SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 153660. June 10, 2003
PRUDENCIO BANTOLINO, NESTOR ROMERO, NILO ESPINA, EDDIE LADICA, ARMAN QUELING,
ROLANDO NIETO, RICARDO BARTOLOME, ELUVER GARCIA, EDUARDO GARCIA and NELSON
MANALASTAS, Petitioners, v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., respondent.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the
Court of Appeals1 dated 21 December 2001 which affirmed with modification the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission promulgated 30 March 2001.2cräläwvirtualibräry
On 15 February 1995 sixty-two (62) employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and its officers,
Lipercon Services, Inc., Peoples Specialist Services, Inc., and Interim Services, Inc., filed a complaint against
respondents for unfair labor practice through illegal dismissal, violation of their security of tenure and the
perpetuation of the Cabo System. They thus prayed for reinstatement with full back wages, and the declaration
of their regular employment status.
For failure to prosecute as they failed to either attend the scheduled mandatory conferences or submit their
respective affidavits, the claims of fifty-two (52) complainant-employees were dismissed. Thereafter, Labor
Arbiter Jose De Vera conducted clarificatory hearings to elicit information from the ten (10) remaining
complainants (petitioners herein) relative to their alleged employment with respondent firm.
In substance, the complainants averred that in the performance of their duties as route helpers, bottle
segregators, and others, they were employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc. They further maintained
that when respondent company replaced them and prevented them from entering the company premises, they
were deemed to have been illegally dismissed.
In lieu of a position paper, respondent company filed a motion to dismiss complaint for lack of jurisdiction and
cause of action, there being no employer-employee relationship between complainants and Coca-Cola
Bottlers, Inc., and that respondents Lipercon Services, Peoples Specialist Services and Interim Services
being bona fide independent contractors, were the real employers of the complainants.3 As regards the
corporate officers, respondent insisted that they could not be faulted and be held liable for damages as they
only acted in their official capacities while performing their respective duties.
On 29 May 1998 Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera rendered a decision ordering respondent company to reinstate
complainants to their former positions with all the rights, privileges and benefits due regular employees, and to
pay their full back wages which, with the exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages must be
computed upon proof of his dismissal as of 31 May 1998, already amounted to an aggregate of
P1,810,244.00.4cräläwvirtualibräry
In finding for the complainants, the Labor Arbiter ruled that in contrast with the negative declarations of
respondent companys witnesses who, as district sales supervisors of respondent company denied knowing the
complainants personally, the testimonies of the complainants were more credible as they sufficiently supplied
every detail of their employment, specifically identifying who their salesmen/drivers were, their places of
assignment, aside from their dates of engagement and dismissal.
On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter that there was indeed an employer-employee
relationship between the complainants and respondent company when it affirmed in toto the latters decision.
In a resolution dated 17 July 2001 the NLRC subsequently denied for lack of merit respondents motion for
consideration.
Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the Court of Appeals which, although affirming the finding of the
NLRC that an employer-employee relationship existed between the contending parties, nonetheless agreed
with respondent that the affidavits of some of the complainants, namely, Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero,
Nilo Espina, Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas, should not have been
given probative value for their failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination. As a
consequence, the appellate court dismissed their complaints for lack of sufficient evidence. In the same
Decision however, complainants Eddie Ladica, Arman Queling and Rolando Nieto were declared regular
employees since they were the only ones subjected to cross-examination.5 Thus x x x (T)he labor arbiter conducted clarificatory hearings to ferret out the truth between the opposing claims of
the parties thereto. He did not submit the case based on position papers and their accompanying documentary
evidence as a full-blown trial was imperative to establish the parties claims. As their allegations were poles
apart, it was necessary to give them ample opportunity to rebut each others statements through crossexamination. In fact, private respondents Ladica, Quelling and Nieto were subjected to rigid cross-examination
by petitioners counsel. However, the testimonies of private respondents Romero, Espina, and Bantolino were
not subjected to cross-examination, as should have been the case, and no explanation was offered by them or
by the labor arbiter as to why this was dispensed with. Since they were represented by counsel, the latter
should have taken steps so as not to squander their testimonies. But nothing was done by their counsel to that
effect.6cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioners now pray for relief from the adverse Decision of the Court of Appeals; that, instead, the favorable
judgment of the NLRC be reinstated.
In essence, petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should not have given weight to respondents claim of
failure to cross-examine them. They insist that, unlike regular courts, labor cases are decided based merely on
the parties position papers and affidavits in support of their allegations and subsequent pleadings that may be
filed thereto. As such, according to petitioners, the Rules of Court should not be strictly applied in this case
specifically by putting them on the witness stand to be cross-examined because the NLRC has its own rules of
procedure which were applied by the Labor Arbiter in coming up with a decision in their favor.
In its disavowal of liability, respondent commented that since the other alleged affiants were not presented in
court to affirm their statements, much less to be cross-examined, their affidavits should, as the Court of
Appeals rightly held, be stricken off the records for being self-serving, hearsay and inadmissible in evidence.
With respect to Nestor Romero, respondent points out that he should not have been impleaded in the instant
petition since he already voluntarily executed a Compromise Agreement, Waiver and Quitclaim in
consideration of P450,000.00. Finally, respondent argues that the instant petition should be dismissed in view
of the failure of petitioners7 to sign the petition as well as the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, in clear violation of the principle laid down in Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman.8
The crux of the controversy revolves around the propriety of giving evidentiary value to the affidavits despite
the failure of the affiants to affirm their contents and undergo the test of cross-examination.
The petition is impressed with merit. The issue confronting the Court is not without precedent in jurisprudence.
The oft-cited case of Rabago v. NLRC9 squarely grapples a similar challenge involving the propriety of the use
of affidavits without the presentation of affiants for cross-examination. In that case, we held that the argument
that the affidavit is hearsay because the affiants were not presented for cross-examination is not persuasive
because the rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the
NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only.
In Rase v. NLRC,10 this Court likewise sidelined a similar challenge when it ruled that it was not necessary for
the affiants to appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise
would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the
Rules and to make mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.
Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v. NLRC11 succinctly states that under Art. 221 of the Labor
Code, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC. Further, it notes that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law and
procedure, all in the interest of due process. We find no compelling reason to deviate therefrom.
To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure
and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may
be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. The submission by
respondent, citing People v. Sorrel,12 that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and
has no real evidentiary value, cannot find relevance in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution
requires a quantum of evidence different from that of an administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the
Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing.
Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided based on verified position
papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits.
As to whether petitioner Nestor Romero should be properly impleaded in the instant case, we only need to
follow the doctrinal guidance set by Periquet v. NLRC13 which outlines the parameters for valid compromise
agreements, waivers and quitclaims Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into
and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply
because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step
in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so
voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.
In closely examining the subject agreements, we find that on their face the Compromise
Agreement14 and Release, Waiver and Quitclaim15 are devoid of any palpable inequity as the terms of
settlement therein are fair and just. Neither can we glean from the records any attempt by the parties to renege
on their contractual agreements, or to disavow or disown their due execution. Consequently, the same must be
recognized as valid and binding transactions and, accordingly, the instant case should be dismissed and finally
terminated insofar as concerns petitioner Nestor Romero.
We cannot likewise accommodate respondents contention that the failure of all the petitioners to sign the
petition as well as the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in contravention of Sec. 5, Rule 7,
of the Rules of Court will cause the dismissal of the present appeal. While the Loquias case requires the strict
observance of the Rules, it however provides an escape hatch for the transgressor to avoid the harsh
consequences of non-observance. Thus x x x x We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance of the rules.
The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party
who executed the same. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification.
Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction (underscoring supplied).
In their Ex Parte Motion to Litigate as Pauper Litigants, petitioners made a request for a fifteen (15)-day
extension, i.e., from 24 April 2002 to 8 May 2002, within which to file their petition for review in view of the
absence of a counsel to represent them.16 The records also reveal that it was only on 10 July 2002 that Atty.
Arnold Cacho, through the UST Legal Aid Clinic, made his formal entry of appearance as counsel for herein
petitioners. Clearly, at the time the instant petition was filed on 7 May 2002 petitioners were not yet
represented by counsel. Surely, petitioners who are non-lawyers could not be faulted for the procedural lapse
since they could not be expected to be conversant with the nuances of the law, much less knowledgeable with
the esoteric technicalities of procedure. For this reason alone, the procedural infirmity in the filing of the
present petition may be overlooked and should not be taken against petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the decision of the NLRC dated 30 March 2001 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor
Arbiter dated 29 May 1998 ordering respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., to reinstate Prudencio
Bantolino, Nilo Espina, Eddie Ladica, Arman Queling, Rolando Nieto, Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia,
Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas to their former positions as regular employees, and to pay them their
full back wages, with the exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages are yet to be computed upon
proof of his dismissal, is REINSTATED, with the MODIFICATION that herein petition is DENIED insofar as it
concerns Nestor Romero who entered into a valid and binding Compromise Agreement and Release, Waiver
and Quitclaim with respondent company.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 196510, September 12, 2018
SOFIA TABUADA, NOVEE YAP, MA. LORETA NADAL, AND GLADYS
EVIDENTE, Petitioners, v. ELEANOR TABUADA, JULIETA TRABUCO, LAURETA REDONDO, AND SPS.
BERNAN CERTEZA & ELEANOR D. CERTEZA, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Competent proof of a legal relationship is not limited to documentary evidence. Object and testimonial
evidence may be admitted for the same purpose. Indeed, the relationship may be established by all the
relevant facts and circumstances that constitute a preponderance of evidence.
A person constituting a mortgage should be the owner of the property, or should have the right of free disposal
of it, or, in the absence of the right of free disposal, such person should be legally authorized for the purpose.
Otherwise, the mortgage is null and void.
The Case
This appeal seeks to undo the decision promulgated on September 30, 2009,1 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) reversed and set aside the judgment rendered in favor of the petitioners in Civil Case No. 05-2842 on
January 18, 2006 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 28, in Iloilo City; and dismissed the complaint in
Civil Case No. 05-2842, an action commenced to declare the nullity of a mortgage and damages.2
Antecedents
On January 27, 2005, the petitioners commenced Civil Case No. 05- 28420 in the RTC against respondents
Spouses Bernan and Eleanor Certeza (Spouses Certeza), Eleanor Tabuada, Julieta Trabuco and Laureta
Redondo. The complainant included a prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and for the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction.3
Summons and the copy of the complaint and its annexes, along with the notice of raffle, were served by
personal and substituted service on the respondents on January 31, 2005 at their respective stated addresses.
According to the returns of service, respondent Eleanor Tabuada personally received the summons and notice
of raffle but refused to acknowledge receipt thereof; Redondo received her summons through her husband,
Emilio, who also refused to acknowledge receipt thereof; Trabuco was served with summons through her
neighbor Grace Miguel, who also did not acknowledge receipt; and the Spouses Certeza received their
summons personally and acknowledged receipt thereof.4
For failure of the respondents to file their answers within the reglementary period, the petitioners filed a Motion
to Declare Defendants in Default and for Judgment Based on Complaint on February 28, 2005.5
On March 3, 2005, the Spouses Certeza wrote the Presiding Judge of the RTC to manifest that they had been
informed by their secretary who had attended in their behalf the February 3, 2005 hearing of the application for
the TRO that there was an on-going negotiation for settlement between the petitioners and respondents
Eleanor Tabuada, Trabuco and Redondo; and that in view of the pendency of the Motion to Declare
Defendants in Default and for Judgment Based on Complaint, the Spouses Certeza were thereby merely
expressing the intention to file their answer.6
On March 21, 2005, Eleanor Tabuada, Trabuco and Redondo submitted their Motion to Admit Answer (with
their Answer with Counter-claim and Cross-claim attached). The petitioners opposed the Motion to Admit
Answer on March 29, 2005.7
On May 11, 2005, the RTC denied the Motion to Admit Answer, and declared Eleanor Tabuada, Trabuco and
Redondo in default. It likewise declared the Spouses Certeza in default for failure to file their answer.8
On June 7, 2005, the respondents submitted their Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, which the petitioners
opposed on June 14, 2005.9
On June 30, 2005, the RTC denied the Motion to Set Aside Order of Default,10 the material portion of the order
of denial stating:
Records show that defendants-spouses Certeza were served summons on January 31, 2005. They filed their
answer on March 21, 2005 only AFTER plaintiffs have already filed a motion to declare them in default. The
belated filing of the answer could not be countenanced by this Court considering that defendants were aware
of the pendency of this case as evidenced by the presence of their representative during the hearing on
February 3, 2005 on the incident for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.11
At the ex parte hearing held on September 9, 2005 to receive their evidence, the petitioners presented Sofia
Tabuada, who testified that her late husband was Simeon Tabuada, the son of Loreta Tabuada and the
brother-in law of defendant Eleanor Tabuada; that her co-plaintiffs were her daughters; that defendant Julieta
Trabuco was the daughter of Eleanor Tabuada while Laureta Redondo was the latter's neighbor; that Loreta
Tabuada had died on April 16, 1990 while her husband had died on July 18, 1997; that she received the notice
sent by the Spouses Certeza regarding their land, known as Lot 4272-B-2, located at Barangay Tacas, Jaro,
Iloilo City that her husband had inherited from his mother, Loreta Tabuada, and where they were residing,
informing them that the land had been mortgaged to them (Spouses Certeza); that she immediately inquired
from Eleanor Tabuada and Trabuco about the mortgage, and both admitted that they had mortgaged the
property to the Spouses Certeza; that she was puzzled to see the signature purportedly of Loreta Tabuada on
top of the name Loreta Tabuada printed on the Mortgage of Real Rights dated July 1, 1994 and the Promissory
Note dated July 4, 1994 despite Loreta Tabuada having died on April 16, 1990; that the property under
mortgage was the where she and her daughters were residing; that the notice caused her to lose her appetite
and sleepless nights, and she suffered hypertension, which entitled her to moral damages of P100,000.00; that
she engaged her counsel to pursue the case against the defendants, paying counsel P40,000.00; and that she
further incurred litigation expenses of P5,000.00.12
The petitioners offered for admission the following exhibits, namely: (a) the death certificate of Loreta Yulo
Tabuada that indicated April 16, 1990 as the date of death; (b) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-82868
of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City covering Lot No. 4272-B-2 situated in Jaro, Iloilo City and registered in
the name of Loreta Tabuada; (c) the Promissory Note dated July 4, 1994 for P68,000.00 executed by Loreta
Tabuada; (d) the Mortgage of Real Rights dated July 1, 1994 involving Lot No. 4272-B-2 under TCT No. T82868 executed by Loreta Tabuada as the mortgagor; (e) the list of payments of the principal obligation subject
of the real estate mortgage and the interests; and (f) the demand letter dated August 12, 2004 from the
Spouses Certeza addressed to Loreta Tabuada demanding the payment of the total obligation of P415,
452.94.13
Judgment of the RTC
On January 18, 2006, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners,14 decreeing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs Sofia Tabuada, Novee Yap, Ma. Loreta
Nadal, and Gladys Evidente, and against defendants Eleanor Tabuada, Julieta Trabuco, Laureta Redondo and
Spouses Bernan and Eleanor Certeza. The Mortgage of Real Rights dated July 1, 1994 and the Promissory
Note dated July 4, 1994, are hereby declared null and void. Defendants are further ordered to pay plaintiffs,
jointly and severally, the following:
a. moral damages amounting to Php 50,000.00;
b. attorney's fees amounting to P10,000.00; and
c. costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.15
The RTC declared the Mortgage of Real Rights dated July 1, 1994 null and void for not complying with the
essential requisites of a real estate mortgage. It opined that based on the complaint and the testimony of Sofia
Tabuada "Eleanor Tabuada, who [was] not the absolute owner of Lot No. 4272-B-2, and without having the
legal authority to mortgage said property [had] misrepresented herself as the deceased Loreta Tabuada and
mortgaged the property without the knowledge of herein plaintiffs, and benefited from said mortgage to the
detriment of the rights and interests of plaintiffs."16 It ruled that moral damages were proper under Article 309,
of the Civil Code based on the showing of disrespect to the dead.17
The respondents appealed.
Decision of the CA
On September 30, 2009, the CA promulgated its decision,18 reversing and setting aside the judgment of the
RTC, and dismissing Civil Case No. 05-28420 instead,19 ruling:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 18, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 28, Iloilo City in Civil Case No. 05-2842 for Declaration of Nullity of Mortgage and Damages with
Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 05-2842 is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration,20 but the CA denied their motion for reconsideration on March 7,
2011.21
Issues
Did the CA seriously err in reversing the RTC considering that there was ample evidence competently
establishing the relationship of plaintiff Sofia Tabuada to the late Loreta Tabuada?
In addition, there is need to resolve whether or not the award of moral damages based on disrespect to the
dead was legally proper.
Ruling of the Court
We reverse the CA, and reinstate the judgment of the RTC, but we delete the award of moral damages based
on disrespect to the dead for being legally improper.
1.
The legal relationship of Sofia Tabuada with
deceased Loreta Tabuada was established
by preponderance of evidence
The CA found merit in the contention that the petitioners were not able to prove by preponderance of evidence
that they were the legal heirs of the late Loreta Tabuada, the registered holder of the title over the mortgaged
real property. The CA noted that the death certificate the petitioners presented was not an authenticated copy
on security paper issued by the National Statistics Office (now Philippine Statistics Authority); and that the
name of the deceased on the death certificate (Loreta Yulo Tabuada) did not match the name of the registered
title holder (Loreta H. Tabuada). It pointed out that the "discrepancy is material as it puts in issue the real
identity of the Loreta H. Tabuada who the plaintiffs claim is their predecessor-in-interest and the person whose
name appears in the death certificate as Loreta Yulo Tabuada. Consequently this inconsistency puts in doubt
the plaintiffs-appellees' ownership over Lot No. 4272-B-2."22
The CA thereby underscored that the petitioners did not prove Sofia Tabuada's legal relationship with the late
Loreta Tabuada because she did not present documentary evidence thereof.23
The CA grossly erred.
Under the Rules of Court, evidence – as the means of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting
a matter of fact24 – may be object,25 documentary,26 and testimonial.27 It is required that evidence, to be
admissible, must be relevant and competent.28 But the admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its
probative value. Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered
at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a
particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within
the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.29
Although documentary evidence may be preferable as proof of a legal relationship, other evidence of the
relationship that are competent and relevant may not be excluded. The preponderance of evidence, the rule
that is applicable in civil cases, is also known as the greater weight of evidence. There is a preponderance of
evidence when the trier of facts is led to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its
nonexistence.30 In short, the rule requires the consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the cases,
regardless of whether they are object, documentary, or testimonial.31
The mere discrepancy – as perceived by the CA – between the name of the deceased entered in the death
certificate (Loreta Yulo Tabuada) and the name of the titleholder (Loreta H. Tabuada) did not necessarily belie
or disprove the legal relationship between Sofia Tabuada and the late Loreta Tabuada. To establish filiation,
the courts like the RTC herein should consider and analyze not only the relevant testimonies of witnesses who
are competent but other relevant evidence as well.32 There was on record herein Sofia Tabuada's
unchallenged declaration of her being the daughter-in-law of the registered titleholder.33 Also on record was the
petitioners' being in the actual possession of Lot No. 4272-B-2, which they had been using as the site for their
family residence.34 Such established circumstances indicated that the deceased Loreta Yulo Tabuada and
titleholder Loreta H. Tabuada could only be one and the same person. Moreover, even the Spouses Certeza
were aware that respondents Eleanor Tabuada and Tabuco were the relatives of Sofia Tabuada; and that the
respective families of Eleanor Tabuada, Tabuco and Sofia Tabuada actually resided on the same lot.35 Verily,
the facts and circumstances sufficiently and competently affirmed the legal relationship between Sofia
Tabuada and the late titleholder Loreta H. Tabuada.
2.
Real estate mortgage was null and void
Under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, a mortgage, to be valid, must have the following requisites, namely: (a)
that it be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation; (b) that the mortgagor be the absolute
owner of the thing mortgaged; and (c) that the person constituting the mortgage has free disposal of the
property, and in the absence of the right of free disposal, that the person be legally authorized for the
purpose.36
It is uncontested that the late Loreta Tabuada had died in 1990, or four years before the mortgage was
constituted; and that Eleanor Tabuada and Trabuco admitted to petitioner Sofia Tabuada that they had
mortgaged the property to the Spouses Certezas. Accordingly, the RTC was fully justified in declaring the
nullity of the mortgage based on its finding that Eleanor Tabuada had fraudulently represented herself to the
Spouses Certeza as the late Loreta Tabuada, the titleholder.37 That the titleholder had been dead when the
mortgage was constituted on the property by Eleanor Tabuada was not even contested by Eleanor Tabuada
and Tabuco. In any event, Eleanor Tabuada had not been legally authorized to mortgage the lot to the
Spouses Certeza.
3.
Respondents Spouses Certeza
were not mortgagees in good faith
The Spouses Certeza contend that they were mortgagees in good faith considering that they had no notice
prior to the filing of Civil Case No. 05- 28420 that the real owner of the property had died several years before
the execution of the mortgage; and that they had believed in good faith in the representations made by Eleanor
Tabuada that she had been Loreta Tabuada, the titleholder.38
The contentions of the Spouses Certeza lack persuasion.
The Spouses Certeza admitted that the petitioners were the relatives by blood or affinity of their co-defendants
Eleanor Tabuada, et al.;39 and that Sofia Tabuada, et al. and the petitioners had been living in their respective
residences built on the property subject of the mortgage.40 Such admissions belied the Spouses Certeza's
contention of being mortgagees in good faith. At the very least, they should have been prudent and cautious
enough as to have inquired about Eleanor Tabuada's assertion of her capacity and authority to mortgage in
view of the actual presence of other persons like the petitioners herein on the property. Such prudence and
caution were demanded of persons like them who are about to deal with realty; they should not close their
eyes to facts that should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.41 Indeed, the
status of a mortgagee in good faith does not apply where the title is still in the name of the rightful owner and
the mortgagor is a different person pretending to be the owner. In such a case, the mortgagee is not an
innocent mortgagee for value and the registered owner will generally not lose his title.42
4.
Award of moral damages reversed because
action was not an instance of disrespect to the dead
The RTC awarded moral damages to the petitioners based on disrespect to the dead on the part of Eleanor
Tabuada for fraudulently signing and executing the mortgage by impersonating the late Loreta Tabuada.
We hold that the RTC thereby fell into a legal error that the Court should correct. The petitioners cannot
recover moral damages from Eleanor Tabuada on the ground of "disrespect to the dead."43 The Civil
Code provision under Article 30944 on showing "disrespect to the dead" as a ground for the family of the
deceased to recover moral and material damages, being under the title of Funerals, obviously envisions the
commission of the disrespect during the period of mourning over the demise of the deceased or on the
occasion of the funeral of the mortal remains of the deceased. Neither was true herein. Hence, the act of
Eleanor Tabuada of fraudulently representing the late Loreta Tabuada did not amount to disrespect to the dead
as basis for the recovery of moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision promulgated on September 30, 2009; REINSTATES the judgment rendered on January 18, 2006 by
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, in Iloilo City in Civil Case No. 05-28420 subject to the deletion of the
award of moral damages; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190846, February 03, 2016
TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Petitioner, v. JOSE G. HOSANA, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 challenging the August 28, 2009 decision2 and November 17,
2009 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Facts
The respondent Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C. Hosana (Milagros) on January 14, 1979.4 During
their marriage, Jose and Milagros bought a house and lot located at Tinago, Naga City, which lot was covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 21229.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to the petitioner Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (Tomas) the subject property, as
evidenced by a deed of sale executed by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Jose in her favor.6 The Deed of Sale stated that the purchase price for
the lot was P200,000.00.7 After the sale, TCT No. 21229 was cancelled and TCT No. 32568 was issued in the
name of Tomas.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On October 19, 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance and
Damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of Deeds of Naga City.9 The complaint was filed before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, Naga City. In the complaint, Jose averred that while he was
working in Japan, Milagros, without his consent and knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the SPA by
forging Jose's signature making it appear that Jose had authorized Milagros to sell the subject property to
Tomas.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for value.11 Before he paid the full
consideration of the sale, Tomas claimed he sought advice from his lawyer-friend who told him that the title of
the subject lot was authentic and in order.12 Furthermore, he alleged that the SPA authorizing Milagros to sell
the property was annotated at the back of the title.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Tomas filed a cross-claim against Milagros and claimed compensatory and moral damages, attorney's fees,
and expenses, for litigation, in the event that judgment be rendered in favor of
Jose.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC declared Milagros in default for her failure to file her answer to Jose's complaint and Tomas' crossclaim.15 On the other hand, it dismissed Tomas' complaint against the Register of Deeds since it was only a
nominal party.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose presented his brother, Bonifacio Hosana (Bonifacio), as sole witness. Bonifacio testified that he learned of
the sale of the subject property from Milagros' son.18 When Bonifacio confronted Milagros that Jose would get
angry because of the sale, Milagros retorted that she sold the property because she needed the money.
Bonifacio immediately informed Jose, who was then in Japan, of the sale.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose was furious when he learned of the sale and went back to the Philippines. Jose and Bonifacio verified
with the Register of Deeds and discovered that the title covering the disputed property had been transferred to
Tomas.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Bonifacio further testified that Jose's signature in the SPA was forged.21 Bonifacio presented documents
containing the signature of Jose for comparison: Philippine passport, complaint-affidavit, duplicate original of
SPA dated 16 February 2002, notice of lis pendens, community tax certificate, voter's affidavit, specimen
signatures, and a handwritten letter.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the other hand, Tomas submitted his own account of events as corroborated by Rosana Robles (Rosana),
his goddaughter. Sometime in December 1997, Tomas directed Rosana to go to the house of Milagros to
confirm if Jose knew about the sale transaction. Through a phone call by Milagros to Jose, Rosana was able to
talk to Jose who confirmed that he was aware of the sale and had given his wife authority to proceed with the
sale. Rosana informed Tomas of Jose's confirmation.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
With the assurance that all the documents were in order, Tomas made a partial payment of P350,000.00 and
another P350,000.00 upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale). Tomas noticed that the
consideration written by Milagros on the Deed of Sale was only P200,000.00; he inquired why the written
consideration was lower than the actual consideration paid. Milagros explained that it was done to save on
taxes. Tomas also learned from Milagros that she needed money badly and had to sell the house because
Jose had stopped sending her money.24chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The RTC Ruling
In its decision dated December 27, 2006,25 the RTC decided in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the
subject property to Tomas. The RTC held that the SPA dated June 10, 1996, wherein Jose supposedly
appointed Milagros as his attorney-in-fact, was actually null and void.
Tomas and Milagros were ordered to jointly and severally indemnify Jose the amount of P20,000.00 as
temperate damages.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The CA Ruling
Tomas appealed the RTC's ruling to the CA.
In a decision dated August 28, 2009,27 the CA affirmed the RTC ruling that the deed of sale and the SPA were
void. However, the CA modified the judgment of the RTC: first, by deleting the award of temperate damages;
and second, by directing Jose and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase price of P200,000.00, with
interest, under the principle of unjust enrichment. Despite Tomas' allegation that he paid P700,000.00 for the
subject lot, the CA found that there was no convincing evidence that established this
claim.28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Tomas filed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA decision on the ground that the amount of P200,000.00
as reimbursement for the purchase price of the house and lot was insufficient and not supported by the
evidence formally offered before and admitted by the RTC. Tomas contended that the actual amount he paid
as consideration for the sale was P700,000.00, as supported by his testimony before the
RTC.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The C A denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit" in a resolution dated November 17,
2009.30chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Petition
Tomas filed the present petition for review on certiorari to challenge the CA ruling which ordered the
reimbursement of P200,000.00 only, instead of the actual purchase price he paid in the amount of
P700,000.00.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Tomas argues that, first, all matters contained in the deed of sale, including the consideration stated, cannot be
used as evidence since it was declared null and void; second, the deed of sale was not specifically offered to
prove the actual consideration of the sale;32third, his testimony establishing the actual purchase price of
P700,000.00 paid was uncontroverted;33 and, fourth, Jose must return the full amount actually paid under the
principle of solutio indebiti.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose, on the other hand, argues that first, Jose is estopped from questioning the purchase price indicated in
the deed of dale for failing to immediately raise this question; and second, the terms of an agreement reduced
into writing are deemed to include all the terms agreed upon and no other evidence can be admitted other than
the terms of the agreement itself.35chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Issues
The core issues are (1) whether the deed of sale can be used as the basis for the amount of consideration
paid; and (2) whether the testimony of Tomas is sufficient to establish the actual purchase price of the
sale.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
OUR RULING
We affirm the CA ruling and deny the petition.
Whether Tomas paid the purchase price of P700,000.00 is a question of fact not proper in a petition for review
on certiorari. Appreciation of evidence and inquiry on the correctness of the appellate court's factual findings
are not the functions of this Court, as we are not a trier of facts.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This Court does not address questions of fact which require us to rule on "the truth or falsehood of alleged
facts,"37 except in the following cases:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making
its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The present case does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Whether Tomas sufficiently proved that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject property is a factual question that
the CA had already resolved in the negative.39 The CA found Tomas' claim of paying P700,000.00 for the
subject property to be unsubstantiated as he failed to tender any convincing evidence to establish his claim.
We uphold the CA's finding.
In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence.40 Moreover, the parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon
the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the
credible evidence."42 Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of the
truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court as it is worthier of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.43chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We agree with the CA that Tomas' bare allegation that he paid Milagros the sum of P700,000.00 cannot be
considered as proof of payment, without any other convincing evidence to establish this claim. Tomas' bare
allegation, while uncontroverted, does not automatically entitle it to be given weight and credence.
It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it;44 the burden rests on
the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment.45 A mere allegation is not
evidence,46 and the person who alleges has the burden of proving his or her allegation with the requisite
quantum of evidence, which in civil cases is preponderance of evidence.
The force and effect of a void contract is distinguished from its admissibility as evidence.
The next question to be resolved is whether the CA correctly ordered the reimbursement of P200,000.00,
which is the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale, based on the principle of unjust enrichment.
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying on the consideration stated in the deed of sale as basis for
the reimbursable amount because a null and void document cannot be used as evidence.
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument.
A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from the very beginning.47 This rule applies to contracts
that are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property without the
other spouse's written consent.48 A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil
effects.49 It cannot be validated either by ratification or prescription.50 When, however, any of the terms of a
void contract have been performed, an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what
has been given under it.51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is basic that if a void contract has already "been performed, the restoration of what has been given is in
order."52 This principle springs from Article 22 of the New Civil Code which states that "every person who
through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same." Hence, the
restitution of what each party has given is a consequence of a void and inexistent contract.
While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot be enforced since it is deemed inexistent, it does not
preclude the admissibility of the contract as evidence to prove matters that occurred in the course of executing
the contract, i.e., what each party has given in the execution of the contract.
Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact, sanctioned
by the Rules of Court.53 The purpose of introducing documentary evidence is to ascertain the truthfulness of a
matter at issue, which can be the entire content or a specific provision/term in the document.
The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the truthfulness of the
consideration stated and its actual payment. The purpose of introducing the deed of sale as evidence is not to
enforce the terms written in the contract, which is an obligatory force and effect of a valid contract. The deed of
sale, rather, is used as a means to determine matters that occurred in the execution of such contract, i.e., the
determination of what each party has given under the void contract to allow restitution and prevent unjust
enrichment.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law of these rules.54 There
is no provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the admissibility of a void document. The Rules only
require that the evidence is relevant and not excluded by the Rules for its
admissibility.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because the purpose of introducing it as evidence is to
ascertain the truth respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the terms of the document itself.
It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which appears to be of doubtful relevancy,
incompetency, or admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal and not reject them on doubtful or technical
grounds, but admit them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason that their rejection
places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent. On the
other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by
completely discarding them or ignoring them.56chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by positive provision of the law prohibiting the
sale of conjugal property without the spouse's consent. It does not, however, preclude the possibility that
Tomas paid the consideration stated therein. The admission of the deed of sale as evidence is consistent with
the liberal policy of the court to admit the evidence: which appears to be relevant in resolving an issue before
the courts.
An offer to prove the regular execution of the deed of sale is basis for the court to determine the
presence of the essential elements of the sale, including the consideration paid.
Tomas argues that the Deed of Sale was not specifically offered to prove the actual consideration of the sale
and, hence, cannot be considered by the court. Tomas is incorrect.
The deed of sale in the present case was formally offered by both parties as evidence.57 Tomas, in fact,
formally offered it for the purpose of proving its execution and the regularity of the
sale.58chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The offer of the deed of sale to prove its regularity necessarily allowed the; lower courts to consider the terms
written therein to determine whether all the essential elements59 for a valid contract of sale are present,
including the consideration of the sale. The fact that the sale was declared null and void does not prevent the
court from relying on consideration stated in the deed of sale to determine the actual amount paid by the
petitioner for the purpose of preventing unjust enrichment.
Hence, the specific offer of the Deed of Sale to prove the actual consideration of the sale is not necessary
since it is necessarily included in determining the regular execution of the sale.
The consideration stated in the notarized Deed of Sale is prima facie evidence of the amount paid by
the petitioner.
The notarized deed of sale is a public document and is prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated
therein.60chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment
of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or
defense and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient.61chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the present case, the consideration stated in the deed of sale constitutes prima facie evidence of the amount
paid by Tomas for the transfer of the property to his name. Tomas failed to adduce satisfactory evidence to
rebut or contradict the consideration stated as the actual consideration and amount paid to Milagros and Jose.
The deed of sale was declared null and void by a positive provision of law requiring the consent of both
spouses for the sale of conjugal property. There is, however, no question on the presence of the consideration
of the sale, except with respect to the actual amount paid. While the deed of sale has no force and effect as a
contract, it remains prima facie evidence of the actual consideration paid.
As earlier discussed, Tomas failed to substantiate his claim that he paid to Milagros the amount of
P700,000.00, instead of the amount of P200,000.00 stated in the deed of sale. No documentary or testimonial
evidence to prove payment of the higher amount was presented, apart from Tomas' sole testimony. Tomas'
sole testimony of payment is self-serving and insufficient to unequivocally prove that Milagros received
P700,000.00 for the subject property.
Hence, the consideration stated in the deed of sale remains sufficient evidence of the actual amount the
petitioner paid and the same amount which should be returned under the principle of unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person
retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good
conscience."62 The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State and is based on
Article 22 of the Civil Code.63chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The principle of unjust enrichment requires Jose to return what he or Milagros received under the void contract
which presumably benefitted their conjugal partnership.
Accordingly, the CA correctly ordered Jose to return the amount of P200,000.00 since this the consideration
stated in the Deed of Sale and given credence by the lower court. Indeed, even Jose expressly stated in his
comment that Tomas is entitled to recover the money paid by him in the amount of P200,000.00 as appearing
in the contract.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review on certiorari. The decision dated August 28, 2009 and
the resolution dated November 17, 2009, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.cra
Lawlawlibrar
G.R. No. 176240
October 17, 2008
ROLANDO SASAN, SR., LEONILO DAYDAY, MODESTO AGUIRRE, ALEJANDRO ARDIMER, ELEUTERIO
SACIL, WILFREDO JUEGOS, PETRONILO CARCEDO and CESAR PACIENCIA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION 4TH DIVISION, EQUITABLE-PCI BANK and HELPMATE,
INC., respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision1 dated 24 April 2006
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79912, which affirmed the Decision dated 22 January 2003 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000241-2002 finding that Helpmate, Inc.
(HI) is a legitimate independent job contractor and that the petitioners were not illegally dismissed from work;
and the Resolution2 dated 31 October 2006 of the same court denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
the petitioners.
Respondent Equitable-PCI Bank (E-PCIBank),3 a banking entity duly organized and existing under and by
virtue of Philippine laws, entered into a Contract for Services4 with HI, a domestic corporation primarily
engaged in the business of providing janitorial and messengerial services. Pursuant to their contract, HI shall
hire and assign workers to E-PCIBank to perform janitorial/messengerial and maintenance services. The
contract was impliedly renewed year after year. Petitioners Rolando Sasan, Sr.,5 Leonilo Dayday,6 Modesto
Aguirre,7 Alejandro Ardimer,8 Eleuterio Sacil,9 Wilfredo Juegos,10 Petronilo Carcedo,11 and Cesar
Peciencia12 were among those employed and assigned to E-PCIBank at its branch along Gorordo Avenue,
Lahug, Cebu City, as well as to its other branches in the Visayas.13
O 23 July 2001, petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Cebu City separate
complaints14 against E-PCIBank and HI for illegal dismissal, with claims for separation pay, service incentive
leave pay, allowances, damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Their complaints were docketed as NLRC RAB-VII
Case No. 07-1381-2001 and raffled to Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez (Labor Arbiter Gutierrez) for their proper
disposition. Subsequently, on 22 August 2001, the petitioners15 amended their complaints to include a claim for
13th month-pay.
Several conciliation hearings were scheduled by Labor Arbiter Gutierrez but the parties still failed to arrive at a
mutually beneficial settlement; hence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez ordered that they submit their respective position
papers.
In their position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank with
respect to the activities for which they were employed, having continuously rendered janitorial and
messengerial services to the bank for more than one year; that E-PCIBank had direct control and supervision
over the means and methods by which they were to perform their jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null
and void because the latter had no power to do so since they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank.
For its part, E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI, an independent job
contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial and messengerial services
thereat. It was HI that paid petitioners’ wages, monitored petitioners’ daily time records (DTR) and uniforms,
and exercised direct control and supervision over the petitioners and that therefore HI has every right to
terminate their services legally. E-PCIBank could not be held liable for whatever misdeed HI had committed
against its employees.
HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the business of providing
janitorial and related services to business establishments, and E-PCIBank was one of its clients. Petitioners
were its employees, part of its pool of janitors/messengers assigned to E-PCIBank. The Contract for Services
between HI and E-PCIBank expired on 15 July 2000. E-PCIBank no longer renewed said contract with HI and,
instead, bidded out its janitorial requirements to two other job contractors, Able Services and Puritan. HI
designated petitioners to new work assignments, but the latter refused to comply with the same. Petitioners
were not dismissed by HI, whether actually or constructively, thus, petitioners’ complaints before the NLRC
were without basis.
Labor Arbiter Gutierrez focused on the following issues: (a) whether petitioners were regular employees of HI;
(b) whether petitioners were illegally dismissed from their employment; and (c) whether petitioners were
entitled to their money claims.
On 7 January 2002, on the basis of the parties’ position papers and documentary evidence, Labor Arbiter
Gutierrez rendered a Decision finding that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not
possess the required substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service under its
own account and responsibility as required under the Labor Code.16 HI is therefore a labor-only contractor and
the real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners. According to Labor Arbiter
Gutierrez:
[T]he undisputed facts show that the [herein petitioners] were made to perform not only as janitors but also as
messengers, drivers and one of them even worked as an electrician. For us, these jobs are not only directly
related to the main business of the principal but are, likewise deemed necessary in the conduct of respondent
Equitable-PCI Bank’s principal business. Thus, based on the above, we so declare that the [petitioners] are
employees of respondent Equitable-PCI Bank. And having worked with respondent Equitable-PCI Bank for
more than one (1) year, they are deemed regular employees. They cannot, therefore, be removed from
employment without cause and without due process, which is wanting in this case. Hence, the severance of
their employment in the guise of termination of contract is illegal.17
In the dispositive portion of his 7 January 2002 Decision, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez awarded to petitioners the
following amounts:
I. – CESAR PACIENCIA
a) Backwages
= ₱25,840.00
July 15, 2001 to January 8, 2002
= ₱190.00 per day
= 5 months and 6 days
= 136 days x ₱190.00
b) Separation Pay
June 10, 1996 to July 15, 2001
= 5 years
=₱190.00 x 26 days x 5 years / 2
c) 13th Month Pay
= ₱190.00 x 26 days
Total
II – Dominador Suico, Jr. (did not file Amended
Complaint)
a) Backwages
July 15, 2001 to January 15, 2002
same as Paciencia
b) Separation Pay
Feb. 2, 1999 to July 15, 2001
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 2.5 years / 2
Total
III – Roland Mosquera (did not file Amended
Complaint)
a) Backwages
(same as Paciencia)
b) Separation Pay
March 8, 1998 to July 15, 2001
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 3 yrs. / 2
Total
IV – Petronillo Carcedo
a) Backwages
(same as Paciencia)
b) Separation Pay
Sept. 16, 1984 to July 15, 2001
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 17 yrs. / 2
c) 13th Month Pay
= ₱190.00 x 26 days
Total
V – Rolando Sasan, Sr.
a) Backwages
(same as Paciencia)
b) Separation Pay
October 1989 to July 15, 2001
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 12 yrs. / 2
c) 13th Month Pay
= ₱190.00 x 26 days
Total
VI – Leonilo Dayday
a) Backwages
(same as Paciencia)
=₱12,350.00
= ₱4,940.00
₱43,130.00
= ₱25,840.00
= ₱6,175.00
= ₱32,015.00
= ₱25,840.00
= ₱7,410.00
= ₱33,250.00
= ₱25,840.00
= ₱41,990.00
= ₱4,940.00
= ₱72,770.00
= ₱25,840.00
= ₱29,640.00
= ₱4,940.00
= ₱60,420.00
= ₱25,840.00
b) Separation Pay
Feb. 8, 1983 to July 15, 2001
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 18 yrs. / 2
c) 13th Month Pay
= ₱190.00 x 26 days
Total
VII – Eleuterio Sacil
a) Backwages
(same as Paciencia)
b) Separation Pay
June 2, 1992 to July 15, 2001
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 9 yrs. / 2
c) 13th Month Pay
= ₱190.00 x 26 days
Total
VIII – Mario Juntilla
a) Backwages
(same as Pacencia)
b) Separation Pay
October 7, 1987 to July 15, 2001
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 14 yrs. / 2
c) 13th Month Pay
= ₱190.00 x 26 days
Total
IX – Wilfredo Juegos
a) Backwages
(same as Pacencia)
b) Separation Pay
July 23, 1990 to July 15, 2001
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 11 yrs. / 2
c) 13th Month Pay
= ₱190.00 x 26 days
Total
X – Modesto Aguirre
a) Backwages
(same as Paciencia)
b) Separation Pay
= Jan. 5, 1992 to July 15, 2001
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 9.5 yrs. / 2
c) 13th Month Pay
= ₱190.00 x 26 days
Total
XI – Alejandro Ardimer
a) Backwages
(same as Paciencia)
b) Separation Pay
= Jan. 20, 1990 to July 15, 2001
= ₱190.00 x 26 days x 11.5 yrs. / 2
c) 13th Month Pay
= ₱190.00 x 26 days
= ₱44,460.00
= ₱4,940.00
= ₱75,240.00
= ₱25,840.00
= ₱22,230.00
= ₱4,940.00
= ₱53,010.00
= ₱25,840.00
= ₱34,580.00
= ₱4,940.00
= ₱65,360.00
= ₱25,840.00
= ₱27,170.00
= ₱4,840.00
= ₱57,950.00
= ₱25,840.00
= ₱23,465.00
= ₱4,940.00
= ₱54,245.00
= ₱25,840.00
= ₱28,405.00
= ₱4,940.00
Total
= ₱59,185.00
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered directing the respondents
Equitable PCI Bank and Helpmate, Inc. to pay jointly and solidarily the complainants as follows:
1. Cesar Paciencia
-
P 43,130.00
2. Dominador Suico, Jr.
-
32,015.00
3. Roland Mosquera
-
33,250.00
4. Petronilo Carceda
-
72,770.00
5. Roland Sasan, Sr.
-
60,420.00
6. Leonilo Dayday
-
75,240.00
7. Eleuterio Sacil
-
53,010.00
8. Mario Juntilla
-
65,360.00
9. Wilfredo Juegos
-
57,950.00
10. Modesto Aguirre
-
54,245.00
11. Alejandro Ardimer
-
59,185.00
-
₱606,575.0018
TOTAL
Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, respondents E-PCIBank and HI appealed the same to the
NLRC, 4th Division, stationed in Cebu City. Their appeals were docketed as NLRC Case No. V-000241-2002.
In support of its allegation that it was a legitimate job contractor, HI submitted before the NLRC several
documents which it did not present before Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. These are:
1. Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock, Certificate of Filing Amended Articles of
Incorporation, and General Information Sheet Stock Corporation of HI showing therein that it increased its
authorized capital stock from ₱1,500,000.00 to ₱20,000,000.00 on 12 March 1999 with the Securities and
Exchange Commission;
2. Audited Financial Statement of HI showing therein that it has Total Assets of ₱20,939,935.72 as of 31
December 2000;
3. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 110173 and Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00582 registered under the
name of HI showing that it has a parcel of land with Market Value of ₱1,168,860.00 located along Rizal Avenue
(now Bacalso Avenue), Cebu City, and
4. Tax Declaration No. GR2K-09-063-00583 registered under the name of HI showing that it has a commercial
building constructed on the preceding lot located along Bacalso Avenue, Cebu City with market value of
₱2,515,170.00.19
The NLRC promulgated its Decision on 22 January 2003 modifying the ruling of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. The
NLRC took into consideration the documentary evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal and, on
the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be
considered engaged in "labor-only contracting."
On the charge of illegal dismissal, the NLRC ruled that:
The charge of illegal dismissal was prematurely filed. The record shows that barely eight (8) days from 15 July
2001 when the complainants were placed on a temporary "off-detail," they filed their complaints on 23 July
2001 and amended their complaints on 22 August 2001 against the respondents on the presumption that their
services were already terminated. Temporary "off-detail" is not equivalent to dismissal. x x x.20
The NLRC deleted Labor Arbiter Gutierrez’s award of backwages and separation pay, but affirmed his award
for 13th month pay and attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the 13th month pay, to the
petitioners.21 Thus, the NLRC decreed in its 22 January 2003 Decision, the payment of the following reduced
amounts to petitioners:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez dated 7 January 2002 is
MODIFIED, to wit:
Ordering respondents Helpmate, Inc. and Equitable PCI Bank to jointly and severally22 pay the complainants of
their 13th month pay and attorney’s fees in the aggregate amount of Forty-Three Thousand Four Hundred
Seventy-Two and 00/100 (₱43,472.00), broken down as follows:
1. Aguirre, Modesto
-
P 5,434.00
2. Ardimer, Alejandro
-
5,434.00
3. Carcedo, Petronilo
-
5,434.00
4. Dayday, Leonilo
-
5,434.00
5. Juegos, Wilfredo
-
5,434.00
6. Juntilla, Mario
-
5,434.00
7. Paciencia, Cesar
-
5,434.00
8. Sacil, Eleuterio
-
5,434.00
TOTAL
₱43,472.0023
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated 1 July 2003.24
Distressed by the decision of the NLRC, petitioners sought recourse with the Court of Appeals by filing a
Petition for Certiorari25 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
79912.
In its Decision dated 24 April 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the NLRC that HI was a
legitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss petitioners:
As to the question of whether or not, as a legitimate independent job contractor, respondent HI illegally
dismissed the petitioners. We rule in the negative.
It is undisputed that the contract between respondent HI and its client E-PCIBank expired on July 15, 2000.
The record shows that after said expiration, respondent HI offered the petitioners new work assignments to
various establishments which are HI’s clients. The petitioners, therefore, were not even placed on "floating
status." They simply refused, without justifiable reason, to assume their new work assignments which refusal
was tantamount to abandonment. There being no illegal dismissal, petitioners are not entitled to backwages or
separation pay.26
The fallo of the 24 April 2006 Decision of the appellate court reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the petition
filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the NLRC, Fourth Division, in NLRC Case No. V-0001452003 promulgated on June 22, 2003.27
Petitioners now come before us via the instant Petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED IN EXCESS OF THEIR
JURISDICTION AND/OR COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE NLRC
4TH DIVISION’S DECISION AND GRAVELY ERRED IN:
I. ACCEPTING AND APPRECIATING THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENTS
DURING APPEAL, ALL EXISTING DURING THE TIME THE NLRC RAB 7’S TRIAL, CONTRARY TO THIS
HONORABLE COURT’S PREVIOUS ESTABLISHED DECISIONS.
II. REVERSING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THE FACTUAL FINDING OF NLRC RAB 7 THAT THE
RESPONDENT HI WAS LABOR ONLY CONTRACTOR.
III. RULING, WITHOUT ANY LEGAL BASIS, THAT THE ILLEGAL DISMISSAL COMPLAINTS WERE
PREMATURELY FILED.28
Before proceeding to the substantive issues, we first address the procedural issues raised by petitioners.
Petitioners object to the acceptance and consideration by the NLRC of the evidence presented by HI for the
first time on appeal. This is not a novel procedural issue, however, and our jurisprudence is already replete
with cases29 allowing the NLRC to admit evidence, not presented before the Labor Arbiter, and submitted to
the NLRC for the first time on appeal. Technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. Labor officials
should use every reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without
regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.30
The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure. After
all, rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and
labor arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily
and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In
keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and
affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. The submission of additional evidence on
appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit counter-evidence.31
In Clarion Printing House, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,32 we again emphasized that:
[T]he NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because technical rules
of procedure are not binding in labor cases.
The settled rule is that the NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence on appeal as technical rules of
evidence are not binding in labor cases. In fact, labor officials are mandated by the Labor Code to use every
and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. Thus, in Lawin Security Services v. NLRC,
and Bristol Laboratories Employees’ Association-DFA v. NLRC, we held that even if the evidence was not
submitted to the labor arbiter, the fact that it was duly introduced on appeal to the NLRC is enough basis for
the latter to be more judicious in admitting the same, instead of falling back on the mere technicality that said
evidence can no longer be considered on appeal. Certainly, the first course of action would be more consistent
with equity and the basic notions of fairness.
For the same reasons, we cannot find merit in petitioners’ protestations against the documentary evidence
submitted by HI because they were mere photocopies. Evidently, petitioners are invoking the best evidence
rule, espoused in Section 3, Rule130 of the Rules of Court. It provides that:
Section 3. – Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself x x x.
The above provision explicitly mandates that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. Notably, certified true copies of these
documents, acceptable under the Rules of Court33 were furnished to the petitioners. Even assuming that
petitioners were given mere photocopies, again, we stress that proceedings before the NLRC are not covered
by the technical rules of evidence and procedure as observed in the regular courts. Technical rules of evidence
do not apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds from an examination of its sufficiency as well as a
careful look into the arguments contained in position papers and other documents.34
Petitioners had more than adequate opportunity when they filed their motion for reconsideration before the
NLRC, their Petition to the Court of Appeals and even to this Court, to refute or present their counter-evidence
to the documentary evidence presented by HI. Having failed in this respect, petitioners cannot now be heard to
complain about these documentary evidences presented by HI upon which the NLRC and the Court of Appeals
based its finding that HI is a legitimate job contractor.
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings,
a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side. It is also an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. It is not the denial of the right to be heard but denial of the opportunity to be
heard that constitutes violation of due process of law. Petitioners herein were afforded every opportunity to be
heard and to seek reconsideration of the adverse judgment against them. They had every opportunity to
strengthen their positions by presenting their own substantial evidence to controvert those submitted by EPCIBank and HI before the NLRC, and even before the Court of Appeals. It cannot win its case by merely
raising unsubstantiated doubt or relying on the weakness of the adverse parties’ evidence.
We now proceed to the resolution of the substantive issues submitted by petitioners for our consideration,
particularly, whether HI is a labor-only contactor and E-PCIBank should be deemed petitioners’ principal
employer; and whether petitioners were illegally dismissed from their employment.
Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to put out or
farm out to a contractor or subcontractor the performance or completion of a specific job, work or service within
a definite or predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be performed or
completed within or outside the premises of the principal.35 A person is considered engaged in legitimate job
contracting or subcontracting if the following conditions concur:
(a) The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes to perform
the job, work or service on its own account and under its own responsibility according to its own manner and
method, and free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters connected with the performance
of the work except as to the results thereof;
(b) The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or investment; and
(c) The agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees
entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to selforganization, security of tenure, and social and welfare benefits.36
In contrast, labor-only contracting, a prohibited act, is an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor
merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal.37 In labor-only
contracting, the following elements are present:
(a) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job,
work or service under its own account and responsibility; and
(b) The employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities
which are directly related to the main business of the principal.38
In distinguishing between permissible job contracting and prohibited labor-only contracting,39 we elucidated
in Vinoya v. National Labor Relations Commission,40 that it is not enough to show substantial capitalization or
investment in the form of tools, equipment, etc. Other facts that may be considered include the following:
whether or not the contractor is carrying on an independent business; the nature and extent of the work; the
skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the performance of specified pieces
of work; the control and supervision of the work to another; the employer’s power with respect to the hiring,
firing and payment of the contractor’s workers; the control of the premises; the duty to supply premises, tools,
appliances, materials and labor; and the mode and manner or terms of payment.41 Simply put, the totality of
the facts and the surrounding circumstances of the case are to be considered.42 Each case must be
determined by its own facts and all the features of the relationship are to be considered.43
In the case at bar, we find substantial evidence to support the finding of the NLRC, affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, that HI is a legitimate job contractor.
We take note that HI has been issued by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Certificate of
Registration44 Numbered VII-859-1297-048. The said certificate states among other things:
"CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION
Numbered VII-859-1297-048
is issued to
HELPMATE, INCORPORATED
330 N. Bacalso Avenue, Cebu City
for having complied with the requirements as provided for under the Labor Code, as amended, and its
Implementing Rules and having paid the registration fee in the amount of ONE HUNDRED PESOS (P100.00)
per Official Receipt Number 9042769, dated October 16, 1997.
In witness whereof, and by authority vested in me by the Labor Code, as amended, and its Implementing Rules
specifically Department Order No. 10 series of 1997, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the Official on
this 23rd day of December 1997."45
Having been issued by a public officer, this certification carries with it the presumption that it was issued in the
regular performance of official duty.46 In the absence of proof, petitioner’s bare assertion cannot prevail over
this presumption. Moreover, the DOLE being the agency primarily responsible for regulating the business of
independent job contractors, we can presume in the absence of evidence to the contrary that it thoroughly
evaluated the requirements submitted by HI as a precondition to the issuance of the Cerificate of Registration.
The evidence on record also shows that HI is carrying on a distinct and independent business from EPCIBank. The employees of HI are assigned to clients to perform janitorial and messengerial services, clearly
distinguishable from the banking services in which E-PCIBank is engaged.
Despite the afore-mentioned compliance by HI with the requisites for permissible job contracting, Labor Arbiter
Gutierrez still declared that HI was engaged in prohibited labor-only contracting because it did not possess
substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work or service under its own account or
responsibility. Both the NLRC and the Court of Appeals ruled to the contrary, and we agree.
"Substantial capital or investment" refers to capital stocks and subscribed capitalization in the case of
corporations, tools, equipments, implements, machineries and work premises, actually and directly used by the
contractor or subcontractor in the performance or completion of the job, work or service contracted out.47 An
independent contractor must have either substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment,
machineries, work premises, among others. The law does not require both substantial capital and investment
in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, etc.48 It is enough that it has substantial capital. In the case of HI,
it has proven both.
We have expostulated that once it is established that an entity such as in this case, HI has substantial capital,
it was no longer necessary to adduce further evidence to prove that it does not fall within the purview of "laboronly" contracting.49 There is even no need for HI to refute the contention of petitioners that some of the
activities they performed such as those of messengerial services are directly related to the principal business
of E- PCIBank.
In any event, we have earlier declared that while these services rendered by the petitioners as janitors,
messengers and drivers are considered directly related to the principal business of a bank, in this case EPCIBank, nevertheless, they are not necessary in the conduct of its (E-PCIBANK’s) principal business.50
HI has substantial capital in the amount of ₱20,939,935.72. It has its own building where it holds office and it
has been engaged in business for more than a decade now.51 As observed by the Court of Appeals, surely,
such a well-established business entity cannot be considered a labor-only contractor.
Etched in an unending stream of cases are four standards in determining the existence of an employeremployee relationship, namely: (a) the manner of selection and engagement of the putative employee; (b) the
mode of payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of power of dismissal; and, (d) the presence or
absence of control of the putative employee’s conduct. Most determinative among these factors is the socalled "control test."52
The presence of the first requisite for the existence of an employer-employee relationship to wit, the selection
and engagement of the employee is shown by the fact that it was HI which selected and engaged the services
of petitioners as its employees. This is fortified by the provision in the contract of services between HI and EPCIBank which states:
Selection, Engagement, Discharge. [HI] shall have exclusive discretion in the selection, engagement,
investigation, discipline and discharge of its employees.53
On the second requisite regarding the payment of wages, it was HI who paid petitioners their wages and who
provided their daily time records and uniforms and other materials necessary for the work they performed.
Therefore, it is HI who is responsible for petitioner’s claims for wages and other employee’s benefits. Precisely,
the contract of services between HI and E-PCIBank reveals the following:
Indemnity for Salaries and Benefits, etc. [HI] shall be responsible for the salaries, allowances, overtime and
holiday pay, and other benefits of its personnel including withholding taxes.54
As to the third requisite on the power to control the employee’s conduct, and the fourth requisite regarding the
power of dismissal, again E-PCIBank did not have the power to control petitioners with respect to the means
and methods by which their work was to be accomplished. It likewise had no power of dismissal over the
petitioners. All that E-PCIBank could do was to report to HI any untoward act, negligence, misconduct or
malfeasance of any employee assigned to the premises. The contract of services between E-PCIBank and HI
is noteworthy. It states:
[HI] shall have the entire charge, control and supervision over all its employees who may be fielded to [EPCIBank]. For this purpose, [HI] shall assign a regular supervisor of its employees who may be fielded to the
Bank and which regular supervisor shall exclusively supervise and control the activities and functions defined
in Section 1 hereof. x x x.55
All these circumstances establish that HI undertook said contract on its account, under its own responsibility,
according to its own manner and method, and free from the control and direction of E-PCIBank. Where the
control of the principal is limited only to the result of the work, independent job contracting exists. The janitorial
service agreement between E-PCIBank and HI is definitely a case of permissible job contracting.
Considering the foregoing, plus taking judicial notice of the general practice in private, as well as in
government institutions and industries, of hiring an independent contractor to perform special
services,56 ranging from janitorial, security and even technical services, we can only conclude that HI is a
legitimate job contractor. As such legitimate job contractor, the law creates an employer-employee relationship
between HI and petitioners57 which renders HI liable for the latter’s claims.
In view of the preceding conclusions, petitioners will never become regular employees of E-PCIBank
regardless of how long they were working for the latter.58
We further rule that petitioners were not illegally dismissed by HI. Upon the termination of the Contract of
Service between HI and E-PCIBank, petitioners cannot insist to continue to work for the latter. Their pull-out
from E-PCIBank did not constitute illegal dismissal since, first, petitioners were not employees of E-PCIBank;
and second, they were pulled out from said assignment due to the non-renewal of the Contract of Service
between HI and E-PCIBank. At the time they filed their complaints with the Labor Arbiter, petitioners were not
even dismissed by HI; they were only "off-detail" pending their re-assignment by HI to another client. And when
they were actually given new assignments by HI with other clients,59 petitioners even refused the same. As the
NLRC pronounced, petitioners’ complaint for illegal dismissal is apparently premature.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated 24 April
2006 and Resolution dated 31 October 2006 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 127240
March 27, 2000
ONG CHIA, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato2 admitting petitioner Ong Chia to Philippine citizenship.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port
of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found
employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On
July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as
required in §2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in §3 of the law, stated —
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of Instruction
No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor General, Manila, docketed
as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon owing to the fact that the said Special
Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted after the February, 1986 revolution such that
processing of petitions for naturalization by administrative process was suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate
his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon
being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness present any witness against him,
he remarked:
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in the sense
that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the Philippines, so, on our
part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of
the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the
testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself.3
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine
citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all the names by which
he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7;
(3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in
violation of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient
or misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate
documentary evidence.4
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by petitioner with
the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767,5 in which petitioner stated that in addition to
his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner,
however, failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition
must fail.6 The state also annexed income tax returns7 allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show
that his net income could hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that,
although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in 1953,
and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage from
1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract,
if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract8 and a JointAffidavit9 executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show that when petitioner married Ramona
Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil
Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been living together as husband and wife since 1953
without the benefit of marriage. This, according to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his
wife in 1953, they had already been married.
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, 10 petitioner resided at
"J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the petition.
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted, reversed the trial
court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance naturalization
cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the
first time on appeal. 11 The appellate court held:
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to state in this
present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his
previous application under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and pseudonyms must be stated in the
petition for naturalization and failure to include the same militates against a decision in his favor. . . This
is a mandatory requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to
come forward and inform the authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his
application for citizenship.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly resided in
"J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised Naturalization Law requires the
applicant to state in his petition "his present and former places of residence." This requirement is
mandatory and failure of the petitioner to comply with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the
Court, the reason for the provision is to give the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the
government, upon the publication of the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their
objections against the petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the
public and said agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when he lived-in with
his wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the consistent ruling that
the "applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of clergy and begetting by her three
children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper and irreproachable as required by the
Revised Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines
by naturalization . . .
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of bonuses,
commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an income tax return "because
he is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It is not only that the person
having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the
employment gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work and thus avoid one's becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that
they are in their old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by
their children. The monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be added to his
income to make it lucrative because like bonuses, commissions and allowances, said pensions are
contingent, speculative and precarious. . .
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN
NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.
II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN BY
SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD.
III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER STATED IN
HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.
IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT
HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had
merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the
trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of
paper devoid of any evidentiary value," 12 so it was argued, because under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 13 of the Rules of Court which provides that —
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization and
insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added).
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by
petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance
when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and
convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first
time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that
decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata. 14 Consequently, a final
favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of
naturalization on the basis of the same documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary
evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving
him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. 15 We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the
rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party
the chance to object to their admissibility. 16 Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object
to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his
objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus:
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was
supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case number of the
alleged petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number of the petition actually filed by the
appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and should not be considered by the
Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal. 17
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a
typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which was
annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet 18 of the Special
Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner
offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents — namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767,
petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income tax
returns — are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable.
Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the
authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle all the
issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St.,
Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with §7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant
Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for
naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the
Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published, 19 with the petition and the other
annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7. 20 This is allegedly because the
publication effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give
investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and
prevent suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he
may have lived at one time or another. 21 It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. 22 As noted by the State,
C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present
and former places of residence. 23 This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization
cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised
Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182835
April 20, 2010
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a former boyfriend
sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.
The Indictment
The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.)
9262 in an information that reads:
That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful
and reckless conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a
pornographic picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was
attached to a completely naked body of another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is
depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby causing substantial emotional anguish,
psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.1
The Facts and the Case
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were
classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off"
sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner
(now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him,
saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to
take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan
somehow managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for
sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was
to ask him to leave her alone.
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a
naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A).2 The sender’s
cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish
surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit
B).3
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy
for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through
the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang
ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."4
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under police
supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his text
messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did.
He came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted
and arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards.
While Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an expert in information
technology and computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one to lift the face of a woman
from a picture and superimpose it on the body of another woman in another picture. Pictures can be
manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it appear that the face and the body belonged to just one
person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities: the face was not
proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was fake and the face on it
had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales explained how this could be done,
transferring a picture from a computer to a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in October 2003 and their
relation lasted until December of that year. He claimed that after their relation ended, Irish wanted
reconciliation. They met in December 2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at that time (later his wife)
was already pregnant, Irish walked out on him.
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess Resort as she
needed his help in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police officers approached him,
seized his cellphone and the contents of his pockets, and brought him to the police station.
Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her identify a prankster
who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender’s number and, pretending to be Irish,
contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages from the prankster, which he
forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said, why the obscene messages appeared to have
originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture
(Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures of a woman whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5
Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures. Michelle claims
that she received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained them because she was
jealous and angry. She did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in the pictures posed in
sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5
and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she was the woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7,
the woman in the picture was fully dressed.
After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner.
The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her experience, prompting the court to comment: "Her tears
were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former
sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the
verity borne out of human nature and experience."6 Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found
Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),7 the latter rendered a decision dated January 31,
2008,8 affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated
April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.
The Issues Presented
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture
with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation
on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
The subordinate issues are:
1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in
R.A. 9262;
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case, already
constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;
3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his
constitutional rights; and
4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case.
The Court’s Rulings
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a person against a
woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
xxxx
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these include any form of
harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman. Thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of violence against women
and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or
causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but
not be limited to, the following acts:
xxxx
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against women
through harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against
the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan had a "dating
relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the parties
are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Thus:
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship.
A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a
dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)
Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the offended woman
have or had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He cites Webster’s
Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the word
"romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make love to" as in "He romanced her."
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual
act. It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun
"romance" to describe a couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed,
Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers
to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child." The dating relationship
that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual intercourse taking place between those
involved.
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-off" variety (awaybati), their romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and on a continuing basis." But the
two of them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to December of 2003. That
would be time enough for nurturing a relationship of mutual trust and love.
An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place does
not mean that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of
misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could not reply
to Rustan’s messages, he would get angry at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month
romantic relation as continuous.10
Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a form of
harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a very dangerous precedent. But
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence against women. This
means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law
is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated
ones.
Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her getting one
could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological distress.
He claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already desensitized by
them.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was not impressed with
their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7). It is doubtful if the woman in
the picture was Irish since her face did not clearly show on them.
Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7.
But her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved
after she deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not have time to delete them.11 And, if she
thought that she had deleted all the pictures from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and
hide such memory card. There would have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures
remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it for several years, given that as she said she was
too jealous to want to see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC was correct in not giving credence to her
testimony.1avvphi1
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan’s low regard for the
alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course
only be determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs
spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and
offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and
pained if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan
sent the picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.
Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him without any warrant,
the evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did not
present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers seized from him at the time of
his arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a
photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted
owning during the pre-trial conference.
Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s testimony that she received the
obscene picture and malicious text messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with
whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers belonged to
Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he
did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove
that Rustan sent those messages.
Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish.13 His defense was that he himself
received those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the
same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the cellphone number of the unidentified person
who sent the messages to him to authenticate the same. The RTC did not give credence to such version and
neither will this Court. Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to
help her identify the sender.
Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1,
Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time
before this Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on
such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground
for objection.14
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence
applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.15
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 204894
March 10, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
NOEL ENOJAS y HINGPIT, ARNOLD GOMEZ y FABREGAS, FERNANDO SANTOS y DELANTAR, and
ROGER JALANDONI y ARI, Appellants.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas charged appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit (Enojas),
Arnold Gomez y Fabregas (Gomez), Fernando Santos y Delantar (Santos), and Roger Jalandoni y Ari
(Jalandoni) with murder before the Las Pifias Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case 06-0854.1
PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (P02 Gregorio) testified that at around 10:30 in the evening of August 29, 2006, he
and P02 Francisco Pangilinan (PO2 Pangilinan) were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM
Southmall when they spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked in front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop near
the intersection of BF Almanza and Alabang-Zapote Roads. The officers approached the taxi and asked the
driver, later identified as accused Enojas, for his documents. The latter complied but, having entertained
doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown them, they asked him to come with them to the police
station in their mobile car for further questioning.2
Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and left his taxi behind. On reaching the 7-11
convenience store on the Zapote-Alabang Road, however, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down to
relieve himself there. As he approached the store’s door, however, he came upon two suspected robbers and
shot it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to escape.
But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death.
On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at an armed man whom he saw running towards
Pilar Village. He saw another man, who came from the Jollibbee outlet, run towards Alabang-Zapote Road
while firing his gun at PO2 Gregorio. The latter returned fire but the men were able to take a taxi and escape.
PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for an ambulance. On returning to his mobile car, he realized that accused
Enojas, the taxi driver they had with them had fled.
P/Insp. Ferjen Torred (Torred), the Chief of Investigation Division of the Las Piñas Police, testified that he and
PO2 Teoson Rosarito (PO2 Rosarito) immediately responded to PO2 Gregorio’s urgent call. Suspecting that
accused Enojas, the taxi driver who fled, was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched the abandoned
taxi and found a mobile phone that Enojas apparently left behind. P/Ins. Torred instructed PO3 Joel Cambi
(PO3 Cambi) to monitor its incoming messages.3
The police later ascertained that the suspect whom PO2 Pangilinan had killed was someone named Reynaldo
Mendoza who was armed with a .38 caliber revolver. The police found spent 9 mm and M-16 rifle shells at the
crime scene. Follow-up operations at nearby provinces resulted in finding the dead body of one of the
suspects, Alex Angeles, at the Metro South Medical Center along Molino, Bacoor, Cavite.4
PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored the messages in accused Enojas’ mobile phone
and, posing as Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The police then conducted an entrapment
operation that resulted in the arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the police were also able
to capture accused Enojas and Gomez. The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile phone text
messages between Enojas and some of his co-accused.5
The victim’s father, Ricardo Pangilinan, testified that his son was at the time of his death 28 years old,
unmarried, and was receiving police pay of ₱8,000.00 to ₱10,000.00 per month. Ricardo spent ₱99,999 for
burial expense, ₱16,000.00 for the interment services, and ₱50,000.00 for purchase of the cemetery lot.6
Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce any evidence or testify in the case,7 the accused
opted to instead file a trial memorandum on March 10, 2008 for their defense. They pointed out that they were
entitled to an acquittal since they were all illegally arrested and since the evidence of the text messages were
inadmissible, not having been properly identified.
On June 2, 2008 the RTC rendered judgment,8 finding all the accused guilty of murder qualified by evident
premeditation and use of armed men with the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms.
It thus sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without the possibility of parole and to
indemnify the heirs of PO2 Pangilinan with ₱165,999.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱2,080,000.00 as compensation for loss of earning capacity.
Upon review in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 03377, on June 14, 2012 the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal
and affirmed in toto the conviction of the accused.9 The CA, however, found the absence of evident
premeditation since the prosecution failed to prove that the several accused planned the crime before
committing it. The accused appealed from the CA to this Court.10
The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present direct evidence that the accused Enojas, Gomez,
Santos, or Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead.11 This may be true but the prosecution could
prove their liability by circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. It has been held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one
circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.12
Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the
conviction of all the accused. Thus:
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the driver of the taxicab suspiciously parked in
front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop. The officers were bringing him with them to the police station
because of the questionable documents he showed upon query. Subsequent inspection of the taxicab
yielded Enojas’ mobile phone that contained messages which led to the entrapment and capture of the
other accused who were also taxicab drivers.
2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the police station where he
was about to be taken for questioning, tending to show that he had something to hide. He certainly did
not go to the police afterwards to clear up the matter and claim his taxi.
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of the men he saw running away from the
scene of the shooting.
4. The text messages identified "Kua Justin" as one of those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the
shootout; the messages also referred to "Kua Justin" as the one who was hit in such shootout and later
died in a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These messages linked the other accused.
5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators succeeded in entrapping accused Santos,
Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were all named in the text messages.
6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by Enojas clearly made
references to the 7-11 shootout and to the wounding of "Kua Justin," one of the gunmen, and his
subsequent death.
7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an organized group of
taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile phones with call numbers
that corresponded to the senders of the messages received on the mobile phone that accused Enojas
left in his taxicab.13
The Court must, however, disagree with the CA’s ruling that the aggravating circumstances of a) aid of armed
men and b) use of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of PO2 Pangilinan to murder. In "aid of armed men,"
the men act as accomplices only. They must not be acting in the commission of the crime under the same
purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. The
use of unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is a special aggravating circumstance that is not among the
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide to
murder.14 Consequently, the accused in this case may be held liable only for homicide, aggravated by the use
of unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier
Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions.15 Text messages are to be proved by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them.16 Here, PO3
Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify
and entrap them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession,
PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.
The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest.1âwphi1 But, assuming that this
was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for rejecting any evidence that may
have been taken from them after an unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not
in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been committed—the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and the investigating
police officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed
it.17 The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong
leads on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment using
this knowledge.
The award of damages by the courts below has to be modified to conform to current jurisprudence.18
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the Court of Appeals Decision of June 14, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC
03377. The Court instead FINDS accused-appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit, Arnold Gomez y Fabregas,
Fernando Santos y Delantar, and Roger Jalandoni y Ari GUILTY of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE with the
special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
Court SENTENCES each of them to 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. The Court also MODIFIES the award of exemplary damages by increasing it to ₱30,000.00, with
an additional ₱50,000.00 for civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and
found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him
away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30
in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected
his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The
two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for
examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also
been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn
statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and
trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted .6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the
accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was Identified
by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he
descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the
bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an
NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests
on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and
immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was
manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of
wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did
not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes
cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly
Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have come
to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and
spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two
watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was bodily
searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16 He also said he
sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches belonged not to him but to
his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his
allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had
immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on the
stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which may
reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of this,
discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant was not
really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical examination. That is
hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time under
detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the
present. No bail has been allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested
and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in
evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the
Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because
it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also
valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had no
warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip
they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was
arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it
was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter,
we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as
follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of
Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of
marijuana leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information
from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of
the particular operation which was being participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984
with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of
Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25,
1984, did you also receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel
Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information,
maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify the person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is
coming with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with
marijuana was received by you many days before you received the intelligence
report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was
coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but
on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received the information that he was
coming. Regarding the reports on his activities, we have reports that he was
already consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had
already gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to
Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the
subject mentioned in your intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need
a search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC. The
Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the
accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency
could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for
example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for
violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear
that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified.
The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a
judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No
effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant
who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not
necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buybust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of
arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it
shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the
gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was
the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised
dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without trial, we
will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its disdain
of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that he is
lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is
innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong
enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall.
That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact
is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous
phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless
search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts
of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the
susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of
the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of
criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any
manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the
name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less
evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not
allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant, his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption
that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is
so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
.M. No. RTJ-07-2076
October 12, 2010
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ALBERTO L. LERMA, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2077
ATTY. LOURDES A. ONA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ALBERTO L. LERMA, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2078
JOSE MARI L. DUARTE, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ALBERTO L. LERMA, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2079
RET. GENERAL MELITON D. GOYENA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ALBERTO L. LERMA, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2080
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ALBERTO L. LERMA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Five (5) administrative cases were filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against Judge Alberto
L. Lerma (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, for violating
Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars, for making untruthful statements in his certificates of service, for
gross ignorance of the law and/or gross negligence, for delay in rendering an order, for abusing judicial
authority and discretion, and for serious irregularity.
In a memorandum1 dated September 24, 2007, embodying the report and recommendation of the OCA, then
Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock (Court Administrator Lock) referred to then Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno (Chief Justice Puno) the five administrative cases filed against respondent judge, to wit: a) Administrative
Matter No. 98-6-179-RTC (Re: Request for transfer of arraignment/trial of Criminal Case No. 3639-R); b) OCA
IPI No. 07-2644-RTJ ([Ret.] General Meliton D. Goyena v. Judge Alberto L. Lerma); c) OCA IPI No. 07-2643RTJ (Jose Mari L. Duarte v. Judge Alberto L. Lerma); d) OCA IPI No. 07-2639-RTJ (Atty. Lourdes A. Ona v.
Judge Alberto L. Lerma); and e) OCA IPI No. 07-2654-RTJ (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Alberto
L. Lerma).
Per resolution2 of the Supreme Court En Banc dated September 25, 2007, the foregoing cases were
respectively redocketed as regular administrative cases, as follows: A.M. Nos. RTJ-07-2076, RTJ-07-2079,
RTJ-07-2078, RTJ-07-2077, and RTJ-07-2080.
Thereafter, the cases were referred to an Investigating Justice3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation
and recommendation.
We shall discuss the cases individually, taking into account their peculiar factual surroundings and the findings
and recommendations of the Investigating Justice.
a.) A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076
On November 27, 1995, Ruperto Pizarro y Bruno (accused) was charged with Violation of Presidential Decree
No. 1866 in an information filed with the RTC, Branch 53, Rosales, Pangasinan and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 3639-R.4 Since accused was already detained at the Quezon City Jail due to the pendency of
another criminal case (Criminal Case No. Q-95-64130-31) filed against him. The court ordered that all notices
of hearings and proceedings in Criminal Case No. 3639-R be forwarded to the Jail Warden of the Quezon City
Jail.5 Subsequently, in a letter dated March 25, 1998,6 Officer-in-Charge/City Warden Arnold Buenacosa of the
Quezon City Jail informed Judge Teodorico Alfonzo B. Bauzon (Judge Bauzon), RTC of Rosales, Pangasinan,
that accused was transferred to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City on March 21, 1998 in compliance
with the commitment order and decision in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64130-31 of the RTC, Branch 82, Quezon
City.
The Supreme Court, in a resolution7 dated June 30, 1998, directed (1) the Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch
53, Rosales, Pangasinan, to forward the records of Criminal Case No. 3639-R to the Executive Judge, RTC,
Muntinlupa City, for appropriate action; (2) the Executive Judge, RTC, Muntinlupa City, to raffle the case
among the judges to arraign the accused and consequently take his testimony; and (3) the Clerk of Court,
RTC, Muntinlupa City, to return the records to the RTC, Branch 53, Rosales, Pangasinan, for the continuation
of the proceedings.
Pursuant to the Supreme Court resolution, Criminal Case No. 3639-R8 was raffled to RTC, Branch 256,
Muntinlupa City, presided by respondent judge. Accused was arraigned on September 29, 1998. Thereafter,
respondent judge proceeded to receive the evidence for the prosecution. On February 7, 2003, the prosecution
formally offered its exhibits, but the firearm subject of the information was not included in the formal offer. On
June 27, 2005, the accused, through Atty. Abelardo D. Tomas of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), filed a
motion for leave of court to file demurrer to prosecution’s evidence.9 Respondent judge granted the said motion
on July 26, 2005.10 On November 8, 2005, Atty. Rodney Magbanua of the PAO filed a demurrer to
prosecution’s evidence,11 contending that, without the subject firearm, the prosecution failed to prove an
essential element of the offense. On February 28, 2007, respondent judge issued an order, granting the
demurrer to prosecution’s evidence and dismissing the case for insufficiency of evidence.12
In a memorandum13 dated September 24, 2007, the OCA charged respondent judge with exceeding his
authority under the Supreme Court resolution dated June 30, 1998 in A.M. No. 98-6-179-RTC. According to the
OCA, the authority given to respondent judge under the resolution was clearly limited to the arraignment of the
accused and the taking of his testimony; it did not authorize respondent judge to decide the merits of the case.
The OCA contended that the act of respondent judge constituted violation of a Supreme Court directive, a less
serious offense, under Section 9(4), Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court.
In his comment dated November 16, 2007, respondent judge asserted that there was neither a conscious nor a
deliberate intent on his part to disobey any directive of the Supreme Court when he granted the demurrer to
evidence filed by the accused in Criminal Case No. 3639-R. He claimed that, through inadvertence, he was not
able to recall the limits of the referral made to him, and stressed that he ruled on the merits of the case in a
way not tainted with fraud, dishonesty, or corruption. He emphasized that he acted on the demurrer to
evidence because of the inadequacy of the evidence for the prosecution and because of the failure of the latter
to object to the demurrer. He maintained that it would have been wrong for him to add to the penalty already
being served by the accused when there was no evidence to warrant the detention of the latter for the
unproved offense.14
Under Section 9(4), Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court, failure to obey the Court’s resolution is a less serious
offense that carries a penalty of suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one
(1) month or more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00.
The Investigating Justice recommends that a fine of ₱15,000.00 be imposed upon respondent, based on the
following findings:
In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is jurisdictional. The place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. Thus, a court
cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside the limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information.15
The demurrer to evidence filed by the accused cited the accusatory portion of the information which charged
him with unlawful possession of a caliber .30 U.S. carbine with two magazines and twenty-five (25) rounds of
ammunition. The information clearly stated that the accused possessed the carbine, magazines, and
ammunitions in Barangay Cabalaongan Sur, Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan. Had respondent
judge exercised a moderate degree of caution before resolving the demurrer to evidence, a mere perusal of
the records would have reminded him that his court was only authorized to arraign the accused, to receive the
evidence in the said case, and to return the records of the case to the RTC, Branch 53, Rosales, Pangasinan
for continuation of the proceedings. In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts.16
Respondent judge was found wanting in the diligence required of him. We agree with the Investigating Justice
in finding respondent judge guilty of violating a Supreme Court directive, and impose upon him a fine of
₱15,000.00.
b.) A.M. No. RTJ-07-2080
In a letter17 dated August 28, 2007, Godofredo R. Galindez, Jr., (Godofredo), president of the Alabang Country
Club, Inc. (Alabang Country Club), in response to the letter dated August 21, 2007 of Court Administrator Lock,
stated that respondent judge played golf at the Alabang Country Club on the following dates and tee-off time:
Date
Tee off-time
April 8, 2000
12:00 P.M.
July 21, 2000
1:08 P.M.
August 4, 2000
1:20 P.M.
November 28, 2000
10:00 A.M.
May 17, 2001
3:05 P.M.
September 29, 2001
12:56 P.M.
March 5, 2002
1:00 P.M.
June 19, 2002
7:12 A.M.
February 12, 2004
1:35 P.M.
February 28, 2005
10:41 A.M.
With the exception of May 17, 2001, during which respondent judge allegedly played nine (9) holes of golf,
Godofredo stated in his letter that the former played eighteen (18) holes of golf on all the aforestated dates.
In another letter18 dated September 3, 2007, Hirofumi Hotta (Hirofumi), operations manager of TAT Filipinas
Golf Club (Tat Filipinas), in answer to an inquiry made by Court Administrator Lock, stated that respondent
judge visited the said golf club and appeared to have played golf there on the following dates – all Thursdays –
and time:
Date
Time
April 14, 2005
1:30 P.M.
April 28, 2005
1:30 P.M.
August 18, 2005
1:30 P.M.
August 25, 2005
1:30 P.M.
November 17, 2005
1:30 P.M.
November 24, 2005
1:30 P.M.
December 15, 2005
1:30 P.M.
January 26, 2006
1:30 P.M.
February 9, 2006
1:30 P.M.
March 2, 2006
1:30 P.M.
March 23, 2006
1:30 P.M.
April 6, 2006
1:30 P.M.
April 27, 2006
1:30 P.M.
June 15, 2006
1:30 P.M.
December 14, 2006
1:30 P.M.
According to the OCA, its records in the Office of the Administrative Services show that respondent judge did
not declare his absences on July 21, 2000, August 4, 2000, March 5, 2002, February 12, 2004, and February
28, 2005, during which he reportedly played golf at the Alabang Country Club. Further, in a certification19 dated
September 5, 2007, Hermogena F. Bayani (Hermogena), Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Leave
Division, OCA, stated that respondent judge did not file any application for a leave of absence on all the dates
mentioned by Hirofumi in his letter dated September 3, 2007. These constituted violations of Supreme Court
Memorandum Order dated November 19, 1973, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999, and
Administrative Circular No. 5 dated October 4, 1988.20
The OCA asserted that on the days that respondent judge played golf, he was lost to the judiciary for half the
working/session hours on those days, positing that this is not merely truancy but also dishonesty and
falsification of certificates of service.
Respondent judge, in his comment, countered that contrary to the allegations of the OCA, he only played golf
thrice in 2000, once in 2001, twice in 2002, six (6) times in 2005, and five (5) times in 2006 – a total of eighteen
(18) times in six years, or at the average of three (3) times a year. He argued that his playing golf 18 times in
six years, or thrice a year, could not be reasonably characterized as habitual to the extent that it jeopardized
the discharge of his functions as a judge. He alleged that since he shared his courtroom with the other judges
in Muntinlupa, he only played golf on days when no other place was available for him to carry out his official
functions. Likewise, he explained that, in 1996, his physician advised him to exercise more vigorously after he
was diagnosed with diabetes and hypertension. Respondent judge also stressed that he had never missed a
day in hearing cases pending in his sala.21
In the hearing conducted by the Investigating Justice on December 4, 2007, the OCA presented Godofredo,
Hirofumi, and Sheila Aquino as witnesses.
Godofredo testified that the dates and time when respondent judge played golf at the Alabang Country Club,
as mentioned in his letter, are based on the logbook entries made by the starter in the country club. A starter,
explained Godofredo, is a person who records in the logbook the names of the individuals who play in the golf
course. The starter may be the player himself or a member who brings in guests to play golf.
On cross-examination, Godofredo admitted that he is not the custodian of the logbook; that he is neither the
starter nor the person who wrote the entries in the logbook; and that he does not recognize in whose
handwriting the entries were made.
Hirofumi, the operations manager of TAT Filipinas, testified that Aquino, the front desk receptionist in the golf
club, made the listing of the respective dates and time when respondent judge played at TAT Filipinas based
on the data stored in their office computer.
Aquino, who had been employed by the company for fifteen (15) years, and had been working as its front desk
receptionist for six (6) years, testified that she saw respondent judge sign the registered member forms at the
golf club prior to playing golf.
The Investigating Justice found as insufficient the evidence that the OCA presented to show that respondent
judge played golf at the Alabang Country Club on the dates alleged, but found substantial evidence that
respondent judge played golf at TAT Filipinas on the dates and time indicated in Hirofumi’s letter dated
September 3, 2007.
The testimony of Aquino, along with the certification issued by Hermogena, that respondent judge did not file
any leave of absence on the dates indicated in Hirofumi’s letter, indubitably established that respondent judge
violated Supreme Court Memorandum Order dated November 19, 1973, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated
January 15, 1999, and Administrative Circular No. 5 dated October 4, 1988.
Supreme Court Memorandum Order dated November 19, 1973 provides for the observance by judges, among
other officials and employees in the judiciary, of a five-day forty-hour week schedule which shall be from 8:00
a.m. to 12:00 p.m. and from 12:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. from Mondays to Fridays.
Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars, and making untruthful statements in the certificate
of service are considered less serious charges under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Under Section
11(B) of Rule 140, these acts may be punished by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for
not less than one (1) month or more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not
exceeding ₱20,000.00.
On the basis of the foregoing findings, we adopt the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that, in this
administrative case, a fine of ₱15,000.00 be imposed upon respondent judge.
c.) A.M. No. RTJ-07-2077
On January 24, 1995, the RTC, Branch 142, Makati City, rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 90-659, entitled
Alexander Van Twest v. Gloria A. Anacleto and/or International Corporate Bank, ordering defendant bank
(Interbank) or its successors-in-interest to release in favor of plaintiff Alexander Van Twest (Van Twest) the
entire proceeds of Interbank Foreign Currency Trust Deposit (FCTD) No. 39156 in the amount of Deutsch Mark
(DM) 260,000.00, including accrued interest and other earnings. The decision also directed defendant Gloria
Anacleto to return to plaintiff the sum of DM 9,777.37 with interest thereon. The court ordered the defendants,
jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff ₱500,000.00 as moral damages, ₱250,000.00 as exemplary damages,
₱200,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and the costs of suit.22 However, even before the decision was rendered, Van
Twest had disappeared and was believed to have been kidnapped and killed.23
Subsequently, Atty. Ernesto V. Perez (Atty. Perez), representing Van Twest, filed a Motion for Execution of
Decision. In the motion, Atty. Perez informed the RTC of Makati City that, on October 30, 2006, the RTC,
Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, with respondent judge presiding, granted the petition to appoint the former as
administrator of the properties or estate of absentee Van Twest in Special Proceeding No. 97-045, entitled In
the Matter of the Petition to Appoint an Administrator for the Estate of Absentee Alexander Van Twest a.k.a.
Eugene Alexander Van West.24 On January 27, 2007, the RTC Branch 142, Makati City, granted the motion for
execution.25
Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) filed a Manifestation and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion dated May 23,
2007 in Special Proceeding No. 97-045, praying that the exercise by Atty. Perez of powers as administrator of
absentee Van Twest be held in abeyance until the said manifestation and motion is heard. Because
respondent judge was on official leave at the time of the filing of the Manifestation and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion,
Judge Philip A. Aguinaldo, pairing judge of RTC Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, acted on the same, and, in an
order dated May 28, 2007, granted Union Bank’s urgent ex-parte motion.
Union Bank thereafter filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Recall Writ of Execution/Garnishment in
Civil Case No. 90-659, citing, in support thereof, the order dated May 28, 2007 issued by Judge Aguinaldo in
Special Proceeding No. 97-045.
On June 1, 2007, Atty. Perez filed with the Muntinlupa RTC an Omnibus Motion: 1) To Lift or Set Aside Pairing
Judge’s Order of May 28, 2007 for having been issued without jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion and/or
violation of due process of law; 2) To Cite Union Bank of the Philippines’ counsel for Indirect Contempt.
At the hearing of the omnibus motion on June 6, 2007, respondent judge ordered Atty. Lourdes A. Ona (Atty.
Ona), counsel for Union Bank, to file her Opposition and/or Comment to the said Motion within 10 days. Atty.
Perez was given the same period from receipt of the Opposition and/or Comment to file his Reply thereto, if
necessary, and thereafter, the matter would be deemed submitted for resolution.
On the same day, however, respondent judge issued another order bearing the same date, ruling that the bank
had not shown any legal basis to set aside the court’s decision of October 30, 2006, or to suspend the Letters
of Administration issued to Atty. Perez pursuant thereto. The order then concluded that Atty. Perez may
exercise all the powers granted to him as Administrator of the absentee Van Twest until further orders of the
court.
In a letter dated July 23, 2007, addressed to the OCA, complainant alleged that respondent judge’s issuance of
the second order dated June 6, 2007 was irregular, in light of the following: 1) At the hearing held on June 6,
2007, the omnibus motion filed by Atty. Perez was deemed submitted for resolution only after the complainant
shall have filed her comment/opposition thereto or until the 10-day period shall have expired; 2) The issuance
of the second order dated June 6, 2007 was secretly railroaded to give Atty. Perez a ground to oppose Union
Bank’s Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Recall Writ of Execution/Garnishment filed with the RTC, Branch
142, Makati City, in time for its hearing originally set on June 8, 2007; 3) Even the staff of respondent judge did
not become aware of the second June 6, 2007 order until much later, since respondent judge never furnished
complainant with a copy thereof until the latter made inquiries regarding the same; and 4) The contents of the
second order dated June 6, 2007 contradicted the first order and rendered the pending incident moot and
academic.
Respondent judge, in his comment, denied the charge and argued that the same should be dismissed. The
complainant, according to respondent judge, should instead be meted disciplinary penalties as a member of
the bar.
Notwithstanding the recommendation of the Investigating Justice, the Court finds that the actions of respondent
judge constitute gross negligence and/or gross ignorance of the law.
We have repeatedly held that to warrant a finding of gross ignorance of the law, it must be shown that the error
is "so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith."26 Gross negligence refers to negligence
characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act,
not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other
persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail
to take on their own property. In cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of
duty is flagrant and palpable.27
In the instant case, the issuance by respondent of divergent orders raises serious questions of impropriety that
taint respondent judge’s credibility, probity, and integrity. Coupled with the clandestine issuance of the second
order — where the Union Bank counsel and even the judge’s own staff were left completely in the dark — the
action of respondent judge gives rise to an inference of bad faith. Indeed, we have ample reason to believe —
as Atty. Ona posits — that the secretly-issued second order was really intended to give Atty. Perez the
ammunition to oppose Union Bank’s Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Recall Writ of Execution/Garnishment
which was to be heard by the RTC of Makati City. Under the circumstances, the breach committed by
respondent can be characterized as flagrant and palpable.
This action of respondent judge violates Section 8 of Rule 140, and carries the penalty of dismissal from the
service or suspension from office for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of
₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.
For this violation, we impose upon respondent judge the penalty of dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of
all benefits, except earned leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government
service, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
d) A.M. No. RTJ-07-2078
Jose Mari L. Duarte (complainant) is one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 2003-433, entitled "Eugene T.
Mateo v. The Board of Governors of Ayala Alabang Village Association: Paolo V. Castano, Constantino A.
Marcaida, Ruben P. Baes, Eric Yutuc, Roberto Santiago, Beatriz "Bettina" H. Pou, Edilberto Uichanco,
Salvador S. Arceo, Jr., Benjamin Narciso, Guy L. Romualdez, and Jose Mari L. Duarte," for Declaration of the
General Membership Meeting and Election of the Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA) as void ab initio,
with prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and
Status Quo Order. Eugene T. Mateo filed the case on July 29, 2003 with the RTC, Muntinlupa City, and it was
eventually raffled to the RTC, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, presided over by respondent judge.28
On August 15, 2003, defendants Salvador S. Arceo, Jr. (Arceo) and Benjamin Narciso (Narciso) filed their
answer with affirmative defenses and counterclaims, while all the other defendants filed a motion to dismiss. In
moving for the dismissal of the case, all defendants invoked the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over the case
and plaintiff’s lack of cause of action. On September 2, 2003, plaintiff filed his opposition to motion to dismiss
with motion to declare defendants in default. In an order dated September 12, 2003, respondent judge denied
defendants’ motion to dismiss and plaintiff’s motion to declare defendants in default, and set for hearing
plaintiff’s application for the issuance of a TRO. Respondent judge eventually denied the prayer of plaintiff for
the issuance of a TRO on September 26, 2003.
On November 25, 2003, respondent judge rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, declaring the AAVA’s
general membership meeting held on June 15, 2003 void ab initio, and ordering that the status quo of the
board’s composition prior to the proceedings of June 15, 2003 be maintained. The respondent judge also
enjoined defendants Arceo, Narciso, Guy L. Romualdez (Romualdez) and Jose Mari L. Duarte from further
exercising the functions of the office they respectively hold. He directed the holding of another election of the
AAVA board, and ordered the defendants to pay jointly and severally the amount of ₱100,000.00 as and by
way of attorney’s fees. The respondent judge dismissed the defendants’ counterclaim.
The aggrieved complainant, together with all the other defendants, appealed to the CA from the above-cited
decision. On December 10, 2003, plaintiff filed with the RTC a petition to direct defendants to show cause why
they should not be cited and thereafter punished for indirect contempt of court (petition for indirect contempt)
for their alleged defiance of respondent judge’s decision dated November 25, 2003, as shown by their
continued performance of duties as governors of Ayala Alabang Village, despite receipt of a copy of the said
decision.
On July 1, 2004, respondent judge issued an order declaring complainant, Arceo and Romualdez, guilty of
indirect contempt, and ordering each of them to pay a fine in the amount of ₱30,000.00.
Unperturbed, complainant and his co-defendants Arceo and Romualdez moved for reconsideration of the July
1, 2004 order. On September 24, 2004, respondent judge granted their motion for reconsideration, and
reversed and set aside his order dated July 1, 2004.
On June 29, 2007, the Special Sixteenth Division of the CA issued a resolution, ruling that the lower court
should have dismissed the plaintiff-appellee’s Complaint for Declaration of the General Membership Meeting
and Election of the AAVA as void ab initio with prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO
and Status Quo Order because it is the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board that has jurisdiction over the
dispute.
On August 23, 2007, Mateo filed a complaint with the Supreme Court, contending that respondent judge did
not have the judicial authority to hear and decide the issues involved in Civil Case No. 2003-433 for want of
jurisdiction. According to complainant, this was brought to the attention of respondent judge, but the latter,
being grossly ignorant of existing laws and rules, if not completely insolent of the same, and with grave abuse
of discretion, took cognizance of the case.
In his comment, respondent judge argued that the error he allegedly committed could be corrected by an
available judicial remedy. He maintained that if he erroneously assumed jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 2003433, the proper recourse available to complainant was not an administrative complaint, but a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Investigating Justice recommended that the instant administrative case against respondent judge be
dismissed. This Court takes the opposite view.
It is true that to constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision, order, or
actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but,
most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption.29
However, when the law is so elementary — and the matter of jurisdiction is an elementary principle that judges
should be knowledgeable of — not to be aware of it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are
expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. They are expected
to keep abreast of our laws and the changes therein as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court.
They owe it to the public to be legally knowledgeable, for ignorance of the law is the mainspring of injustice.
Judicial competence requires no less. It is a truism that the life chosen by a judge as a dispenser of justice is
demanding. By virtue of the delicate position which he occupies in society, he is duty bound to be the
embodiment of competence and integrity.30
On the matter of the order finding complainant guilty of indirect contempt, we also find the action of respondent
judge sadly wanting. Section 4, Rule 71 of the same Rules provides:
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. – Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by
the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the
respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting
particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the
requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose
out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact
but said petition shall be docketed, heard and
decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the
principal action for joint hearing and decision.31
The Rules are unequivocal. Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu
proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory
pleadings. The procedural requirements are mandatory considering that contempt proceedings against a
person are treated as criminal in nature.32 Conviction cannot be had merely on the basis of written pleadings.33
The records do not indicate that complainant was afforded an opportunity to rebut the charges against him.
Respondent judge should have conducted a hearing in order to provide complainant the opportunity to adduce
before the court documentary or testimonial evidence in his behalf. The hearing also allows the court a more
thorough evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the case, including the chance to observe the accused
present his side in open court and subject his defense to interrogation from the complainants or from the court
itself.34
It must be remembered that the power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly with caution, restraint,
judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the
individual.35 In this respect, respondent judge failed to measure up to the standards demanded of member of
the judiciary.
As already mentioned above, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge under
Section 8(9), Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court, and a respondent found guilty of serious charge may be
punished by: a) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits; b) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) months but not
exceeding six (6) months; or c) a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00.
In this case, we find respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law, and impose upon him a fine of
₱40,000.00.
e.) A.M. No. RTJ-07-2079
On January 19, 2006, Bennie Cuason (Cuason) was charged before the RTC, Muntinlupa City, with estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, for defrauding Brigadier General Meliton D.
Goyena (Gen. Goyena) (Ret.) by convincing the latter to invest, entrust, and/or deliver the amount of Twenty
Million Pesos (₱20,000,000.00) on the promise that the former would return the investment with interest, plus
two (2) Condominium Certificates of Title over residential units on the 20st floor at Tower B of Diamond Bay
Towers Condominium, with a total value of Nine Million Five Hundred Ninety-Two Thousand Pesos
(₱9,592,000.00). Gen. Goyena gave the amount of Twenty Million Pesos (₱20,000,000.00) to the accused and
received two (2) condominium certificates of title with numbers 6893 and 6894. After verification, complainant
found that the condominium units were non-existent, or had not yet been constructed.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-179 and was raffled to RTC, Branch 204, Muntinlupa City,
presided over by Judge Juanita T. Guerrero (Judge Guerrero).
On February 14, 2006, accused Cuason, through counsel, filed with the RTC an entry of appearance with a
plea to determine whether or not probable cause exists for the purpose of issuance of a warrant of arrest.
Complainant, also through counsel, subsequently filed a Motion to deny the application for judicial
determination of probable cause and to cite accused in contempt of this Honorable Court on the ground of
forum shopping. On April 4, 2006, accused Cuason filed his comment and/or opposition thereto, and on April
10, 2006, accused Cuason filed a supplemental comment and/or opposition to the motion.
With the designation of RTC, Branch 204, Muntinlupa City, as a special court for drug cases on May 2, 2006,
the case was re-raffled to the sala of respondent judge. After hearing the respective arguments of the parties,
respondent judge issued an omnibus order dated September 4, 2006, dismissing Criminal Case No. 06-179.
The pertinent portions of the omnibus order read as follows:
On this first issue, this Court, after a careful scrutiny of the arguments and evidence of both parties, believes
that there was payment already made as to the principal obligation as admitted by the complainant in his
affidavit dated September 20, 2005 (page 3, par. 17) and what is being left is the payment of interest which,
under the premises, is in [the] form of condominium certificates. So also, while the complainant questions the
authenticity of those certificates as well as the existence of [the] condominium units subject thereof, accused,
indubitably, was able to satisfy this Court as to the authenticity of the questioned certificates and the existence
of the units by showing proofs to that effect.
On September 6, 2006, Gen. Goyena filed with the RTC a very urgent manifestation with motion for the court
to conduct ocular inspection, and on September 22, 2006, he filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration,
ocular inspection and inhibition, anchored on the following grounds: 1) as correctly found by the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, the two (2) condominium units used in partly settling the liabilities of the
accused to the private complainant do not exist – a fact that should have been established by now, if only the
court allowed the ocular inspection prayed for; 2) the court overlooked the pronouncement in the very case it
has relied on, that "Allado and Salonga constitute exceptions to the general rule and may be invoked only if
similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist"; and 3) the order dismissing the case was improperly or
irregularly issued.
On September 18, 2006, complainant filed a letter-complaint addressed to then Supreme Court Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban, charging respondent judge with abuse of judicial authority and discretion, serious
irregularity, and gross ignorance of the law, allegedly shown by the latter’s act of willfully and knowingly
reversing the well-grounded finding of probable cause made by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa
City.
Thereafter, respondent judge issued an order dated October 4, 2006, inhibiting himself from sitting in Criminal
Case No. 06-179, and directing that the records of the case be forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of Court of
the RTC, Muntinlupa City, for appropriate re-raffling. The case was eventually re-raffled to the RTC, Branch
206, Muntinlupa City, presided over by Judge Patricia Manalastas–de Leon (Judge Manalastas-De Leon).
In his memorandum dated September 24, 2007, Court Administrator Lock found ample basis to charge
respondent judge with delay in rendering an order and for abuse of judicial discretion and authority
The OCA stated that Criminal Case No. 06-179 was assigned to respondent judge on May 2, 2006, a fact
which the latter did not dispute. More than a month later, or on June 19, 2006, respondent judge set accused
Cuason’s motion to determine whether or not a probable cause exists for the purpose of the issuance of a
warrant of arrest and complainant’s motion to deny application for judicial determination of probable cause and
to cite accused in contempt of this Honorable Court on the ground of forum shopping for hearing on July 17,
2006. It must be stressed that accused Cuason and complainant filed their respective motions on February 14,
2006 and on March 22, 2006, or while the case was still pending in the sala of Judge Guerrero. After hearing
the said motions on July 17, 2006, it took another forty-eight (48) days for respondent judge to issue the
omnibus order dated September 4, 2006, dismissing the case for lack of probable cause.
In his comment dated November 23, 2007, respondent judge insists that the charge filed against him should be
dismissed.1avvphi1
This Court finds that respondent judge’s delay in the determination of probable cause clearly runs counter to
the provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. – (a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from the
filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the
accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary
investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of this Rules. In case of
doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the
filing of the complaint or information.
While respondent judge could not have ascertained the existence of probable cause for the issuance of an
arrest warrant against Cuason within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information – Criminal
Case No. 06-179 having been re-raffled to his sala only on May 2, 2006 – prudence demanded that
respondent judge should have determined the existence of probable cause within ten (10) days from July 17,
2006, the date he heard the respective arguments of the parties. This interpretation is in keeping with the
provisions of Section 6, Rule 112.
By allowing forty-eight (48) days to lapse before issuing the two-page omnibus order dated September 4, 2006,
respondent judge should be held liable for undue delay in rendering an order, which is classified as a less
serious charge under Section 9(1), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, punishable by suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month or more than three (3) months, or a fine of
more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00.
Furthermore, the Court agrees with the OCA that the respondent judge is guilty of abuse of judicial discretion
and authority.
The information in Criminal Case No. 06-179 clearly accuses Cuason of falsely pretending that he can return
the investment of complainant by paying cash and two (2) condominium units when in fact these units do not
exist or have not yet been constructed. The issue therefore boils down to whether or not the condominium
units exist, and the incontrovertible proof of this are the condominium units themselves. The logical thing to do
would have been to order the conduct of an ocular inspection. Instead of an ocular inspection, respondent
relied on the certificate of registration, the development permit, the license to sell, the building permit, and the
Condominium Certificate of Title ― on the basis of which the judge ordered the dismissal of the case. It may
be that an ocular inspection was premature at the time the respondent dismissed the case because at that time
the case was not yet set for the presentation of evidence of the parties. Nevertheless, it now appears that the
pieces of evidence relied upon by the respondent do not fully support his conclusion.
Section 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that "evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue
as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence." "Relevancy is, therefore, determinable by the rules of
logic and human experience…Relevant evidence is any class of evidence which has ‘rational probative value’
to the issue in controversy."36 Logic and human experience teach us that the documents relied upon by
respondent do not constitute the best evidence to prove the existence or non-existence of the condominium
units. To repeat, the best evidence would have been adduced by an ocular inspection of the units themselves.
Judge Lerma should also have exercised caution in determining the existence of probable cause. At the very
least, he should have asked the prosecutor to present additional evidence, in accordance with Section 6, Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or, in the alternative, to show cause why the case should not
be dismissed instead of precipitately ordering the dismissal of the case. The circumstances required the
exercise of caution considering that the case involved estafa in the considerable amount of ₱20 Million for
which the complainant paid ₱129,970.00 in docket fees before the Office of the City Prosecutor and later
₱167,114.60 as docket fee for the filing of the Information before the RTC.
For this particular violation, we find respondent judge guilty and impose upon him a fine of ₱21,000.00.
As an unflattering footnote to these administrative offenses, the OCA, upon the authority of the Chief Justice,
conducted a judicial audit from August 21-30, 2007 of the RTC, Branch 256, Muntinlupa. The initial result of the
audit revealed that Judge Lerma failed to decide 30 civil cases and 11 criminal cases within the 90-day
reglementary period. It also appears that 101 civil cases and 137 criminal cases remained unacted despite the
lapse of a considerable period.
Judge Lerma had previously been sanctioned by this Court. In a resolution dated September 13, 2003 in A.M.
No. RTJ-03-1799, entitled Ma. Cristina Olondriz Pertierra v. Judge Alberto L. Lerma, this Court found him liable
for conduct unbecoming a judge and imposed upon him the penalty of reprimand. In that case, Judge Lerma
was found having lunch with a lawyer who has a pending case in his sala.
The totality of all these findings underscore the fact that respondent judge’s actions served to erode the
people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary. He has been remiss in the fulfillment of the duty imposed on all
members of the bench in order to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the
judiciary.
To reiterate, officers of the court have the duty to see to it that justice is dispensed evenly and fairly. Not only
must they be honest and impartial, but they must also appear to be honest and impartial in the dispensation of
justice. Judges should make sure that their acts are circumspect and do not arouse suspicion in the minds of
the public. When they fail to do so, such acts cast doubt upon their integrity and ultimately on the judiciary in
general.37 "Courts will only succeed in their task and mission if the judges presiding over them are truly
honorable men, competent and independent, honest and dedicated." 38
Respondent judge failed to live up to the judiciary’s exacting standards, and this Court will not withhold penalty
when called for to uphold the people’s faith in the Judiciary.39
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court RULES, as follows:
1) In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076, Judge Alberto Lerma is found GUILTY of violating a Supreme Court
directive, and we impose upon him a FINE in the total amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(₱15,000.00);
2) In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2080, Judge Alberto Lerma is FINED in the total amount of FIFTEEN
THOUSAND PESOS (₱15,000.00) for violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars, and
for making untruthful statements in his certificate of service;
3) In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2077, Judge Alberto Lerma is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and punished
with the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except earned leave
credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any government agency or instrumentality.
4) In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2078, we find Judge Alberto Lerma GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law, and
impose upon him a FINE of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱40,000.00); and
5) In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2079, we find Judge Alberto Lerma GUILTY of grave abuse of authority and
undue delay in rendering an order, and impose upon him a FINE of TWENTY–ONE THOUSAND
PESOS (₱21,000.00).
This Decision is final and immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015
LUIS UY, SUBSTITUTED BY LYDIA UY VELASQUEZ AND SHIRLEY UY
MACARAIG, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND ROSAURA* MENDOZA, SUBSTITUTED BY
CORAZON BUENA, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision dated 14 September 20112 and Resolution
dated 1 March 20133 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93786.
The subject of the litigation involves a parcel of land known as Lot 5506 of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas
plan (LRC) SWO-2817, L.R. Case No. N-445, L.R.C. Record No. N-22499. The land, situated in Barrio
Alangilan, Batangas City, contains an area of 484 square meters under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-24660.4 The land was previously owned by spouses Anastacio Manuel and Mariquita de Villa (Spouses
Manuel) under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-2840.
On 4 May 1979, petitioner Luis Uy (Uy) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pallocan West, Batangas
City, Branch 4, a Complaint5 for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages against respondents Petra
Rosca (Rosca), and spouses Jose Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses Lacsamana).
In the Complaint, Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived together as
husband and wife from the time they were married in 1944 until 1973 when they separated and lived apart. Uy
and Rosca had eight children.
Uy alleged that on 29 January 1964,6 he and his wife acquired a 484 square meter residential land for a
consideration of P1,936 evidenced by a Deed of Sale7 from the Spouses Manuel. The sellers' OCT No. 0-2840
was cancelled and TCT No. T-24660 was issued in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy."
On 15 June 1964, Uy and Rosca allegedly purchased, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale,8 another
residential land adjacent to the 484 square meter land from the spouses Felix Contreras and Maxima de
Guzman (Spouses Contreras). The second purchase consisted of 215 square meters, as declared under Tax
Declaration No. 61724, for a consideration of P700. Thereafter, a split level house with a floor area of 208.50
square meters was constructed on the 484 square meter land.
Uy further alleged that Rosca, in gross and evident bad faith, executed and signed a false and simulated Deed
of Sale9 dated 18 April 1979 on the 484 square meter land, together with the house erected thereon, for a
consideration of P80,000 in favor of Spouses Lacsamana.
Uy prayed that (1) the Deed of Sale dated 18 April 1979 executed by Rosca in favor of Spouses Lacsamana
be declared null and void with respect to his rights, interest, and ownership; (2) that defendants be directed to
pay, jointly and severally, to Uy the amounts of P100,000 as moral damages, P10,000 as attorney's fees,
P2,000 as expenses incident to litigation, plus costs of suit; (3) upon declaration of the nullity of the Deed of
Sale, the Register of Deeds of Batangas City and the City Assessor be directed to register Uy as the sole
owner of the real properties; (4) if defendant Spouses Lacsamana are found by the court to be buyers in good
faith, Rosca be ordered to turn over to Uy the entire proceeds of sale of the properties and be adjudged to pay
the damages; and (5) that the sum of P600,000 taken by Rosca from Uy be collated into the mass of the
conjugal partnership properties.
In her Answer with Counterclaim dated 22 May 1979, Rosca denied the allegations of Uy and claimed that she
lawfully acquired the subject real properties using her paraphernal funds. Rosca added that she was never
married to Uy and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. In her Counterclaim, Rosca
prayed that the court award her (1) P200,000 as moral damages; (2) P100,000 as exemplary damages; (3)
P12,000 as attorney's fees; (4) P3,000 as incidental litigation expenses; and (5) costs of suit. Spouses
Lacsamana also filed their Answer with Counterclaim dated 21 May 1979 claiming that they were buyers in
good faith and for value and that they relied on the Torrens title which stated that Rosca was the owner of the
subject property.
In the meantime, Uy questioned the registrability of the Deed of Sale before the Office of the Register of Deeds
of Batangas City. The Register of Deeds elevated the matter, on consulta,10 with the Land Registration
Commission (LRC) because of an affidavit subsequently filed by Uy contesting the sale and alleging, among
others, that the property was conjugal in nature and sold without his marital consent.
In a Resolution11 dated 7 November 1979, the LRC decided in favor of registration stating that since the
property in question was registered in Rosca's name, such circumstance indicated that the property belonged
to Rosca, as her paraphernal property. The LRC added that litigious matters, such as a protest from the other
party based on justifiable and legal grounds, were to be decided not by the Register of Deeds but by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the Resolution states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, this Commission is of the opinion that the subject document should be admitted for registration.
SO ORDERED.12
On 18 February 1981, Uy died.13 His two daughters, Lydia Uy Velasquez (Lydia) and Shirley Uy Macaraig
(Shirley) substituted him in the case. Fifteen years later or on 10 May 1996, Rosca also died.14 Earlier,
respondent Jose Lacsamana died on 20 March 1991.15redarclaw
Meanwhile, on 24 December 1982, Spouses Lacsamana sold the property to Corazon Buena (Buena) through
a Deed of Absolute Sale.16 Thus, both Rosca and the Spouses Lacsamana were substituted by Buena as
respondent in this case.
During the trial, Uy presented the testimonies of his two daughters, Lydia and Shirley, as his own witnesses, as
well as Rosca, as an adverse witness.
Lydia testified that the Uy family lived in the house built on the land acquired by Uy and Rosca. She alleged
that the house existed until it was demolished by Buena's agent sometime in 2006. Lydia also stated that the
funds used to construct the family dwelling came from Uy's business. Shirley corroborated the testimony of
Lydia on all material points.
Rosca, on the other hand, testified that sometime before or during World War II, she and Uy cohabited and
settled in Batangas. The couple attempted to formalize their marital union with a marriage ceremony. However,
the celebration was not consummated because of the bombings which occurred on the day of the ceremony.
Likewise, they were unable to secure a marriage contract.
Rosca stated that on 29 January 1964, she alone purchased, as sole vendee, with money coming from her
own personal and paraphernal funds, the land covered by OCT No. 0-2840 and owned by Spouses Manuel.
Thereafter, on 15 June 1964, she again purchased, using her own personal and paraphernal funds, the land
adjacent to the first purchased property owned by Spouses Contreras and covered by Tax Declaration No.
61724. Immediately after, she caused the construction of a split level house on the land using her own
paraphernal funds which became their family dwelling.
Rosca alleged that Uy had an affair with another woman and sired children with her which led to their physical
separation before the year 1973. On 17 September 1976, Rosca obtained a real estate loan in the amount of
P50,000 from Philippine Banking Corporation (PBC) using the house and lot as collateral. In support of this
loan, Rosca executed an Affidavit of Ownership17 dated 27 September 1976, stating that (1) she was the lawful
and sole owner of the 484 square meter land, together with the building erected thereon, and (2) the land was
registered under her name and that the phrase "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" in TCT No. T-24660 was
merely a description of her status.
Defendants offered the testimony of Rosca, Atty. Teodulfo Dequito, Jr., Rosaura Mendoza, and Buena.
Atty. Teodulfo Dequito, Jr. testified that Uy questioned the registrability of the Deed of Sale before the Office of
the Register of Deeds of Batangas City. The Register of Deeds elevated the matter on consulta with the LRC,
which issued a Resolution dated 7 November 1979 recognizing Rosca as the sole registered owner of the
property.
Rosaura Mendoza testified that she and her husband purchased, in the amount of P80,000, the 484 square
meter property of Rosca on 18 April 1979 through a Deed of Absolute Sale of House and Lot.18 The Registry of
Deeds of Batangas City cancelled TCT No. T-24660 and issued TCT No. T-3519 in favor of the spouses. Then,
Spouses Lacsamana mortgaged the property to PBC for P48,000. Upon full payment of the mortgage debt on
15 April 1982, PBC issued a Release of Real Estate Mortgage.
Buena testified that she purchased the same property under TCT No. T-35 from Spouses Lacsamana on 24
December 1982 for a consideration of P80,000. Consequently, the Registry of Deeds of Batangas City
cancelled TCT No. T-35 and issued TCT No. T-324420 in her name. Likewise, the Assessor's Office of
Batangas City issued Tax Declaration No. 90210.21redarclaw
Before the resolution of the case, Shirley and Lydia filed a Motion for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order. They claimed that Buena entered the property and caused the construction of
structures without any court order. Consequently, the RTC issued an Order dated 21 September 2007 granting
the preliminary injunction. Thereafter, the case was submitted for resolution.
In a Decision22 dated 21 April 2009, the RTC decided the case in favor of respondents. The lower court found
that (1) there was no valid marriage between Uy and Rosca; (2) the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca over the
house and lot in favor of Spouses Lacsamana was valid; and (3) both parties were not entitled to their
respective claims for damages. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the instant Complaint filed by plaintiff Uy is hereby DISMISSED. The
preliminary injunction and bond are cancelled and are rendered of no force and effect. The claims for damages
of both parties are hereby DENIED. Cost against both parties.
SO ORDERED.23
Uy filed an appeal24 with the CA. In a Decision25 dated 14 September 2011, the CA affirmed the ruling of the
trial court. The appellate court found that respondents were able to overthrow the presumption of marriage and
that the subject property was Rosca's paraphernal property. The appellate court also upheld the validity of the
sale. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 21, 2009 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.26
Uy then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution27 dated 1
March 2013.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The main issue for our resolution is whether the Deed of Sale dated 18 April 1979, executed by Rosca alone,
without Uy's consent, in favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Uy contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca is not valid for being simulated or fictitious for lack of
consideration and consent. Uy states that no proof was presented by Spouses Lacsamana to show that they
actually paid P80,000 to Rosca for the purchase of the property. Uy also insists that he did not give his consent
to the sale which prejudiced his rights and interest. Uy argues that Rosca did not give physical possession of
the house and lot to the alleged buyers. Further, Uy adds, without admitting that the sale is valid, that the
consideration paid was unreasonably low and unconscionable such that it constitutes an equitable mortgage.
Uy insists that Spouses Lacsamana and Buena cannot be considered buyers in good faith.
Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the contentions of Uy rely on the re-examination and re-evaluation
of the evidence of the parties which had previously been passed upon exhaustively by both the trial and
appellate courts. Respondents added that only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45. Since the
findings of fact of the trial and appellate courts were supported by substantial evidence and none of the
recognized exceptions allowing this Court to exercise its power to review is present, then the petition should be
dismissed.
We agree with respondents.
The issues raised by Uy had been thoroughly passed upon by the trial and appellate courts. We find no reason
to disturb their factual findings. In petitions for review on certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45, like in
the present case, a petitioner can raise only questions of law. Here, Uy would like us to review again the
factual circumstances surrounding the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca with the Spouses Lacsamana and to
declare the Deed of Sale invalid for being simulated due to lack of consideration and consent. Clearly, these
are questions of fact which are within the purview of the trial and appellate courts to determine. Also, the
issues raised do not come within the purview of the recognized exceptions28 for this Court to take cognizance
of the case. We have reiterated time and again that this Court is not the proper venue to consider factual
issues as it is not a trier of facts.
Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca alone is anchored on
whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a presumption established in our Rules "that a man and
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage."29Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.30 However, this presumption may be contradicted by
a party and overcome by other evidence.
Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda v. Trias,31 we held that testimony
by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, as well as the person who
officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.
Documentary evidence may also be shown. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,32 we held that the best
documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself. Under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law of
1929,33 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114,34 which is applicable to the present case being the
marriage law in effect at the time Uy and Rosca cohabited, the marriage certificate, where the contracting
parties state that they take each other as husband and wife, must be furnished by the person solemnizing the
marriage to (1) either of the contracting parties, and (2) the clerk of the Municipal Court of Manila or the
municipal secretary of the municipality where the marriage was solemnized. The third copy of the marriage
contract, the marriage license and the affidavit of the interested party regarding the solemnization of the
marriage other than those mentioned in Section 5 of the same Act shall be kept by the official, priest, or
minister who solemnized the marriage.
Here, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have sourced from his
own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where the marriage allegedly took place.
Even the findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single relevant evidence that he was actually
married to Rosca. On the contrary, the documents Uy submitted showed that he and Rosca were not legally
married to each other. The pertinent portions of the RTC Decision state:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x In the case under consideration, the presumption of marriage, on which plaintiff Uy anchored his
allegations, has been sufficiently offset. Records reveal that there is plethora of evidence showing that plaintiff
Uy and defendant Rosca were never actually married to each other, to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
First. In his Petition for Naturalization as a Filipino citizen filed before the then Court of First Instance of
Batangas on 12 November 1953, plaintiff Uy himself stated in the fifth paragraph of his Petition, to quote: "I am
married (not legally)."
Second. The Sworn Statement of no less than the Governor of the Province of Batangas executed in support
of the plaintiff Uy's Petition for Naturalization categorically states, in Nos. 2 and 4 thereof, that plaintiff Uy was
married (not legally).
Third. The Immigrant Certificate of Residence shows that as late as 9 October 1951, plaintiff Uy also known by
his Chinese name of Uy Suan Tee, regarded himself as "single" when filling up his civil status therein.
Fourth. The Alien Certificate of Registration No. 83758 establishes that plaintiff Uy was an alien duly
registered with the Bureau of Immigration of the Philippines and that his civil status was single.
Fifth. The Affidavit of Vicente J. Caedo, a prominent citizen of Batangas, establishes in Nos. 2 and 4 thereof
that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to defendant Rosca.
Sixth. The testimony of defendant Rosca as an adverse witness reveals that plaintiff Uy was not legally
married to her because their marriage was not consummated.
For his part, plaintiff Uy tried to justify the non-presentation of their marriage certificate by presenting public
documents, namely:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
First. Decision in the case entitled: "In the matter of the Petition of Uy Suan Tee alias Luis G. Uy, to be
admitted a citizen of the Philippines";
Second. Certificate of Live Birth of Violeta Uy, daughter of plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca and the
descriptive word "legitimate" showing that Violeta Uy was legitimate;
Third. Death Claim under SSS Employee Compensation executed and signed by defendant Rosca, stating
that she is the wife of plaintiff Uy;
Fourth. Various pictures of the plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca with their children;
Fifth. Special Power of Attorney executed by defendant Rosca dated 19 July 1985 wherein she admitted being
the wife of plaintiff Uy;
Sixth. Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 3 August 1982 executed by defendant Rosca admitting she is the widow of
plaintiff Uy which was not testified to nor identified by Rosca;
Seventh. Affidavit of Ownership dated 27 September 1976 signed by defendant Rosca admitting her status as
married;
to establish the fact of his marriage with defendant Rosca. Likewise, plaintiff Uy presented defendant Rosca as
an adverse witness purportedly to elicit from her the fact of his marriage with the latter. However, this
presumption had been debunked by plaintiff Uy's own evidence and most importantly, by the more superior
evidence presented by the defendants.
While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband and wife, defendant Rosca's
testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her because their marriage was not
consummated. In People vs. Borromeo, this Court held that persons living together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, absent any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. Consequently, with the presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of
defendant Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant
Rosca, were legally married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore to submit additional proof to show
that they were legally married. He, however, dismally failed to do so.35
Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, their property relations would be
governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple living together were not incapacitated
from getting married. Article 147 provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have
been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For
purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall
be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during
cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the coownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless there is proof
to the contrary. We agree with both the trial and appellate courts that Rosca was able to prove that the subject
property is not co-owned but is paraphernal.
First, in the Resolution dated 7 November 1979 of the LRC in LRC Consulta No. 1194, Rosca was recognized
as the sole registered owner of the property.36redarclaw
Second, in the Deed of Sale dated 29 January 1964 between Spouses Manuel and Rosca covering the 484
square meter land, Uy served as a mere witness to Rosca's purchase of the land as evidenced by his
signature under "signed in the presence of."37 This could only mean that Uy admitted the paraphernal nature of
Rosca's ownership over the property.
Third, in the Affidavit of Ownership dated 27 September 1976 executed by Rosca in support of her real estate
loan application with PBC in the amount of P5 0,000, Rosca stated that she was the sole and lawful owner of
the subject property and that the land was registered under her name and that the phrase "Petra Rosca,
married to Luis G. Uy" in TCT No. T-24660 was merely a description of her status.38redarclaw
Last, the title to the property in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" was notice to the world,
including her heirs and successors-in-interest, that such belonged to Rosca as her paraphernal property.39 The
words "married to" were merely descriptive of Rosca's status at the time the property was registered in her
name.40 Otherwise, if the property was conjugal, the title to the property should have been in the names of Luis
Uy and Petra Rosca.41redarclaw
In Ruiz v. Court of Appeals,42 the property subject of the mortgage was registered in the name of "Corazon G.
Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos." This Court ruled that the title is registered in the name of
Corazon alone because the phrase "married to Rogelio Ruiz" is merely descriptive of the civil status of
Corazon and should not be construed to mean that her husband is also a registered owner.
Based on the evidence she presented, Rosca was able to sufficiently overcome the presumption that any
property acquired while living together shall be owned by the couple in equal shares. The house and lot were
clearly Rosca's paraphernal properties and she had every right to sell the same even without Uy's consent.
Uy further contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca is not valid for being simulated or fictitious for
lack of consideration. Uy states that no proof was presented by Spouses Lacsamana to show that they actually
paid P80,000 to Rosca for the purchase of the property or even if there was consideration, such was
unreasonably low and unconscionable. Thus, Spouses Lacsamana and Buena cannot be considered as
buyers in good faith.
We disagree.
Uy did not present any proof to show that Rosca did not receive any consideration for the sale. Neither did he
submit any evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, showing the fair market value of the property at the
time of the sale to prove that the purchase price was unreasonably low or unconscionable. It was even
mentioned by the appellate court that "appellants failed to prove that on April 18, 1979, the property might have
been worth millions of pesos." Thus, Uy's allegations lack sufficient substantiation.
Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court carry great weight and are binding on this Court when they
coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. This Court will not weigh the evidence all over again since
payment of the purchase price and the consideration for the sale are factual issues which cannot be raised in
this petition.
In sum, we find that the Deed of Sale, executed by Rosca on her paraphernal property in favor of Spouses
Lacsamana, is valid.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14 September 2011 and Resolution
dated 1 March 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93786.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
G.R. No. 166259
November 12, 2012
LAND BANK OFTHE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HONEYCOMB FARMS CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari,1 filed by the petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP),
assailing the Court of Appeals' (CAs) Amended Decision2 and Resolution3 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 69661. The CA
amended Decision reinstated with modification the Judgment4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate,
Masbate, Branch 48, acting as a Special Agrarian Cow1 (SAC) in Special Civil Case No. 4637 for
Determination and Payment of Just Compensation under Republic Act No. (RA) 6657.
The Factual Antecedents
Respondent Honeycomb Farms Corporation (HFC) was the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land
under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2550, with an area of 29.0966 hectares, situated in "Curvada,
Caintagan, Masbate."5 Through a letter dated February 5, 1988, HFC voluntarily offered its land to the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for coverage under RA 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988 (CARL), for P581,932.00 or at P20,000.00 per hectare.6 Pursuant to the rules and regulations
governing the CARL, the government, through the DAR and the LBP, determined an acquirable and
compensable area of 27.5871 hectares, while 1.5095 hectares were excluded for being hilly and
underdeveloped.7
Subsequently, the LBP, as the agency with the authority to determine land valuation and compensation under
the CARL, and using the guidelines set forth in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992,8 fixed the
value of the land in the amount of P165,739.44 and sent a Notice of Valuation to HFC.9
HFC rejected the LBP’s valuation and it filed, on January 15, 1996,10 a petition with the DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB) for a summary administrative determination of just compensation. In its petition, HFC claimed
that the just compensation for the land should be in the amount of P25,000.00 per hectare, considering its
location and productivity, or for an aggregate amount of P725,000.00.11
While the DARAB proceedings were still pending, HFC filed a Complaint for Determination and Payment of
Just Compensation with the RTC, praying for a just compensation of P725,000.00, plus attorney’s fees of ten
percent (10%) of the just compensation.12 HFC justified the direct filing with the SAC by what it saw as
unreasonable delay or official inaction. HFC claimed that the DARAB disregarded Section 16 of RA 6657 which
mandates that the "DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision."13 The
LBP meanwhile countered that HFC’s petition was "premature and lacks a cause of action for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies."14
Meanwhile, on May 14, 1998, the DARAB issued a Decision15 affirming the LBP’s valuation. The dispositive
portion states:
WHEREFORE, conformably to the foregoing consideration, this Board hereby AFFIRMS the valuation of
P165,739.44 fixed by the Land Bank of the Philippines on the subject 27.5871-hectare agricultural landholding.
The Petition dated October 7, 1995 for determination and payment of Just Compensation filed by the
landowner with this forum is hereby DENIED or ordered dismissed without prejudice for want of jurisdiction
over the same on the part of this forum.16
The RTC Decision
On July 27, 2000, the RTC rendered a Judgment17 whose dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered by:
1.) Fixing the just compensation of the parcel of land owned by plaintiff Honeycomb Farms Corp. under
TCT No. T-2550 which is covered by agrarian reform for an area of 27.5871 hectares at P931,109.20
subject to the lien for the docket fee of the amount in excess of P725,000.00 as pleaded for by herein
plaintiff in its complaint;
2.) Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff an attorney’s fee equivalent to 10%
of the total just compensation.18
Owing to the parties’ conflicting valuations, the SAC made its own valuation and briefly concluded that:
A judicious evaluation of the evidence on record shows that the subject area is sporadically planted to (sic)
coconut and corn as is not fully develop (sic) when the government conducted its ocular inspection and
thereafter took over possession of the same although majority of it is a fertile grass land and undisputedly
deemed suitable to agriculture. However, the parcel of land under consideration is located in the side of the
road. It is likewise of judicial notice that it is situated near the commercial district of Curvada, Cataingan,
Masbate. In the light of the foregoing premises, the Court is of the opinion and so holds that the just
compensation for the land of herein plaintiff corporation under TCT No. T-2550 covered by agrarian reform is
P32,000.00 per hectare or P882,787.20 for the area of 27.58571 hectares plus consequential damages at the
same value (P32,000.00) per hectare for the remaining 1.5095 hectares of the plaintiff’s property left and
rendered useless by the compulsory coverage or for the total sum of P931,109.20.19 (emphasis ours)
Both parties appealed to the CA.
HFC argued that the RTC erred in its determination of just compensation; the amount of P931,109.20 is not
supported by the evidence on record while its presented evidence correctly shows that the market value of the
land at the time of taking was P113,000.00 per hectare.20
The LBP raised the threshold issue of whether the SAC had jurisdiction to hear HFC’s complaint because of
the pending DARAB proceedings, emphasizing that the completion of the administrative proceedings before
the DARAB is a condition precedent for the filing of a complaint for the determination of just compensation
before the SAC. The LBP also argued that the RTC committed a serious error when it took judicial notice of the
property’s roadside location, its proximity to a commercial district, its incomplete development as coconut and
corn land, and its condition as grassland, to determine just compensation; thereby, it effectively eschewed the
formula for fixing just compensation, provided under DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992.21 Lastly,
the LBP questioned the award of consequential damages and attorney’s fees for lack of legal and factual
basis.22
The CA Decision
The CA, in its January 28, 2004 Decision, reversed the RTC Judgment and dismissed HFC’s complaint for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies that Section 16(f) of RA 6657 requires. The CA ruled that the LBP
"made a procedural shortcut" when it filed the complaint with the SAC without waiting for the DARAB’s
decision.23
On the LBP’s motion for reconsideration (to which a copy of the May 14, 1998 DARAB Decision was
attached),24 the CA, in its Amended Decision of September 16, 2004, proceeded to decide the case on the
merits and recalled its January 28, 2004 Decision. The dispositive portion of the Amended Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Our January 28, 2004 Decision is hereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE
and a new one entered. The assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch 48 in Civil Case
No. 4637 is hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION that the award of attorney’s fees in favor of herein
plaintiff-appellant is hereby deleted. No costs.25
The CA ruled that in expropriation proceedings, the just compensation to which the owner of the condemned
property is entitled to is the market value. It noted that in order to arrive at the proper market value, several
factors such as the current value of like properties, their actual or potential uses and their size, shape and
location must be considered. The CA thus concluded that the valuation made by the RTC was based on the
evidence on record since the latter considered the sketch plan of the property, the testimonies of the witnesses
and the field reports of both parties. In addition, the CA also deleted the award of attorney’s fees for lack of
factual and legal basis.26
The Petition
The LBP’s petition for review on certiorari raised the following errors:
First, the CA erred in reinstating the decision of the SAC since it had no jurisdiction to hear HFC’s complaint
while the DARAB proceedings were pending. It stressed that the SAC could not acquire jurisdiction over the
complaint since the DARAB continued to retain jurisdiction over the determination of just compensation.
Second, the CA failed to dismiss the complaint on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
and forum shopping on the part of HFC. It notes that the HFC’s complaint was premature and violative of the
forum shopping prohibition since the complaint was filed with the SAC despite the pendency of the DARAB
proceedings.
Lastly, the CA erred when it failed to apply the "basic formula" for determining just compensation prescribed by
DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, series of
1994. It emphasizes that by adopting the values fixed by the SAC, the CA’s determination is contrary to: (1)
Section 17 of RA 6657 and (2) the rulings of the Court bearing on the determination of just compensation, in
particular, Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal27 where the Court categorically held that the formula
prescribed by the DAR in Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, shall be used in the valuation of the
land.28
HFC prays for the dismissal of the LBP’s petition on the following grounds:
First, it submits that the pendency of the DARAB proceedings has no bearing on the jurisdiction of the SAC
since Section 57 of RA 6657 provides that the SAC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for the
determination of just compensation. Conformably with the dictates of Section 57, litigants can file a case for the
determination of just compensation without the necessity of a DARAB determination. Second, it argues that
jurisprudence allows resort to judicial intervention without completing administrative remedies when there has
been unreasonable delay or official inaction, as in this case, on the part of the administrative agency. Third, for
the same reason, it contends that it cannot be charged with forum shopping. Finally, it argues that strict
adherence to the formula prescribed by DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR
Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1994, unduly "ties the hands of the SAC" in the determination of just
compensation.29
The Court’s Ruling
We find the LBP’s petition meritorious.
The SAC properly acquired jurisdiction
over HFC’s complaint for the determination
of just compensation despite the pendency
of the DARAB proceedings
At the core of the LBP’s lack of jurisdiction theory is the premise that SAC could not acquire jurisdiction over
the complaint since the DARAB continued to retain jurisdiction over the matter of determination of just
compensation.
The premise is erroneous because the DARAB does not "exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC in just
compensation cases. The determination of just compensation is judicial in nature."30
"The original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SAC xxx is not a novel issue"31 and is in fact,well-settled. In
Republic of the Philippines v. CA,32 we first ruled that it would subvert the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the
RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions, viz:
Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of determining
the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking. Through notice
sent to the landowner pursuant to § 16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer. In case the landowner
rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and afterward the provincial (PARAD), the
regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case may be, depending on the value of the land,
fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the
matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. This in essence is the procedure for the determination of
compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it, the private respondent’s case was properly
brought by it in the RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have dismissed the case. In the terminology of §
57, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners." It would subvert this "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of
the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the
RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions.33 (citations omitted)
In the recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Belista,34 we extensively discussed the reasons why the
SAC can properly assume jurisdiction over petitions for the determination of just compensation despite the
pendency of administrative proceedings, thus:
Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:
Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) x x x
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act. x x x
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30)
days from submission of the case for decision.
Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR. Further exception to the DAR’s original and
exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a
Special Agrarian Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA No.
6657 is vested in the courts.
In Republic v. CA G.R. No. 122256, October 30, 1996, 263 SCRA 758, the Court explained:
Thus, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original and exclusive jurisdiction
over two categories of cases, to wit: (1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners"
and (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under R.A. No. 6657." The provisions of §50 must be
construed in harmony with this provision by considering cases involving the determination of just compensation
and criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power conferred on the
DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be
granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal
cases. Thus, in EPZA v. Dulay and Sumulong v. Guerrero - we held that the valuation of property in eminent
domain is essentially a judicial function which cannot be vested in administrative agencies, while in Scoty’s
Department Store v. Micaller, we struck down a law granting the then Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction
to try criminal cases for violations of the Industrial Peace Act.
In a number of cases, the Court has upheld the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as SAC,
over all petitions for determination of just compensation to landowners in accordance with Section 57 of RA
No. 6657. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco G.R. Nos. 140160 and 146733, January 13, 2004, 419
SCRA 67, the Court upheld the RTC’s jurisdiction over Wycoco’s petition for determination of just
compensation even where no summary administrative proceedings was held before the DARAB which has
primary jurisdiction over the determination of land valuation. The Court held:
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the landowner filed an action for determination of just
compensation without waiting for the completion of DARAB’s re-evaluation of the land. This, notwithstanding,
the Court held that the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction because of its exclusive and original jurisdiction
over determination of just compensation, thus –
… It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." This "original and
exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original
jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative
decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs
sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert
the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into an appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and, therefore,
would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC Special Agrarian Court by private respondent is valid.
xxxx
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad G.R. No. 127198, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 441, wherein Land
Bank questioned the alleged failure of private respondents to seek reconsideration of the DAR’s valuation, but
instead filed a petition to fix just compensation with the RTC, the Court said:
At any rate, in Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA, we held that there is nothing contradictory between the DAR’s
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over
all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, which includes the determination of questions of
just compensation, and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation. The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second refers to
judicial proceedings.
In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to
determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform
program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation
cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentially a judicial function.
Thus, the trial court did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a
function addressed to the courts of justice.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada [G.R. No. 164876, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 495, where the
issue was whether the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over respondent’s petition for determination of just
compensation despite the pendency of the administrative proceedings before the DARAB, the Court stated
that:
It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the power of
eminent domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent
domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative
agencies. Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of respondent’s petition for determination of just
compensation.35 (Italicization supplied; citations omitted)
Similarly, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,36 whose factual circumstances mirror that of the
present case, we pointedly ruled that the SAC acquired jurisdiction over the action for the determination of just
compensation even during the pendency of the DARAB proceedings, for the following reason:
It is clear from Sec. 57 x x x that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." This "original and
excusive" jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original
jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative
decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs
sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert
the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into an appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore
would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC by private respondent is valid.37 (emphasis ours)
To reiterate, the taking of property under RA 6657 is an exercise of the State’s power of eminent domain. "The
valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a
judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies."38 Specifically, "when the
parties cannot agree on the amount of just compensation, only the exercise of judicial power can settle the
dispute with binding effect on the winning and losing parties."39
Thus, in the present case, HFC correctly filed a petition for the determination of just compensation with the
SAC, which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction in just compensation cases under RA 6657. The
DARAB’s valuation, being preliminary in nature, could not have attained finality, as only the courts can resolve
the issue of just compensation. Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of HFC’s petition for
determination of just compensation.
We also find no merit in the LBP’s argument that the HFC failed to exhaust administrative remedies when it
directly filed a petition for the determination of just compensation with the SAC even before the DARAB case
could be resolved. In Land Bank of the Phils. v. Wycoco,40 we held that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply when the issue has been rendered moot and academic.41 In the
present case, the issue is now moot considering that the valuation made by the LBP had long been affirmed in
toto by the DARAB in its May 14, 1998 Decision.
HFC is not guilty of forum shopping
We do not agree with the LBP’s view that HFC committed forum shopping.
Forum shopping is the act of litigants who repetitively avail themselves of multiple judicial remedies in different
fora, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances; and raising substantially similar issues either pending in or already resolved
adversely by some other court; or for the purpose of increasing their chances of obtaining a favorable decision,
if not in one court, then in another. The rationale against forum-shopping is that a party should not be allowed
to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different courts, for to do so would constitute abuse of court processes
which tends to degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds
to the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.42
To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is
whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether, in the two (or more)
cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.43
In Yu v. Lim,44 we enumerated the requisites of forum shopping, as follows:
Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1)
identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2) identity
of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with
respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the
pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
In the present case, HFC did not commit forum shopping because the third element of litis pendentia is lacking.
As previously mentioned, the DARAB’s land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and
conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party. The courts, in this case, the SAC, will still have to
review with finality the determination, in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.45 Thus, it
becomes clear that there is no identity between the two cases such that a judgment by the DARAB, regardless
of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the case before the SAC.
It has been held that "what is essential in determining the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation caused
the courts and litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on similar or
related causes and/or grant the same or substantially similar reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered upon the same issues."46 In the present case, the evil sought to be
prevented by the prohibition on forum shopping, i.e., the possibility of conflicting decisions, is lacking since the
DARAB determination is merely preliminary and is not binding on the parties; such determination is subject to
challenge before the courts. The law, in fact, allows the landowner to file a case for the determination of just
compensation with the SAC without the necessity of first filing the same with the DARAB. Based on these
considerations, it is clear that the HFC cannot be charged with forum shopping.
To determine just compensation, the SAC
must take into consideration the factors
prescribed by Section 17 of RA 6657 and is
obliged to apply the DAR formula
The CA, in affirming the SAC’s valuation and disregarding that of the LBP, briefly held:
In the instant case, the trial court based its valuation of the property at P32,000.00 per hectare on the evidence
submitted by the parties, such as the sketch plan of the property, the testimonies of witnesses, and the field
investigation reports of both parties. Hence, herein litigants cannot claim that the valuation made by the court
was not based on the evidence on record.47
The LBP maintains that the SAC committed serious error when it failed to apply the "basic formula" for
determining just compensation, prescribed by DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by
DAR Administrative Order No. 11, series of 1994. It emphasizes that by adopting the values fixed by the SAC,
the CA’s determination is contrary to Section 17 of RA 6657 and the applicable rulings of the Court bearing on
the determination of just compensation, which require that the basic formula prescribed by the DAR shall be
used in the valuation of the land.
We agree with the LBP. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms Corporation,48 a recent case with
substantially the same factual antecedents and the same respondent company, we categorically ruled that the
CA and the RTC grievously erred when they disregarded the formula laid down by the DAR, and chose instead
to come up with their own basis for the valuation of the land in question, viz.:
That it is the RTC, sitting as a SAC, which has the power to determine just compensation for parcels of land
acquired by the State, pursuant to the agrarian reform program, is made clear in Section 57 of RA 6657, which
reads:
Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. - The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts
unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30)
days from submission of the case for decision.
To guide the RTC in this function, Section 17 of RA 6657 enumerates the factors that have to be taken into
consideration to accurately determine just compensation. This provision states:
Section 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of
the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the
owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors, shall be considered. The
social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm workers and by the Government to the
property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on
the said land, shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal, we recognized that the DAR, as the administrative agency
tasked with the implementation of the agrarian reform program, already came up with a formula to determine
just compensation which incorporated the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657. We said:
These factors enumerated in Section 17 have been translated into a basic formula in DAR Administrative
Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 11, Series of 1994, issued
pursuant to the DAR's rule-making power to carry out the object and purposes of R.A. 6657, as amended.
In Landbank of the Philippines v. Celada, we emphasized the duty of the RTC to apply the formula provided in
the applicable DAR AO to determine just compensation, stating that:
While the RTC is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current value of like properties, its
nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments
made by the government assessors to determine just compensation, it is equally true that these factors have
been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A.
No. 6657. As the government agency principally tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the
DAR's duty to issue rules and regulations to carry out the object of the law. The DAR Administrative
Orderprecisely "filled in the details" of Section 17, R.A. No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by which the
factors mentioned therein may be taken into account. The RTCwas at no liberty to disregard the formula which
was devised to implement the said provision.
It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Administrative issuances partake
of the nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore
administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue. Unless an
administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply the same.
We reiterated the mandatory application of the formula in the applicable DAR administrative regulations in
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lim, Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz, and Land Bank of
the Philippines v. Barrido. In Barrido, we were explicit in stating that:
While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function vested in the RTC acting as a
Special Agrarian Court, the judge cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full consideration the factors
specifically identified by law and implementing rules. Special Agrarian Courts are not at liberty to disregard the
formula laid down in DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998, because unless an administrative order is declared
invalid, courts have no option but to apply it. The courts cannot ignore, without violating the agrarian law, the
formula provided by the DAR for the determination of just compensation.
These rulings plainly impose on the RTC the duty to apply the formula laid down in the pertinent DAR
administrative regulations to determine just compensation. Clearly, the CA and the RTC acted with grievous
error when they disregarded the formula laid down by the DAR, and chose instead to come up with their own
basis for the valuation of the subject land. [Italicization supplied; emphases ours]
As the law now stands, it is clear that the SAC is duty bound to take into consideration the factors fixed by
Section 17 of RA 6657 and apply the basic formula prescribed and laid down in the pertinent administrative
regulations, in this case, DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative
Order No. 11, series of 1994, to determine just compensation. In the present case, we thus find no difficulty in
concluding that the CA and the RTC, acting as a SAC, seriously erred when they effectively eschewed the
basic formula prescribed by the DAR regulations and chose instead to come up with their own basis for the
valuation of the land in question.
The SAC cannot take judicial notice of the
nature of land in question without the
requisite hearing
Separately from disregarding the basic formula prescribed by the DAR, it has also not escaped our notice that
the SAC also erred in concluding that the subject land consisting of 29.0966 hectares is commercial in nature,
after taking judicial notice that it is "situated near the commercial district of Curvada, Cataingan, Masbate."49 In
Land Bank of the Philippines v.
Honeycomb Farms Corporation,50 we categorically ruled that the parties must be given the opportunity to
present evidence on the nature of the property before the court a quo can take judicial notice of the commercial
nature of a portion of the subject landholding, thus:
While the lower court is not precluded from taking judicial notice of certain facts, it must exercise this right
within the clear boundary provided by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary.
– During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party,
may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a
material issue in the case.
The classification of the land is obviously essential to the valuation of the subject property, which is the very
issue in the present case. The parties should thus have been given the opportunity to present evidence on the
nature of the property before the lower court took judicial notice of the commercial nature of a portion of the
subject landholdings. As we said in Land Bank of the Phils. v. Wycoco 464 Phil. 83, 97-98 (2004):
The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution especially where the case involves a
vast tract of land. Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is
merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact
can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be
disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the
judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not
generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. [Italicization supplied]
The present case must be remanded to the
court of origin for the determination of just
compensation in accordance Section 17 of
RA 6657 and applicable DAR regulations
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal,51 we remanded the case to the SAC for further reception of
evidence because the trial court based its valuation upon a different formula and did not conduct any hearing
for the reception of evidence.52
The mandatory application of the aforementioned guidelines in determining just compensation has been
reiterated recently in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lim, 53
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz,54 and Land Bank qf the Philippines v. Honeycomb
Farms Corporation,55 where we also ordered the remand of the cases to the SAC for the determination of just
compensation, strictly in accordance with the applicable DAR regulations.56
As we are not a trier of facts, we thus find that a remand of this case is necessary in order for the SAC to
determine just compensation, strictly in accordance with Section 17 of RA 6657 and applicable DAR
regulations, in particular, DAR Administrative Order No. 6, series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative
Order No. 11, series of 1994.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition Is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision dated
September 16, 2004 and Resolution dated November 25, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
69661 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Special Civil Case No. 4637 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 48, for the determination of just compensation, based on Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 6657 and the applicable administrative orders of the Department of Agrarian Reform.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 205966, March 02, 2016
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioner, v. FELICIANO P. LEGASPI, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45, dated March 13, 2013, of petitioner
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision2 dated August 15, 2012 and
Resolution3 dated February 18, 2013, both of the Court of Appeals (CA) that reversed the Order4 dated
January 20, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Malolos City, Bulacan regarding a complaint
for annulment of title, revocation of certificate and damages (with application for TRO/writ of preliminary
injunction) filed by petitioner BSP against Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr., Luningning G. De Leon, Engr. Ramon
C. Angelo, Jr., Ex-Mayor Matilde A. Legaspi and respondent Feliciano P. Legaspi, the incumbent Mayor of
Norzagaray, Bulacan at the time of the filing of the said complaint.
The facts follow.
Petitioner BSP filed a Complaint for annulment of title, revocation of certificate and damages (with application
for TRO/writ of preliminary injunction) against Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr., Luningning G. De Leon, Engr.
Ramon C. Angelo, Jr., Ex-Mayor Matilde A. Legaspi and respondent Feliciano P. Legaspi before the RTC of
Malolos, Bulacan. Respondent, together with his fellow defendants, filed their Answer to the complaint.
Thereafter, the RTC, on May 13, 2008, issued an Order mandating the issuance of preliminary injunction,
enjoining defendants Engr. Ramon C. Angelo, Jr. and petitioner Feliciano P. Legaspi, and persons acting for
and in their behalf, from pursuing the construction, development and/or operation of a dumpsite or landfill in
Barangay San Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan, in an area allegedly covered by OCT No. P858/Free Patent No.
257917, the property subject of the complaint.
Herein respondent Legaspi filed a Motion to Dismiss dated August 15, 2008 alleging that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner BSP because the suit is unauthorized by petitioner BSP
itself and that the counsel representing petitioner BSP is not authorized and thus cannot bind the same
petitioner. Respondent Legaspi also alleged that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action because the complaint is prima facie void and that an illegal representation produces no legal effect.
In addition, respondent Legaspi asserted that the complaint was initiated without the authority of the Monetary
Board and that the complaint was not prepared and signed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the
statutory counsel of government agencies.
In opposing the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner BSP argued that the complaint was filed pursuant to Monetary
Board Resolution No. 8865, dated June 17, 2004, and that the complaint was verified by Geraldine Alag,
Director of Asset Management of the BSP, who stated that she was authorized by Monetary Board Resolutions
No. 805 dated June 17, 2008 and 1005 dated July 29, 2005. Petitioner BSP further claimed that it is not
precluded from being represented by a private counsel of its own choice.
After respondent Legaspi filed a Reply, to which petitioner BSP filed a Rejoinder, and against which,
respondent Legaspi filed a Rejoinder, the RTC rendered its Order denying respondent Legaspi's motion to
dismiss.
In denying the Motion to Dismiss, the RTC ruled that it had acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner when the latter filed with the court the Complaint dated April 10, 2008. Furthermore, the RTC
adjudged that in suits involving the BSP, the Monetary Board may authorize the Governor to represent it
personally or through counsel, even a private counsel, and the authority to represent the BSP may be
delegated to any other officer thereof. It took into account the feet that the BSP's complaint dated April 10,
2008 was verified by Geraldine C. Alag, an officer of the BSP being the Director of its Asset Management
Department and the Secretary's Certificate issued by Silvina Q. Mamaril-Roxas, Officer-in-Charge, Office of
the Secretary of BSP's Monetary Board attesting to Monetary Board Resolution No. 900, adopted and passed
on July 18, 2008 containing the Board's approval of the recommendation of the Asset Management
Department (AMD) to engage the services of Ongkiko Kalaw Manhit and Acorda Law Offices (OKMA Law).
Respondent Legaspi filed a motion for reconsideration, adding as its argument that the RTC failed to acquire
jurisdiction over the action because the complaint, a real action, failed to allege the assessed value of the
subject property. As an opposition to respondent Legaspi's additional contention, petitioner BSP claimed that
since the subject property contains an area of 4,838,736 square meters, it is unthinkable that said property
would have an assessed value of less than P20,000.00 which is within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Courts. Petitioner BSP further stated that a tax declaration showing the assessed value of P28,538,900.00 and
latest zonal value of P145,162,080.00 was attached to the complaint.
The RTC, in its Order dated April 3, 2009, denied respondent Legaspi's motion for reconsideration. Hence,
respondent Legaspi elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The CA, in its assailed Decision, dated August 15, 2012, granted respondent Legaspi's petition. The
dispositive portion of the said decision reads as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed January 20, 2009 and April 03, 2009 Orders are SET
ASIDE and the complaint of BSP is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.5ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner BSP moved for reconsideration, but the CA, in its Resolution dated February 18, 2013, denied the
same motion. Hence, the present petition with the following grounds relied upon:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I.
The Regional Trial Court of Malolos City has exclusive original jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case
No. 209-M-2008.
II.
BSP lawfully engaged the services of [the] undersigned counsel.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The principle that it is well settled that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which provides that only questions of law
shall be raised in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before this Court admits of certain
exceptions,7 namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well
as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of
fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.8 Under
the present case, the RTC and the CA have different findings of fact, hence, there is a need for this Court to
address the issues raised by petitioner BSP.
The petition is meritorious.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, the RTC has exclusive original
jurisdiction over civil actions which involve title to possession of real property, or any interest therein, where the
assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).9 Petitioner BSP
insists that the property involved has an assessed value of more than P20,000.00, as shown in a Tax
Declaration attached to the complaint. Incidentally, the complaint,10 on its face, is devoid of any amount that
would confer jurisdiction over the RTC.
The non-inclusion on the face of the complaint of the amount of the property, however, is not fatal because
attached in the complaint is a tax declaration (Annex "N" in the complaint) of the property in question showing
that it has an assessed value of P215,320.00. It must be emphasized that annexes to a complaint are deemed
part of, and should be considered together with the complaint.11 In Fluor Daniel, Inc.-Philippines v. E.B.
Villarosa and Partners Co., Ltd.,12 this Court ruled that in determining the sufficiency of a cause of action, the
courts should also consider the attachments to the complaint, thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We have ruled that a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency of cause of action if it appears clearly
from the complaint and its attachments that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. The converse is also true. The
complaint may be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is obvious from the complaint and its annexes that
the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Hence, being an annex to BSP's complaint, the tax declaration showing the assessed value of the property is
deemed a part of the complaint and should be considered together with it in determining that the RTC has
exclusive original jurisdiction.
In connection therewith, the RTC, therefore, committed no error in taking judicial notice of the assessed value
of the subject property. A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records in the same case, of facts
established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity of its own records of another case
between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the same court, and of public records on file in the
same court.14 Since a copy of the tax declaration, which is a public record, was attached to the complaint, the
same document is already considered as on file with the court, thus, the court can now take judicial notice of
such.
In holding that the courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land, the CA cited
this Court's ruling in Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals.15 This Court's ruling though in Quinagoran is inapplicable
in this case because in the former, the complaint does not allege that the assessed value of the land in
question is more than P20,000.00 and that there was no tax declaration nor any other document showing the
assessed value of the property attached to the complaint. Thus, in Quinagoran, the assessed value of the land
was not on record before the trial court, unlike in the present case.
Moreover, considering that the area of the subject land is four million eight hundred thirty-eight thousand seven
hundred and thirty-six (4,838,736) square meters, the RTC acted properly when it took judicial notice of the
total area of the property involved and the prevailing assessed value of the titled property, and it would also be
at the height of absurdity if the assessed value of the property with such an area is less than P20,000.00.
Anent the issue of the legal representation of petitioner BSP, the CA ruled that the BSP, being a governmentowned and controlled corporation, should have been represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
or the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and not a private law firm or private counsel, as in
this case.
Under Republic Act No. 7653, or the New Central Bank Act, the BSP Governor is authorized to represent the
Bangko Sentral, either personally or through counsel, including private counsel, as may be authorized by the
Monetary Board, in any legal proceedings, action or specialized legal studies.16 Under the same law, the BSP
Governor may also delegate his power to represent the BSP to other officers upon his own responsibility.
As aptly found by the RTC, petitioner BSP was able to justify its being represented by a private counsel, thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
BSP's complaint dated April 10, 2008 was verified by Geraldine C. Alag, an officer of the BSP being the
Director of its Asset Management Department. It has been explained that this was authorized by the Monetary
Board, as per Resolution No. 865 dated June 17, 2004, which reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
To approve delegation of authority to the Director, Asset Management Department (AMD), or in his absence,
the Officer-in-Charge, AMD to sign all documents, contracts, agreements and affidavits relating to the
consolidation of ownership, lease, cancellation of decision, redemption and sale of acquired assets, and all
documents to be filed in court upon clearance by the Office of the General Counsel and Legal Services x x x.
Also submitted to this Court is the Secretary's Certificate issued by Silvina Q. Mamaril-Roxas, Officer-inCharge, Office of the Secretary of BSP's Monetary Board attesting to Monetary Board Resolution No. 900,
adopted and passed on July 18, 2008, which reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
3. At the regular meeting of the MB on 18 July 2008, the MB adopted and passed MB Resolution No. 900, to
wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Board approved the recommendation of the Asset Management Department (AMD) to engage the
services of Ongkiko Kalaw Manhit and Acorda Law Offices (OKMA Law) as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. To act as counsel for the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) in a complaint to be filed against the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary, et al., before the Regional Trial Court,
Malolos, Bulacan, involving a BSP-acquired property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 48694 P(M)
with a total area of 483.87 hectares in Norzagaray, Bulacan, and under the terms and conditions of the service
engagement and the fees as shown in Annex G of the memorandum of Ms. Geraldine C. Alag, Director, AMB,
dated 8 July 2008; and
2. To act as true and lawful attorney-in-fact of the BSP, with full power and authority, as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. To represent the BSP in the pre-trial conference and trial of the case;
b. To negotiate, conclude, enter into and execute a compromise or amicable settlement of the case, under
such terms and conditions as an attorney-in-fact may deem just and reasonable;
c. To agree on the simplification of issues;
d. To file and/or amend the necessary pleadings;
x x x.
Thus, the filing of the instant suit and the engagement of the services of counsel are duly authorized.
It is significant to note that neither the Governor or General Counsel nor the Monetary Board of BSP has come
out to disown the authority given for the filing of the instant suit and for the engagement of the services of
BSP's counsel of record in this case.17ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Therefore, as discussed above, in cases involving the BSP, the Monetary Board may authorize the BSP
Governor to represent it personally or through a counsel, even a private counsel, and the authority to represent
the BSP may be delegated to any of its officers.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 dated March 13, 2013 of petitioner Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas is GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision dated August 15, 2012 and Resolution dated
February 18, 2013 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Orders dated January 20,
2009 and April 3, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Malolos City, Bulacan, are AFFIRMED.
Let this case, therefore, be REMANDED to the trial court for the continuation of its proceedings.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
G.R. No. 156052
February 13, 2008
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO and BONIFACIO S.
TUMBOKON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, respondent.
x----------------------x
CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC., PETRON CORPORATION and PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, movants-intervenors.
x----------------------x
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, movant-intervenor.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
After we promulgated our decision in this case on March 7, 2007, Chevron Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron
Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (collectively, the oil companies) and the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Energy (DOE), filed their respective motions for
leave to intervene and for reconsideration of the decision.
Chevron1 is engaged in the business of importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum products in the
Philippines while Shell and Petron are engaged in the business of manufacturing, refining and likewise
importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum products in the Philippines.2 The DOE is a governmental
agency created under Republic Act (RA) No. 76383 and tasked to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and
control all plans, programs, projects and activities of the government relative to energy exploration,
development, utilization, distribution and conservation.4
The facts are restated briefly as follows:
Petitioners Social Justice Society, Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon, in an original
petition for mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L.
Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance was enacted by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila on November 20, 2001,5 approved by respondent Mayor on November
28, 2001,6 and became effective on December 28, 2001 after publication.7 Sections 1 and 3 thereof state:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety,
and general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land
use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east,
Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pandacan in the west[,] PNR
Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and
Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino
Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial
I.
xxx
xxx
xxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no longer
permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of
effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which
are hereby in consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the
owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and desist from operating
their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated
in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies.
On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU)8 with the oil companies. They agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals
[was] the most viable and practicable option." The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution
No. 97.9 In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective only for a period of six
months starting July 25, 2002.10 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No.
1311 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing the mayor of Manila to issue
special business permits to the oil companies.12
This was the factual backdrop presented to the Court which became the basis of our March 7, 2007 decision.
We ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local Government Code (LGC) to "enforce all laws
and ordinances relative to the governance of the city,"13 including Ordinance No. 8027. We also held that we
need not resolve the issue of whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the
subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian could amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027 since the
resolutions which ratified the MOU and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and
effect only until April 30, 2003. We concluded that there was nothing that legally hindered respondent from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.
After we rendered our decision on March 7, 2007, the oil companies and DOE sought to intervene and filed
motions for reconsideration in intervention on March 12, 2007 and March 21, 2007 respectively. On April 11,
2007, we conducted the oral arguments in Baguio City to hear petitioners, respondent and movantsintervenors oil companies and DOE.
The oil companies called our attention to the fact that on April 25, 2003, Chevron had filed a complaint against
respondent and the City of Manila in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 39, for the annulment of
Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory
injunction.14 The case was docketed as civil case no. 03-106377. On the same day, Shell filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus likewise assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8027 and with application for writs of
preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction.15 This was docketed as civil case no.
03-106380. Later on, these two cases were consolidated and the RTC of Manila, Branch 39 issued an order
dated May 19, 2003 granting the applications for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction:
WHEREFORE, upon the filing of a total bond of TWO MILLION (Php 2,000,000.00) PESOS, let a Writ
of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction be issued ordering [respondent] and the City of Manila, their
officers, agents, representatives, successors, and any other persons assisting or acting in their behalf,
during the pendency of the case, to REFRAIN from taking steps to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, and let
a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction be issued ordering [respondent] to issue [Chevron and Shell]
the necessary Business Permits to operate at the Pandacan Terminal.16
Petron likewise filed its own petition in the RTC of Manila, Branch 42, also attacking the validity of Ordinance
No. 8027 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
(TRO). This was docketed as civil case no. 03-106379. In an order dated August 4, 2004, the RTC enjoined
the parties to maintain the status quo.17
Thereafter, in 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119, also known as the Manila
Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006.18 This was approved by respondent on June
16, 2006.19
Aggrieved anew, Chevron and Shell filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila, Branch 20, asking for the
nullification of Ordinance No. 8119.20 This was docketed as civil case no. 06-115334. Petron filed its own
complaint on the same causes of action in the RTC of Manila, Branch 41.21 This was docketed as civil case no.
07-116700.22 The court issued a TRO in favor of Petron, enjoining the City of Manila and respondent from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8119.23
Meanwhile, in civil case no. 03-106379, the parties filed a joint motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim
on February 20, 2007.24 In an order dated April 23, 2007, the joint motion was granted and all the claims and
counterclaims of the parties were withdrawn.25
Given these additional pieces of information, the following were submitted as issues for our resolution:
1. whether movants-intervenors should be allowed to intervene in this case;26
2. whether the following are impediments to the execution of our March 7, 2007 decision:
(a) Ordinance No. 8119, the enactment and existence of which were not previously brought by
the parties to the attention of the Court and
(b) writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction and status
quo order issued by the RTC of Manila, Branches 39 and 42 and
3. whether the implementation of Ordinance No. 8027 will unduly encroach upon the DOE’s powers and
functions involving energy resources.
During the oral arguments, the parties submitted to this Court’s power to rule on the constitutionality and
validity of Ordinance No. 8027 despite the pendency of consolidated cases involving this issue in the
RTC.27 The importance of settling this controversy as fully and as expeditiously as possible was emphasized,
considering its impact on public interest. Thus, we will also dispose of this issue here. The parties were after all
given ample opportunity to present and argue their respective positions. By so doing, we will do away with the
delays concomitant with litigation and completely adjudicate an issue which will most likely reach us anyway as
the final arbiter of all legal disputes.
Before we resolve these issues, a brief review of the history of the Pandacan Terminals is called for to put our
discussion in the proper context.
History Of The Pandacan Oil Terminals
Pandacan (one of the districts of the City of Manila) is situated along the banks of the Pasig river. At the turn of
the twentieth century, Pandacan was unofficially designated as the industrial center of Manila. The area, then
largely uninhabited, was ideal for various emerging industries as the nearby river facilitated the transportation
of goods and products. In the 1920s, it was classified as an industrial zone.28 Among its early industrial settlers
were the oil companies. Shell established its installation there on January 30, 1914.29 Caltex (now Chevron)
followed suit in 1917 when the company began marketing its products in the country.30 In 1922, it built a
warehouse depot which was later converted into a key distribution terminal.31 The corporate presence in the
Philippines of Esso (Petron’s predecessor) became more keenly felt when it won a concession to build and
operate a refinery in Bataan in 1957.32 It then went on to operate a state-of-the-art lube oil blending plant in the
Pandacan Terminals where it manufactures lubes and greases.33
On December 8, 1941, the Second World War reached the shores of the Philippine Islands. Although Manila
was declared an open city, the Americans had no interest in welcoming the Japanese. In fact, in their zealous
attempt to fend off the Japanese Imperial Army, the United States Army took control of the Pandacan
Terminals and hastily made plans to destroy the storage facilities to deprive the advancing Japanese Army of a
valuable logistics weapon.34 The U.S. Army burned unused petroleum, causing a frightening conflagration.
Historian Nick Joaquin recounted the events as follows:
After the USAFFE evacuated the City late in December 1941, all army fuel storage dumps were set on
fire. The flames spread, enveloping the City in smoke, setting even the rivers ablaze, endangering
bridges and all riverside buildings. … For one week longer, the "open city" blazed—a cloud of smoke by
day, a pillar of fire by night.35
The fire consequently destroyed the Pandacan Terminals and rendered its network of depots and service
stations inoperative.36
After the war, the oil depots were reconstructed. Pandacan changed as Manila rebuilt itself. The three major oil
companies resumed the operation of their depots.37 But the district was no longer a sparsely populated
industrial zone; it had evolved into a bustling, hodgepodge community. Today, Pandacan has become a
densely populated area inhabited by about 84,000 people, majority of whom are urban poor who call it
home.38 Aside from numerous industrial installations, there are also small businesses, churches, restaurants,
schools, daycare centers and residences situated there.39 Malacañang Palace, the official residence of the
President of the Philippines and the seat of governmental power, is just two kilometers away.40 There is a
private school near the Petron depot. Along the walls of the Shell facility are shanties of informal
settlers.41 More than 15,000 students are enrolled in elementary and high schools situated near these
facilities.42 A university with a student population of about 25,000 is located directly across the depot on the
banks of the Pasig river.43
The 36-hectare Pandacan Terminals house the oil companies’ distribution terminals and depot facilities.44 The
refineries of Chevron and Shell in Tabangao and Bauan, both in Batangas, respectively, are connected to the
Pandacan Terminals through a 114-kilometer45 underground pipeline system.46 Petron’s refinery in Limay,
Bataan, on the other hand, also services the depot.47 The terminals store fuel and other petroleum products
and supply 95% of the fuel requirements of Metro Manila,48 50% of Luzon’s consumption and 35%
nationwide.49 Fuel can also be transported through barges along the Pasig river or tank trucks via the South
Luzon Expressway.
We now discuss the first issue: whether movants-intervenors should be allowed to intervene in this case.
Intervention Of The Oil Companies And The DOE Should Be Allowed In The Interest of Justice
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant
therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such
proceedings.50 The pertinent rules are Sections 1 and 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 1. Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and
whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
SEC. 2. Time to intervene. — The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the motion and
served on the original parties.
Thus, the following are the requisites for intervention of a non-party:
(1) Legal interest
(a) in the matter in controversy; or
(b) in the success of either of the parties; or
I against both parties; or
(d) person is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of
property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof;
(2) Intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights of original parties;
(3) Intervenor’s rights may not be fully protected in a separate proceeding51 and
(g)The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.
For both the oil companies and DOE, the last requirement is definitely absent. As a rule, intervention is allowed
"before rendition of judgment" as Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides. Both filed their separate motions after
our decision was promulgated. In Republic of the Philippines v. Gingoyon,52 a recently decided case which was
also an original action filed in this Court, we declared that the appropriate time to file the motions-inintervention was before and not after resolution of the case.53
The Court, however, has recognized exceptions to Section 2, Rule 19 in the interest of substantial justice:
The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is intended to make the powers of the Court
fully and completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival
claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof.54
The oil companies assert that they have a legal interest in this case because the implementation of Ordinance
No. 8027 will directly affect their business and property rights.55
[T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other parties must be in the matter
in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by
direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons not parties to the action were
allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated, expensive and
interminable. And this would be against the policy of the law. The words "an interest in the subject"
means a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded, one that would put the intervenor in a legal
position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint without the establishment of which plaintiff could not
recover.56
We agree that the oil companies have a direct and immediate interest in the implementation of Ordinance No.
8027. Their claim is that they will need to spend billions of pesos if they are compelled to relocate their oil
depots out of Manila. Considering that they admitted knowing about this case from the time of its filing on
December 4, 2002, they should have intervened long before our March 7, 2007 decision to protect their
interests. But they did not.57 Neither did they offer any worthy explanation to justify their late intervention.
Be that as it may, although their motion for intervention was not filed on time, we will allow it because they
raised and presented novel issues and arguments that were not considered by the Court in its March 7, 2007
decision. After all, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court before which the case is pending.58 Considering the compelling reasons favoring intervention, we
do not think that this will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights of the original parties. In fact, it will
be expedited since their intervention will enable us to rule on the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027
instead of waiting for the RTC’s decision.
The DOE, on the other hand, alleges that its interest in this case is also direct and immediate as Ordinance No.
8027 encroaches upon its exclusive and national authority over matters affecting the oil industry. It seeks to
intervene in order to represent the interests of the members of the public who stand to suffer if the Pandacan
Terminals’ operations are discontinued. We will tackle the issue of the alleged encroachment into DOE’s
domain later on. Suffice it to say at this point that, for the purpose of hearing all sides and considering the
transcendental importance of this case, we will also allow DOE’s intervention.
The Injunctive Writs Are Not Impediments To The Enforcement Of Ordinance No. 8027
Under Rule 65, Section 359 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. According to the oil companies, respondent did not
unlawfully fail or neglect to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because he was lawfully prevented from doing so by
virtue of the injunctive writs and status quo order issued by the RTC of Manila, Branches 39 and 42.
First, we note that while Chevron and Shell still have in their favor the writs of preliminary injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction, the status quo order in favor of Petron is no longer in effect since the court
granted the joint motion of the parties to withdraw the complaint and counterclaim.60
Second, the original parties failed to inform the Court about these injunctive writs. Respondent (who was also
impleaded as a party in the RTC cases) defends himself by saying that he informed the court of the pendency
of the civil cases and that a TRO was issued by the RTC in the consolidated cases filed by Chevron and Shell.
It is true that had the oil companies only intervened much earlier, the Court would not have been left in the dark
about these facts. Nevertheless, respondent should have updated the Court, by way of manifestation, on such
a relevant matter.
In his memorandum, respondent mentioned the issuance of a TRO. Under Section 5 of Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, a TRO issued by the RTC is effective only for a period of 20 days. This is why, in our March 7, 2007
decision, we presumed with certainty that this had already lapsed.61 Respondent also mentioned the grant of
injunctive writs in his rejoinder which the Court, however, expunged for being a prohibited pleading. The parties
and their counsels were clearly remiss in their duties to this Court.
In resolving controversies, courts can only consider facts and issues pleaded by the parties.62 Courts, as well
as magistrates presiding over them are not omniscient. They can only act on the facts and issues presented
before them in appropriate pleadings. They may not even substitute their own personal knowledge for
evidence. Nor may they take notice of matters except those expressly provided as subjects of mandatory
judicial notice.
We now proceed to the issue of whether the injunctive writs are legal impediments to the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 8027.
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. ― A preliminary injunction may be granted
when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or nonperformance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(g) IThat a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring
or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting
the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.
There are two requisites for the issuance of a preliminary injunction: (1) the right to be protected exists prima
facie and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation
sought to be prevented will cause an irreparable injustice.
The act sought to be restrained here was the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027. It is a settled rule that an
ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity and, as such, cannot be restrained by injunction.63 Nevertheless,
when the validity of the ordinance is assailed, the courts are not precluded from issuing an injunctive writ
against its enforcement. However, we have declared that the issuance of said writ is proper only when:
... the petitioner assailing the ordinance has made out a case of unconstitutionality strong enough
to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of validity, in addition to a showing of a
clear legal right to the remedy sought....64 (Emphasis supplied)
Judge Reynaldo G. Ros, in his order dated May 19, 2003, stated his basis for issuing the injunctive writs:
The Court, in resolving whether or not a Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction should be issued, is guided by the following requirements: (1) a clear legal right of the
complainant; (2) a violation of that right; and (3) a permanent and urgent necessity for the Writ to
prevent serious damage. The Court believes that these requisites are present in these cases.
There is no doubt that the plaintiff/petitioners have been legitimately operating their business in the
Pandacan Terminal for many years and they have made substantial capital investment therein. Every
year they were issued Business Permits by the City of Manila. Its operations have not been declared
illegal or contrary to law or morals. In fact, because of its vital importance to the national economy, it
was included in the Investment Priorities Plan as mandated under the "Downstream Oil Industry
Deregulation Act of 1988 (R.A. 8479). As a lawful business, the plaintiff/petitioners have a right,
therefore, to continue their operation in the Pandacan Terminal and the right to protect their
investments. This is a clear and unmistakable right of the plaintiff/petitioners.
The enactment, therefore, of City Ordinance No. 8027 passed by the City Council of Manila
reclassifying the area where the Pandacan Terminal is located from Industrial II to Commercial I and
requiring the plaintiff/petitioners to cease and desist from the operation of their business has certainly
violated the rights of the plaintiff/petitioners to continue their legitimate business in the Pandacan
Terminal and deprived them of their huge investments they put up therein. Thus, before the Court,
therefore, determines whether the Ordinance in question is valid or not, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and a Writ of Mandatory Injunction be issued to prevent serious and irreparable damage to
plaintiff/petitioners.65
Nowhere in the judge’s discussion can we see that, in addition to a showing of a clear legal right of
Chevron and Shell to the remedy sought, he was convinced that they had made out a case of
unconstitutionality or invalidity strong enough to overcome the presumption of validity of the
ordinance. Statutes and ordinances are presumed valid unless and until the courts declare the contrary in
clear and unequivocal terms.66 The mere fact that the ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid will
not entitle a party to have its enforcement enjoined.67 The presumption is all in favor of validity. The reason for
this is obvious:
The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must,
in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all
the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative
body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well
being of the people . . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a
clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.68
X—x—x
...[Courts] accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary[,] in the
determination of actual cases and controversies[,] must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.69
The oil companies argue that this presumption must be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness
appears on the face of the ordinance itself.70 We see no reason to set aside the presumption. The ordinance,
on its face, does not at all appear to be unconstitutional. It reclassified the subject area from industrial to
commercial. Prima facie, this power is within the power of municipal corporations:
The power of municipal corporations to divide their territory into industrial, commercial and residential
zones is recognized in almost all jurisdictions inasmuch as it is derived from the police power itself and
is exercised for the protection and benefit of their inhabitants.71
X—x—x
There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to divide its territory into residential and
industrial zones, and to prescribe that offensive and unwholesome trades and occupations are to be
established exclusively in the latter zone.
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Likewise, it cannot be denied that the City of Manila has the authority, derived from the police power, of
forbidding the appellant to continue the manufacture of toyo in the zone where it is now situated, which
has been declared residential....72
Courts will not invalidate an ordinance unless it clearly appears that it is unconstitutional. There is no such
showing here. Therefore, the injunctive writs issued in the Manila RTC’s May 19, 2003 order had no leg to
stand on.
We are aware that the issuance of these injunctive writs is not being assailed as tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. However, we are confronted with the question of whether these writs issued by a lower court are
impediments to the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027 (which is the subject of the mandamus petition). As
already discussed, we rule in the negative.
Ordinance No. 8027 Was Not Superseded By Ordinance No. 8119
The March 7, 2007 decision did not take into consideration the passage of Ordinance No. 8119 entitled "An
Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing
for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto" which was approved by respondent on June 16,
2006. The simple reason was that the Court was never informed about this ordinance.
While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress, the rule with respect to local
ordinances is different. Ordinances are not included in the enumeration of matters covered by mandatory
judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.73
Although, Section 50 of RA 40974 provides that:
SEC. 50 Judicial notice of ordinances. - All courts sitting in the city shall take judicial notice of the
ordinances passed by the [Sangguniang Panglungsod].
This cannot be taken to mean that this Court, since it has its seat in the City of Manila, should have taken steps
to procure a copy of the ordinance on its own, relieving the party of any duty to inform the Court about it.
Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances, a court is not
required to take judicial notice of ordinances that are not before it and to which it does not have access. The
party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text of the rules the
party desires it to have notice of.75 Counsel should take the initiative in requesting that a trial court take judicial
notice of an ordinance even where a statute requires courts to take judicial notice of local ordinances.76
The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial notice of a local ordinance is to remove any discretion a
court might have in determining whether or not to take notice of an ordinance. Such a statute does not direct
the court to act on its own in obtaining evidence for the record and a party must make the ordinance available
to the court for it to take notice.77
In its defense, respondent claimed that he did not inform the Court about the enactment of Ordinance No. 8119
because he believed that it was different from Ordinance No. 8027 and that the two were not inconsistent with
each other.78
In the same way that we deem the intervenors’ late intervention in this case unjustified, we find the failure of
respondent, who was an original party here, inexcusable.
The Rule On Judicial Admissions Is Not Applicable Against Respondent
The oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No. 8027 was repealed by
Ordinance No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379 (where Petron assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No.
8027) when the parties in their joint motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim stated that "the issue ...has
been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the passage of [Ordinance No. 8119]."79 They contend that
such admission worked as an estoppel against the respondent.
Respondent countered that this stipulation simply meant that Petron was recognizing the validity and legality of
Ordinance No. 8027 and that it had conceded the issue of said ordinance’s constitutionality, opting instead to
question the validity of Ordinance No. 8119.80 The oil companies deny this and further argue that respondent,
in his answer in civil case no. 06-115334 (where Chevron and Shell are asking for the nullification of Ordinance
No. 8119), expressly stated that Ordinance No. 8119 replaced Ordinance No. 8027:81
... Under Ordinance No. 8027, businesses whose uses are not in accord with the reclassification were
given six months to cease [their] operation. Ordinance No. 8119, which in effect, replaced
Ordinance [No.] 8027, merely took note of the time frame provided for in Ordinance No. 8119....
Ordinance No. 8119 thus provided for an even longer term, that is[,] seven years;82 (Emphasis
supplied)
Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Judicial admissions. ― An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. (Emphasis
supplied)
While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or
inconsistent with what was pleaded,83 the aforestated rule is not applicable here. Respondent made the
statements regarding the ordinances in civil case nos. 03-106379 and 06-115334 which are not "the same" as
this case before us.84 To constitute a judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in
which it is offered.
Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did not supersede Ordinance No.
8027. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be considered estopped. They rely on the argument
that Ordinance No. 8119 superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn its (8119’s)
validity. We frown on the adoption of inconsistent positions and distrust any attempt at clever positioning under
one or the other on the basis of what appears advantageous at the moment. Parties cannot take vacillating or
contrary positions regarding the validity of a statute85 or ordinance. Nonetheless, we will look into the merits of
the argument of implied repeal.
Ordinance No. 8119 Did Not Impliedly Repeal Ordinance No. 8027
Both the oil companies and DOE argue that Ordinance No. 8119 repealed Ordinance No. 8027. They assert
that although there was no express repeal86 of Ordinance No. 8027, Ordinance No. 8119 impliedly repealed it.
According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8119 reclassified the area covering the Pandacan Terminals to
"High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD)"87 whereas Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the same
area from Industrial II to Commercial I:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety, and
general welfare of the residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of
[those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in
the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the
northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in
the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St.,
and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I. (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Ordinance No. 8119 provides for a phase-out of seven years:
SEC. 72. Existing Non-Conforming Uses and Buildings. - The lawful use of any building, structure or
land at the time of the adoption of this Ordinance may be continued, although such use does not
conform with the provision of the Ordinance, provided:
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(g) In case the non-conforming use is an industrial use:
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d. The land use classified as non-conforming shall program the phase-out and relocation
of the non-conforming use within seven (7) years from the date of effectivity of this
Ordinance. (Emphasis supplied)
This is opposed to Ordinance No. 8027 which compels affected entities to vacate the area within six months
from the effectivity of the ordinance:
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no longer
permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of
effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of businesses which
are hereby in consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8119 also designated the Pandacan oil depot area as a "Planned Unit Development/Overlay
Zone (O-PUD)":
SEC. 23. Use Regulations in Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone (O-PUD). – O-PUD Zones are
identified specific sites in the City of Manila wherein the project site is comprehensively planned as an
entity via unitary site plan which permits flexibility in planning/ design, building siting, complementarily
of building types and land uses, usable open spaces and the preservation of significant natural land
features, pursuant to regulations specified for each particular PUD. Enumerated below are identified
PUD:
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xxx
6. Pandacan Oil Depot Area
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Enumerated below are the allowable uses:
1. all uses allowed in all zones where it is located
2. the [Land Use Intensity Control (LUIC)] under which zones are located shall, in all instances be
complied with
3. the validity of the prescribed LUIC shall only be [superseded] by the development controls and
regulations specified for each PUD as provided for each PUD as provided for by the masterplan of
respective PUDs.88 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent claims that in passing Ordinance No. 8119, the Sanggunian did not intend to repeal Ordinance
No. 8027 but meant instead to carry over 8027’s provisions to 8119 for the purpose of making Ordinance No.
8027 applicable to the oil companies even after the passage of Ordinance No. 8119.89 He quotes an excerpt
from the minutes of the July 27, 2004 session of the Sanggunian during the first reading of Ordinance No.
8119:
Member GARCIA: Your Honor, iyong patungkol po roon sa oil depot doon sa amin sa Sixth District sa
Pandacan, wala pong nakalagay eith sa ordinansa rito na taliwas o kakaiba roon sa ordinansang
ipinasa noong nakaraang Konseho, iyong Ordinance No. 8027. So kung ano po ang nandirito sa
ordinansa na ipinasa ninyo last time, iyon lang po ang ni-lift eithe at inilagay eith. At eith eith
ordinansang …iyong naipasa ng huling Konseho, niri-classify [ninyo] from Industrial II to Commercial C1 ang area ng Pandacan kung nasaan ang oil depot. So ini-lift lang po [eithe] iyong definition, density,
at saka po yon pong … ng… noong ordinansa ninyo na siya eith naming inilagay eith, iniba lang po
naming iyong title. So wala po kaming binago na taliwas o nailagay na taliwas doon sa
ordinansang ipinasa ninyo, ni-lift lang po [eithe] from Ordinance No. 8027."90 (Emphasis supplied)
We agree with respondent.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals the intention of
the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect.91
There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the provisions in the two acts on the same subject
matter are irreconcilably contradictory, the latter act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an implied repeal
of the earlier one.92 The second is: if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly
intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.93 The oil companies argue that the situation
here falls under the first category.
Implied repeals are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest.94 As
statutes and ordinances are presumed to be passed only after careful deliberation and with knowledge of all
existing ones on the subject, it follows that, in passing a law, the legislature did not intend to interfere with or
abrogate a former law relating to the same subject matter.95 If the intent to repeal is not clear, the later act
should be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the earlier act.96
These standards are deeply enshrined in our jurisprudence. We disagree that, in enacting Ordinance No.
8119, there was any indication of the legislative purpose to repeal Ordinance No. 8027.97 The excerpt quoted
above is proof that there was never such an intent. While it is true that both ordinances relate to the same
subject matter, i.e. classification of the land use of the area where Pandacan oil depot is located, if there is no
intent to repeal the earlier enactment, every effort at reasonable construction must be made to reconcile the
ordinances so that both can be given effect:
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not
of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely be
cumulative or a continuation of the old one. What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative
purpose to repeal.98
For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an irreconcilable conflict between the two ordinances. There
is no conflict between the two ordinances. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the Pandacan area from Industrial
II to Commercial I. Ordinance No. 8119, in Section 23, designated it as a "Planned Unit Development/Overlay
Zone (O-PUD)." In its Annex C which defined the zone boundaries,99 the Pandacan area was shown to be
within the "High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R-3/MXD)." These zone classifications in Ordinance No.
8119 are not inconsistent with the reclassification of the Pandacan area from Industrial to Commercial in
Ordinance No. 8027. The "O-PUD" classification merely made Pandacan a "project site ... comprehensively
planned as an entity via unitary site plan which permits flexibility in planning/design, building siting,
complementarity of building types and land uses, usable open spaces and the preservation of significant
natural land features...."100 Its classification as "R-3/MXD" means that it should "be used primarily for high-rise
housing/dwelling purposes and limited complementary/supplementary trade, services and business
activities."101 There is no conflict since both ordinances actually have a common objective, i.e., to shift the
zoning classification from industrial to commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed residential/commercial
(Ordinance No. 8119).
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that a subsequent general law does not repeal a prior
special law on the same subject unless it clearly appears that the legislature has intended by the latter general
act to modify or repeal the earlier special law. Generalia specialibus non derogant (a general law does not
nullify a specific or special law).102 This is so even if the provisions of the general law are sufficiently
comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special act.103 The special act and the general law must
stand together, one as the law of the particular subject and the other as the law of general application.104 The
special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to, or a qualification of, the general act or
provision.105
The reason for this is that the legislature, in passing a law of special character, considers and makes
special provisions for the particular circumstances dealt with by the special law. This being so, the
legislature, by adopting a general law containing provisions repugnant to those of the special law and
without making any mention of its intention to amend or modify such special law, cannot be deemed to
have intended an amendment, repeal or modification of the latter.106
Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law107 since it deals specifically with a certain area described therein (the
Pandacan oil depot area) whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can be considered a general law108 as it covers the
entire city of Manila.
The oil companies assert that even if Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law, the existence of an allencompassing repealing clause in Ordinance No. 8119 evinces an intent on the part of the Sanggunian to
repeal the earlier ordinance:
Sec. 84. Repealing Clause. – All ordinances, rules, regulations in conflict with the provisions of this
Ordinance are hereby repealed; PROVIDED, That the rights that are vested upon the effectivity of this
Ordinance shall not be impaired.
They cited Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, Cebu City v. Department of Agrarian Reform:109
The presence of such general repealing clause in a later statute clearly indicates the legislative intent to
repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the subject matter, whether the prior law is a general law or a
special law... Without such a clause, a later general law will ordinarily not repeal a prior special law on
the same subject. But with such clause contained in the subsequent general law, the prior special law
will be deemed repealed, as the clause is a clear legislative intent to bring about that result.110
This ruling in not applicable here. The repealing clause of Ordinance No. 8119 cannot be taken to indicate the
legislative intent to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the subject matter, including Ordinance No. 8027, a
special enactment, since the aforequoted minutes (an official record of the discussions in
the Sanggunian) actually indicated the clear intent to preserve the provisions of Ordinance No. 8027.
To summarize, the conflict between the two ordinances is more apparent than real. The two ordinances can be
reconciled. Ordinance No. 8027 is applicable to the area particularly described therein whereas Ordinance No.
8119 is applicable to the entire City of Manila.
Mandamus Lies To Compel Respondent Mayor To Enforce Ordinance No. 8027
The oil companies insist that mandamus does not lie against respondent in consideration of the separation of
powers of the executive and judiciary.111 This argument is misplaced. Indeed,
[the] Courts will not interfere by mandamus proceedings with the legislative [or executive departments]
of the government in the legitimate exercise of its powers, except to enforce mere ministerial acts
required by law to be performed by some officer thereof.112 (Emphasis Supplied)
since this is the function of a writ of mandamus, which is the power to compel "the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust or station."113
They also argue that petitioners had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy to compel respondent to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 which was to seek relief from the President of the Philippines through the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) by virtue of the President’s power of supervision over
local government units. Again, we disagree. A party need not go first to the DILG in order to compel the
enforcement of an ordinance. This suggested process would be unreasonably long, tedious and consequently
injurious to the interests of the local government unit (LGU) and its constituents whose welfare is sought to be
protected. Besides, petitioners’ resort to an original action for mandamus before this Court is undeniably
allowed by the Constitution.114
Ordinance No. 8027 Is Constitutional And Valid
Having ruled that there is no impediment to the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027, we now proceed to make
a definitive ruling on its constitutionality and validity.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy and (6) must not be unreasonable.115
The City of Manila Has The Power To Enact Ordinance No. 8027
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its police power.
Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.116 This power flows
from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law).117 While
police power rests primarily with the national legislature, such power may be delegated.118 Section 16 of the
LGC, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments:119
Section 16. General Welfare. ― Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate
and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and
order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies, in this case,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city council. Specifically, the Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the
general welfare of the city:
Section. 458. – Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. – (a) The sangguniang panglungsod, as
the legislative branch of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code xxxx
This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised Charter of the City of Manila:
Section 18. Legislative powers. — The [City Council] shall have the following legislative powers:
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(g) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary
to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this chapter xxxx120
Specifically, the Sanggunian has the power to "reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city."121
The Enactment Of Ordinance No. 8027 Is A Legitimate Exercise Of Police Power
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if
the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a
concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.122
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted "for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public
safety and general welfare"123 of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to
protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from
industrial to commercial.
The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban Development of the
City of Manila which recommended the approval of the ordinance:
(1) the depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products which
include petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil among
others;
(2) the depot is open to attack through land, water or air;
(3) it is situated in a densely populated place and near Malacañang Palace and
(4) in case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire could spread to the neighboring
communities.124
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila
and not just of a particular class.125 The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western
interests which means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there is such a target in their midst, the residents
of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat.
According to respondent:
Such a public need became apparent after the 9/11 incident which showed that what was perceived to
be impossible to happen, to the most powerful country in the world at that, is actually possible. The
destruction of property and the loss of thousands of lives on that fateful day became the impetus for a
public need. In the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy, the threats of terrorism continued [such] that it
became imperative for governments to take measures to combat their effects.126
Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public
require but also what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.127 Clearly,
the Sanggunian was in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents.
In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the government.128 Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general
welfare.129 However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the
methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to
the end in view.130
The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance which reclassified the area
where the depot is situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or
municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision
into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs.131 As a result of the zoning, the continued
operation of the businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no longer be permitted. The
power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself
and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality.132 Consequently, the enactment of
Ordinance No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Manila and any resulting
burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust:
There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to divide its territory into residential and
industrial zones, and to prescribe that offensive and unwholesome trades and occupations are to be
established exclusively in the latter zone.
"The benefits to be derived by cities adopting such regulations (zoning) may be summarized as follows:
They attract a desirable and assure a permanent citizenship; they foster pride in and attachment to the
city; they promote happiness and contentment; they stabilize the use and value of property and
promote the peace, [tranquility], and good order of the city. We do not hesitate to say that the
attainment of these objects affords a legitimate field for the exercise of the police power. He who owns
property in such a district is not deprived of its use by such regulations. He may use it for the purposes
to which the section in which it is located is dedicated. That he shall not be permitted to use it to the
desecration of the community constitutes no unreasonable or permanent hardship and results in no
unjust burden."
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"The 14th Amendment protects the citizen in his right to engage in any lawful business, but it does not
prevent legislation intended to regulate useful occupations which, because of their nature or location,
may prove injurious or offensive to the public."133
We entertain no doubt that Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there is a
concurrence of lawful subject and lawful method.
Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Unfair, Oppressive Or Confiscatory Which Amounts To Taking Without
Compensation
According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair and oppressive as it does not only regulate but
also absolutely prohibits them from conducting operations in the City of Manila. Respondent counters that this
is not accurate since the ordinance merely prohibits the oil companies from operating their businesses in the
Pandacan area.
Indeed, the ordinance expressly delineated in its title and in Section 1 what it pertained to. Therefore, the oil
companies’ contention is not supported by the text of the ordinance. Respondent succinctly stated that:
The oil companies are not forbidden to do business in the City of Manila. They may still very well do so,
except that their oil storage facilities are no longer allowed in the Pandacan area. Certainly, there are
other places in the City of Manila where they can conduct this specific kind of business. Ordinance No.
8027 did not render the oil companies illegal. The assailed ordinance affects the oil companies
business only in so far as the Pandacan area is concerned.134
The oil companies are not prohibited from doing business in other appropriate zones in Manila. The City of
Manila merely exercised its power to regulate the businesses and industries in the zones it established:
As to the contention that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit, it will be seen
that the ordinance copied above does not prohibit the installation of motor engines within the
municipality of Cabanatuan but only within the zone therein fixed. If the municipal council of
Cabanatuan is authorized to establish said zone, it is also authorized to provide what kind of engines
may be installed therein. In banning the installation in said zone of all engines not excepted in the
ordinance, the municipal council of Cabanatuan did no more than regulate their installation by means of
zonification.135
The oil companies aver that the ordinance is unfair and oppressive because they have invested billions of
pesos in the depot.136 Its forced closure will result in huge losses in income and tremendous costs in
constructing new facilities.
Their contention has no merit. In the exercise of police power, there is a limitation on or restriction of property
interests to promote public welfare which involves no compensable taking. Compensation is necessary only
when the state’s power of eminent domain is exercised. In eminent domain, property is appropriated and
applied to some public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise of police power, on the other hand, is
noxious or intended for a noxious or forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not compensable.137 The
restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from danger is not a taking. It is merely the
prohibition or abatement of a noxious use which interferes with paramount rights of the public.
Property has not only an individual function, insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the owner, but also a
social function insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the other members of society.138 The principle is
this:
Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property, however absolute and
unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to
the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to
the right of the community. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such
reasonable restraints and regulations established by law as the legislature, under the governing and
controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.139
In the regulation of the use of the property, nobody else acquires the use or interest therein, hence there is no
compensable taking.140 In this case, the properties of the oil companies and other businesses situated in the
affected area remain theirs. Only their use is restricted although they can be applied to other profitable uses
permitted in the commercial zone.
Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Partial And Discriminatory
The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has discriminated against and singled out the Pandacan
Terminals despite the fact that the Pandacan area is congested with buildings and residences that do not
comply with the National Building Code, Fire Code and Health and Sanitation Code.141
This issue should not detain us for long. An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law.142 The requirements for a valid and reasonable
classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same
class.143
The law may treat and regulate one class differently from another class provided there are real and substantial
differences to distinguish one class from another.144 Here, there is a reasonable classification. We reiterate that
what the ordinance seeks to prevent is a catastrophic devastation that will result from a terrorist attack. Unlike
the depot, the surrounding community is not a high-value terrorist target. Any damage caused by fire or
explosion occurring in those areas would be nothing compared to the damage caused by a fire or explosion in
the depot itself. Accordingly, there is a substantial distinction. The enactment of the ordinance which provides
for the cessation of the operations of these terminals removes the threat they pose. Therefore it is germane to
the purpose of the ordinance. The classification is not limited to the conditions existing when the ordinance was
enacted but to future conditions as well. Finally, the ordinance is applicable to all businesses and industries in
the area it delineated.
Ordinance No. 8027 is Not Inconsistent With RA 7638 And RA 8479
The oil companies and the DOE assert that Ordinance No. 8027 is unconstitutional because it contravenes RA
7638 (DOE Act of 1992)145 and RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Law of 1998).146 They argue
that through RA 7638, the national legislature declared it a policy of the state "to ensure a continuous,
adequate, and economic supply of energy"147 and created the DOE to implement this policy. Thus, under
Section 5 I, DOE is empowered to "establish and administer programs for the exploration, transportation,
marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of energy resources." Considering
that the petroleum products contained in the Pandacan Terminals are major and critical energy resources, they
conclude that their administration, storage, distribution and transport are of national interest and fall under
DOE’s primary and exclusive jurisdiction.148
They further assert that the terminals are necessary for the delivery of immediate and adequate supply of oil to
its recipients in the most economical way.149 Local legislation such as Ordinance No. 8027 (which effectively
calls for the removal of these terminals) allegedly frustrates the state policy of ensuring a continuous,
adequate, and economic supply of energy expressed in RA 7638, a national law.150 Likewise, the ordinance
thwarts the determination of the DOE that the terminals’ operations should be merely scaled down and not
discontinued.151 They insist that this should not be allowed considering that it has a nationwide economic
impact and affects public interest transcending the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Manila.152
According to them, the DOE’s supervision over the oil industry under RA 7638 was subsequently underscored
by RA 8479, particularly in Section 7 thereof:
SECTION 7. Promotion of Fair Trade Practices. ― The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and
DOE shall take all measures to promote fair trade and prevent cartelization, monopolies, combinations
in restraint of trade, and any unfair competition in the Industry as defined in Article 186 of the Revised
Penal Code, and Articles 168 and 169 of Republic Act No. 8293, otherwise known as the "Intellectual
Property Rights Law". The DOE shall continue to encourage certain practices in the Industry which
serve the public interest and are intended to achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure
continuous supply of petroleum products, and enhance environmental protection. These practices
may include borrow-and-loan agreements, rationalized depot and manufacturing operations, hospitality
agreements, joint tanker and pipeline utilization, and joint actions on oil spill control and fire prevention.
(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent counters that DOE’s regulatory power does not preclude LGUs from exercising their police
power.153
Indeed, ordinances should not contravene existing statutes enacted by Congress. The rationale for this was
clearly explained in Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.:154
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
"Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the
legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it
may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional
limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great
a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and
the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation
themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature."
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without
meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local
government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions.
The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to
withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct
conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere
statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units,
which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.155
The question now is whether Ordinance No. 8027 contravenes RA 7638 and RA 8479. It does not.
Under Section 5 I of RA 7638, DOE was given the power to "establish and administer programs for the
exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of energy
resources." On the other hand, under Section 7 of RA 8749, the DOE "shall continue to encourage certain
practices in the Industry which serve the public interest and are intended to achieve efficiency and cost
reduction, ensure continuous supply of petroleum products." Nothing in these statutes prohibits the City of
Manila from enacting ordinances in the exercise of its police power.
The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously protected under the Constitution. In Article II,
Section 25 thereof, the people expressly adopted the following policy:
Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been devoted to guaranteeing and promoting the autonomy
of LGUs. The LGC was specially promulgated by Congress to ensure the autonomy of local governments as
mandated by the Constitution:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. ― (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial
and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to
enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority, responsibilities,
and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National Government to the local
government units. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not see how the laws relied upon by the oil companies and DOE stripped the City of Manila of its power
to enact ordinances in the exercise of its police power and to reclassify the land uses within its jurisdiction. To
guide us, we shall make a brief survey of our decisions where the police power measure of the LGU clashed
with national laws.
In Tan v. Pereña,156 the Court ruled that Ordinance No. 7 enacted by the municipality of Daanbantayan, Cebu
allowing the operation of three cockpits was invalid for violating PD 449 (or the Cockfighting Law of 1974)
which permitted only one cockpit per municipality.
In Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,157 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Batangas City enacted
Resolution No. 210 granting Batangas CATV, Inc. a permit to operate a cable television (CATV) system in
Batangas City. The Court held that the LGU did not have the authority to grant franchises to operate a CATV
system because it was the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) that had the power under EO
Nos. 205 and 436 to regulate CATV operations. EO 205 mandated the NTC to grant certificates of authority to
CATV operators while EO 436 vested on the NTC the power to regulate and supervise the CATV industry.
In Lina, Jr. v. Paño,158 we held that Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Laguna could not be used as justification to prohibit lotto in the municipality of San Pedro, Laguna because
lotto was duly authorized by RA 1169, as amended by BP 42. This law granted a franchise to the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office and allowed it to operate lotteries.
In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.,159 the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City passed
Ordinance Nos. 3353 and 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos in the city. We ruled that these
ordinances were void for contravening PD 1869 or the charter of the Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation which had the power to operate casinos.
The common dominator of all of these cases is that the national laws were clearly and expressly in conflict with
the ordinances/resolutions of the LGUs. The inconsistencies were so patent that there was no room for doubt.
This is not the case here.
The laws cited merely gave DOE general powers to "establish and administer programs for the exploration,
transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of energy resources"
and "to encourage certain practices in the [oil] industry which serve the public interest and are intended to
achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of petroleum products." These powers can be
exercised without emasculating the LGUs of the powers granted them. When these ambiguous powers are
pitted against the unequivocal power of the LGU to enact police power and zoning ordinances for the general
welfare of its constituents, it is not difficult to rule in favor of the latter. Considering that the powers of the DOE
regarding the Pandacan Terminals are not categorical, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the City of
Manila:
SECTION 5. Rules of Interpretation. ― In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the following
rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in
case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower
local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be
interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned;
xxx
xxx
xxx
(g) IThe general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to
local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the
people in the community xxxx
The least we can do to ensure genuine and meaningful local autonomy is not to force an interpretation
that negates powers explicitly granted to local governments. To rule against the power of LGUs to
reclassify areas within their jurisdiction will subvert the principle of local autonomy guaranteed by the
Constitution.160 As we have noted in earlier decisions, our national officials should not only comply with
the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon
which these provisions are based.161
The DOE Cannot Exercise The Power Of Control Over LGUs
Another reason that militates against the DOE’s assertions is that Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution
confines the President’s power over LGUs to one of general supervision:
SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Xxxx
Consequently, the Chief Executive or his or her alter egos, cannot exercise the power of control over
them.162 Control and supervision are distinguished as follows:
[Supervision] means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of
an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.163
Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does
not include any restraining authority over such body.164 It does not allow the supervisor to annul the acts of the
subordinate.165 Here, what the DOE seeks to do is to set aside an ordinance enacted by local officials, a power
that not even its principal, the President, has. This is because:
Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President. The members of
the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power
of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions
and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are
elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly
accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President’s supervision only, not control, so
long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the
President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the
law.166
Thus, the President and his or her alter egos, the department heads, cannot interfere with the activities of local
governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. Accordingly, the DOE cannot substitute its
own discretion for the discretion exercised by the sanggunian of the City of Manila. In local affairs, the wisdom
of local officials must prevail as long as they are acting within the parameters of the Constitution and the law.167
Ordinance No. 8027 Is Not Invalid For Failure To Comply With RA 7924 And EO 72
The oil companies argue that zoning ordinances of LGUs are required to be submitted to the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA) for review and if found to be in compliance with its metropolitan
physical framework plan and regulations, it shall endorse the same to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB). Their basis is Section 3 (e) of RA 7924:168
SECTION 3. Scope of MMDA Services. ― Metro-wide services under the jurisdiction of the
MMDA are those services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or
entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the
individual [LGUs] comprising Metropolitan Manila. These services shall include:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(g) Urban renewal, zoning, and land use planning, and shelter services which include the
formulation, adoption and implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations, programs and
projects to rationalize and optimize urban land use and provide direction to urban growth and
expansion, the rehabilitation and development of slum and blighted areas, the development of shelter
and housing facilities and the provision of necessary social services thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Reference was also made to Section 15 of its implementing rules:
Section 15. Linkages with HUDCC, HLURB, NHA, LGUs and Other National Government Agencies
Concerned on Urban Renewal, Zoning and Land Use Planning and Shelter Services. Within the context
of the National Housing and Urban Development Framework, and pursuant to the national standards,
guidelines and regulations formulated by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board [HLURB] on
land use planning and zoning, the [MMDA] shall prepare a metropolitan physical framework plan and
regulations which shall complement and translate the socio-economic development plan for Metro
Manila into physical or spatial terms, and provide the basis for the preparation, review, integration and
implementation of local land use plans and zoning, ordinance of cities and municipalities in the area.
Said framework plan and regulations shall contain, among others, planning and zoning policies and
procedures that shall be observed by local government units in the preparation of their own plans and
ordinances pursuant to Section 447 and 458 of RA 7160, as well as the identification of sites and
projects that are considered to be of national or metropolitan significance.
Cities and municipalities shall prepare their respective land use plans and zoning ordinances
and submit the same for review and integration by the [MMDA] and indorsement to HLURB in
accordance with Executive Order No. 72 and other pertinent laws.
In the preparation of a Metropolitan Manila physical framework plan and regulations, the [MMDA] shall
coordinate with the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, HLURB, the National
Housing Authority, Intramuros Administration, and all other agencies of the national government which
are concerned with land use and zoning, urban renewal and shelter services. (Emphasis supplied)
They also claim that EO 72169 provides that zoning ordinances of cities and municipalities of Metro Manila are
subject to review by the HLURB to ensure compliance with national standards and guidelines. They cite
Section 1, paragraphs I, (e), (f) and (g):
SECTION 1. Plan formulation or updating. ―
xxx
xxx
xxx
(g) Cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila shall continue to formulate or update their
respective comprehensive land use plans, in accordance with the land use planning and
zoning standards and guidelines prescribed by the HLURB pursuant to EO 392, S. of 1990, and
other pertinent national policies.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(e) Pursuant to LOI 729, S. of 1978, EO 648, S. of 1981, and RA 7279, the comprehensive land use
plans of provinces, highly urbanized cities and independent component cities shall be reviewed and
ratified by the HLURB to ensure compliance with national standards and guidelines.
(f) Pursuant to EO 392, S. of 1999, the comprehensive land use plans of cities and municipalities of
Metropolitan Manila shall be reviewed by the HLURB to ensure compliance with national standards and
guidelines.
(g) Said review shall be completed within three (3) months upon receipt thereof otherwise, the same
shall be deemed consistent with law, and, therefore, valid. (Emphasis supplied)
They argue that because Ordinance No. 8027 did not go through this review process, it is invalid.
The argument is flawed.
RA 7942 does not give MMDA the authority to review land use plans and zoning ordinances of cities and
municipalities. This was only found in its implementing rules which made a reference to EO 72. EO 72
expressly refers to comprehensive land use plans (CLUPs) only. Ordinance No. 8027 is admittedly not a CLUP
nor intended to be one. Instead, it is a very specific ordinance which reclassified the land use of a defined area
in order to prevent the massive effects of a possible terrorist attack. It is Ordinance No. 8119 which was
explicitly formulated as the "Manila [CLUP] and Zoning Ordinance of 2006." CLUPs are the ordinances which
should be submitted to the MMDA for integration in its metropolitan physical framework plan and approved by
the HLURB to ensure that they conform with national guidelines and policies.
Moreover, even assuming that the MMDA review and HLURB ratification are necessary, the oil companies did
not present any evidence to show that these were not complied with. In accordance with the presumption of
validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of proof
showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed. The burden of proof is on the oil companies
which already had notice that this Court was inclined to dispose of all the issues in this case. Yet aside from
their bare assertion, they did not present any certification from the MMDA or the HLURB nor did they append
these to their pleadings. Clearly, they failed to rebut the presumption of validity of Ordinance No. 8027.170
Conclusion
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand to lose billions
of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to
life enjoys precedence over the right to property.171 The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not.
When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals’ right to property, the former
should prevail.172
Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 8027. Without a doubt,
there are no impediments to its enforcement and implementation. Any delay is unfair to the inhabitants of the
City of Manila and its leaders who have categorically expressed their desire for the relocation of the terminals.
Their power to chart and control their own destiny and preserve their lives and safety should not be curtailed by
the intervenors’ warnings of doomsday scenarios and threats of economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced.
Secondary to the legal reasons supporting the immediate implementation of Ordinance No. 8027 are the policy
considerations which drove Manila’s government to come up with such a measure:
... [The] oil companies still were not able to allay the apprehensions of the city regarding the security
threat in the area in general. No specific action plan or security measures were presented that would
prevent a possible large-scale terrorist or malicious attack especially an attack aimed at Malacañang.
The measures that were installed were more directed towards their internal security and did not include
the prevention of an external attack even on a bilateral level of cooperation between these companies
and the police and military.
xxx
xxx
xxx
It is not enough for the city government to be told by these oil companies that they have the most
sophisticated fire-fighting equipments and have invested millions of pesos for these equipments. The
city government wants to be assured that its residents are safe at any time from these installations, and
in the three public hearings and in their position papers, not one statement has been said that indeed
the absolute safety of the residents from the hazards posed by these installations is assured.173
We are also putting an end to the oil companies’ determination to prolong their stay in Pandacan despite the
objections of Manila’s residents. As early as October 2001, the oil companies signed a MOA with the DOE
obliging themselves to:
... undertake a comprehensive and comparative study ... [which] shall include the preparation of a
Master Plan, whose aim is to determine the scope and timing of the feasible location of the Pandacan
oil terminals and all associated facilities and infrastructure including government support essential for
the relocation such as the necessary transportation infrastructure, land and right of way acquisition,
resettlement of displaced residents and environmental and social acceptability which shall be based on
mutual benefit of the Parties and the public.174
Now that they are being compelled to discontinue their operations in the Pandacan Terminals, they cannot
feign unreadiness considering that they had years to prepare for this eventuality.
Just the same, this Court is not about to provoke a crisis by ordering the immediate relocation of the Pandacan
Terminals out of its present site. The enforcement of a decision of this Court, specially one with far-reaching
consequences, should always be within the bounds of reason, in accordance with a comprehensive and wellcoordinated plan, and within a time-frame that complies with the letter and spirit of our resolution. To this end,
the oil companies have no choice but to obey the law.
A Warning To Petitioners’ Counsel
We draw the attention of the parties to a matter of grave concern to the legal profession.
Petitioners and their counsel, Atty. Samson Alcantara, submitted a four-page memorandum that clearly
contained either substance nor research. It is absolutely insulting to this Court.
We have always tended towards judicial leniency, temperance and compassion to those who suffer from a
wrong perception of what the majesty of the law means. But for a member of the bar, an officer of the court, to
file in this Court a memorandum of such unacceptable quality is an entirely different matter.
It is indicative less of a personal shortcoming or contempt of this Court and more of a lawyer’s sorry descent
from a high sense of duty and responsibility. As a member of the bar and as an officer of the court, a lawyer
ought to be keenly aware that the chief safeguard of the body politic is respect for the law and its magistrates.
There is nothing more effective than the written word by which counsel can persuade this Court of the
righteousness of his cause. For if truth were self-evident, a memorandum would be completely unnecessary
and superfluous.
The inability of counsel to prepare a memorandum worthy of this Court’s consideration is an ejemplo malo to
the legal profession as it betrays no genuine interest in the cause he claims to espouse. Or did counsel think
he can earn his moment of glory without the hard work and dedication called for by his petition?
A Final Word
On Wednesday, January 23, 2008, a defective tanker containing 2,000 liters of gasoline and 14,000 liters of
diesel exploded in the middle of the street a short distance from the exit gate of the Pandacan Terminals,
causing death, extensive damage and a frightening conflagration in the vicinity of the incident. Need we say
anthing about what will happen if it is the estimated 162 to 211 million liters175 of petroleum products in the
terminal complex which blow up?
WHEREFORE, the motions for leave to intervene of Chevron Philippines Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation, and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Energy,
are hereby GRANTED. Their respective motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED. The Regional Trial
Court, Manila, Branch 39 is ORDERED to DISMISS the consolidated cases of Civil Case No. 03-106377 and
Civil Case No. 03-106380.
We reiterate our order to respondent Mayor of the City of Manila to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. In
coordination with the appropriate agencies and other parties involved, respondent Mayor is hereby ordered to
oversee the relocation and transfer of the Pandacan Terminals out of its present site.
To ensure the orderly transfer, movement and relocation of assets and personnel, the intervenors Chevron
Philippines Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation shall, within a non-extendible
period of ninety (90) days, submit to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39, the comprehensive plan
and relocation schedule which have allegedly been prepared. The presiding judge of Manila RTC, Branch 39
will monitor the strict enforcement of this resolution.
Atty. Samson Alcantara is hereby ordered to explain within five (5) days from notice why he should not be
disciplined for his refusal, or inability, to file a memorandum worthy of the consideration of this Court.
Treble costs against petitioners’ counsel, Atty. Samson Alcantara.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 174154 : October 17, 2008]
JESUS CUENCO, Petitioner, v. TALISAY TOURIST SPORTS COMPLEX, INCORPORATED AND MATIAS
B. AZNAR III, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision dated April 18, 2005 and the Resolution dated August 15, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 65773.
The Facts
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On May 25, 1992, petitioner leased from respondents for a period of two (2) years, from May 8, 1992 to May 8,
1994, the Talisay Tourist Sports Complex, to be operated as a cockpit. The lease was extended for another
four (4) years, or until May 8, 1998.
Under the Contract of Lease,1 it was stipulated that petitioner shall, like a good father of the family, maintain in
good condition the furniture, chattels and all other equipment and shall, at all times, keep the leased premises
clean and sanitary. For this purpose, petitioner would allow the respondent's building supervisor or his
authorized representative to make a regular spot inspection of the leased premises to see to it that these
stipulations are strictly implemented.2 Any damage caused to the furniture, chattels, equipment and parts of the
leased premises shall be the responsibility of petitioner to repair and compensate.3 Furthermore, petitioner
would give a deposit equivalent to six (6) months rental to answer for whatever damages may be caused to the
premises during the period of the lease.4
Upon expiration of the contract, respondent company conducted a public bidding for the lease of the property.
Petitioner participated in the bidding. The lease was eventually awarded to another bidder, Mr. Rex Cuaqui
Salud.5 Thereafter, petitioner wrote four (4) demand letters to respondents.
The first letter, dated June 8, 1998, reads:
Dear Mr. Aznar:
I was so disheartened that after going through with the supposed public bidding, haggling with the terms and
conditions of a new lease agreement and after full compliance of ALL your requirements and the handshakes
signifying the clinching of the deal, the contract was awarded to another party. Though I believe I deserve a
renewal, I had to accept your decision with a heavy heart.
It is now my desire to be released quickly from whatever liability or responsibility under our previous contract.
Repair works on some damaged portions were already done. Based on our contract, par. 5 thereof, it is my
understanding that I am answerable to all damages caused to furnitures (sic), chattels and other
equipments and minor parts of the leased premises. Once cleared, I want the return of my deposit
of P500,000.00.
Kindly send your inspector to determine by actual ocular inspection if the restoration work is to your
satisfaction.
Very truly yours,
JESUS C. CUENCO [signed]6
Obviously, the letter was not answered, because on June 17, 1998 petitioner found it necessary to write
respondents a second letter reiterating his request for the return of the deposit. The second demand letter
reads:
Dear Mr. Aznar:
It has been more than a week since my letter dated 8 June 1998 requesting the return of my deposit
of P500,000.00. I would assume your representative had already conducted an ocular inspection and you were
satisfied on the restoration works made on the premises. As I ve stated in my said letter, I want to be released
as soon as possible.
I need to know immediately if I still have other things to comply with as pre-condition for the release of the
deposit. As far as I know, I have already done my part.
Very truly yours,
JESUS C. CUENCO [signed]7
With still no response from respondents, petitioner, on August 14, 1998, sent a third demand letter which read:
Dear Mr. Aznar:
I am surprised by the unreasonable delay in the release of my deposit of P500,000.00 in spite of my full
compliance as to repair works on minor damage to the premises during my term as lessee. Twice I requested
in writing for the immediate release of my deposit but until now it remains unheeded. And the so-called
"inventory" which your lawyer Atty. Algoso8 promised to give has not been given. Frankly, I am
doubtful of the accuracy of said inventory, if any, considering the full blast major renovation now being
conducted on the complex by the new concessionaire. I think it's about time we close the last chapter of
the book, in a manner of speaking, so we can proceed in our separate distinct ways.
I reiterate my request to please release right now my deposit of P500,000.00.
Very truly yours,
JESUS C. CUENCO [signed]9
Finally, on August 18, 1998, petitioner, thru his counsel, wrote respondents a final demand letter as follows:
Dear Mr. Aznar:
For ignoring the two letters of my client Mr. Jesus C. Cuenco, dated June 8 and 17, 1998 regarding his request
for the return of his deposit in the sum of P500, 000.00, he has decided to endorse the matter to this office for
appropriate action.
It appears that when Mr. Cuenco leased the cockpit complex he was required to put up a deposit to answer for
damages that may be caused to furnitures (sic), chattels and other equipments and minor repairs on the
leased premises. When the lease expired and he failed to get a renewal, Mr. Cuenco in fulfillment of his
obligation under the contract caused the repair of minor damage to the premises after which your
attention was invited to get your reaction to the restoration work. And since he did not receive any
objection, it can be safely premised that the restoration was to the lessor's satisfaction.
Mr. Cuenco informed me that the new concessionaire has undertaken a full blast major renovation of the
complex. Under this condition and in the absence of an accurate inventory conducted in the presence of both
parties, it would be doubly difficult, if not impossible, to charge Mr. Cuenco of any violation of his undertaking
especially as to deficiency in the furnitures (sic), chattels and other equipments in the premises.
In view of all the foregoing, it is consequently demanded that you return to Mr. Cuenco the aforesaid sum
of P500,000.00 within THREE (3) DAYS from notice hereof; otherwise, he may be constrained to seek judicial
relief for the return of the deposit plus interest, damages and attorney's fees.
Your compliance is enjoined.
Very truly yours, At my instance:
FEDERICO C. CABILAO (signed)
Counsel for Mr. Jesus C. Cuenco10
JESUS C. CUENCO (signed)
As all of his demand letters remained unheeded, on October 21, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint11 for sum of
money, damages and attorney's fees. He maintained that respondents acted in bad faith in withholding the
amount of the deposit without any justifiable reason.12
In their Answer,13 respondents countered that petitioner caused physical damage to some portions of the
leased premises and the cost of repair and replacement of materials amounted to more
than P500,000.00.14 They also averred that respondent Matias B. Aznar III (Aznar) cannot be sued personally
under the contract of lease since a corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its officers and
stockholders, and there was no allegation that Aznar, who is the President of the corporation, signed the
contract in his personal capacity.15
On March 8, 1999, the RTC issued a Pre-trial Order,16 the pertinent portions of which reads:
The following facts were admitted by the [respondents]:
1. There is no inventory of damages up to this time;
2. [Petitioner] deposited the amount of P500,000.00;
3. [Petitioner] sends (sic) several letters of demand to [respondents] but said letters were not answered.
4. There was a renovation of the Talisay Tourist Sports Complex with a qualification that the renovation is only
10% of the whole amount.
The main issues in this case are as follows:
1. Whether or not [petitioner] is entitled to the return of the deposit of P500,000.00, with interest;
2. Whether or not some portions of the complex sustained physical damage during the operation of the same
by the [petitioner].17
On May 24, 1999, the RTC issued an Order18 admitting the exhibits of petitioner, consisting of the contract of
lease dated May 4, 1994 and the four (4) demand letters.
On July 29, 1999, an Order19 was issued by the same court formally admitting the respondents' following
exhibits: the lease contract, inventory of the leased property as of June 4, 1998, inventory of the sports
complex dated June 24, 1995, ocular inspection report dated January 15, 1998 and various receipts mostly in
the name of Southwestern University incurred in different months of 1998.
On August 11, 1999, the RTC rendered a Decision20 in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [petitioner] and against the [respondents], directing the
latter jointly and severally to return to [petitioner] the sum of P500,000.00, representing the deposit mentioned
in the Complaint, plus 3% interest per month from August 18, 1998 until full payment thereof.
The latter are, likewise, directed to pay [petitioner] the sum of P15,000.00 as and for litigation expenses.
With costs against the [respondents].
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC ratiocinated that respondents' failure to reply to the letters of petitioner raises a presumption that
petitioner has complied with his end of the contract. The lower court gave credence to the testimony of
respondents' witness, Ateniso Coronado (Coronado), the property custodian of the respondents, that the
sports complex was repaired and renovated by the new lessee. The court also considered the admission of
respondents' counsel during the pre-trial that no inventory of the property was conducted on the leased
premises. The RTC debunked the inventory presented by the respondents during trial as a mere afterthought
to bolster their claim against petitioner.22
Respondents appealed. On April 18, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision23 reversing and setting aside the
decision of the RTC. The fallo of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Cebu City, dated
August 11, 1999, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one entered finding this case in favor of
defendants-appellants Talisay Tourists Sports Complex and Matias Aznar III. Consequently, Civil Case No.
CEB-22847 for sum of money, damages, and attorney's fees involving herein parties, as well as all other
claims and counterclaims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of factual and legal basis.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.24
The CA ruled in favor of respondents on the basis of: (1) Coronado's testimony that petitioner continued to hold
cockfights two months after the expiration of the lease contract which was not refuted by petitioner; (2) the
summary of repairs made on the property showing that respondents spent the amount of P573,710.17
immediately prior to the expiration of the lease contract and shortly thereafter; and (3) the new lessor incurred
expenses amounting to over P3 million when he shouldered the rest of the repair and renovation of the subject
property.25
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raised the following issues for resolution of the Court: (1) whether a judicial admission is conclusive
and binding upon a party making the admission; and (2) whether such judicial admission was properly rejected
by the CA.26
On the other hand, respondents posed the following: (1) whether the findings of the CA that the cockpit
sustained damage during the period of the lease was rendered not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of the Court; (2) whether the CA committed an error of law in ruling that petitioner is not entitled for
the return of the deposit.27
The ultimate question we must resolve is whether petitioner is entitled to the return of the amount deposited.
The Ruling of the Court
We rule in the affirmative. Respondents failed to present sufficient proof to warrant the retention of the full
amount of the deposit given by petitioner.
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and as a rule, does not weigh anew the evidence presented by the
parties. However, the instant case is one of the exceptions to the rule because of the conflicting decisions of
the RTC and the CA based on contradictory factual findings. Thus, we have reviewed the records in order to
arrive at a judicious resolution of the case at bench.
Petitioner questions the CA's finding that there was damage caused the premises while the lease was still in
force. Such finding could only have been based on alleged inventory of the property conducted by the
respondents. Petitioner takes exception to this evidence because of the earlier judicial admission made by
respondents' counsel that no inventory was conducted and, accordingly, any evidence adduced by the
respondents contrary to or inconsistent with the judicial admission should be rejected.
Indeed, at the pre-trial conference, respondents' counsel made an admission that no inventory was made on
the leased premises, at least up to that time. This admission was confirmed in the Pre-Trial Order issued by
the trial court on March 8, 1999 after the lease expired on May 8, 1998.
Yet, on July 1, 1999, respondents' witness Coronado testified, as follows:
ATTY. VASQUEZ:
Q Why do you know the defendants?cralawred
A Because Talisay Sports Complex is owned by Aznar Brothers Realty Corporation of which I am employed as
(sic) in charge of the realty department.
Q How about Matias Aznar III, the defendant here?cralawred
A He is the Chairman of the Board.
Q Board of what?cralawred
A Of the Aznar Brothers Realty Corporation.
Q Is he the Chairman of Talisay Tourist Sports Complex?cralawred
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that you are in charge of the realty department, what is your function with respect to the
properties of Talisay Tourist and Sports Complex?cralawred
A I am the in-charge of the administration and overseeing of the complex owned by Talisay Sports
Complex.
Q When you said that you are in charge of the administration and overseeing of the complex, what
does it includes (sic)?cralawred
A It includes collection of rentals of complex and routine inspection to determine that there are
missing or damage of (sic) the properties.
Q How long have you been employed with the Aznar Brothers Realty Company?cralawred
A 25 years.
xxx
Q In your earlier testimony, you said that part of your function is to conduct routine inspection of the
complex. Now, was there a routine inspection conducted during the period of the lease contract
between plaintiff and the defendant?cralawred
A Yes, we conducted inspection sometime in January 1998.
Q For what purpose was that inspection?cralawred
A The purpose is to determine if there are damage sustained by the complex.
Q And what was the result of the inspection.
A There were missing and destroyed fixtures and physical damage sustained by the complex.
xxx
COURT
xxx
Q W[h]y did you not take photographs of the damage sustained by the complex?cralawred
A We did not take pictures, Your Honor, because in fact their personnel were in our presence (sic)
during the inspection, they were accompanied by us, because we can not conduct inspection without
the presence of the personnel of Jesus Cuenco, Your Honor, the lessee.
Q Did the personnel of Jesus Cuenco sign any paper acknowledging receipt of any report?cralawred
A There was no refusal, but we did not initiate to let them sign and confirm.
COURT
Q So, we have to rely on your testimony?cralawred
A Yes, sir.28
Obviously, it was on Coronado's testimony, as well as on the documentary evidence29 of an alleged property
inventory conducted on June 4, 1998, that the CA based its conclusion that the amount of damage sustained
by the leased premises while in the possession of petitioner exceeded the amount of petitioner's deposit. This
contradicts the judicial admission made by respondents' counsel which should have been binding on the
respondents.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. ' An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the pleadings, (2) during the trial, by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations, or (3) in other stages of the judicial proceeding.30 The stipulation of facts at the
pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial admissions. The veracity of judicial admissions require no further proof
and may be controverted only upon a clear showing that the admissions were made through palpable mistake
or that no admissions were made. Thus, the admissions of parties during the pre-trial, as embodied in the pretrial order, are binding and conclusive upon them.
Respondents did not deny the admission made by their counsel, neither did they claim that the same was
made through palpable mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts is incontrovertible and may be relied upon by
the courts. The pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt therein may not be brushed aside in
the process of decision-making. Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pre-trial would be rendered
inconsequential and worthless.31 Furthermore, an act performed by counsel within the scope of a "general or
implied authority" is regarded as an act of the client which renders respondents in estoppel. By estoppel is
meant that an admission or representation is conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon.32
Thus, respondents are bound by the admissions made by their counsel at the pre-trial. Accordingly, the CA
committed an error when it gave ample evidentiary weight to respondents' evidence contradictory to the judicial
admission.
The appellate court's findings that the damage in the premises exceeded the amount of the deposit is further
sought to be justified, thus:
Verily, a perusal of the summary of repairs amounting to P573,710.17 claimed to have been made by
appellants over the property at about that time immediately prior to the expiration of the lease contract and
shortly thereafter, would show that the repairs pertained to repairs on the drainage, sewage, immediate
premises and structure of the complex. We find the same highly credible and meritorious considering that as
earlier admitted by appellee, the repairs he made were minor and were confined only to certain portions of the
complex, although substantial repairs were done on the cockhouses only, and that said repairs were done
because of a coming big time derby and not to satisfy the provisions of the lease contract. Also, by implication,
appellee is stating that the new lessor incurred expenses amounting to over P3 million when he shouldered the
rest of the repair and renovation of the complex after the term of lease of appellee.33
Yet, upon perusal of the receipts presented by respondents, we found that majority of the receipts are under
the name of Southwestern University. In their Memorandum,34 respondents aver that Southwestern University
and respondent corporation are sister companies.35 Even if true, this matter is of no consequence because
respondent company and Southwestern University have distinct and separate legal personalities, and
Southwestern University is not a party to this case. Thus, we cannot just accept respondents' argument that
the receipts paid in the name of Southwestern University should be credited to respondent company. In any
event, they were not able to prove that those receipts were in fact used for the repair or maintenance of the
respondents' complex.
Furthermore, respondents are not entitled the full amount of the deposit because the repair and renovation of
the sports complex after the expiration of petitioner's lease were undertaken not by respondents but by the
new lessee. This can be gleaned from Coronado's testimony on cross-examination, viz.:
Q You do not know. Mr. Witness, is it not a fact that the new lessee was Wacky Salud?cralawred
A Yes, sir.
Q And that was sometime of July or August of 1998?cralawred
A They were about to conduct three months repair of the complex?cralawred
Q So, Mr. Wacky Salud conducted, did you say repair or renovation? Is it renovation or repair?cralawred
A There was a renovation and repair.
Q Renovation including repair?cralawred
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q In other words, after the expiration of the contract of Mr. Cuenco, Wacky Salud took over?cralawred
A Yes, he took over that repair and renovation were no longer included in this presentation, that is at his own
expense.
Q Precisely. In other words, some repairs were made by Mr. Salud and not by Aznar Brothers
Realty?cralawred
A Yes, sir.36
Finally, the Court observes that the inventories presented by respondents were not countersigned by petitioner
or were they presented to the latter prior to the filing of the case in the RTC. Thus, we are more inclined to
agree with the trial court that the "inventory was made as an afterthought,"37 in a vain attempt of the
respondents to establish their case.
However, Coronado's testimony that petitioner extended the operation of the sports complex for a period of two
months after the expiration of the lease without the respondents' authority and without the payment of rentals,
remains unrebutted. Enlightening is the following testimony:
Q I observed here in No. 16 of your summary, two months arrears rentals, June to July, how come? The
contract was supposed to expire May 1998?cralawred
A Yes, because it had happened on this extension of the lease because they are still occupying until July after
the expiration of the contract.
COURT
Q You mean to say that they still use the complex for the purpose for which it was intended, which is for
cockfighting?cralawred
WITNESS
A Yes, they are still doing their usual operation.
ATTY. VASQUEZ
Q You mean to say that there were still cockfighting held in the complex even after May 1998?cralawred
A Yes, sir.38
This two (2) months over-stay of petitioner in the leased premises should be charged against the deposit.
Because there was no renewal of the lease contract, it is understood that the continued use of the premises is
on a monthly basis with the rental in the amount previously agreed upon by the parties, in accordance with
Articles 167039 and 168740 of the Civil Code.
In the Contract of Lease of petitioner and respondent company, it was agreed that the rental to be paid shall be
the following:
WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY is the owner of the Talisay Tourist Sports Complex, Inc. located at Tabunok,
Talisay, Cebu;
WHEREAS, the SECOND PARTY has expressed his desire to lease said complex (cockpit) and the FIRST
PARTY have agreed to lease/let the same to the SECOND PARTY subject to the following term and condition,
to wit:
1. In consideration of this lease, the SECOND PARTY agrees to pay the FIRST PARTY a lump sum of ONE
MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) representing advance rental for the first year, the same to be paid on May 8,
1994. Thereafter, the rental shall be as follows:
Second year - P1,050,000.00 or P87,500.00/month
Third year
- 1,100,000.00 or P91,666.67/month
Fourth year - 1,175,000.00 or P97,916.67/month41
Thus, by way of rental for the two-month overstay, the amount of P195,833.34 should be deducted from the
amount of deposit paid by petitioner to respondent company.
As to petitioner's claim of interest of three percent (3%) per month on the amount due him, the same is without
legal basis. We note that no amount of interest was previously agreed upon by the parties in the contract of
lease.
Under Article 2213 of the Civil Code, "interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages,
except when the demand can be established with reasonable certainty." In the instant case, the claim of
petitioner is unliquidated or cannot be established with reasonable certainty upon his filing of the case in the
RTC. This is because of the contending claims of the parties, specifically, the claim of petitioner for the return
of the P500,000.00 deposit vis-a-vis the claim of respondents on the arrears in rentals and on the damage to
the premises. It is only now that the amount that should be returned is ascertained, i.e., P500,000.00 less the
two-months arrears in rentals amounting to P195,833.34, the sum of which will earn
interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum42 from the time the case was filed in the RTC on
October 21, 1998.43 Upon finality of this decision, the rate of interest shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum
from such finality until full satisfaction. The foregoing interest rate is based on the guidelines set by the Court
in Eastern Shipping Lines v. CA, viz.:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is
breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of
the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate
of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore,
the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of
stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount
of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest,
however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty,
the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code)
but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest
shall begin to run only from the date of the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of
damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal
interest shall, in any case, be on the amount of finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal
interest, whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of
credit.44
Concerning the solidary liability of respondents, we hold that respondent Matias Aznar III is not solidarily liable
with respondent company. His function as the President of the company does not make him personally liable
for the obligations of the latter. A corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through its directors, officers
and employees. Obligations incurred by them while acting as corporate agents, are not their personal liability
but the direct accountability of the corporation they represent.45
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-22847 is
hereby REINSTATED with the following modifications:
(1) Talisay Sports Complex, Inc. is solely liable to return the amount of the deposit after deducting the amount
of the two-months arrears in rentals; andcralawlibrary
(2) The rate of legal interest to be paid is SIX PERCENT (6%) on the amount due computed from October 21,
1998, and TWELVE PERCENT (12%) interest, thereon upon finality of this decision until full payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157594
March 9, 2010
TOSHIBA INFORMATION EQUIPMENT (PHILS.), INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Toshiba Information
Equipment (Philippines), Inc. (Toshiba) seeks the reversal and setting aside of (1) the Decision2 dated August
29, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63047, which found that Toshiba was not entitled to the
credit/refund of its unutilized input Value-Added Tax (VAT) payments attributable to its export sales, because it
was a tax-exempt entity and its export sales were VAT-exempt transactions; and (2) the Resolution3 dated
February 19, 2003 of the appellate court in the same case, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
Toshiba. The herein assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated
October 16, 2000 of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in CTA Case No. 5762 granting the claim for credit/refund
of Toshiba in the amount of ₱1,385,282.08.
Toshiba is a domestic corporation principally engaged in the business of manufacturing and exporting of
electric machinery, equipment systems, accessories, parts, components, materials and goods of all kinds,
including those relating to office automation and information technology and all types of computer hardware
and software, such as but not limited to HDD-CD-ROM and personal computer printed circuit board.5 It is
registered with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) as an Economic Zone (ECOZONE) export
enterprise in the Laguna Technopark, Inc., as evidenced by Certificate of Registration No. 95-99 dated
September 27, 1995.6 It is also registered with Regional District Office No. 57 of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) in San Pedro, Laguna, as a VAT-taxpayer with Taxpayer Identification No. (TIN) 004-739-137.7
In its VAT returns for the first and second quarters of 1997,8 filed on April 14, 1997 and July 21, 1997,
respectively, Toshiba declared input VAT payments on its domestic purchases of taxable goods and services
in the aggregate sum of ₱3,875,139.65,9 with no zero-rated sales. Toshiba subsequently submitted to the BIR
on July 23, 1997 its amended VAT returns for the first and second quarters of 1997,10 reporting the same
amount of input VAT payments but, this time, with zero-rated sales totaling ₱7,494,677,000.00.11
On March 30, 1999, Toshiba filed with the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center
of the Department of Finance (DOF One-Stop Shop) two separate applications for tax credit/refund12 of its
unutilized input VAT payments for the first half of 1997 in the total amount of ₱3,685,446.73.13
The next day, on March 31, 1999, Toshiba likewise filed with the CTA a Petition for Review14 to toll the running
of the two-year prescriptive period under Section 230 of the Tax Code of 1977,15 as amended.16 In said
Petition, docketed as CTA Case No. 5762, Toshiba prayed that –
[A]fter due hearing, judgment be rendered ordering [herein respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(CIR)] to refund or issue to [Toshiba] a tax refund/tax credit certificate in the amount of P3,875,139.65
representing unutilized input taxes paid on its purchase of taxable goods and services for the period January 1
to June 30, 1997.17
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) opposed the claim for tax refund/credit of Toshiba, setting up the
following special and affirmative defenses in his Answer18 –
5. [Toshiba’s] alleged claim for refund/tax credit is subject to administrative routinary
investigation/examination by [CIR’s] Bureau;
6. [Toshiba] failed miserably to show that the total amount of ₱3,875,139.65 claimed as VAT input
taxes, were erroneously or illegally collected, or that the same are properly documented;
7. Taxes paid and collected are presumed to have been made in accordance with law; hence, not
refundable;
8. In an action for tax refund, the burden is on the taxpayer to establish its right to refund, and failure to
sustain the burden is fatal to the claim for refund;
9. It is incumbent upon [Toshiba] to show that it has complied with the provisions of Section 204 in
relation to Section 229 of the Tax Code;
10. Well-established is the rule that claims for refund/tax credit are construed in strictissimi juris against
the taxpayer as it partakes the nature of exemption from tax.19
Upon being advised by the CTA,20 Toshiba and the CIR filed a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues,21 wherein
the opposing parties "agreed and admitted" that –
1. [Toshiba] is a duly registered value-added tax entity in accordance with Section 107 of the Tax Code,
as amended.
2. [Toshiba] is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax on its export sales in accordance with then
Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax Code, as amended.
3. [Toshiba] filed its quarterly VAT returns for the first two quarters of 1997 within the legally prescribed
period.
xxxx
7. [Toshiba] is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax on its export sales.
8. [Toshiba] has duly filed the instant Petition for Review within the two-year prescriptive period
prescribed by then Section 230 of the Tax Code.22
In the same pleading, Toshiba and the CIR jointly submitted the following issues for determination by the CTA
–
Whether or not [Toshiba] has incurred input taxes in the amount of ₱3,875,139.65 for the period January 1 to
June 30, 1997 which are directly attributable to its export sales[.]
Whether or not the input taxes incurred by [Toshiba] for the period January 1 to June 30, 1997 have not been
carried over to the succeeding quarters[.]
Whether or not input taxes incurred by [Toshiba] for the first two quarters of 1997 have not been offset against
any output tax[.]
Whether or not input taxes incurred by [Toshiba] for the first two quarters of 1997 are properly substantiated by
official receipts and invoices.23
During the trial before the CTA, Toshiba presented documentary evidence in support of its claim for tax
credit/refund, while the CIR did not present any evidence at all.
With both parties waiving the right to submit their respective memoranda, the CTA rendered its Decision in
CTA Case No. 5762 on October 16, 2000 favoring Toshiba. According to the CTA, the CIR himself admitted
that the export sales of Toshiba were subject to zero percent (0%) VAT based on Section 100(a)(2)(A)(i) of the
Tax Code of 1977, as amended. Toshiba could then claim tax credit or refund of input VAT paid on its
purchases of goods, properties, or services, directly attributable to such zero-rated sales, in accordance with
Section 4.102-2 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95. The CTA, though, reduced the amount to be credited or
refunded to Toshiba to ₱1,385,292.02.
The dispositive portion of the October 16, 2000 Decision of the CTA fully reads –
WHEREFORE, [Toshiba’s] claim for refund of unutilized input VAT payments is hereby GRANTED but in a
reduced amount of ₱1,385,282.08 computed as follows:
1st Quarter
2nd Quarter
Total
Amount of claimed input taxes
filed with the DOF One Stop
Shop Center
P3,268,682.34
P416,764.39
P3,685,446.73
Less: 1) Input taxes not
properly
supported by VAT invoices
and official receipts
a. Per SGV’s verification
(Exh. I)
₱ 242,491.45
₱154,391.13
₱ 396,882.58
₱1,852,437.65
₱ 35,108.00
₱1,887,545.65
₱1,158,016.82
₱227,265.26
₱1,385,282.08
b. Per this court’s further
verification (Annex A)
₱189,499.13 ₱2,300,164.65
Amount Refundable
Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue is ORDERED to REFUND to [Toshiba] or in the alternative,
ISSUE a TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE in the amount of ₱1,385,282.08 representing unutilized input taxes paid
by [Toshiba] on its purchases of taxable goods and services for the period January 1 to June 30, 1997.24
Both Toshiba and the CIR sought reconsideration of the foregoing CTA Decision.
Toshiba asserted in its Motion for Reconsideration25 that it had presented proper substantiation for the
₱1,887,545.65 input VAT disallowed by the CTA.
The CIR, on the other hand, argued in his Motion for Reconsideration26 that Toshiba was not entitled to the
credit/refund of its input VAT payments because as a PEZA-registered ECOZONE export enterprise, Toshiba
was not subject to VAT. The CIR invoked the following statutory and regulatory provisions –
Section 24 of Republic Act No. 791627
SECTION 24. Exemption from Taxes Under the National Internal Revenue Code. – Any provision of existing
laws, rules and regulations to the contrary notwithstanding, no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed on
business establishments operating within the ECOZONE. In lieu of paying taxes, five percent (5%) of the gross
income earned by all businesses and enterprises within the ECOZONE shall be remitted to the national
government. x x x.
Section 103(q) of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended
Sec. 103. Exempt transactions. – The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
xxxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under Presidential Decree Nos.
66, 529, 972, 1491, and 1950, and non-electric cooperatives under Republic Act No. 6938, or international
agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory.
Section 4.103-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95
SEC. 4.103-1. Exemptions. – (A) In general. – An exemption means that the sale of goods or properties and/or
services and the use or lease of properties is not subject to VAT (output tax) and the seller is not allowed any
tax credit on VAT (input tax) previously paid.
The person making the exempt sale of goods, properties or services shall not bill any output tax to his
customers because the said transaction is not subject to VAT. On the other hand, a VAT-registered purchaser
of VAT-exempt goods, properties or services which are exempt from VAT is not entitled to any input tax on
such purchase despite the issuance of a VAT invoice or receipt.
The CIR contended that under Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7916, a special law, all businesses and
establishments within the ECOZONE were to remit to the government five percent (5%) of their gross income
earned within the zone, in lieu of all taxes, including VAT. This placed Toshiba within the ambit of Section
103(q) of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, which exempted from VAT the transactions that were exempted
under special laws. Following Section 4.103-1(A) of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, the VAT-exemption of
Toshiba meant that its sale of goods was not subject to output VAT and Toshiba as seller was not allowed any
tax credit on the input VAT it had previously paid.
On January 17, 2001, the CTA issued a Resolution28 denying both Motions for Reconsideration of Toshiba and
the CIR.
The CTA took note that the pieces of evidence referred to by Toshiba in its Motion for Reconsideration were
insufficient substantiation, being mere schedules of input VAT payments it had purportedly paid for the first and
second quarters of 1997. While the CTA gives credence to the report of its commissioned certified public
accountant (CPA), it does not render its decision based on the findings of the said CPA alone. The CTA has its
own CPA and the tax court itself conducts an investigation/examination of the documents presented. The CTA
stood by its earlier disallowance of the amount of ₱1,887,545.65 as tax credit/refund because it was not
supported by VAT invoices and/or official receipts.1avvphi1
The CTA refused to consider the argument that Toshiba was not entitled to a tax credit/refund under Section
24 of Republic Act No. 7916 because it was only raised by the CIR for the first time in his Motion for
Reconsideration. Also, contrary to the assertions of the CIR, the CTA held that Section 23, and not Section 24,
of Republic Act No. 7916, applied to Toshiba. According to Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7916 –
SECTION 23. Fiscal Incentives. – Business establishments operating within the ECOZONES shall be entitled
to the fiscal incentives as provided for under Presidential Decree No. 66, the law creating the Export
Processing Zone Authority, or those provided under Book VI of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as
the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987.
Furthermore, tax credits for exporters using local materials as inputs shall enjoy the benefits provided for in the
Export Development Act of 1994.
Among the fiscal incentives granted to PEZA-registered enterprises by the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987
was the income tax holiday, to wit –
Art. 39. Incentives to Registered Enterprises. – All registered enterprises shall be granted the following
incentives to the extent engaged in a preferred area of investment:
(a) Income Tax Holiday. —
(1) For six (6) years from commercial operation for pioneer firms and four (4) years for nonpioneer firms, new registered firms shall be fully exempt from income taxes levied by the
national government. Subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by the Board, the income
tax exemption will be extended for another year in each of the following cases:
(i) The project meets the prescribed ratio of capital equipment to number of workers set
by the Board;
(ii) Utilization of indigenous raw materials at rates set by the Board;
(iii) The net foreign exchange savings or earnings amount to at least US$500,000.00
annually during the first three (3) years of operation.
The preceding paragraph notwithstanding, no registered pioneer firm may avail of this incentive
for a period exceeding eight (8) years.
(2) For a period of three (3) years from commercial operation, registered expanding firms shall
be entitled to an exemption from income taxes levied by the National Government proportionate
to their expansion under such terms and conditions as the Board may
determine: Provided, however, That during the period within which this incentive is availed of by
the expanding firm it shall not be entitled to additional deduction for incremental labor expense.
(3) The provision of Article 7(14) notwithstanding, registered firms shall not be entitled to any
extension of this incentive.
The CTA pointed out that Toshiba availed itself of the income tax holiday under the Omnibus Investments
Code of 1987, so Toshiba was exempt only from income tax but not from other taxes such as VAT. As a result,
Toshiba was liable for output VAT on its export sales, but at zero percent (0%) rate, and entitled to the
credit/refund of the input VAT paid on its purchases of goods and services relative to such zero-rated export
sales.
Unsatisfied, the CIR filed a Petition for Review29 with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
63047.
In its Decision dated August 29, 2002, the Court of Appeals granted the appeal of the CIR, and reversed and
set aside the Decision dated October 16, 2000 and the Resolution dated January 17, 2001 of the CTA. The
appellate court ruled that Toshiba was not entitled to the refund of its alleged unused input VAT payments
because it was a tax-exempt entity under Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7916. As a PEZA-registered
corporation, Toshiba was liable for remitting to the national government the five percent (5%) preferential rate
on its gross income earned within the ECOZONE, in lieu of all other national and local taxes, including VAT.
The Court of Appeals further adjudged that the export sales of Toshiba were VAT-exempt, not zero-rated,
transactions. The appellate court found that the Answer filed by the CIR in CTA Case No. 5762 did not contain
any admission that the export sales of Toshiba were zero-rated transactions under Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the
Tax Code of 1977, as amended. At the least, what was admitted by the CIR in said Answer was that the Tax
Code provisions cited in the Petition for Review of Toshiba in CTA Case No. 5762 were correct. As to the Joint
Stipulation of Facts and Issues filed by the parties in CTA Case No. 5762, which stated that Toshiba was
subject to zero percent (0%) VAT on its export sales, the appellate court declared that the CIR signed the said
pleading through palpable mistake. This palpable mistake in the stipulation of facts should not be taken against
the CIR, for to do otherwise would result in suppressing the truth through falsehood. In addition, the State
could not be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents.
Given that Toshiba was a tax-exempt entity under Republic Act No. 7916, a special law, the Court of Appeals
concluded that the export sales of Toshiba were VAT-exempt transactions under Section 109(q) of the Tax
Code of 1997, formerly Section 103(q) of the Tax Code of 1977. Therefore, Toshiba could not claim refund of
its input VAT payments on its domestic purchases of goods and services.
The Court of Appeals decreed at the end of its August 29, 2002 Decision –
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case No.
5762, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered finding [Toshiba], being a tax
exempt entity under R.A. No. 7916, not entitled to refund the VAT payments made in its domestic purchases of
goods and services.30
Toshiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration31 of the aforementioned Decision, anchored on the following
arguments: (a) the CIR never raised as an issue before the CTA that Toshiba was tax-exempt under Section
24 of Republic Act No. 7916; (b) Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7916, subjecting the gross income earned by a
PEZA-registered enterprise within the ECOZONE to a preferential rate of five percent (5%), in lieu of all taxes,
did not apply to Toshiba, which availed itself of the income tax holiday under Section 23 of the same statute;
(c) the conclusion of the CTA that the export sales of Toshiba were zero-rated was supported by substantial
evidence, other than the admission of the CIR in the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues; and (d) the judgment
of the CTA granting the refund of the input VAT payments was supported by substantial evidence and should
not have been set aside by the Court of Appeals.
In a Resolution dated February 19, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
Toshiba since the arguments presented therein were mere reiterations of those already passed upon and
found to be without merit by the appellate court in its earlier Decision. The Court of Appeals, however,
mentioned that it was incorrect for Toshiba to say that the issue of the applicability of Section 24 of Republic
Act No. 7916 was only raised for the first time on appeal before the appellate court. The said issue was
adequately raised by the CIR in his Motion for Reconsideration before the CTA, and was even ruled upon by
the tax court.
Hence, Toshiba filed the instant Petition for Review with the following assignment of errors –
5.1 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT [TOSHIBA], BEING A
PEZA-REGISTERED ENTERPRISE, IS EXEMPT FROM VAT UNDER SECTION 24 OF R.A. 7916,
AND FURTHER HOLDING THAT [TOSHIBA’S] EXPORT SALES ARE EXEMPT TRANSACTIONS
UNDER SECTION 109 OF THE TAX CODE.
5.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO DISMISS OUTRIGHT
AND GAVE DUE COURSE TO [CIR’S] PETITION NOTWITHSTANDING [CIR’S] FAILURE TO
ADEQUATELY RAISE IN ISSUE DURING THE TRIAL IN THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS THE
APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 24 OF R.A. 7916 TO [TOSHIBA’S] CLAIM FOR REFUND.
5.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN [IT] RULED THAT THE COURT OF
TAX APPEALS’ FINDINGS, WITH REGARD [TOSHIBA’S] EXPORT SALES BEING ZERO RATED
SALES FOR VAT PURPOSES, WERE BASED MERELY ON THE ADMISSIONS MADE BY [CIR’S]
COUNSEL AND NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
5.4 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS GRANTING [TOSHIBA’S] CLAIM FOR REFUND[;]32
and the following prayer –
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Petitioner TOSHIBA INFORMATION EQUIPMENT (PHILS.), INC. most
respectfully prays that the decision and resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of
the CTA in CTA Case No. 5762, be set aside and further prays that a new one be rendered AFFIRMING AND
UPHOLDING the Decision of the CTA promulgated on October 16, 2000 in CTA Case No. 5762.
Other reliefs, which the Honorable Court may deem just and equitable under the circumstances, are likewise
prayed for.33
The Petition is impressed with merit.
The CIR did not timely raise before the CTA the issues on the VAT-exemptions of Toshiba and its export sales.
Upon the failure of the CIR to timely plead and prove before the CTA the defenses or objections that Toshiba
was VAT-exempt under Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7916, and that its export sales were VAT-exempt
transactions under Section 103(q) of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, the CIR is deemed to have waived
the same.
During the pendency of CTA Case No. 5762, the proceedings before the CTA were governed by the Rules of
the Court of Tax Appeals,34 while the Rules of Court were applied suppletorily.35
Rule 9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. – Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion
to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence
on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
The CIR did not argue straight away in his Answer in CTA Case No. 5762 that Toshiba had no right to the
credit/refund of its input VAT payments because the latter was VAT-exempt and its export sales were VATexempt transactions. The Pre-Trial Brief36 of the CIR was equally bereft of such allegations or arguments. The
CIR passed up the opportunity to prove the supposed VAT-exemptions of Toshiba and its export sales when
the CIR chose not to present any evidence at all during the trial before the CTA.37 He missed another
opportunity to present the said issues before the CTA when he waived the submission of a
Memorandum.38 The CIR had waited until the CTA already rendered its Decision dated October 16, 2000 in
CTA Case No. 5762, which granted the claim for credit/refund of Toshiba, before asserting in his Motion for
Reconsideration that Toshiba was VAT-exempt and its export sales were VAT-exempt transactions.
The CIR did not offer any explanation as to why he did not argue the VAT-exemptions of Toshiba and its
export sales before and during the trial held by the CTA, only doing so in his Motion for Reconsideration of the
adverse CTA judgment. Surely, said defenses or objections were already available to the CIR when the CIR
filed his Answer to the Petition for Review of Toshiba in CTA Case No. 5762.
It is axiomatic in pleadings and practice that no new issue in a case can be raised in a pleading which by due
diligence could have been raised in previous pleadings.39 The Court cannot simply grant the plea of the CIR
that the procedural rules be relaxed based on the general averment of the interest of substantive justice. It
should not be forgotten that the first and fundamental concern of the rules of procedure is to secure a just
determination of every action.40 Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts
and litigants alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While in certain instances, the Court allows a
relaxation in the application of the rules, it never intends to forge a weapon for erring litigants to violate the
rules with impunity. The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply only in proper cases of
demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game
of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Party litigants and their counsel are well
advised to abide by, rather than flaunt, procedural rules for these rules illumine the path of the law and
rationalize the pursuit of justice.41
The CIR judicially admitted that Toshiba was VAT-registered and its export sales were subject to VAT at zero
percent (0%) rate.
More importantly, the arguments of the CIR that Toshiba was VAT-exempt and the latter’s export sales were
VAT-exempt transactions are inconsistent with the explicit admissions of the CIR in the Joint Stipulation of
Facts and Issues (Joint Stipulation) that Toshiba was a registered VAT entity and that it was subject to zero
percent (0%) VAT on its export sales.
The Joint Stipulation was executed and submitted by Toshiba and the CIR upon being advised to do so by the
CTA at the end of the pre-trial conference held on June 23, 1999.42 The approval of the Joint Stipulation by the
CTA, in its Resolution43 dated July 12, 1999, marked the culmination of the pre-trial process in CTA Case No.
5762.
Pre-trial is an answer to the clarion call for the speedy disposition of cases. Although it was discretionary under
the 1940 Rules of Court, it was made mandatory under the 1964 Rules and the subsequent amendments in
1997. It has been hailed as "the most important procedural innovation in Anglo-Saxon justice in the nineteenth
century."44
The nature and purpose of a pre-trial have been laid down in Rule 18, Section 2 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Nature and purpose. – The pre-trial is mandatory. The court shall consider:
(a) The possibility of an amicable settlement or of a submission to alternative modes of dispute
resolution;
(b) The simplification of the issues;
(c) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(d) The possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid
unnecessary proof;
(e) The limitation of the number of witnesses;
(f) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner;
(g) The propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the
action should a valid ground therefor be found to exist;
(h) The advisability or necessity of suspending the proceedings; and
(i) Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action. (Emphasis ours.)
The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a
judicial admission.45 Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.
The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made. The Court cannot lightly set aside a judicial admission especially when the
opposing party relied upon the same and accordingly dispensed with further proof of the fact already admitted.
An admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings does not require proof.46
In the instant case, among the facts expressly admitted by the CIR and Toshiba in their CTA-approved Joint
Stipulation are that Toshiba "is a duly registered value-added tax entity in accordance with Section 107 of the
Tax Code, as amended[,]"47 that "is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax on its export sales in
accordance with then Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax Code, as amended."48 The CIR was bound by these
admissions, which he could not eventually contradict in his Motion for Reconsideration of the CTA Decision
dated October 16, 2000, by arguing that Toshiba was actually a VAT-exempt entity and its export sales were
VAT-exempt transactions. Obviously, Toshiba could not have been subject to VAT and exempt from VAT at
the same time. Similarly, the export sales of Toshiba could not have been subject to zero percent (0%) VAT
and exempt from VAT as well.
The CIR cannot escape the binding effect of his judicial admissions.
The Court disagrees with the Court of Appeals when it ruled in its Decision dated August 29, 2002 that the CIR
could not be bound by his admissions in the Joint Stipulation because (1) the said admissions were "made
through palpable mistake"49 which, if countenanced, "would result in falsehood, unfairness and injustice";50 and
(2) the State could not be put in estoppel by the mistakes of its officials or agents. This ruling of the Court of
Appeals is rooted in its conclusion that a "palpable mistake" had been committed by the CIR in the signing of
the Joint Stipulation. However, this Court finds no evidence of the commission of a mistake, much more, of a
palpable one.
The CIR does not deny that his counsel, Atty. Joselito F. Biazon, Revenue Attorney II of the BIR, signed the
Joint Stipulation, together with the counsel of Toshiba, Atty. Patricia B. Bisda. Considering the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty,51 Atty. Biazon is presumed to have read, studied, and understood
the contents of the Joint Stipulation before he signed the same. It rests on the CIR to present evidence to the
contrary.
Yet, the Court observes that the CIR himself never alleged in his Motion for Reconsideration of the CTA
Decision dated October 16, 2000, nor in his Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals, that Atty. Biazon
committed a mistake in signing the Joint Stipulation. Since the CIR did not make such an allegation, neither did
he present any proof in support thereof. The CIR began to aver the existence of a palpable mistake only after
the Court of Appeals made such a declaration in its Decision dated August 29, 2002.
Despite the absence of allegation and evidence by the CIR, the Court of Appeals, on its own, concluded that
the admissions of the CIR in the Joint Stipulation were due to a palpable mistake based on the following
deduction –
Scrutinizing the Answer filed by [the CIR], we rule that the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues signed by [the
CIR] was made through palpable mistake. Quoting paragraph 4 of its Answer, [the CIR] states:
"4. He ADMITS the allegations contained in paragraph 5 of the petition only insofar as the cited provisions of
Tax Code is concerned, but SPECIFICALLY DENIES the rest of the allegations therein for being mere
opinions, arguments or gratuitous assertions on the part of [Toshiba] and/or because they are mere erroneous
conclusions or interpretations of the quoted law involved, the truth of the matter being those stated hereunder
x x x x"
And paragraph 5 of the petition for review filed by [Toshiba] before the CTA states:
"5. Petitioner is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax on its export sales in accordance with then
Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax Code x x x.
x x x x"
As we see it, nothing in said Answer did [the CIR] admit that the export sales of [Toshiba] were indeed zerorated transactions. At the least, what was admitted only by [the CIR] concerning paragraph 4 of his Answer, is
the fact that the provisions of the Tax Code, as cited by [Toshiba] in its petition for review filed before the CTA
were correct.52
The Court of Appeals provided no explanation as to why the admissions of the CIR in his Answer in CTA Case
No. 5762 deserved more weight and credence than those he made in the Joint Stipulation. The appellate court
failed to appreciate that the CIR, through counsel, Atty. Biazon, also signed the Joint Stipulation; and that
absent evidence to the contrary, Atty. Biazon is presumed to have signed the Joint Stipulation willingly and
knowingly, in the regular performance of his official duties. Additionally, the Joint Stipulation53 of Toshiba and
the CIR was a more recent pleading than the Answer54 of the CIR. It was submitted by the parties after the pretrial conference held by the CTA, and subsequently approved by the tax court. If there was any discrepancy
between the admissions of the CIR in his Answer and in the Joint Stipulation, the more logical and reasonable
explanation would be that the CIR changed his mind or conceded some points to Toshiba during the pre-trial
conference which immediately preceded the execution of the Joint Stipulation. To automatically construe that
the discrepancy was the result of a palpable mistake is a wide leap which this Court is not prepared to take
without substantial basis.
The judicial admissions of the CIR in the Joint Stipulation are not intrinsically false, wrong, or illegal, and are
consistent with the ruling on the VAT treatment of PEZA-registered enterprises in the previous Toshiba case.
There is no basis for believing that to bind the CIR to his judicial admissions in the Joint Stipulation – that
Toshiba was a VAT-registered entity and its export sales were zero-rated VAT transactions – would result in
"falsehood, unfairness and injustice." The judicial admissions of the CIR are not intrinsically false, wrong, or
illegal. On the contrary, they are consistent with the ruling of this Court in a previous case involving the same
parties, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.) Inc.55 (Toshiba case),
explaining the VAT treatment of PEZA-registered enterprises.
In the Toshiba case, Toshiba sought the refund of its unutilized input VAT on its purchase of capital goods and
services for the first and second quarters of 1996, based on Section 106(b) of the Tax Code of 1977, as
amended.56 In the Petition at bar, Toshiba is claiming refund of its unutilized input VAT on its local purchase of
goods and services which are attributable to its export sales for the first and second quarters of 1997, pursuant
to Section 106(a), in relation to Section 100(a)(1)(A)(i) of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, which read –
SEC. 106. Refunds or tax credits of creditable input tax. – (a) Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are
zero-rated or effectively zero-rated, may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the
sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid
attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied
against output tax: Provided, however, That in the case of zero-rated sales under Section 100(a)(2)(A)(i),(ii)
and (b) and Section 102(b)(1) and (2), the acceptable foreign currency exchange proceeds thereof has been
duly accounted for in accordance with the regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP): Provided,
further, That where the taxpayer is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sale and also in taxable or
exempt sale of goods or properties of services, and the amount of creditable input tax due or paid cannot be
directly and entirely attributed to any one of the transactions, it shall be allocated proportionately on the basis
of the volume sales.
SEC. 100. Value-added tax on sale of goods or properties. – (a) Rate and base of tax. – x x x
xxxx
(2) The following sales by VAT-registered persons shall be subject to 0%:
(A) Export sales. – The term "export sales" means:
(i) The sale and actual shipment of goods from the Philippines to a foreign country, irrespective of any
shipping arrangement that may be agreed upon which may influence or determine the transfer of
ownership of the goods so exported and paid for in acceptable foreign currency or its equivalent in
goods or services, and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipnas (BSP).
Despite the difference in the legal bases for the claims for credit/refund in the Toshiba case and the case at
bar, the CIR raised the very same defense or objection in both – that Toshiba and its transactions were VATexempt. Hence, the ruling of the Court in the former case is relevant to the present case.
At the outset, the Court establishes that there is a basic distinction in the VAT-exemption of a person and the
VAT-exemption of a transaction –
It would seem that petitioner CIR failed to differentiate between VAT-exempt transactions from VAT-exempt
entities. In the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Seagate Technology (Philippines), this Court
already made such distinction –
An exempt transaction, on the one hand, involves goods or services which, by their nature, are specifically
listed in and expressly exempted from the VAT under the Tax Code, without regard to the tax status – VATexempt or not – of the party to the transaction…
An exempt party, on the other hand, is a person or entity granted VAT exemption under the Tax Code, a
special law or an international agreement to which the Philippines is a signatory, and by virtue of which its
taxable transactions become exempt from VAT x x x.57
In effect, the CIR is opposing the claim for credit/refund of input VAT of Toshiba on two grounds: (1) that
Toshiba was a VAT-exempt entity; and (2) that its export sales were VAT-exempt transactions.
It is now a settled rule that based on the Cross Border Doctrine, PEZA-registered enterprises, such as
Toshiba, are VAT-exempt and no VAT can be passed on to them. The Court explained in the Toshiba case
that –
PEZA-registered enterprise, which would necessarily be located within ECOZONES, are VAT-exempt entities,
not because of Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 7916, as amended, which imposes the five percent (5%) preferential
tax rate on gross income of PEZA-registered enterprises, in lieu of all taxes; but, rather, because of Section 8
of the same statute which establishes the fiction that ECOZONES are foreign territory.
xxxx
The Philippine VAT system adheres to the Cross Border Doctrine, according to which, no VAT shall be
imposed to form part of the cost of goods destined for consumption outside of the territorial border of the taxing
authority. Hence, actual export of goods and services from the Philippines to a foreign country must be free of
VAT; while, those destined for use or consumption within the Philippines shall be imposed with ten percent
(10%) VAT.
Applying said doctrine to the sale of goods, properties, and services to and from the ECOZONES, the BIR
issued Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 74-99, on 15 October 1999. Of particular interest to the
present Petition is Section 3 thereof, which reads –
SECTION 3. Tax Treatment of Sales Made by a VAT Registered Supplier from the Customs Territory, to a
PEZA Registered Enterprise. –
(1) If the Buyer is a PEZA registered enterprise which is subject to the 5% special tax regime, in lieu of
all taxes, except real property tax, pursuant to R.A. No. 7916, as amended:
(a) Sale of goods (i.e., merchandise). – This shall be treated as indirect export hence,
considered subject to zero percent (0%) VAT, pursuant to Sec. 106(A)(2)(a)(5), NIRC and Sec.
23 of R.A. No. 7916, in relation to ART. 77(2) of the Omnibus Investments Code.
(b) Sale of service. – This shall be treated subject to zero percent (0%) VAT under the "cross
border doctrine" of the VAT System, pursuant to VAT Ruling No. 032-98 dated Nov. 5, 1998.
(2) If Buyer is a PEZA registered enterprise which is not embraced by the 5% special tax regime,
hence, subject to taxes under the NIRC, e.g., Service Establishments which are subject to taxes under
the NIRC rather than the 5% special tax regime:
(a) Sale of goods (i.e., merchandise). – This shall be treated as indirect export hence,
considered subject to zero percent (0%) VAT, pursuant to Sec. 106(A)(2)(a)(5), NIRC and Sec.
23 of R.A. No. 7916 in relation to ART. 77(2) of the Omnibus Investments Code.
(b) Sale of Service. – This shall be treated subject to zero percent (0%) VAT under the "cross
border doctrine" of the VAT System, pursuant to VAT Ruling No. 032-98 dated Nov. 5, 1998.
(3) In the final analysis, any sale of goods, property or services made by a VAT registered supplier from
the Customs Territory to any registered enterprise operating in the ecozone, regardless of the class or
type of the latter’s PEZA registration, is actually qualified and thus legally entitled to the zero percent
(0%) VAT. Accordingly, all sales of goods or property to such enterprise made by a VAT registered
supplier from the Customs Territory shall be treated subject to 0% VAT, pursuant to Sec.
106(A)(2)(a)(5), NIRC, in relation to ART. 77(2) of the Omnibus Investments Code, while all sales of
services to the said enterprises, made by VAT registered suppliers from the Customs Territory, shall be
treated effectively subject to the 0% VAT, pursuant to Section 108(B)(3), NIRC, in relation to the
provisions of R.A. No. 7916 and the "Cross Border Doctrine" of the VAT system.
This Circular shall serve as a sufficient basis to entitle such supplier of goods, property or services to the
benefit of the zero percent (0%) VAT for sales made to the aforementioned ECOZONE enterprises and shall
serve as sufficient compliance to the requirement for prior approval of zero-rating imposed by Revenue
Regulations No. 7-95 effective as of the date of the issuance of this Circular.
Indubitably, no output VAT may be passed on to an ECOZONE enterprise since it is a VAT-exempt entity. x x
x.58
The Court, nevertheless, noted in the Toshiba case that the rule which considers any sale by a supplier from
the Customs Territory to a PEZA-registered enterprise as export sale, which should not be burdened by output
VAT, was only clearly established on October 15, 1999, upon the issuance by the BIR of RMC No. 74-99. Prior
to October 15, 1999, whether a PEZA-registered enterprise was exempt or subject to VAT depended on the
type of fiscal incentives availed of by the said enterprise.59 The old rule, then followed by the BIR, and
recognized and affirmed by the CTA, the Court of Appeals, and this Court, was described as follows –
According to the old rule, Section 23 of Rep. Act No. 7916, as amended, gives the PEZA-registered enterprise
the option to choose between two sets of fiscal incentives: (a) The five percent (5%) preferential tax rate on its
gross income under Rep. Act No. 7916, as amended; and (b) the income tax holiday provided under Executive
Order No. 226, otherwise known as the Omnibus Investment Code of 1987, as amended.
The five percent (5%) preferential tax rate on gross income under Rep. Act No. 7916, as amended, is in lieu of
all taxes. Except for real property taxes, no other national or local tax may be imposed on a PEZA-registered
enterprise availing of this particular fiscal incentive, not even an indirect tax like VAT.
Alternatively, Book VI of Exec. Order No. 226, as amended, grants income tax holiday to registered pioneer
and non-pioneer enterprises for six-year and four-year periods, respectively. Those availing of this incentive
are exempt only from income tax, but shall be subject to all other taxes, including the ten percent (10%) VAT.
This old rule clearly did not take into consideration the Cross Border Doctrine essential to the VAT system or
the fiction of the ECOZONE as a foreign territory. It relied totally on the choice of fiscal incentives of the PEZAregistered enterprise. Again, for emphasis, the old VAT rule for PEZA-registered enterprises was based on
their choice of fiscal incentives: (1) If the PEZA-registered enterprise chose the five percent (5%) preferential
tax on its gross income, in lieu of all taxes, as provided by Rep. Act No. 7916, as amended, then it would be
VAT-exempt; (2) If the PEZA-registered enterprise availed of the income tax holiday under Exec. Order No.
226, as amended, it shall be subject to VAT at ten percent (10%). Such distinction was abolished by RMC No.
74-99, which categorically declared that all sales of goods, properties, and services made by a VAT-registered
supplier from the Customs Territory to an ECOZONE enterprise shall be subject to VAT, at zero percent (0%)
rate, regardless of the latter’s type or class of PEZA registration; and, thus, affirming the nature of a PEZAregistered or an ECOZONE enterprise as a VAT-exempt entity.60
To recall, Toshiba is herein claiming the refund of unutilized input VAT payments on its local purchases of
goods and services attributable to its export sales for the first and second quarters of 1997. Such export sales
took place before October 15, 1999, when the old rule on the VAT treatment of PEZA-registered enterprises
still applied. Under this old rule, it was not only possible, but even acceptable, for Toshiba, availing itself of the
income tax holiday option under Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7916, in relation to Section 39 of the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987, to be subject to VAT, both indirectly (as purchaser to whom the seller shifts the
VAT burden) and directly (as seller whose sales were subject to VAT, either at ten percent [10%] or zero
percent [0%]).
A VAT-registered seller of goods and/or services who made zero-rated sales can claim tax credit or refund of
the input VAT paid on its purchases of goods, properties, or services relative to such zero-rated sales, in
accordance with Section 4.102-2 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, which provides –
Sec. 4.102-2. Zero-rating. – (a) In general. - A zero-rated sale by a VAT-registered person, which is a taxable
transaction for VAT purposes, shall not result in any output tax. However, the input tax on his purchases of
goods, properties or services related to such zero-rated sale shall be available as tax credit or refund in
accordance with these regulations.
The BIR, as late as July 15, 2003, when it issued RMC No. 42-2003, accepted applications for credit/refund of
input VAT on purchases prior to RMC No. 74-99, filed by PEZA-registered enterprises which availed
themselves of the income tax holiday. The BIR answered Question Q-5(1) of RMC No. 42-2003 in this wise –
Q-5: Under Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 74-99, purchases by PEZA-registered firms
automatically qualify as zero-rated without seeking prior approval from the BIR effective October 1999.
1) Will the OSS-DOF Center still accept applications from PEZA-registered claimants who were
allegedly billed VAT by their suppliers before and during the effectivity of the RMC by issuing VAT
invoices/receipts?
xxxx
A-5(1): If the PEZA-registered enterprise is paying the 5% preferential tax in lieu of all other
taxes, the said PEZA-registered taxpayer cannot claim TCC or refund for the VAT paid on
purchases. However, if the taxpayer is availing of the income tax holiday, it can claim VAT credit
provided:
a. The taxpayer-claimant is VAT-registered;
b. Purchases are evidenced by VAT invoices or receipts, whichever is applicable, with
shifted VAT to the purchaser prior to the implementation of RMC No. 74-99; and
c. The supplier issues a sworn statement under penalties of perjury that it shifted the
VAT and declared the sales to the PEZA-registered purchaser as taxable sales in its
VAT returns.
For invoices/receipts issued upon the effectivity of RMC No. 74-99, the claims for input VAT by PEZAregistered companies, regardless of the type or class of PEZA-registration, should be denied. (Emphases
ours.)
Consequently, the CIR cannot herein insist that all PEZA-registered enterprises are VAT-exempt in every
instance. RMC No. 42-2003 contains an express acknowledgement by the BIR that prior to RMC No. 74-99,
there were PEZA-registered enterprises liable for VAT and entitled to credit/refund of input VAT paid under
certain conditions.
This Court already rejected in the Toshiba case the argument that sale transactions of a PEZA-registered
enterprise were VAT-exempt under Section 103(q) of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, ratiocinating that –
Section 103(q) of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, relied upon by petitioner CIR, relates to VAT-exempt
transactions. These are transactions exempted from VAT by special laws or international agreements to which
the Philippines is a signatory. Since such transactions are not subject to VAT, the sellers cannot pass on any
output VAT to the purchasers of goods, properties, or services, and they may not claim tax credit/refund of the
input VAT they had paid thereon.
Section 103(q) of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, cannot apply to transactions of respondent Toshiba
because although the said section recognizes that transactions covered by special laws may be exempt from
VAT, the very same section provides that those falling under Presidential Decree No. 66 are not. Presidential
Decree No. 66, creating the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), is the precursor of Rep. Act No. 7916,
as amended, under which the EPZA evolved into the PEZA. Consequently, the exception of Presidential
Decree No. 66 from Section 103(q) of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended, extends likewise to Rep. Act No.
7916, as amended.61 (Emphasis ours.)
In light of the judicial admissions of Toshiba, the CTA correctly confined itself to the other factual issues
submitted for resolution by the parties.
In accord with the admitted facts – that Toshiba was a VAT-registered entity and that its export sales were
zero-rated transactions – the stated issues in the Joint Stipulation were limited to other factual matters,
particularly, on the compliance by Toshiba with the rest of the requirements for credit/refund of input VAT on
zero-rated transactions. Thus, during trial, Toshiba concentrated on presenting evidence to establish that it
incurred ₱3,875,139.65 of input VAT for the first and second quarters of 1997 which were directly attributable
to its export sales; that said amount of input VAT were not carried over to the succeeding quarters; that said
amount of input VAT has not been applied or offset against any output VAT liability; and that said amount of
input VAT was properly substantiated by official receipts and invoices.
After what truly appears to be an exhaustive review of the evidence presented by Toshiba, the CTA made the
following findings –
(1) The amended quarterly VAT returns of Toshiba for 1997 showed that it made no other sales, except
zero-rated export sales, for the entire year, in the sum of ₱2,083,305,000.00 for the first quarter and
₱5,411,372,000.00 for the second quarter. That being the case, all input VAT allegedly incurred by
Toshiba for the first two quarters of 1997, in the amount of ₱3,875,139.65, was directly attributable to
its zero-rated sales for the same period.
(2) Toshiba did carry-over the ₱3,875,139.65 input VAT it reportedly incurred during the first two
quarters of 1997 to succeeding quarters, until the first quarter of 1999. Despite the carry-over of the
subject input VAT of ₱3,875,139.65, the claim of Toshiba was not affected because it later on deducted
the said amount as "VAT Refund/TCC Claimed" from its total available input VAT of ₱6,841,468.17 for
the first quarter of 1999.
(3) Still, the CTA could not allow the credit/refund of the total input VAT of ₱3,875,139.65 being claimed
by Toshiba because not all of said amount was actually incurred by the company and duly
substantiated by invoices and official receipts. From the ₱3,875,139.65 claim, the CTA deducted the
amounts of (a) ₱189,692.92, which was in excess of the ₱3,685,446.23 input VAT Toshiba originally
claimed in its application for credit/refund filed with the DOF One-Stop Shop; (b) ₱396,882.58, which
SGV & Co., the commissioned CPA, disallowed for being improperly substantiated, i.e., supported only
by provisional acknowledgement receipts, or by documents other than official receipts, or not supported
by TIN or TIN VAT or by any document at all; (c) ₱1,887,545.65, which the CTA itself verified as not
being substantiated in accordance with Section 4.104-562 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, in relation
to Sections 10863 and 23864 of the Tax Code of 1977, as amended; and (d) ₱15,736.42, which Toshiba
already applied to its output VAT liability for the fourth quarter of 1998.
(4) Ultimately, Toshiba was entitled to the credit/refund of unutilized input VAT payments attributable to
its zero-rated sales in the amounts of ₱1,158,016.82 and ₱227,265.26, for the first and second quarters
of 1997, respectively, or in the total amount of ₱1,385,282.08.
Since the aforementioned findings of fact of the CTA are borne by substantial evidence on record, unrefuted by
the CIR, and untouched by the Court of Appeals, they are given utmost respect by this Court.
The Court will not lightly set aside the conclusions reached by the CTA which, by the very nature of its
functions, is dedicated exclusively to the resolution of tax problems and has accordingly developed an
expertise on the subject unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of authority.65 In Barcelon,
Roxas Securities, Inc. (now known as UBP Securities, Inc.) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,66 this Court
more explicitly pronounced –
Jurisprudence has consistently shown that this Court accords the findings of fact by the CTA with the highest
respect. In Sea-Land Service Inc. v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 122605, 30 April 2001, 357 SCRA 441, 445446], this Court recognizes that the Court of Tax Appeals, which by the very nature of its function is dedicated
exclusively to the consideration of tax problems, has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, and its
conclusions will not be overturned unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of authority. Such
findings can only be disturbed on appeal if they are not supported by substantial evidence or there is a
showing of gross error or abuse on the part of the Tax Court. In the absence of any clear and convincing proof
to the contrary, this Court must presume that the CTA rendered a decision which is valid in every respect.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated August 29, 2002 and the Resolution dated February 19, 2003 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63047 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated
October 16, 2000 of the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case No. 5762 is REINSTATED. Respondent
Commissioner of Internal Revenue is ORDERED to REFUND or, in the alternative, to ISSUE a TAX CREDIT
CERTIFICATE in favor of petitioner Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc. in the amount of
₱1,385,282.08, representing the latter’s unutilized input VAT payments for the first and second quarters of
1997. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157177
February 11, 2008
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner,
vs.
JESUSA P. REYES and CONRADO B. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 29, 2002 as well as its Resolution2 dated February 12,
2003, which affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 142, in
Civil Case No. 91-3453,3 requiring Bank of Philippine Islands (petitioner) to return to spouses Jesusa P. Reyes
and Conrado B. Reyes (respondents) the amount of P100,000.00 plus interest and damages.
The conflicting versions of the parties are aptly summarized by the trial court, to wit:
On December 7, 1990 at around 2:00 p.m., plaintiff Jesusa Reyes together with her daughter, Joan Reyes,
went to BPI Zapote Branch to open an ATM account, she being interested with the ongoing promotions of BPI
entitling every depositor with a deposit amounting to P2,000.00 to a ticket with a car as its prize to be raffled
every month.
She was accommodated, in lieu of the bank manager Mr. Nicasio, by Cicero Capati (Pats) who was an
employee of the bank and in charge of the new accounts and time deposits characteristically described as
having homosexual inclinations. They were entertained by Capati and were made to sit at a table occupied by
a certain Liza.
Plaintiff informed Capati that they wanted to open an ATM account for the amount
of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall be withdrawn from her exiting savings account with BPI bank
which is account no. 0233-2433-88 and the other P100,000.00 will be given by her in cash.
Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip for P200,00.00 to be withdrawn from her
existing savings account with said bank and the plaintiff Jesusa Reyes believing in good faith that Capati
prepared the papers with the correct amount signed the same unaware of the mistakes in figures.
While she was being entertained by Capati, her daughter Joan Reyes was filling up the signature cards and
several other forms.
Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller, Capati returned to where the plaintiff was seating and
informed the latter that the withdrawable balance could not accommodate P200,000.00.
Plaintiff explained that she is withdrawing the amount of P100,000.00 only and then changed and correct the
figure two (2) into one (1) with her signature super-imposed thereto signifying the change, afterwhich the
amount of P100,000.00 in cash in two bundles containing 100 pieces of P500.00 peso bill were given to Capati
with her daughter Joan witnessing the same. Thereafter Capati prepared a deposit slip for P200,000.00 in the
name of plaintiff Jesusa Reyes with the new account no. 0235-0767-48 and brought the same to the teller's
booth.
After a while, he returned and handed to the plaintiff her duplicate copy of her deposit to account no. 02350767-48 reflecting the amount of P200,000.00 with receipt stamp showing December 7, as the date.
Plaintiff and daughter then left.
On December 14, 1990, Mrs. Jesusa received her express teller card from said bank.
Thereafter on December 26, 1990, plaintiff left for the United States (Exhs. "T", "U"- "U-1") and returned
to Manila on January 31, 1991 (Exhs. "V"-"V-1").
When she went to her pawnshop, she was made aware by her statement of account sent to her by BPI
bank that her ATM account only contained the amount of P100,000.00 with interest.
She then sent her daughter to inquire, however, the bank manager assured her that they would look
into the matter.
On February 6, 1991, plaintiff instructed Efren Luna, one of her employees, to update her savings
account passbook at the BPI with the folded deposit slip for P200,000.00 stapled at the outer cover of
said passbook. After presenting the passbook to be updated and when the same was returned, Luna
noticed that the deposit slip stapled at the cover was removed and validated at the back portion thereof.
Thereafter, Luna returned with the passbook to the plaintiff and when the latter saw the validation, she
got angry.
Plaintiff then asked the bank manager why the deposit slip was validated, whereupon the manager
assured her that the matter will be investigated into.
When no word was heard as to the investigation made by the bank, Mrs. Reyes sent two (2) demand
letters thru her lawyer demanding return of the missing P100,000.00 plus interest (Exhs. "B" and "C").
The same was received by defendant on July 25, 1991 and October 7, 1991, respectively.
The last letter prompted reply from defendant inviting plaintiff to sit down and discuss the problem.
The meeting resulted to the bank promising that Capati will be submitted to a lie detector test.
Plaintiff, however, never learned of the result of said test. Plaintiff filed this instant case.
Defendant on the other hand claimed that Bank of the Philippine Island admitted that Jesusa Reyes
had effected a fund transfer in the amount of P100,000.00 from her ordinary savings account to the
express teller account she opened on December 7, 1990 (Exhs. "3" to "3-C"), however, it was the only
amount she deposited and no additional cash deposit of P100,000.00 was made. That plaintiff wanted
to effect the transfer of P200,000.00 but the balance in her account was not sufficient and could not
accommodate the same. Plaintiff thereafter agreed to reduce the amount to be withdrawn
from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 with plaintiff’s signature superimposed on said corrections; that the
original copy of the deposit slip was also altered from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00, however, instead of
plaintiff signing the same, the clerk-in-charge of the bank, in this case Cicero Capati, signed the
alteration himself for Jesusa Reyes had already left without signing the deposit slip. The documents
were subsequently machine validated for the amount of P100,000.00 (Exhs. "2" and "4").
Defendant claimed that there was actually no cash involved with the transactions which happened on
December 7, 1990 as contained in the bank’s teller tape (Exhs."1" to "1-C").
Defendant further claimed that when they subjected Cicero Capati to a lie detector test, the latter
passed the same with flying colors (Exhs. "5" to "5-C"), indicative of the fact that he was not lying when
he said that there really was no cash transaction involved when plaintiff Jesusa Reyes went to the
defendant bank on December 7, 1990; defendant further alleged that they even went to the extent of
informing Jesusa Reyes that her claim would not be given credit (Exh. "6") considering that no such
transaction was really made on December 7, 1990. 4
On August 12, 1994, the RTC issued a Decision5 upholding the versions of respondents, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds in favor of the plaintiff Jesusa P. Reyes and
Conrado Reyes and against defendant Bank of the Philippine Islands ordering the latter to:
1. Return to plaintiffs their P100,000.00 with interest at 14% per annum from December 7, 1990;
2. Pay plaintiffs P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
2. Pay plaintiffs P350,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. Pay plaintiffs P250,000.00 for and attorney's fees.6
The RTC found that petitioner's claim that respondent Jesusa deposited only P100,000.00 instead
of P200,000.00 was hazy; that what should control was the deposit slip issued by the bank to respondent, for
there was no chance by which respondent could write the amount of P200,000.00 without petitioner's
employee noticing it and making the necessary corrections; that it was deplorable to note that it was when
respondent Jesusa's bankbook was submitted to be updated after the lapse of several months when the
alleged error claimed by petitioner was corrected; that Article 1962 of the New Civil Code provides that a
deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another with the obligation of
safely keeping it and of returning the same; that under Article 1972, the depositary is obliged to keep the thing
safely and to return it when required to the depositor or to his heirs and successors or to the person who may
have been designated in the contract.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA which in a Decision dated October 29, 2002 affirmed the RTC
decision with modification as follows:
Nonetheless, the award of 14% interest per annum on the missing P100,000.00 can stand some
modification. The interest thereon should be 12% per annum, reckoned from May 12, 1991, the last day
of the five day-grace period given by plaintiff-appellees' counsel under the first demand letter dated
May 6, 1991 (Exhibit B), or counted from May 7, 1991, the date when defendant-appellant received
said letter. Interest is demandable when the obligation consist in the payment of money and the debtor
incurs in delay.
Also, we have to reduce the P1 million award of moral damages to a reasonable sum of P50,000.00.
Moral damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded
only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to alleviate
the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. The award of
moral damages must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
In addition, we have to delete the award of P350,000.00 as exemplary damages. The absence of
malice and bad faith, as in this case, renders the award of exemplary damages improper.
Finally, we have to reduce the award of attorney's fees to a reasonable sum of P30,000.00, as the
prosecution of this case has not been attended with any unusual difficulty.
WHEREFORE, with the modifications thus indicated, the judgment appealed from is in all other
respects AFFIRMED. Without costs.7
In finding petitioner liable for the missing P100,000.00, the CA held that the RTC correctly gave credence to
the testimonies of respondent Jesusa and Joan Reyes to the effect that aside from the fund transfer
of P100,000.00 from Jesusa's savings account, Jesusa also made a cash deposit of P100,000.00 in the
afternoon of December 7, 1990; that it is unlikely for these two to concoct a story of falsification against a
banking institution of the stature of petitioner if their claims were not true; that the duplicate copy of the deposit
slip showed a deposit of P200,000.00; this, juxtaposed with the fact that it was not machine-validated and the
original copy altered by the bank's clerk from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 with the altered amount "validated,"
is indicative of anomaly; that even if it was bank employee Cicero Capati who prepared the deposit slip, Jesusa
stood her ground and categorically denied having any knowledge of the alteration therein made; that petitioner
must account for the missing P100,000.00 because it was the author of the loss; that banks are engaged in
business imbued with public interest and are under strict obligation to exercise utmost fidelity in dealing with its
clients, in seeing to it that the funds therein invested or by them received are properly accounted for and duly
posted in their ledgers.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated February 12, 2003.
Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:
A. In affirming the decision of the trial court holding BPI liable for the amount of P100,000.00
representing an alleged additional deposit of respondents, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion by resolving the issue based on a conjecture and ignoring physical evidence in
favor of testimonial evidence.
B. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion, being as it is contrary to law, in holding BPI liable
to respondents for the payment of interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
C. This Honorable Court gravely abused its discretion, being as it is contrary to law, in holding BPI
liable for moral damages and attorney's fees at the reduced amounts of P50,000.00 and P30,000.00,
respectively. 8
The main issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in sustaining the RTC's finding that respondent Jesusa
made an initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her newly opened Express Teller account on December 7, 1990.
The issue raises a factual question. The Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing
only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts.9 As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial
court when affirmed by the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal by this Court, as
long as they are borne out by the record or are based on substantial evidence.10 Such rule however is not
absolute, but is subject to well-established exceptions, which are: 1) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; 2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; 3) when the finding is grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 4) when the judgment of the CA is based on a
misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6) when the CA, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case, and those findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; 7) when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; 8) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; 9) when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and 10) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record.11 We hold that this case falls under exception Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 9
which constrain us to resolve the factual issue.
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own affirmative allegations by the degree
of evidence required by law.12 In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence,13 or that evidence which is of greater weight or is more convincing than that which
is in opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is more
believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of truth is on one side than on the other.14
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines for determining preponderance of evidence,
thus:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined.- In civil cases, the party having the burden
of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies the court may consider all the
facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means
and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider
the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand, it must first be stressed that the judge who
had heard and seen the witnesses testify was not the same judge who penned the decision. Thus, not having
heard the testimonies himself, the trial judge or the appellate court would not be in a better position than this
Court to assess the credibility of witnesses on the basis of their demeanor.
Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the witnesses' testimonies and
examined the pieces of evidence on record.
After a careful and close examination of the records and evidence presented by the parties, we find that
respondents failed to successfully prove by preponderance of evidence that respondent Jesusa made an initial
deposit of P200,000.00 in her Express Teller account.
Respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan testified that at the outset, respondent Jesusa told Capati that she
was opening an Express Teller account for P200,000.00; that she was going to withdraw and
transfer P100,000.00 from her savings account to her new account, and that she had an
additional P100,000.00 cash. However, these assertions are not borne out by the other evidence presented.
Notably, it is not refuted that Capati prepared a withdrawal slip15 for P200,000.00. This is contrary to the claim
of respondent Jesusa that she instructed Capati to make a fund transfer of only P100,000.00 from her savings
account to the Express Teller account she was opening. Yet, respondent Jesusa signed the withdrawal slip.
We find it strange that she would sign the withdrawal slip if her intention in the first place was to withdraw
only P100,000.00 from her savings account and deposit P100,000.00 in cash with her.
Moreover, respondent Jesusa's claim that she signed the withdrawal slip without looking at the amount
indicated therein fails to convince us, for respondent Jesusa, as a businesswoman in the regular course of
business and taking ordinary care of her concerns,16 would make sure that she would check the amount written
on the withdrawal slip before affixing her signature. Significantly, we note that the space provided for her
signature is very near the space where the amount of P200,000.00 in words and figures are written; thus, she
could not have failed to notice that the amount of P200,000.00 was written instead of P100,000.00.
The fact that respondent Jesusa initially intended to transfer the amount of P200,000.00 from her savings
account to her new Express Teller account was further established by the teller's tape presented as petitioner's
evidence and by the testimony of Emerenciana Torneros, the teller who had attended to respondent Jesusa's
transactions.
The teller's tape,17 Exhibit "1" unequivocally shows the following data:
151159 07DEC90 1370 288A 233324299
151245 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***200000.0018
BIG AMOUNT
151251 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
***200000.00
151309 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***200000.00
PB BALANCE ERROR
BAL. 229,257.64
151338 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***200000.00
BIG AMOUNT
151344 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
***200000.00
151404 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***200000.00
TOD
151520 07DEC90 1601 288A 233320145
***2000.00
151705 07DEC90 1789 288A 233324299
***22917.00
151727 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***100000.00
BIG AMOUNT
151730 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
***100000.00
151746 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***100000.0019
151810 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076748
151827 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076748
***100000.00 ***100000.0020
151903 07DEC90 1301 288A 233282405
151914 07DEC90 1690 288A 235008955
***1778.05
152107 07DEC90 1601 288A 3333241381
***5000.00
152322 07DEC90 1601 288A 233314374
***2000.00
152435 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076764
152506 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076764
***4000.00 ***4000.00
152557 07DEC90 1601 288A 233069469
***2000.00
152736 07DEC90 1601 288A 233254584
***2000.00
152849 07DEC90 0600 288A 231017585
***3150.00 686448
152941 07DEC90 1790 288A 3135052255
***2800.00 ***2800.00
153252 07DEC90 1601 288A 233098264
(Emphasis supplied)
The first column shows the exact time of the transactions; the second column shows the date of the
transactions; the third column shows the bank transaction code; the fourth column shows the teller's code; and
the fifth column shows the client's account number. The teller's tape reflected various transactions involving
different accounts on December 7, 1990 which included respondent Jesusa's Savings Account No. 233243388
and her new Express Teller Account No. 235076748. It shows that respondent Jesusa's initial intention to
withdraw P200,000.00, not P100,000.00, from her Savings Account No. 233324299 was begun at 3 o'clock,
12 minutes and 45 seconds as shown in Exhibit "1-c."
In explaining the entries in the teller's tape, Torneros testified that when she was processing respondent
Jesusa's withdrawal in the amount of P200,000.00, her computer rejected the transaction because there was a
discrepancy;21 thus, the word "BIG AMOUNT" appeared on the tape. "Big amount" means that the amount was
so big for her to approve,22 so she keyed in the amount again and overrode the transaction to be able to
process the withdrawal using an officer's override with the latter's approval.23 The letter "J" appears after
Figure 288 in the fourth column to show that she overrode the transaction. She then keyed again the amount
of P200,000.00 at 3 o'clock 13 minutes and 9 seconds; however, her computer rejected the transaction,
because the balance she keyed in based on respondent Jesusa's passbook was wrong;24 thus appeared the
phrase "balance error" on the tape, and the computer produced the balance of P229,257.64, and so she keyed
in the withdrawal of P200,000.00.25 Since it was a big amount, she again had to override it, so she could
process the amount. However, the withdrawal was again rejected for the reason "TOD, overdraft,"26 which
meant that the amount to be withdrawn was more than the balance, considering that there was a debited
amount of P30,935.16 reflected in respondent Jesusa's passbook, reducing the available balance to
only P198,322.48.27
Torneros then called Capati to her cage and told him of the insufficiency of respondent Jesusa's
balance.28 Capati then motioned respondent Jesusa to the teller's cage; and when she was already in front of
the teller's cage, Torneros told her that she could not withdraw P200,000.00 because of overdraft; thus,
respondent Jesusa decided to just withdraw P100,000.00.29
This explains the alteration in the withdrawal slip with the superimposition of the figure "1" on the figure "2" and
the change of the word "two" to "one" to show that the withdrawn amount from respondent Jesusa's savings
account was only P100,000.00, and that respondent Jesusa herself signed the alterations.
The teller's tape showed that the withdrawal of the amount of P100,000.00 by fund transfer was resumed at 3
o'clock 17 minutes and 27 seconds; but since it was a big amount, there was a need to override it again, and
the withdrawal/fund transfer was completed. At 3 o'clock 18 minutes and 27 seconds, the amount
of P100,000.00 was deposited to respondent Jesusa's new Express Teller Account No. 235076748.
The teller's tape definitely establishes the fact of respondent Jesusa's original intention to withdraw the amount
of P200,000.00, and not P100,000.00 as she claims, from her savings account, to be transferred as her initial
deposit to her new Express Teller account, the insufficiency of her balance in her savings account, and finally
the fund transfer of the amount of P100,000.00 from her savings account to her new Express Teller account.
We give great evidentiary weight to the teller's tape, considering that it is inserted into the bank's computer
terminal, which records the teller's daily transactions in the ordinary course of business, and there is no
showing that the same had been purposely manipulated to prove petitioner's claim.
Respondent Jesusa's bare claim, although corroborated by her daughter, that the former
deposited P100,000.00 cash in addition to the fund transfer of P100,000.00, is not established by physical
evidence. While the duplicate copy of the deposit slip30 was in the amount of P200,000.00 and bore the stamp
mark of teller Torneros, such duplicate copy failed to show that there was a cash deposit of P100,000.00. An
examination of the deposit slip shows that it did not contain any entry in the breakdown portion for the specific
denominations of the cash deposit. This demolishes the testimonies of respondent Jesusa and her daughter
Joan.
Furthermore, teller Torneros's explanation of why the duplicate copy of the deposit slip in the amount
of P200,000.00 bore the teller's stamp mark is convincing and consistent with logic and the ordinary course of
business. She testified that Capati went to her cage bringing with him a withdrawal slip for P200,000.00 signed
by respondent Jesusa, two copies of the deposit slip for P200,000.00 in respondent Jesusa's name for her new
Express Teller account, and the latter's savings passbook reflecting a balance of P249,657.6431 as of
November 19, 1990.32 Thus, at first glance, these appeared to Torneros to be sufficient for the withdrawal
of P200,000.00 by fund transfer. Capati then got her teller's stamp mark, stamped it on the duplicate copy of
the deposit slip, and gave the duplicate to respondent Jesusa, while the original copy33 of the deposit slip was
left in her cage.34 However, as Torneros started processing the transaction, it turned out that respondent
Jesusa's balance was insufficient to accommodate the P200,000.00 fund transfer as narrated earlier.
Since respondent Jesusa had signed the alteration in the withdrawal slip and had already left the teller's
counter thereafter and Capati was still inside the teller's cage, Torneros asked Capati about the original deposit
slip and the latter told her, "Ok naman iyan,"35 and Capati superimposed the figures "1" on "2" on the deposit
slip36 to reflect the initial deposit of P100,000.00 for respondent Jesusa's new Express Teller account and
signed the alteration. Torneros then machine-validated the deposit slip. Thus, the duplicate copy of the deposit
slip, which bore Torneros’s stamp mark and which was given to respondent Jesusa prior to the processing of
her transaction, was not machine-validated unlike the original copy of the deposit slip.
While the fact that the alteration in the original deposit slip was signed by Capati and not by respondent Jesusa
herself was a violation of the bank's policy requiring the depositor to sign the correction,37 nevertheless, we find
that respondents failed to satisfactorily establish by preponderance of evidence that indeed there was an
additional cash of P100,000.00 deposited to the new Express Teller account.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence.38 We have, on many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth.
Where the physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses,
we consistently rule that the physical evidence should prevail.39
In addition, to uphold the declaration of the CA that it is unlikely for respondent Jesusa and her daughter to
concoct a false story against a banking institution is to give weight to conjectures and surmises, which we
cannot countenance.
In fine, respondents failed to establish their claim by preponderance of evidence.
Considering the foregoing, we find no need to tackle the other issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002 as well
as its Resolution dated February 12, 2003 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by
respondents, together with the counterclaim of petitioner, is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109775 November 14, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE ENCARNACION MALIMIT alias "MANOLO", accused-appellant.
FRANCISCO, J.:
Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with 1 and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, 2 was meted by the trial court 3 the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to indemnify
the heirs of Onofre Malaki the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the cost. 4
In this appeal, appellant asks for his acquittal alleging that the trial court committed the following errors, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES
OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES ON THEIR ALLEGED IDENTIFICATION OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME DESPITE THE FACT (SIC)
THEY REVEALED THEIR ALLEGED "KNOWLEDGE" OF TH6E CRIME MORE THAN FIVE
MONTHS AFTER THE INCIDENT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE WALLET AND ITS
CONTENTS ALTHOUGH THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LEAD TO ITS PRODUCTION WAS
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT. 5
The following is the recital of facts as summarized by the appellee in its Brief, and duly supported by the
evidence on record:
On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, [Onofre] Malaki was attending to his
store. Malaki's houseboy Edilberto Batin, on the other hand, was busy cooking chicken for
supper at the kitchen located at the back of the store (TSN, June 19, 199 (sic), p. 14).
Soon thereafter, Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store of Malaki. Rondon was to
purchase chemical for his rice farm (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 19). Rondon came from his house,
approximately one hundred and fifty (150) meters distant from Malaki's store (Ibid., p. 24).
Meanwhile, Batin had just finished cooking and from the kitchen, he proceeded directly to the
store to ask his employer (Malaki) if supper is to be prepared. As Batin stepped inside the store,
he was taken aback when he saw appellant coming out of the store with a bolo (TSN, June 9,
1992, p. 14), while his boss, bathed in his own blood, was sprawled on the floor "struggling for
his life" (hovering between life and death) (Ibid.).
Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from the store, also saw appellant
Jose Malimit (or "Manolo") rushing out through the front door of Malaki's store with a bloodstained bolo (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 29). Aided by the illumination coming from a pressure lamp
("petromax") inside the store, Rondon clearly recognized Malimit (Ibid., p. 22).
Batin immediately went out of the store to seek help. Outside the store, he met Rondon (TSN,
June 9, 1992, p. 15). After a brief conversation, both Batin and Rondon rushed to the nearby
house of Malaki's brother-in-law Eutiquio Beloy and informed Beloy of the tragic incident which
befell Malaki. Batin, along with Beloy, went back to the store. Inside, they saw the lifeless body
of Malaki in a pool of blood lying prostrate at the floor. Beloy readily noticed that the store's
drawer was opened and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket (Ibid.,
pp. 16-17). 6
In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the credibility of prosecution witnesses Florencio Rondon
and Edilberto Batin by pointing out their alleged delay in revealing what they knew about the incident. He posits
that while the crime took place on April 15, 1991, it was only on September 17, 1991 when these witnesses
tagged him as the culprit.
We find these contentions bereft of merit. Appellant haphazardly concluded that Rondon and Batin implicated
the appellant to this gruesome crime only on September 17, 1991. The aforementioned date however, was
merely the date 7 when Rondon and Batin executed their respective affidavits, 8 narrating that they saw the
appellant on the night of April 15, 1991 carrying a bolo stained with blood and rushing out of Malaki's store. As
to appellant's claim of delay, suffice it to state that extant from the records are ample testimonial evidence
negating appellant's protestation, to wit: (1) after having discovered the commission of the crime, Rondon and
Batin immediately looked for Eutiquio Beloy, Malaki's brother-in-law, and informed him that appellant was the
only person they saw running away from the crime scene; 9 (2) Beloy and Batin reported the crime with the
CAFGU detachment in their barangay where Batin declared that it was appellant who robbed Malaki on that
fateful night; 10 and (3) Batin again made a similar statement later at the Silago Police Station.11
Next, appellant derided the non-presentation by the prosecution of the police blotter which could prove if
appellant was indeed implicated right away by Batin to the crime.12 We do not believe, however, that it was
necessary for the prosecution to present as evidence a copy of the aforementioned police blotter. Neither was
its non-presentation in court fatal to the prosecution's case. Entries in the police blotter are merely
corroborative evidence of the uncontroverted testimony of Batin that he identified the appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime before the Silago police. As such, its presentation as evidence is not
indispensable. 13 Besides, if appellant believed that he was not identified therein, then he should have secured
a copy thereof from the Silago Police Station and utilized the same as controverting evidence to impeach
Batin's credibility as witness. 14 Having failed to do so, appellant cannot now pass the blame on the
prosecution for something which appellant himself should have done.
Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified the appellant only on September 15, 1991, or after
the lapse of five months from commission of the crime, this fact alone does not render their testimony less
credible. The non-disclosure by the witness to the police officers of appellant's identity immediately after the
occurrence of the crime is not entirely against human experience. 15 In fact the natural reticence of most people
to get involved in criminal prosecutions against immediate neighbors, as in this case, 16 is of judicial
notice. 17 At any rate, the consistent teaching of our jurisprudence is that the findings of the trial court with
regard to the credibility of witnesses are given weight and the highest degree of respect by the appellate
court. 18 This is the established rule of evidence, as the matter of assigning values to the testimony of
witnesses is a function best performed by the trial court which can weigh said testimony in the light of the
witness" demeanor, conduct and attitude at the
trial. 19 And although the rule admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies in the
statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived at are clearly
unsupported by the evidence, 20 we found none in this case.
In his second assignment of error, appellant asseverates that the admission as evidence of Malaki's
wallet 21 together with its contents, viz., (1) Malaki's residence certificate; 22 (2) his identification card;23 and (3)
bunch of keys, 24 violates his right against self-incrimination. 25 Likewise, appellant sought for their exclusion
because during the custodial investigation, wherein he pointed to the investigating policemen the place where
he hid Malaki's wallet, he was not informed of his constitutional rights.
We are not persuaded. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no
application in this case. This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, 26 ". . . is a prohibition
of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . ." It is simply a prohibition
against legal process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. 27 It does
not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but
an object evidence. Wigmore, discussing the question now before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said:
If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control of his] own vocal
utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever form exercise, then, it would be possible
for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and
defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly
overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles — a
clear reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the
privilege, . . . but testimonial compulsion 28
Neither are we prepared to order the exclusion of the questioned pieces of evidence pursuant to the provision
of the Constitution under Article III, Section 12, viz:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof, shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him. (Emphasis ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
These are the so-called "Miranda rights" so oftenly disregarded by our men in uniform. However, infractions
thereof render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation.
The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by
law or rules, 29 is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation. Concededly,
appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have his own counsel by the investigating
policemen during the custodial investigation. Neither did he execute a written waiver of these rights in
accordance with the constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts do not affect the
admissibility of Malaki's wallet, identification card, residence certificate and keys for the purpose of establishing
other facts relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet
taken from Malaki on the night of the robbery. The identification card, residence certificate and keys found
inside the wallet, on the other hand, are admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki.
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the same will not
detract from appellant's culpability considering the existence of other evidence and circumstances establishing
appellant's identity and guilt as perpetrator of the crime charged.
We, now come to appellant's third assignment of error where he demurs on the prosecution's evidence,
contending that they are insufficient to sustain his conviction.
Our close scrutiny of the record reveals otherwise. Time and again, we ruled that there can be a verdict of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which
leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others, as the
perpetrator of the crime. 30 In order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must
comply with these essential requisites, viz., (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 31 In this case, there were at least five (5) circumstances constituting an
unbroken chain of events which by their "concordant combination and cumulative effect", satisfy the
requirements for the conviction of the appellant, 32 specifically: (1) appellant was seen by Rondon and Batin,
whose credibilities were untarnished, holding a bolo in his right hand and rushing out of Malaki's store seconds
prior to their discovery of the crime; 33 (2) Malaki sustained multiple stab wounds 34 and he died of "cardiac
arrest, secondary to severe external hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds", 35 (3) witness Elmer Ladica
saw the appellant on August 6, 1991, accompanied by some policemen, retrieve Malaki's wallet underneath a
stone at the seashore in Barangay Hingatungan; 36 (4) appellant himself admitted in his testimony that on
August 6, 1991, he accompanied several policemen to the seashore where he hid Malaki's wallet; 37 and (5)
appellant's flight and his subsequent disappearance from Hingatungan immediately after the incident. 38
On the other hand, appellant's version of the story does not inspire belief. He maintains that on that fateful
night he was in his house together with his wife. He claims that they had just arrived from a gambling spree
allegedly in the house of a certain Maui Petalcorin. Surprisingly, however, the defense did not bother to call
appellant's wife to the witness stand to corroborate appellant's alibi. Neither did it present as witness Maui
Petalcorin, or any other person who may have seen the appellant in the said place, if only to provide a
semblance of truth to this assertion. As the defense of alibi is weak in view of the positive identification of the
appellant by the prosecution witnesses, 39 it becomes weaker because of the unexplained failure of the
defense to present any corroboration. 40 Furthermore, proof that appellant was in his house when the crime
was committed is not enough. Appellant must likewise demonstrate that he could not have been physically
present at the place of the crime or in its vicinity, at the time of its commission. 41 In this case, appellant himself
admitted that his house was just about eighty (80) meters away from the house of
Malaki. 42 It was, therefore, not impossible for him to have been physically present at the place of the
commission of the crime, as in fact, no evidence to negate this possibility was ever adduced by him at the trial.
Appellant's insistence that he merely found Malaki's wallet by chance while gathering shells along the
seashore, and that he feared being implicated in the crime for which reason he hid the wallet underneath a
stone, hardly inspires belief. We are at a loss, just as the trial court was, as to why appellant should fear being
implicated in the crime if indeed he merely found Malaki's wallet by chance. No inference can be drawn from
appellant's purported apprehension other than the logical conclusion that appellant had knowledge of the
crime. Besides, proof that appellant is in possession of a stolen property gives rise to a valid presumption that
he stole the same. 43
In fine, as the killing of Malaki took place on the occasion of robbery, appellant was correctly convicted by the
trial court of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178196
August 6, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUDY BUDUHAN y BULLAN and ROBERT BUDUHAN y BULLAN, defendants-appellants.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 December 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 01940, which affirmed with modifications the Decision2 dated 24 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Maddela, Quirino, Branch 38, in Criminal Case No. 38-18, finding accused-appellants Robert
Buduhan y Bullan and Rudy Buduhan y Bullan guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide
with respect to the deceased Larry Erese, and of the crime of homicide with respect to the deceased
Romualde Almeron. The Court of Appeals ordered the payment of moral damages to the heirs of said victims,
in addition to the award already given by the trial court.
On 26 August 1998, an Information3 was filed against Robert Buduhan, Rudy Buduhan, Boy Guinhicna, Boyet
Ginyang and 3 John Does before the RTC of Maddela, Quirino, for the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
Frustrated Homicide. Docketed as Criminal Case No. 38-18, the accusatory portion of the information provides:
That on or about 10:40 o’clock in the evening of July 24, 1998 in Poblacion Norte, Municipality of
Maddela, Province of Quirino, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, four of them are armed and after first conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another and with force and violence did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
rob ROMUALDE ALMERON of his wallet and wrist watch and LARRY ERESE of his wrist watch to the
damage and prejudice of the said ROMUALDE ALMERON and LARRY ERESE;
That on the occasion of the Robbery, the said accused, armed with firearms of different caliber and
after first conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, shoot and fire upon ROMUALDE ALMERON, LARRY ERESE and
ORLANDO PASCUA resulting to their instanteneous (sic) death and the injuries to the persons of
FERNANDO PERA and GILBERT CORTEZ.
On 20 October 1998, the accused filed a Motion to Quash4 the above information, alleging that the court did
not legally acquire jurisdiction over their persons. The accused contended they were neither caught in flagrante
delicto, nor did the police have personal knowledge of the commission of the offense at the time when their
warrantless arrests were effected.5
In an Order dated 25 August 1999, the RTC denied the above motion on the ground that the assertion of lack
of personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officers regarding the commission of the crime is a matter of
defense, which should be properly taken up during the trial.6
When arraigned on 12 January 2000, the accused Rudy Buduhan, Robert Buduhan and Boyet Ginyang, with
the assistance of their counsel de oficio, entered their pleas of "Not Guilty" to the crime charged.7 With respect
to accused Boy Guinhicna, counsel for the accused informed the trial court of his death and thus moved for the
dismissal of the charges against him.8
On the same date, the pre-trial conference was terminated and both parties agreed on the following stipulation
of facts, namely:
1. That the incident transpired at about 10:40 in the evening of July 24, 1998;
2. That the incident happened at Poblacion Norte, Maddela, Quirino;
3. That no firearm has been confiscated from any of the accused.9
Upon the submission of accused Boy Guinhicna’s Certificate of Death,10 the RTC dismissed the case against
him on 14 February 2000.11 Thereafter, trial of the case ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Cherry Rose Salazar, an employee of the
establishment where the crime was committed12; (2) Senior Police Officer 1 (SPO1) Leo Saquing, a police
officer at the Maddela Police Station who investigated the crime committed13; (3) Dr. Fernando T. Melegrito,
the medical examiner who conducted the autopsies on the bodies of the victims14; (4) Myrna Almeron, the
widow of the victim Romualde Almeron15; and (5) Laurentino Erese, Sr., the father of the victim Larry Erese.16
The defense, on the other hand, presented: (1) appellant Robert Buduhan17; (2) accused Boyet Ginyang18; (3)
Police Inspector Ma. Leonora Chua-Camarao, a Forensic Chemist of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon City19; (4) appellant Rudy Buduhan20; and (5) Reynaldo Gumiho,
an eyewitness who was allegedly present at the scene of the crime shortly before the incident in question
occurred.21
The People’s version of the incident as narrated by its principal witness, Cherry Rose Salazar (Cherry Rose), is
as follows:
On 24 July 1998, Cherry Rose was working as a guest relations officer at the RML Canteen, a beerhouse and
a videoke bar in Maddela, Quirino.22 At about 9:00 to 10:00 p.m., there were only two groups of men inside the
beerhouse.23 The group that went there first was that of the appellants,24 which was composed of Robert
Buduhan, who was wearing a white T-shirt marked Giordano,25 Rudy Buduhan, who was wearing a red Tshirt,26 a man wearing a blue T-shirt,27 and another man wearing a blue T-shirt with a black jacket.28 The
second group was composed of Larry Erese and his companions Gilbert Cortez (alias Abe) and Fernando
Pera (alias Nanding).
At 10:40 p.m., while Cherry Rose was entertaining the group of Larry Erese, Robert approached them and
poked a gun at Larry.29 Immediately, the man wearing a blue T-shirt likewise approached Cherry Rose’s
Manager Romualde Almeron (alias Eddie), who was seated at the counter.30 The man in blue poked a gun at
Romualde and announced a hold-up.31 Larry then handed over his wristwatch to Robert. Instantaneously, all
four men from Robert’s group fired their guns at Larry and Romualde, which caused them to fall down.32 Abe
and Nanding ran out of the RML Canteen when the shooting occurred, and Cherry Rose hid below the table.33
SPO1 Leo T. Saquing34 testified that on 24 July 1998, at 11:00 p.m., he and SPO4 Alex M. Gumayagay were
detailed as duty investigators at the Maddela Police Station when Eddie Ancheta, a fireman, reported to them a
shooting incident at the RML Canteen in Barangay Poblacion Norte, Maddela, Quirino. SPO1 Saquing and
SPO4 Gumayagay then proceeded to the said place. About 50 meters from the scene of the crime, they
encountered four male individuals who were running away therefrom.35 The policemen immediately halted the
men and asked them where they came from. When they could not respond properly and gave different
answers, the policemen apprehended them and brought them to the Maddela Police Station for questioning
and identification.36 Afterwards, the policemen went back to the RML Canteen to conduct an investigation
therein.37 Later that night, the witnesses38 of the shooting incident went to the police station and they positively
pointed to the four persons, later identified as Robert Buduhan, Rudy Buduhan, Boy Guinhicna and Boyet
Ginyang, as the assailants in the said incident.39
Dr. Fernando Melegrito,40 the Chief of Hospital at the Maddela Hospital, testified that he conducted the
autopsies on the bodies of the victims Romualde Almeron, Larry Erese and Orlando Pascua.41 With respect to
Romualde, Dr. Melegrito found that the former sustained a gunshot wound 1/2 x 1/2 centimeter in diameter,
one inch above the right nipple, perforating the fourth rib of the right chest, penetrating the superior aspect of
the right lung, the aorta of the heart, the midportion of the left lung and exited through the back, two inches
below the lower portion of the left scapular region.42 These findings were also contained in Romualde
Almeron’s Autopsy Report.43 From the nature of the wound, Dr. Melegrito concluded that the victim was near
and was in front of the assailant when he was fatally shot.
As regards Larry Erese, Dr. Melegrito testified that said victim sustained a gunshot wound 1/2 x 1/2 centimeter
in diameter in the sternal region of the chest, between the third left and right rib, perforating the arch of the
aorta of the heart and penetrating the subcutaneous tissue of the left lower back at the level of the seventh rib,
where a slug (bullet)44 was extracted.45 These findings were likewise contained in Larry Erese’s Autopsy
Report.46
Concerning the victim Orlando Pascua, Dr. Melegrito testified that the gunshot wound that the former sustained
resulted into a massive disruption of the lung.47 As presented in Pascua’s Autopsy Report,48 the gunshot
wound was 1 x 1 inch in diameter, perforating the midportion of the fourth rib of the left chest, macerating the
three-fourth (3/4) portion of the left lung, and penetrating the subcutaneous tissues of the left back at the level
of the third and fourth ribs, then the fourth and fifth ribs where pellets were extracted therein.
Myrna Almeron49 testified that as a result of the untimely death of her husband Romualde Almeron, which fact
was evidenced by a Death Certificate,50 she incurred expenses for funeral services in the amount
of P38,000.00 and expenses during her husband’s wake in the amount of P25,000.00. She also claimed that
during the night of the shooting incident, Romualde brought with him the amount of P50,000.00 in his wallet,
but the same was no longer recovered. Among these figures, however, Myrna Almeron was only able to
present a receipt for the expenses for funeral services 51 and only in the amount of P26,000.00.
Laurentino Erese testified that during the wake of his deceased son, whose death was evidenced by a Death
Certificate,52 he incurred funeral expenses for Larry in the amount of P18,000.00.53 From the wake to the first
death anniversary, the total expenses were claimed to be more or less P100,000.00.54 However, only the
receipt for the above funeral services55 was offered.
The prosecution did not present the other surviving victims in the shooting incident, namely Gilbert Cortez and
Fernando Pera. The latter were fearful of reprisals from unknown individuals. No evidence was likewise
adduced on their behalf. Also, the other employees who worked as guest relations officers in the RML Canteen
and who likewise witnessed the incident were said to have absconded already.56
For the defense, appellant Robert Buduhan57 testified that on the evening of 24 July 1998, he was at their
boarding house in Poblacion, Maddela, Quirino, together with Rudy Buduhan, Boyet Ginyang, and Boy
Guinhicna. The group drank one bottle of San Miguel Gin, and then went to sleep. Unknown to him and
Guinhicna, Rudy and Ginyang still went out to continue their drinking sessions. While he was sleeping,
Ginyang arrived and woke him up. Ginyang told him that they had to go to the beerhouse where he (Ginyang)
and Rudy had been to because something might have happened to Rudy, as there was a fight there. Robert,
Ginyang and Guinhicna then proceeded to look for Rudy. On their way there, at the junction of the National
Highway, they encountered some policemen who asked them where they were headed. When Robert said that
they were looking for Rudy, the policemen told them to board the police vehicle and the group was given a
ride. As it turned out, Robert’s group was taken to the Municipal Jail of Maddela where they were detained.
The policemen went out to look for Rudy and they likewise put him in jail. The following day, the policemen
confiscated the shirts worn by the group. They were also taken to Santiago City where paraffin tests were
conducted. On the evening of 26 July 1998, the policemen went to the jail with three ladies who were asked to
identify Robert’s group. The ladies, however, did not recognize Robert and his companions.
Boyet Ginyang58 testified that on 24 July 1998, at 10:00 p.m., he and Rudy went to a beerhouse in Maddela,
Quirino. After ordering some drinks and chatting, they suddenly heard gunshots from the outside. Looking
towards the direction of the sound, he saw somebody fall to the ground and at that point, he and Rudy ran to
get away from the place. While running towards their boarding house, Rudy was stopped by an unknown
armed person in a white T-shirt. When Ginyang reached the boarding house, he roused appellant Robert and
Guinhicna from their sleep and asked them to go with him and search for Rudy. Upon reaching the junction at
the National Highway, they were halted by a man who asked where they were heading. After hearing their
story, the man said they should wait for a vehicle that would help them look for Rudy. When the vehicle arrived,
he and the others were brought to the municipal jail. Thereafter, Rudy was likewise picked up by the police and
detained with the group. On the morning of 25 July 1998, three ladies were brought to the municipal jail to
identify his group, but the former did not recognize them. On the morning of 26 July 1998, Ginyang and his
three companions were brought to Santiago City where they were made to undergo paraffin testing.
Afterwards, the group was brought back to the municipal jail in Maddela, Quirino. Ginyang also testified that
the policemen took the shirts they wore on the night of 24 July 1998, but he could not remember when they
did.
Police Inspector Maria Leonora Chua-Camarao59 testified that she was the one who conducted the
examination proper of the paraffin casts taken from Robert Buduhan, Rudy Buduhan, Boyet Ginyang and Boy
Guinhicna. She likewise brought before the trial court the original Letter Request60 of the Maddela Police
Station for the conduct of paraffin casting; the Letter of Request61 addressed to the Officer-in-Charge the PNP
Crime Laboratory in Region 2 for the conduct of paraffin examination; and the paraffin casts of subjects Rudy,
Ginyang, Guinhicna and Robert.62 Police Inspector Chua-Camarao explained that the purpose of conducting a
paraffin test was to determine the presence of gunpowder residue in the hands of a person through extraction
using paraffin wax. The process involves two stages: first, the paraffin casting, in which the hands of the
subject are covered with paraffin wax to extract gunpowder residue; and second, the paraffin examination per
se, which refers to the actual chemical examination to determine whether or not gunpowder residue has indeed
been extracted. For the second stage, the method used is the diphenyl amine test, wherein the diphenyl amine
agent is poured on the paraffin casts of the subject’s hands. In this test, a positive result occurs when blue
specks are produced in the paraffin casts, which then indicates the presence of gunpowder residue. When no
such reaction takes place, the result is negative.
The findings and conclusion on the paraffin test that Police Inspector Chua-Camarao conducted were
contained in Physical Science Report No. C-25-9863 which yielded a negative result for all the four accused.
Nonetheless, the forensic chemist pointed out that the paraffin test is merely a corroborative evidence, neither
proving nor disproving that a person did indeed fire a gun. The positive or negative results of the test can be
influenced by certain factors, such as the wearing of gloves by the subject, perspiration of the hands, wind
direction, wind velocity, humidity, climate conditions, the length of the barrel of the firearm or the open or
closed trigger guard of the firearm.64
Appellant Rudy Buduhan testified that at past 10:00 p.m. of 24 July 1998, he and Ginyang went to a
beerhouse. Shortly after ordering their drinks, they heard gunshots, and a person seated near the door fell.
They then ran towards the road.65 While running, an armed man wearing a white T-shirt held him, while
Ginyang was able to get away.66 After a while, the police arrived and they took him to the Maddela police
station where he was jailed along with Robert, Ginyang and Guinhicna.67 The rest of his testimony merely
corroborated the testimonies of Robert and Ginyang.
Reynaldo Gumiho (Reynaldo)68 testified that on the evening of 24 July 1998, he was in Poblacion, Maddela,
Quirino, for a business transaction involving the sale of a 6x6 truck with a certain alias Boy. At about 8:00 p.m.,
Reynaldo and Boy proceeded to a beerhouse in Maddela. After settling with their drinks, Reynaldo heard a
group of five men near their table who were conversing and he recognized from the accent of their voices that
they were from Lagawe (Ifugao). One of the men then told him that they should leave after finishing their drinks
because the former were looking for someone who killed their relative. Reynaldo disclosed that he recognized
one of the persons whom he usually saw in Lagawe, and that the group was composed of relatively tall people
who were mostly wearing jackets. Not long after, Reynaldo and Boy left the beerhouse so as not to get
involved in any trouble. Two days after he left Maddela, Reynaldo learned of the shooting incident in the
beerhouse.
In a Decision dated 24 July 2003, the trial court found appellants guilty of the charges, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court renders judgment as follows:
1) Finding accused Robert and Rudy, both surnamed Buduhan, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide (Par. 1 Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code)
with respect to the deceased Larry Erese and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua;
2) As to the victim Romualde Almeron, the court also finds them GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Homicide (Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code) and sentences each of them to the indeterminate
penalty of 12 years of Prision Mayor as minimum to 20 years of Reclusion Temporal as maximum;
However, they shall be entitled to a deduction of their preventive imprisonment from the term of their
sentences in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6127.
3) To pay jointly the heirs of Larry Erese the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000 as
exemplary damages, P18,000 as actual expenses and P5,000 as temperate damages; and the heirs of
Mr. Almeron: P50,000 as civil indemnity, P25,000 as exemplary damages, P38,000.00 as actual
expenses and P5,000.00 as temperate damages.
With costs against them.
However, with respect to accused Boyet Ginyang, the court ACQUITS him of the offense charged since
the prosecution had failed to overcome, with the required quantum of evidence, the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Consequently, the Chief of the BJMP, Cabarroguis, Quirino, is hereby
ordered to immediately release him from confinement unless being held for some other lawful cause;
and to make a report hereon within three (3) days from receipt hereof.69
On 1 August 2003, the appellants filed a Notice of Appeal70 raising questions of law and facts.
On 7 June 2004, the Court initially resolved to accept the appeal, docketed as G.R. No. 159843,71 and required
the appellants to file their Brief.72
However, on 5 October 2005, we resolved to transfer the case to the Court of Appeals in view of our ruling in
People v. Mateo.73 The case was then docketed as CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01940.
On 29 December 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the July 24, 2003 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Maddela, Quirino, Branch 38, in Civil Case No. 39-18, is hereby MODIFIED only in that, in addition to
the award already given by the trial court, in consonance with current jurisprudence, the heirs of
ERESE are also entitled to moral damages of P50,000 and in addition to the award already given by
the trial court, the heirs of ALMERON are also entitled to moral damages of P50,000.00.
Pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure as amended by A.M. No.
00-5-03-SC dated September 28, 2004, which became effective on October 15, 2004, this judgment of
the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of
Court of the Court of Appeals.74
From the Court of Appeals, the case was then elevated to this Court for automatic review. In a
Resolution75 dated 5 September 2007, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if
they so desired, within 30 days from notice.
In a Manifestation76 filed on 30 October 2007, the People informed the Court that it will no longer file a
supplemental brief, as the arguments raised by appellants had already been discussed in the brief77 filed
before the Court of Appeals.
Appellants, on the other hand, filed their supplemental brief on 28 November 2007.
As a final plea for their innocence, appellants ask this Court to consider the following assignment of errors:
I.
IN GIVING COMPLETE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PRINCIPAL WITNESS OF THE
PROSECUTION DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF FACTS TAINTING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE
WITNESS.
II.
IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE OF THE APPELLANTS, WHICH WAS CORROBORATED BY
THE FINDINGS OF THE FORENSIC CHEMIST.
III.
IN FAILING TO MAKE A DIRECT RULING ON THE MOTION OF THE ACCUSED TO QUASH THE
INFORMATION ON THE GROUND THAT THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED WITHOUT A WARRANT
OF ARREST IS ILLEGAL AS THERE WAS NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ARRESTING
OFFICERS REGARDING THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
To state differently, appellants argue that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt in view of the trial
court’s error in the appreciation of the evidence for and against them. They fault the trial court’s over-reliance
on the testimony of the prosecution’s main witness and its failure to consider the glaring inconsistencies in
Cherry Rose’s previous accounts of the shooting incident.
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellants insist that Cherry Rose is not a credible witness in view of the conflicting answers she gave in her
sworn statement before the police,78 in the preliminary investigation of the case and in her testimony in open
court. They contend that the trial court failed to scrutinize the entirety of the statements made by Cherry Rose
vis-à-vis the shooting incident.
Appellants called attention to the fact that during the preliminary investigation of the case, Cherry Rose stated
that a man wearing a white Giordano T-shirt shot Larry after Larry handed his wristwatch.79 Thereafter, when
Cherry Rose was asked whom she saw wearing a white Giordano T-shirt, she pointed to Boy
Guinhicna.80 With respect to appellant Robert Buduhan, Cherry Rose identified him as the one who shot
Orlando Pascua.81
In the testimony of Cherry Rose in open court, however, she identified appellant Robert as the man who was
wearing a white Giordano T-shirt and who shot Larry Erese.82
Also, in Cherry Rose’s sworn statement before the police, she narrated that the group of the appellants,
consisting of five persons, was already inside the RML Canteen before the shooting incident
occured.83 However, in her direct examination, Cherry Rose stated that appellant Robert had only three other
companions.84
Finally, in the preliminary investigation, appellants pointed out that Cherry Rose unhesitatingly admitted that
Larry Erese was her intimate boyfriend and that was why she embraced him after the latter was shot.85
In her cross-examination, however, Cherry Rose stated that Larry was only a customer and not her
boyfriend.86 When questioned about her prior statement about this fact given during the preliminary
investigation, Cherry Rose changed her answer and said that Larry was indeed her boyfriend.87
Taking all these circumstances into account, appellants argue that, judging from the conflicting statements of
Cherry Rose, the identification of the accused is highly doubtful.
We are not persuaded.
As between statements made during the preliminary investigation of the case and the testimony of a witness in
open court, the latter deserves more credence. Preliminary investigations are commonly fairly summary or
truncated in nature, being designed simply for the determination, not of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but of
probable cause prior to the filing of an information in court. It is the statements of a witness in open court which
deserve careful consideration.88
In any event, Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, on the matter of inconsistent statements
by a witness, is revealing:
Section 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements. — Before a witness can
be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and
the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to
explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is
put to him concerning them.
The rule that requires a sufficient foundation to be first laid before introducing evidence of inconsistent
statements of a witness is founded upon common sense and is essential to protect the character of a witness.
His memory is refreshed by the necessary inquiries, which enable him to explain the statements referred to
and to show that they were made by mistake, or that there was no discrepancy between them and his
testimony.89
In the present case, the statements made by Cherry Rose during the preliminary investigation with respect to
the identities of the accused were not related to her during the trial. Indeed, it is only during the appeal of this
case that appellants pointed out the supposed inconsistencies in Cherry Rose’s identification of the appellants
in order to destroy her credibility as a witness. No opportunity was ever afforded her to provide an explanation.
Without such explanation, whether plausible or not, we are left with no basis to evaluate and assess her
credibility, on the rationale that it is only when no reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling
her conflicting declarations that she should be deemed impeached.90
In this regard, what the defense brought to Cherry Rose’s attention during the trial were her contradictory
statements about her romantic relationship with Larry Erese. As a result of this confrontation, Cherry Rose
changed her answer. We rule, however, that this inconsistency relates only to an insignificant aspect of the
case and does not involve a material fact in dispute.
Inasmuch as the above-stated mandatory procedural requirements were not complied with, the credibility of
Cherry Rose as a witness stands unimpeached. As found by the trial court, the testimony of Cherry Rose was
straightforward throughout. The appellants were not able to adduce any reason or motive for her to bear false
witness against them. As a matter of fact, Cherry Rose testified during cross-examination that she did not
personally know appellant Robert, and that she had first seen him only during the night when the shooting
incident took place.91
As the trial judge who penned the assailed decision did not hear the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution,92 the rule granting finality to the factual findings of trial courts does not find applicability to the
instant case.93
After a careful review of the entire records of this case, the Court finds no reason to disagree with the factual
findings of the trial court that all the elements of the crime of Robbery with Homicide were present and proved
in this case.
Robbery with Homicide is penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code,94 which
provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons-Penalties. – Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime
of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson.
To warrant conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, one that is primarily classified as a crime against
property and not against persons, the prosecution has to firmly establish the following elements: (1) the taking
of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against the person; (2) the property thus taken
belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) on the occasion
of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic sense, is
committed.95
In Robbery with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur before, during or
after the robbery. It is immaterial that death would supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of homicide is
other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once a homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide.96
The original design must have been robbery; and the homicide, even if it precedes or is subsequent to the
robbery, must have a direct relation to, or must be perpetrated with a view to consummate, the robbery. The
taking of the property should not be merely an afterthought, which arose subsequently to the killing.97
With respect to the elements of the crime, the following excerpts from the direct testimony of Cherry Rose
clearly illustrates the same, viz:
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR FERDINAND D. ORIAS –
Q: At that night of July 24, 1998 at around 10:40 in the evening, what were you doing at RML
Canteen?
A:
I was entertaining a costumer sir. (nakatable)
xxxx
Q:
Who was that person who requested you to entertain him?
A:
Larry Erese sir.
Q:
Do you recall if this Larry Erese have a companions (sic) that time?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Name them?
A:
Abe at Nanding sir.
Q:
That night while you were entertaining them, this three (3) what transpired next?
A:
An Ifugao approached us sir and he poke a gun at Larry Erese sir.
Q:
And what did Larry Erese do when a gun was poke at him?
A:
He gave his wrist watch sir.
Q:
To whom did Larry Erese gave his wrist watch?
A:
To the Ifugao who poke a gun at him sir.
xxxx
Q:
Will you please go around and see if he is inside the courtroom and point at him?
A: The witness is pointing to a man [seated] at the back bench of the court and when asked about his
name he answered Robert Buduhan.
xxxx
Q:
What was the attire of Robert Buduhan at that time?
A:
White T-shirt sir.
Q: Can you name or can you recall any particular description of that T-shirt worn by Robert Buduhan
at that time?
xxxx
A:
It was marked with Giordano sir.
xxxx
Q: When Robert Buduhan approached Larry Erese and Larry Erese gave his wrist watch, do you
recall if Robert Buduhan have a companions (sic) at that time?
A:
There was sir.
Q:
How many of them?
A:
Four (4) sir.
xxxx
Q: Where are these companions of Robert Buduhan at the time Robert Buduhan poke a gun at Larry
Erese?
A:
The other one was there to my Manager [Romualde] Eddie Almeron sir.
Q:
What was the attire of this person who approached Eddie Almeron, your Manager?
A:
He was in blue sir.
xxxx
Q:
He wore blue T-shirt?
A:
Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q:
What about the other two (2) companions of Robert Buduhan where are they?
A:
They were inside sir.
Q:
The first of the two (2) what is the attire?
A:
Color red sir.
Q:
What about the last one?
A:
He was in blue T-shirt and with black jacket sir.
xxxx
Q: The person in red T-shirt whom you claim the companion of Robert Buduhan, can you identify
him?
A:
Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q:
Stand and point at him?
A: Witness pointed one of the accused sitting infront and when asked about his name he answered
Rudy Buduhan.
xxxx
Q: You mention about a person wearing blue T-shirt who approached your Manager Eddie Almeron.
What did he do first before he approached your Manager if [any]?
A:
He poke a gun at our Manager sir.
Q:
What did he tell to you (sic) Manager if any while poking a gun?
A:
Holdup sir.
Q: Are they simultaneous in approaching Larry Erese and Eddie Almeron, this person in blue T-shirt
and the accused Robert Buduhan?
A:
No, sir. Robert Buduhan approached first.
Q:
And then the person in blue T-shirt likewise approached Eddie Almeron?
A:
Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: What transpired first before Larry Erese gave his wrist watch. The announcement of holdup or the
giving of his wrist watch?
A:
The announcement of the holdup comes first sir.
Q: When Larry Erese gave his watch to Robert Buduhan with Robert Buduhan poking a gun at Larry
Erese, what transpired next?
A:
They fired sir.
Q:
Who fired?
A:
All of them sir.
xxxx
Q:
You mentioned a while ago that Robert Buduhan poke a gun at Larry Erese?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Do you know the caliber of the gun?
A:
It looks like a 38 but it is long sir.
Q:
You likewise mention that the person in blue T-shirt poke a gun at Eddie Almeron?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
What about the person in red?
A:
It looks like an armalite sir.
Q:
What about the person in blue T-shirt with black jacket?
A:
Armalite sir.
Q:
When Rudy Buduhan fired his gun was there any person who was hit?
A:
There was sir.
Q:
Name that person?
A:
Larry Erese sir.
Q: When the person in blue T-shirt who was poking a gun at Eddie Almeron fired his gun was there
any person who was hit?
A:
There was sir.
Q:
Who was that person who was hit?
A:
Eddie Almeron sir.
xxxx
Q:
How far is Robert Buduhan from Larry Erese when Robert Buduhan fired his gun?
A:
He was arms like sir.
Q: You mention also about a person in blue T-shirt fired a gun at Eddie Almeron. How far was he
from Eddie Almeron when he fired his gun?
A:
The witness pointed to a place in the courtroom.
xxxx
COURT –
About 2 to 3 meters?
PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR FERDINAND D. ORIAS –
Yes, 2 to 3 meters.
xxxx
Q:
Do you know what happened to Larry Erese?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Where is he now?
A:
He was dead already sir.
Q:
What about Eddie Almeron. Do you know what happened to him?
A:
He was also dead sir.98
Quite obvious from the foregoing testimony is that the act of appellant Robert and his companion in blue T-shirt
of poking their guns towards Larry and Romualde, respectively, and the announcement of a hold-up were what
caused Larry to give his watch to Robert. At this point, there already occurred the taking of personal property
that belonged to another person, which was committed with violence or intimidation against persons.
Likewise, the intent to gain may already be presumed in this case. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an
internal act, which can be established through the overt acts of the offender.99 The unlawful act of the taking of
Larry’s watch at gunpoint after the declaration of a hold-up already speaks well enough for itself. No other
intent may be gleaned from the acts of the appellant’s group at that moment other than to divest Larry of his
personal property.
The appellants acted in conspiracy in perpetrating the crimes charged. As found by the trial court, conspiracy
was proved by the concurrence of the following facts: that the four men were together when they entered the
RML canteen; that they occupied the same table; that they were all armed during that time; that while the
robbery was in progress, neither Rudy nor the one in blue T-shirt with black jacket prevented the robbery or the
killing of the victims; that all four fired their firearms when the robbery was going on and that they fled all
together and were seen running by the police before they were intercepted just a few meters from the scene of
the crime.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. The same degree of proof necessary to prove the crime is required to support a
finding of criminal conspiracy. Direct proof, however, is not essential to show conspiracy.100 Proof of concerted
action before, during and after the crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and objective is sufficient.101
As the fatal shooting of both Larry Erese and Romualde Almeron happened on the occasion of the robbery and
was subsequent thereto, both of the appellants must be held liable for the crime of Robbery with Homicide on
two counts.
The defense of appellants of alibi is at best weak when faced with the positive identification of the appellants
by the prosecution’s principal witness. It is elemental that for alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and
place must be strictly met. This means that the accused must not only prove his presence at another place at
the time of the commission of the offense but he must also demonstrate that it would be physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime at that time.102 In the present case, there was absolutely no claim of any
fact that would show that it was well nigh impossible for appellants to be present at the locus criminis. In fact,
they all testified that they were going towards the vicinity of the area of the shooting incident when the police
apprehended them.
The testimonies of Robert Buduhan and Boyet Ginyang were also markedly inconsistent on the material date
as to when the witnesses in the shooting incident identified them. Robert Buduhan testified that the three lady
witnesses came to identify them at the municipal jail on the evening of 26 July 1998.103 However, in the direct
examination of Boyet Ginyang, he testified that said witnesses arrived on the morning of 25 July 1998.104 This
fact only tends to lend suspicion to their already weak alibi.
Appellants likewise cannot rely on the negative findings of Police Inspector Chua-Camarao on the paraffin
tests conducted in order to exculpate themselves. The said witness herself promptly stated that paraffin test
results are merely corroborative of the major evidence offered by any party, and they are not conclusive with
respect to the issue of whether or not the subjects did indeed fire a gun. As previously mentioned, the positive
and negative results of the paraffin test can also be influenced by certain factors affecting the conditions
surrounding the use of the firearm, namely: the wearing of gloves by the subject, perspiration of the hands,
wind direction, wind velocity, humidity, climate conditions, the length of the barrel of the firearm or the open or
closed trigger guard of the firearm.
Lastly, the persistent claim of appellants of the illegality of their warrantless arrest, due to the lack of personal
knowledge on the part of the arresting officers, deserves scant consideration. As aptly stated in People v.
Salazar,105 granting arguendo that appellants were illegally arrested, such arrest did not invest these
eyewitness accounts with constitutional infirmity as "fruits of the poisonous tree." Considering that their
conviction could be secured on the strength of the testimonial evidence given in open court, which are not
inadmissible in evidence, the court finds no reason to further belabor the matter.
A determination of the appropriate imposable penalties is now in order.
The prescribed penalty for Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
is reclusion perpetua to death. In accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the law
prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals thus correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As regards the charge for the death of Orlando Pascua and the injuries sustained by Fernando Pera and
Gilbert Cortez, the trial court aptly held that the prosecution failed to substantiate the same. No witnesses were
presented to testify as to the circumstances leading to the said incidents, and neither were they proved to be
caused by the criminal actions of the appellants.
The two courts below committed a mistake, however, in convicting the appellants separately of the crime of
Homicide for the death of Romualde Almeron. It bears stressing that in the special complex crime of Robbery
with Homicide, so long as the intention of the felon is to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the
robbery. It is immaterial that death would supervene by mere accident, or that the victim of homicide is other
than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed. Once a homicide is committed by reason or
on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.106
As to the award of damages, we hold that the heirs of Larry Erese and Romualde Almeron are each entitled to
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto. This award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is
granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. 107
We agree with the Court of Appeals’ grant of moral damages in this case even in the absence of proof for the
entitlement to the same. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and
necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family. It is inherently human to
suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing.108 The
heirs of Erese and Almeron are thus entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 each.
On the award of actual damages, we hold that the heirs of Larry Erese are entitled to the award of temperate
damages for P25,000.00, in lieu of the lower amount of P18,000 that was substantiated by a receipt. In People
v. Villanueva,109 we have laid down the rule that when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial
amount to less than P25,000.00, the award of temperate damages for P25,000.00 is justified in lieu of actual
damages of a lesser amount. Conversely, if the amount of actual damages proven exceeds P25,000.00, then
temperate damages may no longer be awarded. Actual damages based on the receipts presented during trial
should instead be granted.
However, with respect to the award of the amount of P38,000.00 to the heirs of Romualde Almeron, the same
is incorrect since the receipt presented therefor covers only the amount of P26,000.00. The award of actual
damages should be reduced accordingly. The grant of temperate damages to the heirs of Almeron is thus
deleted.
The award of exemplary damages is likewise deleted, as the presence of any aggravating circumstance was
neither alleged nor proved in this case.110
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated 29 December 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-HC No. 01940 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. For the death of Larry Erese, appellants Robert Buduhan y Bullan and Rudy Buduhan y Bullan are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced each to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
2. For the death of Romualde Almeron, appellants Robert Buduhan y Bullan and Rudy Buduhan y
Bullan are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced each to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
3. Appellants shall be entitled to a deduction of their preventive imprisonment from the term of their
sentences in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
6127.
4. Appellants are ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Larry Erese as follows:
(a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) P25,000.00 as temperate
damages.
5. Appellants are ordered to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of Romualde Almeron as follows:
(a) P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P50,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) P26,000.00 as actual
damages.
6. For reasons herein stated, appellants are ACQUITTED of the separate crime of Homicide for the
death of Romualde Almeron.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 138534
March 17, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
SPO1 VIRGILIO G. BRECINIO, appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision1 dated October 15, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz,
Laguna, Branch 28, in Criminal Case No. SC-6476, finding herein appellant, SPO1 Virgilio G. Brecinio, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the killing of one Alberto Pagtananan.
Appellant Brecinio was originally charged with homicide thru reckless imprudence in the Municipal Trial Court
of Pagsanjan, Laguna by the PNP Chief of Police of Pagsanjan, Laguna.2 However, upon intervention of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and after a re-investigation conducted by the Office of the Laguna
Provincial Prosecutor, the charge against the appellant was upgraded to murder:3
That on the 30th day of June 1996, more or less 6:00 o’clock in the evening, inside the Municipal Jail,
Municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, while conveniently armed with a
service firearm Colt Caliber .45 with SN 531333, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot
ALBERTO PAGTANANAN, a jail inmate, who was then caught unaware and was hit on the upper quadrant
medical clavicular line, resulting in his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.
That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
Contrary to law.
Arraigned on May 21, 1997, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge.4
The version of the prosecution revolved basically around the testimonies of the two eyewitnesses, Robinson
Arbilo5 and Filomeno Mapalad, Jr.,6 with supplementary testimonies from Dr. Levy Abad,7 the municipal health
officer of Pagsanjan, Laguna, Dr. Arsenio de Roma8 of the Laguna Provincial Hospital who examined the
victim and declared him dead on arrival, Atty. Rogelio G. Munar9 of the NBI and Elpidia PagtanananBarcelona,10 the sister of the victim.
Robinson Arbilo testified that, at around 5:00 p.m., on June 30, 1996, he was with inmates Sammy Bolanos,
Rafael Morales, Edwin Maceda, Filomeno Mapalad, Jr. and victim Alberto Pagtananan inside the Pagsanjan
municipal jail, cell no. 1, when appellant SPO1 Virgilio Brecinio, who was drunk, arrived. Appellant entered
their cell and asked for their names, and the reasons for their detention. After answering, each of them
received a blow in the stomach from the appellant for no apparent reason. Thereafter, appellant ordered them
to bring out all their belongings from their cell. While doing so, they were hit with whatever object the former
could get hold of.
Appellant proceeded to the comfort room and, as he emerged therefrom, he saw the victim Alberto
Pagtananan also coming out. Appellant confronted the victim and asked him where he came from. The victim
answered that he had just urinated. Apparently not believing him, appellant accused the victim of "hiding" and
"making a fool of him." The victim innocently replied "hindi naman po." Irritated by the answer, appellant
berated the victim and when the latter looked at him, he asked, "Ba’t ang sama mong tumingin?" The victim did
not reply. Appellant punched the victim in the stomach but still the latter said nothing.
Appellant pulled out his .45 caliber pistol tucked on his right waist and fired it twice in succession. The first shot
was directed upward; the second downward. The inmates inside the cell were all cowering in fear and were
huddled together in one corner of the bed, covering their ears. Witness Arbilo who was merely one-and-a-half
meters in front of the appellant then saw the latter aim his gun at the victim and fire the third shot, hitting the
victim in the stomach. Seeing the victim lying prostrate on the ground, the inmates lifted and laid him on the
bed. At that juncture, appellant, who was standing in front of the inmates, reholstered his gun on his waist and
ordered them to get water for the victim. SPO1 Bayani Montessur then arrived and ordered the victim to be
brought to a nearby hospital but the latter was declared dead on arrival.
Filomeno Mapalad, Jr. corroborated the testimony of Robinson Arbilo. From a distance of only three meters
behind the appellant, he saw the latter fire the third shot at the victim. He also declared that there was no truth
to the statement in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated June 30, 1996 that the appellant slipped on the floor,
causing the gun to fall and fire accidentally, hitting Pagtananan in the stomach. SPO1 Montessur, a colleague
of appellant, prepared the said affidavit and, after getting his name and address, forced him to sign it. He
signed the affidavit out of fear of the appellant who threatened to kill him if he did not cooperate.
After his release from detention, Mapalad went to the NBI and gave his statement on what actually transpired.
Dr. Levy Abad, municipal health officer of Pagsanjan, Laguna, conducted the post-mortem examination on the
body of the victim. He found that the victim sustained one gunshot wound in the stomach and that the cause of
death was shock and severe internal hemorrhage.
Atty. Rogelio G. Munar, Ballistician V and Chief of the Firearm Investigation Division of the NBI, testified on
Report No. 411-10-796 submitted by his subordinate, Ireneo Ordiano, who could not testify in court as he had
suffered a mild stroke and still encountered difficulty in speaking. He testified on the result of the ballistics
examination which revealed that the slug recovered from the body of the victim Alberto Pagtananan was a .45
caliber copper-jacketed bullet.
Elpidia P. Barcelona, the sister of the victim, testified on the expenses incurred by their family as a result of her
brother’s death. According to her, the family spent ₱25,000 for the funeral services and food served during the
wake, ₱10,000 for the coffin and ₱50,000 for transportation expenses in going to the NBI, plus other expenses.
Contrary to the prosecution’s version, appellant claimed that the shooting was accidental. He declared that he
had just gone out of the comfort room and was about to tuck his .45 caliber pistol in its holster on his waist
when he slipped on the wet floor, causing the gun to drop and fire. After picking up the gun, Eric Garcia, an
inmate, called his attention to the fact that one of the inmates had been hit. He immediately went to the
detention cell and saw the victim, Alberto Pagtananan, lying down with a wound in his stomach. He called
Filomeno Mapalad Jr. and ordered him to bring the victim to the hospital. He was not able to go with the group
as he was immediately placed under arrest.
On cross-examination, appellant testified that his pistol was in good condition and was always loaded and
cocked. Appellant also testified that when his gun fired, it hit the cement wall. Appellant further testified that, in
order to assuage the feelings of the victim’s relatives, his wife sent a cavan of rice, coffee and sugar. They also
tried to amicably settle the case with the family of the victim but were turned down.11
NBI forensic chemist Emilia Andro-Rosaldes was also presented by the defense to testify on the result of the
paraffin examination conducted on the appellant on July 2, 1996, two days after the alleged shooting incident.
She testified that it was Mrs. Gemma Orbeta who made the paraffin cast on the appellant and her only
participation was the examination of the paraffin cast taken from the appellant. According to her, there are four
factors that can affect the presence of gun powder residue in the hands of a person who fires a gun, namely,
the length of the barrel of the gun, the wind velocity, the direction of the shot(s) and the type and caliber of
ammunition. She also declared that the application of paraffin wax to make the paraffin cast can remove
gunpowder residue. She did not know whether paraffin wax had been applied on the hands of the appellant
before the paraffin cast was made.12
The trial court, after weighing the evidence presented by both sides, gave no credence to the version of the
appellant. On October 15, 1998, a decision was rendered, convicting appellant of the crime of murder. The
dispositive portion read:
WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds the accused
SPO1 VIRGILIO BRECINIO y GASTON GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER, defined and punished
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by the Death Penalty Law, but appreciating in his
favor the mitigating circumstance of VOLUNTARY SURRENDER, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the heirs of the deceased-victim ALBERTO PAGTANANAN the sum of
₱50,000.00 as indemnity for his death and the sum of ₱25,000.00 as expenses during the wake and to pay the
costs of the instant suit.
The accused shall further suffer the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal. Appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder and that, if an
offense was indeed committed, it was only reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
A careful evaluation of the records shows that the court a quo was correct in finding appellant guilty of killing
the victim.
We reiterate the familiar and well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses deserve great weight, given the clear advantage of the trial judge (an opportunity not available to the
appellate court) in the appreciation of testimonial evidence. The trial judge personally hears the witnesses and
observes their deportment and manner of testifying. Although the rule admits of certain exceptions, we find no
reason to hold otherwise in the present case.13
As found by the trial court – and we agree – both prosecution witnesses were credible. They gave a steadfast
and credible narration of what they witnessed in a manner reflective of a candid and unrehearsed testimony.
Robinson Arbilo, who stood only one-and-a-half meters in front of the assailant, was very direct, clear and
spontaneous in describing how the appellant shot the victim. His testimony was:
TRIAL PROSECUTION:
Q What happened next when you heard that second shot?
A I saw that Brecinio poked his gun on Pagtananan and fired it.
Q Tell us your relative position from Pagtananan when you saw Brecinio poked his gun at him and
fired?
A We were all seated on the bed, sir.
Q On your side, who is the person on your left side?
A Edwin Maceda, sir.
Q On your right side?
A Nobody because I was seated near the wall, sir.
Q Who was at the left side of Edwin Maceda?
A Sammy Bolanos, sir.
Q How about the person on the left side of Sammy Bolanos?
A Alberto Pagtananan, sir.
Q And on the left side of Alberto Pagtananan?
A Rafael Morales, sir.
Q Were you able to actually see Brecinio poked (sic) a gun where Pagtananan was sitting at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q Tell us how you were able to see Brecinio poked (sic) that particular gun to Pagtananan
A I was seated in a stooping position my hands in both ears but I was looking at Brecinio, sir.
Q What happened next when you saw Brecinio poking a gun at Pagtananan and according to you
heard a gun fire?
A Pagtananan sl[u]mped on the floor, sir.14
Filomeno Mapalad Jr., who was merely three meters behind the appellant, also gave a positive,
straightforward and unequivocal account of what happened. The pertinent portion of his testimony was:
TRIAL PROSECUTOR:
Q And what happened next when Brecinio went outside while Pagtananan went inside the comfort
room?
A Brecinio went out from the comfort room and proceeded inside the cell.
Q And when he was already inside the cell what happened next?
A It was on that occasion when Pagtananan went out coming from the comfort room.
Q And what happened next after Pagtananan went outside coming from the comfort room?
A Brecinio got mad at Pagtananan, sir.
Q How did you come to know that Brecinio got mad at Pagtananan?
A Brecinio said the words, "Niloloko mo ba ako?"
Q And was there any reply from Pagtananan?
A No reply, sir.
Q And what happened when Pagtananan did not reply on the comment of Brecinio?
A Brecinio pulled out a gun from his waist, sir.
Q And what did he do with that gun that he pulled from his waist?
A He fired it, sir.
Q Towards what direction?
A Upward direction, sir.
Q And after firing that first shot towards that upward direction, what else did he do?
A He fired again downwards, sir
Q To whom was that second shot aimed or pointed?
A Downwards direction, sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q How about the third shot?
A It was aimed at Pagtananan, sir?
Q And what is the position of Pagtananan at that time?
A He was just seated, sir.
Q How did you come to know that that third shot was aimed and pointed to Pagtananan?
A I saw it, sir.15
The appellant, in an attempt to impugn the credibility of prosecution witness Filomeno Mapalad, Jr., harps on
the latter’s recantation of his affidavit supporting the defense’s "accident" theory.
We find that Mapalad’s recantation was satisfactorily explained. He testified that he was threatened by the
appellant. As a detainee, he was completely vulnerable to the threats of the appellant, a police officer and
presumably his jailer. He therefore signed the said affidavit (supporting appellant’s "accident" version) as he
was ordered to do. However, immediately after his release from detention, he went to the NBI and narrated
what really transpired. He stood firm in his testimony about the direct involvement of the appellant.
In this connection, the defense never showed that Mapalad was motivated by any ill-motive in implicating the
appellant in the crime. When there is no evidence of improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to
testify falsely against an accused or implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that
no such improper motive exists and the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.16
Likewise, while the paraffin test was negative, such fact alone did not ipso facto prove that the appellant was
innocent. Time and again, we have held that a negative paraffin result is not conclusive proof that a person has
not fired a gun. Stated otherwise, it is possible to fire a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as when the culprit
is wearing gloves or he washes his hands afterwards.17 Since appellant submitted himself for paraffin testing
only two days after the shooting, it was likely he had already washed his hands thoroughly, thus removing all
traces of nitrates therefrom.
The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of treachery which qualified the offense to murder. For
treachery to be considered, the accused must have deliberately and consciously adopted a means of
execution that rendered the person attacked with no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.18
As described by the prosecution, the victim and his co-detainees were inside the cell when appellant, who was
drunk, manhandled them and suddenly fired three successive shots. It was the third shot that killed the victim.
The testimonies of the two eyewitnesses, co-inmates of the victim, showed that the suddenness and mode of
attack adopted by the appellant placed not only the victim but also all of them in such a situation where it was
not possible for them to resist the attack or defend themselves. Even frontal attack can be treacherous when
unexpected and the unarmed victim is in no position to repel the attack or avoid it.19
However, this Court finds that the trial court erred in considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
The fact that appellant did not resist arrest or deny his criminal act did not constitute voluntary surrender. A
surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous and must clearly indicate the intent of the accused to submit
himself unconditionally to the authorities. Here, the appellant, after shooting the victim, was immediately
disarmed and placed under arrest. There was, therefore no voluntary surrender to speak of because the
appellant was in fact arrested.20
We hold that the trial court did not err in convicting the appellant of murder. The penalty therefor under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 (The Heinous Crimes Law) is reclusion perpetua to
death. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua should be imposed in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
We sustain the award by the trial court of civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000, pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence and the policy of the Court.21 As to actual damages, we have ruled that, when actual damages
supported by receipts amount to less than ₱25,000 (as in this case where only ₱10,00022 was duly receipted),
the award of temperate damages for ₱25,000 is justified in lieu of actual damages. Moral damages cannot be
awarded because no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, was presented by the prosecution to support it.23]
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated October 15, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz,
Laguna, Branch 28, in Criminal Case No. SC-6476, finding SPO1 Virgilio G. Brecinio guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is hereby
AFFIRMED. Appellant is ordered to pay the amount of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity and ₱25,000 as temperate
damages to the heirs of Alberto Pagtananan.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995
ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO
TAMAYO, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 114931-33 November 16, 1995
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANNIE FERRER, accused, ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS,
and JOSELITO TAMAYO, accused-appellants.
PUNO, J.:
The case before us occurred at a time of great political polarization in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA
Revolution. This was the time when the newly-installed government of President Corazon C. Aquino was being
openly challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other public fora by "Marcos loyalists," supporters of deposed
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Tension and animosity between the two (2) groups sometimes broke into
violence. On July 27, 1986, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known "Coryista."
From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court against eleven persons identified as
Marcos loyalists charging them with the murder of Salcedo. Criminal Case No. 86-47322 was filed against Raul
Billosos y de Leon and Gerry Nery y Babazon; Criminal Case No. 86-47617 against Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo
Pacadar y Abe and Joel Tan y Mostero; Criminal Case No. 86-47790 against Richard de los Santos y
Arambulo; Criminal Case No. 86-48538 against Joselito Tamayo y Ortia; and Criminal Case No. 86-48931
against Rolando Fernandez y Mandapat. Also filed were Criminal Cases Nos. 86-49007 and 86-49008 against
Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega as well as Annie Ferrer charging them as accomplices to the murder of
Salcedo.
The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX, Manila. All of the accused
pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued accordingly. The prosecution presented twelve witnesses,
including two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and the police officers who were at the
Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their testimonies, the prosecution likewise presented
documentary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and various photographs taken during
the mauling.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the
Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a permit to hold the rally but their application was denied by the
authorities. Despite this setback, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal Monument of the Luneta at 2:30
in the afternoon of the scheduled day. Led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega, both members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the loyalists started an impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and
delivered speeches in between. Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, then Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police
District, arrived and asked the leaders for their permit. No permit could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres
thereupon gave them ten minutes to disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for thirty minutes but this was
refused. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group and said "Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators."
Atty. Nuega added "Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!" The police then pushed the crowd, and used tear gas and
truncheons to disperse them. The loyalists scampered away but some of them fought back and threw stones at
the police. Eventually, the crowd fled towards Maria Orosa Street and the situation later stabilized.1
At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase III of the Luneta. There,
they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos, jogging around the fountain.
They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and Annie Ferrer angrily ordered them "Gulpihin
ninyo and mga Cory hecklers!" Then she continued jogging around the fountain chanting "Marcos pa rin,
Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos, Bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw!" The loyalists replied
"Bugbugin!" A few minutes later, Annie Ferrer was arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang
gumanti, tayo ngayon!" A commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists
attacking persons in yellow, the color of the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt.2 He then saw a man
wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons shouting "Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!" The man
in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and
boxed and kicked and mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they again pounced on
him and pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo
Sumilang, an electrician at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he could
extricate Salcedo from them. But the maulers pursued Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their
fists. Somebody gave Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed to Salcedo's attackers. They backed off
for a while and Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from
behind Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed
Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even as he was already fallen.3 Salcedo tried to stand but accused
Joel Tan boxed him on the left side of his head and ear.4 Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo on his nape,
shouting: "Iyan, Cory Iyan. Patayin!"5 Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but the latter lunged at the victim again.
Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once more fell. Banculo saw
accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when he tried to stand, Sison repeatedly
boxed him.6 Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri approach the victim but did not notice what he did.7
Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the blood from his face. He sat on
some cement steps8 and then tried to flee towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument
but accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for
his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin. Tulungan ninyo ako." He cried: "Pulis, pulis. Wala bang pulis?"9
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo collapsed
and lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged down a van and with the help of a traffic officer, brought Salcedo to
the Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So they took him to the Philippine General Hospital
where he died upon arrival.
Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained various contusions, abrasions, lacerated
wounds and skull fractures as revealed in the following post-mortem findings:
Cyanosis, lips, and nailbeds.
Contused-abrasions: 6.0 x 2.5 cm., and 3.0 x 2.4 cm., frontal region, right side; 6.8 x 4.2 cm.,
frontal region, left side; 5.0 x 4.0 cm., right cheek; 5.0 x 3.5 cm., face, left side; 3.5 x 2.0 cm.,
nose; 4.0 x 2.1 cm., left ear, pinna; 5.0 x 4.0 cm. left suprascapular region; 6.0 x 2.8 cm., right
elbow.
Abrasions: 4.0 x 2.0 cm., left elbow; 2.0 x 1.5 cm., right knee.
Lacerated wounds: 2.2 cm., over the left eyebrow; 1.0 cm., upper lip.
Hematoma, scalp; frontal region, both sides; left parietal region; right temporal region; occipital
region, right side.
Fractures, skull; occipital bone, right side; right posterior cranial fossa; right anterior cranial
fossa.
Hemorrhage, subdural, extensive.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, about 1/2 filled with grayish brown food materials and fluid.10
The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people, both local and foreign. The
press took pictures and a video of the event which became front-page news the following day, capturing
national and international attention. This prompted President Aquino to order the Capital Regional Command
and the Western Police District to investigate the incident. A reward of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) was
put up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief, for persons who could give information leading to
the arrest of the killers.11 Several persons, including Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, cooperated with
the police, and on the basis of their identification, several persons, including the accused, were apprehended
and investigated.
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of the victim and offered their
respective alibis. Accused Joselito Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the photographs presented by
the prosecution12 because on July 27, 1986, he was in his house in Quezon City.13 Gerry Neri claimed that he
was at the Luneta Theater at the time of the
incident. 14 Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was allegedly at his office near the Luneta waiting for
some pictures to be developed at that time. 15 He claimed to be afflicted with hernia impairing his mobility; he
cannot run normally nor do things forcefully. 16 Richard de los Santos admits he was at the Luneta at the time
of the mauling but denies hitting Salcedo. 17 He said that he merely watched the mauling which explains why
his face appeared in some of the photographs. 18 Unlike the other accused, Nilo Pacadar admits that he is a
Marcos loyalist and a member of the Ako'y Pilipino Movement and that he attended the rally on that fateful day.
According to him, he saw Salcedo being mauled and like Richard de los Santos, merely viewed the
incident. 19 His face was in the pictures because he shouted to the maulers to stop hitting Salcedo. 20 Joel Tan
also testified that he tried to pacify the maulers because he pitied Salcedo. The maulers however ignored
him. 21
The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega and Annie Ferrer opted not to testify in their defense.
On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan,
Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by treachery
and sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years
of reclusion temporal as maximum. Annie Ferrer was likewise convicted as an accomplice. The court, however,
found that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other accused and thus acquitted Raul Billosos, Gerry
Nery, Rolando Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. The dispositive portion of the decision reads
as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered in the aforementioned cases as follows:
1. In "People versus Raul Billosos and Gerry Nery," Criminal Case No. 86-47322, the Court
finds that the Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the two (2) Accused beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime charged and hereby acquits them of said charge;
2. In "People versus Romeo Sison, et al.," Criminal Case No. 86-47617, the Court finds the
Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as
principals for the crime of Murder, defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and, there
being no other mitigating or aggravating circumstances, hereby imposes on each of them an
indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14)YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20)
DAYS, of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion Temporal, as
minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
3. In "People versus Richard de los Santos," Criminal Case No. 86-47790, the Court finds the
Accused Richard de los Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of
Murder defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no other extenuating
circumstances, the Court hereby imposes on him an indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN
(14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as
Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum;
4. In "People versus Joselito Tamayo," Criminal Case No. 86-48538 the Court finds the
Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, for the crime of "Murder" defined in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes on him an indeterminate penalty of from
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal,
as Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
5. In "People versus Rolando Fernandez," Criminal Case No. 86-4893l, the Court finds that the
Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Accused for the crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt and hereby acquits him of said charge;
6. In "People versus Oliver Lozano, et al.," Criminal Case No. 86-49007, the Court finds that the
Prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged and hereby acquits them of said charge;
7. In "People versus Annie Ferrer," Criminal Case No. 86-49008, the Court finds the said
Accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as accomplice to the crime of Murder under Article 18
in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes on her an
indeterminate penalty of NINE (9) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of Prision Mayor, as
Minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of Reclusion
Temporal, as Maximum.
The Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Richard de los Santos, Joel Tan, Joselito Tamayo
and Annie Ferrer are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of Stephen
Salcedo the total amount of P74,000.00 as actual damages and the amount of P30,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages, and one-half (1/2) of the costs of suit.
The period during which the Accused Nilo Pacadar, Romeo Sison, Joel Tan, Richard de los
Santos and Joselito Tamayo had been under detention during the pendency of these cases
shall be credited to them provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with
the rules and regulations of the City Jail.
The Warden of the City Jail of Manila is hereby ordered to release the Accused Gerry Nery,
Raul Billosos and Rolando Fernandez from the City Jail unless they are being detained for
another cause or charge.
The Petition for Bail of the Accused Rolando Fernandez has become moot and academic. The
Petition for Bail of the Accused Joel Tan, Romeo Sison and Joselito Tamayo is denied for lack
of merit.
The bail bonds posted by the Accused Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega are hereby
cancelled. 22
On appeal, the Court of Appeals 23 on December 28, 1992, modified the decision of the trial court by acquitting
Annie Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused, except for Joselito Tamayo, to reclusion
perpetua. The appellate court found them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, but
convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide because the information against him did not allege the said qualifying
circumstance. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe, Joel Tan y Mostero and
Richard de los Santos are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and are
each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo y Oria is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Homicide with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength and, as a consequence, an indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision
mayor as Minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as Maximum is hereby
imposed upon him;
3. Accused-appellant Annie Ferrer is hereby ACQUITTED of being an accomplice to the crime
of Murder.
CONSIDERING that the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua has been imposed in the instant
consolidated cases, the said cases are now hereby certified to the Honorable Supreme Court
for review. 24
Petitioners filed G.R. Nos. 108280-83 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court inasmuch as Joselito
Tamayo was not sentenced to reclusion perpetua. G.R. Nos. 114931-33 was certified to us for automatic
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals against the four accused-appellants sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.
Before this court, accused-appellants assign the following errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT NOTED THAT THE
ACCUSED FAILED TO CITE ANYTHING ON RECORD TO SUPPORT THEIR AVERMENT
THAT THERE WERE NO WITNESSES WHO HAVE COME FORWARD TO IDENTIFY THE
PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF STEPHEN SALCEDO.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
THE UNRELIABLE, DOUBTFUL, SUSPICIOUS AND INCONCLUSIVE TESTIMONIES OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS RANULFO SUMILANG.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED
GUILTY WHEN THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT ANY OF THE ACCUSED
CARRIED A HARD AND BLUNT INSTRUMENT, THE ADMITTED CAUSE OF THE
HEMORRHAGE RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE
EXISTS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME
COMMITTED IS MURDER AND NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS
AFFRAY. 25
In their additional brief, appellants contend that:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REACHING A CONCLUSION
OF FACT UTILIZING SPECULATIONS, SURMISES, NON-SEQUITUR CONCLUSIONS, AND
EVEN THE DISPUTED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, TO UPHOLD THE VALIDITY OF
THE VERY SAME JUDGMENT, ALL CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS "D", "G", "O",
"P", "V", TO "V-48", "W" TO "W-13", ALL OF WHICH WERE NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN THE CASE AT BAR DISREGARDING ALTOGETHER THE
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME
COMMITTED WAS MURDER, NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) IN TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY
SIDESTEPPING IN THE PROCESS THE FACTUAL GROUNDS SURROUNDING THE
INCIDENT. 26
Appellants mainly claim that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the testimonies of the two in
prosecution eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, because they are unreliable,
doubtful and do not deserve any credence. According to them, the testimonies of these two witnesses
are suspect because they surfaced only after a reward was announced by General Lim. Renato
Banculo even submitted three sworn statements to the police geared at providing a new or improved
version of the incident. On the witness stand, he mistakenly identified a detention prisoner in another
case as accused Rolando Fernandez. 27 Ranulfo Sumilang was evasive and unresponsive prompting
the trial court to reprimand him several times. 28
There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the reward announced by General Lim, much
less that both or either of them ever received such reward from the government. On the contrary, the evidence
shows that Sumilang reported the incident to the police and submitted his sworn statement immediately two
hours after the mauling, even before announcement of any reward. 29 He informed the police that he would
cooperate with them and identify Salcedo's assailants if he saw them again. 30
The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not make them and his testimony incredible. The
sworn statements were made to identify more suspects who were apprehended during the investigation of
Salcedo's death. 31
The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times by the trial court on the witness stand for
being argumentative and evasive. 32 This is not enough reason to reject Sumilang's testimony for he did not
exhibit this undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On the whole, his testimony was correctly given
credence by the trial court despite his evasiveness at some instances. Except for compelling reasons, we
cannot disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of witnesses considering their visual view of the
demeanor of witnesses when on the witness stand. As trial courts, they can best appreciate the verbal and
non-verbal dimensions of a witness' testimony.
Banculo's mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does not make him an entirely
untrustworthy witness. 33 It does not make his whole testimony a falsity. An honest mistake is not inconsistent
with a truthful testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with imperfect senses. In the
court's discretion, therefore, the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts but disbelieved with
respect to the others. 34
We sustain the appellate and trial courts' findings that the witnesses' testimonies corroborate each other on all
important and relevant details of the principal occurrence. Their positive identification of all petitioners jibe with
each other and their narration of the events are supported by the medical and documentary evidence on
record.
Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified that the victim had
various wounds on his body which could have been inflicted by pressure from more than one hard
object. 35 The contusions and abrasions found could have been caused by punches, kicks and blows from
rough stones. 36 The fatal injury of intracranial hemorrhage was a result of fractures in Salcedo's skull which
may have been caused by contact with a hard and blunt object such as fistblows, kicks and a blunt wooden
instrument. 37
Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and punched. Sumilang in fact testified that Salcedo
was pummeled by his assailants with stones in their hands. 38
Appellants also contend that although the appellate court correctly disregarded Exhibits "D," "G," and "P," it
erroneously gave evidentiary weight to Exhibits "O," "V," "V-1" to "V-48," "W," "W-1" to "W-13." 39 Exhibit "O" is
the Joint Affidavit of Pat. Flores and Pat. Bautista, the police intelligence-operatives who witnessed the rally
and subsequent dispersal operation. Pat. Flores properly identified Exhibit "O" as his sworn statement and in
fact gave testimony corroborating the contents thereof. 40 Besides, the Joint Affidavit merely reiterates what the
other prosecution witnesses testified to. Identification by Pat. Bautista is a surplusage. If appellants wanted to
impeach the said affidavit, they should have placed Pat. Flores on the witness stand.
Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was being mauled at the Luneta —
starting from a grassy portion to the pavement at the Rizal Monument and along Roxas Boulevard, 41 — as he
was being chased by his assailants 42 and as he sat pleading with his assailants. 43 Exhibits "W", "W-1" to "W13" are photographs of Salcedo and the mauling published in local newspapers and magazines such as the
Philippine Star, 44 Mr. and Ms. Magazine, 45 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 46 and the Malaya. 47 The admissibility of
these photographs is being questioned by appellants for lack of proper identification by the person or persons
who took the same.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the
photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. 48 The
value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, 49 and its
admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. 50 The
photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. 51 The correctness
of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the
testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it
subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. 52 Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or
by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. 53
This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence, appellants, through
counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack of proper identification. 54 However,
when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas, counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo
and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-48" to prove that his clients were not in any of the pictures and
therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. 55 The photographs were adopted by
appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty.
Dumayas represented all the other accused per understanding with their respective counsels, including Atty.
Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all
the accused who took the witness stand. 56 No objection was made by counsel for any of the accused, not until
Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a continuing objection to their admissibility. 57
The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the person
who took the same was not presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these photographs by some of
the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy
thereof. That the photographs are faithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants
Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their
presence thereat. 58
An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that only three of the appellants,
namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in various belligerent poses
lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. 59 Appellant Romeo Sison appears only once and he, although
afflicted with hernia is shown merely running after the
victim. 60Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures. The absence of the two appellants
in the photographs does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the killing
of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo,
they were unequivocally identified by Sumilang and
Banculo61Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification.
Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding the existence of conspiracy among the principal accused
and in convicting them of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, not death in tumultuous affray.
Death in a tumultuous affray is defined in Article 251 of the Revised Penal code as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. — When, while several persons, not composing
groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally,
quarrel and assault each other in a confused and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the
affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased, but the
person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or
persons shall be punished by prison mayor.
If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, the
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all
those who shall have used violence upon the person of the victim.
For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1) there be several persons; (2) that they did not
compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and
tumultuous manner; (4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained who
actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or
who used violence can be identified.62
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in a
confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author
thereof cannot be ascertained.63
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and one individual.
Confusion may have occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion subsided
eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after said dispersal that one
distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless individual and attacked him repeatedly, taking
turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray,
nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident.64
As the lower courts found, the victim's assailants were numerous by as much as fifty in number65 and were
armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took advantage of their superior strength and excessive
force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself. They followed Salcedo from the
Chinese Garden to the Rizal Monument several meters away and hit him mercilessly even when he was
already fallen on the ground. There was a time when Salcedo was able to get up, prop himself against the
pavement and wipe off the blood from his face. But his attackers continued to pursue him relentlessly. Salcedo
could not defend himself nor could he find means to defend himself. Sumilang tried to save him from his
assailants but they continued beating him, hitting Sumilang in the process. Salcedo pleaded for mercy but they
ignored his pleas until he finally lost consciousness. The deliberate and prolonged use of superior strength on
a defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder.
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in the instant case. There is no proof that the
attack on Salcedo was deliberately and consciously chosen to ensure the assailants' safety from any defense
the victim could have made. True, the attack on Salcedo was sudden and unexpected but it was apparently
because of the fact that he was wearing a yellow t-shirt or because he allegedly flashed the "Laban" sign
against the rallyists, taunting them into mauling him. As the appellate court well found, Salcedo had the
opportunity to sense the temper of the rallyists and run away from them but he, unfortunately, was overtaken
by them. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on
the part of the person being attacked. 66
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged in the information against Joselito Tamayo.
Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case because the attack against Salcedo was sudden and
spontaneous, spurred by the raging animosity against the so-called "Coryistas." It was not preceded by cool
thought and reflection.
We find however the existence of a conspiracy among appellants. At the time they were committing the crime,
their actions impliedly showed a unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of
Salcedo. Where a conspiracy existed and is proved, a showing as to who among the conspirators inflicted the
fatal wound is not required to sustain a conviction. 67 Each of the conspirators is liable for all acts of the others
regardless of the intent and character of their participation, because the act of one is the act of all. 68
The trial court awarded the heirs of Salcedo P74,000.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, and one half of the costs of the suit. At the time he died on July 27, 1986, Salcedo was
twenty three years old and was set to leave on August 4, 1986 for employment in Saudi Arabia. 69 The reckless
disregard for such a young person's life and the anguish wrought on his widow and three small
children, 70 warrant an increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00. The indemnity of
P50,000.00 must also be awarded for the death of the victim.71
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan and Richard de los Santos are
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder without any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Homicide with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and, as a
consequence, he is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision
mayor as minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum;
3. All accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Stephen
Salcedo the following amounts:
(a) P74,000.00 as actual damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
(c) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 118441-42. January 18, 2000.]
ARMANDO JOSE y PAZ and MANILA CENTRAL BUS LINES (MCL), represented by its General Manager
MR. DANILO T. DE DIOS, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, ROMMEL ABRAHAM, represented by his
father FELIXBERTO ABRAHAM, JOSE MACARUBO and MERCEDES MACARUBO, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and ordering petitioners to pay damages for
injuries to persons and damage to property as a result of a vehicular accident.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary
The facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corporation (MCL) is the operator-lessee of a public utility bus (hereafter
referred to as Bus 203) with plate number NVR-III-TB-PIL and body number 203. Bus 203 is owned by the
Metro Manila Transit Corporation and is insured with the Government Service Insurance System.
On February 22, 1985, at around six o’clock in the morning, Bus 203, then driven by petitioner Armando Jose,
collided with a red Ford Escort driven by John Macarubo on MacArthur Highway, in Marulas, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. Bus 203 was bound for Muntinlupa, Rizal, while the Ford Escort was headed towards Malanday,
Valenzuela on the opposite lane. As a result of the collision, the left side of the Ford Escort’s hood was
severely damaged while its driver, John Macarubo, and its lone passenger, private respondent Rommel
Abraham, were seriously injured. The driver and conductress of Bus 203 rushed Macarubo and Abraham to
the nearby Fatima Hospital where Macarubo lapsed into a coma. Despite surgery, Macarubo failed to recover
and died five days later. Abraham survived, but he became blind on the left eye which had to be removed. In
addition, he sustained a fracture on the forehead and multiple lacerations on the face, which caused him to be
hospitalized for a week.
On March 26, 1985, Rommel Abraham, represented by his father, Felixberto, instituted Civil Case No. 2206-V85 for damages against petitioners MCL and Armando Jose in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172,
Valenzuela.
On July 17, 1986, the spouses Jose and Mercedes Macarubo, parents of the deceased John Macarubo, filed
their own suit for damages in the same trial court, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 2428-V-86, against
MCL alone. On the other hand, MCL filed a third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo, registered owner
of the Ford Escort on the theory that John Macarubo was negligent and that he was the "authorized driver" of
Juanita Macarubo. The latter, in turn, filed a counterclaim for damages against MCL for the damage to her car.
Civil Case No. 2206-V-85 and Civil Case No. 2428-V-86 were consolidated and later tried jointly. The facts, as
found by the trial court, are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In Civil Case No. 2206-V-85, the Court heard the testimonies that during the night previous to the accident of
February 22, 1985 at 6:15 a.m., Rommel Abraham and John Macarubo were at a party. There was therefore,
no sleep for them, notwithstanding testimony to the contrary and the service of drinks cannot be totally
discounted. After the party at 11 p.m., while both Rommel and John were en route home to Valenzuela from La
Loma, the car encountered mechanical trouble and had to be repaired as its cross-joint was detached. The
defect of a cross-joint is not minor and repair thereof would as testified to by Rommel lasted up to early dawn
and the car started to run only after five o’clock in the morning. With lack of sleep, the strains of a party still on
their bodies, and the attention to the repair coupled with the wait until the car was ready to run, are potentials in
a driver for possible accident. The accident happened at 6:15 a.m. when the physical and mental condition of
the driver John Macarubo was as expected not too fit for the driving as he could not anymore control the car.
The desire to be home quick for the much needed sleep could have prompted him to overtake the preceding
vehicle.
Indeed the pictures taken of the two vehicles (Exh. 1, 2 and 3) will clearly show that the MCL bus was at its
proper lane and not in an overtaking position while the car driven by John Macarubo was positioned in a
diagonal manner and crossed the line of the MCL, which is an indication of an overtaking act. If it were the bus
that was overtaking at the time, the car would have been thrown farther away from the point of the impact.
The court is convinced of the close supervision and control of MCL over their drivers, and its exercise of due
diligence in seeing to it that no recklessness is committed by its employees, drivers especially, from the
unrebutted testimonies of Cesar Cainglet.
The Court noted the respective damages of the two vehicles especially the point of the impact. From these
damages as shown by the picture, it can be clearly deduced which vehicle did the bumping. It was the car
driven by John Macarubo that hit the MCL which was on its right and correct lane. 2
Based on the foregoing facts, the trial court rendered judgment on September 28, 1989, dismissing both civil
cases against MCL and ruling favorably on its third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo, ordering the
latter to pay MCL P54,232.12 as actual damages, P24,000.00 for lost income, and P10,000.00 as attorney’s
fees.
Rommel Abraham, the Macarubo spouses, and third-party defendant Juanita Macarubo then appealed to the
Court of Appeals which, on December 21, 1994, rendered a decision reversing the decision of the trial court. It
held (1) that the trial court erred in disregarding Rommel Abraham’s uncontroverted testimony that the collision
was due to the fault of the driver of Bus 203; (2) that the trial court erred in relying on photographs (Exhs. 1-3)
which had been taken an hour after the collision as within that span of time, the positions of the vehicles could
have been changed; (3) that the photographs do not show that the Ford Escort was overtaking another vehicle
when the accident happened and that John Macarubo, its driver, was negligent; and (4) that MCL failed to
make a satisfactory showing that it exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its driver
Armando Jose. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and the defendants-appellees MCL and Armando
Jose are adjudged to pay jointly and severally:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Rommel Abraham, represented by his father Felixberto Abraham:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) P37,576.47 as actual damages;
(b) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(c) P15,000.00 as moral damages;
(d) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(e) P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
2. The heirs of John Macarubo:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death;
(b) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(d) P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Costs against the appellees.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners MCL and Armando Jose raise four issues which boil
down to the question whether it was the driver of Bus 203 or that of the Ford Escort who was at fault for the
collision of the two vehicles.
It is well-settled that a question of fact is to be determined by the evidence offered to support the particular
contention. 3 In the proceedings below, petitioners relied mainly on photographs, identified in evidence as
Exhibits 1 to 3, showing the position of the two vehicles after the collision. On the other hand, private
respondents offered the testimony of Rommel Abraham to the effect that the collision took place because Bus
203 invaded their lane. 4
The trial court was justified in relying on the photographs rather than on Rommel Abraham’s testimony which
was obviously biased and unsupported by any other evidence. Physical evidence is a mute but an eloquent
manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. 5 In criminal cases such as
murder or rape where the accused stands to lose his liberty if found guilty, this Court has, in many occasions,
relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the truth. In People v. Vasquez, 6 where the physical
evidence on record ran counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we ruled that the
physical evidence should prevail. 7
In this case, the positions of the two vehicles, as shown in the photographs (Exhs. 1 to 3) taken by MCL line
inspector Jesus Custodio about an hour and fifteen minutes after the collision, disputes Abraham’s self-serving
testimony that the two vehicles collided because Bus 203 invaded the lane of the Ford Escort and clearly
shows that the case is exactly the opposite of what he claimed happened. Contrary to Abraham’s testimony,
the photographs show quite clearly that Bus 203 was in its proper lane and that it was the Ford Escort which
usurped a portion of the opposite lane. The three photographs show the Ford Escort positioned diagonally on
the highway, with its two front wheels occupying Bus 203’s lane. As shown by the photograph marked Exhibit
3, the portion of MacArthur Highway where the collision took place is marked by a groove which serves as the
center line separating the right from the left lanes. The photograph shows that the left side of Bus 203 is about
a few feet from the center line and that the bus is positioned parallel thereto. This negates the claim that Bus
203 was overtaking another vehicle and, in so doing, encroached on the opposite lane occupied by the Ford
Escort.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Indeed, Bus 203 could not have been overtaking another vehicle when the collision happened. It was filled with
passengers, 8 and it was considerably heavier and larger than the Ford Escort. If it was overtaking another
vehicle, it necessarily had to accelerate. The acceleration of its speed and its heavy load would have greatly
increased its momentum so that the impact of the collision would have thrown the smaller and lighter Ford
Escort to a considerable distance from the point of impact. Exhibit 1, however, shows that the Ford Escort’s
smashed hood was only about one or two meters from Bus 203’s damaged left front. If there had been a great
impact, such as would be the case if Bus 203 had been running at a high speed, the two vehicles should have
ended up far from each other.
In discrediting the physical evidence, the appellate court made the following observations:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
We cannot believe that it was the car which overtook another vehicle and proceeded to the lane occupied by
the bus. There was a traffic jam on the "bus lane" while traffic was light on the "car lane." Indeed, we find it
inconceivable that the car, occupying the lane without any traffic, would overtake and traverse a heavy traffic
lane. 9 (Emphasis supplied.)
This is correct. However, the fact remains that when the Ford Escort finally came to a stop, it encroached on
the opposite lane occupied by Bus 203.
Significantly, Rommel Abraham testified that on February 21, 1985, the night before the accident, he and John
Macarubo went to a friend’s house in La Loma where they stayed until 11 p.m. 10 Abraham’s explanation as to
why they did not reach Valenzuela until six o’clock in the morning of the next day when the accident happened
indicates that the Ford Escort careened and slammed against Bus 203 because of a mechanical defect.
Abraham told the court: 11
ATTY. RESPICIO:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: I am sorry, Your honor. After leaving Arnel’s place where did you go?
ROMMEL ABRAHAM
A: We proceeded in going home, sir.
Q: You were on your way home?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What time did you . . . I will reform the question. You met the accident at about 6:00 o’clock the next day,
6:00 o’clock in the morning the next day, did it take you long to reach BBB?
A: Our car had a mechanical trouble somewhere at 2nd Avenue, sir.
Q: What kind of trouble?
A: The cross-joint were detached, sir.
Q: Are you familiar with cars?
A: A little, sir.
COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: What time was that when you have this cross-joint problem?
A: About 12:00 o’clock perhaps, sir.
Q: What happened to the cross joint?
A: It was cut, ma’am.
Q: You were able to repair that cross-joint 12:00 o’clock and you were able to run and reached this place of
accident at 6:00 o’clock?
A: No, we we’re not able to get spare parts, ma’am.
Q: Why were you able to reach this place at 6:00 o’clock?
A: We went home and look for the spare parts in their house, ma’am.
Q: House of Macarubo?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: So you were able to repair the car?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: What time were you able to repair the car?
A: Around 5:00 o’clock in the morning, sir.
Q: You were able to replace the cross-joint or what?
A: Ginawaan ng paraan, ma’am.
Q: How?
A: The cross-joint were welded in order to enable us to go home, ma’am.
Q: No spare parts was replaced?
A: No, ma’am.
Thus, as Rommel Abraham himself admitted, the Ford Escort’s rear cross-joint was cut/detached. This
mechanism controls the movement of the rear tires. Since trouble in the cross-joint affects a car’s
maneuverability, the matter should have been treated as a serious mechanical problem. In this case, when
asked if they were able to repair the cross-joint, Abraham said "Ginawaan ng paraan, ma’am," by simply
welding them just so they could reach home. His testimony indicates that the rear cross-joint was hastily
repaired and that, at most, the kind of repairs made thereon were merely temporary; just enough to enable
Abraham and Macarubo to reach home. Given such fact, the likelihood is that while the Ford Escort might not
have been overtaking another vehicle, it actually strayed into the bus’ lane because of the defective cross-joint,
causing its driver to lose control of the vehicle.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary:red
The appellate court refused to give credence to the physical evidence on the ground that the photographs were
taken an hour after the collision and that within such span of time the bus could have been moved because
there was no showing that the driver left the scene of the accident. This is not correct. Constancia Gerolada,
Bus 203’s conductress, testified that, immediately after the collision, she and bus driver, petitioner Armando
Jose, took the injured driver and passenger of the Ford Escort to the Fatima Hospital. 12 This fact is not
disputed by private respondents.
Rommel Abraham mentioned in his appellant’s brief in the appellate court a sketch of the scene of the accident
allegedly prepared by one Patrolman Kalale, which shows Bus 203 to be occupying the Ford Escort’s lane.
However, the records of this case do not show that such a sketch was ever presented in evidence in the trial
court or that Patrolman Kalale was ever presented as a witness to testify on the sketch allegedly prepared by
him. Under Rule 132, §3 of the Rules on Evidence, courts cannot consider any evidence unless formally
offered by a party.
Finally, the appellate court also ruled that MCL failed to make a satisfactory showing that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its bus driver, Armando Jose. 13 Under
the circumstances of this case, we hold that proof of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees is not required.
The Civil Code provides in pertinent parts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
ARTICLE 2180. The obligation imposed in Art. 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
x
x
x
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
x
x
x
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Thus, the responsibility of employers is premised upon the presumption of negligence of their employees. As
held in Poblete v. Fabros: 14
[I]t is such a firmly established principle, as to have virtually formed part of the law itself, that the negligence of
the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. This is the presumed
negligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The theory of presumed negligence, in contrast
with the American doctrine of respondent superior, where the negligence of the employee is conclusively
presumed to be the negligence of the employer, is clearly deducible from the last paragraph of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code which provides that the responsibility therein mentioned shall cease if the employers prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages (12 Manresa, 657; Balica v.
Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624; Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co., 30 Phil. 768), as observed in the same
cases just cited.
Therefore, before the presumption of the employer’s negligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees can arise, the negligence of the employee must first be established. While the allegations of
negligence against the employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the complaint are enough to
make out a case of quasi-delict under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the failure to prove the employee’s
negligence during the trial is fatal to proving the employer’s vicarious liability. In this case, private respondents
failed to prove their allegation of negligence against driver Armando Jose who, in fact, was acquitted in the
case for criminal negligence arising from the same incident. 15
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the appellate court erred in holding petitioners liable to private
respondents. The next question then is whether, as the trial court held, private respondent Juanita Macarubo is
liable to petitioners.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code makes the persons specified therein responsible for the quasi-delicts of others.
The burden is upon MCL to prove that Juanita Macarubo is one of those specified persons who are vicariously
liable for the negligence of the deceased John Macarubo.
In its third-party complaint, MCL alleged that Juanita Macarubo was the registered owner of the Ford Escort
car and that John Macarubo was the "authorized driver" of the car. 16 Nowhere was it alleged that John
Macarubo was the son, ward, employee or pupil of private respondent Juanita Macarubo so as to make the
latter vicariously liable for the negligence of John Macarubo. The allegation that John Macarubo was "the
authorized driver" of the Ford Escort is not equivalent to an allegation that he was an employee of Juanita
Macarubo. That John Macarubo was the "authorized driver" of the car simply means that he drove the Ford
Escort with the permission of Juanita Macarubo.
Nor did MCL present any evidence to prove that Juanita Macarubo was the employer of John Macarubo or that
she is in any way liable for John Macarubo’s negligence under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. For failure to
discharge its burden, MCL’s third-party complaint should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the complaints filed in Civil Cases
Nos. 2206-V-85 and 24428-V-86 against Manila Central Bus Lines and Armando Jose, as well as the thirdparty complaint filed in Civil Case No. 2206-V-85 against Juanita Macarubo, are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.chanrobles.com.ph : red
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 205639, January 18, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPRNES, Appellee, v. ANITA MIRANBA Y BELTRAN, Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Appellant was charged before the Regional Trial, Court (RTC) of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 39,
with violation of Section 5, Article 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.1 When arraigned, she pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The prosecution's evidence established that after a surveillance conducted outside appellant's house located in
Barangay Ibaba West, Calapan City, it was confirmed that she was engaged in the illegal sale of shabu. Thus,
at 12:00 noon of May 6, 2005, the police formed a buy-bust team designating PO2 Mariel D. Rodil (PO2 Rodil)
to act as the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Noel Buhay (SPO1 Buhay) and PO2 Ritchie Chan (PO2 Chan) as the
arresting officers and the other team members as back up. Marked and given to PO2 Rodil were four (4) one
hundred peso bills. At 2:00 p.m., the buy-bust team arrived in Barangay Ibaba West and PO2 Rodil proceeded
to appellant's house, while the rest of the team hid somewhere near appellant's house. PO2 Rodil saw
appellant outside her house and after a brief conversation, told her that she was buying shabu worth P400.00.
Appellant then went inside her house and upon her return,' handed to PO2 Rodil one (1) transparent plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance. After PO2 Rodil gave appellant the marked money as payment,
she then made a missed call to PO2 Chan's cell phone as a pre-arranged signal. SPO1 Buhay and PO2 Chan
effected, appellant's arrest. PO2 Chan got the marked money from appellant, while PO2 Rodil held on to the
plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. The team then informed Arnel Almazan, Barangay
Councilor of Barangay Ibaba West, about the operation and they all brought appellant to the Calapan Police
Station.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Both the inventory of the seized item and the taking of appellant's photos were made at the police station. PO2
Rodil marked the seized item and submitted the same for laboratory examination on the same day.3 The
Forensic Chemist, Police Inspector Rhea Fe DC Alviar (PI Alviar) confirmed the specimen submitted -positive
for methamphetamine hydroch 1 oride (shabu).
Appellant denied selling illegal drugs saying that at 2:00 p.m. of May 6, 2005, she was at home watching TV
when the police officers entered her house, frisked her and searched her house. She was later brought to the
Calapan Police Station where she was asked to point to the shabu placed on top of a table; and that she was
also subjected to a drug test.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On March 9, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision5 as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ANITA MIRANDA y BELTRAN GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime charged in the aforequoted information and in default of any
modifying circumstances attendant, hereby sentences her to sutler the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a
fine of VIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS, with the accessories provided by law and with
credit for preventive imprisonment undergone, if any.
The 0.04 grain of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) subject matter of this case is hereby ordered
confiscated in favor of the government to be disposed of in accordance with the law.6chanrobleslaw
Appellant filed her appeal with the CA, which in a Decision7 dated July 4, 2012, denied the same and affirmed
the RTC decision in toto.
Dissatisfied, appellant is now before us seeking a reversal of her conviction. We required the parties to submit
their Supplemental Briefs if they so desire. Appellant filed a Supplemental Brief, while the OSG representing
the People did not, saying that it had already exhaustively discussed the issues in its Appellee's Brief filed with
the CA.
In her Supplemental Brief,8 appellant insists that: (1) the prosecution evidence showed no indication of full
compliance with Section 21(1) of Republic Act (RA) 9165 on the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized,
and/or surrendered dangerous drugs; (2) PO2 Rodil failed to establish that the shabu presented in court was
the very item seized from her at the time of her arrest; and (3) the person who received the seized item from
PO2 Rodil, as well as the person who was tasked to bring the illegal drug from the laboratory to the court, were
never presented in court nor their testimonies offered in evidence.
We find no merit in this appeal.
it is material in every prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug that the drug, which is the corpus
delicti, be presented as evidence in court. Hence, the identity of the prohibited drug must be established
without any doubt. Hven more than this, what must also be established is the fact that the substance bought
during the buy-bust operation is the same substance offered in court as exhibit.9 The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Chain of custody, as defined under Section l(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2002,
which implements RA 9165, states:
Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time oi'
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person
who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in
the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
In this case, we find that the prosecution was able to establish the crucial links in the chain of custody of the
seized sachet of shabu. After PO2 Rodil received the plastic sachet of white crystalline substance from
appellant, she was in possession of the shabu up to the time appellant was brought to the police station for
investigation. With the buy-bust team and appellant at the police station were the Kill Droga Provincial
President, Nicanor Ocampo, Sr. and Barangay Councilor Almazan. PO2 Rodil made an inventory11 of the
seized item which was attested by Ocampo. She also marked the seized item with her initials
"MDR".12 Appellant's photos were also taken pointing to the plastic sachet.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
PO2 Rodil prepared and signed the request14 for laboratory examination and brought the letter request and the
seized item to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office-4B Mimaropa, Suqui, Calapan City for qualitative analysis.
The specimen was received at the laboratory at 5:00 p.m. of the same day.15 PI Alviar examined the white
crystalline substance contained in a heat-sealed plastic transparent plastic sachet with marking "MDR" on the
same right and issued Chemistry Report No. D-025-05 wherein she stated that the specimen was tested
positive for methamphetaminc hydrochloride (shabu).16 The staple-sealed brown envelope with markings D025-05 RFDCA (PI Alviar's initials), which contained one rectangular transparent plastic sachet sealed with
masking tape with the same marking, was offered in evidence and identified in court by PI
Alviar.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There is no doubt that the sachet of shabu, which was bought and confiscated from appellant, brought to the
police station, and was submitted to the crime laboratory for a qualitative examination, was the very same
shabu presented and identified in court. The police had sufficiently preserved the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized item, thus, complying with the prescribed procedure in the custody and control of the
confiscated drugs.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We; find that the penalty imposed, by the RTC and affirmed by the CA is proper under the
law. 19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated July 4, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04416, which affirmed in toto the Decision dated March 9, 2010 of the Regional Trial
Court of Calapan City, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 39, finding appellant Anita Miranda y Beltran guilty of violation
of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
G.R. No. 208093
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
SALIM ISMAEL y RADANG, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the June 14, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No.
00902, which affirmed the August 31, 2010 Judgment2 of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Zamboanga City in Criminal Case Nos. 5021 (19952) and 5022 (19953), finding appellant Salim Ismael y
Radang (Salim) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165 (RA 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. In Criminal Case No.
5021 (19952), Salim was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00
for illegal sale of shabu under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165; and in Criminal Case No. 5022 (19953), he was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fifteen (15) years and
pay a fine of ₱300,000.00 for illegal possession of shabu under Section 11 of the said law.
Factual Antecedents
Salim was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 for selling and possessing
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The twin Informations3 instituted therefor alleged:
In Criminal Case No. 5021 (19952)
That on or about August 25, 2003, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, transport, distribute or
give away to another any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, sell and
deliver to SPO1 Roberto Alberto Santiago, PNP, Culianan Police Station, who acted as poseur buyer, one (1)
small size transparent plastic pack containing white crystalline substance as certified to by PO1 Rodolfo
Dagalea Tan as METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU), said accused knowing the same to be a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In Criminal Case No. 5022 (19953)
That on or about August 25, 2003, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control, two (2) small size heatsealed transparent plastic packs each containing white crystalline substance as certified to by PO1 Rodolfo
Dagalea Tan asMETHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU), said accused knowing the same to be a
dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Arraigned on July 6, 2004, Salim, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to both charges. Upon termination of
the joint pre-trial conference, trial on the merits followed.
Version of the Prosecution
Culled from the records4 were the following operative facts:
On August 25, 2003, at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a confidential informant reported to SPO4
Menardo Araneta [SPO4 Araneta], Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Culianan Police Station4 [at
Zamboanga City], that a certain "Ismael Salim" was engaged in selling shabu at Barangay Talabaan near the
Muslim [c]emetery [in that city.
To verify the report, SPO4 Araneta instructed the said informant to [monitor] the area. After the informant
confim1ed that the said Ismael Salim was indeed selling illegal drugs in the reported area, SPO4 Araneta
formed a buy-bust team composed of SPO1 Enriquez, SPO1 Eduardo N. Rodriguez (SPO1 Rodriguez), SPO1
Roberto A. Santiago (SPO1 Santiago) and PO2 Rodolfo Dagalea Tan (PO2 Tan). It was then agreed that
SPO1 Santiago would act as poseur buyer with SPO1 Rodriguez as back-up. For the purpose, SPO4 Araneta
gave SPO1 Santiago a [₱100] bill bearing Serial No. M419145 as marked money [to be used] in the buy-bust
operation.
Upon arrival at Barangay Talabaan, the team parked their service vehicle along the road. SPO1 Santiago, the
confidential informant and SPO1 Rodriguez alighted from the vehicle and walked towards the [area fronting]
the Muslim cemetery. As they approached the area, the informant pointed to a man wearing a brown T-shirt
and black short pants with white towel around his neck [whom he identified] as appellant Ismael Salim, the
target of the operation.
SPO1 Santiago then [walked] towards appellant and [told] the latter that he [wanted] to buy shabu; to this
appellant replied "how much?" SPO1 Santiago answered that he [wanted to buy ₱100.00 worth of
the shabu, and gave appellant] the ₱100.00 marked money; [whereupon appellant] took from his left pocket
one plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance [which he] handed over to SPO1 Santiago.
Upon seeing the exchange, SPO1 Rodriguez, who was positioned [some 10] meters away, rushed in and
arrested appellant[.] SPO1 Rodriguez made a precautionary search of appellant's body for any concealed
weapon[, and found none]. Instead, SPO1 Rodriguez found, tucked inside [appellant's left front pocket the
₱100.00] marked money and two (2) more plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance wrapped in a
golden cigarette paper.
The police officers then brought appellant to the Culianan Police Station [in Zamboanga City] with SPO1
Santiago keeping personal custody of the items confiscated from [him]. At the [police] station, the plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance subject of the buy-bust operation, the two (2) plastic sachets also
containing white crystalline substance[, and the ₱100.00] marked money bearing Serial No. M419145
recovered from appellant's left pocket, were respectively turned over by SPO1 Santiago and SPO1 Rodriguez
to the Desk Officer, PO3 Floro Napalcruz [PO3 Napalcruz], who likewise turned [these over] to the Duty
Investigator, [PO2 Tan]. PO2 Tan then placed his initial "RDT" on the items recovered from appellant.
PO2 Tan also prepared a request to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory 9, [at] Zamboanga City for laboratory
examination of the plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance subject of the sale between
appellant and SPO1 Santiago, and the other two (2) plastic sachet[s] found inside appellant's pocket by SPO1
Rodriguez.
After conducting qualitative examination on the said specimens, Police Chief Inspector [PCI] Mercedes D.
Diestro, Forensic Chemist [Forensic Chemist Diestro], issued Chemistry Report No. D-367-2003 dated August
25, 2003, finding [the above-mentioned] plastic sachets positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) a
dangerous drug.
Version of the Defense
The defense presented appellant as its lone witness. Appellant denied both charges; he denied
selling shabu to SPO1 Santiago, just as he denied having shabu in his possession when he was arrested on
August 25, 2003.
According to appellant, on August 25, 2003, he went to a store to buy cellphone load so that he could call his
wife. After buying the cellphone load, he went back to his house on board a sikad-sikad, a bicycle-driven
vehicle with a sidecar. When he was about 160 meters away from the Muslim cemetery in Barangay Talabaan,
he was arrested by five persons in civilian attire who introduced themselves as police officers. The police
officers conducted a search on his person but did not find any dangerous dn1gs. Thereafter, he was brought to
Culianan Police Station where he was detained for two days. Appellant insisted that he never sold shabu to the
police officers who arrested him. He said that the first time he saw the alleged shabu was when it was
presented before the trial court. He denied that the police officers had confiscated a cellular phone from him.
He also asserted that all these police officers took away from him was his money and that he had never met
the said police officers prior to his arrest.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On August 31, 2010, the RTC of Zamboanga City, Branch 12 rendered its Judgment finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of having violated Sections 5 and 11,Article II of RA 9165.
The RTC gave full credence to the testimonies of SPO1 Santiago and SPO1 Rodriguez who conducted the
buy-bust operation against appellant; it rejected appellant's defense of denial and frame-up. The RTC noted
that the defense of frame-up is easily concocted and is commonly used as a standard line of defense in most
prosecutions arising from violations of the comprehensive dangerous drugs act.5 Moreover, other than the selfserving statements of appellant, no clear and convincing exculpatory evidence was presented in the present
case.
The dispositive part of the Judgment of the RTC reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING; this Court hereby finds the accused herein, SALIM
ISMAEL y RADANG guilty beyond reasonable doubt in both cases, for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II
of Republic Act No. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and hereby
sentences the said accused, in Criminal Case No. 5021 (19952) for Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱500,000.00), and in Criminal Case No. 5022 (19953) for Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165, to suffer the penalty of Imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to FIFTEEN
(15) YEARS and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
The dangerous drugs seized and recovered from the accused in these cases are hereby ordered confiscated
and forfeited in favor of the government to be disposed in accordance with the pertinent provisions of Republic
Act No. 9165 and its in1plementing rules and guidelines.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Dissatisfied with the RTC's verdict, appellant appealed to the CA, but on June 14, 2013, the CA affirmed in
toto the RTC's Judgment. The CA held that the elements of both illegal sale and illegal possession of
dangerous drugs had been duly proven in the instant case. The CA joined the RTC in giving full credence to
the testimonies of the aforementioned police officers, as they are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner, no evidence to the contrary having been adduced in the twin cases. Moreover, the CA found
that in these cases, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs had not at all been compromised,
but were in fact duly preserved.
The CA disposed as fol1ows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial Region, Branch 12, Zamboanga
City finding accused-appellant Salim Ismael y Radang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 is
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.7
Taking exception to the CA's Decision, appellant instituted the present appeal before this Court and in his
Appellant's Brief8 argues that:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHEN [HIS] GUILT
WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.9
It is appellant's contention that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt because the
prosecution: (1) failed to establish the identity of the prohibited drugs allegedly seized from him and; (2)
likewise failed to comply with the strict requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165.
Our Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
To secure a conviction for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, 1he
prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the
sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.10 What is important
is that the sale transaction of drugs actually took place and that the object of the transaction is properly
presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same drugs seized from the accused.
On the other hand, for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established: "[1]
the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; [2] such possession was not authorized by law; and [3] the
accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs."11
In cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug seized from the accused
constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of utmost importance that the integrity and identity of the
seized drugs must be shown to have been duly preserved. "The chain of custody rule performs this function as
it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed."12
After a careful examination of the records of the case, we find that the prosecution failed to establish an
unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs in violation of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165.
The pertinent provisions of Section 21 state:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs. Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment-The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
Similarly, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) further elaborate on the proper procedure to be
followed in Section 21(a) of RA 9165. It states:
(a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, inm1ediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirement" under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;
In Mallillin v. People,13 the Court explained the chain of custody rule as follows:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent clain1s it
to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up
to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered
to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. (Emphasis supplied)
The first link in the chain is the marking of the seized drug. We have previously held that:
x x x Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband
are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimen will use the markings as reference.
The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or
related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the
criminal proceedings, obviating switching, 'planting,' or contamination of evidence.14
It is important that the seized drugs be immediately marked, if possible, as soon as they are seized from the
accused.
Furthermore, in People v. Gonzales,15 the Court explained that:
The first stage in the chain of custody rule is the marking of the dangerous drugs or related items. Marking,
which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the apprehending officer or the
poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other identifying signs, should be made in the presence of
the apprehended violator immediately upon arrest. The importance of the prompt marking cannot be
denied, because succeeding handlers of dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as reference.
Also, the marking operates to set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from other material
from the moment they are confiscated until they are disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings,
thereby forestalling switching, planting or contamination of evidence. In short, the marking immediately
upon confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in the
preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, SPO1 Rodriguez testified on the seizure of the sachets of shabu he found in appellant's
possession alter the latter was arrested. SPO1 Rodriguez shared the details of how the seized drugs were
handled following its confiscation as follows:
RSP II Ivan C. Mendoza, Jr.:
Q: You are telling the Honorable Court that instead of finding concealed weapon, yon x x x found two small
sized heat-sealed transparent plastic bag[s]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where [were] these two small[-]sized heat-sealed transparent plastic [packs] found?
A: [In] his left-front pocket.
Q: Were they wrapped further in another piece of paper or were they just found in that pocket?
A: [They were] wrapped in a [golden-colored] cigarette paper.
Q: Would you x x x be able to remember that [golden- colored] cigarette paper? The wrapper of plastic pack?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why will you be able to remember it?
A: Because I turned it over to the desk officer and the desk officer turned it over to the investigator, the
investigator marked it.
Q: Who is the investigator?
A: PO2 Rodolfo Tan.
Q: So did you see anything that the investigator Rodolfo Tan do in that golden paper?
A: He marked his initial [sic].
Q: Ah, you saw him [mark] an initial?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What did you see him [mark] on the paper?
A: RDT.
Q: And do you know the meaning of RDT?
A: Yes, Rodolfo Dagalea Tan. 16
The testimony of SPO l Rodriguez on the chain of custody of the seized drugs leaves much to be desired. It is
evident that there was a break in the very first link of the chain when he failed to mark the sachet'3
of shabu immediately upon seizing them from the appellant. According to SPO1 Rodriguez, after finding
sachets of shabu in appellant's possession, he turned the drugs over to the desk officer. SPO1 Rodriguez did
not even explain why he failed to mark or why he could not have marked the seized items immediately upon
confiscation. Allegedly, the desk officer, after receiving the seized items from SPO1 Rodriguez, in turn handed
them over to PO2 Tan. Notably, this desk officer was not presented in court thereby creating another break in
the chain of custody. Again, no explanation was offered for the non-presentation of the desk officer or why he
himself did not mark the seized items. It was only upon receipt by PO2 Tan, allegedly from the desk officer, of
the seized chugs that the same were marked at the police station. This means that from the time the drugs
were seized from appellant until the time PO2 Tan marked the same, there was already a significant gap in the
chain of custody. Because of this gap, there is no certainty that the sachets of drugs presented as evidence in
the trial court were the same drugs found in appellant's possession.
SPO1 Santiago, the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation, was presented to corroborate the testimony of
SPO1 Rodriguez. However, his testimony likewise showed that the arresting officers did not mark the seized
drugs immediately after the arrest and in the presence of the appellant. Similarly, no explanation was given for
the lapse. SPO1 Santiago testified as follows:
Q: So what did you do with the small transparent sachet after police officer Rodriguez came to assist you?
A: After the arrest of a certain Ismael we proceeded to our police station when we arrived there I
turnover [sic] the transparent sachet to our desk officer.
Q: Who was the desk officer?
A: At that time it was PO3 Floro Napalcruz.
Q: Did you notice anything that he did with the specimen that you turnover [sic] to him, if any?
COURT: You are referring to the desk officer?
RSPII IVAN C. MENDOZA, JR.: Yes, Your Honor.
A: During that time, Your Honor, I gave to him the, [sic] which I buy from him [sic] the one (1) piece of
transparent small sachet of shabu then after that I get [sic] out from the office.17
During cross-examination, SPO1 Santiago reiterated that he did not mark the seized drugs. The sachets were
marked after they were received by PO2 Tan.
Q: Now, you said that this plastic sachet taken from the suspect, you turned it over to the desk officer of the
police station?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: After turning it over, you left?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You do not know what happened to the sachet?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did not place your markings there?
A: None, sir.18
It is clear from the above that SPO1 Rodriguez and SPO1 Santiago did not mark the seized drugs immediately
after they were confiscated from appellant. No explanations were given why markings were not immediately
made. At this stage in the chain, there was already a significant break such that there can be no assurance
against switching, planting, or contamination. The Court has previously held that, "failure to mark the drugs
immediately after they were seized from the accused casts doubt on the prosecution evidence warranting an
acquittal on reasonable doubt."19
Both arresting officers testified that they turned over the sachets of shabu to a desk officer in the person of
PO3 Napalcruz at the police station. Notably, PO3 Napalcruz was not presented in court to testify on the
circumstances surrounding the alleged receipt of the seized drugs. This failure to present PO3 Napalcruz is
another fatal defect in an already broken chain of custody. Every person who takes possession of seized drugs
must show how it was handled and preserved while in his or her custody to prevent any switching or
replacement.
After PO3 Napalcruz, the seized drugs were then turned over to PO2 Tan. It was only at this point that marking
was done on the seized drugs. He revealed in his testimony the following:
4th ACP RAY Z. BONGABONG:
Q: [After the apprehension] of the accused in this case, what happened?
A: SPO1 Roberto Santiago turned over to the Desk Officer one (1) small size heat-sealed transparent plastic
pack containing shabu, allegedly a buy[-]bust stuff confiscated from the subject person and marked money
while SPO1 Eduardo Rodriguez turned over two (2) small size heat[-]sealed transparent plastic packs allegedly
confiscated from the possession of the subject person during a body search conducted and one (1) Nokia
cellphone 3310 and cash money of ₱710.00.
x x xx
Q: You as investigator of the case what did you do, if any, upon the turn over of those items?
A: I prepared a request for laboratory examination addressed to the Chief PNP Crime Laboratory 9, R. T. Lim
Boulevard, this City.
Q: This small heat[-]sealed transparent plastic sachet if you can see this again, will you be able to identify the
same?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: How?
A: Through my initial, Sir.
Q: What initial?
A: RDT
Q: What does RDT stands [sic] for?
A: It stands for my name Rodolfo Dagalea Tan.20
In fine, PO2 Tan claimed during his direct examination that he received the seized items from the desk officer.
During cross-examination, however, PO2 Tan contradicted his previous statement on who turned over the
sachets of shabu to him, viz.:
ATTY. EDGARDO D. GONZALES:
Q: Santiago told you that he was the poseur buyer?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: He turned over to you, what?
A: He turned over to me small size heat[-]sealed transparent plastic pack containing white crystalline
substance, containing shabu.
x x xx
Q: You also identified two other pieces of sachet, correct, Sir?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Who turned over to you?
A: SPO1 Eduardo Rodriguez.21
Due to the apparent breaks in the chain of custody, it was possible that the seized item subject of the sale
transaction was switched with the seized items subject of the illegal possession case. This is material
considering that the imposable penalty for illegal possession of shabu depends on the quantity or weight of the
seized drug.
Aside from the failure to mark the seized drugs immediately upon arrest, the arresting officers also failed to
show that the marking of the seized drugs was done in the presence of the appellant. This requirement must
not be brushed aside as a mere technicality. It must be shown that the marking was done in the presence of
the accused to assure that the identity and integrity of the drugs were properly preserved. Failure to comply
with this requirement is fatal to the prosecution's case.
The requirements of making an inventory and taking of photographs of the seized drugs were likewise omitted
without offering an explanation for its non-compliance. This break in the chain tainted the integrity of the seized
drugs presented in court; the very identity of the seized drugs became highly questionable.
To recap, based on the evidence of the prosecution, it is clear that no markings were made immediately after
the arrest of the appellant.1âwphi1 The seized drugs were allegedly turned over to desk officer PO3 Napalcruz
but the prosecution did not bother to present him to testify on the identity of the items he received from SPO1
Rodriguez and SPO1 Santiago. PO3 Napalcruz supposedly turned over the drugs to PO2 Tan who marked the
same at the police station. During his direct testimony, PO2 Tan claimed that he received the drugs from PO3
Napalcruz. However, during his cross-examination, PO2 Tan contradicted himself when he admitted receipt of
the seized drugs from SPO1 Santiago and SPO1 Rodriguez. Aside from these glaring infirmities, there was no
inventory made, or photographs taken, of the seized drugs in the presence of the accused or his
representative, or in the presence of any representative from the media, Department of Justice or any elected
official, who must sign the inventory, or be given a copy of the inventory as required by RA 9165 and its IRR.
Lastly, we note that the trial court, in its November 12, 2007 Order, already denied the admission of Exhibits
''B-1" and "B-2" or the dn1gs subject of the illegal possession case. The relevant portions of the Order are as
follows:
Plaintiff's Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2" however are DENIED admission on the grounds that Exhibit "B-1" submitted
by the prosecution in evidence is merely a cigarette foil, whereas Exhibit "B-2" is a heat sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing 0.0135 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride which are inconsistent with its offer
that Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2" are two (2) plastic heat sealed transparent plastic sachets containing shabu with a
total weight of 0.0310 gram.22
Surprisingly, however, the trial court rendered a verdict convicting the appellant of violating Section 11, RA
9165 on illegal possession of dangerous drugs based on the same pieces of evidence it previously denied.
In sum, we find that the prosecution failed to: (1) overcome the presumption of innocence which appellai1t
enjoys; (2) prove the corpus delicti of the crime; (3) establish an unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs;
and (3) offer any explanation why the provisions of Section 21, RA 9165 were not complied with. This Court is
thus constrained to acquit the appellant based on reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed June 14, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAGR. CR HC No. 00902, which affirmed the August 31, 2010 Judgment of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga City in Criminal Case Nos. 5021 (19952) and 5022 (19953) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, appellant Salim R. Ismael is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant, unless the
latter is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform the Court of the date of his release or reason for
his continued confinement within five days from notice.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 212196
January 12, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RAMIL DORIA DAHIL and ROMMEL CASTRO y CARLOS, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the September 27, 2013 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
05707, which affirmed the July 17, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Angeles City (RTC)
in Criminal Case Nos. DC 02-376, DC 02-377 and DC 02-378, finding accused Ramil Doria Dahil (Dahil) and
Rommel Castro (Castro) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
On October 1, 2002, Dahil and Castro were charged in three (3) separate Informations before the RTC. In
Criminal Case No. DC 02-376, Dahil and Castro were charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 for the sale of 26.8098 grams of marijuana in the Information which reads:
That on or about the 29th day of September, 2002, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating and mutually
helping one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/or deliver to a poseur
buyer six (6) tea bags of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing TWENTY SIX GRAMS AND EIGHT
THOUSAND NINETY EIGHT TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (26.8098), which is a dangerous drug,
without authority whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
In Criminal Case No. DC 02-377, Dahil was charged with possession of 20.6642 grams of marijuana in
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, in the Information which reads: That on or about the 29th
day of September, 2002, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and
custody and control Five (5) tea bags of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing TWENTY GRAMS AND SIX
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY TWO TEN THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (20.6642), which is a
dangerous drug, without authority whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In Criminal Case No. DC 02-378, Castro was charged with possession of 130.8286 grams of marijuana in
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, in the Information which reads: That on or about the 29th
day of September, 2002, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and
custody and control One (1) brick in form wrapped in masking tape of dried marijuana fruiting tops weighing
ONE HUNDRED THIRTY GRAMS and EIGHT THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX TEN
THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (130.8286), which is a dangerous drug, without authority whatsoever.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
On November 14, 2002, Castro was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. Dahil, on the other hand, filed a
motion for reinvestigation and his arraignment was deferred. Trial ensued and the prosecution presented PO2
Arieltino Corpuz (PO2 Corpuz)and SPO1 Eliseo Licu (SPO1 Licu), as witnesses.
On August 6, 2009, the RTC discovered that Dahil was never arraigned through inadvertence.6 The RTC
informed the parties of the situation and the defense counsel did not interpose any objection to the reopening
of the case and the arraignment of Dahil. The latter was then arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. Thereafter,
the public prosecutor manifested that he was adopting all the evidence already adduced.
Version of the Prosecution
Evidence of the prosecution tended to show that, for a couple of weeks, the agents of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), Region 3, conducted surveillance and casing operations relative to the
information they received that a certain alias "Buddy" and alias "Mel" were trafficking dried marijuana in TB
Pavilion, Marisol Subdivision, Barangay Ninoy Aquino, Angeles City. On September 29, 2002, the Chief of
PDEA formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. The team was composed of four (4) police officers,
namely, Sergeant Juanito dela Cruz (Sergeant dela Cruz), as team leader; and PO2 Corpuz, SPO1 Licu and
PO2 Javiar, as members. PO2 Corpuz was designated as the poseur-buyer while SPO1 Licu was assigned as
his back-up.
The team proceeded to the target place at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening. Upon arriving, PO2 Corpuz
together with the informant went to the house of Dahil which was within the TB Pavillon compound. When PO2
Corpuz and the informant were in front of the house, they met Dahil and Castro. The informant then introduced
PO2 Corpuz as the buyer of marijuana. Dahil asked PO2 Corpuz how much would he be buying and the latter
answered that he would buy ₱200.00 worth of marijuana. At this juncture, Dahil took out from his pocket six (6)
plastic sachets of marijuana and handed them to PO2 Corpuz. After checking the items, PO2 Corpuz handed
two (2) ₱100.00 marked bills to Castro.
Immediately thereafter, PO2 Cruz took off his cap to signal that the sale had been consummated. The rest of
the buy-bust team then rushed to their location and arrested Castro and Dahil. PO2 Corpuz frisked Dahil and
recovered from his possession another five (5) plastic sachets containing marijuana while SPO1 Licu searched
the person of Castro and confiscated from him one (1) brick of suspected marijuana.
Both Castro and Dahil, together with the confiscated drugs, were then brought by the buy-bust team to the
PDEA office. There, the seized items were marked by PO2 Corpuz and SPO1Licu. First, the six (6) plastic
sachets of marijuana which were sold by Dahil to PO2 Corpuz were marked with "A-1" to "A-6" and with letters
"RDRC," "ADGC" and "EML." Second, the five (5) plastic sachets recovered from Dahil were marked with "B-1"
to "B-5" and with letters "RDRC," "ADGC" and "EML." Finally, the marijuana brick confiscated from Castro was
marked "C-RDRC." Sergeant dela Cruz then prepared the request for laboratory examination, affidavits of
arrest and other pertinent documents. An inventory of the seized items7 was also prepared which was signed
by Kagawad Pamintuan. Thereafter, PO2 Corpuz brought the confiscated drugs to the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination, which subsequently yielded positive results for marijuana.
The prosecution and defense entered into stipulation as to the essential contents of the prospective testimony
of the forensic chemist, to wit:
1. That a laboratory examination request was prepared by PO3 Dela Cruz;
2. That said letter request for laboratory examination was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory,Camp
Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga;
3. That Engr. Ma. Luisa Gundran David is a forensic chemist;
4. That said forensic chemist conducted an examination on the substance subject of the letter request
with qualification that said request was not subscribedor under oath and that the forensic chemist has
no personal knowledge as from whom and where said substance was taken;
5. That the result of the laboratory examination is embodied in Chemistry Report No. D-0518-2002; and
6. The findings and conclusion thereof.8
The prosecution was ordered to formally offer its evidence on March 7, 2007.9 After much delay, the public
prosecutor was finally able to orally submit his formal offer of exhibits after almost two years, or on January 6,
2009.10 He offered the following documentary evidence: (1) Joint Affidavit of Arrest, (2) Custodial Investigation
Report, (3) Photocopy of the marked money, (4) Brown envelope containing the subject illegal drugs, (5)
Inventory of Property Seized, (6) Laboratory Examination Request, and (7) Chemistry Report No. D-05182002.
Version of the Defense
In his defense, Dahil claimed that on September 29, 2002, a tricycle driver came looking for him after he had
arrived home. He saw the tricycle driver with another man already waiting for him. He was then asked by the
unknown man whether he knew a certain Buddy in their place. He answered that there were many persons
named Buddy. Suddenly, persons alighted from the vehicles parked in front of his house and dragged him into
one of the vehicles. He was brought to Clark Air Base and was charged with illegal selling and possession of
marijuana.
For his part, Castro testified thaton September 29, 2002, he was on 4th Street of Marisol, Barangay Ninoy
Aquino, Angeles City, watching a game of chess when he was approached by some men who asked if he
knew a certain Boy residing at Hardian Extension. He then replied that he did not know the said person and
then the men ordered him to board a vehicle and brought him to Clark Air Base where he was charged
withillegal possession of marijuana.
RTC Ruling
In its Decision,11 dated July 17, 2012, the RTC found both accused liable for violating Sections 5 and 11 of
R.A. No. 9165, and imposed upon them the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱500,000.00 each for the
crime of illegal sale of marijuana;Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years of
Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and a fine of ₱300,000.00 each for the crime of illegal possession of
marijuana.
The RTC was convinced that the prosecution was able to prove the case of selling and possession of illegal
drugs against the accused. All the elements of the crimes were established. To the trial court, the evidence
proved that PO2 Corpuz bought marijuana from Dahil. The latter examined the marijuana purchased and then
handed the marked money to Castro.
The marked money was lost in the custody of the police officers, but the RTC ruled that the same was not fatal
considering that a photocopy of the marked money was presented and identified by the arresting officers.12 It
did not give credence to the defense of frame-up by Dahil and Castro explaining that it could easily be
concocted with no supporting proof.
CA Ruling
The accused then appealed to the CA. In their Brief for the Accused-Appellants,13 they argued that there were
irregularities on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal items seized from them. The
prosecution witnesses exhibited gross disregard of the procedural safeguards which generated clouds of
doubts as tothe identity of the seized items presented in evidence.14
In its Brief for the Appellee,15 the OSG contended that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the
crime of illegal sale and possession of marijuana. As to the chain of custody procedure, it insists that the
prosecution witnesses were able to account for the series of events that transpired, from the time the buy-bust
operation was conducted until the time the items were presented in court.
The CA denied the appeal in its Decision, dated September 27, 2013. In its view, the prosecution was able to
establish that the illegal sale of marijuana actually took place. As could be gleaned from the testimony of PO2
Corpuz, there was an actual exchange as Dahil took out from his pocket six (6) sachets containing marijuana,
while PO2 Corpuz handled out the two (2) ₱100.00 marked bills, after they agreed to transact ₱200.00 worth of
the illegal drug.16 The charge of illegal possession of marijuana, was also thus established by the
prosecution.17 Another five (5) plastic sachets of marijuana were recovered from Dahil’s possession while one
(1) brick of marijuana from Castro’s possession.18
It was likewise proven that the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused during the buy-bust operation were the
same drugs presented before the RTC. As testified to by PO2 Corpuz, the six (6) plastic sachets of marijuana,
which were sold by Dahil toPO2 Corpuz were marked "A-1" to "A-6" and with letters "RDRC," "ADGC"and
"EML," the five (5) plastic sachets recovered in the possession of Dahil were marked "B-1" to "B-5" and with
the initials "ADGC" and "EML," while the marijuana brick confiscated from Castro was marked "C-RDRC."19
It was also held that the prosecution was able to establish the chain of custody. PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu
testified that the said drugs were marked at the police station. An inventory of the seized items was made as
shown by the Inventory Report of Property Seized, duly signed by Kagawad Pamintuan. The Request for
Laboratory Examination revealed that the confiscated drugs were the same items submitted to the PNP crime
laboratory for examination. On the other hand, Chemistry Report No. D-0518-2002 showed that the specimen
gave positive results to the test of marijuana. The accused failed to show that the confiscated marijuana items
were tampered with, or switched, before they were delivered to the crime laboratory for examination.20
Hence, this appeal.
This appeal involves the sole issue of whether or not the law enforcement officers substantially complied with
the chain of custody procedure required by R.A. No. 9165.
The Court’s Ruling
Let it be underscored that appeal incriminal cases throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty of
the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned
or unassigned.21 Considering that what is at stake here is no less than the liberty of the accused, this Court has
meticulously and thoroughly reviewed and examined the records of the case and finds that there is merit in the
appeal. The Court holds that that there was no unbroken chain of custody and that the prosecution failed to
establish the very corpus delicti of the crime charged.
A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of operation has been proven to be an
effective way to flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy, a buy-bust
operation has a significant downside that has not escaped the attention of the framers of the law. It is
susceptible topolice abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion.22
The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if not indispensable in every
prosecution for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs. As such, the identity of the dangerous
drugs should be established beyond doubt by showing that the items offered in court were the same
substances boughtduring the buy-bust operation. This rigorous requirement, known under R.A. No. 9165 as
the chain of custody, performs the function of ensuring thatunnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed.23 In People v. Catalan,24 the Court said:
To discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the
Prosecution must prove the corpus delicti.That proof is vital to a judgment of conviction. On the other hand, the
Prosecution does not comply with the indispensable requirement of proving the violation of Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165 when the dangerous drugs are missing but also when there are substantial gapsin the
chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the authenticity of the evidence
presented in court.
Although R.A. No. 9165 does not define the meaning of chain of custody, Section 1(b) of Dangerous
DrugsBoard Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements R.A. No. 9165, explains the said term as
follows:
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.
Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person
who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in
the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.
As a means of ensuring the establishment of the chain of custody, Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 specifies
that:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photographthe same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Specifically, Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)of R.A. No. 9165
enumeratesthe procedures to be observed by the apprehending officers toconfirm the chain of custody, to wit:
xxx
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrantis served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;
xxx
The strict procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not complied with.
Although the prosecution offered inevidence the Inventory of the Property Seized signed by the arresting
officers and Kagawad Pamintuan, the procedures provided in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not observed.
The said provision requires the apprehending team, after seizure and confiscation, to immediately (1) conduct
a physically inventory; and (2) photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/orseized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the DOJ, and any elected public official who shall be required tosign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof.
First,the inventory of the property was not immediately conducted after seizure and confiscation as it was only
done at the police station. Notably, Article II, Section 21(a) of the IRR allows the inventory to be done at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures. In this case, however, the prosecution did not even claim that the PDEA Office Region 3
was the nearest office from TB Pavilion where the drugs were seized. The prosecution also failed to give
sufficient justification for the delayed conduct of the inventory. PO2 Corpuz testified, to wit:
Q: What documents did you ask Kgd. Abel Pamintuan to sign?
A: The inventory of the property seized, sir.
Q: And did he sign that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Where was he when he signed that?
A: In our office, sir.
Q: Already in your office?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who prepared the inventory of the property seized?
A: Our investigator, sir.
Q: And that was prepared while you were already at your office?
A: Yes, sir, because we did not bring with us the material or equipment for the preparation of the
documents so, we invited him to our office.25
PO2 Corpuz gave the flimsy excusethat they failed to immediately conduct an inventory because they did not
bring with them the material or equipment for the preparation of the documents. Such explanation is
unacceptable considering that they conducted a surveillance on the target for a couple of weeks.26 They should
have been prepared with their equipment even before the buy-bust operation took place.
Second,there is doubt as to the identity of the person who prepared the Inventory of Property Seized.
According to the CA decision, it was Sergeant dela Cruzwho prepared the said document.27 PO2 Cruz on the
other hand, testified that it was their investigatorwho prepared the document while SPO1 Licu’s testimony was
that a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin was their investigator.28
Third, there were conflicting claims on whether the seized items were photographed in the presence of the
accused or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected
public official. During the cross-examination, PO2 Corpuz testified: Q: After you arrested Ramil Dahil,did you
conduct the inventory of the alleged seized items?
A: Yes, sir (sic).
Q: Where did you conduct the inventory?
A: In our office, ma’am
Q: Were pictures takenon the alleged seized items together with Ramil Dahil?
A: No, ma’am.29
[Emphases supplied]
SPO1 Licu when cross-examined on the same point, testified this was:
Q: After you conducted the alleged buy-bust operation, did you conduct an inventory of the alleged
seized items?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Were the accused assisted by counsel at the time you conduct the inventory?
A: No, ma’am.
Q: Were pictures taken on them including the alleged seized items?
A: Pictures were takenon the accused, ma’am.
[Emphasis supplied]
In other words, when questioned on the conduct of the inventory, PO2 Corpuz testified that no pictures of the
seized items were taken while SPO1 Licu said that pictures of the accused were taken. From the vague
statements of the police officers, the Court doubts that photographs of the alleged drugs were indeed taken.
The records are bereft of any document showing the photos of the seized items. The Court notes that SPO1
Licu could have misunderstood the question because he answered that "pictures were taken on the accused"
when the question referred to photographs of the drugs and not of the accused.
The prosecution failed to establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved.
Notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to establish the rigorous requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165, jurisprudence dictates that substantial compliance is sufficient. Failure to strictly comply with the law
does not necessarily render the arrestof the accused illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him
inadmissible.30 The issue of non-compliance with the said section is not of admissibility, but of weight to be
given on the evidence.31 Moreover, Section 21 of the IRR requires "substantial" and not necessarily "perfect
adherence," as long as it can be proven that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
preserved as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.32
To ensure that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, the proper chain of
custody of the seized items must be shown. The Court explained in People v. Malillin33 how the chain of
custody or movement of the seized evidence should be maintained and why this must be shown by evidence,
viz:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it
to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the
condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
In People v. Kamad,34 the Court identified the links that the prosecution must establish in the chain of custody
in a buy-bust situation to be as follows: first, the seizure and marking, ifpracticable, of the illegal drug recovered
from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized bythe
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug
to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked
illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
First link: Marking of the Drugs Recovered from the Accused by the Apprehending Officer
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately
after they have been seized from the accused. "Marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the
poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized. Marking after seizure is the starting point in
the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked because succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markingsas reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate
the markedevidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from
the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching,
planting or contamination of evidence.35
It must be noted that marking isnot found in R.A. No. 9165 and is different from the inventory-taking and
photography under Section 21 of the said law. Long before Congress passed R.A. No. 9165, however, this
Court had consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs would cast
reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.36
In the present case, PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu claimed that they had placed their initials on the seized items.
They, however, gave little information on how they actually did the marking. It is clear, nonetheless, that the
marking was not immediately done at the place of seizure, and the markings were only placed at the police
station based on the testimony of PO2 Corpuz, to wit: Q: So, after recovering all those marijuana bricks and
plastic sachets of marijuana and the marked money from the accused, what else did you do?
A: We brought the two (2) suspects and the evidence and marked money to our office, sir.
Q: So, in your office, what happened there?
A: Our investigator prepared the necessary documents, sir, the request for crime lab examination, joint affidavit
of arrest, booking sheet, and all other documents necessary for the filing of the case against the two (2), sir.
xxx
Q: What about the marijuana, subject of the deal, and the one which you confiscated from the accused, what
did you do with those?
A: Before sending them to Olivas, we placed our markings, sir.37
Hence, from the place of the seizure to the PDEA Office Region 3, the seized items were not marked. It could
not, therefore, be determined how the unmarked drugs were handled. The Court must conduct guesswork on
how the seized drugs were transported and who took custody of them while in transit. Evidently, the alteration
of the seized items was a possibility absent their immediate marking thereof.
Still, there are cases whenthe chain of a custody rule is relaxed such as when the marking of the seized items
is allowed to be undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the
presence of the accused in illegal drugs cases.38 Even a less stringent application of the requirement, however,
will not suffice to sustain the conviction of the accused in this case. Aside from the fact that the police officers
did not immediately place their markings on the seized marijuana upon their arrival at the PDEA Office, there
was also no showing that the markings were made in the presence of the accused.
PO2 Corpuz testified that they only placed their markings on the drugs when they were about to send them to
Camp Olivas for forensic examination. This damaging testimony was corroborated by the documentary
evidence offered by the prosecution. The following documents were made at the PDEA Office: (1) Joint
Affidavit of Arrest, (2) Custodial Investigation Report, (3) Inventory of Property Seized, and (4) Laboratory
Examination Request. Glaringly, only the Laboratory Examination Request cited the markings on the seized
drugs. Thus, it could only mean that when the other documents were being prepared, the seized drugs had not
been marked and the police officers did not have basis for identifying them. Considering that the seized drugs
wereto be used for different criminal charges, it was imperative for the police officers to properly mark them at
the earliest possible opportunity. Here, they failed in such a simple and critical task. The seized drugs were
prone to mix-up at the PDEA Office itself because of the delayed markings.
Worse, not all of the seized drugs were properly marked. As noted by the RTC, Exhibit B-3 RC RD,39 Exhibit A5 RC RD and Exhibit A-6 RD RC40 did not have the initials of the apprehending officers on the back. Bearing in
mind the importance of marking the seized items, these lapses in the procedure are too conspicuous and
cannot be ignored. They placed uncertainty as to the identity of the corpus delicti from the moment of seizure
until it was belatedly marked at the PDEA Office.
Similarly, in People v. Garcia,41 the Court considered the belated marking of the seized drug by the
apprehending officer in acquitting the accused in the case. The officer testified that he marked the confiscated
items only after he had returned tothe police station. Such admission showed that the marking was not done
immediately after the seizure of the items, but after the lapse of a significant intervening time.
Second Link: Turnover of the Seized Drugs by the Apprehending Officer to the Investigating Officer
The second link in the chain of custody is the transfer of the seized drugs by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer. Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a
supervising officer, who will then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for testing.42 This is a
necessary step in the chain of custody because it will be the investigating officer who shall conduct the proper
investigation and prepare the necessary documents for the developing criminal case. Certainly, the
investigating officer must have possession of the illegal drugs to properly prepare the required documents.
The investigator in this case was a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin.43 Surprisingly, there was no testimony from the
witnesses as to the turnover of the seized items to SPO4 Jamisolamin. It is highly improbable for an
investigator in a drug-related case toeffectively perform his work without having custody of the seized items.
Again, the case of the prosecution is forcing this Court to resort to guesswork as to whether PO2 Corpuz and
SPO1 Licu gave the seized drugs to SPO4 Jamisolamin as the investigating officer or they had custody of the
marijuana all night while SPO4 Jamisolamin was conducting his investigation on the same items.
In People v. Remigio,44 the Court noted the failure of the police officers to establish the chain of custody as the
apprehending officer did not transfer the seized items to the investigating officer. The apprehending officer kept
the alleged shabu from the time of confiscation until the time he transferred them to the forensic chemist. The
deviation from the links in the chain of custody led to the acquittal of the accused in the said case.
Third Link: Turnover by the Investigating Officer of the Illegal Drugs to the Forensic Chemist
From the investigating officer, the illegal drug is delivered to the forensic chemist. Once the seized drugs arrive
at the forensic laboratory, it will be the laboratory technician who will test and verify the nature of the
substance. In this case, it was only during his cross-examination that PO2 Corpuz provided some information
on the delivery of the seized drugs to Camp Olivas, to wit:
Q: How about the alleged marijuana, you stated that the same was brought to the crime laboratory, who
brought the same to the crime lab?
A: Me and my back-up, ma’am.
Q: When did you bring the marijuana to the crime lab for examination?
A: I think it was the following day, ma’am.45
As can be gleaned from the testimony of PO2 Corpuz, very little detail was offered on how the seized
marijuana was handled and transferred from the PDEA Office in Angeles City to the crime laboratory in Camp
Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. PO2 Corpuz kept possession of the seized drugs overnight without giving
detailson the safekeeping of the items. The most palpable deficiency of the testimony would be the lack of
information as to who received the subject drugs in Camp Olivas.
Engr. Ma. Luisa Gundran, the forensic chemist who conducted the tests on the subject drugs, did not appear in
court despite the numerous subpoenas sent to her.46 Instead, the prosecution and the defense agreed to
stipulate on the essential points of her proffered testimony. Regrettably, the stipulated testimony of the forensic
chemist failed to shed light as to who received the subject drugs in Camp Olivas. One of the stipulations was
"that said forensic chemist conducted an examination on the substance of the letter-request with qualification
that said request was not subscribed or under oath and that forensic chemist has no personalknowledge as
from whom and where said substance was taken."47 This bolsters the fact that the forensic chemist had no
knowledge as to who received the seized marijuana at the crime laboratory.
The recent case of People v. Beran48 involved irregularities in the third link. The police officer, who both served
as apprehending and investigating officer, claimed that he personally took the drug to the laboratory for testing,
but there was no showing who received the drug from him. The records also showed that he submitted the
sachet to the laboratory only on the next day, without explaining how he preserved his exclusive custody
thereof overnight. All those facts raised serious doubt that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item
have not been fatally compromised. Hence, the accused inthe said case was also acquitted.
Fourth Link: Turnover of the Marked Illegal Drug Seized by the Forensic Chemist to the Court.
The last link involves the submission of the seized drugs by the forensic chemist to the court when presented
as evidence in the criminal case. No testimonial or documentary evidence was given whatsoever as to how the
drugs were kept while in the custody of the forensic chemist until it was transferred to the court. The forensic
chemist should have personally testified on the safekeeping of the drugs but the parties resorted to a general
stipulation of her testimony. Although several subpoenae were sent to the forensic chemist, only a brown
envelope containing the seized drugs arrived in court.49 Sadly, instead of focusing on the essential links in the
chain of custody, the prosecutor propounded questions concerning the location of the misplaced marked
money, which was not even indispensable in the criminal case.
The case of People v. Gutierrez50 also had inadequate stipulations as to the testimony of the forensic chemist.
No explanation was given regarding the custody of the seized drug in the interim - from the time it was turned
over to the investigator up to its turnover for laboratory examination. The records of the said case did not show
what happened to the allegedly seized shabu between the turnover by the investigator to the chemist and its
presentation in court. Thus, since there was no showing that precautions were taken to ensure that there was
no change in the condition of that object and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession
thereof, the accused therein was likewise acquitted.
In view of all the foregoing, the Court can only conclude that, indeed, there was no compliance with the
procedural requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 because of the inadequate physical inventory and the
lack of photography of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from Dahil and Castro. No explanation was offered
for the non-observance of the rule. The prosecution cannot apply the saving mechanism of Section 21 of the
IRR of R.A. No. 9165 because it miserably failed to prove that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items were preserved. The four links required to establish the proper chain of custody were breached
with irregularity and lapses.
The Court cannot either agree with the CA that the evidentiary rule involving the presumption of regularity of
the performance of official duties could apply in favor of the police officers. The regularity of the performance of
duty could not be properly presumed in favor of the police officers because the records were replete with
indicia of their serious lapses.51 The presumption stands when no reason exists in the records by which to
doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty. And even in that instance, the presumption of regularity
will never be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of
evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right of an accused to be presumed innocent.52
Given the procedural lapses, serious uncertainty hangs over the identity of the seized marijuana that the
prosecution presented as evidence before the Court. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the
elements of the crime charged, creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.53
For said reason, there is no need to discuss the specific defenses raised by the accused. WHEREFORE, the
appeal is GRANTED. The September 27, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05707
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellants, Ramil Doria Dahil and Rommel Castro y Carlos, are
ACQUITTED of the crime charged against them and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless
they are being held for some other lawful cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this decision and to inform this Court of
the date of the actual release from confinement of the accused within five (5) days from receipt of copy.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 177222
October 29, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
RANILO DE LA CRUZ Y LIZING, appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
On appeal is the Decision 1 dated 30 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 01266
affirming in toto the judgment 2 dated 14 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City,
Branch 211, finding appellant Ranilo Dela Cruz y
Lizing guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165)
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and ordering him to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00. 3
On 13 September 2002, Dela Cruz was charged with the violation of the aforesaid offense in an
Information 4 that reads:
That on or about the 12th day of September 2002, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any lawful authority, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously deliver, distribute, transport or sell to poseur-buyer PO2 Nick Resuello[,] one
(1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 gram each of white crystalline substance, which
were found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu," a
dangerous drug, for the amount of ₱100.00 with Serial No. XY588120, without the corresponding license and
prescription, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution
presenting as witnesses arresting officers PO2 Braulio Peregrino, PO2 Nick Resuello, PO2 Marcelino Boyles,
PO2 Allan Drilon, investigator-on-case PO3 Virgilio Bismonte and Forensic Chemist Joseph Perdido.
Prosecution evidence shows that on 12 September 2002, the Office of the Station Drugs Enforcement Unit
(SDEU), Mandaluyong City received information that appellant, alias "Boy Tigre," of No. 73, Dela Cruz Street,
Barangay Old Zaniga, Mandaluyong City was engaging in the trade of illegal drugs. A team composed of
Peregrino, Boyles, Drilon and Resuello was dispatched to conduct a buy-bust operation in the area at around
2:00 p.m. of the same day. Peregrino, Boyles, and Drilon positioned themselves at a nearby area while
Resuello, the designated poseur-buyer, approached appellant described as a long-haired, medium built, notso-tall male, sporting a moustache and frequently seen wearing short pants. 6 At the time, appellant was
standing outside of their gate and kept on glancing from side to side. 7 Resuello then told appellant that he
wanted to buy shabu. Dela Cruz looked surprised prompting Resuello to repeat what he had said and handed
him the ₱100 bill with Serial No. XY 588120. Appellant, in turn, handed him a plastic sachet containing the
white crystalline substance. At which point, Resuello executed the pre-arranged signal and Peregrino
immediately rushed to the scene. 8
Peregrino, identifying himself as a policeman, held appellant and informed him of his constitutional rights.
Peregrino then recovered the buy-bust money from appellant. Subsequently, appellant was brought to SDECU
for investigation. Thereat, Peregrino placed his initials (BP) on the plastic sachet containing the white
crystalline substance before sending it to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for chemical
examination. The sachet was later tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Subsequently, Peregrino and Resuello accomplished the booking and information sheets regarding the
incident. Peregrino also executed an affidavit on the matter. 9 Appellant was later identified as Ranilo Dela
Cruz y Lising. 10
On cross-examination, Peregrino and Resuello admitted that the buy-bust money had neither been dusted with
fluorescent powder nor marked. They only made a photocopy of it prior to the operation for purposes of
identification. 11 Peregrino also testified that appellant had not been tested for the presence of fluorescent
powder; neither was a drug examination conducted on him. After the arrest, Peregrino narrated that his office
made a report on the matter which was forwarded to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA). 12 Boyles testified likewise on cross-examination that at the time of the arrest, they had no
coordination with PDEA. 13 Drilon, on the other hand, testified that he had not actually seen the transaction. 14
Forensic Chemist Perdido testified that the plastic sachet was found to contain methamphetamine
hydrochloride. He, however, admitted that he examined the specimen and had made the markings on the
same without the presence of appellant. 15
For the defense, appellant testified that on 12 September 2002, at around 1:00 to 2:00 p.m., he was in his
house watching television with his wife when he heard a knock at the door. Outside, he came upon two men
looking for "Boy Tigre." After admitting that it was he they were looking for, he was told that the barangay
captain needed him. He went with the two men to see the barangay captain. Thereat, the barangay captain
asked whether he knew of anyone engaged in large-scale drug pushing. Appellant replied in the negative and
in response, the barangay captain stated that there was nothing more he (the barangay captain) can do.
Appellant was then told to go to the City Hall. At first, his wife accompanied him there but he later asked her to
go home and raise the money Bismonte had allegedly demanded from him in exchange for his freedom. When
appellant’s wife failed to return as she had given birth, a case for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 was filed against him. 16 Appellant added that he used to be involved in "video-karera" and surmised that
this involvement could have provoked the barangay captain’s wrath. 17
Appellant’s wife, Jocelyn Dela Cruz, corroborated appellant’s testimony. She further stated that after appellant
had identified himself as "Boy Tigre," the two men held on to him and asked him to go with them to the
barangay captain. There, the barangay captain asked appellant if he knew a certain "Amon" of Pitong Gatang.
When appellant replied that he did not, he was then brought to the SDECU where Bismonte allegedly
demanded ₱100,000.00 from them or else a case without bail will be filed against appellant. 18
Finding that the prosecution had proven appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered
judgment against him, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and ordering him to pay a fine
of ₱500,000.00. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the challenged decision was affirmed in toto by the
appellate court, after it ruled that the trial court did not commit any reversible error in finding appellant guilty of
the offense charged.
Before the Court, appellant reiterates his contention that the apprehending police officers’ failure to comply with
Sections 21 19 and 86 20 of R.A. No. 9165 and that failure casts doubt on the validity of his arrest and the
admissibility of the evidence allegedly seized from him. 21 Through his Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental
Brief) dated 4 September 2007, appellant stated that he had exhaustively argued all the relevant issues in his
Brief filed before the Court of Appeals and thus, he is adopting it as Supplemental Brief. 22
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that it was dispensing with the admission of a
supplemental brief. 23 Earlier,
in its Appellee’s Brief, the OSG maintained that despite the non-compliance with the requirements of R.A. No.
9165, the seized drugs are admissible in evidence because their integrity and evidentiary value were properly
preserved in accordance with the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165. 24
At the outset, it is well to restate the constitutional mandate that an accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such
presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum evidence required. In so doing, the prosecution must rest
on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet the
required amount of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In which
case the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted. 25
In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (1) that the transaction or
sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and
seller were identified. 26 The dangerous drug is the very corpus delicti of the offense. 27
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 states that:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
The IRR of the same provision adds a proviso, to wit:
Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant
is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody
over said items;
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the guidelines
prescribed by the law regarding the custody and control of the seized drugs despite its mandatory terms. While
there was testimony regarding the marking of the seized items at the police station, there was no mention
whether the same had been done in the presence of appellant or his representatives. There was likewise no
mention that any representative from the media, DOJ or any elected official had been present during the
inventory or that any of these people had been required to sign the copies of the inventory. Neither does it
appear on record that the team photographed the contraband in accordance with law. Peregrino testified as
follows:
Q While you were at the office, what did you do with the physical evidence, subject of the buy-bust operation?
A When we were at the office[,] we marked the subject physical evidence and requested for physical
examination[,] Ma’am.
ACP Indunan:
What were the markings placed on the physical evidence?
A What we put is initial "BP"
Q What does this BP means [sic]?
A My initial Ma’am, Braulio Perigrino [sic]. 28
Resuello likewise testified in this wise:
ACP Indunan:
Q Before you brought this item to the crime laboratory[,] what other markings you placed on the sachet?
A We put a marking BP, Ma’am.
Q That BP stands for what[,] Mr. witness?
A Braulio Perigrino[,] Ma’am. 29
Following the rule that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and liberally in favor of
the accused, 30 the apprehending team’s omission to observe the procedure outlined by R.A. 9165 in the
custody and disposition of the seized drugs significantly impairs the prosecution’s case.
Now, the prosecution cannot seek refuge in the proviso of the IRR in the absence of proof of entitlement to
such leniency. The prosecution rationalizes its oversight by merely stating that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items were properly preserved in accordance with law. The allegation hardly sways the
Court save when it is accompanied by proof. According to the proviso of the IRR of Section 21(a) of R.A. No.
9165, non-compliance with the procedure shall not render void and invalid the seizure of and custody of the
drugs only when: (1) such non-compliance was under justifiable grounds; and (2) the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. Clearly, there must be
proof that these two (2) requirements were met before any such non-compliance may be said to fall within the
scope of the proviso. Significantly, not only does the present case lack the most basic or elementary attempt at
compliance with the law and its implementing rules; it fails as well to provide any justificatory ground showing
that the integrity of the evidence had all along been preserved. 31
Failing to prove entitlement to the application of the proviso, the arresting officers’ non-compliance with the
procedure laid down by R.A No. 9156 is not excused. This inexcusable non-compliance effectively invalidates
their seizure of and custody over the seized drugs, thus, compromising the identity and integrity of the same.
We resolve the doubt in the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti in favor of appellant 32 as every fact
necessary to constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 33 Considering that
the prosecution failed to present the required quantum of evidence, appellant’s acquittal is in order.
It is well to recall that in several cases that came before us, we have repeatedly emphasized the importance of
compliance with the prescribed procedure in the custody and disposition of the seized drugs. We have over
and over declared that the deviation from the standard procedure dismally compromises the integrity of the
evidence. 34
Anent the argument that the buy-bust operation was conducted without the assistance or consent of PDEA, in
violation of Section 86 of R.A. No. 9165, it must be pointed out that the second paragraph of the same
provision states that the transfer, absorption and integration of the different offices into PDEA shall take effect
within eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of the law which was on 4 July 2002. 35 In view of the fact that
the buy-bust operation was conducted on 12 September 2002, it is excusable that the same was not done in
coordination with PDEA.
All told, the totality of the evidence presented in the instant case does not support appellant’s conviction for
violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
all the elements of the offense. Following the constitutional mandate, when the guilt of the appellant has not
been proven with moral certainty, as in this case, the presumption of innocence prevails and his exoneration
should be granted as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 14 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211
in Criminal Case No. MC02-5912-D is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant RANILO DELA CRUZ y LIZING
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt and ordered
immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held for some other lawful case.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision forthwith and to INFORM
this Court, within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from
confinement.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 144656
May 9, 2002
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO @ PUKE, accused-appellant.
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, sentencing Gerrico
Vallejo y Samartino to death and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00
as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages for the rape-slaying of a 9-year old child, Daisy Diolola, in
Rosario, Cavite on July 10, 1999.
The Information charging accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo with the crime of Rape with Homicide alleged:
"That on or about the 10th day of July 1999, in Barangay Ligtong I, Municipality of Rosario, Province of
Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Trial Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have sexual intercourse with DAISY DIOLOLA Y DITALO, a nine-year old child against the
latter's will and while raping the said victim, said accused strangled her to death."
"CONTRARY TO LAW."2
Accused-appellant was arraigned on July 26, 1999 and, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged, whereupon trial ensued.
Ten (10) witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola, the victim's mother; Dr. Antonio S.
Vertido, medico-legal officer of the NBI; Atty. Lupo Leyva; Mayor Renato Abutan of Rosario, Cavite; Atty. Sikat
Agbunag of the Public Attorney's Office; Pet Byron Buan, NBI Forensic Biologist; Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, NBI
Forensic Chemist; SPO1 Arnel Cuevas of the Rosario, Cavite police station; and Jessiemin Mataverde and
Charito Paras-Yepes, both neighbors of the victim.
The victim's mother, Ma. Nida Diolola, testified that at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999,
she sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy Diolola to their neighbor's house in Pilapil, Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite,
so that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of accused-appellant, could help Daisy with her lessons. Aimee's house,
where accused-appellant was also staying, is about four to five meters away from Daisy's house. Ma. Nida saw
her daughter go to the house of her tutor. She was wearing pink short pants and a white sleeveless shirt. An
hour later, Daisy came back with accused-appellant. They were looking for a book which accused-appellant
could copy to make a drawing or a poster that Daisy would submit to her teacher. After finding the book, Daisy
and accused-appellant went back to the latter's house. When Ma. Nida woke up at about 5:30 o'clock after an
afternoon nap, she noticed that Daisy was not yet home. She started looking for her daughter and proceeded
to the house of Aimee, Daisy's tutor. Aimee's mother told Ma. Nida that Daisy was not there and that Aimee
was not able to help Daisy with her lessons because Aimee was not feeling well as she had her menstrual
period. Ma. Nida looked for Daisy in her brother's and sister's houses, but she was not there, either. At about
7:00 o'clock that evening, Ma. Nida went back to her neighbor's house, and there saw accused-appellant, who
told her that Daisy had gone to her classmate's house to borrow a book. But, when Ma. Nida went there, she
was told that Daisy had not been there. Ma. Nida went to the dike and was told that they saw Daisy playing at
about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon. Jessiemin Mataverde also told Ma. Nida that Daisy was playing in front of
her house that afternoon and even watched television in her house, but that Daisy later left with accusedappellant.
Ma. Nida and her brother and sister searched for Daisy the whole evening of June 10, 1999, a Saturday, until
the early morning of the following day, June 11, 1999, a Sunday, but their search proved fruitless. Then, at
about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of June 11, 1999, she was informed that the dead body of her daughter was
found tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river after the "compuerta" by a certain Freddie Quinto. The body
was already in the barangay hall when Ma. Nida saw her daughter. Daisy was wearing her pink short pants
with her sleeveless shirt tied around her neck. Barangay Councilmen Raul Ricasa and Calring Purihin reported
the incident to the Rosario police. The other barangay officers fetched accused-appellant from his house and
took him to the barangay hall. At the barangay hall, Ma. Nida pointed to accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo as
the probable suspect since he was with the victim when she was last seen alive.3
Another witness, Jessiemin Mataverde, testified that at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that day, she
saw Daisy playing with other children outside her house. She asked Daisy and her playmates to stop playing
as their noise was keeping Jessiemin's one-year old baby awake. Daisy relented and watched television
instead from the door of Jessiemin's house. About five minutes later, accused-appellant came to the house
and told Daisy something, as a result of which she went with him and the two proceeded towards the
"compuerta."
Jessiemin testified that at around 5:00 o'clock that afternoon, while she and her daughter were in front of a
store across the street from her house, accused-appellant arrived to buy a stick of Marlboro cigarette.
Accused-appellant had only his basketball shorts on and was just holding his shirt. They noticed both his
shorts and his shirt were wet. After lighting his cigarette, accused-appellant left.4
Charito Yepes, another neighbor of Ma. Nida, also testified. She said that at about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon
of July 10, 1999, while she and her husband and children were walking towards the "compuerta" near the
seashore of Ligtong, Rosario, Cavite, they met a fisherman named Herminio who said that it was a good day
for catching milkfish (bangus). For this reason, according to this witness, they decided to get some fishing
implements. She said they met accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo near the seashore and noticed that he was
uneasy and looked troubled. Charito said that accused-appellant did not even greet them, which was unusual.
She also testified that accused-appellant's shorts and shirt (sando) were wet, but his face and hair were not.5
SPO1 Arnel Cuevas testified that upon receipt of the report, Rosario Police Chief Ricardo B. de la Cruz, Jr.
responded to the call together with his men, PO2 Garcia, SPO1 Araracap and PO2 Lariza. When they arrived,
Daisy's body was already in the barangay hall. SPO1 Cuevas took photographs of the body. At that time, Daisy
was wearing pink short pants and a dirty white panty with a dirty white sleeveless shirt wrapped around her
neck. The body was afterwards taken to the Samson Funeral Parlor in Rosario, Cavite. The inquiries
conducted by the police showed that one Freddie Quinto was fishing near the compuerta when he accidentally
hit the body of Daisy, which was in the mud and tied to the root of an aroma tree.
Accused-appellant was invited by the policemen for questioning. Two others, a certain Raymond and Esting,
were also taken into custody because they were seen with accused-appellant in front of the store in the late
afternoon of July 10 1999. Later, however, the two were released. Based on the statements of Jessiemin
Mataverde and Charito Paras-Yepes, the policemen went to the house of accused-appellant at about 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon of July 11, 1999 and recovered the white basketball shirt, with the name Samartino and
No. 13 printed at the back, and the violet basketball shorts, with the number 9 printed on it, worn by accusedappellant the day before. The shirt and shorts, which were bloodstained, were turned over to the NBI for
laboratory examination.6
Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, testified that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of July 11,
1999, he conducted a physical examination of accused-appellant. His findings7 showed the following:
"PHYSICAL FINDINGS:
"Abrasions: thigh, right, antero-lateral aspect, lower 3rd 5.0 x 0.1 cm., knee, left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm. legs,
right anterior aspect, 28.0 x 8.0 cms., left anterior aspect, 24.0 x 10.0 cms., feet, plantar aspects; right,
9.0 x 3.0 cms. and left, 13.0 x 5.0 cms.
"Hematoma, left ring finger, posterior aspect, 1.0 x 0.5 cm.
"Lacerations, left ring finger, posterior aspect, 0.3 cm.
"(Living Case No. BMP-9902, p. 101, records)"
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Dr. Vertido went to the Samson Funeral Parlor in Rosario, Cavite for an
autopsy on the cadaver of the victim Daisy Diolola. The autopsy revealed the following postmortem findings:8
"Body in early stage of postmortem decomposition characterized by foul odor, eyes and tongue
protruding, bloating of the face and blister formation.
"Washerwoman's hands and feet.
"Contusion, (pinkish) face, right, 14.0 x 10.0 cms. and left, 13.0 x 6.0 cms. Contused abrasions,
forehead, 13.0 x 5.0 cms. upper lip, 5.0 x 22.0 cms., lower lip, 3.0 x 2.0 cms., neck (nailmarks) anterior
aspect, 8.0 x 5.0 cms., arms, right antero-medial aspect, middle 3rd 3.0 x 15.0 cms. posterior aspect,
upper 3rd, 1.5 x 1.0 cms., left posterior aspect, 20.0 x 9.0 cms., forearm, left, posterior aspect, 21.0 x
8.0 cms. left thumb, anterior aspect, 1.5 x 1.0 cms., left middle, ring and little fingers, dorsal aspect, .50
x 4.0 cms. knees, right, 3.0 x 2.0 cms. and left, 8.0- x 5.0 cms., legs, right anterior aspect, upper and
middle 3rd 3.0 x 2.5 cms. foot right, dorsal aspect.
"Hematoma, periorbital right, 5.0 x 3.0 cms. and left, 4.5 x 3.0 cms.
"Fracture, tracheal rings.
"Hemorrhages, interstitial, neck, underneath, nailmarks. "Petechial hemorrhages,
subendocardial, subpleural.
"Brain and other visceral organs are congested.
"Stomach, contains ½ rice and other food particles.
"CAUSE OF DEATH: -Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation.
"GENITAL EXAMINATION: - Pubic hair, no growth. Labia majora and minora, gaping and congested.
Hymen, moderately tall, thick with fresh lacerations, complete at 3:00, 6:00 and 9:00 o'clock positions,
edges with blood clots." [Autopsy Report No. BTNO-99-152]
Renato Abutan, Municipal Mayor of Rosario, Cavite, testified that he was informed of the rape and murder at
past 10:00 o'clock in the evening of June 11, 1999. The mayor said he immediately proceeded to the municipal
jail, where accused-appellant was detained, and talked to the latter. Accused-appellant at first denied having
anything to do with the killing and rape of the child. The mayor said he told accused-appellant that he could not
help him if he did not tell the truth. At that point, accused-appellant started crying and told the mayor that he
killed the victim by strangling her. Accused-appellant claimed that he was under the influence of drugs. The
mayor asked accused-appellant if he wanted to have the services of Atty. Lupo Leyva, a resident of Rosario,
as his lawyer. When accused-appellant said he did, Mayor Abutan fetched Atty. Leyva from his house and took
him to the police station about 11:00 o'clock that evening.9
Atty. Lupo Leyva corroborated Mayor Abutan's testimony. He said that upon arriving at the police station, he
asked accused-appellant if he wanted his services as counsel in the investigation. After accused-appellant
assented, Atty. Leyva testified that he "sort of discouraged" the former from making statements as anything he
said could be used against him. But, as accused-appellant was willing to be investigated, Atty. Leyva said he
advised him to tell the truth. PO2 Garcia, the investigator, informed accused-appellant of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel and warned him that any answer he gave could and might
be used against him in a court of law. PO2 Garcia asked questions from accused-appellant, who gave his
answers in the presence of Atty. Leyva. After the statement was taken, Atty. Leyva and accused-appellant read
it and afterwards signed it. Atty. Leyva testified that he did not see or notice any indication that accusedappellant had been maltreated by the police. In his sworn statement (Exh. M), accused-appellant confessed to
killing the victim by strangling her to death, but denied having molested her.10
Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that on July 12, 1999, he took blood samples from
accused-appellant in his office for laboratory examination to determine his blood type. Likewise, the basketball
shorts and shirt worn by accused-appellant on the day the victim was missing and the victim's clothing were
turned over to the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI by PO1 Amoranto of the Rosario, Cavite police for
the purpose of determining the presence of human blood and its groups.11
The results of the examinations conducted by Pet Byron T. Buan showed accused-appellant to belong to
Group "O". The following specimens: (1) one (1) white no. 13 athletic basketball shirt, with patches "Grizzlies"
in front and "SAMARTINO" at the back; (2) one (1) violet no. 9 athletic basketball short pants; (3) one (1) white
small "Hello Kitty" T-shirt with reddish brown stains; (4) one (1) "cut" pink short pants with reddish brown
stains; (5) one (1) "cut" dirty white small panty with reddish brown stains, were all positive for the presence of
human blood showing the reactions of Group "A".12
Pet Byron Buan also testified that before he took the blood samples, he had a conversation with accusedappellant during which the latter admitted that he had raped and later killed the victim by strangulation and
stated that he was willing to accept the punishment that would be meted out on him because of the grievous
offense he had committed. Mr. Buan observed that accused-appellant was remorseful and was crying when he
made the confession in the presence of SPO1 Amoranto at the NBI laboratory.13
When accused-appellant was brought before Inquest Prosecutor Elpidia J. Itoc at around noon of July 13, 1999
in Cavite City, accused-appellant had with him a handwritten confession which he had executed inside his cell
at the Municipal Jail of Rosario. In his confession, accused-appellant admitted not only that he killed the victim
but that he had before that raped her. Accused-appellant said he laid down the victim on a grassy area near
the dike. He claimed that she did not resist when he removed her undergarments but that when he tried to
insert his penis into the victim's vagina, she struggled and resisted. Accused-appellant said he panicked and
killed the child. He then dumped her body in the shallow river near the "compuerta" and went home.14
Atty. Sikat Agbunag, a lawyer from the Public Attorney's Office, testified that at noon of July 13, 1999, while
she was in their office in Cavite City, Prosecutor Itoc came together with accused-appellant and some
policemen. Prosecutor Itoc asked Atty. Agbunag to assist accused-appellant about his confession. Atty.
Agbunag read the document, informed accused-appellant of his constitutional rights, and warned him that the
document could be used against him and that he could be convicted of the case against him, but, according to
her, accused-appellant said that he had freely and voluntarily executed the document because he was
bothered by his conscience. Accused-appellant, assisted by Atty. Agbunag, then affixed his signature to the
document and swore to it before Prosecutor Itoc.15
At the instance of City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu of Cavite City, NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan took
buccal swabs and hair samples from accused-appellant, as well as buccal swabs and hair samples from the
parents of the victim, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola and Arnulfo Diolola. The samples were submitted to the DNA
Laboratory of the NBI for examination.
Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, conducted DNA tests on the specimens collected by Dr.
Vertido. She testified that the vaginal swabs of the victim taken by Dr. Vertido during the autopsy contained the
DNA profiles of accused-appellant and the victim.16
The defense then presented as witnesses accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo and his sister Aimee Vallejo.
Their testimonies show that at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, accused-appellant, Aimee,
and their sister Abigail were in their house in Barangay Talisay, Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite when Daisy Diolola
came to ask accused-appellant to draw her school project. After making the request, Daisy left.17 Accusedappellant did not immediately make the drawing because he was watching television. Accused-appellant said
that he finished the drawing at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and gave it to the victim's aunt, Glory. He
then returned home to watch television again. He claimed he did not go out of the house until 7:00 o'clock in
the evening when he saw Ma. Nida, who was looking for her daughter. Accused-appellant said he told her that
he had not seen Daisy. After that, accused-appellant said he went to the "pilapil" and talked with some friends,
and, at about 8:00 o'clock that evening, he went home.
At 9:00 o'clock in the morning of July 11, 1999, barangay officials fetched accused-appellant from his house
and took him to the barangay hall, where he was asked about the disappearance of Daisy. He claimed that he
did not know anything about it. Accused-appellant was allowed to go home, but, at 11:00 o'clock that morning,
policemen came and invited him to the police headquarters for questioning. His mother went with him to the
police station. There, accused-appellant was asked whether he had something to do with the rape and killing of
Daisy. He denied knowledge of the crime.
At 4:00 o'clock that afternoon, accused-appellant accompanied the police to his house to get the basketball
shorts and shirt he was wearing the day before, which were placed together with other dirty clothes at the back
of their house. According to accused-appellant, the police forced him to admit that he had raped and killed
Daisy and that he admitted having committed the crime to stop them from beating him up. Accused-appellant
claimed the police even burned his penis with a lighted cigarette and pricked it with a needle.
Accused-appellant confirmed that Mayor Renato Abutan and Atty. Lupo Leyva went to see him in the
investigation room of the police station and told him that they would help him if he told the truth. Atty. Leyva
asked him whether he wanted him to be his counsel, and accused-appellant said he answered in the
affirmative. He said Atty. Leyva informed him of his constitutional rights. Accused-appellant claimed that,
although he admitted to Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva the commission of the crime, this was because the
police had maltreated him. Accused-appellant said he did not tell the mayor or Atty. Leyva that he had been
tortured because the policemen were around and he was afraid of them. It appears that the family of accusedappellant transferred their residence to Laguna on July 12, 1999 because of fear of reprisal by residents of
their barangay.18 According to accused-appellant, Mayor Abutan and Atty. Leyva were not present when he
gave his confession to the police and signed the same. Accused-appellant claims that although Exhibit "N" was
in his own handwriting, he merely copied the contents thereof from a pattern given to him by the police.19
On July 31, 2000, the trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the offense charged.
The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused Gerrico Vallejo
y Samartino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide, as charged in the
Information, accordingly hereby sentences him to the supreme penalty of DEATH. The accused is
directed to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
"SO ORDERED."20
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that:
"I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF RAPE
WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY AND WEAKNESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION.
"II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT TO THE ALLEGED
ORAL CONFESSIONS OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE ITS BEING HEARSAY IN
NATURE.
"III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO
THE WRITTEN EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE SAME WAS OBTAINED THROUGH FORCE AND INTIMIDATION AND THAT THE
LAWYER WHO ASSISTED HIM DURING HIS CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION DID NOT AND COULD
NOT POSSIBLY GIVE HIM EFFECTIVE LEGAL ASSISTANCE."
We find accused-appellant's contentions to be without merit.
First. An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, provided sufficient circumstantial
evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the
crime.21 In rape with homicide, the evidence against an accused is more often than not circumstantial. This is
because the nature of the crime, where only the victim and the rapist would have been present at the time of its
commission, makes the prosecution of the offense particularly difficult since the victim could no longer testify
against the perpetrator. Resort to circumstantial evidence is inevitable and to demand direct evidence proving
the modality of the offense and the identity of the perpetrator is unreasonable.22
Under Rule 133, section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a
conviction if:
"(a) there is more than one circumstance;
"(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
"(c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt."23
In the case at bar, the following circumstantial evidence establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
accused-appellant:
1. The victim went to Aimee Vallejo's house, where accused-appellant was residing, at 1:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of July 10, 1999, for tutoring.
2. At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant and Daisy went together to the latter's
house to get a book from which the former could copy Daisy's school project. After getting the book,
they proceeded to accused-appellant's residence.
3. From accused-appellant's house, Daisy then went to the house of Jessiemin Mataverde where she
watched television. Accused-appellant thereafter arrived and whispered something to Daisy, and the
latter went with him towards the "compuerta."
4. At about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the spouses Iluminado and Charito Yepes saw accusedappellant coming out of the "compuerta," with his clothes, basketball shorts, and t-shirt wet, although
his face and hair were not. According to these witnesses, he looked pale, uneasy, and troubled (balisa).
He kept looking around and did not even greet them as was his custom to do so.
5. The fishing boat which accused-appellant used as a bomber (a boat for catching fish with dynamite)
was docked by the seashore.
6. A little before 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Jessiemin Mataverde also saw accused-appellant buying
a Marlboro cigarette from a store. Jessiemen also noticed that accused-appellant's clothes were wet
but not his face nor his hair.
7. By 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, as Ma. Nida Diolola looked for her daughter, she was told by
accused-appellant that Daisy had gone to her classmate Rosario's house. The information proved to be
false.
8. Daisy's body was found tied to an aroma tree at the part of the river near the "compuerta."
9. During the initial investigation, accused-appellant had scratches on his feet similar to those caused
by the thorns of an aroma tree.
10. The clothes which accused-appellant wore the day before were bloodstained. The bloodstains on
accused-appellant's clothes and on Daisy's clothes were found positive of human blood type "A."
11. Accused-appellant has blood type "O."
12. The vaginal swabs from Daisy's body contained her DNA profile as well as that of accusedappellant.
Accused-appellant contends that the bloodstains found on his garments were not proven to have been that of
the victim as the victim's blood type was not determined.
The contention has no merit. The examination conducted by Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan of both
accused-appellant's and the victim's clothing yielded bloodstains of the same blood type "A".24 Even if there
was no direct determination as to what blood type the victim had, it can reasonably be inferred that the victim
was blood type "A" since she sustained contused abrasions all over her body which would necessarily produce
the bloodstains on her clothing.25 That it was the victim's blood which predominantly registered in the
examination was explained by Mr. Buan, thus:26
"ATTY. ESPIRITU
Q:
But you will agree with me that more probably than not, if a crime is being committed, and it
results in a bloody death, it is very possible that the blood of the victim and the blood of the assailant
might mix in that particular item like the t-shirt, shorts or pants?
A:
It is possible when there is a huge amount of blood coming from the victim and the suspect, Sir.
It is possible. It will mix. Whichever is the dominant blood in it, it will be the one which will register. For
example, if there is more blood coming from the victim, that blood will be the one to register, on
occasions when the two blood mix.
Q:
But in these specimens number 1 to 5, it is very clear now that only type A and no type O blood
was found?
A:
Yes, sir."
Accused-appellant also questions the validity of the method by which his bloodstained clothes were recovered.
According to accused-appellant, the policemen questioned him as to the clothes he wore the day before.
Thereafter, they took him to his house and accused-appellant accompanied them to the back of the house
where dirty clothes were kept.27 There is no showing, however, that accused-appellant was coerced or forced
into producing the garments. Indeed, that the accused-appellant voluntarily brought out the clothes sought by
the police becomes more convincing when considered together with his confessions. A consented warrantless
search is an exception to the proscription in Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution. As we have held, the
consent of the owner of the house to the search effectively removes any badge of illegality.28
The DNA analysis conducted by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Viloria-Magsipoc is also questioned by accusedappellant. He argues that the prosecution failed to show that all the samples submitted for DNA testing were
not contaminated, considering that these specimens were already soaked in smirchy waters before they were
submitted to the laboratory.
DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for
identical twins, each person's DNA profile is distinct and unique.29
When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim's body for the
suspect's DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample
taken from the suspect and the victim.30
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and
the reference sample.31 The samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their
profile.32 The test may yield three possible results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources (exclusion). This
conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have similar DNA
types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation, contamination, or
failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the
same or a different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion).33 In such a
case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical significance
of the Similarity.34
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among others things, the
following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the
samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of accused-appellant, the smears
taken from the victim as well as the strands of hair and nails taken from her tested negative for the presence of
human DNA,35 because, as Ms. Viloria-Magsipoc explained:
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q:
I noticed that specimens 1 to 5 consisting of bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim
and of the accused gave negative results for the presence of human DNA. Why is it so? What is the
reason for this when there are still bloodstains on the clothing?
A:
After this Honorable Court issued an Order for DNA analysis, serological methods were already
conducted on the said specimens. And upon inquiry from Mr. Buan and as far as he also knew of this
case, and we also interviewed the mother who came over to the laboratory one time on how was the
state of the specimens when they were found out. We found that these specimens were soaked in
smirchy water before they were submitted to the laboratory. The state of the specimens prior to the
DNA analysis could have hampered the preservation of any DNA that could have been there before. So
when serological methods were done on these specimens, Mr. Byron could have taken such portion or
stains that were only amenable for serological method and were not enough for DNA analysis already.
So negative results were found on the clothings that were submitted which were specimens no. 1 to 5
in my report, Sir.
Q:
I also noticed that specimen no. 6-B consisting of the smears taken from the victim also proved
negative for human DNA, why is it so?
A:
Because when we received the vaginal smears submitted by Dr. Vertido, the smear on the slide
was very, very dry and could have chipped off. I already informed Dr. Vertido about it and he confirmed
the state of the specimen. And I told him that maybe it would be the swab that could help us in this
case, Sir. And so upon examination, the smears geared negative results and the swabs gave positive
results, Sir.
Q:
How about specimen no. 7, the hair and nails taken from the victim, why did they show
negative results for DNA?
A:
The hair samples were cut hair. This means that the hair did not contain any root. So any hair
that is above the skin or the epidermis of one's skin would give negative results as the hair shaft is
negative for DNA. And then the nails did not contain any subcutaneous cells that would be amenable
for DNA analysis also, Sir.
Q:
So it's the inadequacy of the specimens that were the reason for this negative result, not the
inadequacy of the examination or the instruments used?
A:
Yes, Sir."
Thus, it is the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for examination, and not the possibility that the samples
had been contaminated, which accounted for the negative results of their examination. But the vaginal swabs
taken from the victim yielded positive for the presence of human DNA. Upon analysis by the experts, they
showed the DNA profile of accused-appellant:36
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q:
So based on your findings, can we say conclusively that the DNA profile of the accused in this
case was found in the vaginal swabs taken from the victim?
A:
Yes, Sir.
Q:
That is very definite and conclusive?
A:
Yes, Sir."
In conclusion, we hold that the totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than that accusedappellant is guilty of the crime charged. Evidence is weighed not counted. When facts or circumstances which
are proved are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with his innocence, such
evidence, in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court.37 This is
how it is in this case.
Second. Accused-appellant challenges the validity of the oral and written confessions presented as evidence
against him. He alleges that the oral confessions were inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay, while the
extrajudicial confessions were obtained through force and intimidation.
The claim is untenable. Section 12 of Art. III of the Constitution provides in pertinent parts:
"(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed
of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.
"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him."
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this constitutional provision: (1) coerced
confessions, the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, and intimidation,
which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12, and (2) uncounselled statements, given without the benefit
of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same section.38
Accused-appellant argues that the oral confessions given to Mayor Abutan of Rosario, Cavite and to NBI
Forensic Biologist should be deemed inadmissible for being violative of his constitutional rights as these were
made by one already under custodial investigation to persons in authority without the presence of counsel.
With respect to the oral confessions, Atty. Leyva testified:39
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q:
Upon meeting this Gerrico Vallejo at the police station were you able to confer with him?
A:
Yes, Sir.
Q:
Did you ask him whether he really wants you to represent or assist him as a lawyer during that
investigation?
A:
I did, as a matter of fact, I asked him whether he would like me to represent him in that
investigation, Sir.
Q:
And what was his answer?
A:
He said "yes".
Q:
After agreeing to retain you as his counsel, what else did you talk about?
A:
I told him that in the investigation, whatever he will state may be used against him, so it's a sort
of discouraging him from making any statement to the police, Sir."
Upon cross-examination, Atty. Leyva testified as follows:40
Q:
You stated that you personally read this recital of the constitutional rights of the accused?
A:
Yes, Sir.
Q:
But it will appear in this recital of constitutional rights that you did not inform the accused that
the statement that he will be giving might be used against him in a court of justice?
A:
I did that, Sir.
Q:
But it does not appear in this statement?
PROSECUTOR LU
The best evidence will be the statement, your Honor.
ATTY ESPIRITU
The only thing that is stated here is that "Maaaring gamitin pabor o laban sa iyo."
COURT
Let the witness answer.
A:
I told him that, as a matter of fact, and I also told him to tell the truth and nothing but the truth."
The testimony of Atty. Leyva is not only corroborated by the testimony of Mayor Renato Abutan,41 it is also
confirmed by accused-appellant who testified as follows:42
"ATTY. ESPIRITU:
Q:
Did Atty. Leyva explain to you the meaning and significance of that document which you are
supposed to have executed and signed?
A:
Yes, Sir.
Q:
What did Atty. Leyva tell you?
A:
That they are allowing me to exercise my constitutional right to reveal or narrate all what I know
about this case, Sir.
Q:
Did Atty. Leyva tell you that if you do not want, nobody can force you to give that statement?
A:
Yes, Sir.
Q:
And did he tell you that what you would be giving is an extra-judicial confession?
A:
Yes, Sir."
Clearly, accused-appellant cannot now claim that he was not apprised of the consequences of the statements
he was to make as well as the written confessions he was to execute. Neither can he question the
qualifications of Atty. Lupo Leyva who acted as his counsel during the investigation. To be an effective
counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a
lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was
adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something
false. Indeed, counsel should not prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.43
Indeed, accused-appellant admitted that he was first asked whether he wanted the services of Atty. Leyva
before the latter acted as his defense counsel.44 And counsel who is provided by the investigators is deemed
engaged by the accused where the latter never raised any objection against the former's appointment during
the course of the investigation but, on the contrary, thereafter subscribed to the veracity of his statement before
the swearing officer.45 Contrary to the assertions of accused-appellant, Atty. Leyva was not the municipal
attorney of Rosario, Cavite but only a legal adviser of Mayor Renato Abutan.46
Accused-appellant contends that the rulings in People vs. Andan47 and People vs. Mantung48 do not apply to
this case. We disagree. The facts of these cases and that of the case at bar are similar. In all these cases, the
accused made extrajudicial confessions to the municipal mayor freely and voluntarily. In all of them, the
extrajudicial confessions were held admissible in evidence, being the spontaneous, free, and voluntary
admissions of the guilt of the accused. We note further that the testimony of Mayor Abutan was never objected
to by the defense.
Indeed, the mayor's questions to accused-appellant were not in the nature of an interrogation, but rather an act
of benevolence by a leader seeking to help one of his constituents. Thus, Mayor Abutan testified:49
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q:
you?
And during the conversation you had with Accused Gerrico Vallejo, what exactly did he tell
A:
At first he said that he did not do that. That was the first thing he told me. Then I told him that I
will not be able to help him if he will not tell me the truth.
Q:
And what was the reply of the accused?
A:
He had been silent for a minute. Then we talked about the incident, Sir.
Q:
And what exactly did he tell you about the incident?
A:
I asked him, "Were you under the influence of drugs at that time"?
Q:
What else did he tell you?
A:
I told him, "What reason pushed you to do that thing?" x x x
Q:
Please tell us in tagalog, the exact words that the accused used in telling you what happened.
A:
He told me that he saw the child as if she was headless at that time. That is why he strangled
the child, Sir. ("Ang sabi niya po sa 'kin, nakita niya raw 'yung bata na parang walang ulo na
naglalakad. Kaya po sinakal niya.")
xxx
xxx
xxx
COURT:
Q:
time?
When you told the accused that you will help him, what kind of help were you thinking at that
A:
I told him that if he will tell the truth, I could help give him legal counsel.
Q:
And what was the answer of the accused?
A:
Yes, he will tell me the truth, Your Honor."
In People vs. Mantung,50 this Court said:
"Never was it raised during the trial that Mantung's admission during the press conference was coerced
or made under duress. As the records show, accused-appellant voluntarily made the statements in
response to Mayor Marquez' question as to whether he killed the pawnshop employees. Mantung
answered in the affirmative and even proceeded to explain that he killed the victims because they made
him eat pork. These circumstances hardly indicate that Mantung felt compelled to own up to the crime.
Besides, he could have chosen to remain silent or to do deny altogether any participation in the robbery
and killings but he did not; thus accused-appellant sealed his own fate. As held in People v. Montiero, a
confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no
person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth
and his conscience."
And in People vs. Andan, it was explained:
"Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the Constitution bars is
the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12 are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit
something false, not prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth."51
For the same reason, the oral confession made by accused-appellant to NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron
Buan is admissible. Accused-appellant would have this Court exclude this confession on the ground that it was
uncounselled and that Mr. Buan, who initiated the conversation with accused-appellant, was part of the NBI.
The issue concerning the sufficiency of the assistance given by Atty. Leyva has already been discussed. On
the other hand, the questions put by Mr. Buan to accused-appellant were asked out of mere personal curiosity
and clearly not as part of his tasks. As Buan testified:52
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q:
What was the subject of your conversation with him?
A:
It is customary when we examine the accused. During the examination, we talk to them for me
to add knowledge on the case, Sir.
Q:
What did you talk about during your conversation?
A:
I asked him if he was the one who did the killing on this victim, Daisy Diolola, Sir.
Q:
And what was the reply of the accused?
A:
He said yes, Sir.
Q:
What else did you ask the accused?
A:
I remember that while asking him, he was crying as if feeling remorse on the killing, Sir.
....
Q:
And it was you who initiated the conversation?
A:
Yes, Sir.
Q:
Do you usually do that?
A:
Yes, Sir. We usually do that.
Q:
Is that part of your procedure?
A:
It is not SOP. But for me alone, I want to know more about the case, Sir. And any information
either on the victim or from the suspect will help me personally. It's not an SOP, Sir."
The confession, thus, can be likened to one freely and voluntarily given to an ordinary individual and is,
therefore, admissible as evidence.
Third. The admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellant is also attacked on the ground
that these were extracted from him by means of torture, beatings, and threats to his life. The bare assertions of
maltreatment by the police authorities in extracting confessions from the accused are not sufficient. The
standing rule is that "where the defendants did not present evidence of compulsion, or duress nor violence on
their person; where they failed to complain to the officer who administered their oaths; where they did not
institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there
appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and where they did not have themselves examined by a
reputable physician to buttress their claim," all these will be considered as indicating voluntariness.53 Indeed,
extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary, and, in the absence of conclusive evidence showing
that the declarant's consent in executing the same has been vitiated, the confession will be sustained.54
Accused-appellant's claim that he was tortured and subjected to beatings by policemen in order to extract the
said confession from him is unsupported by any proof:55
"ATTY. ESPIRITU:
Q:
Did they further interrogate you?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
What else did they ask you?
A:
They were asking me the project, Sir.
Q:
What else?
A:
That is the only thing, Sir.
Q:
Who was doing the questioning?
A:
The investigator, Sir.
Q:
How many were they inside that room?
A:
Five, Sir.
Q:
They are all policemen?
A:
Yes, Sir.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q:
Until what time did they keep you inside that room?
A:
Up to 11:00 in the evening, Sir.
Q:
Between 10:30 in the morning up to 11:00 o'clock in the evening, what did you do there?
A:
They were interrogating and forcing me to admit something, Sir.
Q:
In what way did they force you to admit something?
A:
They were mauling me, Sir.
Q:
The 5 of them?
A:
Yes, Sir.
Q:
The 5 of them remained inside that room with you throughout the questioning?
A:
Yes, Sir.
Q:
In what way did they hurt you?
A:
They burned my private part with a lighted cigarette butt and pierced me with a needle, Sir.
Q:
Who did these things to you?
A:
Mercado, Sir.
Q:
Who is this Mercado?
A:
EPZA policemen, Sir.
Q:
Did the other policemen help in doing these things to you?
A:
No, Sir.
Q:
Were you asked to undress or you were forced to do that?
A:
They forced me to remove my clothes, Sir.
Q:
In what way did they force you to remove your clothes?
A:
They were asking me to take off the pants which I was wearing at the time, Sir.
Q:
Did they do anything to you to force you to remove your pants?
A:
Yes, Sir.
Q:
What?
A:
They boxed me, Sir.
Q:
What else, if any?
A:
They hit me with a piece of wood, Sir.
Q:
What did you feel when your private part was burned with a cigarette butt?
A:
It was painful, Sir.
Q:
In what part of your body were you pricked by a needle?
A:
At my private part, Sir."
These bare assertions cannot be given weight. Accused-appellant testified that he was made to stay in the
municipal hall from 10:00 o'clock in the morning until 11:00 o'clock that night of July 10, 1999, during which
time he was boxed, tortured, and hit with a piece of wood by policemen to make him admit to the crime.
However, accused-appellant was physically examined by Dr. Antonio Vertido at about 9:00 o'clock in the
evening of the same day. While the results show that accused-appellant did sustain injuries, the same are
incompatible with his claim of torture. As Dr. Vertido testified:56
"PROSECUTOR LU:
Q:
What were your findings when you conducted the physical examination of the suspect?
A:
I found abrasions, your Honor, abrasions on the thigh, knees, legs and feet of the suspect, and I
also found hematoma on the left ring finger, posterior aspect and at the same time, a laceration on the
left ring finger.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Q:
In your findings, it appears that the accused in this case suffered certain physical injuries on his
person like this abrasion on the thigh, right anterior lateral aspect lower third of the knee, what could
have caused this injury?
A:
Abrasions are usually caused when the skin comes in contact with a rough surface, Sir.
Hematoma are usually caused by a blunt instrument or object and laceration is the forcible contact of
the skin from that blunt object.
Q:
I am particularly interested in your findings hematoma on the left ring finger, posterior aspect
and laceration left ring finger posterior aspect, what could have caused those injuries on the accused?
A:
My opinion to these hematoma and laceration found on the said left ring finger was that it was
caused by a bite, Sir."
If the account of accused-appellant that he was beaten up is true, Dr. Antonio Vertido would have found more
than mere abrasions and hematoma on his left finger. Dr. Vertido's findings are more consistent with the theory
that accused-appellant sustained physical injuries as a result of the struggle made by the victim during the
commission of the rape in the "compuerta."
At all events, even if accused-appellant was truthful and his assailed confessions are inadmissible, the
circumstantial evidence, as already shown, is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. The
prosecution witnesses presented a mosaic of circumstances showing accused-appellant's guilt. Their
testimonies rule out the possibility that the crime was the handiwork of some other evil mind. These witnesses
have not been shown to have been motivated by ill will against accused-appellant.
On the other hand, no other witness not related to accused-appellant was ever called to corroborate his claim.
The defense presented only accused-appellant's sister, Aimee Vallejo, to corroborate his story. We have held
time and again that alibi cannot prosper if it is established mainly by the accused and his relatives, and not by
credible persons.57 It is well settled that alibi is the weakest of all defenses as it is easy to contrive and difficult
to disprove. For this reason, this Court looks with caution upon the defense of alibi, especially when, as in this
case, it is corroborated only by relatives or friends of the accused.58
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code provides that "When by reason or on the occasion of the rape,
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death."59 Therefore, no other penalty can be imposed on accusedappellant.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88,
Cavite City, finding accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of DEATH and directing him to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages, is hereby AFFIRMED.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of
this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the
possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
De Leon, Jr., J., abroad, on official business.
G.R. No. 150224
May 19, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25,
sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide,
and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00,
moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, actual
damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages amounting to P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.1
Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:
That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to have carnal knowledge of a certain
KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and with use of a bladed
weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the death of the victim, and on the
occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of force and
violence had carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The facts are:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba,
were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal,
Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel
Yatar, through Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn handed the letter to appellant earlier that
morning.3
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in
Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that
she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave, she would just stay home
and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in the house.4
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel. They
saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house through the back door of the kitchen to
have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he was getting
lumber to bring to the house of his mother.5
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the ladder
from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the house.6 She later noticed
appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth at the back of the
house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang.7
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was wearing a
black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the lumber he had
stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellant’s eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant
asked her where her husband was as he had something important to tell him. Judilyn’s husband then arrived
and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the house of Isabel.8
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were off.
She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She noticed that
the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up the ladder to the
second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a rope, so she
went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.9
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her
granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight by
Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines protruding
out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A daughter of Isabel, Cion, called
the police.10
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in Isabel
Dawang’s house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found the naked body of
Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the ladder of the
house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked cadaver
at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50 meters from the
house of Isabel.
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylyns’s death,11 however,
he was placed under police custody.
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar Abagan
accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police station. They suddenly heard
someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He’s running away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited
through the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters
away from the station when Police Officer Abagan recaptured him.12 He was charged with Rape with Homicide.
When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized under Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997,
and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In his Brief,
appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR DOUBTFULNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
THE SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.
Appellant’s contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against appellant. This
Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless
there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or
the significance of which has been misinterpreted.13 Well-entrenched is the rule that the findings of the trial
court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons are presented
necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is in a better
and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and
attitude.14 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, the trial judge’s assessment of credibility
deserves the appellate court’s highest respect.15 Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the
prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.16
The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which provides
that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial
evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime.17
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5) incised, were
found on the victim’s abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small intestines to spill out of her
body.18 Rigor mortis of the vicitm’s body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at 9:00 a.m. on
July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death may be approximated from between nine (9) to twelve (12)
hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.19 In other words, the estimated time of death was sometime
between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the timeframe within which the lone
presence of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan C.
Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the victim,20 Dr. Bartolo
discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated
that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be done through sexual intercourse with the
victim.21 In addition, it is apparent from the pictures submitted by the prosecution that the sexual violation of the
victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm indicating resistance to the
appellant’s assault on her virtue.22
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen from the
vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms.23 A person’s DNA is the same
in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as
the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and
vaginal and rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two
individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.25
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a
crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left. For purposes of
criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can
assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the
conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice
in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in
the same principle as fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological
evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the
crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victim’s
body during the assault.27 Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical contact between
an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared
with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.28
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case, used the
Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR
testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus, getting
sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify small samples
using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how
the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.29
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert
witness on DNA print or identification techniques.30 Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was determined that
the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination.31 The
blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8,
DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victim’s vaginal
canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the
appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the Philippine
criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately,
we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions.
Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be
used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over
which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific techniques. DNA
typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through
PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable
since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal, the trial court
appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn
Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received
from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4)
Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of
the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw
appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at
1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was
approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the ladder of the house
of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of
Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her
intestines protruding from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants,
bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the
victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to
be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of the appellant
are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended,
such flight being indicative of guilt.35
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain which leads to a
fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To
determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (1) there is more
than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.36
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him as
well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against selfincrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips
of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken
from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may
be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any
evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as
there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,39 where immediately after the incident,
the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no
violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to submit to a physical
examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was conducted in
open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional on
the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law.
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing
involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas
an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the
probative weight of the evidence presented.
Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and bloodied
shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawang’s house during the time when
the crime was committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident. Appellant did not demonstrate
with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places at the same time, especially in this case
where the two places are located in the same barangay.40 He lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius
from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere five minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact
severely weakens his alibi.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed reversible error in
convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted on reasonable doubt.
Appellant’s assertion cannot be sustained.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere conjectures
or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more than a minimum of probative
value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a "plus value."41 This may be necessary to
preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable of being exaggerated by
prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus value" may be logically relevant but not legally
sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial court to balance the probative value of such evidence against
the likely harm that would result from its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which the court can
properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral certainty is that degree of certainty that
convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond reasonable doubt.42 This requires that the circumstances, taken
together, should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion
that the accused, and no one else, committed the offense charged.43 In view of the totality of evidence
appreciated thus far, we rule that the present case passes the test of moral certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit.44
Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she last saw the victim
alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang.45 She witnessed the appellant running
down the stairs of Isabel’s house and proceeding to the back of the same house.46 She also testified that a few
days before the victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her
after she came from the school."47 The victim told Judilyn about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape
her five days before her naked and violated body was found dead in her grandmother’s house on June 25,
1998.48 In addition, Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated
from her husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our family."49 According to Judilyn, who was personally
present during an argument between her aunt and the appellant, the exact words uttered by appellant to his
wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I will kill all your family and your relatives x x x."50 These
statements were not contradicted by appellant.
Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It is a rule in
criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of witnesses on the acts or
statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or words that may
express it or from which his motive or reason for committing it may be inferred.51
Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason or on the occasion
thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the victim’s lips by stabbing her repeatedly,
thereby causing her untimely demise.
The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a
woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by
reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, appellant killed
the woman.52 However, in rape committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father, step-father, uncle, or the
common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed.53 Moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.54 The fact that the victim’s hymen is
intact does not negate a finding that rape was committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female
genital organ, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction of rape.55 The strength
and dilatability of the hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during
intercourse. Absence of hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim is of
tender age.56
In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim’s aunt. He is seven years older than the victim
Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his mother-in-law, together with
the victim and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to the house of his parents, approximately one
hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-law’s house. Being a relative by affinity within the third civil degree,
he is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral ascendancy over the victim.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by reason or on the
occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices of this Court maintain their position
that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, they nevertheless submit to the
ruling of the majority that the law is not unconstitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in
the case at bar.
As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00,57 actual damages incurred by the family of the victim
that have been proved at the trial amounting to P93,190.00,58 and moral damages of P75,000.0059 should be
awarded in the light of prevailing law and jurisprudence. Exemplary damages cannot be awarded as part of the
civil liability since the crime was not committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.60
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25 in
Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime
of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED to pay the family of the
victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in actual damages
and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of exemplary damages is DELETED.
Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of the
Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171713
December 17, 2007
ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner,
vs.
Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing (1)
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and (2) the Resolution2 of the same court
dated 1 March 2006 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 70125.
A Complaint3 for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne
Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong
(Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. In her Complaint, Jinky prayed that judgment be
rendered:
(a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz as his daughter.
(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support of P20,000.00 pendente lite and thereafter to fix
monthly support.
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorney’s fees in the sum of P100,000.00.
(d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as maybe just and equitable in the premises.4
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got acquainted. This
developed into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already married to a Japanese
national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge
Panfilo V. Valdez.5
From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together at Fairlane
Subdivision, and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City.
From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on 25 February 1998 was born at
the Central Luzon Doctors’ Hospital, Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the
hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor Joanne’s needs – recognizing the child
as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne,
falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.
Rogelio, despite Jinky’s remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to give support for
the child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the heretofore adverted
complaint.
After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter failed to file any responsive pleading despite
repeated motions for extension, prompting the trial court to declare him in default in its Order dated 7 April
1999. Rogelio’s Answer with Counterclaim and Special and Affirmative Defenses was received by the trial
court only on 15 April 1999. Jinky was allowed to present her evidence ex parte on the basis of which the trial
court on 23 April 1999 rendered a decision granting the reliefs prayed for in the complaint.
In its Decision6 dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural child;
2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a monthly support of P10,000.00 and further
3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00 and the cost of the
suit.
On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion for reconsideration seeking the
court’s understanding, as he was then in a quandary on what to do to find a solution to a very difficult problem
of his life.7
On 29 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with prayer that the decision of the trial court dated 23
April 1999 be vacated and the case be considered for trial de novo pursuant to the provisions of Section 6,
Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.8
On 16 June 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting Rogelio’s Motion for New Trial:
WHEREFORE, finding defendant’s motion for new trial to be impressed with merit, the same is hereby
granted.
The Order of this court declaring defendant in default and the decision is this court dated April 23, 1999
are hereby set aside but the evidence adduced shall remain in record, subject to cross-examination by
defendant at the appropriate stage of the proceedings.
In the meantime defendant’s answer is hereby admitted, subject to the right of plaintiff to file a reply
and/or answer to defendant’s counterclaim within the period fixed by the Rules of Court.
Acting on plaintiff’s application for support pendente lite which this court finds to be warranted,
defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff immediately the sum of P2,000.00 a month from January
15, 1999 to May 1999 as support pendente lite in arrears and the amount of P4,000.00 every month
thereafter as regular support pendente lite during the pendency of this case.9
The RTC finally held:
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the defendant is the father of the plaintiff Joanne Rodjin
Diaz.
Since it was duly established that plaintiff’s mother Jinky Diaz was married at the time of the birth of
Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of the spouses Hasegawa
Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family Code). The child is still presumed legitimate even if the
mother may have declared against her legitimacy (Article 167, Ibid).
The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds provided for in Article 166 of
the same Code. Paragraph 1 of the said Article provides that there must be physical impossibility for
the husband to have sexual intercourse with the wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days following
the birth of the child because of –
a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
b) husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not
possible;
c) serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual intercourse.
It was established by evidence that the husband is a Japanese national and that he was living outside
of the country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he comes home only once a year. Both evidence of
the parties proved that the husband was outside the country and no evidence was shown that he ever
arrived in the country in the year 1997 preceding the birth of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a relationship with another man before she met the
defendant, there is no evidence that she also had sexual relations with other men on or about the
conception of Joanne Rodjin. Joanne Rodjin was her second child (see Exh. "A"), so her first child, a
certain Nicole (according to defendant) must have a different father or may be the son of Hasegawa
K[u]tsuo.
The defendant admitted having been the one who shouldered the hospital bills representing the
expenses in connection with the birth of plaintiff. It is an evidence of admission that he is the real father
of plaintiff. Defendant also admitted that even when he stopped going out with Jinky, he and Jinky used
to go to motels even after 1996. Defendant also admitted that on some instances, he still used to see
Jinky after the birth of Joanne Rodjin. Defendant was even the one who fetched Jinky after she gave
birth to Joanne.
On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds that Joanne Rodjin is the child of Jinky and defendant
Rogelio Ong and it is but just that the latter should support plaintiff.10
On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision and disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate child of
defendant Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz. The Order of this Court awarding support pendente lite
dated June 15, 1999, is hereby affirmed and that the support should continue until Joanne Rodjin Diaz
shall have reached majority age.11
Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit in an Order of the trial court
dated 19 January 2001.12 From the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Rogelio appealed to the Court of
Appeals. After all the responsive pleadings had been filed, the case was submitted for decision and ordered reraffled to another Justice for study and report as early as 12 July 2002.13
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Rogelio’s counsel filed a manifestation informing
the Court that Rogelio died on 21 February 2005; hence, a Notice of Substitution was filed by said counsel
praying that Rogelio be substituted in the case by the Estate of Rogelio Ong,14 which motion was accordingly
granted by the Court of Appeals.15
In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision
dated December 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 63 in Civil Case No.
8799 is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the court a quo for the issuance of an
order directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the
paternity of plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon consultation and in coordination with laboratories
and experts on the field of DNA analysis.
No pronouncement as to costs.16
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 1
March 2006.
In disposing as it did, the Court of Appeals justified its Decision as follows:
In this case, records showed that the late defendant-appellant Rogelio G. Ong, in the early stage of the
proceedings volunteered and suggested that he and plaintiff’s mother submit themselves to a DNA or
blood testing to settle the issue of paternity, as a sign of good faith. However, the trial court did not
consider resorting to this modern scientific procedure notwithstanding the repeated denials of
defendant that he is the biological father of the plaintiff even as he admitted having actual sexual
relations with plaintiff’s mother. We believe that DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms,
would be the most reliable and effective method of settling the present paternity dispute. Considering,
however, the untimely demise of defendant-appellant during the pendency of this appeal, the trial court,
in consultation with out laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis, can possibly avail of such
procedure with whatever remaining DNA samples from the deceased defendant alleged to be the
putative father of plaintiff minor whose illegitimate filiations is the subject of this action for support.17
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues for resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS
RESPONDENT’S COMPLAINT FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE THAT ROGELIO G. ONG WAS HER FATHER.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE
RESPONDENT AS THE LEGITIMATE CHILD OF JINKY C. DIAZ AND HER JAPANESE HUSBAND,
CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF HER
LEGITIMACY.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REMANDED THE CASE TO THE
COURT A QUO FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NO LONGER FEASIBLE DUE
TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G. ONG.18
Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due course and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 23, 2005 be modified, by setting aside the judgment remanding the case to the trial court for DNA
testing analysis, by dismissing the complaint of minor Joanne for compulsory recognition, and by declaring the
minor as the legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa Katsuo.19
From among the issues presented for our disposition, this Court finds it prudent to concentrate its attention on
the third one, the propriety of the appellate court’s decision remanding the case to the trial court for the conduct
of DNA testing. Considering that a definitive result of the DNA testing will decisively lay to rest the issue of the
filiation of minor Joanne, we see no reason to resolve the first two issues raised by the petitioner as they will be
rendered moot by the result of the DNA testing.
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor Joanne for purposes of support
in favor of the said minor.
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated
with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The burden of proving
paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four
significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case,
affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and
child.20
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate.21 As a guaranty in favor of
the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We explained the rationale
of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals22:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded
on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown
by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code23 provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage,
and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of
the husband’s having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.24
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied about by the parties to the
present petition. But with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new technology, it can
now be determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through
DNA testing.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a person’s entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human cells
and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a person’s DNA profile can
determine his identity.25
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an individual is
examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the individual from whom the
sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for identical twins.
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive to
an individual (except in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share a single, fertilized egg), and
DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being a component of every cell in the human body, the DNA of an
individual’s blood is the very DNA in his or her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples from
buccal swabs, saliva, or other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known as A (Adenine), G (guanine), C
(cystosine) and T (thymine). The order in which the four bases appear in an individual’s DNA
determines his or her physical make up. And since DNA is a double stranded molecule, it is composed
of two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These are called "genes."
Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a particular sequence. This
gives a person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA framework, nonetheless, are sections
that differ. They are known as "polymorphic loci," which are the areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling,
tests, fingerprinting). In other words, DNA typing simply means determining the "polymorphic loci."
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a molecular biologist may
proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5) techniques to conduct DNA typing. They are:
the RFLP (restriction fragment length polymorphism); "reverse dot blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which
was used in 287 cases that were admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of November 1994;
DNA process; VNTR (variable number tandem repeats); and the most recent which is known as the
PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was
availed of by most forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of replicating or copying DNA
in an evidence sample a million times through repeated cycling of a reaction involving the so-called
DNA polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes measurements in 13 separate places and can
match two (2) samples with a reported theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are determined. To illustrate, when DNA or
fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence collected from the crime
scene is compared with the "known" print. If a substantial amount of the identifying features are the
same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA or
fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In each of these
regions, a person possesses two genetic types called "allele," one inherited from each parent. In [a]
paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in an individual to
produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to
determine which half of the child’s DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been
inherited from the biological father. The alleged father’s profile is then examined to ascertain whether
he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the man’s DNA types
do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not
excluded as the father.26
In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is provided:
SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Rule, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxxx
(c) "DNA evidence" constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic information
directly generated from DNA testing of biological samples;
(d) "DNA profile" means genetic information derived from DNA testing of a biological sample obtained
from a person, which biological sample is clearly identifiable as originating from that person;
(e) "DNA testing" means verified and credible scientific methods which include the extraction of DNA
from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the comparison of the information obtained
from the DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose of determining, with reasonable certainty,
whether or not the DNA obtained from two or more distinct biological samples originates from the same
person (direct identification) or if the biological samples originate from related persons (kinship
analysis); and
(f) "Probability of Parentage" means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of parentage of a putative
parent compared with the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals in a given
population.
Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis, the resolution thereof may provide the definitive
key to the resolution of the issue of support for minor Joanne. Our articulation in Agustin v. Court of
Appeals27 is particularly relevant, thus:
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe Lim v.
Court of Appeals (336 Phil. 741, 270 SCRA 1), promulgated in 1997, we cautioned against the use of
DNA because "DNA, being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been accorded official recognition
by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant
incriminating acts,verbal and written, by the putative father."
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated
in Tijing v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 125901, 8 March 2001, 354 SCRA 17]:
x x x Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern
and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA
test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA
of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father.
The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of
course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science
when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said results is to deny
progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine jurisprudence
came in 2002 with out en banc decision in People v. Vallejo [G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA
192] where the rape and murder victim’s DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused
were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that "the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether
an association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples
collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson [G.R. No. 125938, 4 April 2003, 400 SCRA 584], we acquitted the
accused charged with rape for lack of evidence because "doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to who
(were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the
perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our doubts."
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC [G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824, 3 March 2004, 424
SCRA 277], where the Court en banc was faced with the issue of filiation of then presidential candidate
Fernando Poe, Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be
difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A
positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing...
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar [G.R. No. 150224, 19 May 2004, 428
SCRA 504], we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with homicide, the principal
evidence for which included DNA test results. x x x.
Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, petitioner questions the appropriateness of
the order by the Court of Appeals directing the remand of the case to the RTC for DNA testing given that
petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is no
longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged impossibility of complying with the order
of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioner’s argument is without basis
especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence28 allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or
upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA
testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or
(ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper
resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the
accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of
DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic material originating from a person’s body,
even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other
body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.29
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be available,
may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an
appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. In People v. Umanito,30 citing Tecson v.
Commission on Elections,31 this Court held:
The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004, 424 SCRA
277] likewise reiterated the acceptance of DNA testing in our jurisdiction in this wise: "[i]n case proof of
filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA
testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any
physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to."
It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether appellant is the father of AAA’s child, which
may be accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair and correct adjudication of the instant
appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are authorized, after due hearing and notice, motu
proprio to order a DNA testing. However, while this Court retains jurisdiction over the case at bar,
capacitated as it is to receive and act on the matter in controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts and does not, in the course of daily routine, conduct hearings. Hence, it would be more
appropriate that the case be remanded to the RTC for reception of evidence in appropriate hearings,
with due notice to the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of Appeals32:
x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their
existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed
equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA
testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when
DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We
therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of
determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
November 2005 and its Resolution dated 1 March 2006 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.SO
ORDERED.