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or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action. Jurisprudence dictates that the attachment
lien continues until the debt is paid, or the sale is had under execution issued on the judgment or until the judgment is
satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in the same manner provided by law.
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Here, records show that while the parties have entered into a compromise agreement which had already been approved
by the RTC, the obligations thereunder have yet to be fully complied with – particularly, the payment of the total
compromise amount. Hence, given that the foregoing debt remains unpaid, the attachment of Sps. Lazaro’s properties
should have continued to subsist.
Grounds
Requirements
Manner of Attaching
Discharge of Attachment
Third Party Claim
Claim for Damages
G.R. No. 185734
Lim, Jr. v. Lazaro
July 3, 2013
Perlas – Bernabe, J.
FACTS: Lim, Jr. filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
before the RTC. Lim Jr seeks to recover the amounts in several dishonored checks issued by the Sps Lazaro, as well
as interests, attorney’s fees, and costs.
RTC granted the writ of preliminary attachment application. Upon the posting of the required bond, three (3) parcels
of land situated in Bulacan, registered in the names of Sps. Lazaro, were levied upon.
Sps. Lazaro, in their answer with counterclaim, opposed the issuance of writ of preliminary attachment and averred
that
1.
Lim, Jr. had no cause of action against them since Colim Merchandise, and not Lim, Jr., was the payee of
the 15 Metrobank checks; and that the PNB and Real Bank checks were not drawn by them.
2.
No fraud should be imputed against them as the checks issued to Colim were merely intended as a form of
collateral.
The parties entered into a Compromise Agreement whereby Sps. Lazaro agreed to pay Lim, Jr. on an installment basis
from September 2006 until October 2013.
Sps. Lazaro then filed an Omnibus Motion to lift the writ of preliminary attachment, which the RTC granted. It ruled
that a writ of preliminary attachment is a mere provisional or ancillary remedy to protect and preserve certain rights
and interests pending final judgment. Considering that the case had already been considered closed and terminated on
the basis of the compromise agreement, the writ of preliminary attachment should be lifted and quashed. CA affirmed
RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of preliminary attachment was properly lifted.
HELD:
NO. The discharge of the writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of Sps. Lazaro was improper.
By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, is an ancillary remedy applied for not for
its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the main
1
The Court pronounced that a writ of attachment is not extinguished by the execution of a compromise agreement
between the parties. The parties to the compromise agreement should not be deprived of the protection provided by
an attachment lien.If we were to rule otherwise, we would in effect create a back door by which a debtor can easily
escape his creditors. Consequently, we would be faced with an anomalous situation where a debtor, in order to buy
time to dispose of his properties, would enter into a compromise agreement he has no intention of honoring in the first
place. The purpose of the provisional remedy of attachment would thus be lost. The lifting of the attachment lien
would be tantamount to an abdication of Lim, Jr.’s rights over Sps. Lazaro’s properties which the Court, absent any
justifiable ground therefor, cannot allow.
G.R. No. 190028
Lim v. RTC of Makati, Br. 56
February 26, 2014
Perlas – Bernabe, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Leticia P. Ligon filed an amended complaint before the RTC of Quezon City for collection of sum
of money and damages, rescission of contract, and nullification of title with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment against Sps. Baladjay, a certain Olivia Marasigan, Polished Arrow Holdings, Inc., and its
incorporators. In her complaint, Ligon alleged, inter alia, that Rosario Baladjay enticed her to extend a short–term
loan in the amount of P3,000,000.00, payable in a month’s time and secured by an Allied Bank post–dated check for
the same amount. Ligon likewise claimed that Rosario, as further enticement for the loan extension, represented that
she and her husband Saturnino were in the process of selling their property in Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa
City (subject property) covered by a clean title, TCT No. 8502, in the name of Rosario Baladjay and that the proceeds
of the said sale could easily pay–off the loan. Unfortunately, the Allied Bank check was dishonored upon presentment
and, despite assurances to replace it with cash, Rosario failed to do so. Moreover, Ligon discovered that the subject
property had already been transferred to Polished Arrow, alleged to be a dummy corporation of Sps. Baladjay and the
individual defendants. As a result, TCT No. 8502 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 9273 in the name of Polished
Arrow. Ligon prayed that all defendants be held solidarily liable to pay her, with interest due as well as attorney's fees
and moral and exemplary damages. Ligon also prayed that the said transfer be nullified, and that a writ of preliminary
attachment be issued in the interim against defendants’ assets, including the subject property. Subsequently, an
Amended Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued and annotated on the dorsal portion of TCT 9273 on December
3, 2002.
On February 18, 2003, a similar complaint for collection of sum of money, damages, and cancellation of title with
prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment was lodged before the Makati City RTC, by Spouses. Vicente
against Sps. Baladjay, Polished Arrow, and other corporations. During the proceedings therein, a writ of preliminary
attachment also against the subject property was issued and annotated on the dorsal portion of TCT No. 9273 on March
12, 2003.
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Before the Quezon City case was concluded the Makati City RTC rendered a Decision rescinding the transfer of the
subject property from Sps. Baladjay to Polished Arrow upon a finding that the same was made in fraud of creditors.
the Makati City RTC directed the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City to: (a) cancel TCT No. 9273 in the name of
Polished Arrow; and (b) restore TCT No. 8502 “in its previous condition” in the name of Rosario Baladjay, married
to Saturnino Baladjay.
Meanwhile, in the pending Quezon City Case, Polished Arrow and the individual defendants were successively
dropped as party–defendants, after it was established that they, by themselves directly or through other persons, had
no more ownership, interest, title, or claim over the subject property. After due proceedings, the Quezon City RTC
rendered a Decision dated March 26, 2008, directing Sps. Baladjay to pay Ligon the amount of P3,000,000.00 with
interest, as well as attorney’s fees and costs of suit. When Ligon sought execution, she discovered that the December
3, 2002 attachment annotation had been deleted from TCT No. 9273 when the subject property was sold by way of
public auction to the highest bidder, respondent Ting, during the execution proceedings in the Makati City Case. In
this regard, Ligon learned that the Makati City RTC had issued its first assailed Order dated February 9, 2007 (First
Assailed Order), directing Atty. Garing, as the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City, to: (a) register the Officer’s
Final Deed of Sale on the official Record Book of the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City; and (b) cancel TCT No.
8502 in the name of Sps. Baladjay and issue a new title in the name of Ting, free from any liens and encumbrances.
Atty. Garing manifested before the Makati City RTC that it submitted the matter en consulta to the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) as he was uncertain whether the annotations on TCT No. 9273 should be carried over to TCT No.
8502. In response to the manifestation, the Makati City RTC issued its second assailed Order dated March 20, 2007
(Second Assailed Order), directing Atty. Garing to comply with the First Assailed Order under pain of contempt. It
explained that it could not allow the LRA to carry over all annotations previously annotated on TCT No. 9273 in the
name of Polished Arrow as said course of action would run counter to its December 9, 2004 Decision which
specifically ordered the cancellation of said TCT and the restoration of TCT No. 8502 in its previous condition. It
further clarified that the new Transfer of Certificate of Title that the said Registrar of Deeds is duty bound to issue
immediately in favor of Leonardo Ting will also be freed from any liens and encumbrances, as simple as that. It was
Atty. Garing’s ministerial duty “to promptly cancel TCT No. 8502/T–44 in the name of defendant–spouses Baladjay
and to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the highest bidder, Leonardo J. Ting.” On June 7, 2007,
Atty. Garing issued TCT No. 19756 in the name of Ting, free from any liens and encumbrances. Later, Ting sold the
subject property to respondent Benito G. Techico (Techico), resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 19756 and the
issuance of TCT No. 31001in Techico’s name.
Ligon filed, inter alia, a certiorari petition against respondent Presiding Judge Reynaldo Laigo, Sheriff Alejo, Atty.
Garing, Ting, and Techico (respondents), alleging, among others, that the Makati City RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the Assailed Orders. Consolidated with Ligon’s certiorari petition is a complaint for indirect
contempt against respondents, whereby it was alleged that the latter unlawfully interfered with the court processes of
the Quezon City RTC. However, CA dismissed Ligon's certiorari petition as well as the complaint for indirect
contempt.
ISSUES:
1.
whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the Makati City RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion?
2.
whether or not Judge Laigo should be cited in contempt and penalized administratively?
2
HELD:
1.
YES. Attachment is a proceeding in rem, and, hence, is against the particular property, enforceable against
the whole world. Accordingly, the attaching creditor acquires a specific lien on the attached property which
nothing can subsequently destroy except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself. The lien
continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the judgment, or until the judgment
is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law. Thus, a prior
registration of an attachment lien creates a preference, such that when an attachment has been duly levied
upon a property, a purchaser thereof subsequent to the attachment takes the property subject to the said
attachment. As provided under PD 1529, said registration operates as a form of constructive notice to all
persons.
Court finds that the CA erred in holding that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in issuing the Assailed
Orders as these issuances essentially disregarded, inter alia, Ligon’s prior attachment lien over the subject property
patently anathema to the nature of attachment proceedings which is well–established in law and jurisprudence.
Notwithstanding the subsequent cancellation of TCT No. 9273 due to the Makati City RTC’s December 9, 2004
Decision, Ligon’s attachment lien over the subject property continued to subsist since the attachment she had earlier
secured binds the property itself, and, hence, continues until the judgment debt of Sps. Baladjay to Ligon as adjudged
in the Quezon City Case is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated in some manner provided by law. The
grave abuse of discretion of the Makati City RTC lies with its directive to issue a new certificate of title in the name
of Ting, free from any liens and encumbrances. This course of action clearly negates the efficacy of Ligon’s attachment
lien and, also, defies the legal characterization of attachment proceedings.
2.
NO. Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. It is a
disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its
proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its
proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. Examining the petition, the Court finds that Ligon
failed to sufficiently show how the acts of each of the respondents, or more specifically, Judge Laigo,
constituted any of the acts punishable under the foregoing section tending towards a wilful disregard or
disobedience of a public authority.
In issuing the Assailed Orders, Judge Laigo merely performed his judicial functions pursuant to the December 9, 2004
Decision in the Makati City Case which had already attained finality. Thus, without Ligon’s proper substantiation,
considering too that Judge Laigo’s official acts are accorded with the presumption of regularity, the Court is
constrained to dismiss the indirect contempt charges in this case.
G.R. No. 125027
Mangila v. CA
August 12, 2002
Carpio, J.
FACTS: Anita Mangila is an exporter of seafoods and doing business under the name of Seafoods Products. Private
respondent Loreta Guina is the President and General Manager of Air Swift International, a single registered
proprietorship engaged in the freight forwarding business.
Mangila contracted the freight forwarding services of Guina for shipment of petitioner’s products, such as crabs,
prawns and assorted fishes, to Guam (USA) where petitioner maintains an outlet. Mangila agreed to pay cash on
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delivery. Guina’s invoice stipulates a charge of 18 percent interest per annum on all overdue accounts, and in case of
suit, stipulates attorney’s fees equivalent to 25 percent of the amount due plus costs of suit. On the first shipment,
Mangila requested for 7 days within which to pay private Guina. However, for the next three shipments, March 17,
24 and 31, 1988, petitioner failed to pay private respondent shipping charges amounting to P109, 376.95. Despite
several demands, Mangila never paid. Thus, on June 10, 1988, Guina filed before the RTC Pasay City an action for
collection of sum of money.
obtained by the court, either by service on him of summons or other coercive process or his voluntary
submission to the court’s authority. Hence, when the sheriff or other proper officer commences
implementation of the writ of attachment, it is essential that he serve on the defendant not only a copy
of the applicant’s affidavit and attachment bond, and of the order of attachment, as explicitly required
by Section 5 of Rule 57, but also the summons addressed to said defendant as well as a copy of the
complaint xxx.”
The Sheriff’s Return showed that summons was not served on Mangila. A woman found at Mangila’s house informed
the sheriff that petitioner transferred her residence to Guagua, Pampanga. The sheriff found out further that petitioner
had left the Philippines for Guam. Thus, construing petitioner’s departure from the Philippines as done with intent to
defraud her creditors, Ginua filed a Motion for Preliminary Attachment, which the court subsequently granted. A Writ
of Preliminary Attachment was thereafter issued.
Furthermore, we have held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages: first, the court
issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ;
and third, the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court must have
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in
any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.
Through the assistance of the sheriff of RTC Pampanga, the Notice of Levy with the Order, Affidavit and Bond was
served on Mangila’s household help in San Fernando, Pampanga on October 1988.
On November 1988, Mangila filed an Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment without submitting herself to the
jurisdiction of the trial court. She pointed out that up to then, she had not been served a copy of the Complaint and the
summons. Hence, petitioner claimed the court had not acquired jurisdiction over her person.
After the hearing on the motion, RTC granted the same on January 13, 1989 upon filing of petitioner’s counter-bond.
The trial court, however, did not rule on the question of jurisdiction and on the validity of the writ of preliminary
attachment. Thereafter, Guina applied for an alias summons and on January 26, 1989 summons was finally served on
petitioner.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the issuance of the writ of attachment and sustained the
filing of the action in the RTC of Pasay.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the validity of the issuance of the writ of Preliminary Attachment
HELD:
Yes, because there was no proper service of summons, order, and the writ of attachment.
Improper Issuance and Service of Writ of Attachment
This Court has long settled the issue of when jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should be acquired in cases
where a party resorts to provisional remedies. A party to a suit may, at any time after filing the complaint, avail of the
provisional remedies under the Rules of Court. Specifically, Rule 57 on preliminary attachment speaks of the grant of
the remedy "at the commencement of the action or at any time thereafter."21 This phrase refers to the date of filing of
the complaint which is the moment that marks "the commencement of the action." The reference plainly is to a time
before summons is served on the defendant, or even before summons issues.
In Davao Light & Power Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court clarified the actual time when jurisdiction should
be had:
“It goes without saying that whatever be the acts done by the Court prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of defendant – issuance of summons, order of attachment and writ of attachment – these
do not and cannot bind and affect the defendant until and unless jurisdiction over his person is eventually
3
In conclusion, we hold that the alias summons belatedly served on petitioner cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal
defect in the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process on petitioner without first
obtaining jurisdiction over her person. The preliminary writ of attachment must be served after or simultaneous with
the service of summons on the defendant whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as
warranted by the circumstances of the case.27 The subsequent service of summons does not confer a retroactive
acquisition of jurisdiction over her person because the law does not allow for retroactivity of a belated service.
G.R. No. 139941
Chuidian v. Sandiganbayan
January 19, 2001
Ynares – Santiago, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian was alleged to be a dummy or nominee of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos in
several companies which were allegedly illegally acquired by the Marcos spouses. Chuidian, as a favored business
associate of the Marcoses, allegedly used false pretenses to induce the officers of the Philippine Export and Foreign
Loan Guarantee Corporation (PHILGUARANTEE for brevity), the Board of Investments (BOI for brevity) and the
Central Bank, to facilitate the procurement and issuance of a loan guarantee in favor of the Asian Reliability Company,
Inc. (ARCI for brevity) sometime in September 1980.
ARCI, which was 98% owned by Chuidian, was granted a loan guarantee of USD 25,000,000.00. ARCI guaranteed
to PHILGUARANTEE that the loan proceeds would be used to establish the five interrelated projects in the
Philippines. Chuidian, however, deviated from the aforesaid guarantee/business plan and personally invested the
proceeds of the loan in corporations operating in the US, particularly in Silicon Valley.
Chuidian claimed that he was merely a victim of the systematic plunder of the Marcoses and that he instituted an
action before the US Federal Courts to recover the companies which the Marcoses illegally wrested from him.
On November 27, 1995, 3 months before the People Power Revolution, PHILGUARANTEE entered into a
compromise agreement with Chuidian where he shall assign and surrender title to all of his companies in favor of
the Philippine government. In return, PHILGUARANTEE shall absolve him from all civil and criminal liability,
including the desistance from pursuing any suit against him regarding the payments for the loan he misused.
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The agreement further stipulated that instead of Chuidian reimbursing the loan, the Philippine government shall pay
him USD 5,300,000.00.
An initial payment of USD 500,000.00 was received by Chuidian as well as another payment amounting to USD
200,000.00. The remaining balance of USD 4,600,000.00 was to be paid through an irrevocable Letter of Credit
from which Chuidian would draw USD 100,000.00 monthly. Such LC was issued on December 12, 1985 and Chuidian
was able to make 2 monthly drawings from the LC at PNB Los Angeles branch.
At the start of the Aquino administration, the PCGG was created, which aimed to extend earnest efforts to search and
recover properties illegally acquired by the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. Among the assets recovered were
Chuidian’s Letter of Credit. Chuidian was, at that time, residing in the US, but even so, his name was placed in the
DFA’s Hold Order list.
On July 30, 1987, the government filed a case before the Sandiganbayan against the Marcos spouses, several
government officials under the Marcos administration, and a number of individuals who are known Marcos cronies,
including Chuidian. The complaint sought the reconveyance, reversion, accounting and restitution of all properties
illegally procured by the defendants.
While the case was pending, the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of attachment
over the Letter of Credit, citing the several grounds as basis:
1.
Chuidian fraudulently embezzled or misapplied the funds of ARCI acting in a fiduciary capacity
2.
Chuidian is guilty of fraud in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation upon which the action was
brought, or that he concealed or disposed of the property that is the subject of the auction
3.
Chuidian removed or disposed of his property, with intent to defraud the plaintiff
4.
Chuidian is residing out of the country or one on whom summons may be served by publication
Chuidian opposed the motion for the issuance of the writ, denying all the allegations. The Sandiganbayan eventually
issued a resolution issuing the writ of attachment against the Letter of Credit as security for the satisfaction of the
judgment. Chuidian filed a motion to lift the attachment citing several grounds—that he had returned to the
Philippines, that there was no evidence of initial fraud or subsequent concealment except for the affidavit submitted
by the PCGG Chairman, that he has not disposed of his assets in an intent to defraud his creditors, and that he was not
a defendant in any criminal action or prosecution in the Philippines. His final point is that he was not guilty of fraud
in contracting the debt or incurring the obligation.
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to lift the attachment. Chuidian then filed a petition for certiorari contending
that the respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it ruled, among others, that PNB was relieved of its obligation to pay the L/C.
ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of the motion to lift the attachment was proper.
HELD:
The court ruled in the affirmative.
Chuidian could have pursued two courses of action, which are:
1.
To file a counterbond according to Rule 57, Sec. 12
4
2.
To quash the attachment on the ground that it was irregularly or improvidently issued.
Petitioner chose the latter because the grounds he raised assail the propriety of issuance of the writ of attachment. He
insisted and emphasized that four years after the writ was issued, he had returned to the Philippines. He also alleged
that while the case against him in the Sandiganbayan was pending, but after the attachment has already been executed,
the government lost 2 cases for fraud lodged against him before the US Courts, thus invoking res judicata.
The court ruled that supervening events which may or may not justify the discharge of the writ are not within the
purview of Rule 57 as grounds.
There was no showing that the issuance of the writ of attachment was attended by impropriety or irregularity.
Furthermore, where the preliminary attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant’s
cause of action, the defendant is not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the attachment under Rule 57, Sec. 13
by offering to show the falsity of the factual averments in the plaintiff’s application and affidavits on which the writ
was based—and consequently that the writ based thereon had been improperly or irregularly issued—the reason being
that the hearing on such a motion for dissolution of the writ would be tantamount to a trial of the merits of the
action.
A consequence to be avoided in such a case is a trial upon the merits of the action would be ventilated upon a
mere hearing of a motion instead of a regular trial. The attachment is a mere provisional remedy to ensure the
safety and preservation of the thing attached until the plaintiff can, by appropriate proceedings, obtain a judgment and
have such property applied to its satisfaction.
Moreover, we have held that when the writ of attachment is issued upon a ground which is at the same time the
applicant's cause of action, the only other way the writ can be lifted or dissolved is by a counterbond, in accordance
with Section 12 of the same rule. However, this recourse was not availed of by Chuidian.
The petition is accordingly DISMISSED and the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED. The PNB is
DIRECTED to remit to Sandiganbayan the proceeds of the L/C for the account of Sandiganbayan in escrow for the
person/s who shall eventually be adjudged lawfully entitled thereto.
G.R. No. 171124
Alejandro Ng Wee v. Tankiansee
February 13, 2008
Nachura, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Alejandro Ng Wee, a valued client of Westmont Bank, made several money placements with
Wincorp, a domestic entity engaged in the business of an investment house with the authority and license to extend
credit. When he tried to investigate the financial condition of the company, he found out that that it extended a loan
equal to his total money placement to a corporation [Power Merge] with a subscribed capital of only P37.5M. This
credit facility originated from another loan of about P1.5B extended by Wincorp to another corporation [Hottick
Holdings].
Under the scheme agreed upon by Wincorp and Hottick's president, petitioner's money placements were transferred
without his knowledge and consent to the loan account of Power Merge through an agreement that virtually freed the
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latter of any liability. Allegedly, through the false representations of Wincorp and its officers and directors, petitioner
was enticed to roll over his placements so that Wincorp could loan the same to Virata/Power Merge.
He filed with the RTC Manila a civil case for damages, impleading Manuel Tankiansee, Vice-Chairman and Director
of Wincorp. The trial court order that issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of the
defendant. The defendants moved for the discharge of the writ on the ground that it was improperly issued and that
the bond furnished was grossly insufficient. It was denied. The respondent assailed the same via certiorari under Rule
65.
Upon denial, he filed another motion to discharge the writ, re-pleading the grounds he raised in his first motion but
raising the following additional grounds: (1) that he was not present in Wincorp's board meetings approving the
questionable transactions; and (2) that he could not have connived with Wincorp and the other defendants because he
and Pearlbank Securities, Inc., in which he is a major stockholder, filed cases against the company as they were also
victimized by its fraudulent schemes. Eventually, the CA lifted the Writ of Preliminary Attachment to the extent that
it concerned respondent's properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct in lifting the writ.
HELD:
Yes. The Court agreed with the respondent in stating that the general and sweeping allegation of fraud against him in
petitioner's affidavit-respondent as an officer and director of Wincorp allegedly connived with the other defendants to
defraud petitioner-is not sufficient basis for the trial court to order the attachment of respondent's properties.
Based on section 1(d) of Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, for a writ of attachment to issue under this rule, the applicant
must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from
the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. The applicant must then be able to
demonstrate that the debtor has intended to defraud the creditor.
In the instant case, the affidavit narrated only the alleged fraudulent transaction between Wincorp and Virata and/or
Power Merge, which, by the way, explains why this Court, in G.R. No. 162928, affirmed the writ of attachment issued
against the latter. It must contain such particulars as to how the fraud imputed to respondent was committed for the
court to decide whether or not to issue the writ. Absent any statement of other factual circumstances to show that
respondent, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a preconceived plan or intention not to pay, or without any
showing of how respondent committed the alleged fraud, the general averment in the affidavit that respondent is an
officer and director of Wincorp who allegedly connived with the other defendants to commit a fraud, is insufficient to
support the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. In the application for the writ under the said ground,
compelling is the need to give a hint about what constituted the fraud and how it was perpetrated because established
is the rule that fraud is never presumed. Verily, the mere fact that respondent is an officer and director of the company
does not necessarily give rise to the inference that he committed a fraud or that he connived with the other defendants
to commit a fraud.
Let it be stressed that the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment is harsh and rigorous for it exposes the debtor
to humiliation and annoyance. The rules governing its issuance are, therefore, strictly construed against the applicant,
such that if the requisites for its grant are not shown to be all present, the court shall refrain from issuing it, for,
otherwise, the court which issues it acts in excess of its jurisdiction. Likewise, the writ should not be abused to cause
5
unnecessary prejudice. If it is wrongfully issued on the basis of false or insufficient allegations, it should at once be
corrected.
G.R. No. 166759
Torres v. Satsatin
November 25, 2009
Peralta, J.
FACTS: Nicanor Satsatin was authorized, via a Special Power of Attorney executed by the Torres siblings, to sell the
latter’s co-owned real properties. These real properties were sold by Nicanor Satsatin to Solar Resources Inc. wherein
the latter allegedly paid the purchase price in full via postdated checks. Apparently, despite repeated verbal and written
demands, Nicanor Satsatin failed to remit the entire proceeds of the sale to the Torres Siblings. Consequently, the
Torres Siblings filed a Complaint for sum of money and damages, against Nicanor Satsatin et al. Subsequently, the
Torres Siblings filed an Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. Said Ex-Parte motion
was granted by RTC Dasmarinas. Nicanor Satsatin filed a Motion to Discharge the aforementioned Writ of
Attachment. However, the RTC denied Satsatin’s Motion to Discharge. Thus, Satsatin elevated the case to the CA via
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Satsatin et al. argued that the subject writ was improper and irregular having been issued and enforced without the
lower court acquiring jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents. They maintained that the writ of attachment
was implemented without serving upon them the summons together with the complaint. They also argued that the
bond issued in favor of the petitioners was defective, because the bonding company failed to obtain the proper
clearance that it can transact business with the RTC of Dasmariñas, Cavite. The CA found the RTC to have committed
grave abuse of discretion and it ordered the lifting of the assailed Writ of Preliminary Attachment.
The Torres siblings now assail the order of the CA and now maintain that the only way the subject writ of attachment
can be dissolved is by a counter-bond. They claim that the respondents are not allowed to file a motion to dissolve the
attachment under Section 13, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, the hearing on the motion for the dissolution
of the writ would be tantamount to a trial on the merits, considering that the writ of preliminary attachment was issued
upon a ground which is, at the same time, the applicant’s cause of action.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the Writ of Attachment issued by the RTC in the case at bar may only be dissolved by a
counter-bond and not by a motion to dissolve the attachment under Section 13, Rule 57 of the Rules of
Court?
2.
Whether or not a writ of attachment may be discharged on the ground that the company who issued the
applicant’s bond is not among those qualified to transact business with the issuing court?
HELD:
1.
No. Although there is truth in the petitioners’ contention that an attachment may not be dissolved by a
showing of its irregular or improper issuance if it is upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant’s
cause of action in the main case, since an anomalous situation would result if the issues of the main case
would be ventilated and resolved in a mere hearing of a motion. However, the same is not applicable here
because it is clear from the respondents’ pleadings that the grounds on which they base the lifting of the writ
of attachment are the irregularities in its issuance and in the service of the writ; not petitioners’ cause of
action.
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In Cuartero v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three
stages: (1) the court issues the order granting the application; (2) the writ of attachment issues pursuant to the order
granting the writ; and (3) the writ is implemented. For the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant be first obtained. However, once the implementation of the writ commences, the court
must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority
to act in any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.
At the time the trial court issued the writ of attachment on November 15, 2002, it can validly do so since the motion
for its issuance can be filed "at the commencement of the action or at any time before entry of judgment." However,
at the time the writ was implemented, the trial court has not acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent
since no summons was yet served upon them. The proper officer should have previously or simultaneously with the
implementation of the writ of attachment, served a copy of the summons upon the respondents in order for the trial
court to have acquired jurisdiction upon them and for the writ to have binding effect. Consequently, even if the writ
of attachment was validly issued, it was improperly or irregularly enforced and, therefore, cannot bind and affect the
respondents.
2.
Yes. Every bond should be accompanied by a clearance from the Supreme Court showing that the company
concerned is qualified to transact business which is valid only for thirty (30) days from the date of its
issuance. However, it is apparent that the Certification issued by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) at the time the bond was issued would clearly show that the bonds offered by Western Guaranty
Corporation may be accepted only in the RTCs of the cities of Makati, Pasay, and Pasig. Therefore, the
surety bond issued by the bonding company should not have been accepted by the RTC of Dasmariñas,
Branch 90, since the certification secured by the bonding company from the OCA at the time of the issuance
of the bond certified that it may only be accepted in the above-mentioned cities.
G.R. No. 203520
Luzon Development Bank v. Krishnan
April 13, 2015
ISSUE: Whether petitioners may deposit bank property in lieu of cash or a counter-bond
HELD:
No, petitioners have no option to deposit real property in lieu of cash or a counter-bond to discharge the attachment
or stay the implementation thereof.
Section 2, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court explicitly states that "[a]n order of attachment may be issued either ex parte
or upon motion with notice and hearing by the court in which the action is pending, or by the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, and must require the sheriff of the court to attach so much of the property in the Philippines of the
party against whom it is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand,
unless such party makes deposit or gives a bond as hereinafter provided in an amount equal to that fixed in the order,
which may be the amount sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand or the value of the property to be attached as
stated by the applicant, exclusive of costs."
Section 5 of the same Rule likewise states that "[t]he sheriff enforcing the writ shall without delay and with all
reasonable diligence attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, only so much of the property in the
Philippines of the party against whom the writ is issued, not exempt from execution, as may be sufficient to satisfy
the applicant's demand, unless the former makes a deposit with the court from which the writ is issued, or gives a
counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order of attachment
or to the value of the property to be attached, exclusive of costs."
From the foregoing, it is evidently clear that once the writ of attachment has been issued, the only remedy of the
petitioners in lifting the same is through a cash deposit or the filing of the counter-bond. Thus, the Court holds that
petitioner's argument that it has the option to deposit real property instead of depositing cash or filing a counter-bond
to discharge the attachment or stay the implementation thereof is unmeritorious.
Peralta, J.
FACTS: Luzon Development Bank, Tomas Clemente, and Oscar Ramirez (petitioners) are the respondents in a
complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages filed by Erlinda Khrishnan (respondent). Respondent claimed
that she maintained time deposits with petitioner bank. When respondent Erlinda presented her Time Deposits
Certificates amounting to P28,597,472.70 for payment, petitioners refused to honor them for the reason that they were
fraudulent. Respondent Erlinda likewise applied for a Preliminary Writ of Attachment which the RTC granted.
By virtue of the writ, petitioner bank's accounts in BPI Family Bank, Calamba, Laguna in the amount of
P28,597,472.70 and its account amounting to P49,000,000.00 in the Central Bank were garnished.
The RTC lifted the attachment by virtue of a Motion to Recall, Quash and/or Lift Attachment or Garnishment by the
petitioner. However, the CA reinstated the writ of attachment by virtue of a Petition for Certiorari filed by respondent.
Subsequently, an Order reinstating the Writ of Attachment was issued for failure of petitioners to file the required
counterbond.
6
In their petition, petitioners contend that it has the option to deposit real property, in lieu of cash or a counter-bond, to
secure any contingent lien on its property in the event respondent wins the case. They argue that Section 2 of Rule 57
only mentions the term "deposit," thus, it cannot only be confined or construed to refer to cash.
The trial court aptly ruled that while it is true that the word deposit cannot only be confined or construed to refer to
cash, a broader interpretation thereof is not justified in the present case for the reason that a party seeking a stay of the
attachment under Section 5 is required to make a deposit in an amount equal to the bond fixed by the court in the order
of attachment or to the value of the property to be attached. The proximate relation of the word "deposit" and "amount"
is unmistakable in Section 5 of Rule 57. Plainly, in construing said words, it can be safely concluded that Section 5
requires the deposit of money as the word "amount" commonly refers to or is regularly associated with a sum of
money.
G.R. No. 203240
Northern Luzon Island Co. v. Garcia
March 18, 2015
Perlas – Bernabe, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Northern Islands Co., Inc. (petitioner) filed a Complaint with application for a writ of preliminary
attachment, before the RTC against respondents, which was subsequently amended (Main Case). It alleged that:
Petitioner caused the delivery to respondents of various appliances in the aggregate amount of P8,040,825.17; the
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goods were transported, shipped, and delivered by Sulpicio Lines, Inc., and were accepted in good order and condition
by respondents’ representatives; however, the value of the goods were not paid by respondents despite repeated
demands.
In connection with the application for a writ of preliminary attachment, petitioner posted a bond, through Visayan
Surety and Insurance Corporation, in the amount of 8,040,825.17. Thereafter, the writ was issued.
Respondents filed a Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment, alleging that the attachment previously ordered by the
RTC exceeded by P9,232,564.56 given that the estimated value of the attached properties, including the garnished
bank accounts, as assessed by their appraiser, Lapaz, amounted to P17,273,409.73, while the attachment bond is only
in the amount of P8,040,825.17. (Meron daw excessive attachment kasi ung bond na in-order ng court is 8M+ pero
ung property na attached is worth 17M+)
The RTC, among others, denied the Motion to Discharge Excess Attachment, finding that the appraisal made by Lapaz
was not reflective of the true valuation of the properties, adding too, that the bond posted by petitioner stands as
sufficient security for whatever damages respondents may sustain by reason of the attachment
Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration specifically assailing the denial of their Motion to Discharge
Excess Attachment. In this relation, they prayed that the RTC refer to a commissioner, pursuant to Rule 32 of the
Rules of Court, the factual determination of the total aggregate amount of respondents’ attached properties so as to
ascertain if the attachment was excessive.
The foregoing motion was, however, denied by the RTC for lack of merit. Thus, respondents elevated the matter to
the CA via petition for certiorari and mandamus, (Certiorari Case).
In the interim, the RTC rendered a Decision dated September 21, 2011 in the Main Case. Essentially, it dismissed
petitioner’s Amended Complaint due to the absence of any evidence to prove that respondents had agreed to the
pricing of the subject goods.
(MAIN CASE) The RTC’s September 21, 2011 Decision was later appealed by petitioner before the CA. Finding that
the Notice of Appeal was seasonably filed, with the payment of the appropriate docket fees, the RTC, in an Order
dated January 25, 2012, ordered the elevation of the entire records of the Main Case to the CA. The appeal was then
raffled to the CA’s Eighth Division, and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 98237. On the other hand, records do not show
that respondents filed any appeal.
(Certiorari Case) Meanwhile, the CA, in a Decision dated January 19, 2012, partly granted the certiorari petition of
respondents, ordering the RTC to appoint a commissioner as provided under Rule 32 of the Rules of Court as well as
the subsequent discharge of any excess attachment if so found therein. It held that: on the issue of attachment, trial by
commissioners under Rule 32 of the Rules of Court was proper so that the parties may finally settle their conflicting
valuations.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC had lost jurisdiction over the matter of the preliminary attachment after petitioner appealed
the decision in the Main Case, and thereafter ordered the transmittal of the records to the CA
7
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction
over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the
other parties.
In this case, petitioner had duly perfected its appeal of the RTC’s September 21, 2011 Decision resolving the Main
Case through the timely filing of its Notice of Appeal dated October 27, 2011, together with the payment of the
appropriate docket fees. The RTC, in an Order dated January 25, 2012, had actually confirmed this fact, and thereby
ordered the elevation of the entire records to the CA. Thus, based on Section 9, Rule 41, it cannot be seriously doubted
that the RTC had already lost jurisdiction over the Main Case.
With the RTC’s loss of jurisdiction over the Main Case necessarily comes its loss of jurisdiction over all matters
merely ancillary thereto. Meanwhile, records do not show that respondents filed any appeal, resulting in the lapse of
its own period to appeal therefrom. Thus, the propriety of conducting a trial by commissioners in order to determine
the excessiveness of the subject preliminary attachment, being a mere ancillary matter to the Main Case, is now mooted
by its supervening appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 98237.
The Court, in view of the nature of a preliminary attachment, definitively ruled that the attachment itself cannot be the
subject of a separate action independent of the principal action because the attachment was only an incident of such
action. Being merely ancillary to a principal proceeding, the attachment must fail if the suit itself cannot be maintained
as the purpose of the writ can no longer be justified.
G.R. No. 181721
Watercraft Venture Corp. v. Wolfe
September 9, 2015
Peralta, J.
FACTS: Watercraft is engaged in the business of building, repairing, storing and maintaining yachts, boats and other
pleasure crafts at the Subic Bay Freeport Zone, Subic, Zambales. In 1997, Watercraft hired Wolfe, a British national
and resident of Subic as its shipyard manager. During his employment, Wolfe stored the sailboat, Knotty Gull, within
Watercraft1 s boat storage facilities, but never paid for the storage fees. On March 7, 2002, Watercraft terminated the
employment of Wolfe.
Sometime in June 2002, Wolfe pulled out his sailboat from Watercraft's storage facilities after signing a Boat PullOut Clearance dated June 29, 2002 where he allegedly acknowledged the outstanding obligation of Sixteen Thousand
Three Hundred and Twenty-Four and 82/100 US Dollars (US$16,324.82) representing unpaid boat storage fees for
the period of June 1997 to June 2002. Despite repeated demands, he failed to pay the said amount. A collection suit
was filed against him which he countered with the argument that the sailboat was purchased in February 1998 as part
of an agreement between him and Watercraft1 s then General Manager, Barry Bailey, and its President, Ricky
Sandoval, for it to be repaired and used as training or fill-in project for the staff, and to be sold later on. He added that
pursuant to a central Listing Agreement for the sale of the sailboat, he was appointed as agent, placed in possession
thereof and entitled to a ten percent (10%) sales commission. He insisted that nowhere in the agreement was there a
stipulation that berthing and storage fees will be charged during the entire time that the sailboat was in Watercraft's
dockyard.
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Meanwhile, the RTC granted Watercraft’s ex - parte application for writ of preliminary attachment and was thereafter
issued. Wolfe’s two vehicles and accounts with BPI were levied and garnished upon respectively. Wolfe filed a Motion
to Discharge the Writ of Attachment, arguing that Watercraft failed to show the existence of fraud and that the mere
failure to pay or perform an obligation does not amount to fraud. The CA granted Wolfe’s petition upon filing of a
petition for certiorari on the ground that the affidavit of merit executed by Watercraft’s Vice - President failed to show
fraudulent intent.
Air was guilty of laches and estopped from pursuing its claim. The RTC directed the plaintiff to pay refund of the
premium of defendant’s counter-bond for the release of the two buses which were attached pursuant to the writ of
attachment the Court issued. The RTC also directed the plaintiff to pay for the lost profits of the defendants for such
attachment of the two buses.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. However, the CA ordered Phil-Air to reimburse the premium on the counterbond amounting to P 82,274.00 since the writ was improvidently issued.
ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations in the affidavit of merit concerning fraud are sufficient to warrant the issuance
of a preliminary writ of attachment
ISSUE: Whether or not Phil-Air should reimburse RCJ Lines for the counter-bond premium and its alleged unrealized
profits.
HELD:
No. Although Sec. 1 of Rule 57 allows a party to invoke fraud as a ground for the issuance of a writ of attachment,
the Rules require that in all averments of fraud, the circumstances constituting fraud must be stated with particularity,
pursuant to Rule 8, Section 5. In this case, Watercraft's Affidavit of Preliminary Attachment does not contain specific
allegations of other factual circumstances to show that Wolfe, at the time of contracting the obligation, had a
preconceived plan or intention not to pay. Neither can it be inferred from such affidavit the particulars of why he was
guilty of fraud in the performance of such obligation.
HELD:
No. The CA and the RTC erred when it held Phil-Air directly liable for the counter-bond premium and RCJ Lines'
alleged unrealized profits. Granting that RCJ Lines suffered losses, the judgment award should have been first
executed on the attachment bond. Only if the attachment bond is insufficient to cover the judgment award can PhilAir be held liable.
Fraudulent intent is not a physical entity, but a condition of the mind beyond the reach of the senses, usually kept
secret, very unlikely to be confessed, and therefore, can only be proved by unguarded expressions, conduct and
circumstances. Thus, the applicant for a writ of preliminary attachment must sufficiently show the factual
circumstances of the alleged fraud because fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment
of the debt or failure to comply with his obligation. The particulars of such circumstances necessarily include the time,
persons, places and specific acts of fraud committed.29 An affidavit which does not contain concrete and specific
grounds is inadequate to sustain the issuance of such writ. In fact, mere general averments render the writ defective
and the court that ordered its issuance acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 193821
Phil. Airconditioning Center v. RCJ Lines
November 23, 2015
Brion, J.
FACTS: Phil Air sold 4 AC units to RCJ. Apparently, RCJ failed to pay the units and all the postdated checks it issued
to Phil Air when presented for payment issued were dishonoured. Phil-Air filed on April 1, 1988 a complaint for sum
of money with prayer for the issuance of a write of preliminary attachment. Phil-Air sought to recover from RCJ Lines
amount of the unpaid delivered AC units, unpaid repair services, total interest, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
In its answer with compulsory counterclaim, RCJ Lines admitted that it purchased the units in the total amount of P
1,240,000.00 and that it had only paid P 400,000.00. It refused to pay the balance because Phil-Air allegedly breached
its warranty.
The RTC granted the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment after Phil-Air posted an
attachment bond in the amount of P 1,656,000.00. Two buses of RCJ Lines were attached pursuant to the writ.
However, the attachment was lifted when the RTC granted RCJ Lines' urgent motion to discharge the writ of
attachment. RCJ Lines posted a counter-bond in the same amount as the attachment bond. The RTC found that Phil-
8
A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued by the court where an action is pending to be levied
upon the property or properties of the defendant. The property is held by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of
whatever judgment that might be secured by the attaching party against the defendant.
The grant of the writ is conditioned not only on the finding of the court that there exists a valid ground for its issuance.
The Rules also require the applicant to post a bond.
There are various modes of discharging an attachment under Rule 57, viz.: (1) by depositing cash or posting a counterbond under Section 12; (2) by proving that the attachment bond was improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or
that the bond is insufficient under Section 13; (3) by showing that the attachment is excessive under Section 13; and
(4) by claiming that the property is exempt from execution under Section 2. RCJ Lines availed of the first mode by
posting a counter-bond.
The filing of a counter-bond to discharge the attachment applies when there has already been a seizure of property by
the sheriff and all that is entailed is the presentation of a motion to the proper court, seeking approval of a cash or
surety bond in an amount equivalent to the value of the property seized and the lifting of the attachment on the basis
thereof. The counter-bond stands in place of the property so released.
To be clear, the discharge of the attachment by depositing cash or posting a counter-bond under Section 12 should not
be confused with the discharge sanctioned under Section 13. Section 13 speaks of discharge on the ground that the
writ was improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or that the attachment bond is insufficient, or that the attachment
is excessive.
To reiterate, the discharge under Section 12 takes effect upon posting of a counter-bond or depositing cash, and after
hearing to determine the sufficiency of the cash deposit or counter-bond. On the other hand, the discharge under
Section 13 takes effect only upon showing that the plaintiffs attachment bond was improperly or irregularly issued, or
that the bond is insufficient. The discharge of the attachment under Section 13 must be made only after hearing.
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The CA and the RTC rulings were reversed. It is patent that under the Rules, the attachment bond answers for all
damages incurred by the party against whom the attachment was issued.
Thus, Phil-Air cannot be held directly liable for the costs adjudged to and the damages sustained by RCJ Lines because
of the attachment. Section 4 of Rule 57 positively lays down the rule that the attachment bond will pay "all the costs
which may be adjudged to the adverse party and all damages which he may sustain by reason of the attachment, if the
court shall finally adjudge that the applicant was not entitled thereto.
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
1.
2.
3.
4.
Definition, Classes
Grounds
Requirements
Damages
G.R. No. 141853
Idolor v. CA
February 7, 2001
Gonzaga – Reyes, J.
FACTS:
●
To secure a loan, Teresita Idolor executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial
foreclosure upon failure to redeem the mortgage in favor of Gumersindo De Guzman. The object of said
mortgage is a 200-square meter property with improvements located in Quezon City.
●
Iluminada, wife of de Guzman, filed a complaint against Idolor before the Office of the Barangay Captain
which resulted in a "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" giving Idolor 90 days to settle her loan.
●
Idolor failed to comply with her undertaking; thus Gumersindo filed a motion for execution before the Office
of the Barangay captain. He filed an extra judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and subsequently
bought it in the public auction.
●
Idolor filed with the RTC, a complaint for annulment of Sheriff's Certificate of Sale with prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction alleging among others alleged irregularity and lack
of notice in the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings subject of the real estate mortgage. In the meantime,
the RTC issued TRO.
●
Idolor claims that the execution of deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject land in favor
of De Guzman was not proper on the following grounds:
that her proprietary right over the subject land was not yet lost since the right to redeem it for one year
had neither lapsed nor run;
that she and the general public have not been validly notified of the auction sale conducted; and
that the newspaper utilized in the publication of the notice of sale was not a newspaper of general
circulation.
●
RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining De Guzman, the Deputy Sheriffs and the Registry of
Deeds of QC from causing the issuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject
property in favor of the De Guzman spouses.
●
CA annulled the writ of preliminary injunction.
HELD:
NO. Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an injunction can
be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a
right to be protected; 2) the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. Hence the
existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not designed to protect
contingent or future rights. Failure to establish either the existence of a clear and positive right which should be
judicially protected through the writ of injunction or that the defendant has committed or has attempted to commit any
act which has endangered or tends to endanger the existence of said right, is a sufficient ground for denying the
injunction. The controlling reason for the existence of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby
prevent a threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly
investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious
consequences which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation.
In the instant case, we agree with the CA that Idolor has no more proprietary right to speak of over the foreclosed
property to entitle her to the issuance of a writ of injunction. It appears that the mortgaged property was sold in a
public auction to Gumersindo and the sheriff's certificate of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of QC.
Idolor had one year from the registration of the sheriff's sale to redeem the property but she failed to exercise her right,
thus spouses de Guzman are now entitled to a conveyance and possession of the foreclosed property. Idolor failed to
show sufficient interest or title in the property sought to be protected as her right of redemption had already expired,
two (2) days before the filing of the complaint. It is always a ground for denying injunction that the party seeking it
has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and no claim to the ultimate relief sought - in other words, that she shows
no equity. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not aground for an injunction.
The failure of Idolor to comply with her undertaking in the "kasunduan" to settle her obligation effectively delayed
De Guzman’s right to extra-judicially foreclose the real estate mortgage. Thus, Idolor has not shown that she is entitled
to the equitable relief of injunction. 1âwphi1.nêt
A.M. No. MTJ – 00 – 1250
Gustilo v. Real
February 28, 2001
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Complainant avers that he was a candidate for punong barangay of Barangay Punta Mesa, Manapla, Negros
Occidental. His lone opponent was Weddy C. Libo-on. Both complainant and Libo-on garnered 819 votes during the
elections, resulting in a tie. The breaking of the tie by the Board of Canvassers was in complainants favor and he was
proclaimed duly elected punong barangay of Punta Mesa, Manapla. His opponent, Libo-on filed an election protest
case before the MCTC of Victorias-Manapla, seeking the recounting of ballots in two precincts, preliminary
prohibitory injunction, and damages.
On May 21, 1997, respondent ordered the issuance of summons to the parties and set the hearing on June 6, 1997.
However, Libo-on filed a motion to advance the hearing to May 29 and 30, 1997, which was granted. Complainant
avers that he was not furnished a copy of this Order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the injunction (in favor of Idolor) was proper
9
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On May 29, 1997, respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) and annulled the proclamation of
complainant as the duly elected punong barangay of Punta Mesa, Manapla. Complainant declares that no copy of this
Order dated May 29, 1997 was served on him.
On May 30, 1997, complainant took his oath of office as punong barangay. That same day, he also filed a petition for
certiorari before the Regional Trial Court. The RTC lifted the TRO issued by respondent and declared as null and
void the order nullifying complainants proclamation as duly elected punong barangay.
Believing that respondent could not decide Civil Case No. 703-M impartially, complainant moved for his inhibition.
On June 11, 1997, respondent denied complainants motion for inhibition and after hearing Libo-ons motion for
permanent injunction, issued a second TRO to maintain the status quo between the contending parties. Complainant
argues that by issuing the second TRO, respondent reversed the order of the RTC of Silay City dated June 5, 1997.
Complainant thus charged respondent Judge Ricardo S. Real, Sr., of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of VictoriasManapla, Negros Occidental with gross misconduct, gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, and violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
ISSUE: Whether or not injunction may be issued without hearing?
HELD:
NO. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 20-95 provides: "The application for a TRO shall be acted upon only
after all parties are heard in a summary hearing conducted within twenty-four (24) hours after the records are
transmitted to the branch selected by raffle. The records shall be transmitted immediately after raffle"
The foregoing clearly show that whenever an application for a TRO is filed, the court may act on the application only
after all parties have been notified and heard in a summary hearing. In other words, a summary hearing may not be
dispensed with. In the instant case, respondent admits that he issued the injunctive writ sought on May 29, 1997 after
receiving the applicants evidence ex parte. His failure to abide by Administrative Circular No. 20-95 in issuing the
first TRO is grave abuse of authority, misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.
Moreover, in willfully nullifying complainants proclamation despite his courts want of authority, respondent
knowingly issued an unjust order. Note that the RTC corrected respondents errors by declaring null and void his Order
dated May 29, 1997. Nonetheless, he compounded his previous errors of judgment by proceeding to hear Libo-ons
motion for permanent injunction and issuing a second TRO on June 11, 1997 on the ground that extreme urgency and
grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise if no injunctive remedy were granted.
Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: (1) there must be a right
in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against which injunction to be directed is a violation
of such right. In this case, complainant had been duly proclaimed as the winning candidate for punong barangay. He
had taken his oath of office. Unless his election was annulled, he was entitled to all the rights of said office. We do
not see how the complainants exercise of such rights would cause an irreparable injury or violate the right of the losing
candidate so as to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining order to maintain the status quo.
10
G.R. No. 168637
Lagrosas v. Bristo – Meyers
September 12, 2008
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Lagrosas was hired as Territory Manager by Bristol-Myers from January 1997 until March 2000.
On February 2000, Ma. Dulcinea Lim, also a Territory Manager and petitioner’s former girlfriend attended a district
meeting of territory managers at McDonald’s Alabang Town Center. After the meeting, she dined out with her friends;
left her car at McDonald’s and rode with Cesar R. Menquito, Jr. When they returned to McDonald’s, Lim saw
petitioner’s car parked beside her car. Lim told Menquito not to stop his car but petitioner followed them and slammed
Menquito’s car thrice. Menquito and Lim alighted from the car. Petitioner approached them and hit Menquito with a
metal steering wheel lock. When Lim tried to intervene, petitioner accidentally hit her head.
Upon learning of the incident, Bristol-Myers required petitioner to explain in writing why he should not be dismissed
for assaulting a co-employee outside of business hours. In March 2000 Bristol-Myers dismissed petitioner’s
employment effective immediately. Petitioner then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Bristol-Myers. The
Labor arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner ruling that while petitioner committed misconduct, it was not connected with
his work. The incident occurred outside of company premises and office hours. He also observed that the misconduct
was not directed against a co-employee who just happened to be accidentally hit in the process. On appeal, the NLRC
ultimately affirmed the LA’s decision. Later, the LA issued a writ of execution. Notices of garnishment were then
served upon the Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. for the supersedeas bond posted by Bristol-Myers and the BPI
for the balance of the judgment award.
Bristol-Myers moved to quash the writ of execution contending that it timely filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA. The CA gave due course to Bristol-Myers’ petition and issued a TRO enjoining the enforcement of the writ of
execution and notices of garnishment. Upon the expiration of the TRO, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
Bristol-Myers then moved to discharge and release the TRO cash bond. It argued that since it has posted an injunction
cash bond, the TRO cash bond should be legally discharged and released. The CA granted Bristol-Myers motion. The
CA considered the misconduct as having been committed in connection with petitioner’s duty as Territory Manager
since it occurred immediately after the district meeting of territory managers.
In the meantime, Bristol-Myers moved to release the TRO cash bond and injunction cash bond in view of the CA’s
decision which was denied by the CA for the motion as premature since the decision is not yet final and executory
due to petitioner’s appeal to the Supreme Court. Bristol-Myers filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted
by the CA. The appellate court held that upon the expiration of the TRO, the cash bond intended for it also expired.
Thus, the discharge and release of the cash bond for the expired TRO is proper. But the appellate court disallowed the
discharge of the injunction cash bond since the writ of preliminary injunction was issued pendente lite since there is a
pending appeal with the Supreme Court. Hence, this petitions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in disallowing the discharge and release of the injunction cash bond
HELD:
Yes, the SC held that the CA erred in disallowing the discharge and release of the injunction cash bond. The injunction
bond is intended as a security for damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been
granted. Its principal purpose is to protect the enjoined party against loss or damage by reason of the injunction, and
the bond is usually conditioned accordingly.
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In this case, the CA issued the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution and
notices of garnishment "pending final resolution of this case or unless the writ is sooner lifted by the Court." By its
decision granting Bristol-Myers’ petition and reinstating the NLRC which dismissed the complaint for dismissal, the
CA had essentially disposed of the main case. It also ordered the discharge of the TRO cash bond and injunction cash
bond. Thus, both conditions of the writ of preliminary injunction were satisfied. Furthermore, the CA held that
petitioner had no right to the monetary awards granted by the LA and the NLRC, and that the implementation of the
writ of execution and notices of garnishment was properly enjoined. This in effect amounted to a finding that petitioner
did not sustain any damage by reason of the injunction.
To reiterate, the injunction bond is intended to protect petitioner against loss or damage by reason of the injunction
only. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, it is not a security for the judgment award by the labor arbiter.
G.R. No. 172138
Jenosa v. Delariarte
September 8, 2010
Carpio, J.
FACTS: On November 22, 2002, some students of the University of San Agustin, including petitioners Niño Carlo
Jenosa, Patrick Canto, Cyndy Apalisok, Clint Eduard Vargas, and Nonell Gregory Duro, were caught engaging in
hazing outside the school premises. Said incident was reported and entered into the blotter of the Iloilo City Police.
Thereafter, dialogues and consultations were conducted among the school authorities, the said petitioner-students, and
their parents. During one meeting (November 28, 2002), the parties agreed that instead of charging the students and
finding them guilty of hazing, the students who participated in such an act as initiators would just transfer to another
school, while those who are neophytes would be suspended for one month. The parties affixed their signatures to the
minutes of the meeting to signify conformity, and in view of such an agreement, the University did not convene the
Committee on Student Discipline (COSD) to investigate the hazing incident.
On December 5, 2002, the parents of petitioner-students sent a letter to the University President, urging him not to
implement the aforesaid agreement. According to them, the principal, without convening the COSD, decided to order
the immediate transfer of petitioner students.
On December 10, the petitioner parents also wrote to School Division Superintendent of DepEd Iloilo City, seeking
her intervention. DepEd then asked the university to comment on the letter, and the university replied, attaching the
minutes of the November meeting in their reply.
On January 3, 2003, the petitioners filed a complaint for injunction and damages with the RTC, asserting that the
order to immediately transfer the students is a violation of due process as the COSD was not convened.
The RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and directed respondents to admit petitioner students during the
pendency of the case. The motion for reconsideration by the petitioners, asking for the dissolution of the writ was
denied. Respondents then filed a motion to dismiss and alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case and that petitioners were guilty of forum shopping.
11
Petitioners filed another complaint for mandatory injunction praying that the report cards and other credentials of the
petitioner-students be released. The RTC consolidated the two cases. The RTC issued the writ and directed the
university to release the credentials of the students. Respondents alleged that they could not comply with the writ as
there is an on-going disciplinary case against petitioner students.
The RTC issued an order denying both motions for reconsideration. The respondents then filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the CA. The CA granted the respondents’ petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the two
cases for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter because of the petitioners’ failure to exhaust administrative
remedies or for being premature. The CA held that the petitioners should have waited for the DepEd’s or the
University President’s action before resorting to judicial action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the two cases for failure
of the petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies.
HELD:
The court held in the negative. The principal had the authority to order the immediate transfer of petitioner students
because of the November agreement signed by the parents. Petitioners were the ones who reneged on their agreement
without any justifiable reason, and since petitioners’ present complaint is one for injunction, and injunction is the
strong arm of equity, petitioners must then come to court with clean hands.
Among the maxims of equity are:
1.
he who seeks equity must do equity and
2.
he who comes into equity must come with clean hands
He who has done inequity shall not have equity. A litigant may be denied relief if his conduct has been inequitable,
unfair and dishonest as to the controversy in issue.
The court upholds the November 28, 2002 agreement and rule that the principal had the authority to order the
immediate transfer of petitioner students.
The court DENIES the petition.
G.R. No. 179665
Solid Builders, Inc. v. China Bank
April 3, 2013
Leonardo – De Castro, J.
FACTS: China Banking Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc. (SBI) in 1996 to 1997. To
secure the loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBC’s favor several surety agreements and
contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of land in the Loyola Grand Villas in Quezon City and New Cubao
Central in Cainta, Rizal. Subsequently, SBI proposed to CBC a scheme through which SBI would sell the mortgaged
properties and share the proceeds with CBC on a 50-50 basis until such time that the whole obligation would be fully
paid. SBI also proposed that there be partial releases of the certificates of title of the mortgaged properties without
the burden of updating interests on all loans.
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In a letter dated March 20, 2000 addressed to CBC, SBI requested the restructuring of its loans, a reduction of interests
and penalties. In response, CBC sent SBI a letter dated April 17, 2000 stating that the loans had been completely
restructured effective March 1, 1999 when SBI signed a new promissory note. Since interest payment has not been
made, no re-pricing is possible. Subsequently, in a letter dated September 18, 2000, CBC demanded SBI to settle its
outstanding account within ten days from receipt thereof.
On October 5, 2000, claiming that the interests, penalties and charges imposed by CBC were iniquitous and
unconscionable and to enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure proceedings, SBI and MFII filed a Complaint “To
Compel Execution of Contract and for Performance and Damages, With Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order” in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which was granted. The trial
court held that SBI and MFII were able to sufficiently comply with the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive
writ:
It is well-settled that to be entitled to an injunctive writ, a party must show that: (1) the invasion of right
sought to be protected is material and substantial; (2) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;
and, (3) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
The three subject letters, particularly the letter dated September 18, 2000, indicate that the promissory notes executed
by Benito Soliven as President of plaintiff SBI amounted to ₱218,540,646.00, excluding interest, penalties and other
charges remained unpaid, and demand that the account be settled within ten days, else defendant bank shall refer the
latter to its lawyers for collection.The message in the letter is clear: If the account is not settled within the grace period,
defendant bank will resort to foreclosure of mortgage on the subject properties.
The actual or imminent damage to plaintiffs is likewise clear. Considering the number of parcels of land and area
involved, if these are foreclosed by defendant bank, plaintiffs’ properties and source of income will be effectively
diminished, possibly to the point of closure. However, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari of CBC,
set aside the Orders dated December 14, 2000, December 10, 2001, and November 10, 2003 and dissolved the
injunctive writ issued by the RTC of Pasig City.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to ask for an injunctive writ in order to prevent defendant bank from
taking over their properties.
HELD:
No. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action prior to judgment of final order, requiring a
party, court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It is a preservative remedy to ensure the
protection of a party’s substantive rights or interests pending the final judgment in the principal action. A plea for an
injunctive writ lies upon the existence of a claimed emergency or extraordinary situation which should be avoided for
otherwise, the outcome of a litigation would be useless as far as the party applying for the writ is concerned. In this
connection, a writ of preliminary injunction is issued to preserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant’s showing of
two important requisite conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts sought to
be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented would cause an
irreparable injury.
Here, SBI and MFII basically claim a right to have their mortgaged properties shielded from foreclosure by CBC on
the ground that the interest rate and penalty charges imposed by CBC on the loans availed of by SBI are iniquitous
and unconscionable.
12
As debtor-mortgagors, however, SBI and MFII do not have a right to prevent the creditor-mortgagee CBC from
foreclosing on the mortgaged properties simply on the basis of alleged "usurious, exorbitant and confiscatory rate of
interest." First, assuming that the interest rate agreed upon by the parties is usurious, the nullity of the stipulation of
usurious interest does not affect the lender’s right to recover the principal loan, nor affect the other terms thereof.
Thus, in a usurious loan with mortgage, the right to foreclose the mortgage subsists, and this right can be exercised by
the creditor upon failure by the debtor to pay the debt due.
Second, even the Order dated December 14, 2000 of the trial court, which granted the application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction, recognizes that the parties still have to be heard on the alleged lack of "fairness of the
increase in interests and penalties" during the trial on the merits. Hence, the basis of the right claimed by SBI and
MFII remains to be controversial or disputable, thus, such claimed right cannot be considered clear, actual and
subsisting. In such a case where the complainant-movant’s right is doubtful or disputed, the issuance of an injunctive
writ is not proper.
In addition, the default of SBI and MFII to pay the mortgage indebtedness disqualifies them from availing of the
equitable relief that is the injunctive writ. A debtor’s various and constant requests for deferment of payment and
restructuring of loan, without actually paying the amount due, are clear indications that said debtor was unable to settle
his obligation. SBI’s default or failure to settle its obligation is a breach of contractual obligation which tainted its
hands and disqualified it from availing of the equitable remedy of preliminary injunction.
As SBI is not entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, so is MFII. The accessory follows the
principal. The accessory obligation of MFII as accommodation mortgagor and surety is tied to SBI’s principal
obligation to CBC and arises only in the event of SBI’s default.
G.R. No. 213948
Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc.
April 18, 2017
Carpio, J.
FACTS: The Knights of Rizal (KOR) filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for Injunction, with Applications for
Temporary Restraining Order, Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and others seeking, among others, for an order to stop
the construction of respondent DMCI's, condominium development project known as the Torre de Manila. The KOR
asserts that the completed Torre de Manila structure will "stick out like a sore thumb, dwarf all surrounding buildings
within a radius of two kilometer/s" and "forever ruin the sightline of the Rizal Monument in Luneta Park. The KOR
further contends that the project is a nuisance per se because the despoliation of the sight view of the Rizal Monument
is a situation that annoy's or offends the senses' of every Filipino who honors the memory of the National Hero Jose
Rizal.
DMCI sought for the dismissal of KOR’s petition contending that the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction over
actions for injunction. Even assuming that the Court has concurrent jurisdiction, DMCI maintains that the petition
should still have been filed with the Regional Trial Court under the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and because the
petition involves questions of fact. DMCI further maintains that the KOR has no standing to institute this proceeding
because it is not a real party in interest in this case. The purposes of the KOR as a public corporation do not include
the preservation of the Rizal Monument as a cultural or historical heritage site. The KOR has also not shown that it
suffered an actual or threatened injury as a result of the alleged illegal conduct of the City of Manila. Lastly, DMCI
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opposes the KOR's application for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction. DMCI asserts that the KOR has failed
to establish "a clear and unmistakable right to enjoin the construction of Torre de Manila, much less request its
demolition."
In its Resolution dated 25 November 2014, the Court resolved to treat the petition as one for mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether or not the KOR has exhibited a clear and unmistakable right so as to entitle it to the issuance of a
mandamus and preclude the lifting of the TRO issued earlier?
HELD:
No. Injunctive reliefs are meant to preserve substantive rights and prevent further injury until final adjudication on the
merits of the case. In the present case, since the legal rights of the KOR are not well-defined, clear, and certain, the
petition for mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO lifted. The general rule is that courts will not disturb the
findings of administrative agencies when they are supported by substantial evidence.
In this case, DMCI already acquired vested rights in the various permits, licenses, or even variances it had applied for
in order to build a 49-storey building which is, and had been, allowed by the City of Manila's zoning ordinance. As
we have time and again held, courts generally hesitate to review discretionary decisions or actions of administrative
agencies in the absence of proof that such decisions or actions were arrived at with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to
exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. In sum, bearing in mind the Court does
not intervene in discretionary acts of the executive department in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, and
considering that mandamus may only be issued to enforce a clear and certain legal right, the present special civil action
for mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO issued earlier must be lifted.
G.R. No. 193809
Novecio v. Lim
March 23, 2015
ISSUE: Whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it
denied the petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction.
HELD:
Yes, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's application for writ of preliminary injunction.
The assailed Resolution reads:
Upon careful evaluation of [the] petitioners' Motion, We find no cogent and compelling reasons to
warrant reversal of Our Resolution. The arguments raised by [the] petitioners were mere reiteration and
already considered and passed upon by this Court in denying [the] petitioners' application for issuance
of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
A review of the records, however, shows that the CA ignored relevant facts that would have justified the issuance of
a preliminary injunction. Contrary to established jurisprudence, the CA also denied the prayer for preliminary
injunction without giving the factual and legal bases for such denial.
Furthermore, in a prayer for preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not required to submit conclusive and complete
evidence. He is only required to show that he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint.
In this case, the petitioners have adequately shown their entitlement to a preliminary injunction. First, the relief
demanded consists in restraining the execution of the RTC decision ordering their ejectment from the disputed land.
Second, their ejectment from the land from which they derive their source of livelihood would work injustice to the
petitioners. Finally, the execution of the RTC decision is probably in violation of the rights of the petitioners, tending
to render the MTC judgment dismissing the forcible entry cases ineffectual.
Brion, J.
FACTS: Maria Carmen J. Tuazon and Manuel V. Nieto (respondents), filed complaints for forcible entry with
damages against Saturnino Novecio, Gavino Novecio, Anastacio Golez, et al. (petitioners) for allegedly squatting and
taking possession of portions of land. On the other hand, petitioners contended that they have already been in
possession of the land for more than two years when the complaints were filed.
The MTC ruled in favor of petitioners who claimed their prior possession on the fact that their livelihood as fisher
folk and farmers require them to live by the riverbank where the land is located.
However, the RTC reversed the ruling stating that the MTC should have given credence to the certification issued by
the DENR-CENRO showing that the land in litigation is the subject of an application for title and claim by the
respondents.
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review with the CA, and an Extremely Urgent Application for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order. The CA, without necessarily resolving the
13
petition on the merits, held that petitioners were not entitled to the relief demanded under Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court. The petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
G.R. No. 223862
Cayabyab v. Dimson
July 10, 2017
Perlas – Bernabe, J.
FACTS: Respondent Jaime C. Dimson is the owner of a poultry farm located in Lubao, Pampanga. He applied for a
barangay clearance with the office of petitioner Chairman Angelita L. David (Chairman David), preparatory to his
application for a business permit, and was informed that the issuance thereof is conditioned on a prior ocular inspection
of the subject poultry farm by the Office of the Mayor of Lubao, Pampanga, Mayor Cayabyab. However, despite the
conduct of an ocular inspection, Chairman David refused to issue the clearance; hence, no business permit was issued
in favor of Dimson.
Dimson received a Cease and Desist Order from the Office of Mayor Cayabyab, directing him to desist from further
conducting any poultry farming on the grounds of: (a) lack of a Barangay Business Permit and a Mayor's Permit; (b)
lack of a pollution control officer; (c) foul odor being emitted by the subject poultry farm that offended passing
motorists, and for which complaints were filed by those affected
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In his motion for reconsideration, Dimson denied that there was foul odor coming from his poultry farm, at the same
time, manifesting that he had already employed a pollution control officer.
The motion was denied by Mayor Cayabyab and clarified that the CDO was primarily issued on the lack of the requisite
Barangay Business Permit and Mayor's Permit. Thereafter, a Closure Order was issued by Mayor Cayabyab effectively
shutting down the subject poultry farm.
Aggrieved, Dimson filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition (With Application for Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction) and prayed for the issuance of a TRO against Mayor Cayabyab and Chairman David
(petitioners)
The RTC denied Dimson's application for TRO for failure to establish a clear and unmistakable right to the said
issuance and to show that he will suffer irreparable injury. It likewise ruled that the TRO can no longer serve its
purpose as the act sought to be restrained was already fait accompli, since a notice of closure was already posted on
the concrete wall of the subject poultry farm
Dimson filed a petition for certiorari before the CA and the CA granted the petition, and directed the RTC to issue a
TRO against the implementation of the CDO and the Closure Order of Mayor Cayabyab. CA held that Dimson was
able to establish the concurrence of the requisites for the issuance of injunctive relief, to wit: (a) he has the right to
engage in poultry farming; (b) the issuance of the CDO and the closure order would work injustice to him; and (c) the
issuance of the said orders which amounted to an abatement of his poultry enterprise without the required judicial
intervention violates his rights, which cannot be justified under the general welfare clause. The CA likewise held that
the issuance of a TRO cannot be denied on the ground of fait accompli since the acts complained of is a continuing
prohibition on an otherwise legitimate business.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in directing the issuance of a TRO against the
implementation of the CDO and the Closure Order of Mayor Cayabyab
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
A writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO are injunctive reliefs and preservative remedies for the protection of
substantive rights and interests. To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the applicant must show that:
1.
there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
2.
this right is directly threatened by an act sought to be enjoined;
3.
the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and
4.
there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.
The burden is, thus, on the applicant to show that there is meritorious ground for the issuance of a TRO in his favor,
since an application for injunctive relief is construed strictly against him.
Here, Dimson failed to sufficiently show the presence of the requisites to warrant the issuance of a TRO against the
CDO and the Closure Order of Mayor Cayabyab.
14
Moreover, a business permit must be secured from the municipal business permits and licensing office in order for the
business to legally operate in the locality. While poultry farming is admittedly a legitimate business, it cannot operate
without a business permit.
In the present case, there is no showing that Dimson filed any application for renewal of his business permit to operate
the subject poultry farm in 2014, apparently due to his failure to secure the necessary barangay clearance which was
not issued based on complaints of foul odor being emitted by the said farm. Hence, having failed to apply for and
secure the necessary business permit to operate in 2014 on account of his inability to obtain the required barangay
clearance due to non-compliance with a requirement standard, Dimson may not legally operate in the Municipality of
Lubao, Pampanga, thereby, warranting the issuance by Mayor Cayabyab of the CDO and the Closure Order.
Accordingly, no error, much less grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed on the RTC in denying Dimson's
application for the issuance of a TRO against the said orders. In the absence of a business permit, Dimson has no clear
legal right to resume his operations pending final determination by the RTC of the merits of the main case for
certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition.
A clear legal right means one clearly founded in or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law, which is not
extant in the present case. It is settled that the possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing
right is not a ground for the issuance of an injunctive relief.
G.R. No. 197472
Republic v. Cortez, Sr.
September 7, 2015
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: Respondent Rev. Cortez, a missionary by vocation engaged in humanitarian and charitable activities,
established an orphanage and school in Sta. Ana, Cagayan. He claimed that since 1962, he has been in peaceful
possession of about 50 hectares of land located in the western portion of Palaui Island which he, with the help of Aetas
and other people under his care, cleared and developed for agricultural purposes in order to support his charitable,
humanitarian and missionary works. Presidents Marcos and Ramos both issued proclamations declaring Palaui Island
as public domain subject to any private rights. On June 13, 2000, Rev. Cortez filed a Petition for Injunction with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Rogelio C. Biñasin his capacity as
Commanding Officer of the Philippine Naval Command in Port San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan. According to him,
some members of the Philippine Navy, upon orders of Biñas, disturbed his peaceful and lawful possession of the said
50-hectare portion of Palaui Island when on March 15, 2000, they commanded him and his men, through the use of
force and intimidation, to vacate the area. When he sought assistance from the Office of the Philippine Naval
Command, he was met with sarcastic remarks and threatened with drastic military action if they do not vacate. Thus,
Rev. Cortez and his men were constrained to leave the area. In view of these, Rev. Cortez filed the said Petition with
the RTC seeking preliminary mandatory injunction ordering Biñas to restore to him possession and to not disturb the
same, and further, for the said preliminary writ, if issued, to be made permanent.||
The bone of contention as the OSG sees it is the injunctive writ since Rev. Cortex failed to prove his clear and positive
right over the 5-hectare portion of Palaui Island covered by the same.|||Rev. Cortex, for his part, asserts that the
arguments of the OSG pertaining to ownership are all immaterial as his Petition for injunction does not involve the
right to possess based on ownership but on the right of possession which is a right independent from ownership. Rev.
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Cortex avers that since he has been in peaceful and continuous possession of the subject portion of Palaui Island, he
has the right of possession over the same which is protected by law. He asserts that based on this right, the writ of
injunction was correctly issued by the RTC in his favor and aptly affirmed by the CA.
The RTC granted the application for the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction but only for the subject 5 hectares
and not the whole 50 hectares occupied by Rev. Cortez which after trial was made final and permanent. The Ca upheld
the RTCs issuance of the final injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory injunction
HELD:
No. The Court finds that Rev. Cortex failed to conclusively establish his claimed right over the subject portion of
Palaui Island as would entitle him to the issuance of a final injunction. here is no such proof showing that the subject
portion of Palaui Island has been declared alienable and disposable when Rev. Cortez started to occupy the same.
Hence, it must be considered as still inalienable public domain. Being such, it cannot be appropriated and therefore
not a proper subject of possession under Article 530 of the Civil Code. Viewed in this light, Rev. Cortez' claimed right
of possession has no leg to stand on. His possession of the subject area, even if the same be in the concept of an owner
or no matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect in his favor since the property cannot be lawfully possessed in
the first place.|||An inalienable public land cannot be appropriated and thus may not be the proper object of possession.
Hence, injunction cannot be issued in order to protect one's alleged right of possession over the same.|||
AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack – Wack Residents’ Assoc., Inc.
G.R. No. 202342
July 19, 2017
ISSUE: Whether or not WWRAI is entitled to a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.
HELD:
No. In Lukang v. Pagbilao Development Corporation, the Court reiterated the purpose and grounds for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction, viz.: A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which is adjunct to
a main suit, as well as a preservative remedy issued to maintain the status quo of the things subject of the action or the
relations between the parties during the pendency of the suit. The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or
continuous irremediable injury to the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and educated. Its sole aim
is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case are fully heard.
Thus, to be entitled to the injunctive writ, the petitioner must show that: (1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right
to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined; (3) the invasion of the right is
material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and
irreparable damage.
Guided by the foregoing principles, the CA erred in finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing its October 28, 2010 and February 23, 2011 Orders, denying WWRAI's application for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
Caguioa, J.
FACTS: AMA Land Inc. had a commercial and residential building project located at EDSA corner Fordham Street
in Wack Wack Village, Mandaluyong City. AMALI notifed Wack Wack Residents Association Inc. of its intention
to use Fordham Street as access road and staging area of the project. AMALI received no response from WWRAI,
AMALI temporarily enclosed the job site and set up a field office along Fordham Street. However, all subsequent
attempts of WWRAI to remove the said field office proved futile.
On May 8, 1996, AMALI filed a petition seeking the temporary use of Fordham Street to its construction site of its
AMA Tower and to establish a permanent easement of right of way in its favor over a portion of Fordham Street.
Aside from its prayer for the declaration of temporary and permanent easement of right of way in its favor over a
portion of Fordham Street, AMALI is also praying for: (a) a temporary restraining order (TRO) to immediately enjoin
WWRAI from demolishing and removing the temporary field office, constructing a fence isolating Fordham Street,
and preventing AMALI from gaining access to the construction site; (b) a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
directing WWRAI to allow AMALI to use Fordham Street as an access road and staging area; (c) an order making the
TRO and the aforesaid writ permanent; and (d) an order declaring a permanent right of way in favor of AMALI.
The construction of the project was put on hold in 1988 due to financial crisis. When AMALI resumed the project,
WWRAI filed in January 2010, an “Urgent Motion to Set for Hearing" its application for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled denied the motion for lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration
of the RTC’s order was filed but was denied.
15
The CA granted WWRAI’s application for temporary restraining order and AMALI was commanded to cease and
desist from further construction of the commercial and residential condominium project. The application of WWRAI
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was granted by the CA as well pending resolution of the x x x
petition for certiorari.
Indeed, WWRAI was unable to convincingly demonstrate a clear and unmistakable right that must be protected by
the injunctive writ. The apprehensions of its members are, as correctly ruled by the RTC, speculative and insufficient
to substantiate the element of serious and irreparable damage.
What cases / subject matters proscribe injunctive relief?
RECEIVERSHIP
1.
2.
3.
4.
When writ may issue
Requirements
Power of receiver
Termination and Compensation
G.R. No. 135706
Larrobis, Jr. v. Phil. Veterans Bank
October 1, 2004
Austria – Martinez, J.
FACTS: In 1980, Sps Larrobis contracted a monetary loan with Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) evidenced by a
promissory note and secured by a Real Estate Mortgage executed on their lot together with the improvements thereon.
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In 1985, the Philippine Veterans Bank went bankrupt and was placed under receivership/liquidation by the Central
Bank from April 25, 1985 until August 1992. In August 1985, the bank, through Francisco Go, sent Sps Larrobis a
demand letter for "accounts receivable” which pertains to the insurance premiums advanced by PVB over the
mortgaged property of petitioners.
When a bank is declared insolvent and placed under receivership, the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board,
determines whether to proceed with the liquidation or reorganization of the financially distressed bank. In both
receivership and liquidation proceedings, the bank retains its juridical personality notwithstanding the closure of its
business and may even be sued as its corporate existence is assumed by the receiver or liquidator.
In August 1995, more than fourteen years from the time the loan became due and demandable, PVB filed a petition
for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of Sps Larrobis’ property. It was then sold in a public auction with Philippine
Veterans Bank as the lone bidder.
In Provident Savings Bank vs. Court of Appeals, we further stated that:
When a bank is prohibited from continuing to do business by the Central Bank and a receiver is appointed
for such bank, that bank would not be able to do new business, i.e., to grant new loans or to accept new
deposits. However, the receiver of the bank is in fact obliged to collect debts owing to the bank, which
debts form part of the assets of the bank. The receiver must assemble the assets and pay the obligation
of the bank under receivership, and take steps to prevent dissipation of such assets. Accordingly, the
receiver of the bank is obliged to collect pre-existing debts due to the bank, and in connection therewith,
to foreclose mortgages securing such debts.
In April 1996, Sps Larrobis filed a complaint with the RTC - Cebu to declare the extra-judicial foreclosure and the
subsequent sale null and void. In the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed to limit the issue to whether or not the
period within which the bank was placed under receivership and liquidation was a fortuitous event which suspended
the running of the ten-year prescriptive period in bringing actions.
Sps Larrobis claims that the right of PVB to execute extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage has already prescribed.
PVB for its part asserts that: the period within which it was placed under receivership and liquidation was a fortuitous
event that interrupted the running of the prescriptive period for the foreclosure of petitioners’ mortgaged property;
within such period, it was specifically restrained and immobilized from doing business which includes foreclosure
proceedings; the extra-judicial demand it made on March 24, 1995 wiped out the period that has already lapsed and
started anew the prescriptive period;
There is also no truth to respondent’s claim that it could not continue doing business from the period of April 1985 to
August 1992, the time it was under receivership. As correctly pointed out by Larrobis, PVB was even able to send
Larrobis a demand letter, through Francisco Go, for "accounts receivable in lieu of the insurance premiums advanced
by PVB over the mortgaged property of Larrobis. How it could send a demand letter on unpaid insurance premiums
and not foreclose the mortgage during the time it was "prohibited from doing business" was not adequately explained
by respondent.
2.
RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It ruled that PVB’s right to foreclose the mortgaged property prescribes
in ten (10) years but such period was interrupted when it was placed under receivership. The period during which the
obligee was prevented by a caso fortuito from enforcing his right is not reckoned against him. (Art. 1154, NCC) When
prescription is interrupted, all the benefits acquired so far from the possession cease and when prescription starts anew,
it will be entirely a new one.
ISSUES:
5.
Whether or not the period within which the bank was placed under receivership and liquidation was a
fortuitous event that interrupted the running of the prescriptive period (NO)
6.
Whether or not the demand letter sent by PVB’s representative is sufficient to interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period. (NO)
HELD:
1.
NO. The period within which the bank was placed under receivership and liquidation was NOT a fortuitous
event and must NOT interrupt the running of the prescriptive period
There is a fortuitous event when its occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for a party to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner. While it is true that foreclosure falls within the broad definition of "doing business"
that is a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements and contemplates to that extent, the performance of acts
or words or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to and in progressive prosecution of the purpose
and object of its organization. It should not be considered included, however, in the acts prohibited whenever banks
are "prohibited from doing business" during receivership and liquidation proceedings.
16
NO. Thee demand letter sent by PVB’s representative is NOT sufficient to interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period.
Prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a written extra-judicial demand
by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor.
In Quirino Gonzales Logging Concessionaire vs. Court of Appeals, we held that the notices of foreclosure sent by the
mortgagee to the mortgagor cannot be considered tantamount to written extrajudicial demands, which may validly
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, where it does not appear from the records that the notes are covered
by the mortgage contract.
In this case, it is clear that the advanced payment of the insurance premiums is NOT part of the mortgage contract and
the promissory note signed by petitioners. They pertain only to the amount of ₱135,000.00 which is the principal loan
of petitioners plus interest. The arguments of respondent bank on this point must therefore fail.
G.R. No. 175356
Chavez v. CA
January 20, 2010
Abad, J.
FACTS: Respondent Fidela Y. Vargas owned a five-hectare mixed coconut land and rice fields in Sorsogon. Petitioner
Evelina G. Chavez had been staying in a remote portion of this land with her family, planting coconut seedlings on
the land and supervising the harvest of coconut and palay. Fidela and Evelina had an agreement to divide the gross
sales of all products from the land between themselves. Since Fidela was busy with her law practice, Evelina undertook
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to hold in trust for Fidela her half of the profits. However, Fidela claimed that Evelina had failed to remit her share of
the profits and, despite demand to turn over the administration of the property to Fidela, Evelina refused to do so.
Fidela thus, filed a complaint against Evelina and her daughter, for recovery of possession, rent, and damages with
prayer for the immediate appointment of a receiver before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulan, Sorsogon. The
RTC however, dismissed the complaint as the issues it raised properly belong to the DARAB.
Dissatisfied, Fidela appealed to the CA and also filed with the court a motion for the appointment of a receiver. The
CA granted the motion and ordained receivership of the land
Parenthetically, Fidela also filed three estafa cases with the RTC of Olongapo City and a complaint for dispossession
with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) against Evelina and Aida. In all these cases,
Fidela asked for the immediate appointment of a receiver for the property.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not respondent Fidela is guilty of forum shopping? (considering that she had filed identical
applications for receivership over the subject properties in the criminal cases she filed before the RTC and
in the administrative case that she filed before the DARAB)
2.
Whether or not the CA erred in granting Fidela's application for receivership?
HELD:
1.
NO. The elements of forum shopping are: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent
the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the
other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
Here, however, the various suits Fidela initiated against Evelina and Aida involved different causes of action and
sought different reliefs. The present civil action that she filed with the RTC sought to recover possession of the
property based on Evelina and Aida’s failure to account for its fruits. The estafa cases she filed with the RTC accused
the two of misappropriating and converting her share in the harvests for their own benefit. Her complaint for
dispossession under Republic Act 8048 with the DARAB sought to dispossess the two for allegedly cutting coconut
trees without the prior authority of Fidela or of the Philippine Coconut Authority.
The above cases are similar only in that they involved the same parties and Fidela sought the placing of the properties
under receivership in all of them. But receivership is not an action. It is but an auxiliary remedy, a mere incident of
the suit to help achieve its purpose. It cannot be said that the grant of receivership in one case will amount to res
judicata on the merits of the other cases.
2.
17
YES. A petition for receivership requires that the property or fund subject of the action is in danger of being
lost, removed, or materially injured, necessitating its protection or preservation. Its object is the prevention
of imminent danger to the property. If the action does not require such protection or preservation, the remedy
is not receivership.
Here Fidela’s main gripe is that Evelina and Aida deprived her of her share of the land’s produce. She does not claim
that the land or its productive capacity would disappear or be wasted if not entrusted to a receiver. Nor does Fidela
claim that the land has been materially injured, necessitating its protection and preservation. Since receivership is a
harsh remedy that can be granted only in extreme situations, Fidela must prove a clear right to its issuance. But she
did not.
G.R. No. 168332 and 169053
Koruga v. Arcenas
June 19, 2009
Nachura, J.
FACTS: These are two petitions that originated from a Complaint filed by Koruga before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City against the Board of Directors of Banco Filipino and the Members of the Monetary Board of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) for violation of the Corporation Code, for inspection of records of a corporation
by a stockholder, for receivership, and for the creation of a management committee.
The First Complaint (Gr 168332)
Koruga is a minority stockholder of Banco Filipino On August 20, 2003, she filed a complaint before the Makati RTC
which alleges:
Violation of Sections 31 to 34 of the Corporation Code ("Code") which prohibit self-dealing and conflicts of interest
of directors and officers:
10.2 Right of a stockholder to inspect the records of a corporation (including financial statements) under
Sections 74 and 75 of the Code
10.3 Receivership and Creation of a Management Committee
Defendant Arcenas, et al. filed their Answer raising, among others, the trial court's lack of jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case. They also filed a Manifestation and Motion seeking the dismissal of the case
In an Order dated October 18, 2004, the trial court denied the Manifestation and Motion. The CA issued a 60-day
TRO enjoining Judge Marella from conducting further proceedings in the case. RTC issued a Notice of Pre-trial setting
the case for pre-trial on June 2 and 9, 2005. Arcenas, et al. filed a Manifestation and Motion before the CA, reiterating
their application for a writ of preliminary injunction which was affirmed by CA.
Dissatisfied, Koruga filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Koruga alleged that the CA
effectively gave due course to Arcenas, et al.'s petition when it issued a writ of preliminary injunction without factual
or legal basis
Meanwhile, on March 13, 2006, this Court issued a Resolution granting the prayer for a TRO and enjoining the
Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 138, from proceeding with the hearing of the case upon the filing by Arcenas,
et al. of a P50,000.00 bond.
Koruga's Complaint in essence, charged defendants with violation of Sections 31 to 34 of the Corporation Code,
prohibiting self-dealing and conflict of interest of directors and officers; invoked her right to inspect the corporation's
records under Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code; and prayed for Receivership and Creation of a Management
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Committee, pursuant to Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the Securities Regulation Code, the Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies, the General Banking Law of 2000, and the New Central Bank
Act. She accused the directors and officers of Banco Filipino of engaging in unsafe, unsound, and fraudulent banking
practices, more particularly, act that violate the prohibition on self-dealing.
G.R. No. 169053
In their Petition, Arcenas, et al. asked the Court to set aside the Decision dated July 20, 2005 of the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 88422, which denied their petition, having found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Makati RTC.
The CA said that the RTC Orders were interlocutory in nature and, thus, may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition
only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court can grant the prayer of Receivership by Kogura in GR 168332 case.
On the strength of these provisions, it is the Monetary Board that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings for
receivership of banks. From the foregoing disquisition, there is no doubt that the RTC has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide a suit that seeks to place Banco Filipino under receivership. The court's jurisdiction could only have been
invoked after the Monetary Board had taken action on the matter and only on the ground that the action taken was in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 203585
Tantano v. Espina – Caboverde
July 29, 2013
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS: Petitioners Mila Caboverde Tantano and Roseller Caboverde are children of respondent Dominada EspinaCaboverde and siblings of other respondents in the present case.
HELD:
The court ruled in the negative. RTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
Petitioners and their siblings, Ferdinand, Jeanny and Laluna are the registered owners and in possession of certain
parcels of land, identified as Lots 2, 3 and 4 locatged in Zamboanga del Norte, having purchased these lots from their
parents.
The court held that it is the BSP that has jurisdiction over the case.
The acts complained of pertain to the conduct of Banco Filipino's banking business. The law vests in the BSP
supervision over operations and activities of banks. Specifically, the BSP's supervisory and regulatory powers include:
conduct of examination to determine compliance with laws and regulations if the circumstances so warrant as
determined by the Monetary Board; Overseeing to ascertain that laws and Regulations are complied with; Regular
investigation which shall not be oftener than once a year from the last date of examination to determine whether an
institution is conducting its business in a safe or sound basis; and Inquiring into the solvency and liquidity of the
institution. Correlatively, the General Banking Law of 2000 specifically deals with loans contracted by bank directors
or officers.
Koruga's invocation of the provisions of the Corporation Code is misplaced. In an earlier case with similar antecedents,
we ruled that:
The Corporation Code, however, is a general law applying to all types of corporations, while the New Central Bank
Act regulates specifically banks and other financial institutions, including the dissolution and liquidation thereof. As
between a general and special law, the latter shall prevail - generalia specialibus non derogant.
Consequently, it is not the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies, or Rule 59 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure on Receivership, that would apply to this case. Instead, Sections 29 and 30 of the New Central Bank
Act should be followed.
Section 30. The Monetary Board may summarily and without need for prior hearing forbid the
institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation as receiver of the banking institution.
Actions of the Monetary Board taken under this section or under Section 29 of this Act shall be final and executory,
and may not be restrained or set aside by the court except on petition for certiorari on the ground that the action taken
was in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
18
The appointment of a receiver under this section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board.
The controversy started on March 7, 2005, when respondents Eve and Fe filed a complaint before the RTC of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte. They prayed for the annulment of the Deed of Sale purportedly transferring
transferring the said lots from their parents in favor of petitioners Mila, Roseller, Jeanny, Laluna and Ferdinand.
During the pendency of the case, their father, Maximo, died. Eve and Fe then filed an amended complaint with Maximo
substituted by his eight children and his wife. The amended complaint reproduced the allegations but added eight more
real properties.
The RTC encouraged the parties to enter into a PSA, a partial settlement agreement, where they fixed the sharing of
the uncontroverted properties among themselves—particularly the eight parcels of land including their products and
improvements. Under this PSA, Dominalda’s daughter Josephine shall be appointed as administrator and the said PSA
provided that Dominalda shall be entitled to receive a share of one-half of the net income derived from the
uncontroverted properties. The PSA also stated that Josephine shall have special authority, among others, to provide
for the medicine of her mother.
The same PSA was submitted to the RTC for approval. Before the RTC could even act on the PSA, Dominalda, who
was impleaded in the case as a defendant, filed a motion to intervene. Eventually, she even filed a motion for leave
to admit amended answer, where she contradicted the contents of the verified answer, alleging that there was never a
sale of the three contested properties in favor of petitioners. The RTC granted the motion to admit such an answer.
The PSA would also be approved, leaving the three contested properties for further proceedings and adjudication.
Dominalda, fearing that the contested properties would be squandered, filed a Verified Urgent
Petition/Application to place the three lots under receivership on July 15, 2008. She alleged that the income
derived from such contested lots were not enjoyed by her, but instead appropriated by petitioner Mila in connivance
with her co-petitioners. She alleged that she also needs her legal share in the income of the aforesaid properties for
her medical expenses and daily sustenance.
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She alleged that unless a receiver is appointed by the court, the income or produce from these properties are in grave
danger of being totally dissipated and spent solely by Mila and some of her siblings. The court heard the application
for receivership on August 27, 2009 and persuaded the family members to discuss among themselves to address the
medical and immediate needs of Dominalda, their mother.
On October 9, 2009, the petitioners and their siblings filed a manifestation which expresses their concurrence to
the proposal for receivership on the condition that Mila be appointed as the receiver, and that after getting the
2/10 share of Dominalda from the income of the contested parcels of land, the remainder shall be divided only by and
among Mila, Roseller, Ferdinand, Laluna and Jeanny.
The RTC eventually issued a resolution granting the application for receivership over the three lots, with all the
conditions present except Mila’s appointment as receiver as the RTC noted that Mila could not discharge the duties
of a receiver, she being a party in the case. Petitioners moved for reconsideration raising that Dominalda’s arguments
are not valid grounds for the appointment of a receiver. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration and stated
that there is no cogent reason to overturn their decision to place the properties under receivership.
Annabelle Saldia and Jesus Tan took their oaths of office and filed a motion to fix and approve the receivership bond,
which was approved by the RTC over the petitioners’ opposition.
Petitioners filed an urgent motion to stay the assumption of receivers, restating that placing the properties under
receivership, reiterating their allegations that the grant of receivership is not warranted according to the circumstances.
The RTC denied the same motion in a resolution, where it fixed the receiver’s bond at PHP 100,000.00 each and duly
appointing Jesus Tan and Annabelle Saldia as receivers.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on September 29, 2010, seeking to declare the February 8,
2010 resolution granting the receivership and the July 19, 2010 resolution denying the MR and appointing the receivers
nominated by respondents as null and void.
They anchored the said petition on two grounds:
1.
non-compliance with the substantial requirements under Rule 59, Sec. 2 because the trial court appointed a
receiver without requiring the applicant to file a bond
2.
lack of factual or legal basis to place properties under receivership as support and medical needs are not
valid grounds for receivership
The CA denied the petition for certiorari, as well as the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this instant petition which
assails the validity of the grant of receivership.
HELD:
The court held in the affirmative for both issues.
Anent the first issue, the court ruled that the application for receivership has no leg to stand on. The allegation that
Dominalda needs income to defray her medical expenses and support is not a valid justification for the appointment
of a receiver. The approval of such an application is an arbitrary exercise of discretion because financial need is not
one of the reasons or grounds under Rule 59, Sec. 1 which prescribes specific grounds for the grant of
receivership. The RTC’s insistence that the approval of the receivership is justified under Sec. 1(d) of Rule 59, which
seems to be a catch-all provision, is far from convincing. To be clear, even in cases falling under such provision, it is
essential that there is a clear showing that there is imminent danger that the properties sought to be placed under
receivership will be lost, wasted or injured.
Furthermore, there is no clear showing that the disputed properties are in danger of being lost or materially impaired
and that placing them under receivership is most convenient and feasible means to preserve, administer or dispose of
them. She merely sought receivership mainly because she considers this as the best remedy to ensure that she would
receive some share in the income of the disputed properties. However, as to the propriety of such application,
Dominalda has not presented nor alleged anything else to prove that the disputed properties were in danger of being
wasted or materially injured, and that the appointment of a receiver was the most convenient and feasible means to
preserve their integrity.
The receivership was also not necessary as the previously executed and approved PSA provided that she would receive
a share of 1/2 of the net income derived from the uncontroverted (other 8) properties. The PSA also had a special
provision for the medicine of Dominalda.
By placing the disputed properties and their income under receivership, it is as if the applicant has obtained indirectly
what she could not obtain directly, which is to deprive the other parties of the possession of the property until the
controversy between them in the main case is finally settled. The Court cannot countenance this arrangement.
As to the second issue regarding the bond, the court ruled that a bond is still necessary prior to the appointment of
receivers in this case. Rule 59, Sec. 2 is clear that before issuing the order appointing a receiver the court shall require
the applicant to file a bond executed to the party against whom the application is presented. The use of the word "shall"
denotes its mandatory nature; thus, the consent of the other party, or as in this case, the consent of petitioners, is of no
moment. Hence, the filing of an applicant’s bond is required at all times. On the other hand, the requirement of a
receiver’s bond rests upon the discretion of the court. Rule 59, Sec. 2 clearly states that the court may, in its discretion,
at any time after the appointment, require an additional bond as further security for such damages.
The petition is GRANTED and the order granting the application for receivership, as well as the appointment of
receivers over the three properties are SET ASIDE.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the appointment of a receiver
despite the fact that the reasons given by the applicant are not any of those enumerated under the rules;
2.
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the receivership bond is not required prior to the appointment of
a receiver.
19
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physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation and similar injury. Second, the act must be wrongful.
REPLEVIN
1.
2.
3.
4.
When writ may issue
Requirements
Third Party Claim
Judgment and Damages
G.R. No. 111080
Had he not assigned the car to his daughter and had he been faithful and prompt in paying the installments required,
this could be avoided. Petitioner brought the situation upon himself and cannot now complain that private respondent
is liable for the mental anguish and humiliation he suffered.
Orosa v. CA
April 5, 2000
Ynares – Santiago, J.
FACTS: In December 6, 1984, private respondent FCP Credit Corporation filed a complaint for replevin and damages
in the RTC against petitioner Jose S. Orosa and one John Doe to recover possession of a 1983 Ford Laser 1.5 Sedan.
The complaint alleged that on September 28, 1983, petitioner purchased the subject motor vehicle on installment from
Fiesta Motor Sales Corporation. He executed and delivered a promissory note in the sum of P133,824.00 payable in
monthly installments. To secure payment, petitioner executed a chattel mortgage over the subject motor vehicle in
favor of Fiesta Motor Sales Corp.
On September 28, 1983, Fiesta Motor Sales assigned the promissory note and chattel mortgage to private respondent
FCP Credit Corporation. The complaint further alleged that petitioner failed to pay part of the installment as well as
three (3) consecutive installment which fell due on August 28, September 28, and October 28, 1984. FCP Credit
Corporation demanded from petitioner payment of the entire outstanding balance of the obligation with accrued
interest and to surrender the vehicle which petitioner was allegedly detaining.
The trial court ruled that since installments in some months were paid, they are not entitled to the writ of replevin, and
was liable to petitioner for actual damages under the replevin bond it filed. Private respondent was also ordered to
return to petitioner the 1983 Ford Laser 1.5 Sedan, or its equivalent, in kind or value in cash, as of date of judgment
and to pay the costs of the suit. The Court of Appeals Eighth Division partially upheld the decision of the trial court,
deleting the portion on damages, and the return of the subject Ford Sedan. Instead, it ordered the payment of amount
equivalent to the value of the fourteen (14) monthly installments made.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was entitled to damages and the possession of the car?
HELD:
Petitioner insists that he suffered untold embarrassment when the complaint was filed against him. According to
petitioner, the car subject of this case was being used by his daughter, married to Jose Concepcion III, a scion of a
prominent family. Petitioner laments that he assigned the car to his daughter so that she could "approximate without
equaling the status of her in-laws." This being the case, petitioner experienced anguish and unquantifiable humiliation
when he had to face his daughter's wealthy in-laws to explain the "why and the whats of the subject case." Petitioner
further insists that an award of moral damages is especially justified since he is no ordinary man, but a businessman
of high social standing, a graduate of De La Salle University and belongs to a well known family of bankers.
Furthermore, we agree with the appellate court that when private respondent brought the complaint, it did so only to
exercise a legal right, believing that it had a meritorious cause of action clearly borne out by a mere perusal of the
promissory note and chattel mortgage. The rule has always been that moral damages cannot be recovered from a
person who has filed a complaint against another in good faith. Moreover, jurisprudence provides that where a party
is not entitled to actual or moral damages, an award of exemplary damages is likewise baseless. Furthermore, where
the award of moral and exemplary damages is eliminated, so must the award for attorney's fees be deleted.
The Court stated that the Court of Appeals was correct in saying that the trial court erred when it ordered private
respondent to return the subject car or its equivalent considering that petitioner had not yet fully paid the purchase
price. To sustain the trial court's decision would amount to unjust enrichment. The Court of Appeals was correct when
it instead ordered private respondent to return, not the car itself, but only the amount equivalent to the fourteen
installments actually paid with interest.
G.R. No. 148132
Smart Communications v. Astorga
January 28, 2008
Nachura, J.
FACTS: Astorga was employed by SMART as District Sales Manager. Among the benefits of her employment was
a car plan in the amount of P455,000.00. SMART launched an organizational realignment to achieve more efficient
operations wherein among the consequences was the abolition of Astorga’s Division which led to her consequent
dismissal. The termination of her employment prompted Astorga to file a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment
of salaries and other benefits with prayer for moral and exemplary damages against SMART.
SMART sent a letter to Astorga demanding that she pay the current market value of the Honda Civic Sedan which
was given to her under the company’s car plan program, or to surrender the same to the company for proper disposition.
Astorga, however, failed and refused to do either, thus prompting SMART to file a suit for replevin with RTC Makati.
Astorga moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of lack of jurisdiction wherein she posited that the regular courts
have no jurisdiction over the complaint because the subject thereof pertains to a benefit arising from an employment
contract; hence, jurisdiction over the same is vested in the labor tribunal and not in regular courts.
The RTC Makati denied her motion to dismiss. She further elevated the case via certiorai to the CA wherein the
appellate court ruled in her favor.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over Replevin?
The law clearly states that one may only recover moral damages if they are the proximate result of the, other party's
wrongful act or omission. Two elements are required. First, the act or omission must be the proximate result of the
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HELD:
Yes. The RTC rightfully assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in denying Astorga’s
motion to dismiss. SMART’s demand for payment of the market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender
of the car, is not a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and creditor rather than employeeemployer relations. As such, the dispute falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante it was resolved that:
Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession in the plaintiff. The primary
relief sought therein is the return of the property in specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is
an ordinary statutory proceeding to adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal property. The
question of whether or not a party has the right of possession over the property involved and if so,
whether or not the adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained said property as to require its return
to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor tribunal and beyond the field of specialization
of Labor Arbiters.
The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin Case. The respective issues raised in each
forum can be resolved independently on the other. In fact in 18 November 1986, the NLRC in the case before it had
issued an Injunctive Writ enjoining the petitioners from blocking the free ingress and egress to the Vessel and ordering
the petitioners to disembark and vacate. That aspect of the controversy is properly settled under the Labor Code. So
also with petitioners’ right to picket. But the determination of the question of who has the better right to take possession
of the Vessel and whether petitioners can deprive the Charterer, as the legal possessor of the Vessel, of that right to
possess in addressed to the competence of Civil Courts.
In thus ruling, this Court is not sanctioning split jurisdiction but defining avenues of jurisdiction as laid down by
pertinent laws.
A.M. No. P – 07 – 2384
Hao v. Andres
June 18, 2008
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: A civil case for replevin was filed by Zenaida Silver against Kenneth Hao (complainant). Judge Fuentes then
issued an Order of Seizure against 22 motor vehicles, of which, 9 were seized by Abe Andres (respondent), Sheriff of
the RTC of Davao City.
Later, Andres was ordered to cease and desist from implementing the order of seizure and to return the subject vehicles
by virtue of the approval of Hao’s Counter Replevin bond.
However, on October 24, 2005, eight of the nine seized motor vehicles were reported missing.
Hao then filed an administrative complaint for gross neglect of duty, grave abuse of authority (oppression) and
violation of Republic Act No. 3019 against Andres. Hao alleged that Andres gave undue advantage to Zenaida Silver
in the implementation of the order and that Andres seized the 9 motor vehicles in an oppressive manner. Hao also
averred that Andres was accompanied by unidentified armed personnel on board a military vehicle which was
excessive since there were no resistance from them. Hao also discovered that the compound where the seized motor
vehicles were placed is actually owned by Silver.
21
Furthermore, Hao reported that three of the carnapped vehicles were recovered by the police.12 He then accused
Andres of conspiring and conniving with Atty. Oswaldo Macadangdang (Silver's counsel) and the policemen in the
carnapping of the motor vehicles. Hao also accused Andres of concealing the depository receipts from them and
pointed out that the depository receipts show that Silver and Atty. Macadangdang were the ones who chose the
policemen who will guard the motor vehicles.
ISSUE: Whether Andres is guilty of gross neglect of duty and of violation of RA 3019
HELD: Yes, Andres is guilty of gross neglect of duty and of violation of RA 3019.
First, the rules (Rules 60, Sec. 6) provide that property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered
immediately to the plaintiff. In accordance with the said rules, Andres should have waited no less than five days in
order to give the complainant an opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond or of the surety or sureties thereon,
or require the return of the seized motor vehicles by filing a counter-bond. This, he failed to do.
Records show that Andres took possession of two of the subject motor vehicles on October 17, 2005, four on October
18, 2005, and another three on October 19, 2005. Simultaneously, as evidenced by the depository receipts, on October
18, 2005, Silver received from Andres six of the seized motor vehicles, and three more motor vehicles on October 19,
2005. Consequently, there is no question that Silver was already in possession of the nine seized vehicles immediately
after seizure, or no more than three days after the taking of the vehicles. Thus, Andres committed a clear violation of
Section 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court with regard to the proper disposal of the property.
Third, we are appalled that even after PO3 Despe reported the unauthorized duplication of the vehicles' keys, Andres
failed to take extra precautionary measures to ensure the safety of the vehicles. It is obvious that the vehicles were put
at risk by the unauthorized duplication of the keys of the vehicles. Neither did he immediately report the incident to
the police or to the court.
Fourth, despite the cease and desist order, Andres failed to return the motor vehicles to their lawful owners. Instead
of returning the motor vehicles immediately as directed, he opted to write Silver and demand that she put up an
indemnity bond to secure the third-party claims. Consequently, due to his delay, the eventual loss of the motor vehicles
rendered the order to return the seized vehicles ineffectual to the prejudice of the complaining owners.
G.R. No. 153788
Navarro v. Escobido
November 27, 2009
Brion, J.
FACTS: Respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with
damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure
of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarro's possession.
The RTC issued writs of replevin for both cases; as a result, the Sheriff seized the two vehicles and delivered them to
the possession of Karen Go.
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In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints stated no cause of action,
since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase (collectively, the lease agreements)
- the actionable documents on which the complaints were based. Navarro's motion, both cases were duly consolidated.
Again, the name KARGO ENTERPRISES entered the picture as this Lease Agreement provides:
“This agreement, made and entered into by and between:
GLENN O. GO, of legal age, married, with post office address at xxx, herein referred to as the LESSORSELLER; representing KARGO ENTERPRISES as its Manager,”
The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the Complaints did not state a cause of action.
In response to the motion for reconsideration Karen Go filed, the RTC issued another order setting aside the order of
dismissal. Acting on the presumption that Glenn Go's leasing business is a conjugal property, the RTC held that Karen
Go had sufficient interest in his leasing business to file the action against Navarro. However, the RTC held that Karen
Go should have included her husband, Glenn Go, in the complaint based on Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
(Rules). Thus, the lower court ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff.
Navarro filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA denied Navarro's petition and affirmed the RTC's order,
leading to the filing of the present petition.
Navarro alleges that even if the lease agreements were in the name of Kargo Enterprises, since it did not have the
requisite juridical personality to sue, the actual parties to the agreement are himself and Glenn Go. Since it was Karen
Go who filed the complaints and not Glenn Go, she was not a real party-in-interest and the complaints failed to state
a cause of action.
Navarro posits that the RTC erred when it ordered the amendment of the complaint to include Glenn Go as a coplaintiff, instead of dismissing the complaint outright because a complaint which does not state a cause of action
cannot be converted into one with a cause of action by a mere amendment or a supplemental pleading. In effect, the
lower court created a cause of action for Karen Go when there was none at the time she filed the complaints.
Even assuming the complaints stated a cause of action against him, Navarro maintains that the complaints were
premature because no prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease agreements before
the complaints for replevin were filed. In short, he argued that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of
replevin is filed which Navarro apparently likens a replevin action to an unlawful detainer.
ISSUES:
5.
Whether or not Karen Go is a real party-in-interest
6.
Whether or not demand is necessary before a complaint for writ of replevin is filed
2.
The Court ruled in the negative.
For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond, pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 60 of the Rules. Section 2 of said rule also provides that the applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of
some other person who personally knows the facts:
a.
That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the
possession thereof;
b.
That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof
according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;
c.
That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized
under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so
seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and
d.
The actual market value of the property.
We see nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the
property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action
for a writ of replevin.
G.R. No. 182963
HELD:
1.
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled
to the avails of the suit.
The central factor in appreciating the issues presented in this case is the business name Kargo Enterprises. The name
appears in the title of the Complaint where the plaintiff was identified as "KAREN T. GO doing business under the
name KARGO ENTERPRISES," and this identification was repeated in the first paragraph of the Complaint.
22
Hence, by the express terms of this Lease Agreement, Glenn Go did sign the agreement only as the manager of Kargo
Enterprises and the latter is clearly the real party to the lease agreements. As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises,
Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to
Navarro's contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does
not state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf
of Kargo Enterprises.
Agner v. BPI Family Savings Bank
June 3, 2013
Peralta, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Spouses executed a Promissory note with Chattel Mortgage in favor of Citimotors, Inc. he contract
provides, among others, that: for receiving the amount of Php834,768.00, petitioners shall pay Php17,391.00 every
15th day of each succeeding month until fully paid; the loan is secured by a 2001 Mitsubishi Adventure Super Sport;
and an interest of 6% per month shall be imposed for failure to pay each installment on or before the stated due date.
Citimotors assigned all its rights, title and interests in the note to ABN AMRO Savings Bank, who later assigned the
same to BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc.
For failure to pay four successive installments from May 15, 2002 to August 15, 2002, respondent, through counsel,
sent to petitioners a demand letter dated August 29, 2002, declaring the entire obligation as due and demandable and
requiring to pay Php576,664.04, or surrender the mortgaged vehicle immediately upon receiving the letter. As the
demand was left unheeded, respondent filed on October 4, 2002 an action for Replevin and Damages before the Manila
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Regional Trial Court (RTC) which was subsequently issued however, the vehicle was not seized. Petitioners appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), but the CA affirmed the lower court's decision and, subsequently, denied
the motion for reconsideration; hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of a writ of replevin is necessary
HELD:
No. The vehicle subject matter of this case was never recovered and delivered to respondent despite the issuance of a
writ of replevin. As there was no seizure that transpired, it cannot be said that petitioners were deprived of the use and
enjoyment of the mortgaged vehicle or that respondent pursued, commenced or concluded its actual foreclosure. The
trial court, therefore, rightfully granted the alternative prayer for sum of money, which is equivalent to the remedy of
"[e]xact[ing] fulfillment of the obligation." Certainly, there is no double recovery or unjust enrichment to speak of.
SUPPORT
1.
2.
3.
4.
Application for Support Pendente Lite
Comment, Hearing, Order
Enforcement of Order
Restitution
G.R. No. 127578
De Asis v. CA
February 15, 1999
Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. . . .
Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise.
The raison d' etre behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission and/or compromise of the right to support
is stated, thus:
The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is not
entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life
itself. The right to life cannot be renounce; hence, support which is the means to attain the former, cannot
be renounced.
To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is
virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden. This is contrary to
public policy.
Purisima, J.
FACTS: An action for maintenance and support docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-935 before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 94, was brought by Vircel D. Andres on October 14, 1988, (the herein private respondent) in
her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis. It is alleged that the defendant Manuel de
Asis (the petitioner here) is the father of subject minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, and the former refused and/or
failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands. Petitioner denied the paternity of said
minor and cannot therefore be required to provide support for him.
By virtue of the petitioner’s manifestation, both the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to move for the dismissal of the
case. The Regional Trial Court a quo issued the following Order of August 8, 1989, dismissing Civil Case No. Q-88935 with prejudice.
On September 7, 1995, another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against Manuel A. de Asis, this
time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal guardian/mother, Vircel D. Andres, docketed
as Civil Case No. C-16107 before Branch 130 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan.
Petitioner Manuel de Asis moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of res judicata as it is barred by the prior
judgment which was dismissed with prejudice.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari which was dismissed as it is devoid of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not a second action for support is barred by the previous action for support which was dismissed
by upon agreement of the parties.
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HELD:
No. The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Article 301 of the Civil
Code, the law in point, reads:
Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a third person.
The manifestation sent in by respondent's mother in the first case, which acknowledged that it would be
useless to pursue its complaint for support, amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that
gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner.
Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's theory that the dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case Q-88-935 has the effect
of res judicata on the subsequent case for support. In Advincula v. Advincula, it appears that the former dismissal was
predicated upon compromise. Acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil status of a persons and future support,
cannot be the subject of compromise (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil Code). Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force
and effect and can not bar the filing of another action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant. (emphasis
supplied).
Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case Q-88-935 and the lower court's pronouncement that such
dismissal was with prejudice, the second action for support may still prosper.
G.R. No. 128157
People v. Manahan
September 29, 1999
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Teresita Tibigar, 16 years old, worked as a stay-in waitress at the Espiritu Canteen. She was raped by the
owner’s brother-in-law Manual Manahan who was temporarily residing therein. Within the same month, Teresita left
the canteen and returned home to Pangasinan. She later found out that she is pregnant. With the help of her mother,
Teresita filed a criminal complaint accusing Manuel Manahan of rape. She gave birth to a healthy baby girl and
christened her Melanie Tibigar.
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RTC found Manahan guilty and sentenced him to death. He was also ordered to indemnify the Teresita for moral
damages, pay the costs, and acknowledge and support the offspring of his indiscretion. Case went to SC on automatic
review.
Defendants sought reconsideration, however the court denied and clarified that petitioners and Chua Giak were held
jointly liable with Edward because of the latter’s “inability” to give sufficient support. Petitioners appealed to the CA
but the CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. Petitioners sought reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC’s order for Manahan to acknowledge and support Melanie Tibigar (child of Teresita) is
proper
ISSUE: Whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents?
HELD:
NO as to the acknowledgment, but YES as to provision of support. The portion of the RTC decision ordering the
accused, a married man, to acknowledge the child Melanie Tibigar is DELETED being contrary to law and
jurisprudence. However, Manahan should support the child as it is in accordance with law.
On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a correction of the view of the court a quo is in order.
Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape shall also be sentenced to "acknowledge
the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from doing so," and "in every case to support the offspring." In the
case before us, compulsory acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment
in doing so as it appears that the accused is a married man. As pronounced by this Court in People v. Guerrero, the
rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize the offspring of the crime, should there
be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate." Consequently, that portion of the judgment under review is
accordingly deleted. In any case, we sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child as it is in accordance
with law.
G.R. No. 163209
Lim v. Lim
October 30, 2009
Carpio, J.
FACTS: Respondent Cheryl S. Lim married Edward Lim, son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children,
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house
of petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edward’s ailing grandmother Chua Giak, and her husband
Mariano Lim.
Edward’s family business which gives him ₱6,000 shouldered the family expenses while Cheryl had no steady source
of income.
On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the children with her, after a violent
confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak.
HELD:
Yes. However, the court modified the appealed judgment by limiting petitioners’ liability only to the grandchildren.
Petitioners theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by its
termination or suspension during the children’s minority.
Although the obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the emancipation of the child
the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally lasts during the obligee's lifetime. While
parental authority under Title IX of the Civil Code pertains to parents passing to ascendants only upon its termination
or suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the
parents but also for the latter’s inability to provide sufficient support.
As observed in another case, it is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their
grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them.
In this case there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient legal support to
her children. This inability of Edward and Cheryl shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest
degree, both in the paternal and maternal lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, is to sanction
the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of parental inability to give
adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void. However, partial
concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants. Cheryl’s right to receive support from the Lim family extends
only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond.
In addition petitioners wish to avail of the option in Article 204 of the Civil Code, allowing them to fulfill their
obligation by maintaining respondents at petitioners’ Makati residence. However such is unavailable. Cheryl’s charge
against Edward for concubinage and her steadfast insistence on its occurrence amounts to a moral impediment
bringing the case within the ambit of the exception clause of Article 204, precluding its application.
G.R. No. 165166
Gotardo v. Buling
August 15, 2012
Brion, J.
Cheryl sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140 for
support. The trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of ₱6,000 pendente lite.
FACTS: On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint for compulsory recognition and support
pendente lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze.
On 31 January 1996, the trial court rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners to "jointly" provide ₱40,000
monthly support to respondents, with Edward shouldering ₱6,000 and petitioners the balance of ₱34,000 subject to
Chua Giak’s subsidiary liability
The petitioner started courting the respondent in the third week of December 1992 and they became sweethearts in
the last week of January 1993. Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the
respondent in the former’s rented room in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the respondent’s uncle, on Tomas
Oppus St., Agbao, Maasin, Southern Leyte.When told of the pregnancy, the petitioner was happy and made plans to
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marry the respondent.They in fact applied for a marriage license.The petitioner even inquired about the costs of a
wedding reception and the bridal gown.Subsequently, however, the petitioner backed out of the wedding plans.
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte for damages
against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry. Later, however, the petitioner and the respondent amicably
settled the case.The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. When the petitioner did not show up
and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July 24, 1995 demanding recognition of
and support for their child.During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondent’s motion granted a
₱2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995.
THE RTC RULING
In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffze’s
filiation. It found the respondent’s testimony inconsistent on the question of when she had her first sexual contact with
the petitioner, i.e., "September 1993" in her direct testimony while "last week of January 1993"
THE CA RULING
In its March 5, 2004 decision, the CA departed from the RTC's appreciation of the respondent’s testimony, concluding
that the latter merely made an honest mistake in her understanding of the questions of the petitioner’s counsel. It noted
that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual relationship even before August 1994; that the respondent had only
one boyfriend, the petitioner, from January 1993 to August 1994; and that the petitioner’s allegation that the
respondent had previous relationships with other men remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside the
RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order
granting a ₱ 2,000.00 monthly child support.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the RTC’s findings and ordered the
petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son Gliffze.
HELD:
No. We do not find any reversible error in the CA’s ruling.
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.32 We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be
a "baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible
under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court."
In Herrera v. Alba, we stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that
parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and the child. We explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman declares — supported
by corroborative proof — that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence
shifts to the putative father.36 We explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative father
are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the
mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.
25
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through
testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of her conception. Rodulfo
corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship.
On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent, only that it occurred
on a much later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the respondent to have
been three (3) months pregnant already in September 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy. However, the
petitioner failed to substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore,
cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioner’s denial cannot overcome the respondent’s
clear and categorical assertions.
The petitioner, as the RTC did, made much of the variance between the respondent’s direct testimony regarding their
first sexual contact as "sometime in September 1993" and her cross-testimony when she stated that their first sexual
contact was "last week of January 1993," as follows:
We find that the contradictions are for the most part more apparent than real, having resulted from the failure of the
respondent to comprehend the question posed, but this misunderstanding was later corrected and satisfactorily
explained. Indeed, when confronted for her contradictory statements, the respondent explained that that portion of the
transcript of stenographic notes was incorrect and she had brought it to the attention of Atty. Josefino Go Cinco (her
former counsel) but the latter took no action on the matter.
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be considered in its entirety
instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to consider only its isolated parts and to
anchor a conclusion based on these parts. "In ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him
on direct, cross and redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered." Evidently, the totality of the
respondent's testimony positively and convincingly shows that no real inconsistency exists. The respondent has
consistently asserted that she started intimate sexual relations with the petitioner sometime in September 1993
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Thus, the
amount of support is variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount
shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient It may be reduced or
increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or
means of the person obliged to support.
In this case, we sustain the award of ₱ 2,000.00 monthly child support, without prejudice to the filing of the proper
motion in the RTC for the determination of any support in arrears, considering the needs of the child, Gliffze, during
the pendency of this case.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The March 5, 2004 decision and the July 27, 2004
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 76326 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
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G.R. No. 201043
Republic v. Yabon
June 16, 2014
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS: Daisy R. Yahon, herein respondent, filed a petition for the issuance of a protection order under the
provisions of R.A. 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act (VAWC for brevity), against her
husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon, an enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army who retired in January 2006. They
were married on June 8, 2003 and did not have any children, but respondent has a daughter with her previous live-in
partner.
On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO which directed him to desist from threatening to commit or committing
further acts of physical abuse and violence against Daisy Yahon, to stay away at a distance of at least 500m from her,
to refrain from harassing, annoying, intimidating, contacting or communicating with her, from using or possessing
any firearm or deadly weapon on occasions not related to his job and to provide reasonable financial spousal
support to the petitioner.
The local police officers and barangay officials, through the chairman where they both reside, at Poblacion, Claveria,
Misamis Oriental and Bobuntongan, Jasaan Misamis Oriental are directed to respond to any request for assistance
regarding this order. They are also directed to accompany Daisy to their conjugal abode to get her personal belongings,
to ensure her safety.
S/Sgt. Yahon, having been personally served with a copy of the TPO, appeared during the scheduled pre-trial but
informed the court that he did not yet have a counsel and requested for time to hire his own counsel. He, however did
not hire a counsel nor file an opposition, or an answer to the petition. Because of such actions, the RTC allowed the
ex-parte presentation of evidence to determine the necessity of issuing a PPO.
The RTC issued another order directing S/Sgt. Yahon to give Daisy spousal support in the amount of PHP
4,000.00/month and 50% of his retirement benefits which shall be automatically deducted and given directly to
respondent. This is what Daisy Yahon prayed for because her husband deliberately refused to give her spousal support
as directed in the TPO, and she claimed that she has no source of livelihood since he told her to resign from her job
and concentrate in keeping their house.
Daisy Yahon also stated that her husband never complied with the TPO as he continued making threats and inflicting
physical abuse upon her, and failed to give her spousal support as ordered by the court.
Based on the evidence presented, and after careful review and scrutiny of the evidence presented in this case, the court
finds that there is a need to issue a PPO. Therefore, the RTC granted the petition, pursuant to A.M. No. 04-10-1-SC,
and directed that a PPO be immediately issued.
Herein petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center filed a manifestation and motion to lift TPO against
the AFP. Making a limited and special appearance, petitioner manifested that on August 29, 2008, it furnished the
AFP Pension and Gratuity Management Center (PGMC for brevity) a copy of the TPO for appropriate action, and the
PGMC, on September 2, 2008, requested the Chief, AFPFC the temporary withholding of the thirty-six (36)
Months Lump Sum (MLS) due to S/Sgt. Yahon. Thereafter, on October 29, 2008, the PGMC forwarded a letter to
the Chief of Staff, AFP for the OTJAG for appropriate action on the TPO, requesting legal opinion as well. Petitioner
26
informed the RTC that S/Sgt. Yahon’s check representing his 36 MLS had been processed and is ready for payment
by the AFPFC, but the check has not been claimed by respondent.
Petitioner also alleged that the RTC has not acquired jurisdiction over the military institution due to lack of summons,
and the AFPFC cannot therefore be bound by the court order for support. It further alleged that the AFPFC is not a
party-in-interest and is a complete stranger to the proceedings before the RTC in the issuance of protection orders.
The RTC denied the motion for having been filed out of time. It noted that the decision granting the TPO and the PPO
to respondent had long become final and executory.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, praying for the annulment of the aforesaid orders as the
provision for spousal support from the retirement and pension benefits was issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Daisy filed her comment with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction. The CA granted the respondent’s
application. While the 36-month lump sum retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon has already been given to
him, yet as admitted by petitioner itself, the monthly pension after the mentioned retirement benefits has not yet been
released to him. The injunctive relief issued seeks to prevent the petitioner from releasing the remaining pension that
may be due to S/Sgt. Yahon.
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied, hence the filing of the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner military institution may be ordered to automatically deduct a percentage from
the retirement benefits of its personnel and directly give the same to his lawful wife pursuant to a protection
order issued by the RTC.
HELD:
The court held in the affirmative.
A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children,
their family or household members, and to grant other necessary relief. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties
from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control
of their life. A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of violence against women and
their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary relief. Its purpose is to safeguard the
offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability
to regain control of their life.
The petitioner argues that under P.D. 1638 and under R.A. 8291, the benefits given to the personnel entitled to such
shall not be subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever, neither shall they be assigned,
ceded or conveyed to any third person, Provided, that if a retired or a separated officer or enlisted man who is entitled
to any benefit under this decree has unsettled money and/or property accountabilities incurred while in the active
service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man or
his survivors under this decree may be withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities.
However, Rule 39, Sec. 13 of the Rules of Court states that except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution—the right to receive legal support, or money or
property obtained as such support, or any pension or gratuity from the Government.
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It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later enactment
must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. Statutes must be so construed and harmonized with
other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. However, if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier
statute must yield to the later enactment. The later law is the latest expression of the legislative will.
Notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children or
that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability because when the foreign law,
judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment
or order shall not be applied.
The court held that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying down an
exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The law itself
declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of the respondent by the
employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the
contrary."
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The petition is therefore DENIED and the resolutions issued for the direction of spousal support are therefore
affirmed.
G.R. No. 193707
Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem
December 10, 2014
G.R. No. 175279 – 80
Lim – Lua v. Lua
June 5, 2013
Villarama, Jr., J.
Peralta, J.
FACTS: Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued
by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. According to
Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival of petitioner and her
son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides again
the Philippines particularly in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for
violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. The trial court
dismissed the complaint since the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense with respect to the
accused, he being an alien.
ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law
HELD:
It cannot be gainsaid, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family
Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent
is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving
the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of
the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. In view
of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption
shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, it is presumed to be the same
with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing non-compliance
therewith.
27
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child
nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would
be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
FACTS: Susan Lim-Lua filed a petition against Danilo Lua for a declaration of nullity of marriage with a prayer for
support pendente lite for herself and her two children amounting to P500,000.00 per month. The RTC granted said
support but only in the amount P250, 000 a month retroactive to Sept. 3, 2003. Upon appeal by Romy to the Court of
Appeals, the appellate court rendered a decision on April 12, 2005 further reducing the amount of support pendente
lite to P115,000 a month also retroactive as of the filing of the complaint on Sept. 3, 2003. Neither Sally nor Romy
appealed the said ruling any further.
The controversy however arose again when Romy complied with the said decision on June 28, 2005. By that date the
total support in arrears amounted to P2,645,000.00. But he deducted from it the value of two expensive cars
(Volkswagen Beetle and BMW316i) he bought for their son and daughter plus their maintenance cost amounting to
P2,482,348.16. Thus he paid Sally only the sum of P162,651.90 as support in arrears. In deducting said amount, Romy
contended that being children of upper class society, their son and daughter had never in their entire life commuted
from one place to another, hence the cars and their maintenance are indispensable to their day-to-day living.
After the trial court disallowed the foregoing deductions, Romy appealed the ruling to the Court of Appeals (CA) and
further claimed the following deductions: medical and dental expenses of Sally and their son, travel expenses of Sally
and their daughter, credit card purchases and salon expenses of their daughter, school expenses of their son and cash
given to their two children all totaling P946,465.64. The CA agreed with Romy and allowed all these items claimed
by him to be deducted from the total arrears of the support pendente lite.
Susan argues that it was patently erroneous for the CA to have allowed the deduction of the value of the two cars and
their maintenance costs from the support in arrears, as these items are not indispensable to the sustenance of the family
or in keeping them alive. Romy, on the other hand, contends that disallowing the subject deductions would result in
unjust enrichment, thus making him pay for the same obligation twice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Romy can claim credit on account of payments designated as gifts and credit for an automobile
given to the children?
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HELD:
No. Support pendente lite is the provisional monthly support granted by the court motu proprio or upon verified
petition of any of the parties before the rendition of the final judgment without delving fully on the merits of the case.
As a matter of law it comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the parties.
In this case, the monthly support was intended primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and
medical and dental expenses of the spouse and children entitled to support like Sally’s scoliosis therapy sessions.
Hence, the value of the two expensive cars bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel
expenses of Sally and their daughter, purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods
(clothing) should not have been deducted as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite.
Only the medical and dental expenses of Sally and their son, credit card purchases of their daughter and son for
groceries and dry goods totaling P648,102.29 may be allowed as deductions. When a father is required to pay to the
mother money for her and their dependent children’s support, he cannot as a matter of law claim credit on account of
payments designated as gifts, nor is he entitled to credit for an automobile given to the children.
G.R. No. 180284
Salas v. Matusalem
September 11, 2013
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS: Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) claimed that Narciso Salas (petitioner) is the father of her son Christian
Paulo Salas. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was then only 24 years old, making her
believe that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and shouldered all expenses in
the delivery of their child, including the cost of caesarian operation and hospital confinement. However, when
respondent refused the offer of petitioner’s family to take the child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her
child and left them to the mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent further alleged that she attempted suicide due to
depression but still petitioner refused to support her and their child.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the amount of P20,000.00, as well as actual,
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
The trial court ruled in favor or respondent. The CA likewise dismissed petitioner’s appeal. On the paternity issue, the
CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling that respondent satisfactorily established the illegitimate filiation of her son
Christian Paulo, and consequently no error was committed by the trial court in granting respondent’s prayer for
support.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of
paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate.25 Thus, if
the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person
is incompetent evidence of paternity.
As to the Baptismal Certificate also indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates
may be considered public documents, they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the
dates so specified. They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the
child’s paternity.
The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs
taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws,” like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has
been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and
other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Reviewing the records, we find the totality of
respondent’s evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not competent proof of paternity
and the totality of respondent’s evidence failed to establish Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An
order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives
of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence.
G.R. No. 206647
Abella v. Cabanero
August 9, 2017
Leonen, J.
FACTS: In a Complaint for Support (Complaint), petitioner Richelle alleged that while she was still a minor in the
years 2000 to 2002, she was repeatedly sexually abused by respondent Cabañero inside his rest house at Barangay
Masayo, Tobias Fornier, Antique. As a result, she allegedly gave birth to a child on August 21, 2002. Richelle prayed
for the child's monthly allowance in the amount of P3,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether filiation of Christian Paulo was duly established and thus entitles him to support from Petitioner
In his Answer, Cabañero denied sexually abusing Richelle, or otherwise having any sexual relations with her. Thus,
he asserted that he could not have been the father of Richelle’s child.
HELD:
No, filiation was not duly established consequently, Petitioner is not obligated to provide support.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed Richelle's Complaint without prejudice, on account of her failure to implead her
minor child, Jhorylle, as plaintiff.
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner appears
as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed
the said document though she claims it was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein.
Richelle filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals.
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The Court of Appeals sustained the dismissal of the Complaint. However, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the
Regional Trial Court's basis for dismissing the Complaint. It emphasized that non-joinder of indispensable parties is
not a ground for the dismissal of an action and added that it would have sufficed for the Regional Trial Court to have
"ordered the amendment of the caption of the Complaint to implead the minor child." The Court of Appeals still ruled
that the dismissal of the Complaint was proper as the filiation and paternity of the child had not been previously
established. As the child's birth certificate did not indicate that Cabañero was the father and as Cabañero had not done
anything to voluntarily recognize the child as his own, the Court of Appeals asserted that Richelle "should have first
instituted filiation proceedings to adjudicate the minor child's paternity."
Following the denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, Richelle filed this Petition.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
INTERPLEADER
1.
2.
3.
What is an action in Interpleader
Requisites
Procedure
G.R. No. L – 23851
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that filiation proceedings should have first been separately
instituted to ascertain the minor child's paternity and that without these proceedings having first been
resolved in favor of the child's paternity claim, petitioner Richelle P. Abella's action for support could not
prosper
HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative.
While it is true that the grant of support was contingent on ascertaining paternal relations between respondent and
petitioner's daughter, Jhorylle, it was unnecessary for petitioner's action for support to have been dismissed and
terminated by the Court of Appeals in the manner that it did. Instead of dismissing the case, the Court of Appeals
should have remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court. There, petitioner and her daughter should have been
enabled to present evidence to establish their cause of action—inclusive of their underlying claim of paternal
relations—against respondent.
In Dolina v. Vallecera clarified that since an action for compulsory recognition may be filed ahead of an action for
support, the direct filing of an action for support, "where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and
resolved," is an equally valid alternative.
Indeed, an integrated determination of filiation is "entirely appropriate" to the action for support filed by petitioner
Richelle for her child. An action for support may very well resolve that ineluctable issue of paternity if it involves the
same parties, is brought before a court with the proper jurisdiction, prays to impel recognition of paternal relations,
and invokes judicial intervention to do so. This does not run afoul of any rule. To the contrary, and consistent with
Briz v. Briz, this is in keeping with the rules on proper joinder of causes of action. This also serves the interest of
judicial economy—avoiding multiplicity of suits and cushioning litigants from the vexation and costs of a protracted
pleading of their cause
Wack – Wack Gold and Country Club v. Won
March 26, 1976
Castro, J.
FACTS: Lee E. Won and Bienvenido Tan both claimed ownership over Wack Wack Golf and Country Club's
membership fee certificate 201, the former, by virtue of the decision rendered in Civil Case 26044 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila and of membership fee certificate 201-serial No. 1478 issued pursuant to a court order in said
case, and the latter by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial No. 1199 issued to him in July 1950 pursuant to
an assignment made in his favor by the original owner and holder thereof.
The corporation filed an action of interpleader in the court a quo to have defendants litigate among themselves their
conflicting claims of ownership. In separate motions, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds
of res judicata, failure of the complainant to state a cause of action, and bar by prescription. Finding the first two
grounds well taken, the trial court dismissed the complain.
The Corporation's position may be stated elsewise as follows: The trial court erred in dismissing the complaint, instead
of compelling the appellees to interplead because there actually are conflicting claims between the latter with respect
to the ownership of membership fee certificate 201, and, as there is no identity of parties, of subject-matter, and of
cause of action, between civil case 26044 of the CFI of Manila and the present action, the complaint should not have
been dismissed upon the ground of res judicata.
Hence, this appeal, the determinative issue of which is the timeless of the remedy of interpleader availed of by the
Corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action for interpleader was timely filed and was the correct remedy in the case
HELD:
While the case at hand is indeed the proper subjet of an action of interpleader, the Court however ruled that it was
belatedly filed in this case and thus should not prosper. The actions of interpleader under Section 120 of the Code of
Civil Procedure is a remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render
wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said
personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to
litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to one or other thing. The remedy is afforded
to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability.
It is the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when application therefor is delayed until after judgment
has been rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the fund, and that this is especially true where the holder of the
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fund had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of such judgment and an opportunity to implead the
adverse claimants in the suit in which such judgment was rendered.
The instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had already been made independently liable in
civil case 26044 and, therefore, its present application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the
final judgment in the said civil case; the appellee Lee had already established his rights to membership fee certificate
201 in the aforesaid civil case and, therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to establish his rights anew, and
thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the possibility
that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil case might eventually be taken away from him; and because the
Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably
late, for which reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay.
G.R. No. 73794
Eternal Gardens v. IAC
September 19, 1988
Paras, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation and private respondent North Philippine Union
Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists (MISSION for short) are corporations duly organized and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. They executed a Land Development Agreement on
October 6, 1976 whereby the former undertook to introduce and construct at its own expense and responsibility
necessary improvements on the property owned by private respondent into a memorial park to be subdivided into and
sold as memorial plot lots, at a stipulated area and price per lot.
Out of the proceeds from the sale, private respondent is entitled to receive 40% of the net gross collection from the
project to be remitted monthly by petitioner to private respondent through a designated depositary trustee bank. All
went well until Maysilo Estate asserted its claim of ownership over the parcel of land in question. Confronted with
such conflicting claims, petitioner as plaintiff filed a complaint for interpleader against private respondent MISSION
and Maysilo Estate.
Alleging among others, that in view of the conflicting claims of ownership of the defendants (herein private respondent
and Maysilo Estate) over the properties subject matter of the contracts, over which plaintiff corporation (herein
petitioner) has no claim of ownership except as a purchaser thereof, and to protect the interests of plaintiff corporation
which has no interest in the subject matter of the dispute and is willing to pay whoever is entitled or declared to be the
owners of said properties, the defendants should be required to interplead and litigate their several claims between
themselves.
An order was issued by the presiding judge requiring defendants to interplead. MISSION filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of cause of action but also presented an answer. The motion to dismiss was denied. The heirs of Maysilo Estate
filed their own answer and an amended answer dated thru the estate's special receiver. Private respondent presented a
motion for the placing on judicial deposit the amounts due and unpaid from petitioner. Acting on such motion, the
trial court denied judicial deposit in its order dated February 13, 1984.
Another order dated October 26, 1984 was issued amending the February 13, 1984 order and directing MISSION to
deposit the amounts it received under the implementation of the Land Development Agreement. The trial court also
passed a resolution dismissing the interpleader.
30
The heirs of the Maysilo Estate moved for reconsideration of the aforementioned order of dismissal: denied. In spite
of that, MISSION filed a motion for Writ of Execution: denied. It was elevated on certiorari and mandamus to the
Intermediate Appellate Court (Court of Appeals): dismissed. The private respondent challenged the IAC decision in
the Supreme Court: denied.
In the case at bar, MISSION, herein private respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the then IAC praying that
the aforementioned Orders of February 13, 1984 and October 26, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court be set aside and
that an order be issued to deposit in court or in a depositor trustee bank of any and all payments, plus interest thereon,
due the private respondent MISSION under the Land Development Agreement, said amounts deposited to be paid to
whomever may be found later to be entitled thereto, with costs. IAC granted the petition and set aside the questioned
portions of the respondent Court's orders of February 13 and October 26, 1984. The private respondent is ordered to
deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development Agreement of October 6, 1976 with a reputable
bank to be designated by the respondent court to be the depository trustee of the said amounts to be paid to whoever
shall be found entitled thereto. Eternal Gardens moved for a reconsideration of the above decision: denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
reconsidering its resolution and in requiring instead in the resolution of September 5, 1985, that petitioner
Eternal Gardens deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development Agreement with a
reputable bank to be designated by the respondent court? (Whether judicial deposit is proper)
HELD:
Respondent Court of Appeals did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Judicial deposit is proper.
A careful analysis of the records will show that petitioner admitted among others in its complaint in Interpleader that
it is still obligated to pay certain amounts to private respondent; that it claims no interest in such amounts due and is
willing to pay whoever is declared entitled to said amounts. There appears to be no plausible reason for petitioner's
objections to the deposit of the amounts in litigation after having asked for the assistance of the lower court by filing
a complaint for interpleader where the deposit of aforesaid amounts is not only required by the nature of the action
but is a contractual obligation of the petitioner under the Land Development Program.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the essence of an interpleader, aside from the disavowal of interest in
the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the
court. it is a rule founded on justice and equity: "that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or
funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled
thereto."
Said appellate court found that more than twenty million pesos are involved; so that on interest alone for savings or
time deposit would be considerable, now accruing in favor of the Eternal Gardens. Finding that such is violative of
the very essence of the complaint for interpleader as it clearly runs against the interest of justice in this case, the Court
of Appeals cannot be faulted for finding that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion which requires
correction by the requirement that a deposit of said amounts should be made to a bank approved by the Court.
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All these notwithstanding, the need for the deposit in question has been established, riot only in the lower courts and
in the Court of Appeals but also in the Supreme Court where such deposit was required in "the resolution of July 8,
1987 to avoid wastage of funds.
In sum, Pasricha alleges that they did not know to whom payment shall be made. Thus, they claim that their nonpayment of rentals was justified.
ISSUE: Whether or not the non-payment of rentals of Pasricha is justified (NO)
G.R. No. 136409
Pasricha v. Don Luis Dizon Realty
March 14, 2008
Nachura, J.
FACTS: Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc (lessor) and Pasricha (lessee) executed two Contracts of Lease involving nine
units in San Luis Building, located in Ermita, Manila. Pasricha agreed to pay monthly rentals, cost of electric
consumption, water bills and the use of telephone cables.
The lease of three rooms did not materialize leaving only six rooms as subjects of the lease contracts. While the
contracts were in effect, Pasricha dealt with Pacheco, then General Manager of Don Luis Dison Realty. Thereafter,
Pacheco was replaced by Ms. Bautista. Pasricha religiously paid the monthly rentals until May 1992. After that,
however, despite repeated demands, petitioners continuously refused to pay the stipulated rent. Dison Realty made a
final demand on Pasricha for the payment of the accrued rentals. Because Pasricha still refused to comply, Dison
Realty filed a complaint for ejectment through Ms. Bautista, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.
Pasricha admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for the leased premises starting July until November 1992,
but claimed that such refusal was justified because of the internal squabble in Dison Realty as to the person authorized
to receive payment. Pasricha also alleged that they were prevented from using the leased units, except for one – Room
35. To show good faith and willingness to pay the rents, Pasricha alleged that they prepared the check vouchers for
their monthly rentals from January 1993 to January 1994. Pasricha further averred in their Amended Answer that the
complaint for ejectment was prematurely filed, as the controversy was not referred to the barangay for conciliation.
HELD:
Pasricha claims that they did not pay rentals because ostensibly they did not know to whom payment should be made.
However, this did not justify their failure to pay, because if such were the case, they were not without any remedy.
The Court held that they should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on the consignation
of payment and of the Rules of Court on interpleader. An action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not
know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect).
The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to protect him against double vexation in
respect of one liability. Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from making
payments.
Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are
or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest
which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting
claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.
G.R. No. 154470 – 71
Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank
September 24, 2012
Brion, J.
FACTS:
For failure of the parties to reach an amicable settlement, the pre-trial conference was terminated. Thereafter, they
submitted their respective position papers.
MeTC dismissed the complaint for ejectment. It considered Pasricha’s non-payment of rentals as unjustified. The
court held that mere willingness to pay the rent did not amount to payment of the obligation; Pasricha should have
deposited their payment in the name of Dison Realty. On the matter of possession of the subject premises, the court
did not give credence to Pasricha’s claim that Dison Realty failed to turn over possession of the premises. The court,
however, dismissed the complaint because of Ms. Bautista’s alleged lack of authority to sue on behalf of the
corporation.
RTC of Manila reversed and set aside the MeTC Decision. RTC ordered Pasricha to vacate the leased premised and
restore possession to Dison Realty; and to pay the accrued rents. The court adopted the MeTC’s finding on petitioners’
unjustified refusal to pay the rent, which is a valid ground for ejectment. It, however, upheld Ms. Bautista’s authority
to represent Dison Realty notwithstanding the absence of a board resolution to that effect, since her authority was
implied from her power as a general manager/treasurer of the company.
First Set of Seven CB Bills
RCBC was the registered owner of seven Central Bank (CB) bills with a total face value of ₱ 70 million, issued on
January 2, 1994 and would mature on January 2, 1995. As evidenced by a "Detached Assignment" dated April 8, 1994
the RCBC sold these CB bills to the Bank of Commerce (BOC). As evidenced by another "Detached Assignment” of
even date, the BOC, in turn, sold these CB bills to Planters Development Bank (PDB).
On April 15, 1994 PDB, in turn, sold to the BOC Treasury Bills worth ₱ 70 million, with maturity date of June 29,
1994, as evidenced by a Trading Order and a Confirmation of Sale. However, instead of delivering the Treasury Bills,
the PDB delivered the seven CB bills to the BOC, as evidenced by a PDB Security Delivery Receipt, bearing a “note:
substitution in lieu of 06-29-94" – referring to the Treasury Bills.. Nevertheless, the PDB retained possession of the
Detached Assignments.
On April 20, 1994, the BOC said, it "sold back” to the PDB three of the seven CB bills. In turn, the PDB transferred
these three CB bills to Bancapital Development Corporation (Bancap). On April 25,1994 the BOC bought the three
CB bills from Bancap.
CA affirmed the RTC Decision but deleted the award of attorney’s fees.
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On the same date of April 20, 1994, BOC sold the remaining four (4) CB bills to Capital One Equities Corporation
which transferred them to All-Asia Corporation. On September 30, 1994, All Asia further transferred the four CB bills
back to the RCBC.
In light of the refusals and impending maturity of the CB bills, the PDB filed with the RTC two separate petitions for
Mandamus, Prohibition and Injunction with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order
against BSP, its officer in charge and RCBC
On November 16, 1994, the RCBC sold back to All Asia one of these 4 CB bills. When the BSP refused to release the
amount, the BOC purchased from All Asia this lone CB bill.
PDB claims that in both the April 15 and April 19 transactions, there was no intent on its part to transfer title of the
CB bills, as shown by its non-issuance of a detached assignment in favor of the BOC and Bancap. PDB alleges that it
merely warehoused the first set of CB bills with BOC as security collateral.
RCBC (7of7) —> BOC —>PDB —> BOC (3of7) —> PDB —> Bancapital —> BOC
On January 17, 1995, the RTC granted PDB’s application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction and granted
PDB’s prayer in the recording in the books of BSP the claim of PDB.
BOC (4of7) —> Cap1 —> Allasia —> RCBC (1of4) —> Allasia —> BOC
BOC = 4
RCBC = 3
RCBC as owner of the three (3) CB bills sold them to IVI Capital and Insular Savings Bank. Again when BSP refused
to release the amount, RCBC reacquired these three CB bills and sold them to the BOC.
BOC in its answer, prayed for the dismissal of the petition arguing that PDB had no cause of action against it since
PDB is no longer the owner of the CB bills. BOC asserted that the April 15 transaction and the April 19 transaction
were valid contracts of sale followed by a transfer of title upon the PDB’s delivery of the 1st set of CB bills in
substitution of the Treasury Bills the PDB originally intended to sell, and to Bancap, likewise by way of substitution.
BSP countered that the PDB cannot invoke Section 10 (d) 4 of CB Circular No. 28 because this section applies only
to an "owner" and a "person presenting the bond," of which the PDB is neither. The PDB has not presented to the BSP
any assignment of the subject CB bills, duly recorded in the BSP’s books, in its favor to clothe it with the status of an
“owner."
RCBC (3of7) —> Insular Savings and IVI Capital —> RCBC —> BOC
BOC = 7
RCBC = 0
Second Set of CB Bills
April 19, 1994, the RCBC, as registered owner sold two CB bills to the PDB. On even date, the PDB delivered to
Bancap the two CB bills. In turn, Bancap sold the CB bills to Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines,
which in turn sold it to the BOC.
Alternatively, the BSP asked that an interpleader suit be allowed between and among the claimants to the subject CB
bills on the position that while it is able and willing to pay the subject CB bills’ face value, it is duty bound to ensure
that payment is made to the rightful owner.
The PDB agreed with the BSP’s alternative response for an interpleader. However, the total face value of the subject
CB bills should be deposited in escrow with a private bank to be disposed of only upon order of the RTC. On
September 28, 2000, the RTC granted the BSP’s motion to interplead.
RCBC (2) —> PDB —> Bancap —> Islamic —> BOC
***BOC acquired/reacquired all the nine CB bills – the first and second sets of CB bills
On June 30, 1994, upon learning of the transfers involving the CB bills, the PDB informed BSP of PDB’s claim over
these CB bills based on the Detached Assignments in its possession. PDB requested the BSP to record its claim in the
BSP’s books, explaining that its non-possession of the CB bills is "on account of imperfect negotiations thereof and/or
subsequent setoff or transfer.” But BSP denied the request.
PDB clarified that it intends to put the BSP on formal notice that whoever is in possession of said bills is not a holder
in due course and therefore should not make payment upon presentation to them. BSP however responded that it was
not in a position to determine who is and who is not the holder in due course since it is not privy to all acts and time
involving the transfers or negotiation" of the CB bills.
On November 17, 1994, the PDB also asked BSP Deputy Governor Edgardo Zialcita that a notation in the BSP’s
books be made against the transfer but it was again denied, reiterating BSP’s previous stand.
32
In October 2000, the BOC filed its Amended Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, reiterating its
earlier arguments asserting ownership over the subject CB bills.
Without any opposition or objection from the PDB, on February 23, 2001, the RTC admitted the BOC’s Amended
Consolidated Answer with Compulsory Counterclaims.
In May 2001, the PDB filed an Omnibus Motion, questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction over the BOC’s "additional
counterclaims." PDB argues that its petitions pray for BSP (not the RTC) to determine who among the conflicting
claimants is the bona fide holder for value. That the RTC cannot entertain the BOC’s counterclaim, regardless of its
nature, because it is the BSP which has jurisdiction to determine who is entitled to receive the proceeds of the CB
bills.
In a January 10, 2002 Order, the RTC dismissed the PDB’s petition, the BOC’s counterclaim and the BSP’s countercomplaint/cross-claim for interpleader, holding that under CB Circular No. 28, it has no jurisdiction (i) over the BOC’s
"counterclaims" and (ii) to resolve the issue of ownership of the CB bills.
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With the denial of their separate motions for Reconsideration, the BOC and the BSP separately filed the present
petitions for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not an interpleader may be made through an answer?
HELD:
Yes. What is quite unique in this case is that the BSP did not initiate the interpleader suit through an original complaint
but through its Answer. This circumstance becomes understandable if it is considered that insofar as the BSP is
concerned, the PDB does not possess any right to have its claim recorded in the BSP’s books; consequently, the PDB
cannot properly be considered even as a potential claimant to the proceeds of the CB bills upon maturity. Thus, the
interpleader was only an alternative position, made only in the BSP’s Answer.
The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil action, is primarily governed by the specific provisions in Rule 62 of the
Rules of Court and secondarily by the provisions applicable to ordinary civil actions. Indeed, Rule 62 does not
expressly authorize the filing of a complaint-in-interpleader as part of, although separate and independent from, the
answer. Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court does not include a complaintin-interpleader as a claim, a form of defense, or as an objection that a defendant may be allowed to put up in his answer
or in a motion to dismiss. This does not mean, however, that the BSP’s "counter-complaint/cross-claim for
interpleader" runs counter to general procedures.
Apart from a pleading, the rules allow a party to seek an affirmative relief from the court through the procedural device
of a motion. While captioned "Answer with counter complaint/cross-claim for interpleader," the RTC understood this
as in the nature of a motion.
The rules define a "civil action" as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong." Interpleader may be considered as a stakeholder’s remedy to prevent a wrong,
that is, from making payment to one not entitled to it, thereby rendering itself vulnerable to lawsuit/s from those legally
entitled to payment.
Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of particular rules to govern the uniqueness of its application
and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, governing ordinary civil actions, a party’s claim is
asserted "in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention."
In an interpleader suit, however, a claim is not required to be contained in any of these pleadings but in the answer(of the conflicting claimants)-in-interpleader. This claim is different from the counter-claim (or cross-claim, third
party-complaint) which is separately allowed under Section 5, par. 2 of Rule 62.
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
1.
2.
3.
33
Nature; Kinds
Parties
Conversion into ordinary action
G.R. No. 150806
Almeda v. Bathala Marketing Ind.
January 28, 2008
Nachura, J.
FACTS: Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee, represented by its president Ramon H. Garcia, renewed its
Contract of Lease with Ponciano L. Almeda (Ponciano), as lessor, husband of petitioner Eufemia and father of
petitioner Romel Almeda. Under the said contract, Ponciano agreed to lease a portion of the Almeda Compound,
located at 2208 Pasong Tamo Street, Makati City, consisting of 7,348.25 square meters, for a monthly rental of
P1,107,348.69, for a term of four (4) years from May 1, 1997 unless sooner terminated as provided in the contract.
The contract of lease contained the following pertinent provisions which gave rise to the instant case:
SIXTH It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that the rental rate stipulated is based on the
present rate of assessment on the property, and that in case the assessment should hereafter be increased
or any new tax, charge or burden be imposed by authorities on the lot and building where the leased
premises are located, LESSEE shall pay, when the rental herein provided becomes due, the additional
rental or charge corresponding to the portion hereby leased; provided, however, that in the event that the
present assessment or tax on said property should be reduced, LESSEE shall be entitled to reduction in
the stipulated rental, likewise in proportion to the portion leased by him;
SEVENTH In case an extraordinary inflation or devaluation of Philippine Currency should supervene,
the value of Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of
payment;
During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Thereafter, respondent dealt with petitioners. In a letter,
petitioners advised respondent that the former shall assess and collect Value Added Tax (VAT) on its monthly rentals.
In response, respondent contended that VAT may not be imposed as the rentals fixed in the contract of lease were
supposed to include the VAT therein, considering that their contract was executed on May 1, 1997 when the VAT law
had long been in effect.
Respondent received another letter from petitioners informing the former that its monthly rental should be increased
by 73% pursuant to condition No. 7 of the contract and Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Respondent opposed petitioners'
demand and insisted that there was no extraordinary inflation to warrant the application of Article 1250 in light of the
pronouncement of this Court in various cases.
Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as demanded by petitioners but continued to pay the stipulated
amount set forth in their contract. Respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining
the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice
The trial court denied petitioners their right to pass on to respondent the burden of paying the VAT since it was not a
new tax that would call for the application of the sixth clause of the contract. The court, likewise, denied their right to
collect the demanded increase in rental, there being no extraordinary inflation or devaluation as provided for in the
seventh clause of the contract. Because of the payment made by respondent of the rental adjustment demanded by
petitioners, the court ordered the restitution by the latter to the former of the amounts paid, notwithstanding the wellestablished rule that in an action for declaratory relief, other than a declaration of rights and obligations, affirmative
reliefs are not sought by or awarded to the parties.
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The appellate court agreed with the conclusions of law and the application of the decisional rules on the matter made
by the RTC. However, it found that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in granting affirmative relief to the
respondent, particularly the restitution of its excess payment.
De Borja v. Pinalakas na Ugnayan ng Maliliit na Mangingisda
G.R. No. 185320
April 19, 2017
Jardeleza, J.
ISSUE: Whether the action for declaratory relief is proper;
HELD:
The court ruled in affirmative. Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows:
1.
the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute,
executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
2.
the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction;
3.
there must have been no breach of the documents in question;
4.
there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose
interests are adverse;
5.
the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and
6.
adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding
It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case, except that petitioners insist that
respondent was already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed.
We do not agree.
After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed, respondent complied with
the terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent
religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of the present suit. There is no showing
that respondent committed an act constituting a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred
from instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory relief.
Petitioners claim that the instant petition is not proper because a separate action for rescission, ejectment and damages
had been commenced before another court; thus, the construction of the subject contractual provisions should be
ventilated in the same forum.
We are not convinced.
It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation we held that the petition for declaratory
relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer. However, we
cannot apply the same ruling to the instant case. In Panganiban, the unlawful detainer case had already been
resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of the declaratory relief case; and it was petitioner in that case who
insisted that the action for declaratory relief be preferred over the action for unlawful detainer. Conversely, in the case
at bench, the trial court had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief
petition. In fact, the trial court, where the rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the suspension of the
proceedings pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief.
Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the instant declaratory relief action instead
of dismissing it, notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/rescission case before the trial court. The resolution
34
of the present petition would write finis to the parties' dispute, as it would settle once and for all the question of the
proper interpretation of the two contractual stipulations subject of this controversy.
FACTS: Petitioner Rosendo De Borja, a commercial fisihing operator, filed a petition for declaratory relief on
February 16, 2004. He asked the court to construe and declare his rights under Sec. 4(58) of R.A. 8550 or the
Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998. He asked the court to determine the reckoning point of the 15-kilometer range of
municipal waters, as provided under the Fisheries Code, in relation with Rule 4.1(a) of its IRR. Sec. 4(58) of the
Fisheries Code and Rule 4.1(a) of its IRR respectively read:
Sec. 4(58). Municipal waters - include not only streams, lakes, inland bodies of water and tidal waters
within the municipality which are not included within the protected areas as defined under R.A. No.
7586 (The NIPAS Law), public forest, timber lands, forest reserves or fishery reserves, but also marine
waters included between two (2) lines drawn perpendicular to the general coastline from points
where the boundary lines of the municipality touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel
with the general coastline including offshore islands and fifteen (15) kilometers from such
coastline. Where two (2) municipalities are so situated on opposite shores that there is less than thirty
(30) kilometers of marine waters between them, the third line shall be equally distant from the opposite
shore of the respective municipalities.
Rule 4.1(a) Coastline - refers to the outline of the mainland shore touching the sea at mean lower low
tide.
De Borja pleaded that the construction of the reckoning point of the 15 km range affects his rights because he is now
exposed to apprehensions and possible harrasments that may be brought by the conflicting interpretations of
the Fisheries Code. Further, he claimed that the varying constructions would spark conflict between fishermen and
law enforcers, and it would ultimately affect food security and defeat the purpose of the Fisheries Code.
Petitioner here did not implead any party as respondent in his petition. The RTC ruled that in interpreting the phrase
“and a third line parallel with the general coastline including offshore islands and fifteen (15) kilometers from such
coastline,” the “mainland principle” and not the “archipelagic principle” should be applied.
The CA, however, in its decision dated February 21, 2008, reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision, stating that De
Borja’s petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed due to prematurity. It ruled that the petition for declaratory
relief did not meet the two requisites for its propriety, namely: justiciable controversy and ripeness for judicial
determination. It ruled that there was no actual case or controversy regarding the definition of municipal waters for
municipalities with offshore islands because the DA has yet to issue guidelines with respect to these.
De Borja filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating that Rule 63, Sec. 1 allows any interested person to bring an action
for declaratory relief for the construction of a statute, such as the Fisheries Code. Hence, it may be the subject of a
petition for declaratory relief independent and regardless of the issuance of implementing guidelines, since
implementing rules only frlow from the statute. He also asserted that the controversy was ripe for judicial
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determination considering the diverse interpretations of the parties on the scope of the 15-km delineation. He prayed
for the CA to relax procedural rules and take cognizance of the petition.
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration on November 3, 2008. It restated that they may not act upon a
hypothetical issue that has not yet ripened into a justiciable controversy.
The court once again emphasizes that court action is discretionary in petitions for declaratory relief. The court
may refuse to construe the instrument or the statute involved, if the same is not necessary and proper under the
circumstances and/or if the construction would not terminate the controversy. The lack of a justiciable controversy,
the absence of agency action and the non-existence of a threatened direct injury make the construction inappropriate
and unripe.
Hence, the present petition for review.
The transcendental importance doctrine cannot remedy the procedural defects that accompany the petition at hand.
According to Justice Reynato Puno, “no amount of exigency can make this Court exercise a power where it is not
proper.” A petition for declaratory relief, like any other action, cannot prosper absent an actual controversy that is
ripe for judicial determination.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Borja’s petition for declaratory relief should prosper.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held in the negative.
The petition for declaratory relief is therefore DENIED.
For a petition for declaratory relief to prosper, it must be shown that the four requisites are present, namely:
1.
There is a justiciable controversy
2.
The controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse
3.
The party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy
4.
The issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination
The SC agreed with the CA’s findings that the case is not yet ripe for determination, as the CA held that it lacks the
first and fourth requisites. The SC, however, is of the position that it lacks all the requisites.
De Borja’s petition does not present a justiciable controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one as to warrant a court’s
intervention. A justiciable controversy is a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests, which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law. It must be
appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, admitting of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in
character. It must not be conjectural or merely anticipatory, which only seeks for an opinion that advises what the law
would be on a hypothetical state of facts.
De Borja failed to show in his petition for declaratory relief the factual allegations showing that his legal rights were
the subject of an imminent or threatened violation that should be prevented by the declaratory relief sought. He
anchored his petition on the possible harassments that may be brought about by conflicting interpretations of
the law. He neither established his legal interest in the controversy nor demonstrated the adverse interests between
him and others. He did not even implead any respondent and merely stated that he was engaged in fishing operations
in various fishing grounds within the internal waters of the Philippines.
Even if the OSG’s comment regarding the interpretation of the Fisheries Code opposed the petition, there would still
be no justiciable controversy for lack of allegation that any person has ever contested or threatened to contest De
Borja’s claim of fishing rights.
Simply put, De Borja’s petition does not contain ultimate facts to support his cause of action. De Borja merely wants
the court to give him an opinion on the proper interpretation of the definition of municipal waters. There is a
constitutional mandate for the SC to settle only actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and
enforceable. Furthermore, the grant of the petition would mean an intrusion into the domain of the executive,
preempting the actions of the DA and other concerned government agencies and stakeholders.
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G.R. No. 181303
Malana v. Tappa
September 17, 2009
Chico – Nazario, J.
FACTS: Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-127937 situated in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (subject property). Petitioners inherited
the subject property from Anastacio Danao (Anastacio), who died intestate. During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had
allowed Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo), who was married to Joaquin Boncad, to build on and occupy the southern portion
of the subject property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any time that
Anastacio and his heirs might need it.
Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelo's family members, continued to occupy the subject property even after
her death, already building their residences thereon using permanent materials. Petitioners also learned that
respondents were claiming ownership over the subject property. Averring that they already needed it, petitioners
demanded that respondents vacate the same. Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners' demand.
They first went to Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Annafunan West for conciliation. During the conciliation
proceedings, respondents asserted that they owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly supporting
their claim of ownership. According to petitioners, respondents' documents were highly dubious, falsified, and
incapable of proving the latter's claim of ownership over the subject property; nevertheless, they created a cloud upon
petitioners' title to the property. Thus, petitioners were compelled to file before the RTC a Complaint to remove such
cloud from their title. They also claimed for damages.
Before respondents could file their answer, the RTC issued an Order dated 4 May 2007 dismissing petitioners'
Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that the jurisdiction of the RTC over real actions is only
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that the subject property had a value
of less than P20,000.00. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC Order dismissing
their Complaint. They argued that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accion reivindicacion
was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from respondents. Petitioner's Complaint should not have
been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC. This was also denied.
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Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, praying to dismiss the two RTC orders for the reason
that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the RTC. They also contended that there was no obstacle to their joining the two causes of action, i.e., quieting of title
and reivindicacion, in a single Complaint. It was denied. The RTC dissected Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court.
The RTC differentiated between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
The first paragraph refers to an action for declaratory relief, which should be brought before the RTC. The second
paragraph, however, refers to a different set of remedies, which includes an action to quiet title to real property.
This Court maintains that an action to quiet title is a real action. [Herein petitioners] do not dispute the assessed value
of the property at P410.00 under Tax Declaration No. 02-48386. Hence, it has no jurisdiction over the action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action filed by the petitioner is an action for declaratory relief.
HELD:
No. An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other
written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The
relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument
and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder.
Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly made a distinction
between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general circumstances in which a
person may file a petition for declaratory relief. As the provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63, on the other hand, specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation
of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by
Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil
Code in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because
they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the
judgment into effect.
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to
quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" which denotes that the provision is merely
permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word
"shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which
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involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00. As found by the
RTC, the assessed value of the subject property is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners' Complaint involving title to
and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the
instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to
secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract
for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an
alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to
which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached
the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set
controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts
can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In the present case, petitioners' Complaint for quieting of title was
filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said
Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latter's express claim of ownership over the subject property before the
Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners' title. Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they
had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief.
G.R. No. 202242
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council
July 17, 2012
Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Former Solicitor General Francisco “Frank” Chavez, who was recommended as a nominee for the position
of chief justice after the unexpected departure of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona,, filed a petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court wherein he insists that the JBC, which screens and vets applications for judiciary positions, should
only have seven members against the council’s current eight-member set-up.
Instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress
began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half
(1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the
legislature.
In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one member of Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of
having two representatives from each House of Congress with one vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution. Chavez
contends that the phrase “ a representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress should have one
representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory components of “congress” as part of the
bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec
8 of the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative from
congress.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the SC may assume jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief which is properly
cognizable by the RTC?
Juanito filed Civil Case for quieting of title and preliminary injunction, against petitioners Atty. Sabitsana and his
wife, Rosario, claiming that the latter bought the lot in bad faith and are exercising acts of possession and ownership
over the same, which acts thus constitute a cloud over his title.
HELD:
Yes. Pursuant to the rule that the nature of an action is determined by the allegations therein and the character of the
relief sought, the Court views the petition as essentially an action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of Section 8 (1),
Article VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as that which would result in the adjudication
of rights sans the execution process because the only relief to be granted is the very declaration of the rights under the
document sought to be construed. It being so, the original jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate
Regional Trial Court (RTC).
In their Answer with Counterclaim, petitioners asserted mainly that the sale to Juanito is null and void absent the
marital consent of Garcia’s wife, Soledad Corto; that they acquired the property in good faith and for value; and that
the Complaint is barred by prescription and laches. They likewise insisted that the RTC of Naval, Biliran did not have
jurisdiction over the case, which involved title to or interest in a parcel of land the assessed value of which is merely
₱1,230.00.
Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an action for declaratory relief is not
among those within the original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to government processes involved but also to the sanctity of the
Constitution, the Court deems it more prudent to take cognizance of it. After all, the petition is also for prohibition
under Rule 65 seeking to enjoin Congress from sending two (2) representatives with one (1) full vote each to the JBC.
HELD:
Yes, the RTCourt has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title.
With respect to the question of transcendental importance, it is not difficult to perceive from the opposing arguments
of the parties that the determinants established in jurisprudence are attendant in this case: (1) the character of the funds
or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party
with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised. The allegations of constitutional violations in
this case are not empty attacks on the wisdom of the other branches of the government. The allegations are
substantiated by facts and, therefore, deserve an evaluation from the Court. The Court need not elaborate on the legal
and societal ramifications of the issues raised. It cannot be gainsaid that the JBC is a constitutional innovation crucial
in the selection of the magistrates in our judicial system.
G.R. No. 181359
Sabitsana v. Muertegi
August 5, 2013
On the question of jurisdiction, it is clear under the Rules that an action for quieting of title may be instituted in the
RTCs, regardless of the assessed value of the real property in dispute. Under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, an action
to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom may be brought in the appropriate RTC.
It must be remembered that the suit for quieting of title was prompted by petitioners’ August 24, 1998 letter-opposition
to respondent’s application for registration. Thus, in order to prevent a cloud from being cast upon his application for
a title, respondent filed Civil Case No. B-1097 to obtain a declaration of his rights. In this sense, the action is one for
declaratory relief, which properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules.
G.R. No. 209331
Department of Finance v. De La Cruz
August 24, 2015
Carpio, J.
FACTS: The case stemmed from the issuance of Executive Order No. 140 (EO 140) on 2 September 2013, which
created the Customs Policy Research Office (CPRO) in the Department of Finance (DOF).
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: Alberto Garcia executed an unnotarized Deed of Sale in favor of respondent Juanito Muertegui(Juanito) over
a 7,500-square meter parcel of unregistered land (the lot) in Leyte del Norte. Juanito’s father Domingo Muertegui, Sr.
and brother Domingo Jr. took actual possession of the lot and planted thereon coconut and ipil-ipil trees.
Later, Garcia sold the same lot to the Muertegui family lawyer, Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. (petitioner), through
a notarized deed of absolute sale. The sale was then registered with the Register of Deeds.
When Domingo Sr. passed away, his heirs applied for registration and coverage of the lot under the Public Land Act
or Commonwealth Act No. 141. However, Atty. Sabitsana opposed the application, claiming that he was the true
owner of the lot. He asked that the application for registration be held in abeyance until the issue of conflicting
ownership has been resolved.
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ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the suit for quieting of title
On the same day of the publication of EO 140, Bureau of Customs (BOC) Commissioner Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon
(Commissioner Biazon) issued Customs Personnel Order No. B-189-2013 (CPO 189-2013) detailing 27 BOC
personnel holding the positions of Collector of Customs V and VI, including respondents in this case, to CPRO
"effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked."
Respondents filed an action for Declaratory Relief with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Executive Judge Dela Cruz issued a TRO
for a period of 72 hours enjoining petitioners or any person acting for and in their behalf from implementing CPO
189-2013.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before this Court, with prayer for the issuance of a TRO or a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Petitioners alleged that the case involves personnel action affecting public
officers which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Petitioners also alleged that
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CPO 189-2013 is an internal personnel order with application that is limited to and only within BOC and as such, it
cannot be the subject of an action for declaratory relief.
In their Comment, respondents alleged that the case involves the validity and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013, and
thus, it is beyond the jurisdiction of the CSC.
In their Reply, petitioners alleged that respondents only assailed the validity of EO 140 to justify their filing of an
action for declaratory relief.
Judge Laron-Cacanindin denied respondents' application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief filed by respondents;
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. The CSC is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service. The rule
is that disciplinary cases and cases involving personnel actions, including "appointment through certification,
promotion, transfer, reinstatement, reemployment, detail, reassignment, demotion, and separation," are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the CSC.
A reading of the petition filed before the RTC shows that respondents were questioning their mass detail and
reassignment to CPRO. According to respondents, their detail was carried out in bad faith and was meant to remove
them from their permanent positions in the BOC. The action appears to be a personnel action under the jurisdiction of
the CSC.
However, the petition went beyond questioning the detail of respondents. Respondents further assailed the validity
and constitutionality of CPO 189-2013. Respondents alleged that CPO 189-2013 was issued even before EC) 140,
pursuant to which CPO 189-2013 was issued, became effective. Respondents alleged that CPO 189-2013 was issued
to beat the deadline of the Commission on Elections' ban on personnel movement from 28 September 2013 to 20
October 2013 due to the scheduled barangay elections. When respondents raised the issue of validity and
constitutionality of CPO 189-2013, the issue took the case beyond the scope of the CSC's jurisdiction because the
matter is no longer limited to personnel action. Thus, the RTC did not abuse its discretion in taking cognizance of the
action.
A.M. No. RTJ – 15 – 2407
Erice v. Sison
November 22, 2017
Caguio, J.
FACTS: Edgar Erice filed a complaint against Mayor, Enrico Echiverri, City Treasurer Evelina Garma, Budget
Officer Jesusa Garcia and Accountant Edna Centeno before the Office of the Ombudsman for alleged violation of the
Government Service Insurance System Act. An Order of Preventive Suspension was issued by the Ombudsman against
Echiverri, et.al. who elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. A TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction was
obtained by Echiverri, et.al. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of Suspension of the Ombudsman and
lifted and set aside the TRO.
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A week later, Echiverri et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with RTC Caloocan. Echiverri et al. prayed that RTC “make a definite judicial declaration on the rights
and obligations of the parties asserting adverse legal interests with respect to the implementation of [their] suspension.”
RTC Executive Judge Kwong issued a 72-hour ex-parte Order to enjoin DILG and Erice from implementing the Order
of Suspension but the case was raffled and assigned to Judge Bordios who inhibited herself. The case was re-raffled
to the respondent Judge Sison.
Erice and DILG reiterated their Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Dissolve. However, Judge Sison still proceeded
with the summary hearing and allowed Echiverri, et.al. to present their evidence despite the OSG not being informed
of such hearing. At the continuation of the summary hearing, the OSG invoked its right to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by Echiverri, et.al. but Judge Sison denied the same and issued and order extending the TRO to 20 days.
Erice then filed an Urgent Motion to Inhibit. Without ruling on the Motion to Inhibit, Judge Sison issued an Order
granting the writ of preliminary injunction.
The OCA recommended that: x x x [R]espondent Judge be found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and FINED
in the amount equivalent to his one (1) month salary with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall
be dealt with more severely.
The OCA found that Judge Sison's act of issuing a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction against Erice and the DILG
to enjoin the latter from enforcing the Ombudsman's Order of Suspension constitutes a violation of Section 14 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 6770, which provides:
SEC. 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject
matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Sison properly took cognizance of the Petition for Declaratory Relief despite the Order
of Preventive Suspension issued by the Ombudsman.
HELD:
No. Notably, the Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases are appealable to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court. Consequently, the RTC had no jurisdiction to interfere with or restrain the execution of the Ombudsman's
decisions in disciplinary cases, more so, because at the time Judge Sison issued the TRO on January 10, 2012 and
proceeded with the writ of preliminary injunction on January 17, 2012 against the enforcement of the Ombudsman
Order of Suspension, the CA had already affirmed that very same Order of Suspension in its Decision dated January
2, 2012.
In any event, Judge Sison should have, at the very least, been aware that court orders or decisions cannot be the subject
matter of a petition for declaratory relief. They are not included within the purview of the words "other written
instrument" in Rule 63 of the Rules of Court governing petitions for declaratory relief. The same principle applies to
orders, resolutions, or decisions of quasi-judicial bodies, and this is anchored on the principle of res judicata.
Consequently, a judgment rendered by a court or a quasi-judicial body is conclusive on the parties, subject only to
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appellate authority The losing party cannot modify or escape the effects of judgment under the guise of an action for
declaratory relief.
Here, Echiverri, et al.'s Petition for Declaratory Relief specifically prayed that the RTC "make a definite judicial
declaration on the rights and obligations of the parties asserting adverse legal interests with respect to the
implementation of the [order of] preventive suspension," effectively putting into question the CA-affirmed
Ombudsman Order of Suspension - a matter clearly beyond the ambit of the RTC's jurisdiction. This, coupled with
the deference to the basic precepts of jurisdiction required of judges, leads to no other conclusion than that Judge Sison
acted in gross ignorance of the law in proceeding with the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
REVIEW OF JUDGMENTS AND FINAL ORDERS OF THE COMELEC AND COA
to an evasion or a refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an
act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross.
We herein take the opportunity to reiterate the well-established principle that the rule that factual findings of
administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no
substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC,
as the framers of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC — created and explicitly made independent by
the Constitution itself — on a level higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to
ascertain the true results of the election by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound
by the rules of evidence.
CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS
The distinctive nature and procedure of this special civil action
G.R. No. 206987
Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy v. COMELEC
September 10, 2013
CERTIORARI
Perez, J.
FACTS: On 7 November 2012, the COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution cancelling petitioner's Certificate
of Registration and/or Accreditation on three grounds: first, the petitioner does not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; that there was no proof showing that its nominees were actually nominated by ANAD itself;
and that ANAD had failed to submit its Statement of Contrbutions and Expenditures as required by law.
ANAD challenged the COMELEC’s affirmation of the cancellation of its Certificate of Registration and/or
Accreditation and disqualified it from participating in the 2013 elections. ANAD claims that the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion when it promulgated the assailed Resolution without giving ANAD the benefit of a summary
evidentiary hearing, thus violating its right to due process. It is to be noted, however, that ANAD was already afforded
a summary hearing on 23 August 2013, during which Mr. Domingo M. Balang, ANAD's president, authenticated
documents and answered questions from the members of the COMELEC pertinent to ANAD's qualifications.
The COMELEC held that while ANAD can be classified as a sectoral party lacking in well-defined political
constituencies, its disqualification still subsists for violation of election laws and regulations, particularly for its failure
to submit at least five nominees, and for its failure to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.
1.
2.
3.
Grounds
Requirements
Procedure; Parties and Effects
G.R. No. 192685
Ampil v. Ombudsman
July 31, 2013
Perez, J.
FACTS: ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance Company (MICO) entered into a Joint Project
Development Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of a condominium building to be known as "The Malayan
Tower." Under the JPDA, MICO shall provide the real property located at the heart of the Ortigas Business District,
Pasig City, while ASB would construct, and shoulder the cost of construction and development of the condominium
building.
A year thereafter, MICO and ASB entered into another contract, with MICO selling to ASB the land it was contributing
under the JPDA. Under the Contract to Sell, ownership of the land will vest on ASB only upon full payment of the
purchase price.
HELD:
No. The only question that may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is
whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. For a
petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.
Sometime in 2000, ASB, as part of the ASB Group of Companies, filed a Petition for Rehabilitation with Prayer for
Suspension of Actions and Proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As a result, the SEC
issued a 60-day Suspension Order (a) suspending all actions for claims against the ASB Group of Companies pending
or still to be filed with any court, office, board, body, or tribunal; (b) enjoining the ASB Group of Companies from
disposing of their properties in any manner, except in the ordinary course of business, and from paying their liabilities
outstanding as of the date of the filing of the petition; and (c) appointing Atty. Monico V. Jacob as interim receiver of
the ASB Group of Companies.Subsequently, the SEC, over the objections of creditors, approved the Rehabilitation
Plan submitted by the ASB Group of Companies.
"Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power
due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts
Because of the obvious financial difficulties, ASB was unable to perform its obligations to MICO under the JPDA
and the Contract to Sell. Thus, on 30 April 2002, MICO and ASB executed their Third contract, a Memorandum of
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in promulgating the assailed Resolution without
the benefit of a summary evidentiary hearing mandated by the due process clause
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Agreement (MOA), allowing MICO to assume the entire responsibility for the development and completion of The
Malayan Tower. The MOA specifies the entitlement of both ASB and MICO to net saleable areas of The Malayan
Tower representing their investments.
Hence, this recourse by Ampil. Challenged in the petition for certiorari is the Resolution of the Ombudsman in
dismissing the criminal complaint filed by Ampil against respondents Espenesin, Serrano, Yuchengco and Cheng, and
the Order denying Ampil’s motion for reconsideration thereof.
On 11 March 2005, Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) for 38 units and the allotted parking spaces were issued
in the name of ASB. On even date but prior to its release, another set of CCTs covering the same subject units but
with MICO as registered owner thereof, was signed by Espenesin in his capacity as Registrar of Deeds of Pasig City.
Notably, Espenesin had likewise signed the CCTs which were originally issued in ASB’s name.
ISSUE: Whether or not certiorari will lie?
Counsel for ASB wrote Espenesin calling his attention to the supposed amendment in the CCTs which he had
originally issued in ASB’s name. Counsel for ASB demanded that Espenesin effect in the second set of CCTs, the
registration of the subject units in The Malayan Tower back to ASB’s name.
After learning of the amendment in the CCTs issued in ASB’s name, Ampil, on 23 January 2007, wrote respondents
Yuchengco and Cheng, President and Chief Financial Officer of MICO, respectively, introducing himself as an
unsecured creditor of ASB Holdings, Inc., one of the corporations forming part of the ASB Group of Companies.
Ampil averred that MICO had illegally registered in its name the subject units at The Malayan Tower which were
reserved for ASB under the MOA, and actually, already registered in ASB’s name with the Register of Deeds of Pasig
City. Ampil pointed out that the "condominium units should have benefited him and other unsecured creditors of ASB
because the latter had categorically informed them previously that the same would be contributed to the Asset Pool
created under the Rehabilitation Plan of the ASB Group of Companies." Ultimately, Ampil demanded that Yuchengco
and Cheng rectify the resulting error in the CCTs, and facilitate the registration of the subject units back to ASB’s
name.
Respondents paid no heed to ASB’s and Ampil’s demands. Ampil charged respondents with Falsification of Public
Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No.
3019 before the Office of the Ombudsman. Alleging that respondents, in conspiracy, erased the name of ASB, and
intercalated and substituted the name of MICO under the entry of registered owner in the questioned CCTs covering
the subject units of The Malayan Tower; and Ampil, as unsecured creditor of ASB, was unjustly prejudiced by the
felonious acts of respondents.
Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution dismissing Ampil’s complaint. For the Ombudsman, the resolution of
whether respondents falsified the CCTs must be prefaced by a determination of who, between MICO and ASB, is the
rightful owner of the subject units. The Ombudsman held that it had no authority to interpret the provisions of the
MOA and, thus, refrained from resolving the preliminary question of ownership. Given the foregoing, the Ombudsman
was hard pressed to make a categorical finding that the CCTs were altered to speak something false. In short, the
Ombudsman did not have probable cause to indict respondents for falsification of the CCTs because the last element
of the crime, i.e., that the change made the document speak something false, had not been established.
Ampil filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Ombudsman denied Ampil’s motion and affirmed the dismissal of his
complaint. Thereafter, Ampil filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the appellate court.
And as already stated, the appellate court affirmed the Ombudsman’s resolution.
40
HELD:
In all, Ampil maintains that the Ombudsman’s absolution of respondents is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
This petition is partially impressed with merit. Accordingly, we find grave abuse of discretion in the Ombudsman’s
incomplete disposition of Ampil’s complaint.
That the Ombudsman is a constitutional officer duty bound to "investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient" brooks no objection. The Ombudsman’s conduct of preliminary investigation is both
power and duty.
Plainly, the Ombudsman has "full discretion," based on the attendant facts and circumstances, to determine the
existence of probable cause or the lack thereof. On this score, we have consistently hewed to the policy of noninterference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers. The Ombudsman’s finding to
proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal case can only be assailed through certiorari proceedings before this
Court on the ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of discretion which contemplates an abuse so
grave and so patent equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, on several occasions, we have interfered with the Ombudsman’s discretion in determining probable cause:
1.
To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
2.
When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
3.
When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
4.
When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
5.
Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
6.
When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7.
Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8.
Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
9.
Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.
The fourth circumstance is present in G.R. No. 192685. While we agree with the Ombudsman’s disquisition that there
is no probable cause to indict respondents for Falsification of Public Documents under Article 171(6) of the Revised
Penal Code, we are puzzled why the Ombudsman completely glossed over Ampil’s charge that respondents committed
prohibited acts listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Nowhere in the Resolution or in the Order
denying reconsideration thereof did the Ombudsman tackle and resolve the issue of whether respondents violated the
particular provisions of Republic Act No. 3019.
Despite the admission by Espenesin that he had altered the CCTs and the Ombudsman’s findings thereon, the
Ombudsman abruptly dismissed Ampil’s complaint-affidavit, resolving only one of the charges contained therein with
nary a link regarding the other charge of violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Indeed, as found
by the Ombudsman, the 4th element of the crime of Falsification of Public Documents is lacking, as the actual
ownership of the subject units at The Malayan Tower has yet to be resolved. Nonetheless, this circumstance does not
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detract from, much less diminish, Ampil’s charge, and the evidence pointing to the possible commission, of offenses
under Sections 3(a) and (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Aggrieved, AL Ang Network Inc filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the RTC,
ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC.
We likewise stress that the determination of probable cause does not require certainty of guilt for a crime. As the term
itself implies, probable cause is concerned merely with probability and not absolute or even moral certainty; it is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. It is sufficient that based on the preliminary investigation conducted,
it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. The term does not mean "actual
and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari, finding that the said petition was only filed to circumvent the non-appealable
nature of small claims cases as provided under Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure on Small Claims Cases. To this
end, the RTC ruled that it cannot supplant the decision of the MTCC with another decision directing Mondejar to pay
Al Ang Network a bigger sum than that which has been awarded.AL Ang Network moved for reconsideration but was
denied. Hence, the instant petition.
On the whole, there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that respondents Espenesin and Serrano
committed prohibited acts listed in Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
the propriety of the MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case.
We are aware that the calibration of evidence to assess whether a prima facie graft case exists against respondents is
a question of fact. We have consistently held that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration
of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor law are entertained, but only questions of
lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. In this case, however, certiorari will lie, given that the
Ombudsman made no finding at all on respondents possible liability for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic
Act No. 3019.
HELD:
YES. AL Ang Network Inc correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to assail the propriety of the MTCC Decision
in the subject small claims case, contrary to the RTC’s ruling.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 192685 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolution of the Ombudsman
dated 30 April 2008 in OMB-C-C-07-0444-J is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to
file the necessary Information for violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 against public respondent
Policarpio L. Espenesin and private respondent Francis Serrano.
G.R. No. 200804
A.L. Ang Network, Inc. v. Mondejar
January 22, 2014
Perlas – Bernabe, J.
FACTS: AL Ang Network Inc was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment from MONDEJAR as one
of the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision. Mondejar left her balance unpaid. Thus, AL Ang Network Inc filed
a complaint for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC to collect
Mondejar’s unpaid water bills from June 1, 2002 to September 30, 2005.
Mondejar contended that she religiously paid the monthly flat rate of ₱75.00 for her water consumption from April
1998 up to February 2003. She claimed that she was unilaterally charged unreasonable and excessive adjustments
without prior notice. However, AL Ang Network disconnected Mondejar’s water line for not paying the adjusted water
charges since March 2003 up to August 2005.
MTCC held that since petitioner was issued a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) by the National Water
Resources Board (NWRB) only on August 7, 2003, it can only charge Mondejar the agreed flat rate of ₱75.00 per
month prior thereto. MTCC noted that AL Ang Network failed to submit evidence showing (a) the exact date when it
actually began imposing the NWRB approved rates; and (b) that the parties had a formal agreement containing the
terms and conditions thereof, without which it cannot establish with certainty respondent’s obligation. Thus, the earlier
agreed rate of ₱75.00 per month should still be the basis for Mondejar’s water consumption charges.
41
Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases
SEC. 23. Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day, based on
the facts established by the evidence (Form 13-SCC). The decision shall immediately be entered by the
Clerk of Court in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.
The decision shall be final and unappealable.
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the remedy of appeal is not
allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on
appeals in small claims cases, similar to other proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude
the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Verily, a petition for certiorari, unlike an appeal, is an original action designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction
and not of judgment. Owing to its nature, it is therefore incumbent upon petitioner to establish that jurisdictional errors
tainted the MTCC Decision. The RTC, in turn, could either grant or dismiss the petition based on an evaluation of
whether or not the MTCC gravely abused its discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding
evidence that is material to the controversy.
Likewise, the Court finds that AL Ang Network Inc filed the said petition before the proper forum (i.e., the RTC). To
be sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of
certiorari. Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a party unbridled freedom to choose the venue of
his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy
dictates that petitions for the issuance of writs of certiorari against first level courts should be filed with the Regional
Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the Court. This
procedure is also in consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions
assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied
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with when it instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has jurisdiction over
the same. In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground that it was an improper remedy, and, as
such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and remanded thereto for its proper disposition.
G.R. No. 190566
Maglalang v. PAGCOR
December 11, 2013
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it on the
ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?
Villarama, J.
FACTS: Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch, Angeles City, which was operated by
respondent PAGCOR, a government-owned or controlled corporation. Petitioner alleged that in the afternoon of
December 13, 2008, while he was performing his functions as teller, a lady customer identified as one Cecilia Nakasato
(Cecilia) approached him in his booth and handed to him an undetermined amount of cash consisting of mixed
P1,000.00 and P500.00 bills (totaling 50,000). However, he erroneously spread the bills into only four clusters instead
of five clusters worth P10,000.00 per cluster. He then declared the total amount of P40,000.00 to Cecilia. Perplexed,
Cecilia asked petitioner why the latter only dished out P40,000.00. Upon recounting, petitioner found that he made a
mistake and apologized to Cecilla. He rectified the error by declaring the full and correct amount. However, petitioner
said that Cecilia accused him of trying to shortchange her and that petitioner tried to deliberately fool her of her money.
An argument ensued between the parties and they were eventually invited to the casino's Internal Security Office in
order to air their respective sides.
On January 8, 2009, petitioner received a Memorandum from the casino, informing him that he was being charged
with Discourtesy towards a casino customer and directing him to explain within 72 hours upon receipt why he should
not be sanctioned or dismissed. Petitioner complied and submitted a letter-explanation.
On March 31, 2009, petitioner received another Memorandum 9 dated March 19, 2009, stating that the Board of
Directors of PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino customer and imposed on him a 30-day
suspension for this first offense. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration that if he is indeed guilty,
the penalty should only be a reprimand. This however was denied.
On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, before the CA, averring that there is no evidence, much less factual and legal basis to support the finding of
guilt against him. petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts
of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its
decision.
Justifying his recourse to the CA, petitioner explained that he did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension which is not within the CSC's appellate jurisdiction.
He also claimed that discourtesy in the performance of official duties is classified as a light offense which is punishable
only by reprimand.
In its assailed Resolution dated September 30, 2009, the CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being
premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse from the CA. The CA held
that the CSC has jurisdiction over issues involving the employer-employee relationship in all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including GOCCs with original charters such as PAGCOR.
Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied.
42
Hence, this petition
HELD:
NO. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him
or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative
officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy
should be exhausted first before the court's judicial power can be sought.
However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the following exceptions:
1.
when there is a violation of due process;
2.
when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3.
when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
4.
when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5.
when there is irreparable injury;
6.
when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied
and assumed approval of the latter;
7.
when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8.
when it would amount to a nulli cation of a claim;
9.
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10.
when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
11.
when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would
greatly prejudice the complainant;
12.
where no administrative review is provided by law;
13.
where the rule of quali ed political agency applies and (14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot.
The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no administrative review
for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations
and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days.
Section 37 of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, provides for the
unavailability of any appeal. Nevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are declared fi nal and
unappealable by law are still subject to judicial review.
In Republic of the Phils. v. Francisco, the court held that decisions of administrative or quasi- administrative agencies
which are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or
upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies
grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse
the factual findings.Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or reversed via petition for
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certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
3.
It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action for
certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not
an appeal. Appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from
each other. One cannot file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the
ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there
is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Despite opposition, the CTA dismissed the case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr.in its March 26, 2013 Resolution, for
failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. According to the CTA, "no proof
whatsoever was presented by the prosecution showing that the certified true copies of the public documents offered
in evidence against both accused were in fact issued by the legal custodians." It cited Section 26, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides that "when the original of a document is a public record, it should not generally
be removed from the office or place in which it is kept."9 As stated in Section 7, Rule 130,10 its contents may be
proven using secondary evidence and such evidence may pertain to the certified true copy of the original document
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Hence, the CTA wrote that the certified true copies of the public
documents offered in evidence should have been presented in court.
There being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's
allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non- exhaustion
of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be set aside.
G.R. No. 208290
People v. Castaneda
December 11, 2013
Per curiam
FACTS: Myrna Garcia and Custodio Vestidas, Jr. were charged before the CTA of falsely declaring goods.
Myrna M. Garcia and Custodio Mendoza Vestidas, Jr. as owner/proprietress and broker of Plinth Enterprise
respectively, conspiring and confederating with each other, with intent to defraud the government, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and fraudulently import into the Port of Manila, 858 cartons of 17,160 pieces of Anti-Virus
Software Kaspersky Internet Security Premium 2012, subject to customs duties,by misdeclaration under Import Entry
No. C-181011 and Bill of Lading No. PFCMAN1715, filed with the Bureau of Customs (BOC),covering One Forty
Footer (1x40) container van shipment bearing No. KKFU7195683 which was falsely declared to contain 40
pallets/1,690 cartons of CD kit cleaner and plastic CD case, said imported items having customs duties amounting to
Three Million Three Hundred Forty One Thousand Two Hundred Forty Five Pesos (Php 3,341,245) of which only the
amount of One Hundred Thousand Three Hundred Sixty Two Pesos (Php100,362) was paid, in violation of the abovecaptioned law, and to the prejudice and damage of the Government in the amount of Three Million Two Hundred
Forty Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Three Pesos (Php3,240,883).
Trial ensued. The prosecution presented a number of witnesses whose essentially observed the physical examination
of Container Van No. KKFU 7195638 conducted by the Bureau of Customs (BOC) and explained the process of
electronic filing under the Electronic to Mobile (E2M) Customs Systems of the BOC and the alleged misdeclared
goods therein.
Subsequent to the presentation of witnesses, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Evidence. On January 15, 2013,
Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. filed their Omnibus Motion to File Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of Court to Cancel
Hearing, which was granted by the CTA. Thereafter, they filed the Demurrer to Evidence, dated January 13, 2012,
claiming that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the following reasons:
1.
The pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in court;
2.
The object evidence consisting of the allegedly misdeclared goods were not presented as evidence; and
43
None of the witnesses for the prosecution made a positive identification of the two accused as the ones
responsible for the supposed misdeclaration.
Anent its offer of private documents,11 the prosecution likewise failed to comply with Section 27, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, which reads, "[a]n authorized public record of a private document may be proved by the original
record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such
officer has the custody." Considering that the private documents were submitted and filed with the BOC, the same
became part of public records. Again, the records show that the prosecution failed to present the certified true copies
of the documents.
The CTA noted that, in its Opposition to the Demurrer, the prosecution even admitted that none of their witnesses
ever positively identified the accused in open court and that the alleged misdeclared goods were not competently and
properly identified in court by any of the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution filed its motion for reconsideration,
but it was denied by the CTA.
On July 24, 2013, the Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring Group (RCMG), as
counsel for the BOC, received a copy of the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment in
the case. Hence, this petition for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CTA when in ruled
that: 1) the pieces of documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution were inadmissible in evidence; 2) the object
evidence consisting of the alleged misdeclared goods were not presented as evidence; and 3) the witnesses failed to
positively identify the accused as responsible for the misdeclaration of goods.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CTA was correct in ordering the dismissal of the case against respondents.
HELD:
Court ruled in affirmative. At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period
for the filing under Rule 65. The petition itself stated that a copy of the 15 May 2013 Resolution was received by the
BOC 2 days after its promulgation, or on 17 May 2013. RATS was only alerted by the developments in the case on
24 July 2013, when Atty. Campos received the 15 July 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the entry of judgment in
the case, considering that no appeal was taken by any of the parties. According to Atty. Campos, it was only on that
occasion when he discovered the 15 May 2013 Resolution of the CTA. Thus, it was prayed that the petition be given
due course despite its late filing.
Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that certiorari should be instituted within
a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is
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inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy
disposition of their case. While there are recognized exceptions to such strict observance, there should be an effort on
the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply
with the rules.
No convincing justification for the belated filing of the petition was advanced to warrant the relaxation of the Rules.
Notably, the records show that the petition was filed only on August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the due
date which fell on July 16, 2013. To excuse this grave procedural lapse will not only be unfair to the other party, but
it will also sanction a seeming rudimentary attempt to circumvent standing rules of procedure. The late filing of the
petition was borne out of the petitioner’s failure to monitor incoming court processes that needed to be addressed by
the office. Clearly, this is an admission of inefficiency
Even if the Court decides to suspend the rules and permit this recourse, the end result would remain the same. While
a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, it must be shown that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial
of due process. A perusal of the challenged resolutions of the CTA does not disclose any indication of grave abuse of
discretion on its part or denial of due process. The records are replete with indicators that the petitioner actively
participated during the trial and, in fact, presented its offer of evidence and opposed the demurrer.
G.R. No. 110280
UP Board of Regents v. Ligot
October 12, 1993
Romero, J.
FACTS: The UP administration, in an effort to make the UP the university of the people, conceptualized and
implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program
(STFAP), popularly known as the “Iskolar ng Bayan” program. STFAP aspired to expand the coverage of government
educational subsidies so as to include the deserving in the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder.
The UP Board of Regents issued a resolution on April 28, 1988 establishing the STFAP. A year later, it was granted
official recognition when the Congress allocated a portion of the national budget for its implementation. Applicants
are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among others, they state the amount and source of the annual income
of the family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which the University may evaluate
their financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets. At the end the application
form, the student applicant, as well as his parent, signs a sworn statement.
Measures were adopted to safeguard the integrity of the program and one such measure was the inclusion as one of
the punishable acts of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of the University the deliberate
falsification or suppression/withholding of any material information required in the application form.
To further insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling scheme of verification of data indicated in a student’s
application form is undertaken. Among those who applied for the STFAP benefits for SY 1989-1990 was Ramon P.
Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law.
Nadal’s aunt was interviewed and the team submitted a home visit report finding discrepancies between the report and
his application form. The same was presented to the Diliman Committee on Scholarships and Financial Assistance. In
44
compliance with the Committee’s directive, Bella Villanueva (head of the Office of Scholarships and Student
Services) wrote Nadal informing him that the investigation showed that the had failed to declare a 1977 Corolla car
owned by his brother, as well as his mother’s income who was supporting his two brothers. He was also informed that
he was reclassified as Bracket 9 from Bracket 4, retroactive to June 1989, unless he is able to submit proof to toe
contrary. Nadal was required to pay back the equivalent amount of school fees with interest based on current
commercial rates. Failure to settle his amount would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the
withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be referred to the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation.
On July 12, 1991, Nadal issued a certification stating that his mother migrated to the US in 1981 but because she has
not yet been legalized, she has not been able to find a steady source of income. He also stated that his mother, along
with one of his brothers, was shouldering the expenses of his two younger brothers’ college education.
UP then charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal on August 23, 1991, noting further discrepancies
between his application form and the certification. After hearing, on October 27, 1992, the SDT rendered a decision
exculpating him from the charge of deliberately withholding information that he is maintaining a Toyota Corolla but
finding him guilty of willfully and deliberately withholding information about his mother’s income, tantamount to
acts of dishonesty in relation to his studies. The penalty for this was expulsion and the reimbursement of all STFAP
benefits he received.
The decision was automatically elevated to the Executive Committee of UP Diliman for review. The committee
affirmed the SDT decision. Nadal then appealed to the Board of Regents but the BOR affirmed the SDT decision, but
because the BOR was wiling to extend compassion to his situation as well as his mother’s TNT situation in the US,
the penalty was modified from expulsion to one-year suspension, effective immediately, plus reimbursement of
all benefits received from STFAP, with legal interest. He was also denied a certification of good moral
character.
Nadal filed a motion for reconsideration from the BOR decision, and UP filed an opposition against the said motion.
After several meetings by the BOR, they imposed the penalties of suspension for one (1) year effective March 29,
1993, non-issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not
reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest per annum from march 30, 1993 and non-issuance
of his transcript of records until he has settled his financial obligations with the university.
On April 22, 1993, Nadal filed with the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and a prayer
for a temporary restraining order against President Abueva, BOR, and several others.
Nadal contends that he was not afforded due process when, after the board meeting on March 28, 1993 that resulted
in a decision of NOT GUILTY in his favor, the Chairman of the UP BOR without notice to him, called another meeting
for the following day to deliberate on his motion for reconsideration, which then resulted to a decision of GUILTY.
The RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the UP BOR from implementing the decision made in
March 29, 1993.
Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition, citing
whether or not Nadal was denied due process, and whether or not the judge of the lower court, in issuing the writ of
preliminary injunction, gravely abused their discretion.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.
HELD:
The court held in the affirmative.
It has been previously held in jurisprudence that academic institutions have a right to refuse admission to a student
arising from the imposition upon him of an administrative disciplinary sanction. Let it not be forgotten that respondent
aspires to join the ranks of the professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice may prevail. The
sentinels who stand guard at the portals leading to the hallowed Temples of Justice cannot be overzealous in admitting
only those who are intellectually and morally fit. In those who exhibit duplicity in their student days, one spots the
shady character who is bound to sow the seeds of chicanery in the practice of his profession.
It has been shown sufficiently that respondent has committed an act of dishonesty in withholding vital information in
connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the Rules and Regulations on Student
Conduct and Discipline of UP. As such, UP’s inherent power and authority to impose disciplinary sanction may be
invoked and rightfully exercised. This is in line with its exercise of academic freedom, which is, in the case at bar, the
right to suspend and refuse admission to a student who has subverted its authority in the implementation of the STFAP.
The lower court should have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus
is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner being
required. It is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or
judgment. To grant the writ of preliminary injunction is to squarely violate the suspension order and the university’s
exercise of academic freedom by allowing Nadal to enroll for the first semester of SY 1993-1994. This grants an
untoward impunity to Nadal, who has not only blatantly violated the provisions of STFAP and school rules, but also
prayed for the school to be restricted to exercise its academic freedom.
The petition is therefore GRANTED.
G.R. No. 770484
Tuazon v. RD of Caloocan
June 17, 2003
En Banc
FACTS: Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. On April 6, 1965, with funds pooled
from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. a piece of land measuring about 8,756
square meters, in the latter's subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. In virtue of this sale, Carmel's Torrens
title (No. 64007) over the lot was cancelled and a new one (No. 8314) issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons
took possession of their property.
Some eight (8) years thereafter, they discovered that by presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of the land
they had purchased with their hard-earned money, and that their land and the other lots in the subdivision had been
"declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present
bona fide occupants thereof."
45
On September 14, 1973-a year almost to the day after the declaration of martial law Mr. Ferdinand Marcos, then
president of the country, invoking his emergency powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate effect.
The decree invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the
Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several lots for sale to the public (the Tuasons being among
the buyers). The land bought by Carmel was part of the Tala Estate (one of the so-called "Friar Lands"). However,
said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding that Carmel had failed to complete payment of the price. It
adjudged that —
... according to the records of the Bureau of Lands, neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent
transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots
claimed by the Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of said
Association stand. Hence, title to said land has remained with the Government, and the land now
occupied by the members of said association has never ceased to form part of the property of the
Republic of the Philippines, any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the
said property of the Republic of the Philippines being therefore null and void ab initio as against the law
and public policy.
However, Mr. Marcos’s decree contained contradictory declarations. While acknowledging on the one hand that the
lots in the Carmel Subdivision were occupied by the buyers thereof, and in fact the latter's dwellings stood thereon,
he states on the other that the "members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. (are) the present bona fide
occupants" of all said lots. The latter averment is not only essentially inconsistent with the former but is both a physical
and legal fallacy. Well known is the rule of physics that two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time.
But this notwithstanding, and upon the factual premise already indicated, Mr. Marcos disposed of the land of the
petitioner spouses and others similarly situated. On the strength of this presidential decree, the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City caused the inscription on the Tuasons' title, TCT No. 8314, of the following:
MEMORANDUM. — Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this certificate of title is declared invalid
and null and void ab initio and considered cancelled as against the Government and the property
described herein is declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang
Homeowners Association, Inc.
The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos decree as an arbitrary
measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation not only of the constitutional
provisions on due process and eminent domain but also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the
indefeasibility of Torrens titles; and they prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory
inscription on their title and restore its efficacy, or in the alternative, that they be compensated for the loss from the
Assurance Fund.
Mr. Marcos' Solicitor General sought to sustain the decree. In his comment on the petition, he questioned the propriety
of the remedy of certiorari resorted to by the petitioners, it not appearing that the public respondents were being sued
as judicial or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion. He opined that the petitioner spouses had no cause to complain of unjust deprivation of property because
in legal contemplation they had never become owners thereof because of non-payment of the purchase price by their
predecessor-in-interest; and the decree was justifiable under the social justice clause of the Constitution and the police
power, being in response to the pressing housing need of the employees of the Office of the President who were left
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homeless and landless after they were asked to vacate Malacanang Park where they had theretofore been residing. He
expressed the view, too, that petitioner spouses were not entitled to recover anything from the Assurance Fund.
Petitions for intervention have of late been filed by sixty-four (64) persons, members of the "Consuelo Heights
Homeowners Association" headed by Tomasa Bartolome, on the claim that they, too, had been divested of their lands
by the same Presidential Decree No. 293, adopting as their own the allegations and prayer embodied in the Tuasons'
petition.
In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one for prohibition if the averments of
the former sufficiently made out a case for the latter. Considered in this wise, it will also appear that an executive
officer had acted without jurisdiction — exercised judicial power not granted to him by the Constitution or the laws
— and had furthermore performed the act in violation of the constitutional rights of the parties thereby affected. The
Court will grant such relief as may be proper and efficacious in the premises even if not specifically sought or set out
in the prayer of the appropriate pleading, the permissible relief being determined after all not by the prayer but by the
basic averments of the parties' pleadings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a petition for certiorari is proper.
HELD:
Yes. It is true that the extraordinary writ of certiorari may properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts,
unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
functions, while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, or person ... exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the petition will be shown upon
analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power.
The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination of facts, and
applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially
constitute a judicial function, or an exercise of jurisdiction — which is the power and authority to hear or try and
decide or determine a cause. He adjudged it to be an established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their
subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots
claimed by Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of ... (the) Association (of
homeowners) stand." And applying the law to that situation, he made the adjudication that "title to said land has
remained with the Government, and the land now occupied by the members of said association has never ceased to
form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines," and that 'any and all acts affecting said land and
purporting to segregate it from the said property of the Republic ... (were) null and void ab initio as against the law
and public policy.
These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in the performance
of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone
knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law — the judicial acts
done by him were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien
to his office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed
as head of the martial law regime.
Moreover, he made the finding ostensibly on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of Lands." Prescinding from the
fact that there is no indication whatever the nature and reliability of these records and that they are in no sense
conclusive, it is undeniable that the petitioner Tuasons (and the petitioners in intervention) were never confronted with
those records and afforded a chance to dispute their trustworthiness and present countervailing evidence. This is yet
another fatal defect. The adjudication was patently and grossly violative of the right to due process to which the
petitioners are entitled in virtue of the Constitution. Mr. Marcos, in other words, not only arrogated unto himself a
power never granted to him by the Constitution or the laws but had in addition exercised it unconstitutionally.
46
There is no dispute about the fact that title to the land purchased by Carmel was actually issued to it by the Government.
Against this presumption there is no evidence. It must hence be accorded full sway in these proceedings. It may well
be the fact that Carmel really did fail to make full payment of the price of the land purchased by it from the Government
pursuant to the provisions of Act 1120. This is a possibility that cannot be totally discounted. If this be the fact, the
Government may bring suit to recover the unpaid installments and interest, invalidate any sale or encumbrance
involving the land subject of the sale, and enforce the lien of the Government against the land by selling the same in
the manner provided by Act Numbered One Hundred and Ninety for the foreclosure of mortgages., This it can do
despite the lapse of a considerable period of time. Prescription does not lie against the Government. But until and
unless such a suit is brought and results in a judgment favorable to the Government, the acquisition of title by Carmel
and the purchases by the petitioners and the petitioners-intervenors from it of portions of the land covered by its
original title must be respected.
G.R. No. 230953
GSIS v. CA
June 20, 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS: Prior to joining the judiciary, retired judge Demonteverde was a civil servant in NEA, DBP and PAO. Upon
her retirement from the judiciary, she sought for her retirement benefits as a civil servant under R.A. 8291 and as a
judge under R.A. 910. The GSIS Board of Trustees granted Demonteverde’s plea to have her retirement benefits
granted under R.A. 8291 and the payment of her retirement benefits shall be reckoned from the time she retired from
the judiciary.
Apparently, Demonteverde sought for a partial reconsideration of the GSIS BoT’s order and insists that her retirement
benefits from R.A 8291 should be reckoned from the time she reached 60 years old which is the mandatory retirement
age in the government service and not from the time she retired from the judiciary. Said motion was denied.
Consequently, she elevated the case to the CA via petition for certiorari under rule 65.
Her petition was dismissed by the CA due to procedural technicalities. The CA ruled that the proper remedy should
have been to file an appeal under Rule 43. However, upon Demonteverde’s motion for reconsideration, the CA
reversed itself. Thus, the GSIS filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the CA’s order reversing its earlier
ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed order?
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HELD:
Yes. A special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of court will not be a cure for failure to file a timely appeal
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. As a general rule, Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as
a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal. However, the exceptions to the said rule are (1) if the petition
for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari, (2) when
errors of judgment are averred and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.
In this case, the CA erred when it failed to substantiate its decision to grant Demonteverede’s motion for
reconsideration as it summarily rendered that Demonteverde’s case was an exception to the general rule. Here,
Demonteverde filed her motion for reconsideration against the GSIS BoT’s assailed decision after 48 days already
from receipt of the latter’s decision which is already beyond the prescribed period by the rules. Verily, she already
lost her right to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal. Thus, the CA should have dismissed her petition outright
on the ground of erroneous cause of action as the remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or cumulative.
G.R. No. 203797 – 98
Reyes v. Sandiganbayan
June 27, 2018
that (1) a crime has been committed; and (2) there is probable cause that Reyes was guilty thereof. That the
Ombudsman referred to the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Report as additional basis for its findings does nothing to
refute the validity of the preliminary investigation, the evidence gathered therein, or the conclusion of the Ombudsman
after that investigation.
On the basis of these findings, the Sandiganbayan cannot be said to have committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied Reyes's assertion that no probable cause exists for both
cases.
In a petition for certiorari, the public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to
determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine
the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the public respondent
acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. Here, there is none.
PROHIBITION
Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS: Carmencita was charged with Technical Malversation and of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The Informations were consolidated into one case with the First Division of the Sandiganbayan
(Sandiganbayan).
Reyes filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion (For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Deferment of Arraignment
set for 28 July 2011) in the anti-graft case, and another Urgent Omnibus Motion (For Judicial Determination of
Probable Cause; and Deferment of/Holding in Abeyance the Arraignment) in the technical malversation case. Both
motions were denied by the Sandiganbayan.
1.
2.
3.
Grounds
Requirements
Procedure; Parties and effects
G.R. No. 191424
Vivas v. Monetary Board of BSP
August 7, 2013
Mendoza, J.
ISSUE: Whether court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied
the assertion of the petitioner that no probable cause exists for either case
FACTS: The Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI) was a duly registered rural banking institution. Record shows
that the corporate life of RBFI expired on May 31, 2005. Notwithstanding, petitioner Alfeo D. Vivas (Vivas) and his
principals acquired the controlling interest in RBFI sometime in January 2006. At the initiative of Vivas and the new
management team, an internal audit was conducted on RBFI and results thereof highlighted the dismal operation of
the rural bank.
HELD:
No, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
denied the assertion of the petitioner that no probable cause exists for either case.
In view of those findings, certain measures calculated to revitalize the bank were allegedly introduced. The Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued the Certificate of Authority extending the corporate life of RBFI for another fifty
(50) years. The BSP also approved the change of its corporate name to EuroCredit Community Ban.
Reyes contends that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied her assertion that no probable cause exists for both cases. In addition to her previous
contentions, Reyes assails the Sandigabayan's reliance on the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Report being not part
of the record of the case and considers it hearsay. She considers such as highly irregular and improper for the
Sandiganbayan to have used the findings of such report as bases for upholding the existence of probable cause.
Pursuant to Section 28 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, otherwise known as The New Central Bank Act, the
Integrated Supervision Department II (ISD II) of the BSP conducted a general examination with the cut-off date of
December 31, 2007. Shortly after the completion of the general examination, an exit conference was held, during
which the BSP officials and examiners apprised Vivas, the Chairman and President of ECBI, as well as the other bank
officers and members of its BOD, of the advance findings noted during the said examination.
Reyes's contention is misplaced.
Monetary Board (MB) issued Resolution No. 1255, placing ECBI under Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework
because of the following serious findings and supervisory concerns noted during the general examination.
It must be emphasized that the Ombudsman itself conducted its own preliminary investigation in this case. It was
during this investigation that the Ombudsman, faced with the facts and circumstances extant herein, was led to believe
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Vivas moved for a reconsideration of Resolution No. 1255 on the grounds of non-observance of due process and
arbitrariness.
The ISD II, on several instances, had invited the BOD of ECBI to discuss matters pertaining to the placement of the
bank under PCA framework and other supervisory concerns before making the appropriate recommendations to the
MB. The proposed meeting, however, did not materialize due to postponements sought by Vivas.
The scheduled March 31, 2009 general examination of the books, records and general condition of ECBI with the cutoff date of December 31, 2008, did not push through. According to Vivas, ECBI asked for the deferment of the
examination pending resolution of its appeal before the MB. Vivas believed that he was being treated unfairly because
the letter of authority to examine allegedly contained a clause which pertained to the Anti-Money Laundering Law
and the Bank Secrecy Act.
The MB, on the other hand, posited that ECBI unjustly refused to allow the BSP examiners from examining and
inspecting its books and records, in violation of Sections 25 and 34 of R.A. No. 7653.
Meanwhile, the MB issued Resolution No. 1164, dated August 13, 2009, denying the appeal of ECBI from Resolution
No. 1255 which placed it under PCA framework.
On December 7, 2009, the ISD II reminded ECBI of the non-submission of its financial audit reports for the years
2007 and 2008 with a warning that failure to submit those reports and the written explanation for such omission shall
result in the imposition of a monetary penalty.
On March 4, 2010, the MB issued Resolution No. 276 placing ECBI under receivership in accordance with the
recommendation of the ISD II. The said resolution prohibits the Eurocredit Bank from doing business in the
Philippines and to place its assets and affairs under receivership; and to designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation as Receiver of the bank.
Assailing MB Resolution No. 276, Vivas filed this petition for prohibition before this Court, ascribing grave abuse of
discretion to the MB for prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking business and for placing it under receivership.
Vivas contend that the implementation of the questioned resolution was tainted with arbitrariness and bad faith,
stressing that ECBI was placed under receivership without due and prior hearing in violation of his and the bank’s
right to due process. He adds that respondent PDIC actually closed ECBI even in the absence of any directive to this
effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for prohibition will prosper
HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative. Vivas Availed of the Wrong Remedy. To begin with, Vivas availed of the wrong
remedy. The MB issued Resolution No. 276, dated March 4, 2010, in the exercise of its power under R.A. No. 7653.
Under Section 30 thereof, any act of the MB placing a bank under conservatorship, receivership or liquidation may
not be restrained or set aside except on a petition for certiorari.
48
Even Granting that a petition for prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy under the circumstances
obtaining. Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court prevents inferior courts,
tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law,
and confines them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. Its office is to restrain subordinate courts, tribunals
or persons from exercising jurisdiction over matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters
of which it has cognizance.
Indeed, prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which would direct the defendant to
desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a writ
of prohibition is to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to provide a remedy for
acts already accomplished.
In this case, the petition for prohibition apparently seeks to prevent the acts of closing of ECBI and placing it under
receivership. Resolution No. 276, however, had already been issued by the MB and the closure of ECBI and its
placement under receivership by the PDIC were already accomplished. Apparently, the remedy of prohibition is no
longer appropriate. Settled is the rule that prohibition does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli.
Moreover, Even if treated as a petition for certiorari, the petition should have been filed with the CA. Section 4 of
Rule 65 provides that:
..If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these
Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
Here, Monetary Board is a quasi-judicial agency which was already settled and reiterated in the case of Bank of
Commerce v. Planters Development Bank And Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas.
Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible because it simply ignored the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. True, the Court, the CA and the RTC have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not grant the party seeking any
of the extraordinary writs the absolute freedom to file a petition in any court of his choice. The petitioner has not
advanced any special or important reason which would allow a direct resort to this Court. Under the Rules of Court,
a party may directly appeal to this Court only on pure questions of law. In the case at bench, there are certainly factual
issues as Vivas is questioning the findings of the investigating team.
In any event, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the MB for the issuance of the assailed Resolution No.
276. The Court has taken this into account, but it appears from all over the records that ECBI was given every
opportunity to be heard and improve on its financial standing. The records disclose that BSP officials and examiners
met with the representatives of ECBI, including Vivas, and discussed their findings. There were also reminders that
ECBI submit its financial audit reports for the years 2007 and 2008 with a warning that failure to submit them and a
written explanation of such omission shall result in the imposition of a monetary penalty. More importantly, ECBI
was heard on its motion for reconsideration. For failure of ECBI to comply, the MB came out with Resolution No.
1548 denying its request for reconsideration of Resolution No. 726. Having been heard on its motion for
reconsideration, ECBI cannot claim that it was deprived of its right under the Rural Bank Act
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G.R. No. 186613
Corales v. Republic
August 27, 2013
Moreover, prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing
with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal, may only be resorted to when there is "no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
Perez, J.
FACTS: Rosendo Corales was the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for three consecutive terms.
Corales appointed petitioner Dr. Angeles to the position of Municipal Administrator and his appointment was
unanimously approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna. However, on Corales’ second and third
terms as mayor, Corales renewed Dr. Angeles’ appointment but the Sangguniang
Bayan disapproved Dr. Angeles’ appointment on the ground of nepotism, as well as purported unfitness and
unsatisfactory performance. Regardless of such disapproval, Dr. Angeles continued to discharge the functions and
duties of a Municipal Administrator for which he received an annual salary of P210,012.00.
The Provincial State Auditor of Laguna issued an Audit Observation Memorandum stating that Dr. Angeles’
appointment was without legal basis for having been repeatedly denied confirmation by the Sangguniang Bayan; he
is a de facto officer and it should be Corales as appointing authority who should be liable to pay for Dr. Angeles’
salary; and recommended that an appropriate Notice of Disallowance should be issued for the payment of salary
expenses incurred without legal basis by the Municipality of Nagcarlan in the amount of P1,282,829.99.
Petitioner Corales, together with Dr. Angeles, filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against Andal and the
members of the Sangguniang Bayan before the RTC of San Pablo, Laguna. The OSG filed a Motion to Dismiss
petitioners’ Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus grounded on lack of cause of action, prematurity and nonexhaustion of administrative remedies. The RTC denied Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Andal was merely a
nominal party. The Republic of the Philippines (represented by COA, represented by Andal) filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals ascribing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the trial court in rendering the Orders dated 17 May 2007 and 5 September 2007 as it unjustly denied
respondents’ right to actively prosecute the case through a mere declaration that it was a nominal party despite a clear
showing that the Petition for Prohibition referred to the respondent as a real party in interest. The CA granted Petition
for Certiorari, thereby annulling and setting aside the RTC Orders and, accordingly, dismissing the Petition for
Prohibition with the trial court. Corales and Angeles filed Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a palpably erroneous resolution of a substantial question of
law when it ordered the dismissal of petitioners’ suit for prohibition.
HELD:
No. From the foregoing, it is beyond doubt that the issuance of an AOM is, indeed, an initial step in the conduct of an
investigative audit considering that after its issuance there are still several steps to be conducted before a final
conclusion can be made or before the proper action can be had against the Auditee. There is, therefore, no basis for
petitioner Corales’ claim that his comment thereon would be a mere formality. Further, even though the AOM issued
to petitioner Corales already contained a recommendation for the issuance of a Notice of Disallowance, still, it cannot
be argued that his comment/reply to the AOM would be a futile act since no Notice of Disallowance was yet issued.
Again, the records are bereft of any evidence showing that Andal has already taken any affirmative action against
petitioner Corales after the issuance of the AOM.
49
In this case, petitioners insist that it is no longer necessary to exhaust administrative remedies considering that there
is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and appropriate remedial measure to assail the imposition under the AOM
aside from an action for prohibition.
As previously stated, petitioners’ action for prohibition was premature. The audit investigative process was still in its
initial phase. There was yet no Notice of Disallowance issued. And, even granting that the AOM issued to petitioner
Corales is already equivalent to an order, decision or resolution of the Auditor or that such AOM is already tantamount
to a directive for petitioner Corales to reimburse the salaries paid to petitioner Dr. Angeles, still, the action for
prohibition is premature since there are still many administrative remedies available to petitioners to contest the said
AOM. Section 1, Rule V of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, provides: "[a]n aggrieved party may
appeal from an order or decision or ruling rendered by the Auditor embodied in a report, memorandum, letter, notice
of disallowances and charges, Certificate of Settlement and Balances, to the Director who has jurisdiction over the
agency under audit." From the final order or decision of the Director, an aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission
proper. It is the decision or resolution of the Commission proper which can be appealed to this Court.
Clearly, petitioners have all the remedies available to them at the administrative level but they failed to exhaust the
same and instead, immediately sought judicial intervention. Otherwise stated, the auditing process has just begun but
the petitioners already thwarted the same by immediately filing a Petition for Prohibition.
G.R. No. 193150
Javier v. Gonzales
January 23, 2017
Sereno, C. J.
FACTS: This case originated from a criminal case for murder with frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder
lodged in Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of Baler, Aurora.
Gonzales filed a Motion for Bail with the RTC of Baler. Private complainant Carmen Macatiag (Macatiag) — sister
of the deceased victim, Rufino Concepcion — filed her Opposition to Gonzales's Motion for Bail. The RTC of Baler
granted Gonzales bail. Thereafter, Macatiag filed with this Court an Urgent Petition for Transfer of Venue. While her
petition was pending, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the RTC of Baler granting bail to
Gonzales, who filed his Opposition to her motion. The RTC of Baler denied the Motion for Reconsideration and
upheld its Order granting bail. Macatiag also filed with the RTC of Baler a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend
Proceedings pending the resolution of her previous petition for transfer of venue.
On 17 August 1999, the Court granted the transfer of venue and reassigned the case to the RTC of Palayan City, which
was then presided by Judge Erlinda Buted. During the proceedings of the case, Gonzales failed to appear repeatedly
before the Court. Said RTC later found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Thereafter, the Clerk of Court
was directed to enter the judgment of conviction in the RTC's criminal docket pursuant to paragraph 4, Section 6, Rule
120. Since the death penalty was still in force at the time the judgment was promulgated, Judge Buted also ordered
that the records of the case be immediately forwarded to the CA for automatic review.
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In less than a month after the judgment of conviction was rendered, Gonzales filed, through Atty. Benitez, an Omnibus
Motion asking that the judgment promulgated on 22 December 2005 be reconsidered and set aside. Gonzales argued
that he had not been properly notified of the promulgation of judgment; that he had not been represented by counsel;
and that the RTC had proceeded with deliberate haste in convicting him. The Order was set aside and he was reinstated
in his bail.
Thereafter, petitioner Javier, Macatiag's daughter, discovered that the RTC had rendered a Decision dated 31 October
2006 acquitting Gonzales of all charges. On 16 January 2007, she filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before
the CA, citing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of Judge Soluren. The
Office of the Solicitor General filed a Comment dated 12 October 2007 praying that the Petition be denied due course
and dismissed for lack of merit.
The OSG opined that Judge Soluren did not commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing the earlier Decision of
Judge Buted.The CA agreed with the OSG that the promulgation was void, because respondent Gonzales had not been
validly notified of the rescheduled promulgation of judgment on 22 December 2005; that since Gonzales's lawyer,
Atty. Benitez, had already withdrawn his representation on the first scheduled date of promulgation, respondent had
no knowledge that the promulgation had been rescheduled to 22 December 2005; that since he was no longer
Gonzales's lawyer, Atty. Benitez was relieved of the duty to inform his client of court notices and processes; that since
respondent was not personally notified of the rescheduled promulgation, Judge Buted's promulgation in absentia was
invalid. The CA further adopted the OSG's stance that before resorting to a Rule 65 petition for certiorari to question
respondent judge's act of acquitting private respondent, petitioner should have first filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in agreeing with the OSG that there was no grave abuse of discretion
HELD:
Yes. Judge Soluren acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she gave
due course to respondent's Omnibus Motion. Aside from being the wrong remedy, the motion lacked merit.
The filing of a motion for reconsideration to question a decision of conviction can only be resorted to if the accused
did not jump bail, but appeared in court to face the promulgation of judgment. Respondent did not appear during the
scheduled promulgation and was deemed by the judge to have jumped bail. The fifth paragraph of Section 6, Rule
120, states that if the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause,
he shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment, and the court shall order his arrest.
In utter disregard of this Court's circulars, Judge Soluren capriciously, whimsically, and arbitrarily took cognizance
of private respondent's Omnibus Motion, granted it, and rendered a totally opposite Decision of acquittal. What she
should have done was dismiss the Omnibus Motion outright, since Judge Buted's Decision of conviction was already
subject to automatic review by the CA. By acting on the wrong remedy, which led to the reversal of the conviction,
Judge Soluren contravened the express orders of this Court. Her blatant abuse of authority was so grave and so severe
that it deprived the court of its very power to dispense justice.
G.R. No. 197762
Career Executive Service Board v. CSC
March 7, 2017
Sereno, C.J.
FACTS: In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) seeks the reversal
of the Decision and Resolution of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) declaring that (a) it had the jurisdiction to
resolve an appeal from a CESB Resolution refusing to declassify certain positions in Public Attorney's Office (PAO);
and (b) the PAO positions involved in the appeal do not require third-level eligibility.
On 24 September 2010, the PAO received a copy of the CESB Report on the Career Executive Service (CES)
Occupancy of the Department of Justice (DOJ). This document stated, among others, that out of 35 filled positions in
the PAO, 33 were occupied by persons without the required CES eligibility.
In response to the report, PAO Deputy Chief Mosing sent a letter to CESB Executive Director Maria Anthonette V.
Allones. He informed her that the positions of Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, and Regional
Public Attorneys (subject positions) were already permanent in nature pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9406,
which accorded security of tenure to the occupants thereof.
While the matter was pending, PAO Deputy Chief Mosing wrote a letter to then DOJ Secretary Leila M. de Lima to
inform her about the communications sent by the PAO to the CESB. Chief State Counsel Ricardo V. Paras III
elucidated the legal opinion of the DOJ on the matter declaring that the appointments of the top-level officials of
the PAO are permanent is without merit. For one, the positions of the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public
Attorney and Regional Public Attorneys are part of the CES. The DOJ also noted that the permanent nature of an
appointment does not automatically translate to an exemption from CES coverage, as it is only the CESB that has the
authority to exempt certain positions from CES requirements.
PAO wrote to the CSC to request a legal opinion on the same matter. Citing its mandate as an independent
constitutional commission and its authority under the Administrative Code to "render opinions and rulings on all
personnel and other civil service matters," the CSC declared that third-level eligibility is not required for the
subject positions in the PAO. They opined that the Prosecution Service Act of 2010 explicitly provides that the
Prosecutor General (the retitled position of Chief State Prosecutor) has the same qualifications for appointment, among
other things, as those of the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals (CA). Further, the Senior Deputy State
Prosecutor and the Regional Prosecutor have the same qualifications as those of an associate justice.
CESB Resolution No. 918: The CESB issued Resolution No. 918 denying the PAO's request to declassify the subject
positions. Citing the Position Classification Study submitted by its secretariat, the CESB noted that the positions in
question "require leadership and managerial competence" and were thus part of the CES. Hence, the appointment of
persons without third-level eligibility for these posts cannot be considered permanent.
Aggrieved by the CESB Resolution, the PAO filed a Verified Notice of Appeal25 and an Urgent Notice of Appeal
with the CSC.
Before the CSC: PAO assailed CESB Resolution No. 918 on the following grounds: (a) the resolution was rendered
contrary to R.A. 9406 in relation to R.A. 10071, the 1987 Constitution and the CSC letter-opinion; and (b) the CESB
usurped the legislative function of Congress when the former required additional qualifications for appointment to
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certain PAO positions. The PAO likewise asserted that its appeal had been brought to the CSC, because the latter had
the power to review decisions and actions of one of its attached agencies - the CESB.
or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
requires the concurrence of both these requisites.
CSC directed the CESB to comment on the appeal. Instead of submitting a comment, however, the CESB filed a
Motion for Clarification to assail the authority of the CSC to review its Decision. It asserted that the CSC had no
jurisdiction to decide the appeal given that (a) the appeal involved a controversy between two government entities
regarding questions of law; and (b) the CESB was an autonomous agency whose actions were appealable to the Office
of the President.
In this case, the second requirement is plainly absent. As respondents correctly observed, there was an appeal available
to the CESB in the form of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
On the merits, the CSC ruled in favor of the PAO officials. It declared that the CESB would be in violation of R.A.
9406 if the latter would require an additional qualification - in this case, third-level eligibility - for purposes of
permanent appointments to certain PAO positions. CESB sought reconsideration of the Decision, but its motion was
denied.
CESB asserts that the allegations in its Petition - the patent illegality of the assailed Decision and Resolution of the
CSC, as well as the lack of jurisdiction and the grave abuse of discretion attending the latter's ruling - are not suitable
for an appeal under Rule 43. It argues that since these grounds properly pertain to a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, this remedy is more appropriate.
Such contention is untenable. As previously stated, certiorari and prohibition are proper only if both requirements are
present, that is, if the appropriate grounds are invoked; and an appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy is
unavailable. Mere reference to a ground under Rule 65 is not sufficient.
CESB filed the instant Petition imputing grave abuse of discretion to respondent CSC. Because the instant case
involves the contradictory views of two government offices, the Court likewise required the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to comment on the matter as the lawyer of the government.
Here, the CESB could have appealed the CSC Decision and Resolution to the CA via a petition for review under Rule
43. Hence, the filing of the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is improper regardless of the grounds invoked
therein.
OSG: It supports the view of the CSC and the PAO. It cites the Constitution and the Administrative Code as the
sources of the authority of the CSC to review rulings of the CESB, particularly with regard to personnel matters such
as the reclassification of positions. OSG asserts that the subject positions in the PAO should be declassified from the
CES. It points out that the primary function of these PAO officials -- the provision of legal assistance to the indigent
- is specialized in nature; in contrast, their managerial functions are merely incidental to their role.
Moreover, we find no reason to allow the CESB to avail itself of the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and
prohibition. Indeed, the petition itself cites no exceptional circumstance47 other than the supposed transcendental
importance of the issues raised, "as the assailed CSC Decision is gravely prejudicial to the mandate of the Petitioner."
Even when confronted by respondents with regard to the availability of an appeal, the CESB still failed to cite any
special justification for its refusal to avail itself of an appeal. Instead, it opted to focus on the nature of the grounds
asserted in its Petition. For the reasons stated above, a mere reference to grave abuse of discretion cannot justify a
resort to a petition under Rule 65.
ISSUE: WHETHER A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION WAS THE PROPER REMEDY TO
QUESTION THE ASSAILED CSC DECISION AND RESOLUTION
HELD:
We DENY the Petition.
At the outset, we note that the CESB availed itself of an improper remedy to challenge the ruling of the CSC. In any
event, after a judicious consideration of the case, we find that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it resolved
the PAO's appeal and reversed CESB Resolution No. 918. The CSC also correctly ruled that third-level eligibility is
not required for the subject positions.
The CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it resolved the PAO's appeal and reversed CESB Resolution No. 918.
After analyzing and harmonizing the legal provisions pertaining to each of these two agencies, the Court concludes
that the CSC has the authority to review CESB Resolution No. 918. We have arrived at this conclusion after a
consideration of (a) the broad mandate of the CSC under the Constitution and the Administrative Code; and (b) the
specific and narrowly tailored powers granted to the CESB in the Integrated Reorganization Plan and the
Administrative Code.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
A petition for certiorari and prohibition is not the appropriate remedy to challenge the ruling of the CSC.
Respondents contend that the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by the CESB before this Court was improper,
because the remedy of appeal was available via a petition for review under Rule 43. On the other hand, the CESB
insists that a Rule 65 petition is proper, because it is disputing the authority and jurisdiction of the CSC. We find in
favor of respondents.
It is settled that a resort to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and prohibition is proper only in cases where (a) a
tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal
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reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that
of the court.
MANDAMUS
1.
2.
3.
4.
Grounds
Requisites
Procedure; Parties and effects
Damages
G.R. No. 174813 – 15
Hipos, Sr. v. Bay
March 17, 2009
Chico – Nazario, J.
FACTS: Two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were
filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, et al before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, acting as a
Family Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay.
Petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Cases before the City Prosecutor. They claimed that there
was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged.However, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a
Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming the Informations filed against petitioners and their co-accused.
2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal,
reversed the Resolution, holding that there was lack of probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a
Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay.
Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations.
Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the present Petition for Mandamus,
bringing forth this lone issue for our consideration:
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court can compel Judge Bay to dismiss the case through a Writ of Mandamus
HELD:
NO. While a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on
the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge
Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the same.
Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of
discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of
petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at
some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the respondent
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus
lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control
the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in
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The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition thereof, such as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. While the prosecutor
retains the discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court. The court
is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by the prosecutor
before or after the arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the records upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of the court must not,
however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
G.R. No. 161735
Sanchez v. Lastimosa
September 25, 2007
Nachura, J.
FACTS: In 1989, petitioner Sanchez, a constable in the Philippine Constabulary (PC), was discharged from the service
for allegedly losing his service firearm. Petitioner Meteoro, also a constable, was likewise discharged from the service
in 1990 for being absent without leave. On appeal, they were both cleared of all charges. They then applied for
reinstatement but their applications were not acted upon even up to the integration of the PC into the Philippine
National Police.
On January 27, 1998, the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) issued Resolution No. 98-037 considering as
absorbed into the police force, among others, those who had been discharged by virtue of pending administrative or
criminal cases but who were later acquitted or had their cases dismissed, and who subsequently filed petitions for
reinstatement that were not acted upon by the PNP.
As no absorption order had yet been issued by the Chief of the PNP, the constables in the list requested the assistance
of the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG). On July 29, 1998, the Office of the
Secretary of the DILG sent a memorandum to respondent Roberto T. Lastimoso, then the Chief of the PNP, endorsing
the constables' entreaties and requesting for a feedback thereon.
Without any response from the Chief of the PNP, and their pleas for the issuance of the absorption orders still unacted
upon, petitioners instituted, on September 30, 1998, a petition for mandamus in the RTC of Quezon City.
During the pendency of the said petition, NAPOLCOM issued Resolution No.99-061 recalling the earlier Resolution
No. 98-105 (resolution affirming and confirming the absorption into the PNP of the 126 ex-PC constables to which
petitioners were included). The recall was based from Commission's finding that the list submitted was not actually
of the constables whose applications for absorption were indorsed for approval, but of those whose applications were
still to be reviewed, evaluated and disposed of.
On November 15, 2001, however, the RTC rendered its Decision in the mandamus case declaring as void ab initio
NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 99-061 and ruling in favor of the petitioners. On appeal, the CA, reversed the ruling of
the trial court and ruled that a writ of mandamus could not be issued because petitioners had not established with
distinct clarity their right to be absorbed into the PNP.
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Appellate court later denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, petitioners brought the case before us
via a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a cause of action for Mandamus to compel the respondent to absorb the
petitioners in the PNP?
HELD:
No. The remedy of mandamus is employed only to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but
not to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary one.
In order that a writ of mandamus may aptly issue, it is essential that, on the one hand, petitioner has a clear legal right
to the claim that is sought and that, on the other hand, respondent has an imperative duty to perform that which is
demanded of him. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is
questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command
and to expedite, not to inquire and to adjudicate. Thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal
right but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will
not issue.
Viewed in light of the said guideposts, the PNP Chief's issuance of the orders for the absorption of herein petitioners
in the police force is not compellable by a writ of mandamus precisely because the same does not involve a
performance of a ministerial duty.
Let it be noted that petitioners were discharged from the PC service, subsequently cleared of the charges against them,
applied for reinstatement but their applications were not acted upon until the integration of the PC into the PNP in
1990 when R.A. No. 6975 was enacted. Thus, we no longer speak of the reinstatement of the petitioners to the service
because the Philippine Constabulary no longer exists, but of their employment in the PNP which is, as we held inGloria
v. De Guzman, technically an issuance of a new appointment. The power to appoint is essentially discretionary to be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights. Consequently, it cannot be the subject of
an application for a writ of mandamus.
Even if, for the sake of argument, petitioners can derive a right from NAPOLCOM Resolution 98-105, still their right
collapses and their mandamus petition becomes moot with the issuance by NAPOLCOM of Resolution No. 99-061
recalling the approval of their absorption. The trial court should then have immediately dismissed the mandamus
petition when the OSG submitted a copy of Resolution No. 99-061 because well-settled is the rule that courts will not
resolve a moot question.
G.R. No. 156052
Social Justice Society v. Atienza
March 7, 2007
Corona, J.
FACTS: On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Maynila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and the
respondent Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved the ordinance on November 28. It became effective on December 28.
The said ordinance was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units. The contents of
such ordinance is that it reclassified the area of Punta, Sta. Ana, bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero
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St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo St. from Industrial II to Commercial I. It directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed by the ordinance to cease and desist from operating their businesses situated in the area.
Among the businesses in the said area are the “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies Caltex, Petron and Shell.
On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals was the most
viable and practicable option.”
Meanwhile, the petitioners filed this action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be
compelled to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the Pandacan Terminals.
Petitioners contend that the respondent has the mandatory legal duty under the Local Government Code to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals. Respondents, however, maintain that the
ordinance has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions.
ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus will lie in enforcing Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan
Terminals.
HELD:
The court held in the affirmative.
Under Rule 65, Sec. 3, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoin as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance, when refused,
of a ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance
of the act and it must be clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which
a substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to
inquire and to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement
that which is already established. Unless the right to the relief is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.
As the chief executive of the city, the mayor has the duty to enforce the ordinance as long as it has not been repealed
by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the
duty. The reason for this is obvious: it might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were
to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and
which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional.
Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with the ordinance, the resolutions which ratified it and made
it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. There is nothing that
legally hinders the enforcement of the questioned ordinance. The petition is hereby GRANTED.
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G.R. No. 188488
Laygo v. Municipal Mayor of Solano
January 11, 2017
because the subleasing claimed by Bandrang had ended and the subsequent receipt by the Municipality of payments
ratified the contract with petitioners.
Jardeleza, J.
FACTS: In July 2005, Aniza Bandrang (Bandrang) sent two letter-complaints to then Municipal Mayor Santiago O.
Dickson (Mayor Dickson) and the Sangguniang Bayan of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya, informing them of the illegal
sublease she entered into with petitioners Rodolfo Laygo and Willie Laygo over Public Market Stalls No. 77-A, 77B, 78-A, and 78-B, which petitioners leased from the Municipal Government. Bandrang claimed that petitioners told
her to vacate the stalls, which they subsequently subleased to another. Bandrang expressed her willingness to testify
against petitioners if need be, and appealed that she be given priority in the future to lease the stalls she vacated.5
In August 2005, the Sangguniang Bayan endorsed the letter of Bandrang and a copy of Resolution No. 183-2004 to
Mayor Dickson for appropriate action. The Sangguniang informed Mayor Dickson that the matter falls under the
jurisdiction of his office since it (Sangguniang) has already passed and approved Resolution No. 183-2004, which
authorized Mayor Dickson to enforce the provision against subleasing of stalls in the public market. Mayor Dickson
informed the Sangguniang that the stalls were constructed under a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme, which
meant that the petitioners had the right to keep their stalls until the BOT agreement was satisfied. He then asked the
Sangguniang if provisions were made to sanction lessees under the BOT scheme similar to the provision against
subleasing (Item No. 9) in the contract of lease.
Thereafter, Bandrang wrote another letter to the Sangguniang, praying and recommending to Mayor Dickson, by way
of a resolution, the cancellation of the lease contract between the Municipality and petitioners for violating the
provision on subleasing. The Sangguniang once again referred the letter of Bandrang, together with a copy of
Resolution No. 183-2004, to Mayor Dickson for appropriate action. The Sangguniang opined that Resolution No. 1832004 already empowered and authorized Mayor Dickson to cancel the lease contracts pursuant to its pertinent
provisions.
Mayor Dickson, however, did not act on the letter of Bandrang and on the referrals of the Sanggunian. Thus, Bandrang
filed a Petition for Mandamus against him before the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya (RTC).
Bandrang alleged that despite already being aware of the violations of the lease contracts of petitioners with the
Municipality, Mayor Dickson still refused to enforce the provisions of the lease contracts against subleasing. Bandrang
concluded that Mayor Dickson's inaction can only be construed as an unlawful neglect in the performance and
enforcement of his public duty as the Chief Executive of Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.
Mayor Dickson claimed that under the principle of pari delicto, Bandrang had no right to seek remedy with the court
as she was guilty herself in leasing the market stalls. Mayor Dickson insisted that he acted in accordance with law by
referring the matter to the Sangguniang for appropriate action. He likewise asserted that the subject of the mandamus
was not proper as it entailed an act which was purely discretionary on his part.
Mayor Dickson elaborated that Bandrang had no cause of action because the stalls were on a BOT scheme covered
by an ordinance. On the other hand, petitioners denied that they were the lessees of Stalls 77 A and B and 78 A and
B. They clarified that Clarita Laygo (Clarita), their mother, was the lessee of the stalls by virtue of a BOT scheme of
the Municipality. At the time they entered into a contract of lease with Bandrang, it was agreed that the contract was
subject to the consent of the other heirs of Clarita. Moreover, there is no more ground for the revocation of the lease
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RTC Ruling: RTC issued an Order directing the substitution of then incumbent mayor Hon. Philip A. Dacayo (Mayor
Dacayo) as respondent in place of Mayor Dickson.
The RTC held that the contract between petitioners and the Municipal Government was a lease contract, as evidenced
by a certification signed by Mayor Epifanio LD. Galima (Mayor Galima) dated September 17, 2006.dIt concluded
that petitioners clearly violated the terms and conditions of the lease contract, which gave rise to the enactment of
Resolution No. 183-2004. Since Mayor Dickson failed in his duty to enforce the resolution and delayed its
implementation without valid reason, mandamus is a proper remedy.
Court of Appeals Ruling: CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that the contract between petitioners and the Municipal
Government is a lease contract and, thus, Resolution No. 183-2004 applies to them.
On the issue of whether mandamus is proper, the CA also affirmed the ruling of the RTC stating that although
mandamus is properly availed of to compel a ministerial duty, it is also available to compel action in matters involving
judgment and discretion but not to direct an action in a particular way, to wit:
x x x However, mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment
and discretion, though not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.
In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Bayan of Solano ("Sangguniang") delegated to Mayor Dickson and subsequently
to incumbent Mayor Dacayo, the power to cancel the lease contracts of those market stallholders who violated their
contracts with the Municipality. Inferred from this power is the power of the Mayor to determine who among the
market stallholders violated their lease contracts with the Municipality. Such power connotes an exercise of discretion.
When then Mayor Dickson refused to exercise this discretion, even after the Sangguniang assured him that the subject
resolution empowered him to have the lease contracts of the Laygos cancelled, said act of refusal became proper
subject of mandamus, as it involved a duty expected of him to be performed.
ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus is proper.
HELD:
No. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the sovereign,
directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the performance of a
particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is directed
or from operation of law. As a rule, mandamus will not lie in the absence of any of the following grounds:
1.
that the court, officer, board, or person against whom the action is taken unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust, or station; or
2.
that such court, officer, board, or person has unlawfully excluded petitioner/relator from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled.
Neither will the extraordinary remedy of mandamus lie to compel the performance of duties that are discretionary in
nature.
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In Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Villaflor,44 we explained the difference between the exercise of ministerial and discretionary
powers, to wit:
"Discretion," when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law
or acting officially, under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.
A purely ministerial act or duty in contradiction to a discretional act is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the
act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when
the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
Applying the foregoing distinction, we find that the Petition for Mandamus must fail because the acts sought to be
done are discretionary in nature.
The petition sought an order to direct Mayor Dickson to cancel the lease contract of petitioners with the Municipal
Government and to lease the vacated market stalls to interested persons. The privilege of operating a market stall
under license is always subject to the police power of the city government and may be refused or granted for reasons
of public policy and sound public administration. Being a delegated police power falling under the general welfare
clause of Section 16 of the Local Government Code, the grant or revocation of the privilege is, therefore, discretionary
in nature.
Moreover, Resolution No. 183-2004, or even its subsequent equivalent, Resolution No. 135-2007, merely authorizes
the mayor "to enforce the No. 11 provision of the contract of lease of market stalls between the Municipal Government
and the stallholders at the Solano [P]ublic Market who violated the No. 9 provision of said contract x x x." Item No.
11 provides that "[i]f any back rental remains unpaid for more than [15] days or if any violation be made of any of the
stipulations of this lease by the LESSEE, the LESSOR may declare this lease terminated and, thereafter, reenter the
leased premises and repossess the same, and expel the LESSEE or others claiming under him/her from the leased
premises."
Clearly, Item No. 11 does not give the mayor a mandate to motu propio or automatically terminate or cancel the lease
with a lessee who is delinquent in the payment of rentals or who is in violation of any of the provisions of the contract.
This is apparent from the permissive word "may" used in the provision. It does not specifically enjoin the mayor to
cancel the lease as a matter of "duty."
We do not discount the exceptions to the rule that only a ministerial duty can be compelled by a writ of mandamus.
In Angchango, Jr. v. Ombudsman, we also held that in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion,
the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. However, this
rule admits of exceptions such as in cases where there is gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable
excess of authority. These exceptions do not apply in this case.
Firstly, while Mayor Dickson may be compelled to act on the directive provided in Resolution No. 135-2007, he may
not be compelled to do so in a certain way, as what was prayed for by Bandrang in seeking the cancellation of the
contract and to re-lease the vacated market stalls to interested persons. It was enough that Mayor Dickson be reminded
55
of his authority to cancel the contract under Item No. 11 but not even the Court can substitute its own judgment over
what he had chosen.
As it was, Mayor Dickson did act on the matter before him. He exercised his discretion by choosing not to cancel the
contract on the ground of pari delicto, explaining that Bandrang, as the sub-lessee herself, was in violation of the same
policy on subleasing. The complaint does not allege that in deciding this way, Mayor Dickson committed grave abuse
of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. Further, aside from the imperative duty of the
respondent in a petition for mandamus to perform that which is demanded of him, it is essential that, on the one hand,
the person petitioning for it has a clear legal right to the claim that is sought. To be given due course, a petition for
mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board
or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. The petitioner in every case must
therefore be an aggrieved party, in the sense that he possesses a clear right to be enforced and a direct interest in the
duty or act to be performed. In the early case of Almario v. City Mayor, et al., where we ruled that the petitioner
seeking to compel the city mayor to eject occupants of stalls in the public market had no locus standi to file the petition
for mandamus, Similarly with Almario, Bandrang is not an applicant for any stall in the public market which is the
subject of the controversy. She is neither a representative of any such applicant, stall holder, or any association of
persons who are deprived of their right to occupy a stall in said market. Therefore, he is not the real party in interest
who has the capacity, right or personality to institute the present action.
G.R. No. 211362
Cudia v. Superintendent of PMA
February 24, 2015
Peralta, J.
FACTS: Cadet First Class Aldrin Jeff Cudia was a member of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 of the Philippine Military
Academy (PMA) at Fort Gregorio del Pilar in Baguio City. A few months before graduation in November 2013, Cudia
was reported to the Honor Committee (HC) for violation of the Honor Code. The report stated “. . . lying, that is,
giving statement that perverts the truth in his written appeal, stating that his fourth period class ended at 1500 hours
that made him late in the succeeding class.”
After an investigation, formal hearings were conducted by the HC, resulting in an 8-1 guilty verdict. Upon further
deliberation, the presiding officer announced a 9-0 guilty verdict. In February 2014, Col. Rossano Briguez, the
commandant of cadets, affirmed the findings of the HC and recommended to Vice Admiral Edgar Abogado, then
PMA superintendent, the separation from the PMA of Cadet Cudia for “violation of the First Tenet of the Honor Code”
(lying). The Cudia family appealed to the Office of the President for reconsideration of the decision of the PMA Honor
Committee.
In June 2014, the Office of the President sustained the findings of the AFP chief of staff and the Cadet Review and
Appeals Board (CRAB). The case was further elevated to the Supreme Court when the family filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with temporary restraining order.
ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus is proper to compel the PMA to include Cadet 1 CL Cudia in the list of graduates
of Siklab Diwa Class of 2014 and to allow him to take part in the commencement exercises?
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HELD:
No. Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer,
or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled.
For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined must be a ministerial act or duty. An act is ministerial if the act
should be performed "[under] a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of [the tribunal or corporation's] own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done." The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform
the act specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed to a discretionary act whereby the officer has the choice to decide
how or when to perform the duty.
Suffice it to say at this point that these matters are within the ambit of or encompassed by the right of academic
freedom; therefore, beyond the province of the Court to decide. The powers to confer degrees at the PMA, grant
awards, and commission officers in the military service are discretionary acts on the part of the President as the AFP
Commander-in-Chief.
Certainly, mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases. It cannot be availed against an official or government agency
whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. For a writ to issue, petitioners should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded, and there should be an imperative duty on the part of respondents to perform the act
sought to be mandated.
The same reasons can be said as regards the other reliefs being sought by petitioners, which pertain to the HC and the
CRAB proceedings. In the absence of a clear and unmistakable provision of a law, a mandamus petition does not lie
to require anyone to a specific course of conduct or to control or review the exercise of discretion; it will not issue to
compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do or give to the applicant
anything to which he is not entitled by law.
G.R. No. 211833
Villanueva v. JBC
April 7, 2015
Reyes, J.
FACTS: The petitioner was appointed as the Presiding Judge of the MCTC, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion,
Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. Later, he applied for the vacant position of
Presiding Judge in several RTCs however, petitioner was not included in the list of nominees.
The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer that its decision not to include his name in the list of
applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level
courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and since
the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list.
In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC
could add no more; (2) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human
56
Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment. The petitioner also asserted that the requirement of the Prejudicature
Program mandated by Section 104 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 85575 should not be merely directory and should be
fully implemented. He further alleged that he has all the qualifications for the position prescribed by the Constitution
and by Congress, since he has already complied with the requirement of 10 years of practice of law.
The JBC and the OSG stated that the petition is procedurally infirm and that the assailed policy does not violate the
equal protection and due process clauses. They posited that: (1) the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to
prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the
Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function; (2) the remedy of mandamus
and declaratory relief will not lie because the petitioner has no clear legal right that needs to be protected; (3)
the equal protection clause is not violated because the classification of lower court judges who have served at least
five years and those who have served less than five years is valid as it is performance and experience based; and (4)
there is no violation of due process as the policy is merely internal in nature.
ISSUE: Whether the action for mandamus was proper
HELD:
No, the action for mandamus was not proper.
The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. The petitioner insisted that
mandamus is proper because his right was violated when he was not included in the list of candidates for the RTC
courts he applied for. He said that his non-inclusion in the list of candidates for these stations has caused him direct
injury.
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal right to the thing
demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. The petitioner bears the
burden to show that there is such a clear legal right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling
duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act. The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to
compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. Clearly, the use of discretion and the
performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive.
The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a course of conduct,
which, it quickly seems to us, was what the petitioner would have the JBC do in his favor. The function of the JBC to
select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is discretionary, not ministerial. Moreso, the petitioner
cannot claim any legal right to be included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the
constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the judiciary may not be used to legally demand that
one's name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy.
Moreover, petitioner is essentially seeking a promotional appointment, that is, a promotion from a first-level court to
a second level court. There is no law, however, that grants him the right to a promotion to second-level courts.
Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable by mandamus inasmuch as
it involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC.
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HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative. The instant petition arose from a special civil action for quo warranto under Rule 66
of the Revised Rules of Court. A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the
use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or
if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.
QUO WARRANTO
1.
2.
3.
4.
Parties
Period
Limitation
Judgment for Cost
G.R. No. 131977
Mendoza v. Allas
February 4, 1999
Puno, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. He was appointed Customs Service Chief
of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS). In 1989, petitioner's position was thus categorized as
"Director III, CIIS" and he discharged the function and duties of said office.
Petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection District X, Cagayan de Oro City. In his
place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting Director III" of the CIIS.
Petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario, informing him of his termination
from the Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent Allas' appointment as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos.
Petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas before the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled
in favor of petitioner hence, the court ordered the ouster of respondent Allas from the position of Director III, and at
the same time directed the reinstatement of petitioner to the same position.
Respondent Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, while the case was pending before said court,
respondent Allas was promoted by President Ramos to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for
Assessment and Operations. As a consequence of this promotion, petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's appeal as
having been rendered moot and academic. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the case
accordingly. The order of dismissal became final and entry was made.
Petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision. The court denied the motion on the ground
that the contested position vacated by respondent Allas was now being occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores
who was not a party to the quo warranto petition.
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals questioning the order of
the trial court. But this was denied. Hence, this recourse.
"The Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that a writ of execution may no longer be issued, considering that
respondent Olores who was not a party to the case now occupies the subject position.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in holding that the a writ of execution may no longer be issued
57
Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule,
however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's
successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of
the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person-- to determine
whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to
which he lays claim.
In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was
threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against
respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution
of the trial court's decision.
G.R. No. 168696
Calleja v. Panday
February 28, 2006
Austria – Martinez, J.
FACTS: Respondents filed a petition for Quo Warranto with Damages, Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction, Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against petitioners. Respondents alleged that they
had been members of the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Inc. since 1985 but on May 2005,
petitioners (who are also incorporators and stockholders of said corporation) forcibly and with the aid of armed men
usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to respondents.
On May 24, 2005, RTC Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to RTC in Naga City. According to RTC Br. 58,
since the verified petition showed that the respondents were residents of Naga City, the action for quo warranto should
be brought in the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents
resides. However, the Executive Judge of RTC Naga City refused to receive the case folder of the case for quo warranto
for improper venue stating that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo warranto case to another
administrative jurisdiction. The RTC Br. 58 proceeded to issue and serve summons on petitioners (Calleja). Petitioner
Tabora filed his Answer dated June 8, 2005, raising therein the affirmative defenses of (1) improper venue, (2) lack
of jurisdiction, and (3) wrong remedy of quo warranto. Thereafter, the other petitioners also filed their Answer, also
raising the same affirmative defenses. All the parties were then required to submit their respective memoranda.
The RTC Br 58 issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss pursuant to the Interim Rules of Procedure for IntraCorporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) which mandates that motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading
(Section 8) and in consonance with Administrative Order 8-01 of the Supreme Court dated March 1, 2001, and ordered
remanded to the Regional Trial Court Branch 23, Naga City which under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been designated
as special court to try and decide intra-corporate controversies under R.A. 8799.
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Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration of the assailed Order and elevated the case via a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the respondents (Panday, et.al.) correctly filed a petition for quo warranto considering that
the positions were those of a private corporation.
2.
Whether or not the RTC-58 has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
1.
No.
It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped the offices, powers
and functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers make out a case for an intra-corporate
controversy. Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court, adopting Justice Jose Y. Feria’s view, declared in
Unilongo v. Court of Appeals that Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is "limited to actions of
quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office;
and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated," while "actions of quo warranto against
corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No. 902-A as amended)."
However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows:
5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree
No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial
Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional
Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. xxx
Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were formerly
cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred to the courts of
general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not
apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private corporation. Presently, Section 1(a) of
Rule 66 reads thus:
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action for the usurpation of a public office,
position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines against
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise;
xxxx
As explained in the Unilongo case, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains the phrase "or an
office in a corporation created by authority of law" which was found in the old Rules. Clearly, the present Rule 66
only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers
who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the
passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies
Under R.A. No. 8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by
respondents before the trial court since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners toassume the
office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.
58
2.
No.
Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that the petition should be commenced and tried in the Regional Trial Court
that has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation. It is undisputed that the principal office of the
corporation is situated at Goa, Camarines Sur. Thus, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC,
it is the Regional Trial Court designated as Special Commercial Courts in Camarines Sur which shall have jurisdiction
over the petition for quo warranto filed by herein Respondents.
Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents’ petition for quo
warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one involving an intra-corporate dispute. The
trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned administrative issuances of this
Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction
over cases previously cognizable by the SEC.
G.R. No. 179431 – 32
Lokin, Jr. v. COMELEC
June 22, 2010
Bersamin, J.
FACTS: The Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under the
party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national
and local elections.
CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its
representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The nominees, in the
order that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007, 3 were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil
L. Galang. The nominees' certificates of acceptance were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC.
The list of nominees was later published in two newspapers of general circulation, The Philippine Star News (sic) and
The Philippine Daily Inquirer.
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and
amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007, whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and
Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus
included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.
Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC Chairperson Benjamin
Abalos, transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than 81% of the CIBAC members, in order to confirm the
withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje. In their petitions, the members
of CIBAC averred that Lokin and Tugna were not among the nominees presented and proclaimed by CIBAC in its
proclamation rally held in May 2007; and that Galang had signified his desire to focus on his family life.
With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos, purportedly as
secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, of
the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de
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Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. Nazareno replied, however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be
granted because COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054.
The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the president of CIBAC were
presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such; that the president was charged by Section 1 of Article IV of
the CIBAC By-Laws to oversee and direct the corporate activities, which included the act of submitting the party's
manifestation of intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections as well as its certificate of nominees; that from all
indications, Villanueva as the president of CIBAC had always been provided the leeway to act as the party's
representative and that his actions had always been considered as valid; that the act of withdrawal, although done
without any written Board approval, was accomplished with the Board's acquiescence or at least understanding; and
that the intent of the party should be given paramount consideration in the selection of the nominees.
As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC.
In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to
proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC.
In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12, 2007; and the
resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBAC's withdrawal of the nominations
of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBAC's second, third and fourth nominees, respectively, and the substitution by CruzGonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the right of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution
No. 7804). He alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. 18 the law that
the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement.
The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list organization has been done and its nominee
has assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the candidates to the House of
Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Thus, Lokin should raise the question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a special civil action for quo
warranto in the HRET, not in a special civil action for certiorari in this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the case
HELD:
Yes. An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated
and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between
them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by
a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections.
A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the winning
candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner
in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for
supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.
The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it concerns a very
peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election
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protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to
determine which between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the
legal votes, Lokin's case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat
another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the
case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some
other cause of disqualification for her.
Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the
September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987
Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now
implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final
orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a
petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days.
Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin's petitions for certiorari and for mandamus
against the COMELEC.
G.R. No. 195229
Aratea v. COMELEC
October 9, 2012
Carpio, J.
FACTS: Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for Mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel
Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo
asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified
under oath that he was eligible for the office he sought election.
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolution cancelling Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy. Lonzanida’s
motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc remained pending during the May 2010 elections.
Lonzanida and Efren Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes and were respectively proclaimed
Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court. On the same date, Aratea wrote the DILG
and requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally required to assume the Office of the Mayor
in view of Lonzanida’s disqualification. DILG Legal Opinion stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office
by reason of his criminal conviction. As a consequence of Lonzanida’s disqualification, the Office of the Mayor was
deemed permanently vacant. Thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the Mayor in an acting capacity without
prejudice to the COMELEC’s resolution of Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration.
COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution12 disqualifying Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010
elections. The COMELEC En Banc’s resolution was based on two grounds: first, Lonzanida had been elected and had
served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been
convicted by final judgment of ten (10) counts of falsification under the Revised Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced
for each count of falsification to imprisonment.
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Antipolo filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Petition-in-Intervention. She claimed her right
to be proclaimed as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the
COMELEC Second Division, through its 18 February 2010 Resolution, ordered the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy and the striking out of his name from the list of official candidates for the position of Mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales in the May 2010 elections.
Aratea asserted that Antipolo, as the candidate who received the second highest number of votes, could not be
proclaimed as the winning candidate. Since Lonzanida’s disqualification was not yet final during election day, the
votes cast in his favor could not be declared stray.
COMELEC En Banc GRANTS the Petition for Intervention of Estela D. Antipolo and Orders Vice-Mayor Efren
Racel Aratea to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of the Mayor, and to cause a peaceful
turn-over of the said office to Antipolo upon her proclamation.
Aratea filed the present petition
ISSUE: Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, or made a false material
representation under Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab
initio, is determinative of whether Aratea or Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales?
HELD:
We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s certificate of
candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray
votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of
Mayor.
A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the commission of prohibited acts and possession of
a permanent resident status in a foreign country." All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses
under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the
language of Section 68 that would justify including violation of the three-term limit rule, or conviction by final
judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under
Section 68.
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there
is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy.
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding
that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of
the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for
the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material
representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or
cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto
proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate,
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with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for
quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.
It is obvious from a reading of the laws and jurisprudence that there is an overlap in the grounds for eligibility and
ineligibility vis-à-vis qualifications and disqualifications. For example, a candidate may represent that he is a resident
of a particular Philippine locality37 when he is actually a permanent resident of another country. In cases of such
overlap, the petitioner should not be constrained in his choice of remedy when the Omnibus Election Code explicitly
makes available multiple remedies. Section 78 allows the filing of a petition to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy before the election, while Section 253 allows the filing of a petition for quo warranto after the
election. Despite the overlap of the grounds, one should not confuse a petition for disqualification using grounds
enumerated in Section 68 with a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78.
It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to be stated in a certificate of candidacy,
under Section 74 of the Code, may be made only after the lapse of the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the
Code, through no fault of the person who discovers such misrepresentations and who would want the disqualification
of the candidate committing the misrepresentations. It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a gap between
the time of the discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made after the 25-day period under Sec. 78
of the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation of the results of the election is made. During this socalled "gap" the would-be petitioner (who would seek the disqualification of the candidate) is left with nothing to do
except to wait for the proclamation of the results, so that he could avail of a remedy against the misrepresenting
candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo warranto against him. Respondent Commission sees this "gap" in what
it calls a procedural gap which, according to it, is unnecessary and should be remedied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED to constitute a Special
Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
Petitioner Efren Racel Aratea is ORDERED to cease and desist from discharging the functions of the Office of the
Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
ARATEA vs. COMELEC — DISSENTING OPINION (BRION, J.) On Quo Warranto
The nature of the eligibility requirements for a local elective office and the disqualifications that may apply to
candidates necessarily create distinctions on the remedies available, on the effects of lack of eligibility and on the
application of disqualification. The remedies available are essentially: the cancellation of a CoC, disqualification
from candidacy or from holding office, and quo warranto, which are distinct remedies with varying applicability
and effects.
In the denial of due course to or cancellation of a CoC, the ground is essentially lack of eligibility under the
pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office; the governing
provisions are Sections 78 and 69 of the OEC.
In a disqualification case, as mentioned above, the grounds are traits, conditions, characteristics or acts of
disqualification, individually applicable to a candidate, as provided under Sections 68 and 12 of B.P. Blg. 881;
Section 40 of LGC 1991; and, as discussed below, Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
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In a quo warranto petition, the grounds to oust an elected official from his office are ineligibility and disloyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines. This is provided under Section 253 of the OEC and governed by the Rules of Court
as to procedures. While quo warranto and cancellation share the same ineligibility grounds, they differ as to the
time these grounds are cited. A cancellation case is brought before the elections, while a quo warranto is filed after
and may still be filed even if a CoC cancellation case was not filed before elections.
The only difference between the two proceedings is that, under section 78, the qualifications for elective office are
misrepresented in the certificate of candidacy and the proceedings must be initiated before the elections, whereas
a petition for quo warranto under section 253 may be brought on the basis of two grounds - (1) ineligibility or (2)
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, and must be initiated within ten days after the proclamation of the
election results. Under section 253, a candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected to office, and he is
disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.
Respondent Carlos raises the issue of procedural infirmity in the direct recourse to the Supreme Court by De Castro,
who thereby failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Petitioner De Castro maintains that a direct recourse to this Court is warranted by the urgent demands of public interest.
Petitioner likewise cites stability in the civil service and protection of the rights of civil servants as rationale for
disregarding the hierarchy of courts.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Castro failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts by filing the petition for quo
warranto to the SC
HELD:
YES. Petitioner De Castro’s excuses are not special and important circumstances that would allow a direct recourse
to this Court. More so, mere speculation and doubt to the exercise of judicial discretion of the lower courts are not and
cannot be valid justifications to hurdle the hierarchy of courts.
As to the period for filing — The period to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC depends on the
provision of law invoked. If the petition is filed under Section 78 of the OEC, the petition must be filed within
twenty-five (25) days from the filing of the CoC. However, if the petition is brought under Section 69 of the same
law, the petition must be filed within five (5) days from the last day of filing the CoC. The three-term limit
disqualification, because of its unique characteristics, does not strictly follow this time limitation and is discussed
at length below. At the very least, it should follow the temporal limitations of a quo warranto petition which must
be filed within ten (10) days from proclamation.
Although Section 5(1) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, the jurisdiction of
this Court is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of the Court of Appeals and regional trial court and does not
give petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The hierarchy of courts must be strictly observed.
De Castro v. Carlos
April 16, 2013
A direct invocation of this Court’s jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons that are
clearly and specifically set forth in a petition. The rationale behind this policy arises from the necessity of preventing
(1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the Court, which is better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the Court’s docket. Petitioner failed to exhibit these exceptions.
G.R. No. 194994
Sereno, C.J.
FACTS: President Arroyo appointed petitioner De Castro as MMDA Assistant General Manager (AGMO I).
With the onset of President Aquino’s administration, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa issued OP MC No. 2, S.
2010, amending OP MC No. 1, S. 2010, directing all non-Career Executive Service Officials (non-CESO) occupying
Career Executive Service (CES) positions in all agencies of the executive branch to remain in office and continue to
perform their duties and discharge their responsibility until October 31, 2010 or until their resignations have been
accepted and/or until their respective replacements have been appointed or designated.
In November 2010, respondent Carlos was designated as OIC of the Office of the AGMO by virtue of MMDA
Memorandum Order No. 24, which in turn cited OP Memorandum Circular No. 2 as basis.
Thereafter, De Castro’s name was stricken off the MMDA payroll, and he was no longer paid his salary beginning
November 2010.
Seeking reinstatement, and declining an offer to become Director IV of MMDA Public Health and Safety Services,
De Castro made a formal demand for his reinstatement through a letter addressed to the Office of the President.
Settled is the rule that "the Supreme Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform
the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition." A disregard of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts warrants, as a rule, the outright dismissal of a petition.
Even assuming that petitioner’s direct resort to this Court is permissible, the Petition must still be dismissed for lack
of merit.
"A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise a franchise or an
office and to oust the holder from the enjoyment, thereof, if the claim is not well-founded, or if his right to enjoy the
privilege has been forfeited." Where the action is filed by a private person, in his own name, he must prove that he is
entitled to the controverted position, otherwise, respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.
Considering that petitioner is an appointee of then President Arroyo whose term ended on 30 June 2010, petitioner’s
term of office was also deemed terminated upon the assumption of President Aquino. He is no longer entitled to that
position. Likewise, it is inconsequential that petitioner was allegedly replaced by another non-CESO eligible. In a quo
warranto proceeding, the person suing must show that he has a clear right to the office allegedly held unlawfully by
another. Absent a showing of that right, the lack of qualification or eligibility of the supposed usurper is immaterial.
However, President Aquino appointed respondent Carlo as the new AGMO of the MMDA. Hence, the instant Petition.
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All the foregoing considered, the petition merits an outright dismissal for disregarding the hierarchy of courts and
petitioner’s lack of cause of action against respondent for failure to sufficiently show that he has undisturbed rights to
the position of AGMO of the MMDA.
On July 22, 2013, the 16th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines formally convened in a joint session. On the
same day, Reyes, as the recognized elected Representative for the Lone District of Marinduque, along with the rest of
the Members of the House of Representatives, took their oaths in open session before Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
Velasco v. Belmonte
January 12, 2016
On December 5, 2013 and January 20, 2014, respectively, Velasco sent two letters to Reyes essentially demanding
that she vacate the office of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque and to relinquish the same in his favor.
The COMELEC issued an Order dated December 11, 2013 directing, inter alia, that all copies of its Resolutions be
forwarded and furnished to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. for the latter's information and guidance.
G.R. No. 211140
Leonardo – De Castro, J.
FACTS: Velasco principally alleges that he is the "legal and rightful winner during the May 13, 2013 elections in
accordance with final and executory resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
On October 10, 2012, one Joseph Socorro Tan (Tan), filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition
to deny due course or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES as candidate for
the position of Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. In his petition, Tan alleged that
Reyes made several material misrepresentations in her COC. The case was docketed as SPA No. 13- 053.
On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the petition; hence, Reyes’ COC was accordingly
cancelled. Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration thereto. However, on May14, 2013 the COMELEC
En Banc affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC First Division.
On May 18, 2013, despite its receipt of the May 14, 2013 COMELEC Resolution, the Marinduque Provincial Board
of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes as the winner of the May 13, 2013 elections for the position of
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
On May 31, 2013, Velasco filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam against Reyes in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). On the same date, a Petition for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam was also filed against
Reyes in the HRET.
On June 5, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring final and executory the resolution
of the Commission en banc promulgated on May 14, 2013 with respect to the cancellation of Reyes’ COC.
On June 10, 2013, Reyes filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari assailing (i) the May 14, 2013 Resolution and
(ii) the June 5, 2013 Certificate of Finality. On the other hand, it appears that Velasco filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the COMELEC assailing the proceedings of the PBOC and the proclamation of Reyes as null and void (SPC
No. 13-010). Both petitions were however denied and dismissed respectively.
On June 28, 2013, Tan filed a Motion for Execution (of the March 27, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division and the May 14, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc) which was later granted by the COMELEC
En Banc on July 10, 2013.
On July 9, 2013, acting on the motion for reconsideration of Velasco, the COMELEC En Banc reversed the June 19,
2013 (SPC No. 13-010) denial of Velasco's petition and declared null and void and without legal effect the
proclamation of Reyes.
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On December 10, 2013, Velasco wrote a letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. requesting, among others, that he be allowed
to assume the position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. However, Velasco relates that his efforts
proved futile. He alleges that despite all the letters and requests to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap,
they refused to recognize him as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. Likewise, in the
face of numerous written demands for Reyes to vacate the position and office of the Representative of the Lone District
of Marinduque, she continues to discharge the duties of said position.
Hence, the instant Petition for Mandamus with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction.
Velasco asserts that both respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap are unlawfully neglecting the
performance of their alleged ministerial duties; thus, illegally excluding him (Velasco) from the enjoyment of his right
as the duly elected Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.
In her Comment, Reyes contends that the petition is actually one for quo warranto and not mandamus given that it
essentially seeks a declaration that she usurped the subject office; and the installation of Velasco in her place by
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. when the latter administers his oath of office and enters his name in the Roll of Members. She
argues that, being a collateral attack on a title to public office, the petition must be dismissed as enunciated by the
Court in several cases.
As to the issues presented for resolution, Reyes questions the jurisdiction of the Court over Quo Warranto cases
involving Members of the House of Representatives. She posits that "even if the Petition for Mandamus be treated as
one of Quo Warranto, it is still dismissible for lack of jurisdiction and absence of a clear legal right on the part of
Velasco.” She argues that numerous jurisprudence have already ruled that it is the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of Members of the House of Representatives. Given the foregoing, Reyes concludes that this Court is"devoid of
original jurisdiction to annul her proclamation." But she hastens to point out that (i) "even granting for the sake of
argument that the proclamation was validly nullified, Velasco as second placer cannot be declared the winner . . ." as
he was not the choice of the people of the Province of Marinduque; and (ii) Velasco is estopped from asserting the
jurisdiction of this Court over her (Reyes) election because he (Velasco) filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam in the
HRET on May 31, 2014.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action availed is really one of mandamus or quo warranto?
HELD:
After a painstaking evaluation of the allegations in this petition, it is readily apparent that this special civil action is
really one for mandamus and not a quo warranto case, contrary to the asseverations of the respondents.
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3.
In this case, given the present factual milieu, i.e., (i) the final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No.
207264; (ii) the final and executory resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's
Certi cate of Candidacy; and (iii) the final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13- 010 declaring
null and void the proclamation of Reyes and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of
Representative for the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque — it cannot be claimed that the present petition
is one for the determination of the right of Velasco to the claimed office. To be sure, what is prayed for herein is
merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and not to try disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will
not convert this petition to one for quo warranto.
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person may file a verified petition for
mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law speci fically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." A petition for mandamus will prosper if it is shown that the subject
thereof is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and that the
petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. As the facts stand in this case, Speaker Belmonte, Jr.
and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap have no discretion whether or not to administer the oath of office to Velasco and to register
the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, respectively. It is beyond cavil that there is
in existence final and executory resolutions of this Court in G.R. No. 207264 affirming the final and executory
resolutions of the COMELEC in SPA No. 13-053 (DC) cancelling Reyes's Certi cate of Candidacy. There is likewise
a final and executory resolution of the COMELEC in SPC No. 13-010 declaring null and void the proclamation of
Reyes, and proclaiming Velasco as the winning candidate for the position of Representative for the Lone District of
the Province of Marinduque.
The important point of reference should be the date the COMELEC finally decided to cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) of Reyes which was on May 14, 2013. The most crucial time is when Reyes's COC was cancelled
due to her non- eligibility to run as Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque — for without
a valid COC, Reyes could not be treated as a candidate in the election and much less as a duly proclaimed winner.
Thus, Reyes HAS ABSOLUTELY NO LEGAL BASIS to serve as a Member of the House of Representatives for the
Lone District of the Province of Marinduque, and therefore, she thus HAS NO LEGAL PERSONALITY to be
recognized as a party-respondent at a quo warranto proceeding before the HRET.
EXPROPRIATION
1.
The right of Eminent Domain
Constitutional Provision: “Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.”
RA 7160: The Local Government Code, Section 19
2.
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Who may expropriate
Two stages in expropriation
a.
b.
Determination of Public Use
Just Compensation
G.R. No. 142394
City of Manila v. Serrano
June 20, 2001
Mendoza, J.
FACTS: On December 21, 1993, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7833, authorizing the
expropriation of certain properties in Manila’s First District in Tondo, covered by TCT Nos. 70869, 105201,
105202, and 138273. The purpose of the expropriation was for the land to be sold and distributed to qualified occupants
pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila.
One of the properties sought to be expropriated, Lot 1-C, covered by TCT 138272 derived from TCT 70869 consists
of 343.10 square meters. The previous owner of the lot, Feliza de Guia, had the lot settled among the heirs by virtue
of a compromise agreement. Lot 1-C was assigned to Edgardo De Guia and was eventually transferred to Lee Kuan
Hui, and was subsequently sold to Demetria de Guia on January 24, 1996.
On September 26, 1997, the City of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation. On November 12, 1997,
respondents Serranos filed a consolidated answer, in which they alleged that the late Demetria De Guia acquired Lot
1-C from Lee Kuan Hui and that they have been the bona fide occupants of the parcel of land for more than 50 years,
and that the expropriation would result in their dislocation, it being the only land left to them by their deceased mother.
They also raised as a defense that the lot is exempt from expropriation because dividing the said land would entitle
them to only 50 square meters of land each. The respondents prayed that the questioned lot be declared exempt from
expropriation.
The RTC then issued an order on October 9, 1998, directing the petitioner to deposit the amount of Php 1,825,241.00.
After the petitioner made the deposit, the RTC issued another order on December 15, 1998 directing the issuance of a
writ of possession in favor of petitioner City of Manila.
Respondents filed a certiorari with the CA alleging the same defenses—that they would be rendered landless and that
Lot 1-C is exempt from expropriation because R.A. 7279 provides that properties consisting of residential lands not
exceeding 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities are exempt from expropriation and that they would only
receive around 49 square meters after the partition of Lot 1-C which consists of only 343.10 square meters.
The CA rendered a decision on November 16, 1999 holding that the lot is not exempt from expropriation because
it exceeds 300 square meters which is no longer considered a small property as per R.A. 7279. However, the other
modes of acquisition of lands enumerated under the law must first be tried by the city government before resulting to
expropriation. As petitioner failed to show that it had exhausted all remedies before resorting to expropriation, the CA
enjoined the City of Manila from expropriating Lot 1-C.
The subsequent motions for reconsideration filed by the petitioner were denied, hence the petitioner filed the present
petition for certiorari.
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Atty. Henedino M. Brondial – 2020 Syllabus
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erroneously presumed that Lot 1-C has been condemned in favor of the City of
Manila when the RTC issued the writ of possession and petitioner’s entry into the properties as it was
premature to determine whether the requirements of R.A. 7279 have been complied with since no
evidentiary hearing had yet been conducted by the RTC.
1.
HELD:
The court held in the negative.
The decision and resolution of the CA is therefore REVERSED and the order of the RTC is REINSTATED. The
case is therefore REMANDED to the RTC for hearing upon these facts.
Rule 67 provides that upon the filing of the complaint, or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant,
the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with
the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of
taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu
thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the
Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary.
If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be
fixed by the court.
After such deposit is made, the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in
possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the
parties.
Thus, a writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these
requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes immaterial. The requirements were, as held in this case,
satisfied and therefore it became the ministerial duty of the RTC to issue the writ of possession.
The CA committed an error in ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the requirements of acquiring the land by
other means under R.A. 7279.
The cited jurisprudence, Filstream, was necessitated because an order of condemnation had already been issued by
the RTC in that case. Therefore, the judgment in this case had already become final. In this case, the RTC has
not gone beyond the issuance of the writ of possession. A hearing is still necessary to determine whether or not the
petitioner indeed complied with the requirements of R.A. 7279. It is therefore premature at this stage of the
proceedings to find that the petitioner resorted to expropriation. without first trying the other modes of acquisition
under the aforesaid law.
Whether the petitioner City of Manila has complied with these provisions requires the presentation of evidence,
although in its amended complaint, it did allege that it had complied with the same. The determination of such a
question must be settled in the hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the
condemnation of the properties to be expropriated.
Expropriation proceedings consists of two stages:
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2.
Condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition is for a public purpose or public use
(or determination of the propriety of the expropriation); and
The determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of private property to be made by the court
with the assistance of not more than three commissioners
G.R. No. 198139
NAPOCOR v. CA
September 8, 2014
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
Civil Case No. 5785
Respondents Felicisimo Tarcelo (Tarcelo) and the heirs of Comia Santos (Santos heirs) are the owners of two lots
measuring 4,404 and 2,611 square meters, respectively, which are situated in Brgy. Tabangao-Ambulong, Batangas
City.
Sometime in 2000, petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) filed Civil Case No. 5785 with the Batangas City
RTC, seeking to expropriate portions of Tarcelo and the Santos heirs’ lots to the extent of 1,595.91 square meters
which are affected by the construction and maintenance of NPC’s 1,200 MW Ilijan Natural Gas Pipeline Project. In
other words, NPC’s natural gas pipeline shall traverse respondents’ lands to such extent.
On July 29, 2002, the Batangas City RTC issued an order of condemnation, thus authorizing NPC to take possession
of the subject lots. Thereafter, it appointed three commissioners who in turn submitted their respective Reports5 and
recommendations on the amount of just compensation to be paid to respondents.
On November 7, 2005, the Batangas City RTC rendered a Decision fixing just compensation for the subject lots at
P1,000.00 per square meters. This was based on the commissioners’ reports.
In the Commissioner’s Report filed by Chairman of the Board Emelinda C. Atienza, she recommended the amount of
P1,120.00 per square meter as just compensation for the properties involved in this case.
Commissioners Alberto M. Nuique and Eladio Taupa of the National Power Corporation (NPC) also submitted their
own Commissioner’s Report. They recommended that the amount of P475.00 per square meter be made as the payment
of the affected portion of the subject property which is 10% of the fair market value pursuant to Republic Act No.
6395 as amended. This was because only a right-of-way easement will be acquired. According to the Supreme Court
in the case of NPC v. Manubay Agro Industrial Dev. Corp., G.R. No. 150936, August 18, 2004, even if what is
acquired is only an easement of right of way, still, the plaintiff should pay the full value of the property and not a mere
easement fee.
CA-G.R. CV No. 86712
NPC filed an appeal. The CA ruled:
“At bar, it cannot be gainsaid that the construction of underground pipeline is a simple case of mere
passage of gas pipeline. It will surely cause damage and prejudice to the agricultural potentials of
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appellees’ property. Deep excavation will have to be done whereby plants and trees will be uprooted. A
possible leakage could certainly do harm and adversely restrict the agricultural and economic activity of
the land. This is not to mention that it will create an environmental health hazard dangerous to the
occupant’s life and limb.
In pronouncing the just compensation in this case, We fix the rate of the subject property at SEVEN HUNDRED
NINETY SEVEN [sic] and FIFTY CENTAVOS (P797.50) per square meter by averaging P475.00 and P1,120.00 of
the commissioner’s report. This is nearest to and in consonance with the ruling that in expropriation proceedings, the
owner of the property condemned is generally entitled to the fair market value, that is the sum of money which a
person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell.
Hence, defendants-appellees are entitled for [sic] just compensation to [sic] the full market value of their property not
just ten percent (10%) of it.
The appealed decision was affirmed and modified the just compensation in this case is lowered from ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) to SEVEN HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN and FIFTY CENTAVOS (P797.50) per
square meter.
Respondents moved for execution. In a March 6, 2009 Order, the Batangas City RTC granted their respective motions,
and a Writ of Execution was issued.
On May 14, 2009, a Notice of Garnishment was served on the Manager of the Land Bank of the Philippines, NPC
Branch, Quezon City for the satisfaction of the amount of P5,594,462.50 representing just compensation for the whole
of respondents’ 4,404- and 2,611-square meter lots – or 7,015 square meters – and not merely the supposedly affected
portions thereof totaling 1,595.91 square meters as NPC originally sought to acquire.
On May 29, 2009, NPC filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion seeking to quash the Writ of Execution and Notice of
Garnishment, which it claimed were inconsistent with the Batangas City RTC’s November 7, 2005 Decision and the
CA’s June 26, 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 86712. It argued that the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 86712 resolved
only the issue of whether respondents should be paid the full market value of the affected 1,595.91-square meter area
or just a 10% easement fee therefor; it did not decide whether NPC should pay just compensation for the entire area
of 7,015 square meters.
On September 24, 2009, the Batangas City RTC issued an Order denying NPC’s Urgent Omnibus Motion. These cases
involved either the construction and maintenance of electric transmission lines or the widening of road component.
None of the cited cases involved underground natural gas pipelines, as in this case. In the case of transmission lines,
the NPC imposes a limitation on the property owner’s use of their property in that below said transmission lines no
plant higher than three (3) meters is planted. Moreover, there is the possible inestimable damage that an unpredictable
natural disaster such as an earthquake of tectonic origin, the precise date and time of occurrence of which are yet
beyond the powers of man to accurately foretell, could inflict on the underground natural gas pipelines and
consequently, on all things, living and non-living, that exist in the vicinity of the defendants’ properties.
Moreover, the ruling that just compensation should be paid for the entire area of the owner’s property and not just the
affected portion thereof is not without precedent.
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In the case at bar, it was not disputed that the subject properties are agricultural lands. In order to be useful to its
owners, such agricultural lands must be cultivated to yield a harvest of agricultural produce. But when such lands are
burdened with an easement even of the non-apparent kind, but which to all intents and purposes restrict, nay, preclude
the very activity that would render it useful to its owners because the existence of such easement poses an
undeniable danger to the life and limb of the occupants, then such lands cease to be useful to the property owners
and useful only to the entity that imposed the easement upon the land.
CA pronounced that “At bar, it cannot be gainsaid that the construction of underground pipeline is a simple case of
mere passage of gas pipeline. It will surely cause damage and prejudice to the agricultural potentials of appellees’
property. Deep excavation will have to be done whereby plants and trees will be uprooted. A possible leakage could
certainly do harm and adversely restrict the agricultural and economic activity of the land. This is not to
mention that it will create an environmental health hazard dangerous to the occupant’s life and limb.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.
The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss.”
NPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied since the said motion lacked the required notice of hearing.
Thereafter, it filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, assailed the writ of execution and notice of garnishment were
inconsistent with the CA’s June 26, 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 86712 in which just compensation was fixed
at P1,000.00 per square meter only for the affected area of 1,595.91 square meters, and not for the whole of
respondents’ respective lots.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that there was nothing in the November 7, 2005 Decision of the Batangas City RTC to indicate that NPC
was being ordered to pay just compensation only for the 1,595.91-square meter portion of respondents’ properties; on
the contrary, the trial court held that –
Based on the foregoing, the court fixes the just compensation for the subject properties situated in Brgy.
Tabangao-Ambulong, Batangas City at ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) per square meter.24 (Emphasis
supplied) – which meant that in the fixing of the amount of just compensation, the trial court did not confine itself to
the 1,595.91-square meter portion but rather to the subject properties in their entirety and without qualification. It
added that just compensation should be “neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the land;” the trial
court’s judgment may be clarified by referring to other portions thereof, and not by reading them separately from the
whole decision.
Finally, the CA found nothing wrong with the trial court’s October 23, 2009 Order denying NPC’s Motion for
Reconsideration (of the trial court’s September 24, 2009 Order), since the said motion lacked the required notice of
hearing; it was properly treated as a pro forma motion, a mere scrap of paper.
NPC filed its Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate court in an August 9, 2011 Resolution.
Hence, the instant Petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding RTC’s order to approve the notice of garnishment demanding
payment of just compensation for the entire property of respondents instead of the affected portions
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HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
Petitioner’s Arguments
In its Petition and Consolidated Reply, NPC argues that while there is no dispute as to its liability to respondents, the
Sheriff’s computation as reflected in the Notice of Garnishment is erroneous in that it is being made to pay for more
than what was adjudged; just compensation should be limited to the value of that portion so taken, and not the entire
property of which such portion forms part. It cites cases where the computation and payment of just compensation
was limited to the value of the affected portions only.
Respondents’ Arguments
Praying that the Petition be denied for lack of merit, the Santos heirs in their Comment restate the assailed CA
Decision, and add that while NPC sought a mere right-of-way for its pipelines, the truth is that their property will
be rendered useless by the toxic fumes and hazardous substances that could be emitted by such pipelines; that
their situation is akin to that of the landowner in the case of National Power Corporation v. Manubay AgroIndustrial Development Corporation,35 who was adjudged to be entitled to the full value of the property, and not a
mere easement fee; and that NPC cannot claim liberality in the application of the Rule on motions36 because there
exist no special or compelling circumstances to warrant the relaxation of the rule, and NPC’s failure is the result of
fault and negligence on its part, and it has not shown to the satisfaction of the court that it is entitled to leniency.
On the other hand, respondent Tarcelo argues in his Comment that there is no inconsistency between the the decision
of the trial court and CA. The trial court and the CA treated respondents’ properties as a whole or in their entirety in
resolving the cases before them; that NPC already knew beforehand that it is being ordered to pay just compensation
for the entirety of respondents’ properties and not mere portions thereof.
Our Ruling
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily
in derogation of private rights. It is one of the harshest proceedings known to the law. The authority to condemn is to
be strictly construed in favor of the owner and against the condemnor. When the power is granted, the extent to which
it may be exercised is limited to the express terms or clear implication of the statute in which the grant is contained.
Corollarily, it has been held that trial courts should exercise care and circumspection in the resolution of just
compensation cases, considering that they involve the expenditure of public funds.
The above principles were somehow lost on both the trial and appellate courts.
The Commissioners’ Reports in Civil Case No. 5785 indicate that only the affected areas were intended to be
acquired and compensated. The trial court itself particularly decreed in its November 7, 2005 Decision that only the
affected portions of respondents’ properties were to be acquired and compensated for.
The CA therefore patently erred in declaring in its assailed Decision that there is nothing in the November 7, 2005
Decision of the Batangas City RTC to indicate that NPC was being ordered to pay just compensation only for the
1,595.91-square meter portion of respondents’ properties. On the contrary, the evidence is quite clear that NPC has
been made liable precisely to such extent only, and not more.
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The Court likewise observes that the June 26, 2007 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 86712 did not particularly declare
that NPC should pay for the entire area of respondents’ properties. It merely stated that respondents should be
compensated for the full and fair market value of their property and not merely paid a 10% easement fee therefor; it
did not resolve the issue of whether NPC should pay just compensation for the entire area of 7,015 square meters. It
simply said that NPC should pay for the full per-square meter value of the affected portions, and not just a
fraction thereof (or 10%).
It has always been the rule that “[t]he only portion of the decision that may be the subject of execution is that which
is ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion. Whatever may be found in the body of the decision can only be
considered as part of the reasons or conclusions of the court and serve only as guides to determine the ratio decidendi.”
Thus, with the decretal portion of the trial court’s November 7, 2005 Decision particularly stating that NPC
shall have the lawful right to enter, take possession and acquire easement of right-of-way over the affected
portions of respondents’ properties upon the payment of just compensation, any order executing the trial
court’s Decision should be based on such dispositive portion. “An order of execution is based on the disposition,
not on the body, of the decision.”
Petitioner National Power Corporation is adjudged liable to PAY JUST COMPENSATION to respondents
Felicisimo Tarcelo and the Heirs of Comia Santos for the affected portions of their respective properties totaling
1,595.91 square meters, at P797.50 per square meter, subject to interest at the rate of twelve per cent (12%) per annum
from July 29, 2002 up to June 30, 2013, and thereafter, six percent (6%) per annum from July 1, 2013 until full
satisfaction, pursuant to Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board Circular No. 799, Series of 2013 and applicable
jurisprudence;
G.R. No. 160656
Republic v. Andaya
June 15, 2007
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Ismael Andaya is the registered owner of two parcels of land in Butuan City. Said properties are subject to
a 60-meter wide perpetual easement for public highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other similar works of the
government or public enterprise, at no cost to the government, except only the value of the improvements existing
thereon that may be affected. Republic negotiated with Andaya to enforce the 60-meter easement of right-of-way. The
easement was for concrete levees and floodwalls for Phase 1, Stage 1 of the Lower Agusan Development Project. The
parties, however, failed to reach an agreement.
Consequently, the Republic instituted an action before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City to enforce the easement
of right-of-way or eminent domain. The trial court issued a writ of possession. It also constituted a Board of
Commissioners (Board) to determine the just compensation. Eventually, the trial court issued an Order of
Expropriation upon payment of just compensation. Later, the Board reported that there was a discrepancy in the
description of the property sought to be expropriated. The Republic thus amended its complaint, reducing the 60-meter
easement to 10 meters, or an equivalent of 701 square meters.
The Board reported that the project would affect a total of 10,380 square meters of Andaya’s properties, 4,443 square
meters of which will be for the 60-meter easement. The Board also reported that the easement would diminish the
value of the remaining 5,937 square meters. As a result, it recommended the payment of consequential damages
amounting to ₱2,820,430 for the remaining area. Andaya objected to the report because although the Republic reduced
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the easement to 10 meters or an equivalent of 701 square meters, the Board still granted it 4,443 square meters. He
contended that the consequential damages should be based on the remaining area of 9,679 square meters. Thus, the
just compensation should be ₱11,373,405. The Republic did not file any comment, opposition, nor objection.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Republic is liable for just compensation, if in enforcing the legal easement of right-ofway on a property, the remaining area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable?
HELD:
Yes. The Republic is liable for just compensation of only the remaining areas consisting of 5,937 square meters, with
interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of the writ of possession or the actual taking until full
payment is made. For the purpose of determining the final just compensation, the case is remanded to the trial court.
Said court is ordered to make the determination of just compensation payable to respondent Andaya with deliberate
dispatch.
It is undisputed that there is a legal easement of right-of-way in favor of the Republic. Andaya’s transfer certificates
of title contained the reservation that the lands covered thereby are subject to the provisions of the Land Registration
Act and the Public Land Act. Section 112 of the Public Land Act provides that lands granted by patent shall be subject
to a right-of-way not exceeding 60 meters in width for public highways, irrigation ditches, aqueducts, and other similar
works of the government or any public enterprise, free of charge, except only for the value of the improvements
existing thereon that may be affected. In view of this, the Court of Appeals declared that all the Republic needs to do
is to enforce such right without having to initiate expropriation proceedings and without having to pay any just
compensation. Hence, the Republic may appropriate the 701 square meters necessary for the construction of the
floodwalls without paying for it.
HOWEVER, the Court did sustain the Republic’s argument that it is not liable to pay consequential damages if in
enforcing the legal easement on Andaya’s property, the remaining area would be rendered unusable and uninhabitable.
"Taking," in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, occurs not only when the government actually deprives or
dispossesses the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a practical destruction or
material impairment of the value of his property. Using this standard, there was undoubtedly a taking of the remaining
area of Andaya’s property. True, no burden was imposed thereon and Andaya still retained title and possession of the
property. But, as correctly observed by the Board and affirmed by the courts a quo, the nature and the effect of the
floodwalls would deprive Andaya of the normal use of the remaining areas. It would prevent ingress and egress to the
property and turn it into a catch basin for the floodwaters coming from the Agusan River.
For this reason, Andaya is entitled to payment of just compensation, which must be neither more nor less than the
monetary equivalent of the land. One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be
deprived of his private property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due
process is that there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use. Noteworthy, Section
9, Article III of our Constitution mandates that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
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G.R. No. 169914
Asia’s Emerging Dragon v. DOTC
April 18, 2008
Chico – Nazario, J.
FACTS: Expropriation proceedings for the NAIA IPT III was instituted by the Government with the RTC of Pasay
City.. Congressman Baterina, together with other members of the House of Representatives, sought intervention by
filing a Petition for Prohibition in Intervention. Baterina, et al. believe that the Government need not file expropriation
proceedings to gain possession of NAIA IPT III and that PIATCO is not entitled to payment of just compensation,
In essence, Baterina is opposing the expropriation proceedings on the ground that NAIA IPT III is already public
property. Hence, PIATCO is not entitled to just compensation for NAIA IPT III.
ISSUE: Whether the Republic’s resort to expropriation over the airport project built on government land was
appropriate
HELD:
Yes. This Court already made an unequivocal pronouncement in its Resolution dated 21 January 2004 in Agan that
for the Government of the Republic to take over the NAIA IPT III facility, it has to compensate PIATCO as a builder
of the structures; and that "[t]he compensation must be just and in accordance with law and equity for the government
cannot unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors."63 As between the Republic and PIATCO,
the judgment on the need to compensate PIATCO before the Government may take over NAIA IPT III is already
conclusive and beyond question.
The Court then, in Gingoyon, directly addressed the issue on the appropriateness of the Republic's resort to
expropriation proceedings:
The Government has chosen to resort to expropriation, a remedy available under the law, which has the
added benefit of an integrated process for the determination of just compensation and the payment
thereof to PIATCO. We appreciate that the case at bar is a highly unusual case, whereby the Government
seeks to expropriate a building complex constructed on land which the State already owns. There is an
inherent illogic in the resort to eminent domain on property already owned by the State. At first blush,
since the State already owns the property on which NAIA 3 stands, the proper remedy should be akin to
an action for ejectment.
However, the reason for the resort by the Government to expropriation proceedings is understandable in this case. The
2004 Resolution, in requiring the payment of just compensation prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA 3,
effectively precluded it from acquiring possession or ownership of the NAIA 3 through the unilateral exercise of its
rights as the owner of the ground on which the facilities stood. Thus, as things stood after the 2004 Resolution, the
right of the Government to take over the NAIA 3 terminal was preconditioned by lawful order on the payment of just
compensation to PIATCO as builder of the structures.
The right of eminent domain extends to personal and real property, and the NAIA 3 structures, adhered as they are to
the soil, are considered as real property. The public purpose for the expropriation is also beyond dispute. It should also
be noted that Section 1 of Rule 67 (on Expropriation) recognizes the possibility that the property sought to be
expropriated may be titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals,
and in such case an averment to that effect should be made in the complaint. The instant expropriation complaint did
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aver that the NAIA 3 complex "stands on a parcel of land owned by the Bases Conversion Development Authority,
another agency of [the Republic of the Philippines]."
ISSUE: Whether the mere issuance of the writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings transfers ownership of
the lots in favor of the City
Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole judicial recourse by which the Government may have acquired the NAIA
3 facilities while satisfying the requisites in the 2004 Resolution. Eminent domain though may be the most effective,
as well as the speediest means by which such goals may be accomplished. Not only does it enable immediate
possession after satisfaction of the requisites under the law, it also has a built-in procedure through which just
compensation may be ascertained. Thus, there should be no question as to the propriety of eminent domain proceedings
in this case.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative. As a general rule, ejectment proceedings, due to its summary nature, are not suspended
or their resolution held in abeyance despite the pendency of a civil action regarding ownership.
G.R. No. 189232
Abad v. Fil – Homes Realty
November 24, 2010
Carpio – Morales, J.
FACTS: : Fil-Homes Realty and Development Corporation and Magdiwang Realty Corporation (respondents), coowners of two lots situated in Sucat, Parañaque City filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Sps. Abad before
the Parañaque Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC).
During the pendency of the case, the City of Parañaque filed expropriation proceedings covering the lots before the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque with the intention of establishing a socialized housing project therein for
distribution to the occupants including petitioners. A writ of possession was consequently issued and a Certificate of
Turn-over given to the City.
The MeTC rendered judgment in the unlawful detainer case against petitioners and ordered them to vacate and
surrender possession of the premises. The MeTC held that as no payment had been made to respondents for the lots,
they still maintain ownership thereon. It added that petitioners cannot claim a better right by virtue of the issuance of
a Writ of Possession for the project beneficiaries have yet to be named.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), by Decision reversed the MeTC decision and dismissed respondents’
complaint. The RTC went on to rule that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the City bars the continuation
of the unlawful detainer proceedings, and since the judgment had already been rendered in the expropriation
proceedings which effectively turned over the lots to the City, the MeTC has no jurisdiction to "disregard the . . . final
judgment and writ of possession" due to non-payment of just compensation; It is serious error for the court a quo to
rule in the unlawful detainer case that Magdiwang Realty Corporation and Fil-Homes Realty and Development
Corporation could still be given possession of the properties which were already expropriated in favor of the City of
Parañaque; The court a quo has no valid reason to disregard the said final judgment and the writ of possession already
issued by the Regional Trial Court in favor of the City of Parañaque and against Magdiwang Realty Corporation and
Fil-Homes Realty Development Corporation and make another judgment concerning possession of the subject
properties contrary to the final judgment of the Regional Trial Court
Respondents filed a petition for review before the CA. The latter ordered that Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court
be hereby REINSTATED relying in the case Republic v. Gingoyon, which ruled that the issuance of a writ of
possession in the expropriation proceedings does not signify the completion of the expropriation proceedings. Hence
this petition.
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Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 538 enlightens, however:
Section 1. When the Government seeks to acquire, through purchase or expropriation proceedings, lands
belonging to any estate or chaplaincy (cappellania), any action for ejectment against the tenants
occupying said lands shall be automatically suspended, for such time as may be required by the
expropriation proceedings or the necessary negotiations for the purchase of the lands, in which latter
case, the period of suspension shall not exceed one year.
To avail himself of the benefits of the suspension, the tenants shall pay to the landowner the current rents
as they become due or deposit the same with the court where the action for ejectment has been instituted.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Here, petitioners did not comply with any of the acts mentioned in the law to avail of the benefits of the suspension.
Nevertheless they posit that since the lots are the subject of expropriation proceedings, respondents can no longer
assert a better right of possession; and that the City Ordinance authorizing the initiation of expropriation proceedings
designated them as beneficiaries of the lots, hence, they are entitled to continue staying there. Petitioners’ position is
without merit.
In Lintag v. National Power Corporation clearly outlines the stages of expropriation, viz:
Expropriation of lands consists of two stages:
The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends
with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful
right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint x x x.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of "the
just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the court with the assistance of
not more than three (3) commissioners x x x .
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. The process is
not complete until payment of just compensation. Accordingly, the issuance of the writ of possession in this case does
not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. To effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the NPC to
pay the property owners the final just compensation.
In the present case, the mere issuance of a writ of possession in the expropriation proceedings did not transfer
ownership of the lots in favor of the City. Such issuance was only the first stage in expropriation. There is even no
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evidence that judicial deposit had been made in favor of respondents prior to the City’s possession of the lots, contrary
to Section 19 of the LGC.
Respecting petitioners’ claim that they have been named beneficiaries of the lots, the city ordinance authorizing the
initiation of expropriation proceedings does not state so. Petitioners cannot thus claim any right over the lots on the
basis of the ordinance.
Even if the lots are eventually transferred to the City, it is non sequitur for petitioners to claim that they are
automatically entitled to be beneficiaries thereof. For certain requirements must be met and complied with before they
can be considered to be beneficiaries.
G.R. No. 193936
NPC v. YCLA Sugar Development Corp.
December 11, 2013
Reyes, J.
FACTS: On December 2, 1997, National Power Corporation filed a Complaint for expropriation against YCLA and
several other individuals for the construction of the 69 KV Calapan-Mamburao Island Grid Project in Puerto Galera,
Oriental Mindoro. NPC sought to expropriate a portion of the parcels of lands owned by the defendants for the
acquisition of an easement of right-of-way over areas that would be affected by the construction of transmission lines.
YCLA filed its Answer alleging that the Complaint should be dismissed outright for failure of NPC to allege the public
use for the intended expropriation of its properties.
On April 30, 1999, the parties moved for the constitution of a Board of Commissioners to be appointed by the RTC
to determine the reasonable amount of just compensation to be paid by the NPC. The RTC issued an order terminating
the pre-trial conference and directing the constitution of the Board of Commissioners.
The RTC, on June 4, 1999, issued a writ of possession in NPC’s favor.
The Board of Commissioners submitted its Report on May 2, 2001 which fixed the amount of just compensation of
the subject properties at P500.00 per sqm. YCLA objected to the amount recommended by the Board as the amount
of just compensation should be fixed at P900.00 per sqm considering the improvements in their properties.
YCLA filed its motion asking the RTC to direct the Board to conduct an ocular inspection over the subject properties
and amend/revise the Board’s Report dated May 2, 2001, which was granted by the RTC.
On September 15, 2003, the Board submitted its second Report which fixed the just compensation of the subject
properties at P1,000.00 per sqm. The second Report stated that the prevailing market value of the property is P500.00
to P1,500.00 per sqm, per actual sale and opinion value of reliable persons x x x. The amount of P1,000.00 per sqm
should be the basis in the computation of the price per square meter of the land subject matter of the instant case.”
The RTC rendered a Decision which adopted the report and recommendation of the Board fixing the amount of just
compensation at P1,000 per square meter. The RTC pointed out that the recommendation that the amount of just
compensation at P500.00 per sqm was arrived without conducting an ocular inspection and upon YCLA’s request, the
conducting of ocular inspection prompted the Board to revise its first report.
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NPC appealed alleging that the RTC erred in relying on the second Report of the Board as the amount adopted was
too excessive considering that the subject properties were barren and undeveloped agricultural lands.
The CA rendered its decision modifying the amount of just compensation at P900.00 per sqm.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC and CA had sufficient basis in arriving at the questioned amount of just compensation
of the subject properties.
HELD:
No. In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken
from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word "just" is used
to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered
for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample. The constitutional limitation of "just
compensation" is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly defined as the price
fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the fair value of
the property; as between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government.
It is settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings.
In this case, in arriving at the amount of just compensation, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily on the Board of
Commissioners’ Report dated September 15, 2003, which, in turn, was arrived at after conducting an ocular inspection
of the subject properties on August 27, 2003. However, the Board of Commissioners’ recommendation as to the
amount of just compensation was based on the prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003. What escaped
the attention of the lower courts is that the prevailing market value of the subject properties in 2003 cannot be used to
determine the amount of just compensation considering that the Complaint for expropriation was filed by NPC on
December 2, 1997.
Further, the Court notes that the Board of Commissioners, in its Report dated September 15, 2003, merely alleged that
its members arrived at the amount of ₱1,000.00 per sq m as just compensation for the subject properties based on
actual sales, presumably of surrounding parcels of land, and on the opinion of "reliable persons" that were interviewed.
However, the Report dated September 15, 2003 is not supported by any corroborative documents such as sworn
declarations of the "reliable persons" that were supposedly interviewed.
A commissioners’ report of land prices is considered as evidence in the determination of the amount of just
compensation due the land owner in expropriation cases. The recommended amount of just compensation contained
in the commissioners’ report of land prices, in turn, is based on various factors such as the fair market value of the
property, the value of like properties. Thus, it becomes imperative that the commissioners’ report of land prices be
supported by pertinent documents, which impelled the commissioners to arrive at the recommended amount for the
condemned properties, to aid the court in its determination of the amount of just compensation. Otherwise, the
commissioner’s report becomes hearsay and should thus not be considered by the court.
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The trial court, in expropriation cases, may accept or reject, whether in whole or in part, the report submitted by the
Board of Commissioners, which is merely advisory and recommendatory in character. It may also recommit the report
or set aside the same and appoint new commissioners. In this case, the lower courts gave full faith and credence to the
Board of Commissioners' Report dated September 15, 2003 notwithstanding that it was not supported by any
documentary evidence.
G.R. No. 158464
Limkaichong v. LBP
August 2, 2016
Bersamin, J.
FACTS: The petitioner was the registered owner of agricultural lands with a total area of 19.6843 hectares situated
in Villegas, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. (OCT) FV-34400, OCT No.
34401, OCT No. 34402, and OCT No. 34403, all of the Register of Deeds of Negros Oriental. For purposes of placing
those lands within the coverage of R.A. No. 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
Office of the Provincial Adjudicator, in Dumaguete City sent to her in 1998 several Notices of Land Valuation and
Acquisition by which her lands were valued for acquisition by the DAR. After the petitioner rejected such valuation
of her lands, the DARAB conducted summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation.
On May 28, 1999, the DARAB issued its order affirming the valuation of the lands upon finding the valuation
consistent with existing administrative guidelines on land valuation.
Petitioner filed a complaint for the fixing of just compensation for her lands with the RTC of Dumaguete. The
respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of the petitioner’s failure to timely appeal the DARAB order
which had rendered it final and executory. As an opposition, the petitioner insists that while it has been filed beyond
the reglamentary period, the RTC was not barred from acquiring jurisdiction because it sits as a special agrarian court.
The SAC granted the Motion to Dismiss which was affirmed by the CA on appeal.
The petitioner argues that she is entitled to equal protection and treatment accorded by the very same trial court to
other landowners whose landholdings were placed under agrarian reform coverage, listing the cases involving other
landowners who had been given the chance to be heard on their claim for re-valuation by the trial court. She justifies
her resort to certiorari by claiming that the RTC, in dismissing Civil Case No. 12558, acted whimsically and arbitrarily,
and gravely abused its discretion; and that certiorari was necessary to prevent irreparable damage and injury to her
resulting from the acquisition by the State of her lands based on wrongful valuation and without paying her the proper
and just compensation.
The respondents counter that the petitioner's reliance on the equal protection clause of the fundamental law is
misplaced and bereft of legal and factual basis; that, on the contrary, they faithfully performed their task in relation to
her landholdings, and in accordance with the agrarian laws and guidelines issued in furtherance thereof; that the final
and executory DARAB valuation should no longer be disturbed by her frivolous claim of lack of due process; that her
failure to properly observe the rules of procedure relative to reglementary periods should not be concealed by a trivial
claim of violation of her constitutional rights; that pursuant to Section 60 24 of RA 6657, the decision became final
because an appeal by petition for review was not taken from the decision of the RTC as the SAC within 15 days from
notice of the decision; and that there was no proof of service on the CA of a copy of the petition as required by Section
3, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Circular No. 19-91, thereby warranting the outright dismissal of the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not on the question of constitutional right to equal protection of law, the CA erred in ruling that
the Petition for Certiorari was not the proper remedy
HELD:
Yes. The following requisites must concur for certiorari to prosper, namely: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal,
a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Without jurisdiction
means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is excess of jurisdiction when the court transcends its
power or acts without any statutory authority. Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act
at all in contemplation of law.
Indeed, the Court has held that the availability of an appeal as a remedy is a bar to the bringing of the petition for
certiorari only where such appeal is in itself a sufficient and adequate remedy, in that it will promptly relieve the
petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment or final order complained of. The Court does not hesitate or halt
on its tracks in granting the writ of certiorari to prevent irreparable damage and injury ,to a party in cases where the
trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment, or where there may be a failure of justice; or where
the assailed order is a patent nullity; or where the grant of the writ of certiorari will arrest future litigations; or for
certain considerations, such as public welfare and public policy.
G.R. No. 1900-4
LBP v. Dalauta
August 8, 2017
Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Respondent Eugenio Dalauta (Dalauta) was the registered owner of an agricultural land in Florida, Butuan
City. The land was placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under compulsory acquisition of the CARP.
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered ₱192,782.59 as compensation for the land, but Dalauta rejected
such valuation for being too low. The case was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) through the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Butuan City. A summary administrative proceeding was
conducted to determine the appropriate just compensation for the subject property which affirmed the valuation made
by LBP.
Dalauta filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting as SAC. He alleged that LBP's
valuation of the land was inconsistent with the rules and regulations prescribed in DAR Administrative Order (A.O.)
No. 06, series of 1992, for determining the just compensation of lands covered by CARP's compulsory acquisition
scheme. SAC constituted the Board of Commissioners tasked to inspect the land and to make a report thereon. The
Commissioners recommended that the value of the land be pegged at ₱100,000.00 per hectare. With both Dalauta and
the DAR objecting to the recommended valuation, the SAC allowed the parties to adduce evidence to support their
respective claims.
Dalauta argued that the valuation of his land should be determined using the formula in DAR A.O. No. 6, series of
1992. Norberto C. Fonacier (Fonacier), the purchaser of the trees, testified that he and Dalauta executed their
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Agreement, which showed that he undertook to bear all expenses in harvesting the trees and to give Dalauta the amount
of ₱350,000.00 as net purchase payment, for which he issued a check. Dalauta clarified that about 2,500 trees per
hectare were planted on about twenty-one (21) hectares of his land, while the remaining four (4) hectares were reserved
by his brother for planting com. He also claimed to have replanted the land with gemelina trees, as advised by his
lawyer, after Fonacier harvested the trees in January 1994. Such plants were the improvements found by the
Commissioners during their inspection. Dalauta added that he had no tenants on the land. He prayed that the
compensation for his land be pegged at ₱2,639,566.90.
The Court ruled that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be
vested in administrative agencies. The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determination, but
when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public
use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall
prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the 'justness' of the decreed
compensation. " It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners."
LBP argued that the valuation of Dalauta's land should be determined using their formula . LBP claimed that during
the ocular inspection/investigation, only 36 coconut trees existed on the subject land; that three (3) hectares of it were
planted with corn; and the rest was idle with few second-growth trees. To support its claim, LBP presented witnesses.
Based on their witnesses’ testimony, the trees had no value and could be considered as weeds and that the use of LBP’s
formula was because the land had no income. Hence, pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 6, series of 1992, the total value of
Dalauta's land should be computed as LV = MV x 2.
As earlier cited, in Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657, Congress expressly granted the RTC, acting as SAC, the original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. Only the legislature
can recall that power. The DAR has no authority to qualify or undo that. The Court's pronouncement in Veterans
Bank, Martinez, Soriano, and Limkaichong, reconciling the power of the DAR and the SAC essentially barring any
petition to the SAC for having been filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB
Rules of Procedure, cannot be sustained.
SAC rendered its decision ordering DAR and LBP to pay ₱2,639,557 as value of the Land. LBP filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied by the SAC. BP filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
before the CA. CA ruled that the SAC correctly took cognizance of the case. It reiterated that the SAC had original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation. With regard to just
compensation, the CA sustained the valuation by the SAC for being well within R.A. No. 6657, its implementing rules
and regulations, and in accordance with settled jurisprudence.
While R.A. No. 6657 itself does not provide for a period within which a landowner can file a petition for the
determination of just compensation before the SAC, it cannot be imprescriptible because the parties cannot be placed
in limbo indefinitely. The Civil Code settles such conundrum. Considering that the payment of just compensation is
an obligation created by law, it should only be ten (10) years from the time the landowner received the notice of
coverage. The Constitution itself provides for the payment of just compensation in eminent domain cases. Under
Article 1144, such actions must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court had properly taken jurisdiction over the case despite the finality of the PARAD
Resolution; Whether or not the trial court correctly computed the just compensation of the subject property
Nevertheless, any interruption or delay caused by the government like proceedings in the DAR should toll the running
of the prescriptive period. The statute of limitations has been devised to operate against those who slept on their rights,
but not against those desirous to act but cannot do so for causes beyond their control.
HELD:
RTC, acting as SAC, had original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation. It explained that the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC would be undermined if the DAR
would vest in administrative officials the original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the SAC an appellate
court for the review of administrative decisions.
In agrarian reform cases, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR, more specifically, in the DARAB as provided for
in Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657. Meanwhile, E.O. No. 229 also vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation
of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
On the other hand, the SACs are the Regional Trial Courts expressly granted by law with original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners as per Section 57 of R.A. No.
6657. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heir of Trinidad S. V da. De Arieta, SC ruled that:
LBP's valuation of lands covered by CARL is considered only as an initial determination, which is not
conclusive, as it is the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, that should make the final determination
of just compensation, taking into consideration the factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657
and the applicable DAR regulations.
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In this case, Dalauta received the Notice of Coverage on February 7, 1994. He then filed a petition for determination
of just compensation on February 28, 2000. Clearly, the filing date was well within the ten year prescriptive period
There may be situations where a landowner, who has a pending administrative case before the DAR for determination
of just compensation, still files a petition before the SAC for the same objective. Such recourse is not strictly a case
of forum shopping, the administrative determination being not resjudicata binding on the SAC. Nevertheless, the
practice should be discouraged. Everyone can only agree that simultaneous hearings are a waste of time, energy and
resources. To prevent such a messy situation, a landowner should withdraw his case with the DAR before filing his
petition before the SAC and manifest the fact of withdrawal by alleging it in the petition itself. Failure to do so, should
be a ground for a motion to suspend judicial proceedings until the administrative proceedings would be terminated. It
is simply ludicruous to allow two procedures to continue at the same time.
The Court agrees with the position of Justice Francis Jardeleza that just compensation for respondent Dalauta's land
should be computed based on the formula provided under DAR-LBP Joint Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of
2003 (JMC No. 11 (2003)). This Memorandum Circular, which provides for the specific guidelines for properties with
standing commercial trees.
As to the just compensation, the September 18, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals decreeing payment of
₱2,639,557 .00 as the value of the subject property is SET ASIDE. Let the case be remanded to the Regional Trial
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Court, Branch 5, Butuan City, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, for purposes of computing just compensation in
accordance with JMC No. 11 (2003) and this disposition.
FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
Unless the parties stipulate, personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary
because Section 3 of Act No. 3135 only requires the posting of the notice of sale in three public places and the
publication of that notice in a newspaper of general circulation. In this case, the parties stipulated in paragraph N
of the real estate mortgage that all correspondence relative to the mortgage including notifications of
extrajudicial actions shall be sent to mortgagor Ramirez at his given address. MBC had no choice but to comply
with this contractual provision it has entered into with Ramirez. Hence, we cannot agree with the bank that
paragraph N of the real estate mortgage does not impose an additional obligation upon it to provide personal notice of
the extrajudicial foreclosure sale to the mortgagor Ramirez.
1.
The Complaint
2.
The Judgment
3.
Sale of Foreclosed Property
Equity of Redemption v. Right of Redemption
4.
Deficiency Judgment
Red the law on extra – judicial foreclosure: RA 3135, 4118
G.R. No. 198800
Ramirez v. Manila Banking Corp.
December 11, 2013
HELD:
YES. The Court held that when MBC failed to send the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure sale to Ramirez, it
committed a contractual breach of said paragraph N sufficient to render the extrajudicial foreclosure sale on September
8, 1994 null and void. The contract is the law between them.
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS: Petitioner Jose T. Ramirez mortgaged two parcels of land in Marikina City covered by TCTs in favor of
respondent Manila Banking Corporation (MBC) to secure his loan. The real estate mortgage provides that all
correspondence relative to the mortgage including notifications of extrajudicial actions shall be sent to petitioner
Ramirez at his given address.
Ramirez failed to pay his loan despite demands. Thus, MBC filed a request for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage. Being the sole bidder, MBC was issued a certificate of sale as the highest bidder. MBC demanded that
Ramirez vacate the properties.
Ramirez sued MBC for annulment of sale and prayed that the certificate of sale be annulled on the ground that no
notice of the foreclosure and sale by public auction was personally given to him in violation of paragraph N of the real
estate mortgage which requires personal notice to him of said extrajudicial foreclosure.
MBC claimed that the foreclosure proceedings were valid. Under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, no personal notice to the
mortgagor is required in case of a foreclosure sale. The bank claims that paragraph N of the real estate mortgage does
not impose an additional obligation to it to provide personal notice to the mortgagor Ramirez
The RTC ruled that the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were null and void and the certificate of sale is invalid.
The CA reversed the trial court’s decision and ruled that absence of personal notice of foreclosure to Ramirez as
required by paragraph N of the real estate mortgage is not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale. Ramirez’s motion
for reconsideration was denied in the assailed CA Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not deed of mortgage requires personal notice to the petitioner-mortgagor by the respondentmortgagee bank
G.R. No. 184045
Marquez v. Alindog
January 22, 2014
Perlas – Bernabe, J.
FACTS: Sometime in June 1998, petitioner Anita J. Marquez extended a loan in the amount of ₱500,000.00 to a
certain Benjamin Gutierrez. As security therefore, Gutierrez executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated June 16,
1998 over a parcel of land located in Tagaytay City covered by TCT 13443 (subject property) registered under the
name of Benjamin A. Gutierrez, married to Liwanag Camerin (Sps. Gutiererez). The mortgage was duly annotated on
the dorsal portion of TCT which Sps. Marquez had verified as clean prior to the mortgage.
Since Gutierrez defaulted in the payment of his loan obligation, Anita sought the extra-judicial foreclosure of the
subject property. At the public auction sale held on January 19, 2000, Anita emerged as the highest bidder for the
amount of ₱1,171,000.00. Upon Gutierrez’s failure to redeem the same property within the prescribed period therefor,
title was consolidated in the name of Anita J. Marquez, which, however, bore an annotation of adverse claim dated
March 2, 2000 in the names of respondents-spouses Carlito and Carmen Alindog (Sps. Alindog). Said annotation was
made only after the subject property’s mortgage to Sps. Marquez. Subsequently, Sps. Alindog filed a civil case for
annulment of real estate mortgage and certificate of sale with prayer for damages against Sps. Marquez and a certain
Agripina Gonzales (Gonzales) before the RTC. Sps. Alindog alleged that they purchased the subject property from
Gutierrez way back in September 1989, but were unable to secure a certificate of title in their names because Gonzales
– to whom they have entrusted said task – had deceived them.
Anita, then filed an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the RTC. Claiming that the same
is ministerial on the court’s part following the consolidation of her and her husband’s title over the subject property.
The RTC granted Anita’s ex-parte petition and thereby directed the issuance of a writ of possession.
However, Sps. Alindog, claiming that they would suffer irreparable injury from the implementation of the writ of
possession, sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with prayer for
damages to the same court.
After further proceedings on the injunction case, the RTC, through an Order dated November 14, 2005, issued a writ
of preliminary injunction enjoining Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the subject property until after the
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controversy has been fully resolved on the merits. Thus, notwithstanding the consolidation of Sps. Marquez’s title
over the subject property, the RTC granted Sps. Alindog’s prayer for injunctive relief, holding that any further
dispossession on their part would cause them irreparable injury.
Sps. Marquez moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC. Unperturbed, Sps. Marquez elevated the case
to the CA on certiorari but the CA denied Sps. Marquez’s petition as it found no grave abuse of discretion on the
RTC’s part when it issued the injunctive writ that enjoined Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the subject
property. Sps. Marquez then moved for reconsideration which was however, denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it issued
the injunctive writ which enjoined Sps. Marquez from taking possession of the subject property?
HELD:
Yes. It is an established rule that the purchaser in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale is entitled to the possession of the
property and can demand that he be placed in possession of the same either during (with bond) or after the expiration
(without bond) of the redemption period therefor. Several cases on the matter, explained that a writ of possession duly
applied for by said purchaser should issue as a matter of course, and thus, merely constitutes a ministerial duty on the
part of the court
The procedure for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is governed by Act No. 3135 (section 7), as
amended. The law expressly authorizes the purchaser to petition for a writ of possession during the redemption period
by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that purpose in the corresponding registration or cadastral proceeding in
the case of property with Torrens title; and upon the filing of such motion and the approval of the corresponding bond,
the law also in express terms directs the court to issue the order for a writ of possession. The order for a writ of
possession issues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding
bond. No discretion is left to the court. And any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale (and the
consequent cancellation of the writ) is left to be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in section 8 of the
law. Such question is not to be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of possession, since, under
the Act, the proceeding for this is ex parte.
It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not
redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of
the said property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance
to him of a new transfer certificate of title. The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the
redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. No
such bond is required after the redemption period if the property is not redeemed. Possession of the land then becomes
an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the
writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
G.R. No. 148448
Ardiente v. Provincial Sheriff
August 17, 2004
Carpio – Morales, J.
FACTS: Spouses Ardiente obtained a loan from the Peninsula Development Bank secured by Real Estate Mortgage
over a parcel of land. Out of the proceeds of the loan, the Ardientes purchased a mini bus. As Ardientes failed to pay
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the loan, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and the parcels of land covered thereby were sold at public
auction to the bank which was the highest bidder.
Two days before the period to redeem the foreclosed mortgage expired, Spouses Ardiente filed before the RTC a
complaint for Annulment of Auction Sale with Preliminary Injunction and Damages Alleging that the requisite of
notifying the mortgagors of the intended extra-judicial foreclosure sale was not duly complied with. The bank, on the
other hand, filed its Answer with Counterclaim and alleged that petitioners were duly notified of the extra-judicial
foreclosure and public auction sale. There was sufficient notice and publication served to all concerned of said public
auction sale of the properties offered as collaterals.
By Decision, the trial court, noting the absence of documentary evidence showing strict compliance with the statutory
requirements on publication of notice of extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, declared the extra-judicial foreclosure
and the sale of the mortgaged properties null and void. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court after finding the argument of the defendant-appellants bank et al. that the lack of required notice and
publication of the extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage was not averred in the complaint, hence, cannot be the basis
of an adverse judgment. The CA noted that while it may be true that the Supreme Court said, in the case of
Tambunting v. Court of Appeals and relied upon by the trial court, that the presumption of compliance with official
duty is rebutted by the failure to present proof of posting and publication of the notice of sale, such may be applied
only when these omissions are alleged and raised by the party in the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of mortgagee to comply with the publication requirements may be raised on appeal.
HELD:
No. With respect to petitioners' paragraphs 15 and 16 allegations in their Complaint, clearly, they were questioning
the validity of the extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage on the basis of lack of notice to them as mortgagors.
It is settled that personal notice to the mortgagor in extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings is not necessary, hence, not
a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale. With respect to petitioners' argument that the bank, in paragraph 25 of its
Answer, in fact put in issue its compliance with the requirements of Act 3135, "more specifically with regards to the
notices of the public auction sale as well as the extra-judicial application in accordance with law," to thus call for the
presentation of evidence, they citing again Benavides,23 the same fails.
Benavides bears on the rendition of judgment on the pleadings. It holds that where the defendant's answer tenders an
issue, as where it does not only deny the material allegations of the complaint but also sets up certain special and
affirmative defenses, the nature of such answer calls for presentation of evidence, hence, it is error to render a
judgment on the pleadings thereon without such evidence.
No doubt, it is a well-settled rule that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure
sales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and the sale
at least voidable.24
Despite petitioners' non-allegation of lack of publication of notice of foreclosure in their Complaint, the bank pleaded
in its Answer (1) "that petitioners were duly notified of the extrajudicial foreclosure and public auction sale" and
"[t]here was sufficient notice and publication served to all concern[ed] of said public auction sale," and (2) that it and
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the Office of the provincial Sheriff "fully compl[ied] with the requirements of law under Act 3135, more specifically
with regard to notices of the public auction as well as the extra-judicial foreclosure in accordance with law."
Yet petitioners never refuted in their Reply and Answer to Counterclaim such defense of the bank nor presented
evidence before the trial court to disprove the same.
In fact, in its Comment on petitioners' Formal Offer of Evidence before the trial court, the bank, passing on Exhibit
"D" - its letter to petitioners advising them that they had one year from November 11, 1993 to exercise their right of
redemption, stated that said exhibit was admitted "with the qualification as to the purpose to the effect that said extrajudicial foreclosure was filed in accordance with law and that all requirements of said law were complied with and
that plaintiffs were duly notified of said proceedings."25
Despite the bank's repeated claim that the statutory requirements governing extra-judicial foreclosure had been
complied with, the bank's plea of lack of publication of notice of foreclosure was not raised by petitioners either in the
Amended Complaint or in the Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. It was not also raised during the trial as the entire
transcripts of the stenographic notes of the proceedings before the trial court show. Nor even in their memorandum
filed before the trial court, petitioners having merely assailed the lack of "personal" notification to them of any
"intended" extrajudicial foreclosure and the "grossly and greatly inadequate" purchase price of the lands.
The office, purpose or function of the complaint is to inform the defendant clearly and definitely of the claims made
against him so that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial. Otherwise stated, if the wrong or omission of
the defendant is not alleged in the complaint, then the defendant would be precluded from presenting evidence to
refute the imputation of such wrong or present justification for the alleged omission. In this case, even perfunctory
reading of the Petition and the Amended Petition, readily reveals the absence of any averment relating to the required
posting and publication of the notice of foreclosure sale. Understandably then, the defendant-appellant Bank saw no
need to present the Sheriff’s Certification of Posting and the newspaper where the notice was published as well as the
publisher’s affidavit. Clearly, the presumption that the Provincial Sheriff of Quezon has discharged his official duty
in a regular manner and that the defendant-appellant Bank complied with the requirements under the law will suffice.
Despite the bank’s repeated claim that the statutory requirements governing extrajudicial foreclosure had been
complied with, the plea of bank’s lack of publication of notice of foreclosure was not raised by petitioners either in
the Amended Complaint or in the Reply and Answer to Counterclaim. It was not also raised during the trial as the
entire transcripts of the stenographic notes of the proceedings before the trial court show. Nor even in their
memorandum filed before the trial court, petitioners having merely assailed the lack of "personal" notification to them
of any "intended" extrajudicial foreclosure and the "grossly and greatly inadequate" purchase price of the lands.
Indeed, as correctly held by the respondent Court, the issue of lack of publication of the notice of foreclosure of the
mortgage was raised only on appeal. Petitioner does not represent that he directly attacked in his complaint the validity
of the foreclosure because of such lack of notice.
G.R. No. 187973
LZK Holdings v. Planters Development Bank
January 20, 2014
Reyes, J.
FACTS: LZK Holdings obtained a Php 40 Million loan from Planters Bank on December 16, 1996 and secured the
same with a Real Estate Mortgage over its lot located in La Union. The lot is 589 square meters, covered by TCT No.
T-45337.
On September 21, 1998, the lot was sold at a public auction after Planters Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real
estate mortgage thereon because of LZK Holdings’ failure to pay its loan. Planters Bank was the highest bidder
during the sale and its certificate of sale was registered on March 16, 1999.
On April 5, 1999, however, LZK Holdings filed before the RTC of Makati City a complaint for annulment of
extrajudicial foreclosure, mortgage contract, promissory note and damages. They also prayed for the issuance of
a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the consolidation of title over the lot by Planters Bank. Planters
Bank then filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC-San Fernando.
On March 13, 2000, 3 days before the expiration of LZK Holdings’ redemption period, the RTC Makati issued a TRO,
effective for 20 days which enjoined Planters Bank from consolidating its title over the property. On April 3, 2000,
the RTC Makati ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction fo the same purpose, but the same was only
issued only on June 20, 2000 upon LZK Holdings’ posting of a bond.
Planters Bank, however, succeeded in consolidating its ownership over the property on April 24, 2000. However, the
proceedings for the ex-parte issuance of a writ of possession was suspended by the RTC San Fernando, La Union,
because of the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction issued in favor of the petitioner. Planters Bank moved for
reconsideration of the same, but was denied. The RTC Makati thereafter declared as null and void the consolidated
title of Planters Bank in an order dated June 2, 2000. The ruling was also affirmed by the CA dated February 26,
2004. The same was also affirmed by the SC.
Planters Bank also appealed the order of the RTC San Fernando, La Union, which held in abeyance the resolution of
the issuance of the writ of possession because of the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC
Makati. The CA granted the appeal and annulled the assailed order of RTC San Fernando. LZK Holdings then filed a
petition for review with the SC, and the court affirmed the CA’s ruling.
As such, Planters Bank then filed before the RTC San Fernando a motion to set the ex-parte hearing for the issuance
of the writ of possession. LZK Holdings opposed the motion but in an order dated April 2, 2008, the RTC denied the
opposition and set the hearing on April 14, 2008.
On April 8, 2008, however, the RTC San Fernando issued another order declaring the scheduled hearing moot and
academic and granting Planter Bank’s ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession. The CA affirmed
the same decision in a decision dated January 27, 2009.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of possession in favor of Planters Bank was rightfully issued and granted.
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HELD:
The court held in the affirmative.
Goldenway Merchandising Corp. v. Equitable PCI Bank
G.R. No. 195540
March 13, 2013
Villarama, Jr., J.
A writ of possession is a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land. It
commands the sheriff to enter the land and give possession to it to the person entitled under the judgment. It may be
issued in case of an extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Act No. 3135, Sec. 7, as amended by Act
No. 4118. Under said provision, the writ of possession may be issued to the purchaser in a foreclosure sale either
within the one-year redemption period upon the filing of a bond, or after the lapse of the redemption period,
without need of a bond.
The duty of the court to issue the writ of possession is ministerial and to emphasize its ministerial character, the SC
has held in other cases that injunction is disallowed to prohibit its issuance, just as they have held that the issuance
of the same cannot be stayed by a pending action for annulment of mortgage or the foreclosure itself.
Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the right of Planter’s Bank to a writ of possession is binding and
conclusive on the parties.
The doctrine of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment states that “when a right or fact has been judicially tried
and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment
of the court, as long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them.”
All the elements of the doctrine are present in the case. Hence, LZK Holdings can no longer question Planter Bank’s
right to a writ of possession over the subject property because the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of the particular issue on the writ.
The contention of LZK Holdings that the issuance of the writ of possession violated Act 3135 is not well-taken by
the court.
No hearing is required prior to the issuance of the writ as the proceeding for the same is ex parte and summary in
nature. It is a non-litigious proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as a purchaser in a foreclosure
sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. It is for the benefit of one party only and without notice by the court to
any person adverse of interest. Relief is granted without giving the person against whom the relief is sought an
opportunity to be heard.
The RTC did not commit an error in cancelling the previously set hearing and granting the motion for the writ of
possession without granting LZK Holdings notice or the opportunity to be heard.
The petition is hereby DENIED and the pertinent rulings (January 27, 2009 CA ruling affirming the decision of the
RTC) is hereby AFFIRMED.
FACTS: On November 29, 1985, Goldenway Merchandising Corporation (petitioner) executed a Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of Equitable PCI Bank (respondent) over its real properties situated in Valenzuela, Bulacan (now
Valenzuela City) and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-152630, T-151655 and T-214528 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan. The mortgage secured the Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00) loan
granted by respondent to petitioner and was duly registered.
As petitioner failed to settle its loan obligation, respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage on December 13,
2000. During the public auction, the mortgaged properties were sold for ₱3,500,000.00 to respondent. Accordingly, a
Certificate of Sale was issued to respondent on January 26, 2001.
In a letter dated March 8, 2001, petitioner’s counsel offered to redeem the foreclosed properties by tendering a check
in the amount of ₱3,500,000.00. On March 12, 2001, petitioner’s counsel met with respondent’s counsel reiterating
petitioner’s intention to exercise the right of redemption. However, petitioner was told that such redemption is no
longer possible because the certificate of sale had already been registered. Petitioner also verified with the Registry of
Deeds that title to the foreclosed properties had already been consolidated in favor of respondent and that new
certificates of title were issued in the name of respondent on March 9, 2001.
Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the respondent, asserting that it is the oneyear period of redemption under Act No. 3135 which should apply and not the shorter redemption period provided in
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8791. Petitioner argued that applying Section 47 of R.A. 8791 to the real estate mortgage
executed in 1985 would result in the impairment of obligation of contracts and violation of the equal protection clause
under the Constitution. Additionally, petitioner faulted the respondent for allegedly failing to furnish it and the Office
of the Clerk of Court, RTC of Valenzuela City with a Statement of Account as directed in the Certificate of Sale, due
to which petitioner was not apprised of the assessment and fees incurred by respondent, thus depriving petitioner of
the opportunity to exercise its right of redemption prior to the registration of the certificate of sale.
In its Answer with Counterclaim, respondent pointed out that petitioner cannot claim that it was unaware of the
redemption price which is clearly provided in Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791, and that petitioner had all the opportune
time to redeem the foreclosed properties from the time it received the letter of demand and the notice of sale before
the registration of the certificate of sale.
RTC: Dismissed. It noted that the issue of constitutionality of Sec. 47 of R.A. No. 8791 was never raised by the
petitioner during the pre-trial and the trial. Aside from the fact that petitioner’s attempt to redeem was already late,
there was no valid redemption made because Atty. Judy Ann Abat-Vera who talked to Atty. Joseph E. Mabilog of the
Legal Division of respondent bank, was not properly authorized by petitioner’s Board of Directors to transact for and
in its behalf.
CA: affirmed the trial court’s decision. According to the CA, petitioner failed to justify why Section 47 of R.A. No.
8791 should be declared unconstitutional. Furthermore, the appellate court concluded that a reading of Section 47
plainly reveals the intention to shorten the period of redemption for juridical persons.
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In the present petition, it is contended that Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 is inapplicable considering that the contracting
parties expressly and categorically agreed that the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage shall be in accordance with
Act No. 3135. Petitioner contended that the right of redemption is part and parcel of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
itself and attaches thereto upon its execution, a vested right flowing out of and made dependent upon the law governing
the contract of mortgage and not on the mortgagee’s act of extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgaged properties. Thus,
applying Section 47 of R.A. No. 8791 to the present case would be a substantial impairment of its vested right of
redemption under the real estate mortgage contract. Such impairment would be violative of the constitutional
proscription against impairment of obligations of contract, a patent derogation of petitioner’s vested right and clearly
changes the intention of the contracting parties.
Petitioner further argues that since R.A. No. 8791 does not provide for its retroactive application, courts therefore
cannot retroactively apply its provisions to contracts executed and consummated before its effectivity. Also, since
R.A. 8791 is a general law pertaining to the banking industry while Act No. 3135 is a special law specifically
governing real estate mortgage and foreclosure, under the rules of statutory construction that in case of conflict a
special law prevails over a general law regardless of the dates of enactment of both laws, Act No. 3135 clearly should
prevail on the redemption period to be applied in this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment in RA 8791 be validly applied when the real estate mortgage contract was
executed in 1985 and the mortgage foreclosed when R.A. No. 8791 was already in effect?
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, those who
petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis therefor.
Otherwise, the petition must fail
Petitioner’s contention that Section 47 of R.A. 8791 violates the constitutional proscription against impairment of the
obligation of contract has no basis.
The purpose of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution is to safeguard the integrity of contracts against
unwarranted interference by the State. There is an impairment if a subsequent law changes the terms of a contract
between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the
enforcement of the rights of the parties.
Section 47 did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their foreclosed properties but only modified the time
for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new redemption
period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three
months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption
period because Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose
owners shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.
Petitioner’s claim that Section 47 infringes the equal protection clause as it discriminates mortgagors/property owners
who are juridical persons is equally bereft of merit.
76
The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class privilege.1âwphiWe
agree with the CA that the legislature clearly intended to shorten the period of redemption for juridical persons whose
properties were foreclosed and sold in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135.27
The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and natural persons was based on the nature of the properties
foreclosed – whether these are used as residence, for which the more liberal one-year redemption period is retained,
or used for industrial or commercial purposes, in which case a shorter term is deemed necessary to reduce the period
of uncertainty in the ownership of property and enable mortgagee-banks to dispose sooner of these acquired assets. It
must be underscored that the General Banking Law of 2000, crafted in the aftermath of the 1997 Southeast Asian
financial crisis, sought to reform the General Banking Act of 1949 by fashioning a legal framework for maintaining a
safe and sound banking system. In this context, the amendment introduced by Section 47 embodied one of such safe
and sound practices aimed at ensuring the solvency and liquidity of our banks. Therefore, it was based on a
reasonable classification and germane to the purpose of the law.
The right of redemption being statutory, it must be exercised in the manner prescribed by the statute, and within the
prescribed time limit, to make it effective. Furthermore, as with other individual rights to contract and to property, it
has to give way to police power exercised for public welfare. The concept of police power is well-established in this
jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare.” The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights
are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State,
but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may
require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. Settled is the rule that
the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government.
G.R. No. 179665
Solid Builders v. CBC
April 3, 2013
Leonardo – De Castro, J.
FACTS: China Banking Corporation (CBC) granted several loans to Solid Builders, Inc. (SBI) in 1996 to 1997. To
secure the loans, Medina Foods Industries, Inc. (MFII) executed in CBC’s favor several surety agreements and
contracts of real estate mortgage over parcels of landin Quezon City and Rizal. Subsequently, SBI proposed to CBC
a scheme through which SBI would sell the mortgaged properties and share the proceeds with CBC on a 50-50 basis
until such time that the whole obligation would be fully paid. SBI also proposed that there be partial releases of the
certificates of title of the mortgaged properties without the burden of updating interests on all loans.
Eventually, SBI requested the restructuring of its loans, a reduction of interests and penalties. In response, CBC sent
SBI a letter dated April 17, 2000 stating that the loans had been completely restructured effective March 1, 1999 when
SBI signed a new promissory note. Since interest payment has not been made, no re-pricing is possible. Subsequently,
CBC demanded SBI to settle its outstanding account within ten days from receipt thereof.
Apparently, claiming that the interests, penalties and charges imposed by CBC were iniquitous and unconscionable
and to enjoin CBC from initiating foreclosure proceedings, SBI and MFII filed a Complaint “To Compel Execution
of Contract and for Performance and Damages, With Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte
Temporary Restraining Order” in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which was granted. The trial court
held that SBI and MFII were able to sufficiently comply with the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ:
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The three subject letters, particularly the letter dated September 18, 2000, indicate that the promissory notes executed
by Benito Soliven as President of plaintiff SBI amounted to ₱218,540,646.00, excluding interest, penalties and other
charges remained unpaid, and demand that the account be settled within ten days, else defendant bank shall refer the
latter to its lawyers for collection. The message in the letter is clear: If the account is not settled within the grace
period, defendant bank will resort to foreclosure of mortgage on the subject properties.
The actual or imminent damage to plaintiffs is likewise clear. Considering the number of parcels of land and area
involved, if these are foreclosed by defendant bank, plaintiffs’ properties and source of income will be effectively
diminished, possibly to the point of closure. However, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari of CBC
and dissolved the injunctive writ issued by the RTC of Pasig City.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is irreparable injury in the foreclosure of a mortgaged property?
HELD:
No. Where there is a valid cause to foreclose on the mortgages, it cannot be correctly claimed that the irreparable
damage sought to be prevented by the application for preliminary injunction is the loss of the mortgaged properties to
auction sale. The alleged entitlement of SBI and MFII to the "protection of their properties put up as collateral for the
loans" they procured from CBC is not the kind of irreparable injury contemplated by law. Foreclosure of mortgaged
property is not an irreparable damage that will merit for the debtor-mortgagor the extraordinary provisional remedy
of preliminary injunction. All is not lost for defaulting mortgagors whose properties were foreclosed by creditorsmortgagees. The respondents will not be deprived outrightly of their property, given the right of redemption granted
to them under the law. Moreover, in extrajudicial foreclosures, mortgagors have the right to receive any surplus in the
selling price. Thus, if the mortgagee is retaining more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled to, this fact alone
will not affect the validity of the sale but will give the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus.
G.R. No. 169568
Robles v. Yapcinco
October 22, 2014
Bersamin, J.
FACTS: Fernando Yapcinco constituted a mortgage on a property in favor of Jose Marcelo as security for an
obligation. Later, Marcelo transferred his right to Apolinario Cruz. When Yapcinco was unable to pay, Cruz instituted
an action for judicial foreclosure of mortgage. The property was later sold at public auction where Cruz was the highest
bidder. However, he did not register the certificate of sale; nor was a judicial confirmation of sale issued.
Cruz donated the property to his grandchildren, among whom were Apolinario Bernabe, and Rolando Robles
(petitioner). Later, Robles falsified a deed of absolute sale to make it appear that Yapcinco sold the property to him.
Consequently, Yapcinco’s TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued to Bernabe.
The heirs of Yapcinco filed an action against Bernabe to annul the latter’s TCT, declaring that although the property
had been mortgaged, the mortgage had not been foreclosed, judicially or extra-judicially; that the property was
released from the mortgage per Entry No. 32-2182 in the Memorandum of Incumbrances; and that the deed of absolute
sale between Fernando Yapcinco and Bemabe, et aL. was void.
Bernabe was declared in default and Yapcinco’s TCT was restored.
77
Later, Robles filed an action for the nullification of document, cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages against
the respondents declaring that the heirs of Yapcinco had acted in bad faith in causing the issuance of TCT No. 354061
because they had known fully well that the property had long been excluded from the estate of Yapcinco by virtue of
the foreclosure; that a certificate of absolute sale was issued in the name of Apolinario Cruz as early as 1959; and that
he had a vested right in the property pursuant to the deed of donation executed by Apolinario Cruz in his favor, among
others.
The RTC ruled in favor or Robles that the respondents could not claim to have no knowledge that the property in litis
was no longer part of the estate of the late Fernando F. Yapcinco; that one of them had substituted the late Fernando
F. Yapcinco in the judicial foreclosure proceedings, and even appealed the adverse decision to the CA; that they could
not argue that they were not bound by the foreclosure of the mortgage due to the non registration of the certificate of
sale because as between the parties registration was not a requisite for the validity of the foreclosure; and that they did
not redeem the property until the present.
However, the CA reversed the decision and held that due to the non registration of the certificate of sale, the period
of redemption did not commence to run. It also held that Apolinario Cruz never acquired title to the property and could
not have conveyed and transferred ownership over the same to his grandchildren through the deed of donation1 and
that contrary to the RTC's finding, Patrocinio Yapcinco's knowledge of Apolinario Cruz' interest over the subject
property was not tantamount to registration.
ISSUE: Whether failure to register the sale invalidates the judicial foreclosure proceedings
HELD:
Before anything more, the Court clarifies that the failure of Apolinario Cruz to register the certificate of sale was of
no consequence in this adjudication. The registration of the sale is required only in extra-judicial foreclosure sale
because the date of the registration is the reckoning point for the exercise of the right of redemption. In contrast,
the registration of the sale is superfluous in judicial foreclosure because only the equity of redemption is granted to
the mortgagor, except in mortgages with banking institutions. The equity of redemption is the right of the defendant
mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the 90day period after the judgment becomes final, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to the confirmation of the sale.
In this light, it was patent error for the CA to declare that: "By Apolinario Cruz's failure to register the 18 March 1958
Certificate of Absolute Sale in the Office of the Register of Deeds, the period of redemption did not commence to
run."
The applicable rule on March 18, 1959, the date of the foreclosure sale, was Section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
which relevantly provided that: "Such sale shall not affect the rights of persons holding prior incumbrances upon the
property or a part thereof, and when confirmed by an order of the court, it shall operate to divest the rights of all the
parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed
by law." The records show that no judicial confirmation of the sale was made despite the lapse of more than 40 years
since the date of the sale. Hence, it cannot be said that title was fully vested in Apolinario Cruz.
The effect of the failure of Apolinario Cruz to obtain the judicial confirmation was only to prevent the title to the
property from being transferred to him. For sure, such failure did not give rise to any right in favor of the mortgagor
or the respondents as his successors-in-interest to take back the property already validly sold through public auction.
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Nor did such failure invalidate the foreclosure proceedings. To maintain otherwise would render nugatory the judicial
foreclosure and foreclosure sale, thus unduly disturbing judicial stability. The non-transfer of the title notwithstanding,
Apolinario Cruz as the purchaser should not be deprived of the property purchased at the foreclosure sale. With the
respondents having been fully aware of the mortgage, and being legally bound by the judicial foreclosure and
consequent public sale, and in view of the unquestioned possession by Apolinario Cruz and his successors-in-interest
(including the petitioner) from the time of the foreclosure sale until the present, the respondents could not assert any
better right to the property. It would be the height of inequity to still permit them to regain the property on the basis
alone of the lack of judicial confirmation of the sale. After all, under the applicable rule earlier cited, the judicial
confirmation operated only "to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser,
subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law."
G.R. No. 200567
MBTC v. CPR Promotions and Marketing, Inc.
June 22, 2015
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS: From February to October 1997, respondent CPR Promotions and Marketing, Inc. (CPR Promotions)
obtained loans from petitioner MBTC. These loans were covered by fifteen (15) promissory notes (PNs) all signed by
respondents, spouses Leoniza F. Reynoso and Cornelio P. Reynoso, Jr. (spouses Reynoso), as Treasurer and President
of CPR Promotions, respectively. To secure the loans, the spouses Reynoso executed two deeds of real estate mortgage
on separate dates. All of the mortgaged properties are registered under the spouses Reynoso's names, except for TCT
No. 565381, which is registered under CPR Promotions. Thereafter, the spouses Reynoso executed a continuing surety
agreement binding themselves solidarity with CPR Promotions to pay any and all loans CPR Promotions may have
obtained from petitioner MBTC, including those covered by the said PNs.
Upon maturity of the loans, respondents defaulted, prompting MBTC to file a petition for extra-judicial foreclosure
of the real estate mortgages, pursuant to Act No. 3135. Subsequently, on May 5, 1998, the mortgaged properties
covered by TCT Nos. 624835 and 565381 were sold at a public auction sale. MBTC participated therein and submitted
the highest bid in the amount of PhP 10,374,000. The day after, on May 6, 1998, petitioner again participated and won
in the public auction sale of the remaining mortgaged properties, having submitted the highest bid amounting to PhP
3,240,000. Petitioner was issued the corresponding Certificates of Sale on July 15 and 16, 1998. Notwithstanding the
foreclosure of the mortgaged properties for the total amount of PhP 13,614,000, petitioner MBTC alleged that there
remained a deficiency balance of PhP 2,628,520.73, plus interest and charges. Despite petitioner's repeated demands,
however, respondents failed to settle the alleged deficiency. Thus, petitioner filed an action for collection of sum of
money against respondents.
The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioner that there, indeed, was a balance of PhP 2,628,520.73, plus
interest and charges, as of September 18, 1998, and that respondents are liable for the said amount, as part of their
contractual obligation. The appellate court, through the assailed Decision, reversed the court a quo and ruled in favor
of respondents. Supporting the reversal is the CA's finding that there was a sudden change in the terminology used,
from "total amount due" to "principal amount." According to the CA, from February to May 1998, the amount sought
to be collected ballooned from PhP11,216,783.99 to PhP 12,891,397.78. From this apparently unexplained increase,
the CA deduced that the increased amount must mean the principal and interest and other charges. Furthermore, the
appellate court found that petitioner failed to prove that there was a deficiency, since the records failed to corroborate
the claimed amount. As noted by the CA, "[Petitioner] did not even introduce the continuing surety agreement on
which the trial court gratuitously based its decision."
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ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the respondent can claim refund for excess payment. No
2.
Whether or not MBTC can claim for deficiency and expenses incurred. No
HELD:
The court ruled in the negative. While We fully agree with the CA that MBTC was not able to prove the amount
claimed, We however, find that neither were respondents able to timely setup their claim for refund. Respondents
belatedly raised their compulsory counterclaim.
Respondents belatedly raised their compulsory counterclaim
Accordingly, a counterclaim is compulsory if: (a) it arises out of or is necessarily connected with the transaction or
occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication the
presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain
the claim both as to its amount and nature, except that in an original action before the RTC, the counterclaim may be
considered compulsory regardless of the amount.27chanrobleslaw
In determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, We have, in several cases, utilized the following
tests:
1.
Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same?
2.
Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
3.
Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendant's
counterclaim?
4.
Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim, such that the conduct of separate trials
of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties
and the court?
This test is the "compelling test of compulsoriness."
Based on the above tests, it is evident that a claim for recovery of the excess in the bid price vis-a-vis the amount due
should be interposed as a compulsory counterclaim in an action for recovery of a deficiency filed by the mortgagee
against the debtor-mortgagor. First, in both cases, substantially the same evidence is needed in order to prove their
respective claim. Second, adjudication in favor of one will necessarily bar the other since these two actions are
absolutely incompatible with each other; a debt cannot be fully paid and partially unpaid at the same time. Third, these
two opposing claims arose from the same set of transactions. And finally, if these two claims were to be the subject
of separate trials, it would definitely entail a substantial and needless duplication of effort and time by the parties and
the court, for said actions would involve the same parties, the same transaction, and the same evidence. The only
difference here would be in the findings of the courts based on the evidence presented with regard to the issue of
whether or not the bid prices substantially cover the amounts due.
Having determined that a claim for recovery of an excess in the bid price should be set up in the action for payment
of a deficiency as a compulsory counterclaim, We rule that respondents failed to timely raise the same.
As to the petitioner MBTC, the CA erred in ruling that the total amount due was PhP 12,891,397.78.
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We have already ruled in several cases that in extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, where the proceeds of the sale
are insufficient to pay the debt, the mortgagee has the right to recover the deficiency from the debtor. Verily, there
can only be a deficit when the proceeds of the sale is not sufficient to cover (1) the costs of foreclosure proceedings;
and (2) the amount due to the creditor, inclusive of interests and penalties, if any, at the time of foreclosure.
A.
Petitioner failed to prove the amount due at the time of foreclosure
Having alleged the existence of a deficiency balance, it behooved petitioner to prove, at the very least, the amount due
at the date of foreclosure against which the proceeds from the auction sale would be applied. Otherwise, there can be
no basis for awarding the claimed deficiency balance. Unfortunately for petitioner, it failed to substantiate the amount
due as of May 5, 1998 as appearing in its Statement of Account.
As can be gleaned, petitioner failed to sufficiently explain during the proceedings how it came up with the alleged
"deficiency" in the amount of PhP 2,443,143.43, as per the Statement of Account. Reversing the formula, petitioner's
claim would only be mathematically possible if the missing interest and penalties for the three-month period—from
February 10, 1998 to May 6, 1998—amounted to PhP 3,047,954,73,59 which is inconsistent with MBTC's declaration
in its Statement of Account as of May 5, 1998.60 Needless to say, this amount is not only unconscionable, it also finds
no support from any of the statement of accounts and loan stipulations agreed upon by the parties.
Given MBTC's conflicting, if not irreconcilable, allegations as to the amount due as of the date of foreclosure—as
noted in the statement of accounts, the petition for foreclosure, and the promissory notes—the computation offered by
MBTC cannot be accepted at face value. Consequently, there can then be no basis for determining the value of the
additional interests and penalty charges that became due, and, more importantly, whether or not there was indeed a
deficiency balance at the time the mortgaged properties were foreclosed.
In addition, it is noticeable that petitioner's presentation of the computation is circuitous and needlessly lengthened.
As a matter of fact, nowhere in the petition, in its complaint,61 reply,62 pre-trial brief,63 among others, did it make a
simple computation of respondents' obligation as well as the amounts to be applied to it, or even a summary thereof,
when it could have easily done so.
B.
Petitioner failed to prove the amount of expenses incurred in foreclosing the mortgaged properties
Another obstacle against petitioner's claim for deficiency balance is the burden of proving the amount of expenses
incurred during the foreclosure sales. To recall, petitioner alleged that it incurred expenses totalling PhP 1,373,238.04
and PhP 419,166.67 for the first and second public auction sales, respectively. Curiously, petitioner never offered as
evidence receipts proving payment of filing fees, publication expenses, Sheriffs Commission on Sale, attorney's fee,
registration fee for the Certificate of Sale, insurance premium and other miscellaneous expenses, all of which MBTC
claims that it incurred. Instead, petitioner urges the Court to take judicial notice of the expenses.
Petitioner's argument is untenable.
First, the Court cannot take judicial notice of the attorney's fees being claimed by petitioner because although 10%
was the rate agreed upon by the parties, We have, in a line of cases, held that the percentage to be charged can still be
fixed by the Court. For instance, in Mambulao Lumber Company v. Philippine National Bank,65 the Court held:
In determining the compensation of an attorney, the following circumstances should be considered: the amount and
character of the services rendered; the responsibility imposed; the amount of money or the value of the property
affected by the controversy, or involved in the employment; the skill and experience called for in the performance of
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the service; the professional standing of the attorney; the results secured; and whether or not the fee is contingent or
absolute, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is to be contingent
than when it is not. From the stipulation in the mortgage contract earlier quoted, it appears that the agreed fee is 10%
of the total indebtedness, irrespective of the manner the foreclosure of the mortgage is to be effected. The agreement
is perhaps fair enough in case the foreclosure proceedings is prosecuted judicially but, surely, it is unreasonable when,
as in this case, the mortgage was foreclosed extra-judicially, and all that the attorney did was to file a petition for
foreclosure with the sheriff concerned. x x x (emphasis added)
Similarly, in Bank of the Philippine Islands, Inc. v. Spouses Norman and Angelina Yu,66 the Court reduced the claim
for attorney's fees from 10% to 1% based on the following reasons: (1) attorney's fee is not essential to the cost of
borrowing, but a mere incident of collection; (2) 1% is just and adequate because the mortgagee bank had already
charged foreclosure expenses; (3) attorney's fee of 10% of the total amount due is onerous considering the rote effort
that goes into extrajudicial foreclosures.
Second, the Court cannot also take judicial notice of the expenses incurred by petitioner in causing the publication of
the notice of foreclosure and the cost of insurance. This is so because there are no standard rates cited or mentioned
by petitioner that would allow Us to take judicial notice of such expenses. It is not unthinkable that the cost of
publication would vary from publisher to publisher, and would depend on several factors, including the size of the
publication space. Insurance companies also have their own computations on the insurance premiums to be paid by
the insurer, which the courts cannot be expected to be knowledgeable of. To be sure, in arguing for the Court to take
judicial notice of the alleged expenses, MBTC merely cited Sec. 3 of Act 3135 requiring publication and the mortgage
agreement provision on the insurance requirement, without more.67 Said provisions never expressly provided for the
actual cost of publication and insurance, nor any formulae for determining the same. Thus, the claims for publication
and insurance expenses ought to be disallowed.
Third, the claims for registration fees and miscellaneous expenses were also never substantiated by receipts.
In sum, given petitioner's failure to establish the sum due at the time the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and
sold via public auction, as well as the expenses incurred in those foreclosure proceedings, it would be impossible for
the Court to determine whether or not there is, indeed, a deficiency balance petitioner would have been entitled to.
In demanding payment of a deficiency in an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, proving that there is indeed one
and what its exact amount is, is naturally a precondition thereto. The same goes with a claim for reimbursement of
foreclosure expenses, as here. In this regard, it is elementary that the burden to prove a claim rests on the party asserting
such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.68 For having
failed to adequately substantiate its claims, We cannot sustain the finding of the trial court that respondents are liable
for the claimed deficiency, inclusive of foreclosure expenses. Neither can We sustain the CA's finding that respondents
are entitled to the recovery of the alleged excess payment.
G.R. No. 214803
Roldan v. Barrios
April 23, 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Alona G. Roldan filed an action for foreclosure of real estate mortgage against respondents spouses
Barrios.
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[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance
would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation
may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now
Regional Trial Courts).
The RTC dismissed the foreclosure cases finding that being a real action and the assessed value of the mortgaged
property is only P13,380.00, it is the first level court which has jurisdiction over the case and not the RTC
Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC when it
ordered the dismissal of her foreclosure case without prejudice and denying her motion for reconsideration. She argues
that foreclosure of mortgage is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation which is within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the RTC.
Petitioner cites Russell v. Vestil to show that action for foreclosure of mortgage is an action incapable of pecuniary
estimation and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the RTC
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance, support, or
foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage,
annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and for rescission, which is a
counterpart of specific performance.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the foreclosure cases filed with it on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the negative. The RTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in civil actions where the subject
of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. It also has jurisdiction in civil cases involving title to, or
possession of, real property or any interest in it where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00,
and if it is below P20,000.00, it is the first level court which has jurisdiction.
An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiffs cause of action is based on a claim that he owns
such property or that he has the legal right to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the
same.
The allegations and reliefs sought in petitioner's action for foreclosure of mortgage showed that the loan obtained by
respondents spouses Barrios from petitioner fell due and they failed to pay such loan which was secured by a mortgage
on the property of the respondents spouses; and prayed that in case of default of payment of such mortgage
indebtedness to the court, the property be ordered sold to answer for the obligation under the mortgage contract and
the accumulated interest. It is worthy to mention that the essence of a contract of mortgage indebtedness is that a
property has been identified or set apart from the mass of the property of the debtor-mortgagor as security for the
payment of money or the fulfillment of an obligation to answer the amount of indebtedness, in case of default in
payment. Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of non-payment of the mortgage indebtedness. In a real estate
mortgage when the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage
and to have the property seized and sold with the view of applying the proceeds to the payment of the obligation.
Therefore, the foreclosure suit is a real action so far as it is against property, and seeks the judicial recognition of a
property debt, and an order for the sale of the res.
As foreclosure of mortgage is a real action, it is the assessed value of the property which determines the court's
jurisdiction. Considering that the assessed value of the mortgaged property is only P13,380.00, the RTC correctly
found that the action falls within the jurisdiction of the first level court. er Section 33(3) of BP 129 as amended.
This Court is not persuaded as to the case cite by petitioner. In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, we had the occasion to
rule that:
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While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law
specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value
of the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located
elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional Trial
Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2). However, the subject matter of the complaint in this
case is annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF
CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION."
Clearly, the last paragraph clarified that while civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, are also incapable of pecuniary estimation as it is not for recovery of money, the court's jurisdiction
will be determined by the assessed value of the property involved.
PARTITION
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The Complaint
The Order
Stages of Partition
Rule of Commissioners
The Judgment
G.R. No. 168970
Balus v. Balus
January 15, 2010
Peralta, J.
FACTS: Petitioners and respondents are the children of Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. On January 3, 1979, Rufo
mortgaged a parcel of land as a security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte. Rufo
failed to pay his loan. The mortgaged property was foreclosed and subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at
the public auction.
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A Certificate of Sale was executed by the sheriff in favor of the Bank. The sheriff on January 25, 1984, executed a
Definite Deed of Sale in the Bank’s favor. A new title was issued in the name of the Bank.
Rufo died on July 6, 1984.
On October 10, 1989, an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate was executed between the petitioners and respondents,
adjudicating to each of them one-third portion of the subject property consisting of 10,246 square meters. The
Extrajudicial Settlement contained provisions admitting of the knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the
property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time.
Three years after, respondents bought the subject property from the Bank and a Deed of Sale of Registered Land was
executed in respondents’ favor. Title was also issued in the name of the respondents but petitioner Celestino Balus
remained in possession of the subject lot.
Respondents filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against Celestino, contending that they had
contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the new owners of the disputed property,
but the petitioner still refused to surrender possession of the same to them. Respondents claimed that they had
exhausted all remedies for the amicable settlement of the case, but to no avail.
The RTC ordered Saturnino and Leonarda to execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the Celestino, the one-third share of
the property in question, presently possessed by him, and described in the deed of partition. The RTC held that the
right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions
of the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the respondents bought the subject lot
from the Bank.
Saturnino and Leonarda appealed to the CA. The CA reversed RTC ordering petitioner to immediately surrender
possession of the subject property to the respondents, when petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject
property within the redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new title in
the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished.
ISSUE: Whether or not the co-ownership by Celestino and respondents over the subject property persisted even after
the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its name, and even after it was eventually
bought back by the respondents from the Bank.
property owned in common. It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of them
a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference
from the other. In other words, the purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an objective which negates
petitioner's claims in the present case.
G.R. No. 161746
Feliciano v. Canoza
September 1, 2010
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS: When Antonio Feliciano passed away on May 20, 1930, he left behind his only property, a parcel of land
located at Bunga Mayor, Bustos, Bulacan. The land had an area of 1,125 square meters and was evidenced by Tax
Declaration No. 1402 in his name. On March 28, 1972, Leona, Maria, Pedro and Salina, all surnamed Feliciano,
declared themselves to be the only surviving heirs of Antonio Feliciano, with the exception of Salina. They executed
an extrajudicial settlement of Antonio Feliciano's estate and appropriated among themselves the said parcel of land,
to the exclusion of the heirs of Esteban Feliciano and Doroteo Feliciano, deceased children of Antonio Feliciano. On
even date, Leona, Maria, Pedro and Salina executed a deed of absolute sale or Kasulatan sa Ganap Na Bilihan over
the property in favor of the late Jacinto Feliciano (Pedro's portion), Felisa Feliciano (Salina's portion) and Pedro
Canoza (Leona and Maria's portions).
During his lifetime, Jacinto Feliciano applied for a free patent over the portion of land he bought, declaring that the
same was a public land, first occupied and cultivated by Pedro Feliciano. Jacinto was issued Free Patent No. (IV-4)
012293 on November 28, 1977 and the same was forwarded to the Register of Deeds of Malolos, Bulacan, but
unfortunately, it was burned on March 7, 1987. Pedro Canoza, for his part, also applied for a free patent over the
portion of land which he bought, claiming that the same was public land, first occupied and cultivated by Leona and
Maria Feliciano. He was issued Free Patent No. (IV-4) 012292, now covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. P-364, on February 23, 1979.
Petitioners alleged that the settlement of the estate and sale were done without their participation and consent as heirs
of Esteban and Doroteo. Likewise, they averred that the ancestral home of the Felicianos is erected on the subject
property and that they have occupied the same since birth. Canoza and Jacinto falsely declared that the property was
not occupied, so their titles to the property should be declared null and void on the ground that they have made false
statements in their respective applications for free patent.
HELD:
No. The Court is not persuaded. The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. In
addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the
time of his death, as well as those which have accrued thereto since the opening of the succession. In the present case,
since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the
disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently,
petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from their father.
Respondents alleged that they were buyers in good faith and for value. They likewise contended that assuming that
there was preterition of legal heirs, they never took part in it. As affirmative defenses, they alleged that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action; the lower court had no jurisdiction as the subject of the case were free patents and
therefore prior exhaustion of administrative remedies was required; the case was prematurely filed; no effort was
exerted towards a settlement; plaintiffs' right has prescribed; Eugenio Feliciano was a mere squatter who should be
ordered to vacate; the deed of sale was validly, genuinely and duly executed; Eugenio and Angelina were guilty of
misleading the court because there were other heirs who were indispensable parties but who were not included; and
Presidential Decree No. 1508 or the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law was not resorted to by plaintiffs.
Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue their supposed co-ownership of the
subject property contradicts the provisions of the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their
intention of having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the petitioner and respondents
a specific 1/3 portion of the same. Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
The RTC rendered the extra-judicial settlement null and void as well as the subsequent sale to the Canozas. The trial
court explained that by operation of law, the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) have as much right as Leona, Maria, Pedro
and Salina Feliciano to inherit the property in question, and they cannot be deprived of their right unless by
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disinheritance for causes set forth in the law. When Leona Feliciano, Pedro Feliciano, Maria Feliciano and Salina
Feliciano appropriated the disputed lot solely to themselves through the extrajudicial settlement of estate, they
committed a fraudulent act.
respondent promised to give her an additional amount for her share in her father’s estate. Thus, after the signing of
the Deed, petitioner demanded from respondent the promised additional amount, but respondent refused to pay,
claiming that she had no more money.
The CA ruled that prescription had set in, citing the case of Pedrosa v. Court of Appeals, which held that the applicable
prescriptive period to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement is four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. It
reasoned that when petitioners filed the instant complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement of Antonio
Feliciano's estate, more than four (4) years had elapsed from the issuance of the free patents. As regards the portion
claimed by the late Jacinto Feliciano, sixteen (16) years had elapsed from the time the free patent was issued to him
before petitioners filed the complaint, while in the case of Canoza, fourteen (14) years had elapsed from the issuance
of the free patent in Canoza's favor. Hence, according to the CA, the action for the annulment of the documents had
prescribed.
A year later, while processing her tax obligations with the BIR, respondent was required to submit an original copy
of the Deed. Left with no more original copy of the Deed, respondent summoned petitioner to her office and asked
her to countersign a copy of the Deed. Petitioner refused to countersign the document, demanding that respondent first
give her the additional amount that she promised. Considering the value of the three parcels of land (which she claimed
to be worth ₱20M), petitioner asked for ₱1M, but respondent begged her to lower the amount. Petitioner agreed to
lower it to ₱600,000.00. Because respondent did not have the money at that time and petitioner refused to countersign
the Deed without any assurance that the amount would be paid, respondent executed a promissory note.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in treating the action filed as an annulment of the extrajudicial settlement and in
applying the four year prescriptive period therefor
HELD:
We affirm the ruling of the CA. As the records show, the heirs of Doroteo and Esteban did not participate in the
extrajudicial partition executed by Salina with the other compulsory heirs, Leona, Maria and Pedro. Undeniably, the
said deed was fraudulently obtained as it deprived the known heirs of Doroteo and Esteban of their shares in the estate.
A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent
to the same, is fraudulent and vicious. Hence, an action to set it aside on the ground of fraud could be instituted. Such
action for the annulment of the said partition, however, must be brought within four (4) years from the discovery of
the fraud.
Evidently, the applicable prescriptive period to institute the action to annul the deed of extrajudicial settlement was
four (4) years counted from the discovery of fraud as held in the case of Gerona v. De Guzman. However, the records
show that petitioners' complaint was filed only on October 18, 1993, or almost sixteen (16) years after Jacinto Feliciano
was issued Free Patent No. (IV-4) 012293 on November 28, 1977, and almost fourteen (14) years from the time Pedro
Canoza was issued OCT No. P-364 on November 28, 1979. As petitioners are deemed to have obtained constructive
notice of the fraud upon the registration of the Free Patent, they clearly failed to institute the present civil action within
the allowable period. The same result obtains even if their complaint is treated as one (1) essentially for reconveyance
as more than ten (10) years have passed since petitioners' cause of action accrued. The CA committed no error in
dismissing their complaint.
G.R. No. 183852
Mangahas v. Brobio
October 20, 2010
Nachura, J.
FACTS: On January 10, 2002, Pacifico S. Brobio (Pacifico) died intestate, leaving three parcels of land. He was
survived by his wife, respondent Eufrocina A. Brobio, and four legitimate and three illegitimate children; petitioner
Carmela Brobio Mangahas is one of the illegitimate children. On May 12, 2002, the heirs of the deceased executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of the Late Pacifico Brobio with Waiver. In the Deed, petitioner and
Pacifico’s other children, in consideration of their love and affection for respondent and the sum of ₱150,000.00,
waived and ceded their respective shares over the three parcels of land in favor of respondent. According to petitioner,
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When the promissory note fell due, respondent failed and refused to pay despite demand. Petitioner made several more
demands upon respondent but the latter kept on insisting that she had no money. Petitioner filed a Complaint for
Specific Performance with Damages against respondent. In her Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, respondent
admitted that she signed the promissory note but claimed that she was forced to do so. She also claimed that the
undertaking was not supported by any consideration.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The RTC found that the alleged "pressure and confused disposition"
experienced by respondent and the circumstances that led to the execution of the promissory note do not constitute
undue influence as would vitiate respondent’s consent thereto. RTC also brushed aside respondent’s claim that the
promissory note was not supported by valuable consideration. The court maintained that the promissory note was an
additional consideration for the waiver of petitioner’s share in the three properties in favor of respondent.
CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint.The CA found that there was a complete absence of
consideration in the execution of the promissory note, which made it inexistent and without any legal force and effect.
The court noted that "financial assistance" was not the real reason why respondent executed the promissory note, but
only to secure petitioner’s signature. The CA held that the waiver of petitioner’s share in the three properties, as
expressed in the deed of extrajudicial settlement, may not be considered as the consideration of the promissory note,
considering that petitioner signed the Deed way back in 2002 and she had already received the consideration of
₱150,000.00 for signing the same. The CA went on to hold that if petitioner disagreed with the amount she received,
then she should have filed an action for partition.
Further, the CA found that intimidation attended the signing of the promissory note. Respondent needed the Deed
countersigned by petitioner in order to comply with a BIR requirement; and, with petitioner’s refusal to sign the said
document, respondent was forced to sign the promissory note to assure petitioner that the money promised to her
would be paid. Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the CA Decision. CA denied petitioner’s motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred when it stated that petitioner should have filed an action for partition instead of
a case for specific performance?
HELD:
The petition is meritorious. Respondent may have desperately needed petitioner’s signature on the Deed, but there is
no showing that she was deprived of free agency when she signed the promissory note. Being forced into a situation
does not amount to vitiated consent where it is not shown that the party is deprived of free will and choice. Respondent
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still had a choice: she could have refused to execute the promissory note and resorted to judicial means to obtain
petitioner’s signature. Instead, respondent chose to execute the promissory note to obtain petitioner’s signature,
thereby agreeing to pay the amount demanded by petitioner.
The fact that respondent may have felt compelled, under the circumstances, to execute the promissory note will not
negate the voluntariness of the act. As rightly observed by the trial court, the execution of the promissory note in the
amount of ₱600,000.00 was, in fact, the product of a negotiation between the parties.
On the issue that the promissory note is void for not being supported by a consideration, we likewise disagree with
the CA. A contract is presumed to be supported by cause or consideration. The presumption that a contract has
sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no consideration. To overcome the
presumption, the alleged lack of consideration must be shown by preponderance of evidence. The burden to prove
lack of consideration rests upon whoever alleges it, which, in the present case, is respondent.
Respondent failed to prove that the promissory note was not supported by any consideration. From her testimony and
her assertions in the pleadings, it is clear that the promissory note was issued for a cause or consideration, which, at
the very least, was petitioner’s signature on the document.
The foregoing discussion renders the issue on partition insignificant. Be that as it may, we would like to state that the
remedy suggested by the CA is not the proper one under the circumstances. An action for partition implies that the
property is still owned in common. Considering that the heirs had already executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement
and waived their shares in favor of respondent, the properties are no longer under a state of co-ownership; there is
nothing more to be partitioned, as ownership had already been merged in one person.
G.R. No. 151334
Vda. de Figuracion v. Figuracion – Gerilla
February 13, 2013
Reyes, J.
The matter was initially brought before the Katarungang Pambarangay, but no amicable settlement was reached by
the parties. Emilia instituted the herein Complaint for the partition of Lot Nos. 2299, 705 and 707, annulment of the
Affidavit of Self- Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 42244, reconveyance of eastern half portion of
Lot No. 707, quieting of title and damages.
In opposition, the petitioners averred the following special and affirmative defenses:
1.
the respondent’s cause of action had long prescribed and that she is guilty of laches hence, now estopped
from bringing the suit;
2.
TCT No. 42244 in the name of Felipa and Hilaria have already attained indefeasibility and conclusiveness
as to the true owners of Lot No. 707; and
3.
an action for partition is no longer tenable because Felipa and Hilaria have already acquired rights adverse
to that claimed by respondent Emilia and the same amount to a repudiation of the alleged co-ownership.
RTC dismissed the complaint and declared the affidavit of self-adjudication[,] deed of sale and the transfer certificate
of title involving Lot 707 null and void.
The RTC ruled that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 will be premature since their ownership is yet to be transmitted
from Leandro to his heirs whose respective shares thereto must still be determined in estate settlement proceedings.
Anent Lot No. 707, the RTC held that petitioner Carolina transferred only her one-half (½) share to Felipa and Hilaria
and any conveyance of the other half pertaining to Agripina was void. While the RTC nullified the Affidavit of SelfAdjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 42244, it refused to adjudicate the ownership of the lot’s eastern
half portion in favor of respondent Emilia since a settlement of the estate of Eulalio is yet to be undertaken.
CA ruled that the RTC erred in refusing to partition Lot No. 707.
FACTS: Leandro Figuracion acquired two parcels of land in Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Both lands were registered in the
name of "Leandro Figuracion married to Carolina Adviento". Leandro executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the above
real properties in favor of his six (6) children on August 23, 1955. Their shares, however, were not delineated with
particularity because spouses Leandro and Carolina reserved the lots and its fruits for their expenses.
Also involved in the controversy is Lot No. 707 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta, Pangasinan owned by Eulalio
Adviento (Eulalio). On November 28, 1961, a Deed of Quitclaim over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 in favor of
respondent Emilia.
Soon thereafter or on December 11, 1962, petitioner Carolina executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication9
adjudicating unto herself the entire Lot No. 707 as the sole and exclusive heir of her deceased parents, Eulalio and
Faustina. On the same date, Carolina also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No. 707 in favor of petitioners
Hilaria and Felipa.
In 1971, Emilia and her family went to the United States and returned to the Philippines only in 1981. Upon her return
and relying on the Deed of Quitclaim, she built a house on the eastern half of Lot No. 707.
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The legal debacle of the Figuracions started in 1994 when Hilaria and her agents threatened to demolish the house of
Emilia who, in retaliation, was prompted to seek the partition of Lot No. 707 as well as Lot Nos. 2299 and 705.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not Emilia can compel the partition of Lot No. 707
2.
Whether or not Emilia’s right to demand for partition has already been barred by acquisitive prescription or
laches
HELD:
1.
YES. The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership. Here, the respondent
Emilia traces her ownership over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 from the Deed of Quitclaim executed by
Agripina, who in turn, was the co-owner thereof being one of the legitimate heirs of Eulalio.
A co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share; hence, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void and only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property. The rights has already been effectively bequeathed to respondent Emilia
thru the Deed of Quitclaim. In turn, being the successor-in-interest of Agripina’s share in Lot No. 707, respondent
Emilia took the former’s place in the co-ownership and as such co-owner, has the right to compel partition at any time.
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2.
NO. Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the other co-heirs or coowners absent a clear repudiation of the co ownership.The act of repudiation, as a mode of terminating coownership, is subject to certain conditions, to wit: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an
act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
of the property for the period required by law. The petitioners failed to comply with these conditions.
Further, records do not reflect conclusive evidence showing the manner of occupation and possession exercised
by Hilaria and Felipa over the lot from the time it was registered in their names. The only evidence of possession
extant in the records dates back only to 1985 when Hilaria and Felipa declared the lot in their names for taxation
purposes. Prescription can only produce all its effects when acts of ownership, or in this case, possession, do not
evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners. Hence, prescription among co-owners cannot
take place when acts of ownership exercised are vague.
G.R. No. 212413
Agarrado v. Librando – Agarrado
June 6, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.
FACTS: Petitioners Ma. Rosario Agarrado, Ruth Librada Agarrado, and Roy Agarrado are children of the late spouses
Rodrigo and Emilia Agarrado, who, during their lifetime, acquired a 287-square meter land (subject property) in
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
On August 18, 1978, Emilia died intestate, leaving Rodrigo and their children as her compulsory heirs.
Meanwhile, unknown to the petitioners, Rodrigo was involved in an illicit affair with respondent Cristita LibrandoAgarrado with whom Rodrigo begot respondent Ana Lou Agarrado-King. As it turned out, Ana Lou was conceived
during the existence of the marriage between Rodrigo and Emilia, but was born one month after the dissolution of
Rodrigo and Emilia's marriage through the latter's death.
Rodrigo married Cristita on July 6, 1981 and he eventually died on December 8, 2000. He left his surviving spouse,
Cristita, his legitimate children by his marriage with Emilia, and Ana Lou.
On January 23, 2003, Cristita and Ana Lou filed a complaint before the RTC of Bacolod City for the partition of the
subject property, with Ma. Rosario, Ruth, Roy, "and other heirs of Rodrigo Agarrado" as defendants. None of the
other heirs were however named in any pleading filed by either the plaintiffs.
Aggrieved by the decision of the RTC ordering the partition, the petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
which, however was dismissed by such court. Despite the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the CA affirmed its
earlier decision.
HELD:
Yes. In determining whether a case is incapable of pecuniary estimation, identifying the nature of the principal action
or remedy sought is primarily necessary.
For actions on partition, the subject matter is two-phased. The Court ruled that partition is at once an action (1) for
declaration of co-ownership and (2) for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties
involved. Thus, in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he/she is a co-owner of the
subject properties, and second, the conveyance of his/her lawful share.
Jurisdiction over cases for partition of real properties is determined by law. Particularly, the same is identified by
Sections 19(2) and 33(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act 7691.
The provisions state that in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction where the assessed value of the property exceeds
P20,000.00 or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds P50,000.00. For those below the foregoing
threshold amounts, exclusive jurisdiction lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts
(MTC), or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTC). Thus, the determination of the assessed value of the property,
which is the subject matter of the partition, is essential.
According to the case of Tumpag vs. Tumpag, it is a hornbook doctrine that the court should only look into the facts
alleged in the complaint to determine whether a suit is within its jurisdiction. Only these facts can be the basis of the
court's competence to take cognizance of a case, and that one cannot advert to anything not set forth in the complaint,
such as evidence adduced at the trial, to determine the nature of the action thereby initiated.
In the case Foronda-Crystal, it was declared by the court that even if the assessed value is not alleged in the complaint,
the rule requiring such to be indicated, could be liberally applied through a facial examination of the documents already
attached to the complaint.
However, a scouring of the records of this case revealed that the complaint did indeed lack any indication as to the
assessed value of the subject property. None of the assertions in the complaint indicate the assessed value of the
property to be partitioned that would invariably determine as to which court has the authority to acquire jurisdiction.
More, none of the documents annexed to the complaint and as attached in the records of this case indicates any such
amount Thus, the petitioners are correct in restating their argument against the RTC's jurisdiction, for it has none to
exercise.
Clearly, therefore, jurisprudence has ruled that an action for partition, while one not capable of pecuniary estimation,
falls under the jurisdiction of either the first or second level courts depending on the amounts specified in Secs. 19(2)
and 33(3) of B.P. 129, as amended.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in not ordering the dismissal of the case for failure to allege the market value of
the subject property?
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According to the CA, while petitioner alleges that CASTEA violated the conditions of the donation and thus, the
automatic revocation clause applies, it should have first filed an action for reconveyance of the property against
CASTEA. The CA also found that petitioner's action has already prescribed. Petitioner had 10 years to file an action
for reconveyance from the time the Deed of Donation was violated. The action for unlawful detainer was filed more
than 12 years later. Hence, this petition.
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER
1.
Parties
2.
Procedure: Summary
3.
Judgment
4.
Immediate Execution
Preliminary Injunction
5.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bodega has the right of possession over the property.
HELD:
The court ruled in the negative.
Appeal
G.R. No. 194199
Province of Camarines Sur v. Bodega Glassware
March 22, 2017
Jardeleza, J.
FACTS: Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Peñafrancia, Naga City. It donated around 600 square
meters of this parcel of land to the Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc. (CASTEA) through a Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos The Deed of Donation included an automatic revocation clause which states:
That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the above-described portion of land subject of the
present donation for no other purpose except the construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed by the
above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc. in
connection with its functions under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the
Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association, PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, that the DONEE shall not sell,
mortgage or incumber the property herein donated including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any party
and provided, lastly, that the construction of the building or buildings referred to above shall be commenced within a
period of one (1) year from and after the execution of this donation, otherwise, this donation shall be deemed
automatically revoked and voided and of no further force and effect.
CASTEA accepted the donation. However, on August 15, 1995, CASTEA entered into a Contract of Lease with
Bodega over the donated property for a period of 20 years. Bodega took actual possession of the property. On
November 11, 2007, petitioner sent a letter to Bodega. In this letter, petitioner stated that Bodega's occupation of the
property was by mere tolerance of the petitioner. As it now intended to use the property for its developmental projects,
petitioner demanded that Bodega vacate the property and surrender its peaceful possession. Bodega refused to comply
with the demand.
Petitioner revoked its donation through a Deed of Revocation of Donation. It asserted that CASTEA violated the
conditions in the Deed of Donation when it leased the property to Bodega.
CASTEA never challenged this revocation. Petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against Bodega before the
MTC Naga City. The MTC Naga City ruled in favor of the petitioner. It ordered Bodega to vacate the property and to
pay P15,000 a month as reasonable compensation.
Bodega appealed this Decision to the RTC Naga City which reversed it In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC Naga City that the petitioner cannot demand that Bodega vacate the property.
An action for unlawful detainer, as in this case, pertains to specific circumstances of dispossession. It refers to a
situation where the current occupant of the property initially obtained possession lawfully.This possession only
became unlawful due to the expiration of the right to possess which may be a contract, express or implied, or by mere
tolerance.
An action for unlawful detainer must allege and establish the following key jurisdictional facts:
1.
initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
2.
eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latter's right of possession;
3.
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
thereof; and
4.
within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment
When in an unlawful detainer action, the party seeking recovery of possession alleges that the opposing party occupied
the subject property by mere tolerance, this must be alleged clearly and the acts of tolerance established. Further, the
party seeking possession must identify the source of his or her claim as well as satisfactorily present evidence
establishing it.
In this case, petitioner alleged that as early as 2005, it had asked Bodega to present proof of its legal basis for occupying
the property. Bodega, however, failed to heed this demand. For several years, petitioner merely tolerated Bodega's
possession by allowing it to continue using its building and conducting business on the property. Petitioner demanded
that Bodega vacate the property in November 2007. This presents a clear case of unlawful detainer based on mere
tolerance. Petitioner proceeds to argue that its right of possession is based on its ownership. This, in turn, is hinged on
its position that the property reverted back to the petitioner when the donation was revoked as provided in the
automatic revocation clause in the Deed of Donation.
We shall rule on the effect of the automatic revocation clause for the purpose of ascertaining who between petitioner
and Bodega has the right to possess the property.
In this case, the Deed of Donation contains a clear automatic revocation clause. The clause states:
That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the above-described portion of land subject of the
present donation for no other purpose except the construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed by the
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above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in
connection with its function s under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the
Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association, PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, that the DONEE shall not sell,
mortgage or incumber the property here in donated including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any party
and provided, lastly, that the construction of the building or buildings referred to above shall be commenced within a
period of one (1) year from and after the execution of this donation, otherwise, this donation shall be deemed
automatically revoked and voided and of no further force and effect.
The provision identifies three conditions for the donation: (1) that the property shall be used for "no other purpose
except the construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed by the above-named DONEE to house its
offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in connection with its functions under its
charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the Camarines Sur High School Alumni
Association," (2) CASTEA shall "not sell, mortgage or incumber the property herein donated including any and all
improvements thereon in favor of any party," and (3) "the construction of the building or buildings referred to above
shall be commenced within a period of one (1) year from and after the execution." The last clause of this paragraph
states that "otherwise, this donation shall be deemed automatically revoked x x x." We read the final clause of this
provision as an automatic revocation clause which pertains to all three conditions of the donation. When CASTEA
leased the property to Bodega, it breached the first and second conditions.
Accordingly, petitioner takes the position that when CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it violated the conditions
in the Deed of Donation and as such, the property automatically reverted to it. It even executed a Deed of Revocation.
The records show that CASTEA never contested this revocation. Hence, applying the ruling in De Luna, Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, Dolor and Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc., petitioner validly
considered the donation revoked and by virtue of the automatic revocation clause, this revocation was automatic and
immediate, without need of judicial intervention. Thus, the CA clearly erred in its finding that petitioner should have
first filed an action for reconveyance. This contradicts the doctrine stated in the aforementioned cases and renders
nugatory the very essence of an automatic revocation clause.
Thus, as petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and CASTEA never contested it, the property donated
effectively reverted back to it as owner. In demanding the return of the property, petitioner sources its right of
possession on its ownership. Under Article 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has a right of action against the holder
and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.
This right of possession prevails over Bodega's claim which is anchored on its Contract of Lease with CASTEA.
CASTEA's act of leasing the property to Bodega, in breach of the conditions stated in the Deed of Donation, is the
very same act which caused the automatic revocation of the donation. Thus, it had no right, either as an owner or as
an authorized administrator of the property to lease it to Bodega. While a lessor need not be the owner of the property
leased, he or she must, at the very least, have the authority to lease it out. None exists in this case. Bodega finds no
basis for its continued possession of the property.
As to the question of prescription, we rule that the petitioner's right to file this ejectment suit against Bodega has not
prescribed.
First, we reiterate that jurisprudence has definitively declared that Article 764 on the prescription of actions for the
revocation of a donation does not apply in cases where the donation has an automatic revocation clause. This is
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necessarily so because Article 764 speaks of a judicial action for the revocation of a donation. It cannot govern cases
where a breach of a condition automatically, and without need of judicial intervention, revokes the donation.
Second, we cannot agree with the ruling of the CA that the petitioner should have first filed an action for reconveyance
of the property, and that petitioner's action has prescribed since it did not file the action within 10 years. This reveals
a failure to understand the nature of a donation with an automatic revocation clause. At the risk of repetition, the
breach of the condition in the donation causes the automatic revocation. All the donor has to do is to formally inform
the donee of the revocation. Judicial intervention only becomes necessary if the donee questions the propriety of the
revocation. Even then, judicial intervention is required to merely confinn and not order the revocation. Hence, there
can be no 10-year prescriptive period to file an action to speak of. When the donee does not contest the revocation, no
court action is necessary.
Third, as owner of the property in this case, the petitioner is entitled to its possession. The petitioner's action for
ejectment is anchored on this right to possess. Under the Civil Code and the Rules of Court, a party seeking to eject
another from a property for unlawful detainer must file the action for ejectment within one year from the last demand
to vacate. This is the prescriptive period that the petitioner is bound to comply with in this case. The records show that
the petitioner served its last demand letter on November 11, 2007. It filed the action for ejectment on March 13, 2008
or around four months from the last demand. The action is clearly within the prescriptive period.
G.R. No. 217296
Santiago v. Northbay Knitting, Inc.
October 11, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS: Respondent Northbay Knitting, Inc. filed a complaint for ejectment before the MeTC of Navotas City
against the petitioners. Respondent alleged that it owns the subject property, a parcel of land in Phase I, North Side of
the Dagat-Dagatan Project in Navotas covered by TCT No. M-38092. The petitioners were simply allowed to occupy
the property and were not paying any rent. On March 5, 2009, the respondent sent demand letters to petitioners
asking them to vacate the property within 5 days from receipt and to pay rent in the event that they refuse to vacate
within the period given. However, despite receipt of the letters, the petitioners refused to vacate or pay the rent. As
a result, the respondent filed an ejectment suit against them on April 14, 2009.
Petitioners aver that respondent merely exists on paper as its certificate of registration has already been revoked by
the SEC for failure to operate. NKI became the registered owner of the property on June 16, 2008, while the petitioners
came into possession of the said property through their predecessor-in-interest, Hermenigildo Odan, and have been in
continuous possession since 1970. Odan had leased the property from the family of late Francisco Felipe Gonzales.
Later, he subleased the property to the petitioners. The government also expropriated the said property and declared
it as an Area for Priority Development or Urban Land Reform Zone under Proclamation No. 3384. Being tenants
and actual occupants of the place, they alleged that they could not be evicted.
A conditional contract to sell was then entered into by the respondent and the NHA. However, the respondent violated
the terms of said contract, causing the automatic cancellation of the same.
Sometime in 2008, NHA then sold the property to respondent without giving the petitioners, as actual occupants,
the right of first refusal granted under the law. Thus, petitioners were then constrained to file a case questioning
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said sale. Petitioners contented that this case on the issue of their right of first refusal is a prejudicial question that
must be resolved first before the MeTC can take cognizance of the ejectment case.
The MeTC ruled in favor of respondents, ordering the petitioners to remove the improvements and to peacefully
vacate and voluntarily surrender the questioned property in favor of respondent, as well as the payment of Php 2,000
rent from May 4, 2009.
The Malabon RTC, however, set aside the MeTC decision for lack of jurisdiction since respondent failed to show
a case of unlawful detainer. The RTC then assumed jurisdiction over the case and set a preliminary conference.
Upon appeal by the respondent, the CA granted the same and reversed and set aside the RTC decision. The MeTC
decision is therefore affirmed and reinstated. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MeTC has jurisdiction over the case filed by respondent Northbay Knitting, Inc.
HELD:
The court held in the affirmative.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following:
1.
Possession of the property by the defendant was initially by contract with, or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
2.
Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latter’s right of possession;
3.
Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
of the same; and
4.
Within one (1) year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.
The CA correctly found that the respondent’s complaint sufficiently shows all the allegations required to support a
case for unlawful detainer, which vests MeTC with jurisdiction over the case.
Respondent stated that it is the absolute owner of the subject property, as evidenced by the TCT and supported by its
Tax Declaration and real property tax receipt for the tax due in 2008. Petitioners, who are the actual occupants of said
property, never paid rent but continued to possess the property upon Northbay Knitting, Inc.’s mere tolerance.
Despite the receipt of respondent’s demand letters to vacate, petitioners refused and continued to occupy the
property.
Unlawful detainer involves the person’s withholding from another of the possession of the real property to which the
later is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former’s right to hold possession under the contract, either
expressed or implied. A requisites for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be
originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to
possess. It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful possession must be
established. If, as in the present case, the claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance, the acts of tolerance
must be proved.
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Petitioners’ second argument that there is a pending action questioning the validity of the sale is clearly a collateral
attack on Northbay Knitting Inc.’s title which is not allowed in an unlawful detainer case. A certificate of title
cannot be subject to a collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law. Questions as to the validity of respondent’s title can be ventilated in a proper suit instituted
separately to directly attack its validity, an issue that cannot be definitively resolved in the unlawful detainer case.
The only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the premises,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants. Possession here refers to possession de facto
and not possession de jure. It does not even matter if the party’s title to the property is questionable. Where the parties
to an ejectment issue raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between
the parties has the better right to possess the property. However, when the issue of ownership is inseparably linked
to that of possession, as in this case, adjudication on the ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the
purpose of resolving the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not
a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property.
An ejectment suit is summary in nature and not susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting
ownership over the property. In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question
of ownership in his pleadings. Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the ownership of the land nor
is conclusive of the facts found in said case between the same parties, but upon a separate cause of action involving
possession.
The court therefore DENIES the present petition and AFFIRMS the CA decision in reinstating the MeTC decision
in favor of Northbay Knitting, Inc.
G.R. No. 202448
Regalado v. De la Rama vda. de dela Peña
December 13, 2017
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, Jose, Jessica, and Jaime Antonio (Jaime) all surnamed de la Pena
(respondents), are the registered owners of two parcels of land with a total area of 44 hectares located in Murcia,
Negros Occidental. These properties are referred to as Lot Nos. l38-D and 138-S (subject properties).
Purportedly, in 1994, without the knowledge and consent of respondents, Joseph Regalado (petitioner) entered, took
possession of, and planted sugar cane on the subject properties without paying rent to respondents. In the crop year
1995-1996, respondents discovered such illegal entry, which prompted them to verbally demand from petitioner to
vacate the properties but to no avail. Later, the parties appeared before the Barangay Office of Cansilayan, Murcia,
Negros Occidental but failed to arrive at any amicable settlement. The Lupon Tagapamayapa of said Barangay issued
a Certificate to File Action; after, respondents filed a Complaint8 for recovery of possession and damages with
injunction against petitioner.
Petitioner countered that in 1994, Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, and Jessica executed their separate Waivers of
Undivided Share of Lands renouncing their rights and interests over the subject properties in favor of Jaime. In turn,
Jaime subsequently waived his rights and interests on the same properties to petitioner. Petitioner claimed that
respondents did not attempt to enter the properties as they already intentionally relinquished their interests thereon.
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Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
Petitioner posited that based on the allegations in the Complaint, the action involved recovery of physical possession
of the properties in dispute; said Complaint was also filed within one year from the date the parties had a confrontation
before the Barangay; and thus, the case was one for Ejectment and must be filed with the proper Municipal Trial Court
(MTC).
Respondents alleged that the waiver of rights in favor of Jaime was conditioned on the payment of their P6.7 million
loan with the Republic Planters Bank (RPB) and Philippine National Bank (PNB); and, in case the subject properties
would be sold, its proceeds shall be equally distributed to respondents. They further stated that such waiver bestowed
rights over the properties solely upon Jaime. They added that the subsequent waiver executed by Jaime to petitioner
should have been with conformity of the banks where the properties were mortgaged; and conditioned on the payment
of the P6.7 million loan. They pointed out that neither Jaime nor petitioner paid any amount to RPB or PNB; and as a
result, the waivers of rights in favor of Jaime, and later to petitioner, were void.
Respondents also contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case because their demand for petitioner to vacate
the properties was made during the crop year 1995-1996, which was earlier than the referral of the matter to Barangay
Cansilayan.
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. It held that it had jurisdiction over the case because the area of the subject
properties was 44 hectares, more or less, and "it is safe to presume that the value of the same is more than P20,000.00.
RTC: ordered petitioner to turn over the subject properties to respondents and to pay them P50,000.00 as attorney's
fees. It ratiocinated that the waiver of rights executed by Jaime to petitioner was coupled with a consideration.
However, petitioner failed to prove that he paid a consideration for such a waiver; as such, petitioner was not entitled
to possess the subject properties.
CA: affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
In our jurisdiction, there are three kinds of action for recovery of possession of real property: 1) ejectment (either for
unlawful detainer or forcible entry) in case the dispossession has lasted for not more than a year; 2) accion publiciana
or a plenary action for recovery of real right of possession when dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and,
3) accion reinvindicatoria or an action for recovery of ownership.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691), the proper Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), MTC, or Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment cases. Moreover, jurisdiction of the
MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall include civil actions involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property does not exceed P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila).20 On
the other hand, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to or possession of real
property, or any interest therein in case the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro
Manila).
88
Jurisdiction is thus determined not only by the type of action filed but also by the assessed value of the property. It
follows that in accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria, the assessed value of the real property is a jurisdictional
element to determine the court that can take cognizance of the action.
In this case, petitioner consistently insists that a) the Complaint is one for ejectment; or b) if the same is deemed an
accion publiciana, the RTC still lacks jurisdiction as the assessed value of the subject properties was not alleged in
the Complaint.
As such, to ascertain the proper court that has jurisdiction, reference must be made to the averments in the complaint,
and the law in force at the commencement of the action. This is because only the facts alleged in the complaint can be
the basis for determining the nature of the action, and the court that can take cognizance of the case.
Here, the pertinent portions of the Complaint read:
2.
That plaintiffs [herein respondents] are the owners of two (2) parcels of land known as Lot.
No. 138-D with Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-103187 and Lot No. 138-S with Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T- 103189, with a total land area of 44 hectares, all of Murcia Cadastre
x x x;
3.
That sometime in 1994, without the knowledge and consent of herein plaintiffs, the defendant
[herein petitioner] entered into and took possession of the aforementioned parcels of land and
planted sugar cane without paying any rental to herein plaintiffs;
4.
That plaintiffs discovered the illegal entry and occupation by the defendant of the
aforementioned property and demand to vacate the property was made orally to the defendant
sometime in 1995-96 crop year but defendant refused and still refuses to vacate the premises;
5.
A confrontation before the Brgy. Kapitan of Brgy[.] Cansilayan, Murcia, Negros Occidental,
and before the Pangkat Tagapag[ka]sundo between herein parties where plaintiffs again
demanded orally for the defendant to vacate the premises but defendant refused to vacate the
premises and no amicable settlement was reached during the confrontation of the parties, thus
a certificate to file action has been issued x x x;
6.
That plaintiffs were barred by the defendant from entering the property of the plaintiffs for the
latter to take possession of the same and plant sugar cane thereby causing damages to the
plaintiffs;
7.
That because of the refusal of the defendant to allow the plaintiffs to take possession and
control of their own property, plaintiffs were constrained to seek the aid of counsel and
consequently thereto this complaint.24
Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, there are special jurisdictional facts that must be set forth in the
complaint to make a case for ejectment, which, as mentioned, may either be for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
In particular, a complaint for forcible entry must allege the plaintiff's prior physical possession of the property; the
fact that plaintiff was deprived of its possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and the action must
be filed within one year from the time the owner or the legal possessor learned of their dispossession.2On the other
hand, a complaint for unlawful detainer must state that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of the real
property after the expiration or termination of his or her right to possess it; and the complaint is filed within a year
from the time such possession became unlawful.
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In the instant case, respondents only averred in the Complaint that they are registered owners of the subject properties,
and petitioner unlawfully deprived them of its possession. They did not assert therein that they were dispossessed of
the subject properties under the circumstances necessary to make a case of either forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
Hence, in the absence of the required jurisdictional facts, the instant action is not one for ejectment.
The Court agrees with petitioner that while this case is an accion publiciana, there was no clear showing that the RTC
has jurisdiction over it.
Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by law. It cannot be presumed or implied, and must distinctly
appear from the law. It cannot also be vested upon a court by the agreement of the parties; or by the court's erroneous
belief that it had jurisdiction over a case.
To emphasize, when respondents filed the Complaint in 1998, RA 7691 was already in force as it was approved on
March 25, 1994 and took effect on April 15, 1994. As such, it is necessary that the assessed value of the subject
properties, or its adjacent lots (if the properties are not declared for taxation purposes)be alleged to ascertain which
court has jurisdiction over the case. As argued by petitioner, the Complaint failed to specify the assessed value of the
subject properties. Thus, it is unclear if the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction, or the MTC has jurisdiction, over
respondents' action.
In the absence of any allegation in the Complaint of the assessed value of the subject properties, it cannot be
determined which court has exclusive original jurisdiction over respondents' Complaint. Courts cannot simply take
judicial notice of the assessed value, or even market value of the land. Resultantly, for lack of jurisdiction, all
proceedings before the RTC, including its decision, are void.
A.M. MTJ – 05 – 1580
Ferrer v. Rabaca – Garcia
October 6, 2010
Bersamin, J.
FACTS: The complainants were the President and the Executive Director of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 176394CV of the MeTC, an ejectment suit entitled YMCA vs. Cano wherein the respondent judge ruled in favor of the former
and ordered Cano to vacate the premises.
The plaintiff's counsel filed a motion for immediate execution, praying that a writ of execution be issued "for the
immediate execution of the aforesaid Judgment." The plaintiff cited Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court as basis
for its motion. Apparently, the respondent Judge denied the motion for immediate execution due to an alleged appeal
which was seasonably filed. It is alleged that the respondent Judge advised the counsel for the plaintiff to file a motion
for reconsideration. Said motion was eventually denied. The complainants averred that respondent Judge's denial of
their motions had rendered their victory inutile, and had unfairly deprived the plaintiff of the possession of the
premises. They further averred that respondent Judge's refusal to perform an act mandated by the Rules of Court had
given undue advantage to the defendant to the plaintiff's damage and prejudice.
Consequently, the complainants filed an administrative complaint against the respondent Judge due to the latter’s
refusal to perform an act mandated by the Rules of Court and had given undue advantage to the defendant to the
plaintiff's damage and prejudice.
89
In his comment, respondent Judge denied the charges. He explained that he had honestly thought that his court had
lost jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the provision of Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court (which provides
that "in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed
in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties") once he had given due course to the
defendant's notice of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Rabaca’s denial of the motion for immediate execution was proper?
HELD:
No. Section 19, Rule 70 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides:
"SEC. 19. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion,
unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a supersedeas bond,
approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages,
and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of
the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court.
Clearly, the perfection of an appeal by itself is not sufficient to stay the execution of the judgment in an ejectment
case. The losing party should likewise file a supersedeas bond executed in favor of the plaintiff to answer for rents,
damages and costs, and, if the judgment of the court requires it, he should likewise deposit the amount of the rent
before the appellate court from the time during the pendency of the appeal. Otherwise, execution becomes ministerial
and imperative.
Here, the defendant seasonably filed his Notice of Appeal; he however failed to file any supersedeas bond. Prior to
the filing of such notice of appeal, more specifically on 12 July 2004, complainants have already filed their Motion
for Execution dated 8 July 2004. Instead of acting on the Motion for Execution, respondent Judge Rabaca gave due
course to the appeal in an Order dated 14 July 2004 and directed his Branch Clerk of Court to elevate the records of
the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Branch Clerk of Court however failed to forward the records to the
RTC. This fact is clear from Judge Rabaca's Order dated 28 July 2004 wherein he directed the Branch Clerk of Court
to forward the records of the case to the Manila Regional Trial Court immediately.Thus, it is clear that when the
complainant moved for the immediate execution of Judge Rabaca's decision, the latter still had jurisdiction over the
case. He therefore clearly erred when he refused to act on the Motion for Execution.
G.R. No. 170916
CGR Corp. v. Treyes
April 27, 2007
Carpio – Morales, J.
FACTS: Petitioners claimed to have occupied 37.3033 hectares of public land even before the notarized separate
Fishpond Lease Agreement in their respective favor were approved in October 2000 by the Secretary of Agriculture
for a period of 25 years or until December 31, 2024.
On November 18, 2000, Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. (respondent) allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered the leased
properties and once inside barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set up a barbed wire fence along the road going
to petitioners’ fishponds, and harvested several tons of milkfish, fry and fingerlings owned by Petitioners.
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On November 22, 2000, petitioners promptly filed complaints for Forcible Entry against Ernesto M. Treyes, Sr. and
respondent. In a separate move, petitioners filed in March 2004 with the Bacolod RTC a complaint for damages against
respondent.
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners’ complaint for damages on three grounds – litis pendentia, res
judicata and forum shopping. Bacolod RTC dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground of prematurity, it holding
that a complaint for damages may only be maintained "after a final determination on the forcible entry cases has been
made."
ISSUE: Whether, during the pendency of their separate complaints for forcible entry, petitioners can independently
institute and maintain an action for damages which they claim arose from incidents occurring after the
dispossession by respondent of the premises.
HELD:
The answer is in the affirmative. The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to "rents" or
"the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises" or "fair rental value of the property" and
attorney’s fees and costs.
Settled is the rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the property. Considering that the only issue raised in ejectment is that of
rightful possession, damages which could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere
possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may
have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. Other damages must thus be claimed
in an ordinary action.
As reflected in the earlier-quoted allegations in the complaint for damages of herein petitioners, their claim for
damages have no direct relation to their loss of possession of the premises. It had to do with respondent’s alleged
harvesting and carting away several tons of milkfish and other marine products in their fishponds, ransacking and
destroying of a chapel built by petitioner CGR Corporation, and stealing religious icons and even decapitating the
heads of some of them, after the act of dispossession had occurred.
Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia - that the identity between the pending actions, with respect to the parties,
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, is such that any judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of which is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration - is not present, hence, it may not be invoked to
dismiss petitioners’ complaint for damages.
Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no jurisdiction over claims for damages other
than the use and occupation of the premises and attorney’s fees. Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of
the complaint for damages, the elements of litis pendentia not being present, or where a final judgment in the forcible
entry case will not amount to res judicata in the former.
Petitioners’ filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained as a result of their dispossession or
those caused by the loss of their use and occupation of their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a
cause of action.
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G.R. No. 202354
Zacarias v. Anacay
September 24, 2014
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS: The present controversy stemmed from a complaint for Ejectment with Damages/Unlawful Detainer filed on
December 24, 2008 by petitioner Amada Zacarias thru her son and attorney-in-fact, Cesar C. Zacarias, against the
above-named respondents, Victoria Anacay and members of her household. Said respondents are the occupants of a
parcel of land situated at Silang, Cavite and covered by Tax Declaration in the name of petitioner
The MCTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint and held that the allegations of the complaint failed to state
the essential elements of an action for unlawful detainer as the claim that petitioner had permitted or tolerated
respondents’ occupation of the subject property was unsubstantiated. It noted that the averments in the demand letter
sent by petitioner’s counsel that respondents entered the property through stealth and strategy, and in petitioner’s own
“Sinumpaang Salaysay”, are more consistent with an action for forcible entry which should have been filed within
one year from the discovery of the alleged entry. Since petitioner was deprived of the physical possession of her
property through illegal means and the complaint was filed after the lapse of one year from her discovery thereof, the
MCTC ruled that it has no jurisdiction over the case.
Upon appeal, the RTC reversed MTC’s decision and pointed out that in her complaint, petitioner did not state that
respondents entered her property through stealth and strategy but that petitioner was in lawful possession and acceded
to the request of respondents to stay in the premises until May 2008 but respondents’ reneged on their promise to
vacate the property by that time. It held that the suit is one for unlawful detainer because the respondents unlawfully
withheld the property from petitioner after she allowed them to stay there for one year.
With the failure of respondents to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary period, the above decision became
final and executory.
On November 28, 2011, petitioner filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution. At the scheduled hearing,
respondents’ counsel appeared and submitted a Formal Entry of Appearance with Manifestation informing the court
that on the same day they had filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for injunction before the CA
CA rendered in favor of respondents and held that MCTC clearly had no jurisdiction over the case as the complaint
did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer. Since the prescriptive period for
filing an action for forcible entry has lapsed, petitioner could not convert her action into one for unlawful detainer,
reckoning the one-year period to file her action from the time of her demand for respondents to vacate the property.
Further, the CA said that while petitioner has shown that she is the lawful possessor of the subject property, she availed
of the wrong remedy to recover possession but nevertheless may still file an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria with the proper regional trial court.
Petitioner contends that the CA erred and committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of
jurisdiction in nullifying the judgment of the RTC which has long become final and executory.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MTC has jurisdiction
HELD:
No, the Court finds neither reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA.
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The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction over
the case, are the allegations in the complaint.11 In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of
facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which Section 112 of Rule 70 provides a summary
remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.13 Such
remedy is either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession
of his land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In illegal detainer, the defendant
unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or
implied.
Here, the MCTC and CA both ruled that the allegations in petitioner’s complaint make out a case for forcible entry
but not for unlawful detainer.
In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if
it recites the following:
1.
initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
2.
eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the
latter’s right of possession;
3.
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
thereof; and
4.
within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.
Here, Petitioner’s complaint failed to allege a cause of action for unlawful detainer as it does not describe possession
by the respondents being initially legal or tolerated by the petitioner and which became illegal upon termination by
the petitioner of such lawful possession.
Petitioner’s insistence that she actually tolerated respondents’ continued occupation after her discovery of their entry
into the subject premises is incorrect. As she had averred, she discovered respondents’ occupation in May 2007. Such
possession could not have been legal from the start as it was without her knowledge or consent, much less was it based
on any contract, express or implied. We stress that the possession of the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally
legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
In Valdez v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that where the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement
of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over the case. Thus:
“To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be
recovered. Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would be an improper remedy.
xxxx
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word “tolerance” confirms our view heretofore
expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered,
to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry.
It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is
forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the
intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal,
the case is unlawful detainer.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or
how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.”
The complaint in this case is defective as it failed to allege how and when entry was effected. The bare allegation of
petitioner that “sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the defendants have entered the subject property and
occupied the same”, as correctly found by the MCTC and CA, would show that respondents entered the land and built
their houses thereon clandestinely and without petitioner’s consent, which facts are constitutive of forcible entry, not
unlawful detainer. Consequently, the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the case and the RTC clearly erred in reversing
the lower court’s ruling and granting reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.
G.R. No. 198356
Supapo v. De Jesus
April 20, 2015
Brion, J.
FACTS: The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon
City. The subject lot is covered by TCT No. C-28441 under the Spouses Supapo’s names. The land has an assessed
value of P39,980.00 as shown in the Declaration of Real Property Value (tax declaration) issued by the Office of the
City Assessor of Caloocan.
It was during one of their visits in 1992 when they saw two (2) houses built on the said lot. These houses were built
without their knowledge and permission and learned that Spouses de Jesus and Macario occupied each house.
Spouses Supapo demanded the immediate surrender of the subject lot by bringing the dispute before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa and was issued later on a Certificate to File Action.
A criminal case was filed by the Spouses Supapo against the respondents for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law (P.D.
No. 772). The trial court held the respondents guilty and ordered them to vacate the subject premises. Respondents
appealed to CA.
While the appeal was pending, R.A. No. 8368 or “An Act Repealing PD No. 772,” was enacted by the Congress, and
resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case.
On April 30, 1999, the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case became final.
91
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Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against respondents Roberto and Susan De Jesus, Macario
Bernardo and persons claiming rights under them with the MeTC of Caloocan City.
property — no longer holds true. As tilings now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties the
assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.
The MeTC ruled in favor of the Spouses Supapo. The respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the RTC. The
RTC granted the petition for certiorari on the grounds that the action has prescribed; and accion publiciana falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot, located in Metro Manila, is
P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax declaration45 issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan. The
respondents do not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax declaration.
It held that in cases where the only issue involved is possession, the MeTC has jurisdiction if the action for forcible
entry or unlawful detainer is filed within one (1) year from the time to demand to vacate was made. Otherwise, the
complaint for recovery of possession should be filed before the RTC.
2.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the MeTC has jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana.
2.
Whether or not the action is already barred by prescription
3.
Whether or not the action is barred by res judicata.
In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved is a
registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1529].
HELD:
We hold that: (1) the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction; (2) the cause of action has not prescribed; and (3) the
complaint is not barred by res judicata.
The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits under the Torrens system. The most essential
insofar as the present case is concerned is Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which states:
Section 47. Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land in derogation of the
title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
1.
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of
the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.
In the present case, the Spouses Supapo filed an action for the recovery of possession of the subject lot but they based
their better right of possession on a claim of ownership.
At the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. The Spouses Supapo
acquired the TCT on the subject lot in 1979. Interestingly, the respondents do not challenge the existence,
authenticity and genuineness of the Supapo's TCT.
In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to the possession
thereof. The right to possess and occupy the land is an attribute and a logical consequence of ownership. Corollary to
this rule is the right of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person illegally occupying their property. Again,
this right is imprescriptible.
3.
This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not ownership.
However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between
the parties has the right to possess the property.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or possession of real
property is plenary.
a.
b.
c.
d.
The requisites for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are:
The former judgment or order must be final;
It must be a judgment on the merits;
It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of
action.
Res judicata is not present in this case.
RA No. 7691, however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions where
the assessed value of the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila.
While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the there is no identity of subject matter, parties and
causes of action between the criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law and the civil action for the
recovery of the subject property.
In view of these amendments, jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property is now
determined by its assessed value. The assessed value of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the
assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value.
First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint, although initiated by the Spouses Supapo, was
prosecuted in the name of the people of the Philippines. The accion publiciana, on the other hand, was filed by and in
the name of the Spouses Supapo.
The doctrine on which the RTC anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA — that
all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of the
Second, there is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the prosecution of a crime under the AntiSquatting Law while the accion publiciana is an action to recover possession of the subject property.
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And third, there is no identity of causes of action. The people of the Philippines filed the criminal case to protect
and preserve governmental interests by prosecuting persons who violated the statute. The Spouses Supapo filed the
accion publiciana to protect their proprietary interests over the subject property and recover its possession.
Even casting aside the requirement of identity of causes of action, the defense of res judicata has still no basis.
The concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require that there is identity of causes of action provided that
there is identity of issue and identity of parties.
G.R. No. 223399
De Guzman – Fuerte v. Estomo
April 23, 2018
The CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC. It held that the complaint in ejectment cases should embody
such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases for which Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort
to parole evidence. The CA found that the complaint failed to describe that the possession by the Spouses Estomo was
initially legal or tolerated and became illegal upon termination of lawful possession.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the complaint filed by the petitioner did not constitute an unlawful
detainer case
Peralta, J.
FACTS: Petitioners filed a complaint for unlawful detainer dated August 10, 2009 against the respondent spouses.
The subject property is situated at Block 3, Lot 2, Birmingham Homes, Dalig City 1, Antipolo City, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. R-55253.
Fuerte alleged that Manuela Co (Co) executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property in her favor.
Upon Co's failure to pay the loan, Fuerte caused the foreclosure proceedings and eventually obtained ownership of
the property. However, the writ of possession was returned unsatisfied since Co was no longer residing at the property
and that the Spouses Estomo and their family occupied the same. It was only after the said return that Fuerte discovered
and verified that the Spouses Estomo were in possession of the property. In a letter dated December 1, 2008, she
demanded them to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property and pay the corresponding compensation.
The Spouses Estomo refused to heed to her demands.
The Spouses Estomo denied that they illegally occupied the subject property. They also denied the existence of the
December 1, 2008 letter. They averred that they acquired the property from the Homeowners Development
Corporation on February 15, 1999 through a Contract to Sell, registered it under their names, covered by TCT No.
407613, and had been their family home since 2000. Sometime in 2006, Concepcion sought the services of Co, a real
estate broker, to assist her in securing a loan. Co obtained the certificate of title to be shown to potential creditors,
however, she never returned it. The TCT was cancelled by an alleged Absolute Sale of Real Property executed on
June 22, 2006, when Silvino was out of the country as a seaman, and then TCT No. R-39632 was issued under Co's
name. On July 13, 2006, Co mortgaged the subject property in the amount of P800,000.00. Consequently, the Spouses
Estomo filed an annulment case against Co and Fuerte on January 30, 2007. When they were served with the writ of
possession in favor of Fuerte, they filed a terceria with the sheriff, a motion to recall the writ of possession, and asked
for the consolidation of the land registration case to the annulment case on August 5, 2008. In the Orders dated October
28, 2008 and October 30, 2008, the trial court quashed the writ and directed the consolidation of the cases.
The MTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice finding that Fuerte failed to attach in the complaint a copy of the
demand letter and establish that the same was duly received by the spouses. The RTC, on appeal, reversed and set
aside the decision of the MTCC. It held that Fuerte established the existence of the December 1, 2008 demand letter,
which was sent through registered mail under Registry Receipt No. 5209 of the Antipolo City Post Office. The notice
to vacate the subject property served through registered mail is a substantial compliance with the modes of service
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under Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Suits for annulment of sale, cancellation of titles, reconveyance as
well as criminal complaints for falsification do not operate to abate ejectment proceedings involving the same property.
HELD:
At the outset, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in
the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The
nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations
contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones
to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
In summary ejectment suits such as unlawful detainer and forcible entry, the only issue to be determined is who
between the contending parties has better possession of the contested property. The Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts in Cities, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over these cases
and the proceedings are governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after
the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of
the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the
right to possess.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following:
a.
Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
b.
Eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by the plaintiff to the defendant about the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
c.
Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff of its enjoyment;
and
d.
Within one year from the making of the last demand to vacate the property on the defendant, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
As the allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court, the
complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer. In the absence of these factual allegations,
an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy and the municipal trial court does not have jurisdiction over
the case.
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Iglesia ni Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc. v. De la Cruz
G.R. No. 208284
April 23, 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: On March 26, 2007, the Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc. (PETITIONER),
represented by Francisco Galvez (Galvez), filed before the MeTC of Malabon City a Complaint for unlawful detainer
with damages (Complaint) against respondent Loida Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), using the name CHURCH OF JESUS
CHRIST, "NEW JERUSALEM" and all persons claiming rights under her (collectively, respondents). Said Complaint
contained the following allegations:
1.
Petitioner is the owner of certain parcels of land consisting of an area of TWO HUNDRED FOUR (204)
SQUARE METERS and SEVENTY-ONE (71) SQUARE METERS both covered by Original Certificate
of Title and the corresponding Tax Declaration
2.
Galvez is the nephew of Rosendo Gatchalian (Rosendo), the founder and the leader of petitioner way back
in 1940 who organized the said religious corporation and built a chapel within the subject lot
3.
Since 1940, Miguela Gatchalian (Miguela), the late mother of Galvez and her family used to occupy and
possess and likewise built a house of their own in the concept of an owner with uninterrupted, peaceful, and
physical possession on a certain portion of the subject lot as they were relatives and long-time members of
petitioner and were allowed by the founder Rosendo to occupy the same
4.
During the lifetime of Rosendo, the chapel inside the subject lot was used exclusively by the members of
petitioner for worship every Sunday;
5.
However, when Rosendo died, the members became disorganized Since then, members who come and visit
the chapel were allowed to enter the chapel and conduct their meetings and worship therein;
6.
Sometime in 1998, without the knowledge and consent of all the members and officers of petitioner, Dela
Cruz formed, organized, and created the name of CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST, "NEW JERUSALEM"
7.
The organization formed by Dela Cruz was used by her as an instrument in claiming that she is the
representative of the said religious organization and had the right over the subject lot
8.
The occupation and possession of Dela Cruz over the subject lot of petitioner was merely tolerated because
they were former members of petitioner
9.
On 12 February 2007, a demand was sent to respondents to vacate and surrender the peaceful possession of
the chapel and to stop using the [subject lot] of petitioner but the respondents failed and refused to vacate
the same. The demand letter was personally served but Dela Cruz refused to sign the same.
Dela Cruz countered that Galvez deviously acquired a new title by declaring the previous one as struck by flood OCT
No. 8257 (owner's copy) was never lost as such and is still in the possession of the Obispo Representante at Pastor
General ng Iglesia ni Jesu Kristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc. Also, she alleged that Galvez declared the improvement
(house) in his name. However, the same document on the dorsal portion thereof showed that the improvement was
described as situated " on the land of New Jerusalem, New Church of Jesus Christ". What is more, Dela Cruz therein
emphasized that the reconstituted title granted to Galvez was irregular and invalid because the alleged corporation
represented by Galvez was not yet existing when the reconstituted title was issued; and that Galvez moreover did not
have any authority to institute the instant proceedings in behalf of fee existing corporation, the Obispo Representante
at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni JesuKristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc.
MeTC dismissed petitioner's Complaint for lack of evidence. The MeTC held that petitioner had failed to establish by
preponderant evidence that it had a better right of possession over the disputed property arising from its claim of
ownership. MeTC found that petitioner was organized as a religious corporation only on June 15, 1999, and was
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registered only on August 4, 1999, per its SEC Certificate of Incorporation; that petitioner did not own any real
property per the List of Properties that it submitted to the SEC; that petitioner, which was organized only in 1990,
made the claim that it lost the owner's copy of OCT No. 8257, which explains why it prayed for the issuance of a new
owner's copy.
Upon the other hand, the MeTC found that Dela Cruz had successfully proven that she was the authorized
representative of the Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesu Kristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc.; and
that this corporation sole is the owner of the disputed property as shown by OCT.
RTC rendered its Decision[upholding the MeTC Decision. The RTC held that the disputed property which is covered
by OCT No. (8257) M-35266 is registered in the name of "The Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila,
Philippines, Inc."; and that the only issue to be resolved is who as between the parties is authorized to represent the
registered owner of the disputed property. Petitioner thereafter filed a Petition for Review with the CA. CA denied the
Petition for Review.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL
HELD:
This Court finds no merit in the present Petition.
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1) the defendant's
initial possession of the property was lawful, either by contact with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually,
such possession became illegal upon the plaintiff’s notice to the defendant of the termination of the latter's right of
possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment of the
property; and (4) the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate
the property.
In this case, the MeTC, the RTC, and the CA ruled for respondents, by uniformly holding that Dela Cruz was able to
show by convincing evidence that she is the duly authorized representative of the registered owner of the disputed
property. Quoting the RTC, the CA agreed that it is beyond doubt or dispute that the disputed property is registered
in the name of "The Iglesia de Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc." and that the sole issue for
resolution in the case is which party was authorized to represent the registered owner of the disputed property:
The only issue to be resolved is who as between [Galvez] and [Dela Cruz] is authorized to represent the
registered owner of the subject property.
The Court notes that as stated in [Galvez's] Complaint, religious organization 'Nueva [de] Manila', of
which he represents was organized way back in 1940; but why is it that [Galvez] registered it only in
1999? On die other hand, 'Bagong Jerusalem' which also bears the name of 'New Jerusalem' in its English
translation and 'Jerusalem Nueva' in its Spanish translation was registered in 1955 as a corporation sole
with Rev. Pineda as the Bishop Representative and General Pastor of the church and not Rosendo, the
founder as Galvez claimed x x x. Galvez failed to explain this glaring inconsistency, which rendered his
evidence not worthy of credence.
When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in [her] pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue
of possession. In other words, "[w]here the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the courts may
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pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right, to possess the property. However, where
the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and
binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue or possession.
SEC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the Interport Resources Corporation from holding the July
9, 1996 scheduled annual meeting of the stockholders. Notwithstanding the SEC's TRO, the stockholders proceeded
with the meeting on July 9, 1996, presided over by respondent Manalaysay.
The principal issue must be possession de facto, or actual possession, and ownership is merely ancillary to such issue.
The summary character of the proceedings is designed to quicken the determination of possession de facto in the
interest of preserving the peace of the community, but the summary proceedings may not be proper to resolve
ownership of the property. Consequently, any issue on ownership arising in forcible entry or unlawful detainer is
resolved only provisionally for the purpose of determining the principal issue of possession.
SEC declared the stockholders meeting of Interport Resources Corporation held on July 9, 1996, null and void and
directed respondents to appear before the SEC on July 15, 1996, at 3:00 p.m., to show cause why no disciplinary
action should be taken against them or why they should not be cited in contempt.
Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system, is entitled to all the attributes of property ownership, which necessarily
includes possession." Nevertheless, "an ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has
presented proof of ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the particular ejectment
case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently proven."
CA revered and set aside the SEC order declaring respondents guilty of contempt.
Quite independently of the foregoing, what further strengthens herein respondents' posture was petitioner's utter failure
to adduce proof that he merely tolerated respondents' possession of the disputed property. In Corpuz v. Spouses
Agustin, this Court recognized that even as the registered owner generally has the right of possession as an attribute
of: ownership, nevertheless the dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer is justified where proof of
preponderant evidence of material possession of the disputed premises has not been convincingly adduced
We cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has instituted an unlawful, detainer case against respondents.
It is an established fact that for more than three decades, the latter have been in continuous possession of the subject
property, which, as such, is in the concept of ownership and not by mere tolerance of petitioner's father. Under these
circumstances, petitioner cannot simply oust respondents from possession through the summary procedure of an
ejectment proceeding.
In the case at bench, petitioner miserably failed to substantiate its claim that it merely tolerated respondents' possession
of the disputed property. Indeed, "with the averment here that the respondents’ possession was by mere tolerance of
the petitioner, the acts of tolerance must be proved, for bare allegation of tolerance did not suffice.
Kinds: Direct v. Indirect
Procedure
Judgment and Review
G.R. No. 129521
HELD:
NO. While the SEC is vested with the power to punish for contempt, the salutary rule is that the power to punish for
contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea
of punishment. The courts and other tribunals vested with the power of contempt must exercise the power to punish
for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the judges as
persons but for the functions that they exercise.
In this case, the SEC issued the citation for contempt sua sponte. There was no charge filed by a private party aggrieved
by the acts of respondents. Strictly speaking, there was no disobedience to the SEC's temporary restraining order. The
Court of Appeals enjoined that order. Consequently, respondents' act in proceeding with the scheduled stock-holders'
meeting was not contumacious as there was no willful disobedience to an order of the SEC. The disobedience which
the law punishes as constructive contempt implies willfulness. For, at bottom, contempt is a willful disregard or
disobedience.
A.M. No. RTJ – 03 – 1771
Yasay v. Recto
September 7, 1999
Sison v. Caoibes, Jr.
May 27, 2004
Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS: The instant administrative complaint arose when Salvador Sison, a Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority (MMDA) traffic enforcer, filed a verified Complaint. In turn, the complaint stemmed from an Order in
Criminal Case No. 99-0023 which the respondent judge issued, requiring the complainant to appear before him to
explain a traffic incident involving his son and the complainant. The said Order reads, thus:
Pardo, J.
FACTS: SEC Chairman Yasay upon request of certain stockholders of Interport Resources Corporation, directed
respondent Ricalde to submit to the SEC a list of stockholders and to set a definite time and place for the validation
of proxies and nominations for directors of the firm.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the order of the SEC finding respondents guilty of
contempt for disobeying its temporary restraining order to desist from holding the annual stockholders
meeting of the Interport Resources Corporation scheduled on July 9, 1996.
The SEC was rather hasty in asserting its power to punish for contempt. The chairman and commissioners of the SEC
must exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint.
CONTEMPT
1.
2.
3.
After the hearing, on July 15, 1996, the SEC issued an order stating Manalaysay and Ricalde guilty of contempt.
Per information from the authorized driver of the Presiding Judge of this Court on September 8, 1999, at about 3:00
o’clock in the afternoon of said date, said authorized driver, while on board the official car of the undersigned on an
official errand was flagged by the accused along the Epifanio delos Santos Avenue while he was positioning the car
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he was driving to the right lane as he was then to make a right turn; that after he stopped, he was told by the accused
that swerving to the right lane was prohibited when it appeared that the sign therefore was still far off and not readily
visible to the naked eye; that nonetheless, he introduced himself as the authorized driver of the undersigned, his son
in fact, and showed to the accused the calling card of the undersigned with a notation in (sic) the dorsal portion thereof
introducing the bearer of the card and requesting for assistance from law enforcers, and accordingly begged that he be
allowed to proceed on his way considering that there was no danger to limb, life and property occasioned by his
alleged traffic violation; that notwithstanding such introduction and plea, the accused confiscated the driver’s license
of the authorized driver, even bragging in the process that he did the same to somebody who introduced himself as a
lawyer the day before.
Respondent judge vehemently denied the accusations against him, contending that he was merely preserving the
dignity and honor due to the courts of law. He anchors the justification of his acts against the complainant on Section
3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The aforementioned actuation of the accused, if true, is not only indicative of his arrogance and deliberate disregard
of the usual respect, courtesy and accommodation accorded to a court of law and/or its representative but is one
constitutive of indirect contempt under Section 3, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, specially
considering that the authorized driver of the Presiding Judge of this Court was then on official errand.
According to the Investigating Justice, he found respondent judge to have abused his authority in charging and
punishing complainant for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Investigating Justice
recommended that the respondent be admonished and warned.
Pursuant to the recommendation of the Court Administrator, the Court, in a Resolution dated April 2, 2003, resolved
to (a) dismiss the instant administrative complaint against Sheriff Teodoro Alvarez (Sheriff) for lack of merit; and (b)
refer the matter against respondent Judge Caoibes, Jr. to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals for raffle among
the Associate Justices of the Court, and for investigation, report and recommendation. The case was, thereafter, raffled
to Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order of contempt was proper?
WHEREFORE, within a non-extendible period of twenty-four (24) hours from receipt hereof, the accused is ordered
to show cause why he should not be cited as in contempt of court and dealt with accordingly. The Branch Sheriff of
this Court is authorized and ordered to serve a copy of this Order upon the accused immediately and to make a return
of his proceedings thereon. After receipt of this Order, the accused is ordered to personally file his comment in Court,
within the period allowed him herein.
SO ORDERED.
Because of the complainant’s failure to appear before the respondent judge, the latter issued an order (September 22,
1999) for the complainant’s arrest and commitment, and for the complainant to appear for hearing before his sala. On
the scheduled hearing, the complainant appeared and executed an affidavit admitting to the court that he made a
mistake and that it was all a misunderstanding. The respondent judge, thereafter, lifted the September 22, 1999 Order.
However, in the complaint of Sison, he alleged the following important points:
That complainant was greatly surprised when respondent TEODORO ALVAREZ (Sheriff) came and arrested him
without any warrant of arrest, only on orders of the respondent Judge. He was brought to the Respondent Judge in Las
Piñas City who ordered him detained in the Las Piñas City Jail. When he was arrested, he was not able to call his
family to inform them where he was because he failed to return home in the evening;
That the next day, he was informed by respondent Alvarez that there will be a hearing of his indirect contempt charge
before the sala of the respondent Judge in Las Piñas City. During the hearing, the complainant was made to admit by
the respondent Judge that he made a mistake in apprehending his driver-son. Thus, after admitting his mistakes under
duress respondent Judge ordered complainant’s discharged from detention;
That the undersigned complainant did not know of any offense he had committed, except for his issuing a traffic
violation receipt to the driver-son of the respondent Judge which he is tasked by law to do so for those found violating
traffic rules and regulations;
HELD:
No. At first blush, it would seem that the respondent judge was justified in holding the complainant for contempt, due
to the latter’s refusal to comply with the judge’s Order of September 15, 1999. However, it is not lost upon this Court
that the complainant was not a party to any of the cases pending before the RTC, Branch 253. What triggered the
contempt charge was, in fact, the traffic violation incident involving the respondent judge’s son. Furthermore, the
record shows that when the complainant filed his reply to the charge as required by the respondent judge, the same
was refused by some staff member in the latter’s sala.
The court stated that while the power to punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial
proceedings and to uphold due administration of justice, judges, however, should exercise their contempt powers
judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and with the end in view of utilizing their contempt powers for
correction and preservation not for retaliation and vindication.
The respondent Judge was not justified to so consider the act and remarks of Sison as thereby displaying arrogance
towards and deliberate disregard of the usual respect, courtesy and accommodation due to a court of law and its
representative. First of all, the refusal of Sison and the supposed remarks should not cause resentment on the part of
the respondent Judge because he knew, as a public official himself, that Sison was only doing his duty of enforcing
evenly the particular traffic regulation against swerving into a one-way street from the wrong direction, regardless of
the office or position of the violator’s father. Secondly, the respondent Judge should have had the circumspection
expected of him as a judge to realize that the remarks of Sison were invited by Caoibes III’s attempt to bluff his way
out of the apprehension because he was the son of an RTC judge. Hence, the respondent Judge would have no grounds
to cite Sison for contempt of court. And, thirdly, the respondent Judge and his son should have challenged the issuance
of the traffic violation receipt pursuant to the pertinent rules if they did not agree with the basis of the apprehension
and also administratively charged Sison for any unwarranted act committed. Since neither was done by them, but, on
the contrary, both ultimately accepted the validity of the apprehension, as borne out by the retrieval of the driver’s
license after September 29, 1999 by paying the fines corresponding to the traffic violation, then it follows that the
respondent Judge had the consciousness that his son was at fault, instead of Sison.
The complainant, thus, prayed that the respondents be summarily dismissed from the service.
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The foregoing renders clear that the respondent Judge had no legitimate basis by which to consider Sison’s
apprehension of his son as indirect contempt. As indicated earlier, the act complained against must be any of those
specified in Sec. 3, Rule 71, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; otherwise, there is no contempt of court, which requires
that the person obstructed should be performing a duty connected with judicial functions. As such, the respondent
Judge acted oppressively and vindictively.
Parenthetically, it is odd that the respondent Judge would even propose herein that his son Caoibes III, who is already
25 years at the time of the apprehension, was working for his father as the latter’s personal driver, albeit not officially
employed in the Judiciary. Most likely, therefore, Caoibes III might not be doing anything for his father at the time of
his apprehension but was in the place for his own purposes.
Further, this court takes judicial notice that the respondent judge was already previously sanctioned for being found
guilty of serious impropriety unbecoming a judge, for delivering fistic blows on a complainant judge. To our mind,
the instant case falls under "similar conduct," which the Court avowed would be dealt with more severely if repeated.
Thus, respondent judge is found guilty of serious impropriety unbecoming a judge for violating Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, and is hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government or any of its instrumentalities
including government-owned and controlled corporations.
G.R. No. 150949
Espanol v. Formoso
June 21, 2007
Sandoval – Gutierrez, J.
FACTS: Sharcons Builders Philippines, Inc. filed a case for quieting of title with the RTC when they were prevented
from fencing and taking possession of the lot by the spouses Joseph and Enriqueta Mapua, alleging that they were the
true owners of the land. The defendants impleaded were spouses Mapua, Evanswinda Morales (the seller of the land
to Sharcons Builders) and the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City.
In their answer, the spouses Mapua alleged that all the documents relied upon by Sharcons regarding their ownership
are spurious and falsified.
In the course of the proceedings, herein petitioner Judge Dolores L. Español issued an order stating that the herein
respondents Benito See (president), Marly See (treasurer) and their counsel, Atty. Benjamin Formoso, have used a
spurious certificate of title and tax declaration when Sharcons filed a complaint for quieting of title. As such,
petitioner then declared the respondents guilty of direct contempt of court and ordered their confinement for 10
days in the municipal jail of Dasmariñas, Cavite.
In addition, Judge Español’s ruling stated that using the presumption that whoever is a possession and a user of
falsified document is the forger thereof, and recommended falsification charges against the named respondents. She
recommended that a copy of her order be sent to the NBI and the DOJ for their appropriate action, and as for Atty.
Formoso, a copy of the order is also directed to be forwarded to the Bar Confidant’s Office.
In ruling upon the merits of the case, petitioner judge ‘stumbled’ upon a particular civil case for cancellation of title
and damages filed with the RTC in Imus, Cavite, presided by Judge Lucenito N. Tagle. She then took judicial notice
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of the judge’s decision declaring that the Sharcons’ TCT and other supporting documents are falsified and that they
are responsible for such an act.
On July 12, 2001, petitioner issued warrants of arrest against respondents and they were indeed confined in the
municipal jail of Dasmariñas, Cavite. They filed a motion for bail and motion to lift order of arrest but were outrightly
denied.
Respondents then filed with the CA a petition for writ of habeas corpus, and the CA granted the same. The order
of commitment, as well as the finding of the RTC that the respondents are guilty of direct contempt, is therefore
nullified and set aside. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are guilty of direct contempt of court for using falsified documents.
HELD:
The court ruled in the negative.
Contempt of court, as defined in In re: Jones is “some act or conduct which tends to interfere with the business of the
court, by a refusal to obey some lawful order of the court, or some act of disrespect to the dignity of the court which
in some way tends to interfere with or hamper the orderly proceedings of the court and thus lessens the general
efficiency of the same.” It is also a “defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to
bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigants or
their witnesses during litigation.”
In this jurisdiction, it is now recognized that the courts have inherent power to punish for contempt on the ground that
respect for the courts guarantees the very stability of the judicial institution.
Indirect or constructive contempt, meanwhile, is one perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court and may include
misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions,
disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of a court, or injunction granted
by a court or a judge, any abuse or any unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt, or any improper conduct directly or indirectly tending to impede, obstruct or degrade
the administration of justice.
Under Rule 71, direct contempt is punished summarily, while indirect contempt is punished after a charge in writing
has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within a period fixed by the court and
to be heard by himself or by counsel.
The imputed use of a falsified document, moreso where the falsity is not apparent on its face, merely constitutes
indirect contempt.
Español, in convicting respondents for direct contempt, took judicial notice of the decision in a previous civil case. In
Gener v. De Leon, the SC held that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or pending in the same court.
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As such, the petition is therefore DENIED and the ruling of the CA in finding that the respondents are not guilty of
direct contempt is AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 205956
Marantan v. Diokno
February 12, 2014
Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Petitioner P/Supt. Hansel M. Marantan (Marantan) is the respondent in G.R. No. 199462, a petition filed on
December 6, 2011, but already dismissed although the disposition is not yet final. Respondent Monique Cu-Unjieng
La'O (La ‘O) is one of the petitioners in the said case, while respondent Atty. Jose Manuel Diokno (Atty. Diokno) is
her counsel therein.
G.R. No. 199462 relates to Criminal Case Nos. 146413-PSG, 146414-PSG and 146415-PSG, entitled "People of the
Philippines v. P/SINSP Hansel M. Marantan, et al.," pending before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
265 (RTC), where Marantan and his co-accused are charged with homicide. The criminal cases involve an incident
which transpired on November 7, 2005, where Anton Cu-Unjieng (son of respondent La’O), Francis Xavier Manzano,
and Brian Anthony Dulay, were shot and killed by police officers in front of the AIC Gold Tower at Ortigas Center,
which incident was captured by a television crew from UNTV 37 (Ortigas incident).
In G.R. No. 199462, La’O, together with the other petitioners, prayed, among others, that the resolution of the Office
of the Ombudsman downgrading the charges from murder to homicide be annulled and set aside; that the
corresponding informations for homicide be withdrawn; and that charges for murder be filed.
In the meantime, on January 6, 2013, a shooting incident occurred in Barangay Lumutan, Municipality of Atimonan,
Province of Quezon, where Marantan was the ground commander in a police-military team, which resulted in the
death of thirteen (13) men (Atimonan incident). This encounter, according to Marantan, elicited much negative
publicity for him.
Marantan alleges that, riding on the unpopularity of the Atimonan incident, La’O and her counsel, Atty. Diokno, and
one Ernesto Manzano, organized and conducted a televised/radio broadcasted press conference. During the press
conference, they maliciously made intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the Court in handling
G.R. No. 199462, as well as contumacious comments on the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC, branding
Marantan and his co-accused guilty of murder in the Ortigas incident.
On January 29, 2013, this interview was featured in "TV Patrol," an ABS-CBN news program. Marantan quotes a
portion of the interview, as follows:
Atty. Diokno : So ang lumabas din sa video that the actual raw footage of the UNTV is very long. Ang
nangyari, you see the police officers may nilalagay sila sa loob ng sasakyan ng victims na parang
pinapalabas nila that there was a shootout pero ang nangyari na yon e tapos na, patay na.
Ernesto Manzano : Kung sinasabi nilang carnapper dapat huliin nilang buhay yong mga mahal naming
sa buhay and kinasuhan pero ang ginawa nila, sila mismo na ang nagbigay ng hatol.
Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o : Sinasabi nila na may kinarnap siya, tinutukan ng baril, hindi magagawa
yong kasi kilala ko siya, anak ko yon e x x x he is already so arrogant because they protected him all
these years. They let him get away with it. So even now, so confident of what he did, I mean confident of
murdering so many innocent individuals.
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Atty. Diokno : Despite the overwhelming evidence, however, Supt. Marantan and company have never
been disciplined, suspended or jailed for their participation in the Ortigas rubout, instead they were
commended by their superiors and some like Marantan were even promoted to our consternation and
disgust. Ang problema po e hangang ngayon, we filed a Petition in the Supreme Court December 6,
2011, humihingi po kami noon ng Temporary Restraining Order, etc. – hangang ngayon wala pa pong
action ang Supreme Court yong charge kung tama ba yong pag charge ng homicide lamang e subalit
kitang kita naman na they were killed indiscriminately and maliciously.
Atty. Diokno : Eight years have passed since our love ones were murdered, but the policemen who killed
them led by Supt. Hansel Marantan the same man who is involved in the Atimonan killings – still roam
free and remain unpunished. Mr. President, while we are just humble citizens, we firmly believe that
police rub-out will not stop until you personally intervene.
Ernesto Manzano : Up to this date, we are still praying for justice.
Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o : Ilalaban namin ito no matter what it takes, we have the evidence with us,
I mean everything shows that they were murdered.
Marantan submits that the respondents violated the sub judice rule, making them liable for indirect contempt under
Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, for their contemptuous statements and improper conduct tending directly
or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. He argues that their pronouncements and
malicious comments delved not only on the supposed inaction of the Court in resolving the petitions filed, but
also on the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC and prematurely concluded that he and his co-accused
are guilty of murder.
The respondents, argue that there was no violation of the sub judice rule as their statements were legitimate
expressions of their desires, hopes and opinions which were taken out of context and did not actually impede,
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in a concrete way; that no criminal intent was shown as the utterances
were not on their face actionable being a fair comment of a matter of public interest and concern; and that this petition
is intended to stifle legitimate speech.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are liable for indirect contempt.
HELD:
The Court rueld in the negative. The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial
proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.
A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:
Section 3.
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice[.]
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. This form of contempt is conduct that
is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the
administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in
criminal contempt, and no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that he
intended to commit it.6
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For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such does impede, interfere with and
embarrass the administration of justice. The specific rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.
The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct their business unhampered by
publications and comments which tend to impair the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the
administration of justice. The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid in determining the proper
constitutional boundary between these two rights.
The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must be "extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high" before an utterance can be punished. There must exist a clear and present
danger that the utterance will harm the administration of justice. Freedom of speech should not be impaired through
the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a
serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely,
threat. The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly relate to the merits of the case, particularly
the guilt of petitioner, and the conduct of the Court as to its failure to decide G.R. No. 199462.
As to the merits, the comments seem to be what the respondents claim to be an expression of their opinion that
their loved ones were murdered by Marantan. The mere restatement of their argument in their petition cannot
actually, or does not even tend to, influence the Court.
As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents' comments reveals that they were simply stating that it had
not yet resolved their petition. There was no complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate amount of time had
passed since the petition was filed without any action from the Court. There appears no attack or insult on the dignity
of the Court either.
"A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press
merely because it concerns a judicial proceeding still pending in the court is, upon the theory that in such a case, it
must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of justice." Freedom of public comment should,
in borderline instances, weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. The power to punish
for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the
interest of justice.
G.R. No. 182738
Capitol Hils Golf and Country Club v. Sanchez
February 24, 2014
Peralta, J.
FACTS: Manuel Sanchez, a stockholder of Capitol Hills, sought to nullify an annual and special meeting of the
stockholders of Capitol Hills with the RTC wherein he likewise prayed for the issuance of an order for the production
and inspection of documents. Said motion was granted by the RTC. Apparently, said order was not complied with by
Capitol Hills. Thus, in September, 3, 2007, the RTC issued a resolution for strict compliance reiterating its first order
wherein it threatened to cite the defendants in contempt and a possible fine.
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Capitol Hills filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the aforementioned resolution. In resolving the
petition, the CA ruled that there is no indication that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Anent the argument against the threatened imposition of sanction for contempt of court and
the possible payment of a hefty fine, the CA opined that the case of Dee v. Securities and Exchange Commission cited
by petitioners is inapplicable, since the assailed Resolution merely warned petitioners that they would be cited for
contempt and be fined if they fail to comply with the court's directive.
Capitol Hills contend that the "threatened imminent action" by the RTC to penalize them sua sponte or without regard
to the guideline laid down by the Court in Engr. Torcende v. Judge Sardid is not proper and calls for the exercise of
the Court’s power of supervision over the lower courts. Likewise, citing Panaligan v. Judge Ibay, they claim that the
threatened citation for contempt is not in line with the policy that there should be wilfullness or that the contumacious
act be done deliberately in disregard of the authority of the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy in assailing an impending contempt
proceeding?
HELD:
No. In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated. To the Court's mind, the September 3,
2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the September 10, 2002 Order. It is not yet a "judgment or
final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt" as contemplated under the Rules. The penalty mentioned therein
only serves as a reminder to caution petitioners of the consequence of possible non-observance of the long-overdue
order to produce and make available for inspection and photocopying of the requested records/documents. In case of
another failure or refusal to comply with the directive, the court or respondent could formally initiate the indirect
contempt proceedings pursuant to the mandatory requirements of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.
Even if the court is to treat the September 3, 2007 Resolution as a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of
indirect contempt," this would still not work to petitioners' advantage. Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
substantially provides that the person adjudged in indirect contempt must file an appeal under Rule 41 (Appeal from
the Regional Trial Courts) and post a bond for its suspension pendente lite. Obviously, these were not done in this
case. Instead, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules and did not post the required bond,
effectively making the September 3, 2007 Resolution final and executory.
Discussions on Contempt (technically, there was still no contempt proceeding in the case at bar)
A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court or commits any improper conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect
contempt.
In relation to Modes of Discovery
In particular, Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules states that, in addition to a possible treatment of a party as nonsuited or as in default, the sanctions prescribed in the Rules for failure to avail of, or refusal to comply with, the modes
of discovery shall apply. Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an officer or managing agent of a party
refuses to obey an order to produce any document or other things for inspection, copying, or photographing or to
permit it to be done, the court may make such orders as are just. The enumeration of options given to the court under
Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules is not exclusive, as shown by the phrase "among others."
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To ensure that availment of the modes of discovery is otherwise untrammeled and efficacious, the law imposes serious
sanctions on the party who refuses to make discovery, such as dismissing the action or proceeding or part thereof, or
rendering judgment by default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or arrest of the party or agent of the
party; payment of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to compel discovery; taking
the matters inquired into as established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking discovery; refusal to allow
the disobedient party support or oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out pleadings or parts thereof; staying
further proceedings.
Two ways of initiating Indirect Contempt proceedings
(1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) by a verified petition.
In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court
provide the procedure to be followed in case of indirect contempt.
First, there must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for
contempt.
Second, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him.
Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider respondent's
answer.
Fourth, only if found guilty will respondent be punished accordingly.
In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules prescribe that a verified petition which has
complied with the requirements of initiatory pleadings as outlined in the heretofore quoted provision of second
paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, must be filed.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars
and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for
filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related
to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt
charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision.
But in indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by the court, the above rules do not necessarily apply.
First, since the court itself motu proprio initiates the proceedings, there can be no verified petition to
speak of. Instead, the court has the duty to inform the respondent in writing, in accordance with his or
her right to due process. This formal charge is done by the court in the form of an Order requiring the
respondent to explain why he or she should not be cited in contempt of court.
Second, when the court issues motu proprio a show-cause order, the duty of the court (1) to docket and
(2) to hear and decide the case separately from the main case does not arise, much less to exercise the
discretion to order the consolidation of the cases. There is no petition from any party to be docketed,
heard and decided separately from the main case precisely because it is the show-cause order that
initiated the proceedings.
What remains in any case, whether the proceedings are initiated by a verified petition or by the court motu proprio, is
the duty of the court to ensure that the proceedings are conducted respecting the right to due process of the party being
cited in contempt. In both modes of initiating indirect contempt proceedings, if the court deems that the answer to the
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contempt charge is satisfactory, the proceedings end. The court must conduct a hearing, and the court must consider
the respondent's answer. Only if found guilty will the respondent be punished accordingly.
A.M. No. RTJ – 13 - 2366
Tormis v. Paredes
February 4, 2015
Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Jill Tomis averred that in his class discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis
(Judge Tormis), then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the
judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was
abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law. Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge
Tormis in his discussions not only once but several times.
In his Comment, Judge Paredes denied the accusations of Jill. He stated that Judge Tormis had several administrative
cases, some of which he had investigated; that as a result of the investigations, he recommended sanctions against
Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill, her daughter, to get back at him; that he discussed in his class the case of
Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis’ involvement in the marriage scams nor her sanctions as a result of the
investigation conducted by the Court;
Judge Paredes averred that the discussions relative to the administrative cases of Judge Tormis could not be the subject
of an administrative complaint because it was not done in the performance of his judicial duties.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Paredes’ discussion of Judge Tormis’ administrative case violated the subjudice rule
HELD:
Yes. The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. The rationale for the rule was
spelled out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez, where it was stated that it is a traditional conviction of civilized
society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every
extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such
facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.
Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge Tormis in 2010, the investigation relative
to the said case had not yet been concluded. In fact, the decision on the case was promulgated by the Court only on
April 2, 2013. In 2010, he still could not make comments on the administrative case to prevent any undue influence
in its resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one of the judges involved, was in
contravention of the subjudice rule. Justice Diy was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated Section
4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
G.R. No. 199825
OCA v. Custodio
July 26, 2017
Leonen, J.
FACTS: This indirect contempt case stemmed from an intra-corporate controversy among the Board of Trustees of
petitioner St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite, Inc. (St. Francis School).
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St. Francis School was established with the assistance of the La Salle brothers on July 9, 1973 by respondent Laurita
Custodio (Custodio)
Without a written agreement, the La Salle brothers agreed to give the necessary supervision to establish the school's
academic foundation.
In 1998, petitioner Bro. Bernard Oca (Bro. Oca) became a member of St. Francis School as a La Salle-appointed
supervisor. He sat in the Board of Trustees and was later elected as its Chairman and St. Francis School's President.
Sometime in August 2001, the members of the Board of Trustees came into a disagreement regarding the school's
administrative structure and La Salle's supervision over the school. Cirila, Josefina, Bro. Oca, and Bro. Magbanua
wanted to expand the scope of La Salle's supervision to include matters relating to the school's finances,
administration, and operations. In 2000, petitioner Bro. Dennis Magbanua (Bro. Magbanua) was also admitted as a La
Salle-appointed supervisor. He sat as a trustee and was later elected as Treasurer of St. Francis School.
This was opposed by Custodio. After several incidents relating to the disagreement, Custodio filed a complaint against
St. Francis School, Bro. Oca, and Bro. Magbanua on June 7, 2002 with Branch 23, Regional Trial Court, Trece
Martires, Cavite. She alleged that Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua were never qualified to sit in the Board of Trustees.
This case was dismissed. Custodio was subsequently removed from the Board of Trustees and as Curriculum
Administrator.
Custodio again filed a complaint against petitioners for violating the Corporation Code with Branch 21, Regional Trial
Court, Imus, Cavite. She sought to disqualify Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua as members and trustees of the school and
to declare void all their acts as President and Treasurer, respectively. She likewise prayed for a temporary restraining
order and/or a preliminary injunction to enjoin the remaining board members from holding meetings and to prevent
Bro. Oca and Bro. Magbanua from discharging their functions as members, trustees, and officers of St. Francis School
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that they would have proven that Reynante lacked the moral
integrity to act as court-appointed cashier had they been given the opportunity to be heard. On January 3, 2003, the
Regional Trial Court denied reconsideration.
Petitioners filed an Explanation, Manifestation and Compliance. They alleged that they partially complied with the
October 21, 2002 Order by submitting an accounting on the tuition fee collections and by turning over to Reynante a
manager's check in the amount of P397,127.64 payable to St. Francis School. The amount allegedly represented the
school's matriculation fees from October to December 2002. However, they alleged that Reynante refused to accept
the check and required that the amount be turned over in cash or in a check payable to cash. Thus, petitioners placed
the check in the custody of the Regional Trial Court for safekeeping
Custodio filed a Comment dated February 26, 2003. Custodio manifested that petitioners did not even substantially
comply with the October 21, 2002 Order because it excluded from its accounting and turnover the following amounts:
4.
₱4,339,601.54 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 239 of the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.;
5.
₱5,639,856.11 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 459 of the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.;
6.
₱92,970.00 representing fees paid by the school canteen; and
7.
All other fees collected from January 2003 to February 19, 2003.
Custodio also claimed that petitioners violated the trial court order that only she and Reynante were authorized to pay
the outstanding accounts of St. Francis School. Petitioners allegedly made salary payments to four (4) employees who
had resigned.
On March 24, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued another Order directing petitioners to fully comply with its earlier
order to submit a report and to turn over to Reynante all the money they had collected
Petitioners filed a Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion on April 18, 2003, praying, among
others, that the trial court issue an order excluding from its March 24, 2003 Order the amounts which were not covered
in its October 21, 2002 Order.
Regional Trial Court heard Custodio's prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
The day after the hearing, Custodio filed a Manifestation and Motion dated October 9, 2002. She alleged that after
the hearing for the Temporary Restraining Order, the counsel for petitioners went to St. Francis School to instruct
several parents not to acknowledge Custodio's administration as she had been removed as a member, trustee, and
curriculum administrator and that her complaint had been dismissed. The parents were also allegedly directed to pay
the students' matriculation fees exclusively to petitioner Alejandro N. Mojica (Alejandro), son of petitioner Cirila.
Alejandro held office at the Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc. which was allegedly owned by the family of petitioner
Josefina.
On October 14, 2002, Custodio also filed a Motion for Clarification praying that the trial court clarify to whom the
school's fees should be paid while her Complaint and Manifestation and Motion were still pending.
On October 21, 2002, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order designating Reynante to act as school cashier "with
authority to collect all fees" and, together with Custodio, "to pay all accounts."
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On August 5, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order denying all motions raised in petitioners' Manifestation,
Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion and declared that they had not complied with the March 24, 2003
Order
On August 21, 2003, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order granting Custodio's Manifestation and Motion dated
October 9, 2002 and issuing a status quo order allowing Custodio to discharge her functions as school director and
curriculum administrator. The trial court ruled in favor of Custodio when it found that petitioners had already
established another school, the Academy of St. John (Academy of St. John) in Sta. Clara, General Trias, Cavite.
Custodio filed the Petition to Cite Respondents in Contempt of Court under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
Regional Trial Court, Dasmariñas, Cavite found petitioners guilty of indirect contempt for failing to comply with the
Orders dated October 21, 2002 and March 24, 2003
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court Decision. It found that it was sufficiently established that petitioners did
not remit all the money they had previously collected despite the trial court's October 21, 2002 Order, which they
admitted to be lawful.
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The Court of Appeals ruled that defying the trial court orders amounted to contumacious conduct, which "tended to
prejudice St. Francis School's operations due to lack of operational funds."
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review via Rule 45 arguing that they complied with the October 21, 2002 Order in good
faith
Petitioners held that to be cited for contempt, the contemnor must be guilty of willful disobedience. However, they
did not disobey the trial court orders. They insisted that they had complied in good faith because the trial court October
21, 2002 Order only pertained to the school's matriculation fees and not any other fees. They claimed that the October
21, 2002 Order was a response to Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October 14, 2002, which only requested
that the matriculation fees be turned over to
Reynante. Thus, they averred that it was reasonable for them to conclude that the subject of the turnover was the
matriculation fees only.
Petitioners asserted that these circumstances showed that there was reasonable doubt on their guilt and their acquittal
was warranted.
Plaintiff and defendants, as well as Mr. Al Mojica, are directed to turn-over to Ms. Herminia Reynante
all money previously collected and to submit a report on what have been collected, how much, from
whom and the dates collected. Effective October 22, 2002, Ms. Herminia Reynante shall submit to the
Court, to the plaintiff and to all the defendants a monthly report of all receivables collected and all
disbursements made.
The wording of the October 21, 2002 Order is clear that the amounts do not pertain only to the matriculation fees but
to all collectibles, all fees, and all accounts. It also states that petitioners were to render a report and turn over all the
amounts they had previously collected. It does not state that only matriculation fees were to be handed over.
Likewise, the subject of Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October 14, 2002 did not solely cover matriculation
fees. Her prayer sought to clarify "where the matriculation fees and other fees should be paid pending the hearing of
the Complaint and the Manifestation and Motion."
Further, the Regional Trial Court did not unduly expand the scope of the October 21, 2002 Order when it issued its
March 24, 2003 Order. The trial court only reiterated in October 21, 2002 Order in this March 24, 2003 Order and
specified more particularly the amounts that needed to be remitted.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners are guilty of indirect contempt.
HELD:
Yes. This Court rules that petitioners Oca, Magbanua, Cirila, and Josefina are guilty of indirect contempt. There is a
contumacious refusal on their part to comply with the Regional Trial Court Orders.
Contempt of court is willful disobedience to the court and disregard or defiance of its authority, justice, and dignity.
It constitutes conduct which "tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or
in some manner to impede the due administration of justice" or "interfere with or prejudice parties['] litigant or their
witnesses during litigation."
Indirect contempt is only punished after a written petition is filed and an opportunity to be heard is given to the party
charged.
In the case at bar, petitioners were charged with indirect contempt through "disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
writ, process, order, orjudgment of a court."
Petitioners insist that they have complied with the October 21, 2002 Order in good faith as they have already turned
over the matriculation fees to Reynante. They claim that this Order pertained to the matriculation fees only, excluding
any other fees, as it was issued in connection with Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October 14, 2002, which
requested that the matriculation fees be turned over to Reynante. Custodio's Motion for Clarification dated October
14, 2002 allegedly did not cover other fees.
However, the October 21, 2002 Order did not pertain to matriculation fees only:
Regarding the collection of matriculation fees and other collectibles, Ms. Herminia Reynante is hereby
designated by the Court to act as cashier of the school to the exclusion of others with authority to collect
all fees and, together with plaintiff Laurita Custodio, to pay all accounts. Said authority shall continue
102
until the matter of the application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is heard
and resolved. This is hereby ordered so that an orderly operation of the school will be achieved.
However, despite its clear wording, petitioners still did not comply with the March 24, 2003 Order. Instead, they filed
a Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion on April 18, 2003, praying that the trial court
exclude the other amounts, which were allegedly not included in the October 21, 2002 Order
The trial court denied petitioners' Manifestation, Observation,Compliance, Exception and Motion in its August 5,
2003 Order for being a differently worded motion for reconsideration, which is a prohibited pleading under Section 8
of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC). The trial court noted that
petitioners still had not complied with its March 24, 2003 Order and reiterated that they must submit a report and turn
over all the money they had collected. Still, petitioners refused to comply.
On August 21, 2003, the trial court granted Custodio's Manifestation and Motion dated October 9, 2002. It issued a
status quo order allowing Custodio to discharge her functions as school director and curriculum administrator because
it found that petitioners had already established a new school. However, petitioners still did not comply despite this
Order. Instead, they filed their September 1, 2003 Motion for Clarification, raising questions on Custodio's use of the
turned over money, Custodio's and Reynante's bonds as guaranty to the money's exclusive use as teachers' retirement
fund, and petitioners' liability in case of Custodio's misuse of this amount.
All these acts show petitioners' contumacious refusal to abide by the orders of the trial court. The trial court reiterated
the orders to turn over the amounts at least thrice. Petitioners' filing of numerous pleadings reveals their contumacious
refusal to comply and their abuse of court processes.
Petitioners argue that contempt proceedings are similar to criminal proceedings, and thus, there must be proof beyond
reasonable doubt of their guilt.
The punishment for contempt is classified into two (2): civil contempt and criminal contempt.
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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 2
Atty. Henedino M. Brondial – 2020 Syllabus
Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge "for the benefit of the other
party." A criminal contempt is committed when a party acts against the court's authority and dignity or commits a
forbidden act tending to disrespect the court or judge.
In People v. Godoy, the Court held that the real character of the proceedings is to be determined by the relief sought,
or the dominant purpose, and the proceedings are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment,
and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.
Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal or quasi-criminal actions. They are
punitive in nature, and the Government, the courts, and the people are interested in their prosecution. Their purpose is
to preserve the power and vindicate the authority and dignity of the court, and to punish for disobedience of its orders.
Strictly speaking, however, they are not criminal proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act
involved is also a crime. The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of
both a civil and criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings should
be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is
consistent with the summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern
criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the
protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly
construed. However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial rights
of the accused are preserved.
Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their nature; that is, they are proceedings for
the enforcement of some duty, and essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required. As otherwise
expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of a private party to an
action and to compel obedience to a judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is
one for civil contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly the disobedience, by one party to a suit, of
a special order made in behalf of the other party and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed, and the purpose of the
punishment is to aid in an enforcement of obedience. The rules of procedure governing criminal contempt
proceedings, or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings …
In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party, or his successor, or someone who
has a pecuniary interest in the right to be protected. In criminal contempt proceedings, it is generally held that the
State is the real prosecutor.
Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and the burden
is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In proceedings for civil contempt, there is no
presumption, although the burden of proof is on the complainant, and while the proof need not be beyond reasonable
doubt, it must amount to more than a mere preponderance of evidence. It has been said that the burden of proof in a
civil contempt proceeding lies somewhere between the criminal "reasonable doubt" burden and the civil "fair
preponderance" burden.
Civil contempt proceedings seek to compel the contemnor to obey acourt order, judgment, or decree which he or she
refuses to do for the benefit of another party. It is for the enforcement and the preservation of a right of a private party,
who is the real party in interest in the proceedings. The purpose of the contemnor's punishment is to compel obedience
103
to the order. Thus, civil contempt is not treated like a criminal proceeding and proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
necessary to prove it
In the case at bar, the dispositive portion of the Decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the respondents, namely: Bro.
Bernard Oca, Bro. Dennis Magbanua, Ms. Cirila N. Mojica, Mrs. Josefina Pascual, Al N. Mojica, Atty.
Silvestre Pascual and St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite, GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT
of Court against the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite for their failure to comply with the
Orders of the Court dated October 21, 2002 and March 24, 2003, and they are hereby ordered to pay a
FINE, jointly and severally, in the amount of Php30,000.00 for the restoration of the dignity of the Court
and to comply with the Orders of the Court dated October 21, 2002 and March 24, 2003 within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of this judgment.
While the nature of the punishment imposed is a mixture of both criminal and civil, the contempt proceeding in this
case is more civil than criminal.
The purpose of the filing and the nature of the contempt proceeding show that Custodio was seeking enforcement of
the trial court orders in the intra-corporate controversy because petitioners refused to comply. Hence, this is a civil
contempt case, which does not need proof beyond reasonable doubt. And This Court finds that it was sufficiently
proven that there was willful disobedience on the part of petitioners. Therefore, petitioners ought to be cited in
contempt.
However, this Court rules that the charges against Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre ought to be dismissed. In Ferrer v.
Rodriguez, this Court ruled that a non-litigant may be cited in contempt if he or she acted in conspiracy with the parties
in violating the court order.
However, there is no evidence of conspiracy in this case. The powerto punish contempt must be "exercised cautiously,
sparingly, and judiciously." Without evidence of conspiracy, it cannot be said that the non-litigants are guilty of
contempt.
This Court finds that there is no sufficient evidence of conspiracy to hold both Alejandro and Atty. Silvestre liable for
contempt.
Alejandro merely collected the matriculation fees as a designated cashier who worked in the Rural Bank of General
Trias, Inc. He neither exercised power over the money nor had the authority to order how it would be kept or disposed.
Moreover, it has been established that the matriculation fees had already been turned over to Reynante.
Atty. Silvestre was indeed a member of the Board of Trustees. However, decisions of the Board of Trustees are not
subject to the control of just one (1) person. While a board member may protest, the majority of the board may overrule
him or her. Thus, it is not correct to say that a board member is empowered to cause compliance of the trial court
orders. It does not matter if Atty. Silvestre was unable to prove his intention to comply with the orders. The burden of
proving contempt is upon complainants and there is no presumption of guilt in contempt proceedings such that the
party accused of contempt must prove that he is innocent.
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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 2
Atty. Henedino M. Brondial – 2020 Syllabus
OCA IPI No. 17 – 4663 – RTJ
Causing v. De la Rosa
March 7, 2018
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the administrative case against Judge Dela Rosa should be dismissed.
2.
Whether or not Atty. Causing was correctly held in contempt.
Caguioa, J.
FACTS: Atty. Berteni Causing and his client, Percival Mabasa charged Judge Jose Lorenzo R. Dela Rosa with gross
ignorance of the law, gross misconduct and gross incompetence for reversing the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 09268685-86 (Libel cases) entitled People v. Eleazar, et. al.
The Libel Cases were dismissed by former Acting Presiding Judge Gamor Disalo in an Order dated April 13, 2015 on
the ground that the right of the accused to speedy trial had been violated. An MR was filed by the prosecution before
RTC Br. 4 Manila, now presided by respondent Judge Dela Rosa, which he granted in the assailed Resolution dated
Nov. 23, 2015.
The Complainants questioned Judge Dela Rosa’s Nov. 23, 2015 Resolution granting the prosecution’s MR. They
alleged that it was elementary for Judge Dela Rosa to know that the prior dismissal of a criminal case due to a violation
of right to a speedy trial is equivalent to dismissal on the merits of the case. Thus, granting the MR is tantamount to
violation of right against double jeopardy.
The complainants also criticized Judge Dela Rosa’s act of referring to the IBP Atty. Causing’s posts on his Facebook
and blogspot account about the subject criminal cases. According to them, Judge Dela Rosa should have first required
Atty. Causing to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt for publicizing and taking his posts to social
media. Atty. Causing emphasized that the posts were presented using decent words. Thus, it was incorrect for Judge
Dela Rosa to refer his actions to a disciplinary body such as the IBP. Atty. Causing further asserted that he did not
violate the sub judice rule because this rule cannot be used to preserve the unfairness and errors of respondent Judge
Dela Rosa.
In a 1st Indorsement dated January 16, 2017, the OCA directed respondent Judge Dela Rosa to file his Comment
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
In his Comment dated March 13, 2017 (Comment), Judge Dela Rosa averred that he had already reversed the
November 23, 2015 Resolution as early as June 20, 2016 or way before the filing of the Complaint on January 6, 2017
— when he issued a Resolution of even date. Respondent Judge Dela Rosa explained in his Comment that he had
issued the November 23, 2015 Resolution because, after studying the records, he discovered that Complainants caused
much of the delay in the proceedings.
The OCA recommended in a Report and Recommendation that the administrative complaint against Judge Dela Rosa
be dismissed for lack of merit. The OCA also found that in the absence of proof that Judge Dela Rosa was ill-motivated
in issuing the Nov. 23, 2015 Order and that he had issued his June 20, 2016 Resolution reversing himself, the charge
of gross ignorance of the law should be dismissed.
Respondent Judge has already admitted that he made a mistake in issuing the said order as this would have
constituted a violation of the right of the accused against double jeopardy. To rectify his error, he granted the
motion for reconsideration filed by the accused.
104
HELD:
1.
Yes. In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby adopts and approves the findings of facts and conclusions
of law in the above-mentioned OCA Report and Recommendation.
Gross ignorance of the law is the disregard of basic rules and settled jurisprudence.40 A judge may also be
administratively liable if shown to have been motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption in ignoring,
contradicting or failing to apply settled law and jurisprudence.
The Court however has also ruled that "not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance of his official duties
renders him liable."
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the judge in the performance
of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be established that he was
moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or some other like motive. As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud,
dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though
such acts are erroneous.
The Court agrees with the OCA that it would be absurd to hold respondent Judge Dela Rosa liable for his November
23, 2015 Order when he had himself rectified this in his subsequent June 20, 2016 Order. To rule otherwise would be
to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the process of
administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. To hold otherwise "would be nothing short of harassing judges
to take the fantastic and impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments."
Furthermore, nothing in the records of the case suggests that respondent Judge Dela Rosa was motivated by bad faith,
fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in rendering his decision.
2.
The Court agrees with the OCA that respondent Judge Dela Rosa's act of referring the matter to the IBP, an
independent tribunal who exercises disciplinary powers over lawyers, was a prudent and proper action to
take for a trial court judge. The Court has explained, in the case of Lorenzo Shipping Corporation v.
Distribution Management Association of the Philippines, that judges' power to punish contempt must be
exercised judiciously and sparingly, not for retaliation or vindictiveness, viz.
x x x [T]he power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in order to
retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. As judges[,] we
ought to exercise our power to punish contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint,
and with the end in view of utilizing the power for the correction and preservation of the dignity
of the Court, not for retaliation or vindictiveness.
In fine, the administrative charge against respondent Judge Dela Rosa should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.
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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 2
Atty. Henedino M. Brondial – 2020 Syllabus
Spouses Bayani and Myrna Partoza v. Lilian Montano and Amelia Solomon
A.C. No. 111173
June 11, 2018
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: A civil action for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Real Estate Mortgage, Reconveyance of Transfer
Certificate and Damages was filed by the spouses Bayani and Myrna M. Partoza (spouses Partoza) against Lilia B.
Montano and Amelia T. Solomon. The case was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court. On November 25, 2010, a
Notice of Appeal[4] was filed by the counsel on record, Atty. Samson D. Villanueva (Atty. Villanueva). the CA
required the submission of the Appellant's Brief pursuant to Rule 44, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. On
April 27, 2011, however, Atty. Villanueva filed his Withdrawal of Appearance;[6] subsequently, a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Appellant's Brief[7] dated May 19, 2011, was also filed. Atty. Villanueva's Withdrawal
of Appearance carried the conformity of the appellant's attorney-in-fact, Honnie M. Partoza (Honnie) who, on the
same occasion, also acknowledged receipt of the entire records of the case from Atty. Villanueva.
Thereafter, respondent Atty. Claro Jordan M. Santamaria (respondent) submitted an Appellant's Brief[8] dated July 4,
2011.
In a Resolution[9] dated August 4, 2011, the CA directed Atty. Villanueva to submit proof of authority of Honnic to
represent appellants as their attorney-in-fact and the latter's conformity to Atty. Villanueva's Withdrawal of
Appearance. [Respondent] is directed to submit within five (5) days from notice his formal Entry of Appearance as
counsel for appellants and to secure and submit to this Court also within the same period the written conformity of his
clients to his appearance as their counsel. Likewise, said counsel is also directed to furnish this Court the assailed RTC
Decision that should have been appended to the Appellant's Brief also within the same period. Atty. Villanueva then
filed a Manifestation with Motion[10] dated August 31, 2011 explaining that he communicated with Ronnie and with
appellants as well, but was informed that appellants were residing abroad (in Germany at the time). He then requested
for a period of 15 days, or until September 15, 2011, to comply with the CA's Resolution.
On March 20, 2012, the CA issued a Resolution granting the Manifestation and Motion filed by Atty. Villanueva, and
ordered the latter to show cause, within 10 days from notice, why he should not be cited in contempt for his failure to
comply with the CA's Resolution of August 4, 2011; and why the Appellant's Brief filed by respondent should not be
expunged from the rollo of the case and the appeal dismissed for his failure to comply with the August 4, 2011
Resolution. All these directives by the CA were ignored by the respondent. Thus, in a Resolution[12] dated October
25, 2012, the CA cited respondent in contempt of court and imposed on him a fine of P5,000.00. In the same
Resolution, the CA once again directed respondent: (1) to comply with requirements of a valid substitution of counsel
and to file his formal Entry of Appearance within five days from notice; and (2) to show cause, within the same period,
why the Appellant's Brief filed should not be expunged from the rollo of the case and the appeal be dismissed for his
failure to comply with the Rules of Court.
Ultimately, in a Resolution dated April 11, 2013, the CA ordered the Appellant's Brief filed by respondent expunged
from the rollo and dismissed the appeal. More than that, the CA directed respondent to explain why he should not be
suspended from the practice of law for willful disobedience to the orders of the court. Respondent paid no heed to this
Resolution. So it was that the CA, in a Resolution[13] dated September 17, 2013, referred the unlawyerly acts of
respondent to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER
105
In his Answer[14] of November 13, 2013, respondent contended: (1) that the spouses Partoza sought his opinion
regarding their case and later on requested that he handle their appeal before the CA; (2) that he advised the spouses
Partoza to inform Atty. Villanueva of their decision to engage the services of a new counsel; (3) that he relied on the
Withdrawal of Appearance filed by Atty. Villanueva and then prepared the Appellant's Brief; (4) that he was not aware
of the authority of Honnie to represent spouses Panoza as well as of Honnie's conformity to the Withdrawal of
Appearance by Atty. Villanueva; (5) that he believed that he had no personality to represent the spouses Partoza in
the case, and to address the problems/compliances pertaining to appellant's appeal; and (6) that it was still Atty.
Villanueva who should have continued to represent the spouses Partoza. The Investigating Commissioner Michael G.
Fabunan (Investigating Commissioner) found respondent liable for willful disobedience to the lawful orders of the
CA and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for six months.
The act of respondent in not filing any of the compliances required of him in the 4 August 2011, 20 March 2012, 5
September 2012, and 25 October 2012 Resolutions of the [CA] despite due notice, emphasized his contempt and total
disregard of the legal proceedings, for which he should be held liable. Granting that he [was] not aware of the problem
between Atty. Villanueva and [Honnie], he could have explained this fact by complying with the court resolutions and
not just ignored them on the premise that he has no personality to represent the [spouses Partoza]. The compliances
required of the respondent by the [CA] are provided under the rules for a valid substitution of counsel and validity of
the appeal and may not be disregarded. The nonchalant attitude of the respondent cannot be left unsanctioned. Clearly,
his acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful orders of the [CA], which under Section 27. Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court is a sufficient case for suspension.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is lible for contempt.
HELD:
This Court adopts the findings of fact of, and the penalty recommended by, the IBP Board of Governors. This Court
explained the crucial role played by lawyers in the administration of justice in Salabao v. Villaruel, Jr.,viz.:
While it is true that lawyers owe 'entire devotion' to the cause of their clients, it cannot he emphasized
enough that their first and primary duty is not to the client but to the administration or justice. Canon 12
of the Code of Professional Responsibility slates that 'A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it
his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.' x x x This is a fundamental
principle in legal ethics and professional responsibility that has iterations in various forms.
Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration of justice, any act of a lawyer
that obstructs, perverts, or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action
against him. There is no dispute that respondent did not comply with five Resolutions of the CA. His actions were
definitely contumacious. By his repeated failure, refusal or inability to comply with the CA resolutions, respondent
displayed not only reprehensible conduct but showed an utter lack of respect for the CA and its orders. Respondent
ought to know that a resolution issued by the CA, or any court for that matter, is not mere request that may be complied
with partially or selectively. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court. In particular,
Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that it "is the duty of an attorney [t]o observe and maintain the
respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." In addition, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that "[a] lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes." Also, Canon 11 provides that a "lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others."
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REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 2
Atty. Henedino M. Brondial – 2020 Syllabus
This Court, in Anudon v. Cefra[19] citing Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar, held that a lawyer's obstinate refusal to comply
with the Court's orders not only betrayed a recalcitrant flaw in his character; it also underscored his disrespect towards
the Court's lawful orders which was only too deserving of reproof "Lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court
orders and processes, and this deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof may subject the lawyer
not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well."[21] In this case, respondent deliberately
ignored five CA Resolutions, thereby violating his duty to observe and maintain the respect due the courts. In one
case,[22] the Court suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for one year for having ignored twelve (12) CA
Resolutions. The Court found that the said lawyer's conduct gave the impression that he was above the duly constituted
judicial authorities of the land, and looked down on them with a patronizing and supercilious attitude. In this case, we
find the penalty of suspension for six (6) months, as recommended by the IBP, commensurate under the circumstances.
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
1.
2.
Venue v. Jurisdiction
Kinds of settlement
a.
Extrajudicial
i.
By Agreement
ii.
By self – adjudication
b.
i.
ii.
iii.
3.
a.
b.
c.
d.
4.
5.
6.
106
Judicial
Summary
By Petition
(1)
Intestate
(2)
Testate
By Partition
The Administrator or Executor
Special v. Regular
Bonds
Powers and Duties
Accountability
Claims Against the Estate
Actions by and against Executor and Adminstrator
Distribution and Partition
G.R. No. 133743
San Luis v. San Luis
February 6, 2007
Ynares – Santiago, J.
FACTS: The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis, a former governor of Laguna.
Felicisimo had three marriages. Felicisimo’s first marriage with Virginia Sulit and out of which, six children were
born named Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Felicisimo’s second
marriage was with Merry Lee Corwin and had a son named Tobias. However, a divorce was obtained for the second
marriage in 1973. Felicisimo’s third marriage was with Felicidad Sagalongos (now San Luis), of whom he had no
child with and lived together for 18 years up to Felicisimo’s death in December 18, 1992.
Felicidad sought the dissolution of conjugal assets and settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. She filed for petition for
letters of administration before the RTC of Makati. Felicidad alleged that she is a widow of Felicisimo; that at the
time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila;
that the surviving heirs of the decedent are Felicidad, the six children of 1st marriage and his son of 2nd marriage;
that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; and that the
decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
A motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue and failure to state cause of action was filed by Rodolfo San
Luis. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the province of Laguna
as this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that Felicidad has no legal personality
as she is only a mistress, since Felicisimo was still legally married to Merry Lee.
The trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration and held that the petition should have been filed in
Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City since Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and resident of Sta. Cruz,
Laguna at the time of his death.
Felicidad moved for reconsideration which was denied and appealed to the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the
orders of the trial court. The CA ordered that the records of the case be remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings. The CA also held that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term “place of residence” of
the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual, physical
habitation or actual residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. Although
Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the
petition for letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
ISSUE: Whether or not the venue is properly laid.
HELD:
Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo
should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case
of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as
contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
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application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.
In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is
required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate
of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes
of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and
"domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is
his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his
legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a
person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved
that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent
submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the
aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General
Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village
Association and Ayala Country Club, Inc., letter-envelopes from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him
at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling cards stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico,
Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on
December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati
City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City.
G.R. No. 189121
Garcia – Quiazon v. Belen
July 31, 2013
Perez, J.
FACTS: This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by
herein respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners
Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children.
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On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen
(Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. Elise
claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both
capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the
validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the
subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise,
among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as
her father.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children opposed the issuance
of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.The petitioners asserted that as shown by
his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant
to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been
filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City.
The RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. On appeal, the
decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not CA gravely erred in affirming that Eliseo was a resident of Las Pinas; and
2.
Whether CA overlooked that the fact that Elise has not shown any interest in the petition for letters of
administration
HELD:
1.
No. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of
a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted
in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood
in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or
place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil
actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in
the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode,
provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC
that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the
records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For
this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
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In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that
he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates
can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not
binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes,
deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent
with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous. That Eliseo went to the extent
of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent
the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports petitioners’
submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record. Factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding upon this
Court.
2.
No. Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not shown any
interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration. Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays
down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration. Upon the other hand,
Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested
person.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is
deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation
to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a
desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir,
who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party
within the purview of the law.
G.R. No. 177099
Agtarap v. Agtarap
June 8, 2011
Nachura, J.
FACTS: Joaquin Agtarap died intestate on November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without any known debts or obligations.
Joaquin contracted two marriages during his lifetime, with Lucia Garcia (Lucia) and with Caridad Garcia (Caridad)
respectively. Joaquin and Lucia, who died on April 24, 1924, had three children—Jesus (died without issue), Milagros,
and Jose (survived by three children, namely, Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa). Joaquin married Caridad on February 9,
1926 and also had three children—Eduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her daughter Cecile). At the time
of his death, Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City, covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and 874-(38255). Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, had been leasing and improving the
said realties and had been appropriating for himself P26, 000.00 per month since April 1994.
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Eduardo asked to be appointed administrator and was granted by the probate court, issuing him with letters of
administrator. Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots belong
to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia, and that, upon Lucia’s death in April 1924, they became the pro
indiviso owners of the subject properties. They said that their residence was built with the exclusive money of their
late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to the house were shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the
restaurant (Manong’s Restaurant) was built with the exclusive money of Joseph and his business partner.
Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order of Partition, holding that considering that the bulk of the estate properties were
acquired during the existence of the second marriage as shown by TCT No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) which
showed on its face that decedent was married to Caridad Garcia, which fact oppositors failed to contradict by evidence
other than their negative allegations, the greater part of the estate is perforce accounted by the second marriage and
the compulsory heirs thereunder. It also declared that the real estate properties belonged to the conjugal partnership
of Joaquin and Lucia. It also directed the modification of the October 23, 2000 Order of Partition to reflect the correct
sharing of the heirs. However, before the RTC could issue a new order of partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both
appealed to the CA. The CA settled, together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin, the estates of Lucia, Jesus,
Jose, Mercedes, Gloria, and Milagros. Moreover, the CA the estate of Milagros in the intestate proceedings despite
the fact that a proceeding was conducted in another court for the probate of the will of Milagros, bequeathing all to
Eduardo whatever shares that she would receive from Joaquin’s estate. CA also affirmed that the bulk of the realties
subject of this case belong to the first marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the certificates of title were
registered in the name of Joaquin Agtarap casado con ("married to") Caridad Garcia.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, is vested with the power and
authority to determine questions of ownership.
HELD:
Yes. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only to
matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this
rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or
one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could
do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to
be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general
jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion
in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final determination of ownership
in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends
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to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status
of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the instant case considering that the parties are all heirs of Joaquin and
that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the
determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is but collateral to the probate court’s jurisdiction to settle
the estate of Joaquin.
G.R. No. 183053
Suntay III v. Cojuangco – Suntay
October 10, 2012
Perez, J
FACTS: The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate. Cristina was survived by her spouse
Federico and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two
illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A.
Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents. Respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s estate
Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that:
1.
as the surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of the decedent’s estate;
2.
as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by the decedent, he must be accorded preference in the
administration thereof;
3.
Isabel and her siblings had been alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years;
4.
the enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son,
Emilio III and Nenita;
5.
even before the death of his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal properties, and thus, is better
situated to protect the integrity of the decedent’s estate;
6.
the probable value of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated;
7.
Isabel’s allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.
Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of administration on the ground that Isabel had no right
of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabel’s
parents’ marriage being declared null and void. Federico eventually died and Emilio III was appointed as administrator
of the decedent’s intestate estate. However, the appellate court reversed and set aside the ruling of the trial court and
appointed respondent as administratrix of the subject estate. The SC reversed and set aside the ruling of the CA and
appointed as joint administrator Isabel and Emilio I. Isabel now contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6,
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored
and that Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Emilio III, as an illegitimate child of the decedent’s son, is entitled to be an administrator of
the decedent’s estate?
HELD:
No. The Rules prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration, it categorically seeks out
the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an
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administrator. It should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the
surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of "next of kin," the reference
is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such
that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir.
The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an
interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests
necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of
administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate
of the one to be appointed as administrator.Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedent’s
legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of
the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court and
depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case.
G.R. No. 146006
Lee v. RTC of QC
February 23, 2004
Corona, J.
FACTS: Dr. Juvencio P. Ortañez incorporated the Philippine International Life Insurance Company, Inc. on July 6,
1956. At the time of the company’s incorporation, Dr. Ortañez owned ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital
stock. When Dr. Ortañez died, he left behind a wife (Juliana Salgado Ortañez), three legitimate children (Rafael, Jose
and Antonio Ortañez) and five illegitimate children by Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina OrtañezEnderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortañez). Rafael Ortañez filed before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate
of Dr. Ortañez but Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes and her siblings filed an opposition to the petition for letters of
administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed that the intestate court appoint a special administrator.
Judge Ernani Cruz Paño, then presiding judge of Branch 85, appointed Rafael and Jose Ortañez joint special
administrators of their father’s estate. Hearings continued for the appointment of a regular administrator. Special
administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez submitted an inventory of the estate of their father which included, among
other properties, 2,029 shares of stock in Philippine International Life Insurance Company.representing 50.725% of
the company’s outstanding capital stock.
The decedent’s wife, Juliana S. Ortañez, claiming that she owned 1,014 Philinterlife shares of stock as her conjugal
share in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase in favor of herein petitioner Filipino Loan Assistance
Group (FLAG) represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. Ortañez failed to repurchase the shares of
stock within the stipulated period, thus ownership thereof was consolidated. Special Administrator Jose Ortañez,
acting in his personal capacity and claiming that he owned the remaining 1,011 Philinterlife shares of stocks as his
inheritance share in the estate, sold said shares with right to repurchase also in favor of herein petitioner FLAG. After
one year, petitioner FLAG consolidated in its name the ownership of said shares.
It appears that several years before (during the pendency of the intestate proceedings), Juliana Ortañez and her two
children, Special Administrators Rafael and Jose Ortañez, entered into a memorandum of agreement for the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, partitioning the estate (including the Philinterlife shares
of stock) among themselves. Ma. Divina Ortañez–Enderes and her siblings filed a motion for appointment of special
administrator of Philinterlife shares of stock. The intestate court granted the motion appointed private respondent
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Enderes special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock. Enderes filed an urgent motion to declare void ab
initio the memorandum of agreement. She filed a motion to declare the partial nullity of the extrajudicial settlement
of the decedent’s estate. She also filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the deeds of sale of Philinterlife
shares of stock. All were opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortañez.
Jose Ortañez filed an omnibus motion for (1) the approval of the deeds of sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock and
(2) the release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes as special administratrix of the Philinterlife shares of stock on the
ground that there were no longer any shares of stock for her to administer. The intestate court denied the omnibus
motion of Special Administrator Jose Ortañez for the approval of the deeds of sale for the reason that:
A sale of a property of the estate without an Order of the probate court is void and passes no title to the
purchaser. Since the sales in question were entered into by Juliana S. Ortañez and Jose S. Ortañez in
their personal capacity without prior approval of the Court, the same is not binding upon the Estate.
The intestate court issued another order granting the motion of Special Administratrix Enderes for the annulment of
the March 4, 1982 memorandum of agreement or extrajudicial partition of estate. The court reasoned that:
In consonance with the Order of this Court denying the approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares of
stocks and release of Ma. Divina Ortañez-Enderes as Special Administratrix, the "Urgent Motion to
Declare Void Ab Initio Memorandum of Agreement" is hereby impliedly partially resolved insofar as
the transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife shares of stock are concerned.
Jose Ortañez filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which was denied, ruling that there was no legal
justification whatsoever for the extrajudicial partition of the estate by Jose Ortañez, his brother Rafael Ortañez and
mother Juliana Ortañez during the pendency of the settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortañez, without the requisite
approval of the intestate court, when it was clear that there were other heirs to the estate who stood to be prejudiced
thereby. Consequently, the sale made by Jose Ortañez and his mother Juliana Ortañez to FLAG of the shares of stock
they invalidly appropriated for themselves, without approval of the intestate court, was void.
Special Administrator Jose Ortañez filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was
denied. He elevated the case to the Supreme Court via petition for review under Rule 45 which the Supreme Court
dismissed on a technicality. The resolution of the Supreme Court dismissing the petition of Special Administrator Jose
Ortañez became final and was subsequently recorded in the book of entries of judgments.
Meanwhile, herein petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, with the rest of the FLAG-controlled board of directors,
increased the authorized capital stock of Philinterlife, diluting in the process the 50.725% controlling interest of the
decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortañez, in the insurance company. This became the subject of a separate action at the
Securities and Exchange Commission filed by private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes against petitioner
Jose Lee and other members of the FLAG-controlled board of Philinterlife. Thereafter, various cases were filed by
Jose Lee as president of Philinterlife and Juliana Ortañez and her sons against private respondent-Special
Administratrix Enderes in the SEC and civil courts. All were connected to the core dispute on the legality of the sale
of decedent Dr. Ortañez’s Philinterlife shares of stock to petitioner FLAG. Special Administratrix Enderes and her
siblings filed a motion for execution of the Orders of the intestate court because the orders of the intestate court
nullifying the sale had long became final. This was granted. However, in several occasions that the sheriff went to the
office of petitioners to execute the writ of execution, he was barred by the security guard upon petitioners’ instructions.
Enderes filed a motion to cite herein petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao in contempt. Petitioners Lee and Aggabao
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subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 59736. Petitioners
alleged that the intestate court gravely abused its discretion. This was dismissed by the CA.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not sale of property included in the inventory of the estate by some of the heirs made during the
pendency of the intestate proceeding without intestate court’s approval may be declared null and void.
2.
Whether or not the intestate or probate court can execute its order nullifying the invalid sale
HELD:
1.
Our jurisprudence is clear that (1) any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir
pending final adjudication requires court approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property
can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized
disposition.
We cannot allow petitioners to reopen the issue of nullity of the sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock in their favor
because this was already settled a long time ago by the Court of Appeals in its decision dated June 23, 1998 in CAG.R. SP No. 46342. This decision was effectively upheld by us in our resolution dismissing the petition for review on
a technicality and thereafter denying the motion for reconsideration on the ground that there was no compelling reason
to reconsider said denial. Our decision became final and was accordingly entered in the book of entry of judgments.
For all intents and purposes therefore, the nullity of the sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock made by Juliana Ortañez
and Jose Ortañez in favor of petitioner FLAG is already a closed case. To reopen said issue would set a bad precedent,
opening the door wide open for dissatisfied parties to relitigate unfavorable decisions no end. This is completely
inimical to the orderly and efficient administration of justice.
What we have here is a situation where some of the heirs of the decedent without securing court approval have
appropriated as their own personal property the properties of [the] Estate, to the exclusion and the extreme prejudice
of the other claimant/heirs. In other words, these heirs, without court approval, have distributed the asset of the estate
among themselves and proceeded to dispose the same to third parties even in the absence of an order of distribution
by the Estate Court. As admitted by petitioner’s counsel, there was absolutely no legal justification for this action by
the heirs. There being no legal justification, petitioner has no basis for demanding that public respondent [the intestate
court] approve the sale of the Philinterlife shares of the Estate by Juliana and Jose Ortañez in favor of the Filipino
Loan Assistance Group.
It is clear that Juliana Ortañez, and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed Ortañez, invalidly entered
into a memorandum of agreement extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among themselves, despite their
knowledge that there were other heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of the estate by the intestate
court. Since the appropriation of the estate properties by Juliana Ortañez and her children (Jose, Rafael and Antonio
Ortañez) was invalid, the subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party (FLAG), without court approval,
was likewise void.
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under Art. 533 of the Civil
Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption
from the moment of death of the decedent. However, an heir can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be
allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all
debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall have been given their shares. This means that an heir
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may only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any specific property therein. In the present case, Juliana
Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not
lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would
cause the other claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case.
Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez sold specific properties of the estate, without court approval. It is well-settled that
court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent’s estate. In the early case of Godoy vs.
Orellano, we laid down the rule that the sale of the property of the estate by an administrator without the order of the
probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser. We made in Estate of Olave vs. Reyes where we stated that
when the estate of the deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator
cannot enter into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate court. There is hardly any doubt
that the probate court can declare null and void the disposition of the property under administration, made by private
respondent, the same having been effected without authority from said court. It is the probate court that has the power
to authorize and/or approve the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null
and void for as long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated.
2.
Yes. The intestate court has the power to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale
of estate property, otherwise its power to annul the unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate property
would be meaningless. In other words, enforcement is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate court’s
power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to prevent the dissipation of estate property before
final adjudication.
On the contention that the probate court could not issue a writ of execution with regard to its order nullifying the sale
because said order was merely provisional, the argument is misplaced. There is no question, based on the facts of this
case, that the Philinterlife shares of stock were part of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortañez from the very start as in fact
these shares were included in the inventory of the properties of the estate submitted by Rafael Ortañez after he and his
brother, Jose Ortañez, were appointed special administrators by the intestate court.
The issue here is the effect of the sale made by the decedent’s heirs, Juliana Ortañez and Jose Ortañez, without the
required approval of the intestate court. This being so, the contention of petitioners that the determination of the
intestate court was merely provisional and should have been threshed out in a separate proceeding is incorrect.
G.R. No. 118671
Heirs of Hilario Ruiz v. Edmond Ruiz
January 29, 1996
Puno, J.
FACTS: On June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond
Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes and his three granddaughters, private
respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all daughters of Edmond Ruiz. The testator
bequeathed to them substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz as executor of his estate.
Hilario Ruiz died on April 12, 1988. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was distributed among
Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent’s will. For unknown reasons, Edmond Ruiz,
the executor, did not take any action for the probate of his father’s holographic will.
111
Four years after the testator’s death, on June 29, 1992, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed a petition
for probate before the RTC, and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. Edmond surprisingly opposed
the same on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence.
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate, the house and lot on No. 2 Oliva St., Valle Verde IV, Pasig,
which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, was leased out by Edmond
Ruiz to third persons. The court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the amount in rentals,
which Edmond did.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an Ex-Parte Motion
for Release of Funds. It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited and respondent Montes opposed the
motion. She thereafter filed a Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs and Motion for the Issuance of Certificate
of Allowance of Probate Will. She prayed for the release of the rentals to the three grandchildren, and for the
distribution of the testator’s properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in
accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.
The probate court denied petitioner’s motion for the release of funds but granted respondent Montes’ motion in view
of petitioner’s lack of opposition. The court ordered the release of rent payments to the decedent’s granddaughters and
delivery of the titles and possession of the properties bequeathed to them to Montes upon filing of the bond.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he filed his opposition but the court failed to consider. Petitioner
also reiterated his previous motion for release of funds. Petitioner then, through counsel, made a manifestation that he
was withdrawing his motion for the release of funds in view of the fact that the lease contract over the Valle Verde
property had been renewed for another year.
Despite the manifestation, the court ordered the release of funds to Edmond but only such amount that may be
necessary to cover administration and allowances for support of the testator’s three granddaughters. The court,
however, held in abeyance the release of titles to respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of
six months from the date of first publication of the notice to creditors.
Petitioner assailed this with the CA but the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the probate court’s decision. Hence,
petitioner filed the present petition. Petitioner alleges that Rule 83, Sec. 3 only gives the widow and the minor or
incapacitated children of the deceased the right to receive allowances for support during the settlement of the estate
proceedings and that the granddaughters are not qualified as they are not incapacitated nor minors.
ISSUES: Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate’s debts
and obligations, can grant: `
1.
An allowance from the funds of the estate to support the testator’s grandchildren
2.
The release of the titles to certain heirs
3.
Possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will
HELD:
1.
The court held in the negative. It is settled that allowances for support under Rule 83, Sec. 3 should not be
limited to the “minor or incapacitated” children of the deceased. The law is rooted on the fact that the right
and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.
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Grandchildren are still not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedent’s estate. The law clearly
limits the allowance to “widow and children” and does not extend the same to grandchildren, regardless of minority
or incapacity.
2.
The court held in the negative. An order releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance
distribution of the estate which is only allowed, under Rule 109, Sec. 2, when the court, in its discretion and
upon such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected
by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions
set forth in Rule 90.
Rule 90, Sec. 1 details these conditions:
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made:
(1)
(2)
after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and
estate tax have been paid; or
before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a
sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as
the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months after admitting the will
to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and settles only the question
of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may
be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
The intrinsic validity of Hilario’s holographic will has been controverted by the petitioner before the probate court
and the rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive
shares in the estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same in ordinary cases.
3.
The court ruled in the affirmative. The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and
management of real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised “so
long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration.
The court may therefore allow the possession of the properties under such conditions. Petitioner must be reminded
that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully
settled and partitioned. As executor, he is the mere trustee of the estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust
funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order. He cannot unilaterally assign to
himself and possess all his parents’ properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal
of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of
administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as
to their veracity, propriety and justness.
112
G.R. No. 149926
Unionbank v. Santibanez
February 23, 2000
Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS: On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim Santibañez entered into a
loan agreement in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of one (1) unit Ford 6600
Agricultural Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC,
the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations. On Dec. 1980, FCCC and Efraim entered into another
loan agreement for the payment of another unit of Ford 6600 and one unit of a Rotamotor. Again, Efraim and Edmund
executed a promissory note and a Continuing Guaranty Agreement for the later loan. In 1981, Efraim died, leaving a
holographic will. Testate proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City. Edmund was appointed as the special
administrator of the estate. During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister
Florence, executed a Joint Agreement, wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the
three (3) tractors: (2) tractors for Edmund and (1) for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their
late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them. In the meantime, a Deed of Assignment
with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between FCCC and Union Bank, wherein the FCCC assigned all
its assets and liabilities to Union Bank.
Demand letters were sent by Union Bank to Edmund, but the latter refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, Union
Bank filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the
RTC of Makati City. Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he
was in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his return to the Philippines.
Florence filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto.
Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it
was null and void; hence, she was not liable to Union Bank under the joint agreement.
Union Bank asserts that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate heirs (Edmund and Florence) as
provided in Article 774 of the Civil Code; and that the unconditional signing of the joint agreement estopped Florence,
and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document.
In her comment to the petition, Florence maintains that Union Bank is trying to recover a sum of money from the
deceased Efraim Santibañez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate court. She points out that at the
time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings. She asserts that even
if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have been subjected to the
approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court before which the
testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred
by the said decedent. The trial court also found that the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs, Edmund
and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said agreement
was void, considering that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid partition until
after the will has been probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was the now
defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities. The court also
agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedent’s account. Ruling that the joint agreement
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executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court held that the petitioner’s cause of action against respondent
Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the petitioner should have filed its claim
with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the
partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no valid partition may be had until after the will has been
probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors)
in generic terms when the deceased referred to them as "all other properties." Moreover, the active participation of
respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the claim of Union Bank should have been filed with the probate court before which the
testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was pending.
2.
Whether or not the agreement between Edmund and Florence (which was in effect, a partition of hte estate)
was void considering that it had not been approved by the probate court.
3.
Whether or not there can be a valid partition among the heirs before the will is probated.
HELD:
Well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the deceased, to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The
said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated.
In the present case, Efraim left a holographic will which contained the provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise,
shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of
Edmund and Florence, my children.
The above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might
have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included
therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not
valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid,
specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late
father’s holographic will covering the said tractors.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is binding.
We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto "have agreed to divide
between themselves and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the
indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit
Corp." The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall take
possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the partition,
and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition
being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption
of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
113
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent. The bank, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim
Santibañez, should have thus filed its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of
the Revised Rules of Court.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent’s estate in the probate court is mandatory. This requirement is for
the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator of the claims against
it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The
plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of
the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs.
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold Florence accountable for any liability incurred by her late
father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty agreement,
were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its
money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said
promissory notes and continuing guaranty.
G.R. No. 171206
Heirs of Maglasang v. MBC
September 23, 2013
Perlas – Bernabe, J.
FACTS: On June 16, 1975, spouses Flaviano and Salud Maglasang (Sps. Maglasang) obtained a credit line from
respondent in the amount of P350,000.00 which was secured by a real estate mortgage executed over seven of their
properties. They availed of their credit line by securing loans in the amounts of P209,790.50 and P139,805.83, both
of which becoming due and demandable within a period of one year. Further, the parties agreed that the said loans
would earn interest at 12% per annum and an additional 4% penalty would be charged upon default.
After Flaviano died intestate on February 14, 1977, his widow Salud and their surviving children, herein petitioners
Oscar (and other siblings all surnamed Maglasang) appointed, their brother petitioner Edgar as their attorney-in-fact.
Thus, Edgar fi led a verified petition for letters of administration of the intestate estate of Flaviano before the then
Court of First Instance of Leyte, Ormoc City. In view of the issuance of letters of administration, the probate court,
on August 30, 1977, issued a Notice to Creditors for the filing of money claims against Flaviano's estate. Accordingly,
as one of the creditors of Flaviano, respondent notified the probate court of its claim in the amount of P382,753.19 as
of October 11, 1978, exclusive of interests and charges. During the pendency of the intestate proceedings, Edgar and
Oscar were able to obtain several loans from respondent, secured by promissory notes which they signed. In an Order
dated December 14, 1978 (December 14, 1978 Order), the probate court terminated the proceedings with the surviving
heirs executing an extra-judicial partition of the properties of Flaviano's estate. The loan obligations owed by the estate
to respondent, however, remained unsatisfied due to respondent's certification that Flaviano's account was undergoing
a restructuring.
In this light, respondent proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage covering the Sps. Maglasang's properties
and emerged as the highest bidder. There, however, remained a deficiency, thus on June 24, 1981, respondent filed a
suit to recover the deficiency amount of P250,601.05 against the estate of Flaviano.
RTC (formerly, the probate court) rendered a Decision on April 6, 1987 directing the petitioners to pay respondent,
jointly and severally, the amount of P434,742.36 with interest at the rate of 12%per annum plus a 4% penalty charge.
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Dissatisfied, petitioners elevated the case to the CA on appeal, contending, inter alia, that the remedies available to
respondent are alternative and exclusive, such that the the election of one operates as a waiver or abandonment of the
others. Thus when respondent filed its claim against the estate of Flaviano in the proceedings before the probate court,
it effectively abandoned its right to foreclose on the mortgage.
During the pendency of the appeal, Flaviano's widow, Salud, passed away on July 25, 1997.
CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the RTC’s Decision. It pointed out that the probate court erred when it,
through the December 14, 1978 Order, closed and terminated the proceedings without first satisfying the claims of the
creditors of the estate. As a consequence, respondent was not able to collect from the petitioners and thereby was left
with the option of foreclosing the real estate mortgage. Further, the CA held that Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules does
not apply to the present case since the same does not involve a mortgage made by the administrator over any property
belonging to the estate of the decedent. According to the CA, what should apply is Act No. 3135 which entitles
respondent to claim the deficiency amount after the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage of Sps.
Maglasang's properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s award of the deficiency amount in favor of respondent?
HELD:
Yes. Claims against deceased persons should be filed during the settlement proceedings of their estate. Such
proceedings are primarily governed by special rules found under Rules 73 to 90 of the Rules, although rules governing
ordinary actions may, as far as practicable, apply suppletorily. Among these special rules, Section 7, Rule 86 of the
Rules (Section 7, Rule 86) provides the rule in dealing with secured claims against the estate:
SEC. 7.Mortgage debt due from estate. — A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by a
mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner
provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose
his mortgage or realize upon his security by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party
defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the
property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his
deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage
or other security alone, and foreclose the same at any time within the period of the statute of limitations,
and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of
the other assets of the estate.
As the foregoing generally speaks of "[a] creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by a mortgage or other
collateral security" as above-highlighted, it may be reasonably concluded that the aforementioned section covers all
secured claims, whether by mortgage or any other form of collateral, which a creditor may enforce against the estate
of the deceased debtor. On the contrary, nowhere from its language can it be fairly deducible that the said section
would — as the CA interpreted — narrowly apply only to mortgages made by the administrator over any property
belonging to the estate of the decedent. To note, mortgages of estate property executed by the administrator, are also
governed by Rule 89 of the Rules, captioned as "Sales, Mortgages, and Other Encumbrances of Property of Decedent."
It only stated that the aforesaid section equally applies to cases where the administrator mortgages the property of the
estate to secure the loan he obtained. The pronouncement was a ruling of inclusion and not one which created a
distinction.
114
Jurisprudence breaks down the rule under Section 7, Rule 86 and explains that the secured creditor has three
remedies/options that he may alternatively adopt for the satisfaction of his indebtedness. In particular, he may choose
to: (a) waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (b) foreclose
the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (c) rely on the mortgage exclusively, or
other security and foreclose the same before it is barred by prescription, without the right to le a claim for any
deficiency. It must, however, be emphasized that these remedies are distinct, independent and mutually exclusive from
each other; thus, the election of one effectively bars the exercise of the others.
In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially forclose the mortgage of the properties previously belonging to Sps.
Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore availed of the third option. Lest it be misunderstood, it dod not
exercise the first option of directly filing a claim against the estate, as petitioners assert, since it merely notified the
probate court of the outstanding amount of its claim against the estate of Flaviano and that it was currently restructuring
the account. Thus, having unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-judicial foreclosure under Section
7, Rule 86, respondent is now precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed.
G.R. No. 150175
Pilapil v. Heris of M. Briones
March 10, 2006
Chico – Nazario, J.
FACTS: Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children. When Maximino died,
Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her husband’s estate. Donata was appointed as the administratrix of
Maximino’s estate, and subsequently CFI issued an Order awarding ownership of the real properties to Donata.
Donata died. Erlinda, one of Donata’s nieces, instituted with the RTC a petition for the administration of the intestate
estate of Donata. Erlinda and her husband, Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as administrators of Donata’s
intestate estate. The other heirs of Donata opposed Erlinda’s claim.This Court, however, was no longer informed of
the subsequent development in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Donata; and as far as this Petition is concerned,
all the heirs of Donata, including Erlinda, appear to be on the same side.
Silverio Briones, nephew of Maximino, filed a Petition with the RTC for Letters of Administration for the intestate
estate of Maximino, which was initially granted by the RTC. The RTC also issued an Order, allowing Silverio to
collect rentals from Maximino’s properties.
Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set Aside the Order, claiming that the said properties were already under his
and his wife’s administration as part of the intestate estate of Donata. Silverio’s Letters of Administration for the
intestate estate of Maximino was subsequently set aside by the RTC.
Heirs of Maximino then filed a Complaint with the RTC. They alleged that Donata had fraudulently excluded them
from the intestate proceedings of the estate of Maximino before the CFI. They particularly stated two grounds. First,
that they were not given notice of the institution of Special Proceedings No. 928-R and the scheduled hearings therein.
Second, that they lived along the same street as Donata and, yet, Donata failed to inform them of the CFI Order and
the issuance of new TCTs in her name covering the real properties which belonged to the estate of Maximino.
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RTC decided in favor of the heirs of Maximino. RTC declared that the heirs of Maximino were entitled to ½ of the
real. It also ordered Erlinda to reconvey to the heirs of Maximino the said properties and to render an accounting of
the fruits thereof. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Donata committed fraud in the settlement of estate of Maximino
HELD:
NO. While it is granted that the heirs of Maximino had rights to his intestate estate upon his death by virtue of Articles
995 and 1005 of the New Civil Code, the Order of CFI declaring Donata as the sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of
Maximino is also valid.
The heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Donata managed, through fraud, to have
the real properties, belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her name. There was no evidence
showing that the CFI actually failed to send notices of Special Proceedings No. 928-R to the heirs of Maximino or
that it did not require presentation of proof of service of such notices. It should be remembered that there stands a
presumption that the CFI Judge had regularly performed his duties in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, which included
sending out of notices and requiring the presentation of proof of service of such notices; and, the heirs of Maximino
did not propound sufficient evidence to debunk such presumption. They only made a general denial of knowledge of
Special Proceedings No. 928-R, at least until 1985.
Also, since Maximino’s siblings only lived nearby, they had ample opportunity to discuss with Donata the status of
the estate of their deceased brother. After Donata’s death, Erlinda took possession of the real properties, and continued
to manage the same and collect the rental fees thereon. Donata and, subsequently, Erlinda, were so obviously
exercising rights of ownership over the real properties, in exclusion of all others, which must have already put the
heirs of Maximino on guard if they truly believed that they still had rights thereto.
The heirs of Maximino knew he died and even attended his wake. They did not offer any explanation as to why they
had waited 33 years from Maximino’s death before one of them, Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
for the intestate estate of Maximino. The heirs of Maximino put off acting on their rights to the estate of Maximino
for so long that when they finally did, attributing fraud to Maximino’s wife, Donata, the latter had already passed
away, on 1 November 1977, and was no longer around to explain and defend herself. The delay of the heirs of
Maximino is not without consequence.
A.M. No. P – 01 – 1448
Sabidong v. Solas
June 25, 2013
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS: Trinidad Sabidong, complainant’s mother, is one of the longtime occupants of a parcel of land, designated
as Lot 11 originally registered in the name of C. N. Hodges and situated at Barangay San Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo City.
The Sabidongs are in possession of one-half portion of Lot 11 of the said Estate (Hodges Estate), as Priscila Saplagio
occupied the other half-portion. Lot 11 was the subject of an ejectment suit filed by the Hodges Estate. On May 31,
1983, a decision was rendered in said case ordering the defendant to immediately vacate the portion of Lot 11 leased
to her and to pay the plaintiff rentals due, attorney’s fees, expenses and costs. At the time, respondent was the Clerk
of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City.
115
Sometime in October 1984, respondent submitted an Offer to Purchase on installment Lots 11 and 12. The
Administratrix of the Hodges Estate rejected respondent’s offer in view of an application to purchase already filed by
the actual occupant of Lot 12, "in line with the policy of the Probate Court to give priority to the actual occupants in
awarding approval of Offers". While the check for initial down payment tendered by respondent was returned to him,
he was nevertheless informed that he may file an offer to purchase Lot 11 and that if he could put up a sufficient down
payment, the Estate could immediately endorse it for approval of the Probate Court so that the property can be awarded
to him "should the occupant fail to avail of the priority given to them."
The following day respondent again submitted an Offer to Purchase Lot 11 with an area of 234 square meters for the
amount of ₱35,100. Under the Order issued by the probate court, respondent’s Offer to Purchase Lot 11 was approved
upon the court’s observation that the occupants of the subject lots "have not manifested their desire to purchase the
lots they are occupying up to this date and considering time restraint and considering further, that the sales in favor of
the x x x offerors are most beneficial to the estate x x x". On January 21, 1987, the probate court issued another Order
granting respondent’s motion for issuance of a writ of possession in his favor.
A Deed of Sale With Mortgage covering Lot 11 was executed between respondent and the Hodges Estate represented
by its Administratrix.
On June 14, 1999, this Court received the sworn letter-complaint asserting that as court employee respondent cannot
buy property in litigation (consequently he is not a buyer in good faith), commit deception, dishonesty, oppression
and grave abuse of authority.
On November 29, 2000, Court Administrator Benipayo issued an Evaluation and Recommendation finding respondent
guilty of violating Article 1491 of the Civil Code. Said rule prohibits the purchase by certain court officers of property
and rights in litigation within their jurisdiction. Respondent maintained that his purchase of the subject land is not
covered by the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code. He pointed out that he bought Lot 11-A a
decade after the MTCC of Iloilo, Branch 3, had ordered the ejectment of Priscila Saplagio and Trinidad Sabidong
from the subject lot. He insisted that public trust was observed when complainant was accorded his right of first refusal
in the purchase of Lot 11-A, albeit the latter failed to avail said right. Asserting that he is a buyer in good faith and for
value, respondent cited the dismissal of the cases for Estafa and annulment of title and damages which complainant
filed against him.
On September 10, 2007, respondent compulsorily retired from service. Prior to this, he wrote then Senior Deputy
Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño, requesting for the release of his retirement benefits pending resolution of
the administrative cases against him.
On June 2, 2008, Judge Patricio submitted his final Report and Recommendation finding respondent liable for grave
misconduct and dishonesty under A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC or the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent Solas violated the rule on disqualification to purchase property in litigation?
HELD:
NO. Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such as clerks of court from acquiring property
involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of their courts. Said provision reads:
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Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in person
or through the mediation of another:
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective
functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part
by virtue of their profession.
The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary
relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons. "In
so providing, the Code tends to prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not to give occasion for fraud, which is what
can and must be done."
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the property must take place during the pendency of the litigation
involving the property. Where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706
which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be that as it may, it can not be said that the property
is no longer "in litigation" at that time considering that it was part of the Hodges Estate then under settlement
proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment
that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. A property forming part of the estate under judicial settlement
continues to be subject of litigation until the probate court issues an order declaring the estate proceedings closed and
terminated. The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate
proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive
the same. Since there is no evidence to show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 27, had already
been closed and terminated at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated November 21, 1994,
Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in litigation" subject to the operation of Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor of respondent did not violate the rule on disqualification
to purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then pending before another court (RTC) and not MTCC where
he was Clerk of Court.
(Note: On the charges against the respondent, we find him liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct. Respondent
deceived complainant’s family who were led to believe that he is the legal representative of the Hodges Estate, or at
least possessed of such power to intercede for overstaying occupants of the estate’s properties like complainant.
Boasting of his position as a court officer, a City Sheriff at that, complainant’s family completely relied on his repeated
assurance that they will not be ejected from the premises. Upon learning that the lot they were occupying was for sale
and that they had to negotiate for it through respondent, complainant’s family readily gave the amounts he demanded
and, along with Saplagio, complied with the requirements for a loan application with PAG-IBIG. All the while and
unknown to complainant’s family, respondent was actually working to acquire Lot 11 for himself)
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G.R. No. 156407
Aranas v. Mercado
January 15, 2014
Bersamin, J.
FACTS: Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife, Teresita
and their five children, namely: Allan, Felimon, Carmencitaa, Richard, and Maria Teresita; and his two children by
his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty and
Cebu Emerson.He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real
property in Badian, Cebu to Mervir Realty.
On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the RTC in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator
of Emigdio's estate. The RTC granted the petition considering that there was no opposition. The letters of
administration in favor of Teresita were issued on September 7, 1992. As the administrator, Teresita submitted an
inventory of the estate of Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated
in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal properties" worth
P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry
valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu
Emerson worth P22,708.25.
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the
RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma's motion
through the order of January 8, 1993. On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8,
1993, supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of
stock; the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real properties with the market
value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of P4,440,700.00;
and the certificate of stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.
On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present evidence and for Teresita
to be examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory. On April 19, 1993, Thelma
opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the inventory.
With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties should
be included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on that issue.
RTC RULING: After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order
finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included.
Aggrieved by the decision, Teresita filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the excluded properties are
already in the possession and ownership of Mervir Realty.
CA RULING: The RTC, as an intestate court, also had no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of
title to property registered in the name of third persons or corporation; that a property covered by the Torrens system
should be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by disregarding the presumption, had
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transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on the matter; and that the RTC also
gravely abused its discretion in holding that Teresita, et al. were estopped from questioning its jurisdiction because of
their agreement to submit to the RTC the issue of which properties should be included in the inventory.
ISSUE: Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such
properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the
decedent during his lifetime?
HELD:
No. Under Section 6 (a),Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the discretion
of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon
issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation
and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the
duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of administration.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court
cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title
adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the
trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised.|
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate court, relates only to
matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this
rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or
one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could
do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to
be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general
jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion
in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a
separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends
to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status
of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
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G.R. No. 208828 – 29
Silverio Sr. v. Silverio Jr.
August 13, 2014
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS: The case involved the settlement of the estate of Beatriz Silverio. The decedent was married to Ricardo
Silverio, Sr. and had four children named Ricardo Silverio, Jr. , Edgardo, Ligaya and Nelia Silverio-Dee. The
administrator first appointed by the Court was Edgardo but by virtue of a Joint Manifestation filed by the heirs of
Beatriz Silverio, the motion to withdraw as administrator was filed by Edgardo was approved by the intestate court.
In Edgardo’s stead, Silverio Sr. was appointed as new administrator. In an Order dated January 3, 2005, Silverio Sr.
was removed as administrator and Silverio, Jr. was designated as new administrator.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Silverio Sr. and Nelia Silverio-Dee. On May 31, 2005, the intestate court
issued an Omnibus Order affirming the January 3, 2005 Order. The intestate court also granted the motion of Silverio
Jr. to take his oath as administrator effective upon receipt of the order and expunged the inventory report filed by
Silverio Sr.
On December 12, 2005, the intestate court recalled the Order granting letters of administration to Silverio Jr. and
reinstated Silverio Sr. The intestate court, acting on the motion for partial reconsideration filed by Silverio, Jr.,
upholding the grant of Letters of Administration to Silverio Jr. and removed Silverio Sr., for gross violation of his
duties and functions.
Silverio Sr. moved for reconsideration, whereas, Silverio-Dee filed for Petition for Certiorari before the CA.
On August 28, 2008, the CA rendered a decision reinstating Silverio Sr. as administrator. The decision stated:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The portions of the Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of
administration to and the taking of an oath of administration by Ricardo Silverio, Jr., as well as the removal of Ricardo
Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of Beatriz Silverio, are declared NULL and VOID. The writ of preliminary
injunction earlier issued is MADE PERMANENT in regard to the said portions. Respondent RTC is ORDERED to
reinstate Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of Beatriz Silverio. Costs against the Private Respondents.
SO ORDERED."
The intestate court in its Omnibus Order dated 31 October 2006, ordered among others, the sale of certain properties
belonging to the estate. The portion of the order which is pertinent to the present petition reads:
"WHEREFORE, above premises considered, this Court for the foregoing reasons resolves to grant the following:
(1)
xxx
(2)
xxx
(3)
Allowing the sale of the properties located at (1) No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City,
covered by T.C.T. No. 137155 issued by Register of Deeds of Makati City; (2) No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes
Park, Makati City covered by T.C.T. No. 4137154 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City; and (3)
No. 19 Taurus St., Bel-Air Subd. Makati City covered by TCT No. 137156 issued by the Register of Deeds
of Makati City to partially settle the intestate estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio, and authorizing the
Administrator to undertake the proper procedure or transferring the titles involved to the name of the estate;
and
(4)
To apply the proceeds of the sale mentioned in Number 3 above to the payment of taxes, interests, penalties
and other charges, if any, and to distribute the residue among the heirs Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., Ricardo S.
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Silverio, Jr., Ligaya S. Silverio represented by Legal Guardian Nestor S. Dela Merced II, Edmundo S.
Silverio and Nelia S. SilverioDee in accordance with the law on intestacy.
SO ORDERED."
Silverio, Jr., by virtue of the Omnibus Order executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of CITRINE over the property
in No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati. Another Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of Monica Ocampo
over the property in No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati and which Ocampo subsequently sold to ZEE2
Resources, Inc.
Silverio-Dee filed a petition for certiorari and with prayer for injunctive relief to declare the sales in favor of CITRINE
and Monica Ocampo as void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the intestate court cannot annul the sales as it has a limited jurisdiction and does not include
resolving issues of ownership.
HELD:
No. There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare null and void the disposition of the property under
administration, made by private respondent, the same having been effected without authority from said court. It is the
probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is
said court that can declare it null and void for as long as the proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold
petitioner’s contention that the probate court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render meaningless the power
pertaining to the said court. (Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any
disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court approval
and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no need for
a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed by respondent Silverio, Jr. with prior approval of the
intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31, 2006. Subsequently, however, the sale was annulled by the
said court on motion by petitioner.
In reversing the intestate court’s order annulling the sale of the subject properties, the CA noted that said ruling is
anchored on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed at the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still in effect. It then concluded that the eventual decision in the latter case
making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent only with respect to the appointment of petitioner as
administrator and not to the grant of authority to sell mooted the issue of whether the sale was executed at the time
when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction were in effect.
The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate [sic] court in so far as it authorizes the sale of the three properties
in question was not declared by the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division as null and void. It is axiomatic that it is the
dispositive portion of the decision that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those
rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations.
From all the foregoing, We declare that it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the intestate court when it
ordered the sale of the Cambridge Property and Intsia Property as NULL and VOID citing as justification the decision
118
of the Court of Appeals, Seventh Division in CAG.R. SP No. 97196. To reiterate, the injunction order which was
made permanent by the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) was declared to be limited only to the portion of the
Omnibus Order that upheld the grant of letters of administration by SILVERIO, JR. and the removal of SILVERIO,
SR. as administrator and nothing else.
G.R. No. 187524
Butiong v. Plazo
August 5, 2015
Peralta, J.
FACTS: Pedro L. Riñoza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with his first wife, respondents
Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as well as several properties including a resort covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title (TCT) No. 51354 and No. 51355, each with an area of 351 square meters, and a family home, the land on
which it stands is covered by TCT Nos. 40807 and 40808, both located in Nasugbu, Batangas.
In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession, respondents
alleged that sometime in March 1991, they discovered that their co-heirs, Pedro's second wife, Benita Tenorio and
other children, had sold the subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria and Maria Butiong, who are
now deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria, without their knowledge and consent.
When confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the same, showing respondents a document she believed
evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which, however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a previous loan
obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.
Upon inquiry, the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no record of any transaction
involving the subject properties, giving them certified true copies of the titles to the same. When respondents went to
the subject properties, they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the resort had been demolished. They were not,
however, able to enter as the premises were padlocked.
Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late
father was published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, they caused the annotation of their adverse claims over
the subject properties before the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among others, for
the annulment of all documents conveying the subject properties to the petitioners and certificates of title issued
pursuant thereto.
In their Answer, petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack of personal knowledge and
good faith in acquiring the subject properties. In the course of his testimony during trial, petitioner Francisco further
contended that what they purchased was only the resort. He also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which provides, among others, that respondents' co-heirs
sold the family home to the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for P1 million as well as a Deed of Sale whereby
Benita sold the resort to petitioners for P650,000.00.
On October 1, 2001, the trial court ruled in favor of respondents and thus, nullified the transfer of the subject properties
to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the documents of conveyance offered by petitioners as well
as the circumstances surrounding the execution of the same. Specifically, the Extra-Judicial Settlement was notarized
by a notary public who was not duly commissioned as such on the date it was executed.
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The CA affirmed the trial court's Judgment
On appeal, The Supreme Court denied on June 20, 2007, petitioner's Petition for Review on Certiorari for submitting
a verification of the petition, a certificate of non-forum shopping and an affidavit of service that failed to comply with
the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice regarding competent evidence of affiant's identities. MR was also denied.
Unsatisfied, petitioner wrote a letter dated March 24, 2008 addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno praying
that a decision on the case be rendered based on the .merits and not on formal requirements "as he stands to lose
everything his parents had left him just because the verification against non-forum shopping is formally defective."
However, in view of the Entry of Judgment having been made on October 31, 2007, the Court likewise noted said
letter without action
On November 27, 2008, The RTC issued an Order, issuing a Partial Writ of Execution of its October 1, 2001 Decision
with respect to the portions disposing of petitioner's claims as affirmed by the CA.
The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed, on February 11, 2009, a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and
Order before the CA assailing the October 1, 2001 Decision as well as the November 27, 2008 Order of the RTC on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents was captioned as "Judicial Partition with Annulment
of Title and Recovery of Possession," the allegations therein show that the cause of action is actually one for settlement
of estate of decedent Pedro. Considering that settlement of estate is a special proceeding cognizable by a probate court
of limited jurisdiction while judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession are ordinary civil
actions cognizable by a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining the latter
while it was sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction. This is in view of the prohibition found in the Rules on the
joinder of special civil actions and ordinary civil actions. Thus, petitioner argued that the ruling of the trial court is
void and has no effect for having been rendered in without jurisdiction.
Petitioner maintains that since respondents' complaint alleged the following causes of action, the same is actually one
for settlement of estate and not of judicial partition
ISSUE: Whether the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction
HELD:
No. Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents' causes of action pertaining to the properties left behind
by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their interests thereon, may fall under an action
for settlement of estate. However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature
of the suit, the allegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the action is clearly one for judicial partition with
annulment of title and recovery of possession.
RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estate
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no will and no
debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives
119
duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register
of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one
heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of the
register of deeds. The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by
stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself
by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to the filing of the
public instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register
of deeds, a bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal
property involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the payment
of any just claim that may be filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left
no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two (2) years after the death of
the decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in
the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person
who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A person having the right to compel the partition of real
estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate
description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other persons interested in
the property.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the allegations of respondents in their complaint are but customary,
in fact, mandatory, to a complaint for partition of real estate. Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro died
intestate; (2) that respondents, together with their co-heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is
represented by a judicial representative duly authorized for the purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the only
known heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an account and description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that Pedro's
estate has no known indebtedness; and (6) that respondents, as rightful heirs to the decedent's estate, pray for the
partition of the same in accordance with the laws of intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that based on the allegations of the
complaint, the case is one for judicial partition. That the complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs of the
decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights thereto, does not perforce make it an action for settlement of estate.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in
his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or. fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules
of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified
administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. An exception to this rule, however,
is found in the aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 74 wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no debts due
from his estate, may divide the estate either extrajudicially or in an ordinary action for partition without submitting
the same for judicial administration nor applying for the appointment of an administrator by the court.30 The reason
is that where the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an
administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are
immediately entitled.
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In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving
his estate without any pending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner'.s contention, respondents were under no legal
obligation to submit me subject properties of the estate to a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and
are, in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or extra-judicially.
Thus, respondents committed no error in filing an action for judicial partition instead of a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate as the same is expressly permitted by law. That the complaint contained allegations inherent in an
action for settlement of estate does not mean that there was a prohibited joinder of causes of action for questions as to
the estate's properties as well as a determination of the heirs, their status as such, and the nature and extent of their
titles to the estate, may also be properly ventilated in partition proceedings alone. In fact, a complete inventory of the
estate may likewise be done during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts. Indeed, where
the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then they may not be compelled to submit to
administration proceedings, dispensing of the risks of delay and of the properties being dissipated.
Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint al$o prayed for the annulment of title and recovery of possession does
not strip the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. Asking for the annulment of certain transfers
of property could very well be achieved in an action for partition,37 as can be seen in cases where courts determine
the parties' rights arising from complaints asking not only for the partition of estates but also for the annulment of
titles and recovery of ownership and possession of property.38 In fact, in Bagayas v. Bagayas,39 wherein a complaint
for annulment of sale and partition was dismissed by the trial court due to the impropriety of an action for annulment
as it constituted a collateral attack on the certificates of title of the respondents therein, this Court found the dismissal
to be improper in the following manner:
In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action for partition premised on the existence or nonexistence of co-ownership between the parties, the Court categorically pronounced that a resolution on
the issue of ownership does not subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties to a collateral
attack. It must be borne in mind that what cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and
not the title itself. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title itself.
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In
contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not, represented by that
document.
Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the settlement of the issue of ownership. In fact, the determination as
to the existence of the same is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition, as held in Municipality of Biñan
v. Garcia:
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not
a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition is proper. This phase may end with a declaration that
plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is
legally prohibited. It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth
exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant
from the real estate in question is in order.
The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the
court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by
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the [cjourt after the- parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the
party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question,
An action for partition, therefore, is premised on the existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the parties.
Unless and until the issue of co-ownership is definitively resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of an
estate.
In view of the foregoing, petitioner's argument that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in entertaining -the action
of settlement of estate and annulment of title in a single proceeding is clearly erroneous for the instant complaint is
precisely one for judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession, filed within the confines of
applicable law and jurisprudence. Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691), amending Batas Pambansa
Big. 129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since the action herein was not merely for partition and recovery of
ownership but also for annulment of title and documents, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus
cognizable by the RTC. Hence, considering that the trial court clearly had jurisdiction in rendering its decision, the
instant petition for annulment of judgment must necessarily fail.
Note that even if the instant action was one for annulment of title alone, without the prayer for judicial partition, the
requirement of instituting a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status and rights of the respondents
as putative heirs may be dispensed with, in light of the fact that the parties had voluntarily submitted the issue to the
trial court and had already presented evidence regarding the issue of heirship.
ESCHEATS
1.
2.
3.
Definition
Historical Bacground and Legal Basis
Actions for Revisions
G.R. No. 138953
Alvarico v. Sola
June 6, 2002
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Fermina A. Lopez, a widow, was an awardee of Lots Nos. 4, 5, 3-B, 3-C and 6-B, Sgs-3451 and being the
winning bidder at the auction sale of these parcels by the Bureau of Lands. On May 28, 1983, Fermina executed a
Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights over Lot 5 in favor of Amelita, who agreed to assume all the
obligations, duties, and conditions imposed upon Fermina under MSA Application No. V-81066. The document of
transfer was filed with the Bureau of Lands.
The Bureau of Lands issued an order approving the transfer of rights and granting the amendment of the application
from Fermina to Amelita. Consequently, an OCT was issued in the name of Amelita and her husband.
On June 24, 1993, herein petitioner filed Civil Case No. CEB-1419110 for reconveyance against Amelita. He claimed
that on January 4, 1984, Fermina donated the land to him and immediately thereafter, he took possession of the same.
He averred that the donation to him had the effect of withdrawing the earlier transfer to Amelita.
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For her part, Amelita maintained that the donation to petitioner is void because Fermina was no longer the owner of
the property when it was allegedly donated to petitioner, the property having been transferred earlier to her. She added
that the donation was void because of lack of approval from the Bureau of Lands, and that she had validly acquired
the land as Fermina's rightful heir. She also denied that she is a trustee of the land for petitioner. After trial, the RTC
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. On appeal, RTC decision was reversed.
ISSUE: Whether or not a person imputing bad faith on the transfer of land patents may assail the validity of an OCT
subsequently issued to the transferee of the land patents.
HELD:
No. This allegation of bad faith on the part of Amelita Sola in acquiring the title is devoid of evidentiary support. For
one, the execution of public documents, as in the case of Affidavits of Adjudication, is entitled to the presumption of
regularity, hence convincing evidence is required to assail and controvert them. Second, it is undisputed that OCT No.
3439 was issued in 1989 in the name of Amelita. It requires more than petitioner's bare allegation to defeat the Original
Certificate of Title which on its face enjoys the legal presumption of regularity of issuance. A Torrens title, once
registered, serves as notice to the whole world. All persons must take notice and no one can plead ignorance of its
registration.
Even assuming that respondent Amelita Sola acquired title to the disputed property in bad faith, only the State can
institute reversion proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act, to wit: All actions for reversion to the
Government of lands of the public domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the
officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
In other words, a private individual may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the effect
of canceling a free patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis thereof, such that the land
covered thereby will again form part of the public domain. Only the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead
may do so. Since Amelita Sola's title originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between
the grantor and the grantee. Clearly then, petitioner has no standing at all to question the validity of Amelita's title. It
follows that he cannot "recover" the property because, to begin with, he has not shown that he is the rightful owner
thereof.
G.R. No. 172720
Maltos v. Heirs of Eusebio Borromeo
September 14, 2005
Leonen, J.
FACTS: Eusebio Borromeo was issued a Free Patent over a piece of agricultural land. Well within the five-year
prohibitory period, Eusebio Borromeo sold the land to Eliseo Maltos. Eusebio Borromeo died on January 16, 1991.
His heirs claimed that prior to his death, he allegedly told his wife, Norberta Borromeo, and his children to nullify the
sale made to Eliseo Maltos and have the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-5477 cancelled because the sale was within
the five-year prohibitory period. Norberta Borromeo and her children (heirs of Borromeo) filed a Complaint for Nullity
of Title and Reconveyance of Title against Eliseo Maltos, Rosita Maltos, and the Register of Deeds.
Eliseo Maltos and Rosita Maltos (Maltos Spouses) filed their Answer, arguing that the sale was made in good faith
and that in purchasing the property, they relied on Eusebio Borromeo’s title.
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ISSUE: Whether or not an individual can, in his private capacity, institute reversion proceedings?
HELD:
No. The purpose of reversion is “to restore public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or
corporations to the mass of public domain.” The general rule is that reversion of lands to the state is not automatic,
and the Office of the Solicitor General is the proper party to file an action for reversion. Since an action for reversion
presupposes that the property in dispute is owned by the state, it is proper that the action be filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, being the real party- in-interest. Reversion is a remedy provided under Section 101 of the Public
Land Act: SECTION 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor-General or the officer acting in his stead, in the proper courts,
in the name of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
In this case, a free patent over the subject parcel of land was issued to Eusebio Borromeo. This shows that he already
had title to the property when he sold it to petitioner Eliseo Maltos. Since only the State can institute reversion
proceedings under Sec. 101 of the Public Land Act and since reversion was not instituted by the Solicitor-General or
the officer acting in his stead, reversion is not proper in the case at bar.
GUARDIANS AND GUARDIANSHIP
(R92 to 97, as amended by A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC, May 1, 2003)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Venue v. Jurisdiction
Appointment, kinds, qualifications
Requirement
Power and Duties
Termination
G.R. No. 147148
Govena v. Ledesma Gustilo
January 13, 2003
Carpio – Morales, J.
FACTS: On July 8, 1996, respondent filed at the RTC of Makati a "PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
GUARDIANSHIP"1 over the person and properties of her sister Julieta, the pertinent allegations of which read:
1.
That for the most part during the year 1995 and 1996, Julieta Ledesma has been a patient in the Makati
Medical Center where she is under medical attention for old age, general debility, and a "mini"-stroke which
she suffered in the United States in early 1995;
2.
That Julieta Ledesma is confined to her bed and can not get up from bed without outside assistance, and she
has to be moved by wheel chair;
3.
That Julieta Ledesma owns real estate and personal properties in Metro Manila and in Western Visayas,
with an aggregate estimated assessed and par value of P1 Million Pesos[;]
4.
That Julieta Ledesma is not in a position to care for herself, and that she needs the assistance of a guardian
to manage her interests in on-going corporate and agricultural enterprises;
5.
That the nearest of kin of Julieta Ledesma are her sisters of the full blood, namely, petitioner Amparo
Ledesma Gustilo, Teresa Ledesma (aka. Sister Cristina of the Religious of the Assumption, and Loreto
Ledesma Mapa, all of whom have given their consent to the filing of this petition.
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6.
That petitioner has extensive experience in business management of commercial, agricultural and corporate
enterprises, many of which are in the same entities where Julieta Ledesma holds an interest, and that she is
in a position to monitor and supervise the delivery of vitally needed medical services to Julieta Ledesma
whether in the Metro Manila area, or elsewhere.
Petitioner filed an Opposition to the petition for letters of guardianship for the reason that the petition lacked factual
and legal basis in that Julieta Ledesma is competent and sane and there is absolutely no need to appoint a guardian to
take charge of her person/property. She is very able to take charge of her affairs, and this is clearly evident from her
letters to the petitioner.
HELD:
In the selection of a guardian, a large discretion must be allowed the judge who deals directly with the parties. As this
Court said:
As a rule, when it appears that the judge has exercised care and diligence in selecting the guardian, and has given due
consideration to the reasons for and against his action which are urged by the interested parties, his action should not
be disturbed unless it is made very clear that he has fallen into grievous error
In the case at bar, petitioner has not shown that the lower courts committed any error.
The trial court found Julieta "incompetent and incapable of taking care of herself and her property" and appointed
respondent as guardian of her person and properties.
Petitioner (Amparo) is 72 years of age, the youngest sister of Julieta. Admittedly, the Oppositor Pilar Goyena, 90 years
of age has been the close friend and companion of Julieta for 61 years. Julieta was with Oppositor when she suffered
her first stroke in Makati in 1991 which was the reason why Julieta had to give up the management of their hacienda
in Bacolod. It is also not disputed that Julieta was with Pilar when she had her second stroke in the U.S. In short, the
special bond of friendship existing between Julieta and the Oppositor cannot be denied. Now that Julieta is unable to
manage her personal life and business concerns due to senility and "vascular dementia," the oppositor wants to be
appointed her guardian or else Bart Lacson, Fely Montelibano and Jose T. Revilla.
It is interesting to note that the oppositor has interposed her objection to the appointment of Amparo as guardian
because she thinks that the latter dislikes her. Nevertheless, not one of the nearest of kin of Julieta opposed the petition.
Thus, Ms. Goyena's mere conjecture that Amparo dislikes her is no sufficient reason why the petition should be denied.
Neither does it make Amparo unsuitable and unfit to perform the duties of a guardian. On the contrary, it is Ms.
Goyena who could be considered as to have an adverse interest to that of Julieta if it is true that 50% of Julieta's
holdings at the Makati Medical Center has been transferred to her as alleged in Exhibit 1 and Exhibit A. The
qualification of Amparo to act as guardian over the person and properties of Julieta has been duly established. As a
sister, she can best take care of Julieta's concerns and well being. Now that Julieta is in the twilight of her life, her
family should be given the opportunity to show their love and affection for her without however denying Pilar Goyena
access to her considering the special bond of friendship between the two. Needless to say, the oppositor at 90 years of
age could not be said to be physically fit to attend to all the needs of Julieta.
Petitioner cannot rely on Garchitorena v. Sotelo with respect to the existence of antagonistic interests between
respondent and Julieta. In that case, the interest of Perfecto Gabriel as creditor and mortgagee of the minor-wards'
properties (a house and lot) is antagonistic to the interest of the wards as mortgagors, hence, Gabriel's appointment as
guardian was erroneous. For while he sought to foreclose the wards' properties as creditor and mortgagee on one hand,
he had to, on the other hand, endeavor to retain them for the wards as their guardian. Added to that was Gabriel's
appointment as guardian without him informing the guardianship court that he held a mortgage on the properties.
Furthermore, he deliberately misinformed the said court that the first mortgagee was the Santa Clara Monastery when
it was him. None of the said circumstances obtain in the present case.
Petitioner's assertion that respondent's intent in instituting the guardianship proceedings is to take control of Julieta's
properties and use them for her own benefit is purely speculative and finds no support from the records.
The claim that respondent is hostile to the best interests of Julieta also lacks merit. That respondent removed Julieta
from the Makati Medical Center where she was confined after she suffered a stroke does not necessarily show her
hostility towards Julieta, given the observation by the trial court, cited in the present petition, that Julieta was still
placed under the care of doctors after she checked out and was returned to the hospital when she suffered another
stroke.
Finally, this Court notes two undisputed facts in the case at bar, to wit: 1) Petitioner opposed the petition for the
appointment of respondent as guardian before the trial court because, among other reasons, she felt she was disliked
by respondent, a ground which does not render respondent unsuitable for appointment as guardian, and 2) Petitioner
concealed the deteriorating state of mind of Julieta before the trial court, which is reflective of a lack of good faith.
On appeal of petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on the following ratiocination:
While the oppositor may have been very close to Julieta, there is no sufficient showing that petitioner is hostile to the
best interests of the latter. On the contrary, it was the petitioner who, realizing the need for the appointment of a person
to guard her sister's interests, initiated the petition for guardianship. We see no indication that petitioner is animated
by a desire to prejudice Julieta's health as well as financial interests. In point of fact, it was oppositor-appellant who
had initially concealed the deteriorating state of mind of Julieta from the court. Oppositor's advanced age of 90 years
also militate against her assuming the guardianship of the incompetent. The oppositor has declared that she is not
interested to be appointed legal guardian
G.R. No. 110427
Caniza v. CA
February 24, 1997
Narvasa, C.J.
FACTS: Carmen Caňiza, 94 years old, a spinster, a retired pharmacist and former professor of the College of
Chemistry and Pharmacy of UP, was declared incompetent by judgment on November 20, 1989 in a guardianship
proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. She was declared as such because of her advanced age
and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. As such, Amparo A. Evangelista
was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court and the trial court erred in finding that respondent is not unsuitable for
appointment as guardian of the person and properties of Julieta.
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Caňiza was the owner of a house and lot on 61 Tobias St., QC. On September 17, 1990, her guardian commenced a
suit in the MeTC of Quezon City to eject the spouses Pedro and Leonora Estrada from said premises. The complaint
was later amended to identify the incompetent Caňiza as plaintiff, suing through her legal guardian.
withholding possession from the plaintiff is deemed sufficient, and a complaint for unlawful detainer is
sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law.
The complaint alleged that Caňiza was the absolute owner of the property in question and that she had, out of kindness,
allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in their house, rentfree. The complaint also alleges that Caňiza urgently needed the house on account of her advanced age and failing
health, “so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment,” and that
Caňiza, through Evangelista, her legal guardian, had already asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the
house but they had refused to do so. By the defendants’ act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the
house, they were enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent, as they were not paying any rent for the
house; Caňiza was losing much money as her house could not be rented out by others. It was alleged in the complaint
that the same was filed within one year from the date of the first letter of demand dated February 3, 1990.
The Estradas’ defense that their possession of the property was not ‘by virtue of a contract, express or implied’ hence
they are not subject to the provisions of Rule 70, is not well-taken by the court. It is a literal and erroneous construction
of the rules. Cañiza's act of allowing the Estradas to occupy her house, rent-free, did not create a permanent and
indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor. Common sense, and the most rudimentary sense of fairness clearly
require that that act of liberality be implicitly, but no less certainly, accompanied by the necessary burden on the
Estradas of returning the house to Cañiza upon her demand. More than once has this Court adjudged that a person
who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission without any contract between them is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
The MeTC rendered judgment in Caňiza’s favor, ordering the Estradas to vacate the premises. On appeal, however,
the RTC reversed the decision and held that the “action by which the issue of the defendants’ possession should be
resolved is accion publiciana, cognizable by the RTC at first instance, and not accion interdictal (unlawful detainer).
Caňiza appealed the same decision with the CA but the CA affirmed the decision in toto.
It may not be amiss to point out in this connection that where there had been more than one demand to vacate, the
one-year period for filing the complaint for unlawful detainer must be reckoned from the date of the last demand. The
reason for this is that the lessor has the option to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the lessee
remain in the premises. The complaint was filed within one year from the last demand.
The CA, in affirming the decision, ruled that the defendant spouses have not been living in the subject property as
mere occupants by tolerance, but have been there as a sort of adopted family by Carmen Caňiza, as evidenced by a
Xerox copy of the holographic will of the plaintiff. While said will, unless and until it has passed probate by the proper
court, could not be the basis of defendants’ claim to the property, it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of the
incompetent that defendants are to remain and are to continue their occupancy and possession. Caňiza’s supervening
incompetency cannot be said to have vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the defendant spouses out.
2.
Caňiza, through her guardian, filed a petition for certiorari with the SC, praying for the reversal of the CA decision.
The Estradas insist that the case against them was not one of unlawful detainer as possession of the house had not
been obtained by them through any “contract, express or implied,” and as such, their occupancy is not deemed to be
one terminable upon mere demand. Neither could they be the subject of a forcible entry suit, as they are occupying
the property with prior consent of the “real owner,” Caňiza, which occupancy can ripen into full ownership once the
holographic will is admitted to probate. They contend that it is beyond the power of Evangelista, as Caňiza’s legal
guardian, to oust them from the premises.
Caňiza died on March 19, 1994, and her heirs, Amparo Evangelista and Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew,
substituted for her.
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court as the general guardian of both the person and the estate of
her aunt. Her Letters of Guardianship (December 19, 1989) clearly installed her as the guardian of both her person
and properties, with full authority to take possession of the property of the incompetent wherever they may be situated
and to perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties.
That right to manage the ward’s estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover from it anyone
who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the unlawful detainer suit was proper.
2.
Whether or not Evangelista, as Caňiza’s legal guardian, had authority to file the ejectment suit.
3.
Whether or not Evangelista may continue to represent Caňiza after her death.
In bringing the action to eject the spouses, Evangelista was merely discharging the duty to attend to the “comfortable
and suitable maintenance of the ward” imposed upon her by Rule 96, Sec. 4.
HELD:
1.
The court held in the affirmative. Undoubtedly, a cause of action for desahucio has been adequately set out.
It is settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, it suffices to allege that the defendant is unlawfully
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The court ruled in the affirmative. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly
denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian,
Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the ward's
will. A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or revoked;
and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the law being
quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.” An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing
property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for
any reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of
possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities
afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
In relation to the spouses’ defenses in the ejectment action, even when the forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases,
they raise the defense of ownership, the question may be resolved by the lower courts only to determine the issue of
possession.
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3.
The court ruled in the affirmative. The ward passed away during the pendency of the appeal and the spouses
moved to dismiss the petition as they argued that the ward’s death automatically terminated the guardianship
and divested Amparo Evangelista of legal personality to represent the ward in the appeal. This was not welltaken by the court.
While it is well-established that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either
the guardian or the ward, the rule does not afford any advantage to the spouses. Amparo Evangelista, as the niece of
the ward, is one of the latter’s two surviving heirs, the other one being her nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion
and by the resolution of the court on June 20, 1994, they were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place
of the deceased, in accordance with Rule 3, Sec. 17.
An ejectment case survives the death of a party. The ward’s demise did not extinguish the suit instituted by her through
her guardian. The action, not being a purely personal one, survived her death and the heirs have taken her place and
now represent her interest.
The petition is therefore GRANTED. The CA decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and the MeTC decision
granting the ejectment of the spouses is therefore REINSTATED AND AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 194366
Neri v. Heirs of Hadju Yusop Uy
October 10, 2012
Perlas – Bernabe, J.
FACTS: Anunciacion Neri (Anunciacion) had seven children, two (2) from her first marriage with Gonzalo Illut
(Gonzalo), namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from her second marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique), namely:
Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and
Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several homestead properties with
a total area of 296,555 square meters located in Samal, Davao del Norte
On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died intestate.
Her husband, Enrique, in his personal capacity and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas,
together with Napoleon, Alicia, and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed
of Sale on July 7, 1979, adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties, and thereafter, conveying them
to the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (spouses Uy) for a consideration of P80,000.00.
On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of sale of the said homestead properties
against spouses Uy (later substituted by their heirs)before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No.96-28, assailing the
validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period.
The complaint was later amended to include Eutropia and Victoria as additional plaintiffs for having been excluded
and deprived of their legitimes as children of Anunciacion from her first marriage.
In their amended answer with counterclaim, the heirs of Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5-year
prohibitory period from the issuance of the homestead patents. They also denied knowledge of Eutropia and Victoria's
exclusion from the extrajudicial settlement and sale of the subject properties, and interposed further the defenses of
prescription and laches.
The RTC rendered a decision ordering, among others,the annulment of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled that while the sale occurred beyond the 5-year prohibitory period, the sale is still void
because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to
sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas. Consequently, it rejected the defenses of laches and
prescription raised by spouses Uy, who claimed possession of the subject properties for 17 years, holding that coownership rights are imprescriptible.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC in its April 27, 2010 Decision and dismissed the
complaint of the petitioners. It held that, while Eutropia and Victoria had no knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement
and sale of the subject properties and as such, were not bound by it, the CA found it unconscionable to permit the
annulment of the sale considering spouses Uy's possession thereof for 17 years, and that Eutropia and Victoria
belatedly filed their action in 1997, or more than two years from knowledge of their exclusion as heirs in 1994 when
their stepfather died. It, however, did not preclude the excluded heirs from recovering their legitimes from their coheirs.
The CA declared the extrajudicial settlement and the subsequent sale as valid and binding with respect to Enrique and
his children, holding that as co-owners, they have the right to dispose of their respective shares as they consider
necessary or fit. While recognizing Rosa and Douglas to be minors at that time, they were deemed to have ratified the
sale when they failed to question it upon reaching the age of majority.It also found laches to have set in because of
their inaction for a long period of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the extrajudicial settlement is proper as to the minor children of Enrique.
HELD:
The court ruled in affirmative but only as to Rosawho ratified the extrajudicial settlement.
It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein are indisputably legitimate children of Anunciacion from her first and
second marriages with Gonzalo and Enrique, respectively, and consequently, are entitled to inherit from her in equal
shares
As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on September 21, 1977, her children and Enrique acquired their respective
inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares in her whole estate
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of spouses
Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly
excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas. were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid
and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity.
However, while the settlement of the estate is null and void, the subsequent sale of the subject properties made by
Enrique and his children, Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the respondents is valid but only with respect to
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their proportionate shares therein.It cannot be denied that these heirs have acquired their respective shares in the
properties of Anunciacion from the moment of her death] and that, as owners thereof, they can very well sell their
undivided share in the estate.
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement and sale, their natural
guardian and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction. However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that
time, Enrique was merely clothed with powers of administration and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16
shares in the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the proper judicial
authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching the age of majority, is unenforceable. Records, however, show that
Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with absolute deed of sale.
Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and therefore, not binding on Eutropia, Victoria
and Douglas, only the shares of Enrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda and Rosa in the homestead properties have
effectively been disposed in favor of spouses Uy.
On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees with petitioners that the present action has not prescribed in so far as it
seeks to annul the extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the prescriptive period of 2
years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court reckoned from the execution of the extrajudicial settlement
finds no application to petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who were deprived of their lawful participation in
the subject estate.
However, the action to recover property held in trust prescribes after 10 years from the time the cause of action accrues,
which is from the time of actual notice in case of unregistered deed.[23] In this case, Eutropia, Victoria... and Douglas
claimed to have knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement with sale after the death of their father, Enrique, in 1994
which spouses Uy failed to refute. Hence, the complaint filed in 1997 was well within the prescriptive period of 10
years.
Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of Anunciacion Neri NULL and VOID;
Declaring the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy as regards
the 13/16 total shares of the late Enrique Neri, Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers
and Rosa D. Neri-Millan VALID;
Declaring Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos, Victoria D. Illut-Piala and Douglas D. Neri as the LAWFUL OWNERS of the
3/16 portions of the subject homestead properties, covered by Original Certificate of Title Nos. (P-7998) P-2128, (P14608) P-5153 and P-20551 (P-8348); and
Ordering the estate of the late Enrique Neri, as well as Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. NeriChambers and Rosa D. Neri-Millan to return to the respondents jointly and solidarily the amount paid corresponding
to the 3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and
Douglas in the total amount of P15,000.00, with legal interest at 6% per annum computed from the time of payment
until finality of this decision and 12% per annum thereafter until fully paid.
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G.R. No. 184528
Oropesa v. Oropesa
April 25, 2012
Leonardo – De Castro, J.
FACTS: On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the RTC of Parañaque City, a petition for him and Ms. Louie
Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his father, the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa.
In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted with several maladies and has
been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered a stroke twice, that his judgment and memory were impaired
and such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have
had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of failure to manage his property properly; that due to his age and
medical condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit
and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.
In an Order the presiding judge set the case for hearing, and directed the court social worker to conduct a social case
study and submit a report thereon. The Court Social Worker subsequently submitted her report but without any finding
on the (respondent) who refused to see and talk to the social worker.
On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship.
After petitioner presented evidence, he filed a manifestation dated May 29, 2006 resting his case. The (petitioner)
failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.
Respondent then filed his "Omnibus Motion (1) to Declare the petitioner to have waived the presentation of his Offer
of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge the
Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and (3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.
Court granted respondent's motion. Thereafter, respondent filed his Demurrer to Evidence which was also granted by
the trial court.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the CA but his appeal
was dismissed. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but it was also denied. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether respondent is considered an "Incompetent" person as defined under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules
of Court who should be placed under Guardianship?
HELD:
No. A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of Court tells us that persons who, though of sound mind but by
reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar causes, are incapable of taking care of themselves and their property
without outside aid are considered as incompetents who may properly be placed under guardianship. The full text of
the said provision reads:
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." — Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes persons
suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who
are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and
persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar causes,
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cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming thereby an
easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite
evidence." We consider that evidentiary standard unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar.
In fact, respondent points out that the only medical document presented by petitioner proves that he is indeed
competent to run his personal affairs and administer his properties. Portions of the said document, entitled "Report of
Neuropsychological Screening," were quoted by respondent in his Memorandum to illustrate that said report in fact
favored respondent's claim of competence.
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his father's incompetence
consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were claiming interest in their father's real and
personal properties) and their father's former caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their direction). These
testimonies, which did not include any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of
petitioner's cause of action and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by respondent.
Even if we were to overlook petitioner's procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer of evidence, his
documentary proof were comprised mainly of certificates of title over real properties registered in his, his father's and
his sister's names as co-owners, tax declarations, and receipts showing payment of real estate taxes on their co-owned
properties, which do not in any way relate to his father's alleged incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only
medical document on record is the aforementioned "Report of Neuropsychological Screening" which was attached to
the petition for guardianship but was never identified by any witness nor offered as evidence. In any event, the said
report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent at best, for although the report had negative findings regarding memory
lapses on the part of respondent, it also contained findings that supported the view that respondent on the average was
indeed competent.
G.R. No. 191993
Abad v. Biazon
December 5, 2012
Reyes, J.
FACTS: Eduardo Abad filed a petition for guardianship over the person and properties of his aunt Maura B. Abad
with the RTC Dagupan. Eduardo alleged that Maura, who is single, more than ninety (90) years old and a resident of
Mangaldan, Pangasinan, is in dire need of a guardian who will look after her and her business affairs. Due to her
advanced age, Maura is already sickly and can no longer manage to take care of herself and her properties unassisted
thus becoming an easy prey of deceit and exploitation.
Leonardo Biason, also Maura’s nephew, filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to the Petition and opposed
Eduardo’s appointment as guardian.He alleged that he was not notified of the pendency of the petition for the
appointment of the latter’s guardian. He opposed as Eduardo cannot possibly perform his duties as guardian since he
resides in Quezon City while Maura maintains her abode in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Biason prayed that he be
appointed as Maura’s guardian since he was previously granted by the latter with a power of attorney to manage her
properties.
RTC denied Eduardo’s petition and appointed Biason as Maura’s guardian.
126
Eduardo appealed to the CA and argued that not being a resident of Mangaldan, Pangasinan should not be a ground
for his disqualification as he had actively and efficiently managed the affairs and properties of his aunt even if he is
residing in Metro Manila. Moreover, he was expressly chosen by Maura to be her guardian. Eduardo further averred
that no hearing was conducted to determine the qualifications of Biason prior to his appointment as guardian. CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Eduardo filed Petition for Review on Certiorari (R45) to the SC praying for nullification of Biason’s guardianship
over Maura. He contends that that CA erred in affirming the RTC’s decision despite the fact that it did not hold any
hearing to determine whether Biason possessed all the qualifications for a guardian as provided by law. Abad also
bewails his disqualification as guardian on the sole basis of his residence. He emphasizes that it is not a requirement
for a guardian to be a resident of the same locality as the ward, or to be living with the latter under the same roof in
order to qualify for the appointment.
Unfortunately, pending the resolution of the instant petition, Biason died. Maura averred that Biason’s death rendered
moot and academic the issues raised in the petition. She thus prayed that the petition be dismissed and the guardianship
be terminated.
ISSUE: Whether or not Biason’s death rendered the issue on guardianship as moot and academic
HELD:
YES. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a
determination of the issue would be without practical use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief
to which the petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
In his petition, Abad was challenging Biason’s qualifications and the procedure by which the RTC appointed him as
guardian for Maura. However, with Biason’s demise, it has become impractical and futile to proceed with resolving
the merits of the petition. It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily
terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward. The supervening event of death rendered it pointless to
delve into the propriety of Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie between him and Maura has already been
dissolved. The petition, regardless of its disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any
substantial relief. Moreover, Abad, in his Comment, shared Maura’s belief that the petition has lost its purpose and
even consented to Maura’s prayer for the dismissal of the petition.
TRUSTEES
1.
2.
Parties
Kinds / Classes
G.R. No. 183050
Advent Capital and Finance Corp. v. Alcantara
January 25, 2012
Abad, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Advent Capital and Finance Corporation (Advent Capital) filed a petition for rehabilitation with
the RTC of Makati City. Subsequently, the RTC named Atty. Danilo L. Concepcion as rehabilitation receiver. Upon
audit of Advent Capital's books, Atty. Concepcion found that respondents Nicasio and Editha Alcantara (collectively,
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the Alcantaras) owed Advent Capital P27,398,026.59, representing trust fees that it supposedly earned for managing
their several trust accounts.
Prompted by this finding, Atty. Concepcion requested Belson Securities, Inc. (Belson) to deliver to him, as Advent
Capital's rehabilitation receiver, the P7,635,597.50 in cash dividends that Belson held under the Alcantaras' Trust
Account. Atty. Concepcion claimed that the dividends, as trust fees, formed part of Advent Capital's assets. Belson
refused, however, citing the Alcantaras' objections as well as the absence of an appropriate order from the
rehabilitation court.
Thus, Atty. Concepcion filed a motion before the rehabilitation court to direct Belson to release the money to him.
He said that, as rehabilitation receiver, he had the duty to take custody and control of Advent Capital's assets. The
Alcantaras made a special appearance before the rehabilitation court to oppose Atty. Concepcion's motion. They
claimed that the money in the trust account belonged to them under their Trust Agreement with Advent Capital. The
latter, they said, could not claim any right or interest in the dividends generated by their investments since Advent
Capital merely held these in trust for the Alcantaras, the trustors-beneficiaries. For this reason, Atty. Concepcion had
no right to compel the delivery of the dividends to him as receiver.
The rehabilitation court granted Atty. Concepcion's motion. It held that, under Rule 59, Section 6 of the Rules of
Court, a receiver has the duty to immediately take possession of all of the corporation's assets and administer the same
for the benefit of corporate creditors. He has the duty to collect debts owing to the corporation, which debts form part
of its assets. Complying with the rehabilitation court's order and Atty. Concepcion's demand letter, Belson turned
over the subject dividends to him.
According to Advent Capital, it could automatically deduct its management fees from the Alcantaras' portfolio that
they entrusted to it. Paragraph 9 of the Trust Agreement provides that Advent Capital could automatically deduct its
trust fees from the Alcantaras' portfolio, "at the end of each calendar quarter," with the corresponding duty to submit
to the Alcantaras a quarterly accounting report within 20 days after.
But the problem is that the trust fees that Advent Capital's receiver was claiming were for past quarters. Based on the
stipulation, these should have been deducted as they became due. As it happened, at the time Advent Capital made
its move to collect its supposed management fees, it neither had possession nor control of the money it wanted to
apply to its claim. Belson, a third party, held the money in the Alcantaras' names. Whether it should deliver the same
to Advent Capital or to the Alcantaras is not clear. What is clear is that the issue as to who should get the same has
been seriously contested.
The practice in the case of banks is that they automatically collect their management fees from the funds that their
clients entrust to them for investment or lending to others. But the banks can freely do this since it holds or has control
of their clients' money and since their trust agreement authorized the automatic collection. If the depositor contests
the deduction, his remedy is to bring an action to recover the amount he claims to have been illegally deducted from
his account.
Here, Advent Capital does not allege that Belson had already deducted the management fees owing to it from the
Alcantaras' portfolio at the end of each calendar quarter. Had this been done, it may be said that the money in Belson's
possession would technically be that of Advent Capital. Belson would be holding such amount in trust for the latter.
And it would be for the Alcantaras to institute an action in the proper court against Advent Capital and Belson for
misuse of its funds.
The Alcantaras filed a special civil action of certiorari before the CA seeking to annul the rehabilitation court's order.
CA rendered a decision, granting the petition and directing Atty. Concepcion to account for the dividends and deliver
them to the Alcantaras. The CA ruled that the Alcantaras owned those dividends. They did not form part of Advent
Capital's assets as contemplated under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation. The CA pointed
out that the rehabilitation proceedings in this case referred only to the assets and liabilities of the company proper, not
to those of its Trust Department which held assets belonging to other people.
But the above did not happen. Advent Capital did not exercise its right to cause the automatic deduction at the end of
every quarter of its supposed management fee when it had full control of the dividends. That was its fault. For their
part, the Alcantaras had the right to presume that Advent Capital had deducted its fees in the manner stated in the
contract. The burden of proving that the fees were not in fact collected lies with Advent Capital.
ISSUE: Whether or not the cash dividends held by Belson and claimed by both the Alcantaras and Advent Capital
constitute corporate assets of the latter that the rehabilitation court may, upon motion, require to be conveyed
to the rehabilitation receiver for his disposition
The real owner of the trust property is the trustor-beneficiary. In this case, the trustors-beneficiaries are the Alcantaras.
Thus, Advent Capital could not dispose of the Alcantaras' portfolio on its own. The income and principal of the
portfolio could only be withdrawn upon the Alcantaras' written instruction or order to Advent Capital. The latter could
not also assign or encumber the portfolio or its income without the written consent of the Alcantaras. All these are
stipulated in the Trust Agreement.
HELD:
Advent Capital asserts that the cash dividends in Belson's possession formed part of its assets based on paragraph 9
of its Trust Agreement with the Alcantaras, which states:
Trust Fee: Other Expenses - As compensation for its services hereunder, the TRUSTEE shall be entitled to a trust or
management fee of 1 (one) % per annum based on the quarterly average market value of the Portfolio or a minimum
annual fee of P5,000.00, whichever is higher. The said trust or management fee shall automatically be deducted from
the Portfolio at the end of each calendar quarter. The TRUSTEE shall likewise be reimbursed for all reasonable and
necessary expenses incurred by it in the discharge of its powers and duties under this Agreement, and in all cases, the
TRUSTEE shall have a first lien on the Portfolio for the payment of the trust fees and other reimbursable expenses.
127
G.R. No. 166884
Land Bank of the Phil. v. Perez
June 13, 2012
Brion, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) is a government financial institution and the official
depository of the Philippines. Respondents are the officers and representatives of Asian Construction and
Development Corporation (ACDC), a corporation incorporated under Philippine law and engaged in the construction
business. LBP filed a complaint for estafa stating that LBP extended a credit accommodation to ACDC through the
execution of an Omnibus Credit Line Agreement.
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In various instances, ACDC used the Letters of Credit/Trust Receipts Facility of the Agreement to buy construction
materials. The respondents, as officers and representatives of ACDC, executed trust receipts in connection with the
construction materials, with a total principal amount of P52,344,096.32. The trust receipts matured, but ACDC failed
to return to LBP the proceeds of the construction projects or the construction materials subject of the trust receipts.
LBP sent ACDC a demand letter, dated May 4, 1999, for the payment of its debts, including those under the Trust
Receipts Facility in the amount of P66,425,924.39. When ACDC failed to comply with the demand letter, LBP filed
the affidavit-complaint.
The respondents filed a joint affidavit wherein they stated that they signed the trust receipt documents on or about the
same time LBP and ACDC executed the loan documents; their signatures were required by LBP for the release of the
loans. The trust receipts in this case do not contain (1) a description of the goods placed in trust, (2) their invoice
values, and (3) their maturity dates, in violation of Section 5 (a) of P.D. 115. Moreover, they alleged that ACDC acted
as a subcontractor for government projects such as the Metro Rail Transit, the Clark Centennial Exposition and the
Quezon Power Plant in Mauban, Quezon. Its clients for the construction projects, which were the general contractors
of these projects, have not yet paid them; thus, ACDC had yet to receive the proceeds of the materials that were the
subject of the trust receipts and were allegedly used for these constructions. As there were no proceeds received from
these clients, no misappropriation thereof could have taken place.
The ACP of Makati dismissed the complaint pointing out that the evidence presented by the LBP is insufficient. On
appeal, the Secretary of Justice reversed said ruling after the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The Secretary
of Justice pointed out that there was no question that the goods covered by the trust receipts were received by ACDC.
He likewise adopted LBP's argument that while the subjects of the trust receipts were not mentioned in the trust
receipts, they were listed in the letters of credit referred to in the trust receipts. He also noted that the trust receipts
contained maturity dates and clearly set out their stipulations. He further rejected the respondents' defense that ACDC
failed to remit the payments to LBP due to the failure of the clients of ACDC to pay them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the disputed transactions are trust receipts
HELD:
No. Section 4 of P.D. 115 defines a trust receipt transaction in this manner:
Section 4. What constitutes a trust receipt transaction. — A trust receipt transaction, within the meaning
of this Decree, is any transaction by and between a person referred to in this Decree as the entruster, and
another person referred to in this Decree as entrustee, whereby the entruster, who owns or holds absolute
title or security interests over certain specified goods, documents or instruments, releases the same to
the possession of the entrustee upon the latter's execution and delivery to the entruster of a signed
document called a "trust receipt" wherein the entrustee binds himself to hold the designated goods,
documents or instruments in trust for the entruster and to sell or otherwise dispose of the goods,
documents or instruments with the obligation to turn over to the entruster the proceeds thereof to the
extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust receipt or the goods, documents or
instruments themselves if they are unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the terms and
conditions specified in the trust receipt, or for other purposes substantially equivalent to any of the
following:
In the case of goods or documents, (a) to sell the goods or procure their sale; or (b) to manufacture or
process the goods with the purpose of ultimate sale: Provided, That, in the case of goods delivered under
128
trust receipt for the purpose of manufacturing or processing before its ultimate sale, the entruster shall
retain its title over the goods whether in its original or processed form until the entrustee has complied
fully with his obligation under the trust receipt; or (c) to load, unload, ship or tranship or otherwise deal
with them in a manner preliminary or necessary to their sale[.]
Article 1371 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered." Under this provision, we can examine the
contemporaneous actions of the parties rather than rely purely on the trust receipts that they signed in order to
understand the transaction through their intent.
Thus, in concluding that the transaction was a loan and not a trust receipt, we noted in Colinares that the industry or
line of work that the borrowers were engaged in was construction. We pointed out that the borrowers were not
importers acquiring goods for resale. Indeed, goods sold in retail are often within the custody or control of the trustee
until they are purchased. In the case of materials used in the manufacture of finished products, these finished products
— if not the raw materials or their components — similarly remain in the possession of the trustee until they are sold.
But the goods and the materials that are used for a construction project are often placed under the control and custody
of the clients employing the contractor, who can only be compelled to return the materials if they fail to pay the
contractor and often only after the requisite legal proceedings. The contractor's difficulty and uncertainty in claiming
these materials (or the buildings and structures which they become part of), as soon as the bank demands them,
disqualify them from being covered by trust receipt agreements. Since these transactions are not trust receipts, an
action for estafa should not be brought against the respondents, who are liable only for a loan.
ADOPTION AND CUSTODY OF MINORS
1.
2.
3.
a.
b.
c.
The Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 (RA 8552)
Inter Country Adoption Act of 1995 (RA 8043)
Rule of Adoption (A.M. No. 02 – 6 – 02 – SC dated July 31, 2002, effective August 22, 2002)
Who may adopt
Who may be adopted
Venue and jurisdiction
G.R. No. 105308
Cang v. CA
September 25, 1998
Romero, J.
FACTS: Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were married on January 27, 1973 and begot three children, Keith
born on July 3, 1973, Charmaine on January 23, 1977 and Joseph Anthony on January 3, 1981.
In the early years of their marriage, the Cang’s relationship was undisturbed. Anna Marie later learned of her husband’s
alleged extra marital affair with Wilma Soco who is a family friend of the Clavanos.
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Cebu and rendered a decision approving the joint manifestation of the Cang spouses providing that they
agreed to live separately and apart or from bed and board.
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Herbert Cang left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District
Court of the State of Nevada. Said court issued the divorce decree that also granted sole custody of the three minor
children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to Herbert.
parents or one of the parents provided that the petition for adoption alleges facts sufficient to warrant
exemption from compliance therewith. This is in consonance with the liberality with which this Court treats
the procedural aspect of adoption.
Thereafter, Herbert took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. But in 1986, he divorced
his American wife and never remarried. Meanwhile, Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, the brother
and sister-in-law of Anna Cang filed for the adoption of the three minor children before the RTC of Cebu. The petition
bears the signature of the 14-year-old Keith signifying consent to his adoption. Anna Marie filed an affidavit of consent
alleging that her husband had evaded his legal obligation to support his children; that her brothers and sisters including
Ronald Clavano had been helping her in taking care of her children; that she would be going to the United States to
attend to a family business, “leaving the children would be a problem and would naturally hamper (her) job-seeking
venture abroad”; and that her husband had long forfeited his parental rights over the children.
In the instant case, only the affidavit of consent of the natural mother was attached to the petition for adoption.
Petitioner's consent, as the natural father is lacking. Nonetheless, the petition sufficiently alleged the fact of
abandonment of the minors for adoption by the natural father.
Upon learning of the petition for adoption, Herbert immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition.
But pending resolution of the petition for adoption, Herbert moved to reacquire custody over his children alleging that
Anna Marie had transferred to the United States and leaving custody of their children to private respondents. The RTC
of Cebu issued an order that Anna Marie had, in effect, relinquished custody over the children and such custody should
be transferred to the father. The court directed the Clavanos to deliver the custody over the minors to Herbert.
On March 27, 1990, the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 14, issued a decree of adoption whereby the petition for adoption
of the minors Keith, Charmaine and Joseph Anthony all surnamed Cang, by the petitioners-spouses Ronald V. Clavano
and Maria Clara Diago Clavano is hereby granted and approved. The Lower Court considered the opposition of
Herbert to rest on a shaky foundation. Simply put, the oppositor Herbert Cang has abandoned his children and
abandonment of a child by its parent is commonly specified by statute as a ground for dispensing with his consent to
its adoption. Indeed, in such case, adoption will be allowed not only without the consent of the parent, but even against
his opposition.
Herbert appealed to the CA. He asserted that the petition for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to divest him
of parental authority because: (a) he did not have a written consent to the adoption; (b) he never abandoned his
children; (c) Keith and Charmaine did not properly give their written consent; and (d) the petitioners for adoption did
not present as witness the representative of the Department of Social Welfare and Development who made the case
study report required by law. The CA affirmed the decree of adoption.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have the his written as it did not
have his written consent as a natural father as required by Article 31 (2) of PD No. 603 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code and Article 188(2) of the Family Code.
2.
Whether or not petitioner Herbert has abandoned his children making his consent to the adoption
unnecessary.
HELD:
1.
Yes. As clearly inferred from the foregoing provisions of law, the written consent of the natural parent is
indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent
can be dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is "insane or hopelessly
intemperate." The court may acquire jurisdiction over the case even, without the written consent of the
129
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto was not sought, the
matter of whether he had abandoned his child becomes a proper issue for determination. The issue of abandonment
by the oppositor natural parent is a preliminary issue that an adoption court must first confront. Only upon, failure of
the oppositor natural father to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he did not abandon his child may the petition
for adoption be considered on its merits.
2.
No. In its ordinary sense, the word "abandon'' means to forsake entirely, to forsake or renounce utterly. The
dictionaries trace this word to the root idea of "putting under a ban." The emphasis is on the finality and
publicity with which a thing or body is thus put in the control of another, hence, the meaning of giving up
absolutely, with intent never to resume or claim one's rights or interests. In reference to abandonment of a
child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evinces a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or
refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe their children."
In the instant case, records disclose that petitioner's conduct did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental
duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to, constitute abandonment. Physical estrangement alone,
without financial and moral desertion, is not tantamount to abandonment. While admittedly, petitioner was physically
absent as he was then in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and
support for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters and
telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.
Aside from these letters, petitioner also presented certifications of banks in the U.S.A. showing that even prior to the
filing of the petition for adoption, he had deposited amounts for the benefit of his children. Exhibits 24 to 45 are copies
of checks sent by petitioner to the children from 1985 to 1989.
In a number of cases, this Court has held that parental authority cannot be entrusted to a person simply because he
could give the child a larger measure of material comfort than his natural parent. There should be a holistic approach
to the matter, taking into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the
child. The conclusion of the courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support other
than his inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There should
be proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his children would not miss his guidance and counsel if they
were given to adopting parents. The letters he received from his children prove that petitioner maintained the more
important emotional tie between him and his children. The children needed him not only because he could cater to
their whims but also because he was a person they could share with their daily activities, problems and triumphs.
Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of
adoption in this case precisely because, as this Court has demonstrated earlier, the finding of the courts below on the
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issue of petitioner's abandonment of his family was based on a misappreciation that was tantamount to nonappreciation, of facts on record.
Said petition must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the
facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
G.R. No. 135216
Vda. de Jacob v. CA
August 19, 1999
Panganiban, J.
FACTS: Thomasa, Petitioner herein, claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was
appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract
between herself and the deceased.
Defendant Pedro, on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he
presented an Order dated 18 July 1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting
the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil.
During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46 (entitled "Tomasa
vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera, et al) herein defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share
of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and as his sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the
marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.
Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge Moya. In an effort to disprove the genuineness
and authenticity of Judge Moya's signature in the Order granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of Judge
Moya was taken at his residence on 01 October 1990.
In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in judicial proceedings taken about
twenty-nine (29) years ago when he was then presiding judge since he was already 79 years old and was suffering
from "glaucoma".
Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings of Atty. Pagui (NBI Chief Document
Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two (32) specimen signatures of Judge Moya) declaring the
signature of Judge Moya in the challenged Order as genuine and authentic. Hence, the trial court ruled for defendantappellee sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the
reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent."
In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the absence of clear and convincing
proof to the contrary, the presumption applies that Judge Moya in issuing the order acted in the performance of his
regular duties. Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged Order was subjected to a rigid examination
of two (2) handwriting experts, this negates the possibility of forgery of Judge Moya's signature.
ISSUE: Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.
130
HELD:
No, Pedro is not a legally adopted son. The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship. This Respondent Pilapil failed to do.
In this case, the trial court relied mainly on respondent’s expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya
himself. Respondent Pilapil justifies the trial judge’s action by arguing that the Deposition was ambiguous. He
contends that Judge Moya could not remember whether the signature on the Order was his and cites the following
portion as proof:
Q. What was you[r] response, sir?
A: I said I do not remember.
Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judge's testimony out of its context. Considered with
the rest of the Deposition, Judge Moya's statements contained no ambiguity. He was clear when he answered the
queries in the following manner:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. What else did she tell you[?]
A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the order.
Q. What was your response sir[?]
A. I said I do not remember.
The answer "I do not remember" did not suggest that Judge Moya was unsure of what he was declaring. In fact, he
was emphatic and categorical in the subsequent exchanges during the Deposition:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. "A" deposition[;] will you please recall whether you issued this Order and
whether the facsimile of the signature appearing thereon is your signature.
A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and the signature reading Jose[;] I can’t make out clearly
what comes after the name[;] Jose Moya is not my signature.
Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More importantly, when shown the
signature over his name, he positively declared that it was not his.
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his statements. At the time, he could
with medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of the defense counsel, he even read a document shown
to him.42 Indeed, we find no reason – and the respondent has not presented any – to disregard the Deposition of Judge
Moya.
Judge Moya's declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document Examiner Bienvenido Albacea,
who declared:
Atty. Paraiso
Q And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in your examination of this document?
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A Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the questioned and the standard signature Jose L. Moya were not
written by one and the same person. On the basis of my findings that I would point out in detail, the difference in the
writing characteristics [was] in the structural pattern of letters which is very apparent as shown in the photograph as
the capital letter "J".
It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having been sought without any compensation.
Moreover, his competence was recognized even by Respondent Pilapil’s expert witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui.
Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was purportedly made in open
court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only
decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty. Moreover, Judge Moya
insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned
Order did not contain this information.
Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the
documents that he signed and other acts that he performed thereafter.46 In the same vein, no proof was presented that
Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management in Manila and the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro
Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of
respondent.
G.R. No. 117209
Republic of the Phil. v. Hon. Jose R. Hernandez
February 9, 1996
Regalado, J.
Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of imagination and liberality, be justified under the
rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of action. While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims
as he may have, there should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and
fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited
joinder is not authorized. Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition against
the joinder of a petition for adoption and for change of name, there is no relation between these two petitions, nor are
they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any common question of fact or law, which conjointly
would warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test of conceptual unity
demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.
The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action is
addressed to suits that are intimately related and also present interwoven and dependent issues which can be most
expeditiously and comprehensively settled by having just one judicial proceeding, but not to suits or actions whose
subject matters or corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse such that they are best taken up individually.
G.R. No. 103695
FACTS: Private respondent spouses filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran. In the very same
petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same
being the name with
which he was baptized in keeping with religious tradition and by which he has been called by his adoptive family,
relatives and friends since he arrived at private respondents' residence.
Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption. Petitioner further
contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with
that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the
registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of one's legal name, a petition for
change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor
being conformably satisfied. Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a
prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in
order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for change of name of the adopted may be filed jointly with the petition for adoption.
HELD:
No. If a change in one's name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive
and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
131
wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined. A petition
for change of name being a proceeding in rem. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself,
governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as
a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the
appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.
Republic v. CA
March 15, 1996
Mendoza, J.
FACTS: A petition was filed in the RTC by the spouses Caranto for the adoption of Midael C. Mazon, then 15 years
old, who had been living with Jaime since he was 7 years old. When the spouses married, Midael stayed with them
under their care and custody. The spouses thus prayed that judgment be rendered:
a.
Declaring the child Michael C. Mazon the child of petitioners for all intents and purposes;
b.
Dissolving the authority vested in the natural parents of the child; and
c.
That the surname of the child be legally changed to that of the spouses and that the first name which was
mistakenly registered as "Midael" be corrected to "Michael."
The RTC set the case for hearing, giving notice thereof by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Province of Cavite and by service of the order upon the DSWD and OSG.
The OSG opposed the petition insofar as it sought the correction of the name to "Michael." He argued that although
the correction concerned only a clerical and innocuous error, it could not be granted because the petition was basically
for adoption, not the correction of an entry in the civil registry under Rule 108.
RTC granted the petition, ruling that Rule 108 applies only to the correction of entries concerning the civil status of
persons and the correction of names in the civil registry is not one of the matters enumerated in Rule 108, §2 as "entries
subject to cancellation or correction." According to the trial court, the error could be corrected in the same proceeding
for adoption to prevent multiplicity of actions and inconvenience to the petitioners.
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The OSG appealed, citing as additional ground that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because in the
notice published in the newspaper, the name given was "Michael," instead of "Midael," which is the name of the minor
in his Certificate of Live Birth.
The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice by
publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction
of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter.
The CA affirmed in toto the RTC. Hence this petition for review.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the private respondents' petition for adoption?
2.
Whether or not the RTC decision, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is valid?
HELD:
1.
Yes. The OSG invokes the ruling in Cruz v. Republic. There the petition for adoption and the notice
published in the newspaper gave the baptismal name of the child ("Rosanna E. Cruz") instead of her name
in the record of birth ("Rosanna E. Bucoy"). It was held that this was a substantial defect in the petition and
the published order of hearing. Indeed, there was a question of identity involved in that case. Rosanna E.
Cruz could very well be a different person from Rosanna E. Bucoy, as common experience would indicate.
The present case is different. It involves an obvious clerical error in the name of the child sought to be adopted. The
correction involves merely the substitution of the letters "ch" for the letter "d." Changing the name of the child from
"Midael C. Mazon" to "Michael C. Mazon" cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names can be read and
pronounced with the same rhyme and tone. The purpose of the publication requirement is to give notice so that those
who have any objection to the adoption can make their objection known. That purpose has been served by publication
of notice in this case.
2.
No. The trial court was clearly in error in holding Rule 108 to be applicable only to the correction of errors
concerning the civil status of persons. This case falls under Rule 108, §2, letter "(o)," referring to "changes
of name." Indeed, it has been the uniform ruling of this Court that Rule 108 covers "those harmless and
innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is clearly misspelled."
Rule 108, §3 further provides:
Ҥ3
Parties. — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.”
The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an indispensable party, without
whom no final determination of the case can be had. As he was not impleaded in this case much less given notice of
the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The
absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the
complaint including the judgment.
Nor was notice of the petition for correction of entry published as required by §4. While there was notice given by
publication in this case, it was notice of the petition for adoption; only the prayer for adoption of the minor was stated.
Nothing was mentioned that in addition, the correction of his name in the civil registry was also being sought. The
local civil registrar was thus deprived of notice and, consequently, of the opportunity to be heard.
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G.R. No. 175080
Reyes v. Mauricio
November 24, 2010
Perez, J.
FACTS: Eugenio Reyes (Eugenio) was the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Turo, Bocaue, Bulacan,
with an area of four thousand five hundred twenty-seven (4,527) square meters, more or less, and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 109456(M). Said title came from and cancelled TCT No. T-62290 registered in the
name of Eufracia and Susana Reyes, siblings of Eugenio. The subject property was adjudicated to Eugenio by virtue
of an extrajudicial settlement among the heirs following the death of his parents.
The controversy stemmed from a complaint filed before the DARAB of Malolos, Bulacan by respondents Librada F.
Mauricio (Librada), now deceased, and her alleged daughter Leonida F. Mauricio (Leonida) for annulment of contract
denominated as Kasunduan and between Librada and Eugenio as parties. Respondents also prayed for maintenance of
their peaceful possession with damages.
Respondents alleged that they are the legal heirs of the late Godofredo Mauricio (Godofredo), who was the lawful and
registered tenant of Eugenio through his predecessors-in-interest to the subject land; that from 1936 until his death in
May 1994, Godofredo had been working on the subject land and introduced improvements consisting of fruit-bearing
trees, seasonal crops, a residential house and other permanent improvements; that through fraud, deceit, strategy and
other unlawful means, Eugenio caused the preparation of a document denominated as Kasunduan dated 28 September
1994 to eject respondents from the subject property, and had the same notarized by Notary Public Ma. Sarah G. Nicolas
in Pasig, Metro Manila; that Librada never appeared before the Notary Public; that Librada was illiterate and the
contents of the Kasunduan were not read nor explained to her; that Eugenio took undue advantage of the weakness,
age, illiteracy, ignorance, indigence and other handicaps of Librada in the execution of the Kasunduan rendering it
void for lack of consent; and that Eugenio had been employing all illegal means to eject respondents from the subject
property. Respondents prayed for the declaration of nullity of the Kasunduan and for an order for Eugenio to maintain
and place them in peaceful possession and cultivation of the subject property. Respondents likewise demanded
payment of damages.2 During trial, respondents presented a leasehold contract executed between Susana and
Godofredo to reaffirm the existing tenancy agreement.
Eugenio averred that no tenancy relationship existed between him and respondents. He clarified that Godofredo’s
occupation of the subject premises was based on the former’s mere tolerance and accommodation. Eugenio denied
signing a tenancy agreement, nor authorizing any person to sign such an agreement. He maintained that Librada,
accompanied by a relative, voluntarily affixed her signature to the Kasunduan and that she was fully aware of the
contents of the document. Moreover, Librada received P50,000.00 from Eugenio on the same day of the execution of
the Kasunduan. Eugenio also questioned the jurisdiction of the DARAB since the principal relief sought by
respondents is the annulment of the contract, over which jurisdiction is vested on the regular courts. Eugenio also
asserted that Leonida had no legal personality to file the present suit.
Provincial Adjudicator concluded that Godofredo was the tenant of Eugenio, and Librada, being the surviving spouse,
should be maintained in peaceful possession of the subject land.
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The DARAB held that the Mauricio’s are former tenants of Spouses Reyes. It found that when Spouses Reyes died,
siblings Eufracia, Susana and Eugenio, among others inherited the subject property. Under the law, they were
subrogated to the rights and substituted to the "obligations" of their late parents as the agricultural lessors over the
farmholding tenanted by respondents. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and resolution of the DARAB.
ISSUE: Whether or not filiation can be collaterally attacked.
HELD:
We are in full accord with the Court of Appeals when it ruled that Eugenio cannot collaterally attack the status of
Leonida in the instant petition.
It is settled law that filiation cannot be collaterally attacked. Well-known civilista Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, in his book
"Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence," noted that the aforecited doctrine is rooted from
the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. He explained thus:
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another
action for a different purpose. The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the legitimacy
is more clearly expressed in the Mexican code (article 335) which provides: "The contest of the
legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint before the competent
court; any contest made in any other way is void." This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles
170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy."
This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the present
articles.
In Braza v. City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, the Court stated that legitimacy and filiation
can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack.
The same rule is applied to adoption such that it cannot also be made subject to a collateral attack. In Reyes v. Sotero,
this Court reiterated that adoption cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s
estate. Furthermore, in Austria v. Reyes, the Court declared that the legality of the adoption by the testatrix can be
assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose and cannot be subject to collateral attack.
Other issue: Eugenio submits that no tenancy relationship exists between him and respondents. This is a question of
fact beyond the province of this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in which only
questions of law may be raised. Applying the principle that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court,
we defer to the factual ruling of the Provincial Adjudicator, as affirmed by DARAB and the Court of Appeals, which
clearly had the opportunity to closely examine the witnesses and their demeanor on the witness stand.
Assuming that the leasehold contract between Susana and Godofredo is void, our conclusion remains. We agree with
the Court of Appeals that a tenancy relationship cannot be extinguished by mere expiration of term or period in a
leasehold contract; or by the sale, alienation or the transfer of legal possession of the landholding.
G.R. No. 148311
In the Matter of Stephanie Nathy Astorga - Garcia
March 31, 2005
Sandoval – Gutierrez, J.
FACTS: On August 31, 2000, Honoratio B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate
child, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994, that her mother is
Gemma Astorga Garcia, and that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname, and that he is now
a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name, “Astorga” be changed to
“Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig,” his surname.
On March 23, 2001, the RTC granted the adoption and ruled that pursuant to Art. 189 of the Family Code, the minor
shall be known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
On April 20, 2001, petitioner then filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration, praying that the minor be
allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. On May 28, 2001, the RTC denied the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, as there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the
surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition, contending, among others, that the RTC erred in depriving Stephanie of a
middle name as a consequence of adoption because:1
1.
There is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting
parent;
2.
It is customary for every Filipino to have the surname of the mother as his middle name;
3.
The middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person;
4.
Adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should also
not be violated;
5.
Permitting her to use “Garcia” as her middle name avoids the stigma of illegitimacy;
6.
Her continued use of “Garcia” as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The OSG agrees with the petitioner. The OSG cited the following reasons: that it is necessary to maintain the minor’s
filiation with the natural mother because under Art. 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the
latter. To prevent confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of such should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name; what the
law does not prohibit, it allows. Third, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily
the mother’s surname. This custom has already been recognized by the Civil Code and the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the minor can validly use her mother’s surname as her middle name as a result of the adoption
proceedings.
HELD:
The court held in the affirmative.
The name of an individual has two parts: the given or proper name and the surname or family name. The first is that
which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. Articles 364 to 380
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of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of surname of an individual whatever may be
his status in life—illegitimate or legitimate, adopted, a married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow.
However, the law is silent as to the use of middle name. As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law
regulating the use of a middle name. Even Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, otherwise known
as “An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father,” is silent as to what middle name a
child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Art. 375(1):
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word
‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
The law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Art. 365 of the Civil Code merely provides
that “an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.” Art. 189 of the Family Code likewise enumerates the
right to use the surname of the adopter as one of the adopted child’s rights.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the
Family Code, the law recognizes the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his middle name.
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the
rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. The modern trend is to consider
adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also an act which endows the
child with a legitimate status. One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to the Family Code and R.A. 8552 (The Domestic Adoption Act of
1998).
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is then entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and mother,
as discussed. Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her
maternal lineage. Indeed, the Family Code states that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his or her biological
parent, hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future. Moreover,
records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana,
San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother
and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow Stephanie
to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving relationship with her
mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
134
The petition is therefore GRANTED. The decision is modified—Stephanie may use GARCIA, her mother’s surname,
as her middle name, and CATINDIG, her father’s surname, as her last name.
G.R. No. 168992 – 93
Petition for Adoption of Michelle and Michael Lim
May 21, 2009
Carpio, J.
FACTS: Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were
childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban).
Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were
the children’s parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael).
Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977.3
Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive schools.
They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim
died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given under Republic Act No. 85526
(RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate
petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and
1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already
married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. Michael also
gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent. Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise executed
an Affidavit of Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered
as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown.10 The DSWD issued a similar
Certification for Michael.
The trial court ruled that since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new
husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article
III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise of
parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental authority
because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations and
responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
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HELD:
No. It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed
the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial
court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
1.
if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
2.
if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse
has signified his/her consent thereto; or
3.
if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint parental
authority shall be exercised by the spouses.
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation.
As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt
jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption
were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining
her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted
are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate
children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are
certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in
Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal
capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s
adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived
pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
A.C. No. 10196
Nery v. Sampana
September 9, 2014
Carpio, Acting C.J.
FACTS: This is a disbarment complaint filed by Melody R. Nery (Nery) against Atty. Glicerio A. Sampana (Sampana)
for failing to file the petition for adoption despite receiving his legal fees and for making Nery believe that the petition
was already filed.
In her verified complaint filed on 18 June 2010, Nery alleged that in June 2008, she engaged the services of Sampana
for the annulment of her marriage and for her adoption by an alien adopter. The petition for annulment was eventually
granted, and Nery paid P200,000.00 to Sampana. As for the adoption, Sampana asked Nery if she had an aunt, whom
they could represent as the wife of her alien adopter. Sampana then gave Nery a blurred copy of a marriage contract,
which they would use for her adoption. Thereafter, Nery paid Sampana P100,000.00, in installment: (a) P10,000.00
on 10 September 2008; (b) P50,000.00 on 2 October 2008; and (c) P40,000.00 on 17 November 2008. Nery no longer
asked for receipts since she trusted Sampana.
On 14 February 2009, Sampana sent a text message informing Nery that he already filed the petition for adoption and
it was already published. Sampana further informed Nery that they needed to rehearse before the hearing.
Subsequently, Sampana told Nery that the hearing was set on 5 March 2010 in Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan. When
Nery asked why she did not receive notices from the court, Sampana claimed that her presence was no longer necessary
because the hearing was only jurisdictional. Sampana told Nery that the hearing was reset to 12 March 2010.
On 11 March 2010, Nery inquired from Branch 11 of Malolos, Bulacan about the status of the petition for adoption
and discovered that there was no such petition filed in the court. Thus, in the afternoon of the same day, Nery met
Sampana and sought the reimbursement of the P100,000.00 she paid him. Sampana agreed, but said that he would
deduct the filing fee worth P12,000.00. Nery insisted that the filing fee should not be deducted, since the petition for
adoption was never filed. Thereafter, Nery repeatedly demanded for the reimbursement of the P100,000.00 from
Sampana, but the demands were left unheeded.
In an Order, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), stated that Sampana
failed to file his answer to the complaint and to appear during the mandatory conference. Thus, both parties were
directed to submit their position papers.
In his position paper, Sampana admitted receiving "one package fee" from Nery for both cases of annulment of
marriage and adoption. Sampana alleged that he initially frowned upon the proposed adoption because of the old age,
civil status and nationality of the alien adopter, but Nery insisted on being adopted. Thus, Sampana suggested that "if
the [alien] adopter would be married to a close relative of [Nery], the intended [adoption by an alien] could be
possible." Sampana, then, required Nery to submit the documents, including the marriage contracts and the
certification of the alien's qualification to adopt from the Japanese Embassy (certification). Nery furnished the blurred
marriage contract, but not the certification. Sampana alleged that he prepared the petition for adoption but did not file
it because he was still waiting for the certification.
Sampana denied that he misled Nery as to the filing of the petition for adoption. Sampana claimed that Nery could
have mistaken the proceeding for the annulment case with the petition for adoption, and that the annulment case could
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have overshadowed the adoption case. In any case, Sampana committed to refund the amount Nery paid him, after
deducting his legal services and actual expenses.
On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved IBP Commissioner Antiquiera's report in
finding Sampana guilty of malpractice for making Nery believe that he already filed the petition for adoption and for
failing to file the petition despite receiving his legal fees. Thus, Sampana was meted with a penalty of three (3) months
suspension from the practice of law.
G.R. No. 188801
Castro v. Greogorio
October 15, 2014
Leonen, J.
FACTS: Rosario and Jose allegedly got married in Laoag City. They had a child which only lived for nine days due
to a heart d. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple of months because of the incompatibilities between them.They
briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to Joanne a year later.
Jose filed a petition for adoption before the RTC of Batac, Ilocos Norte. He alleged that Jed and Regina were his
illegitimate children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio, whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper. Jose
was said to be living with Jed and Regina temporarily in Batac, Ilocos Norte. The children have allegedly been in his
custody since Lilibeth’s death in July 1995. RTC-Batac granted the adoption.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IBP's findings were correct?
HELD:
Partly. The recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors is well-taken, except as to the penalty.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to
the client's cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless
of importance.
In the present case, Sampana admitted that he received "one package fee" for both cases of annulment and adoption.
Despite receiving this fee, he unjustifiably failed to file the petition for adoption and fell short of his duty of due
diligence and candor to his client. Sampana's proffered excuse of waiting for the certification before filing the petition
for adoption is disingenuous and flimsy. Under the Domestic Adoption Act provision, which Sampana suggested, the
alien adopter can jointly adopt a relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of his/her Filipino spouse,
and the certification of the alien's qualification to adopt is waived.
Having no valid reason not to file the petition for adoption, Sampana misinformed Nery of the status of the petition.
He then conceded that the annulment case overshadowed the petition for adoption. Verily, Sampana neglected the
legal matter entrusted to him. He even kept the money given him, in violation of the Code's mandate to deliver the
client's funds upon demand. A lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him gives rise to the
presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use, in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client
and of the public confidence in the legal profession.
This is not the first administrative case filed against Sampana. In Lising v. Sampana, we already found Sampana guilty
of his unethical and illegal act relative to his double sale of a parcel of land. We imposed upon him the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year and warned him that a repetition of a similar act shall be dealt
with more severely. In Rollon v. Naraval, we imposed upon the respondent therein the penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for two (2) years for failing to render any legal service after receiving the filing and partial service fee.
Thus, considering the serious consequence of disbarment and the previous rulings of this Court, we deem it proper to
increase the penalty for Sampana's malpractice and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility to suspension
from the practice of law for three (3) years.
Jose died. On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition seeking to annul Jed and Regina’s adoption.
Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the adoption sometime in 2005.They alleged fraud in the birth
certificates of Jed and Regina and that no notice was given by the RTC to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption.
Rosario and Joanne argue that they should have been given notice by the trial court of the adoption, as adoption laws
require their consent as a requisite in the proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rosario and Joanne’s consent were required in the adoption
HELD:
YES. For the adoption to be valid, Rosario and Joanne’s consent were required under the Republic Act No. 8552,
Rosario being the wife and Joanne being Jose’s child over 10years old.
The law on adoption (RA8552) requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only
the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.The provision is mandatory. As the child to be
adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule
also insures harmony between the spouses.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite their
de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her consent to the
adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario’s consent. His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent
in her name cannot be considered compliance with the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the
trial court of the proceedings, she would have had a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit.
Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older. The consent of the
adopter’s other children is necessary as it ensures harmony among the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts
the other children on notice that they will have to share their parent’s love and care, as well as their future legitimes,
with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario’s legitimate child and that she was over 10 years old at the time of
the adoption proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.
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To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court that he and Rosario were childless, thereby
preventing Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the adoption
was not valid.
Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father died on October 26, 1987, or only less
than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained finality. As such, it was error for
the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law.
Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their
substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of
procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive statutory rights.Since the trial court failed to personally
serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.
G.R. No. 192531
Bartolome v. SSS
November 12, 2014
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS: John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.,
on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the government's
Employees' Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel
whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely death the following day.
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, John’s biological
mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social
Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10,
2009 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because you are no longer considered as the
parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents you submitted
to us.
The denial was appealed to the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS
La Union Branch.
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioner’s entitlement to the death
benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered John’s primary beneficiary. As
culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather,
Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag
City dated February 4, 1985, which decree of adoption attained finality. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the ECC. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: ARE THE BIOLOGICAL PARENTS OF THE COVERED, BUT LEGALLY ADOPTED, EMPLOYEE
CONSIDERED SECONDARY BENEFICIARIES AND, THUS, ENTITLED, IN APPROPRIATE
CASES, TO RECEIVE THE BENEFITS UNDER THE ECP?
HELD:
The petition is meritorious. The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record.
137
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in view of John’s
work-related demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended, which
reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - As used in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the
primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on
dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary
beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary
beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly
income benefit.
ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:
RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition.
(a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined at the time of employee’s death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee’s death until he remarries;
and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried not
gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated
and incapable of self - support due to physicalor mental defect which is congenital or acquired during
minority; Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a
primary beneficiary only when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for
monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged natural children,
they shall be counted from the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:
(1) The legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the employee for regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully employed, and
not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable of self
- support due to physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority.
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as amended, it is at once
apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167
of the Code an interpretation not contemplated by the provision. We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on
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Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the
Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."
When Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental authority over John was
severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when
the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4)
years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such circumstance,
parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account
Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of
adoption, who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a novel concept.
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the parental
authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be
restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights and obligations of the
adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished.
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is concerned. The
manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the grounds for rescission, justifies the retention
of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental
authority in favor of the biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to
fend for himself at such a tender age.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption,
the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological
parents, in some instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the governing
provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents and
relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate of their child
who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form
part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy
on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.
In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain obligations, which,
We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s
adoptive parent
Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282,
otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for work-related deaths
138
or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in
PD 626, John’s deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered
petitioner as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during John’s
minority, the restoration of petitioner's parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and John’s
clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death
benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
HABEAS CORPUS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Definition and Nature or Scope
Requisites for Application
Disallowance or Discharge of Writ
Preliminary Citation v. Writ
The return: when evidence; when plea
G.R. No. 139789
Ilusorio v. Bildner
May 12, 2000
Pardo, J.
FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age who possessed extensive property valued millions of pesos. He
is married to Erlinda Kalaw. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at
Urdaneta Condominium, Makati City when he is in Manila, and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he
is in Baguio City, while Erlinda lived in Antipolo City. On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano's arrival from the
United States, he stayed with Erlinda in Antipolo City for about five months. During that period, his health deteriorated
allegedly because of an overdose of medicine that was given to him by Erlinda. On May 31, 1998, from Baguio City,
Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City. Instead he lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati City. Consequently,
Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of Potenciano. After due
hearing, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, but Erlinda was given visitation rights. Both parties elevated the
case to this Court. Erlinda sought the reversal of the dismissal of her petition, while Potenciano wanted to annul the
visitation rights of Erlinda.
This Court ruled that the evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio's liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is
about 86 years of age, or under medication, does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of
mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. Being of
sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his
residence and the people he opts to see or live with. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice,
Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived
of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. Finally, no court is
empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond
judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman's free choice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is warranted in this case
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HELD:
No. As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which
the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to
be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the
restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later
become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best
and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and
to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom
of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s
liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or
under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age
or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. LibLex
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan
January 28, 2003
The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner. The general rule that habeas
corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issue the same applies, because petitioner is under detention pursuant to
the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the filing by the Ombudsman of the amended
information for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to
the authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant for his arrest had been issued.
Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for asserting one’s right to bail. It cannot be
availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has
not abused such discretion in refusing to grant bail, or has not even exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is
to file an application for bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow hearings thereon to
proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified but would also preempt the Sandiganbayan’s
resolution of the pending application for bail of petitioner. The recourse of petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the
hearing on his application for bail.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his liberty.
G.R. No. 148468
circumstances, habeas corpus, may be granted by the courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to
a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as “the fundamental instrument for
safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action” due to “its ability to cut through the barriers
of form and procedural mazes.”
Callejo, Sr., J.
G.R. No. 147780
FACTS: Several criminal complaints against Joseph Estrada and Atty. Edward Serapio, together with other persons,
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. The filing of the complaints arose when Gov. Singson publicly accused
President Joseph Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities such as the operation on the illegal
numbers game known as jueteng. Before the Sandiganbayan, several Informations were filed against President Estrada
charging Joseph Estrada with plunder. An Amended Information was filed charging Estrada and several co-accused
including Serapio with plunder. No bail was recommended. Before the arraignment, Serapio filed a series of motions
and/or petitions before the Sandiganbayan, among which are as follows: (1) petition for bail; (2) motion to quash
amended information; and (3) petition for habeas corpus on the ground that the delay in proceeding with the bail
hearing was caused by the prosecution, thus, prosecution is deemed to have waive its right to question the propriety
of grant of bail.
Serapio also assailed the decision of the Sandiganbayan in allowing the joint hearing of petitioner’s petition for bail
with that of President Estrada and Jinggoy’s petition for bail.
ISSUE: Whether or not Serapio was deprived of his right to due process and should be released from detention via a
writ of habeas corpus.
HELD:
No. As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty
in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so. In exceptional
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Lacson v. Perez
May 10, 2001
Melo, J.
FACTS: On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob armed with explosives,
firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons" assaulting and attempting to break into
Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region.
She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and
promoters of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected.
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a "state of rebellion," which allegedly gave a semblance
of legality to the arrests, the following four related petitions were filed before the Court –
1.
G. R. No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus, and habeas corpus (with an urgent application for
the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) filed by Panfilio M.
Lacson, Michael Ray B. Aquino, and Cezar O. Mancao;
2.
G. R. No. 147781 for mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, with prayer for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with
prayer for a temporary restraining order filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago;
3.
G. R. No. 147799 for prohibition and injunction with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order filed by Ronaldo A. Lumbao; and
4.
G. R. No. 147810 for certiorari and prohibition filed by the political party Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino.
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All the foregoing petitions assail the declaration of a state of rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the
warrantless
arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law.
Significantly, on May 6, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a "state of
rebellion" in Metro Manila. Accordingly, the instant petitions have been rendered moot and academic.
As to petitioners' claim that the proclamation of a "state of rebellion" is being used by the authorities to justify
warrantless arrests, the Secretary of Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons in
connection with the "rebellion." He states that what is extant are general instructions to law enforcement officers and
military agencies to implement Proclamation No. 38. Indeed, as stated in respondents' Joint Comments:
[I]t is already the declared intention of the Justice Department and police authorities to obtain regular
warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001 which means
that preliminary investigations will henceforth be conducted.
ISSUE: Whether their petitions will prosper
HELD:
No. In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected
of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The
warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a "state of rebellion."
Moreover, petitioners' contention in G. R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition), 147781 (Defensor-Santiago Petition), and
147799 (Lumbao Petition) that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant do not justify their
resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest
is not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. Such an individual may ask for a preliminary
investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where he may adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit
himself to inquest proceedings to determine whether or not he should remain under custody and correspondingly be
charged in court. Further, a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities
within the periods provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, otherwise the arresting officer could be held
liable for delay in the delivery of detained persons. Should the detention be without legal ground, the person arrested
can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is without prejudice to his filing an action for damages
against the arresting officer under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies
which they can avail themselves of, thereby making the prayer for prohibition and mandamus improper at this time.
Aside from the foregoing reasons, several considerations likewise inevitably call for the dismissal of the petitions at
bar.
G.R. No. 147780 (Lacson Petition)
In connection with their alleged impending warrantless arrest, petitioners Lacson, Aquino, and mancao pray that the
"appropriate court before whom the informations against petitioners are filed be directed to desist from arraigning and
proceeding with the trial of the case, until the instant petition is finally resolved."
prosecution conducted in accordance with the Rules of Court, for by that time any arrest would have been in pursuant
of a duly issued warrant.
As regards petitioners' prayer that the hold departure orders issued against them be declared null and void ab initio, it
is to be noted that petitioners are not directly assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders in their petition.
They are not even expressing intention to leave the country in the near future. The prayer to set aside the same must
be made in proper proceedings initiated for that purpose.
Anent petitioners' allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of their application for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, it is manifest that the writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unlawful
restraint
G.R. No. 147781(Defensor-Santiago Petition)
The petition herein is denominated by petitioner Defensor-Santiago as one for mandamus. It is basic in matters relating
to petitions for mandamus that the legal right of the petitioner to the performance of a particular act which is sought
to be compelled must be clear and complete. Mandamus will not issue unless the right to relief is clear at the time of
the award. Up to the present time, petitioner Defensor Santiago has not shown that she is in imminent danger of being
arrested without a warrant. In point of fact, the authorities have categorically stated that petitioner will not be arrested
without a warrant.
G.R. No. 147810
Petitioner Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino is not a real party-in-interest. The rule requires that a party must show a
personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to
warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers in his behalf.
Here, petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify resort to the Court. Petitioner is a
juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged
that its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of
rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal right has been invaded or infringed, or
whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement.
At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that its right to
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the declaration of a "state of rebellion" and that said
proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the Constitution.
However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little comfort to petitioner, this Court not having
jurisdiction in the first instance over such a petition. Section 5[1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original
jurisdiction of the Court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
This relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date, no complaints or charges have been filed against any
of the petitioners for any crime. And in the event that the same are later filed, this Court cannot enjoin criminal
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G.R. No. 175864
Sangca v. City Prosecutor of Cebu
June 8, 2007
Ynares – Santiago, J.
FACTS: PDEA charged Lovely Impal Adam with violation of RA 9165. The inquest prosecutor recommended the
dismissal of the case but was disapproved by the City Prosecutor. Consequently, an Information charging Adam with
violation of Section 5, Article 2 of R.A. No. 9165 was filed before RTC.
On Petition for Review before the Department of Justice, Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez found no probable cause to
hold Adam liable for the offense charged. The Justice Secretary then directed the City Prosecutor of Cebu City to
withdraw the Information. PDEA filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the Justice Secretary on
December 8, 2006.
On January 4, 2007, petitioner Anisah Impal Sangca filed the instant petition praying for the issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus and the release of Lovely Impal Adam.
Finding that Adam could not be held liable for the crime charged, Judge Ingles issued an Order on January 26, 2007
granting the Motion to Withdraw Information and ordering the release of the accused, unless otherwise held for
another valid Ground.
ISSUE: Whether or not petition for habeas corpus may be availed of in case of warrantless arrests where there is
pending Motion to Withdraw Information before the trial court.
HELD:
Yes. A Writ of Habeas Corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which any person is deprived
of his liberty, or in which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled to it. Its essential
object and purpose is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person from it if such restraint
is illegal. The singular function of a petition for habeas corpus is to protect and secure the basic freedom of physical
liberty.
In the instant case, records show that Adam has been released upon order of the trial judge on January 26, 2007.
Therefore, the petition has become moot.
G.R. No. 160739
Mangila v. Pangilinan
July 17, 2013
Bersamin, J.
FACTS: Seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four others with syndicated estafa, in
relation to PD No. 1689, and with violations of Section 7(b) of RA No. 8042 were filed in the Municipal Trial Court.
The complaints arose from the recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila and the others to the private
complainants as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of fees from private
complainants without lawful authority from the POEA. After preliminary investigation, the trial judge issued the
warrant of arrest. Mangila was arrested and detained.
Claiming that the trial judge did not have the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation; that the preliminary
investigation he conducted was not yet completed when he issued the warrant of arrest; and that the issuance of the
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warrant of arrest was without sufficient justification or without a prior finding of probable cause, Mangila filed in the
CA a petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from detention. Her petition averred that the remedy of habeas
corpus was available to her because she could no longer file a motion to quash or a motion to recall the warrant of
arrest considering that Judge Pangilinan had already forwarded the entire records of the case to the City Prosecutor
who had no authority to lift or recall the warrant. CA denied the petition. MR was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not habeas corpus was the proper remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from detention?
HELD:
No. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint.Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted
for the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his detention
may be inquired into and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks
relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties
before the court are the petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to
be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if
the petitioner fails to show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty," is a prerogative writ which does not issue as a
matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court or judge. It is, however, a writ of right on proper formalities
being made by proof. Resort to the writ is not to inquire into the criminal act of which a complaint is made but unto
the right of liberty, notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from illegal restraint. The
primary, if not the only object of the writ of habeas corpus ad subjuciendum, is to determine the legality of the restraint
under which a person is held.
The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to
be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not issue where the
person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record.
With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ
of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. This is because the
restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process, could not be inquired into through habeas corpus.
The writ of habeas corpus secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined
by a court of justice, and to have ascertained if he is held under lawful authority. The function of habeas corpus, where
the party who has appealed to its aid is in custody under process, does not extend beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction
of the court by which it was issued and the validity of the process upon its face. It is not a writ of error.
Mangila had no need to seek the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to secure her release from detention. Her proper
recourse was to bring the supposed irregularities attending the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the
issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention of the City Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the most
direct access to the entire records of the case, including the warrant of arrest, following Judge Pangilinan’s transmittal
of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action. The writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for
another available remedy.
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G.R. No. 210636
Tujan – Militante v. Cada - Deapera
July 28, 2014
known as the Rules on Custody of Minors and Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. According to the
CA, the rules on summons contemplated in ordinary civil actions have no place in petitions for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus, it being a special proceeding.
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS: On March 24, 2011, respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed before the RTC-Caloocan a verified petition
for writ of habeas corpus. In the said petition, respondent demanded the immediate issuance of the special writ,
directing petitioner Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante to produce before the court respondent's biological daughter, minor
Criselda M. Cada (Criselda), and to return to her the custody over the child. Additionally, respondent indicated that
petitioner has three (3) known addresses where she can be served with summons and other court processes, to wit: (1)
24 Bangkal St., Amparo Village, Novaliches, Caloocan City; (2) 118B K9Street, Kamias, Quezon City; and (3) her
office at the Ombudsman-Office of the Special Prosecutor, 5th Floor, Sandiganbayan, Centennial Building,
Commonwealth Avenue cor. Batasan Road, Quezon City.
The next day, on March 25, 2011, the RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of habeas corpus, ordering petitioner to bring the
child to court on March 28, 2011. Despite diligent efforts and several attempts, however, the Sheriff was unsuccessful
in personally serving petitioner copies of the habeas corpus petition and of the writ. Instead, on March 29, 2011, the
Sheriff left copies of the court processes at petitioner’s Caloocan residence, as witnessed by respondent’s counsel and
barangay officials. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to appear at the scheduled hearings before the RTC-Caloocan.
Meanwhile, on March 31, 2011, petitioner filed a Petition for Guardianship over the person of Criselda before the
RTC-Quezon City. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition for guardianship on the ground of litis pendentia,
among others. Thereafter, or on June 3, 2011, respondent filed a criminal case for kidnapping before the Office of the
City Prosecutor – Quezon City against petitioner and her counsel. RTC-Quezon City granted respondent’s motion to
dismiss.
Raquel moved for the ex-parte issuance of an alias writ of habeas corpus before the RTC-Caloocan, which was granted
by the trial court on August 8, 2011. Petitioner, by way of special appearance, moved for the quashal of the writ and
prayed before the RTC Caloocan for the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition, claiming, among others, that she was
not personally served with summons.
RTC-Caloocan issued an Order denying petitioner’s omnibus motion, citing Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, where the Court
held that a writ of habeas corpus, being an extraordinary process requiring immediate proceeding and action, plays a
role somewhat comparable to a summons in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the Court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent, as petitioner herein.
Moreover, personal service, the RTC said, does not necessarily require that service be made exclusively at petitioner’s
given address, for service may be made elsewhere or wherever she may be found for as long as she was handed a copy
of the court process in person by anyone authorized by law. Since the sheriff was able to personally serve petitioner a
copy of the writ, albeit in Quezon City, the RTC-Caloocan validly acquired jurisdiction over her person.11 The
dispositive portion of the Order reads:
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. It held that jurisdiction was properly laid when respondent filed the habeas
corpus petition before the designated Family Court in Caloocan City. Anent the RTC-Caloocan’s jurisdiction, the
appellate court ruled that service of summons is not required under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, otherwise
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ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus petition filed by respondent; and
2.
Assuming arguendo it does, whether or not it validly acquired jurisdiction over petitioner and the person of
Criselda.
HELD:
1.
The RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding
In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Section 20 of
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. As provided:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving
custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial
region to which the Family Court belongs.
However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the presiding judge of the Family Court,
provided, however, that the regular court shall refer the case to the Family Court as soon as its presiding judge returns
to duty.
The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in places where there are no Family Courts.
The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the judicial region where they belong.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court
or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and
decision on the merits.
Upon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on custody of minors. The appellate court, or the member
thereof, issuing the writ shall be furnished a copy of the decision. (emphasis added)
Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus, may therefore be filed with any of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is
sought. On this point, Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129), otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, finds relevance. As in Section 13, it is indubitable that the filing of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus before a family court in any of the cities enumerated is proper as long as the writ
is sought to be enforced within the National Capital Judicial Region, as here.
In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and
Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented
in Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.
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2.
As regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons was improperly served, suffice it to state that service of
summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court or A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.
As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons, in ordinary civil
actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.
G.R. No. 197597
Datukan Malang Salibo v. The Warden
April 8, 2015
Leonen, J.
FACTS: From November 7, 2009, up to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo, for brevity) and other
Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj Pilgrimage. While in Saudi, Salibo visited and prayed in the
cities of Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah. He returned to the Philippines on December 20, 2009.
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station in Maguindanao suspected him to
be Butukan S. Malang. The said Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for allegedly participating
in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in such
pending case.
Salibo presented himself before the said police officers to clear his name and explained that he was not Butukan S.
Malang and that he could not have participated in the Maguindanao Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia when
the same happened. To support his allegations, he presented pertinent portions of his passport, his boarding passes and
other documents to prove that a certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to December
19, 2009.
The police officers assured him that they would not arrest him because he was not the suspected Malang. Afterwards,
however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page two of his passport that evidenced his departure for
Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009. They detained him at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about three days before
transferring him to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Cotabato City, where he was detained for
another 10 days. While in Cotabato, the CIDG allegedly made him sign and affix his thumbprint on documents.
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City, where he is currently detained.
Salibo then filed an urgent petition for habeas corpus on September 17, 2010, questioning the legality of his detention
and depravation of his liberty. He maintained that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. The CA issued, in a
resolution, a writ of habeas corpus and ordered the warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex to file a return of the writ
one day before the scheduled hearing and produce the person of Salibo at the 10:00am hearing set on September 27,
2010.
On September 27, 2010, the jail guards brought Salibo before the trial court, but the warden failed to file a return one
day before the hearing. He also appeared without counsel during the hearing. Faced with such circumstances, the trial
court canceled the hearing and reset it to September 29, 2010, at 2:00pm. On September 28, 2010, the warden filed
the return but during the September 29, 2010 hearing on the return, the warden appeared with Atty. Romeo L. Villante,
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Jr., Legal Officer/Administering Officer of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology. Salibo questioned his
appearance on behalf of the warden and argued that only the OSG has the authority to appear on behalf of a respondent
in a habeas corpus proceeding. The September 29, 2010 hearing, therefore was cancelled and the hearing was again
reset on October 1, 2010.
The return was finally heard on October 1, 2010. Assistant Solicitors Noel Salo and Isar Pepito appeared on behalf of
the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex and argued that the petition for Habeas Corpus should be dismissed, since
Salibo was charged under a valid information and warrant of arrest, a petition for habeas corpus was “no longer
availing.” Salibo countered that the Information, Amended Information, Warrant of Arrest and Alias Warrant of Arrest
all point to Butukan S. Malang, and not Datukan Malang Salibo, as accused. He reiterated his presence at Saudi Arabia
the day the massacre occurred.
The RTC found that Salibo was not “judicially charged” under any resolution, information or amended information.
It accepted Salibo’s defense that it was Butukan S. Malang that was charged and not Datukan Malang Salibo. He was
also not validly arrested as there was no valid warrant or alias warrant of arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo,
the trial court ruled, was not restrained of his liberty under process issued by a court. The RTC is likewise convinced
that Datukan Malang Salibo is not the Butukan S. Malang charged with murder in connection with the Maguindanao
Massacre, and the court took cognizance of the established fact that he was out of the country on the day of the said
massacre, as evidenced by a Flight Manifest from the BOI and his Saudi Arabian Airlines Ticket. The RTC granted
Salibo’s petition for Habeas Corpus.
On appeal to the CA, the CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the petition for Habeas Corpus. The CA found
that Salibo’s arrest was made under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest. Even assuming that Datukan Malang
Salibo was not the same Butukan S. Malang, the CA said that “the orderly course of trial must be pursued and the
usual remedies exhausted before the writ of habeas corpus may be invoked.” Salibo filed a motion for reconsideration
but was denied.
Hence, this petition. Salibo maintains, still, his separate identity from the Butukan S. Malang charged with several
counts of murder, that he is being illegally deprived of his liberty and that his proper remedy is a petition for Habeas
Corpus. As for the respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged in court. Even assuming
that he is not Butukan S. Malang in the warrants, Salibo should have pursued the ordinary remedy of a Motion to
Quash Information, not a petition for Habeas Corpus.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the RTC decision on the petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the CA;
2.
Whether or not Salibo’s filing of a petition for Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy.
HELD:
1.
The court held in the affirmative. The court held that respondent Warden correctly appealed the decision
regarding the petition for the issuance of the writ of Habeas Corpus before the CA. Should the court issuing
the writ designate a lower court to which the writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide
the petition of habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court acquires the power and authority
to determine the merits of the petition for habeas corpus. Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision
appealable to the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.
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2.
The court held in the affirmative. Called the “great writ of liberty,” the writ of habeas corpus was devised
and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and
only sufficient defense of personal freedom. The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary and summary in
nature, consistent with the law’s zealous regard for personal liberty. Rule 102, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court
states that the writ of habeas corpus “shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled thereto.” The primary purpose of the writ is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint
as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense as to entitle a person to the efficient remedy of
habeas corpus. It may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy or when there is an alleged violation of the liberty of
abode. Habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in the right
to liberty in Art. III, Sec. 1. Habeas corpus being a remedy for a constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious
and deliberate level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty will not further be curtailed in the labyrinth of
other processes.
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained
under a lawful process or order of the court. The restraint has become legal and the remedy of habeas corpus is
rendered moot and academic; this is provided in Rule 102, Sec. 4.
However, in this present case, petitioner Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense.
He was not restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally deprived of his liberty, and,
therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas Corpus. As found in the lower courts, the warrants of
arrest issued by the RTC charged and accused Batukan S. Malang and not Datukan Malang Salibo of the 57 counts of
murder related to the Maguindanao Massacre. Salibo was also not validly arrested without a warrant. He was not
caught in flagrante delicto, or in a hot pursuit, nor was he an escapee. The police officers, therefore, had no probable
cause to arrest petitioner Salibo without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process of
law, for which a habeas corpus may be issued.
Should the government choose to prosecute Salibo, it must pursue the proper remedies against him as provided in the
Rules. Until then, the court rules that Salibo is illegally deprived of liberty and his petition for habeas corpus must be
granted.
The petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The CA decision dismissing the petition for habeas corpus is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Warden is ORDERED to immediately RELEASE Datukan Malang Salibo.
CHANGE OF NAME v. CORRECTION / CANCELLATION OF ENTRIES
As amended RA9048 and RA10172
Rule 103 v. Rule 108
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Venue v. Jurisdiction
Contents of Petition / Grounds
Hearing
Judgment
RA 9048 and its implementing rules
G.R. No. 130277
Eleosida v. Civil Registrar of QC
May 9, 2002
Puno, J.
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the RTC of Quezon City dismissing motu propio
the petition for Ma. Lourdes Eleosida to correct some entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian.
Petitioner seeks to correct in the birth cert. of her son the following:
The surname “Borbon” should be changed to Eleosida (since the parents were never married; the child is:
1.
illegitimate and, therefore, should follow the mother’s surname;
2.
The date of the wedding should be blank;
3.
Petitioner’s name should be Ma. Lourdes Eleosida (instead of Borbon).
No opposition was made to this petition.
RTC, however, dismissed it on the basis that only clerical errors (CLERICAL ERRORS) of a harmless and innocuous
nature like misspelled name, occupation of the parents, etc. may be subject of judicial order authorizing changes or
corrections and not as may affect the civil status, nationality or citizenship of the person (substantial/material
change/error) involved.
It ruled that:
In the present case, it is very clear that the changes desired by the petitioner will ultimately affect the
CIVIL STATUS OF CHARLES CHRISTIAN, as she wants the Court to Direct the Civil Registrar of
Quezon City to substitute her maiden name, ELEOSIDA, with that of BORBON; to delete the
information supplied in ITEM 12, respecting the date and place of marriage of parents, on the ground
that she was never married to respondent CARLOS VILLENA BORBON and amend the information in
ITEM 14, respecting the name of the informant, from MA. LOURDES E. BORBON to MA. LOURDES
B. ELEOSIDA, and is indicative of petitioner's intention and device to establish that CHARLES
CHRISTIAN's civil status as ILLEGITIMATE.
Petitioner fled the instant petition for review raising the issue of whether corrections of entries in the certificate of live
birth pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be allowed even if
the errors to be corrected are substantial and not merely clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the change of name may be granted even the same is substantial.
The same request to delete the "married" status of their parents from their respective birth certificates was made by
Carlito's siblings.
HELD:
The Court ruled in the affirmative.
With respect to the birth certificates of Carlito's children, he prayed that the date of his and his wife's marriage be
corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their marriage certificate.
The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in
the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our
ruling in Republic vs. Valencia where we held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the
true facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given
opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.
Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petition in which it was additionally prayed that Carlito's second name of "John" be
deleted from his record of birth; and that the name and citizenship of Carlito's father in his marriage certificate be
corrected from "John Kho" to "Juan Kho" and "Filipino" to "Chinese", respectively. As required, the petition was
published for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation, after which it was set for hearing.
Respondents presented documentary evidence showing compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the
petition. During the same hearing, an additional correction in the birth certificates of Carlito's children was requested
to the effect that the first name of their mother be rectified from "Maribel" to "Marivel".
It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not merely clerical or harmless errors
but substantial ones as they would affect the status of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as
the legitimacy of their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under Rule 108 in
accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the appropriate procedural requirements are
complied with. The records show that upon receipt of the petition, the trial court issued a notice of hearing setting the
hearing on June 26, 1997 at 8:30 in the morning at Room 118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City. The trial court likewise
ordered the publication of said notice once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
and its posting in selected places in Metro Manila. The notice stated that the petitioner shall prove her petition during
said hearing and all other persons having or claiming any interest thereon shall also appear and show if there is any
reason why the petition should not be granted. Respondents Carlos Villena Borbon, the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City and the Solicitor General were all furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing together with a copy of
the petition. On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued a second order giving the petitioner an opportunity to show
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements and to present evidence during the hearing set on July 23, 1997. The
foregoing satisfy all the requirements of Rule 108 to make it an adversary proceeding. It was therefore an error for the
trial court to dismiss the petition motu proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support her
petition and all the other persons who have an interest over the matter to oppose the same.
On September 4, 2002, the trial court directed the local civil registrar of Butuan City to correct the entries in the record
of birth of Carlito, as follows: (1) change the citizenship of his mother from "Chinese" to "Filipino"; (2) delete "John"
from his name; and (3) delete the word "married" opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last correction was
ordered to be effected likewise in the birth certificates of Carilto's siblings.
Republic v. Kho
June 29, 2007
CA denied petitioner's appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court. The CA found that Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which outlines the proper procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, was
observed in the case.
G.R. No. 170340
Carpio – Morales, J.
FACTS: On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for
correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth certificates. Carlito
also asked the court in behalf of his minor children to order the correction of some entries in their birth certificates.
In the case of Carlito, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of the citizenship of his mother to "Filipino"
instead of "Chinese", as well as the deletion of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of marriage of parents"
because his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco, were allegedly not legally married.
145
Additionally, the trial court ordered the correction of the birth certificates of the minor children of Carlito to reflect
the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel Dogmoc as January 21, 2000, instead of April 27, 1989, and the name
"Maribel" as "Marivel".
Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, faulting the trial court in granting the
petition for correction of entries in the subject documents despite the failure of respondents to implead the minors'
mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to offer sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with regard to
the questioned "married" status of Carlito and his siblings' parents, and the latter's citizenship.
Petitioner also faulted the trial court for ordering the change of the name "Carlito John Kho" to "Carlito Kho" for noncompliance with jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.
Further, the CA ruled that although Carlito failed to observe the requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, he
had complied nonetheless with the jurisdictional requirements for correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. The petition for correction of entry in Carlito's birth record, it noted, falls under letter "o"
of the enumeration under Section 2 of Rule 108.
In the present petition, petitioner contends that since the changes sought by respondents were substantial in nature,
they could only be granted through an adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel and
respondents' parents, should have been notified or impleaded.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Kho‘s request for change in the details of their birth certificate requires an adversarial
proceeding?
HELD:
It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of Carlito's mother as it appeared
in his birth certificate and delete the "married" status of Carlito's parents in his and his siblings' respective birth
certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical
errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail substantial and controversial amendments.
For the change involving the nationality of Carlito's mother as reflected in his birth certificate is a grave and important
matter that has a bearing and effect on the citizenship and nationality not only of the parents, but also of the offspring.
Further, the deletion of the entry that Carlito's and his siblings' parents were "married" alters their filiation from
"legitimate" to "illegitimate", with significant implications on their successional and other rights.
Clearly, the changes sought can only be granted in an adversary proceeding. However, this Court ruled, and has since
repeatedly ruled, that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule
108. This court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true
facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding as follows:
"One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to
contest it."
The enactment of Republic Act No. 9048, otherwise known as "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR
MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE
CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF JUDICIAL ORDER," has been considered to lend legislative affirmation
to the judicial precedence that substantial corrections to the civil status of persons recorded in the civil registry may
be effected through the filing of a petition under Rule 108.
The obvious effect of Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative correction of clerical or
typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the
correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings.
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate adversary proceeding
necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition.
The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but
were inadvertently left out.
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person. The decision on
the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially
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through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely
all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication
of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and
decide it.
In the case, the city prosecutor who was acting as representative of the OSG did not raise any objection to the noninclusion of Marivel and Carlito's parents as parties to the proceeding. Parenthetically, it seems highly improbable that
Marivel was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in her children's birth certificates, especially since the
notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the residence she shared with Carlito and the children.
Petition for Change on Name of Julian Lim Carulasan Wang
G.R. No. 159966
March 30, 2005
Tinga, J.
FACTS: Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and
Sing--Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. Eventually they got married on September 22, 1998 so
they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. The parents plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let the child study
there together with his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore.
On September 22, 2002, the mother, representing the minor child, filed a petition for the change of name and/or
correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and have his registered
name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
Petitioners reasons that:
1.
In Singapore, maiden surname of the mother is not carried in a person’s name so Julian will be discriminated
2.
Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different
surnames
3.
“Carulasan” sounds funny in Singapore’s Mandarin language since they do not have the letter “R” but if
there is, they pronounce it as “L.”
RTC denied the petition because the reason given for change of name did not fall within grounds recognized by law.
The change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since the state has an interest in the name of a person,
names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the bearers.Under Art 174 of the FC, legitimate children have the
right to bear the surnames of the father and mother, and there is no reason why this right should now be taken from
Julian, considering he is still a minor. When Julian reaches the age of majority, then he can decide on whether he will
change his name by dropping his middle name.
RTC denied the MR. To allow the requested change of name herein is tantamount to giving due recognition of
Singapore laws instead of Philippine laws which is controlling.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before SC. Petitioner argued that the convenience of the child is a valid reason
for changing the name as long as it will not prejudice the State and others. The middle name “Carulasan” will cause
him undue embarrassment.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the middle name of the minor child should be dropped on the grounds presented by petitioner
HELD:
NO. SC ruled that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or
civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. The
State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of
name is a privilege and not a right.
The touchstone for the grant of change of name is that there be “proper and reasonable cause.” Among the grounds
for change of name which have been held valid are:
a.
when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
b.
when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation;
c.
when the change will avoid confusion;
d.
when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
alien parentage;
e.
a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; and
f.
when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for
a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound
discretion of the court.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by the petitioner for dropping his middle name is convenience. However,
how such a change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly
established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper
and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate6 from the Local Civil Registrar
of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with the following entries:
Annotation : "Late Registration"
Annotation/Remarks : "Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza on January 13, 1997"
Remarks : Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22, 1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child
shall be known as Patrick Alvin Titular Braza
Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy7 of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on April
22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition8 to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the Local Civil
Register.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said
marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners
prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the
father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all
surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and
filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this
purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by Order9 of September 6, 2007, dismissed
the petition without prejudice, it holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not
acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and
Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should
be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied, they filed the present petition for review.
Also, the petitioner is a minor and considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is
based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age
of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and
granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
G.R. No. 181174
Braza v. Civil Registrar of Neg. Occ.
December 4, 2009
Carpio – Morales, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known as "Pablito
Sicad Braza," were married1 on January 4, 1978. The union bore Ma. Cristina’s co-petitioners Paolo Josef2 and Janelle
Ann3 on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo4 on June 4, 1980.
Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.
During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began
introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina
147
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO MAY PASS UPON THE VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE AND
QUESTIONS ON LEGITIMACY EVEN IN AN ACTION TO CORRECT ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL
REGISTRAR
HELD:
The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an entry in the
civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to
correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which
is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying
or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the
occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in
which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.
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The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the marriage
between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with which
they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard
P. Edel, as witnesses. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s birth records and that the
rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.
In a petition for certiorari filed by the Republic, thru the OSG, it was alleged that there is no law allowing the change
of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision in favor of the
Republic.
Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s
marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by
Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code,
respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407
to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
ISSUE: Whether or not a correction of entries on the birth certificate of Silverio may be made
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned
only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed
before the court a quo.
G.R. No. 174689
Silverio v. Republic
October 19, 2007
Corona, J.
FACTS: On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first
name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, impleaded the civil
registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and
Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate
of live birth (birth certificate).His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and
that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man's body, he consulted several
doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation.
His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact
undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in
his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing