Memorize Arts 2, 15, 16 and 17
QUE PO LAY V. CA
March 29, 1954
J. Montemayor
Issues: Whether there was a need for a publication of the said circular to make it
effective?
Held: It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular
and regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation
should be published before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the
public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular
must first be published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such
contents including its penalties.
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant,
with costs de oficio.
TANADA VS. TUVERA
April 24, 1985 and Reso dated December 29, 1986
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish
and/or cause the publication of various Presidential Decrees (PDs), letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and
administrative orders, in the Official Gazette.
Petitioners invoked that a law, to be valid and enforceable, must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. The government argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided,” as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately
upon their approval.
The SC, in its decision in 1985, affirmed the necessity of the publication of the presidential
issuances which are of general application. Petitioners then moved for
reconsideration/clarification asserting that the clause “unless it is otherwise provided”
meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative.
ISSUE:
Whether publication is an indispensable requirement for the effectivity of the presidential
issuances in question.
YES. Publication of presidential issuances at bar is an indispensable requirement for their
effectivity despite the special provisions as to the date they are to take effect.
Art. 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.” The phrase “unless it is
otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. All statutes, including those of
local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.
In the case at bar, the SC held that all presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity. On the other hand, interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
UMALI VS. ESTANISLAO
May 29, 1992
J. Padilla
FACTS:
Congress enacted Republic Act 7167 amending section 29, paragraph (L), items (1) and
(2) (A) of the National Internal Revenue Code (adjusting the basic and additional
exemptions allowable to individuals for income tax purposes to the poverty threshold
level). The said Act was signed and approved by the President on 19 December 1991 and
published on 14 January 1992 in "Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation. On 26
December 1991, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue(CIR) promulgated Revenue
Regulations No. 1-92 stating that the regulations shall take effect on compensation
income from January 1, 1992. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the CIR
to implement RA 7167 in regard to income earned or received in 1991, and prohibition to
enjoin the CIR from implementing the revenue regulation.
Issues:
1. Whether or not R.A. 7167 took effect upon its approval by the president on December
19, 1991 or on January 30, 1992, 15 days after its publication?
2. Assuming that Republic Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992 (15 days after its
publication in “Malaya”), whether or not the said law nonetheless covers or applies to
compensation income earned or received during calendar year 1991.
Ruling:
1. R.A. 7167 took effect on January 30, 1992 after 15 days of its publication. (Tanada vs
Tuvera) The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and
not to the requirement of publication itself which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date without its previous publication. Publication is
indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen (15) day period shall be shortened or extended.
2. Yes. The Court is of the considered view that Republic Act 7167 should cover or extend
to compensation income earned or received during calendar year 1991. Sec. 29, par. [L],
Item No. 4 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides: Upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, the President shall automatically adjust not
more often than once every three years, the personal and additional exemptions taking
into account, among others, the movement in consumer price indices, levels of minimum
wages, and bare subsistence levels. The exemptions were last adjusted in 1986. The
president could have adjusted it in 1989 but did not do so. The poverty threshold level
refers to the level at the time Republic Act 7167 was enacted by Congress. The Act is a
social legislation intended to alleviate in part the present economic plight of the lower
income taxpayers. Republic Act 7167 says that the increased personal exemptions shall be
available after the law shall have become effective. These exemptions are available upon
the filing of personal income tax returns, done not later than the 15th day of April after
the end of a calendar year. Thus, under Republic Act 7167, which became effective, on 30
January 1992, the increased exemptions are literally available on or before 15 April 1992
[though not before 30 January 1992]. But these increased exemptions can be available on
15 April 1992 only in respect of compensation income earned or received during the
calendar year 1991. The personal exemptions as increased by Republic Act 7167 are not
available in respect of compensation income received during the 1990 calendar year; the
tax due in respect of said income had already accrued, and been presumably paid (The
law does not state retroactive application). The personal exemptions as increased by
Republic Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available as to compensation income received
during 1992 because it would in effect postpone the availability of the increased
exemptions to 1 January-15 April 1993. The implementing regulations collide with Section
3 of Rep. Act 7167 which states that the statute "shall take effect upon its approval”. The
revenue regulation should take effect on compensation income earned or received from 1
January 1991. Since this decision is promulgated after 15 April 1992, those taxpayers who
have already paid are entitled to refunds or credits.
FORTUNE MOTORS (PHILS.) INC. v. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, and THE COURT OF APPEALS
November 28, 1996
J. Hermosisima
FACTS: 1. Fortune Motors (Phils.) Inc. obtained 3 different loans from Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company. To secure the total obligation, petitioner mortgaged certain real
estate in favor of the bank. Due to financial constraints, petitioner failed to pay the loan
upon maturity. Metrobank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and in effect,
foreclosed the real estate mortgage.
2. The extrajudicial foreclosure was actually conducted by Senior Deputy Sheriff Pablo Y.
Sy who had sent copies of the Notice of Extrajudicial Sale to the opposing parties by
registered mail. In accordance with law, he posted copies of the Notice of Sheriff's Sale at
three conspicuous public places in Makati — the office of the Sheriff, the Assessor's Office
and the Register of Deeds in Makati. He thereafter executed the Certificates of Posting.
The said notice was in fact published in three issues of "The New Record." An affidavit of
publication was executed by Teddy F. Borres, publisher of the said newspaper.
3. Subsequently, the mortgaged property was sold at public auction to the mortgagee
bank, the highest bidder. Petitioner failed to redeem the mortgaged property within the
one-year redemption period and so, the titles thereto were consolidated in the name of
Metrobank by which token the latter was entitled to the possession of the property
mortgaged and, in fact possessed the same.
4. Petitioner then filed a complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure. The
trial court rendered judgment in favour of the petitioner.
5. Metrobank appealed to the CA to reverse the decision rendered by the lower court. CA
ruled in favour of respondent bank. Subsequently, a motion for reconsideration filed by
the petitioner was denied by CA.
6. Aggrieved by the decision of CA, petitioner appealed before the SC but was denied. As
such, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CA erred in declaring that publication of Notice of Extrajudicial
Foreclosure was valid
2. 2. Whether or not CA erred in declaring that Notices of Extrajudicial Foreclosure
and sale were duly received by the petitioner
3. 3. Whether or not CA erred in failing to adjudge the irregularities in the bidding,
posting, publication and sale of Fortune Building.
4. 4. Whether or not CA erred in rendering judgment based on presumption
RULING:
PUBLICATION OF NOTICE OF EXTRAJUDICAL FORECLOSURE WAS VALID
Petitioner’s claim: The newspaper “Daily Record” doesn’t qualify as a newspaper of
general circulation since it only reaches .004% of the population of Makati and is not the
standard contemplated by law when it refers to “newspaper of general publication”.
Furthermore, petitioner claims that it is not a daily newspaper because it is published only
once a week. Comments: With regard to the first issue, SC has already made a ruling in
the case of “Bonnevie vs CA” that to be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough
that it is
(1) published for the dissemination of local news and general information
(2) it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers
(3) it is published at regular intervals for at least 1 year before the date of publication.
Furthermore, PD 1079 do not require that the newspaper which publishes judicial notices
should be a daily newspaper. Nor is there a requirement that the newspaper should have
the largest circulation in the place of publication.
Petitioner’s claim: It was published and edited in Quezon City and not in Makati where
the foreclosed property is situated, and that, when publisher enumerated places where
said newspaper is being circulated, Makati was not mentioned.
Comments: The contention is untenable. In 1984, when the publisher’s affidavit was
executed, Makati was still part of the province of Rizal. Thus in the enumeration of places
where it was being circulated, only cities of Manila, Quezon, Caloocan, Pasay, Tagaytay,
etc were named. Furthermore as aptly reasoned by CA, the application given by the trial
court to PD 1079 is too narrow and restricted and could not have been the intention of the
said law. If the interpretation by trial court is followed, Manila Bulletin, PDI, or Philippine
Star, which all enjoy a wide circulation throughout the country, cannot publish legal
notices that would be honoured outside the place of their publication. But this is not the
interpretation given by courts. For what is important is that a paper should be in general
circulation in the place where the properties to be foreclosed are located in order that
publication may serve the purpose for which it was intended.
Petitioner’s claim: When its representative went to a newspaper stand to look for a copy
of the “New Record”, he could not find any. Comments: This allegation should not be the
basis to conclude that the newspaper "New Record" is not of general circulation. The
representative admitted that he was looking for a newspaper named “Daily Record”.
Naturally, he could not find a newspaper by that name since there is no “Daily Record”.
G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1993
Chief Justice Narvasa
Co vs Court of Appeals
By Unknown - May 08, 2014
ALBINO S. CO, petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993
Facts:
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel — and in
payment of his share of the expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated —
petitioner Albino Co delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn
against the Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of
P361,528.00. The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days
later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by
the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The
case eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged, and his being sentenced to suffer
a term of imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the
sum of P361,528.00.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals which later affirmed the decision of the
lower court. This is a petition for certiorari from the appellee under the grounds that a
check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered
by Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Anti - Bouncing Check Law. In Circular (No. 4),
dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided as follows:
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the
payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable
for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
However this was later reversed in administrative circular was subsequently
issued on August 8, 1984.
Issue:
Whether or not Co is guilty of violating BP 22 at the time of issuance of his check?
Held:
No. This was because at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1,
1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on
September 21, 1987, which the RTC's conviction was relied on, the delivery of a "rubber"
or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable
offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice.
The new circular was delivered after almost one (1) year when Albino Co hand
the "bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1, 1983.
The Court merits this case under the maxims that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines," according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive
effect, unless the contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration
that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal.
Ratio:
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar,
fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered,
the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override
the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and
discussed, negating criminal liability.
G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961
EMETERIO CUI
vs.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
CONCEPCION, J.:
Facts:
Emeterio Cui enrolled in the defendant university where plaintiff finished his law studies
in the up to and including the first semester of the fourth year. During all the school years
in which plaintiff was studying law in defendant Law College, he was awarded
scholarship grants and his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after ends of the
semester. Plaintiff left the defendant's law college and enrolled for the last semester of his
fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad Santos University graduating from the
college of law of the latter university. He applied to take the bar examination in which he
needed the transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano University. The defendant
refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87, noting the contract that he signed
which stated that in consideration of the scholarship granted to him by the University, he
waives his right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the defendant
the equivalent of the scholarship cash and followed by Memorandum No. 38 that the
Director of Private Schools issued.
Issue:
Whether or not the contract between Cui and the respondent university, whereby the
former waives his right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the
defendant the equivalent of the scholarship cash valid or not?
Held:
The contract of waiver between the plaintiff and respondent on September 10, 1951, is a
direct violation of Memorandum No. 38 and hence null and void. The contract was
contrary to sound policy and civic honesty. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No.
38, s. 1949 is sound policy. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is
understood that such scholarships are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and
other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the
recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution.
Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school.
PEOPLE VS. DONATO
J. Davide Jr.
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DONATO [198 SCRA 130; G.R. NO.79269; 5 JUN 1991]
Thursday, February 12, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2,
1986 for acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a
Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the
Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over
the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which
was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a
capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987
the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996,
942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code
as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail, which
was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once
every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a
supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and
to allow it to present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability
that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended
that:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from
detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and
presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose
identity and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00
was offered and paid for his arrest.
This however was denied. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.
Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not
a capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when
it is a capital offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the
Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution.
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion
perpetua to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to
him.
Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case (petition for habeas corpus).
Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his codetainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a
condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition
for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of
the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the
constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused
and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc., et al, v.
Feliciano
Justice Bautista
Full Text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1965/mar1965/gr_l-24022_1965.html
Facts:
On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and Corn
Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric
tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate, pursuant to the
recommendation of the National Economic Council. The President submitted said letter to his cabinet for
consideration and on December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the needed importation. On January 4,
1965, the President designated the Rice and Corn Administration as the government agency authorized
to undertake the importation. Considering that said importation, the Iloilo Palay and corn Planters
Association alleged that it is contrary to RA 3453 which prohibits the government from importing rice and
tat there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same. They said that it its illegal because it is
prohibited by RA 3452 which in Section 10 provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to
private properties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that RCA is prohibited from
doing so. According to them, RA 2207 which provides that should there be an existing or imminent
shortage in the local supply of rice of suh gravity as to constitute a national emergency and certified by
the NEC, the president may authorize such importation thru any government agency he may designate is repealed by RA 3452.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 2207 which allows importation of rice by government agency during national
emergency is repealed by RA 3452
Held:
No, RA 2207 is not repealed by RA 3452.
Section 16 of RA 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides "All laws or parts thereof inconsistent
with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.". This repealing clause is not
an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act/s that are intended to be
repealed. Rather, is is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial
conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. Such being the case, the presumption against implied
repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigre. The
failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law,
unless on irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old
laws. Here there is no inconsistency.
While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach are
different; one is by a total ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same being
applicable only to the government during normal period. Also, RA 3452 only authorizes importation during
normal times, but when there is shortage in the local supply of sucy gravity as to constitute a national
emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207. These two laws are therefore not inconsistent and so implied
repeal does not ensue.
Ting vs Ting
BENJAMIN G. TING,
Petitioner,
- versus CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING,
Respondent.
Nachura
G.R. No. 166562
March 31, 2009
Facts:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school.
They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant
with their first child. On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while
their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City
praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed
that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage,
which, however, only became manifest thereafter.
Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car
twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had
money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial
support to his family.
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable
person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care
of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week. Both presented expert
witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each others claim. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent declaring the
marriage null and void.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s decision. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,
arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case
ISSUE
1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth
under the Santos and Molina cases,
No. To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed
in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the
principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was
struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,[54] and again in Antonio v. Reyes.[55] In these cases, we
explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of
the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in
good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court
in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided,
it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate
the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle
is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.
Not be followed when:
1. If it were plainly unreasonable
2. When courts of equal authority have conflicting decisions
3. The binding force of the decision was actual principles necessary for the decision; not the words or
reasoning used to reach the decision
Why do courts follow stare decisis?
1. It legitimizes judicial institutions
2. It promotes judicial economy
3. It allows for predictability
NOT USE WHEN?
1. When its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings
2. When it cannot accommodate chaging social and political understandings
3. It leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of the congress
4. Activist judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them
4-PRONGED TEST
1. Determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability
2. Consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation
3. Determine whether related principles of law have sofar developed as to have the old rule no more
than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine
4. Find out whether facts have so charged or come to be seem differently, as to have robbed the old
rule of significant application or justification
LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent.
G. R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001356
FACTS:
The case at bar is a petition for certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner and private respondent married in 1975, a union that begot four children. She
contends that respondent surprisingly showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to
perform his marital obligations starting 1988. His “true color” of being an emotionally
immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was
a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon until 1:00
o’clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking,
respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded
shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children
themselves were not spared from physical violence.
Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in
Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, she returned
home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as
expected. On the morning of 22 March 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner for about
half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. He was
imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries.
Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity
of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. The trial court declared their
marriage to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part
of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Respondent appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, which in turn
reversed the decision of the trial court. Thus, the marriage of respondent and petitioner
still subsists.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the appellate court erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.
(2) Whether or not the guidelines in the case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina
should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature.
HELD:
(1) The appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there was absolutely no
evidence showed and proved by petitioner the psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent. Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible
cases of psychoses as extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances.
Psychological incapacity, as laid down in the case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals and
further explained in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to
the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
(2) The “doctrine of stare decisis,” ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of
the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim – “legis interpretado legis vim
obtinet” – that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has
the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed
would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when
a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that
the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied
on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the
familiar rule of “lex prospicit, non respicit.”
Thus the term psychological incapacity, borrowed from the Canon Law, was given legal
life by the Court in the case of Santos; in the case of Molina, additional procedural
guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages
grounded on psychological incapacity was added. Both judicial decisions in Santos and
Molina have the force and effect of law. Thus, the guidelines in the case of Molina are
mandatory in nature. The petition was denied.
Sps. SALVACION vs. CENTRAL BANK AND CHINA BANK
(G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997)
FACTS:
Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for four counts of rape and
serious illegal against Karen Salvacion, a minor. Before felon escaped from jail,
the policemen recovered from him several dollar checks and a dollar account under
China Bank Corp. Further numerous criminal cases were filed against him.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an order granting
the application of herein petitioners for the issuance of writ of preliminary
attachment.
Petitioners then tried to execute on Bartelli’s dollar deposit for China
Banking Corporation for moral and civil damages. However, said respondent
invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. which provides that “foreign
currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order to process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever”. The counsel for petitioners was prompted to
seek the opinion of one of the herein respondents Central Bank which affirmed
China Banks invocation of said provision of CB Circular No. 960. Both
respondents argue that exempting the foreign currency deposits from attachment,
garnishment or any other order or process of any court to assure the development
and speedy growth of the economy.
Hence, the petition for declaratory relief.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dollar deposit of respondent Bartelli, a foreign transient,
is entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and
PD No. 1246 against, garnishment or other court processes.
RULING:
NO, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246,
insofar as they amend Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are held to be inapplicable to
this case due to peculiar circumstances. Respondents must comply with the writ of
execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of
Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes pointless the favorable
judgment and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents rightfully deserve.
The SC then held that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not
anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those
entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention
of the law may be good when enacted. However, it failed to anticipate the
unreasonable effects producing outright injustice and inequality.
The SC also adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who opined that
the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were
designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to
give the latter protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a
transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and
1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays
only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the
bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient,
he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.
Further, the SC averred that the application of the law must be in harmony
with justice. Should the Section 113 of CBC No. 113 made applicable to a tourist,
injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest. This
would also negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that “in case
of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.”
CIR v.Primetown, GR 162155, August 28, 2007
FACTS: Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of income
tax which Primetown paid in 1997. He claimed that they are entitled for a refund because they suffered
losses that year due to the increase of cost of labor and materials, etc. However, despite the losses, they still
paid their quarterly income tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to BIR. Hence,
they were claiming for a refund. On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required Primetown
to submit additional documents to which Primetown complied with. However, its claim was not acted upon
which prompted it to file a petition for review in CTA on April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the petition as it
was filed beyonf the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund according to Sec
229 of NIRC. According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC.
Since Primetown filed its final adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year, the
petition was filed 731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Hence, beyond the reglementary
period. Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of CTA. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year period
HELD: Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be understood to be 12 calendar
months. The SC defined a calendar month as a month designated in the calendar without regard to the
number of days it may contain. The court held that Administrative Code of 1987 impliedly repealed Art 13
of NCC as the provisions are irreconcilable. Primetown is entitled for the refund since it is filed within the
2-year reglementary period