1.
Alonso vs. Villamor, G.R. No. L-2352, July 16, 1910
Case: Real party in interest is not the name that appears as
plaintiff.
The error in this case is purely technical. To take advantage
of it for other purposes than to cure it, does not appeal to a
fair sense of justice. Its presentation as fatal to the plaintiff's
case smacks of skill rather than right.
A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one,
more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of
movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It
is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and
fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then,
brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all
imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks
that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels,
are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
Technicality, when it deserts its proper once as an aid to
justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no
vested rights in technicalities. No litigant should be permitted
to challenge a record of a court of these Islands for defect of
form when his substantial rights have not been prejudiced
thereby.
● Sec. 503 Code of Civil Procedure - prohibits the reversal of
any judgment on merely formal or technical grounds or for
such error as has not prejudiced the rights of the excepting
party. Under these provisions of law, this court has the
power to amend by substituting the name of the real party
in interest.
● Sec 110 Code of Civil Procedure - courts are authorized and
directed to allow a party of amend any pleading or
proceeding at any stage of the action, in furtherance of
justice and upon such terms, if any, as may be proper
● Sec 114 Code of Civil Procedure - every action must be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.
TAKE NOTE: General rule remains to be that rules of
procedure must be observed and that relaxation thereof is
only the exception.
Eladio Alonso, plaintiff and appellee v. Tomas Villamor et al.,
defendants and appellants. No. 2352 July 26, 1910
FACTS:
Defendants were members of the municipal board of the
municipality of Placer. They wrote a letter addressed to the
plaintiff who at that time was the priest in charge of the
church. The contents of the letter basically stated that there
was an order from the provincial fiscal saying that
cemeteries, convents, and other buildings erected on land
belonging to the town belong to the town. As such, they are
notifying the priest that all revenues and products of the
church must be turned over to the treasury of the
municipality. All alms given by churchgoers and devotees to
the image of St. Vicente lodged in the church should also be
turned into the municipal treasury.
Two weeks later, the defendants took possession of the
church and all of the personal properties contained therein.
The plaintiff, as the priest and as the person in charge
thereof, made protests that went unheeded. Hence, an
action was brought by him to recover from the defendants
the value of the articles and the rental value of the church.
The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
In the defendants’ appeal, one of the defenses presented was
that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest. The
defendants assert that the court erred in permitting the
action to be brought and continued in the name of the
plaintiff, Tomas Villamor, instead of in the name of the bishop
of the diocese within which the church was located or in the
name of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the formal/technical defect raised by the
defendant constitutes enough ground to reverse the decision
of the court?
Cu-Unjieng v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 139596 January 24, 2004
Cu-Unjieng vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 139596
January 24, 2004
Facts
Respondent UnionBank of the Philippines (UBP) owned a
parcel of agricultural land which it offered to sell at Php2.2M.
Petitioner offered to buy the property for a lesser price of
Php2.078M and paid an earnest money of P103,915.27 as
proof of his interest to buy the property.
However, UnionBank rejected petitioner’s offer because the
land in dispute was covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law such that, the sale of such land without the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform is null and
void.
Unable to accept UBP rejection of his offer, petitioner filed
an action for specific performance and damages against UBP
before the RTC. The RTC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint
because the said court find no perfected contract of sale that
transpired between the parties.
Thereafter, petitioner appealed but was denied for
nonpayment of the required docket and other appeal fees.
Notwithstanding, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was also denied and the Court even
expunged from the record the appellant’s brief.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner is seeking for the relaxation of procedural rules
by contending that his failure to pay the appeal docket fees
on time is a non-fatal lapse, or a non-jurisdictional defect
which the CA should have ignored in order to attain
substantial justice.
Further, petitioner passes the blame to the RTC clerk of court
who allegedly made the erroneous computation of docket
fees.
Issue:
WON, rules of procedure can be relaxed on this case?
2
Case: Failure of appellant to pay docket & other law fee on
time.
● Right to appeal is merely statutory and a party seeking to
avail of that right must comply with the statute or rules.
● Payment of the docket and other legal fees within the
prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional,
noncompliance with which is fatal to an appeal. For, to stress,
appeal is not a matter of right, but a mere statutory privilege.
● Time and again, this Court has consistently held that full
payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without
such payment, the appeal is not perfected and the appellate
court does not acquire jurisdiction to entertain the appeal,
thereby rendering the decision sought to be appealed final
and executory.
○ An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of the RTC
to the CA must be made within fifteen (15) days from notice.
And within this period, the full amountof the appellate court
docket and other lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from.
○ Section 4, Rule 41 (Failure of the appellant to pay docket
and other law fee)
Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay
to the clerk of court which rendered the judgement or final
order appealed from , the full amount of the appellate court
docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees
shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the
original record or record on appeal.
■ nonpayment of the appellate court docket and other lawful
fees within the reglementary period as provided under
Section 4, Rule 41, supra, is a ground for the dismissal of an
appeal under Section 1 (c) of Rule 50.
David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105294, February
26, 1997
David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105294, February
26, 1997
Facts:
Case: Equity Jurisdiction
Petitioner filed with the trial court an amended petition with
prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction, seeking to stop
private respondent from fencing its property and depriving
her of access to the highway.
The appeal of petitioner is based on equity which has been
aptly described as "justice outside legality."
Petitioner claims that property was sold to private
respondent without her knowledge and consent thereby
allegedly prevented her from exercising her right of preemption or right of redemption.
Private respondent denied the allegations of petitioner. The
parents and relatives of petitioner were never tenants or
lessees of the former owner, Singian Brothers; rather, they
were found to be illegally occupying the property as ruled by
the MTC in a separate Civil Case.
Also, petitioner had another access to the highway without
passing through the lot in question.
Failing to obtain relief at both the trial and respondent
courts, petitioner now submits the following issues for
consideration of this
Court
Issues:
"Whether or not petitioner is entitled such easement through
the recognition and application of the Filipino values of
pakikisama and pakikipagkapwa-tao?
3
However, equity is applied only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure.
There are rigorous standards to be complied with by owners
of the dominant estate before they may be granted with
easement of right of way. These standards must be strictly
complied with because easement is a burden on the property
of another. Before such inconvenience may be imposed by
the Court, applicants must prove that they deserve judicial
intervention on the basis of law, and certainly not when their
isolation is caused by their own acts.
Neypes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141524, September
14, 2005
Case: Filed an appeal beyond 15 days and it was time barred.
FRESH PERIOD RULE. — The Supreme Court may promulgate
procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to
amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more
simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy
disposition of cases.
● "Fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial
Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.
○ To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and
to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the
Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days
within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial
Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion
for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
○ The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period
uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full
or partial) or any final order or resolution.
Notwithstanding the provision of Sec. 3, Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court, SC said that the filing of such MR would have the
effect of giving the movant a fresh period of 15 days to file a
notice of appeal which will be reckoned from the time of
receiving the order denying his motion for consideration.
Note: You only invoke the exceptional cases if the
circumstances really warrant. Equity is applicable only in the
absence of and never against the law.
Facts:
Napes, et. al. file a complaint before the RTC for nullification
of judgement over land titles/ reconveyance of property.
Some of the defendants of the civil action filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of prescription of action.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss such that it
issued an order dismissing the case.
Aggrieved, Complainants filed a motion for reconsideration of
the order dismissing the case. Such MR was filed by the
plaintiffs on the 15th day following the receipt of the order
dismissing the case.
Under Sec. 3, Rule 41 ROC, an appeal had to be filed within 15
days from notice of judgement/ final order.
Neypes filed a motion for reconsideration from the order
dismissing the case on the 15th day. But then the motion for
reconsideration was denied by the RTC and 5 days following
the receipt of the plaintiffs of the order denying the motion
to dismiss, they eventually filed a notice of appeal.
So 14 days plus 5 days is already 19 days. Hence, the RTC said
that the notice of appeal will have to be denied due course
because it was already time barred.
Under the old rules which was applicable in this case, Section
3 of Rule 41, a notice of appeal must be filed within 15 days
and in the case of Neypes, it was filed some 19 days from
receipt of their copy of the decision.
Neypes went to the CA but the latter upheld the ruling of the
RTC further holding that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration would only interrupt the running of the
prescriptive period for filing of a notice of appeal.
Neypes argued that the filing of a motion for reconsideration
would have the effect of giving them a fresh period of 15 days
to file a notice of appeal.
Again, the RTC said the rule is very clear that the filing of an
MR merely tolls the running of the prescriptive period. Hence,
Neypes only had 1 day remaining to file a notice of appeal
after filing their MR.
Ruling:
Neypes’ argument is impressed with merit. Notwithstanding
the provision of Sec. 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, SC said
that the filing of such MR would have the effect of giving the
movant a fresh period of 15 days to file a notice of appeal
which will be reckoned from the time of receiving the order
denying his motion for consideration.
Pursuant to the rulemaking of the SC which necessarily
carries with it the power likewise not only to amend and
repeal but also to relax the application of the rules and
procedures it promulgated.
After all, in the oft-cited case of Alonzo vs Villamor, GR no. L2352, July 26, 1910:
4
Regulus vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 198172, January 25, 2016
The petitioner is the owner of an apartment (San Juan
Apartments) located at San Juan Street, Pasay City. Antonio
dela Cruz (respondent) leased two units The contract of lease
for each of the two units similarly provides a lease period of
one (1) month, subject to automatic renewals, unless
terminated by the petitioner upon written notice.
The petitioner sent the respondent a letter to terminate the
lease of the two subject units. Due to the respondent’s
refusal to vacate the units, the petitioner filed a complaint for
ejectment before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasay
City, Manila. The MTC resolved the case in the petitioner’s
favor and ordered the respondent to vacate the premises and
pay the rentals due until the respondent complies.
The respondent appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Pending appeal, the respondent consigned the monthly
rentals to the RTC due to the petitioner’s refusal to receive
the rentals. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC in toto
and denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the
respondent.
In a Petition for Review filed by the respondent, the CA
reversed the lower courts’ decisions and dismissed the
ejectment case. The dismissal of the case became final and
executory.
The petitioner filed a motion (to withdraw funds deposited by
the defendant-appellant as lessee) praying for the withdrawal
of the rentals consigned by the respondent with the RTC. The
RTC granted the petitioner’s motion. T
he RTC explained that the effect of the complaint’s dismissal
would mean that there was no complaint filed at all. The
petitioner, however, is entitled to the amount of rentals for
the use and occupation of the subject units, as provided in
the executed contracts of lease and on the basis of justice
and equity. CA affirmed the order RTC.
The petitioner returned to the RTC and moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution to allow it to proceed against
the supersedeas bond the respondent posted, representing
rentals for the leased properties from May 2001 to October
2001, and to withdraw the lease payments deposited by
respondent from November 2001 until August 2003.
The RTC granted the motion.
Petitioner assailed the said order in the CA. CA reversed the
decision of the RTC explaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction
to levy the property of the respondent.
Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction when it allowed the
withdrawal of the bond and the execution of the levied
property of the respondent.
Held: Yes, the RTC exercised its equity jurisdiction. The
appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The
appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter
and parties when an appeal is perfected.
On the other hand, equity jurisdiction aims to provide
complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to
adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case
because of a resulting legal inflexibility when the law is
applied to a given situation. The purpose of the exercise of
equity jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust
enrichment and to ensure restitution.
The RTC’s equity jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its
appellate jurisdiction on the ejectment case. The RTC could
not have issued its orders in the exercise of its appellate
5
jurisdiction since there was nothing more to execute on the
dismissed ejectment case. As the RTC orders explained, the
dismissal of the ejectment case effectively and completely
blotted out and cancelled the complaint. Hence, the RTC
orders were clearly issued in the exercise of the RTC’s equity
jurisdiction, not on the basis of its appellate jurisdiction.
Regulus vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 198172, January 25, 2016
Case: Notary public failed to affix his seal in Certiorari.
Regulus said it’s defective. The rule is that courts should not
be unduly strict on procedural lapses that do not really impair
the proper administration of justice. The higher objective of
procedural rules is to ensure that the substantive rights of the
parties are protected. Litigations should, as much as possible,
be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Every
party-litigant must be afforded ample opportunity for the
proper and just determination of his case, free from the
unacceptable plea of technicalities.
● Equity Jurisdiction - Aims to provide complete justice in
cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its judgments to
the special circumstances of a case because of a resulting
legal inflexibility when the law is applied to a given situation.
The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction, among
others, is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure
restitution.
5. The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration. She filed
her Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC.
Sumbilla vs. Matrix, G.R. No. 197582, June 29, 2015
Case:
Violation of BP 129. Petition to change the fine for each count
of violation. The immutability of final judgments is not a hard
and fast rule. The Court has the power and prerogative to
suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their
operation if and when justice requires it. After all, procedural
rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a
stringent application of the rules would hinder rather than
serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must
yield to the latter.
● {Sec 2 Rule 1 Rules of Court} SEC. 2. Construction. — These
rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.
Substantial justice demands that we suspend our Rules in this
case. "It is always within the power of the court to suspend its
own [R]ules or except a particular case from its operation,
whenever the purposes of justice require. . . . Indeed, when
there is a strong showing that a grave miscarriage of justice
would result from the strict application of the Rules, this
Court will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of
substantial justice." Suspending the Rules is justified "where
there exist strong compelling reasons, such as serving the
ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof." After
all, the Court's "primordial and most important duty is to
render justice . . . ."
TAKE NOTE: You only invoke the exceptional cases if the
circumstances really warrant. Equity is applicable only in the
absence of and never against the law.
Facts:
1. Sumbilla obtained a cash loan from Matrix Finance Crop. As
partial payment for her loan, she issued six checks with a
uniform face value of 6,667 pesos. They were presented upon
maturity however all checks were dishonored on the ground
that they were drawn against a closed account
2. Petitioner refused to heed the demand letter of
respondnet so she was charged with six counts of violation o
BP 22.
3. MeTC found petitioner guilty criminally and civilly for the
issuance of the six worthless checks. For each count of
violation of BP 22 involving a check with a face value of 6,667
pesos, the MeTC meted petitioner a penalty of fine
amounting to 80 000 PESOS with subsidiary imprisonment.
Her civil liability for the six consolidated cases was computed
in the total amount of 40,002 pesos.
4. Instead of filing an appeal, she filed a Motion for
Reconsideration with the MeTC which was denied being a
pleading barred under the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. She subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal but was
also denied for HAVING BEEN FILED BEYOND THE 15-DAY
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD. She filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 with the RTC which was dismissed. She elevate
dthe case to the CA via petitioner for review under Rule 42.
However, the CA ruled that an ordinary appeal under Sec.
2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is the correct remedy
under the circumstances because the RTC rendered a
decision under Rule 65 in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction.
6
Issue: Whether or not the penalty imposed in the MeTC
Decision dated January 14, 2009, which is already final and
executory, may still be modified – YES
Held:
The petition is meritorious.
The Doctrine of Finality and Immutability of Judgments. The
decision of MeTC is ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTORY
after petitioner FAILED TO TIMELY FILE A NOTICE OF
APPEAL.
Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments,
a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable an
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made by the
court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.
Exceptions to the Doctrine of Finality and Immutability of
Judgments This doctrine is not a hard and fast rule. The Court
has the power and prerogative to suspend its own rules and to
exempt case from their operation if and when justice requires
it.
Procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of
justice. If the stringent application of the rules would hinder
rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former
must yield to the later.
The penalty imposed in this case is obviously out of range of
that prescribed in Sec. 1 of BP 22. Since the term of the
subsidiary imprisonment is based on the total amount of the
fine or one day for each amount equivalent to the highest
minimum wage rate prevailing in the PH at the time of the
rendition of judgment. If petitioner is insolvent, she will suffer
a longer prison sentence.
REPUBLIC v ESTIPULAR G.R. No. 136588, July 20, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J. Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondents: PILAR ESTIPULAR
"1. [That] the notice of the petition be published, at the
expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the
Official Gazette, and posted on the main entrance of the
provincial building and of the municipal building of the
municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least
thirty days prior to the date of hearing;
FACTS:
Respondent, Pilar Estipular, filed a Petition for Reconstitution
of Title before the Regional Trial Court. She declared that she
was the only surviving legal heir of the late Fermin Estipular,
who died intestate. Fermin, when he was alive, was issued a
Certificate of Title by the Register of Deeds over a parcel of
land. Said Certificate of Title, however, was either destroyed
or burned as a result of the burning of the Register of Deeds
of La Union during World War 2. As the land was already
declared and distributed to ten persons who succeeded him,
the herein respondent prayed that the said Certificate of Title
be reconstituted.
The Regional Trial Court ordered that a Notice of Hearing be
published for two successive issues of the Official Gazette and
be posted at the main entrance of the Municipal building
where the said property was located. Republic Act No. 26,
however, requires that a petition for reconstitution of a lost
or destroyed certificate of title must be posted at the main
entrance of the provincial building as well, which was not
complied with in the case at bar.
The Petition was granted by the RTC.
On appeal, the CA ruled that there was substantial
compliance with the provisions of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the Regional Trial Court acquired
jurisdiction over the case through substantial compliance
with the provisions of the law.
HELD:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is
conferred only by the Constitution or by law. It cannot be (1)
granted by the agreement of the parties; (2) acquired,
waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the
parties; or (3) conferred by the acquiescence of the courts.
Republic Act No. 26 lays down the special requirements and
procedure that must be followed before jurisdiction may be
acquired over a petition for reconstitution of title. These
requirements are mandatory and compliance with them is
jurisdictional.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held:
"Reconstitution of a certificate of title, in the context of
Republic Act No. 26, denotes the restoration in the original
form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument
attesting [to] the title of a person to a piece of land. The
purpose of the reconstitution is to have, after observing the
procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly
the same way it has been when the loss or destruction
occurred. Among the conditions explicitly required by the law
is publication of the petition twice in successive issues of the
Official Gazette, and its posting at the main entrance of the
provincial building and of the municipal building of the
municipality or city in which the land is situated, at least
thirty days prior to the date of hearing. This directive is
mandatory; indeed, its compliance has been held to be
jurisdictional. x x x"
Thus, before the trial court can acquire jurisdiction to hear
and decide a reconstitution case, compliance with the
following requisites is imperative:
7
"2. [That] the notice state among other things, the number of
the lost or destroyed certificates of title if known, the name
of the registered owner, the name of the occupants or
persons in possession of the property, the owner of the
adjoining properties and all other interested parties, the
location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date
on which all persons having any interest therein must appear
and file their claim of objection to the petition;
"3. [That] a copy of the notice also be sent, by registered mail
or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every
person named therein (i.e. the occupants or persons in
possession of the property, the owner of the adjoining
properties and all other interested parties) whose address is
known at least thirty days prior to the date of the hearing;
and
"4. [That] at the hearing, petitioner submit proof of
publication, posting and service of the notice as directed by
the court."
In the present case, it is undisputed that the Notice of
Hearing of respondents Petition for Reconstitution was not
posted at the main entrance of the provincial building.
Clearly, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case.
It must be emphasized that under the law, the publication of
a notice of hearing in the Official Gazette is not enough. The
posting of said notice at the main entrances of both the
municipal and the provincial building is another equally vital
requisite. The purposes of the stringent and mandatory
character of the legal requirements of publication, posting,
and mailing are to safeguard against spurious and unfounded
land ownership claims, to apprise all interested parties of the
existence of such action, and to give them enough time to
intervene in the proceeding.
8. Atlas Developer & Steel Industries, Inc. vs. Sarmiento
Enterprises, 184 SCRA 153
FACTS:
Respondent Sarmiento filed in the CFI of Pasig, Metro Manila,
a complaint for collection of the sum of P8,076 representing
the cost of the steel bars and MS plates purchased by herein
petitioner.
Instead of filing an answer, the petitioner filed on Nov 2,
1982, a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of
improper venue because the sales invoice provided that, “if
the legal action is resorted to for enforcing the collection of
such account, parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of
the Court of the City of Manila.”
Petitioner alleged that said stipulation is valid, binding and
enforceable. The MTD was denied by Judge Pineda, the
presiding Judge in Pasig, Manila. Petitioner’s MFR was
likewise denied by Judge Cicero Jurado who succeeded Judge
Pineda, he ruled that such stipulation, speaking as it does of
jurisdiction and not venue, is void and of no legal effect.
Petitioner filed a second MFR which was also denied. Thus,
this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the venue of the action was properly
laid in the CFI at Pasig, Metro Manila
Ruling:
No. The petition for certiorari was granted. The SC ruled that
Judge Jurado’s ruling carried an overly strict and literal
interpretation of the stipulation in the sales invoice.
Although it provides that the City Court of Manila shall have
jurisdiction over the legal action arising from the contract, the
parties must have intended to fix the venue only, for
jurisdiction over an action is conferred by law, and may not
be changed by mere agreement of the parties.
8
8. Atlas Developer & Steel Industries, Inc. vs. Sarmiento
Enterprises, 184 SCRA 153
Case: Venue of action may be fixed by agreement of the
parties Although it provides that the City Court of Manila shall
have "jurisdiction" over a legal action arising from the
contract, the parties must have intended to fix the venue
only, for jurisdiction over an action is conferred by law, and
may not be changed by mere agreement of the parties
Sections 19 and 33 of B.P. 129, provide:
● "Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
civil cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and
probate proceedings, estate and intestate, including the grant
of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of
the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does
not exceed twenty thousand pesos exclusive of interest and
costs but inclusive of damages of whatever kind, the amount
of which must be specifically alleged.
● Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases — Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: "(8) In all other
cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest and costs or
the value of the property in controversy, amounts to more
than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000)."
● Sec. 1-b, Rule 4, Rules of Court The venue of an action in
the inferior court is "the place specified by the parties by
means of a written agreement, whenever the court shall have
jurisdiction to try the action by reason of its nature or the
amount involved"
9. Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968
9. Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968
Spouses Tijam filed at the CFI of Cebu to collect a sum of
money from spouses Sibonghanoy at P1,908.
Case: Party questioned the jurisdiction of the court after
failing to attain affirmative relief.
This was one month after Judiciary Act of 1948 which states
that inferior courts have jurisdiction of money claims P2000
below. The CFI proceed to hold the case and rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. The question whether the court had jurisdiction
either of the subject matter of the action or of the parties
was not important in such cases because the party is barred
from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the
court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the
reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated — obviously
for reasons of public policy.
The respondents appealed to the CA and was then denied.
After getting denied at the CA they only brought up the
question of Jurisdiction then.
Although they were right that the courts had no jurisdiction
due to the Judiciary Act of 1948, the parties re estopped from
bringing this question due to the fact that a decision was
already issued and that it was only brought up after getting a
result from the Court whose jurisdiction was being
questioned.
● “Undesirable Practice” - Court frowned upon the
'undesirable practice' of appellants submitting their case for
decision and then accepting the judgment, if favorable, but
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse.
TAKE NOTE: But about a month prior to the filing of the
complaint, more specifically on June 7, 1948, the Judiciary Act
of 1948 took effect, depriving the Court of First Instance of
original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive
of interest, is not more than P2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b],
R.A. No. 296.).
9
10. Balibago Faith Baptist Church, Inc. vs. Faith in Christ
Jesus Baptist Church, Inc.
G.R. No. 191527, August 22, 2016
10. Balibago Faith Baptist Church, Inc. vs. Faith in Christ
Jesus Baptist Church, Inc.
G.R. No. 191527, August 22, 2016
Facts:
Case: Jurisdiction of the court over specific cases. Court's
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by
law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to
take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action.
Plaintiff PBSBC granted a contract of simple loan to plaintiff
BFBC for the latter’s purchase of the former’s property and
BFBC started to possess the same and hold their religious
activities thereat.
While BFBC was in possession of the property, defendants
Galvan, et.al, joined the regular services of plaintiff BFBC. It
turned out that defendants have an interest in the property
and they formed and incorporated defendant FCJBC and took
control of the property.
This prompted FBSBC and BFBC to file an action for unlawful
detainer against FCJBC and Galvan before the MTC.
Issue:
WON the MTC has jurisdiction over the case considering the
characterization of the case by the plaintiff in his pleading is
one of unlawful detainer and considering further that the
nature of the action is one of forcible entry.
Ruling:
No, the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case.
The case is one of forcible entry. Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the ROC
provides in part that, when the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration of the
right to hold, the person being deprived may file any time
within 1 year in the MTC for restitution of such possession.
In this case, the nature of the cause of action which shows
that the case is one of forcible entry is controlling for
determining the jurisdiction of the court, and not the
characterization of the plaintiff of its allegation which shows
that it is one of forcible entry.
Since the case is at bar is one of forcible entry, the MTC has
no jurisdiction over the case. The proper recourse is to file a
plenary action to recover possession before the RTC.
10
Indeed, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no
judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the
creator of any obligation. All
acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from
it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become final, and
any writ of execution based on it is void.
TAKE NOTE:
● General rule, jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred by law and it is to be determined on the basis of
what appears in the complaint, or it has to be determined on
the basis of the allegations, not on the basis of the caption of
the complaint.
● The complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting
unlawful detainer or forcible entry if the complaint filed was
for unlawful detainer, or forcible entry, respectively. It cannot
be made to depend on the exclusive characterization of the
case by one of the parties, jurisdiction cannot be made to
depend upon the defenses set up in the answer, in a motion
to dismiss or in a motion for reconsideration.
11. De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 510 SCRA 10
Case: Jurisdiction of MTC, McTC, MTC - BP 129 (6)
The Reyes family owned a lot. Petitioner Lourdes Dela Cruz
was one of their lessees, and she religiously paid rent over a
portion of the lot for well over 40 years. Sometime in 1989, a
fire struck the premises and destroyed, among others,
petitioner’s dwelling.
After the fire, petitioner and some tenants returned to the
said lot and rebuilt their respective houses; simultaneously,
the Reyes family made several verbal demands on the
remaining lessees, including petitioner, to vacate the lot but
the latter did not comply.
On February 21, 1994, petitioner was served a written
demand to vacate said lot but refused to leave. Despite the
setback, the Reyes family did not initiate court proceedings
against any of the lessees.
law.
Section 33 of Chapter III -- on Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts of B. P. No. 129 provides:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.—
Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts
shall exercise:
xxxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry
and
unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the
defendant raises
the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question
of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.
On November 26, 1996, the disputed lot was sold by the
Reyeses to respondent Melba Tan Te by virtue of the
November 26, 1996 Deed of Absolute Sale.
Respondent bought the lot in question for residential
purposes. Despite the sale, petitioner Dela Cruz did not give
up the lot. On January 14, 1997, petitioner was sent a written
demand to relinquish the premises which she ignored,
prompting respondent Tan Te to initiate conciliation
proceedings at the barangay level.
While respondent attempted to settle the dispute by offering
financial assistance, petitioner countered by asking PhP
500,000.00 for her house. Respondent rejected the counter
offer which she considered unconscionable. As a result, a
certificate to file action was issued to Tan Te.
On September 8, 1997, respondent Tan Te filed an ejectment
complaint with damages before the Manila MeTC. The
complaint averred that: (
1) the previous owners, the Reyeses were in possession and
control of the contested lot;
(2) on November 26, 1996, the lot was sold to Tan Te;
(3) prior to the sale, Dela Cruz forcibly entered the property
with strategy and/or stealth;
(4) the petitioner unlawfully deprived the respondent of
physical possession of the property and continues to do so;
and,
(5) the respondent sent several written demands to
petitioner to vacate the premises but refused to do so.
On October 24, 1997, petitioner filed her answer and alleged
that:
(1) the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case because it falls
within the jurisdiction of the RTC as more than one year had
elapsed from petitioner’s forcible entry;
(2) she was a rent-paying tenant protected by PD 20;
(3) her lease constituted a legal encumbrance upon the
property; and (4) the lot was subject of expropriation.
WON MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case because it falls
within the jurisdiction of the RTC as more than one year had
elapsed from petitioner’s forcible entry.
HELD:
METC HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT.
Jurisdiction is the power or capacity given by the law to a
court or tribunal to entertain,
hear and determine certain controversies. Jurisdiction over
the subject matter is conferred by
11
11. De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 510 SCRA 10
Case: Jurisdiction of MTC, McTC, MTC - BP 129 (6)
GEN RULE: The general rule is that what determines the
nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over
the case are the allegations in the complaint. These cannot be
made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or
pleadings filed by the defendant.
EXP: That while the allegations in the complaint make out the
case for forcible entry, where tenancy is averred by way of
defense and is proved to be the real issue, the case should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
● Other exceptions: Agricultural Tenancy, Allegations are
vague, weak & iffy.
➔ Section 19, of Chapter II of B.P. No. 129 on Regional Trial
Courts provides: Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. —
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction:
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Two (2) kinds of action to recover possession of real property
which fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC are: (1) the
plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession
(accion publiciana) when the dispossession has lasted for
more than one year or when the action was filed more than
one (1) year from date of the last demand
received by the lessee or defendant; and (2) an action for the
recovery of ownership (accion reivindicatoria) which includes
the recovery of possession.
These actions are governed by the regular rules of procedure
and adjudication takes a longer period than the summary
ejectment suit.