored savings plan because of the paperwork
required. Can we craft policies to overcome inertia as a transaction barrier?
One creative solution to the problem of inertia is to use that inertia to “nudge” (but
not force) people into making better decisions. For example, if salads were made more
accessible in a cafeteria line and desserts less accessible, more people might choose salads
(but of course could consume desserts if they wanted to take the trouble to do so).
Similarly, if fast-food restaurants routinely filled drink orders with medium-size cups and
forced customers to ask for supersize ones, we might drink less soda.
In the workplace, employers could routinely sign all employees up for their savings plan
but allow those who do not want it to fill out the needed paperwork to withdraw from the
plan. As with food selection, “nudging” helps people make better decisions by reducing
the costs of making a decision that might improve their long-run utility, thus creating a
situation in which their inertia must be overcome if they want to make a different choice.
See Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and
Happiness, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008.
Market Failure: Externalities Market failure can also arise when
a buyer and a seller agree to a transaction that imposes costs or benefits on
people who were not party to their decision; in other words, some decisions
have costs or benefits that are “external” to the decision makers. Why do
these externalities cause market failure?
When buyers and sellers make their decisions, they generally weigh the
costs and benefits only to themselves and, of course, decide to complete a
transaction when the benefits outweigh the costs. If all transaction costs
and benefits fall to the decision makers, then society can be assured that the
10
Chapter 1 Introduction
transaction represents a step toward Pareto efficiency. However, if costs or
benefits fall to people who were not able to influence the decision, then the
transaction may not have positive net benefits to society.
For us to have confidence that a particular transaction is a step toward
Pareto efficiency, the decision must be voluntarily accepted by all who are
affected by it. If there are externalities to a transaction, people who are
affected by it—but who cannot influence the ultimate decision—are being
forced into a transaction that they may not have been willing to make. If
so, the costs of the transaction might be greater than the benefits, once all
the costs and benefits (and not just those of the decision makers) have been
counted.
Child labor offers a stark example of externalities, because children do not
have the competence or the power to make many important decisions affecting their lives. If parents are selfish and ignore the interests of their children
in making decisions about sending them to work or to school, then society
cannot trust their decisions as advancing economic efficiency (because the
costs and benefits to the children have been ignored in making work/school
decisions).
Externalities would also exist if, say, workers had no mechanism to transfer their costs of being injured at work to their employers, who are the ones
making the decisions about how much to spend to reduce workplace risk. If
such a mechanism does not exist (a question that we explore in Chapter 8),
then our workplaces will be less safe than they should be, because employers
are ignoring at least some costs (the ones borne by workers) in making their
decisions about risk reduction.
Market Failure: Public Goods A special kind of externality is sometimes called the free-rider problem. For example, suppose that a union representing workers in the noisy sawmill industry intends to sponsor research
on the effects of excessive noise on workers’ hearing loss. This research is
expensive, but because it would be useful to unions or individual workers
in other noisy industries, the sawmill-workers union considers whether it
could defray its expenses by selling its findings to other interested parties.
The union would quickly realize, however, that once its findings become
known to its members or its first “customers,” the results would quickly
become available to all—through word-of-mouth, newspaper, or Internet
sources—even to those free riders who do not pay.
Such research findings constitute an example of what is called a public good—a good that can be consumed by any number of people at the
same time, including those who do not pay. Because nonpayers cannot be
excluded from consuming the good, no potential customer will have an
incentive to pay. Knowing this, the potential provider of the good or service
(the sawmill-workers union in our example) will probably decide not to
produce it.
In the case of public goods, private decision makers ignore the benefits
to others when making their decisions because they have no mechanism to
“capture” these benefits. As a result, society will under-invest in such goods
11
Chapter 1 Introduction
unless a government, which can compel payments through its tax system,
steps in to produce the public goods.
Market Failure: Price Distortion A special barrier to transaction is caused by taxes, subsidies, and other forces that create “incorrect”
prices. Prices powerfully influence the incentives to transact, and the prices
asked or received in a transaction should reflect the true preferences of
the parties to it. When prices become decoupled from preferences, parties
may be led to make transactions that are not socially beneficial or to avoid
others that would be advantageous. If plumbers charge $25 per hour, but
their customers must pay an additional tax of $5 to the government, customers who are willing to pay between $25 and $30 per hour and would
hire plumbers in the absence of the tax are discouraged from doing so—to
the detriment of both parties.
Normative Economics and
Government Policy
Solutions to problems that prevent the completion of socially beneficial
transactions frequently involve governmental intervention. If the problem is
a lack of information about health risks, say, one obvious solution is for the
government to take steps to ensure that workers are informed about such
risks. If the problem is that some law prevents women, say, from working
the hours that they want, an obvious solution is to repeal the law.
For other types of transaction barriers, the needed intervention is for the
government to either compel or actively promote transactions different from
the ones that would be made by “the market” (i.e., those made by private
decision makers). When the government decides to “replace” a market decision made by one of its own, the policy prescription is complicated by the
need to guess just what the appropriate transaction is. In the following subsections, we discuss government interventions that deal with two examples
of transaction barriers.
Capital Market Imperfections Workers find obtaining loans
that would allow them to obtain job training or finance a cross-country
move to obtain a better job difficult, because usually all they can offer
to secure the loan is their promise to pay it back. The government, however, might make such loans even if it faced the same risk of default,
because enabling workers to acquire new skills or move to where workers
are needed would strengthen the overall economy. Of course, if the government did decide to make these loans, it would have to decide on the
appropriate circumstances for approving such loans, including how much
money to loan.
Externalities Earlier, we argued that parents may not take the welfare
of their children into account when making decisions about whether to send
them to work or to school. A solution to this problem that most societies
12
Chapter 1 Introduction
have undertaken is to require children to stay in school until they reach a
certain age and to provide at least that level of schooling at public expense.
Ideally, of course, deciding on the mandatory school-leaving age would
require the government to look carefully at the lifetime benefits of various
schooling levels (see Chapter 9) and compare them to both the direct costs
of education and the opportunity costs of the children’s lost production.
Performing the cost–benefit analyses needed to intelligently address the
problem of externalities requires a solid grasp of economic theory (which we
discuss in Chapter 8).
Efficiency Versus Equity
The social goal of a more equitable distribution of income is often of paramount importance to political decision makers, and disputes can arise over
whether equity or economic efficiency should be the prime consideration
in setting policy. One source of dispute is rooted in the problem that no
one unique set of transactions is Pareto efficient. In fact, a number of sets of
transactions can satisfy our definition of economic efficiency, and questions
can arise on which set is the most equitable.
To understand the multiple sets of efficient transactions that are possible,
we return to our example of the woman willing to create blueprints for $20
per hour. If Ace Engineering Services is willing to pay up to $22 per hour
for blueprints and Sally is willing to work for $20, their agreement on her
employment at an hourly wage of, say, $21 would be beneficial to both
parties. However, the same can be said for an agreement on wages of either
$20.25 or $21.75 per hour. We can objectively judge any of these potential
agreements as efficient (relative to her not working) because both parties
are better off than they would have been if they had not transacted. But
which of the potential agreements is more equitable remains unclear unless
we define a subjective standard for “fairness.”
The second source of dispute over equity and efficiency is rooted in the
following problem: To achieve more equity, steps away from Pareto efficiency must often be taken.6 Minimum-wage laws, for example, block transactions that parties might be willing to make at a lower wage; thus, some
who would have accepted jobs at less than the legislated minimum are not
offered any at all, because their services are “priced out of the market.” Similarly, social welfare programs have often been structured so that recipients
who find paid work receive, in effect, a zero wage—a price distortion of
major proportions but one that is neither easily nor cheaply avoided (as we
see in Chapter 6).
Normative economics tends to stress efficiency over equity considerations, not because it is more important but because it can be more easily
analyzed mathematically. For a transaction to be mutually beneficial, all that
is required is for each party to individually feel better off. Thus, studying voluntary transactions (i.e., market behavior) is useful when taking economic
efficiency into account. Equity considerations, however, always involve comparing the welfare lost by some against the utility gained by others—which,
13
Chapter 1 Introduction
given the impossibility of measuring happiness, cannot be scientifically done.
For policy decisions that are based on considerations of equity, society usually turns to guidance from the political system, not from markets.
Plan of the Text
The study of labor economics is mainly a study of the interplay between
employers and employees—or between demand and supply. Chapter 2 presents a quick overview of demand and supply in the labor market, allowing
students to see from the outset the interrelationship of the major forces at
work shaping labor market behavior. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are concerned
primarily with the demand for labor. Consequently, they are devoted to
analyzing employers’ incentives and behaviors.
Chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 contain analyses of various aspects of workers’
labor supply behavior. They address issues of whether to work for pay (as
opposed to consuming leisure or working around the home without pay),
the choice of occupations or jobs with different characteristics, and decisions
that workers must make about educational and other investments designed
to improve their earning capacities. Like the earlier “demand” chapters,
these “supply” chapters necessarily incorporate aspects of behavior on the
other (here, employer) side of the labor market.
Chapters 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16 address special topics of interest to
labor economists, including the effects of institutional forces on the labor
market. Chapter 11 analyzes how the compensation of workers can be structured to create incentives for greater productivity. Chapter 12 analyzes wage
differentials associated with race, gender, and ethnicity. Chapter 13 deals
with the labor market effects of labor unions. Chapter 14 focuses on an
analysis of unemployment. The final two chapters discuss the phenomena
of inequality (Chapter 15) and globalization (Chapter 16) while reviewing
most of the major concepts introduced earlier in the text.
At the end of each chapter are several features that are designed to
improve readers’ understanding. First, starting with Chapter 2, readers
will find a summary of an empirical study related to concepts introduced in
the text. These summaries are designed to convey, in a nontechnical way,
how researchers can creatively confront the challenges of testing the predictions of economic theory in the “real world.” Because the summaries often
assume a basic familiarity with regression analysis (a basic statistical tool in
economics), we introduce this technique in Appendix 1A.
The end-of-chapter materials also include a set of review questions that
are designed to test understanding of the chapter’s concepts and how these
concepts can be applied to policy issues. The questions are ordered by level of
difficulty (the more difficult ones come later), and answers to the odd-numbered questions are in a separate section at the end of the textbook. Some
numerically based problems follow the review questions, and again answers
to the odd-numbered problems are at the end of the textbook.
For students who want to go more deeply into the concepts introduced
in the text of each chapter, we provide extensive footnotes designed to
14
Chapter 1 Introduction
provide references to seminal works and the most recent literature. At the
end of each chapter, we also provide selected readings that go more deeply
into the material. Many chapters also have an appendix that delves deeper
into a specialized topic that may be of interest to some readers.
Review Questions
1. Using the concepts of normative economics, when would the labor market be judged to be at a point of optimality? What imperfections might
prevent the market from achieving this point?
2. Are the following statements positive or normative? Why?
a. Employers should not be required to offer pensions to their employees.
b. Employers offering pension benefits will pay lower wages than they
would if they did not offer a pension program.
c. If the further immigration of lower-skilled foreigners is prevented, the
wages of lower-skilled immigrants already here will rise.
d. The military draft compels people to engage in a transaction that they
would not voluntarily enter into; it should therefore be avoided as a
way of recruiting military personnel.
e. If the military draft were reinstituted, military salaries would probably
fall.
3. Suppose that the federal government needs workers to repair a levee along
a flood-prone river. From the perspective of normative economics, what
difference does it make whether nondisabled workers are compelled to
work (for pay) on the levee or whether a workforce is recruited through
the normal process of making job offers to applicants and relying on their
voluntary acceptance?
4. What are the functions and limitations of an economic model?
5. In this chapter, a simple model was developed that predicted that workers employed in jobs paying wages less than they could get in comparable
jobs elsewhere would tend to quit to seek higher-paying jobs. Suppose
that we observe a worker who, after repeated harassment or criticism
from her boss, quits an $8-per-hour job to take another job paying $7.50
per hour. Answer the three following questions:
a. Is this woman’s behavior consistent with the economic model of job
quitting outlined in the text?
b. Can we test to see whether this woman’s behavior is consistent with
the assumption of rationality?
c. Suppose that the boss in question had harassed other employees, but
this woman was the only one who quit. Can we conclude that economic theory applies to the behavior of some people but not to others?
6. A law in one town of a Canadian province limits large supermarkets to
just four employees on Sundays. Analyze this law by using the concepts
of normative economics.
15
Chapter 1 Introduction
7. Child labor laws generally prohibit children from working until
age 14 and restrict younger teenagers to certain kinds of work that
are not considered dangerous. Reconcile the prohibitions of child
labor legislation with the principles underlying normative economic
analysis.
8. In discussing ways to reduce lung diseases caused by workplace hazards, one commentator said, “Gas masks are uncomfortable to wear, but
economists argue that they are the socially preferred method for reducing the inhalation of toxic substances whenever they can be produced for
less than it takes to alter a ventilation system.” Following the perspective
of normative economics, comment on this quotation.
Problems
1. (Appendix 1A) You have collected the following data (see Table 1P.1) on 13
randomly selected teenage workers in the fast-food industry. What is the
general relationship between age and wage? Plot the data, and then construct
a linear equation for this relationship.
Table 1P.1 Assumed Wages and Ages of Fast Food Workers
Age (years)
Wage
(dollars per hour)
Age (years)
Wage
(dollars per hour)
16
$7.25
18
$8.00
16
$8.00
18
$8.50
17
$7.50
18
$9.50
17
$8.00
19
$8.50
17
$8.25
19
$8.75
18
$7.25
19
$10.00
18
$7.75
2. (Appendix) Suppose that a least squares regression yields the following
estimate:
Wi = –1 + 0.3Ai
where W is the hourly wage rate (in dollars) and A is the age (in years).
A second regression from another group of workers yields the following
estimate:
Wi = 3 + 0.3Ai –0.01(Ai)2
a. How much is a twenty-year-old predicted to earn according to the
first estimate?
b. How much is a twenty-year-old predicted to earn according to the
second estimate?
16
Chapter 1 Introduction
3. (Appendix) Suppose that you estimate the following relationship between
wages and age:
Wi = –1 + 0.3Ai
(0.1)
(the standard error is in parentheses). Are you confident that wages actually rise with age?
4. (Appendix) Suppose that you have information on which of the 13 randomly selected teenage workers in the fast-food industry worked part
time and which worked full time. Variable Fi is equal to 1 if the worker is
employed full time, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. With this information,
you estimate the following relationship between wages, age, and full-time
employment:
Wi = −0.5 + 0.25Ai + 0.75Fi
(0.10)
(0.20)
(the standard errors are in parentheses).
a. How much is a 20-year-old who works full time predicted to earn
according to this estimate?
b. How much is a 20-year-old who works part time predicted to earn
according to this estimate?
5. (Appendix) Given the regression estimate in problem 4, evaluate the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients in the regression.
6. (Appendix) Compare the first regression estimate in problem 2 with the
regression estimate in problem 4.
a. Is an omitted variable bias present when the full-time variable is not
included? Explain.
b. What can be said about the correlation between age and full-time
employment? Explain.
Selected Readings
Autor, David. “Work of the Past, Work of the Future.” The American Economic
Review 109 (May 2019): 1–32.
Boyer, George R., and Robert S. Smith. “The Development of the Neoclassical Tradition in Labor Economics.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 54 (January 2001): 199–223.
Friedman, Milton. Essays in Positive Economics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1953.
Hausman, Daniel M. “Economic Methodology in a Nutshell.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 3 (Spring 1989): 115–128.
McCloskey, Donald. “The Rhetoric of Economics.” Journal of Economic Literature
21 (June 1983): 481–517.
17
Appendix 1A Statistical Testing of Labor Market Hypotheses
Appendix 1A
Statistical Testing of Labor
Market Hypotheses
This appendix briefly introduces how labor economists test hypotheses. In
this chapter, we discuss how one might attempt to test the hypothesis that,
other things being equal, one should expect to observe that the higher the
wage a firm pays, the lower the voluntary labor turnover among its employees will be. Put another way, if we define a firm’s quit rate as the proportion
of its workers who voluntarily quit in a given time period (e.g., a year), we
expect to observe that the higher a firm’s wages are, the lower its quit rate
will be, holding other factors affecting quit rates constant.
A Univariate Test
An obvious first step is to collect data on the quit rates among a set of firms
during a given year and match these data with the firms’ wage rates. This
type of analysis is called univariate because we are analyzing the effects on
quit rates of just one other variable (the wage rate). The data are called
cross-sectional because they provide observations across behavioral units at
a point in time.7 Table 1A.1 contains such information for a hypothetical
set of 10 firms in a single labor market in a given year, such as 2019. For
example, firm A is assumed to have paid an average hourly wage of $8 and
to have experienced a quit rate of 40 percent in 2019.
The data on wages and quit rates are presented graphically in Figure 1A.1.
Each dot in this figure represents a quit-rate/hourly wage combination for
one of the firms in Table 1A.1. Firm A, for example, is represented in the
figure by point A, which shows a quit rate of 40 percent and an hourly wage
of $8, while point B shows comparable data for firm B. According to a visual
inspection of all 10 data points in this figure, firms paying higher wages in
our hypothetical sample indeed have lower quit rates. Although the data
points in Figure 1A.1 obviously do not lie on a single straight line, their
Table 1A.1 Average-Wage and Quit-Rate Data for a Set of 10 Hypothetical Firms in a
­Single Labor Market in 2019
Firm
Average
Quit rate (%) Firm
hourly wage
paid ($)
Average
Quit
hourly wage rate (%)
paid ($)
A
8
40
F
16
20
B
8
30
G
20
25
C
12
35
H
20
15
D
12
25
I
24
20
E
16
30
J
24
10
18
Appendix 1A Statistical Testing of Labor Market Hypotheses
Slope -1.25
Estimated
Relationship:
Qi = 45 – 1.25Wi
8
12
16
20
24
Figure 1A.1 Estimated Relationship Between Wages and Quit Rates
by Using Data From Table 1A.1
pattern suggests that on average, a linear (straight-line) relationship between
a firm’s quit rate and its wage rate.
Any straight line can be represented by the general equation
Y = a + bX
(1A.1)
Variable Y is the dependent variable, and it is generally shown on the vertical
axis of the graph depicting the line. Variable X is the independent, or explanatory, variable, which is usually shown on the horizontal axis.8 The letters a
and b are the parameters (the fixed coefficients) of the equation, where a represents the intercept and b the slope of the line. Put differently, a is the value
of Y when the line intersects the vertical axis (X = 0). The slope, b, indicates
the vertical distance that the line travels for each one-unit increase in the
horizontal distance. If b is a positive number, the line slopes upward (going
from left to right); if b is a negative number, the line slopes downward.
If one were to try to draw the straight line that best fits the points in Figure 1A.1, the line would clearly slope downward and would not go through
all 10 points. It would lie above some points and below others; thus, it
would “fit” the points but only with some error. We could model the relationship between the data points on the graph, then, as follows:
Q i = α0 + α1Wi + εi
(1A.2)
Here, Q i represents the quit rate for firm i, and it is the dependent variable.
The independent variable is Wi, firm i’s wage rate. α0 and α1 are the parameters of the line, and α0 is the intercept and α1 the slope. The term εi is a
random error term; it is included in the model because we do not expect that
the line (given by Q i = α0 + α1Wi) will connect all the data points perfectly.
Behaviorally, we are assuming the presence of random factors unrelated to
wage rates that also cause the quit rate to vary across firms.
We seek to estimate what the true values of α0 and α1 are. Each pair of
values of α0 and α1 defines a different straight line, and an infinite number
19
Appendix 1A Statistical Testing of Labor Market Hypotheses
of lines can be drawn that “fit” points A–J. We look into which of these
straight lines fits the data the best. Some precise criterion must be used to
decide which line fits the best, and the procedure typically used by statisticians and economists is to choose that line for which the sum (in our
example, across all firms) of the squared vertical distances between the line
and the individual data points is minimized. The line that is estimated from
the data and that uses this method, which is called least squares regression
analysis, has a number of desirable properties.9
Application of this method to the data found in Table 1A.1 yields the
following estimated line:
Q i = 45 – 1.25Wi(1A.3)
(5.3) (0.31)
The estimate of α0 is 45, and the estimate of α1 is – 1.25.10 Thus, if a firm
had a wage rate of $8/hour in 2019, we would predict that its annual quit
rate would have been 45 − 1.25 × (8), or 35 percent. This estimated quit–
wage relationship is drawn in Figure 1A.1 as the line YY. (The numbers in
parentheses after the equation will be discussed later.)
Several things should be noted about this relationship. First, taken at
face value, this estimated relationship implies that firms paying their workers
nothing (a wage of 0) would have been projected to have only 45 percent of
their workers quit each year (45 − 1.25 × (0) = 45), whereas firms paying
their workers more than $36 an hour would have had negative quit rates.11
The former result is nonsensical (why would any workers stay if they are paid
nothing?), and the latter result is logically impossible (the quit rate cannot
be less than zero). As these extreme examples suggest, using linear models
to make predictions that take one outside the range of observations used
in the estimation (in the example, wages from $8 to $24) is irrational. The
relationship between wages and quit rates cannot be assumed to be linear
(represented by a straight line) for very low and very high values of wages.
Fortunately, the linear regression model used in the example can be easily
generalized to allow for nonlinear relationships.
Second, the estimated intercept (45) and slope (−1.25) that we obtained
are only estimates of the “true” relationship, and uncertainty is associated
with these estimates. The uncertainty arises partly from the fact that we are
trying to infer the true values of α0 and α1—that is, the values that characterize the wage–quit relationship in the entire population of firms—from a
sample of just 10 firms. The uncertainty about each estimated coefficient is
measured by its standard error, or the estimated standard deviation of the
coefficient. These standard errors are reported in parentheses under the estimated coefficients in equation (1A.3); for example, given our data, the estimated standard error of the wage coefficient is 0.31, and that of the intercept
term is 5.3. The larger the standard error, the greater the uncertainty about
our estimated coefficient’s value.
Under suitable assumptions about the distribution of εi, the random
error term in equation (1A.2), we can use these standard errors to test
20
Appendix 1A Statistical Testing of Labor Market Hypotheses
hypotheses about the estimated coefficients.12 In our example, we test the
hypothesis that α1 is negative (which implies, as suggested by theory, that
higher wages reduce quits) against the null hypothesis that α1 is 0 and that
wages and quits have no relationship. One common test involves computing for each coefficient a t statistic, which is the ratio of the coefficient to
its standard error. A heuristic rule, which can be made precise, is that if the
absolute value of the t statistic is greater than 2, the hypothesis that the true
value of the coefficient equals 0 can be rejected. Put another way, if the
absolute value of a coefficient is at least twice the size of its standard error,
one can be fairly confident that the true value of the coefficient is a number
other than 0; in this case, we say that the estimated coefficient is statistically
significant (a shorthand way of saying that it is significantly different from 0
in a statistical sense). In our example, the t statistic for the wage coefficient
is −1.25/0.31, or −4.0, which leaves us confident that the true relationship
between wage levels and quit rates is negative.
Multiple Regression Analysis
The preceding discussion has assumed that the only variable influencing quit
rates, other than random (unexplained) factors, is a firm’s wage rate. The
discussion of positive economics in this chapter stresses, however, that the
prediction of a negative relationship between wages and quit rates is made
holding all other factors constant. As we will discuss in Chapter 10, economic
theory suggests that many factors besides wages systematically influence quit
rates. These include characteristics both of firms (e.g., employee benefits
offered, working conditions, and firm size) and of their workers (e.g., age
and level of training). If any of these other variables that we have omitted
from our analysis tend to vary across firms systematically with the wage rates
that the firms offer, the resulting estimated relationship between wage rates
and quit rates will be incorrect. In such cases, we must take these other
variables into account by using a model with more than one independent
variable. We rely on economic theory to indicate which variables should be
included in our statistical analysis and to suggest the direction of causation.
To illustrate this procedure, suppose for simplicity that the only variable
affecting a firm’s quit rate besides its wage rate is the average age of its
workforce. With other factors kept constant, older workers are less likely
to quit their jobs, for a number of reasons (as workers grow older, ties to
friends, neighbors, and coworkers become stronger, and the psychological
costs involved in changing jobs—which often requires a geographic move—
grow larger). To capture the effects of both wage rates and age, we assume
that a firm’s quit rate is given by
Q i = α´0 + α´ 1Wi + α´2 Ai + εi(1A.4)
Ai is a variable representing the age of firm i’s workers. Although Ai could
be measured as the average age of the workforce, or as the percentage of the
firm’s workers older than some age level, for expositional convenience, we
have defined it as a dichotomous variable. Ai is equal to 1 if the average age of
21
Appendix 1A Statistical Testing of Labor Market Hypotheses
firm i’s workforce is greater than 40, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. Theory
suggests that α´2 is negative, which means that whatever values of α´0, α´1,
and Wi pertain (while keeping all other facts constant), firms with workforces
having an average age above 40 years should have lower quit rates than firms
with workforces having an average age equal to or below age 40.
The parameters of equation (1A.4)—that is, the values of α´0, α´1, and α´2—
can be estimated by using multiple regression analysis, a method that is analogous to the one described earlier. This method finds the values of the parameters
that define the best straight-line relationship between the d
­ ependent variable
and the set of independent variables. Each parameter tells us the effect on the
dependent variable of a one-unit change in the corresponding independent
variable, holding the other independent variables constant. Thus, the estimate of
α´1 tells us the estimated effect on the quit rate (Q) of a one-unit change in the
wage rate (W), holding the age of a firm’s workforce (A) constant.
The Problem of Omitted Variables
If we use a univariate regression model in a situation calling for a multiple
regression model—that is, if we leave out an important independent variable—our results may suffer from omitted variables bias. We illustrate this
bias because it is an important pitfall in hypothesis testing and because it
illustrates the need to use economic theory to guide empirical testing.
To simplify our example, we assume that we know the true values of α´0,
α´1, and α´2 in equation (1A.4) and that this model has no random error
term (each εi is 0). Specifically, we assume that
Q i = 50 − 1.25Wi – 10Ai
(1A.5)
Thus, at any level of wages, a firm’s quit rate will be 10 percent lower if
the average age of its workforce exceeds 40 than it will be if the average age
is less than or equal to 40.
Figure 1A.2 graphically illustrates this assumed relationship between quit
rates, wage rates, and workforce average age. For all firms that employ workers whose average age is less than or equal to 40, Ai equals 0 and thus their
quit rates are given by the line Z0Z0. For all firms that employ workers whose
average age is greater than 40, Ai equals 1 and thus their quit rates are given
by the line Z1Z1. The quit-rate schedule for the latter set of firms is 10 percent below the one for the former set. Both schedules indicate, however,
that a $1 increase in a firm’s average hourly wage will reduce its annual quit
rate by 1.25 percent (i.e., both lines have the same slope).
Now, suppose that a researcher were to estimate the relationship between
quit rates and wage rates but ignored the fact that the average age of a firm’s
workers also affects the quit rate. That is, suppose that they were to omit a
measure of age and estimate the following equation:
Q i = a0 + α1Wi + εi(1A.6)
How the estimated value of α1 corresponds to the true slope of the wage–
quit schedule, which we have assumed to be −1.25, is crucial.
22
Appendix 1A Statistical Testing of Labor Market Hypotheses
4
8
12
16
20
24
Figure 1A.2 True Relationships Between Wages and Quit Rates
(Equation 1A.5)
The answer depends heavily on how average wages and the average age
of employees vary across firms. Table 1A.2 lists combinations of quit rates
and wages for three hypothetical firms that employed older workers (average
age greater than 40) and three hypothetical firms that employed younger
workers. Given the wage that each firm paid, the values of its quit rate can
be derived directly from equation (1A.5).
The earnings of workers tend to increase as they age.13 On average, then,
firms employing older workers are assumed in the table to have higher wages
than firms employing younger workers. The wage–quit combinations for
these six firms are indicated by the dots on the lines Z0Z0 and Z1Z1 in Figure 1A.3,14 which reproduce the lines in Figure 1A.2.
Table 1A.2 Hypothetical Average-Wage and Quit-Rate Data for Three Firms That
Employed Older Workers and Three That Employed Younger Workers
Employ older workers
(Ai = 1)
Employ younger workers
(Ai = 0)
Firm
Average
Quit
hourly
rate (%)
wage paid ($)
Firm
Average
Quit
hourly
rate (%)
wage paid ($)
k
16
20
p
8
40
l
20
15
q
12
35
m
24
10
r
16
30
23
Appendix 1A Statistical Testing of Labor Market Hypotheses
When we estimate equation (1A.6) by using these six data points, we
obtain the following straight line:
Q i = 57 – 2Wi(1A.7)
(5.1) (0.31)
This estimated relationship is denoted by the line XX in Figure 1A.3.
The estimate of α1, which equals −2, implies that every dollar increase in
wages reduces the quit rate by 2 percent, yet we know (by assumption) that
the actual reduction is 1.25 percent. Our estimated response overstates the
sensitivity of the quit rate to wages because the estimated equation ignored
the effect that age has on quits.
Put differently, quit rates are lower in high-wage firms both because the
wages they pay are higher and because high-wage firms tend to employ
older workers, who are less likely to quit. By ignoring age in the analysis,
we mistakenly conclude that quit rates are more sensitive to wage changes
than they actually are. Therefore, by omitting from our model an important
explanatory variable (age) that both affects quit rates and is associated with
wage levels, we have obtained a wrong estimate of the effect of wages on
quit rates.
This discussion highlights the “other things held equal” nature of most
hypotheses in labor economics. In testing hypotheses, we must control for
other factors that are expected to influence the variable of interest. Typically,
this is done by specifying that the dependent variable is a function of a set
of variables. This specification must be guided by economic theory, and
one reason for learning economic theory is that it can guide us in testing
Estimated Slope –2 (estimated ignoring worker age)
True Slopes -1.25
4
8
12
16
20
24
Figure 1A.3 Estimated Relationships Between Wages and Quit Rates
by Using Data From Table 1A.2
24
Appendix 1A Statistical Testing of Labor Market Hypotheses
hypotheses about human behavior. Without a firm grounding in theory,
analyses of behavior can easily fall victim to omitted variables bias.
Having said this, we must point out that having data on all variables that
could conceivably influence what is being examined is neither possible nor
crucial. As emphasized in this chapter, testing economic models involves
looking for average relationships and ignoring idiosyncratic factors. Two
workers at the same age and being paid the same wage rate may exhibit
different quit behaviors because, for example, one wants to leave town to
get away from a dreadful relative. This idiosyncratic factor is not important
for the testing of an economic model of quit rates, because having a relative has neither a predictable effect on quits (some relatives are desirable to
be around) nor any correlation with one’s wage rate. To repeat, omitted
variables bias is a problem only if the omitted variable has an effect on the
dependent variable (quit rate) and is correlated with an independent variable of interest (wages).
Notes
1. For an article that examines work from a philosophical perspective, see
Yoram Weiss, “Work and Leisure: A History of Ideas,” Journal of Labor
Economics 27 (January 2009): 1–20.
2. For articles on rationality and the related issue of preferences, see Gary
Becker, “Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory,” Journal of Political Economy 70 (February 1962): 1–13; Richard H. Thaler, “From
Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (Winter 2000): 133–141; Stefano DellaVigna, “Psychology and
Economics: Evidence from the Field,” Journal of Economic Literature
47 (June 2009): 315–372; Andrei Schleifer, “Psychologists at the Gate:
A Review of Daniel Kahneman’s Thinking Fast and Slow,” Journal of
Economic Literature 50 (December 2012): 1080–1091.
3. V. Bhaskar, Alan Manning, and Ted To, “Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in Labor Markets,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 16
(Spring 2002): 158.
4. Pareto efficiency gets its name from the Italian economist Vilfredo
Pareto, who, around 1900, insisted that economic science should make
normative pronouncements only about unambiguous changes in social
welfare. Rejecting the notion that utility can be measured (and therefore
compared across individuals), Pareto argued that we can know whether
a transaction improves social welfare only on the basis of the testimony
or behavior of the affected parties. If they as individuals regard themselves as better off, then the transaction is unambiguously good—even
though we are unable to measure how much better off they feel.
5. For a full discussion and analysis of human vulnerabilities in making
decisions, see George A. Akerloff and Robert J. Shiller, Phishing for
Phools: The Economics of Manipulation and Deception (Princeton, NJ:
25
Appendix 1A Statistical Testing of Labor Market Hypotheses
Princeton University Press, 2015). For an article arguing that Pareto
efficiency requires that the parties to a voluntary transaction must properly comprehend the information underlying their choices, see Sandro Ambuehl and Axel Ockenfels, “The Ethics of Incentivizing the
Uninformed,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 107
(May 2017): 91–95.
6. For a lucid discussion of the trade-offs between efficiency and equity,
see Arthur Okun, Equality and Efficiency: The Big Trade-Off (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1975).
7. Several other types of data are also used frequently by labor economists.
One could look, for example, at how a given firm’s quit rate and wage
rate vary over time. Observations that provide information on a single
behavioral unit over a number of time periods are called time-series data.
Sometimes, labor economists have data on the behavior of a number of
observational units (e.g., employers) for a number of time periods; combinations of cross-sectional and time-series data are called panel data.
8. An exception occurs in the supply and demand curves that firms face, in
which the independent variable, price, is typically shown on the vertical
axis.
9. These properties include that on average, the correct answer for α1 is
obtained; the estimates are the most precise possible among a certain
class of estimators; and the sum of the positive and negative vertical
deviations of the data points from the estimated line will be 0. For a
more formal treatment of the method of least squares, see any statistics
or econometrics text. A good introduction for a reader with no statistical background is Larry D. Schroeder, David L. Sjoquist, and Paula
E. Stephan, Understanding Regression Analysis: An Introductory Guide
(Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1986).
10. Students with access to computer software for estimating regression
models can easily verify this result.
11. For example, at a wage of $40/hour, the estimated quit rate would be
45 - 1.25 × (40), or 10 percent per year.
12. These assumptions are discussed in any econometrics text.
13. Reasons why this occurs are discussed in Chapters 5, 9, and 11.
14. The fact that the dots fall exactly on a straight line is a graphic representation of the assumption that equation (1A.5) has no random error
term. If random error is present, the dots would fall around, but not all
on, a straight line.
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