BASIC LEGAL ETHICS
Practice of Law
Office of Court Administrator vs Ladaga, A.M. No. P-991287, January 26, 2001
FULL TEXT:
A.M. No. P-99-1287
January 26, 2001
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati City,
respondent.
appearing in court without the required authorization
from the Court.5 On January 25, 1999, the Court
Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint
against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic
Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees," which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. – In addition to
acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and
transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
x
x
x
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty.
Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court
Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority
to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa
Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885, entitled
"People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga" for Falsification of
Public Document pending before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 40.1 While respondent's
letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres,
the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent
a letter to the Court Administrator, dated September 2,
1998, requesting for a certification with regard to
respondent's authority to appear as counsel for the
accused in the said criminal case.2 On September 7,
1998, the Office of the Court Administrator referred the
matter to respondent for comment.3
In his Comment,4 dated September 14, 1998,
respondent admitted that he had appeared in Criminal
Case No. 84885 without prior authorization. He reasoned
out that the factual circumstances surrounding the
criminal case compelled him to handle the defense of his
cousin who did not have enough resources to hire the
services of a counsel de parte; while, on the other hand,
private complainant was a member of a powerful family
who was out to get even with his cousin. Furthermore,
he rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case
did not prejudice his office nor the interest of the public
since he did not take advantage of his position. In any
case, his appearances in court were covered by leave
applications
approved
by
the
presiding
judge.1âwphi1.nêt
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a Resolution
denying respondent's request for authorization to
appear as counsel and directing the Office of the Court
Administrator to file formal charges against him for
(b) Outside employment and other activities related
thereto. – Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
x
x
x
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession
unless authorized by the Constitution or law, Provided,
that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with
their official functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required
respondent to comment on the administrative
complaint.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms.
Ladaga are "close blood cousins" who belong to a
"powerless family" from the impoverished town of
Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he
finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always
supported and guided him while he looked up to her as
a mentor and an adviser. Because of their close
relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondent's help and
advice when she was charged in Criminal Case No. 84885
for falsification by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo
Andres, whose only purpose in filing the said criminal
case was to "seek vengeance" on her cousin. He
explained that his cousin's discord with Ms. Andres
started when the latter's husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres,
left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga.
During the course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and
Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The birth certificate
of their eldest child is the subject of the falsification
charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that since
he is the only lawyer in their family, he felt it to be his
duty to accept Ms. Ladaga's plea to be her counsel since
she not have enough funds to pay for the services of a
lawyer. Respondent also pointed out that in his seven (7)
years of untainted government service, initially with the
Commission on Human Rights and now with the
judiciary, he had performed his duties with honesty and
integrity and that it was only in this particular case that
he had been administratively charged for extending a
helping hand to a close relative by giving a free legal
assistance for "humanitarian purpose." He never took
advantage of his position as branch clerk of court since
the questioned appearances were made in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in
Makati where he is holding office. He stressed that
during the hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave
as shown by his approved leave applications attached to
his comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted
respondent's comment and referred the administrative
matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for
investigation, report and recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga
made the following findings and recommendation:
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared
as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza
Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for
"Falsification of Public Documents" before the METC of
Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said
respondent in said case was without the previous
permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the
occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel
before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave
of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge
Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was
handling. That the respondent appeared as pro bono
counsel likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-client
Narcisa Ladaga herself positively declared that the
respondent did not receive a single centavo from her.
Helpless as she was and respondent being the only
lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of
his compassion and high regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that
respondent ever handled a case for a member of his
family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free
and for the purpose of settling the case amicably.
Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his
appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this,
during all the years that he has been in government
service, he has maintained his integrity and
independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the
respondent appeared as counsel for his cousin without
first securing permission from the Court, and considering
that this is his first time to do it coupled with the fact that
said appearance was not for a fee and was with the
knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully
recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern
warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt
with more severely.6
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating
judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging
in the private practice of their profession. A similar
prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the
Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys
from engaging in the private practice of their profession.
The said section reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. – No judge or
other official or employee of the superior courts or of the
Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private
practice as a member of the bar or give professional
advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of
a profession, specifically the law profession in this case,
which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court
appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts
of the same nature habitually or customarily holding
one's self to the public as a lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva,7 we explained the
meaning of the term "private practice" prohibited by the
said section, to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney
Fule did not constitute private practice, within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is
more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise
(State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S.
768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of
statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4
S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel
on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law. The following
observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
"Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that
one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his
professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services."
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City
Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.8
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated
instances when respondent appeared as pro bono
counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not
constitute the "private practice" of the law profession
contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondent's isolated court
appearances did not amount to a private practice of law,
he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from
the head of the Department, which is this Court as
required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules, thus:
Sec 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in
any private business, vocation, or profession or be
connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from
the head of the Department: Provided, That this
prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers
and employees whose duties and responsibilities require
that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is
granted permission to engage in outside activities, time
so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the
agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided,
finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do
not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him
in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part
in the management of the enterprise or become an
officer of the board of directors.9
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court
proceedings on numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-15,
1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as
borne out by his own admission. It is true that he filed
leave applications corresponding to the dates he
appeared in court. However, he failed to obtain a prior
permission from the head of the Department. The
presiding judge of the court to which respondent is
assigned is not the head of the Department
contemplated by law.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty.
Misael M. Ladaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern
warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
CASE DIGEST: Office of Court Administrator vs
Ladaga,
A.M. No. P-99-1287, January 26, 2001
FACTS:
• On August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael
Ladaga Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC of Makati,
Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator,
Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority to appear
as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza
Ladaga, in a Criminal Case for Falsification of Public
Document before the MTC of Quezon City, Branch
40.
• Pending his request, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the
private complainant of the criminal case sent a
letter to the Court Administrator requesting for a
certification with regards to Atty. Ladaga’s authority
to appear as counsel for the accused.
•On September 14, 1998, Atty. Ladaga admitted
before the OCA that he had appeared in said
criminal case without prior authorization. He
reasoned out that his appearance in the criminal
case did not prejudice his office nor the interest of
the public since he did not take advantage of his
position and that his appearances in court were
covered by leave application approved by the
presiding judge. On January 25, 1999, the Court
Administrator filed the instant administrative
complaint against respondent for violating Sec.
7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known
as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, which provides: (b)
Outside employment and other activities related
thereto – Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not: (2) Engage in the private
practice of their profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided that such practice will
not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ladaga’s appearance as
a pro bono counsel for his relative constitutes
private practice of law as prohibited by the rules.
RULING: No, Atty. Ladaga’s appearance as private
counsel for his cousin does not constitute private
practice of law. It should be noted that the private
practice of a profession, specifically the law
profession, does not pertain to an isolated court
appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession of
acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies
that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession
and that his professional services are available to
the public for a compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
Furthermore, Sec. 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules: No officer or employee shall engage
directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial,
credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of the
Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be
absolute in the case of those officers and employees
whose duties and responsibilities require that their
entire time be at the disposal of the Government;
Provided, further, That if an employee is granted
permission to engage in outside activities, time so
devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by
the agency to the end that it will not impair in any
way the efficiency of the officer or employee: While
it is true that respondent filed leave applications
corresponding to the dates he appeared in court, he,
however, failed to obtain a prior permission from
the head of the Department (CJ of the Supreme
Court). The presiding judge of the court to which
respondent is assigned is not the head of the
Department contemplated by law. Wherefore,
respondent Atty. Misael Ladaga was REPRIMANDED
for appearing without prior authorization from the
head of the Department with a stern warning that
any repetition of such act would be dealt with more
severely.
Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, September 3,
1991
FULL TEXT:
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA,
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel
for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching
proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would
indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article
IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of
a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be naturalborn citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of
a college degree, and must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section
l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly
provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at
the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years
of age and holders of a college degree. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis
supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no
jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a
legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and
the application of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation
of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by
maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an
attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an
attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating
with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and
fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his
associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken,
129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising person, firms, associations or corporations as
to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings
pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative capacity
performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law.
Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative
capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as
to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
(State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W.
2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of
a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice,
as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments,
where the work done involves the determination by the
trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no
small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive
field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in litigation. They require in
many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of
justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer
which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office.
It is of importance to the welfare of the public that
these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139,144). (Emphasis ours)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association
v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The University of the Philippines Law Center in
conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (19741975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in
even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public
service.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line
of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for
attorneys engaging in the active practice of their
profession, and he follows some one or more lines of
employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at
law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell,
155 NW 312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA
by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law
practice that is set forth in the Article on the
Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of
COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal
work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers
who are employed in COA now would have the
necessary qualifications in accordance with the
Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of
the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be
allowed to make a very brief statement?
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is
that this is equivalent to the practice of law.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
The Commissioner will please proceed.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the
members of the Commission on Audit. Among others,
the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They
must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting
from the provision — "who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years".
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution,
provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA)
should either be certified public accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis
supplied)
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in
excluding members of the Bar who are now employed
in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to
make the clarification that this provision on
qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not
necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law
outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that
as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are
using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then they are qualified to
be considered for appointment as members or
commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on
Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on
Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem
it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this
provision on the qualifications as regards members of
the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at
least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one
question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and
which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage
in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of
lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke,
Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons:
Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private
practice. The term, as commonly understood, means
"an individual or organization engaged in the business
of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who
practice alone are often called "sole practitioners."
Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually
a partnership and members of the firm are the partners.
Some firms may be organized as professional
corporations and the members called shareholders. In
either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger
or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled
"associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to
traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as
that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern
Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p.
593). The practice of law is defined as the performance
of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood
to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870
[1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn.
325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform
almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously
be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative agency.
(Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a
client is at once the most publicly familiar role for
lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average
lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms,
and a large percentage spend their entire practice
without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless,
many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating
lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and
the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or
in litigation work that is constrained in very important
ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it
some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of
these special roles, the most prominent is that of
prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are
imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way
in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to
perform that work. The most common of these roles
are those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the
public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is
this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a
corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of
a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even
today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept
of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before
the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the
informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in
most developed societies today, substantially more
legal work is transacted in law offices than in the
courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both
litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most
cases they find themselves spending more time doing
what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling
than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been
described as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial
lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in
law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where
internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general
practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each
involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal
processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of
lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at
least some legal services outside their specialty. And
even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a
lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as
By no means will most of this work involve litigation,
unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a
litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of
much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to
have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills
of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting,
and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the
new skills of evaluation and mediation are both
effective for many clients and a source of employment.
(Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily,
herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate
law practice, a departure from the traditional concept
of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a
revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular
those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the
major emerging trends in corporation law is
indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems
of today requires an accurate understanding of the
nature and implications of the corporate law research
function accompanied by an accelerating rate of
information accumulation. The recognition of the need
for such improved corporate legal policy formulation,
particularly "model-making" and "contingency
planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of
traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to
be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the consequences of given
courses of action, and the need for fast decision and
response in situations of acute danger have prompted
the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing,
and electronic computing equipment. Understandably,
an improved decisional structure must stress the
predictive component of the policy-making process,
wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a
segment thereof is developed to test projected
alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic
effects flowing therefrom.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a
lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation.
His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter
alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting
out as corporate secretary (in board meetings),
appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory
agencies (including the Securities and Exchange
Commission), and in other capacities which require an
ability to deal with the law.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly
engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the
law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized attention in
the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education.
Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume
responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These
include such matters as determining policy and
becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis
supplied.)
Certainly, the general orientation for productive
contributions by those trained primarily in the law can
be improved through an early introduction to multivariable decisional context and the various approaches
for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with
either a master's or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning at the legal
policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques
of other professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate
finance problems would require the services of an
astute attorney because of the complex legal
implications that arise from each and every necessary
step in securing and maintaining the business issue
raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is
assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla."
He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with
a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of
business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers,
many people could not explain what it is that a
corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of
attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary
with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller
and some large corporations farm out all their legal
problems to private law firms. Many others have inhouse counsel only for certain matters. Other
corporation have a staff large enough to handle most
legal problems in-house.
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling
of being isolated from the action, or not understanding
how one's work actually fits into the work of the
orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who
needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short,
a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to
be more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may
sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation
(MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter
the international law field. After all, international law is
practiced in a relatively small number of companies and
law firms. Because working in a foreign country is
perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted
by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the
overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the
younger attorneys do their "international practice" in
law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice,"
May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the
lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of
Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A
bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good
lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the
excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business
Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs
a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we
talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and
the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the
intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily
with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of
insights into current advances which are of particular
significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an
introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a
corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and
(3) a devotion to the organization and management of
the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as
intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial
jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the
corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences
affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate
lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the
resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he
provides counsel for are required to make, and the
need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple
levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units.
Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public
entities but with each other — often with those who
are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in
decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a
new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating
in the organization and operations of governance
through participation on boards and other decisionmaking roles. Often these new patterns develop
alongside existing legal institutions and laws are
perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with
governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches
from industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to
influence governmental policies. And there are lessons
to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit,
Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts
between governmental and business Japan's MITI is
world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office
of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group
within the managerial structure of all kinds of
organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and
temporary groups within organizations has been found
to be related to indentifiable factors in the groupcontext interaction such as the groups actively revising
their knowledge of the environment coordinating work
with outsiders, promoting team achievements within
the organization. In general, such external activities are
better predictors of team performance than internal
group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of
the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking
ways both to anticipate effective managerial
procedures and to understand relationships of financial
liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis
supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel,
three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics
has been found an effective tool for new managerial
thinking regarding both planning and pressing
immediate problems. An understanding of the role of
feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow,
enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic
problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make
the system dynamics principles more accessible to
managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis
supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make
better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty.
In the context of a law department, it can be used to
appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in
negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk
involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis
supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management.
Computer-based models can be used directly by parties
and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated
set of such tools provide coherent and effective
negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction
in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of
the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires
special skills that comprise a major part of the general
counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of
remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing
legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and
made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within
which are undertaken those activities of the firm to
which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly
supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive
in a global, interdependent environment. The practice
and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate
the relationships needed in trying to make a global
economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate
Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in
the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of
the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic
issues, including structuring its global operations,
managing improved relationships with an increasingly
diversified body of employees, managing expanded
liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions
with public decision-makers, coping internally with
more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing
corporate law is not enough to make one a good
general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of
how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And
even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand
all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must,
at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the
management issues if only to be able to grasp not only
the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem
corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel,"
April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the
bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of
financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet,
many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the
financial law territory. What transpires next is a
dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by
President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the
Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments
confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of
the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of
office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman
of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant
petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine
Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a
grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception
in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional
license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124,
Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and
having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law
office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank
Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations
officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama,
which involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating
legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the
Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business
conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant
or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General
(1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL.
Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in
election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its
accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field
of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with
the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and
urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and
engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform
law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also
made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the
Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which
conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member
of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government
functions with individual freedoms and public
accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis
supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of
which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel
acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to
meet the various contingencies that arise during a
negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower
concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal
counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the members of the team.
(Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2,
Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11).
(Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's
Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants;
and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any
debt restructuring program. For aside from performing
the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they
score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development
Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L.
Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United
States Agency for International Development, during
the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at
the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored
by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 2631, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more
so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise
in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement
drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign
lawyer may work with an international business
specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model
loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract
agreements contain such a mixture of technical
language that they should be carefully drafted and
signed only with the advise of competent counsel in
conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical
support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of
the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p.
321). ( Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt
restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms
and conditions which determines the contractual
remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements
of the contract. A good agreement must not only define
the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state
the recourse open to either party when the other fails
to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle
which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign
loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in
domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once
said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but
where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not
the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See
Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign
Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal,
Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977,
p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the
term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept
of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal
construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and
the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement — that he has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and
must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being
that the appointee should possess the qualifications
required by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others
better qualified who should have been preferred. This is
a political question involving considerations of wisdom
which only the appointing authority can decide.
(emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central
Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where
it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as
in this case, and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil
Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke
an appointment on the ground that another person is
more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its
choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary
power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in
the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . .
(Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949;
Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give
its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman
of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section
1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three
Members shall hold office for seven years, two
Members for five years, and the last Members for three
years, without reappointment. Appointment to any
vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed
or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice
it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the
traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as
distinguished from the modern concept of the practice
of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was
intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition
would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps
practised two or three times a week and would outlaw
say, law practice once or twice a year for ten
consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice
Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made
use of a definition of law practice which really means
nothing because the definition says that law practice " .
. . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of
law." True I cited the definition but only by way of
sarcasm as evident from my statement that the
definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase
by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the
law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in
making use of the law, or in advising others on what the
law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense,
perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that
Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine
Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This
is different from the acts of persons practising law,
without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even
disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say,
on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications.
This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an
action or petition be brought against the President?
And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how
can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent
President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted
doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference
except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such
grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the
instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the
Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a
grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of
the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a
nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court
reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the
appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee,
whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is
likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming
body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a
Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the
U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by
the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah.
Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was
Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah
agreed on condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was
captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of
Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of
what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury,
accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his
skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The
procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the
spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the
petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
CASE DIGEST: Cayetano v. Monsod,
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991
CAYETANO V. MONSOD (201 SCRA 210) G.R. No.
100113 September 3, 1991 RENATO CAYETANO,
petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R.
SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Christian Monsod was nominated by President
Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years. On June 5, 1991, the
Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the
same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC. Pertinent provision of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution regarding the required qualifications for
COMELEC is as follows: There shall be a Commission
on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment,
at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years. Challenging the validity of the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections be declared null and
void. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the
Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations
of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also
been paying his professional license fees as lawyer
for more than ten years. After graduating from the
College of Law (U.P.) and passing the bar, Atty.
Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During
his stint in the World Bank Group (19631970),
Monsod worked as an operations officer for about
two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved
getting acquainted with the laws of membercountries negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with
the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer
of an investment bank and subsequently of a
business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered
services to various companies as a legal and
economic consultant or chief executive officer. As
former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL, Monsod's work
involved being knowledgeable in election law. He
appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings
before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former CoChairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference
for Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in
affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and
lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made
use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quasi judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia MuñozPalma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and
public accountability and the party-list system for the
House of Representative.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Christian Monsod possesses the
required qualification of having been in the practice
of law for at least ten years.
ULEP vs. The Legal Clinic, 223 SCRA 378
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993
MAURICIO C. ULEP, Petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC,
INC., Respondent.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to
cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to
or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of
said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or
entities from making advertisements pertaining to the
exercise of the law profession other than those allowed
by law."chanrobles virtual law library
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner
are as follows:
Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.chanrobles virtual law library
THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am- 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN
Ave., Mla.
Annex B
RULING:
Yes. In the light of the various definitions of the
term “Practice of law" and taking into consideration
the liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyermanager, a lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyerlegislator of both the rich and the poor — verily
more than satisfy the constitutional requirement —
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.
GUAM DIVORCE.
DON PARKINSONchanrobles virtual law library
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam
Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
Friday during office
hours.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration
Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to
Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call
Marivic.chanrobles virtual law library
THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila
nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232; 521-7251;
522-2041; 521-0767
associations and the memoranda submitted by them on
the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
It is the submission of petitioner that the
advertisements above reproduced are champterous,
unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and
destructive of the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar and that, as a
member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements, hence the reliefs
sought in his petition as hereinbefore
quoted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact
of publication of said advertisement at its instance, but
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in
the rendering of "legal support services" through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines. Respondent further argues that
assuming that the services advertised are legal services,
the act of advertising these services should be allowed
supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen
vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2reportedly decided by the
United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal
profession of the issues raised herein, we required the
(1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine
Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers'
Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle
(WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the
Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de
Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective position
papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their
memoranda. 3The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and
cooperation of which this Court takes note with
appreciation and
gratitude.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court
are whether or not the services offered by respondent,
The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes
practice of law and, in either case, whether the same
can properly be the subject of the advertisements
herein complained
of.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the
merits of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening
to present hereunder excerpts from the respective
position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar
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Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which
respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms,
i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services",
common sense would readily dictate that the same are
essentially without substantial distinction. For who
could deny that document search, evidence gathering,
assistance to layman in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies
like birth, marriage, property, or business registration,
obtaining documents like clearance, passports, local or
foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish
to make issue with respondent's foreign citations.
Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position
manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view
espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is
alright to advertise one's legal
services).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its
opposition to respondent's act of establishing a "legal
clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same
through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative
supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually
restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical
activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed. 4
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A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the
impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it renders legal
services.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers
legal services to the public, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent is offering
legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes this to
be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is)
the effect that the advertisements have on the reading
public.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The impression created by the advertisements in
question can be traced, first of all, to the very name
being used by respondent - "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such
a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the
rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a
medical clinic connotes medical services for medical
problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic"
connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes
doctors.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in
the advertisements subject of the present case, appears
with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more
reinforces the impression that it is being operated by
members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In
addition, the advertisements in question appear with a
picture and name of a person being represented as a
lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes
whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the
service or services being
offered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is
merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by it,
or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively
engaged in law practice does. And it becomes
unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal
services" and "legal support services," as the
respondent would have it. The advertisements in
question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the
reading public that legal services are being offered by
lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce
the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public
order and public
policy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the
advertisements in question are only meant to inform
the general public of the services being offered by it.
Said advertisements, however, emphasize to Guam
divorce, and any law student ought to know that under
the Family Code, there is only one instance when a
foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code
(defines) a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent
union between a man and woman entered into
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an
inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relation during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is
obvious that the message being conveyed is that
Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage
celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going
to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but
encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine
law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark
side" of legal practice, where certain defects in
Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At
worst, this is outright malpractice.
Rule 1.02. - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence
in the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that
advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the
Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle
with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems
to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not
suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the
"special contract of permanent union," the inviolable
social institution," which is how the Family Code
describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity
and inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement
appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy,
which is suggestive of immoral publication of
applications for a marriage
license.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed,
it can readily be concluded that the above impressions
one may gather from the advertisements in question
are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
example alone confirms what the advertisements
suggest. Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being
encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with
impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine
courts does not extend to the place where the crime is
committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal
support services" respondent offers do not constitute
legal services as commonly understood, the
advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers
and that it offers legal services, as earlier discussed.
Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of
an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar
themselves are encouraging or inducing the
performance of acts which are contrary to law, morals,
good customs and the public good, thereby destroying
and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be
enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited from further
performing or offering some of the services it presently
offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services
to the public in
general.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized
legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and
retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly
benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled
but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of
such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches
upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to
prohibit such
business.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at
bar can be better performed by specialists in other
fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their
having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field
cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to
the Bar. To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the
legal profession will deny the profession of the great
benefits and advantages of modern technology. Indeed,
a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a
lawyer using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in
skill.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful
not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any
form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar
but also, and more importantly, for the protection of
the public. Technological development in the profession
may be encouraged without tolerating, but instead
ensuring prevention of illegal
practice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is
allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such
services are made available exclusively to members of
the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering
technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively,
the more difficult task of carefully distinguishing
between which service may be offered to the public in
general and which should be made available exclusively
to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This,
however, may require further proceedings because of
the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of
respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright,
such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration
abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise
illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent
may not be prohibited from simply disseminating
information regarding such matters, it must be required
to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it
is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of
action may be illegal under Philippine law, that it is not
authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that
a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on which
course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend
any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to
possible sanctions for illegal practice of
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should
be directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a
clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not
authorized to practice law or perform legal
services.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be
ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent
himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term
being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without
any adequate and effective means of regulating his
activities. Also, law practice in a corporate form may
prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but
before allowance of such practice may be considered,
the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws
must conform to each and every provision of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court. 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
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Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the
practice of law but engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced
paralegals, with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is
absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of holding
out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal
Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its
enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice
which thus yields itself to the regulatory powers of the
Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely
engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity.
Respondent's own commercial advertisement which
announces a certain Atty. Don Parkinson to be handling
the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications,
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and
rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers.
It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of
deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising
clients as to their legal right and then take them to an
attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in
court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984 ed., p.
39).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in
the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be
evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers
to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device
by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out
itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal
services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially
so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for
malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the
limitation of practice of law to persons who have been
duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the
discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent
uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers
who act for it are subject to court discipline. The
practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish
to engage in it nor can it be assigned to another (See 5
Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons
who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows
that not only respondent but also all the persons who
are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in
unethical law practice.
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:chanrobles virtual law
library
The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in
answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only
unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral;
and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to
supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate
officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice
of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support
services" to answers, litigants and the general public as
enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its
Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of
Respondent's Comment). But its advertised services, as
enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that
it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside of
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory
services on Persons and Family Relations Law,
particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of
marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems,
immigration problems; the Investments Law of the
Philippines and such other related
laws.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Its advertised services unmistakably require the
application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and
procedures related thereto, the legal advices based
thereon and which activities call for legal training,
knowledge and
experience.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the
aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall
squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen
equally term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:chanrobles virtual law
library
In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court,
paramount consideration should be given to the
protection of the general public from the danger of
being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who
may be engaged in the practice of
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a
rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year
bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and
pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer
qualified to practice
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many
jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice,
there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal
with the general public as such. While it may now be
the opportune time to establish these courses of study
and/or standards, the fact remains that at present,
these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime,
this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to
protect the general public from being exploited by
those who may be dealing with the general public in the
guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do
so.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
In the same manner, the general public should also be
protected from the dangers which may be brought
about by advertising of legal services. While it appears
that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of
Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears
in the instant case that legal services are being
advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to
protect the general public from falling prey to those
who advertise legal services without being qualified to
offer such services. 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of
Respondent, however, seems to give the impression
that information regarding validity of marriages,
divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa
extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and
foreign investment, which are in essence, legal matters ,
will be given to them if they avail of its services. The
Respondent's name - The Legal Clinic, Inc. - does not
help matters. It gives the impression again that
Respondent will or can cure the legal problems brought
to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed,
staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading
impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal
Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical clinic,
when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic,
Inc.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very
admissions of its President and majority stockholder,
Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and
main purpose of Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the
Philippines:chanrobles virtual law library
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly
advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain
which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are)
illegal and against the Code of Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in this
country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is
an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that
in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc.,
could work out/cause the celebration of a secret
marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this
country. While it is advertised that one has to go to said
agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly
fooling the public for valid marriages in the Philippines
are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so
under the law. And to employ an agency for said
purpose of contracting marriage is not
necessary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and
other countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to
advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain
from qualified practitioners legal services for their
particular needs can justify the use of advertisements
such as are the subject matter of the petition, for one
(cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the
illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be amended so
that such act could become
justifiable.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
We submit further that these advertisements that seem
to project that secret marriages and divorce are
possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not
so, are highly
reprehensible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about
how they could go about having a secret marriage here,
when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek
advice on divorce, where in this country there is none,
except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the
Philippines. It is also against good morals and is
deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to
be able to do that which by our laws cannot be done
(and) by our Code of Morals should not be
done.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
measure that he recommends, a decision of the
National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law?
In my opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is
charged for the legal advice or information, and the
legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major
non-legal
problem.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme
Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by
circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and
offenses of this character justify permanent elimination
from the Bar. 10
It is largely a matter of degree and of
custom.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:
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1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice
of law, such as management consultancy firms or travel
agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the
services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully
practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that
the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged
in independently of the practice of law) involves
knowledge of the law does not necessarily make
respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can
render effective service unless he is familiar with such
statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to
suggest a course of conduct which the law forbids. It
seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of
the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do
not constitute the practice of law . . . . It is not only
presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that
most men have considerable acquaintance with broad
features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law accurate or inaccurate - moulds our conduct not only
when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are
serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen
generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws
touching their particular business or profession. A good
example is the architect, who must be familiar with
zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and
tenement house statutes, and who draws plans and
specification in harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a
fire tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or
the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some
If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on
his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the
architect in respect to the building code and the like,
then an architect who performed this function would
probably be considered to be trespassing on territory
reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the
industrial relations field had been pre-empted by
lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the elbow
of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The
most important body of the industrial relations experts
are the officers and business agents of the labor unions
and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger
corporate employers, it has been the practice for some
years to delegate special responsibility in employee
matters to a management group chosen for their
practical knowledge and skill in such matter, and
without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More
recently, consultants like the defendants have the same
service that the larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The handling of industrial relations is growing into a
recognized profession for which appropriate courses
are offered by our leading universities. The court should
be very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread,
well-established method of conducting business is
unlawful, or that the considerable class of men who
customarily perform a certain function have no right to
do so, or that the technical education given by our
schools cannot be used by the graduates in their
business.
In determining whether a man is practicing law, we
should consider his work for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being
engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client
along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be
the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the
case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along
economic and psychological lines. The law only provides
the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning
code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of
building the architect may plan. The incidental legal
advice or information defendant may give, does not
transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me
add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he
performed services which are customarily reserved to
members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For
instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew
employees' wills.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Another branch of defendant's work is the
representations of the employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without
a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law.
Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may
select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under
discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept
the employment whether or not he is a member of the
bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where
the business turns on a question of law. Most real
estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not
lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a
disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the
dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same
opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept
the assignment. Or if a controversy between an
employer and his men grows from differing
interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite
likely that defendant should not handle it. But I need
not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation
is not presented by the
proofs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Defendant also appears to represent the employer
before administrative agencies of the federal
government, especially before trial examiners of the
National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the
federal government, acting by virtue of an authority
granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State
of New Jersey is without power to interfere with such
determination or to forbid representation before the
agency by one whom the agency admits. The rules of
the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the
right to appear in person, or by counsel, or by other
representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th,
1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here means a licensed
attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In
this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully do
whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing
questions purely legal. (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d
800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism
[1974], at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person
engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of
law provided that:chanrobles virtual law library
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal
problem;.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved
to members of the bar;
.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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All these must be considered in relation to the work for
any particular client as a
whole.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and nonlawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility succintly
states the rule of conduct:chanrobles virtual law library
Rule 15.08 - A lawyer who is engaged in another
profession or occupation concurrently with the practice
of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting
as a lawyer or in another
capacity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to
render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition).
Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like
securing a marriage license, and making arrangements
with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of
law. However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then
what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a
non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such
services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information
on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas
(See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving
informational materials may not constitute of law. The
business is similar to that of a bookstore where the
customer buys materials on the subject and determines
on the subject and determines by himself what courses
of action to take.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from
purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals
may apply the law to the particular problem of the
client, and give legal advice. Such would constitute
unauthorized practice of law.
It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text
which publication of a legal text which purports to say
what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere
fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his
problem does not affect this. . . . . Apparently it is urged
that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and
the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be
filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But
that is the situation with many approved and accepted
texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is
no personal contact or relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist that relation of
confidence and trust so necessary to the status of
attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL
PRACTICE - THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At
most the book assumes to offer general advice on
common problems, and does not purport to give
personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport to give
personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person in a particular
situation - in their publication and sale of the kits, such
publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful
practice of law . . . . There being no legal impediment
under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no
proper basis for the injunction against defendant
maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to
persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or
separation agreement any printed material or writings
relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the
memorandum of modification of the judgment against
defendant having an interest in any publishing house
publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his
having any personal contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the
finding that for the change of $75 or $100 for the kit,
the defendant gave legal advice in the course of
personal contacts concerning particular problems which
might arise in the preparation and presentation of the
purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or
pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the
preparation of necessary documents (The injunction
therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the
practice of law, particularly with reference to the giving
of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to
specific problems of particular individuals in connection
with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation
agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v.
Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra
at p. 101.).
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are
"strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not
controverted, however, that if the services "involve
giving legal advice or counselling," such would
constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in
this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry may be
necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it
can give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong
notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the
solemnities, formalities and other requisites of
marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no
Philippine marriage can be
secret.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable.
The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily
related to the first paragraph) fails to state the
limitation that only "paralegal services?" or "legal
support services", and not legal services, are available."
11chanrobles virtual law library
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase
"practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at
bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice of
law" has long been the subject of judicial construction
and interpretation. The courts have laid down general
principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and
scope of the term, some of which we now take into
account.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice
law is to give advice or render any kind of service that
involves legal knowledge or skill. 12chanrobles virtual
law library
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contract by which
legal rights are secured, although such matter may or
may not be pending in a court. 13chanrobles virtual law
library
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at
law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions to
clients to inform them of their rights and obligations,
preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary
layman, and appearance for clients before public
tribunals which possess power and authority to
determine rights of life, liberty, and property according
to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14chanrobles virtual law library
When a person participates in the a trial and advertises
himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15One
who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal
rights and then takes the business to an attorney and
asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also
practicing law. 16Giving advice for compensation
regarding the legal status and rights of another and the
conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of
law. 17One who renders an opinion as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to
that extent, practicing law. 18chanrobles virtual law
library
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19after
citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the
test to determine whether certain acts constitute
"practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:chanrobles virtual law
library
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and
the application of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation
of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all
actions taken for them in matters connected with the
law.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken ,
129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also
considered to be in the practice of law when he:
. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business
of advising person, firms, associations or corporations
as to their right under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings,
pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or
commission constituted by law or authorized to settle
controversies and there, in such representative
capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of
obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative
capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as
to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
(State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.
W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers
Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions
and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and
courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice
to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating
an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of
a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate
and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262,
263).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no
small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive
field of business and trust relations and other affairs.
Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always
subject to become involved in litigation. They require in
many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of
justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as
concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer
which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office.
It is of importance to the welfare of the public that
these manifold customary functions be performed by
persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol.
3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139,
144).
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of
activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree
with the perceptive findings and observations of the
aforestated bar associations that the activities of
respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of
law."chanrobles virtual law library
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal
support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's
own description of the services it has been offering, to
wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready
information by trained paralegals to laymen and
lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory,
through the extensive use of computers and modern
information technology in the gathering, processing,
storage, transmission and reproduction of information
and communication, such as computerized legal
research; encoding and reproduction of documents and
pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document
search; evidence gathering; locating parties or
witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and
assistance to laymen in need of basic institutional
services from government or non-government agencies,
like birth, marriage, property, or business registrations;
educational or employment records or certifications,
obtaining documentation like clearances, passports,
local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of
other countries that they may find useful, like foreign
divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail
of preparatory to emigration to the foreign country, and
other matters that do not involve representation of
clients in court; designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the efficient
management of law offices, corporate legal
departments, courts and other entities engaged in
dispensing or administering legal services. 20chanrobles
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While some of the services being offered by respondent
corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems
and programs for the efficient management of law
offices, or the computerization of research aids and
materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception
to the general
rule.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation
gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and nondiagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on
marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity
of this Court that all the respondent corporation will
simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to
the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it
will necessarily have to explain to the client the
intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the
proper course of action to be taken as may be provided
for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for the which services it will
consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls
squarely within the jurisprudential definition of
"practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered
by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the
weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving
legal advice, contract drafting and so
forth.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an
article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the
Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star,
entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into
the structure, main purpose and operations of
respondent corporation was given by its own
"proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday
at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of
the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No
matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as
complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic
situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who,
like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take
care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation
and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor,
litigation, and family law. These specialist are backed up
by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and
attorneys.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by
the trend in the medical field toward specialization, it
caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the
big law firms.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when
they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That's
what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted
what's bothering you, they take your temperature, they
observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how
we operate, too. And once the problem has been
categorized, then it's referred to one of our
specialists.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require
surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic
disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like
preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss
can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a
hospital the residents or the interns. We can take care
of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung
baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang maconfine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea,"
explains Atty.
Nogales.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment"
are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich relative
who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand
to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would refer
you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real
estate taxes and arrears which would need to be put in
order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for
the right to transfer her property, and only a specialist
in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the
problem. Now, if there were other heirs contesting your
rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who
knows how to arrange the problem for presentation in
court, and gather evidence to support the case.
21chanrobles virtual law library
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to
carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by
virtue of the nature of the services it renders which
thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory
prohibitions against the advertisements which it has
caused to be published and are now assailed in this
proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
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Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by
the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently
establish that the main purpose of respondent is to
serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services
from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but
rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the
practice of law. 22chanrobles virtual law library
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services
being offered by private respondent which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only
a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
23chanrobles virtual law library
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited
to those individuals found duly qualified in education
and character. The permissive right conferred on the
lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to
withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of
moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from
the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to
practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control
of the court. 24chanrobles virtual law library
The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction
wherefrom respondent would wish to draw support for
his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the
practice of law is limited to those who meet the
requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar,
and various statutes or rules specifically so provide.
25The practice of law is not a lawful business except for
members of the bar who have complied with all the
conditions required by statute and the rules of court.
Only those persons are allowed to practice law who, by
reason of attainments previously acquired through
education and study, have been recognized by the
courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal
science entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect,
or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients,
with respect to the construction, interpretation,
operation and effect of law. 26The justification for
excluding from the practice of law those not admitted
to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from
competition, but in the protection of the public from
being advised and represented in legal matters by
incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the
judicial department can exercise little control.
27chanrobles virtual law library
We have to necessarily and definitely reject
respondent's position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the
law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever
may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that
this should first be a matter for judicial rules or
legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it
has done.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Paralegals in the United States are trained
professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are
schools and universities there which offer studies and
degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in
the Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals" or
"legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards
and guidelines also evolved to protect the general
public. One of the major standards or guidelines was
developed by the American Bar Association which set
up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant
Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been
proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also
associations of paralegals in the United States with their
own code of professional ethics, such as the National
Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American
Paralegal Association. 29chanrobles virtual law library
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and
limited acceptance of what may be considered as
paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons
not duly licensed to practice law are or have been
allowed limited representation in behalf of another or
to render legal services, but such allowable services are
limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or
regulations granting permission therefor. 30chanrobles
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Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial
policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
authority, a person who has not been admitted as an
attorney cannot practice law for the proper
administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled
person into the practice of law. 31That policy should
continue to be one of encouraging persons who are
unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in
the state. 32chanrobles virtual law library
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned
advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts. 33He is not
supposed to use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, selflaudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his
qualifications or legal services. 34Nor shall he pay or
give something of value to representatives of the mass
media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to
attract legal business. 35Prior to the adoption of the
code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should
not resort to indirect advertisements for professional
employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph to be published
in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been
or is engaged or concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the
importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like
self-laudation. 36chanrobles virtual law library
The standards of the legal profession condemn the
lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise
his talents or skill as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. 37The prescription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal
business rests on the fundamental postulate that the
that the practice of law is a profession. Thus, in the case
of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R.
Bayot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of
respondent which are involved in the present
proceeding, 39was held to constitute improper
advertising or
solicitation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was
a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of
his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business
from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to
advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer
degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and
adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his
services or offering them to the public. As a member of
the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary
activities as the money-changers of old defiled the
temple of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is
the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot
be forced but must be the outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).
standing of the profession. 43chanrobles virtual law
library
We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the
best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust,
which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as
to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal byproduct of effective service which is right and proper. A
good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus
to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees
the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda.
40chanrobles virtual law library
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also
permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected
with, address, telephone number and special branch of
law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of
changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or
office address, being for the convenience of the
profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have
his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law. 44chanrobles
virtual law library
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are
prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation
and define the extent to which they may be
undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad
categories, namely, those which are expressly allowed
and those which are necessarily implied from the
restrictions. 41chanrobles virtual law library
The first of such exceptions is the publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief
biographical and informative data. "Such data must not
be misleading and may include only a statement of the
lawyer's name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable
addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of
birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with
dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of
honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and
legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable
law lists; the names and addresses of references; and,
with their written consent, the names of clients
regularly represented." 42chanrobles virtual law library
The law list must be a reputable law list published
primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade
journal or periodical which is published principally for
other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
properly publish his brief biographical and informative
data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society
program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be
published in a law list the conduct, management or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and
contents of the advertisements for which respondent is
being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of
the fees charged by said respondent corporation for
services rendered, we find and so hold that the same
definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any
of the above-mentioned
exceptions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of
Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes
the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously
not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact
that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly
allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition
against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a
statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the
availability upon request of a written schedule of fees
or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific
services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or
impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional
Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the
Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated
therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until
it is implemented by such authority in that state."
46This goes to show that an exception to the general
rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent,
can be made only if and when the canons expressly
provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at
bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the
American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on
the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing
television commercials, it was found that public opinion
dropped significantly 47 with respect to these
characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present
situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the
publication of advertisements of the kind used by
respondent would only serve to aggravate what is
already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal
profession whose integrity has consistently been under
attack lately by media and the community in general. At
this point in time, it is of utmost importance in the face
of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to
adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct
which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to
regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal
profession.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of
the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise
his services except in allowable instances 48or to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of law.
49Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the
prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of
The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar,
he is hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved
in this proceeding will be dealt with more
severely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the
legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal
Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and
determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing
into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within
the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding
which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course,
imperative that this matter be promptly determined,
albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under
the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a
corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the
practice of law in this country. This interdiction, just like
the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be
subverted by employing some so-called paralegals
supposedly rendering the alleged support
services.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition
by respondent is the concern and province of the
Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding
quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the
factual background and basis for the grant of
respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative
misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar
matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such
action as may be necessary under the
circumstances.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and
ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from
issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of
any advertisement in any form which is of the same or
similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of
this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly,
any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law
or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.
Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant
and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate
action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, GriñoAquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and
Quiason, JJ., concur.
CASE DIGEST: ULEP vs. The Legal Clinic,
223 SCRA 378
Ulep v The Legal Clinic, Inc.
B.M. No. 553
Ponente: J. Regalado
Date: June 17, 1993
Petitioners: MAURICIO C. ULEP
Respondents: THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
FACTS:
Ulep, a member of the bar, filed a petition against the
Legal Clinic because its advertisements are
‘unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and
destructive of the confidence of the community in
the integrity of the members of the bar’ and that as a
member of the bar, he is ashamed and offended by
the said advertisements.
The advertisement of the Legal Clinic includes
“secret marriage” and “divorce” among others. In an
article published in the Starweek (Philippine
Star)entitled “Rx for Legal Problems,” Atty. Rogelio
Nogales, proprietor of The Legal Clinic, explained
the main purpose, structure, and operations of
the said corporation.
In response, The Legal Clinic admits the fact of
publication of the advertisement but claims that it is
not engaged in the practice of law but in the
rendering of “legal support services” through
paralegals with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines.
Position paper of IBP:
The use of the name “The Legal Clinic Inc” gives the
impression that it is being operated by lawyers and
that it renders legal services. There is no difference
between “legal support services” and “legal
services.”
The advertisements in questions are meant to
induce the performance of acts contrary to law,
morals, public order and public policy. This is against
Rule 1.02 which states that, “a lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.”
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not the services offered by The
Legal Clinic constitutes practice of law.
2.
Whether or not their services can
properly be the subject of the advertisements.
RULING:
1.
Yes. Practice of law means any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and
experience. Generally, to practice law is to give
advice or render any kind of service that involves
legal knowledge or skill.
In practice, a lawyer engages in three principal types
of professional activity:
(1) legal advise and instructions to clients to inform
them of their rights and obligations
(2) preparation for clients of documents
requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman
(3) appearance for clients before the public tribunals
which possess power and authority to determine
rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in
order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law.
Applying the criteria, the activities of The Legal Clinic
constitute practice of law. With its attorneys and so
called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to
the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or
her on the proper course of action to be taken as
may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisement represents and for which
services it will consequently charge and be
paid. That activity falls squarely within the
definition of “practice of law.”
best advertising possible for a lawyer is a wellmerited reputation for profession capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to
generate it and to magnify his success.
DISPOSITIVE:
The Court resolved to RESTRAIN AND ENJOIN The
Legal Clinic Inc from issuing or causing the publication
or dissemination of any advertisement in any form
and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
activity, operation, or transaction proscribed by
law or the Code of Professional Ethics. Atty. Rogelio
Nogales, as a member of the Philippine Bar, is
reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts which are involved in this
proceeding will be dealt with more severely. The
question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose
for which the Legal Clinic was created was not
decided upon by the Court. They are constrained to
refrain from lapsing into an obiter since it is
clearly not within the adjucative parameters of
the present proceedings which is administrative in
nature.
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS,
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, B.M. NO. 2540, SEPTEMBER 24,
2013
FULL TEXT:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 2540
September 24, 2013
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of
Attorneys filed by petitioner Michael A. Medado
(Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines
with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979 and passed
the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted
average of 82.7.
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the
Philippine International Convention Center (PICC) together
with the successful bar examinees. He was scheduled to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980, but he failed
to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had
misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys given by
the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a
vacation.
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2.
The standard of legal profession condemn
the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession, advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods.
The canon of the profession states that the
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Several years later, while rummaging through his old
college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not
signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the
entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance
record.
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already
working. He stated that he was mainly doing corporate
and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in
litigation practice. Thus, he operated "under the mistaken
belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing
of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to
his status as a lawyer"; and "the matter of signing in the
Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was
subsequently forgotten."
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to
provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances
to be credited.
Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable
to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado
filed the instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to
sign in the Roll of Attorneys.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a
clarificatory conference on the matter on 21 September
2012 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to
this Court on 4 February 2013. The OBC recommended
that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit. It
explained that, based on his answers during the
clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid
justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s
prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of a
fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to
suspension from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in
the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him
the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have
reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of
members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is
warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good
moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition
to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a
third party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s
omission; rather, it was Medado himself who
acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of
more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why
it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado
very candidly replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time,
what can you say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo,
you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time,
it’s a combination of apprehension and anxiety of what’s
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gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I have
to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as
necessary.
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action
for disqualification from the practice of law, which is
more than what we can say of other individuals who were
successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar.
For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner
strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of
the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he
possesses the character required to be a member of the
Philippine Bar.
Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and
able legal practitioner, having held various positions at the
Laurel Law Office, Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the
Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy
Development Corporation.
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a fullfledged member of the Philippine Bar. While the practice
of law is not a right but a privilege, this Court will not
unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals
who have shown mental fitness and moral fiber to
withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner
Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since
1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, without
having signed in the Roll of Attorneys. He justifies this
behavior by characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor
intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest
error of judgment."
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a
person from the legal consequences of his acts as it
negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law cannot be
utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is
presumed to know the law and its
consequences. Ignorantia factiexcusat; ignorantia legis
neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may
have at first operated under an honest mistake of fact
when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC
entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of
Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he
had signed was merely an attendance record, he could no
longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, Medado should have known
that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys,
as it was the act of signing therein that would have made
him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to
continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps
to complete all the requirements for admission to the Bar,
he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law
by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer of the court,
and acting as such without authority, may constitute
indirect contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or
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imprisonment or both. Such a finding, however, is in the
nature of criminal contempt and must be reached after
the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings. In this
case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner
committed indirect contempt of court by knowingly
engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from
making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no
formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against
him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law
likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in
the unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit
lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law,
the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is
subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of
Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized
practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students
and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they
are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the
ethical standards of the legal profession.
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations
of Canon 9have warranted the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law. As Medado is not yet a full-fledged
lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law.
However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin
to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For
his transgression of the prohibition against the
unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it fit to fine
him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one year period,
petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in
the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any
act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in
the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this
Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of
Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A.
Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE
(1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is
likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of ₱32,000 for his
unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period,
petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is
STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes
practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of
Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
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PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.,
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice
(On leave)
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
(On official leave)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA**
Associate Justice
(On official leave)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN**
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
(On leave)
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,
JR.*
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
(On official leave)
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLASBERNABE
Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
CASE DIGEST: IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS, MICHAEL A. MEDADO, B.M. NO. 2540,
SEPTEMBER 24, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Michael A. Medado graduated from the
University of the Philippines with the degree of
Bachelor of Laws in 1979 and passed the same
year’s bar examinations with a general weighted
average of 82.7.
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the
Philippine International Convention Center (PICC)
together with the successful bar examinees. He was
scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May
1980, but he failed to do so on his scheduled date,
allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to
Sign the Roll of Attorneys given by the Bar Office
when he went home to his province for a vacation.
Several years later, while rummaging through his
old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign
the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized
that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he
had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably
just an attendance record.
By the time Medado found the notice, he was
already working. He stated that he was mainly doing
corporate and taxation work, and that he was not
actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he
operated “under the mistaken belief [that] since he
ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll
of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his
status as a lawyer”; and “the matter of signing in the
Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion,
and was subsequently forgotten.”
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he was
required to provide his roll number in order for his
MCLE compliances to be credited. Not having signed
in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide
his roll number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012,
Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he
be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) recommended
that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s
gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of
merit.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice
of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer
of the court, and acting as such without authority,
may constitute indirect contempt of court, which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. Such a
finding, however, is in the nature of criminal
contempt and must be reached after the filing of
charges and the conduct of hearings.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Medado should be allowed to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely
prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized
practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by
the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision,
because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty
to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This
duty likewise applies to law students and Bar
candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they
are bound to comport themselves in accordance
with the ethical standards of the legal profession.
HELD:
YES.
RATIO:
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to
excuse a person from the legal consequences of his
acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of
law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification,
because everyone is presumed to know the law and
its consequences. Ignorantia facti excusat;
ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado
may have at first operated under an honest mistake
of fact when he thought that what he had signed at
the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was
already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment
he realized that what he had signed was merely an
attendance record, he could no longer claim an
honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that
point, Medado should have known that he was not
a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar because
of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it
was the act of signing therein that would have made
him so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose
to continue practicing law without taking the
necessary steps to complete all the requirements for
admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
In this case, while it appears quite clearly that
petitioner committed indirect contempt of court by
knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law,
we refrain from making any finding of liability for
indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining
thereto has been filed against him.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law
likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly,
assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
DISPOSITION: As Medado is not yet a full-fledged
lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of
law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a
penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign
in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of
this Resolution. For his transgression of the
prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law,
we likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of
P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is
warned that he is not allowed to engage in the
practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any
act that constitutes practice of law before he has
signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with
severely by this Court.
A privilege, not a matter of right
Re: Petition Of Al Argosino To Take The Lawyer’s Oath,
Bar Matter No. 712. July 13, 1995
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO
THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF
SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C.
ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February
1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino
along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with
the crime of homicide in connection with the
death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September
1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed
from the infliction of severe physical injuries
upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted
as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr.
Argosino and his co-accused then entered into
plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a
result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the
lesser offense of homicide through reckless
imprudence. This plea was accepted by the
trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February
1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused
individuals was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his
colleagues filed an application for probation
with the lower court. The application for
probation was granted in an Order dated 18
June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court
Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of
probation was set at two (2) years, counted
from the probationer's initial report to the
probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr.
Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take
the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he
disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and
his then probation status. He was allowed to
take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this
Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August
1993.1 He passed the Bar Examination. He
was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's
oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition
with this Court to allow him to take the
attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the
practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T.
Santiago had terminated his probation period
by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We
note that his probation period did not last for
more than ten (10) months from the time of the
Order of Judge Santiago granting him
probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr.
Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early
Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the
Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone
who demands it. Rather, it is a
high personal privilege limited to citizens
of good moral character, with special
educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified.2 The essentiality of good moral
character in those who would be lawyers is
stressed in the following excerpts which we
quote with approval and which we regard as
having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character"
prescribed by the statute, as a
condition precedent to the
applicant's right to receive a
license to practice law in North
Carolina, and of which he
must, in addition to other
requisites, satisfy the court,
includes all the elements
necessary to make up such a
character. It is something more
than an absence of bad
character. It is the good name
which the applicant has acquired,
or should have acquired, through
association with his fellows. It
means that he must have
conducted himself as a man of
upright character ordinarily
would, or should, or does. Such
character expresses itself, not in
negatives nor in following the line
of least resistance, but quite
often, in the will to do the
unpleasant thing if it is right, and
the resolve not to do the pleasant
thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that
this requirement of the statute is
eminently proper. Consider for a
moment the duties of a lawyer.
He is sought as counsellor, and
his advice comes home, in its
ultimate effect, to every man's
fireside. Vast interests are
committed to his care; he is the
recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with is
client's property, reputation, his
life, his all. An attorney at law is
a sworn officer of the Court,
whose chief concern, as such,
is to aid the administration of
justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of
Kaufman,5 citing Re Law
Examination of 1926 (1926) 191
Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that
there exists nowhere greater
temptations to deviate from the
straight and narrow path than in
the multiplicity of circumstances
that arise in the practice of
profession. For these reasons the
wisdom of requiring an applicant
for admission to the bar to
possess a high moral standard
therefore becomes clearly
apparent, and the board of bar
examiners as an arm of the court,
is required to cause a minute
examination to be made of the
moral standard of each candidate
for admission to practice. . . . It
needs no further argument,
therefore, to arrive at the
conclusion that the highest
degree of scrutiny must be
exercised as to the moral
character of a candidate who
presents himself for admission to
the bar. The evil must, if
possible, be successfully met at
its very source, and prevented,
for, after a lawyer has once been
admitted, and has pursued his
profession, and has established
himself therein, a far more
difficult situation is presented to
the court when proceedings are
instituted for disbarment and for
the recalling and annulment of his
license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not
one of the inherent rights of every
citizen, as in the right to carry on
an ordinary trade or business. It
is a peculiar privilege granted and
continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness in
intellectual attainment and in
moral character. All may aspire to
it on an absolutely equal basis,
but not all will attain it. Elaborate
machinery has been set up to
test applicants by standards fair
to all and to separate the fit from
the unfit. Only those who pass
the test are allowed to enter the
profession, and only those who
maintain the standards are
allowed to remain in it.
Re
Rouss:7
Membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with
conditions, and a fair private and
professional character is one of
them; to refuse admission to an
unworthy applicant is not to
punish him for past offense: an
examination into character, like
the examination into learning, is
merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior
Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because
of their learning and ability, so
that they may not only protect the
rights and interests of their
clients, but be able to assist court
in the trial of the cause. Yet what
protection to clients or assistance
to courts could such agents give?
They are required to be of good
moral character, so that the
agents and officers of the court,
which they are, may not bring
discredit upon the due
administration of the law, and it is
of the highest possible
consequence that both those who
have not such qualifications in
the first instance, or who, having
had them, have fallen
therefrom, shall not be permitted
to appear in courts to aid in the
administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement
of good moral character is, in fact, of greater
importance so far as the general public and the
proper administration of justice are concerned,
than the possession of legal learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License,
55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10
L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas.
187):
The public policy of
our state has
always been to
admit no person to
the practice of the
law unless he
covered an upright
moral
character. The
possession of this
by the attorney is
more important, if
anything, to the
public and to the
proper
administration of
justice than legal
learning. Legal
learning may be
acquired in after
years, but if the
applicant passes
the threshold of the
bar with a bad
moral character the
chances are that his
character will
remain bad, and
that he will become
a disgrace instead
of an ornament to
his great
calling — a curse
instead of a benefit
to his community —
a Quirk, a Gammon
or a Snap, instead
of a Davis, a Smith
or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior
may be inquired into in respect of those
seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of
such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly
broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings
for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral
character of an attorney in a
proceeding for his admission to
practice is broader in scope than
in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention
that upon application for
admission to the California Bar
the court cannot reject him for
want of good moral character
unless it appears that he has
been guilty of acts which would
be cause for his disbarment or
suspension, could not be
sustained; that the inquiry is
broader in its scope than that in a
disbarment proceeding, and the
court may receive any evidence
which tends to show the
applicant's character as respects
honesty, integrity, and general
morality, and may no doubt
refuse admission upon proofs
that might not establish his guilt
of any of the acts declared to be
causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be
satisfied by those who would seek admission
to the bar must of necessity be more stringent
than the norm of conduct expected from
members of the general public. There is a very
real need to prevent a general perception that
entry into the legal profession is open to
individuals with inadequate moral
qualifications. The growth of such a perception
would signal the progressive destruction of our
people's confidence in their courts of law and in
our legal system as we know it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable
"hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the
required standard of good moral character. The
deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries
which proximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly
indicated serious character flaws on the part of
those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino
and his co-accused had failed to discharge
their moral duty to protect the life and wellbeing of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking
admission to the fraternity involved, reposed
trust and confidence in all of them that, at the
very least, he would not be beaten and kicked
to death like a useless stray dog. Thus,
participation in the prolonged and mindless
physical beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that
moral duty and was totally irresponsible
behavior, which makes impossible a finding
that the participant was then possessed of
good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation
granted by the trial court has expired, the Court
is prepared to consider de novo the question of
whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged
himself of the obvious deficiency in moral
character referred to above. We stress that
good moral character is a requirement
possession of which must be demonstrated not
only at the time of application for permission to
take the bar examinations but also, and more
importantly, at the time of application for
admission to the bar and to take the attorney's
oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this
Court, for its examination and consideration,
evidence that he may be now regarded as
complying with the requirement of good moral
character imposed upon those seeking
admission to the bar. His evidence may
consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from
responsible members of the community who
have a good reputation for truth and who
have actually known Mr. Argosino for
a significant period of time, particularly since
the judgment of conviction was rendered by
Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court
how he has tried to make up for the senseless
killing of a helpless student to the family of the
deceased student and to the community at
large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words,
submit relevant evidence to show that he is a
different person now, that he has become
morally fit for admission to the ancient and
learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to
inform this Court, by appropriate written
manifestation, of the names and addresses of
the father and mother (in default thereof,
brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice
hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be
furnished to the parents or brothers and
sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
CASE DIGEST: Re: Petition Of Al Argosino To
Take The Lawyer’s Oath, Bar Matter No. 712. July
13, 1995
Facts:
Al Caparros Argosino a bar passer in 1993 was about
to take the lawyer’s oath however he was deferred
due to his conviction for resulting in reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. Argosino together
with 7 other malefactors are accused of the death of
Raul Camaligan, a neophyte during their initiation rites
in September 1991. The 8 accused had withdrew their
pleas of not guilty, the court rendered judgment with
an imposed a sentence of imprisonment.
The petitioner’s application for probation was granted
by the trial court and on April 14, 1994 he filed before
this Court to petition to allow him to take the lawyer’s
oath. Justice Florentino Feliciano issued a resolution
requires the petitioner to submit an evidence that he
may now be regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon
those seeking admission to the bar.
For the compliance of submission of evidence
petitioner submitted no less than 15
certification/letters executed by two senators, five trial
court judges, and six members of religious orders. He
also submitted evidence that he and the other 7
accused established a scholarship foundation in
honour of the victim.
Finally the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, the
father of Raul to comment regarding petitioner’s
prayer to allow him to take the lawyer’s oath.
According to him; the 8 accused must be charged
murder because they had abused confidence, that the
mother of the Argosino and wife of one of the accused
begged for their forgiveness and informed the
aggrieved parties that the father of one of the accused
died of heart attack upon learning of his son’s
involvement of the crime. Because of the earnest
effort of the family, Atty. Camaligan forgive the
petitioner and his co-accused, he also stated that he
is not in the position to declare whether or not he is
morally fit for admission to the bar.
Issue:
Whether or not Al C. Argosino should take the
lawyer’s oath and to start his practice in the legal
profession despite charges against him?
Held:
Yes. Aside from his compliance with the requirements;
Atty. Camaligan’s forgiveness to the accused, that he
has been proven he is not inherently of bad moral
fiber, he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern
for civic duties and public service. His effort to atone
the death of Raul Camigan has given him the benefit
of the doubt.
The Court told the petitioner that the lawyer’s oath is
not merely a ceremony for practicing law and should
act in accordance with the lawyer’s oath.
Finally they allowed petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to
take the lawyer’s oath, to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
and practice in the legal profession.we resolve to
allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the
lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice
the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the
Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of
bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various
certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a
genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted
all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan.
We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt,
taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth
to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
The lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or
formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at
ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn
promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If
all lawyers conducted themselves strictly... according
to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone
concerned.
A privilege burdened with conditions
Pike P. Arrieta vs. Atty. Joel A. Llosa, A.C. No. 4369,
November 28, 1997
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 4369 November 28, 1997
PIKE P. ARRIETA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOEL A. LLOSA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
Complainant Pike P. Arrieta prays for the
disbarment of Atty. Joel A. Llosa for certifying
under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Particularly, complainant avers that respondent
notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
March 24, 1993 1 making it appear that some
of the vendors in said Deed namely, Edelina T.
Bonilla, Jesus T. Bonilla and Leonardo P.
Toledano were parties and signatories thereto
when in truth and in fact, all three were already
dead prior to the execution of the said Deed of
Absolute Sale. Jesus T. Bonilla died on August
22, 1992 2 while Leonardo P. Toledano died on
November 1, 1992.3 Edelina T. Bonilla
allegedly died on or about June 11, 1992.
In answer, respondent admitted having
notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale. But
before affixing his notarial seal, he first
ascertained the authenticity of the signatures,
verified the identities of the signatories, and
determined the voluntariness of its execution.
Satisfied with all of the above, it was only then
that he certified the document.
Curiously, on September 9, 1996, complainant
had a complete turn-around and moved for the
dismissal of his complaint. He alleged that the
instant case is only a product of
misunderstanding and misinterpretation of
some facts and is now convinced that
everything is in order.
The designated Investigating Commissioner of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
recommended the dismissal of the instant
case. The Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines adopted the above
recommendation and resolved to dismiss the
instant case after finding no compelling reason
to continue with the disbarment proceedings.
This Court cannot agree.
Sec. 1 of Public Act No. 2103
provides:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be
made before a notary public or an
officer duly authorized by law of
the country to take
acknowledgment of instruments
or documents in the place where
the act is done. The notary public
or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that
the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known
to him and that he is the same
person who executed it, and
acknowledged that the same is
his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under
his official seal, if he is by law
required to keep a seal, and if
not, his certificate shall so state.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that the party
acknowledging must appear before the notary
public or any person authorized to take
acknowledgment of instruments or
documents. 4 Aside from being required to
appear before the Notary Public, it is similarly
incumbent upon the person acknowledging the
instrument to declare before the same Notary
Public that the execution of the instrument was
done by him of his own free will.
In the Acknowledgment of the Deed of Sale,
respondent certified: "BEFORE ME, this 24th
day of March, 1993 at Dumaguete City,
Philippines, personally appeared . . . Jesus
Bonilla; . . . Leonardo Toledano; . . . .
" 5 Respondent claims that as a Notary Public,
he asked the signatories whether the
signatures appearing above their respective
names were theirs, and whether they
voluntarily executed the Deed of Absolute
Sale. In order to ascertain their identities,
respondent asked for their respective
residence certificates.
Except for Edelina T. Bonilla whose alleged
death was not evidenced by a death certificate,
respondent certified in the acknowledgment
that Jesus T. Bonilla and Leonardo P.
Toledano personally appeared before him.
Respondent's acts require the presence of the
vendors to be able to verify the authenticity of
their signatures, the identities of the signatories
and the voluntariness of the execution of the
Deed. It defies imagination and belief how
these could have happened. It would have
been impossible, both physically and legally,
for Jesus T. Bonilla and Leonardo P. Toledano
to have personally subscribed and sworn
before respondent as to the authenticity and
validity of the Deed of Sale as they had already
passed on to the Great Beyond prior to the
execution of the said documents.
Yet, respondent certified to this effect. By
affixing his notarial seal on the instrument, he
converted the Deed of Absolute Sale, from
being a private document into a public
document. By certifying the Deed, respondent,
in effect, proclaimed to the world (1) that all the
parties therein personally appeared before him;
(2) that they are all personally known to him;
(3) that they were the same persons who
executed the instruments; (4) that he inquired
into the voluntariness of execution of the
instrument; and (5) they acknowledged
personally before him that they voluntarily and
freely executed the same.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested
with substantial public interest, such that only
those who are qualified or authorized may act
as notaries public. Notarization of a private
document converts the document into a public
one making it admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity. 6 A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face and, for this reason,
notaries public must observe with the utmost
care the basic requirements in the performance
of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the
public in the integrity of this form of
conveyance would be undermined.7
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary
public, respondent is mandated to discharge
his sacred duties which are dictated by public
policy and, as such, impressed with public
interest. Faithful observance and utmost
respect of the legal solemnity of an oath in an
acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.8
It is for the above reason that this Court is most
concerned about the explanation given by
complainant for withdrawing his complaint
against respondent. In his Motion to Dismiss
dated September 9, 1996, complainant
declares:
xxx xxx xxx
That he is now fully convinced
that everything was in order, and
that nobody was ever prejudiced
by the acts of the respondent.
Herein complainant has realized
that he himself, or any other legal
practitioner, would have done
similarly as the respondent, if
confronted with such an urgent
voluntary transaction in an
emergency situation; . . . .
That respondent acted the way he did because
he was confronted with an alleged urgent
situation is no excuse at all. As an individual,
and even more so as a member of the legal
profession, he is required to obey the laws of
the land AT ALL TIMES, to refrain from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct AT ALL TIMES, to uphold the
integrity of his profession AT ALL TIMES, to
promote respect to his profession AT ALL
TIMES, and to act with justice AT ALL TIMES.
It is dismaying to note how respondent so
cavalierly disregarded the requirements and
solemnities of the Notarial Law simply to
accommodate his clients. Not only did he
commit an illegal act but also did so without
thinking of the possible damage or prejudice
that might result from non-observance of the
same.
As a lawyer, respondent breached his
professional responsibility by certifying under
oath an instrument fully knowing that some of
the signatories thereto were long dead. This
Court cannot countenance this practice,
especially coming, as it does, from respondent
who formerly served as president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Negros
Oriental Chapter, President of the Dumaguete
Lions Club and City Councilor of Dumaguete. If
indeed respondent had taken steps to verify
the identities of the signatories, he would have
easily known that the signatures were fake as
they purported to be those of his former clients.
It is worth stressing that the practice of law is
not a right but a privilege bestowed by the
State on those who show that they possess,
and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such
privilege.9 [M]embership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. There being no
lifetime guaranty, a lawyer has the privilege
and right to practice law only during good
behavior and can be deprived of it for
misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after opportunity to be
heard has been afforded him. 10
Pursuant to the foregoing, it is primarily
required of lawyers to obey the Constitution
and laws of the land. 11 They must refrain from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. 12
An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for
any violation of his oath or of his duties as an
attorney and counsellor, which include
statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these
being broad enough to cover practically any
misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or
private capacity. 13
Respondent's act of certifying under oath a
Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of
the vendors were already dead, they being his
former clients, constitutes misconduct. But this
being his first administrative offense, such
should no warrant the supreme penalty of
disbarment.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court finds respondent
Atty. Joel A. Llosa guilty of misconduct.
Consequently, he is ordered SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for six (6) months
effective immediately, with a warning that
another infraction would be dealt with more
severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all
the courts of the land as well as the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant and recorded in the personal files of
respondent himself.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and
Panganiban, JJ., concur.
CASE DIGEST: Pike P. Arrieta vs. Atty. Joel A.
Llosa, A.C. No. 4369, November 28, 1997
FACTS:
A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Llosa by
Pike P. Arrieta for allegedly notarizing a Deed of
Absolute sale, wherein, vendors noted were
already dead prior to its execution. In answer,
respondent admitted having notarized the Deed of
Absolute Sale. But before affixing his notarial
seal, he first ascertained the authenticity of the
signatures, verified the identities of the
signatories, and determined the voluntariness of
its execution.
However, in a later date, the respondent sought to
dismiss the disbarment case admitting to the fact
the instant case is only a product of
misunderstanding and misinterpretation of some
facts and is now convinced that everything is in
order. The designated Investigating
Commissioner of the IBP recommended the
dismissal of the instant case. The Board of
Governors of the IBP adopted the above
recommendation and resolved to dismiss the
instant case after finding no compelling reason to
continue with the disbarment proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Joel A. Llosa be disbarred or
suspended from practice of law.
HELD:
YES. Respondent ordered SUSPENDED for six
months from practice of law with a warning that
another infraction will be dealt with more severely.
Citing Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 also known
as the Notarial law, the Supreme Court explained
the importance of adherence to said law as part of
the responsibility of a duly deputized authority to
conduct such notarial process. Due diligence is to
be observed, this being part of a lawyers
professional responsibility and procedural lapse
is not an excuse to cater to the convenience of
clients. Any violation is tantamount to
misconduct. Such misconduct is a ground for
disbarment as stated by the Section 27 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court stressed the primary
responsibility of lawyers as stated in Canon I of
the Code of Professional Responsibility that a
lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal processes. A lawyer must also refrain from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Any violation of his oath or of
his duties as an attorney and counsellor, which
include statutory grounds enumerated in Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these
being broad enough to cover practically any
misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or
private capacity may be disbarred or suspended.
Carrie-Anne Reyes vs. Atty. Ramon F. Nieva, A.C. No.
4369, November 28, 1997
EN BANC
A.C. No. 8560, September 06, 2016
CARRIE-ANNE SHALEEN CARLYLE S.
REYES, Complainant, v. ATTY. RAMON F.
NIEVA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
For the Court's resolution is the
Complaint1 dated March 3, 2010 filed by
complainant Carrie-Anne Shaleen Carlyle S.
Reyes (complainant) against respondent Atty.
Ramon F. Nieva (respondent), praying that the
latter be disbarred for sexually harassing her.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that she has been
working at the Civil Aviation Authority of the
Philippines (CAAP) as an Administrative Aide
on a Job Order basis since October 2004.
Sometime in January 2009, she was
reassigned at the CAAP Office of the Board
Secretary under the supervision of respondent,
who was then acting as CAAP Acting Board
Secretary. During complainant's stint under
respondent, she would notice that during office
hours, respondent would often watch
"pampagana" videos saved in his office laptop,
all of which turned out to be pornographic films.
Complainant also averred that whenever
respondent got close to her, he would hold her
hand and would sometimes give it a kiss.
During these instances, complainant would
remove her hands and tell him to desist.
According to complainant, respondent even
offered her a cellular phone together with the
necessary load to serve as means for their
private communication, but she refused the
said offer, insisting that she already has her
own cellular phone and does not need another
one.2
Complainant also narrated that at about 5
o'clock in the afternoon of April 1, 2009,
respondent texted her to wait for him at the
office. Fearing that respondent might take
advantage of her, complainant convinced two
(2) of her officemates to accompany her until
respondent arrived. Upon respondent's arrival
and seeing that complainant had companions,
he just told complainant and the other two (2)
office staff to lock the door when
they leave.3
Complainant further recounted that on the
following day, April 2, 2009, respondent called
her on her cellular phone, asked if she
received his text message, and told her he
would tell her something upon his arrival at the
office. At about 9:30 in the morning of even
date, respondent asked complainant to encode
a memorandum he was about to dictate.
Suddenly, respondent placed his hand on
complainant's waist area near her breast and
started caressing the latter's torso.
Complainant immediately moved away from
respondent and told him "sumosobra na ho
kayo sir." Instead of asking for an apology,
respondent told complainant he was willing to
give her P2,000.00 a month from his own
pocket and even gave her a note stating "just
bet (between) you and me, x x x kahit na si
mommy," referring to complainant's mother
who was also working at CAAP. At around past
11 o'clock in the morning of the same day,
while complainant and respondent were left
alone in the office, respondent suddenly closed
the door, grabbed complainant's arm, and
uttered "let's seal it with a kiss," then attempted
to kiss complainant. This prompted
complainant to thwart respondent's advances
with her left arm, raised her voice in order to
invite help, and exclaimed "wag naman kayo
ganyan sir, yung asawa nyo magagalit, sir may
asawa ako." After respondent let her go,
complainant immediately left the office to ask
assistance from her former supervisor who
advised her to file an administrative
case4 against respondent before the CAAP
Committee on Decorum and Investigation
(CODI).5
Finally, complainant alleged that after her
ordeal with respondent, she was traumatized
and was even diagnosed by a psychiatrist to
be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder
with recurrent major depression.6 Eventually,
complainant filed the instant complaint.
In his defense,7 respondent denied all of
complainant's allegations. He maintained that
as a 79-year old retiree who only took a
position at the CAAP on a consultancy basis, it
was very unlikely for him to do the acts
imputed against him, especially in a very small
office space allotted for him and his staff. In
this regard, he referred to his CounterAffidavit8 submitted before the CODI, wherein
he explained, inter alia, that: (a) while he
indeed watches "interesting shows" in his office
laptop, he never invited anyone, including
complainant, to watch with him and that he
would even close his laptop whenever
someone comes near him;9 (b) he never held
and kissed complainant's hand because if he
had done so, he would have been easily
noticed by complainant's co-staffers;10 (c) he
did offer her a cellular phone, but this was
supposed to be an office phone which should
not be used for personal purposes, and thus,
could not be given any sexual meaning;11 (d)
he did tell complainant to wait for him in the
afternoon of April 1, 2009, but only for the
purpose of having an available encoder should
he need one for any urgent matter that would
arise;12 and (e) he would not do the acts he
allegedly committed on April 2, 2009 as there
were other people in the office and that those
people can attest in his favor.13 Respondent
then pointed out that the administrative case
filed against him before the CODI was already
dismissed for lack of basis and that
complainant was only being used by other
CAAP employees who were agitated by the
reforms he helped implement upon his
assumption as CAAP consultant and
eventually as Acting Corporate Board
Secretary.14
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation15 dated
August 14, 2012, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner
recommended the dismissal of the instant
administrative complaint against
respondent.16 He found that complainant failed
to substantiate her allegations against
respondent, as opposed to respondent's
defenses which are ably supported by
evidence. Citing respondent's evidence, the
Investigating Commissioner opined that since
the CAAP Office of the Board Secretary was
very small, it is implausible that a startling
occurrence such as an attempted sexual
molestation would not be noticed by not only
the other occupants of said office area, but
also by those occupying the office adjacent to
it, i.e., the CAAP Operations Center, which is
separated only by glass panels. Further, the
Investigating Commissioner drew attention to
the investigation conducted by the CODI
showing that the collective sworn statements of
the witnesses point to the eventual conclusion
that none of the alleged acts of misconduct
attributed to respondent really occurred.17
In a Resolution18 dated May 10, 2013, the IBP
Board of Governors (IBP Board) unanimously
reversed the aforesaid Report and
Recommendation. As such, respondent was
found guilty of committing sexual advances,
and accordingly, recommended that he be
suspended from the practice of law for three
(3) months.
In view of respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration,19 the IBP Board referred the
case to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD) for study, evaluation, and
submission of an Executive Summary to the
IBP Board.20
In the Director's Report21 dated July 8, 2014,
the IBP-CBD National Director recommended
that the current IBP Board adhere to the report
and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner as it is supported by the
evidence on record; on the other hand, the
reversal made by the previous IBP Board is
bereft of any factual and legal bases, and
should therefore, be set aside. In this light, the
current IBP Board issued a Resolution22 dated
August 10, 2014 setting aside the previous IBP
Board's Resolution, and accordingly, dismissed
the administrative complaint against
respondent.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or
not respondent should be held administratively
liable for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The Court's Ruling
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR provides:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the
constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal
processes.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
The provision instructs that "[a]s officers of the
court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a
high standard of legal proficiency, but also of
morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing."23
In similar light, Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR
states:
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
Good moral character is a trait that every
practicing lawyer is required to possess. It may
be defined as "what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation, or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, or the
estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known. Moral character is
not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality."24 Such
requirement has four (4) ostensible purposes,
namely: (a) to protect the public; (b) to protect
the public image of lawyers; (c) to protect
prospective clients; and (d) to protect errant
lawyers from themselves.25
In Valdez v. Dabon,26 the Court emphasized
that a lawyer's continued possession of good
moral character is a requisite condition to
remain a member of the Bar, viz.:
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded by
the Court that possession of good moral
character is both a condition precedent and a
continuing requirement to warrant admission to
the Bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession. This proceeds from the lawyer's
bounden duty to observe the highest degree of
morality in order to safeguard the Bar's
integrity, and the legal profession exacts from
its members nothing less. Lawyers are called
upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free
from misdeeds and acts constitutive of
malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers
of the court demand no less than the highest
degree of morality.
The Court explained in Arnobit v. Atty.
Arnobit that "as officers of the court, lawyers
must not only in fact be of good moral
character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community. A member of
the bar and an officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping a mistress but
must also behave himself so as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the
impression that he is flouting those moral
standards." Consequently, any errant behavior
of the lawyer, be it in his public or private
activities, which tends to show deficiency in
moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension
or disbarment.27 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Verily, lawyers are expected to abide by the
tenets of morality, not only upon admission to
the Bar but also throughout their legal career,
in order to maintain their good standing in this
exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be
suspended from the practice of law or
disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains
to his private activities, as long as it shows him
to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor.28
respondent's office space was so small that
any commotion caused by a sexual
harassment attempt would have been easily
noticed by the other occupants thereof;30 and
(b) the investigation conducted by the CODI
per the Transcript31 submitted by respondent
where the witnesses said that they did not
notice anything out of the ordinary on April 2,
2009, the date when respondent's alleged
sexual advances against complainant were
committed.32 However, the foregoing evidence,
taken as a whole, did not actually refute
complainant's allegation that at around past 11
o'clock in the morning of April 2, 2009,
respondent closed the door, grabbed
complainant's right arm, uttered the words "let's
seal it with a kiss" and attempted to kiss
complainant despite the latter's resistance.
A careful perusal of the aforesaid Transcript
shows that at around past 11 o'clock in the
morning of April 2, 2009, there was a time that
complainant and respondent were indeed left
alone in the office:
Mr. Mendoza: Ngayon, puwede mo bang
idescribe sa amin nung 9:30 to 11:00 sinu-sino
kayo doon?
Witness 1: Tatlo (3) lang kami sir po dun.
Si Ma'am Carrie Anne [complainant], si sir
Nieva [respondent] tsaka aka po.
Mr. Mendoza: So ikaw lang ang witness, ang
taong naroon 9:30 to 11?
Witness 1: Yes sir.
After due consideration, the Court reverses the
findings and recommendations of the IBP, and
finds respondent administratively liable for
violations of the CPR, as will be explained
hereunder.
xxxx
To recapitulate, the IBP found that as
compared to complainant's purposedly bare
and uncorroborated allegations, respondent's
evidence point to the conclusion that none of
the alleged sexual advances made by
respondent against complainant actually
occurred. As such, it absolved respondent from
any administrative liability. In support of such
finding, the IBP largely relied on the following:
(a) the five (5) photographs29 respondent
submitted to the CODI to show that
Mr. Mendoza: Pag nag-order ng pagkain
minsan may natitira pa bang iba?
Mr. Mendoza: Saan kayo kumakain ng lunch?
Witness 1: Sa loob po kami naglulunch.
Witness 1: Itong po yung dalawa yung natira
nung umalis po aka. Um... pagbalik ko po wala
na po si Ma'am Caan [complainant] si Ma'am
Amy nalang po ang nandoon.
Mr. Mendoza: So siya [complainant] nalang at
tsaka si Atty. Nieva [respondent] ang naiwan
doon sa room? Eh nasaan na yung
ibang OJT pa?
Witness 1: Tatlo lang po kasi kami
nun sir, nasa Land Bank po yung dalawa.
Mr. Mendoza: So nasa Land Bank sila.
So totoong may nangyari na naiwan silang
dalawa [complainant and respondent] na time
na silang dalawa lang ang naiwan sa kuwarto?
Witness 1: Opo nung mga quarter to 12 siguro
po nun.
Mr. Mendoza: Ilang beses na may
nangyayaring ganun na silang naiiwan doon sa
kuwarto?
Witness 1: Yun lang po kasi yung natatandaan
ko po sir na time na naiwan sila eh.
xxxx
Mr. Abesamis: Umalis ka sa room para bumili
ng pagkain nandoon si Atty. Nieva
[respondent]?
Witness 1: Andoon pa po silang
dalawa [complainant and respondent]. Pero
tapos na po silang magtype nun tas
nag decide na maglunch na eh.
Mr. Borja: Nung oras ng mga alas
onse (11) pagitan ng alas onse (11) hanggang
alas dose (12), nasaan ka joy [Witness 4]?
Witness 4: Andun po sa ORCC [CAAP
Operations Center].
Mr. Borja: Si ano naman Donna [Witness
5] ganun din? Kasi sinasabi dito noong
bandang ganung oras past eleven (11) parang
nag-advance yata si Atty. Nieva
[respondent] kay Ms. Reyes (Caan)
[complainant] ngayon nung chinachansingan
siya parang ganun ang dating eh "Iraised up
my voice also, so that the OPCEN personnel
will hear of the alarm" may narinig ba kayo na
sumigaw siya?
Witness 4: Eh kasi sir wala pong braket yun
yung time na ano yung RPCC 764 so nagcocoordinate kami...
Mr. Borja: Ano yung 764?
Witness 4: Yung sa Tuguegarao yung
nawawala siya so may alerfa tapos ditressfa so
intransi po kami... opo...
Mr. Borja: So busing-busy ka sa telepono?
Witness 4: Opo lahat kami.
Mr. Abesamis: Saan? Sino ang naiwan?
Mr. Borja: Pati ikaw?
Witness 1: Dalawa pa lang sila sir pagbalik ko
tatlo na sila pero wala naman po si Ma'am
Caan [complainant]. Nung umalis po ako si sir
Nieva [respondent] tsaka si Ma'am Caan yung
nandoon then pagbalik ko po wala na si Ma'am
Caan, si sir Nieva tsaka silang dalawa na po
yung nandoon.
Witness 5: Opo.
Mr. Borja: Sinong walang ginagawa nun?
Witness 4: Wala kasi kanya-kanya kami
ng coordination lahat kami nasa telepono.
Mr. Abesamis: Ok. So wala na silang
kasamang iba?
Mr. Borja: Kaya kapag kumakalampag yung
pader [sa] kabila hindi niyo maririnig?
Witness 1: Opo.33
Witness 4: Hindi siguro sir kasi kung nakasara
din sila ng pinto tapos kanya-kanya kaming
may kausap sa telepono eh.
The same Transcript also reveals that the
CODI interviewed the occupants of the
adjacent office, i.e., the CAAP Operations
Center, which, according to the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, was only
separated from complainant and respondent's
office, i.e. the CAAP Office of the Board
Secretary, by glass panels. Pertinent parts of
the interview read:
Mr. Borja: Kung hindi kayo nakikipag-usap
ngayon wala kayong ginagawa, narinig niyo
ang usapan doon sa kabila.
Witness 5: Yes sir.
Atty. Gloria: Lalo na pag malakas.
Witness 4: Ah opo.
Mr. Borja: Pag malakas pero therein
normal voice lang level.
Mr. Mendoza: Naririnig?
Witness 4: Kasi minsan malakas din yung radio
nila eh. Kung minsan kasi sir may mga music
sila. Eto sir yung time na kinuha... Dami nila
eh... Lumabas nakita naming mga ano
mga 10:45 na yan nabasa sir.
Witness 4: Kung malakas.
Mr. Borja: Pero ang pinag-uusapan natin
lagpas ng alas onse (11) ha bago mag-alas
dose (12) ang pinaka latest message mo
dito 02/03/06 11:06. So between 11:06 to
12 wala kayong...
Mr. Abesamis: So wala kayong naririnig man
lang kahit isang word na malakas doon sa
kanila during the time na nangyari ito?
Witness 4: Kasi nakikipag-coordination talaga
kami kahit... kami lang nandoon sa telepono.
Mr. Borja: Written pero voice coordination niyo
sa telepono kayo?
Mr. Mendoza: Ah kung malakas?
Witness 4: Opo.
Witness 4: Nung time na iyan wala kasi kaming
maalala...
Mr. Abesamis: Walang possibility na narinig
niyo pero mas busy kayo sa telephone
operation.
Witness 4: Busy kami.
Witness 4: Tsaka naka log-in sa log book.
Mr. Abesamis: Hindi makikilatis yung ano...
xxxx
Mr. Abesamis: Ma'am Joy [Witness 4] sabi niyo
kanina naririnig niyo si sir [respondent] sa
kabila kung wala kayong kausap lalong-lalo na
kapag malakas yung salita?
Witness 4: Kasi may time na sumigaw na
babae nga pero kala lang namin ah...
Mr. Abesamis: Nung date na iyon o hindi?
Witness 4: Hindi, hindi pa sigurado eh kasi...
Witness 4: Opo.
Mr. Abesamis: So ibig sabihin kahit hindi
malakas may possibility na maririnig niyo yung
usapan kung walang radio? Siguro if intelligible
or knowledgeable pero maririnig mo sa kabila?
Witness 4: Kung mahina o normal yung
usapan?
Mr. Abesarnis: Hindi yung date bang iyon ang
sinasabi mo?
Witness 4: Hindi kasi busy talaga kami
sa coordination nung ano eh nung time na
iyon. Nasabay kasi eh nung time na iyon
hinahanap pa namin yung requirement.
Witness 4: Hindi siguro pag sarado sila.
Mr. Mendoza: Pero bago yung bago mag April
2, meron ba kayo na tuligan na nag-aanuhan
ng ganun, nagrereklamo tungkol kay Atty.
Nieva [respondent], wala? May narinig kayong
movie na parang sounding na porno ganun?
Mr. Abesamis: Pero kung halimbawa sisigaw?
Witness 4: Wala music lang talaga sir.
Witness 4: Maririnig siguro kasi kapag
nagdidictate si Attorney [respondent] minsan
naririnig namin.
Mr. Mendoza: So music.
Mr. Abesarnis: Normal na usapan,
conversation.
Mr. Mendoza: Maski sarado yung pinto?
Witness 4: Kung minsan kasi binubuksan nila
yung door pag mainit yung kuwarto nila.
Mr. Borja: At that time hindi bukas iyon?
Witness 4: Kami ano eh may cover ng ano
cartolina na white.
Mr. Borja: Makakatestify lang kayo sa audio
eh, kasi wala kayong nakikita.34
The above-cited excerpts of the Transcript
show that at around past 11 o'clock in the
morning of April 2, 2009, complainant and
respondent were left alone in the CAAP Office
of the Board Secretary as complainant's
officemates were all out on errands. In this
regard, it was error on the part of the IBP to
hastily conclude from the testimonies of
complainant's officemates who were
interviewed by the CODI that nothing out of the
ordinary happened. Surely, they were not in a
position to confirm or refute complainant's
allegations as they were not physically in the
office so as to make a credible testimony as to
the events that transpired therein during that
time.
Neither can the testimonies of those in the
CAAP Operations Center be used to conclude
that respondent did not do anything to
complainant, considering that they themselves
admitted that they were all on the telephone,
busy with their coordinating duties. They
likewise clarified that while their office is indeed
separated from the CAAP Office of the Board
Secretary only by glass panels, they could not
see what was happening there as they covered
the glass panels with white cartolina. In light of
their preoccupation from their official duties as
well as the fact that the glass panels were
covered, it is very unlikely for them to have
noticed any commotion happening in the
adjacent CAAP Office of the Board Secretary.
Furthermore, the IBP should have taken the
testimonies of the witnesses in the CODI
proceedings with a grain of salt. It bears noting
that all those interviewed in the CODI
proceedings were job order and regular
employees of the CAAP. Naturally, they would
be cautious in giving any unfavorable
statements against a high-ranking official of the
CAAP such as respondent who was the Acting
Board Secretary at that time - lest they earn
the ire of such official and put their career in
jeopardy.
Thus, the IBP erred in concluding that such
Transcript shows that respondent did not
perform the acts complained of. On the
contrary, said Transcript proves that there was
indeed a period of time where complainant and
respondent were left alone in the CAAP Office
of the Board Secretary which gave respondent
a window of opportunity to carry out his acts
constituting sexual harassment against
complainant.
More importantly, records reveal that
complainant's allegations are adequately
supported by a Certificate of Psychiatric
Evaluation35 dated April 13, 2009 stating that
the onset of her psychiatric problems diagnosed as post-traumatic stress disorder
with recurrent major depression started after
suffering the alleged sexual molestation at the
hands of respondent. Moreover, complainant's
plight was ably supported by other CAAP
employees36 as well as a retired Brigadier
General of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines37 through various letters to
authorities seeking justice for complainant.
Perceptibly, complainant would not seek help
from such supporters, and risk their integrity in
the process, if none of her allegations were
true. Besides, there is no evidence to establish
that complainant was impelled by any improper
motive against respondent or that she had
reasons to fabricate her allegations against
him. Therefore, absent any competent proof to
the contrary, the Court finds that complainant's
story of the April 2, 2009 incident was not
moved by any ill-will and was untainted by
bias; and hence, worthy of belief and
credence.38 In this regard, it should be
mentioned that respondent's averment that
complainant was only being used by other
CAAP employees to get back at him for
implementing reforms within the CAAP was
plainly unsubstantiated, and thus, a mere selfserving assertion that deserves no weight in
law.39
In addition, the Court notes that respondent
never refuted complainant's allegation that he
would regularly watch "pampagana" movies in
his office-issued laptop. In fact, respondent
readily admitted that he indeed watches
"interesting shows" while in the office, albeit
insisting that he only does so by himself, and
that he would immediately dose his laptop
whenever anyone would pass by or go near his
table. As confirmed in the Transcript40 of the
investigation conducted by the CODI, these
"pampagana" movies and "interesting shows"
turned out to be pornographic materials, which
respondent even asks his male staff to
regularly play for him as he is not well-versed
in using computers.41
Without a doubt, it has been established that
respondent habitually watches pornographic
materials in his office-issued laptop while
inside the office premises, during office hours,
and with the knowledge and full view of his
staff. Obviously, the Court cannot countenance
such audacious display of depravity on
respondent's part not only because his
obscene habit tarnishes the reputation of the
government agency he works for - the CAAP
where he was engaged at that time as Acting
Corporate Secretary - but also because it
shrouds the legal profession in a negative light.
As a lawyer in the government service,
respondent is expected to perform and
discharge his duties with the highest degree of
excellence, professionalism, intelligence, and
skill, and with utmost devotion and dedication
to duty.42 However, his aforesaid habit
miserably fails to showcase these standards,
and instead, displays sheer unprofessionalism
and utter lack of respect to the government
position he was entrusted to hold. His flimsy
excuse that he only does so by himself and
that he would immediately close his laptop
whenever anyone would pass by or come near
his table is of no moment, because the
lewdness of his actions, within the setting of
this case, remains. The legal profession - much
more an engagement in the public service
should always be held in high esteem, and
those who belong within its ranks should be
unwavering exemplars of integrity and
professionalism. As keepers of the public faith,
lawyers, such as respondent, are burdened
with a high degree of social responsibility and,
hence, must handle their personal affairs with
greater caution. Indeed, those who have taken
the oath to assist in the dispensation of justice
should be more possessed of the
consciousness and the will to overcome the
weakness of the flesh, as respondent in this
case.43
In the Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation adopted by the IBP Board of
Governors, the quantum of proof by which the
charges against respondent were assessed
was preponderance of evidence.
Preponderance of evidence "means evidence
which is of greater weight, or more convincing
than that which is offered in opposition to
it."44 Generally, under Rule 133 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence, this evidentiary threshold
applies to civil cases:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how
determined. - In civil cases, the party having
the burden of proof must establish his case
by a preponderance of evidence. In
determining where the preponderance or
superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved lies, the court may consider all the
facts and circumstances of the case, the
witnesses' manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying,
the nature of the facts to which they testify, the
probability or improbability of their testimony,
their interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same may
legitimately appear upon the trial. The court
may also consider the number of witnesses,
though the preponderance is not necessarily
with the greater number. (Emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, in non-civil cases such as De
Zuzuarregui, Jr. v. Soguilon45 cited by the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, the Court had
pronounced that the burden of proof by
preponderance of evidence in disbarment
proceedings is upon the complainant.46 These
rulings appear to conflict with other
jurisprudence on the matter which contrarily
hold that substantial evidence is the quantum
of proof to be applied in administrative cases
against lawyers.47 The latter standard was
applied in administrative cases such as Foster
v. Agtang,48 wherein the Court had, in fact,
illumined that:
[T]he quantum of evidence required in civil
cases is different from the quantum of
evidence required in administrative
cases. In civil cases, preponderance of
evidence is required. Preponderance of
evidence is "a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court
as worthier of belief than that which is offered
in opposition thereto." In administrative
cases, only substantial evidence is
needed. Substantial evidence, which is more
than a mere scintilla but is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion, would
suffice to hold one administratively
liable.49 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Similarly, in Peña v. Paterno,50 it was held:
Section 5, in [comparison with] Sections 1
[(Preponderance of evidence, how proved)]
and 2 [(Proofbeyond reasonable doubt)], Rule
133, Rules of Court states that in
administrative cases, only substantial
evidence is required, not proof beyond
reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or
preponderance of evidence as in civil
cases. Substantial evidence is that amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.51 (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)
Based on a survey of cases, the recent ruling
on the matter is Cabas v. Sususco,52 which
was promulgated just this June 15, 2016. In the
said case, it was pronounced that:
In administrative proceedings, the quantum
of proof necessary for a finding of guilt
is substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Further, the complainant has the
burden of proving by substantial evidence the
allegations in his complaint. The basic rule is
that mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere
suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be
given credence.53 (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, this more recent pronouncement
ought to control and therefore, quell any further
confusion on the proper evidentiary threshold
to be applied in administrative cases against
lawyers.
Besides, the evidentiary threshold of
substantial evidence - as opposed to
preponderance of evidence - is more in
keeping with the primordial purpose of and
essential considerations attending this type of
cases. As case law elucidates, "[d]isciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the
conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense
a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio.
Public interest is its primary objective, and the
real question for determination is whether or
not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the
Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor."54
With the proper application of the substantial
evidence threshold having been clarified, the
Court finds that the present charges against
respondent have been adequately proven by
this standard. Complainant has established her
claims through relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion - that is, that respondent
had harassed her and committed despicable
acts which are clear ethical violations of the
CPR. In fine, respondent should be held
administratively liable and therefore, penalized.
Jurisprudence provides that in similar
administrative cases where the lawyer
exhibited immoral conduct, the Court meted
penalties ranging from reprimand to
disbarment. In Advincula v. Macabata,55 the
lawyer was reprimanded for his distasteful act
of suddenly turning the head of his female
client towards him and kissing her on the lips.
In De Leon v. Pedreña,56 the lawyer was
suspended from the practice of law for a period
of two (2) years for rubbing the female
complainant's right leg with his hand, trying to
insert his finger into her firmly closed hand,
grabbing her hand and forcibly placed it on his
crotch area, and pressing his finger against her
private part. While in Guevarra v.
Eala57 and Valdez v. Dabon,58 the Court meted
the extreme penalty of disbarment on the
erring lawyers who engaged in extramarital
affairs. Here, respondent exhibited his immoral
behavior through his habitual watching of
pornographic materials while in the office and
his acts of sexual harassment against
complainant. Considering the circumstances of
this case, the Court deems it proper to impose
upon respondent the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon F.
Nieva is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01,
Canon 1, and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon
the finality of this Decision, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be served on the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and all courts in the country
for their information and guidance and be
attached to respondent's personal record as
attorney.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST: Carrie-Anne Reyes vs. Atty.
Ramon F. Nieva, A.C. No. 4369, November 28, 1997
Facts:
Complainant alleged that she has been working at
the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines
(CAAP)as an Administrative Aide on a Job Order
basis since October 2004 and was reassigned at
the CAAP Office ofthe Board Secretary under the
supervision of respondent, who was then acting
as CAAP Acting BoardSecretary. Complainant
averred that whenever respondent got close to
her, he would hold her hand andwould sometimes
give it a kiss. Respondent also offered her a
cellular phone together with the necessary loadto
serve as means for their private communication,
but she refused the said offer.Complainant also
narrated that on April 2, 2009, respondent asked
complainant to encode a memorandum hewas
about to dictate. Suddenly, respondent placed his
hand on complainant's waist area near her breast
andstarted caressing the latter's torso.
Complainant immediately moved away from
respondent. Instead of askingfor an apology,
respondent told complainant he was willing to
give her P2,000.00 a month from his own
pocketand even gave her a note stating "just bet
(between) you and me, x x x kahit na si mommy,"
referring tocomplainant's mother who was also
working at CAAP. At around past 11 o'clock in the
morning of the sameday, while complainant and
respondent were left alone in the office,
respondent suddenly closed the door,grabbed
complainant's arm, and uttered "let's seal it with a
kiss," then attempted to kiss complainant.
Thisprompted complainant to thwart respondent's
advances, raised her voice in order to invite help.
Afterrespondent let her go, complainant
immediately left the office to ask assistance from
her former supervisor whoadvised her to file an
administrative case 4 against respondent before
the CAAP Committee on Decorum
andInvestigation (CODI).
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not
respondent should be held administratively liable
for violatingthe Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The Court's Ruling
Yes. The Court found respondent Atty. Ramon F.
Nieva GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and
Rule 7.03,Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and SUSPENDED him from the
practice of law for a period oftwo (2) years, with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with moreseverely.Good
moral character is a trait that every practicing
lawyer is required to possess. It may be defined
as "what aperson really is, as distinguished from
good reputation, or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, or theestimate in which he is
held by the public in the place where he is known.
Moral character is not a subjectiveterm but one
which corresponds to objective reality." 24 Such
requirement has four (4) ostensible
purposes,namely: (a) to protect the public; (b) to
protect the public image of lawyers; (c) to protect
prospective clients; and (d) to protect errant
lawyers from themselves.
Transcript proves that there was indeed a period
of time where complainant and respondent were
left alone inthe CAAP Office of the Board
Secretary which gave respondent a window of
opportunity to carry out his actsconstituting
sexual harassment against complainant.In
addition, it has been established that respondent
habitually watches pornographic materials in his
office-issued laptop while inside the office
premises, during office hours, and with the
knowledge and full view of hisstaff. The Court
cannot countenance such audacious display of
depravity on respondent's part not onlybecause
his obscene habit tarnishes the reputation of the
government agency he works for but also because
itshrouds the legal profession in a negative light.
As a lawyer in the government service,
respondent is expectedto perform and discharge
his duties with the highest degree of excellence,
professionalism, intelligence, andskill, and with
utmost devotion and dedication to duty.
A profession, not a business
Dominador P. Burbe vs. Alberto C. Magulta, A.C. No.
5713, June 10, 2002
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 5713. June 10, 2002.]
(Adm. Case No. 99-634)
DOMINADOR P. BURBE, Complainant, v.
Atty. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client,
a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client,
even if the client never paid any fee for the
attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a
business; it is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary
consideration.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Case
Before us is a Complaint for the disbarment or
suspension or any other disciplinary action
against Atty. Alberto C. Magulta. Filed by
Dominador P. Burbe with the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on June 14, 1999, the
Complaint is accompanied by a Sworn
Statement alleging the following:chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
x
x
x
"That in connection with my business, I was
introduced to Atty. Alberto C. Magulta,
sometime in September, 1998, in his office at
the Respicio, Magulta and Adan Law Offices at
21-B Otero Building, Juan de la Cruz St.,
Davao City, who agreed to legally represent
me in a money claim and possible civil case
against certain parties for breach of contract;
"That consequent to such agreement, Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta prepared for me the
demand letter and some other legal papers, for
which services I have accordingly paid;
inasmuch, however, that I failed to secure a
settlement of the dispute, Atty. Magulta
suggested that I file the necessary complaint,
which he subsequently drafted, copy of which
is attached as Annex A, the filing fee whereof
will require the amount of Twenty Five
Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00);
"That having the need to legally recover from
the parties to be sued I, on January 4, 1999,
deposited the amount of P25,000.00 to Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta, copy of the Receipt
attached as Annex B, upon the instruction that
I needed the case filed immediately;
"That a week later, I was informed by Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta that the complaint had
already been filed in court, and that I should
receive notice of its progress;
"That in the months that followed, I waited for
such notice from the court or from Atty.
Magulta but there seemed to be no progress in
my case, such that I frequented his office to
inquire, and he would repeatedly tell me just to
wait;
"That I had grown impatient on the case,
considering that I am told to wait [every time] I
asked; and in my last visit to Atty. Magulta last
May 25, 1999, he said that the court personnel
had not yet acted on my case and, for my
satisfaction, he even brought me to the Hall of
Justice Building at Ecoland, Davao City, at
about 4:00 p.m., where he left me at the Office
of the City Prosecutor at the ground floor of the
building and told to wait while he personally
follows up the processes with the Clerk of
Court; whereupon, within the hour, he came
back and told me that the Clerk of Court was
absent on that day;
"That sensing I was being given the run-around
by Atty. Magulta, I decided to go to the Office
of the Clerk of Court with my draft of Atty.
Magulta’s complaint to personally verify the
progress of my case, and there told that there
was no record at all of a case filed by Atty.
Alberto C. Magulta on my behalf, copy of the
Certification dated May 27, 1999, attached as
Annex C;
"That feeling disgusted by the way I was lied to
and treated, I confronted Atty. Alberto C.
Magulta at his office the following day; May 28,
1999, where he continued to lie to with the
excuse that the delay was being caused by the
court personnel, and only when shown the
certification did he admit that he has not at all
filed the complaint because he had spent the
money for the filing fee for his own purpose;
and to appease my feelings, he offered to
reimburse me by issuing two (2) checks,
postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the
amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00,
respectively, copies of which are attached as
Annexes D and E;
"That for the inconvenience, treatment and
deception I was made to suffer, I wish to
complain Atty. Alberto C. Magulta for
misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive
conduct;"
x
x
x. 1
On August 6, 1999, pursuant to the July 22,
1999 Order of the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline, 2 respondent filed his Answer 3
vehemently denying the allegations of
complainant "for being totally outrageous and
baseless." The latter had allegedly been
introduced as a kumpadre of one of the
former’s law partners. After their meeting,
complainant requested him to draft a demand
letter against Regwill Industries, Inc. — a
service for which the former never paid. After
Mr. Said Sayre, one of the business partners of
complainant, replied to this letter, the latter
requested that another demand letter — this
time addressed to the former — be drafted by
respondent, who reluctantly agreed to do so.
Without informing the lawyer, complainant
asked the process server of the former’s law
office to deliver the letter to the addressee.
Aside from attending to the Regwill case which
had required a three-hour meeting, respondent
drafted a complaint (which was only for the
purpose of compelling the owner to settle the
case) and prepared a compromise agreement.
He was also requested by complainant to do
the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Write a demand letter addressed to Mr.
Nelson Tan
2. Write a demand letter addressed to ALC
Corporation
3. Draft a complaint against ALC Corporation
4. Research on the Mandaue City property
claimed by complainant’s wife
All of these respondent did, but he was never
paid for his services by complainant.
Respondent likewise said that without telling
him why, complainant later on withdrew all the
files pertinent to the Regwill case. However,
when no settlement was reached, the latter
instructed him to draft a complaint for breach of
contract. Respondent, whose services had
never been paid by complainant until this time,
told the latter about his acceptance and legal
fees. When told that these fees amounted to
P187,742 because the Regwill claim was
almost P4 million, complainant promised to pay
on installment basis.
On January 4, 1999, complainant gave the
amount of P25,000 to respondent’s secretary
and told her that it was for the filing fee of the
Regwill case. When informed of the payment,
the lawyer immediately called the attention of
complainant, informing the latter of the need to
pay the acceptance and filing fees before the
complaint could be filed. Complainant was told
that the amount he had paid was a deposit for
the acceptance fee, and that he should give
the filing fee later.
Sometime in February 1999, complainant told
respondent to suspend for the meantime the
filing of the complaint because the former
might be paid by another company, the First
Oriental Property Ventures, Inc., which had
offered to buy a parcel of land owned by
Regwill Industries. The negotiations went on
for two months, but the parties never arrived at
any agreement.
Sometime in May 1999, complainant again
relayed to respondent his interest in filing the
complaint. Respondent reminded him once
more of the acceptance fee. In response,
complainant proposed that the complaint be
filed first before payment of respondent’s
acceptance and legal fees. When respondent
refused, complainant demanded the return of
the P25,000. The lawyer returned the amount
using his own personal checks because their
law office was undergoing extensive renovation
at the time, and their office personnel were not
reporting regularly. Respondent’s checks were
accepted and encashed by complainant.
Respondent averred that he never
inconvenienced, mistreated or deceived
complainant, and if anyone had been
shortchanged by the undesirable events, it was
he.
The IBP’s Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation dated
March 8, 2000, the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) opined as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . [I]t is evident that the P25,000 deposited
by complainant with the Respicio Law Office
was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint.
With complainant’s deposit of the filing fees for
the Regwill complaint, a corresponding
obligation on the part of respondent was
created and that was to file the Regwill
complaint within the time frame contemplated
by his client, the complainant. The failure of
respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his
misuse of the filing fees deposited by
complainant, and his attempts to cover up this
misuse of funds of the client, which caused
complainant additional damage and prejudice,
constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his
part, unbecoming a member of the law
profession: The subsequent reimbursement by
the respondent of part of the money deposited
by complainant for filing fees, does not
exculpate the respondent for his
misappropriation of said funds. Thus, to
impress upon the respondent the gravity of his
offense, it is recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year." 4
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the Commission’s
recommendation.
Main Issue:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Misappropriation of Client’s Funds
Central to this case are the following alleged
acts of respondent lawyer: (a) his non-filing of
the Complaint on behalf of his client and (b) his
appropriation for himself of the money given for
the filing fee.
Respondent claims that complainant did not
give him the filing fee for the Regwill complaint;
hence, the former’s failure to file the complaint
in court. Also, respondent alleges that the
amount delivered by complainant to his office
on January 4, 1999 was for attorney’s fees and
not for the filing fee.
We are not persuaded. Lawyers must exert
their best efforts and ability in the prosecution
or the defense of the client’s cause. They who
perform that duty with diligence and candor not
only protect the interests of the client, but also
serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the
bar and help maintain the respect of the
community for the legal profession. 5 Members
of the bar must do nothing that may tend to
lessen in any degree the confidence of the
public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity
of the profession. 6
Respondent wants this Court to believe that no
lawyer-client relationship existed between him
and complainant, because the latter never paid
him for services rendered. The former adds
that he only drafted the said documents as a
personal favor for the kumpadre of one of his
partners.
We disagree. A lawyer-client relationship was
established from the very first moment
complainant asked respondent for legal advice
regarding the former’s business. To constitute
professional employment, it is not essential
that the client employed the attorney
professionally on any previous occasion. It is
not necessary that any retainer be paid,
promised, or charged; neither is it material that
the attorney consulted did not afterward handle
the case for which his service had been
sought.
If a person, in respect to business affairs or
troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a
view to obtaining professional advice or
assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits
or acquiesces with the consultation, then the
professional employment is established. 7
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists
notwithstanding the close personal relationship
between the lawyer and the complainant or the
nonpayment of the former’s fees. 8 Hence,
despite the fact that complainant was
kumpadre of a law partner of respondent, and
that respondent dispensed legal advice to
complainant as a personal favor to the
kumpadre, the lawyer was duty-bound to file
the complaint he had agreed to prepare — and
had actually prepared — at the soonest
possible time, in order to protect the client’s
interest. Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that
lawyers should not neglect legal matters
entrusted to them.
This Court has likewise constantly held that
once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a
client, they owe fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in them. 9 They owe entire devotion to
the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and the defense of the client’s
rights, and the exertion of their utmost learning
and abilities to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from the client, save by the rules of
law legally applied. 10
Similarly unconvincing is the explanation of
respondent that the receipt issued by his office
to complainant on January 4, 1999 was
erroneous. The IBP Report correctly noted that
it was quite incredible for the office personnel
of a law firm to be prevailed upon by a client to
issue a receipt erroneously indicating payment
for something else. Moreover, upon
discovering the "mistake" — if indeed it was
one — respondent should have immediately
taken steps to correct the error. He should
have lost no time in calling complainant’s
attention to the matter and should have issued
another receipt indicating the correct purpose
of the payment.
The Practice of Law — a
Profession, Not a Business
In this day and age, members of the bar often
forget that the practice of law is a profession
and not a business. 11 Lawyering is not
primarily meant to be a money-making venture,
and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. 12 The gaining of a
livelihood is not a professional but a secondary
consideration. 13 Duty to public service and to
the administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers, who must
subordinate their personal interests or what
they owe to themselves. The practice of law is
a noble calling in which emolument is a
byproduct, and the highest eminence may be
attained without making much money. 14
In failing to apply to the filing fee the amount
given by complainant — as evidenced by the
receipt issued by the law office of respondent
— the latter also violated the rule that lawyers
must be scrupulously careful in handling
money entrusted to them in their professional
capacity. 15 Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that lawyers
shall hold in trust all moneys of their clients and
properties that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to
them are in gross violation of professional
ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession. 16 It may be
true that they have a lien upon the client’s
funds, documents and other papers that have
lawfully come into their possession; that they
may retain them until their lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid; and that they
may apply such funds to the satisfaction of
such fees and disbursements. However, these
considerations do not relieve them of their duty
to promptly account for the moneys they
received. Their failure to do so constitutes
professional misconduct. 17 In any event, they
must still exert all effort to protect their client’s
interest within the bounds of law.
If much is demanded from an attorney, it is
because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it correlative duties not only to the
client but also to the court, to the bar, and to
the public. 18 Respondent fell short of this
standard when he converted into his legal fees
the filing fee entrusted to him by his client and
thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The
fact that the former returned the amount does
not exculpate him from his breach of
duty.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On the other hand, we do not agree with
complainant’s plea to disbar respondent from
the practice of law. The power to disbar must
be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear
case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and the character of the bar will
disbarment be imposed as a penalty. 19
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is
found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon
his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be
furnished all courts as well as the Office of the
Bar Confidant, which is instructed to include a
copy in respondent’s file.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
CASE DIGEST: Dominador P. Burbe vs. Alberto C.
Magulta, A.C. No. 5713, June 10, 2002
the clerk of court to see for himself the
status of his case. Petitioner found out
that no such case has been filed.
Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where
he continued to lie to with the excuse that
the delay was being caused by the court
personnel, and only when shown the
certification did he admit that he has not
at all filed the complaint because he had
spent the money for the filing fee for his
own purpose; and to appease petitioner’s
feelings, he offered to reimburse him by
issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1
and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of
P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively.
Issue:
Whether or not the lawyer should be
disbarred.
CASE DIGEST
Held:
Facts:
Petitioner engaged the services of the
respondent to help him recover a claim of
money against a creditor. Respondent
prepared demand letters for the
petitioner, which were not successful and
so the former intimated that a case
should already be filed. As a result,
petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and
included also amounts for the filing of the
case.
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the
decision of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP as follows: “It is
evident that the P25,000 deposited by
complainant with the Respicio Law Office
was for the filing fees of the Regwill
complaint. With complainant’s deposit of
the filing fees for the Regwill complaint, a
corresponding obligation on the part of
respondent was created and that was to
file the Regwill complaint within the time
frame contemplated by his client. The
failure of respondent to fulfill this
obligation due to his misuse of the filing
fees deposited by complainant, and his
attempts to cover up this misuse of funds
of the client, which caused complainant
additional damage and prejudice,
constitutes highly dishonest conduct on
his part, unbecoming a member of the law
profession. The subsequent
reimbursement by the respondent of part
of the money deposited by complainant
for filing fees, does not exculpate the
respondent for his misappropriation of
said funds.”
A couple of months passed but the
petitioner has not yet received any
feedback as to the status of his case.
Petitioner made several follow-ups in the
lawyer’s office but to no avail. The lawyer,
to prove that the case has already been
filed even invited petitioner to come with
him to the Justice Hall to verify the status
of the case. Petitioner was made to wait
for hours in the prosecutor’s office while
the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of
Court to inquire about the case. The
lawyer went back to the petitioner with
the news that the Clerk of Court was
absent that day.
Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer,
petitioner personally went to the office of
Nature of the Practice of Law
Barrientos vs. Daarol, 218 SCRA 30
CASE DIGEST:
FACTS:
Complainant Victoria C. Barrientos filed a sworn
complaint in the Supreme Court on August 20, 1975
which seeks for the disbarment of respondent
Tansfiguracion Daaron
The complainant, Victoria Barrientos, is single, a
college student, and was about 20 years and 7 months
old during the time (July-October 1975) of her
relationship with respondent, having been born on
December 23, 1952; while respondent Transfiguracion
Daarol is married, General Manager of Zamboanga del
Norte Electric Cooperative, and 41 years old at the
time of the said relationship, having been born on
August 6, 1932;
The respondent is married to Romualda A. Sumaylo
with whom be has a son; that the marriage ceremony
was solemnized on September 24, 1955 at Liloy,
Zamboanga del Norte by a catholic priest, Rev. Fr.
Anacleto Pellamo, Parish Priest thereat; and that said
respondent had been separated from his wife for
about 16 years at the time of his relationship with
complainant;
The respondent had been known by the Barrientos
family for quite sometime, having been a former
student of complainant's father in 1952 and, a former
classmate of complainant's mother at the Andres
Bonifacio College in Dipolog City; that he became
acquainted with complainant's sister, Norma in 1963
and eventually with her other sisters, Baby and Delia
and, her brother, Boy, as he used to visit Norma at her
residence; that he also befriended complainant and
who became a close friend when he invited her, with
her parents' consent, to be one of the usherettes
during the Masonic Convention in Sicayab, Dipolog
City from June 28 to 30, 1973, and he used to fetch
her at her residence in the morning and took her
home from the convention site after each day's
activities;
The respondent courted complainant, and after a
week of courtship, complainant accepted
respondent's love on July 7, 1973; that in the evening
of August 20, 1973, complainant with her parents'
permission was respondent's partner during the
Chamber of Commerce affair at the Lopez Skyroom in
the Dipolog City, and at about 10:00 o'clock that
evening, they left the place but before going home,
they went to the airport at Sicayab, Dipolog City and
parked the jeep at the beach, where there were no
houses around; that after the usual preliminaries, they
consummated the sexual act and at about midnight
they went home; that after the first sexual act,
respondent used to have joy ride with complainant
which usually ended at the airport where they used to
make love twice or three times a week; that as a result
of her intimate relations, complainant became
pregnant;
That after a conference among respondent,
complainant and complainant's parents, it was agreed
that complainant would deliver her child in Manila,
where she went with her mother on October 22, 1973
by boat, arriving in Manila on the 25th and, stayed
with her brother-in-law Ernesto Serrano in Singalong,
Manila; that respondent visited her there on the 26th,
27th and 28th of October 1973, and again in February
and March 1974; that later on complainant decided to
deliver the child in Cebu City in order to be nearer to
Dipolog City, and she went there in April 1974 and her
sister took her to the Good Shepherd Convent at
Banawa Hill, Cebu City; that on June 14, 1974, she
delivered a baby girl at the Perpetual Succor Hospital
in Cebu City and, named her "Dureza Barrientos"; that
about the last week of June 1974 she went home to
Dipolog City; that during her stay here in Manila and
later in Cebu City, the respondent defrayed some of
her expenses; that she filed an administrative case
against respondent with the National Electrification
Administration; which complaint, however, was
dismissed; and then she instituted the present
disbarment proceedings against respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Transfiguracion Daaron be disbarred
from practice of law.
RULING:
YES. The Supreme Court find Transfiguracion Daarol
guilty of immoral conduct unworthy of being a
member of the Bar and is ordered DISBARRED and his
name is stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact
be of good moral character but must also be seen to
be of good moral character and must lead a life in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. More specifically, a member of the Bar
and an officer of the Court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of
mistresses but must also behave himself in such a
manner as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral standards
(Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21, 26 [1989], citing
Toledo vs. Toledo, 7 SCRA 757 [1963] and Royong vs.
Oblena, 7 SCRA 859 [1963]).
In brief, respondent Daarol morally delinquent and as
such, should not be allowed continued membership in
the ancient and learned profession of law (Quingwa v.
Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).
Alawi vs. Alauya, 268 SCRA 628
CASE DIGEST:
FACTS:
Complainant Sophia Alawi was a sales representative
(or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd.
of Davao City, a real estate and housing company.
Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City.
They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was
executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya
of one of the housing units belonging to the above
mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and
in connection therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December
15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of
Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his
contract with the company on the grounds that his
consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation,
deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by
the sales agent, SOPHIA ALAWI, which made said
contract void ab initio.
ISSUE:
Whether or Alauya has a right of action against
Sophia Alawi
RULING:
Respondent Ashari M. Alauya is REPRIMANDED for the
use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent
language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer,
and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is
warned that any similar or other impropriety or
misconduct in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
Admission to the Practice of Law
In re Edillion 84 SCRA 568
A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its
competence to reinstate a disbarred member of the
bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors
bearing on the specific case, public interest, the
integrity of the profession and the welfare of the
recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are given
their due weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was
disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being
unanimous with the late.
Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he
had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated. The
minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted
such prayer. It was there made clear that it "is without
prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." 2
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that
led to the disbarment of respondent may not be
amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the
late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short)
Board of Governors, unanimously adopted Resolution
No. 75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the
Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution
notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the
IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri,
submitted the said resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2,
Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP,
which. reads: ... Should the delinquency further
continue until the following June 29, the Board shall
promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the
continued delinquency and take whatever action it
shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation
to the Supreme Court for the removal of the
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Notice of the action taken should be submit by
registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of
the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the
Court required the respondent to comment on the
resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted
his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his
refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On
March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President
and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's
comment: On March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint
reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on
June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were
required to submit memoranda in amplification of their
oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth
submitted for resolution." 3
Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP
Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme
Court the removal of a delinquent member's name
from the Roll of Attorneys as found in Rules of
Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to
the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent
member from the Roll of Attorneys. 4
The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized
in the aforesaid resolution "is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a
pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in
good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay
the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence
of this compelled financial support of the said
organization to which he is admittedly personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to
liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the
above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP ByLaws are void and of no legal force and effect. 5 It was
pointed out in the resolution that such issues was
raised on a previous case before the Court, entitled
'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the
Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The
Court exhaustively considered all these matters in
that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of
the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9,
1973. 6 The unanimous conclusion reached by the
Court was that the integration of the Philippine Bar
raises no constitutional question and is therefore
legally unobjectionable, "and, within the context of
contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has
become an imperative means to raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility fully and effectively." 7
As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous.
From the time the decision was rendered, there were
various pleadings filed by respondent for
reinstatement starting with a motion for
reconsideration dated August 19, 1978. Characterized
as it was by persistence in his adamantine refusal to
admit the full competence of the Court on the matter,
it was not unexpected that it would be denied. So it
turned out. 8 It was the consensus that he continued to
be oblivious to certain balic juridical concepts, the
appreciation of which does not even require great
depth of intellect. Since respondent could not be said
to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his
pleadings in other cases coming before this Tribunal
were quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled
with invective for which he had been duly taken to
task, there was the impression that his recalcitrance
arose from and sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the
extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was
more than justified.
Since then, however, there were other
communications to this Court where a different
attitude on his part was discernible. 9 The tone of
defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating
character invoked — the state of his health and his
advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of
former clients who still rely on him for counsel, their
confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his
career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable,
defender of the causes entrusted to him.
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that
reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the
resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that
there was full acceptance on his part of the
competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its
plenary power to regulate the legal profession and
can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly
paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years had
elapsed during which he war. barred from exercising
his profession was likewise taken into account. It may
likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent
power to punish for contempt and paraphrasing the
dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v.
Lukban, 10 the power to discipline, especially if
amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. 11
One last word. It has been pertinently observed that
there is no irretrievable finality as far as admission to
the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of
membership. What must ever be borne in mind is that
membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a
privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide by
any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the
gravity thereof warrant such drastic move. Thereafter
a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations
evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of
the transgressor, he may once again be considered
for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our
resolution of October 23, 1980.
The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial
A. Edillon.
Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr.,
Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concurs in the result.
CASE DIGEST: In re Edillion 84 SCRA 568
FACTS:
Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on
August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being unanimous with the
late.
Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he
had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated. The
minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted
such prayer. It was there made clear that it "is without
prejudice to issuing an extended opinion."
As set forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief
Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of
Governors, unanimously adopted Resolution No. 7565 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of
the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A.
Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of
the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys
for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to
the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding
due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its
then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said
resolution to the Court for consideration and
approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article
III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should
the delinquency further continue until the following
June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the
cause or causes of the continued delinquency and
take whatever action it shall deem appropriate,
including a recommendation to the Supreme Court
for the removal of the delinquent member's name
from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken
should be submit by registered mail to the member
and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On
January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent
to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to
above he submitted his comment on February 23,
1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership
fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court
required the IBP President and the IBP Board of
Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: On March
24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the
case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the
hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments.
The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution." 3
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marcial A. Edillon be reinstated
RULING:
YES. The Court, in the light of the above, felt that
reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the
resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that
there was full acceptance on his part of the
competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its
plenary power to regulate the legal profession and
can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly
paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years had
elapsed during which he was barred from exercising
his profession was likewise taken into account. It may
likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent
power to punish for contempt and paraphrasing the
dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v.
Lukban, the power to discipline, especially if
amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle.
The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial
A. Edillon.
In Re: Integration of the Bar 49 SCRA 22
January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE
BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar
Integration1 submitted its Report dated November 30,
1972, with the "earnest recommendation" — on the
basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in
Administrative Case No. 5262 of the Court, and
"consistently with the views and counsel received
from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as
well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the
Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this Honorable
Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as
soon as possible through the adoption and
promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the
Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar,
after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible
and practicable to existing provincial and other local
Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in
favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were
orally expounded before the Court. Written
oppositions were admitted,3 and all parties were
thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda.4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and
followed significant developments relative to the
matter of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that
there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in
favor of Bar integration, the Court created the
Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of
ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine
Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No.
3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of
the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds
Therefor." The measure was signed by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and
took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This
law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the
approval of this Act, the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar under such conditions as it shall
see fit in order to raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred
thousand pesos is hereby
appropriated, out of any funds in the
National Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, to carry out the
purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such
sums as may be necessary for the
same purpose shall be included in the
annual appropriations for the Supreme
Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon
its approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with
argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration
and contains all necessary factual data bearing on the
advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar
integration. Also embodied therein are the views,
opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of
the rank and file of the Philippine lawyer population
relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed
integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and
presented to them by that body in a national Bar
plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as well as
ample material upon which the Court may decide
whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this
time.
the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of
its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar
means the official unification of the
entire lawyer population of the
Philippines. This
requires membership and financial
support (in reasonable amount) of
every attorney as conditions sine qua
non to the practice of law and the
retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity
of all persons whose names appear in
the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated
Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must
include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible
unless it is decreed by an entity with
power to do so: the State. Bar
integration, therefore, signifies the
setting up by Government authority of
a national organization of the legal
profession based on the recognition of
the lawyer as an officer of the court.
Designed to improve the position of
the Bar as an instrumentality of justice
and the Rule of Law, integration
fosters cohesion among lawyers, and
ensures, through their own organized
action and participation, the promotion
of the objectives of the legal
profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with
minimum supervision and regulation
by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in
general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of
justice;
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to
integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be
constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the
integration of the Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a
statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will
suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of
its members high ideals of integrity,
learning, professional competence,
public service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional
interests of its members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a
spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion
of law, jurisprudence, law reform,
pleading, practice and procedure, and
the relations of the Bar to the Bench
and to the public, and publish
information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal
education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of
legal research in substantive and
adjective law, and make reports and
recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its
public responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among
other things, make it possible for the
legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance
in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants
against the abuse of tyrannical judges
and prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its
responsibility in the disciplining and/or
removal of incompetent and unworthy
judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which
traditionally cannot defend itself
except within its own forum, from the
assaults that politics and self-interest
may level at it, and assist it to maintain
its integrity, impartiality and
independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the
selection of judges and prosecuting
officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice
of law, and break up any monopoly of
local practice maintained through
influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families
of disabled and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and
establish legal aid offices and set up
lawyer reference services throughout
the country so that the poor may not
lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and
informational materials that are difficult
to obtain in many of our provinces;
(10) Devise and maintain a program of
continuing legal education for
practising attorneys in order to elevate
the standards of the profession
throughout the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards,
and promulgate minimum fees
schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish
law libraries for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate
the people on their legal rights and
obligations, on the importance of
preventive legal advice, and on the
functions and duties of the Filipino
lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive
and meaningful country-wide
involvement of the lawyer population
in the solution of the multifarious
problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it
may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its
power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution,
"to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an
inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority
over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court
may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a
new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power,
but is a mere legislative declaration that the
integration of the Bar will promote public interest or,
more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue — whether the
unification of the Bar would be constitutional —
hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the
lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association
and freedom of speech, and on the nature of the dues
exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent
discussion made by the Commission on Bar
Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar
integration measures has been put in
issue, the Courts have upheld their
constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support
this reasoning:
— Courts have inherent power to
supervise and regulate the practice of
law.
— The practice of law is not a vested
right but a privilege; a privilege,
moreover, clothed with public interest,
because a lawyer owes duties not only
to his client, but also to his brethren in
the profession, to the courts, and to
the nation; and takes part in one of the
most important functions of the State,
the administration of justice, as an
officer of the court.
— Because the practice of law is
privilege clothed with public interest, it
is far and just that the exercise of that
privilege be regulated to assure
compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
— These public responsibilities can
best be discharged through collective
action; but there can be no collective
action without an organized body; no
organized body can operate effectively
without incurring expenses; therefore,
it is fair and just that all attorneys be
required to contribute to the support of
such organized body; and, given
existing Bar conditions, the most
efficient means of doing so is by
integrating the Bar through a rule of
court that requires all lawyers to pay
annual dues to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
Bar integration does not compel the
lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The body
compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the
Unified Bar imposes only the duty to
pay dues in reasonable amount. The
issue therefore, is a question of
compelled financial support of group
activities, not involuntary membership
in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar
activities serves the function of
elevating the educational and ethical
standards of the Bar to the end of
improving the quality of the legal
service available to the people. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating
the quality of professional services,
may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be
shared by the subjects and
beneficiaries of the regulatory program
— the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does
compel a lawyer to be a member of
the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police
power of the State. The legal
profession has long been regarded as
a proper subject of legislative
regulation and control. Moreover, the
inherent power of the Supreme Court
to regulate the Bar includes the
authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of
an integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate (or
the corollary right not to associate).
For the Court to prescribe dues to be
paid by the members does not mean
that the Court levies a tax.
Integration does not make a lawyer a
member of any group of which he is
not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed
the Bar examinations. All that
integration actually does is to provide
an official national organization for the
well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every
lawyer is already a member.
A membership fee in the Integrated
Bar is an exaction for regulation, while
the purpose of a tax is revenue. If the
Court has inherent power to regulate
the Bar, it follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a
membership fee for that purpose. It
would not be possible to push through
an Integrated Bar program without
means to defray the concomitant
expenses. The doctrine of implied
powers necessarily includes the power
to impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's
power to regulate the Bar is that the
regulation does not impose an
unconstitutional burden. The public
interest promoted by the integration of
the Bar far outweighs the
inconsequential inconvenience to a
member that might result from his
required payment of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
A lawyer is free, as he has always
been, to voice his views on any
subject in any manner he wishes,
even though such views be opposed
to positions taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a
member's due to promote measures
to which said member is opposed,
would not nullify or adversely affect his
freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally
condition the right to practice law upon
membership in the Integrated Bar, it is
difficult to understand why it should
become unconstitutional for the Bar to
use the member's dues to fulfill the
very purposes for which it was
established.
The objection would make every
Governmental exaction the material of
a "free speech" issue. Even the
income tax would be suspect. The
objection would carry us to lengths
that have never been dreamed of. The
conscientious objector, if his liberties
were to be thus extended, might
refuse to contribute taxes in
furtherance of war or of any other end
condemned by his conscience as
irreligious or immoral. The right of
private judgment has never yet been
exalted above the powers and the
compulsion of the agencies of
Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers
already practising because although
the requirement to pay annual dues is
a new regulation, it will give the
members of the Bar a new system
which they hitherto have not had and
through which, by proper work, they
will receive benefits they have not
heretofore enjoyed, and discharge
their public responsibilities in a more
effective manner than they have been
able to do in the past. Because the
requirement to pay dues is a valid
exercise of regulatory power by the
Court, because it will apply equally to
all lawyers, young and old, at the time
Bar integration takes effect, and
because it is a new regulation in
exchange for new benefits, it is not
retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not
unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue — whether the
Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this
time — requires a careful overview of the practicability
and necessity as well as the advantages and
disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England,
Canada and the United States, Bar integration has
yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline
among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence
and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more
meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the
activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar
facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized
practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership
campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for
the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better
and more effective discharge by the Bar of its
obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the
courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary
consequences are envisioned and in fact expected
from the unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued
that in the event of integration, Government authority
will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be
weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result;
effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will
become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude
into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils
prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have
failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar
integration experience in England, Canada and the
United States. In all the jurisdictions where the
Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or
evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has
restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged
professional consciousness, energized the Bar's
responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the
administration of justice.
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar
integration? The official statistics compiled by the
Commission on Bar integration show that in
the national poll recently conducted by the
Commission in the matter of the integration of the
Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all
over the archipelago who have turned in their
individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted
in favor of Bar integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per
cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are
non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80) local
Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the
Philippines have submitted resolutions and other
expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or
support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar
association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed
position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual
lawyers who cast their plebiscite ballots on the
proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the
Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor
thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285
(or 2.06 per cent) are non-committal.5 All these clearly
indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar
integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing
conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in
Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials
and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
"perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable,"
within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise
the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power
vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the
Constitution, hereby ordains the integration of the Bar
of the Philippines in accordance with the attached
COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio
and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
CASE DIGEST: In Re: Integration of the Bar 49
SCRA 22
FACTS:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar
Integration1 submitted its Report dated November 30,
1972, with the "earnest recommendation" — on the
basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in
Administrative Case No. 5262 of the Court, and
"consistently with the views and counsel received
from its [the Commission's] Board of Consultants, as
well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the
Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this Honorable
Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as
soon as possible through the adoption and
promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the
Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar,
after due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible
and practicable to existing provincial and other local
Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in
favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were
orally expounded before the Court. Written
oppositions were admitted,3 and all parties were
thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there
had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of
Bar integration, the Court created the Commission on
Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the
advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No.
3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of
the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor."
The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E.
Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the
same day as Rep. Act 6397.
ISSUE:
(1) Does the Court have the power to
integrate the Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar
be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the
integration of the Bar at this time?
RULING:
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it
may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its
power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution,
"to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an
inherent part of the Court's constitutional authority
over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court
may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of
the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers
a new power nor restricts the Court's inherent power,
but is a mere legislative declaration that the
integration of the Bar will promote public interest or,
more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue — whether the
unification of the Bar would be constitutional —
hinges on the effects of Bar integration on the
lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of
association and freedom of speech, and on the nature
of the dues exacted from him.
To resolve the third and final issue — whether the
Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this
time — requires a careful overview of the
practicability and necessity as well as the advantages
and disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England,
Canada and the United States, Bar integration has
yielded the following benefits: (1) improved discipline
among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence
and ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more
meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in
the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater Bar
facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized
practice; (6) avoidance of costly membership
campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for
the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better
and more effective discharge by the Bar of its
obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the
courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary
consequences are envisioned and in fact expected
from the unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued
that in the event of integration, Government authority
will dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be
weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result;
effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will
become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude
into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils
prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have
failed to materialize in over fifty years of Bar
integration experience in England, Canada and the
United States. In all the jurisdictions where the
Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or
evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has
restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged
professional consciousness, energized the Bar's
responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the
administration of justice.
In Re: Cunanan, Resolution, March 18, 1954
Resolution
March 18, 1954
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission
to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of
1946 to 1953;
ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R.
Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile Inton for
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for
respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have
aroused so much public interest and concern as
Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the
"Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of
Court governing admission to the bar, "in order
that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may
be deemed to have passed his examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general
average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule
127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless,
considering the varying difficulties of the
different bar examinations held since 1946 and
the varying degree of strictness with which the
examination papers were graded, this court
passed and admitted to the bar those candidates
who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent
in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948,
and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74
per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to
practice law as those reconsidered and passed by
this court, and feeling conscious of having been
discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to
R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who
obtained averages of a few percentage lower than
those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress
for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate
Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the
passing general average in bar examinations to
70 per cent effective since 1946. The President
requested the views of this court on the bill.
Complying with that request, seven members of
the court subscribed to and submitted written
comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter
the President vetoed it. Congress did not override
the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No.
371, embodying substantially the provisions of
the vetoed bill. Although the members of this
court reiterated their unfavorable views on the
matter, the President allowed the bill to become
a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The
law, which incidentally was enacted in an
election year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING
MARKS
FOR
BAR
EXAMINATIONS
FROM
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND
FORTY-SIX UP TO AND
INCLUDING
NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and
House of Representatives of the
Philippines
in
Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the
provisions of section fourteen, Rule
numbered one hundred twenty-seven of
the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who
obtained a general average of seventy per
cent in any bar examinations after July
fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up
to the August nineteen hundred and fiftyone bar examinations; seventy-one per
cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two
bar examinations; seventy-two per cent in
the in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three
bar examinations; seventy-three per cent
in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar
examinations; seventy-four per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar
examinations without a candidate
obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in
any subject, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office
as
member
of
the
Philippine
Bar: Provided, however, That for the
purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or
more of a fraction, shall be considered as
one and included as part of the next whole
number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained
a grade of seventy-five per cent in any
subject in any bar examination after July
fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six
shall be deemed to have passed in such
subject or subjects and such grade or
grades shall be included in computing the
passing general average that said
candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the
Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful
postwar candidates filed petitions for admission
to the bar invoking its provisions, while others
whose motions for the revision of their
examination papers were still pending also
invoked the aforesaid law as an additional
ground for admission. There are also others who
have sought simply the reconsideration of their
grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions
for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or
not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to
revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to
the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No.
972 which, if declared valid, should be applied
equally to all concerned whether they have filed
petitions or not. A complete list of the
petitioners, properly classified, affected by this
decision, as well as a more detailed account of
the history of Republic Act No. 972, are
appended to this decision as Annexes I and II.
And to realize more readily the effects of the law,
the following statistical data are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to
be benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No.
972 total 1,168, classified as follows:
1946
(August)
206
121
18
1946
(November) 477
228
43
1947
749
340
0
1948
899
409
11
1949
1,218 532
164
1950
1,316 893
26
1951
2,068 879
196
1952
2,738 1,033 426
1953
2,555
TOTAL
968
284
12,230 5,421 1,168
Of the total 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in
subsequent examination, and only 586 have filed
either motions for admission to the bar pursuant
to said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful
candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said
Republic Act. These candidates had each taken
from two to five different examinations, but
failed to obtain a passing average in any of them.
Consolidating, however, their highest grades in
different subjects in previous examinations, with
their latest marks, they would be sufficient to
reach the passing average as provided for by
Republic Act No. 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be
benefited by this Republic Acts is therefore
1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of
these 604 petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to
1951 had individually presented motions for
reconsideration which were denied, while 125
unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953,
had presented similar motions, which are still
pending because they could be favorably
affected by Republic Act No. 972, — although
as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no
sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of farreaching effects on the practice of the legal
profession and the administration of justice, and
because some doubts have been expressed as to
its validity, the court set the hearing of the aforementioned petitions for admission on the sole
question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972
is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this
question by the brilliant assistance of the
members of the bar who have amply argued,
orally an in writing, on the various aspects in
which the question may be gleaned. The valuable
studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J.
Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura
Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law,
and of the U.P. Women's Lawyers' Circle, the
Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz,
Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos,
Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de
Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman
Ozaeta against it, aside from the memoranda of
counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego,
M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio
Enrile Inton, and of petitioners Cabrera,
Macasaet and Galema themselves, has greatly
helped us in this task. The legal researchers of
the court have exhausted almost all Philippine
and American jurisprudence on the matter. The
question has been the object of intense
deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal, and
finally, after the voting, the preparation of the
majority opinion was assigned to a new member
in order to place it as humanly as possible above
all suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object,
according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of
reading materials and inadequate preparation.
Quoting a portion of the Explanatory Note of the
proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator
Pablo Angeles David stated:
The reason for relaxing the standard 75
per cent passing grade is the tremendous
handicap which students during the years
immediately
after
the
Japanese
occupation has to overcome such as the
insufficiency of reading materials and the
inadequacy of the preparation of students
who took up law soon after the liberation.
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the
examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed.
And now it is claimed that in addition 604
candidates be admitted (which in reality total
1,094),
because
they
suffered
from
"insufficiency of reading materials" and of
"inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to
public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had inadequate
preparation for the practice of the profession, as
was exactly found by this Tribunal in the
aforesaid examinations. The public interest
demands of legal profession adequate
preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as
legal problem evolved by the times become more
difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of
the vital requisites for the practice of law that
should be developed constantly and maintained
firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the
protection of property, life, honor and civil
liberties. To approve officially of those
inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate
themselves to such a delicate mission is to create
a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement
that there was an insufficiency of legal reading
materials is grossly exaggerated. There were
abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone
in mimeographed copies were made available to
the public during those years and private
enterprises had also published them in monthly
magazines and annual digests. The Official
Gazette had been published continuously. Books
and magazines published abroad have entered
without restriction since 1945. Many law books,
some even with revised and enlarged editions
have been printed locally during those periods. A
new set of Philippine Reports began to be
published since 1946, which continued to be
supplemented by the addition of new volumes.
Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question
is valid, it has to be enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect
or from the point of view of applicable
principles, but the resolution of the question
would have been easier had an identical case of
similar background been picked out from the
jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any
precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history,
from which has been directly derived the judicial
system established here with its lofty ideals by
the Congress of the United States, and which we
have preserved and attempted to improve, or in
our contemporaneous judicial history of more
than half a century? From the citations of those
defending the law, we can not find a case in
which the validity of a similar law had been
sustained, while those against its validity cite,
among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54
NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW,
441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of
Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of
the President which is expressed in his vote of
the original bill and which the postponement of
the contested law respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When
similar laws in other countries had been
promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared
them without force or effect. It is not within our
power to offer a precedent to uphold the disputed
law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have
examined carefully the case that has been cited
to us as a favorable precedent of the law — that
of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of
Appeals of New York revoked the decision of the
Supreme court of that State, denying the petition
of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law
under the provisions of a statute concerning the
school of law of Columbia College promulgated
on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the
Court of Appeals to be consistent with the
Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at
that time provided:
They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any
other office of public trust. All votes for
either of them for any elective office
except that of the Court of Appeals, given
by the Legislature or the people, shall be
void. They shall not exercise any power
of appointment to public office. Any male
citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of
good moral character, and who possesses
the requisite qualifications of learning and
ability, shall be entitled to admission to
practice in all the courts of this State. (p.
93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of
the constitutional precept is as follows:
Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public
officers; the power of appointing them
had previously rested with the judges, and
this was the principal appointing power
which they possessed. The convention
was evidently dissatisfied with the
manner in which this power had been
exercised, and with the restrictions which
the judges had imposed upon admission
to practice before them. The prohibitory
clause in the section quoted was aimed
directly at this power, and the insertion of
the provision" expecting the admission of
attorneys, in this particular section of the
Constitution, evidently arose from its
connection with the object of this
prohibitory clause. There is nothing
indicative of confidence in the courts or
of a disposition to preserve any portion of
their power over this subject, unless the
Supreme Court is right in the inference it
draws from the use of the word
`admission' in the action referred to. It is
urged that the admission spoken of must
be by the court; that to admit means to
grant leave, and that the power of granting
necessarily implies the power of refusing,
and of course the right of determining
whether the applicant possesses the
requisite qualifications to entitle him to
admission.
These positions may all be conceded,
without affecting the validity of the act.
(p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860,
the decision seems to indicate that it provided
that the possession of a diploma of the school of
law of Columbia College conferring the degree
of Bachelor of Laws was evidence of the legal
qualifications that the constitution required of
applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision
does not however quote the text of the law, which
we cannot find in any public or accessible private
library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law
consistent with the Constitution of New York,
the Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:
The motive for passing the act in question
is apparent. Columbia College being an
institution of established reputation, and
having a law department under the charge
of able professors, the students in which
department were not only subjected to a
formal examination by the law committee
of the institution, but to a certain definite
period of study before being entitled to a
diploma of being graduates, the
Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly,
considered this examination, together
with the preliminary study required by the
act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal
requirements, to the ordinary examination
by the court; and as rendering the latter
examination, to which no definite period
of preliminary study was essential,
unnecessary and burdensome.
The act was obviously passed with
reference to the learning and ability of the
applicant, and for the mere purpose of
substituting the examination by the law
committee of the college for that of the
court. It could have had no other object,
and hence no greater scope should be
given to its provisions. We cannot
suppose that the Legislature designed
entirely to dispense with the plain and
explicit requirements of the Constitution;
and the act contains nothing whatever to
indicate an intention that the authorities of
the college should inquire as to the age,
citizenship, etc., of the students before
granting a diploma. The only rational
interpretation of which the act admits is,
that it was intended to make the college
diploma competent evidence as to the
legal attainments of the applicant, and
nothing else. To this extent alone it
operates as a modification of pre-existing
statutes, and it is to be read in connection
with these statutes and with the
Constitution itself in order to determine
the present condition of the law on the
subject. (p.89)
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Legislature has not taken from the
court its jurisdiction over the question of
admission, that has simply prescribed
what shall be competent evidence in
certain cases upon that question. (p.93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability
of the case of Cooper with that at bar may be
clearly seen. Please note only the following
distinctions:
(1) The law of New York does not require that
any candidate of Columbia College who failed in
the bar examinations be admitted to the practice
of law.
(2) The law of New York according to the very
decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court
its jurisdiction over the question of admission of
attorney at law; in effect, it does not decree the
admission of any lawyer.
(3) The Constitution of New York at that time
and that of the Philippines are entirely different
on the matter of admission of the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been
evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession and their supervision
have been disputably a judicial function and
responsibility. Because of this attribute, its
continuous and zealous possession and exercise
by the judicial power have been demonstrated
during more than six centuries, which certainly
"constitutes the most solid of titles." Even
considering the power granted to Congress by
our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the
rules promulgated by this Court regarding the
admission to the practice of law, to our judgment
and proposition that the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at
law is a legislative function, properly belonging
to Congress, is unacceptable. The function
requires (1) previously established rules and
principles, (2) concrete facts, whether past or
present, affecting determinate individuals. and
(3) decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a
judicial function of the highest degree. And it
becomes more undisputably judicial, and not
legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the
petitions of these same individuals are attempted
to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from
which ours has been derived, the act of
admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession
is concededly judicial. A comprehensive and
conscientious study of this matter had been
undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon
(1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a
legislative enactment providing that Cannon be
permitted to practice before the courts was
discussed. From the text of this decision we
quote the following paragraphs:
This statute presents an assertion of
legislative power without parallel in the
history of the English speaking people so
far as we have been able to ascertain.
There has been much uncertainty as to the
extent of the power of the Legislature to
prescribe the ultimate qualifications of
attorney at law has been expressly
committed to the courts, and the act of
admission has always been regarded as a
judicial function. This act purports to
constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law,
and in this respect it stands alone as an
assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)
Under the Constitution all legislative
power is vested in a Senate and Assembly.
(Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the
prescribing
of
qualifications
for
admission to the bar are legislative in
character, the Legislature is acting within
its constitutional authority when it sets up
and prescribes such qualifications. (p.
444)
But when the Legislature has prescribed
those qualifications which in its judgment
will serve the purpose of legitimate
legislative solicitude, is the power of the
court to impose other and further
exactions and qualifications foreclosed or
exhausted? (p. 444)
Under our Constitution the judicial and
legislative departments are distinct,
independent, and coordinate branches of
the government. Neither branch enjoys all
the powers of sovereignty which properly
belongs to its department. Neither
department should so act as to embarrass
the other in the discharge of its respective
functions. That was the scheme and
thought of the people setting upon the
form of government under which we
exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525;
Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs.
Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
The judicial department of government is
responsible for the plane upon which the
administration of justice is maintained. Its
responsibility in this respect is exclusive.
By committing a portion of the powers of
sovereignty to the judicial department of
our state government, under 42a scheme
which it was supposed rendered it
immune
from embarrassment
or
interference by any other department of
government, the courts cannot escape
responsibility fir the manner in which the
powers of sovereignty thus committed to
the judicial department are exercised. (p.
445)
The relation at the bar to the courts is a
peculiar and intimate relationship. The
bar is an attache of the courts. The quality
of justice dispense by the courts depends
in no small degree upon the integrity of its
bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring
scandal
and
reproach
to
the
administration of justice and bring the
courts themselves into disrepute. (p.445)
Through all time courts have exercised a
direct and severe supervision over their
bars, at least in the English speaking
countries. (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court
ends thus:
Our conclusion may be epitomized as
follows: For more than six centuries prior
to the adoption of our Constitution, the
courts
of
England,
concededly
subordinate to Parliament since the
Revolution of 1688, had exercise the right
of determining who should be admitted to
the practice of law, which, as was said in
Matter of the Sergeant's at Law, 6
Bingham's New Cases 235, "constitutes
the most solid of all titles." If the courts
and judicial power be regarded as an
entity, the power to determine who should
be admitted to practice law is a
constituent element of that entity. It may
be difficult to isolate that element and say
with assurance that it is either a part of the
inherent power of the court, or an
essential element of the judicial power
exercised by the court, but that it is a
power belonging to the judicial entity and
made of not only a sovereign institution,
but made of it a separate independent, and
coordinate branch of the government.
They took this institution along with the
power traditionally exercise to determine
who should constitute its attorney at law.
There is no express provision in the
Constitution which indicates an intent that
this traditional power of the judicial
department should in any manner be
subject to legislative control. Perhaps the
dominant thought of the framers of our
constitution was to make the three great
departments of government separate and
independent of one another. The idea that
the Legislature might embarrass the
judicial department by prescribing
inadequate qualifications for attorneys at
law is inconsistent with the dominant
purpose of making the judicial
independent of the legislative department,
and such a purpose should not be inferred
in the absence of express constitutional
provisions. While the legislature may
legislate with respect to the qualifications
of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its
general and unquestioned power to
protect the public interest. When it does
legislate a fixing a standard of
qualifications required of attorneys at law
in order that public interests may be
protected, such qualifications do not
constitute only a minimum standard and
limit the class from which the court must
make its selection. Such legislative
qualifications do not constitute the
ultimate qualifications beyond which the
court cannot go in fixing additional
qualifications deemed necessary by the
course of the proper administration of
judicial functions. There is no legislative
power to compel courts to admit to their
bars persons deemed by them unfit to
exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at
law. (p. 450)
Furthermore, it is an unlawful attempt to
exercise the power of appointment. It is
quite likely true that the legislature may
exercise the power of appointment when
it is in pursuance of a legislative
functions. However, the authorities are
well-nigh unanimous that the power to
admit attorneys to the practice of law is a
judicial function. In all of the states,
except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N.J.
Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our
investigation reveals, attorneys receive
their formal license to practice law by
their admission as members of the bar of
the court so admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex
parte Secombre, 19 How. 9,15 L. Ed.
565; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.
Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 53,
19 L. Ed. 285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48
Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519;
Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N.W.
1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann.
Cas. 413.
The power of admitting an attorney to
practice having been perpetually
exercised by the courts, it having been so
generally held that the act of the court in
admitting an attorney to practice is the
judgment of the court, and an attempt as
this on the part of the Legislature to confer
such right upon any one being most
exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear
that the licensing of an attorney is and
always has been a purely judicial
function, no matter where the power to
determine the qualifications may reside.
(p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, in answering a consultation of
the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
It is indispensible to the administration of
justice and to interpretation of the laws
that there be members of the bar of
sufficient ability, adequate learning and
sound moral character. This arises from
the need of enlightened assistance to the
honest, and restraining authority over the
knavish, litigant. It is highly important,
also that the public be protected from
incompetent and vicious practitioners,
whose opportunity for doing mischief is
wide. It was said by Cardoz, C.L., in
People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.Y.
456, 470, 471, 162 N.E. 487, 489, 60
A.L.R. 851: "Membership in the bar is a
privilege burden with conditions." One is
admitted to the bar "for something more
than private gain." He becomes an
"officer of the court", and ,like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to advance
the end of justice. His cooperation with
the court is due "whenever justice would
be imperiled if cooperation was
withheld." Without such attorneys at law
the judicial department of government
would be hampered in the performance of
its duties. That has been the history of
attorneys under the common law, both in
this country and England. Admission to
practice as an attorney at law is almost
without exception conceded to be a
judicial function. Petition to that end is
filed in courts, as are other proceedings
invoking judicial action. Admission to the
bar is accomplish and made open and
notorious by a decision of the court
entered upon
its
records. The
establishment by the Constitution of the
judicial department conferred authority
necessary to the exercise of its powers as
a coordinate department of government. It
is an inherent power of such a department
of government ultimately to determine the
qualifications of those to be admitted to
practice in its courts, for assisting in its
work, and to protect itself in this respect
from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient
learning, and those not possessing good
moral character. Chief Justice Taney
stated succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed.
565, "It has been well settled, by the rules
and practice of common-law courts, that
it rests exclusively with the court to
determine who is qualified to become one
of its officers, as an attorney and
counselor, and for what cause he ought to
be removed." (p.727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively
filed a petition to secure license to practice the
legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In
re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall,
333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court, holding the
test oath for attorneys to be
unconstitutional, explained the nature of
the attorney's office as follows: "They are
officers of the court, admitted as such by
its order, upon evidence of their
possessing sufficient legal learning and
fair private character. It has always been
the general practice in this country to
obtain this evidence by an examination of
the parties. In this court the fact of the
admission of such officers in the highest
court of the states to which they,
respectively, belong for, three years
preceding their application, is regarded as
sufficient evidence of the possession of
the requisite legal learning, and the
statement of counsel moving their
admission sufficient evidence that their
private and professional character is fair.
The order of admission is the judgment of
the court that the parties possess the
requisite qualifications as attorneys and
counselors, and are entitled to appear as
such and conduct causes therein. From its
entry the parties become officers of the
court, and are responsible to it for
professional misconduct. They hold their
office during good behavior, and can only
be deprived of it for misconduct
ascertained and declared by the judgment
of the court after opportunity to be heard
has been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron,
admission or their exclusion is not the
exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is
the exercise of judicial power, and has
been so held in numerous cases. It was so
held by the court of appeals of New York
in the matter of the application of Cooper
for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81.
"Attorneys and Counselors", said that
court, "are not only officers of the court,
but officers whose duties relate almost
exclusively to proceedings of a judicial
nature; and hence their appointment may,
with propriety, be entrusted to the court,
and the latter, in performing his duty, may
very justly considered as engaged in the
exercise of their appropriate judicial
functions." (pp. 650-651).
We quote from other cases, the following
pertinent portions:
Admission to practice of law is almost
without exception conceded everywhere
to be the exercise of a judicial function,
and this opinion need not be burdened
with citations in this point. Admission to
practice have also been held to be the
exercise of one of the inherent powers of
the court. — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472,
172 Pac. 906.
Admission to the practice of law is the
exercise of a judicial function, and is an
inherent power of the court. — A.C.
Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California,
281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power
of Legislature respecting admission to
bar, 65, A.L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear
distinction between the functions of the judicial
and legislative departments of the government.
The distinction between the functions of
the legislative and the judicial
departments is that it is the province of the
legislature to establish rules that shall
regulate and govern in matters of
transactions occurring subsequent to the
legislative action, while the judiciary
determines rights and obligations with
reference to transactions that are past or
conditions that exist at the time of the
exercise of judicial power, and the
distinction is a vital one and not subject to
alteration or change either by legislative
action or by judicial decree.
The judiciary cannot consent that its
province shall be invaded by either of the
other departments of the government. —
16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, p. 229.
If the legislature cannot thus indirectly
control the action of the courts by
requiring of them construction of the law
according to its own views, it is very plain
it cannot do so directly, by settling aside
their judgments, compelling them to grant
new trials, ordering the discharge of
offenders, or directing what particular
steps shall be taken in the progress of a
judicial
inquiry.
—
Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in
the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general
average of 70 per cent without falling below 50
per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to
the practice of law, the disputed law is not a
legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment
revoking those promulgated by this Court during
the aforecited year affecting the bar candidates
concerned; and although this Court certainly can
revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable
reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court,
and not the legislative nor executive department,
that may be so. Any attempt on the part of any of
these departments would be a clear usurpation of
its functions, as is the case with the law in
question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress
the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rule
promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the
admission to the practice of law, is no valid
argument. Section 13, article VIII of the
Constitution provides:
Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have
the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice
of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading,
practice and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared
Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the
same. The Congress shall have the power
to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines. —
Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII,
sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not
conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal
responsibilities concerning the admission to the
practice of law. the primary power and
responsibility which the Constitution recognizes
continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress
found that this Court has not promulgated any
rule on the matter, it would have nothing over
which to exercise the power granted to it.
Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the
rules promulgated by this Court, but the
authority and responsibility over the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law and their supervision remain
vested in the Supreme Court. The power to
repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not
signify nor permit that Congress substitute or
take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of
its primary power on the matter. The
Constitution does not say nor mean that
Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate
directly attorneys at law, or a determinate group
of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is
limited to repeal, modify or supplement the
existing rules on the matter, if according to its
judgment the need for a better service of the legal
profession requires it. But this power does not
relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit,
suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and
supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the
power to promulgate and enforce rules for the
admission to the practice of law and the
concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement
them may and should be exercised with the
respect that each owes to the other, giving careful
consideration to the responsibility which the
nature of each department requires. These
powers have existed together for centuries
without diminution on each part; the harmonious
delimitation being found in that the legislature
may and should examine if the existing rules on
the admission to the Bar respond to the demands
which public interest requires of a Bar endowed
with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of
appeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up
any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial
power, which has the inherent responsibility for
a good and efficient administration of justice and
the supervision of the practice of the legal
profession, should consider these reforms as the
minimum standards for the elevation of the
profession, and see to it that with these reforms
the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise
of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending,
disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is
realized. They are powers which, exercise within
their proper constitutional limits, are not
repugnant, but rather complementary to each
other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that
would respond to the increasing and exacting
necessities of the administration of justice.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37,
illustrates our criterion. Guariña took
examination and failed by a few points to obtain
the general average. A recently enacted law
provided that one who had been appointed to the
position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice
of law without a previous examination. The
Government appointed Guariña and he
discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote
province. This tribunal refused to give his license
without previous examinations. The court said:
Relying upon the provisions of section 2
of Act No. 1597, the applicant in this case
seeks admission to the bar, without taking
the prescribed examination, on the ground
that he holds the office of provincial fiscal
for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted
February 28, 1907, is as follows:
Sec. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen
of Act Numbered One Hundred and
ninety, entitled "An Act providing a Code
of Procedure in Civil Actions and Special
Proceedings in the Philippine Islands," is
hereby amended to read as follows:
1. Those who have been duly licensed
under the laws and orders of the Islands
under the sovereignty of Spain or of the
United States and are in good and regular
standing as members of the bar of the
Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this code; Provided, That any
person who, prior to the passage of this
act, or at any time thereafter, shall have
held, under the authority of the United
States, the position of justice of the
Supreme Court, judge of the Court of
First Instance, or judge or associate judge
of the Court of Land Registration, of the
Philippine Islands, or the position of
Attorney General, Solicitor General,
Assistant Attorney General, assistant
attorney in the office of the Attorney
General, prosecuting attorney for the City
of Manila, city attorney of Manila,
assistant city attorney of Manila,
provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro
Province, or assistant attorney for the
Moro Province, may be licensed to
practice law in the courts of the Philippine
Islands without an examination, upon
motion before the Supreme Court and
establishing such fact to the satisfaction
of said court.
The records of this court disclose that on
a former occasion this appellant took, and
failed to pass the prescribed examination.
The report of the examining board, dated
March 23, 1907, shows that he received
an average of only 71 per cent in the
various branches of legal learning upon
which he was examined, thus falling four
points short of the required percentage of
75. We would be delinquent in the
performance of our duty to the public and
to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative
indication of the deficiency of the
applicant in the required qualifications of
learning in the law at the time when he
presented his former application for
admission to the bar, we should grant him
license to practice law in the courts of
these Islands, without first satisfying
ourselves that despite his failure to pass
the examination on that occasion, he now
"possesses the necessary qualifications of
learning and ability."
But it is contented that under the
provisions of the above-cited statute the
applicant is entitled as of right to be
admitted to the bar without taking the
prescribed examination "upon motion
before the Supreme Court" accompanied
by satisfactory proof that he has held and
now holds the office of provincial fiscal
of the Province of Batanes. It is urged that
having in mind the object which the
legislator apparently sought to attain in
enacting the above-cited amendment to
the earlier statute, and in view of the
context generally and especially of the
fact that the amendment was inserted as a
proviso in that section of the original Act
which specifically provides for the
admission of certain candidates without
examination. It is contented that this
mandatory construction is imperatively
required in order to give effect to the
apparent intention of the legislator, and to
the candidate's claim de jure to have the
power exercised.
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902
of the Congress of the United States, articles 2,
16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16
of Act 190, the Court continued:
Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred
upon this court by the commission and
confirmed to it by the Act of Congress
would be limited and restricted, and in a
case such as that under consideration
wholly destroyed, by giving the word
"may," as used in the above citation from
Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any
Act of Congress prescribing, defining or
limiting the power conferred upon the
commission is to that extent invalid and
void, as transcending its rightful limits
and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those
who were appointed to the positions enumerated,
and with particular emphasis in the case of
Guariña, the Court held:
In the various cases wherein applications
for the admission to the bar under the
provisions of this statute have been
considered heretofore, we have accepted
the fact that such appointments had been
made as satisfactory evidence of the
qualifications of the applicant. But in all
of those cases we had reason to believe
that the applicants had been practicing
attorneys prior to the date of their
appointment.
In the case under consideration, however,
it affirmatively appears that the applicant
was not and never had been practicing
attorney in this or any other jurisdiction
prior to the date of his appointment as
provincial fiscal, and it further
affirmatively appears that he was
deficient in the required qualifications at
the time when he last applied for
admission to the bar.
In the light of this affirmative proof of his
defieciency on that occasion, we do not
think that his appointment to the office of
provincial fiscal is in itself satisfactory
proof if his possession of the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability. We
conclude therefore that this application
for license to practice in the courts of the
Philippines, should be denied.
In view, however, of the fact that when he
took the examination he fell only four
points short of the necessary grade to
entitle him to a license to practice; and in
view also of the fact that since that time
he has held the responsible office of the
governor of the Province of Sorsogon and
presumably gave evidence of such
marked ability in the performance of the
duties of that office that the Chief
Executive, with the consent and approval
of the Philippine Commission, sought to
retain him in the Government service by
appointing him to the office of provincial
fiscal, we think we would be justified
under the above-cited provisions of Act
No. 1597 in waiving in his case the
ordinary examination prescribed by
general rule, provided he offers
satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in
a special examination which will be given
him by a committee of the court upon his
application therefor, without prejudice to
his right, if he desires so to do, to present
himself at any of the ordinary
examinations prescribed by general rule.
— (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power
to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to
fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the case of Day
and Cannon, has been found also to suffer from
the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and
that if it has intended to make a classification, it
is arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21,
1899 required of the Supreme Court, until
December 31 of that year, to grant license for the
practice of law to those students who began
studying before November 4, 1897, and had
studied for two years and presented a diploma
issued by a school of law, or to those who had
studied in a law office and would pass an
examination, or to those who had studied for
three years if they commenced their studies after
the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court
declared that this law was unconstitutional being,
among others, a class legislation. The Court said:
This is an application to this court for
admission to the bar of this state by virtue
of diplomas from law schools issued to
the applicants. The act of the general
assembly passed in 1899, under which the
application is made, is entitled "An act to
amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act
to revise the law in relation to attorneys
and counselors," approved March 28,
1884, in force July 1, 1874." The
amendment, so far as it appears in the
enacting clause, consists in the addition to
the section of the following: "And every
application for a license who shall comply
with the rules of the supreme court in
regard to admission to the bar in force at
the time such applicant commend the
study of law, either in a law or office or a
law school or college, shall be granted a
license under this act notwithstanding any
subsequent changes in said rules". — In
re Day et al, 54 N.Y., p. 646.
. . . After said provision there is a double
proviso, one branch of which is that up to
December 31, 1899, this court shall grant
a license of admittance to the bar to the
holder of every diploma regularly issued
by any law school regularly organized
under the laws of this state, whose regular
course of law studies is two years, and
requiring an attendance by the student of
at least 36 weeks in each of such years,
and showing that the student began the
study of law prior to November 4, 1897,
and accompanied with the usual proofs of
good moral character. The other branch of
the proviso is that any student who has
studied law for two years in a law office,
or part of such time in a law office, "and
part in the aforesaid law school," and
whose course of study began prior to
November 4, 1897, shall be admitted
upon a satisfactory examination by the
examining board in the branches now
required by the rules of this court. If the
right to admission exists at all, it is by
virtue of the proviso, which, it is claimed,
confers substantial rights and privileges
upon the persons named therein, and
establishes rules of legislative creation for
their admission to the bar. (p. 647.)
Considering the proviso, however, as an
enactment, it is clearly a special
legislation, prohibited by the constitution,
and invalid as such. If the legislature had
any right to admit attorneys to practice in
the courts and take part in the
administration of justice, and could
prescribe the character of evidence which
should be received by the court as
conclusive of the requisite learning and
ability of persons to practice law, it could
only be done by a general law, persons or
classes of persons. Const. art 4, section 2.
The right to practice law is a privilege,
and a license for that purpose makes the
holder an officer of the court, and confers
upon him the right to appear for litigants,
to argue causes, and to collect fees
therefor, and creates certain exemptions,
such as from jury services and arrest on
civil process while attending court. The
law conferring such privileges must be
general in its operation. No doubt the
legislature, in framing an enactment for
that purpose, may classify persons so long
as the law establishing classes in general,
and has some reasonable relation to the
end sought. There must be some
difference which furnishes a reasonable
basis for different one, having no just
relation to the subject of the legislation.
Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 Ill.
66, 35 N.E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 Ill.
98, 40 N.E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis,
165 U.S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
The length of time a physician has
practiced, and the skill acquired by
experience, may furnish a basis for
classification (Williams vs. People 121
Ill. 48, II N.E. 881); but the place where
such physician has resided and practiced
his profession cannot furnish such basis,
and is an arbitrary discrimination, making
an enactment based upon it void (State vs.
Pennyeor, 65 N.E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here
the legislature undertakes to say what
shall serve as a test of fitness for the
profession of the law, and plainly, any
classification must have some reference
to learning, character, or ability to engage
in such practice. The proviso is limited,
first, to a class of persons who began the
study of law prior to November 4, 1897.
This class is subdivided into two classes
— First, those presenting diplomas issued
by any law school of this state before
December 31, 1899; and, second, those
who studied law for the period of two
years in a law office, or part of the time in
a law school and part in a law office, who
are to be admitted upon examination in
the subjects specified in the present rules
of this court, and as to this latter
subdivision there seems to be no limit of
time for making application for
admission. As to both classes, the
conditions of the rules are dispensed with,
and as between the two different
conditions and limits of time are fixed. No
course of study is prescribed for the law
school, but a diploma granted upon the
completion of any sort of course its
managers may prescribe is made allsufficient. Can there be anything with
relation to the qualifications or fitness of
persons to practice law resting upon the
mere date of November 4, 1897, which
will furnish a basis of classification.
Plainly not. Those who began the study of
law November 4th could qualify
themselves to practice in two years as
well as those who began on the 3rd. The
classes named in the proviso need spend
only two years in study, while those who
commenced the next day must spend
three years, although they would
complete two years before the time limit.
The one who commenced on the 3rd. If
possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted
without examination before December
31, 1899, and without any prescribed
course of study, while as to the other the
prescribed course must be pursued, and
the diploma is utterly useless. Such
classification cannot rest upon any natural
reason, or bear any just relation to the
subject sought, and none is suggested.
The proviso is for the sole purpose of
bestowing privileges upon certain defined
persons. (pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs.
Cannon, 240 N.W. 441, where the legislature
attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the
practice of law, the court also held with regards
to its aspect of being a class legislation:
But the statute is invalid for another
reason. If it be granted that the legislature
has power to prescribe ultimately and
definitely the qualifications upon which
courts must admit and license those
applying as attorneys at law, that power
can not be exercised in the manner here
attempted. That power must be exercised
through general laws which will apply to
all alike and accord equal opportunity to
all. Speaking of the right of the
Legislature to exact qualifications of
those desiring to pursue chosen callings,
Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs.
West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct.
232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: "It is
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of
the United States to follow any lawful
calling, business or profession he may
choose, subject only to such restrictions
as are imposed upon all persons of like
age, sex, and condition." This right may
in many respects be considered as a
distinguishing feature of our republican
institutions. Here all vocations are all
open to every one on like conditions. All
may be pursued as sources of livelihood,
some requiring years of study and great
learning for their successful prosecution.
The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed,
the "estate" acquired in them — that is,
the right to continue their prosecution —
is often of great value to the possessors
and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them,
any more than their real or personal
property can be thus taken. It is
fundamental under our system of
government that all similarly situated and
possessing equal qualifications shall
enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes
regulating the practice of medicine,
requiring medications to establish the
possession on the part of the application
of his proper qualifications before he may
be licensed to practice, have been
challenged, and courts have seriously
considered whether the exemption from
such examinations of those practicing in
the state at the time of the enactment of
the
law
rendered
such
law
unconstitutional because of infringement
upon this general principle. State vs.
Thomas Call, 121 N.C. 643, 28 S.E. 517;
see, also, The State ex rel. Winkler vs.
Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N.W. 345;
State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99
N.W. 468.
This law singles out Mr. Cannon and
assumes to confer upon him the right to
practice law and to constitute him an
officer of this Court as a mere matter of
legislative grace or favor. It is not material
that he had once established his right to
practice law and that one time he
possessed the requisite learning and other
qualifications to entitle him to that right.
That fact in no matter affect the power of
the Legislature to select from the great
body of the public an individual upon
whom it would confer its favors.
A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws
1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme
Court to admit to the practice of law
without examination, all who had served
in the military or naval forces of the
United States during the World War and
received a honorable discharge therefrom
and who (were disabled therein or thereby
within the purview of the Act of Congress
approved June 7th, 1924, known as
"World War Veteran's Act, 1924 and
whose disability is rated at least ten per
cent thereunder at the time of the passage
of this Act." This Act was held
|unconstitutional on the ground that it
clearly violated the quality clauses of the
constitution
of
that
state. In
re Application of George W. Humphrey,
178 Minn. 331, 227 N.W. 179.
A good summary of a classification
constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12
Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:
The general rule is well settled by
unanimity of the authorities that a
classification to be valid must rest upon
material differences between the person
included in it and those excluded and,
furthermore, must be based upon
substantial distinctions. As the rule has
sometimes avoided the constitutional
prohibition, must be founded upon
pertinent and real differences, as
distinguished from irrelevant and
artificial ones. Therefore, any law that is
made applicable to one class of citizens
only must be based on some substantial
difference between the situation of that
class and other individuals to which it
does not apply and must rest on some
reason on which it can be defended. In
other words, there must be such a
difference between the situation and
circumstances of all the members of the
class and the situation and circumstances
of all other members of the state in
relation to the subjects of the
discriminatory legislation as presents a
just and natural cause for the difference
made in their liabilities and burdens and
in their rights and privileges. A law is not
general because it operates on all within a
clause unless there is a substantial reason
why it is made to operate on that class
only, and not generally on all. (12 Am.
Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who,
without a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,
have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent
in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per
cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in 1953, and those
will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per
cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the
rules require a minimum general average of 75
per cent, which has been invariably followed
since 1950. Is there any motive of the nature
indicated by the abovementioned authorities, for
this classification ? If there is none, and none has
been given, then the classification is fatally
defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944,
1941 or the years before, with the general
average indicated, were not included because the
Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful
candidates of those years. This fact does not
justify the unexplained classification of
unsuccessful candidates by years, from 19461951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the
exclusion of those who failed before said years
under the same conditions justified. The fact that
this Court has no record of examinations prior to
1946 does not signify that no one concerned may
prove by some other means his right to an equal
consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared
unconstitutional on account of its retroactivity, it
is argued that it is curative, and that in such form
it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972
intend to cure ? Only from 1946 to 1949 were
there cases in which the Tribunal permitted
admission to the bar of candidates who did not
obtain the general average of 75 per cent: in 1946
those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947
and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948,
70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950
to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which
was considered by the Court as equivalent to 75
per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of
circumstances deemed to be sufficiently
justifiable. These changes in the passing
averages during those years were all that could
be objected to or criticized. Now, it is desired to
undo what had been done — cancel the license
that was issued to those who did not obtain the
prescribed 75 per cent ? Certainly not. The
disputed law clearly does not propose to do so.
Concededly, it approves what has been done by
this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is that
the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained
by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952
as sufficient to qualify them to practice law.
Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment
of the Court that is being cured, and to complete
the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the
disputed law is being extended up to the years
1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the
general average by one per cent, with the order
that said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This
purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best
proof that what the law attempts to amend and
correct are not the rules promulgated, but the will
or judgment of the Court, by means of simply
taking its place. This is doing directly what the
Tribunal should have done during those years
according to the judgment of Congress. In other
words, the power exercised was not to repeal,
alter or supplement the rules, which continue in
force. What was done was to stop or suspend
them. And this power is not included in what the
Constitution has granted to Congress, because it
falls within the power to apply the rules. This
power corresponds to the judiciary, to which
such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial
passing of examinations, at indefinite intervals.
The grave defect of this system is that it does not
take into account that the laws and jurisprudence
are not stationary, and when a candidate finally
receives his certificate, it may happen that the
existing laws and jurisprudence are already
different, seriously affecting in this manner his
usefulness. The system that the said law
prescribes was used in the first bar examinations
of this country, but was abandoned for this and
other disadvantages. In this case, however, the
fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in
the title will have temporary effect only from
1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a
permanent system for an indefinite time. This is
contrary to Section 21 (1), article VI of the
Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2
completely; and because it is inseparable from
article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affect the
entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following
grounds: first, because they are not within the
legislative powers of Congress to enact, or
Congress has exceeded its powers; second,
because they create or establish arbitrary
methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; and third, because their purposes or
effects violate the Constitution or its basic
principles. As has already been seen, the
contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby
declare that Republic Act No. 972 is
unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without
any force nor effect for the following reasons, to
wit:
1. Because its declared purpose is to admit 810
candidates who failed in the bar examinations of
1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly
inadequately prepared to practice law, as was
exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid
years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these
candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the
opportunity to determine if they are at present
already prepared to become members of the Bar.
It obliges the Tribunal to perform something
contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner.
This is a manifest encroachment on the
constitutional responsibility of the Supreme
Court.
2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking
the resolution of this Court on the petitions of
these 810 candidates, without having examined
their respective examination papers, and
although it is admitted that this Tribunal may
reconsider said resolution at any time for
justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other
may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it
directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the
Constitution.
3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded
its legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules on admission to the Bar.
Such additional or amendatory rules are, as they
ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent
to its promulgation and should tend to improve
and elevate the practice of law, and this Tribunal
shall consider these rules as minimum norms
towards that end in the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the
Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely
in the daily performance of judicial functions and
is essential to a worthy administration of justice.
It is therefore the primary and inherent
prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the
ultimate decision on who may be admitted and
may continue in the practice of law according to
existing rules.
4. The reason advanced for the pretended
classification of candidates, which the law
makes, is contrary to facts which are of general
knowledge and does not justify the admission to
the Bar of law students inadequately prepared.
The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is
undoubtedly a class legislation.
5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not
embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what
the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable
from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is
void.
6. Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of
that part of article 1 referring to the examinations
of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as
it concerns the examinations in those years, shall
continue in force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after
hearing and availing of the magnificent and
impassioned discussion of the contested law by
our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the
debate among the members of the Court, and
after hearing the judicious observations of two of
our beloved colleagues who since the beginning
have announced their decision not to take part in
voting, we, the eight members of the Court who
subscribed to this decision have voted and
resolved, and have decided for the Court, and
under the authority of the same:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic
Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of
1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law
are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and
without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight
Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the
examinations subsequent to the approval of the
law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid
and shall continue to be in force, in conformity
with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned
petitions of the candidates who failed in the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are
denied, and (2) all candidates who in the
examinations of 1953 obtained a general average
of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered
as having passed, whether they have filed
petitions for admission or not. After this decision
has become final, they shall be permitted to take
and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar on the date or dates that the
chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo,
Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
ANNEX I
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 972
A resume‚ of pertinent facts concerning the bar
examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:
August, 1946
1
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason,
Chairman, Prof. Gerardo Florendo, Atty.
Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez,
Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty.
Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez Cardenas,
and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members.
Number of candidates
206
Number of candidates
whose grades were raised
12
73'S
6
72'S
6
Number of candidates who
passed
85
Number of candidates who
failed
121
Number of those affected
by Republic Act No. 972
18
Percentage of success
Percentage of failure
Passing grade
(per
cent)
72
November, 1946
Board of Examiners: The same as that of
August, 1946, except Hon. Jose Teodoro who
was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
Number of candidates
481
Number of candidates
whose grades were raised
19
(72 per cent and above 73
per cent --Minutes of March 31,
1947)
Number of candidates who
passed
249
Number of candidates who
failed
228
Number of those affected
by Republic Act No. 972
43
Percentage of success
(per
cent)
52.20
Percentage of failure
(per
cent)
47.80
Passing grade
(per
(By resolution of the cent)
Court).
72
October, 1947
(per
cent)
41.62
(per
cent)
58.74
Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon,
Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty.
Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto
de la Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio
Peña, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Carlos B.
Hilado, Members.
Number of candidates
749
Number of candidates
whose grades were raised
43
70.55 per cent with 2 1
subject below 50 per cent
69 per cent
40
68 per cent
2
Number of candidates who
passed
409
Number of candidates who
failed
340
Number of those affected
by Republic Act No. 972
Number of candidates who
passed
490
Number of candidates who
failed
409
Number of those affected
by Republic Act No. 972
11
Percentage of success
(per
cent)
62.40
Percentage of failure
(per
cent)
37.60
Passing grade
(per
cent)
70
972
Percentage of success
(per
cent)
54.59
Percentage of failure
(per
cent)
45.41
(per
cent)
69
(by resolution of the Court).
Passing grade
August, 1949
(by resolution of the Court).
Note.--In passing the 2 whose grades
were 68.95 per cent and 68.1 per cent
respectively, the Court found out that
they were not benefited at all by the
bonus of 12 points given by the
Examiner in Civil Law.
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla,
Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo, Hon. Enrique
Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor
M. Endencia, Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon.
Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.
Number of candidates
1,218
Number of candidates
whose grades were raised
(74's)
55
Number of candidates who
passed
686
Number of candidates who
failed
532
Number of those affected
by Republic Act No. 972
164
August, 1948
Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R.
Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis P. Torres,
Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr.,
Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta,
Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael
Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.
Number of candidates
899
Number of candidates
whose grades were raised
64
71's
29
70's
35
Percentage of success
(per
cent)
56.28
Percentage of failure
(per
cent)
43.72
Passing grade
(per
cent)
74
(by resolution of the Court).
August, 1950
Board
of
Examiners: Hon.
Fernando
Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara,
Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P.
Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J.
Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor,
Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio
Horrilleno, Members.
2
Number of candidates
Number of candidates who
passed
1,189
Number of candidates who
failed
879
Number of those affected
by Republic Act No. 972
196
Percentage of success
(per
cent)
57.49
Percentage of failure
(per
cent)
42.51
Passing grade
(per
cent)
75
38
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per
cent by recommendation and authority
of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty.
Francisco Delgado).
Number of candidates who
passed
432
Number of candidates who
failed
894
Number of those affected
by Republic Act No. 972
26
(per
cent)
August, 1952
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla,
Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Hon.
Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas,
Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon.
Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty.
Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.
32.14
Number of candidates
2,738
Number of candidates
whose grades were raised
(74's)
163
Number of candidates who
passed
1,705
Number of candidates who
failed
1,033
Number of those affected
by Republic Act No. 972
426
Percentage of failure
(per
cent)
67.86
Passing grade
(per
cent)
75
August, 1951
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo,
Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty.
Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe
Natividad, Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo
Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Alfonso
Felix, Members.
Number of candidates
112
1,316
Number of candidates
whose grades were raised
Percentage of success
Number of candidates
whose grades were raised
(74's)
2,068
Percentage of success
(per
cent)
62.27
Percentage of failure
(per
cent)
37.73
Passing grade
(per
cent)
75
Ci La Me I P Cri Re Le Ge
v. nd rc. nt ol m. m. g. n.
. .
Av
.
August, 1953
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,
Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty.
Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr.,
Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon.
Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon.
Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.
Number of candidates
2,555
Number of candidates
whose grades were raised
(74's)
100
Number of candidates who
passed
1,570
Number of candidates who
failed
986
Number of those affected
by Republic Act No. 972
284
M Agunod, 66 71 61 7 8 83 73 75 71.
RD Filemon
6 0
4
- 1. L.
M Cunanan 76 72 74 7 7 70 65 72 71.
RD , Albino
5 0
45
- 2.
M Mejia, 64 64 65 6 8 74 68 80 69.
RD Flaviano
8 3
85
- 3. V.
1948
Percentage of success
(per
cent)
61.04
Percentage of failure
(per
cent)
38.96
(per
cent)
75
Passing grade
M Orlina, 71 68 66 7 6 75 70 88 69.
RD Soledad
5 3
9
- 4. R.
M Vivero, 75 73 73 6 6 66 65 80 69.
RD Antonio
5 3
95
- 5. Lu.
M Gatchali 72 66 71 7 7 68 65 50 69.
RD an,
5 8
65
- 6. Salud
1949
7.
A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar
under Republic Act No. 972, grouped by the
years in which they took the bar examinations,
with annotations as to who had presented
motions for reconsideration which were denied
(MRD), and who filed mere motions for
reconsideration without invoking said law,
which are still pending, follows:
PETITIONER
UNDER
FLUNKERS' LAW
THE
BAR
Abaya, 69 79 75 7 7 89 55 75 70.
Jesus A.
5 1
8
M Advincu 76 80 62 8 8 72 60 65 70.
RD la, David
6 1
5
- 8. D.
9.
Agravia 63 85 70 7 8 81 65 80 71.
dor,
7 0
8
Alfredo
L.
10. Alacar, 61 63 83 7 7 85 65 80 72.
Pascual
9 1
05
C.
11. Amog,
Pedro
M.
75 66 76 7 8 74 55 85 72.
8 1
2
23. Canda, 75 72 75 8 7 77 65 75 73.
Benjami
2 6
55
n S.
12. Apolinar 75 84 78 7 7 70 60 75 71.
io,
8 0
95
Miguel
S.
24. Canon, 77 86 67 8 7 69 70 85 73.
Guillerm
8 5
9
o
13. Aquino, 82 77 71 7 7 77 60 75 73.
Maximo
7 6
15
G.
14. Asinas, 75 83 69 8 8 83 55 85 72.
Candido
0 1
65
D.
15. Baldivin 75 65 72 8 8 69 60 80 71.
o, Jose
2 2
95
B.
16. Balinton 75 80 64 7 7 67 65 70 70
a,
8 4
Bernard
o
17. Banawa, 78 70 70 7 8 83 60 60 72.
Angel L.
5 1
3
25. Carlos, 75 81 81 7 7 73 65 70 73.
Estela S.
9 2
8
26. Cerezo, 69 76 76 7 7 80 55 80 70.
Gregorio
9 1
4
O.
27. Clarin, 75 82 76 8 7 69 70 75 73.
Manuel
1 3
95
L.
28. Claudo, 76 62 78 7 7 72 60 70 71.
Conrado
7 3
4
O.
29. Condevi 68 65 74 8 8 75 60 75 71.
llamar,
0 5
65
Antonio
V.
18. Bandala, 66 80 66 7 9 72 55 70 69.
Anacleto
1 3
6
A.
M Cornejo, 72 75 69 8 8 79 65 80 73.
RD Crisanto
2 3
4
R.
30.
19. Bandon, 74 79 69 7 9 73 60 80 73.
Alawadi
7 1
35
n L.
31. Corona, 68 76 73 8 8 72 60 75 71.
Olvido
1 1
15
D.
20. Baquero, 76 79 64 7 8 72 65 75 72.
Benjami
7 5
5
n
32. Dizon, 76 86 69 8 7 74 65 80 73.
Marcial
3 5
1
C.
21. Blanco, 75 75 70 7 7 76 60 90 72.
Jose
5 7
5
33. Enriquez 75 77 70 8 8 77 65 80 73.
, Agustin
1 1
75
P.
22. Buenalu 75 71 72 7 6 82 60 75 70.
z,
8 7
85
Victoria
no T.
34. Espiritu, 80 88 69 7 7 77 65 75 73.
Irineo E.
5 6
8
35. Fernand 63 82 76 7 8 84 65 75 72.
ez,
5 1
95
Macario
J.
48. Jocom,
Jacobo
M.
36. Gallardo 78 79 67 7 7 75 60 65 70.
,
7 6
95
Amando
C.
37. Garcia, 76 80 66 7 7 70 60 75 69.
Freidric
5 2
7
h M.
38. Garcia, 64 77 68 8 8 77 65 75 72.
Julian L.
2 9
15
39. Garcia,
Leon
Mo.
77 86 71 8 6 82 65 75 71.
0 0
85
40. Garcia, 76 82 73 8 7 83 60 85 73.
Pedro V.
1 4
6
41. Garcia, 62 91 79 7 7 75 65 80 71.
Santiago
5 2
8
C.
42. Genoves 75 83 70 7 8 76 55 80 72.
, Pedro
8 7
7
77 77 74 7 7 64 55 85 70.
7 4
65
49. Juares, 77 84 56 7 7 82 60 85 70
Nicolas
6 3
50. Kalalang 65 75 74 8 7 70 65 85 70.
,
0 0
3
Remigio
51. Layuma 67 84 65 7 8 66 60 80 70.
s,
5 9
3
Vicente
L.
52. Leyson, 69 83 75 7 8 75 65 75 73.
Amanci
6 1
15
o F.
53. Libanan, 71 83 61 7 8 81 65 85 71.
Marcelin
7 0
75
o
54. Lim,
Jose E.
77 77 72 7 7 64 65 70 71.
6 2
15
55. Lim,
Jose F.
70 75 62 8 8 71 65 80 70.
3 0
4
43. Gonzale 75 71 71 7 8 75 60 75 72.
s,
5 6
65
Amado
P.
56. Linao, 66 84 76 7 8 75 60 75 71.
Mariano
8 0
75
M.
44. Guia,
77 76 66 8 7 76 60 75 70.
Odon R.
1 4
9
de
57. Lopez,
Angelo
P.
67 81 75 7 7 81 55 80 71
2 9
45. Fernand 62 68 71 8 7 90 65 75 70.
ez,
0 4
85
Simeon
58. Lopez,
Eliezar
M.
77 75 60 7 7 85 60 75 70.
5 7
7
46. Jakosale 82 83 73 8 6 87 65 70 73.
m,
2 1
6
Filoteo
59. Lopez, 72 71 70 7 7 84 60 75 71.
Nicanor
8 7
55
S.
47. Jesus,
Felipe
D. de
60. Manolet 72 70 65 7 8 90 60 80 71.
o,
8 1
95
Proceso
D.
75 83 67 7 7 85 60 75 72.
9 8
45
61. Mancao, 67 64 71 8 7 76 65 80 70.
Alfredo
3 6
95
P.
74. Pido,
Serafin
C.
62. Manera, 75 78 75 7 6 79 60 65 71
Mariano
5 8
A.
75. Pimentel 77 75 76 8 7 68 55 80 71.
, Luis P.
1 6
6
63. Mercado 67 64 71 8 7 76 65 80 70.
, Arsenio
3 6
95
N.
64. Miranda, 76 81 67 8 7 77 65 80 72.
Benjami
2 4
55
n G.
65. Manad, 77 75 68 8 6 72 65 75 71.
Andres
2 9
15
B.
1948
66. Orosco, 72 84 69 8 7 82 65 75 71.
Casimir
1 0
9
o P.
67. Padua, 76 76 68 8 7 79 50 75 70.
Manuel
0 9
1
C.
68. Palang,
Basilio
S.
71 75 82 7 5 87 55 75 69.
1 5
6
69. Palma, 62 75 69 9 8 79 55 80 69.
Cuadrat
3 0
5
o
70. Pañgani 67 83 61 8 9 74 60 75 70.
ban, Jose
1 1
6
V.
71. Pareja,
Felipe
66 71 75 8 6 74 60 70 68.
1 7
75
72. Patalinju 73 77 78 7 7 71 55 75 71.
g,
3 8
25
Eriberto
73. Paulin,
Jose C.
66 69 71 7 8 82 65 75 72.
7 3
1
72 78 63 8 7 85 70 80 72.
0 1
05
76. Plantilla, 72 78 68 8 7 81 65 85 73.
Rodrigo
9 9
55
C.
77. Regalari 72 80 64 8 7 81 55 80 69.
o, Benito
0 5
55
B.
78. Robis, 62 77 74 7 6 80 70 80 70.
Casto P.
3 8
9
79. Rodil,
68 69 70 8 7 75 65 75 70.
Francisc
1 6
75
o C.
80. Rodrigu 80 75 69 8 7 80 65 80 73.
ez,
0 2
35
Mariano
I.
81. Romero, 78 75 66 7 7 83 65 75 72.
Crispulo
7 6
85
P.
82. Saez,
75 75 72 8 6 77 60 75 71
Porfirio
1 9
D.
83. Saligum 79 79 74 7 6 65 65 70 71.
a,
8 9
8
Crisogo
no D.
84. Samano, 75 84 72 7 7 82 60 75 71.
Fortunat
7 0
9
o A.
85. Santos, 71 68 68 7 7 85 55 75 69.
Faustina
6 5
5
C.
86. Santos, 68 69 76 7 7 82 65 75 72.
Josefina
1 7
3
R.
87. Seludo, 75 80 69 7 7 82 65 75 73.
Ananias
9 7
25
G.
99. Español 71 78 55 7 8 69 65 93 70.
a, Pablo
6 5
2
S.
88. Semilia, 68 85 55 8 8 79 65 80 71.
Rafael I.
3 9
25
100 Foronda, 60 78 68 7 8 88 62 93 71.
.
Clarenci
9 4
9
o J.
89. Telan, 77 79 70 7 7 75 60 75 70.
Gaudenc
5 0
85
io
90. Tesorero 75 71 63 7 8 62 65 63 69.
,
5 2
65
Leocadi
o T.
91. Torre,
85 81 71 7 6 65 55 70 70.
Valentin
6 9
4
S. de la
92. Torres,
Ariston
L.
78 71 72 8 6 84 55 85 70.
1 1
4
93. Veyra, 70 75 71 7 6 80 65 80 70.
Zosimo
9 5
65
C. de
94. Viado,
Jose
67 70 74 7 7 90 55 80 70.
5 5
7
95. Villacarl 73 87 71 8 6 70 75 85 73.
os,
2 9
85
Delfin
A.
96. Villamil, 73 81 76 8 8 73 55 85 73.
Leonor
6 6
6
S.
97. Zabala, 76 70 67 7 7 76 60 75 70.
Amando
5 6
6
A.
101 Hechano 59 76 75 7 6 68 75 96 71.
.
va,
5 9
3
Vicente
M Peñalosa 80 78 61 7 6 77 66 85 70.
RD , Osias
6 1
2
R.
102
.
103 Sarmient 65 86 63 8 8 72 60 72 70.
.
o, Floro
2 9
15
A.
M Torre,
75 85 68 7 6 67 65 69 70.
RD Catalino
8 9
25
P.
104
.
105 Ungson, 61 87 75 7 5 85 83 82 72.
.
Fernand
0 7
8
o S.
1951
106 Abasolo, 77 70 64 6 7 70 76 64 71.
.
Romulo
5 6
7
107 Adeva,
.
Daniel
G.
75 59 74 6 6 51 78 67 70.
5 9
4
108 Aguilar, 73 63 68 7 7 69 75 75 71.
.
Vicente
5 0
25
Z.
1950
M Cruz,
70 71 78 8 7 72 64 96 73.
RD Filomen
1 6
4
o de la
98.
109 Amodia, 75 76 66 7 7 60 77 76 72.
.
Juan T.
5 6
35
M Añosa, 76 78 63 7 7 61 75 79 71.
RD Pablo S.
5 4
6
-
110
.
121 Buela, 72 77 61 7 7 58 79 71 69.
.
Arcadio
0 1
75
P.
111 Antiola, 68 76 75 7 7 70 81 66 73.
.
Anastaci
0 1
05
o R.
112 Aquino, 70 71 71 6 7 62 76 77 71.
.
S. Rey
0 4
1
A.
113 Atienza, 71 78 68 8 8 51 82 75 73.
.
Manuel
0 6
85
G.
114 Avanceñ 71 71 65 7 7 72 78 80 71.
.
a,
5 0
8
Alfonso
M Balacuit, 75 73 75 7 7 65 75 76 73.
RD Camilo
0 2
25
N.
115
.
116 Barinaga 68 69 73 7 7 50 80 79 71.
.
,
0 4
2
Jeremias
L.
M
RD
117
.
Barrient 76 60 67 5 7 63 77 62 70.
os,
5 4
25
Ambrosi
o D.
M Benitez, 67 75 75 6 7 72 75 78 72.
RD Tomas
0 3
2
P.
118
.
119 Biason, 73 82 67 6 6 72 77 68 71.
.
Sixto F.
5 6
25
M Briñas,
RD Isagani
A.
120
.
71 69 74 7 7 52 79 72 71.
0 6
95
122 Cabilao, 73 50 75 7 7 60 71 79 71.
.
Leonard
5 5
25
o S.
123 Cabrera, 75 66 70 6 7 81 70 79 72.
.
Ireneo
5 2
4
M.
124 Cacacho
.
, Emilio
V.
125 Calilung 64 73 73 8 7 57 75 59 69.
.
,
0 3
65
Soledad
C.
M Calimli 64 73 73 8 7 57 75 59 69.
RD m, Jose
0 3
65
B.
126
.
127 Calimli 66 82 69 6 6 52 83 75 70
.
m, Pedro
0 9
B.
128 Camello, 70 77 63 6 7 66 84 64 71.
.
Sotero
5 5
55
H.
129 Campos, 71 88 70 7 6 69 71 62 70.
.
Juan A.
5 4
15
130 Castillo, 78 78 70 6 7 67 69 76 72.
.
Antonio
0 9
65
del
M Castillo, 75 61 72 7 7 71 67 66 71.
RD Domina
5 4
1
dor Ad.
131
.
M Castro, 72 86 72 7 6 75 76 71 72.
RD Jesus B.
5 5
85
-
132
.
133 Casuga, 75 72 72 7 6 61 75 60 70.
.
Bienveni
0 9
95
do B.
134 Cabangb 77 67 61 8 7 59 83 76 72.
.
ang,
0 3
2
Santiago
B.
135 Cruz,
69 74 75 7 6 65 76 70 71.
.
Federico
5 8
65
S.
136 Dacanay 70 73 62 7 7 69 85 71 72.
.
,
5 2
05
Eufemio
P.
137 Deysolo 66 62 72 7 7 62 83 62 70.
.
ng,
5 0
85
Felisbert
o
M Dimaan 78 79 63 7 7 75 81 59 73.
RD o,
Jr.,
5 3
5
Jose N.
138
.
139 Espinosa 78 63 58 7 7 67 87 63 71.
.
,
0 0
6
Doming
o L.
M Farol,
80 78 66 7 8 72 62 73 72.
RD Evencia
5 1
25
C.
140
.
141 Felix,
71 71 75 6 7 58 75 69 70.
.
Conrado
5 0
75
S.
142 Fernan, 67 88 66 8 7 68 78 75 72.
.
Pablo L.
5 3
35
143 Gandioc 64 58 66 6 7 70 89 75 72.
.
o,
5 6
1
Salvador
G.
144 Gastardo 70 69 68 7 7 66 86 72 73.
.
, Crispin
5 8
9
B.
145 Genson, 75 57 73 6 6 54 78 56 69.
.
Angelo
5 7
55
B.
146 Guiani, 68 60 75 6 7 67 75 77 71.
.
Guinald
5 4
5
M.
147 Guina, 66 69 67 6 7 52 83 61 69.
.
Gracian
0 8
6
o P.
M
RD
148
.
Homeres 74 74 75 7 7 69 75 71 73.
,
5 1
35
Praxedes
P.
149 Ibarra, 60 75 74 7 7 70 80 75 71.
.
Venanci
0 4
9
o M.
150 Imperial, 72 78 75 7 7 56 82 77 73.
.
Monico
5 2
7
L.
M
RD
151
.
Ibasco, 71 70 63 8 7 60 85 53 70.
Jr.,
5 1
85
Emilian
o M.
152 Inandan, 77 77 67 5 7 75 79 57 72.
.
Fortunat
3 3
5
o C.
153 Jimenez, 75 70 70 7 7 61 75 78 72.
.
Florenci
5 2
05
o C.
154 Kintanar 70 83 72 6 7 73 75 69 72.
.
,
5 6
95
Woodro
w M.
155 Languid 63 71 63 8 7 61 85 79 70.
.
o, Cesar
5 0
55
V.
156 Lavilles, 61 89 75 5 7 63 75 78 70.
.
Cesar L.
5 3
55
157 Llenos, 64 70 65 6 7 65 92 75 71.
.
Francisc
0 2
75
o U.
158 Leon,
63 73 60 8 7 75 90 70 72.
.
Marcelo
5 5
75
D. de
159 Llanto, 72 68 60 6 7 67 84 68 71.
.
Priscilla
5 6
35
166 Martin, 68 72 63 7 6 63 84 62 70.
.
Benjami
5 9
1
n S.
M
RD
167
.
Monterr 70 80 75 8 7 66 82 51 73.
oyo,
0 6
95
Catalina
S.
M
RD
168
.
Montero 73 67 66 8 8 65 81 75 73.
,
0 1
75
Leodega
rio C.
169 Monzon, 70 72 74 7 6 70 77 69 72.
.
Candido
5 7
05
T.
160 Machac 68 59 78 7 6 57 75 75 70.
.
hor,
0 7
15
Oscar
170 Nativida 73 79 68 6 7 69 75 79 72.
.
d,
5 3
2
Alberto
M.
M
RD
161
.
Magsino 77 66 70 7 7 71 75 61 72.
,
0 6
75
Encarna
cion
M Navallo, 70 72 68 8 8 66 71 74 72.
RD Capistra
5 1
1
no C.
171
.
M
RD
162
.
Maligay 70 61 75 6 7 50 91 51 72.
a,
5 5
3
Demetri
o M.
172 Nisce,
.
Camilo
Z.
163 Manio, 67 67 69 8 7 67 75 75 70.
.
Gregorio
0 1
65
164 Puzon, 72 82 60 6 6 70 68 72 62.
.
Eduardo
0 9
05
S.
M Marcial, 66 75 74 7 7 67 81 75 73.
RD Meynard
0 5
15
o R.
165
.
66 66 75 6 7 68 85 62 73.
5 9
5
M Ocampo, 75 81 76 6 7 67 75 69 73.
RD Antonio
5 4
75
F. de
173
.
174 Olaviar, 72 70 69 5 6 70 77 75 70.
.
Jose O.
5 6
5
M Perez,
75 76 66 8 7 63 82 69 72.
RD Cesario
0 2
95
Z.
175
.
176 Pogado, 70 66 65 7 7 64 75 70 69.
.
Causin
0 5
95
O.
188 Foz,
75 72 75 7 6 70 76 64 72.
.
Julita A.
5 5
5
177 Ramos- 75 73 62 6 7 59 75 66 70.
.
Balmori,
5 8
2
Manuela
189 Santa
77 69 65 7 8 75 70 75 73
.
Ana,
5 1
Candido
T.
178 Recinto, 73 76 68 7 7 68 80 53 72.
.
Ireneo I.
5 4
3
190 Santos, 72 66 69 6 6 70 81 71 71.
.
Aquilino
5 8
7
M Redor, 62 77 73 7 6 64 76 69 70
RD Francisc
5 9
o K.
179
.
191 Santos, 76 72 75 7 6 62 76 79 73.
.
Valerian
5 8
1
o V.
M Regis, 76 74 68 6 6 65 88 75 73.
RD Deograc
5 5
35
ias A.
180
.
181 Rigor,
.
Estelita
C.
67 78 61 8 7 77 79 65 70.
0 1
9
M Rimorin 70 72 62 6 8 66 67 79 70.
RD -Gordo,
0 8
15
Estela
182
.
183 Rosario, 70 64 70 7 7 73 85 57 72.
.
Prisco
0 2
65
del
184 Rosario, 75 91 65 7 6 68 79 62 72.
.
Vicente
5 8
2
D. del
185 Saavedr 73 80 63 7 7 73 68 62 70.
.
a, Felipe
5 6
35
186 Salazar, 66 72 73 7 6 68 77 69 70.
.
Alfredo
5 7
85
N.
187 Salem, 77 81 72 6 7 60 76 75 73
.
Romulo
5 3
R.
192 Suico,
.
Samuel
73 79 72 7 7 59 84 65 73.
5 1
3
193 Suson, 74 68 66 8 6 59 79 67 70.
.
Teodoric
0 6
35
o
194 Tado,
64 76 67 6 7 72 76 53 69.
.
Florenti
5 6
7
no P.
195 Tapayan 69 72 69 7 7 73 82 79 73.
.
,
0 6
75
Doming
o A.
M
67 60 71 7 7 67 84 60 72.
RD Tiausas,
5 9
7
Miguel
196 V.
.
197 Torres, 68 71 71 7 7 63 82 71 71.
.
Carlos P.
0 0
6
198 Tria,
69 72 75 6 6 54 78 66 70.
.
Hipolito
0 9
05
199 Velasco, 65 72 75 7 7 67 78 76 72.
.
Avelino
5 1
1
A.
200 Villa,
65 80 73 7 6 79 65 75 70.
.
Francisc
5 8
2
o C.
201 Villagon 78 67 74 6 7 51 69 71 70.
.
zalo, Job
5 2
25
R.
202 Villaram 75 74 75 5 7 66 67 75 71.
.
a,
Jr.,
5 5
45
Pedro
211 Arcange 75 85 71 7 7 65 68 65 71.
.
l,
3 6
85
Agustin
Ag.
212 Acosta, 75 81 78 8 5 65 77 70 72.
.
Dionisio
7 6
8
N.
1952
203 Abacon, 75 72 78 8 7 72 64 55 72.
.
Pablo
1 8
7
M Abad,
73 76 73 8 7 63 62 75 70.
RP Agapito
5 5
95
204
.
M Abella, 70 81 76 8 7 66 77 58 72.
RP Ludovic
1 0
7
o B.
205
.
M
RP
206
.
Abellera 75 79 79 8 7 51 63 70 71.
,
7 6
7
Geronim
o F.
M
RP
207
.
Abenoja 71 72 78 8 7 75 69 70 72.
r,
4 0
9
Agapito
N.
208 Alandy, 64 83 93 9 6 59 60 60 71.
.
Doroteo
1 8
2
R.
209 Alano,
.
Fabian
T.
70 83 61 8 7 87 72 70 71.
3 2
9
M Alcantar 71 79 80 8 7 70 72 62 73.
RP a, Pablo
1 3
65
V.
210
.
M
RP
213
.
Abingun 66 85 80 8 7 58 76 75 73.
a,
4 5
65
Agapito
C.
214 Adove, 76 86 78 7 6 78 69 62 73.
.
Nehemia
7 6
55
s C.
215 Adrias, 75 83 61 8 7 67 79 75 73.
.
Inocenci
8 6
4
o C.
216 Aglugub 75 83 73 8 7 62 72 62 72.
.
, Andres
8 2
65
R.
217 Andrada 76 85 66 8 6 77 75 77 73.
.
,
7 3
Mariano
L.
M Almeda, 72 72 75 8 6 67 73 65 70.
RP Serafin
1 1
75
V.
218
.
219 Almonte 73 71 72 9 7 67 65 53 70.
.
-Peralta,
1 5
7
Felicida
d
M Amodia, 75 79 68 8 6 64 75 78 71.
RP Juan T.
5 2
4
220
.
M Antonio, 71 76 81 8 7 52 72 70 73.
RP Felino
3 9
3
A.
221
.
M Antonio, 75 92 90 6 6 64 68 60 73.
RP Jose S.
8 5
75
222
.
223 Añonue 71 87 78 8 6 63 74 76 72.
.
vo,
1 4
7
Ramos
B.
224 Aquino, 67 77 57 7 6 70 69 80 67.
.
S. Rey
8 9
7
A.
225 Arteche, 78 83 50 8 7 77 70 70 70.
.
Filomen
9 6
8
o D.
M Arribas, 75 78 70 8 7 70 67 78 72.
RP Isaac M.
1 3
2
226
.
M
RP
227
.
Azucena 72 67 78 8 7 67 77 65 73.
,
9 2
95
Ceferino
D.
228 Atienza, 72 87 70 7 6 55 75 75 70.
.
Ricardo
9 6
85
231 Balcita, 75 77 79 9 6 60 67 50 70.
.
Oscar C.
0 4
65
232 Barilea, 71 67 82 7 6 61 65 80 70.
.
Domina
7 4
5
dor Z.
M Banta,
RP Jose Y.
233
.
M
RP
234
.
75 80 77 8 7 63 71 75 73.
1 5
95
Barrient 76 70 67 8 6 65 70 81 70.
os,
0 7
7
Ambrosi
o D.
235 Batucan, 66 76 78 8 6 76 67 78 71.
.
Jose M.
8 2
2
236 Bautista, 70 82 84 8 5 61 71 62 71.
.
Atilano
5 8
25
C.
237 Bautista, 71 68 63 8 8 67 80 70 72.
.
Celso J.
7 0
75
238 Beldero 76 81 76 9 7 66 67 62 72.
.
n, Jose
2 0
65
M Belo,
RP Victor
B.
239
.
76 77 64 7 7 71 76 76 72.
3 5
85
229 Balacuit, 75 78 89 7 7 54 66 75 73.
.
Camilo
5 0
3
N.
M Bejec, 79 80 73 8 6 77 75 50 73.
RP Conceso
2 3
15
D.
240
.
M Baclig, 77 84 83 8 6 70 61 65 73
RP Cayetan
0 9
o S.
230
.
M Beltran, 72 75 81 7 7 57 75 80 73.
RP Gervasio
3 5
95
M.
241
.
M
RP
242
.
Benaoja 74 84 77 8 7 63 68 62 72.
n,
4 5
85
Robustia
no O.
M Beriña, 70 80 79 7 6 72 64 78 71.
RP Roger C.
9 8
85
243
.
M Bihis,
75 86 65 9 6 64 84 75 73.
RP Marcelo
2 4
45
M.
244
.
M Binaoro, 73 69 78 8 7 59 70 82 72.
RP Vicente
3 3
75
M.
245
.
M Bobila, 76 86 76 8 6 59 71 78 73.
RP Rosalio
3 8
05
B.
246
.
247 Buenafe, 78 80 75 7 7 55 72 80 72.
.
Avelina
5 0
75
R.
248 Bueno, 73 78 71 7 7 67 71 60 71.
.
Anastaci
8 1
15
o F.
249 Borres, 67 85 62 9 7 63 76 80 70.
.
Maximi
1 2
9
no L.
M Cabegin, 72 71 76 7 7 70 71 60 72.
RP Cesar V.
5 4
2
250
.
M Cabello, 72 78 78 8 5 70 67 71 70.
RP Melecio
9 8
5
F.
251
.
M Cabrera, 79 88 53 9 7 85 75 76 73.
RP Irineo
1 1
3
M.
252
.
253 Cabreros 71 79 83 8 6 62 71 50 70.
.
, Paulino
4 0
85
N.
254 Calayag, 69 79 66 8 6 75 68 76 70.
.
Florenti
8 9
6
no R.
M Calzada, 76 72 80 6 6 71 66 62 70.
RP Cesar de
7 2
85
la
255
.
256 Canabal, 70 82 81 7 7 51 75 75 73.
.
Isabel
7 8
7
M Cabugao 76 87 69 8 5 64 78 75 71.
RP , Pablo
0 8
8
N.
257
.
258 Calañgi, 73 93 71 8 7 66 69 62 71.
.
Mateo
7 0
8
C.
259 Canda, 72 71 77 9 6 75 66 82 71.
.
Benjami
0 2
95
n S.
260 Cantoria 71 80 71 8 7 55 72 75 71
.
, Eulogio
9 0
261 Capacio, 67 78 71 9 6 75 72 60 70.
.
Jr.,
0 5
65
Conrado
262 Capitulo 75 70 53 8 7 63 76 91 71.
.
,
7 8
2
Alejandr
o P.
M Calupita 75 93 81 7 6 75 68 56 73.
RP n,
Jr.,
6 4
15
Alfredo
263
.
M Caluya, 75 86 70 8 7 52 77 82 73.
RP Arsenio
7 7
9
V.
264
.
M
RP
265
.
Campani 80 75 78 7 7 71 63 76 73.
lla,
7 3
65
Mariano
B.
M Campos, 66 85 83 8 6 61 80 57 73.
RP Juan A.
4 7
25
266
.
267 Cardoso, 78 71 73 7 7 56 69 60 71.
.
Angelita
6 9
8
G.
273 Colorad 68 75 80 7 7 66 67 80 72.
.
o,
4 7
6
Alfonso
R.
274 Chavez, 73 65 79 8 7 69 66 84 73.
.
Doroteo
4 3
1
M.
275 Chavez, 77 76 79 8 7 53 71 75 73.
.
Honorat
6 4
65
o A.
M
RP
276
.
Cobangb 69 81 74 8 7 61 78 80 73.
ang,
2 6
85
Orlando
B.
277 Cortez, 78 60 88 8 6 66 69 64 73.
.
Armand
6 0
1
o R.
278 Crisosto 76 87 74 7 6 55 76 66 71.
.
mo,
6 2
45
Jesus L.
268 Cartagen 71 72 65 8 6 73 80 70 71.
.
a,
9 4
65
Hermini
o R.
M Cornejo, 68 87 78 8 7 50 80 60 73.
RP Crisanto
6 9
7
R.
279
.
M Castro,
RP Daniel
T.
269
.
65 75 77 7 8 60 75 69 73.
6 5
15
M Cruz,
75 81 79 8 7 57 68 75 72.
RP Raymun
5 2
95
do
280
.
270 Cauntay, 70 78 72 7 7 69 64 80 71.
.
Gaudenc
3 7
2
io V.
M Cunanan 78 92 63 8 7 72 68 65 72.
RP , Jose C.
3 6
4
281
.
271 Castro, 70 68 69 8 7 75 72 70 73.
.
Pedro L.
7 6
35
de
272 Cerio,
75 82 75 8 6 54 76 75 71.
.
Juan A.
6 0
75
282 Cunanan 70 82 64 9 6 75 73 76 71.
.
,
2 7
45
Salvador
F.
283 Cimafra 71 76 76 8 7 71 75 71 73.
.
nca,
0 0
35
Agustin
B.
284 Crisol,
.
Getulio
R.
70 91 78 8 6 55 71 50 70.
5 8
8
M Dusi,
RP Felicisi
mo R.
285
.
76 82 69 8 6 62 80 71 72.
2 6
85
M Datu,
70 75 72 8 8 55 68 79 71.
RP Alfredo
6 0
5
J.
286
.
287 Dacuma, 71 67 87 8 7 50 65 70 71.
.
Luis B.
3 1
25
M Degamo, 73 80 82 7 8 67 67 57 73.
RP Pedro R.
4 0
65
288
.
289 Delgado, 70 84 82 8 7 52 73 50 72.
.
Vicente
4 7
65
N.
M Diolazo, 75 83 86 7 5 54 75 75 72.
RP Ernesto
3 4
25
A.
290
.
291 Dionisio 73 84 64 8 7 78 75 66 72.
.
,
Jr.,
9 1
8
Guillerm
o
M Dichoso, 71 77 71 8 6 75 80 70 73.
RP Alberto
1 9
65
M.
292
.
M
RP
293
.
Dipasupi 70 76 82 7 7 70 72 56 73.
l,
3 9
9
Claudio
R.
M Delgado, 75 84 63 6 6 60 70 72 68.
RP Abner
7 4
35
294
.
M
RP
295
.
Doming 70 69 81 8 6 63 71 75 72.
o,
2 8
2
Domina
dor T.
296 Ducusin, 70 78 53 8 7 77 62 76 68.
.
Agapito
8 5
05
B.
M Duque, 75 77 78 8 7 72 64 75 73.
RP Antonio
6 6
9
S.
297
.
298 Duque, 75 80 73 8 6 67 65 66 70.
.
Castulo
3 6
65
299 Ebbah, 70 80 85 7 6 63 76 75 73.
.
Percival
6 6
95
B.
300 Edisa,
65 77 75 8 7 62 75 65 72
.
Sulpicio
9 5
301 Edradan, 70 75 84 8 7 59 69 86 73.
.
Rosa C.
4 1
4
M Enage,
RP Jacinto
N.
302
.
66 70 88 9 7 67 65 75 73.
3 2
2
M Encarna 75 86 73 8 6 77 69 75 72.
RP cion,
1 3
65
Alfonso
B.
303
.
304 Encarna 65 78 58 6 6 64 75 78 67.
.
cion,
8 6
1
Cesar
305 Estoista, 78 76 74 8 5 67 70 76 71.
.
Agustin
6 8
7
A.
M Fabros,
RP Jose B.
306
.
66 75 80 8 8 71 67 70 73.
2 0
05
M Fajardo, 77 69 82 8 6 60 75 75 73.
RP Balbino
3 5
9
P.
307
.
308 Fajardo, 70 79 77 7 7 50 73 75 72.
.
Genaro
9 9
5
P.
309 Evangeli 75 75 72 8 6 63 77 70 72.
.
sta,
7 3
15
Felicida
d P.
310 Familara 68 75 87 8 6 65 68 65 71.
.
,
3 4
85
Raymun
do Z.
311 Fariñas, 70 78 89 6 6 75 70 50 72.
.
Dionisio
6 5
75
312 Favila,
.
Hilario
B.
M
RP
313
.
71 84 74 7 7 67 73 59 72.
0 5
2
Felician 71 69 70 8 6 81 72 70 72.
o,
5 9
25
Alberto
I.
M Fernand 73 77 86 7 7 76 64 50 73
RP o, Lope
9 0
F.
314
.
M Flores, 78 72 77 8 6 60 68 73 72.
RP Dionisio
3 7
05
S.
315
.
M Fortich, 70 82 70 7 7 65 64 75 70.
RP Benjami
0 8
35
n B.
316
.
M Fuente, 76 88 72 7 6 71 79 79 73.
RP Jose S.
4 0
55
de la
317
.
318 Fohmant 72 79 71 7 6 61 76 60 70.
.
es,
7 8
9
Nazario
S.
M Fuggan, 76 81 74 6 7 71 73 60 72.
RP Lorenzo
9 1
85
B.
319
.
320 Gabuya, 70 83 82 8 7 63 75 65 73.
.
Jesus S.
3 0
75
321 Galang, 69 83 84 7 7 57 71 60 71.
.
Victor
6 0
95
N.
322 Gaerlan, 73 87 77 9 6 61 72 75 73.
.
Manuel
0 7
15
L.
323 Galem,
.
Nestor
R.
72 79 86 7 6 61 75 70 73.
8 0
05
324 Gallardo 75 88 75 7 6 70 70 65 71.
.
, Jose Pe
5 3
85
B.
M Gallos, 70 78 84 9 8 51 65 70 72.
RP Cirilo B.
1 0
85
325
.
326 Galindo, 70 89 87 6 7 71 62 62 73.
.
Eulalio
5 8
4
D.
M
RP
336
.
Gosiaoc 68 93 85 7 6 69 70 54 72.
o,
8 4
35
Lorenzo
V.
M Gonzale 77 75 71 8 5 70 70 60 70.
RP s, Rafael
9 5
05
C.
337
.
327 Galman, 72 72 80 8 7 56 70 53 71.
.
Patrocini
5 1
15
o G.
M Gracia,
RP Eulalia
L. de
338
.
328 Gamalin 76 79 81 8 6 63 69 55 72.
.
da,
6 7
55
Carlos S.
339 Grageda, 70 85 72 6 7 60 73 73 70.
.
Jose M.
7 0
75
A.
329 Gamboa, 71 67 70 7 7 60 75 68 70.
.
Antonio
2 6
95
G.
340 Guzman, 75 86 69 8 6 79 75 76 73.
.
Juan de
4 4
6
330 Gannod, 69 80 75 8 6 62 73 68 71.
.
Jose A.
1 8
25
M Garcia,
RP Matias
N.
331
.
67 78 74 9 7 59 76 65 72.
0 9
8
M Ganete, 75 87 77 8 7 57 68 81 73.
RP Carmelo
2 4
3
332
.
333 Gilbang, 75 67 80 8 6 57 64 70 70.
.
Gaudios
2 7
5
o R.
334 Gofredo, 68 78 72 8 7 52 70 76 70.
.
Claro C.
6 8
9
335 Gomez, 71 76 71 8 7 63 69 62 70.
.
Jose S.
1 6
85
66 68 90 8 7 59 69 65 73.
4 7
3
M Guzman, 76 79 79 7 7 69 68 80 73.
RP Mateo
3 2
9
de
341
.
342 Guzman, 71 61 74 7 6 66 78 75 70.
.
Salvador
2 1
75
B.
343 Guzman, 75 84 64 8 7 61 78 58 71.
.
Salvador
1 4
75
T. de
344 Habelito 71 76 71 8 7 60 67 55 69.
.
,
7 3
65
Geronim
o E.
345 Hedrian 75 68 84 7 6 58 76 60 72.
.
a,
6 6
9
Naterno
G.
346 Hernand 67 75 72 8 7 72 66 76 70.
.
ez,
1 2
6
Quintin
B.
356
.
1952
357 La
Q, 75 71 75 7 7 67 81 59 73.
.
Jose M.
2 0
5
347 Homeres 73 84 65 8 7 77 63 76 70.
.
, Agustin
6 0
7
R.
348 Ines,
65 88 71 8 7 73 61 70 70.
.
Leonilo
8 7
55
F.
349 Jamer, 68 75 83 8 8 61 65 50 72
.
Alipio S.
9 0
M
RP
350
.
Ibasco, 75 65 68 8 7 70 83 54 73.
Jr.,
5 6
8
Emilian
o M.
M Jardinic 73 86 72 7 8 67 67 64 72.
RP o,
Jr.,
8 2
8
Emilio
351
.
358 Leon,
67 75 78 9 7 51 72 80 72.
.
Brigido
1 8
55
C. de
359 Leones, 68 81 79 8 7 60 77 60 73
.
Constant
4 3
e B.
360 Liboro, 72 69 80 8 7 62 70 61 72.
.
Horacio
7 3
4
T.
361 Llanera, 77 81 80 7 6 59 75 63 73
.
Cesar L.
8 4
362 Lomont 75 76 69 7 7 76 74 75 73.
.
od, Jose
0 3
2
P.
363 Luna,
.
Lucito
70 75 69 8 5 53 74 75 68.
3 9
4
M Jaen,
76 75 78 8 7 66 70 77 73.
RP Justinian
4 1
85
o F.
352
.
M Luz,
76 90 78 8 6 58 75 77 73.
RP Lauro L.
8 4
95
364
.
353 Jaring, 72 77 79 7 7 57 71 50 70.
.
Antonio
0 2
75
S.
M Macasae 73 81 72 8 6 75 72 70 72.
RP t, Tomas
3 6
5
S.
365
.
M Javier, 75 84 79 7 7 61 66 66 73.
RP Aquilino
8 7
05
M.
354
.
355 Jomuad, 75 75 72 8 7 58 76 43 72.
.
Francisc
8 8
4
o
M Jose,
RP Nestor
L.
78 61 64 7 6 76 64 80 69.
3 8
7
366 Magbira 80 67 84 7 7 62 65 68 73.
.
y,
6 0
05
Godofre
do V.
367 Majarais 70 62 64 8 8 75 71 79 72.
.
,
2 8
85
Rodolfo
P.
M Makabe 75 90 77 8 5 71 72 78 73.
RP nta,
3 9
3
Eduardo
368
.
M Malapit, 74 83 74 8 5 60 72 76 71.
RP Justinian
9 8
1
o S.
369
.
378 Mara,
70 78 78 8 7 67 66 65 72.
.
Guillerm
9 5
35
o L.
M Mercado 73 77 82 8 7 52 69 85 73.
RP , Felipe
2 8
9
A.
379
.
370 Maloles, 70 87 73 7 7 50 76 76 72.
.
Iluminad
6 7
3
o M.
M Miculob, 70 82 73 8 7 52 79 65 72.
RP Eugenio
6 7
8
P.
380
.
371 Maniqui 75 80 73 9 6 71 65 70 72.
.
s, Daniel
1 9
1
R.
381 Mison,
.
Rafael
M. Jr.,
372 Maraña, 65 79 60 7 7 51 75 86 67.
.
Arsenio
2 3
9
M
RP
382
.
Monpon 79 79 68 8 6 78 69 83 73.
banua,
8 4
1
Antonio
D.
M
RP
383
.
Montero 72 89 69 8 7 68 70 75 72.
,
9 0
15
Leodega
rio C.
373 Marasig 75 71 83 7 6 62 69 70 72.
.
an,
5 9
75
Napoleo
n
M Marco, 75 67 74 7 6 75 75 57 71.
RP Jaime P.
6 4
9
374
.
M Martir, 70 86 76 7 7 71 75 53 72.
RP Osmund
8 2
95
o P.
375
.
M
RP
376
.
Masanca 73 87 75 7 7 50 78 80 73.
y,
7 2
2
Amando
E.
M
RP
377
.
Mationg,
Ignacio
T.
62 87 72 7 7 76 69 77 71.
9 3
3
79 78 73 7 7 68 69 53 71.
5 1
95
384 Morada, 75 76 67 7 6 66 75 76 70.
.
Servillan
1 5
9
o S.
385 Mocorro 78 84 78 8 6 73 68 70 73
.
,
4 0
Generos
o
M
RP
386
.
Mosquer 75 78 75 8 7 55 77 66 73.
a,
5 2
15
Estanisla
o L.
387 Motus, 80 78 70 9 7 75 70 57 73.
.
Rodento
4 2
75
r P.
388 Macario, 70 67 74 8 7 63 72 66 72.
.
Pedro R.
6 8
15
M Nadela, 72 64 64 8 7 50 75 75 69.
RP Geredio
1 3
15
n T.
389
.
M
RP
390
.
Nazaren 67 70 71 7 7 79 75 57 72.
o,
6 6
05
Romeo
P.
391 Nieto,
69 79 77 7 7 62 76 76 72.
.
Benedict
7 2
9
o S.
M
RP
392
.
Noguera 71 86 81 8 7 56 72 70 73.
,
0 3
15
Raymun
do
M Olaviar, 70 62 85 8 7 50 68 79 71.
RP Jose O.
1 4
8
399
.
M Olandes 70 91 76 8 7 66 70 79 73.
RP ca, Per
7 2
45
O.
400
.
401 Orden, 72 65 84 8 6 50 72 68 71.
.
Apoloni
6 6
45
o J.
402 Ortiz,
71 75 78 8 6 67 70 78 72.
.
Melenci
1 6
1
o T.
M Pablo, 72 64 76 8 7 61 76 75 72.
RP Fedelino
6 2
95
S.
403
.
M Nodado, 70 70 69 7 5 37 64 72 63.
RP Domicia
3 7
6
no R.
393
.
404 Pacifico, 76 79 69 8 7 52 72 80 71.
.
Vicente
0 6
95
V.
394 Nono,
67 77 78 6 7 59 71 76 71.
.
Pacifico
7 5
35
G.
M Paderna, 75 69 72 7 7 58 75 70 72.
RP Perfecto
5 8
6
D.
405
.
M Nuval, 78 72 67 9 7 68 78 67 73.
RP Manuel
0 2
65
R.
395
.
406 Padlan,
.
Crispin
M.
396 Ocampo, 75 90 77 7 6 55 65 67 60.
.
Augusto
2 9
7
71 66 76 7 6 67 74 66 71.
9 8
65
407 Padilla, 70 65 67 8 7 75 78 75 73.
.
Jose C.
2 8
3
397 Oliveros 72 75 68 7 8 50 75 79 71.
.
, Amado
2 4
9
A.
408 Padilla, 71 88 78 8 5 75 78 50 72.
.
Jr.,
6 9
95
Estanisla
o E.
398 Opiña,
.
Jr.,
Pedro
M Palma,
RP Bartolo
me
76 77 74 6 7 66 68 70 71.
7 3
85
67 81 80 8 7 75 69 75 73.
2 1
25
409
.
M Papa,
75 72 85 8 7 59 63 71 73.
RP Angel A.
5 7
45
410
.
M Parayno, 71 88 74 8 6 66 76 73 73.
RP Mario V.
9 9
65
411
.
412 Pariña,
.
Santos
L.
70 87 85 7 6 67 63 76 71.
7 4
85
M Pasion, 63 80 68 8 8 79 76 58 72.
RP Anastaci
1 2
55
o
413
.
414 Pastrana, 69 76 71 7 6 63 77 83 71.
.
Rizal R.
6 8
65
M Paulin,
RP Jose O.
415
.
M
RP
416
.
70 66 80 8 7 50 65 80 70.
7 5
9
Pelaez, 79 87 73 8 6 71 68 65 73.
Jr.,
3 9
2
Vicente
C.
M Pido,
RP Serafin
C.
420
.
77 81 72 8 6 71 60 75 71.
2 9
15
421 Pinlac, 67 76 74 8 6 79 65 72 70.
.
Filemon
6 5
55
422 Poblete, 72 79 82 7 6 64 74 50 72.
.
Celso B.
6 6
15
M Piza,
RP Luz
423
.
68 70 75 8 7 67 64 75 70.
7 4
8
424 Puzon, 72 80 81 6 7 53 67 70 71.
.
Eduardo
9 2
05
S.
425 Quetulio 75 90 60 9 6 78 76 83 72.
.
,
3 4
9
Josefina
D.
M
RP
426
.
Quipane 69 88 79 8 6 62 71 66 71.
s,
2 5
55
Melchor
V.
M Quietson 73 75 76 7 7 81 71 53 72.
RP , Bayani
7 0
85
R.
427
.
417 Peña,
.
Jesus
75 75 75 6 7 70 60 66 70.
2 5
4
428 Racho, 68 75 81 8 7 53 66 54 70.
.
Macario
2 8
55
D.
418 Perez,
.
Toribio
R.
71 64 81 9 6 58 67 70 71.
2 9
25
429 Ramirez, 71 80 73 8 6 62 75 80 71.
.
Sabas P.
7 2
65
419 Pestaño, 77 81 74 8 5 68 76 75 73.
.
Melquia
7 9
2
des
M Raffiñan 80 83 79 7 6 72 68 65 73.
RP , Jose A.
9 2
25
430
.
M Ramos, 75 87 76 7 7 72 61 75 72.
RP Patricio
5 2
25
S.
431
.
441 Rigonan, 71 85 65 8 7 70 76 70 72.
.
Cesar V.
6 5
7
M Ramos- 78 84 76 9 4 75 80 65 73.
RP Balmori,
0 8
45
Manuela
432
.
M Rivero, 72 88 72 9 6 73 66 80 72.
RP Buenave
4 8
6
ntura A.
443
.
M Raro,
RP Celso
433
.
75 81 76 6 7 77 55 77 71.
7 5
4
M Robles, 75 77 75 7 8 64 69 70 73.
RP Enrique
7 2
7
444
.
M Rayos, 75 86 79 9 7 67 67 70 73.
RP Victor S.
1 1
9
434
.
445 Rodrigu 76 75 76 6 6 77 65 78 72.
.
ez,
3 9
25
Orestes
Arellano
435 Revilla, 75 78 81 9 7 54 69 81 73.
.
Mariano
0 0
35
S.
436 Reyes,
.
Abdon
L.
72 64 81 7 7 73 69 53 72.
8 6
85
437 Reyes, 72 87 78 8 7 75 62 70 72.
.
Doming
3 2
7
o B.
442 Rivera, 71 56 70 9 7 65 75 71 71.
.
Honorio
0 1
2
446 Roldan, 67 80 79 8 7 71 75 70 73.
.
Jose V.
3 3
9
447 Rosario, 80 75 65 7 6 72 80 70 73.
.
Adelaida
0 8
15
R. del
448 Rosario, 75 75 79 9 6 65 66 63 72.
.
Restituto
0 8
1
F. del
438 Reyes, 75 85 84 6 7 71 68 50 73.
.
Francisc
8 5
9
o M.
M
RP
449
.
Sabelino 71 81 69 7 7 71 75 70 72.
,
5 7
95
Conrado
S.
439 Reyes,
.
Lozano
M.
80 57 78 7 7 65 64 79 73.
9 8
35
450 San
77 86 72 8 5 76 65 72 71.
.
Juan,
9 9
6
Damaso
M Reyes, 75 75 82 8 7 64 68 60 73.
RP Oscar R.
2 6
65
440
.
451 Sañiel, 72 93 76 8 6 75 66 62 72.
.
Felix L.
0 7
1
452 Samanie 75 80 76 7 6 67 68 70 70.
.
go, Jesus
2 0
6
B.
M
RP
453
.
Sandova 75 83 70 8 7 67 77 60 73.
l,
3 7
95
Emmanu
el M.
M Sanidad, 71 75 81 9 6 64 76 68 72.
RP Emmanu
0 2
95
el Q.
454
.
455 Santiago 75 76 84 9 6 65 59 70 71.
.
,
Jr.,
3 3
8
Cristoba
l
456 Santillan 76 89 83 8 6 58 65 52 71.
.
, Juanito
3 3
25
Ll.
M Santos, 75 75 78 8 7 76 66 70 73.
RP Rodolfo
2 3
7
C.
457
.
M Santos, 67 54 69 7 6 64 71 60 66.
RP Ruperto
6 3
75
M.
458
.
M Santos, 72 71 73 7 7 79 71 85 73.
RP Aquilino
9 3
8
C.
459
.
M Santos,
RP Rufino
A.
460
.
75 81 79 8 7 72 66 54 73.
5 4
3
461 Suandin 75 67 67 9 7 59 76 76 73.
.
g,
2 9
1
Bantas
M Sulit,
76 79 76 7 7 75 68 67 73.
RP Feliz M.
8 2
5
462
.
463 Songco, 70 68 82 8 6 69 76 65 73.
.
Felicisi
4 0
35
mo G.
464 Soriano, 64 79 77 8 8 53 70 65 70.
.
Aniceto
0 0
7
S.
465 Suarez, 73 85 70 8 7 70 64 70 71.
.
Pablo D.
7 6
9
M Sybico, 79 70 70 7 7 75 72 60 73.
RP Jesus L.
2 5
05
466
.
467 Tabaque 69 68 77 7 7 68 72 60 71.
.
,
9 4
85
Benjami
n R.
M Tan
RP Kiang,
Clarita
468
.
81 79 72 8 6 75 73 80 73.
0 2
95
M Tando,
RP Amado
T.
469
.
71 82 78 8 7 61 71 60 72
3 1
470 Tasico,
.
Severo
E.
71 69 75 8 7 75 67 63 71.
9 0
65
471 Tiburcio 73 82 72 9 7 57 68 54 71.
.
, Ismael
3 6
15
P.
M
RP
472
.
Tiongso 70 70 76 8 7 75 75 50 73.
n,
4 7
45
Federico
T.
M Tolentin 75 89 63 8 8 73 73 50 73.
RP o, Jesus
4 5
4
C.
473
.
474 Torrijas, 77 66 67 8 6 75 71 63 71.
.
Alfredo
3 8
3
A.
M Tobias, 69 58 74 8 7 55 65 57 67.
RP Artemio
1 1
55
M.
475
.
M
RP
476
.
Trillana, 76 86 76 8 7 68 75 50 73.
Jr.,
6 0
8
Apoloni
o
M Trinidad 66 91 83 7 6 66 67 65 70.
RP , Manuel
5 3
8
O.
477
.
478 Trinidad 66 78 78 8 7 51 64 75 70.
.
, Pedro
5 8
8
O.
M Udarbe, 80 82 77 8 6 56 68 75 72.
RP Flavio J.
2 7
6
479
.
480 Umali, 68 75 81 8 7 69 68 60 71.
.
Osmund
0 1
7
o C.
481 Umaya
.
m,
Juanito
C.
77 75 87 8 5 56 66 60 71
5 6
M Usita,
75 72 75 7 7 76 71 70 73.
RP Gelacio
4 3
55
U.
482
.
483 Valino, 72 81 80 8 6 78 71 75 73.
.
Francisc
4 2
7
o M.
484 Varela, 67 75 81 8 7 57 81 70 73.
.
Domina
6 2
85
dor M.
485 Vega,
78 62 79 8 7 70 71 65 73.
.
Macairo
7 0
8
g L. de
M Velasco, 71 80 74 8 6 66 76 76 71.
RP Emmanu
5 0
85
el D.
486
.
487 Velez, 73 70 89 8 5 50 72 67 71.
.
Maria E.
0 6
05
M Venal, 78 91 58 6 7 55 75 73 73.
RP Artemio
7 6
65
V.
488
.
489 Venus, 69 81 74 8 6 66 72 77 77.
.
Conrado
5 2
05
B.
M Verzosa, 75 79 72 8 7 68 74 59 73.
RP Federico
8 6
7
B.
490
.
M
RP
491
.
Villafuer 75 83 70 7 6 64 75 65 71.
te,
6 4
2
Eduardo
V.
M
RP
492
.
Villanue 75 85 79 8 6 77 67 70 73.
va,
8 6
95
Cecilio
C.
493 Villar, 73 69 70 8 7 66 69 50 70.
.
Custodio
8 6
75
R.
M
RP
494
.
Villaseñ 80 85 67 7 6 75 76 73 73.
or,
7 2
15
Leonida
s F.
495 Viterbo, 80 77 65 9 7 65 65 65 70.
.
Jose H.
3 0
65
496 Yaranon 70 77 76 8 7 50 75 75 71.
.
, Pedro
5 2
85
M Yasay, 75 75 72 7 6 77 70 60 71.
RP Mariano
6 3
1
R.
497
.
M Ygay,
73 80 83 8 6 59 72 77 72.
RP Venanci
4 2
65
o M.
498
.
499 Yulo,
73 82 78 7 6 81 75 75 73.
.
Jr.,
5 0
95
Teodoro
500 Zamora, 70 65 76 7 6 77 69 82 71.
.
Alberto
9 2
3
501 Rigonan, 70 79 69 8 7 62 71 64 71.
.
Felipe C.
9 6
2
A list of those who petitioned for the
consolidation of their grades in subjects
passed in previous examinations, showing
the years in which they took the
examinations together with their grades
and averages, and those who had filed
motions for reconsideration which were
denied, indicated by the initials MRD,
follows:
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 72
Ci La Me In P Cri Re Le Ge
v. nd rc. t. ol. m. m. g. n.
Av.
1. Amao,
Sulpici
o M.
1946
68 67 76 7 73 73 49 50 66.
6
5
1950
59 80 67 7 62 80 71 57 67.
7
4
2. Baldo,
Olegari
o Ga.
1951
65 76 58 5 59 63 75 72 64.
5
9
1952
65 68 75 8 72 59 73 57 69.
4
75
1953
57 74 68 6 76 52 71 76 66.
8
7
3. Blanco,
Jose B.
MRD1949
75 75 70 7 77 76 60 90 72.
5
15
1951
64 71 58 6 68 70 75 71 66.
5
95
4. Conden
o,
Mateo
1950
71 80 62 7 75 81 55 92 69.
5
3
1951
70 60 61 6 77 64 67 81 67.
5
85
5. Ducusi
n,
Agapit
o B.
MRD1949
69 70 76 7 76 71 55 60 68.
3
65
1 Peña,
0. Jesus S.
1950
60 71 55 6 67 75 56 89 68.
7
1
1950
25 75 45 7 45 52 46 71 46.
5
2
1951
70 77 65 7 66 52 70 50 66.
9
4
1952
75 75 75 6 75 70 60 66 70.
2
4
6. Garcia,
Manuel
N.
MRD1949
1950
60 70 82 7 70 69 60 80 69.
9
25
57 65 51 6 54 85 56 84 60.
9
3
7. Luna,
Lucito
A.
1946
1952
1952
70 75 69 8 59 53 74 75 68.
3
4
1952
1953
68 78 70 7 69 70 58 69 67.
5
75
1951
65 62 75 6 73 57 75 71 66.
0
8
1 Rement
2. izo,
Filemo
n S.
1949
65 75 72 7 60 75 55 85 66.
5
65
1951
68 57 48 6 91 66 55 75 64.
0
05
1952
68 53 68 6 58 56 75 64 65.
7
7
72 68 68 7 75 72 60 75 69.
5
35
65 79 60 7 73 51 75 86 67.
2
9
1 Amao,
3. Sulpici
o M.
9. Montan
o,
Manuel
M.
1951
1950
63 53 69 7 75 76 57 69 66.
6
55
8. Maraña
,
Arsenio
s.
1949
1 Placido
1. ,
Sr.,
Isidro
61 60 58 6 70 63 75 64 64.
0
8
70 77 65 7 66 52 70 50 66.
9
4
78 64 66 6 81 50 71 78 70.
8
65
1952
67 80 51 6 69 77 73 53 66.
9
35
1953
65 67 78 7 75 62 69 80 70.
4
9
1 Rodulf
4. a, Juan
T.
1951
67 60 70 6 68 56 75 66 67.
5
75
1950
35 65 40 7 63 57 27 49 45
5
1952
70 71 67 7 67 75 71 70 70.
8
1
MRD1951
68 59 72 5 69 65 75 75 69.
5
3
1953
70 73 74 7 81 56 69 71 71.
0
05
1 Sanche
5. z, Juan
J.
1948
39 69 82 7 76 72 55 50 63.
5
5
MRD1949
67 56 69 7 72 77 60 75 68
5
1951
70 59 55 6 68 57 78 67 65.
0
8
1 Santos,
6. Consta
ntino
Finally, with regards to the examinations of
1953, while some candidates--85 in all-presented motions for reconsideration of their
grades, others invoked the provisions of
Republic Act No. 972. A list of those candidates
separating those who filed mere motions for
reconsideration (56) from those who invoked the
aforesaid Republic act, is as follows:
1953
PETITIONERS
RECONSIDERATION
1952
62 76 54 8 72 77 66 65 66.
2
65
1953
73 71 70 6 78 64 65 78 70.
5
4
1 Santos,
7. Salvad
or H.
1951
60 64 55 7 68 52 70 75 62.
0
85
1952
75 64 70 8 76 55 61 75 69.
1
1
1953
70 71 79 6 72 54 66 80 70
5
1 Sevilla,
8. Macari
o C.
MRD1948
50 64 76 6 66 69 60 52 63.
6
1
MRD1949
47 66 78 6 71 86 65 85 68
4
FOR
Ci La Me In P Cri Re Le Ge
v. nd rc. t. ol m. m. g. n.
.
Av
.
1. Acenas, 73 70 68 6 82 51 67 77 73.
Calixto
2
45
R.
2. Alcantar 67 70 75 8 87 54 71 80 72.
a, Pedro
5
8
N.
3. Alejandr 67 72 71 7 80 76 75 77 73.
o,
5
4
Exequie
l
4. Andres, 70 73 86 5 79 50 71 78 72.
Gregori
8
7
o M.
5. Arnaiz, 66 80 76 5 79 68 77 81 73.
Antonio
8
4
E.
6. Asis,
66 78 75 8 77 55 73 69 71.
Floriano
1
25
U. de
7. Bacaiso, 71 65 76 6 76 50 75 70 70.
Celestin
8
95
o M.
8. Bala,
64 82 47 7 82 58 75 82 67
Florenci
0
o F.
9. Baldo, 57 74 68 6 76 52 71 76 66.
Olegario
8
7
A.
1 Barrios, 65 71 76 7 80 62 83 73 73.
0. Benjami
5
95
n O.
1 Buhay, 73 76 71 9 76 61 74 78 73.
1. Eduardo
1
35
L.
1 Burgos, 72 80 89 6 66 37 69 68 70.
2. Domina
1
05
dor C.
1 Cariño, 79 81 60 7 74 74 76 74 73
3. Eldo J.
5
1 Casar, 67 73 84 7 77 61 71 74 73.
4. Dimapu
9
35
ro
1 Castañe 70 73 80 7 75 70 73 78 73.
5. da,
1
95
Gregori
o
1 Fernand 65 75 87 8 81 63 61 80 72.
9. ez,
0
8
Alejandr
o G.
2 Gapus, 76 80 86 7 64 74 66 69 73.
0. Rosita S.
7
9
(Miss)
2 Garcia, 70 86 70 7 73 63 73 75 71.
1. Rafael
5
65
B.
2 Gracia, 73 68 75 5 80 51 72 71 71
2. Miguel
9
L. de
2 Gungon, 68 76 76 8 77 57 77 83 73.
3. Armand
4
6
o G.
2 Gutierre 68 77 66 7 72 59 71 74 69.
4. z,
0
1
Antonio
S.
2 Ilejay, 77 70 76 7 81 62 70 68 73.
5. Abraha
7
7
m I.
2 Leon,
66 66 75 7 77 55 71 82 70.
6. Benjami
0
35
n La. De
2 Lugtu, 62 70 78 6 78 56 69 81 69.
7. Felipe L.
5
9
1 Estrella 67 79 64 7 82 62 71 74 70.
6. do,
3
2
Benjami
n R.
2 Lukman 76 64 67 6 73 59 73 75 70.
8. , Abdul9
45
Hamid
1 Fabunan 70 72 68 6 77 60 76 74 71.
7. ,
9
1
Edilbert
o C.
2 Maloles, 77 76 68 6 71 51 75 78 70.
9. Jr.,
8
85
Benjami
n G.
1 Feril,
75 71 84 6 70 60 65 70 71.
8. Doming
5
6
o B.
3 Maloles, 77 71 60 7 79 62 68 72 69.
0. Julius G.
1
75
3 Mandi, 65 76 70 6 79 68 75 72 71.
1. Santiago
1
1
P.
4 Peralta, 70 70 52 8 68 63 59 69 63.
3. Rodolfo
1
7
P.
3 Margete 70 76 66 7 85 73 71 75 72.
2. , Rufino
5
75
C.
4 Pigar,
76 75 78 6 72 72 71 79 73.
4. Leopold
1
75
o R.
3 Melocot 70 81 73 7 83 52 72 75 72.
3. on,
8
35
Nestorio
B.
4 Publico, 68 69 76 7 70 59 74 67 70.
5. Paciano
6
6
L.
3 Molina, 75 78 70 6 75 63 66 85 70.
4. Manuel
1
95
C.
3 Muñoz, 75 80 86 6 74 57 68 76 73.
5. Mariano
7
75
A.
3 Navarro, 80 75 65 7 83 55 73 79 73
6. Buenave
5
ntura M.
3 Nodado, 60 67 67 5 70 50 56 75 61.
7. Domicia
0
7
no R.
3 Papas, 65 62 71 6 70 56 66 67 66
8. Sisenan
1
do B.
3 Pagulay 63 75 71 6 83 67 70 72 70.
9. an-Sy,
2
4
Fernand
o
4 Padula, 70 77 54 6 74 78 75 68 69.
0. Benjami
2
05
n C.
4 Radaza, 75 78 76 6 77 50 71 86 72.
6. Leovigil
1
2
do
4 Ramos, 64 62 75 9 81 52 66 80 70.
7. Bernard
3
1
o M.
4 Rabaino 68 72 75 7 78 55 69 76 70.
8. , Andres
3
65
D.
4 Ravaner 70 77 80 7 82 62 69 78 73.
9. a, Oscar
1
6
N.
5 Renovill 65 75 80 6 79 52 62 78 69.
0. a, Jose
8
5
M.
5 Sabaot, 69 73 80 6 82 69 69 79 73.
1. Solomo
9
85
n B.
5 Sumawa 66 76 69 7 74 56 72 68 69.
2. y,
6
1
Ricardo
S.
4 Pasno, 78 72 66 5 71 58 72 78 69.
1. Enrique
4
85
M.
5 Torrefie 70 77 74 7 73 50 68 72 69.
3. l,
5
55
Sofronio
O.
4 Peña,
70 95 81 7 67 66 67 73 72.
2. Jr.,
8
55
Narciso
5 Vera,
60 61 47 7 69 50 67 77 60.
4. Federico
7
9
V. de
5 Viray, 65 67 67 5 73 64 71 65 67.
5. Venanci
2
15
o Bustos
8. Estonina 80 74 64 8 81 56 68 82 72.
,
9
4
Severino
5 Ylaya,
6. Angela
P.
(Miss)
9. Fernand 65 75 87 8 81 63 61 80 72.
ez,
0
8
Alejandr
o Q.
63 70 56 7 68 54 70 77 64.
5
5
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 972
Ci La Me In P Cri Re Le Ge
v. nd rc. t. ol m. m. g. n.
.
Av
.
1 Fernand 70 75 77 7 78 67 72 73 73.
0. ez, Luis
5
35
N.
1 Figueroa 70 75 87 7 75 50 68 68 72.
1. , Alfredo
8
3
A.
1. Ala,
70 71 73 5 73 74 81 77 73.
Narciso
9
5
1 Formille 65 75 89 6 83 51 70 75 73.
2. za,
8
25
Pedro
2. Alcantar 67 70 75 8 87 54 71 80 72.
a, Pedro
5
8
N.
1 Garcia, 69 68 83 8 73 62 62 70 71
3. Manuel
3
M.
3. Arellano 74 66 73 6 78 63 78 72 72.
,
0
9
Antonio
L.
1 Grospe, 68 75 78 6 79 61 69 82 71.
4. Vicente
6
6
E.
4. Buhay, 73 76 71 9 76 61 74 78 73.
Eduardo
1
35
L.
1 Galema, 72 79 86 7 60 61 75 70 73.
5. Nestor
8
05
R.
(1952)
5. Calautit, 71 78 84 7 75 61 68 72 73.
Celestin
5
2
o R.
1 Jacobo, 76 76 75 7 76 50 72 76 72.
6. Rafael
4
3
F.
6. Casunca 61 73 82 6 81 68 71 84 73.
d, Sulvio
9
05
P.
1 Macalin 67 77 79 7 74 72 68 77 72.
7. dong,
9
75
Reinerio
L.
7. Enrique 84 69 76 7 82 50 58 79 72.
z,
5
05
Pelagio
y
Concepc
ion
1 Mangub 70 70 78 6 80 74 62 70 71.
8. at,
1
45
Antonio
M.
1 Montan 78 64 66 6 81 50 71 78 70.
9. o,
8
65
Manuel
M.
2 Plomant 73 67 74 5 68 70 76 71 71.
0. es,
8
6
Marcos
2 Ramos, 70 80 76 6 72 69 72 79 72.
1. Eugenio
7
6
R.
2 Reyes, 71 73 77 7 81 59 72 74 73.
2. Juan R.
6
2
2 Reyes, 65 78 83 6 76 75 70 70 72.
3. Santiago
0
9
R.
2 Rivera, 65 67 78 7 75 62 69 80 70.
4. Eulogio
4
9
J.
2 Santos, 73 71 70 6 78 64 65 78 70.
5. Constant
5
4
ino P.
2 Santos, 70 71 79 6 72 54 66 80 70
6. Salvador
5
H.
2 Sevilla, 70 73 74 7 81 56 69 71 71.
7. Macario
0
05
C.
2 Villavic 78 75 70 6 69 77 64 77 73.
8. encio,
7
2
Jose A.
2 Viray, 76 73 76 7 80 58 68 83 73.
9. Ruperto
3
25
G.
There are the unsuccessful candidates totaling
604 directly affected by this resolution. Adding
490 candidates who have not presented any
petition, they reach a total of 1,094.
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court
reduced to 72 per cent the passing general
average in the bar examination of august and
November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per
cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949; maintaining
the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising
to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent
since 1950. This caused the introduction in 1951,
in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12
which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12,
14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court,
concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to
the practice of the profession. The amendments
embrace many interesting matters, but those
referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately
concern us. The proposed amendment is as
follows:
SEC. 14. Passing average. — In order
that a candidate may be deemed to have
passed the examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of
70 per cent without falling below 50 per
cent in any subject. In determining the
average, the foregoing subjects shall be
given the following relative weights:
Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration
and Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile
Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per
cent; Political Law, 10 per cent;
International Law, 5 per cent; Remedial
Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social
Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per
cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall not be
required to take another examination in
any subject in which they have obtained a
rating of 70 per cent or higher and such
rating shall be taken into account in
determining their general average in any
subsequent
examinations: Provided,
however, That if the candidate fails to get
a general average of 70 per cent in his
third examination, he shall lose the
benefit of having already passed some
subjects and shall be required to the
examination in all the subjects.
SEC. 16. Admission and oath of
successful applicants. — Any applicant
who has obtained a general average of 70
per cent in all subjects without falling
below 50 per cent in any examination held
after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has
been otherwise found to be entitled to
admission to the bar, shall be allowed to
take and subscribe before the Supreme
Court the corresponding oath of office.
(Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the
portion pertinent to the matter before us being:
It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful
candidates at bar examinations should be
compelled to repeat even those subjects
which they have previously passed. This
is not the case in any other government
examination. The Rules of Court have
therefore been amended in this measure to
give a candidate due credit for any subject
which he has previously passed with a
rating of 75 per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by
Congress on May 3, 1951, the President
requested the comments of this Tribunal before
acting on the same. The comment was signed by
seven Justices while three chose to refrain from
making any and one took no part. With regards
to the matter that interests us, the Court said:
The next amendment is of section 14 of
Rule 127. One part of this amendment
provides that if a bar candidate obtains 70
per cent or higher in any subject, although
failing to pass the examination, he need
not be examined in said subject in his next
examination. This is a sort of passing the
Bar Examination on the installment plan,
one or two or three subjects at a time. The
trouble with this proposed system is that
although it makes it easier and more
convenient for the candidate because he
may in an examination prepare himself on
only one or two subjects so as to insure
passing them, by the time that he has
passed the last required subjects, which
may be several years away from the time
that he reviewed and passed the firs
subjects, he shall have forgotten the
principles and theories contained in those
subjects and remembers only those of the
one or two subjects that he had last
reviewed and passed. This is highly
possible because there is nothing in the
law which requires a candidate to
continue taking the Bar examinations
every year in succession. The only
condition imposed is that a candidate, on
this plan, must pass the examination in no
more that three installments; but there is
no limitation as to the time or number of
years
intervening
between
each
examination taken. This would defeat the
object and the requirements of the law and
the Court in admitting persons to the
practice of law. When a person is so
admitted, it is to be presumed and
presupposed that he possesses the
knowledge and proficiency in the law and
the knowledge of all law subjects required
in bar examinations, so as presently to be
able to practice the legal profession and
adequately render the legal service
required by prospective clients. But this
would not hold true of the candidates who
may have obtained a passing grade on any
five subjects eight years ago, another
three subjects one year later, and the last
two subjects the present year. We believe
that the present system of requiring a
candidate to obtain a passing general
average with no grade in any subject
below 50 per cent is more desirable and
satisfactory. It requires one to be all
around, and prepared in all required legal
subjects at the time of admission to the
practice of law.
xxx
xxx
xxx
We now come to the last amendment, that
of section 16 of Rule 127. This
amendment provides that any application
who has obtained a general average of 70
per cent in all subjects without failing
below 50 per cent in any subject in any
examination held after the 4th day of July,
1946, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of
office. In other words, Bar candidates
who obtained not less than 70 per cent in
any examination since the year 1946
without failing below 50 per cent in any
subject, despite their non-admission to the
Bar by the Supreme Court because they
failed to obtain a passing general average
in any of those years, will be admitted to
the Bar. This provision is not only
prospective but retroactive in its effects.
We have already stated in our comment
on the next preceding amendment that we
are not exactly in favor of reducing the
passing general average from 75 per cent
to 70 per cent to govern even in the future.
As to the validity of making such
reduction retroactive, we have serious
legal doubts. We should not lose sight of
the fact that after every bar examinations,
the Supreme Court passes the
corresponding resolution not only
admitting to the Bar those who have
obtained a passing general average grade,
but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who
have failed. The present amendment
would have the effect of repudiating,
reversing and revoking the Supreme
Court's resolution denying and rejecting
the petitions of those who may have
obtained an average of 70 per cent or
more but less than the general passing
average fixed for that year. It is clear that
this question involves legal implications,
and this phase of the amendment if finally
enacted into law might have to go thru a
legal test. As one member of the Court
remarked during the discussion, when a
court renders a decision or promulgate a
resolution or order on the basis of and in
accordance with a certain law or rule then
in force, the subsequent amendment or
even repeal of said law or rule may not
affect the final decision, order, or
resolution already promulgated, in the
sense of revoking or rendering it void and
of no effect.
Another aspect of this question to be
considered is the fact that members of the
bar are officers of the courts, including the
Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is
admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court
impliedly regards him as a person fit,
competent and qualified to be its officer.
Conversely, when it refused and denied
admission to the Bar to a candidate who
in any year since 1946 may have obtained
a general average of 70 per cent but less
than that required for that year in order to
pass, the Supreme Court equally and
impliedly considered and declared that he
was not prepared, ready, competent and
qualified to be its officer. The present
amendment giving retroactivity to the
reduction of the passing general average
runs counter to all these acts and
resolutions of the Supreme Court and
practically and in effect says that a
candidate not accepted, and even rejected
by the Court to be its officer because he
was unprepared, undeserving and
unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of
all, must be admitted and allowed by this
Court to serve as its officer. We repeat,
that this is another important aspect of the
question to be carefully and seriously
considered.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951,
stating the following:
I am fully in accord with the avowed
objection of the bill, namely, to elevate
the standard of the legal profession and
maintain it on a high level. This is not
achieved, however, by admitting to
practice precisely a special class who
have failed in the bar examination,
Moreover, the bill contains provisions to
which I find serious fundamental
objections.
Section 5 provides that any applicant who
has obtained a general average of 70 per
cent in all subjects without failing below
50 per cent in any subject in any
examination held after the 4th day of July,
1946, shall be allowed to take and
subscribed the corresponding oath of
office. This provision constitutes class
legislation, benefiting as it does
specifically one group of persons,
namely, the unsuccessful candidates in
the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar
examinations.
The same provision undertakes to revoke
or set aside final resolutions of the
Supreme Court made in accordance with
the law then in force. It should be noted
that after every bar examination the
Supreme Court passes the corresponding
resolution not only admitting to the Bar
those who have obtained a passing
general average but also rejecting and
denying the petitions for reconsideration
of those who have failed. The provision
under consideration would have the effect
of revoking the Supreme Court's
resolution denying and rejecting the
petitions of those who may have failed to
obtain the passing average fixed for that
year. Said provision also sets a bad
precedent in that the Government would
be morally obliged to grant a similar
privilege to those who have failed in the
examinations for admission to other
professions
such
as
medicine,
engineering, architecture and certified
public accountancy.
Consequently, the bill was returned to the
Congress of the Philippines, but it was not
repassed by 2/3 vote of each House as prescribed
by section 20, article VI of the Constitution.
Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the Senate.
It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING
MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS
FROM
1946
UP
TO
AND
INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the
provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of the
Rules of Court, any bar candidate who
obtained a general average of 70 per cent
in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946
up to the August 1951 Bar examinations;
71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations;
72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations;
73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations;
74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations
without a candidate obtaining a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be
allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as member
of the Philippine Bar; Provided, however,
That 75 per cent passing general average
shall be restored in all succeeding
examinations; and Provided, finally, That
for the purpose of this Act, any exact onehalf or more of a fraction, shall be
considered as one and included as part of
the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained
a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any
bar examination after July 4, 1945 shall be
deemed to have passed in such subject or
subjects and such grade or grades shall be
included in computing the passing general
average that said candidate may obtain in
any subsequent examinations that he may
take.
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its
approval.
With the following explanatory note:
This is a revised Bar bill to meet the
objections of the President and to afford
another opportunity to those who feel
themselves discriminated by the Supreme
Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who
would otherwise have passed the bar
examination but were arbitrarily not so
considered by altering its previous
decisions of the passing mark. The
Supreme Court has been altering the
passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74 in
1951. In order to cure the apparent
arbitrary fixing of passing grades and to
give satisfaction to all parties concerned,
it is proposed in this bill a gradual
increase in the general averages for
passing the bar examinations as follows;
For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per
cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per
cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per
cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73
percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74
per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark
will be restored with the condition that the
candidate shall not obtain in any subject a
grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for
relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing
grade, is the tremendous handicap which
students during the years immediately
after the Japanese occupation has to
overcome such as the insufficiency of
reading materials and the inadequacy of
the preparation of students who took up
law soon after the liberation. It is believed
that by 1956 the preparation of our
students as well as the available reading
materials will be under normal
conditions, if not improved from those
years preceding the last world war.
In this will we eliminated altogether the
idea of having our Supreme Court
assumed the supervision as well as the
administration of the study of law which
was objected to by the President in the Bar
Bill of 1951.
The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last
year stated among his objections that the
bill would admit to the practice of law "a
special class who failed in the bar
examination". He considered the bill a
class legislation. This contention,
however, is not, in good conscience,
correct because Congress is merely
supplementing what the Supreme Court
have already established as precedent by
making as low as 69 per cent the passing
mark of those who took the Bar
examination in 1947. These bar
candidates for who this bill should be
enacted, considered themselves as having
passed the bar examination on the
strength of the established precedent of
our Supreme Court and were fully aware
of the insurmountable difficulties and
handicaps which they were unavoidably
placed. We believe that such precedent
cannot or could not have been altered,
constitutionally, by the Supreme Court,
without giving due consideration to the
rights already accrued or vested in the bar
candidates who took the examination
when the precedent was not yet altered, or
in effect, was still enforced and without
being inconsistent with the principles of
their previous resolutions.
If this bill would be enacted, it shall be
considered as a simple curative act or
corrective statute which Congress has the
power to enact. The requirement of a
"valid classification" as against class
legislation, is very expressed in the
following American Jurisprudence:
A valid classification must include all
who naturally belong to the class, all who
possess a common disability, attribute, or
classification, and there must be a
"natural" and substantial differentiation
between those included in the class and
those it leaves untouched. When a class is
accepted by the Court as "natural" it
cannot be again split and then have the
dissevered factions of the original unit
designated
with
different
rules
established for each. (Fountain Park Co.
vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
Another case penned by Justice Cardozo:
"Time with its tides brings new conditions
which must be cared for by new laws.
Sometimes the new conditions affect the
members of a class. If so, the correcting
statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes
the condition affect only a few. If so, the
correcting statute may be as narrow as the
mischief. The constitution does not
prohibit special laws inflexibly and
always. It permits them when there are
special evils with which the general laws
are incompetent to cope. The special
public purpose will sustain the special
form. . . . The problem in the last analysis
is one of legislative policy, with a wide
margin of discretion conceded to the
lawmakers. Only in the case of plain
abuse will there be revision by the court.
(In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council
of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed.
1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)
This bill has all the earmarks of a
corrective statute which always retroacts
to the extent of the care of correction only
as in this case from 1946 when the
Supreme Court first deviated from the
rule of 75 per cent in the Rules of Court.
For the foregoing purposes the approval
of this bill is earnestly recommended.
The President allowed the period within which
the bill should be signed to pass without vetoing
it, by virtue of which it became a law on June 21,
1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered
972 (many times erroneously cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an
election year, and that both the President and the
author of the Bill were candidates for re-election,
together, however, they lost in the polls.
to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of
examination, the qualifications of applicants, the
passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the
legislative power. But the power to determine
when a candidate has made or has not made the
required grade is judicial, and lies completely
with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an
exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond
the scope of the congressional prerogative of
amending the rules. To say that candidates who
obtain a general average of 72 per cent in 1953,
73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955
should be considered as having passed the
examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege
and discretion judged in this Court. It is a
mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for
different years with grades lower than the
passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show
that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial
authority and discretion. It is furthermore
objectionable as discriminatory. Why should
those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and
1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower
passing grade, while those taking earlier or later
are not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared
unconstitutional, because it is not embraced
within the rule-making power of Congress,
because it is an undue interference with the
power of this Court to admit members thereof,
and because it is discriminatory.
Separate Opinions
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has
always been, the exclusive privilege of this
Court, because lawyers are members of the Court
and only this Court should be allowed to
determine admission thereto in the interest of the
principle of the separation of powers. The power
to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is
used in is exercise. This power should be
distinguished from the power to promulgate
rules which regulate admission. It is only this
power (to promulgate amendments to the rules)
that is given in the Constitution to the Congress,
not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not
PARAS, C.J., dissenting:
Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in
order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to
have passed his examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of 75 per
cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per
cent in any subject.' This passing mark has
always been adhered to, with certain exception
presently to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in
August, 1946, the original list of successful
candidates included only those who obtained a
general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon
motion for reconsideration, however, 12
candidates with general averages ranging from
(Sgd.) PABLO ANGELES DAVID
Senator
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed
by Congress as above transcribed. The President
again asked the comments of this Court, which
endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable,
the Acting Executive Secretary, Manila,
with the information that, with respect to
Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the
Court are taking the same views they
expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by
Congress in May, 1951, contained in the
first indorsement of the undersigned dated
June 5, 1951, to the Assistant Executive
Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS
72 to 73 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by
resolution of December 18, 1946. In the
examinations of November, 1946 the list first
released containing the names of successful
candidates covered only those who obtained a
general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon
motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a
general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75
per cent by resolution of March 31, 1947. This
would indicate that in the original list of
successful candidates those having a general
average of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per
cent were included. After the original list of 1947
successful bar candidates had been released, and
on motion for reconsideration, all candidates
with a general average of 69 per cent were
allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948.
With respect to the bar examinations held in
August, 1948, in addition to the original list of
successful bar candidates, all those who obtained
a general average of 70 per cent or more,
irrespective of the grades in any one subject and
irrespective of whether they filed petitions for
reconsideration, were allowed to pass by
resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year
1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the
passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per
cent; and this amounted, without being noticed
perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule
127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held
subsequent to 1948, whose general averages
mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed
motions for reconsideration invoking the
precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948,
but said motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public
hearings where law deans and professors,
practising attorneys, presidents of bar
associations, and law graduates appeared and
argued lengthily pro or con, approved a bill
providing, among others, for the reduction of the
passing general average from 75 per cent to 70
per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held
after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the
President mainly in view of an unfavorable
comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason,
Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953,
the Congress passed another bill similar to the
previous bill vetoed by the President, with the
important difference that in the later bill the
provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court
of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social
Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3)
the publication of the bar examiners before the
holding of the examination, and (4) the equal
division among the examiners of all the
admission fees paid by bar applicants, were
eliminated. This second bill was allowed to
become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the
President by merely not signing it within the
required period; and in doing so the President
gave due respect to the will of the Congress
which, speaking for the people, chose to repass
the bill first vetoed by him.
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates
who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in
any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August
1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations;
72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent
in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in
the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be
allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any
bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per
cent in any subject in any examination after July
4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such
subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall
be included in computing the passing in any
subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar
examinations previous to the approval of
Republic Act No. 972 and failed to obtain the
necessary passing average, filed with this Court
mass or separate petitions, praying that they be
admitted to the practice of law under and by
virtue of said Act, upon the allegation that they
have obtained the general averages prescribed
therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6,
1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing
on said petitions, and members of the bar,
especially authorized representatives of bar
associations, were invited to argue or submit
memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged
for said hearing being that some doubt had "been
expressed on the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar
examinations and the matter" involved "a new
question of public interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that
the power to regulate the admission to the
practice of law is inherently judicial, are
immaterial, because the subject is now governed
by the Constitution which in Article VII, section
13, provides as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have the power
to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade and shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive right. The
existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes
and are declared Rules of Court, subject
to the power of the Supreme Court to alter
and modify the same. The Congress shall
have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.
Under this constitutional provision, while the
Supreme Court has the power to promulgate
rules concerning the admission to the practice of
law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter
or supplement said rules. Little intelligence is
necessary to see that the power of the Supreme
Court and the Congress to regulate the admission
to the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue
that this Act, in so far as it covers bar
examinations held prior to its approval, is
unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final
resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to
admit to the practice of law the various
petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative
encroachment upon the judicial power. In my
opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place,
resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do
not have the finality of decisions in justiciable
cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix
certain periods after which they become
executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar
matters,
specially
on
motions
for
reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any give
year, are subject to revision by this Court at any
time, regardless of the period within which the
motion were filed, and this has been the practice
heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar
examinations and admission to the practice of
law may be deemed as a judicial function only
because said matters happen to be entrusted,
under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to
the Supreme Court. There is no judicial function
involved, in the subject and constitutional sense
of the word, because bar examinations and the
admission to the practice of law, unlike
justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants.
It is no more than the function of other
examining boards. In the second place,
retroactive laws are not prohibited by the
Constitution, except only when they would be ex
post facto, would impair obligations and
contracts or vested rights or would deny due
process and equal protection of the law. Republic
Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post
facto enactment, does not impair any obligation
and contract or vested rights, and denies to no
one the right to due process and equal protection
of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere
curative statute intended to correct certain
obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by
this Court of different passing general averages
in certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to
July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against,
because we no longer have any record of those
who might have failed before the war, apart from
the circumstance that 75 per cent had always
been the passing mark during said period. It may
also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates
similarly situated as those benefited by Republic
Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of
classification, the reasonableness must be
determined by the legislative body. It is proper to
recall that the Congress held public hearings, and
we can fairly suppose that the classification
adopted in the Act reflects good legislative
judgment derived from the facts and
circumstances then brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or
encroachment upon the judgment of this Court
by the Legislative Department, it is sufficient to
state that, if there is any interference at all, it is
one expressly sanctioned by the Constitution.
Besides, interference in judicial adjudication
prohibited by the Constitution is essentially
aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have
already been vested or acquired in virtue of
decisions of courts, not merely for the empty
purpose of creating appearances of separation
and equality among the three branches of the
Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not
produced a case involving two parties and
decided by the Court in favor of one and against
the other. Needless to say, the statute will not
affect the previous resolutions passing bar
candidates who had obtained the general average
prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law
would be objectionable and unconstitutional if,
for instance, it would provide that those who
have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946,
whose general average is below 80 per cent, will
not be allowed to practice law, because said
statute would then destroy a right already
acquired under previous resolutions of this
Court, namely, the bar admission of those whose
general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.
Without fear of contradiction, I think the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power conferred by the Constitution, may pass a
resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by
reducing the passing average to 70 per cent,
effective several years before the date of the
resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15,
1948 allowed to pass all candidates who obtained
a general average of 69 per cent or more and on
April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general
average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of
whether they filed petitions for reconsideration,
it in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127
retroactively, because during the examinations
held in August 1947 and August 1948, said
section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent)
was supposed to be in force. In stands to reason,
if we are to admit that the Supreme Court and the
Congress have concurrent power to regulate the
admission to the practice of law, that the latter
may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the
passing general average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the
ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, since this Court had already adopted
as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar
examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948
examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire
into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter
that is addressed to the judgment of the
legislators. This Court in many instances had
doubted the propriety of legislative enactments,
and yet it has consistently refrained from
nullifying them solely on that ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates
benefited under Republic Act 972 is against
public interest, is to assume that the matter of
whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the
general public was not considered by the
Congress. As already stated, the Congress held
public hearings, and we are bound to assume that
the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this
Court, to their oath of office, had taken all the
circumstances into account before passing the
Act. On the question of public interest I may
observe that the Congress, representing the
people who elected them, should be more
qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to
accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of
the will of the people through their duly elected
representatives.
I would, however, not go to the extent of
admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its
concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement
the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the
practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or
capricious manner, in the same way that this
Court may not do so. We are thus left in the
situation, incidental to a democracy, where we
can and should only hope that the right men are
put in the right places in our Government.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is
constitutional and should therefore be given
effect in its entirety.
Separate Opinions
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has
always been, the exclusive privilege of this
Court, because lawyers are members of the Court
and only this Court should be allowed to
determine admission thereto in the interest of the
principle of the separation of powers. The power
to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is
used in is exercise. This power should be
distinguished from the power to promulgate
rules which regulate admission. It is only this
power (to promulgate amendments to the rules)
that is given in the Constitution to the Congress,
not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not
to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of
examination, the qualifications of applicants, the
passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the
legislative power. But the power to determine
when a candidate has made or has not made the
required grade is judicial, and lies completely
with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an
exercise of the judicial function, and lies beyond
the scope of the congressional prerogative of
amending the rules. To say that candidates who
obtain a general average of 72 per cent in 1953,
73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955
should be considered as having passed the
examination, is to mean exercise of the privilege
and discretion judged in this Court. It is a
mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for
different years with grades lower than the
passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show
that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial
authority and discretion. It is furthermore
objectionable as discriminatory. Why should
those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and
1955 be allowed to have the privilege of a lower
passing grade, while those taking earlier or later
are not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared
unconstitutional, because it is not embraced
within the rule-making power of Congress,
because it is an undue interference with the
power of this Court to admit members thereof,
and because it is discriminatory.
PARAS, C.J., dissenting:
Under section 145 of Rule of Court No. 127, in
order that a bar candidate "may be deemed to
have passed his examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of 75 per
cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per
cent in any subject.' This passing mark has
always been adhered to, with certain exception
presently to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in
August, 1946, the original list of successful
candidates included only those who obtained a
general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon
motion for reconsideration, however, 12
candidates with general averages ranging from
72 to 73 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by
resolution of December 18, 1946. In the
examinations of November, 1946 the list first
released containing the names of successful
candidates covered only those who obtained a
general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon
motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a
general average of 72 per cent were raised to 75
per cent by resolution of March 31, 1947. This
would indicate that in the original list of
successful candidates those having a general
average of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per
cent were included. After the original list of 1947
successful bar candidates had been released, and
on motion for reconsideration, all candidates
with a general average of 69 per cent were
allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948.
With respect to the bar examinations held in
August, 1948, in addition to the original list of
successful bar candidates, all those who obtained
a general average of 70 per cent or more,
irrespective of the grades in any one subject and
irrespective of whether they filed petitions for
reconsideration, were allowed to pass by
resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year
1947 the Court in effect made 69 per cent as the
passing average, and for the year 1948, 70 per
cent; and this amounted, without being noticed
perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule
127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held
subsequent to 1948, whose general averages
mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed
motions for reconsideration invoking the
precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948,
but said motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public
hearings where law deans and professors,
practising attorneys, presidents of bar
associations, and law graduates appeared and
argued lengthily pro or con, approved a bill
providing, among others, for the reduction of the
passing general average from 75 per cent to 70
per cent, retroactive to any bar examination held
after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the
President mainly in view of an unfavorable
comment of Justices Padilla, Tuason,
Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953,
the Congress passed another bill similar to the
previous bill vetoed by the President, with the
important difference that in the later bill the
provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court
of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social
Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3)
the publication of the bar examiners before the
holding of the examination, and (4) the equal
division among the examiners of all the
admission fees paid by bar applicants, were
eliminated. This second bill was allowed to
become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the
President by merely not signing it within the
required period; and in doing so the President
gave due respect to the will of the Congress
which, speaking for the people, chose to repass
the bill first vetoed by him.
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates
who obtained a general average of 70 per cent in
any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August
1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations;
72 per cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent
in the 1954 bar examinations; and 74 per cent in
the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a
grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be
allowed to pass. Said Act also provides that any
bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per
cent in any subject in any examination after July
4, 1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such
subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall
be included in computing the passing in any
subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar
examinations previous to the approval of
Republic Act No. 972 and failed to obtain the
necessary passing average, filed with this Court
mass or separate petitions, praying that they be
admitted to the practice of law under and by
virtue of said Act, upon the allegation that they
have obtained the general averages prescribed
therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6,
1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing
on said petitions, and members of the bar,
especially authorized representatives of bar
associations, were invited to argue or submit
memoranda as amici curiae, the reason alleged
for said hearing being that some doubt had "been
expressed on the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past bar
examinations and the matter" involved "a new
question of public interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that
the power to regulate the admission to the
practice of law is inherently judicial, are
immaterial, because the subject is now governed
by the Constitution which in Article VII, section
13, provides as follows:
The Supreme Court shall have the power
to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the practice of law. Said
rules shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade and shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive right. The
existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes
and are declared Rules of Court, subject
to the power of the Supreme Court to alter
and modify the same. The Congress shall
have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.
Under this constitutional provision, while the
Supreme Court has the power to promulgate
rules concerning the admission to the practice of
law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter
or supplement said rules. Little intelligence is
necessary to see that the power of the Supreme
Court and the Congress to regulate the admission
to the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue
that this Act, in so far as it covers bar
examinations held prior to its approval, is
unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final
resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing to
admit to the practice of law the various
petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative
encroachment upon the judicial power. In my
opinion this view is erroneous. In the first place,
resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do
not have the finality of decisions in justiciable
cases where the Rules of Court expressly fix
certain periods after which they become
executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar
matters,
specially
on
motions
for
reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any give
year, are subject to revision by this Court at any
time, regardless of the period within which the
motion were filed, and this has been the practice
heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar
examinations and admission to the practice of
law may be deemed as a judicial function only
because said matters happen to be entrusted,
under the Constitution and our Rules of Court, to
the Supreme Court. There is no judicial function
involved, in the subject and constitutional sense
of the word, because bar examinations and the
admission to the practice of law, unlike
justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants.
It is no more than the function of other
examining boards. In the second place,
retroactive laws are not prohibited by the
Constitution, except only when they would be ex
post facto, would impair obligations and
contracts or vested rights or would deny due
process and equal protection of the law. Republic
Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post
facto enactment, does not impair any obligation
and contract or vested rights, and denies to no
one the right to due process and equal protection
of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere
curative statute intended to correct certain
obvious inequalities arising from the adoption by
this Court of different passing general averages
in certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to
July 4, 1946, are being discriminated against,
because we no longer have any record of those
who might have failed before the war, apart from
the circumstance that 75 per cent had always
been the passing mark during said period. It may
also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates
similarly situated as those benefited by Republic
Act No. 972. At any rate, in the matter of
classification, the reasonableness must be
determined by the legislative body. It is proper to
recall that the Congress held public hearings, and
we can fairly suppose that the classification
adopted in the Act reflects good legislative
judgment derived from the facts and
circumstances then brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or
encroachment upon the judgment of this Court
by the Legislative Department, it is sufficient to
state that, if there is any interference at all, it is
one expressly sanctioned by the Constitution.
Besides, interference in judicial adjudication
prohibited by the Constitution is essentially
aimed at protecting rights of litigants that have
already been vested or acquired in virtue of
decisions of courts, not merely for the empty
purpose of creating appearances of separation
and equality among the three branches of the
Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not
produced a case involving two parties and
decided by the Court in favor of one and against
the other. Needless to say, the statute will not
affect the previous resolutions passing bar
candidates who had obtained the general average
prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law
would be objectionable and unconstitutional if,
for instance, it would provide that those who
have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946,
whose general average is below 80 per cent, will
not be allowed to practice law, because said
statute would then destroy a right already
acquired under previous resolutions of this
Court, namely, the bar admission of those whose
general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.
Without fear of contradiction, I think the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power conferred by the Constitution, may pass a
resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by
reducing the passing average to 70 per cent,
effective several years before the date of the
resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15,
1948 allowed to pass all candidates who obtained
a general average of 69 per cent or more and on
April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general
average of 70 per cent or more, irrespective of
whether they filed petitions for reconsideration,
it in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127
retroactively, because during the examinations
held in August 1947 and August 1948, said
section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent)
was supposed to be in force. In stands to reason,
if we are to admit that the Supreme Court and the
Congress have concurrent power to regulate the
admission to the practice of law, that the latter
may validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the
passing general average.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the
ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, since this Court had already adopted
as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar
examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948
examinations. Anyway, we should not inquire
into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter
that is addressed to the judgment of the
legislators. This Court in many instances had
doubted the propriety of legislative enactments,
and yet it has consistently refrained from
nullifying them solely on that ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates
benefited under Republic Act 972 is against
public interest, is to assume that the matter of
whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the
general public was not considered by the
Congress. As already stated, the Congress held
public hearings, and we are bound to assume that
the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this
Court, to their oath of office, had taken all the
circumstances into account before passing the
Act. On the question of public interest I may
observe that the Congress, representing the
people who elected them, should be more
qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to
accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of
the will of the people through their duly elected
representatives.
I would, however, not go to the extent of
admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its
concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement
the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the
practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or
capricious manner, in the same way that this
Court may not do so. We are thus left in the
situation, incidental to a democracy, where we
can and should only hope that the right men are
put in the right places in our Government.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is
constitutional and should therefore be given
effect in its entirety.
CASE DIGEST : In Re: Cunanan, Resolution, March 18,
1954
IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534, MARCH 18, 1954
FACTS
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the
Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. Under the Rules of Court
governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate
(for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed
his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a
general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject."(Rule 127, sec. 14,
Rules of Court).
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as
those reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling
conscious of having been discriminated against (See
Explanatory Note to R. A. No. 972), unsuccessful
candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage
lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress
for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12
which, among others, reduced the passing general average
in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946.
The President requested the views of the court on the bill.
Complying with that request, seven members of the court
subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse
thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it.
Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved
Senate Bill No. 371 which is an Act to fix the passing
marks for bar examinations from nineteen hundred and
forty-six up to and including nineteen Hundred and fiftyfive, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed
bill.
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author,
to admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public
interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had
inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as
evidenced by their failure in the exams.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking
its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision
of their examination papers were still pending also invoked
the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. To
avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first
reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of
whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their
grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be
pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid,
should be applied equally to all concerned whether they
have filed petitions or not.
ISSUE
Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.
.
HELD
RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to
admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved,
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and
responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from
which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension,
disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between
the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of
the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant
license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities may say,
merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest
encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the
resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter
them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the
Constitution. 3. That congress has exceeded its power to
repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the
bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the
profession, and those rules promulgated are considered the
bare minimum.) 4. It is a class legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A.
972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what
the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the
provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.
Good Moral Character is a Continuing
Requirement
Grande v. Atty. De Silva, A.C. No. 4838, July 29, 2003
A.C. No. 4838
July 29, 2003
EMILIO GRANDE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EVANGELINE DE
SILVA, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Complainant Emilio Grande was the private
offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346
to 96-1353, filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Marikina City, Branch 273, for Estafa and
Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22,
entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff
versus Sergio Natividad, Accused." During the
proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de
Silva, counsel for the accused, tendered to
complainant Check No. 0023638 in the amount
of P144,768.00, drawn against her account with
the Philippine National Bank, as settlement of
the civil aspect of the case against her client.
Complainant refused to accept the check, but
respondent assured him that the same will be
paid upon its presentment to her drawee bank.
She manifested that as a lawyer, she would not
issue a check which is not sufficiently funded.
Thus, respondent was prevailed upon by
complainant to accept the check. Consequently,
he desisted from participating as a complaining
witness in the criminal case, which led to the
dismissal of the same and the release of the
accused, Sergio Natividad.
When complainant deposited the check, the same
was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the
reason: "Account Closed." On June 19, 1997,
complainant wrote a letter to respondent
demanding that she pay the face value of the
check. However, his demand was ignored by
respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal
complaint against her for Estafa and Violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Marikina, which was
docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036. On September 22,
1997, the Marikina City Prosecutor filed the
necessary information for violation of Batas
1
Pambansa Bilang 22 against respondent Atty.
Evangeline de Silva.
On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the
instant administrative complaint for disbarment
of respondent for deceit and violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath.
In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to
respondent’s given address at Carmelo
Compound, Newton Avenue, Mayamot,
Antipolo City, she was required to comment on
the complaint within ten (10) days from
notice. However, it was returned unserved with
the notation "Moved". The Assistant National
Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest address
of respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig
City.
On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring
respondent to comment on the administrative
complaint filed against her was served at the
aforesaid address. This was again returned
unserved with the notation: "Refused". Thus, the
case was referred to the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
In a Report dated December 6, 2001,
Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous
found respondent guilty of deceit, gross
misconduct and violation of the Lawyer’s Oath.
Thus, he recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2)
years.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of
Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554
which adopted the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2)
years.
We fully agree with the findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The record shows that respondent prevailed upon
complainant to accept her personal check by way
of settlement for the civil liability of her client,
Sergio Natividad, with the assurance that the
check will have sufficient funds when presented
for payment. In doing so, she deceived
complainant into withdrawing his complaint
against her client in exchange for a check which
she drew against a closed account.
It is clear that the breach of trust committed by
respondent in issuing a bouncing check
2
3
4
5
6
7
amounted to deceit and constituted a violation of
her oath, for which she should be accordingly
penalized. Such an act constitutes gross
misconduct and the penalties for such
malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section
27of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.
– A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
The nature of the office of an attorney requires
that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral
character. Since this qualification is a condition
precedent to a license to enter upon the practice
of law, the maintenance thereof is equally
essential during the continuance of the practice
and the exercise of the privilege. Gross
misconduct which puts the lawyer’s moral
character in serious doubt may render her unfit
to continue in the practice of law.
The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any
reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension
or disbarment, because it is important that
members of the legal brotherhood must conform
to the highest standards of morality. Any
wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for
the profession, whether it be professional or nonprofessional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus,
a lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment
of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is
unbecoming and does not speak well of a
member of the bar, for a lawyer’s professional
and personal conduct must at all times be kept
beyond reproach and above suspicion.
Moreover, the attitude of respondent in
deliberately refusing to accept the notices served
on her betrays a deplorably willful character or
disposition which stains the nobility of the legal
profession. Her conduct not only underscores
her utter lack of respect for authority; it also
brings to the fore a darker and more sinister
character flaw in her psyche which renders
8
9
10
11
12
13
highly questionable her moral fitness to continue
in the practice of law: a defiance for law and
order which is at the very core of her profession.
Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a
career in the administration of justice because
obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is
demanded of every lawyer. How else would
respondent even endeavor to serve justice and
uphold the law when she disdains to follow even
simple directives? Indeed, the first and foremost
command of the Code of Professional
Responsibility could not be any clearer:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD
THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF
THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Needless to state, respondent’s persistent refusal
to comply with lawful orders directed at her with
not even an explanation for doing so is
contumacious conduct which merits no
compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
at all times. She can only do this by faithfully
performing her duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to her clients. We can not tolerate any
misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair name
of an honorable profession.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of Two (2) Years, effective upon receipt
hereof. Let copies of this Decision be entered in
her record as attorney and be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on official leave.
Footnotes
Rollo, p. 4.
Id., pp. 5-6.
Id., pp. 1-3.
Id., p. 7.
Id., p. 16.
Id., p. 21.
Id., p. 27.
14
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Cesar A. Espiritu v. Atty. Juan Cabredo
IV, A.M. No. 5831, 13 January 2003.
Balinon v. De Leon, 94 Phil. 277
[1954].
Royong v. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865
[1963]; In re De los Angeles, 106 Phil. 1
[1959]; Mortel v. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 586
[1956].
Pangan v. Ramos, 194 Phil. 1 [1981].
Constantino v. Saludares, A.M. No.
2029, 7 December 1993, 228 SCRA 233.
Sencio v. Calvadores, A.M. No. 5841,
20 January 2003.
Reyes v. Javier, A.C. No. 5574, 2
February 2002.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
CASE DIGEST
EMILIO GRANDE v. ATTY.
EVANGELINE DE SILVA, AC. No.
4838, 2003-07-29
Facts:
Complainant Emilio Grande was the
private offended party in Criminal
Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-1353, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of
Marikina City, Branch 273, for Estafa
and Violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22, entitled "People of... the
Philippines, Plaintiff versus Sergio
Natividad, Accused."... uring the
proceedings,
respondent
Atty.
Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the
accused, tendered to complainant
Check No. 0023638... as settlement of
the civil aspect of the case against her
client.
Thus, respondent was prevailed upon
by complainant to accept the check.
Consequently, he desisted from
participating as a complaining witness
in the criminal case, which led to the
dismissal of the same and the release of
the accused, Sergio
Natividad.
When complainant deposited the check,
the same was returned unpaid by the
drawee bank for the reason: "Account
Closed." On June 19, 1997,
complainant wrote a letter to
respondent demanding that she pay the
face value of the check.
However, his demand was... ignored by
respondent; hence, he instituted a
criminal complaint against her for
Estafa and Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Marikina, which
was docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036. On
September 22, 1997, the Marikina City
Prosecutor
filed
the
necessary
information for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 against respondent
Atty. Evangeline de Silva.
On November 10, 1997, complainant
filed the instant administrative
complaint for disbarment of respondent
for deceit and violation of the Lawyer's
Oath.
Issues:
complainant
filed
the
instant
administrative
complaint
for
disbarment of respondent for deceit and
violation of the Lawyer's Oath.
Ruling:
In a Report dated December 6, 2001,
Investigating Commissioner Florimond
C. Rous found respondent guilty of
deceit, gross misconduct and violation
of the Lawyer's Oath. Thus, he
recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for
two (2) years.
The record shows that respondent
prevailed upon complainant to accept
her personal check by way of settlement
for the civil liability of her client,
Sergio Natividad, with the assurance
that the check will have sufficient funds
when presented for payment. In doing
so, she... deceived complainant into
withdrawing his complaint against her
client in exchange for a check which
she drew against a closed account.
It is clear that the breach of trust
committed by respondent in issuing a
bouncing check amounted to deceit and
constituted a violation of her oath, for
which she should be accordingly
penalized.[8] Such an act constitutes
gross misconduct and the penalties...
for such malfeasance is prescribed by
Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of
attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefore. - A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court
for any deceit, malpractice or other
gross misconduct in such office,...
grossly immoral conduct or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for
a willful disobedience appearing as
attorney for a party without authority to
do... so.
Moreover, the attitude of respondent in
deliberately refusing to accept the
notices served on her betrays a
deplorably willful character or
disposition which stains the nobility of
the legal profession.[13] Her conduct
not only underscores her utter lack of...
respect for authority; it also brings to
the fore a darker and more sinister
character flaw in her psyche which
renders highly questionable her moral
fitness to continue in the practice of
law: a defiance for law and order which
is at the very core of her profession.
Indeed, the first and foremost command
of the Code of Professional
Responsibility could not be any clearer:
CANON 1.
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT
FOR
LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Needless to state, respondent's
persistent refusal to comply with lawful
orders directed at her with not even an
explanation
for
doing
so
is
contumacious conduct which merits no
compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession at... all times. She can
only do this by faithfully performing
her duties to society, to the bar, to the
courts and to her clients.[14] We can
not tolerate any misconduct that tends
to besmirch the fair name of an
honorable profession.
The records reveal the following facts:
From the Report and Recommendation of the
Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears that
complainant and respondent married on October
29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman Catholic
Church in Quezon City. They established their
residence in Antipolo, Rizal, where eight of their
eleven children were born. In 1962 respondent
relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato
(now Gen. Santos City), where his last three
children were born and where he practiced his
profession until his appointment as a CFI Judge
in Butuan City on January 30, 1976.
In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as
CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting with a
certain Elena (Helen) Peña, in Nasipit, Agusan
del Norte. On December 28, 1977, Elena gave
birth to their first child, named Ofelia Sembrano
Peña.
Tapucar v. Tapucar, A.C. No. 4148, July 30, 1998
A.C. No. 4148
July 30, 1998
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ
TAPUCAR, complainant,
vs.
Atty. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993,
complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought
the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L.
Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly
immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain
Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous
circumstances.
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already
administratively charged four times for conduct
unbecoming an officer of the court. In
Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on
April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge
of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six
months suspension without pay, while in
Administrative Matters Nos. 1720, 1911 and
2300-CFI, which were consolidated, this Court
on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from
the service of respondent.
Now he faces disbarment.
1
2
3
4
In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty.
Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative
complaint against respondent for immorality.
After investigation, the penalty of suspension
from office for a period of six months without
pay was meted by this Court upon respondent.
5
Despite this penalty, respondent still continued
to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another
charge of immorality and other administrative
cases, such as: conduct unbecoming an officer of
the court, and grossly immoral conduct. These
cases were consolidated and after investigation,
this Court ordered his dismissal and separation
from the service.
6
But his dismissal as a judge did not impel
respondent to mend his ways. He continued
living with Elena, which resulted in the birth on
September 20, 1989, of their second child named
Laella Peña Tapucar. Moreover, he completely
abandoned complainant and his children by her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan
del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along
Elena and their two children. And on March 5,
1992, respondent contracted marriage with Elena
in a ceremony solemnized by MTC Judge
Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This
was done while the respondent's marriage to
complainant subsists, as nothing on record shows
the dissolution thereof.
Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to
United States of America upon her retirement
from the government service in 1990. However,
her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept her
posted of the misery they allegedly suffered
because of their father's acts, including deception
and intrigues against them. Thus, despite having
previously withdrawn a similar case which she
filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the
present petition for disbarment under the
compulsion of the maternal impulse to shield and
protect her children from the despotic and cruel
acts of their own father. Complainant secured the
assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma.
Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this
case.
Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report
and recommendation. After conducting a
thorough investigation, the Commission through
Commissioner
Victor
C.
Fernandez
recommended that respondent be disbarred, and
his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
Mainly, this was premised on the ground that,
notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed
upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court,
respondent continued the illicit liaison with
Elena.
7
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted
that, instead of contradicting the charges against
him, respondent displayed arrogance, and even
made a mockery of the law and the Court, as
when he said:
I have been ordered suspended by
Supreme Court for two months
without pay in 1980 for having a
mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena
(Helen) Peña, now my wife. Being
ordered separated
in later
administrative case constitute
double jeopardy. If now disbarred
for marrying Ms. Elena Peña will
constitute triple jeopardy. If that's
the law so be it.
8
Based on said report, the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, passed on
May 17, 1997, a Resolution adopting the
Commissioner's recommendation, as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97
Adm. Case No. 4148
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs.
Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar
RESOLVED to ADOPT and
APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner in
the above-entitled case, herein
made
part
of
the
Resolution/Decision as Annex
"A";
and,
finding
the
recommendation therein to be
fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and
rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro L.
Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED
and that his name be stricken off
the roll of attorneys.
We find the Report and Recommendation of
Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and
adopted by the Board of Governors of IBP, more
than sufficient to justify and support the
foregoing Resolution, herein considered as the
recommendation to this Court by said Board
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12 (b), of the Rules
of Court. * We are in agreement that
respondent's actuations merit the penalty of
disbarment.
Well settled is the rule that good moral character
is not only a condition precedent for admission
to the legal profession, but it must also remain
intact in order to maintain one's good standing in
that exclusive and honored fraternity. There is
perhaps no profession after that of the sacred
ministry in which a high-toned morality is more
imperative than that of law. The Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that:
9
10
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not
engage
in
unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or
conduct.
deceitful
resides. He must maintain due regard for public
decency in an orderly society.
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession. (Emphasis
supplied.)
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts and to his clients. Exacted
from him, as a member of the profession charged
with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the
defense of what is right, are such positive
qualities of decency, truthfulness and
responsibility that have been compendiously
described as "moral character." To achieve such
end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to
honor and maintain the dignity of his profession,
and thus improve not only the public regard for
the Bar but also the administration of justice.
As this Court often reminds members of the Bar,
they must live up to the standards and norms
expected of the legal profession, by upholding
the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility always. Lawyers
must maintain a high standard of legal
proficiency, as well as morality including
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are
at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of
public opinion and community approbation.
Needless to state, those whose conduct — both
public and private — fails this scrutiny would
have to be disciplined and, after appropriate
proceedings, penalized accordingly.
Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent
here was once a member of the judiciary, a fact
that aggravates his professional infractions. For
having occupied that place of honor in the
Bench, he knew a judge's actuations ought to be
free from any appearance of impropriety. For a
judge is the visible representation of the law and,
more importantly, of justice. Ordinary citizens
consider him as a source of strength that fortifies
their will to obey the law. Indeed, a judge
should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in
all of his actuations, lest it be a demoralizing
example to others. Surely, respondent could
not have forgotten the Code of Judicial Conduct
entirely as to lose its moral imperatives.
11
12
13
14
Like a judge who is held to a high standard of
integrity and ethical conduct, an attorney-atlaw is also invested with public trust. Judges and
lawyers serve in the administration of justice.
Admittedly, as officers of the court, lawyers
must ensure the faith and confidence of the
public that justice is administered with dignity
and civility. A high degree of moral integrity is
expected of a lawyer in the community where he
15
16
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or
suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows
him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, thus proving
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
17
The power to disbar, however, is one to be
exercised with great caution, and only in a clear
case of misconduct which seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer
of the Court and member of the bar. For
disbarment proceedings are intended to afford
the parties thereto full opportunity to vindicate
their cause before disciplinary action is taken, to
assure the general public that those who are
tasked with the duty of administering justice are
competent, honorable, trustworthy men and
women in whom the Courts and the clients may
repose full confidence.
18
In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr., a
complaint for disbarment was filed against a
member of the bar by his wife. She was able to
prove that he had abandoned his wife and their
son; and that he had adulterous relations with a
married but separated woman. Respondent was
not able to overcome the evidence presented by
his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral
conduct. In another case, a lawyer was
disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife
and cohabited with another woman who had
borne him a child. The Court held that
respondent failed to maintain the highest degree
19
20
of morality expected and required of a member
of the bar.
In the present case, the record shows that despite
previous sanctions imposed upon him by this
Court, respondent continued his illicit liaison
with a woman other than his lawfully-wedded
wife. The report of the Commissioner assigned
to investigate thoroughly the complaint found
respondent far from contrite; on the contrary, he
exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance, in
the face of charges against him. The IBP Board
of Governors, tasked to determine whether he
still merited the privileges extended to a member
of the legal profession, resolved the matter
against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly
immoral conduct abounds against him and could
not be explained away. Keeping a mistress,
entering into another marriage while a prior one
still subsists, as well as abandoning and/or
mistreating complainant and their children, show
his disregard of family obligations, morality and
decency, the law and the lawyer's oath. Such
gross misbehavior over a long period of time
clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent's
character, his moral indifference to scandal in the
community, and his outright defiance of
established norms. All these could not but put the
legal profession in disrepute and place the
integrity of the administration of justice in peril,
hence the need for strict but appropriate
disciplinary action.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L.
Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of
Court is directed to strike out his name from the
Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Melo, Puno Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Martinez and Quisumbing, JJ.,
concur.
Bellosillo and Purisima, JJ., took no part.
CASE DIGEST
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR v.
ATTY. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, AC.
No. 4148, 1998-07-30
Facts:
In a letter-complaint dated November
22, 1993, complainant Remedios
Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment
of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar,
on the ground of continuing grossly
immoral conduct for cohabiting with a
certain Elena (Helen) Peña under...
scandalous circumstances.
Prior to this complaint, respondent was
already administratively charged four
times for conduct unbecoming an
officer of the court.
complainant and respondent were
married on October 29, 1953 at the
Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church
in Quezon City.
They established their residence in
Antipolo, Rizal, were eight of their...
eleven children were born. In 1962
respondent relocated his family to
Dadiangas, Cotabato (Now General
Santos City), where his last three
children were born and where he
practiced his profession until his
appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan
City on January 30, 1976.
In August, 1976, shortly after being
appointed as CFI Judge, respondent
began cohabiting with a certain Elena
(Helen) Peña, in Nasipit, Agusan Del
Norte. On December 28, 1977 Elena
gave birth to their first child, named
Ofelia Sembrano Peña.
Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an
administrative
complaint
against
respondent for immorality. After
investigation, the penalty of suspension
from office for a period of six months
without pay was meted
Despite this penalty, respondent still
continued to cohabit with Elena, giving
rise to another charge of immorality and
other administrative cases, such as
conduct unbecoming an officer of the
court, and grossly immoral conduct.
These cases were consolidated and
after... investigation, this Court ordered
his dismissal and separation from the
service.
He continued living with Elena, which
resulted in the birth on September 20,
1989, of their second child named
Laella Peña Tapucar. Moreover, he
completely abandoned complainant and
his children by... her.
on March 5, 1992, respondent
contracted marriage with Elena in a
ceremony solemnized by Metropolitan
Trial Court Judge Isagani A. Geronimo
of Antipolo,... Rizal. This was done
while the respondent's marriage to
complainant subsists, as nothing on
record shows the dissolution thereof.
Thus, despite having previously
withdrawn a similar case which she
filed in 1976, complainant was forced
to file the present petition for
disbarment under the compulsion of the
material impulse to shield and protect
her children from the... despotic and
cruel acts of their own father.
Complainant secured the assistance of
her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma. Susana
Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this
case.
After
conducting
a
thorough
investigation, the Commission through
Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez
recommended that respondent be
disbarred, and his name be stricken off
the roll of attorneys.
Issues:
Whether or not (WON) respondent's
actuations merit the penalty of
disbarment.
Ruling:
We are in agreement that respondent's
actuations merit the penalty of
disbarment.
Well settled is the rule that good moral
character is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the legal
profession, but it must also remain
intact in order to maintain one's good
standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity.
The
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
As this Court often reminds members of
the Bar, they must live up to the
standards and norms expected of the
legal profession, by upholding the
ideals and tenets embodied in the Code
of Professional Responsibility always.
Lawyers must maintain a high
standards of legal... proficiency, as well
as morality including honesty, integrity
and fair dealing. For they are at all times
subject to the scrutinizing eye of public
opinion and community approbation.
Needless to state, those whose conduct
both public and private fails this
scrutiny would have to... be disciplined
and, after appropriate proceedings,
penalized accordingly.
Moreover, it should be recalled that
respondent here was once a member of
the judiciary, a fact that aggravates this
professional infractions.
For having occupied that place of honor
in the Bench, he knew a judge's
actuations ought to be free from any
appearance of... impropriety.
Like a judge who is held to a high
standard of integrity and ethical
conduct,... an attorney-at-law is also
invested with public trust. Judges and
lawyers serve in the administration of
justice. Admittedly, as officers of the
court, lawyers must ensure the... faith
and confidence of the public that justice
is administered with dignity and
civility. A high degree or moral
integrity is expected of a lawyer in the
community where he resides. He must
maintain due regard for public decency
in an orderly society.
On these considerations, the Court may
disbar or suspend a lawyer for
misconduct, whether in his professional
or private capacity, which shows him to
be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity, and good demeanor,
thus proving unworthy to continue as an
officer of the... court.
Keeping a mistress, entering into
another marriage while a prior one still
subsists, as well as abandoning and/or
mistreating complainant and their
children,... show his disregard of family
obligations, morality and decency, the
law and the lawyer's oath. Such gross
misbehavior over a long period of time
clearly shows a serious flaw in
respondent's character, his moral
indifference to scandal in the
community, and his outright defiance...
of established norms. All these could
not but put the legal profession in
disrepute and place the integrity of the
administration of justice in peril, hence
the need for strict but appropriate
disciplinary action.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty.
Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby
DISBARRED.
Principles:
The
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave
in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
Garrido v. Attys. Garrido and Valencia, A.C. No. 6593,
February 4, 2010
A.C. No. 6593
February 4, 2010
MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and
ROMANA P. VALENCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaintaffidavit and a supplemental affidavit for
disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel
E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana
P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on
Discipline charging them with gross immorality.
The complaint-affidavit states:
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1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel
E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on
June 23, 1962 at San Marcelino Church,
Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by
Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x
2. That our marriage blossomed into
having us blessed with six (6) children,
namely, Mat Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito,
Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel
Victorino and Madonna Angeline, all
surnamed Garrido;
3. x x x x
4. That on May, 1991, during my light
moments with our children, one of my
daughters, Madeleine confided to me that
sometime on the later part of 1987, an
unknown caller talked with her claiming
that the former is a child of my husband.
I ignored it and dismissed it as a mere
joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one
of my daughters told me that sometime on
August 1990, she saw my husband
strolling at the Robinson’s Department
Store at Ermita, Manila together with a
woman and a child who was later
identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida
Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia
Garrido, respectively x x x
5. x x x x
6. That I did not stop from unearthing the
truth until I was able to secure the
Certificate of Live Birth of the child,
stating among others that the said child is
their daughter and that Atty. Angel
Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana
Paguida Valencia were married at
Hongkong sometime on 1978.
7. That on June 1993, my husband left our
conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona
Paguida Valencia at their residence x x x
8. That since he left our conjugal home he
failed and still failing to give us our
needed financial support to the prejudice
of our children who stopped schooling
because of financial constraints.
xxxx
That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings
against his mistress as alleged in the same
affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering
that out of their immoral acts I suffered not only
mental anguish but also besmirch reputation,
wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x x
In his Counter-Affidavit, Atty. Garrido denied
Maelotisea’s charges and imputations. By way of
defense, he alleged that Maelotisea was not his
legal wife, as he was already married to
Constancia David (Constancia) when he married
Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea
after he and Constancia parted ways. He further
alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades
and understood his "bad boy" image before she
married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew
apart over the years due to financial problems,
Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became
close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his
difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal
problems and his financial difficulties with his
second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he
failed to give financial support to his children
with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6)
children were educated in private schools; all
graduated from college except for Arnel
Victorino, who finished a special secondary
course. Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea
had not been employed and had not practiced her
profession for the past ten (10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages
were contracted before he became a member of
the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage
contracted after the death of Constancia on
December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with
Maelotisea were born before he became a
lawyer.
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In her Counter-Affidavit, Atty. Valencia denied
that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She
explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife
of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between
them was void from the beginning due to the then
existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with
Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that
Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship
between her and Atty. Garrido, as they
(Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978.
Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship
with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this
silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially
helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second
family. Atty. Valencia alleged that Maelotisea
was not a proper party to this suit because of her
silence; she kept silent when things were
favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia
also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of
action against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the
following motions before the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline:
First, the respondents filed a Motion for
Suspension of Proceedings in view of the
criminal complaint for concubinage Maelotisea
filed against them, and the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity (of marriage) Atty.
Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to
Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline denied this motion for lack of merit.
Second, the respondents filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaints after the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City declared the marriage
between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea "an
absolute nullity." Since Maelotisea was never the
legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents
argued that she had no personality to file her
complaints against them. The respondents also
alleged that they had not committed any immoral
act since they married when Atty. Garrido was
already a widower, and the acts complained of
were committed before his admission to the bar.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also
denied this motion.
Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the
dismissal of the complaints she filed against the
respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain
friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the
father of her six (6) children. The IBP
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Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied
this motion.
On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating
Commissioner San Juan) submitted her Report
and Recommendation for the respondents’
disbarment. The Commission on Bar Discipline
of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of
Governors) approved and adopted this
recommendation with modification under
Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30,
2004. This resolution in part states:
x x x finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering that
Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the
degree of morality required as members of the
bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby
DISBARRED for gross immorality. However,
the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit of the
complaint.
Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this
resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline denied his motion under Resolution
No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.
Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court
through the present petition for review. He
submits that under the circumstances, he did not
commit any gross immorality that would warrant
his disbarment. He also argues that the offenses
charged have prescribed under the IBP rules.
Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be
allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain
his profession; he is already in the twilight of his
life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright
and irreproachable life notwithstanding his
situation.
In compliance with our Resolution dated August
25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty.
Risos-Vidal), Director of the Commission on Bar
Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition.
She recommends a modification of the penalty
from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the
view that disbarment is very harsh considering
that the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took
responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his
ways by filing a petition for declaration of nullity
of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also
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notes that no other administrative case has ever
been filed against Atty. Garrido.
THE COURT’S RULING
After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the
findings of the IBP Board of Governors against
Atty. Garrido, and to reject its recommendation
with respect to Atty. Valencia.
General Considerations
Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with
procedure – such as the verification of pleadings
and prejudicial questions, or in this case,
prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits
of desistance by the complainant – do not apply
in the determination of a lawyer’s qualifications
and fitness for membership in the Bar. We have
so ruled in the past and we see no reason to
depart from this ruling. First, admission to the
practice of law is a component of the
administration of justice and is a matter of public
interest because it involves service to the
public. The admission qualifications are also
qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the
privilege to practice law. Second, lack of
qualifications or the violation of the standards for
the practice of law, like criminal cases, is a
matter of public concern that the State may
inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the
complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct
party whose interest in the outcome of the charge
is wholly his or her own; effectively, his or her
participation is that of a witness who brought the
matter to the attention of the Court.
As applied to the present case, the time that
elapsed between the immoral acts charged and
the filing of the complaint is not material in
considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido
when he applied for admission to the practice of
law, and his continuing qualification to be a
member of the legal profession. From this
perspective, it is not important that the acts
complained of were committed before Atty.
Garrido was admitted to the practice of law. As
we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo, the
possession of good moral character is both a
condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the bar and
to retain membership in the legal profession.
Admission to the bar does not preclude a
subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper
complaint, into any question concerning the
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mental or moral fitness of the respondent before
he became a lawyer. Admission to the practice
only creates the rebuttable presumption that the
applicant has all the qualifications to become a
lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary even after
admission to the Bar.
Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the
Constitution recognizes the disciplinary
authority of the Court over the members of the
Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's
exclusive power to admit applicants to the
practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation
of this constitutional authority is Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which expressly
states that a member of the bar may be disbarred
or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit,
grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath
that he is required to take before admission to the
practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the
practice of law and the nature of disbarment
proceedings as a public interest concern,
Maelotisea’s affidavit of desistance cannot have
the effect of discontinuing or abating the
disbarment proceedings. As we have stated,
Maelotisea is more of a witness than a
complainant in these proceedings. We note
further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal
only after she had presented her evidence; her
evidence are now available for the Court’s
examination and consideration, and their merits
are not affected by her desistance. We cannot fail
to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of
desistance, not to disown or refute the evidence
she had submitted, but solely becuase of
compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for
her personal financial interest in continuing
friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and
respectable
members
of
the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is
so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the community’s sense of decency. We
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make these distinctions as the supreme penalty
of disbarment arising from conduct requires
grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.
In several cases, we applied the above standard
in considering lawyers who contracted an
unlawful second marriage or multiple marriages.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo, the respondent
lawyer entered into multiple marriages and
subsequently used legal remedies to sever them.
We ruled that the respondent’s pattern of
misconduct undermined the institutions of
marriage and family – institutions that this
society looks up to for the rearing of our children,
for the development of values essential to the
survival and well-being of our communities, and
for the strengthening of our nation as a whole. In
this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited
the wayward respondent.
In Villasanta v. Peralta, the respondent lawyer
married the complainant while his marriage with
his first wife was subsisting. We held that the
respondent’s act of contracting the second
marriage was contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality. The lack of good moral
character required by the Rules of Court
disqualified the respondent from admission to
the Bar.
Similar to Villasanta was the case of
Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma, where the respondent
secretly contracted a second marriage with the
daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found
that the respondent exhibited a deplorable lack of
that degree of morality required of members of
the Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of
marriage – a sacred institution that demands
respect and dignity. We also declared his act of
contracting a second marriage contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality.
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from
the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido
established a pattern of gross immoral conduct
that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was
not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was
reprehensible to the highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left
Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter
and during the marriage, he had romantic
relationships with other women. He had the gall
to represent to this Court that the study of law
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was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and
the study of law are not mutually exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea
as a bachelor, when in truth he was already
married
to
Constancia. This
was
a
misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a
woman into a prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second
marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the
subsistence of his first marriage. This was an
open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but
of the commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extramarital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two
marriages were in place and without taking into
consideration the moral and emotional
implications of his actions on the two women he
took as wives and on his six (6) children by his
second marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate
his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of
Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty.
Valencia who bore him a daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal
knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who
was not then a lawyer) that he was free to marry,
considering that his marriage with Maelotisea
was not "valid."
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty.
Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in
an apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a
union entered into while another marriage was in
place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law,
Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had
sexual relations with two (2) women who at one
point were both his wedded wives. He also led a
double life with two (2) families for a period of
more than ten (10) years.
Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of
his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the
position advanced by Atty. Alicia A. RisosVidal, this was not an act of facing up to his
responsibility or an act of mending his ways.
This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge,
to escape liability for his past actions by having
his second marriage declared void after the
present complaint was filed against him.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple
violations relating to the legal profession,
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specifically, violations of the bar admission
rules, of his lawyer’s oath, and of the ethical
rules of the profession.
He did not possess the good moral character
required of a lawyer at the time of his admission
to the Bar. As a lawyer, he violated his lawyer’s
oath, Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court, and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, all of which commonly require
him to obey the laws of the land. In marrying
Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy,
as he entered this second marriage while his first
marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He
openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his
petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
He violated ethical rules of the profession,
specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which commands
that he "shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct"; Canon 7 of the
same Code, which demands that "[a] lawyer shall
at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession"; Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that,
"[a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession."
As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty.
Garrido with the expectation and that he would
set a good example in promoting obedience to
the Constitution and the laws. When he violated
the law and distorted it to cater to his own
personal needs and selfish motives, he
discredited the legal profession and created the
public impression that laws are mere tools of
convenience that can be used, bended and abused
to satisfy personal whims and desires. In this
case, he also used the law to free him from
unwanted relationships.
The Court has often reminded the members of
the bar to live up to the standards and norms
expected of the legal profession by upholding the
ideals and principles embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Lawyers are bound
to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, including
honesty, integrity and fair dealing. Lawyers are
at all times subject to the watchful public eye and
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community approbation. Needless to state,
those whose conduct – both public and private –
fail this scrutiny have to be disciplined and, after
appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.
Atty. Valencia
We agree with the findings of Investigating
Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia
should be administratively liable under the
circumstances for gross immorality:
x x x The contention of respondent that they were
not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they got
married shall not afford them exemption from
sanctions, for good moral character is required as
a condition precedent to admission to the Bar.
Likewise there is no distinction whether the
misconduct was committed in the lawyer’s
professional capacity or in his private life. Again,
the claim that his marriage to complainant was
void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from
responsibility x x x Although the second
marriage of the respondent was subsequently
declared null and void the fact remains that
respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that
degree of morality required of them as members
of the Bar.
Moral character is not a subjective term but one
that corresponds to objective reality. To have
good moral character, a person must have the
personal characteristics of being good. It is not
enough that he or she has a good reputation, i.e.,
the opinion generally entertained about a person
or the estimate in which he or she is held by the
public in the place where she is known. The
requirement of good moral character has four
general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the
public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers;
(3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to
protect errant lawyers from themselves. Each
purpose is as important as the other.
Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook
that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia
already knew that Atty. Garrido was a married
man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and
that he already had a family. As Atty. Garrido’s
admitted confidante, she was under the moral
duty to give him proper advice; instead, she
entered into a romantic relationship with him for
about six (6) years during the subsistence of his
two marriages. In 1978, she married Atty.
Garrido with the knowledge that he had an
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outstanding
second
marriage.
These
circumstances, to our mind, support the
conclusion that she lacked good moral character;
even without being a lawyer, a person possessed
of high moral values, whose confidential advice
was sought by another with respect to the latter’s
family problems, would not aggravate the
situation by entering into a romantic liaison with
the person seeking advice, thereby effectively
alienating the other person’s feelings and
affection from his wife and family.
While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty.
Garrido’s marriage with Maelotisea was null and
void, the fact remains that he took a man away
from a woman who bore him six (6) children.
Ordinary decency would have required her to
ward off Atty. Garrido’s advances, as he was a
married man, in fact a twice-married man with
both marriages subsisting at that time; she should
have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start.
Instead, she continued her liaison with Atty.
Garrido, driving him, upon the death of
Constancia, away from legitimizing his
relationship with Maelotisea and their children.
Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencia’s
presence and willingness, Atty. Garrido even left
his second family and six children for a third
marriage with her. This scenario smacks of
immorality even if viewed outside of the prism
of law.1avvphi1
We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencia’s
expressed belief that Atty. Garrido’s second
marriage to Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she
felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may
be correct in the strict legal sense and was later
on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of
Atty. Garrido’s marriage to Maelotisea, we do
not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed
belief.
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented
to be married in Hongkong, not within the
country. Given that this marriage transpired
before the declaration of the nullity of Atty.
Garrido’s second marriage, we can only call this
Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage,
contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a
marriage together with family. Despite Atty.
Valencia’s claim that she agreed to marry Atty.
Garrido only after he showed her proof of his
capacity to enter into a subsequent valid
marriage, the celebration of their marriage in
Hongkong leads us to the opposite conclusion;
they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added
security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by
entering into the subsequent marriage outside
Philippine jurisdiction. In this regard, we cannot
help but note that Atty. Valencia afterwards
opted to retain and use her surname instead of
using the surname of her "husband." Atty.
Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her
husband did not live and cohabit with her under
one roof, but with his second wife and the family
of this marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did
not mind at all "sharing" her husband with
another woman. This, to us, is a clear
demonstration of Atty. Valencia’s perverse sense
of moral values.
Measured against the definition of gross
immorality, we find Atty. Valencia’s actions
grossly immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as
to approximate a criminal act, for she married a
man who, in all appearances, was married to
another and with whom he has a family. Her
actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible
to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty.
Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and
engaged in a romantic relationship with him
during the subsistence of his two previous
marriages. As already mentioned, Atty.
Valencia’s conduct could not but be scandalous
and revolting to the point of shocking the
community’s sense of decency; while she
professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she
helped the second family build a house prior to
her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object
to sharing her husband with the woman of his
second marriage.
We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as her behavior demeaned the
dignity of and discredited the legal profession.
She simply failed in her duty as a lawyer to
adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality. In Barrientos v. Daarol, we held that
lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be
of good moral character but must also be seen to
be of good moral character and must lead lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of
the community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up
to these standards before she was admitted to the
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bar and after she became a member of the legal
profession.
Conclusion
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law
through the Supreme Court, membership in the
Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances
concretely show the lawyer’s lack of the
essential qualifications required of lawyers. We
resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty.
Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia
for this reason.
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the
respondents, we are aware that the power to
disbar is one to be exercised with great caution
and only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the
lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer
of the Court.
We are convinced from the totality of the
evidence on hand that the present case is one of
them. The records show the parties’ pattern of
grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates
their lack of mental and emotional fitness and
moral character to qualify them for the
responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as
professionals and as officers of the court.
While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garrido’s
plea for compassion and his act of supporting his
children with Maelotisea after their separation,
we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his
demonstrated violations of his oath, the Rules of
Court and of the Code of Professional
Responsibility overrides what under other
circumstances are commendable traits of
character.
In like manner, Atty. Valencia’s behavior over a
long period of time unequivocally demonstrates
a basic and serious flaw in her character, which
we cannot simply brush aside without
undermining the dignity of the legal profession
and without placing the integrity of the
administration of justice into question. She was
not an on-looker victimized by the
circumstances, but a willing and knowing full
participant in a love triangle whose incidents
crossed into the illicit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
resolves to:
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(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the
practice of law for gross immorality, violation of
the Lawyer’s Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and
(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the
practice of law for gross immorality, violation of
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the
personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and
Atty. Romana P. Valencia in the Office of the
Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the
names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P.
Valencia from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
CASE DIGEST
GARRIDO V. ATTYS. GARRIDO AND
VALENCIA, A.C. NO. 6593, FEBRUARY
4, 2010
FACTS: Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Angel
E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana
P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Committee on Discipline charging them with
gross immorality.
Maelotisea alleged that she is the legal wife of
Atty. Garrido. They have 6 children.
Sometime in 1987, one of their children
confided that an unknown caller talked with
her claiming that the former is a child of Atty
Garrido. Also, one of her daughter, May
Elizabeth, told her that she saw Atty. Garrido
strolling at a mall together with a woman and
a child who was later identified as Atty.
Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia
Garrido, respectively.
Maelotisea was able to secure the Certificate
of Live Birth of the child, stating among others
that the said child is the daughter of Atty.
Garrido and Atty. Valencia.
In 1993, Atty. Garrido left the conjugal home
and joined Atty. Valencia at their residence
and even got married. Since he left the
conjugal home Atty. Garrido failed and still
failing to give Maelotisea the needed financial
support to the prejudice of their children who
stopped schooling because of financial
constraints.
By way of defense, Atty. Garrido alleged that
Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was
already married to Constancia David
(Constancia) when he married Maelotisea. He
claimed he married Maelotisea after he and
Constancia parted ways. As he and Maelotisea
grew apart over the years due to financial
problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia.
He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he
confided his difficulties. Together, they
resolved his personal problems and his
financial difficulties with his second family.
Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give
financial support to his children with
Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6)
children were educated in private schools; all
graduated from college except for Arnel
Victorino, who finished a special secondary
course.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his
marriages were contracted before he became a
member of the bar on May 11, 1979, with the
third marriage contracted after the death of
Constancia on December 26, 1977. Likewise,
his children with Maelotisea were born before
he became a lawyer.
On her part, Atty. Valencia denied that she was
the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained
that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty.
Garrido since the marriage between them was
void from the beginning due to the then
existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with
Constancia.
In the course of the hearings before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, Maelotisea
filed a motion for the dismissal of her
complaint, arguing that she wanted to maintain
friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is
the father of her six (6) children.
ISSUES:
1. Should the disbarment case against Atty.
Garrido be dismissed because the alleged
immoral acts were committed before he
was admitted to the Philippine Bar?
2. Whether the desistance of Maelotisea
merits the dismissal of the case.
3. Whether Atty. Garrido should be disbarred
for gross immoral conduct.
4. Whether Atty. Valencia’s defense that the
marriage between Atty. Garrido and
Maelotisea is void tenable.
RULING:
A.
Prescription of offenses by the
complainant do not apply in the
determination of a lawyer’s qualifications
and fitness for membership in the Bar.
Admission to the practice of law is a
component of the administration of justice and
is a matter of public interest because it
involves service to the public.
The time that elapsed between the immoral
acts charged and the filing of the complaint is
not material in considering the qualification of
Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission
to the practice of law, and his continuing
qualification to be a member of the legal
profession. From this perspective, it is not
important that the acts complained of were
committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted
to the practice of law. The possession of good
moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to
warrant admission to the bar and to retain
membership
in
the
legal
profession. Admission to the bar does not
preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry,
upon proper complaint, into any question
concerning the mental or moral fitness of
the respondent before he became a
lawyer (Zaguirre v. Castillo). Admission to
the practice only creates the rebuttable
presumption that the applicant has all the
qualifications to become a lawyer; this may be
refuted by clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary even after admission to the Bar.
B.
In light of the public service
character of the practice of law and the
nature of disbarment proceedings as a
public interest concern, Maelotisea’s
affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect
of discontinuing or abating the disbarment
proceedings. Maelotisea is more of a witness
than a complainant in these proceedings. We
note further that she filed her affidavits of
withdrawal only after she had presented her
evidence; her evidence are now available for
the Court’s examination and consideration,
and their merits are not affected by her
desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that
Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not
to disown or refute the evidence she had
submitted, but solely because of compassion
(and, impliedly, out of concern for her
personal financial interest in continuing
friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).
C.
The undisputed facts gathered from the
evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido
established a pattern of gross immoral conduct
that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was
not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was
reprehensible to the highest degree.
First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left
Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter
and during the marriage, he had romantic
relationships with other women. He had the
gall to represent to this Court that the study of
law was his reason for leaving his wife;
marriage and the study of law are not
mutually exclusive.
Second, he misrepresented himself to
Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was
already married to Constancia. This was a
misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a
woman into a prohibited relationship.
Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second
marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the
subsistence of his first marriage. This was an
open admission, not only of an illegal liaison,
but of the commission of a crime.
Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extramarital affair with Atty. Valencia while his
two marriages were in place and without
taking into consideration the moral and
emotional implications of his actions on the
two women he took as wives and on his six (6)
children by his second marriage.
Fifth, instead of making legal amends to
validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the
death of Constancia, Atty. Garrido married
Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.
Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal
knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who
was not then a lawyer) that he was free to
marry, considering that his marriage with
Maelotisea was not “valid.”
Seventh, as the evidence on record implies,
Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in
Hongkong in an apparent attempt to accord
legitimacy to a union entered into while
another marriage was in place.
Eighth, after admission to the practice of law,
Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and
had sexual relations with two (2) women who
at one point were both his wedded wives. He
also led a double life with two (2) families for
a period of more than ten (10) years.
By his actions, Garrido committed multiple
violations relating to the legal profession,
specifically, violations of the bar admission
rules, of his lawyer’s oath, and of the ethical
rules of the profession.
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and
respectable
members
of
the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it
is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or
so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the community’s sense of decency. We
make these distinctions as the supreme penalty
of disbarment arising from conduct requires
grossly immoral, not simply immoral,
conduct.
He did not possess the good moral character
required of a lawyer at the time of his
admission to the Bar. As a lawyer, he violated
his lawyer’s oath, Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, and Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, all of which
commonly require him to obey the laws of the
land.
He violated ethical rules of the profession,
specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which commands
that he “shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct”;
Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands
that “a lawyer shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession”;
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that, “a lawyer
shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.”
D. While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty.
Garrido’s marriage with Maelotisea was null
and void, the fact remains that he took a man
away from a woman who bore him six (6)
children. Ordinary decency would have
required her to ward off Atty. Garrido’s
advances, as he was a married man, in fact a
twice-married man with both marriages
subsisting at that time; she should have said no
to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead,
she continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido,
driving him, upon the death of Constancia,
away from legitimizing his relationship with
Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this,
because of Atty. Valencia’s presence and
willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second
family and six children for a third marriage
with her. This scenario smacks of immorality
even if viewed outside of the prism of law.
Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as
her behavior demeaned the dignity of and
discredited the legal profession. She simply
failed in her duty as a lawyer to adhere
unwaveringly to the highest standards of
morality. Lawyers, as officers of the court,
must not only be of good moral character
but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and must lead lives in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the
community. Atty. Valencia failed to live up to
these standards before she was admitted to the
bar and after she became a member of the legal
profession.
Moral character is not a subjective term but
one that corresponds to objective reality. To
have good moral character, a person must have
the personal characteristics of being good. It is
not enough that he or she has a good
reputation, i.e., the opinion generally
entertained about a person or the estimate in
which he or she is held by the public in the
place where she is known. The requirement
of good moral character has four general
purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public;
(2) to protect the public image of lawyers;
(3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to
protect errant lawyers from themselves.
Each purpose is as important as the other.
The Fallo:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Court resolves to:
(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the
practice of law for gross immorality, violation
of the Lawyer’s Oath; and violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and
(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from
the practice of law for gross immorality,
violation of Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
———————————————THINGS DECIDED:
A) Prescription of offenses by the complainant
do not apply in the determination of a lawyer’s
qualifications and fitness for membership in
the Bar.
B) It is not important that the acts complained
of were committed before the lawyer
complained of was admitted to the practice of
law.
C) The possession of good moral character is
both a condition precedent and a continuing
requirement to warrant admission to the bar
and to retain membership in the legal
profession. Admission to the bar does not
preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon
proper complaint, into any question
concerning the mental or moral fitness of the
respondent before he became a lawyer
(Zaguirre v. Castillo).
D) In light of the public service character of
the practice of law and the nature of
disbarment proceedings as a public interest
concern, complainant’s affidavit of desistance
cannot have the effect of discontinuing or
abating the disbarment proceedings.
E) Lawyers, as officers of the court, must not
only be of good moral character but must also
be seen to be of good moral character and must
lead lives in accordance with the highest moral
standards of the community.
F) The requirement of good moral character
has four general purposes, namely: (1) to
protect the public; (2) to protect the public
image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective
clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from
themselves. Each purpose is as important as
the other.
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar
Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E.
GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON
PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY.
FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO,
JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D.
Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo
Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C.
Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel
Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for
disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions
during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
Who may practice law
In Re: Victoriano D. Lanuevo, A.C. No. 1162 August 29,
1975
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a
confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and reevaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar
Examinations question, Oscar Landicho — who
flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations
with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%,
respectively — invited the attention of the Court
to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination
(Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised
for one reason or another, before the bar results were
released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I,
rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the
Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C.
Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D.
Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are
strong reasons to believe that the grades in other
examination notebooks in other subjects also
underwent alternations — to raise the grades — prior
to the release of the results. Note that this was
without any formal motion or request from the proper
parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the
examiners concerned reconsidered their
grades without formal motion, there is no reason why
they may not do so now when proper request answer
motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due
process postulates. Might not one say that some
candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their
grades were not asked to be reconsidered
'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not
afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go
into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately
decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2,
Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court
checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations
and found that the grades in five subjects — Political
Law and Public International Law, Civil Law,
Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law —
of a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954
underwent some changes which, however, were duly
initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner
concerned. Further check of the records revealed that
the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one
Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who
flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar
examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%,
72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He
passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of
74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a
Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as
the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar
Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant
Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners
concerned to submit their sworn statements on the
matter, with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar
Confidant admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias
Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners
for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the
circumstances under which the same was done and
his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn
statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or rechecked the notebook involved pertaining to his
subject upon the representation to him by Bar
Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the
same and that the examinee concerned failed only in
his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of
passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents
warranting a formal investigation, the Court required,
in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant
Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days
from notice why his name should not be stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34,
rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the
examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore
he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar
examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5,
1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10)
days from notice why his name should not be stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p.
99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also
required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10)
days from notice why no disciplinary action should be
taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31,
rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while
respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo
and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and
35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973,
respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in
addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on
March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47,
rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer
on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the
same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm.
Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it
was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who reevaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with
Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public
International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner
in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was
asked to help in the correction of a number of
examination notebooks in Political Law and Public
International Law to meet the deadline for submission
(pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this
development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise
included as respondent in Administrative Case No.
1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a
respondent for it was also discovered that another
paper in Political Law and Public International Law
also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This
notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be
owned by another successful candidate by the name
of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in
the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or rechecking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile
Law resulting in the change of the grade from 4% to
50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is
owned by another successful candidate by the name
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz
and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the
investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of
Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the
1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation
Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra,
alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of
Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on
September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight
physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila
committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student
of the same university. Confronted with this
information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V,
pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that
he does not remember having been charged with the
crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI,
pp. 45-60, rec.).
paper is on the borderline and if I
could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing
mark;
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the
bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact
which he is required under the rules to do.
4. That taking his word for it and under
the belief that it was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court to do
so in the further belief that I was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so,
I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%;
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on
July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2,
1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required
to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo,
Galang and Pardo submitted their respective
memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho
took up permanent residence in Australia, where he is
believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not
summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except
respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his
oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only
his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence
the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them
to the Court. The same became the basis for their
cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer,
which they offered as their direct testimony in the
investigation conducted by the Court, the respondentexaminers recounted the circumstances under which
they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination
notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent
Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law,
affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in
December last year, while I was
correcting the examination notebooks,
Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant,
explained to me that it is the practice
and the policy in bar examinations that
he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of
the grades obtained in all subjects and
if he finds that candidate obtained an
extraordinary high grade in one
subject and a rather low one in
another, he will bring back the latter to
the examiner concerned for reevaluation and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of
January of this year, he brought back
to me an examination booklet in Civil
Law for re-evaluation, because
according to him the owner of the
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law
was brought back to me for such reevaluation and upon verifying my files
I found that the notebook is numbered
'95;
6. That the original grade
was 64% and my re-evaluation of the
answers were based on the same
standard used in the correction and
evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3
and 4 with original grades of 7% each
was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with
4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and
No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis
supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially
reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit
with following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2,
6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as
it is no longer to make the
reconsideration of these answers
because of the same evaluation and
standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10
remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at
10%;
4. That at the time I made the
reconsideration of examination booklet
No. 951 I did not know the identity of
its owner until I received this
resolution of the Honorable Supreme
Court nor the identities of the
examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was
made in good faith and under the
belief that I am authorized to do so in
view of the misrepresentation of said
Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following
circumstances:
a) Since I started
correcting the papers
on or about October
16, 1971, relationship
between Atty. Lanuevo
and myself had
developed to the point
that with respect to the
correction of the
examination booklets
of bar candidates I
have always followed
him and considered his
instructions as
reflecting the rules and
policy of the Honorable
Supreme Court with
respect to the same;
that I have no
alternative but to take
his words;
b) That considering
this relationship
and considering his
misrepresentation to
me as reflecting the
real and policy of the
Honorable Supreme
Court, I did not bother
any more to get the
consent and
permission of the
Chairman of the Bar
Committee. Besides,
at that time, I was
isolating myself from
all members of the
Supreme Court and
specially the chairman
of the Bar Committee
for fear that I might be
identified as a bar
examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever
has been received by me in return for
such recorrection, and as proof of it, I
declined to consider and evaluate one
booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid
because I was not the one who made
the original correction of the same
(Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge,
Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and Public
International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8,
1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar
Confidant went to my residence to
obtain from me the last bag of two
hundred notebooks (bearing
examiner's code numbers 1200 to
1400) which according to my record
was on February 5, 1972, he came to
my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding
in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme
Court, with at least two companions.
The bar confidant had with him an
examinee's notebook bearing code
number 661, and, after the usual
amenties, he requested me if it was
possible for me to review and reexamine the said notebook because it
appears that the examinee obtained a
grade of 57, whereas, according to the
Bar Confidant, the said examinee had
obtained higher grades in other
subjects, the highest of which was 84,
if I recall correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was
allowed to receive or re-examinee the
notebook as I had submitted the same
beforehand, and he told me that I was
authorized to do so because the same
was still within my control and
authority as long as the particular
examinee's name had not been
identified or that the code number
decode and the examinee's name was
revealed. The Bar Confidant told me
that the name of the examinee in the
case present bearing code number
661 had not been identified or
revealed; and that it might have been
possible that I had given a particularly
low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the
Bar Confidant's representations to me,
and as it was humanly possible that I
might have erred in the grading of the
said notebook, I re-examined the
same, carefully read the answer, and
graded it in accordance with the same
standards I had used throughout the
grading of the entire notebooks, with
the result that the examinee deserved
an increased grade of 66. After again
clearing with the Bar Confidant my
authority to correct the grades, and as
he had assured me that the code
number of the examinee in question
had not been decoded and his name
known, ... I therefore corrected the
total grade in the notebook and the
grade card attached thereto, and
properly initia(l)ed the same. I also
corrected the itemized grades (from
item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two
sets of grading sheets, my personal
copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant
brought with him the other copy
thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought
with him the other copy the grading
sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 5859; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he
denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo
P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference
the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in
additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the
examinee's notebook in political and
international law, code numbered 661,
I did know the name of the examinee.
In fact, I came to know his name only
upon receipt of the resolution of March
5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish
to state that I do not know him
personally, and that I have never met
him even up to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the
impression that I was authorized to
make such review, and had repeatedly
asked the Bar Confidant whether I
was authorized to make such revision
and was so assured of my authority as
the name of the examinee had not yet
been decoded or his identity revealed.
The Bar Confidant's assurance was
apparently regular and so appeared to
be in the regular course of express
prohibition in the rules and guidelines
given to me as an examiner, and the
Bar Confidant was my official liaison
with the Chairman, as, unless called, I
refrained as much as possible from
frequent personal contact with the
Chairman lest I be identified as an
examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came
to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the
evening at my residence, I felt it
inappropriate to verify his authority
with the Chairman. It did not appear to
me that his representations were
unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed,
the Bar Confidant was riding in the
official vehicle of the Supreme Court,
a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by
two companions, which was usual,
and thus looked like a regular visit to
me of the Bar Confidant, as it was
about the same hour that he used to
see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code
numbered 661 was still in the same
condition as when I submitted the
same. In agreeing to review the said
notebook code numbered 661, my aim
was to see if I committed an error in
the correction, not to make the
examinee pass the subject. I
considered it entirely humanly
possible to have erred, because I
corrected that particular notebook on
December 31, 1971, considering
especially the representation of the
Bar Confidant that the said examinee
had obtained higher grades in other
subjects, the highest of which was
84% in remedial law, if I recall
correctly. Of course, it did not strike
me as unusual that the Bar Confidant
knew the grades of the examinee in
the position to know and that there
was nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the
original grade obtained by the
examinee with notebook code
numbered 661 was 57%. After review,
it was increased by 9 points, resulting
in a final grade of 66%. Still, the
examinee did not pass the subject,
and, as heretofore stated, my aim was
not to make the examinee pass,
notwithstanding the representation
that he had passed the other subjects.
...
9. I quite recall that during the first
meeting of the Bar Examiners'
Committee consensus was that where
an examinee failed in only one subject
and passed the rest, the examiner in
said subject would review the
notebook. Nobody objected to it as
irregular. At the time of the
Committee's first meeting, we still did
not know the names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception,
not a party to it. It had absolutely no
knowledge of the motives of the Bar
Confidant or his malfeasance in office,
and did not know the examinee
concerned nor had I any kind of
contract with him before or rather the
review and even up to the present
(Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.;
emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law,
affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar
Confidant would deliver and collect
examination books to my residence at
951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong,
Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had
already completed correction of the
books in Criminal Law and was
helping in the correction of some of
the papers in another subject, the Bar
Confidant brought back to me one (1)
paper in Criminal Law saying that that
particular examinee had missed the
passing grade by only a fraction of a
percent and that if his paper in
Criminal Law would be raised a few
points to 75% then he would make the
general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised
the grade to 75%, that is, giving a
raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3
points, initialled the revised mark and
revised also the mark and revised also
the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of
the book of the examinee concerned"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent
Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar
Confidant in good faith and without the slightest
inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question
who up to now remains a total stranger and without
expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated
in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
Remedial Law which I had previously
graded and submitted to him.
He informed me that he and
others (he used the words "we") had
reviewed the said notebook. He
requested me to review the said
notebook and possibly reconsider the
grade that I had previously given. He
explained that the examine concerned
had done well in other subjects, but
that because of the comparatively low
grade that I had given him in Remedial
Law his general average was short of
passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that
he thought that if the paper were
reviewed I might find the examinee
deserving of being admitted to the
Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr.
Lanuevo particularly called my
attention to the fact in his answers the
examinee expressed himself clearly
and in good enough English. Mr.
Lanuevo however informed me that
whether I would reconsider the grades
I had previously given and submitted
was entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr.
Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant
to address such a request to me and
that the said request was in order, I, in
the presence of Mr. Lanuevo,
proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate
each and every item of the paper in
question. I recall that in my reevaluation of the answers, I increased
the grades in some items, made
deductions in other items, and
maintained the same grades in other
items. However, I recall that after Mr.
Lanuevo and I had totalled the new
grades that I had given after reevaluation, the total grade increased
by a few points, but still short of the
passing mark of 75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973,
respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his
sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of
January or early part of February
1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw
me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion
Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to
me an examinee's notebook in
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the
notebook, with resulted in increasing
the total grade of the examineeconcerned in Remedial Law
from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein
respondent acted in good faith. It may
well be that he could be faulted for not
having verified from the Chairman of
the Committee of Bar Examiners the
legitimacy of the request made by Mr.
Lanuevo. Herein respondent,
however, pleads in attenuation of such
omission, that —
a) Having been
appointed an Examiner
for the first time, he
was not aware, not
having been apprised
otherwise, that it was
not within the authority
of the Bar Confidant of
the Supreme Court to
request or suggest that
the grade of a
particular examination
notebook be revised or
reconsidered. He had
every right to presume,
owing to the highly
fiduciary nature of the
position of the Bar
Confidant, that the
request was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade
of the particular
examinee concerned,
herein respondent
carefully evaluated
each and every
answer written in the
notebook. Testing the
answers by the criteria
laid down by the Court,
and giving the said
examinee the benefit
of doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's
representation that it
was only in that
particular subject that
the said examine
failed, herein
respondent became
convinced that the said
examinee deserved a
higher grade than that
previously given to
him, but that he did not
deserve, in herein
respondent's honest
appraisal, to be given
the passing grade of
75%. It should also be
mentioned that, in
reappraising the
answers, herein
respondent
downgraded a
previous rating of an
answer written by the
examinee, from 9.25%
to 9% (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 36-39, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law,
affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of
the Bar Examiners' Committee after
the Bar Examinations were held, I was
informed that one Bar examinee
passed all other subjects except
Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners'
Committee that I would be willing to
re-evaluate the paper of this particular
Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant
handed to me a Bar candidate's
notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade
of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and
after re-evaluating the answers of this
particular Bar candidate I decided to
increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my
report and duly initialed the changes in
the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent
Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn
statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing
sworn statement, I hereby state that
I re-evaluated the examination
notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613
in Mercantile Law in absolute good
faith and in direct compliance with the
agreement made during one of the
deliberations of the Bar Examiners
Committee that where a candidate
fails in only one subject, the Examiner
concerned should make a re-
evaluation of the answers of the
candidate concerned, which I did.
of the examinations when released is
final and irrevocable.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not
know at the time I made the
aforementioned re-evaluation that
notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law
pertained to bar examine Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and
that I have never met up to this time
this particular bar examinee (Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
It was to at least minimize the
occurrence of such instances that
motivated me to bring those
notebooks back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar
Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks,
checking the entries in the grading
sheets and the posting on the record
of ratings, I was impressed of the
writing and the answers on the first
notebook. This led me to scrutinize all
the set of notebooks. Believing that
those five merited re-evalation on the
basis of the memorandum circularized
to the examiners shortly earlier to the
effect that
... in the correction of
the papers, substantial
weight should then be
given to clarify of
language and
soundness of
reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them
back to the respective examiners for
re-evaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division
that immediately after the release of
the results of the examinations, we are
usually swarmed with requests of the
examinees that they be shown their
notebooks. Many of them would copy
their answers and have them checked
by their professors. Eventually some
of them would file motions or requests
for re-correction and/or re-evaluation.
Right now, we have some 19 of such
motions or requests which we are
reading for submission to the
Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are
meritorious, but just the same they
have to be denied because the result
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent
Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in
question to the examiners concerned
in his hotest belief that the same
merited re-evaluation; that in so doing,
it was not his intention to forsake or
betray the trust reposed in him as bar
confidant but on the contrary to do
justice to the examinee concerned;
that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner, because the
matter of whether or not re-evaluation
was inorder was left alone to the
examiners' decision; and that, to his
knowledge, he does not remember
having made the alleged
misrepresentation but that he
remembers having brought to the
attention of the Committee during the
meeting a matter concerning another
examinee who obtained a passing
general average but with a grade
below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the
Committee agreed to remove the
disqualification by way of raising the
grade in said subject, respondent
brought the notebook in question to
the Examiner concerned who thereby
raised the grade thus enabling the
said examinee to pass. If he
remembers right, the examinee
concerned is one surnamed "de la
Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never
entertained a notion that his act would
stir such serious charges as would
tend to undermine his integrity
because he did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p.
35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his
answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having
deceived the examiners concerned
into believing that the examinee
involved failed only in their respective
subjects, the fact of the matter being
that the notebooks in question were
submitted to the respective examiners
for re-evaluation believing in all good
faith that they so merited on the basis
of the Confidential Memorandum
(identified and marked as Exh. 1Lanuevo, particularly that portion
marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which
was circulated to all the examiners
earlier, leaving to them entirely the
matter of whether or not re-evaluation
was in order,
2. That the following coincidence
prompted me to pry into the notebooks
in question:
Sometime during the
latter part of January
and the early part of
February, 1972, on my
way back to the office
(Bar Division) after
lunch, I though of
buying a sweepstake
ticket. I have always
made it a point that the
moment I think of so
buying, I pick a
number from any
object and the first
number that comes
into my sight becomes
the basis of the ticket
that I buy. At that
moment, the first
number that I saw was
"954" boldly printed on
an electrical
contribance (evidently
belonging to the
MERALCO) attached
to a post standing
along the right
sidewalk of P. Faura
street towards the
Supreme Court
building from San
Marcelino street and
almost adjacent to the
south-eastern corner
of the fence of the
Araullo High
School(photograph of
the number '954', the
contrivance on which it
is printed and a portion
of the post to which it
is attached is identified
and marked as Exhibit
4-Lanuevo and the
number "954" as Exh.
4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954)
in mind, I proceeded to
Plaza Sta. Cruz to look
for a ticket that would
contain such number.
Eventually, I found a
ticket, which I then
bought, whose last
three digits
corresponded to "954".
This number became
doubly impressive to
me because the sum
of all the six digits of
the ticket number was
"27", a number that is
so significant to me
that everything I do I
try somewhat
instinctively to link or
connect it with said
number whenever
possible. Thus even in
assigning code
numbers on the Master
List of examinees from
1968 when I first took
charge of the
examinations as Bar
Confidant up to 1971, I
either started with the
number "27" (or "227")
or end with said
number. (1968 Master
List is identified and
marked as Exh. 5Lanuevo and the figure
"27" at the beginning
of the list, as Exh. 5-a
Lanuevo; 1969 Master
List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo
and the figure "227" at
the beginning of the
list, as Exh. 6-aLanuevo; 1970 Master
List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo
and the figure "227" at
the beginning of the list
as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo;
and the 1971 Master
List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo
and the figure "227" at
the end of the list as
Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me
of this number (27)
was born out of these
incidents in my life, to
wit: (a) On November
27, 1941 while with the
Philippine Army
stationed at Camp
Manacnac,
Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, I was stricken
with pneumonia and
was hospitalized at the
Nueva Ecija Provincial
Hospital as a result. As
will be recalled, the
last Pacific War broke
out on December 8,
1941. While I was still
confined at the
hospital, our camp was
bombed and strafed by
Japanese planes on
December 13, 1941
resulting in many
casualties. From then
on, I regarded
November 27, 1941 as
the beginning of a new
life for me having been
saved from the
possibility of being
among the
casualties;(b) On
February 27, 1946, I
was able to get out of
the army byway of
honorable discharge;
and (c) on February
27, 1947, I got married
and since then we
begot children the
youngest of whom was
born on February 27,
1957.
Returning to the office
that same afternoon
after buying the ticket,
I resumed my work
which at the time was
on the checking of the
notebooks. While thus
checking, I came upon
the notebooks bearing
the office code number
"954". As the number
was still fresh in my
mind, it aroused my
curiosity prompting me
to pry into the contents
of the notebooks.
Impressed by the
clarity of the writing
and language and the
apparent soundness of
the answers and,
thereby, believing in all
good faith on the basis
of the aforementioned
Confidential
Memorandum (Exh. 1Lanuevo and Exh. 1-aLanuevo) that they
merited re-evaluation, I
set them aside and
later on took them
back to the respective
examiners for possible
review recalling to
them the said
Confidential
Memorandum but
leaving absolutely the
matter to their
discretion and
judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation
or deception could have reference to
either of the two cases which I brought
to the attention of the committee
during the meeting and which the
Committee agreed to refer back to the
respective examines, namely:
(a) That of an
examinee who
obtained a passing
general average but
with a grade below
50% (47%) in
Mercantile Law(the
notebooks of this
examinee bear the
Office Code No. 110,
identified and marked
as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and
the notebook in
Mercantile Law
bearing the Examiner's
Code No. 951 with the
original grade of 4%
increased to 50% after
re-evaluation as Exh.
9-a-Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an
examinee who
obtained a borderline
general average of
73.15% with a grade
below 60% (57%) in
one subject which, at
the time, I could not
pinpoint having
inadvertently left in the
office the data thereon.
It turned out that the
subject was Political
and International Law
under Asst. Solicitor
General Bernardo
Pardo (The notebooks
of this examinee bear
the Office Code No.
1622 identified and
marked as Exh. 10Lanuevo and the
notebook in Political
and International Law
bearing the Examiner's
Code No. 661 with the
original grade of 57%
increased to 66% after
re-evaluation, as Exh.
10-a-Lanuevo). This
notebook in Political
and International Law
is precisely the same
notebook mentioned in
the sworn statement of
Asst. Solicitor General
Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------ Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases
mentioned in the next preceding
paragraph, only one (1) subject or
notebook was reviewed or reevaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law
in the former; and only Political and
International Law in the latter, under
the facts and circumstances I made
known to the Committee and pursuant
to which the Committee authorized the
referral of the notebooks involved to
the examiners concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner
in Taxation even volunteered to review
or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks
in his subject but that I told the
Committee that there was very little
time left and that the increase in grade
after re-evaluation, unless very highly
substantial, may not alter the outcome
since the subject carries the weight of
only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp.
45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves
to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid
of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he
was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of
respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of
the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as
he "was going over those notebooks, checking the
entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the
record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973,
he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post
provoked him "to pry into the contents of the
notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code
number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not
acquainted with former BarConfidant
Victorio Lanuevo and never met him
before except once when, as required
by the latter respondent submitted
certain papers necessary for taking
the bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent
policy of the Supreme Court not to
reconsider "failure" cases; after the
official release thereof; why should it
now reconsider a "passing" case,
especially in a situation where the
respondent and the bar confidant do
not know each other and, indeed, met
only once in the ordinary course of
official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude
that the entire situation clearly
manifests a reasonable doubt to which
respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a
copy of this Honorable Court's
resolution dated March 5, 1973, had
no knowledge whatsoever of former
Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's
actuations which are stated in
particular in the resolution. In fact, the
respondent never knew this man
intimately nor, had the herein
respondent utilized anyone to contact
the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his
behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said
actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo
as stated in the Resolution, which are
evidently purported to show as having
redounded to the benefit of herein
respondent, these questions arise:
First, was the re-evaluation of
Respondent's examination papers by
the Bar Examination Committee done
only or especially for him and not done
generally as regards the paper of the
other bar candidates who are
supposed to have failed? If the reevaluation of Respondent's grades
was done among those of others, then
it must have been done as a matter of
policy of the Committee to increase
the percentage of passing in that
year's examination and, therefore, the
insinuation that only respondent's
papers were re-evaluated upon the
influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo
would be unjustifiable, if not far
fetched. Secondly, is the fact that
BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations
resulted in herein Respondent's
benefit an evidence per se of
Respondent's having caused
actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to
be done in former's behalf? To
assume this could be disastrous in
effect because that would be
presuming all the members of the Bar
Examination Committee as devoid of
integrity, unfit for the bar themselves
and the result of their work that year,
as also unworthy of anything. All of
these inferences are deductible from
the narration of facts in the resolution,
and which only goes to show said
narration of facts an unworthy of
credence, or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's
Resolution of March 5, 1973 would
make this Respondent Account or
answer for the actuations of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the
actuations of the Bar Examiners
implying the existence of some
conspiracy between them and the
Respondent. The evident imputation is
denied and it is contended that the Bar
Examiners were in the performance of
their duties and that they should be
regarded as such in the consideration
of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp.
100-104, rec.).
I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates
how respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly
initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-
evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of
respondent Galang by deceiving separately and
individually the respondents-examiners to make the
desired revision without prior authority from the
Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had
been submitted to the Court through the respondent
Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for
and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around
the middle part of December, 1971, just before
Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil
Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the
process of correcting examination booklets, and then
and there made the representations that as
BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades
obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he
finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high
grade in one subject and a rather low one on another,
he will bring back to the examiner concerned the
notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh.
2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V,
pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972,
respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondentexaminer Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil
Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee
who owned the particular notebook is on the
borderline of passing and if his grade in said subject
could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will
get a passing average. Respondent-examiner
Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under
the belief that was really the practice and policy of the
Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was
just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he reevaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's
grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular
notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's
Code Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954.
This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the
identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated
the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and
3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56,
57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision,
Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including
Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still
failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing
average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or
early part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel
Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with
an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which
respondent Manalo and previously corrected and
graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested
respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and
possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and
representing that "they" has reviewed the said
notebook and that the examinee concerned had done
well in other subjects, but that because of the
comparatively low grade given said examinee by
respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general
average of said examinee was short of passing.
Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and
observation that he thought that if the notebook were
reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the
examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar.
Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the
attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in his
answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and
in good English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo
called the attention of respondent Manalo to
Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that
read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be
more a test of logic, knowledge of
legal fundamentals, and ability to
analyze and solve legal problems
rather than a test of memory; in the
correction of papers, substantial
weight should be given to clarify of
language and soundness of
reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by
respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's)
discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that
respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the
authority to make such request and further believing
that such request was in order, proceeded to reevaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of
Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's
grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from
63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated
with his signature the changes made by him in the
notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook
examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as
earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged
to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1
& 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75;
Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo,
Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade
due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one
occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to
respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a
new batch of examination papers in Political Law and
Public International Law to be corrected, respondent
Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law
bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing
respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns
the said notebook seems to have passed in all other
subjects except in Political Law and Public
International Law; and that if the said notebook would
be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least
75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations.
After satisfying himself from respondent that this is
possible — the respondent Bar Confidant informing
him that this is the practice of the Court to help out
examinees who are failing in just one subject —
respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby
told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook.
Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the
answers, this time with leniency. After the reevaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from
68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then
made the corresponding corrections in the grading
sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made.
This notebook with Office Code Number 954 also
belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee
Galang's general average was still below the passing
grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination
notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in
Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who
was then helping in the correction of papers in
Political Law and Public International Law, as he had
already finished correcting the examination notebooks
in his assigned subject — Criminal Law — that the
examinee who owns that particular notebook had
missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a
percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be
raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would
make the passing grade. Accepting the words of
respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and
because he did not want to be the one causing the
failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised
the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he
initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in
the general list and likewise initialed the same. The
examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his
Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71;
Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been
shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the
latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation;
but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that
where a candidate had almost made the passing
average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of
policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing
the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He
recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the
Confidential Memorandum but this was long before
the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo
as the same was received by him before the
examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not
raise Galang's general average to a passing grade
because of his failing mark in three more subjects,
including Mercantile Law. For the revision of
examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law,
respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his
quite ingenious scheme — by securing authorization
from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner
in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee
on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested
that where an examinee failed in only one subject and
passed the rest, the examiner concerned would
review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as
irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion
(Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by
respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other
subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was
made during the meeting within hearing of the order
members, who were all closely seated together.
Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness
tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day,
respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo
a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code
Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent
Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after
re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the
final grade to 71%. The matter was not however
thereafter officially brought to the Committee for
consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp.
33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being
given the information that the particular examinee
failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he
would not have consented to make the re-evaluation
of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent
Montecillo likewise added that there was only one
instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his
personal records, that he had to change the grade of
an examinee after he had submitted his report,
referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's
Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number
954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent
Lanuevo went to the residence of respondentexaminer Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200
notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the
residence of respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen
panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines with
two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo,
this was around the second week of February, 1972,
after the first meeting of the Bar Examination
Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that
occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's
Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual
amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and
re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because,
according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who
owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades
in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in
Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent
Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the
grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers
of the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of
grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number
1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee
Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D.
Lanuevo, respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE
ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias
ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR
SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having
requested on his own initiative the five examiners
concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that
eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's
average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%,
or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more
or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar
examinations via a resolution of the Court making
74% the passing average for that year's examination
without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any
subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is
likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from
the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps
towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of
Galang or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the
examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed
only in their respective subjects and/or was on the
borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to
justify his actuations on the authority of the
aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential
Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases
Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol.
VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar
Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted
in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same
merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his
intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him
as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to
the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act
in a presumptuous manner because the matter of
whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left
alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo,
Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the
investigation, the said confidential memorandum was
intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the
initial correction of the examination papers and never
as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners
the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the
examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion
or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive
to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo,
Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian — whose
declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations
and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo,
are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each
other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of
the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164)
and clarified by extensive cross-examination
conducted during the investigation and hearing of the
cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly
maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar
Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records
that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the
trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and
the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant
as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in
and characterized his relationship with the five
members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee,
who were thus deceived and induced into reevaluating the answers of only respondent Galang
in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his
grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted
a member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that
characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and
well-calculated moves in successively representing
separately to each of the five examiners concerned to
the effect that the examinee failed only in his
particular subject and/or was on the borderline of
passing. To repeat, the before the unauthorized reevaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5)
major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his
general average was only 66.25% — which under no
circumstances or standard could it be honestly
claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he
was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the
first notebook of Galang was referred back to the
examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had
only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics
and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade
of 81%. The averages and individual grades of
Galang before and after the unauthorized reevaluation are as follows:
BAI
1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
BAI
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no reevaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
or 33 weighted points.
Taxation 74% 74% = no reevaluation made.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5%
(75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no reevaluation made.
————————————
General Weighted Averages 66.25%
74.15%
Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the reevaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5)
subjects under the circumstances already narrated,
Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to
74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the
great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar
examinations and to the disadvantage of the other
examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee
Galang, with the possible addition of examinees
Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only
one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter
who — Political Law and Public International Law for
Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed,
has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or
reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to
make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After
the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the
Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual
grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and
thereafter compute the general average. That done,
he will then prepare a comparative data showing the
percentage of passing and failing in relation to a
certain average to be submitted to the Committee and
to the Court and on the basis of which the Court will
determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or
73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business
evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot
assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal
made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the
over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better
than the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation
should be done by the examinee and the same
should be addressed to the Court, which alone can
validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such
initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby
compromises his position as well as the image of the
Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely
doing justice to Galang without any intention of
betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by
the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in
the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out
Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the
papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far
better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which
he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.),
which could be more properly claimed as borderline
cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's
claim of absolute good faith in referring back the
papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation.
For certainly, as against the original weighted average
of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute
that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90)
examinees were more deserving of reconsideration.
Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by
respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on
the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations,
especially the said more than ninety candidates. And
the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to
apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar
Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after
the said re-evaluation and increase of grades,
precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any
pretension of good faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in
Political Law and International Law of Ernesto
Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case
of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the
over ninety examinees who were far better situated
than Galang would not give him away. Even the reevaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one
notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of
the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee
to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails
only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed
in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively — as
hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the
office code number given to Galang's notebook,
unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in
his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo,
Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the
investigation with this Court as to why he pried into
the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It
only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at
straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was
revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only
on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95)
months after he filed his answer on March 19,
1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 3536, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA
CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO
RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER
MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE
ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL
LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR REEVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF
HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO
66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted
having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on
Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the
Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what
circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and
Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners
concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these
two cases were officially brought to the Bar
Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol.
VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer
them back to the Examiners concerned for reevaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to
remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela
Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent
Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two
cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was
presented at the said first meeting of the Committee
(Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of
the dates of every meeting of the Committee was
made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.).
The alleged sheet containing the date of the two
examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of
the Committee were not presented by respondent
Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them
inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room
when he went on leave after the release of the Bar
results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears,
however, that the inventory conducted by officials of
the Court in the Confidential Room of respondent
Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh.
X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 1113, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law,
maintained that there was only one notebook in
Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him
and this is substantiated by his personal file and
record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this
notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V,
p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the
original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela
Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover
of the notebook of said examinee and the change is
authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo.
He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented
in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing
Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number
110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No.
1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the
figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as
Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48,
rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty.
Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their
admission in evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo
testified that he remembers a case of an examinee
presented to the Committee, who obtained passing
marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee
agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the
notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed
(Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject,
but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V,
p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not
aware of any case of an examinee who was on the
borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50%
in one subject that was taken up by the Committee
(Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook
with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to
Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the
Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner
concerned. The day following the meeting in which
the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613
was taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said
notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This
particular notebook with Office Code Number 954
belongs to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee
whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken up
by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case
brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.).
Pardo declared that there was no case of an
examinee that was referred to the Committee that
involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of
Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the
representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the
meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the
Committee that where an examinee failed in only one
subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in
whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate
or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 6063, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in
Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back
to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing
grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:
Labor Laws 3%
Taxation 69%
Mercantile Law 68%
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and
after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law are
as follows:
BA
Political Law 57% 66%
= 9 pts. or 27
weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73%
= No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68%
68% = "
Criminal Law 78%
78% = "
Remedial Law 85%
85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83%
="
——————————
——————
Average (weighted)
73.15% 74.5%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm.
Case No. 1162, rec.)
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in
Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo
to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said
subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:
Politica
l Law
70%
Taxatio
n 72%
His grades and averages before and after the
disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:
BA
Political Law 70% 70%
= No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75%
="
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47%
50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78%
78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88%
88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79%
="
——————————
———————
Weighted Averages
74.95% 75.4%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in
Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in
Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar
Examination Committee in February, 1971, which
violation was due to the misrepresentation of
respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of
Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can
hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the
Bar Examination Committee because even at the time
of said referral, which was after the unauthorized reevaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang
had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws.
His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law
was considered 75% under the Confidential
Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His
grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated
by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious
misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and
confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby
impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and
undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He
should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela
Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be
required to show cause and the corresponding
investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of
the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in
five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and
International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and
Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in
admitting candidates to the legal profession, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion,
requires: (1) previous established rules and principles;
(2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting
determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to
whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition for
Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The
determination of whether a bar candidate has
obtained the required passing grade certainly involves
discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin,
1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through
a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a
member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight
(8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the
eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to
each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the
Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the
individual members of the Committee, on the other, is
the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy
clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the
Committee in connection with the exercise of
discretion in the admission of examinees to
membership of the Bar must be in accordance with
the established rules of the Court and must always be
subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect
to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily
confidential as the designation indicates, his functions
in connection with the conduct of the Bar
examinations are defined and circumscribed by the
Court and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the
examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5)
subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated
by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from
the Court, a serious breach of the trust and
confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar
Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that
enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar
examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a
complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess
any discretion with respect to the matter of admission
of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with
authority to determine whether or not an examinee's
answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or
whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is
correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited
was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial.
What is decisive is whether the proceedings or
incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the
Bar were in accordance with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
of 1964, in connection, among others, with the
character requirement of candidates for admission to
the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission
as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme
Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character,
and that no charges against him involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court
in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old
Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule
127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound
to lay before the Court all his involvement in any
criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to
enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine
applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what
crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme
Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying
before or informing the Court of one's personal record
— whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted,
convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending —
becomes more compelling. The forms for application
to take the Bar examinations provided by the
Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the
disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral
turpitude filed or pending against the applicant but
also of all other criminal cases of which he has been
accused. It is of course true that the application form
used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for
the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the
disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any.
But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show
satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character
is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can
consider them in the ascertainment and determination
of his moral character. And undeniably, with the
applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be
in a better position to consider the applicant's moral
character; for it could not be gainsaid that an
applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether
pending or terminated by its dismissal or applicant's
acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his
character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963
and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for
the second and third time, respectively, the
application form provided by the Court for use of
applicants already required the applicant to declare
under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted
for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense
involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending
case of that nature against him." By 1966, when
Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time,
the application form prepared by the Court for use of
applicants required the applicant to reveal all his
criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or
not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is
required under oath to declare that "he has not been
charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal
Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or
convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime
involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case
against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet,
respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold
or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight
physical injuries which was then and until now is
pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter
repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in
his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967,
1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and
withholding from the Court his pending criminal case
for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967,
1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he
committed perjury when he declared under oath that
he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely
representing to the Court that he had no criminal case
pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed
unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven
(7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application
to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had
been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is
a ground for revocation of his license to practice law
is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741).
Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach
the conclusion that the respondent, in
withholding from the board of law
examiners and from the justice of this
court, to whom he applied for
admission, information respecting so
serious a matter as an indictment for a
felony, was guilty of fraud upon the
court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the
board of law examiners, or the judge
to whom he applied for admission,
been apprised of the true situation,
neither the certificate of the board nor
of the judge would have been
forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of
Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W
— 709 — 710).
from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re
Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an
absolute right to be granted every one
who demands it, but is a privilege to
be extended or withheld in the
exercise of sound discretion. The
standards of the legal profession are
not satisfied by conduct which merely
enables one to escape the penalties of
the criminal law. It would be a
disgrace to the Judiciary to receive
one whose integrity is questionable as
an officer of the court, to clothe him
with all the prestige of its confidence,
and then to permit him to hold himself
as a duly authorized member of the
bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil.
399-401].
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and
annulled, and he was required to surrender to the
clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name
was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on
motion is conferred in the discretion of
the Appellate Division.' In the exercise
of the discretion, the court should be
informed truthfully and frankly of
matters tending to show the character
of the applicant and his standing at the
bar of the state from which he comes.
The finding of indictments against him,
one of which was still outstanding at
the time of his motion, were facts
which should have been submitted to
the court, with such explanations as
were available. Silence respecting
them was reprehensible, as tending to
deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104;
emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his
involvement in any criminal case despite his having
been apprised by the Investigation of some of the
circumstances of the criminal case including the very
name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it
when he was confronted by the victim himself, who
was called to testify thereon), and his continued
failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in
that criminal case up to the present time, indicate his
lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and
good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of
becoming a member of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of
the formal resolution of the Court requiring him to
explain why his name should not be stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as
August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to
the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not
offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to
take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular
manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no
other alternative but to order the surrender of his
attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is not
without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on
several occasions in the past nullified the admission
of successful bar candidates to the membership of the
Bar on the grounds, among others, of
(a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative
to, the requirement on applicant's educational
attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the
Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T.
Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the
findings of the Court Investigators contained in their
report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re:
Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good
moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314];
and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations
[People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil.
151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs.
Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of
Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found
that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified
and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of
public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor
General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge
Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court
of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G.
Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz
and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted
having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of
the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of
respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however,
professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or
increased the grades of the notebooks without
knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the
said notebooks; and that they did the same without
any consideration or expectation of any. These the
records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the
opinion and WE so declare that indeed the
respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or recorrecion in good faith and without any consideration
whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved
in the matter of admission of members to the Bar, the
respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances,
should have exercised greater care and caution and
should have been more inquisitive before acceding to
the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo.
They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar
Examination Committee, who would have referred the
matter to the Supreme Court. At least the
respondents-examiners should have required
respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the
complete grades and/or the average of the examinee
represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed
only in their respective and particular subject and/or
was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy
themselves that the examinee concerned was really
so circumstances. This they could have easily done
and the stain on the Bar examinations could have
been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and
Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that the
answers of respondent Galang really deserved or
merited the increased grades; and so with respondent
Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto
Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to
respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear
that they increased the grades of Galang in their
respective subject solely because of the
misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence,
in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to
me one paper and you said that this particular
examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject
he received 60 something, I cannot remember the
exact average and if he would get a few points higher,
he would get a passing average. I agreed to do that
because I did not wish to be the one causing his
failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also
allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent
Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee
seems to have passed in allot her subject except this
subject and that if I can re-evaluate this examination
notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this
particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so
I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said
'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to
help out examinees who are failing in just one subject'
so I readily acceded to his request and said 'Just
leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left
it with me and what i did was to go over the book and
tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark
correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was
to be more lenient and if the answers was correct
although it was not complete I raise the grade so I
had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to
correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the
changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the
favorable re-evaluations made by respondents
Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo
notwithstanding their declarations that the increases
in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee
concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the
misrepresentation and deception committed by
respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo —
Q And by reason of
that information you
made the re-evaluation
of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have reevaluated the paper of
your own accord in the
absence of such
information?
A No, your Honor,
because I have
submitted my report at
that time" (Vol. V, p.
33, rec.; see also
allegations in
paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5,
Affidavit of April 17,
1972, Exh. BMontecillo; allegation
No. 2, Answer dated
march 19, 1973, Exh.
A-Montecillo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp.
40-41, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian —
3. That sometime in the later part of
January of this year, he brought back
to me an examination booklet in Civil
Law for re-evaluation because
according to him the owner of the
paper is on the borderline and if I
could reconsider his grade to 75% the
candidate concerned will get passing
mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under
the belief that it was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court to do
so and in the further belief that I was
just manifesting cooperation in doing
so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..."
(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was
made in good faith and under the
belief that I am authorized to do so in
view of them is representation of said
Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
33-34, rec.).
Manalo —
(c) In revising the grade of the
particular examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each
and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answer by the
criteria laid down by the Court, and
giving the said examinee the benefit of
the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's
representation that it was only in that
particular subject that said examinee
failed, herein respondent became
convinced that the said examinee
deserved a higher grade than that
previously given him, but he did not
deserve, in herein respondent's
honest appraisal, to be given the
passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo —
... I considered it entirely humanly
possible to have erred, because I
corrected that particular notebook on
December 31,1971, considering
especially the representation of the
Bar Confidant that the said examinee
had obtained higher grades in other
subjects, the highest of which was
84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62,
rec.; emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances
utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein
examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no
one among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation
effected by them was impartial or free from any
improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty
and competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he
deserved the increased grades given after the said re-
evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records,
Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the
explanations of the respondents-examiners, which
were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in
connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of
Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve
the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their
explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are
constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners
that their participation in the admission of members to
the Bar is one impressed with the highest
consideration of public interest — absolute purity of
the proceedings — and so are required to exercise
the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the
performance of their duties relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his
memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed
that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up
this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or
support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness
due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into
helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a participant
in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner
named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will
show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's
memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge
against the honor and integrity of the late Justice
Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18,
1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's
insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not
bring this out during the investigation which in his
words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that
he did not make this charge during the investigation
when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred
the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and
possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter
departed for Australia "until this case shall have been
terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as
being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome
of this case on the part of respondent or an act of
reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not
impugn the motives of the five other members of the
1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed
that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising
the grades of respondent Galang in their respective
subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the
results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar
Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see
and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the
purpose of seeking his help in connection with the
1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised
Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian
mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination
booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before
the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7,
rec). Even though such information was divulged by
respondent Pamatian after the official release of the
bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly
expected of a member of the Judiciary who should
exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by
resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His
unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the
bar examinations and to impair public faith in the
Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that
the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo to
enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations
was committed for valuable consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by
Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official
release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February,
1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as
Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo and his wife acquired from
the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot
with an area of 374 square meters,
more or less, for the amount of
P84,114.00. The deed of sale was
dated March 5, 1972 but was
notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the
same date, however, respondent
Lanuevo and his wife executed two
(2)mortgages covering the said house
and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in
the total amount of P67,291.20 (First
mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No.
90913: date of instrument — April 5,
1972, date of inscription — April 20,
1972: Second mortgage — P8,411.40,
Entry No. 90914: date of instrument
— April 5, 1972, date of inscription
— April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III,
rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as
down payment the amount of only
P17,000.00, which according to him is
equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the
purchase price of P84,114.00.
Respondent Lanuevo claimed that
P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his
savings while the remaining the
P12,000.00 came from his sister in
Okinawa in the form of a loan and
received by him through a niece
before Christmas of 1971 in dollars
($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII,
pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his
alleged P5,000.00
savings and P12,000.00 loan from his
sister; are not fully reflected and
accounted for in respondent's 1971
Statement of Assets and Liabilities
which he filed on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent
Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank
deposit in the amount of only
P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his
bank deposit listed under Assets was
in the amount of P1,011.00, which
shows therefore that of the P2,000.00
bank deposit listed in his 1971
statement under Assets, only the
amount of P989.00 was used or
withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00
receivable listed under Assets in his
1971 statement was not realized
because the transaction therein
involved did not push through
(Statement of Assets and Liabilities of
respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to
1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971
$2000 loan of respondent from his
married sister in Okinawa is extremely
doubtful. In the first place, said
amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not
reflected in his 1971 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities filed on January
17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note
which he allegedly received from his
sister at the time he received the $200
was not even presented by
respondent during the investigation.
And according to Respondent
Lanuevo himself, while he considered
this a loan, his sister did not seriously
consider it as one. In fact, no mode or
time of payment was agreed upon by
them. And furthermore, during the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo
promised to furnish the Investigator
the address of his sister in Okinawa.
Said promise was not fulfilled as borne
out by the records. Considering that
there is no showing that his sister,
who has a family of her own, is among
the top earners in Okinawa or has
saved a lot of money to give to him,
the conclusion, therefore, that
the P17,000.00 of respondent
Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or
undeclared income is inevitable under
the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their
BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS
for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry
No. 4992: August 14, 1972 — date of
instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of
inscription). On February 28, 1973,
the second mortgage in favor of BF
Homes, Entry No. 90914, was
redeemed by respondent and was
subsequently cancelled on March
20,1973, Entry No. 30143.
Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973
the first mortgage in favor of BF
Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also
redeemed by respondent Lanuevo
and thereafter cancelled on March 20,
1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.).
Hence, only the mortgage in favor of
GSIS remains as the encumbrance of
respondent's house and lot. According
to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly
amortization of the GSIS mortgage is
P778.00 a month, but that since May
of 1973, he was unable to pay the
same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets
and Liabilities, which he filed in
connection with his resignation and
retirement (filed October 13, 1972),
the house and lot declared as part of
his assets, were valued at
P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an
item in his liabilities in the same
statement was the GSIS real estate
loan in the amount
of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of
Assets and Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972
Statement of Assets and Liabilities is
a 1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00.
That he acquired this car sometime
between January, 1972 and
November, 1972 could be inferred
from the fact that no such car or any
car was listed in his statement of
assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the
years previous to 1965. It appears,
however, that his listed total assets,
excluding receivables in his 1971
Statement was P19,000.00, while in
his 1972 (as of November, 1972)
Statement, his listed total
assets, excluding the house and lot
was P18,211.00, including the said
1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between
the official release of the 1971 Bar
examinations and the acquisition of
the above-mentioned properties, tends
to link or tie up the said acquisitions
with the illegal machination committed
by respondent Lanuevo with respect
to respondent Galang's examination
papers or to show that the money
used by respondent Lanuevo in the
acquisition of the above properties
came from respondent Galang in
consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after
the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the
serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations
alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in
fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12,
1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered
by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed
his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the
end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation
before he was required to show cause on March 5,
1973 but after he was informed of the said
irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official
release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations,
respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave
from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining
the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of
P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation
that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his
BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.),
which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against
respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in
relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (AntiGraft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing
another public officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by
competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duties of
the latter, or allowing himself to be
presented, induced, or influenced to
commit such violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any
party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality,
evidence bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees
of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or
permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes
the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is
determined that his property or money "is manifestly
out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec.
2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent
Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and
Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the
investigation; but they were examined as they are part
of the records of this Court.
B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible
contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang
and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo
before the latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of
the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the
Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days
— 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at the
MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University)
— 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent
Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the
Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental
agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans
including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of
Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo
successively held the position of Junior Investigator,
Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans
Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator
(Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During
that period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo
had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries
of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational
benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive
as of the date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is
also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it
was his father who all the time attended to the
availment of the said educational benefits and even
when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law
at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In
1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old,
and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a
technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol.
V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the
investigation, he claimed that he was the private
secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 1213, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the
notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine
Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on
the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang
from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational
Institution effective the first semester of the school
year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to
respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St.,
Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that
he never went to the Office of the Philippine Veterans
to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that
he does not even know the location of the said office.
He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the
G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to
go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to
submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But
respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the
GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists
that he never bothered to take a look at the
neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The
huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is
beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the
City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator
in the Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated
claims for the several benefits given to veterans like
educational benefits and disability benefits; that he
does not remember, however, whether in the course
of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across
the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational
benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr.
Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII,
pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of
the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating
at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later
he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans
Legion especially while working with the Philippine
Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the
guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During
the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was
operating in Samar only and he had no
communications with other guerrilla organization in
other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans
Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not
remember having attended its meeting here in Manila,
even while he was employed with the Philippine
Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders
of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo
was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken
with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva
Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still
confined there when their camp was bombed and
strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941
(Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated
August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a
member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise
known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned
and inducted as a member thereof on January 16,
1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His
unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US
Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed
headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the
38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the
mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9
May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945,
date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated
December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has
submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar
Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any
purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the
Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its
strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar
examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above
delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO.
1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS
HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED
STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS;
AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163,
RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E.
GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND
HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE
ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo,
Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
Antonio, J., is on official leave.
Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.
CASE DIGEST:
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar
Confidant and Deputy Clerk of
Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E.
GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON
PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY.
FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO
PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondent.
FACTS:
Landicho wrote a confidential letter to the
court about the startling fact that the grade in one
examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar
candidate was raised for one reason or another,
before the bar results were released that year and
that there are grades in other examination
notebooks in other subjects that underwent
alterations to raise the grades prior to the release
of results. The Court checked the records of the
1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades
in five subjects — Political Law and Public
International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law,
Criminal Law, and Remedial Law — of a successful
bar candidate with office code no. 954, Ramon
Galang, underwent some changes which,
however, were duly initialed and authenticated
by the respective examiner concerned. Each of
the five examiners in his individual sworn
statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or
re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to
his subject upon the representation to him by Bar
Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do
the same and that the examinee concerned failed
only in his particular and/or was on the borderline
of passing.
The investigation showed that the reevaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E.
Galang alias Roman Galang, was unauthorized,
and therefore he did noy obtain a passing average
in the 1971 Bar Examinations.
Lanuevo admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back
to the respective examiners for re-evaluation or
re-checking. The five examiners having reevaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by
the Bar Confidant.
As investigator conducted by the NBI also
showed that Ramon Galang was charged with the
crime of slight physical injuries committed on
certain de Vera, of the same University.
Confronted with this information, respondent
Galang declared that he does not remember
having been charged with the crime of slight
physical injuries in that case.
It must also be noted that immediately after
the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar
Examinations, Lanuevo gained possession of few
properties, including that of a house in V+BF
Homes, which was never declared in his
declaration of assets and liabilities. But Lanuevo’s
statement of assets and liabilities were not taken
up during the investigation but were examined as
parts of the records of the court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Lanuevo is guilty defrauding
the examiners into re-evaluating Galang’s exam
notebook.
2. Whether or not Galang is guilty of
fraudulently concealing and withholding from the
court his pending case.
RULING:
1. Yes. It is evident that Lanuevo staged the
plot to convince the examiners to individually reexamine the grades of Galang to help him pass
even without the authority of the Court.
The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the
answers of the examinees and cannot assume the
functions of passing upon the appraisal made by
the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all
Examiner. He cannot presume to know better
than the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation
should be done by the examinee and the same
should be addressed to the Court, which alone
can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes
such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and
thereby compromises his position as well as the
image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious
misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and
confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant,
thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar
examinations and undermining public faith in the
Supreme Court.
2. Yes. Ramon Galang is guilty of fraudulently
concealing and withholding from the Court his
pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1961,
1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971;
and in 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971, he committed
perjury when he declared under oath that he had
no pending criminal case in court. That the
concealment of an attorney of the fact that he
had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged
crime, in his application to take the Bar Exam is a
ground for revocation of his license to practice
law as well-settled. He is therefore unworthy of
becoming a member of the noble profession of
law.
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with
the character requirement of candidates for
admission to the Bar, provides that "every
applicant for admission as a member of the Bar
must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good
moral character, and that no charges against
him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or
are pending in any court in the Philippines."
That the concealment of an attorney in his
application to take the Bar examinations of the fact
that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an
alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license
to practice law is well — settled.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take
the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner
in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other
alternative but to order the surrender of his
attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name
from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe
del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be
granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege
to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound
discretion. The standards of the legal profession are
not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be
a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose
integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to
clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and
then to permit him to hold himself as a duly
authorized member of the bar
This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and
Compassion dated November 10, 2008 filed by
petitioner Danilo de Guzman. He prays that this
Honorable Court "in the exercise of equity and
compassion, grant petitioner’s plea for judicial
clemency, and thereupon, order his reinstatement as
a member in good standing of the Philippine Bar."1
To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated
a Resolution, in B.M. No. 1222, the dispositive portion
of which reads in part:
WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the
recommendations of the Investigating Committee,
hereby resolves to —
(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the
practice of law effective upon his receipt of this
RESOLUTION;
xxxx
The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of
questions in Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar
Examinations. Petitioner at that time was employed
as an assistant lawyer in the law firm of Balgos &
Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was
the examiner for Mercantile Law during the said bar
examinations. The Court had adopted the findings of
the Investigating Committee, which identified
petitioner as the person who had downloaded the test
questions from the computer of Balgos and faxed
them to other persons.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably
recommended the reinstatement of petitioner in the
Philippine Bar. In a Report dated January 6, 2009, the
OBC rendered its assessment of the petition, the
relevant portions of which we quote hereunder:
Re: 2003 Bar Examinations, B.M. No. 1222 February 4,
2004
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
B.M. No. 1222
April 24, 2009
RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a
lawyer to fulfill his father’s childhood dream to
become one. This task was not particularly easy for
him and his family but he willed to endure the same in
order to pay tribute to his parents.
Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he
already imposed upon himself the duty of rendering
service to his fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his
exposure to public service when he was elected
Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of
Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City. During this time, he
initiated several projects benefiting the youth in their
barangay.
Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking
up Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and eventually
pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law
school, he was elected as the President of the
Student Council of the Institute of Law of the Far
Eastern University (FEU). Here, he spearheaded
various activities including the conduct of seminars for
law students as well as the holding of bar operations
for bar examinees.
Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth
and student leader, petitioner still managed to excel in
his studies. Thus, he was conferred an Academic
Excellence Award upon his graduation in Bachelor of
Laws.
Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner
immediately entered government service as a Legal
Officer assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of
Taguig. Simultaneously, he also rendered free legal
services to less fortunate residents of Taguig City who
were then in need of legal assistance.
In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the
Associate Lawyers at the Balgos and Perez Law
Offices. It was during his stay with this firm when his
craft as a lawyer was polished and developed.
Despite having entered private practice, he continued
to render free legal services to his fellow Taguigeños.
Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate,
petitioner’s flourishing career was cut short as he was
stripped of his license to practice law for his alleged
involvement in the leakage in the 2003 Bar
Examinations.
Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself
inside his house to avoid the rather unavoidable
consequences of his disbarment.
On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new
lease in life when he was taken as a consultant by the
City Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated
as a member of the Secretariat of the People’s Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB). For the next five (5)
years, petitioner concentrated mainly on rendering
public service.
Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact
of his act which unfortunately, compromised the
integrity of the bar examinations. As could be borne
from the records of the investigation, he cooperated
fully in the investigation conducted and took personal
responsibility for his actions. Also, he has offered his
sincerest apologies to Atty. Balgos, to the Court as
well as to all the 2003 bar examinees for the
unforeseen and unintended effects of his actions.
Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his
mistakes and has taken the said humbling experience
to make him a better person.
Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted
the following testimonials and endorsements of
various individuals and entities all attesting to his
good moral character:
1) Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007,
"Resolution Expressing Full Support to Danilo
G. De Guzman in his Application for Judicial
Clemency, Endorsing his Competence and
Fitness to be Reinstated as a Member of the
Philippine Bar and for Other Purposes" dated
4 June 2007 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
City of Taguig;
2) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong
Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi
ng Southeast People’s Village Homeowners
Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA) kay Danilo G.
De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong
Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang
Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang
Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang
mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1
June 2007 of the Southeast People’s Village
Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA),
Ibayo-Tipas, City of Taguig;
3) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong
Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi
ng Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek,
Inc. (SAREMAC) kay G. Danilo G. De
Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran
ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pagsusulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang
Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng
Isang Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the
Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc.
(SAREMAC), Lower Bicutan, City of Taguig;
4) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong
Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi
ng Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG
KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc.
(SAMANA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa
Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng
Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pagsusulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang
Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng
Isang Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the
Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI)
Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA),
Sta. Ana, City of Taguig;
5) "An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the
Competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De
Guzman as to Warrant the Grant of Judicial
Clemency and his Reinstatement as Member
of the Philippine Bar" dated 8 June 2007 of
Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino, Laogan,
Trespeses and Llantino Law Offices;
6) "Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual
Competence of Danilo G. De Guzman to be
Truly Deserving of Judicial Clemency and
Compassion" dated 5 July 2007 of Rev. Fr.
Paul G. Balagtas, Parish Priest, Archdiocesan
Shrine of St. Anne;
7) "Testimonial Letter" dated 18 February
2008 of Atty. Loreto C. Ata, President, Far
Eastern University Law Alumni Association
(FEULAA), Far Eastern University (FEU);
8) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong
Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi
ng Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc.
(SABISKA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa
Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng
Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pagsusulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang
Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng
Isang Abogado" dated 8 July 2008 of the
Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc.
(SABISKA);
9) Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008,
"A Resolution Recognizing the Contributions
of Danilo G. De Guzman to the People’s Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB) – Taguig City,
Attesting to his Utmost Dedication and
Commitment to the Call of Civic and Social
Duty and for Other Purposes" dated 11 July
2008 of the People’s Law Enforcement Board
(PLEB);
10) "A Personal Appeal for the Grant of
Judicial Forgiveness and Compassion in
Favor of Danilo G. De Guzman" dated 14 July
2008 of Atty. Edwin R. Sandoval, Professor,
College of Law, San Sebastian College –
Recoletos;
11) "An Open Letter Personally Attesting to
the Moral competence and Fitness of Danilo
G. De Guzman" dated 5 September 2008 of
Mr. Nixon F. Faderog, Deputy Grand [Kn]ight,
Knights of Columbus and President, General
Parent-Teacher Association, Taguig National
High School, Lower Bicutan, Taguig City;
12) "Testimonial Letter" dated 5 September
2008 of Atty. Primitivo C. Cruz, President,
Taguig Lawyers League, Inc., Tuktukan,
Taguig City;
13) "Testimonial Letter" dated 21 October
2008 of Judge Hilario L. Laqui, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trail Court (RTC), Branch
218, Quezon City; and
14) "Testimonial Letter" dated 28 October
2008 of Justice Oscar M. Herrera, former
Justice, Court of Appeals and former Dean,
Institute of Law, Far Eastern University (FEU).
Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner
pleaded that he be afforded the same kindness and
compassion in order that, like Atty. Basa, his
promising future may not be perpetually foreclosed. In
the said case, the Court had the occasion to say:
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age,
admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine
Islands. Recently, he was charged in the Court of
First Instance of the City of Manila with the crime of
abduction with consent, was found guilty in a decision
rendered by the Honorable M.V. De Rosario, Judge of
First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned
for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven
days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision
was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the
second division of the Supreme Court.
xxxx
When come next, as we must, to determine the exact
action which should be taken by the court, we do so
regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the
violation of the criminal law by the respondent
attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the other
hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our
compassion to the uttermost in order that so
promising a career may not be utterly ruined.
Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more
circumspect in his actions and solemnly pledged to
exert all efforts to atone for his misdeeds.
There may be a reasonable ground to consider the
herein Petition.
In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the
Lawyer’s Oath (Bar Matter 712), which may be
applied in the instant case, the Court said:
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve
to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the
lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice
the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, the
Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of
bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various
certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a
genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted
all efforts, to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan.
We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt,
taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth
to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
xxxx
Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs.
Atty. Ismael F. Mejia (Administrative Case No. 2984),
the Court [in] deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty.
Mejia to the practice of law stated:
The Court will take into consideration the applicant’s
character and standing prior to the disbarment, the
nature and character of the charge/s for which he was
disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment
and the time that has elapsed in between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement.
Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had
only been in the practice of law for five (5) years when
he was disbarred from the practice of law. It is of no
doubt that petitioner had a promising future ahead of
him where it not for the decision of the Court stripping
off his license.
Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only
before but likewise, after his disbarment, as attested
to overwhelmingly by his constituents, colleagues as
well as people of known probity in the community and
society.
Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the
bar, he had already manifested his intense desire to
render public service as evidenced by his active
involvement and participation in several social and
civic projects and activities. Likewise, even during and
after his disbarment, which could be perceived by
some as a debilitating circumstance, petitioner still
managed to continue extending his assistance to
others in whatever means possible. This only proves
petitioner’s strength of character and positive moral
fiber.
However, still, it is of no question that petitioner’s act
in copying the examination questions from Atty.
Balgos’ computer without the latter’s knowledge and
consent, and which questions later turned out to be
the bar examinations questions in Mercantile Law in
the 2003 Bar Examinations, is not at all
commendable. While we do believe that petitioner
sincerely did not intend to cause the damage that his
action ensued, still, he must be sanctioned for unduly
compromising the integrity of the bar examinations as
well as of this Court.
We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since
reformed and has sincerely reflected on his
transgressions. Thus, in view of the circumstances
and likewise for humanitarian considerations, the
penalty of disbarment may now be commuted to
suspension. Considering the fact, however, that
petitioner had already been disbarred for more than
five (5) years, the same may be considered as proper
service of said commuted penalty and thus, may now
be allowed to resume practice of law.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is
respectfully recommended that the instant Petition for
Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated 10
November 2008 of petitioner DANILO G. DE
GUZMAN be GRANTED. Petitioner’s disbarment is
now commuted to suspension, which suspension is
considered as served in view of the petitioner’s five
(5) year disbarment. Hence, petitioner may now be
allowed to resume practice of law.
The recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant is well-taken in part. We deem petitioner
worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his
penalty to seven (7) years suspension from the
practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has
already served his disbarment.
1avvphi1.zw+
Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to
punish but to correct offenders.2 While the Court is
ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers,
it also knows how to show compassion when the
penalty imposed has already served its purpose.3
In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute
the supreme penalty of disbarment imposed on the
lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse of the
disbarred lawyer4 and the conduct of his public life
during his years outside of the bar.5 For example, in
Valencia v. Antiniw, we held:
However, the record shows that the long period of
respondent's disbarment gave him the chance to
purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse
and repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness
and capacity to live up once again to the exacting
standards of conduct demanded of every member of
the bar and officer of the court. During respondent's
disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for
his professional infraction, he has been persistent in
reiterating his apologies and pleas for reinstatement
to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to
show that he has regained his worthiness to practice
law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and
unblemished record as an elected public servant, as
attested to by numerous civic and professional
organizations, government institutions, public officials
and members of the judiciary.6
And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,7 we noted:
Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for
Mejia’s disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the
fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the
age of the petitioner and the length of time during
which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are
not the sole measure in allowing a petition for
reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the
rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992,
no other transgression has been attributed to him,
and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has
learned his lesson from this experience, and his
punishment has lasted long enough. x x x
RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse
expected of him considering the gravity of his
transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has
redirected focus since his disbarment towards public
service, particularly with the People’s Law
Enforcement Board. The attestations submitted by his
peers in the community and other esteemed members
of the legal profession, such as retired Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge
Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty.
Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such
as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to his positive impact
on society at large since the unfortunate events of
2003.
Petitioner’s subsequent track record in public service
affords the Court some hope that if he were to
reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his
achievements as a lawyer would redound to the
general good and more than mitigate the stain on his
record. Compassion to the petitioner is warranted.
Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him the following
stern warning:
"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn
servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them
underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society,
argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a
pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic."8
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition
for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is hereby
GRANTED IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G.
DE GUZMAN from the practice of law is
hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS
SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW,
reckoned from February 4, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
CASE DIGEST:
B.M. No. 1222
April 24, 2009
ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,
FACTS:
Danilo De Guzman was disbarred for an issue
regarding the 2003 Bar Examinations.
Working as an assistant lawyr in the Balgos &
Perez, he leaked the exam questions to his
fraternity brothers thinking that they were just
quizzers in a book supposedly written by the
xaminer who was one of te partners.
He now prays that he be granted judicial
clemency and be reinstated as a member in good
standing in the Phil. Bar.
He presented as evidence his track record in
public service that has been going on even before
he entered law school. After his disbarment he
worked s the consultant of the city gov’t of taguig
and later a member of the secretariat of the
people law enforcemet board.
ISSUE:
Whether o not danilo de guzman should be
reinstated as member of the bar.
HELD:
YES. The Court deem petitioner worthy of
clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty
to seven (7) years suspension from the practice of
law, inclusive of the five (5) years he has already
served his disbarment.
The record shows that the long period of
respondent's disbarment gave him the chance to
purge himself of his misconduct, to show his
remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his
willingness and capacity to live up once again to
the exacting standards of conduct demanded of
every member of the bar and officer of the court.
The Court reiterated (Barrios v. Martinez, A.C. No.
4585, November 12, 2004, 442 SCRA 324, 341) "Of
all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their
sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the
world, to repudiate and override the laws, to
trample them underfoot and to ignore the very
bands of society, argues recreancy to his position
and office and sets a pernicious example to the
insubordinate and dangerous elements of the
body politic."
On September 22, 2003, there was a rumored
leakage in the bar examination on the Mercantile
Law subject.
Investigation was lead back to the office of Atty.
Marcial O.T. Balgos, then Mercantile Law
Examiner, where the leakage started.
Allegedly, Atty. Danilo de Guzman (assistant
lawyer in the firm of Balgos and Perez) stole a
copy of Atty. Balgos’ file on Mercantile Law with
the proposed test items, and the former sent it to
some members of the Beta Sigma Lambda
Fraternity.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. de Guzman are guilty of gross
misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar.
RULING:
Yes. De Guzman aided cheating or dishonesty by
his fraternity brothers in the examination, which
is violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
for members of the Bar. As for Atty. Balgos’
negligence, if he had taken those simple
precautions to protect the secrecy of his papers,
nobody could have stolen them and copied and
circulated them. The integrity of the bar
examinations would not have been sullied by the
scandal.
Law Student Practice Rule A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC
June 25, 2019 –
Amended Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court, Law
Student Practice (A.M.
No. 19-03-24-SC)
Whereas, pursuant to the provisions of Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, the Supreme
Court has the power to adopt and promulgate rules
concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure
in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged;
Whereas, there is a need to amend the provisions of
Rule 138-A to ensure access to justice of the
marginalized sectors, to enhance learning
opportunities of law students, to instill among them
the value of legal professional social responsibility,
and to prepare them for the practice of law;
Whereas, there is a need to institutionalize clinical
legal education program in all law schools in order to
enhance, improve, and streamline law student
practice, and regulate their limited practice of law; and
Whereas, to produce practice-ready lawyers, the
completion of clinical legal education courses must be
a prerequisite to take the bar examinations as provided
in Section 5 of Rule 138.
Now, therefore, the Supreme Court En Banc hereby
adopts and promulgates the Revised Law Student
Practice Rule.
The Revised Rule shall take effect at the start of the
Academic Year 2020-2021 following its publication
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
A.M. NO. 19-03-24-SC
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE
Section 1. Coverage. – This rule shall cover the
limited practice of law by students certified herein.
The limited practice of law covers appearances,
drafting, and submission of pleadings and documents
before trial and appellate courts and quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies, assistance in mediation and
other alternative modes of dispute resolution, legal
counselling and advice, and such other activities that
may be covered by the Clinical Legal Education
Program of the law school as herein provided.
Section 2. Definition of Terms. –
(a) Clinical Legal Education Program is an
experiential, interactive and reflective credit-earning
teaching course with the objectives of providing law
students with practical knowledge, skills and values
necessary for the application of the law, delivery of
legal services and promotion of social justice and
public interest, especially to the marginalized, while
inculcating in the students the values of ethical
lawyering and public service. It consists of learning
activities covered by this Rule undertaken in either a
1) law clinic or an 2) externship, which shall
incorporate the teaching of legal theory and doctrines,
practical skills, as well as legal ethics.
(b) Externship is part of the clinical legal educational
program if: (a) it allows students to engage in legal
work for the marginalized sectors or for the promotion
of social justice and public interest, and b) it is
undertaken with any of the following: i) the courts, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), government
offices; and (ii) law school-recognized nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
(c) Law Clinic refers to an office or center which is a
component of the law school’s clinical legal education
program that renders legal assistance and services as
herein provided to eligible persons, groups, and/or
communities.
(d) Law Student Practitioner is a law student certified
under Section 3 of this Rule.
(e) Supervising Lawyer refers to a member of the
Philippine Bar in good standing who is authorized by
the law school to supervise the law student
practitioner under this Rule.
Section 3. Eligibility Requirements of Law Student
Practitioners. – No law student shall be permitted to
engage in any of the activities under the Clinical Legal
Education Program of a law school unless the law
student has applied for and secured the following
certifications:
(a) Level 1 certification, for law students who have
successfully completed their first-year law courses;
and/or
(b) Level 2 certification, for law students currently
enrolled for the second semester of their third-year
law courses, Provided however, where a student fails
to complete all their third-year law courses, the Level
2 certification shall be deemed automatically revoked.
The certification issued shall be valid until the student
has completed the required number of courses in the
clinical legal education program to complete the law
degree, unless sooner revoked for grounds stated
herein.
Section 4. Practice Areas of Law Student
Practitioners. – Subject to the supervision and
approval, of a supervising lawyer, a certified law
student practitioner may:
For Level 1 certification
(1) Interview prospective clients;
(2) Give legal advice to the client;
(3) Negotiate for and on behalf of the client;
(4) Draft legal documents such as affidavits,
compromise agreements, contracts, demand letter,
position papers, and the like;
(5) Represent eligible parties before quasi-judicial or
administrative bodies;
The Level 1 certification issued under this provision
shall be valid before all courts, quasi-judicial and
administrative bodies within the judicial region where
the school is located.
(6) Provide public legal orientation; and
Level 2 Certification
(7) Assist in public interest advocacies for policy
formulation and implementation.
(2) Assist in the taking of depositions and/or preparing
judicial affidavits of witnesses;
Within ten (10) days from receipt of the application,
the Executive Judge of the RTC shall (a) evaluate the
application together with its attachments, and (b)
recommend to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) the approval and issuance of the certification.
If the Executive Judge finds the application to be
incomplete, the law school shall be notified and
required to comply with the requirements within five
(5) days from receipt of notice.
(3) Appear on behalf of the client at any stage of the
proceedings or trial, before any court, quasi-judicial or
administrative body;
The Level 2 certification issued under this provision
shall be valid before all courts, quasi-judicial, and
administrative bodies.
For Level 2 certification
(1) Perform all activities under Level 1 Certification;
(4) In criminal cases, subject to the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, to appear
on behalf of a government agency in the prosecution
of criminal actions; and
(5) In appealed cases, to prepare the pleadings
required in the case.
Section 5. Certification Application Requirements. –
The law student must submit a duly-accomplished
application form under oath in three (3) copies,
accompanied by proof of payment of the necessary
legal and filing fees.
The law school, through the dean or the authorized
representative, shall submit to the Office of the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
having jurisdiction over the territory where the law
school is located, the duly-accomplished application
form together with an endorsement under oath.
Level 1 Certification
The Executive Judge of the RTC shall evaluate,
approve, and issue the certification within ten (10)
days from receipt of the application.
Section 6. Duties of Law Student Practitioners. –
Acting under a certification, the law student shall:
(a) Observe the provisions of Section 24(b), Rule 130
of the Rules of Court;
(b) Be prohibited from using information acquired in
one’s capacity as a law student practitioner for
personal or commercial gain;
(c) Perform the duties and responsibilities to the best
of one’s abilities as a law student practitioner; and
(d) Strictly observe the Canons of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Section 7. Use of Law Student Practitioner’s Name. –
A law student practitioner may sign briefs, pleadings,
letters, and other similar documents which the student
has produced under the direction of the supervising
lawyer, indicating the law student practitioner’s
certificate number as required under this Rule.
Section 8. Law Student Practitioner’s
Oath/Affirmation. – A law student who has been
issued a certificate under this Rule must, before
performing the activities allowed herein, take an oath
in the following form:
"I, (name), having been granted a certificate of law
student practice by the Supreme court under Rule 138A of the Rules of Court, do solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, I will support the Constitution and obey
the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the
same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and
will conduct myself as a certified law student
practitioner according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to the parties I represent; and I impose upon
myself these voluntary obligations without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God."
(b) Personally appear with the law student practitioner
in all cases pending before the second-level courts and
in all other cases the supervising lawyer determines
that his or her presence is required;
Section 9. Duties of Law Schools. – The law school,
through its dean or authorized representative, must:
(a) Develop and adopt a Clinical Legal Education
Program;
(e) Read, approve, and personally sign any pleadings,
briefs or other similar documents prepared by the
certified law student practitioner prior to the filing
thereof, and read and approve any documents which
shall be prepared by the certified law student
practitioner for execution by the eligible party; and
(b) Develop and establish at least one law clinic in its
school;
(f) Provide the level of supervision to the certified law
student practitioner required by these rules.
(c) Endorse qualified students for certification as law
student practitioner under this Rule. Such
endorsement shall constitute as a certification that the
dean or authorized representative knows that the
applicant is a student enrolled in the Clinical Legal
Education Course, possesses good moral character,
and has met the requirements of Section 3 of this
Rule; and
Section 12. Clinical Faculty. – Law schools shall
have such number of faculty members to teach clinical
legal education courses as may be necessary to
comply with this Rule.
(d) Ensure compliance by law student practitioners
and supervising lawyers with the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Section 10. Qualification of Supervising Lawyers. – A
supervising lawyer under this Rule shall be a member
of the bar in good standing.
Section 11. Duties of Supervising Lawyers. – The
following are the duties of a supervising lawyer:
(a) Supervise such number of certified law student
practitioners as far as practicable;
(c) Assume personal responsibility for any work
performed by the certified law student practitioner
while under his or her supervision;
(d) Assist and advise the certified law student
practitioner in the activities authorized by these rules
and review such activities with the certified law
student practitioner, all to the extent required for the
proper practical training of the certified law student
practitioner and the protection of the client;
Section 13. Sanctions. – (a) Without prejudice to
existing laws, rules, regulations, and circulars, the
following shall be considered as unauthorized practice
of law by a certified law student practitioner –
i. Engaging in any of the acts provided in Section 4 of
this Rule without the necessary certification or
without the consent and supervision of the supervising
lawyer;
ii. Making false representations in the application for
certification;
iii. Using an expired certification to engage in the
limited practice of law under this Rule;
iv. Rendering legal services outside the scope of
practice areas allowed under Section 4 of this Rule;
v. Asking for or receiving payment or compensation
for services rendered under the Clinical Legal
Education Program as provided in this Rule; and
Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, Associate Justice
Andres B. Reyes, Jr., Associate Justice
vi. Such other analogous circumstances.
Alexander G. Gesmundo, Associate Justice
Unauthorized practice of law shall be ground for
revocation of the law student practitioner’s
certification and/or disqualification for a law student
from taking the bar examination for a period to be
determined by the Supreme Court.
(b) The above provisions notwithstanding, any act
constituting a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility shall subject the supervising lawyer,
Clinical Legal Education Program head, and/or law
school dean to disciplinary action, as the
circumstances may warrant.
Section 14. Effectivity. – This rule shall take effect at
the start of Academic year 2020-2021 following its
publication in two (2) newspapers of general
circulation. The requirements under second paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 138 as amended by A.M. No. 1903-24-SC dated June 25, 2019 shall apply to bar
examination applicants commencing the 2023 bar
examinations.
June 25, 2019, Manila, Philippines.
Signed:
Lucas P. Bersamin, Chief Justice
Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice
Diosdado M. Peralta, Associate Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo, Associate Justice
Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, Associate Justice
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Associate Justice
Francis Jardeleza (on leave), Associate Justice
Jose C. Reyes, Jr., Associate Justice
Ramon Paul L. Hernando, Associate Justice
Rosmari D. Carandang, Associate Justice
Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, Associate Justice
Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, Associate Justice
1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed
the fact of his criminal conviction and his then
probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution
dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the Bar
Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take
the lawyer's oath of office.
Re: Petition Of Al Argosino To Take The Lawyer’s Oath,
Bar Matter No. 712. July 13, 1995
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with
this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of
office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring
that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his
probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April
1994. We note that his probation period did not last
for more than ten (10) months from the time of the
Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated
18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed
three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition
for Admission to the Bar.
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR
AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR
APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen
(13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on
8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan
stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries
upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part
of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and
his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with
the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining,
pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide
through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted
by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February
1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period
ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his
colleagues filed an application for probation with the
lower court. The application for probation was granted
in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional
Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of
probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer
assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr.
Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege
limited to citizens of good moral character, with
special educational qualifications, duly ascertained
and certified.2 The essentiality of good moral
character in those who would be lawyers is stressed
in the following excerpts which we quote with
approval and which we regard as having persuasive
effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by
the statute, as a condition precedent
to the applicant's right to receive a
license to practice law in North
Carolina, and of which he must, in
addition to other requisites, satisfy the
court, includes all the elements
necessary to make up such a
character. It is something more than
an absence of bad character. It is the
good name which the applicant has
acquired, or should have acquired,
through association with his fellows. It
means that he must have conducted
himself as a man of upright character
ordinarily would, or should, or
does. Such character expresses itself,
not in negatives nor in following the
line of least resistance, but quite
often, in the will to do the unpleasant
thing if it is right, and the resolve not to
do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this
requirement of the statute is eminently
proper. Consider for a moment the
duties of a lawyer. He is sought as
counsellor, and his advice comes
home, in its ultimate effect, to every
man's fireside. Vast interests are
committed to his care; he is the
recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with is client's
property, reputation, his life, his all. An
attorney at law is a sworn officer of the
Court, whose chief concern, as such,
is to aid the administration of justice. .
..
xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing
Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926)
191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
It can also be truthfully said that there
exists nowhere greater temptations to
deviate from the straight and narrow
path than in the multiplicity of
circumstances that arise in the
practice of profession. For these
reasons the wisdom of requiring an
applicant for admission to the bar to
possess a high moral standard
therefore becomes clearly apparent,
and the board of bar examiners as an
arm of the court, is required to cause a
minute examination to be made of the
moral standard of each candidate for
admission to practice. . . . It needs no
further argument, therefore, to arrive
at the conclusion that the highest
degree of scrutiny must be exercised
as to the moral character of a
candidate who presents himself for
admission to the bar. The evil must, if
possible, be successfully met at its
very source, and prevented, for, after
a lawyer has once been admitted, and
has pursued his profession, and has
established himself therein, a far more
difficult situation is presented to the
court when proceedings are instituted
for disbarment and for the recalling
and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of
the inherent rights of every citizen, as
in the right to carry on an ordinary
trade or business. It is a peculiar
privilege granted and continued only
to those who demonstrate special
fitness in intellectual attainment and in
moral character. All may aspire to it on
an absolutely equal basis, but not all
will attain it. Elaborate machinery has
been set up to test applicants by
standards fair to all and to separate
the fit from the unfit. Only those who
pass the test are allowed to enter the
profession, and only those who
maintain the standards are allowed to
remain in it.
Re Rouss:7
Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions, and a fair
private and professional character is
one of them; to refuse admission to an
unworthy applicant is not to punish
him for past offense: an examination
into character, like the examination
into learning, is merely a test of
fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of
their learning and ability, so that they
may not only protect the rights and
interests of their clients, but be able to
assist court in the trial of the cause.
Yet what protection to clients or
assistance to courts could such
agents give? They are required to be
of good moral character, so that the
agents and officers of the court, which
they are, may not bring discredit upon
the due administration of the law,
and it is of the highest possible
consequence that both those who
have not such qualifications in the first
instance, or who, having had them,
have fallen therefrom, shall not be
permitted to appear in courts to aid in
the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good
moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so
far as the general public and the proper administration
of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal
learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55
S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.]
288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our
state has always been
to admit no person to
the practice of the law
unless he covered an
upright moral
character. The
possession of this by
the attorney is more
important, if
anything, to the public
and to the proper
administration of
justice than legal
learning. Legal
learning may be
acquired in after years,
but if the applicant
passes the threshold
of the bar with a bad
moral character the
chances are that his
character will remain
bad, and that he will
become a disgrace
instead of an ornament
to his great calling — a
curse instead of a
benefit to his
community — a Quirk,
a Gammon or a Snap,
instead of a Davis, a
Smith or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be
inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to
the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to
be properly broader than inquiry into the moral
proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character
of an attorney in a proceeding for his
admission to practice is broader in
scope than in a disbarment
proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that
upon application for admission to the
California Bar the court cannot reject
him for want of good moral character
unless it appears that he has been
guilty of acts which would be cause for
his disbarment or suspension, could
not be sustained; that the inquiry is
broader in its scope than that in a
disbarment proceeding, and the court
may receive any evidence which tends
to show the applicant's character as
respects honesty, integrity, and
general morality, and may no doubt
refuse admission upon proofs that
might not establish his guilt of any of
the acts declared to be causes for
disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be
satisfied by those who would seek admission to the
bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm
of conduct expected from members of the general
public. There is a very real need to prevent a general
perception that entry into the legal profession is open
to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications.
The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in
their courts of law and in our legal system as we know
it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing"
activities certainly fell far short of the required
standard of good moral character. The deliberate
(rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction
of severe physical injuries which proximately led to
the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly
indicated serious character flaws on the part of those
who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his coaccused had failed to discharge their moral duty to
protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who
had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved,
reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the
very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to
death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in
the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of
that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior,
which makes impossible a finding that the participant
was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by
the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to
consider de novo the question of whether applicant
A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious
deficiency in moral character referred to above. We
stress that good moral character is a requirement
possession of which must be demonstrated not only
at the time of application for permission to take the
bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at
the time of application for admission to the bar and to
take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for
its examination and consideration, evidence that he
may be now regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon
those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may
consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from
responsible members of the community who have a
good reputation for truth and who have actually
known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was
rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the
Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless
killing of a helpless student to the family of the
deceased student and to the community at large. Mr.
Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant
evidence to show that he is a different person now,
that he has become morally fit for admission to the
ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform
this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the
names and addresses of the father and mother (in
default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the
parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan.
law. He averred that his probation period had
been terminated. It is noted that his probation
period did not last for more than 10 months.
ISSUE: Whether Argosino should be allowed to
take the oath of attorney and be admitted to the
practice of law
DOCTRINES:
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero
and Melo, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J. is on leave.
CASE DIGEST:
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited
to citizens of good moral character, with special
education qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified.
Requirement of good moral character is of
greater importance so far as the general public
and proper administration of justice is concerned.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE
BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL
BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
All aspects of moral character and behavior may
be inquired into in respect of those seeking
admission to the Bar.
FACTS:
Requirement of good moral character to be
satisfied by those who would seek admission to
the bar must be a necessity more stringent than
the norm of conduct expected from members of
the general public.
On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13
others, was charged with the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan.
The death of Camaligan stemmed from the
affliction of severe physical injuries upon him in
course of "hazing" conducted as part of the
university fraternity initiation rites. On February
11, 1993, the accused were consequently
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period
ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years. Eleven (11) days
later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an
application for probation with the lower court.
The application was granted on June 18 1993. The
period of probation was set at two (2) years,
counted from the probationer's initial report to
the probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition
to take the bar exam. He was allowed and he
passed the exam, but was not allowed to take the
lawyer's oath of office. On April 15, 1994,
Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take the
attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice of
Participation in the prolonged mindless physical
beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan
constituted evident rejection of that moral duty
and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the participant
was possessed of good moral character.
Good moral character is a requirement
possession of which must be demonstrated at the
time of the application for permission to take the
bar examinations and more importantly at the
time of application for admission to the bar and
to take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence
that he may now be regarded as complying with
the requirement of good moral character
imposed upon those who are seeking admission
to the bar. He should show to the Court how he
has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a
helpless student to the family of the deceased
student and to the community at large. In short,
he must show evidence that he is a different
person now, that he has become morally fit for
admission to the profession of law. He is already
directed to inform the Court, by appropriate
written manifestation, of the names of the
parents or brothers and sisters of Camaligan from
notice.
daughters.8 Through the years, complainant rose from the
ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a Store Manager of
the 7-11 Store in Muntinlupa.9chanrobleslaw
Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent
enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM),
where he stayed for one (1) year before transferring to the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in 1992.10 In 1993, he was
discharged from the PMA and focused on helping their father
in the family's car rental business. In 1997, he moved to
Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their three (3)
children.11 Since then, respondent never went back to school
to earn a college degree.12chanrobleslaw
In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila,
respondent told complainant that the former had enrolled in a
law school in Nueva Vizcaya.13 Subsequently, in 2004, their
mother informed complainant that respondent passed the Bar
Examinations and that he used complainant's name and
college records from the University of Makati to enroll at St.
Mary's University's College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya and take the Bar Examinations.14 Complainant
brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse
consequences to him.15chanrobleslaw
In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent's use of
his name and identity when he saw the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" on the Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed
at the latter's office in Taguig City.16 Nevertheless,
complainant did not confront respondent about it since he
was pre-occupied with his job and had a family to
support.17chanrobleslaw
Patrick A. Caronan Vs. Richard A. Caronan A.K.A. ATTY.
PATRICK A. CORONAN, A.C. No. 11316. July 12, 2016
EN BANC
A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016
PATRICK A. CARONAN, Complainant, v. RICHARD A.
CARONAN A.K.A. "ATTY. PATRICK A.
CARONAN," Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by
complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant), before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), against respondent "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan," whose real name is allegedly Richard A. Caronan
(respondent), for purportedly assuming complainant's identity
and falsely representing that the former has the required
educational qualifications to take the Bar Examinations and be
admitted to the practice of law.
The Facts
Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio2 R.
Caronan, Jr. and Norma A. Caronan. Respondent is the older
of the two, having been born on February 7, 1975, while
complainant was born on August 5, 1976.3 Both of them
completed their secondary education at the Makati High
School where complainant graduated in 19934 and respondent
in 1991.5 Upon his graduation, complainant enrolled at the
University of Makati where he obtained a degree in Business
Administration in 1997.6 He started working thereafter as a
Sales Associate for Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the
operator of 7-11 Convenience Stores.7 In 2001, he married
Myrna G. Tagpis with whom he has two (2)
Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as
Store Manager, complainant was ordered to report to the
head office of PSC in Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival,
he was informed that the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) was requesting his presence at its office in Taft Avenue,
Manila, in relation to an investigation involving respondent
who, at that point, was using the najne "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan."18 Accordingly, on May 18, 2009, complainant
appeared before the Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes
Division of the NBI where he was interviewed and asked to
identify documents including: (1) his and respondent's high
school records; (2) his transcript of records from the
University of Makati; (3) Land Transportation Office's records
showing his and respondent's driver's licenses; (4) records
from St. Mary's University showing that complainant's
transcript of records from the University of Makati and his
Birth Certificate were submitted to St. Mary's University's
College of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St. Mary's University
showing respondent's photograph under the name "Patrick A.
Caronan."19 Complainant later learned that the reason why he
was invited by the NBI was because of respondent's
involvement in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by
Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap (Agtarap), who was one of the
principal sponsors at respondent's wedding.20chanrobleslaw
Realizing that respondent had been using his name to
perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful activities, complainant
took it upon himself to inform other people that he is the real
"Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent's real name is
Richard A. Caronan.21 However, problems relating to
respondent's use of the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan"
continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC received a letter
from Quasha Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices requesting
that they be furnished with complainant's contact details or,
in the alternative, schedule a meeting with him to discuss
certain matters concerning respondent.22 On the other hand,
a fellow church-member had also told him that respondent
who, using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan," almost
victimized his (church-member's) relatives.23 Complainant
also received a phone call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes
(Reyes), who narrated how respondent tricked her into
believing that he was authorized to sell a parcel of land in
Taguig City when in fact, he was not.24 Further, he learned
that respondent was arrested for gun-running activities,
illegal possession of explosives, and violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
Due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the
name "Patrick A. Caronan," complainant developed a fear for
his own safety and security.26 He also became the subject of
conversations among his colleagues, which eventually forced
him to resign from his job at PSC.27 Hence, complainant filed
the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged
use of the former's name and identity, and illegal practice of
law.28chanrobleslaw
In his Answer, respondent denied all the allegations against
him arid invoked res judicata as a defense. He maintained
that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had
already been resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the
IBP Board of Governors dismissed30 the administrative
case31 filed by Agtarap against him, and which case had
already been declared closed and terminated by this Court in
A.C. No. 10074.32 Moreover, according to him, complainant is
being used by Reyes and her spouse, Brigadier General
Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign, discredit,
and harass him because he filed several administrative and
criminal complaints against them before the
Ombudsman.33chanrobleslaw
29
On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled
mandatory conference where both parties failed to
appear.34 Instead, respondent moved to reset the same on
April 20, 2015.35 On such date, however, both parties again
failed to appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to issue an
Order36 directing them to file their respective position papers.
However, neither of the parties submitted
any.37chanrobleslaw
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose
Villanueva Cabrera (Investigating Commissioner) issued his
Report and Recommendation,38 finding respondent guilty of
illegally and falsely assuming complainant's name, identity,
and academic records.39 He observed that respondent failed
to controvert all the allegations against him and did not
present any proof to prove his identity.40 On the other hand,
complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence that
he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan."41chanrobleslaw
Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and
complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on
August 31, 2012 that: (a) his parents are Porferio Ramos
Caronan and Norma Atillo; and (b) he is married to Rosana
Halili-Caronan.42 However, based on the Marriage Certificate
issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO), "Patrick A.
Caronan" is married to a certain "Myrna G. Tagpis," not to
Rosana Halili-Caronan.43chanrobleslaw
The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the
fact that .the photograph taken of respondent when he was
arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16, 2012 shows
the same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP
records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."44 These, according to
the Investigating Commissioner, show that respondent indeed
assumed complainant's identity to study law and take the Bar
Examinations.45 Since respondent falsely assumed the name,
identity, and academic records of complainant and the real
"Patrick A. Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor of laws
degree nor took the Bar Exams, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.46 He also recommended that
respondent and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred
from being admitted as a member of the Bar; and finally, for
making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was
directed to institute appropriate actions against
respondent.47chanrobleslaw
On June 30, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XXI-2015-607,48 adopting the Investigating
Commissioner's recommendation.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in
ordering that: (a) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken
off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard A.
Caronan" be barred from being admitted to the Bar.
The Court's Ruling
After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and recommendations of
the IBP.
As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established
by clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real
"Patrick A. Caronan" and that respondent, whose real name is
Richard A. Caronan, merely assumed the latter's name,
identity, and academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's
University's College of Law, obtain a law degree, and take the
Bar Examinations.
As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and
complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on
August 31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan
and Norma Atillo.49 Respondent himself also stated that he is
married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.50 This diverges from the
official NSO records showing that "Patrick A. Caronan" is
married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana HaliliCaronan.51 Moreover, the photograph taken of respondent
when he was arrested as "Richard A. Caronan" on August 16,
2012 shows the same person as the one in the photograph in
the IBP records of "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."52 Meanwhile,
complainant submitted numerous documents showing that he
is the real "Patrick A. Caronan," among which are: (a) his
transcript of records from the University of Makati bearing his
photograph;53 (b) a copy of his high school yearbook with his
photograph and the name "Patrick A. Caronan" under it;54 and
(c) NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and
2013.55chanrobleslaw
To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that
respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity, and
school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since
complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the
Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the
name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.
The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose
real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred from admission
to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
no applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be
admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed
a pre-law course, viz.:
Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar
examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate
that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before
he began the study of law, he had pursued
and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and
recognized university or college, requiring for admission
thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the
course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's
degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subject
as major or field of concentration: political science, logic,
english, Spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases
supplied)
In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college
degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a year
later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993
without graduating.56 Clearly, respondent has not completed
the requisite pre-law degree.
The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent
may later on complete his college education and earn a law
degree under his real name. However, his false assumption of
his brother's name, identity, and educational records renders
him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after
all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be
granted to everyone who demands it.57 Rather, it is a
privilege limited to citizens of good moral character.58 In In
the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S.
Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary
Action as Member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar, Atty. Froilan
R. Melendrez,59 the Court explained the essence of good
moral character:
Good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in which . he is
held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral
character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds
to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional
integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables
a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.[60]
(Emphasis supplied)
Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of
moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he assumed
the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and
dragged the latter into controversies which eventually caused
him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he
had been working for years. Good moral character is essential
in those who would be lawyers.61 This is imperative in the
nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists
between him and his client, as well as between him and the
court.62chanrobleslaw
Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by
pretending to have the necessary qualifications to be a
lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his
alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the filing of
several criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and
his acts do not have a place in the legal profession where one
of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity
and dignity.63chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely
assuming the name, identity, and academic records of
complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law
degree and take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly, without
prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil and/or criminal
cases, the Court hereby resolves that:
(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No.
49069 is ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of
Attorneys;
(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the
practice of law or making any representations as a lawyer;
(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member
of the Philippine Bar in the future;
(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines to respondent under the name "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
Certificates issued in such name
are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and cralawlawlibrary
(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered
to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin boards of all
courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real
name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he is not a
member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false
assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A. Caronan."
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the
Office of the Court Administrator.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno C.J. Carpio,Velasco, Jr.,Leonardo-De Castro, Brion,
Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Perlas-Bernabe,
Leonen, Jardeleza, and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, and Reyes, JJ., on official leave.
CASE DIGEST: PATRICK A. CARONAN v. RICHARD A.
CARONAN A.K.A. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN
A.C. No. 11316, July 12, 2016
FACTS:
Complainant and respondent are siblings.
Respondent is the older of the two.
In 2004, their mother informed complainant that
respondent passed the Bar Examinations and that he
used complainant's name and college records from
the University of Makati to enroll at St. Mary's
University's College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya and take the Bar Examinations. Complainant
brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any
adverse consequences to him.
Sometime in May 2009, however, the NBI was
requesting his presence at its office in relation to an
investigation involving respondent who, at that point,
was using the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan."
Complainant later learned respondent's involvement
in a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr.
Joseph G. Agtarap, who was one of the principal
sponsors at respondent's wedding.
Realizing that respondent had been using his name to
perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful activities,
complainant took it upon himself to inform other
people that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and
that respondent's real name is Richard A. Caronan.
Hence, complainant filed the present ComplaintAffidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the
former's name and identity, and illegal practice of
law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that:
(a) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys; and
(b) the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from
being admitted to the Bar.
RULING:
NO. As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant
has established by clear and overwhelming evidence
that he is the real "Patrick A. Caronan" and that
respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan,
merely assumed the latter's name, identity, and
academic records to enroll at the St. Mary's
University's College of Law, obtain a law degree, and
take the Bar Examinations.
To the Court's mind, the foregoing indubitably
confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's
name, identity, and school records to gain admission
to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP
correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A.
Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent,
whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred
from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to
the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had
pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law
course.
(1)
the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of
Attorneys No. 49069 is ordered DROPPEDand
STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys;
(2)
respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in
the practice of law or making any representations as
a lawyer;
(3)
respondent is BARRED from being admitted as
a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;
(4)
the Identification Cards issued by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under
the name "Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates
issued in such name are CANCELLED and/or
REVOKED; and
(5)
the Office of the Court Administrator is
ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the
bulletin boards of all courts of the country a
photograph of respondent with his real name, "
Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he is not a
member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his
false assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick
A. Caronan."
In the case at hand, respondent never completed his
college degree. Respondent has not completed the
requisite pre-law degree.
The Court does not discount the possibility that
respondent may later on complete his college
education and earn a law degree under his real
name. However, his false assumption of his brother's
name, identity, and educational records renders him
unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law,
after all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional
right to be granted to everyone who demands it.
Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good
moral character.
Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter
lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when
he assumed the name, identity, and school records of
his own brother and dragged the latter into
controversies which eventually caused him to fear for
his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been
working for years. Good moral character is essential
in those who would be lawyers.61 This is imperative
in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust
relation which exists between him and his client, as
well as between him and the court.62chanrobleslaw
Penalties:
Samuel B. Arnado vs. Atty. Homobono Adaza, A.C. No.
9834. August 26, 2015
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 9834, August 26, 2015
SAMUEL B. ARNADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. HOMOBONO
A. ADAZA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an administrative case against Atty. Homobono A.
Adaza (respondent) for his failure to comply with the
requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) under Bar Matter No. 850.
The Antecedent Facts
In a letter, dated 15 March 2013, Atty. Samuel B. Arnado
(complainant) called the attention of this Court to the practice
of respondent of indicating "MCLE application for exemption
under process" in his pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and
2012, and "MCLE Application for Exemption for
Reconsideration" in a pleading filed in 2012. Complainant
informed the Court that he inquired from the MCLE Office
about the status of respondent's compliance and received the
following Certification, dated 2 January 2013, from Prof.
Myrna S. Feliciano (Prof. Feliciano), MCLE's Executive
Director:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This is to certify that per our records, ATTY. HOMOBONO A.
ADAZA with Roll Number 14118 of IBP MIS AMIS ORIENTAL
Chapter did not comply with the requirements of Bar Matter
[No.] 850 for the following compliance
periods:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
a.
b.
c.
First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 April 14, 2004)
Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 April 14, 2007)
Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007 April 14, 2010)
This is to further certify that Arty. Adaza filed an Application
for Exemption from the MCLE requirement on (sic) January
2009 but was DENIED by the MCLE Governing Board on (sic)
its January 14, 2009 meeting.1
In its Resolution dated 17 June 2013, the Court referred this
case to he MCLE Committee for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
In a letter, dated 5 August 2013, Atty. Jesusa Jean D. Reyes
(Atty. Reyes), Assistant Executive Officer of the MCLE Office,
forwarded to the Court the rollo of the case together with the
MCLE Governing Board's Evaluation, Report and
Recommendation.2 In its Evaluation, Report and
Recommendation3 dated 14 August 2013,4 the MCLE
Governing Board, through retired Supreme Court Associate
Justice Bernardo P. Pardo (Justice Pardo), MCLE Chairman,
informed the Court that respondent applied for exemption for
the First and Second Compliance Periods covering 15 April
2001 to 14 April 2004 and 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007,
respectively, on the ground of "expertise in law" under
Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. The MCLE Governing
Board denied the request on 14 January 2009. In the same
letter, the MCLE Governing Board noted that respondent
neither applied for exemption nor complied with the Third
Compliance period from 15 April 2007 to 14 April 2010.
In its 9 December 2013 Resolution, the Court directed the
Second Division Clerk of Court to furnish respondent with
complainant's letter of 15 March 2013. The Court likewise
required respondent to file his comment within ten days from
notice.
In his Compliance and Comment5 dated 3 February 2014,
respondent alleged that he did not receive a copy of the 5
August 2013 letter of Atty. Reyes. He stated that he was
wondering why his application for exemption could not be
granted. He further alleged that he did not receive a formal
denial of his application for exemption by the MCLE Governing
Board, and that the notice sent by Prof. Feliciano was based
on the letter of complainant who belonged to Romualdo and
Arnado Law Office, the law office of his political opponents,
the Romualdo family. Respondent alleged that the Romualdo
family controlled Camiguin and had total control of the judges
and prosecutors in the province. He further alleged that the
law firm had control of the lawyers in Camiguin except for
himself.
Respondent enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and
claimed that he had been practicing law for about 50 years.
He stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
xxxx
Fifth, with a great degree of immodesty, I was the first
outsider of the Supreme Court WHOM PRESIDENT CORAZON
C. AQUINO, offered, immediately after she took over
government in February 1986, a seat as Justice of the
Supreme Court but I refused the intended appointment
because I did not like some members of the Cory crowd to
get me to the SC in an effort to buy my silence;
Sixth, I almost single-handedly handled the case of CORAZON
C. AQUINO in the canvassing of the results of the 1986 snap
elections, DISCUSSING CONSTITUTIONAL and legal issues
which finally resulted to the EDSAI revolution;
xxxx
Eighth; I was one of the two lead counsels of now SENATOR
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO in the national canvassing
before the National Canvassing Board when she ran for
President against then GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS. The other
counsel was former Justice of the Supreme Court SERAFIN
CUEVAS;
Ninth, I handled the 1987 and 1989 as well as the 2003 COUP
CASES for leading generals like ABENINA and COMMENDAOR
and COLONELS like GREGORIO HONASAN as well as the SIX
OAKWOOD CAPTAINS, including now SENATOR ANTONIO
TRILL ANES;
Tenth, I filed a case with the Supreme Court contesting the
constitutionality and validity of the 2010 national elections,
still undecided up to this day;
Eleventh, I filed together with another lawyer, a case in the
Supreme Court on the constitutionality and legality of the
Corona impeachment which the SC only decided after the
Senate decided his case and former SC Chief Justice Corona
conceding to the decision, thus the SC declaring the case
moot and academic;
Twelfth, I have been implementing and interpreting the
Constitution and other laws as GOVERNOR OF MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION and the senior
member of the Opposition in the regular Parliament in the
Committee on Revision of Laws and Constitutional
Amendments;
Thirteenth, I was the leading Opposition member of
Parliament that drafted the Omnibus Election Law;
Fourteenth, I was the leading member of the Opposition in
Parliament that prepared and orchestrated the debate in the
complaint for impeachment against PRESIDENT FERDINAND
MARCOS;
Fifteenth, I have been practicing law for about fifty years now
with appearances before the Supreme Court when Justices
were like Concepcion, Barrera and JBL REYES; in the Court of
Appeals; and numerous courts all over the country;
Sixteenth, I have been engaged as lawyer for a number of
lawyers who have exemptions from the MCLE;
x x x x6
Respondent further claimed that he had written five books:
(1) Leaders From Marcos to Arroyo; (2) Presidentiables and
Emerging Upheavals; (3) Beginning, Hope and Change; (4)
Ideas, Principles and Lost Opportunities; and (5) Corona
Impeachment. Thus, he asked for a reconsideration of the
notice for him to undergo MCLE. He asked for an exemption
from MCLE compliance, or in the alternative, for him to be
allowed to practice law while complying with the MCLE
requirements.
In its 2 June 2014 Resolution, the Court referred respondent's
Compliance and Comment to the Office of the Bar Confidant
(OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
The Report and Recommendation of the OBC
In its Report and Recommendation dated 25 November 2014,
the OBC reported that respondent applied for exemption for
the First and Second Compliance Periods on the ground of
expertise in law. The MCLE Governing Board denied the
request on 14 January 2009. Prof. Feliciano informed
respondent of the denial of his application in a letter dated 1
October 2012. The OBC reported that according to the MCLE
Governing Board, "in order to be exempted (from compliance)
pursuant to expertise in lp.w under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar
Matter No. 850, the applicant must submit sufficient,
satisfactory and convincing proof to establish his expertise in
a certain area of law." The OBC reported that respondent
failed to meet the requirements necessary for the exemption.
The OBC reported that this Court requires practicing members
of the Bar to indicate in all their pleadings filed with the
courts the counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance or
Certificate of Exemption pursuant to 6ar Matter No. 1922. The
OBC further reported that the MCLE Office has no record that
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration; and thus, his
representation in a pleading that his "MCLE Application for
Exemption [is] for Reconsideration" in 2012 is baseless.
The OBC further reported that under Rule 12 of Bar Matter
No. 850 and Section 12 of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations, non-compliance with the MCLE requirements
shall result to the dismissal of the case and the striking out of
the pleadings from the records.7 The OBC also reported that
under Section 12(d) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, a
member of the Bar who failed to comply with the MCLE
requirements is given 60 days from receipt of notification to
explain his deficiency or to show his compliance with the
requirements. Section 12(e) also provides that a member who
fails to comply within the given period shall pay a noncompliance fee of PI,000 and shall be listed as a delinquent
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon
the recommendation of the MCLE Governing Board. The OBC
reported that the Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to
respondent on 13 August 2013. The OBC also reported that
on 14 August 2013, the MCLE Governing Board recommended
that cases be filed against respondent in connection with the
pleadings he filed without the MCLE compliance/exemption
number for the immediately preceding compliance period and
that the pleadings he filed be expunged from the records.
The OBC found that respondent had been remiss in his
responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC stated that respondent's
failure to comply with the MCLE requirements jeopardized the
causes of his clients because the pleadings he filed could be
stricken off from the records and considered invalid.
The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a
delinquent member of the Bar and guilty of non-compliance
with the MCLE requirements. The OBC further recommended
respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six
months with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. The
OBC also recommended that respondent be directed to
comply with the requirements set forth by the MCLE
Governing Board.
The Issue
The only issue here is whether respondent is administratively
liable for his failure to comply with the MCLE requirements.
The Ruling of this Court
Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo
continuing legal education "to ensure that throughout their
career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence,
maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the
standards of the practice of law."8 The First Compliance Period
was from 15 April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the Second
Compliance Period was from 15 April 2004 to 14 April 2007;
and the Third Compliance Period was from 15 April 2007 to
14 April 2010. Complainant's letter covered respondent's
pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 which means
respondent also failed to comply with the MCLE requirements
for the Fourth Compliance Period from 15 April 2010 to 14
April 2013.
The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed
to comply with the four compliance periods. The records also
showed that respondent filed an application for exemption
only on 5 January 2009. According to the MCLE Governing
Board, respondent's application for exemption covered the
First and Second Compliance Periods. Respondent did not
apply for exemption for the Third Compliance Period. The
MCLE Governing Board denied respondent's application for
exemption on 14 January 2009 on the ground that the
application did not meet the requirements of expertise in law
under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. However, the
MCLE Office failed to convey the denial of the application for
exemption to respondent. The MCLE Office only informed
respondent, through its letter dated 1 October 2012 signed by
Prof. Feliciano, when it received inquiries from complainant,
Judge Sinfroso Tabamo, and Camiguin Deputy Provincial
Prosecutor Renato A. Abbu on the status of respondent's
MCLE compliance. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration after one year, or on 23 October 2013, which
the MCLE Governing Board denied with finality on 28
November 2013. The denial of the motion for reconsideration
was sent to respondent in a letter9 dated 29 November 2013,
signed by Justice Pardo.
Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by
failing to comply with Bar Matter No. 850. His application for
exemption for the First and Second Compliance Periods was
filed after the compliance periods had ended. He did not
follow-up the status of his application for exemption. He
furnished the Court with his letter dated 7 February 201210 to
the MCLE Office asking the office to act on his application for
exemption but alleged that his secretary failed to send it to
the MCLE Office.11 He did not comply with the Fourth
Compliance Period.
In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE Office
enjoined him to comply with the requirements for the First to
Third Compliance periods. It was reiterated in the 29
November 2013 letter denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration of his application for exemption. The OBC also
reported that a Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to
respondent on 13 August 2013. Under Section 12(5) of the
MCLE Implementing Regulations, respondent has 60 days
from receipt of the notification to comply. However, in his
Compliance and Comment before this Court, respondent
stated that because of his involvement in public interest
issues in the country, the earliest that he could comply with
Bar Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14 February 2014 and
that he already registered with the MCLE Program of the
University of the Philippines (UP) Diliman on those dates.
Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations
provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Section 12. Compliance Procedures
xxxx
(5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the
foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade compliance with
the MCLE requirements.
A member failing to comply with the continuing legal
education requirement will receive a Non-Compliance Notice
stating his specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days
from the receipt of the notification to explain the deficiency or
otherwise show compliance with the requirements. Such
notice shall be written in capital letters as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR
NON-COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE
MCLE REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF
THIS NOTICE SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A
DELINQUENT MEMBER AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO
PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF
COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE MCLE COMMITTEE.
The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his
compliance with the MCLE requirement. Credit units earned
during this period may only be counted toward compliance
with the prior period requirement unless units in excess of the
requirement are earned in which case the excess may be
counted toward meeting the current compliance period
requirement.
A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the
compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee of
PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent member of the
IBP by the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation
of the MCLE Committee, in which case Rule 13 9-A of the
Rules of Court shall apply.
Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE
Program of UP Diliman, it would only cover his deficiencies for
the First Compliance Period. He is still delinquent for the
Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. The Court has
not been furnished proof of compliance for the First
Compliance Period.
The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent
towards Complying with the requirements of Bar Matter No.
850. He assumed that his application for exemption, filed
after the compliance periods, would be granted. He
purportedly wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up the status of
his application but claimed that his secretary forgot to send
the letter. He now wants the Court to again reconsider the
MCLE Office's denial of his application for exemption when his
motion for reconsideration was already denied with finality by
the MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013. He had the
temerity to inform the Court that the earliest that he could
comply was on 10-14 February 2014, which was beyond the
60-day period required under Section 12(5) of the MCLE
Implementing Regulations, and without even indicating when
he intended to comply with his deficiencies br the Second,
Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked the
Court to allow him to continue practicing law while complying
with the MCLE requirements.
The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it
acted on respondent's application for exemption on 14
January 2009, it took the office three years to inform
respondent of the denial of his application. The MCLE Office
only informed respondent on 1 October 2012 and after it
received inquiries regarding the status of respondent's
compliance. Hence, during the period when respondent
indicated "MCLE application for exemption under process" in
his pleadings, he was not aware of the action of the MCLE
Governing Board on his application for exemption. However,
after he had been informed of the denial of his application for
exemption, it still took respondent one year to file a motion
for reconsideration. After the denial of his motion for
reconsideration, respondent still took, and is still aking, his
time to satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In addition,
when respondent indicated "MCLE Application for Exemption
for Reconsideration" in a pleading, he had not filed any
motion for reconsideration before the MCLE Office.
Respondent's failure to comply with the MCLE requirements
and disregard of the directives of the MCLE Office warrant his
declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP. While the
MCLE Implementing Regulations state that the MCLE
Committee should recommend to the IBP Board of Governors
the listing of a lawyer as a delinquent member, there is
nothing that prevents the Court from using its administrative
power and supervision to discipline erring lawyers and from
directing the IBP Board of Governors o declare such lawyers
as delinquent members of the IBP.
The OBC recommended respondent's suspension from the
practice of aw for six months. We agree. In addition, his
listing as a delinquent member pf the IBP is also akin to
suspension because he shall not be permitted to practice law
until such time as he submits proof of full compliance to the
IBP Board of Governors, and the IBP Board of Governors has
notified the MCLE Committee of his reinstatement, under
Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing Regulations. Hence, we
deem it proper to declare respondent as a delinquent member
of the IBP and to suspend him from the practice of law for six
months or until he has fully complied with the requirements
of the MCLE for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth
Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid
the required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office
to promptly act on matters that require its immediate
attention, such as but not limited to applications for
exemptions, and to communicate its action to the interested
parties within a reasonable period;
(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be
exempted from MCLE compliance as the matter had already
been denied with finality by the MCLE Governing Board on 28
November 2013;
(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and SUSPEND him from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS, or until he has fully complied with the MCLE
requirements for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth
Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and he has fully paid
the required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Homobono A.
Adaza's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and to all courts in the land. Let copies be also
furnished the MCLE Office and the IBP Governing Board for
their appropriate actions.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Del Castillo, Mendoza, Leonen, and Jardeleza,* JJ., concur.
CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
In March 15, 2013, Arnado called the attention of the SC to the practice
of Adaza of indicating “MCLE application for exemption under process”
in his pleadings filed in 2009-2012, and “MCLE Application for
Exemption for Reconsideration” in a pleading filed in 2012.
Arnado informed the SC that he inquired from the MCLE Office of the
status of Adaza’s compliance and received a Certification from the MCLE
Executive Director that Adaza did not comply with the requirements of
Bar Matter No. 850 for the periods: First Compliance Period (April15,
2001 – April 14, 2004); Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 – April
14,2007); and Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007 – April 14, 2010).
keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the
profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law”. Arnado’s
letter covered Adaza’s pleadings filed in 2009 – 2012, which means he
also failed to comply with the MCLE requirements for the Fourth
Compliance Period (April 15, 2010 – April 14, 2013). According to the
MCLE Governing Board, Adaza’s application for exemption covered First
and Second Compliance Periods, but did not apply for exemption for the
Third Compliance Period. The application for exemption was denied on
January 2009, however, the MCLE Office failed to convey the denial of
the application for exemption of Adaza, and only informed him in its
letter dated October 1, 2012 when it received inquiries from
complainants. Clearly, Adaza had been remised in his responsibilities by
failing to comply with Bar Matter No. 850.But the MCLE Office is not
without fault in this case. While it acted on Adaza’s application for
exemption on January 14, 2009, it took the office three years to inform
Adaza of the denial of his application. Hence, during the period when
respondent indicated “MCLE application for exemption under process” in
his pleadings, he was not aware of the action of the MCLE Governing
Board on his application for exemption. However, after he had been
informed of the denial of his application for exemption, it still took Adaza
one year to file a motion for reconsideration. After the denial of his
motion for reconsideration, Adaza still took, and still taking, his time to
satisfy the requirements of MCLE. In addition, whenua indicated “MCLE
Application for Exemption for Reconsideration” in a pleading, he had not
filed any motion for reconsideration before the MCLE Office. Adaza’s
failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of the
directives of the MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent
member of the IBP.
Also, his application for exemption from MCLE requirement on 2009 was
denied by the MCLE Governors on the ground that the application did not
meet the requirements of expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar
Matter No. 850.
In his Comment, Adaza stated that he was wondering why his application
for exemption could not be granted. Adaza then enumerated his
achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing law
for about 50 years. He stated:
1. that he was the first outsider of the SC whom president Cory offered a
seat as Justice of the SC but refused the intended appointment because
he hid not likesome of the Cory crowd;
2. That he almost single-handedly handled the case of Cory in canvassing
of the results in the 1986 snap elections, discussing constitutional and
legal issues which finally resulted to EDSA I revolution;
3. That he was one of the two lead counsels of Senator MDS in the
national canvassing for President, the other counsel being the former
Justice Serafin Cuevas;
4. The he handled the 1987 and1989, as well as the 2003 Coup cases;
5. That he filed a case in the SC contesting the constitutionality of 2010
national elections;
6. That he filed a case together with another lawyer in the SC on the
constitutionality of the Corona impeachment;
7.That he has been implementing and interpreting the Constitution and
other laws as Governor of Misamis Oriental, Commission of Immigration
and senior member of the Opposition in the regular Parliament in the
Committee on Revision of Laws and Constitutional Amendments;
8. That he was the leading Opposition member Parliament that drafted
the Omnibus Election Law;
9. That he was the leading member of the Parliament that prepared and
orchestrated the debate in the complaint for impeachment against
President Marcos;
10. That he has been engaged as lawyer for a number of lawyers who
have exemptions from the MCLE.
He also further claimed that he had written five books.
The OBC recommended that Adaza be declared a delinquent member of
the Bar and guilty of noncompliance with the MCLE requirements.
It further recommended his suspension from the practice of law for six
months.
ISSUE:
Is Adaza administratively liable for his failure to comply with the MCLE
requirements?
RULING:
Yes. Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo
continuing legal education “to ensure that throughout their career, they
Importance of the Lawyer's Oath
Olbes v. Deciembre, A.C. No. 5365, April 27, 2005
A.C. No. 5365
April 27, 2005
SPOUSES FRANKLIN and LOURDES OLBES, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE, Respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of Professional
Responsibility was the malevolent act of respondent, who filled up the
blank checks entrusted to him as security for a loan by writing on those
checks amounts that had not been agreed upon at all, despite his full
knowledge that the loan they were meant to secure had already been
paid.
The Case
Before us is a verified Petition1 for the disbarment of Atty. Victor V.
Deciembre, filed by Spouses Franklin and Lourdes Olbes with the
Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court. Petitioners charged
respondent with willful and deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification
and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. After he had filed his
Comment2 on the Petition, the Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through
Commissioner Caesar R. Dulay, held several hearings. During those
hearings, the last of which was held on May 12, 2003,3 the parties were
able to present their respective witnesses and documentary
evidence. After the filing of the parties' respective formal offers of
evidence, as well as petitioners' Memorandum,4 the case was
considered submitted for resolution. Subsequently, the commissioner
rendered his Report and Recommendation dated January 30, 2004,
which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors
in its Resolution No. XV-2003-177 dated July 30, 2004.
The Facts
In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were government
employees working at the Central Post Office, Manila; and that
Franklin was a letter carrier receiving a monthly salary of P6,700, and
Lourdes, a mail sorter, P6,000.5
Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 her application
for a loan from Rodela Loans, Inc., in the amount of P10,000. As
security for the loan, she issued and delivered to respondent five
Philippine National Bank (PNB) blank checks (Nos. 0046241-45),
which served as collateral for the approved loan as well as any other
loans that might be obtained in the future.6
On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid respondent the amount
of P14,874.37 corresponding to the loan plus surcharges, penalties
and interests, for which the latter issued a receipt,7 herein quoted as
follows:
"August 31, 1999
Received the amount of P14,874.37 as payment of the loan
of P10,000.00 taken earlier by Lourdes Olbes.
(Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre
8-31-99
P10,000.00
PNB Check No. 46241 –8/15/99"8
Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four
(of the five) blank PNB Checks (Nos. 0046241, 0046242, 0046243 and
0046244) for the amount of P50,000 each, with different dates of
maturity -- August 15, 1999, August 20, 1999, October 15, 1999 and
November 15, 1999, respectively.9
On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the Provincial
Prosecution Office of Rizal an Affidavit-Complaint against petitioners
for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22. He alleged
therein that on July 15, 1999, around one-thirty in the afternoon at
Cainta, Rizal, they personally approached him and requested that he
immediately exchange with cash their postdated PNB Check Nos.
0046241 and 0046242 totaling P100,000.10
Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, respondent filed against
petitioners another Affidavit-Complaint for estafa and violation of BP
22. He stated, among others, that on the same day, July 15, 1999,
around two o'clock in the afternoon at Quezon City, they again
approached him and requested that he exchange with cash PNB
Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244 totaling P100,000.11
Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, 1999, they never
went either to Cainta, Rizal, or to Quezon City to transact business
with respondent. Allegedly, they were in their office at the time, as
shown by their Daily Time Records; so it would have been physically
impossible for them to transact business in Cainta, Rizal, and, after an
interval of only thirty minutes, in Quezon City, especially considering
the heavy traffic conditions in those places.12
Petitioners averred that many of their office mates -- among them,
Juanita Manaois, Honorata Acosta and Eugenia Mendoza -- had
suffered the same fate in their dealings with respondent.13
In his Comment,14 respondent denied petitioners' claims, which he
called baseless and devoid of any truth and merit. Allegedly,
petitioners were the ones who had deceived him by not honoring their
commitment regarding their July 15, 1999 transactions. Those
transactions, totaling P200,000, had allegedly been covered by their
four PNB checks that were, however, subsequently dishonored due to
"ACCOUNT CLOSED." Thus, he filed criminal cases against
them. He claimed that the checks had already been fully filled up
when petitioners signed them in his presence. He further claimed that
he had given them the amounts of money indicated in the checks,
because his previous satisfactory transactions with them convinced
him that they had the capacity to pay.
Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his private and
personal transactions, which were not in any way connected with his
profession as a lawyer. The criminal cases against petitioners were
allegedly private actions intended to vindicate his rights against their
deception and violation of their obligations. He maintained that his
right to litigate should not be curtailed by this administrative action.
Report of the Investigating Commissioner
In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Dulay
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for two years for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The commissioner said that respondent's version of the facts was not
credible. Commissioner Dulay rendered the following analysis and
evaluation of the evidence presented:
"In his affidavit-complaint x x x executed to support his
complaint filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of
Rizal respondent stated that:
2.
That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of
Cainta, Rizal, both LOURDES E. OLBES and
FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and
requested me to immediately exchange with cash,
right there and then, their postdated checks
totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used
by them in their business venture.
"Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support his
complaint filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City respondent stated that:
2.
That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in
the jurisdiction of Quezon City, M.M., both
LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x
x x, personally met and requested me to
immediately exchange with cash, right there and
then, their postdated checks totaling P100,000.00
then, to be immediately used by them in their
business venture.
"The above statements executed by respondent under oath
are in direct contrast to his testimony before this
Commission on cross-examination during the May 12, 2003
hearing, thus:
ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing)
Q.
Based on these four (4) checks which you
claimed the complainant issued to you, you filed
two separate criminal cases against them, one, in
Pasig City and the other in Quezon City, is that
correct?
A.
Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were
deposited at different banks.
Q.
These four checks were accordingly issued
to you by the complainants on July 15, 1999, is
that correct?
A.
I will consult my records, You Honor,
because it's quite a long time. Yes, Your Honor,
the first two checks is in the morning and the next
two checks is in the afternoon (sic).
COMM. DULAY:
Because, Your Honor, the materiality is
to find out whether he is telling the
truth. The place, Your Honor, according
to the respondent is his client. Now I
am asking who is that client?
Which are the first two checks?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
COMM. DULAY:
The first two checks covering check
Nos. 46241 and 46242 in the
morning. And Check No. 46243 and
46244 in the afternoon, Your Honor.
Your answer.
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
A.
Q.
Could you recall what particular time in the
morning that these two checks with number
0046241 and 0046242 xxx have been issued to
you?
A.
I could not remember exactly but in the
middle part of the morning around 9:30 to 10:00.
Q.
This was issued to you in what particular
place?
A.
Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas
Center, Pasig City.
Q.
Is that your house?
A.
No, it's not my house?
Q.
What is that, is that your law office?
A.
That is my retainer client.
Q.
What is the name of that retainer client of
yours?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
Your Honor, may I object because what
is the materiality of the question?
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
That is very material. I am trying to test
your credibility because according to
you these checks have been issued in
Pasig in the place of your client on a
retainer. That's why I am asking your
client…
COMM. DULAY:
The name of the client is not material I
think. It is enough that he said it was
issued here in Pasig. What building?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor.
COMM. DULAY:
What is the materiality of knowing the
name of his client's office?
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building.
Q.
And the same date likewise, the
complainants in the afternoon issued PNB Check
Nos. 0046243 and 0046244, is that correct?
A.
Yes.
Q.
So would you want to tell this Honorable
office that there were four checks issued in the
place of your client in Pasig City, two in the
morning and two in the afternoon?
A.
That is correct, sir.
"Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his narration of
the transaction with the complainants. As between his
version as to when the four checks were given, we find the
story of complainant[s] more credible. Respondent has
blatantly distorted the truth, insofar as the place where the
transaction involving the four checks took place. Such
distortion on a very material fact would seriously cast doubt
on his version of the transaction with complainants.
"Furthermore respondent's statements as to the time when
the transactions took place are also obviously and glaringly
inconsistent and contradicts the written statements made
before the public prosecutors. Thus further adding to the
lack of credibility of respondent's version of the transaction.
"Complainants' version that they issued blank checks to
respondent as security for the payment of a loan
of P10,000.00 plus interest, and that respondent filled up the
checks in amounts not agreed upon appears to be more
credible. Complainants herein are mere employees of the
Central Post Office in Manila who had a previous loan
of P10,000.00 from respondent and which has since been
paid x x x. Respondent does not deny the said
transaction. This appears to be the only previous
transaction between the parties. In fact, complainants were
even late in paying the loan when it fell due such that they
had to pay interest. That respondent would trust them once
more by giving them another P200,000.00 allegedly to be
used for a business and immediately release the amounts
under the circumstances described by respondent does not
appear credible given the background of the previous
transaction and personal circumstances of
complainants. That respondent who is a lawyer would not
even bother to ask from complainants a receipt for the
money he has given, nor bother to verify and ask them what
businesses they would use the money for contributes further
to the lack of credibility of respondent's version. These
circumstances really cast doubt as to the version of
respondent with regard to the transaction. The resolution of
the public prosecutors notwithstanding we believe
respondent is clearly lacking in honesty in dealing with the
complainants. Complainant Franklin Olbes had to be jailed
as a result of respondent's filing of the criminal
cases. Parenthetically, we note that respondent has also
filed similar cases against the co-employees of complainants
in the Central Post Office and respondent is facing similar
complaints in the IBP for his actions."15
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as
approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. However, the
penalty should be more severe than what the IBP recommended.
Respondent's Administrative Liability
Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with
conditions.16 It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in
the law, but also known to possess good moral character. 17 "A lawyer
is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly
circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary
duty is the advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he
[or she] has sworn to be a fearless crusader."18
By taking the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth
and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and
impartial administration of justice.19 Lawyers should act and comport
themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in
order to promote the public's faith in the legal profession. 20
The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the
following:
"Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.
xxx
xxx
xxx
"Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of
the Integrated Bar.
xxx
xxx
xxx
"Rule 7.03.
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession."
A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and required of
members of the bar.21 Such conduct of nobility and uprightness should
remain with them, whether in their public or in their private lives. As
officers of the courts and keepers of the public's faith, they are
burdened with the highest degree of social responsibility and are thus
mandated to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth and
honor.22
The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon them the duty
of exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in
their relationships with others. The oath is a sacred trust that must be
upheld and kept inviolable at all times. Thus, lawyers may be
disciplined for any conduct, whether in their professional or in their
private capacity, if such conduct renders them unfit to continue to be
officers of the court.23
In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to the story
of petitioners, who said that they had given five blank personal checks
to respondent at the Central Post Office in Manila as security for
the P10,000 loan they had contracted. Found untrue and unbelievable
was respondent's assertion that they had filled up the checks and
exchanged these with his cash at Quezon City and Cainta, Rizal. After
a careful review of the records, we find no reason to deviate from these
findings.
Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch one's imagination
to arrive at an inevitable conclusion. Respondent does not deny
the P10,000 loan obtained from him by petitioners. According to
Franklin Olbes' testimony on cross-examination, they asked
respondent for the blank checks after the loan had been paid. On the
pretext that he was not able to bring the checks with him, 24 he was not
able to return them. He thus committed abominable dishonesty by
abusing the confidence reposed in him by petitioners. It was their high
regard for him as a member of the bar that made them trust him with
their blank checks.25
It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility
was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank
checks by indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and
despite respondent's full knowledge that the loan supposed to be
secured by the checks had already been paid. His was a brazen act of
falsification of a commercial document, resorted to for his material
gain.
And he did not stop there. Because the checks were dishonored upon
presentment, respondent had the temerity to initiate unfounded
criminal suits against petitioners, thereby exhibiting his vile intent to
have them punished and deprived of liberty for frustrating the criminal
duplicity he had wanted to foist on them. As a matter of fact, one of
the petitioners (Franklin) was detained for three months26 because of
the Complaints. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious dishonesty and
professional misconduct. He committed an act indicative of moral
depravity not expected from, and highly unbecoming, a member of the
bar.
Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to
enter into the practice of law. It is equally essential to observe this
norm meticulously during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege.27 Good moral character includes at least
common honesty.28 No moral qualification for bar membership is more
important than truthfulness and candor.29 The rigorous ethics of the
profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous
behavior.30 Lawyers must be ministers of truth. Hence, they must not
mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their
dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.31
Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable
practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable;32 they reveal a basic
moral flaw. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct that merely enables one to escape the penalties of criminal
laws.33
Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we
find the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years
from the practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing
deceit and misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filledup checks that led to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome.
In Eustaquio v. Rimorin,34 the forging of a special power of attorney
(SPA) by the respondent to make it appear that he was authorized to
sell another's property, as well as his fraudulent and malicious
inducement of Alicia Rubis to sign a Memorandum of Agreement to
give a semblance of legality to the SPA, were sanctioned with
suspension from the practice of law for five years. Here, the conduct
of herein respondent is even worse. He used falsified checks as bases
for maliciously indicting petitioners and thereby caused the detention of
one of them.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby
indefinitely SUSPENDED from the practice of law effective
immediately. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts as well
as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is directed to append a copy
to respondent's personal record. Let another copy be furnished the
National Office of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, SandovalGutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
B.M. No. 810 January 27, 1998
IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH BY ARTHUR M.
CUEVAS, JR.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar
Examinations 1. His oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the
FACTS:
Court's resolution dated August 27, 1996 which permitted him to
take the Bar Examinations "subject to the condition that should (he)
pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyer's oath
This is a disbarment case against the respondent Atty. Victor Deciembre
pending approval of the Court . . ." due to his previous conviction for
for violating the Code of Responsibility for filling up blank checks and by
Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The conviction
writing on those checks amounts that had not been agreed upon at all.
stemmed from petitioner's participation in the initiation rites of the
LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA
Lourdes Olbes renewed her application to the loan from Rodelia Loans,
COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in September 1991, where Raul I.
Inc., in the amount of 10,000php, she issued to the respondent 5 blank
Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence
checks for the security of the loan and as collateral for the approved
inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted
loan and loans for the loans to come. Complainant even paid
probation. On May 10, 1995, he was discharged from probation and
respondent P14, 874.37 for the loan plus surcharges, penalties and
his case considered closed and terminated.
interests, for which the latter issued receipt.
Unbeknownst to the spouses, the respondent filled up the four PNB
checks for the amount of 50,000php each with different dates of
maturity. He then filed before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal
in Affidavit-Complaint against the petitioners for estafa and violation of
Batasang Pambansa 22 stating that in July 15, 1999 around 1:30 the
spouses exchanged with cash PNB Check in Cainta, Rizal, and in the
same day around 2:00 in Quezon City that the checks had been signed
by them in his presence and claimed he had given them the amounts of
money indicated in the checks.The Investigating Commissioner is not
convinced that respondent’s complain was not credible and should be
suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Victor Deciembre is guilty for violating the Rules
1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
Yes. The accusation of the respondents against the petitioner is not
truthful, that it is physically impossible for the spouses to transact
business in Cainta, Rizal and Quezon City. It was shown in the DTR in
their in their office and the interval of 30 minutes between the two
transaction in different area is not possible. Upon investigation the
commissioner stated that respondent’s narration is not truthful, with
this the court finds the side of the complainant more credible. The Court
finds merit that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously
transgressed by filling up bank checks by indicating amounts agreed
upon at all and he is aware that the loan is for securing the checks had
already been paid.
Respondent is guilty of serious dishonest and professional misconduct
the court suspends Atty. Victor Deciembre is suspended from the
practice of law.
Nature of the Lawyer's Oath
In re: Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr. 285 SCRA 59, January 27.
1998
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
In this petition, received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner
prays that "he be allowed to take his lawyer's oath at the Court's
most convenient time"2 attaching thereto the Order dated May 16,
1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of Antique discharging
him from his probation, and certifications attesting to his righteous,
peaceful and law abiding character issued by: (a) the Mayor of the
Municipality of Hamtic, Antique; (b) the Officer-in-Charge of Hamtic
Police Station; (c) the Sangguniang Kabataan of Pob. III, Hamtic,
through its chairman and officers; (d) a member of the IBP Iloilo
Chapter; (e) the Parish Priest and Vicar General of St. Joseph
Cathedral, San Jose, Antique; and (f) the President of the Parish
Pastoral Council, Parish of Sta. Monica, Hamtic, Antique. On July
15, 1997, the Court, before acting on petitioner's application,
resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan, father of the
deceased hazing victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment thereon. In
compliance with the Court's directive, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan filed
his comment which states as follows:
1 — He fully appreciates the benign concern given
by this Hon. Court in allowing him to comment to
the pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to take
the lawyer's oath, and hereby expresses his
genuine gratitude to such gesture.
2 — He conforms completely to the observation of
the Hon. Court in its resolution dated March 19,
1997 in Bar Matter No. 712 that the infliction of
severe physical injuries which approximately led to
the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan
was deliberate (rather than merely accidental or
inadvertent) thus, indicating serious character
flaws on the part of those who inflicted such
injuries. This is consistent with his stand at the
outset of the proceedings of the criminal case
against the petitioner and his co-defendants that
they are liable not only for the crime of homicide
but murder, since they took advantage of the
neophytes' helpless and defenseless condition
when they were "beaten and kicked to death like a
useless stray dog", suggesting the presence of
abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior
strength and treachery (People vs. Gagoco, 58
Phil. 524).
3 — He, however, has consented to the accusedstudents' plea of guilty to the lesser offense of
reckless imprudence resulting to the homicide,
including the petitioner, out of pity to their mothers
and a pregnant wife of the accused who went
together at his house in Lucena City, literally
kneeling, crying and begging for forgiveness for
their sons, on a Christmas day in 1991 and on
Maundy Thursday in 1992, during which they
reported that the father of one of the accused died
of heart attack upon learning of his son's
involvement in the case.
4 — As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner
and his co-defendants in the criminal case for the
death of his son. But as a loving father, who lost a
son in whom he has high hope to become a good
lawyer — to succeed him, he still feels the pain of
his untimely demise, and the stigma of the
gruesome manner of taking his life. This he cannot
forget.
5 — He is not, right now, in a position to say
whether petitioner, since then has become morally
fit for admission to the noble profession of the law.
He politely submits this matter to the sound and
judicious discretion of the Hon. Court.3
FACTS:
At the
outset,
the
Court
shares
the
Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., passed the 1996 Bar Examinations. His oathtaking was held in abeyance in view of the Court's resolution which
permitted him to take the Bar Examinations "subject to the condition
that should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath pending approval of the Court . . ." due to his previous
conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The
conviction stemmed from petitioner's participation in the initiation rites
of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in the SAN BEDA
COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in September 1991, where Raul I.
Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence
inflicted upon him. Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted
probation. On May 10, 1995, he was discharged from probation and his
case considered closed and terminated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Cuevas has the moral fitness required to take
the lawyer’s oath?
RULING:
Petitioner is allowed to take the LAWYER’S OATH and sign the ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS. The Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Camaligan, father
of hazing victim Raul Camaligan, and condoles with the untimely death
of a son who is expected to become a lawyer and succeed his father. In
his comment submitted to the Court, Atty. Camaligan submits
petitioner’s plea to be admitted to the membership to the Philippine
Bar, to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court. The deliberate
participation of Cuevas in the senseless beating of a helpless neophyte
which resulted to his death indicates that petitioner does not possess
the moral fitness required for admission to the Bar. However, petitioner
was discharged from probation without any infraction thereafter of the
conditions of the probation and the various certifications attesting to
his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he has
taken decisive steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral
character and atone for the unfortunate death of Camaligan. The Court
then decides to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that it
allowed AL ARGOSINO, petitioner’s co-accused to take the lawyer’s
oath.
sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and commiserates with the
untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan
admits that "[h]e is not, right now, in a position to say whether
petitioner since then has become morally fit . . ." and submits
petitioner's plea to be admitted to the noble profession of law to the
sound and judicious discretion of the Court.
The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for
disallowing or allowing petitioner's admission to the noble profession of
law. His deliberate participation in the senseless beatings over a
helpless neophyte which resulted to the latter's untimely demise
indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the
bar. And as the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few
who possess the high standards of intellectual and moral qualifications
the Court is duty bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants,
as well as to exclude those who have been admitted but have become
a disgrace to the profession. The Court, nonetheless, is willing to give
petitioner a chance in the same manner that it recently allowed Al
Caparros Argosino, petitioner's co-accused below, to take the lawyer's
oath.4
Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.'s discharge from probation without any
infraction of the attendant conditions therefor and the various
certifications attesting to his righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented
character prove that he has taken decisive steps to purge himself of
his deficiency in moral character and atone for the unfortunate death of
Raul I. Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit of the
doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of the youth to be
rash, temerarious and uncalculating. 5 Let it be stressed to herein
petitioner that the lawyer's oath is not a mere formality recited for a few
minutes in the glare of flashing cameras and before the presence of
select witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to conduct himself beyond
reproach at all times and to live strictly according to his oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr. Justice
Padilla's comment in the sister case of Re: Petition of Al Agrosino To
Take Lawyer's Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, "[t]he Court
sincerely hopes that" Mr. Cuevas, Jr., "will continue with the assistance
he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a
better position to render legal and other services to the more
unfortunate members of society"6.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner
Arthur M.. Cuevas, Jr., to take the lawyer's oath and to sign the Roll
of Attorneys on a date to be set by the Court, subject to the payment
of appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached to petitioner's
personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban and Martinez, JJ.,
concur.
From the period of January 1993 to May 1994
complainant had several conferences with the
respondent regarding the processing of her
travel documents. To facilitate the processing,
respondent demanded an additional amount of
Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) and
prevailed upon complainant to resign from her
job as stenographer with the Commission on
Human Rights.
Sebastian v. Calis, Adm. Case No. 5118, Sept. 9, 1999
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5118. September 9, 1999.]
(A.C. CBD No. 97-485)
MARILOU SEBASTIAN, Complainant, v.
ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For unlawful, dishonest; immoral or deceitful
conduct as well as violation of his oath as
lawyer, respondent Atty. Dorotheo Calis faces
disbarment.
On June 20, 1994, to expedite the processing
of her travel documents complainant issued
Planters Development Bank Check No.
12026524 in the amount of Sixty Five
Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) in favor of Atty.
D. Calis who issued a receipt. After receipt of
said amount, respondent furnished the
complainant copies of Supplemental to U.S.
Nonimmigrant Visa Application (Of 156) and a
list of questions which would be asked during
interviews.
When complainant inquired about her
passport, Atty. Calis informed the former that
she will be assuming the name Lizette P. Ferrer
married to Roberto Ferrer, employed as sales
manager of Matiao Marketing, Inc. The
complainant was furnished documents to
support her assumed identity.
Realizing that she will be travelling with
spurious documents, the complainant
demanded the return of her money, however
she was assured by respondent that there was
nothing to worry about for he has been
engaged in the business for quite sometime;
with the promise that her money will be
refunded if something goes wrong.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
The facts of this administrative case, as found
by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), 1 in its
Report are as follows:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Complainant (Marilou Sebastian) alleged that
sometime in November, 1992 she was referred
to the respondent who promised to process all
necessary documents required for
complainant’s trip to the USA for a fee of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00).
On December 1, 1992 the complainant made a
partial payment of the required fee in the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), which was received by Ester
Calis, wife of the respondent for which a
receipt was issued.
Weeks before her departure respondent
demanded for the payment of the required fee
which was paid by complainant, but the
corresponding receipt was not given to her:
chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
When complainant demanded for her passport,
respondent assured the complainant that it will
be given to her on her departure which was
scheduled on September 6, 1994. On said date
complainant was given her passport and visa
issued in the name of Lizette P. Ferrer.
Complainant left together with Jennyfer Belo
and a certain Maribel who were also recruits of
the Respondent.
Upon arrival at the Singapore International
Airport, complainant together with Jennyfer
Belo and Maribel were apprehended by the
Singapore Airport Officials for carrying spurious
travel documents; Complainant contacted the
respondent through overseas telephone call
and informed him by her predicament. From
September 6 to 9, 1994, complainant was
detained at Changi Prisons in Singapore.
proceeded ex parte.
On September 24, 1998, the Commission on
Bar Discipline issued its Report on the case,
finding that:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
On September 9, 1994 the complainant was
deported back to the Philippines and
respondent fetched her from the airport and
brought her to his residence at 872-A Tres
Marias Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Respondent
took complainant’s passport with a promise
that he will secure new travel documents for
complainant. Since complainant opted not to
pursue with her travel, she demanded for the
return of her money in the amount of One
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00)
On June 4, 1996, June 18 and July 5, 1996
respondent made partial refunds of
P15,000.00; P6,000.00; and P5,000.00.
On December 19, 1996 the complainant
through counsel, sent a demand letter to
respondent for the refund of a remaining
balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand
Pesos (P114,000.00) which was ignored by
the Respondent.
Sometime in March 1997 the complainant went
to see the respondent, however his wife
informed her that the respondent was in Cebu
attending to business matters.
In May 1997 the complainant again tried to see
the respondent however she found out that the
respondent had transferred to an unknown
residence apparently with intentions to evade
responsibility.
Attached to the complaint are the photocopies
of receipts for the amount paid by
complainant, applicants for U.S.A. Visa,
questions and answers asked during
interviews; receipts acknowledging partial
refunds of fees paid by the complainant
together with demand letter for the remaining
balance of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand
Pesos (P114,000.00); which was received by
the Respondent. 2
Despite several notices sent to the respondent
requiring an answer to or comment on the
complaint, there was no response. Respondent
likewise failed to attend the scheduled hearings
of the case. No appearance whatsoever was
made by the Respondent. 3 As a result of the
inexplicable failure, if not obdurate refusal of
the respondent to comply with the orders of
the Commission, the investigation against him
"It appears that the services of the respondent
was engaged for the purpose of securing a visa
for a U.S.A. travel of complainant. There was
no mention of job placement or employment
abroad, hence it is not correct to say that the
respondent engaged in illegal recruitment.
The alleged proposal of the respondent to
secure the U.S.A. visa for the complainant
under an assumed name was accepted by the
complainant which negates deceit on the part
of the Respondent. Noted likewise is the partial
refunds made by the respondent of the fees
paid by the complainant. However, the transfer
of residence without a forwarding address
indicates his attempt to escape responsibility.
In the light of the foregoing, we find that the
respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for
violating Canon 1 Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that
a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended
that ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS be SUSPENDED
as a member of the bar until he fully refunds
the fees paid to him by complainant and
comply with the order of the Commission on
Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec 6 of
the Rules of Court." 4
Pursuant to Section 12, Rule 139-B of the
Rules of Court, this administrative case was
elevated to the IBP Board of Governors for
review. The Board in a Resolutions 5 dated
December 4, 1998 resolved to adopt and
approve with amendment the recommendation
of the Commission. The Resolution of the
Board states:
jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as
Annex "A" ; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, with an
amendment that Respondent Atty. Dorotheo
Calis be DISBARRED for having been found
guilty of Gross Misconduct for engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
cralaw virtua1aw library
We are now called upon to evaluate, for final
action, the IBP recommendation contained in
its Resolution dated December 4, 1998, with
its supporting report.
After examination and careful consideration of
the records in this case, we find the Resolution
passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP in
order. We agree with the finding of the
Commission that the charge of illegal
recruitment was not established because
complainant failed to substantiate her
allegation on the matter. In fact she did not
mention any particular job or employment
promised to her by the Respondent. The only
service of the respondent mentioned by the
complainant was that of securing a visa for the
United States.
We likewise concur with the IBP Board of
Governor in its Resolution, that herein
respondent is guilty of gross misconduct by
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct contrary to Canon 1, Rule
101 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent deceived the complainant by
assuring her that he could give her visa and
travel documents; that despite spurious
documents nothing untoward would happen;
,that he guarantees her arrival in the USA and
even promised to refund her the fees and
expenses already paid, in case something went
wrong. All for material gain.
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a
lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They
reveal moral flaws in a lawyer. They are
unacceptable practices. A lawyer’s relationship
with others should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith, fairness and
candor. This is the essence of the lawyer’s
oath. The lawyer’s oath is not mere facile
words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that
must be upheld and keep inviolable. 6 The
nature of the office of an attorney requires that
he should be a person of good moral character.
7 This requisite is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law,
its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law. 8 We have
sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a
lawyer, whether in his professional or private
capacity, puts his moral character in serious
doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders
him unfit to continue in the practice of law. 9
It is dismaying to note how respondent so
cavalierly jeopardized the life and liberty of
complainant when he made her travel with
spurious documents. How often have victims of
unscrupulous travel agents and illegal
recruiters been imprisoned in foreign lands
because they were provided fake travel
documents Respondent totally disregarded the
personal safety of the complainant when he
sent her abroad on false assurances. Not only
are respondent’s acts illegal, they are also
detestable from the moral point of view. His
utter lack of moral qualms and scruples is a
real threat to the Bar and the administration of
justice.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege
bestowed by the State on those who show that
they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. 10 We must
stress that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the
privilege to practice law only during good
behavior. He can be deprived of his license for
misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after giving him the
opportunity to be heard. 11
Here, it is worth noting that the adamant
refusal of respondent to comply with the
orders of the IBP and his total disregard of the
summons issued by the IBP are contemptuous
acts reflective or unprofessional conduct. Thus,
we find no hesitation in removing respondent
Dorotheo Calis from the Roll of Attorneys for
his unethical, unscrupulous and unconscionable
conduct toward complainant.
Lastly, the grant in favor of the complainant for
the recovery of the P114,000.00 she paid the
respondent is in order. 12 Respondent not only
unjustifiably refused to return the
complainant’s money upon demand, but he
stubbornly persisted in holding on to it,
unmindful of the hardship and humiliation
suffered by the complainant.
WHEREFORE, respondent Dorotheo Calis is
hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy
of this Decision be FURNISHED to the IBP and
the Bar Confidant to be spread on the personal
records of Respondent. Respondent is likewise
ordered to pay to the complainant immediately
the mount of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand
(P114,000.00) Pesos representing the amount
he collected from her.
cralawnad
SO ORDERED.
the Code of Professional Responsibility
states that
CASE DIGEST:
SEBASTISAN VS. CALIS
A.C. NO. 5118/314SCRA1;SEPTEMBER 9, 1999
J. _____
FACTS:
Sometime in November 1992, one
Marilou Sebastian, herein complainant,
was referred to Atty. Dorotheo Calis,
herein respondent, for the latter to process
all the documents needed for the former to
travel to the United States of America with
the consideration of P150,000.00. With the
respondent’s promise to return the
complainant’s money if there would be
trouble with the documents for her travel.
In 4 separate payments, complainant paid
the entire consideration receiving,
however, only 3 receipts for the payments.
Respondent, Calis, provided the
complainant with spurious documents
which resulted for complainant to be
detained in Changi Prisons upon arrival in
Singapore and thereafter, the complainant
was deported back to the Philippines.
Upon arrival in the Philippines, the
respondent promised to secure new travel
documents for the complainant. However,
the complainant opted to demand for the
return of her money. Calis made partial
payments of 15,000, 6000, and 5000 to the
complainant but was unreachable when
the complainant demanded for the rest of
the payment.
Calis also failed to attend the
hearings with the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) despite being issued
summons and being required to answer or
comment on the complaint. Therewith, the
IBP recommended the disbarment of
herein respondent.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Atty. Dorotheo
Calis is guilty of violation of Canon 1, Rule
101 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which thereby constitutes
his disbarment.
RULING:
Yes, Atty. Calis is guilty of
violation of Canon 1, Rule 101 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The
practice of law is not a right but a privilege
carrying with it the condition of
continuous good moral character. The
gross misconduct of a lawyer subjects him
unfit to practice law..Canon 1, Rule 101 of
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
In the case at bar, Calis guaranteed
to secure all the necessary documents for
Sebastian’s travel to the United States with
the promise to return the money if
anything goes wrong with her travel.
Calis’s acts of giving the complainant
spurious documents constitutes deception
and unlawful conduct on his part. Adding
to it is respondent’s refusal to honor the
summons of the IBP which reflects his
unprofessional conduct. The court views
Calis’s conduct and continuance in
service as a threat to the administration of
justice. Therefore, Calis is deemed
disbarred and is ordered to immediately
return the rest of the complainant’s
money.
In his Comment, respondent explained that, as early
as May 12, 2000, Benitez had already signed the
SPA. He claimed that due to inadvertence, it was
only on January 4, 2001 that he was able to notarize
it. Nevertheless, the SPA notarized by him on January
4, 2001 was not at all necessary because Benitez had
signed a similar SPA in favor of Goco sometime
before his death, on May 12, 2000. Because it was no
longer necessary, the SPA was cancelled the same
day he notarized it, hence, legally, there was no
public document that existed. Respondent prayed that
the complaint be dismissed on the ground of forumshopping since similar charges had been filed with the
Civil Service Commission and the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. According to him, the
complaints were later dismissed based on findings
that the assailed act referred to violations of the
implementing rules and regulations of PD 1594, PD
1445, RA 7160 and other pertinent rules of the
Commission on Audit (COA). He stressed that no
criminal and administrative charges were
recommended for filing against him.
In a Resolution dated March 12, 2003, the Court
referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. On August 26, 2003, the IBP
submitted its investigation report:
2
Lawyer’s Duties
Section Rule 138
3
CANON 1
4
ARTURO L. SICAT v. ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA,
JR., [A.C. NO. 5864 : April 15, 2005]
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5864
April 15, 2005
ARTURO L. SICAT, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GREGORIO E. ARIOLA, JR., respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In an affidavit-complaint, complainant Arturo L. Sicat,
a Board Member of the Sangguniang
Panglalawigan of Rizal, charged respondent Atty.
Gregorio E. Ariola, the Municipal Administrator of
Cainta, Rizal, with violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by committing fraud,
deceit and falsehood in his dealings, particularly the
notarization of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
purportedly executed by a one Juanito C. Benitez.
According to complainant, respondent made it appear
that Benitez executed the said document on January
4, 2001 when in fact the latter had already died on
October 25, 2000.
He alleged that prior to the notarization, the
Municipality of Cainta had entered into a contract with
J.C. Benitez Architect and Technical Management,
represented by Benitez, for the construction of lowcost houses. The cost of the architectural and
engineering designs amounted to P11,000,000 and
two consultants were engaged to supervise the
project. For the services of the consultants, the
Municipality of Cainta issued a check dated January
10, 2001 in the amount of P3,700,000, payable to J.C.
Benitez Architects and Technical Management and/or
Cesar Goco. The check was received and encashed
by the latter by virtue of the authority of the SPA
notarized by respondent Ariola.
Complainant further charged respondent with the
crime of falsification penalized under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code by making it appear that certain
persons participated in an act or proceeding when in
fact they did not.
5
6
x x x it is evident that respondent notarized
the Special Power of Attorney dated 4
January 2001 purportedly executed by Juanito
C. Benitez long after Mr. Benitez was dead. It
is also evident that respondent cannot feign
innocence and claim that he did not know Mr.
Benitez was already dead at the time because
respondent, as member of the Prequalification
and Awards Committee of the Municipality of
Cainta, personally knew Mr. Benitez because
the latter appeared before the Committee a
number of times. It is evident that the Special
Power of Attorney dated 4 January 2001 was
part of a scheme of individuals to defraud the
Municipality of Cainta of money which was
allegedly due them, and that respondent by
notarizing said Special Power of Attorney
helped said parties succeed in their plans.
1
7
The IBP recommended to the Court that respondent's
notarial commission be revoked and that he be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one
year.
After a careful review of the records, we find that
respondent never disputed complainant's accusation
that he notarized the SPA purportedly executed by
Benitez on January 4, 2001. He likewise never took
issue with the fact that on said date, Benitez was
already dead. His act was a serious breach of the
sacred obligation imposed upon him by the Code of
Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1, which prohibited him from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. As
a lawyer and as an officer of the court, it was his duty
to serve the ends of justice, not to corrupt it. Oath8
9
bound, he was expected to act at all times in
accordance with law and ethics, and if he did not, he
would not only injure himself and the public but also
bring reproach upon an honorable profession.
In the recent case of Zaballero v. Atty. Mario J.
Montalvan, where the respondent notarized certain
documents and made it appear that the deceased
father of complainant executed them, the Court
declared the respondent there guilty of violating
Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Court was emphatic that lawyers
commissioned as notaries public should not
authenticate documents unless the persons who
signed them are the very same persons who
executed them and personally appeared before them
to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein. The Court added that notaries public must
observe utmost fidelity, the basic requirement in the
performance of their duties, otherwise the confidence
of the public in the integrity of notarized deeds and
documents will be undermined.
In the case at bar, the records show that Benitez died
on October 25, 2000. However, respondent notarized
the SPA, purportedly bearing the signature of Benitez,
on January 4, 2001 or more than two months after the
latter's death. The notarial acknowledgement of
respondent declared that Benitez "appeared before
him and acknowledged that the instrument was his
free and voluntary act." Clearly, respondent lied and
intentionally perpetuated an untruthful statement.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and
routinary act. It converts a private document into a
public instrument, making it admissible in evidence
without the necessity of preliminary proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Neither will respondent's defense that the SPA in
question was superfluous and unnecessary, and
prejudiced no one, exonerate him of
accountability. His assertion of falsehood in a public
document contravened one of the most cherished
tenets of the legal profession and potentially cast
suspicion on the truthfulness of every notarial act. As
the Municipal Administrator of Cainta, he should have
been aware of his great responsibility not only as a
notary public but as a public officer as well. A public
office is a public trust. Respondent should not have
caused disservice to his constituents by consciously
performing an act that would deceive them and the
Municipality of Cainta. Without the fraudulent SPA,
the erring parties in the construction project could not
have encashed the check amounting to P3,700,000
and could not have foisted on the public a spurious
contract ― all to the extreme prejudice of the very
Municipality of which he was the Administrator.
According to the COA Special Task Force:
10
11
12
consultancy services in the conduct of
Detailed Feasibility Study and Detailed
Engineering Design of the Proposed
Construction of Cainta Municipal Medium Rise
Low Cost Housing, in the contract amount
of P11,000,000. The agent resorted to
misrepresentation, manufacture or fabrication
of fictitious document, untruthful narration of
facts, misrepresentation, and counterfeiting or
imitating signature for the purpose of creating
a fraudulent contract. All these were tainted
with deceit perpetrated against the
government resulting to undue injury. The first
and partial payment, in the amount
of P3,700,000.00 was made in the absence of
the required outputs. x x x
15
We need not say more except that we are constrained
to change the penalty recommended by the IBP which
we find too light.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola,
Jr., is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let copies of
this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant and entered in the records of respondent,
and brought to the immediate attention of the
Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
13
14
Almost all acts of falsification of public
documents as enumerated in Article 171 in
relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code were evident in the transactions of the
Municipality of Cainta with J.C. Benitez &
Architects Technical Management for the
CASE DIGEST
SICAT vs. ARIOLA
A.C. No. 5864; April 15, 2005
PER CURIAM
Facts:
Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola is the Municipal
Administrator of Cainta, Rizal, who notarized a
Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed
by Juanito C. Benitez as a representative of J.C.
Benitez Architect and Technical Management for
the construction of low-cost housing project of the
Municipality of Cainta. The project amounted to
11,000,000.00 and supervised by two consultants
which were paid with a check issued by
Municipality of Cainta dated January 10, 2001 in
the amount of 3,700,000.00 payable to J.C.
Benitez Architects and Technical Management
and/or Cesar Goco. Said check was received and
encashed by Goco by virtue of the authority of the
SPA notarized by respondent Ariola on January 4,
2001 when in fact Juanito Benitez had already
died on October 25, 2000. The impossibility of
Benitez to sign the SPA notarized by Ariola gives
rise to a complaint filed by complainant Arturo L.
Sicat, a Board Member of the Sangguniang
Panglalawigan of Rizal, alleging that Ariola
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
by committing fraud, deceit and falsehood in his
dealings, particularly the notarization of SPA
purportedly executed by Juanito Benitez.
In his comment, respondent explained that as
early as May 12, 2000, Benitez had already
signed the SPA and that due to inadvertence it
was only notarized on January 4, 2001 after the
death of Benitez.
The IBP recommended to the Court that
respondent’s notarial commission be revoked and
that he be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of one year.
himself and the public but also reproach upon an
honorable profession. Respondent should not
have caused disservice to his constituents by
consciously performing an act that would deceive
them and the Municipality of Cainta. Without the
fraudulent SPA, the erring parties in the
construction project could not have encashed the
check amounting to P3,700,000.00 and could not
have imposed on the public a false contract.
The penalty recommended by the IBP is too
light, respondent Atty. Gregorio E. Ariola, Jr., is
found guilty of gross misconduct and is
DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Ariola engaged in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in
notarizing SPA despite prior death of signatory?
Ruling:
Yes. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public
should not authenticate documents unless the
persons who signed them are the very same
persons who executed them and personally
appeared before them to attest to the contents
and truth of what are stated therein. Notaries
public must observe utmost fidelity, the basic
requirement in the performance of their duties,
otherwise the confidence of the public in the
integrity of notarized deeds and documents will be
undermined.
In the case at bar, Benitez died on October 25,
2000. However, respondent notarized the SPA,
allegedly bearing the signature of Benitez, on
January 4, 2001 or more than two months after the
latter’s death. The notarial acknowledgement of
respondent declared that Benitez appeared
before him and acknowledged that the instrument
was his free and voluntary act. Clearly,
respondent lied and intentionally perpetuated an
untruthful statement. His act was a serious breach
of the sacred obligation imposed upon him by the
Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which prohibited him from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. As a lawyer and as an officer of
the court, it was his duty to serve the ends of
justice, not to corrupt it. Oath-bound, he was
expected to act at all times in accordance with law
and ethics, and if did not, he would not only injure
MANUEL L. LEE vs. ATTY. REGINO B. TAMBAGO A.C. No.
5281 February 12, 2008
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. NO. 5281 : February 12, 2008]
MANUEL L. LEE, Petitioner, v. ATTY.
REGINO B. TAMBAGO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated April 10, 2000,
complainant Manuel L. Lee charged respondent
Atty. Regino B. Tambago with violation of the
Notarial Law and the ethics of the legal
profession for notarizing a spurious last will
and testament.
In his complaint, complainant averred that his
father, the decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never
executed the contested will. Furthermore, the
spurious will contained the forged signatures of
Cayetano Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the
purported witnesses to its execution.
In the said will, the decedent supposedly
bequeathed his entire estate to his wife Lim
Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he
devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, halfsiblings of complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and
acknowledged before respondent on June 30,
1965. Complainant, however, pointed out that
the residence certificate of the testator noted
in the acknowledgment of the will was dated
January 5, 1962. Furthermore, the signature
of the testator was not the same as his
signature as donor in a deed of
donation (containing his purported genuine
signature). Complainant averred that the
signatures of his deceased father in the will
and in the deed of donation were "in any way
(sic) entirely and diametrically opposed from
(sic) one another in all angle[s]."
1
2
3
4
5
Complainant also questioned the absence of
notation of the residence certificates of the
purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo. He
alleged that their signatures had likewise been
forged and merely copied from their respective
voters' affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of
such purported will was on file in the archives
division of the Records Management and
Archives Office of the National Commission for
Culture and the Arts (NCCA). In this
connection, the certification of the chief of the
archives division dated September 19, 1999
stated:
Doc. 14, Page No. 4, Book No. 1, Series of
1965 refers to an AFFIDAVIT executed by
BARTOLOME RAMIREZ on June 30, 1965 and is
available in this Office['s] files.
6
Respondent in his comment dated July 6, 2001
claimed that the complaint against him
contained false allegations: (1) that
complainant was a son of the decedent Vicente
Lee, Sr. and (2) that the will in question was
fake and spurious. He alleged that complainant
was "not a legitimate son of Vicente Lee, Sr.
and the last will and testament was validly
executed and actually notarized by respondent
per affidavit of Gloria Nebato, common-law
wife of Vicente Lee, Sr. and corroborated by
the joint affidavit of the children of Vicente
7
8
Lee, Sr., namely Elena N. Lee and Vicente N.
Lee, Jr. xxx."
9
Respondent further stated that the complaint
was filed simply to harass him because the
criminal case filed by complainant against him
in the Office of the Ombudsman "did not
prosper."
Respondent did not dispute complainant's
contention that no copy of the will was on file
in the archives division of the NCCA. He
claimed that no copy of the contested will
could be found there because none was filed.
Lastly, respondent pointed out that
complainant had no valid cause of action
against him as he (complainant) did not first
file an action for the declaration of nullity of
the will and demand his share in the
inheritance.
In a resolution dated October 17, 2001, the
Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
10
In his report, the investigating commissioner
found respondent guilty of violation of
pertinent provisions of the old Notarial Law as
found in the Revised Administrative Code. The
violation constituted an infringement of legal
ethics, particularly Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR). Thus, the investigating commissioner
of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended the suspension of respondent
for a period of three months.
11
12
13
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution
No. XVII-2006-285 dated May 26, 2006,
resolved:
[T]o ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering
Respondent's failure to comply with the laws in
the discharge of his function as a notary public,
Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby suspended
from the practice of law for one year and
Respondent's notarial commission is Revoked
and Disqualified fromreappointment as
Notary Public for two (2) years.
14
We affirm with modification.
A will is an act whereby a person is permitted,
with the formalities prescribed by law, to
control to a certain degree the disposition of
his estate, to take effect after his death. A will
may either be notarial or holographic.
15
The law provides for certain formalities that
must be followed in the execution of wills. The
object of solemnities surrounding the execution
of wills is to close the door on bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guarantee their truth and
authenticity.
16
A notarial will, as the contested will in this
case, is required by law to be subscribed at the
end thereof by the testator himself. In
addition, it should be attested and subscribed
by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
17
The will in question was attested by only two
witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this
circumstance alone, the will must be
considered void. This is in consonance with
the rule that acts executed against the
provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws
shall be void, except when the law itself
authorizes their validity.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested
will, respondent was required to faithfully
observe the formalities of a will and those of
notarization. As we held in Santiago v.
Rafanan:
22
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations
and duties of notaries public. They are required
to certify that the party to every document
acknowledged before him had presented the
proper residence certificate (or exemption from
the residence tax); and to enter its number,
place of issue and date as part of such
certification.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be
disregarded, considering the degree of
importance and evidentiary weight attached to
notarized documents. A notary public,
especially a lawyer, is bound to strictly
observe these elementary requirements.
23
24
18
The Civil Code likewise requires that a will
must be acknowledged before a notary public
by the testator and the witnesses. The
importance of this requirement is highlighted
by the fact that it was segregated from the
other requirements under Article 805 and
embodied in a distinct and separate provision.
These omissions by respondent invalidated the
will.
The Notarial Law then in force required the
exhibition of the residence certificate upon
notarization of a document or instrument:
19
20
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some
competent officer or court and declaring it to
be his act or deed. It involves an extra step
undertaken whereby the signatory actually
declares to the notary public that the same is
his or her own free act and deed. The
acknowledgment in a notarial will has a twofold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testator's
wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure
that his estate is administered in the manner
that he intends it to be done.
21
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment
of the will in question shows that this particular
requirement was neither strictly nor
substantially complied with. For one, there was
the conspicuous absence of a notation of the
residence certificates of the notarial witnesses
Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment.
Similarly, the notation of the testator's old
residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law.
Section 251. Requirement as to notation of
payment of [cedula] residence tax. - Every
contract, deed, or other document
acknowledged before a notary public shall have
certified thereon that the parties thereto have
presented their proper [cedula] residence
certificate or are exempt from the [cedula]
residence tax, and there shall be entered by
the notary public as a part of such certificate
the number, place of issue, and date of each
[cedula] residence certificate as aforesaid.
25
The importance of such act was further
reiterated by Section 6 of the Residence Tax
Act which stated:
26
When a person liable to the taxes prescribed in
this Act acknowledges any document before a
notary public xxx it shall be the duty of such
person xxx with whom such transaction is had
or business done, to require the exhibition of
the residence certificate showing payment of
the residence taxes by such person xxx.
In the issuance of a residence certificate, the
law seeks to establish the true and correct
identity of the person to whom it is issued, as
well as the payment of residence taxes for the
current year. By having allowed decedent to
exhibit an expired residence certificate,
respondent failed to comply with the
requirements of both the old Notarial Law and
the Residence Tax Act. As much could be said
of his failure to demand the exhibition of the
residence certificates of Noynay and Grajo.
On the issue of whether respondent was under
the legal obligation to furnish a copy of the
notarized will to the archives division, Article
806 provides:
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the
witness. The notary public shall not be
required to retain a copy of the will, or file
another with the office of the Clerk of
Court. (emphasis supplied)
Respondent's failure, inadvertent or not, to file
in the archives division a copy of the notarized
will was therefore not a cause for disciplinary
action.
Nevertheless, respondent should be faulted for
having failed to make the necessary entries
pertaining to the will in his notarial register.
The old Notarial Law required the entry of the
following matters in the notarial register, in
chronological order:
1. nature of each instrument executed, sworn
to, or acknowledged before him;
2. person executing, swearing to, or
acknowledging the instrument;
3. witnesses, if any, to the signature;
4. date of execution, oath, or acknowledgment
of the instrument;
5. fees collected by him for his services as
notary;
6. give each entry a consecutive number;
and
cralawlibrary
7. if the instrument is a contract, a brief
description of the substance of the
instrument.
27
In an effort to prove that he had complied with
the abovementioned rule, respondent
contended that he had crossed out a prior
entry and entered instead the will of the
decedent. As proof, he presented a photocopy
of his notarial register. To reinforce his claim,
he presented a photocopy of a
certification stating that the archives division
had no copy of the affidavit of Bartolome
Ramirez.
evidence presented will not be admitted. Thus,
the photocopy of respondent's notarial register
was not admissible as evidence of the entry of
the execution of the will because it failed to
comply with the requirements for the
admissibility of secondary evidence.
In the same vein, respondent's attempt to
controvert the certification dated September
21, 1999 must fail. Not only did he present a
mere photocopy of the certification dated
March 15, 2000; its contents did not squarely
prove the fact of entry of the contested will in
his notarial register.
30
31
Notaries public must observe with utmost
care and utmost fidelity the basic
requirements in the performance of their
duties, otherwise, the confidence of the public
in the integrity of notarized deeds will be
undermined.
32
33
Defects in the observance of the solemnities
prescribed by law render the entire will invalid.
This carelessness cannot be taken lightly in
view of the importance and delicate nature of a
will, considering that the testator and the
witnesses, as in this case, are no longer alive
to identify the instrument and to confirm its
contents. Accordingly, respondent must be
held accountable for his acts. The validity of
the will was seriously compromised as a
consequence of his breach of duty.
34
35
In this connection, Section 249 of the old
Notarial Law provided:
Grounds for revocation of commission. - The
following derelictions of duty on the part of a
notary public shall, in the discretion of the
proper judge of first instance, be sufficient
ground for the revocation of his commission:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b) The failure of the notary to make the
proper entry or entries in his notarial register
touching his notarial acts in the manner
required by law.
xxx
xxx
xxx
(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper
notation regarding cedula certificates.
36
28
A photocopy is a mere secondary evidence. It
is not admissible unless it is shown that the
original is unavailable. The proponent must
first prove the existence and cause of the
unavailability of the original, otherwise, the
29
These gross violations of the law also made
respondent liable for violation of his oath as a
lawyer and constituted transgressions of
Section 20 (a), Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court and Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the
CPR.
37
38
39
The first and foremost duty of a lawyer is to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, uphold the Constitution and obey
the laws of the land. For a lawyer is the
servant of the law and belongs to a profession
to which society has entrusted the
administration of law and the dispensation of
justice.
40
41
While the duty to uphold the Constitution and
obey the law is an obligation imposed on every
citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities well
beyond the basic requirements of good
citizenship. As a servant of the law, a lawyer
should moreover make himself an example for
others to emulate. Being a lawyer, he is
supposed to be a model in the community in so
far as respect for the law is concerned.
42
43
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. A breach of these conditions
justifies disciplinary action against the erring
lawyer. A disciplinary sanction is imposed on a
lawyer upon a finding or acknowledgment that
he has engaged in professional
misconduct. These sanctions meted out to
errant lawyers include disbarment, suspension
and reprimand.
44
45
Disbarment is the most severe form of
disciplinary sanction. We have held in a
number of cases that the power to disbar must
be exercised with great caution and should
not be decreed if any punishment less severe such as reprimand, suspension, or fine - will
accomplish the end desired. The rule then is
that disbarment is meted out only in clear
cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court.
46
47
48
49
Respondent, as notary public, evidently failed
in the performance of the elementary duties of
his office. Contrary to his claims that he
"exercised his duties as Notary Public with due
care and with due regard to the provision of
existing law and had complied with the
elementary formalities in the performance of
his duties xxx," we find that he acted very
irresponsibly in notarizing the will in question.
Such recklessness warrants the less severe
punishment of suspension from the practice of
law. It is, as well, a sufficient basis for the
revocation of his commission and his
perpetual disqualification to be commissioned
as a notary public.
50
51
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Regino B.
Tambago is hereby found guilty of professional
misconduct. He violated (1) the Lawyer's Oath;
(2) Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3) Canon 1
and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; (4) Art. 806 of the Civil Code
and (5) the provisions of the old Notarial Law.
Atty. Regino B. Tambago is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one year and his notarial
commission REVOKED.Because he has not
lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him
as a notary public and as an officer of the
court, he
is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from
reappointment as a notary public.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to all
the courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Bar
Confidant, as well as made part of the personal
records of respondent.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST:
Manuel L. Lee vs. Atty. Regino B. Tambago
AC No. 5281, February 12, 2008
J. Corona (Administrative case)
FACTS:
In a letter-complaint, complainant Manuel L. Lee
(petitioner) charged respondent Atty. Regino B.
Tambago with violation of the Notarial Law and
the ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a
spurious last will and testament.
The complainant Lee averred that his father, the
decedent Vicente Lee, Sr., never executed the
contested will. Furthermore, the spurious will
contained the forged signatures of Cayetano
Noynay and Loreto Grajo, the purported witnesses
to its execution.
In the said will, the decedent (Vicente Lee, Sr)
supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to his
wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which
he devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, halfsiblings of complainant. The will was purportedly
executed and acknowledged before respondent on
June 30, 1965.
Additionally, the Complainant (LEE) points out
that:
FIRST, the residence certificate of the testator
noted in the acknowledgment of the will was
dated January 5, 1962. Furthermore, the signature
of the testator was not the same as his signature
as donor in a deed of donation (containing his
purported genuine signature).
SECOND, complainant Lee also questioned the
absence of notation of the residence certificates
of the purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo.
He alleged that their signatures had likewise
been forged and merely copied from their
respective voters' affidavits.
THIRD, signatures of his deceased father in the will
and in the deed of donation WERE COMPLETELY
DIFFERENT (were in any way entirely and
diametrically opposed from (sic) one another in all
angle[s] Complainant also questioned the absence
of notation of the residence certificates of the
purported witnesses Noynay and Grajo). He
alleged that their signatures had likewise been
forged and merely copied from their respective
voters affidavits.
The Supreme Court referred the case to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation. The
investigating commissioner found respondent
guilty of violation of pertinent provisions of the
old Notarial Law as found in the Revised
Administrative Code. The violation constituted an
infringement of legal ethics, particularly Canon 1
and Rule 1.01of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).
The investigating commissioner of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the
suspension of respondent for a period of three
months. The IBP Board of Governors approved
and adopted the recommendation.
Atty. Tambago’s notarial commission is Revoked
and Disqualified from reappointment as Notary
Public for two (2) years.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the will in question is valid. (NO)
2. W/N Atty. Tambago is liable for violation of the Notarial
Law (YES)
HELD:
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is
required by law to be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself. In addition, it
should be attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.
The will in question was attested by only two
witnesses, Noynay and Grajo. On this circumstance
alone, the will must be considered void.
This is in consonance with the rule that acts
executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law
itself authorizes their validity. The Civil Code
likewise requires that a will must be acknowledged
before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses.
The importance of this requirement is highlighted
by the fact that it was segregated from the other
requirements under Article 805 and embodied in
a distinct and separate provision.
An acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some competent
officer or court and declaring it to be his act or
deed. It involves an extra step undertaken
whereby the signatory actually declares to the
notary public that the same is his or her own free
act and deed. The acknowledgment in a notarial
will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the
testators wishes long after his demise and (2) to
assure that his estate is administered in the
manner that he intends it to be done.
IN THIS CASE, acknowledgement of the will in
question shows that this particular requirement
was neither strictly nor substantially complied
with. For one, there was the conspicuous absence
of a notation of the residence certificates of the
notarial witnesses Noynay and Grajo in the
acknowledgment. Similarly, the notation of the
testators old residence certificate in the same
acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law.
These omissions by respondent invalidated the
will.
As the acknowledging officer of the contested
will, respondent was required to faithfully
observe the formalities of a will and those of
notarization.
2. YES, Atty. Tambago violated the Notarial Law.
“The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and
duties of notaries public. They are required to
certify that the party to every document
acknowledged before him had presented the
proper residence certificate (or exemption from
the residence tax). A notary public, especially a
lawyer, is bound to strictly observe these
elementary requirements
Atty. Tambago should be faulted for having failed
to make the necessary entries pertaining to the
will in his notarial register.
The Notarial Law required the entry of the
following matters in the notarial register, in
chronological order:
1. nature of each instrument executed, sworn to,
or acknowledged before him;
2. person
executing,
swearing
to,
or
acknowledging the instrument;
3. witnesses, if any, to the signature; date of
execution, oath, or acknowledgment of the
instrument;
4. fees collected by him for his services as notary;
5. give each entry a consecutive number; and if
the instrument is a contract, a brief description of
the substance of the instrument.
Atty. Regino B. Tambago is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for one year and his
notarial commission REVOKED.
Because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness
expected of him as a notary public and as an officer
of the court, he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED
from reappointment as a notary public.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty.
Regino B. Tambago is hereby found
guilty of professional misconduct. He
violated (1) the Lawyer's Oath; (2)
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; (3)
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; (4) Art.
806 of the Civil Code and (5) the
provisions of the old Notarial Law.
Atty. Regino B. Tambago is
hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one year and his
notarial
commission REVOKED.Because he
has not lived up to the
trustworthiness expected of him as a
notary public and as an officer of the
court, he
is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED fr
om reappointment as a notary public.
PETER T. DONTON vs. ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO
A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006
A.C. No. 6057
June 27, 2006
PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent
Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for
serious misconduct and deliberate violation of
Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T.
Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a
criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a
public document against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"),
Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as
the notary public who notarized the Occupancy
Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent
filed a counter-charge for perjury against
complainant. Respondent, in his affidavitcomplaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September
11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by me under
the following circumstances:
1
Let copies of this Resolution be
furnished to all the courts of the land,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Bar Confidant, as
well as made part of the personal
records of respondent.
2
3
4
5
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner
and long-time resident of a real
property located at No. 33 Don Jose
Street, Bgy. San Roque, Murphy,
Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September
1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and
thereby disqualified to own real
property in his name – agreed that
the property be transferred in the
name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr.
Donton, requested me to prepare
several documents that would
guarantee recognition of him being
the actual owner of the property
despite the transfer of title in the
name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared,
among others, the OCCUPANCY
AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stier’s
free and undisturbed use of the
property for his residence and
business operations. The
OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied
up with a loan which Mr. Stier had
extended to Mr. Donton.
6
Complainant averred that respondent’s act of
preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite
knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is
disqualified to own real property in his name,
constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate
violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that
respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do
something in violation of law and assisting Stier in
carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent
claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case
against him upon the instigation of complainant’s
counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan, because
respondent refused to act as complainant’s witness
in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay.
Respondent admitted that he "prepared and
notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted
its genuineness and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court
referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"),
Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan
("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP Commission
on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking
part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the
Philippines." Commissioner San Juan
recommended respondent’s suspension from the
practice of law for two years and the cancellation
of his commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April
2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with
modification, the Report and recommended
respondent’s suspension from the practice of law
for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors
forwarded the Report to the Court as provided
under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated
7
8
that he was already 76 years old and would already
retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending
cases. He also said that his practice of law is his
only means of support for his family and his six
minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP
denied the motion for reconsideration because the
IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case as the
matter had already been referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of
Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give
advice to any client which will involve defiance of
the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey. A
lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme
or who connives in violating the law commits an
act which justifies disciplinary action against the
lawyer.
By his own admission, respondent admitted that
Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning
real property. Yet, in his motion for
reconsideration, respondent admitted that he
caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of
land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of the
prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred
the title in complainant’s name. But respondent
provided "some safeguards" by preparing several
documents, including the Occupancy Agreement,
that would guarantee Stier’s recognition as the
actual owner of the property despite its transfer in
complainant’s name. In effect, respondent advised
and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership of lands by
preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution.
Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he
prepared and notarized the Occupancy Agreement
to evade the law against foreign ownership of
lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law
to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to
malpractice in his office, for which he may be
suspended.
In Balinon v. De Leon, respondent Atty. De Leon
was suspended from the practice of law for three
years for preparing an affidavit that virtually
permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re:
Santiago, respondent Atty. Santiago was
suspended from the practice of law for one year for
preparing a contract which declared the spouses to
be single again after nine years of separation and
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
allowed them to contract separately subsequent
marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel
O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and
Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.
Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office
of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department
of Justice, and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
Asscociate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
CASE DIGEST:
PETER DONTON v. ATTY. TANSINGCO
A.C. No. 6057
June 27, 2006
FACTS:
Peter Donton files a complaint against Atty
Emmanuel Tansingco as the notary public who
notarized the Occupancy Afreement and against
others (Diane Stier, and Emelyn Manggay) for
estafa thru falsification of public document.
A disbarment complaint filed by petitioner against
respondent for serious misconduct and deliberate
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and 1.02 of the Coe
of Professional Resposibility arose when
respondent filed a counter –charge of perjury
against petitioner.
Atty. Tansingco in his answer stated that he
prepared and notarized the Occupancy
Agreement at the request of Mr. Stier, and owner
an a long-time resident of a real property locate
in the country. Since Mr. Stier is an alien and not
a citizen of the Philippines and thereby
disqualified to own real property in his name, he
agreed that the property be transferred in the
name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
Petitioner Donton averred that respondent
lawyer committed a serious misconduct due to his
act of preparing an Occupancy Agreement despite
knowledge that Stier is a foreign national and
therefore is a deliberate violation of the code.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Atty. Emmanuel
Tansingco committed serious misconduct
RULING:
Yes. The court ruled that a lawyer should not
render any service or give advice to any client
which will involve defiance of the laws which he is
bound to obey. A lawyer who assists a client in a
dishonest scheme or who connives in violating a
law commits an act which justifies disciplinary
actions against the lawyer.
Respondent lawyer knows about the law that a
foreign national is disqualified in owning real
lands in the country but he still continued his act
and transferred the title to petitioner’s name and
aware of the prohibition, respondent then quickly
rectified his act and provided some safeguards by
preparing several documents including the
Occupancy Agreement.
In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in
circumventing the constitutional prohibition
against foreign ownership of lands by preparing
said documents.
(b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and sentenced
respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to indemnify the complainant in the amount
of P5,400.00 in Criminal Case No. 8538359;
RULE 1.01
People vs. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360 (Jan. 30, 1990)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 3360
January 30, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant
vs.
ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July
1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the
Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension
from the practice of law imposed upon her by a
decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 October
1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093.
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one
Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a
total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a
commission basis, with the condition that the
respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and
return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14
February 1984. Sometime in February 1984,
respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of
jewelry which then amounted to approximately
P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated 16
February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a
check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of
P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for
the amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for
payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance, all
three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank,
Traders Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds.
Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor,
respondent made no arrangements with the bank
concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced
and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms.
Marquez.
Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against
respondent with the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (a)
one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 8538358; and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22,
docketed respectively as Criminal Cases Nos. 8538359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial,
the trial court rendered a decision dated 25 August
1987 which:
(a) acquitted respondent of the charge of
estafa; and
(c) to pay a fine of P 6,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify
the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in
Criminal Case No. 85-38360; and
( d) to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to indemnify
the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in
Criminal Case No. 85-38361, and to pay the costs in
all three (3) cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No.
05093 affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court but,
in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the
practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision
read as follows:
For reasons above stated and finding the
evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction,
the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to
this modification.
It appearing from the records that the accused
Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar, and the
offense for (sic) which she is found guilty
involved moral turpitude, she is hereby ordered
suspended from the practice of law and shall
not practice her profession until further action
from the Supreme Court, in accordance with
Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. A copy of this decision must be
forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by
Section 29 of the same Rule.
SO ORDERED.
1
On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted
respondent's Notice of Appeal and advised her "to
address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable
Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February
1989, respondent filed with this Court a Notice of
Appeal.
In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court
noted without action respondent's Notice of Appeal and
declared that the Court of Appeals' decision of 17
October 1988 had become final and executory upon
expiration of the period for filing a petition for review
on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution,
the Court found that respondent had lost her right to
appeal by certiorari when she posted with this Court a
Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review
on certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court within the reglementary period.
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension,
respondent states:
that suspension from the practice of law is
indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty
aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine
considering that accused-appellant's action on
the case during the trial on the merits at the
lower court has always been motivated purely
by sincere belief that she is innocent of the
offense charged nor of the intention to cause
damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.
We read the above statement as a claim by the
respondent that, she had not violated her oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that
when she issued the checks which bounced, she did
not intend to cause damage to complainant Ms.
Marquez.
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of
law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent
Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the
offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral
turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22
is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects
public interest and public order. In Lozano v.
Martinez, the Court explained the nature of the offense
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following terms:
2
xxx
xxx
xxx
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P.
Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored
upon its presentation for payment. . . . The
thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of
penal sanctions, the making of worthless
checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is prescribed by the law.
The law punishes the act not as an offense
against property but an offense against public
order.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The effects of the issuance of a worthless
check transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and
touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury
to the public. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousandfold, can very well pollute
the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare
of society and the public interest. (Italics
supplied)
3
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the
practice of law because she had been convicted of
crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as
follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by
Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of
the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly
or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The
practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid
agents
or
brokers,
constitutes
malpractice. (Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court
of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The
Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance
may suspend an attorney from practice for any
of the causes named in the last preceding
section, and after such suspension such
attorney shall not practice his profession until
further action of the Supreme Court in the
premises. (Italics supplied)
We should add that the crimes of which respondent
was convicted also import deceit and violation of her
attorney's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility under both of which she was bound to
"obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant
case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the
exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it
certainly relates to and affects the good moral
character of a person convicted of such offense.
In Melendrez v. Decena, this Court stressed that:
4
the nature of the office of an attorney at law
requires that she shall be a person of good
moral character. This qualification is not only
a condition precedent to an admission to the
practice of law; its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law.
1âwphi1
5
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the
Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall
remain suspended from the practice of law until further
orders from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall
be forwarded to the Bar Confidant and to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of
respondent.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes
and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., in the
result.
Footnotes
Court of Appeals' Decision, p. 7; Rollo p. 14;
italics supplied.
1
2
146 SCRA 323 (1986).
3
146 SCRA at 338 and 340.
Administrative Case No. 2104, promulgated
24 August 1989.

4
5
Id., slip op., p. 16; italics supplied.
CASE DIGEST:
FACTS:

In 17 December 1983, Atty. Fe Taunda,
the respondent, received from Herminia
A. Marquez, the complainant, several
pieces of jewelry with a total stated value
of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission
basis, with the condition that the
respondent would turn over the sales
proceeds and return the unsold items to
Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February
1984.
 In February 1984, instead of returning the
unsold pieces of jewelry which then
amounted to approximately P26,250.00,
the respondent issued three checks that
bounced and were dishonored by the
drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for
insufficiency of funds, to wit:
(a) a check dated 16 February 1984
for the amount of P5,400.00;
(b) a check dated 23 February 1984
also for the amount of P5,400.00; and
(c) a check dated 25 February 1984
for the amount of P15,450.00.
 Atty. Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the
Philippine Bar, was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila in violation
of B.P. 22 with a fine and subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
indemnify the complainant Herminia
Marquez.

On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a
Notice of Appeal with the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a
Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted
respondent's Notice of Appeal and
advised her "to address her Notice of
Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court,
the proper forum."
On 1 February 1989, respondent filed a
Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court. In
a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated
12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda,
asks The Supreme Court to lift the
suspension from the practice of law
imposed upon her by a decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 17 October 1988.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Tuanda’s Motion
to Lift Order of Suspension be granted.
RULING: NO. Court Resolved to DENY the
Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.
Respondent shall remain suspended from the
practice of law until further orders from this
Court.
The respondent was thus correctly
suspended from the practice of law because
she had been convicted of crimes involving
moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as
follows:
Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or
suspended by Supreme Court on what
grounds. A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court of
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or
wilfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or
brokers,
constitutes
malpractice.
(Italics supplied)
Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the
Court of Appeals or a Court of First
Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a
Court of First Instance may suspend an
attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in the last preceding
section, and after such suspension
such attorney shall not practice his
profession until further action of the
Supreme Court in the premises. (Italics
supplied)
We should add that the crimes of which
respondent was convicted also import deceit
and violation of her attorney's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility under
both of which she was bound to "obey the
laws of the land." Conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude might not (as in the
instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does
not) relate to the exercise of the profession of
a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and
affects the good moral character of a person
convicted of such offense.
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA vs. ATTY. LAURENCE D.
CORDOVA A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 3249 November 29, 1989
SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In an unsworn letter-complaint dated 14 April 1988
addressed to then Mr. Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee, complainant Salvacion Delizo charged
her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with
immorality and acts unbecoming a member of the
Bar. The letter-complaint was forwarded by the Court
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission
on Bar Discipline ("Commission"), for investigation,
report and recommendation.
The Commission, before acting on the complaint,
required complainant to submit a verified complaint
within ten (10) days from notice. Complainant
complied and submitted to the Commission on 27
September 1988 a revised and verified version of her
long and detailed complaint against her husband
charging him with immorality and acts unbecoming a
member of the Bar.
In an Order of the Commission dated 1 December
1988, respondent was declared in default for failure to
file an answer to the complaint within fifteen (15) days
from notice. The same Order required complainant to
submit before the Commission her evidence ex parte,
on 16 December 1988. Upon the telegraphic request
of complainant for the resetting of the 16 December
1988 hearing, the Commission scheduled another
hearing on 25 January 1989. The hearing scheduled
for 25 January 1989 was rescheduled two (2) more
times-first, for 25 February 1989 and second, for 10
and 11 April 1989. The hearings never took place as
complainant failed to appear. Respondent Cordova
never moved to set aside the order of default, even
though notices of the hearings scheduled were sent to
him.
In a telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989,
complainant informed the Commission that she and
her husband had already "reconciled". In an order
dated 17 April 1989, the Commission required the
parties (respondent and complainant) to appear
before it for confirmation and explanation of the
telegraphic message and required them to file a
formal motion to dismiss the complaint within fifteen
(15) days from notice. Neither party responded and
nothing was heard from either party since then.
Complainant having failed to submit her evidence ex
parte before the Commission, the IBP Board of
Governors submitted to this Court its report
reprimanding respondent for his acts, admonishing
him that any further acts of immorality in the future will
be dealt with more severely, and ordering him to
support his legitimate family as a responsible parent
should.
The findings of the IBP Board of Governors may be
summed up as follows:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married
on 6 June 1976 and out of this marriage, two (2)
children were born. In 1985, the couple lived
somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year,
respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job
as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to
Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G.
Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and
left her own husband and children to stay with
respondent. Respondent Cordova and Fely G.
Holgado lived together in Bislig as husband and wife,
with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the
public as his wife, and Fely Holgado using the name
Fely Cordova. Respondent Cordova gave Fely
Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store
in the public market at Bislig, while at the same time
failing to support his legitimate family.
On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his
complainant wife had an apparent reconciliation.
Respondent promised that he would separate from
Fely Holgado and brought his legitimate family to
Bislig, Surigao del Sur. Respondent would, however,
frequently come home from beerhouses or cabarets,
drunk, and continued to neglect the support of his
legitimate family. In February 1987, complainant
found, upon returning from a trip to Manila
necessitated by hospitalization of her daughter
Loraine, that respondent Cordova was no longer living
with her (complainant's) children in their conjugal
home; that respondent Cordova was living with
another mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had
taken his younger daughter Melanie along with him.
Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from
the complinant, compelling complainant to go to court
and to take back her daughter by habeas corpus. The
Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave her custody of their
children.
Notwithstanding respondent's promises to reform, he
continued to live with Luisita Magallanes as her
husband and continued to fail to give support to his
legitimate family.
Finally the Commission received a telegram message
apparently from complainant, stating that complainant
and respondent had been reconciled with each other.
After a review of the record, we agree with the
findings of fact of the IBP Board. We also agree that
the most recent reconciliation between complainant
and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does
not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and
immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in
public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon him
as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar
itself. An applicant for admission to membership in the
bar is required to show that he is possessed of good
moral character. That requirement is not exhausted
and dispensed with upon admission to membership of
the bar. On the contrary, that requirement persists as
a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in
good standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras, this Court, following the rule in
the United States, held that "the continued possession
... of a good moral character is a requisite condition
for the rightful continuance in the practice of the law ...
and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even
though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for
disbarment. " It is important to note that the lack of
moral character that we here refer to as essential is
not limited to good moral character relating to the
discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an
attorney at law. The moral delinquency that affects
the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted
moral standards of the community, conduct for
instance, which makes "a mockery of the inviolable
social institution or marriage." In Mortel, the
respondent being already married, wooed and won
the heart of a single, 21-year old teacher who
subsequently cohabited with him and bore him a son.
Because respondent's conduct in Mortel was
particularly morally repulsive, involving the marrying
of his mistress to his own son and thereafter
cohabiting with the wife of his own son after the
marriage he had himself arranged, respondent was
disbarred.
1
2
3
In Royong v. Oblena, the respondent was declared
unfit to continue as a member of the bar by reason of
his immoral conduct and accordingly disbarred. He
was found to have engaged in sexual relations with
the complainant who consequently bore him a son;
and to have maintained for a number of years an
adulterous relationship with another woman.
4
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained
for about two (2) years an adulterous relationship with
a married woman not his wife, in full view of the
general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his
legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on the wound,
failed or refused to support. After a brief period of
"reform" respondent took up again with another
woman not his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing
along his young daughter to live with them. Clearly,
respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental
institution of marriage and its elementary obligations
before his own daughter and the community at large.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND
respondent from the practice of law indefinitely and
until farther orders from this Court. The Court will
consider lifting his suspension when respondent
Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the Commission
and this Court that he has and continues to provide
for the support of his legitimate family and that he has
given up the immoral course of conduct that he has
clung to.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ.,
concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.
Footnotes
l 100 Phil. 586 (1956).
2 100 Phil. at 592.
3 100 Phil. a, 593.
4 117 Phil. 865 (1963).
CASE DIGEST:
FACTS:



On 27 September 1988 complainant
Salvacion Delizo charged her husband,
Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with
immorality and acts unbecoming a
member of the Bar.
The hearing scheduled for 25 January
1989 was rescheduled two (2) more
times-first, for 25 February 1989 and
second, for 10 and 11 April 1989. The
hearings never took place as complainant
failed to appear. Respondent Cordova
never moved to set aside the order of
default, even though notices of the
hearings scheduled were sent to him. In a
telegraphic message dated 6 April 1989,
complainant informed the Commission
that she and her husband had already
"reconciled".
The IBP Board of Governors found out
that the respondent, Cordova maintained
for about two (2) years an adulterous
relationship with a married woman not his
wife, in full view of the general public, to
the humiliation and detriment of his
legitimate family which he, rubbing salt on
the wound, failed or refused to support.
After a brief period of "reform" respondent
took up again with another woman not his
wife, cohabiting with her and bringing
along his young daughter to live with
them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his
disregard of the fundamental institution of
marriage and its elementary obligations
before his own daughter and the
community at large.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Corova may be
suspended or removed from his Office as
attorney
despite
recent
reconciliation
between complainant and respondent.
RULING: YES.
The Supreme Court
Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the
practice of law indefinitely and until farther
orders from this Court. The Court will consider
lifting his suspension when respondent
Cordova submits proof satisfactory to the
Commission and this Court that he has and
continues to provide for the support of his
legitimate family and that he has given up the
immoral course of conduct that he has clung
to.
After a review of the record, The Supreme
Court agree with the findings of fact of the IBP
Board. They also agree that the most recent
reconciliation between complainant and
respondent, assuming the same to be real,
does not excuse and wipe away the
misconduct and immoral behavior of the
respondent carried out in public, and
necessarily adversely reflecting upon him as
a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine
Bar itself. An applicant for admission to
membership in the bar is required to show that
he is possessed of good moral character.
That requirement is not exhausted and
dispensed
with
upon
admission
to
membership of the bar. On the contrary, that
requirement persists as a continuing condition
for membership in the Bar in good standing.
In Mortel v. Aspiras, this Court, following the
rule in the United States, held that "the
continued possession ... of a good moral
character is a requisite condition for the
1
rightful continuance in the practice of the law
... and its loss requires suspension or
disbarment, even though the statutes do not
specify that as a ground for disbarment. " It
is important to note that the lack of moral
character that we here refer to as essential is
not limited to good moral character relating to
the
discharge
of
the
duties
and
responsibilities of an attorney at law. The
moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community,
conduct for instance, which makes "a
mockery of the inviolable social institution or
marriage." In Mortel, the respondent being
already married, wooed and won the heart of
a single, 21-year old teacher who
subsequently cohabited with him and bore
him a son. Because respondent's conduct
in Mortel was particularly morally repulsive,
involving the marrying of his mistress to his
own son and thereafter cohabiting with the
wife of his own son after the marriage he had
himself arranged, respondent was disbarred.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
2
3
In Royong v. Oblena, the respondent was
declared unfit to continue as a member of the
bar by reason of his immoral conduct and
accordingly disbarred. He was found to have
engaged in sexual relations with the
complainant who consequently bore him a
son; and to have maintained for a number of
years an adulterous relationship with another
woman.
4
PATRICIA FIGUEROA vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR. SBC
Case No. 519 July 31, 1997
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia
Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon
Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal
profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar
examinations on the fourth attempt, after
unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968.
Before be could take his oath, however, complainant
filed the instant petition averring that respondent and
she had been sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock
was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his
repeated promises to many her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before
Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and July 1971.
Respondent and complainant were townmates in
Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in
their teens, they were steadies. Respondent even
acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as
Queen at the 1953 town fiesta. Complainant first
acceded to sexual congress with respondent
sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son,
Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. It was
after the child was born, complainant alleged, that
respondent first promised he would marry her after he
passes the bar examinations. Their relationship
continued and respondent allegedly made more than
twenty or thirty promises of marriage. He gave only
P10.00 for the child on the latter's birthdays. Her trust
in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she
learned that respondent married another woman.
Hence, this petition.
1
Upon complainant's motion, the Court authorized the
taking of testimonies of witnesses by deposition in
1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case
citing complainant's failure to comment on the motion
of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty
to take aforesaid testimonies by deposition.
Complainant filed her comment required and that she
remains interested in the resolution of the present
case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied
respondent's motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a
motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed
by respondent on September 17, 1979. Respondent's
third motion to dismiss was noted in the Court's
Resolution dated September 15, 1982. In 1988,
respondent repeated his request, citing his election as
a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay,
Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic
organizations and good standing in the community as
well as the length of time this case has been pending
as reasons to allow him to take his oath as a lawyer.
2
3
SBC Case No. 519 July 31, 1997
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant,
vs.
SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
4
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to
dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to
prosecute the case for an unreasonable period of time
and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer's
oath upon payment of the required fees.
5
Respondent's hopes were again dashed on
November 17, 1988 when the Court, in response to
complainant's opposition, resolved to cancel his
scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBP's report dated May 17, 1997 recommended
the dismissal of the case and that respondent be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's
oath in 1971 because of the charge of gross
immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate,
respondent bore an illegitimate child with his
sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he
did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes
the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross
immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of
respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in
premarital sexual relations with complainant and
promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral
character on his part but the same does not constitute
grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to
justify suspension or disbarment the act complained
of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. "A
grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree." It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
respectable members of the community.
6
have sexual congress with him. Complainant was
then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued
their relationship and was not an innocent young girl
who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately,
respondent chose to marry and settle permanently
with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for
seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is
a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered
into because of love, not for any other reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an
act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and
unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make
respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually,
sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be
admitted into. Even assuming that his past
indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that
respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer
constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this
time there appears to be no other indiscretion
attributed to him. Respondent, who is now sixty-two
years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly,
to take the lawyer's oath.
10
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is
ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment
of the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and
Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres Jr., JJ.,
are on leave.
CASE DIGEST:
7
FACTS:
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang quite
relevant because mere intimacy between a man and
a woman, both of whom possess no impediment to
marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit
on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so
unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of
disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result of
such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.
8

9
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts
whose sexual relations were evidently consensual.
We do not find complainant's assertions that she had
been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She
continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even
after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until
1971. All those years of amicable and intimate
relations refute her allegations that she was forced to

In 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that
respondent. Respondent had passed the 1970
bar examinations but before he could take his
oath, the complainant filed the instant petition
averring that respondent and she had been
sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was
born to them and that respondent did not fulfill
his repeated Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied
admission to the legal profession promises to
marry her.
On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case
citing complainant's failure to comment on the
motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved
from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by

deposition. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied
respondent's motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again
denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of
abandonment filed by respondent on
September 17, 1979. Respondent's third
motion to dismiss was noted in the Court's
Resolution dated September 15, 1982.
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to
dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant
to prosecute the case for an unreasonable
period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr.
to take the lawyer's oath upon payment of the
required fees, but the respondent's hopes were
again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the
Court, in response to complainant's opposition,
resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking.
2

bond which should be entered into because of love,
not for any other reason.
The SC cannot help viewing the instant complaint
as an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter
and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to
make respondent suffer severely and it seems,
perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked
very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that
his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six
years that respondent has been prevented from
being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment
therefor. During this time there appears to be no
other indiscretion attributed to him. Respondent,
who is now sixty-two years of age, should thus be
allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer's oath.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Patricia Figueroa’s filed
petition be granted.
2. Whether or not Mr. Barranco be allowed to
take his oath and be admitted to the legal
profession.
RULING: YES. The instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED. YES. Respondent Simeon Barranco,
Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon
payment of the proper fees.
Respondent was prevented from taking the
lawyer's oath in 1971 because of the charge of
gross immorality made by complainant. To
recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child
with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also
claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her
after he passes the bar examinations.
The SC finds that these facts do not constitute gross
immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of
respondent from the legal profession. His engaging
in premarital sexual relations with complainant and
promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral
character on his part but the same does not
constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has
held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act
complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to
a high degree." It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless
act which shows a moral indifference to the opinion
of respectable members of the community.
6
Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and
actively pursued their relationship and was not an
innocent young girl who could be easily led astray.
Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and
settle permanently with another woman. We cannot
castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his
dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual
Samala vs Valencia Adm Case No. 5439 January 22,
2007
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5439
January 22, 2007
CLARITA J. SAMALA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a complaint dated May 2, 2001 filed
by Clarita J. Samala (complainant) against Atty.
Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for
Disbarment on the following grounds: (a)
serving on two separate occasions as counsel
for contending parties; (b) knowingly misleading
the court by submitting false documentary
evidence; (c) initiating numerous cases in
exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d)
having a reputation of being immoral by siring
illegitimate children.
After respondent filed his Comment, the Court,
in its Resolution of October 24, 2001, referred
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP)
for
investigation,
report
and
recommendation.
The
investigation
was
conducted
by
Commissioner Demaree Jesus B. Raval. After a
series of hearings, the parties filed their
respective memoranda and the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.
Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared
the Report and Recommendation dated
January 12, 2006. He found respondent guilty of
violating Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended
the penalty of suspension for six months.
In a minute Resolution passed on May 26,
2006, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the report and recommendation of
Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty
of suspension from six months to one year.
We adopt the report of the IBP Board of
Governors except as to the issue on immorality
and as to the recommended penalty.
On serving as counsel for contending
parties.
Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK,
filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
272, Marikina City, entitled "Leonora M. Aville v.
Editha Valdez" for nonpayment of rentals,
herein respondent, while being the counsel for
defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for the
tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and
Bayuga by filing an Explanation and
Compliance before the RTC.
In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 75,
Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez and
Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante and her
husband"
for
ejectment,
respondent
represented Valdez against Bustamante - one
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of the tenants in the property subject of the
controversy. Defendants appealed to the RTC,
Branch 272, Marikina City docketed as SCA
Case No. 99-341-MK. In his decision dated May
2, 2000, Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela
Cruz warned respondent to refrain from
repeating the act of being counsel of record of
both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.
But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the
RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, entitled "Editha
S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of
Deeds of Marikina City," respondent, as counsel
for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of
Contract with Damages and Cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500 against
Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case
No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK.
Records further reveal that at the hearing of
November 14, 2003, respondent admitted that
in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer
for Lagmay (one of the tenants) but not for
Bustamante and Bayuga albeit he filed the
Explanation and Compliance for and in behalf of
the tenants. Respondent also admitted that he
represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804
and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK against
Bustamante and her husband but denied being
the counsel for Alba although the case is entitled
"Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her
husband," because Valdez told him to include
Alba as the two were the owners of the
property and it was only Valdez who signed
the complaint for ejectment. But, while
claiming that respondent did not represent Alba,
respondent, however, avers that he already
severed his representation for Alba when the
latter charged respondent with estafa. Thus,
the filing of Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK against
Alba.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests
except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of
professional misconduct, act as counsel for a
person whose interest conflicts with that of his
present or former client. He may not also
undertake to discharge conflicting duties any
more than he may represent antagonistic
interests. This stern rule is founded on the
principles of public policy and good taste. It
springs from the relation of attorney and client
which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers
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are expected not only to keep inviolate the
client's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing for
only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their lawyers, which is of
paramount importance in the administration of
justice.
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation would
prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or doubledealing in the performance of that duty.
The stern rule against representation of
conflicting interests is founded on principles of
public policy and good taste. It springs from the
attorney's duty to represent his client with
undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the
client's confidence as well as from the injunction
forbidding the examination of an attorney as to
any of the privileged communications of his
client.
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in
the case in which he has represented him but
also after the relation of attorney and client has
terminated. The
bare
attorney-client
relationship with a client precludes an attorney
from accepting professional employment from
the client's adversary either in the same
case or in a different but related action. A
lawyer is forbidden from representing a
subsequent client against a former client when
the subject matter of the present controversy is
related, directly or indirectly, to the subject
matter of the previous litigation in which he
appeared for the former client.
We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez that the
termination of the relation of attorney and client
provides no justification for a lawyer to represent
an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of
the former client. The reason for the rule is that
the client's confidence once reposed cannot be
divested by the expiration of the professional
employment. Consequently, a lawyer should
not, even after the severance of the relation with
his client, do anything which will injuriously
affect his former client in any matter in which he
previously represented him nor should he
disclose or use any of the client's confidences
acquired in the previous relation.
In this case, respondent's averment that his
relationship with Alba has long been severed by
the act of the latter of not turning over the
proceeds collected in Civil Case No. 98-6804, in
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connivance with the complainant, is unavailing.
Termination of the attorney-client relationship
precludes an attorney from representing a new
client whose interest is adverse to his former
client. Alba may not be his original client but the
fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and
Alba v. Bustamante and her husband," is a
clear indication that respondent is protecting the
interests of both Valdez and Alba in the said
case. Respondent cannot just claim that the
lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba
has long been severed without observing
Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
wherein the written consent of his client is
required.
In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr., citing the case
of Quiambao v. Bamba, we held that:
The proscription against representation of
conflicting interests applies to a situation where
the opposing parties are present clients in the
same action or in an unrelated action. It is of no
moment that the lawyer would not be called
upon to contend for one client that which the
lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that
there would be no occasion to use the
confidential information acquired from one to the
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are
wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing
parties in one case, one of whom would lose the
suit, are present clients and the nature or
conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers
with each of them would affect the performance
of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.
Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
states that "a lawyer shall preserve the
confidences and secrets of his client even after
the attorney-client relation is terminated."
The reason for the prohibition is found in the
relation of attorney and client, which is one of
trust and confidence of the highest degree. A
lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts
connected with his client's case. He learns from
his client the weak points of the action as well
as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be
considered sacred and guarded with care.
From the foregoing, it is evident that
respondent's representation of Valdez and Alba
against Bustamante and her husband, in one
case, and Valdez against Alba, in another case,
is a clear case of conflict of interests which
merits a corresponding sanction from this Court.
Respondent may have withdrawn his
representation in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK
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upon being warned by the court, but the same
will not exculpate him from the charge of
representing conflicting interests in his
representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.
Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in
accepting professional employments, to refrain
from all appearances and acts of impropriety
including circumstances indicating conflict of
interests, and to behave at all times with
circumspection and dedication befitting a
member of the Bar, especially observing
candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions
with his clients.
On knowingly misleading the court by
submitting false documentary evidence.
Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 007137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for ejectment,
respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as
evidence of Valdez's ownership despite the fact
that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued
in the name of Alba on February 2, 1995.
Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case
No. 00-7137 on November 27, 2000 and
presented TCT No. 273020 as evidence of
Valdez's
ownership
of
the
subject
property. During
the
hearing
before
Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that
when the Answer was filed in the said case, that
was the time that he came to know that the title
was already in the name of Alba; so that when
the court dismissed the complaint, he did not do
anything anymore. Respondent further avers
that Valdez did not tell him the truth and things
were revealed to him only when the case for
rescission was filed in 2002.
Upon examination of the record, it was noted
that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK for rescission
of contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500
was also filed on November 27, 2000, before
RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, thus belying
the averment of respondent that he came to
know of Alba's title only in 2002 when the case
for rescission was filed. It was revealed during
the hearing before Commissioner Raval that
Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK
were filed on the same date, although in
different courts and at different times.
Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of
the fact that the title he submitted was already
cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name
of Alba in 1995 yet, as proof of the latter's
ownership.
Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which
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provides that a lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be mislead by any artifice. It matters not that the
trial court was not misled by respondent's
submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of
Valdez, as shown by its decision dated January
8, 2002 dismissing the complaint for
ejectment. What is decisive in this case is
respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court
by presenting TCT No. 273020 despite the fact
that said title was already cancelled and a new
one, TCT No. 275500, was already issued in the
name of Alba.
In Young v. Batuegas,37 we held that a lawyer
must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his
admission to the Bar that he will "do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to his clients." He should bear in
mind that as an officer of the court his high
vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the
law and the facts of the case and to aid it in
doing justice and arriving at correct
conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are
entitled to expect only complete honesty from
lawyers appearing and pleading before them.
While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend
his client's rights and is expected to display the
utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his
conduct must never be at the expense of truth.
A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs
to a profession to which society has entrusted
the administration of law and the dispensation of
justice. As such, he should make himself more
an exemplar for others to emulate.
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>On initiating numerous cases in exchange
for nonpayment of rental fees.
Complainant alleges that respondent filed the
following cases: (a) Civil Case No. 2000-657MK at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No.
00-7137 at the MTC, Branch 75; and (c) I.S.
Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled
"Valencia v. Samala" for estafa and grave
coercion, respectively, before the Marikina City
Prosecutor. Complainant claims that the two
criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the
cases she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S.
No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318
against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for
trespass to dwelling.
As culled from the records, Valdez entered into
a retainer agreement with respondent. As
payment for his services, he was allowed to
occupy the property for free and utilize the same
as his office pursuant to their retainer
agreement.
Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01036162 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for
estafa and grave coercion, respectively, to
protect his client's rights against complainant
who filed I.S. No. 00-4306 for estafa against
Lagmay, and I.S. No. 00-4318 against Alvin
Valencia for trespass to dwelling.
We find the charge to be without sufficient basis.
The act of respondent of filing the aforecited
cases to protect the interest of his client, on one
hand, and his own interest, on the other, cannot
be made the basis of an administrative charge
unless it can be clearly shown that the same
was being done to abuse judicial processes to
commit injustice.
The filing of an administrative case against
respondent for protecting the interest of his
client and his own right would be putting a
burden on a practicing lawyer who is obligated
to defend and prosecute the right of his client.
On having a reputation for being immoral by
siring illegitimate children.
We find respondent liable for being immoral by
siring illegitimate children.
During the hearing, respondent admitted that he
sired three children by Teresita Lagmay who are
all over 20 years of age, while his first wife was
still alive. He also admitted that he has eight
children by his first wife, the youngest of whom
is over 20 years of age, and after his wife died
in
1997,
he
married
Lagmay
in
1998. Respondent further admitted that
Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments
being claimed by complainant. However, he
does not consider his affair with Lagmay as a
relationship and does not consider the latter
as his second family. He reasoned that he was
not staying with Lagmay because he has two
houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in
Marikina.
In this case, the admissions made by
respondent are more than enough to hold him
liable on the charge of immorality. During the
hearing, respondent did not show any remorse.
He even justified his transgression by saying
that he does not have any relationship with
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Lagmay and despite the fact that he sired three
children by the latter, he does not consider them
as his second family. It is noted that during the
hearing, respondent boasts in telling the
commissioner that he has two houses - in
Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in
Marikina, where Lagmay lives. It is of no
moment that respondent eventually married
Lagmay after the death of his first wife. The fact
still remains that respondent did not live up to
the exacting standard of morality and decorum
required of the legal profession.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. It may be difficult to specify
the degree of moral delinquency that may
qualify an act as immoral, yet, for purposes of
disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been
defined as that "conduct which is willful, flagrant,
or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable
members of the community. Thus, in several
cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a
lawyer for keeping a mistress in defiance of the
mores and sense of morality of the
community. That respondent subsequently
married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his
wife and that this is his first infraction as regards
immorality serve to mitigate his liability.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent
Atty.
Luciano
D.
Valencia GUILTY of
misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) years, effective immediately upon
receipt of herein Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all
courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines as well as the Office of the Bar
Confidant for their information and guidance,
and let it be entered in respondent's personal
records.
SO ORDERED.
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MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
CASE DIGEST:
FACTS:



Complainant Clarita J. Samala filed
against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia for
Disbarment on the following grounds:
serving on two separate occasions as
counsel for contending parties,
knowingly misleading the court by
submitting
false
documentary
evidence, initiating numerous cases in
exchange for nonpayment of rental
fees and having a reputation of being
immoral by siring illegitimate children.
Commissioner found respondent guilty
of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility
and recommended the penalty of
suspension for six months.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted
and approved the report and
recommendation of Commissioner
Reyes but increased the penalty of
suspension from six months to one
year.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the respondent is
guilty for violation of Canons 1, 10 and 21 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING: Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. It may
be
difficult to specify the degree of moral
delinquency that may qualify an act as
immoral, yet, for purposes of disciplining a
lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as
that "conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable
members of the community.
In this case, respondent admitted that
he sired three children by Teresita Lagmay
who are all over 20 years of age, while his first
wife was still alive. He also admitted that he
has eight children by his first wife, the
youngest of whom is over 20 years of age,
and after his wife died, he married Lagmay.
These admissions made by respondent are
more than enough to hold him liable on the
charge of immorality.
The Court also found that the
respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice. It was shown that
the respondent knowingly submitted to the
court a title that was already cancelled, thus,
false documentary evidence, in lieu of a new
title issued in the name of Alba which
misleads the decision of the lower court.
Lastly, as a lawyer, respondent is
bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which states
that "a lawyer shall preserve the confidences
and secrets of his client even after the
attorney-client relation is terminated." In this
case, it is evident that respondent's
representation of Valdez and Alba against
Bustamante and her husband, in one case,
and Valdez against Alba, in another case, is a
clear case of conflict of interests which merits
a corresponding sanction from this Court.
Thus, respondent is reminded to be more
cautious
in
accepting
professional
employments, to refrain from all appearances
and
acts
of
impropriety
including
circumstances indicating conflict of interests,
and to behave at all times with circumspection
and dedication befitting a member of the Bar,
especially observing candor, fairness and
loyalty in all transactions with his clients.
The Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D.
Valencia GUILTY of misconduct and violation
of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of
Professional
Responsibility.
He
is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) years, effective immediately upon
receipt of herein Resolution.
In re Gutierrez 5 SCRA 661 (1962)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. L-363
July 31, 1962
IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent.
Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint.
Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of
the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5, 1945.
In criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First
Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of the
murder of Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor
of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was
sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon review by
this Court the judgment of conviction was affirmed on
June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-17101), but the penalty
was changed to reclusion perpetua. After serving a
portion of the sentence respondent was granted a
conditional pardon by the President on August 19,
1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was
remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate
any of the penal laws of the Philippines."
On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased
Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a
verified complaint before this Court praying that
respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers
pursuant to Rule 127, section 5. Respondent
presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts
alleged by complainant regarding pardon in defense,
on the authority of the decision of this Court in the
case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar
may be removed suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court by reason of his
conviction of a crime insolving moral turpitude. Murder
is, without doubt, such a crime. The term "moral
turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary
to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. In re
Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment
statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes to his fellowmen or to society in general,
contrary to the accepted rule of right and duty
between man and man. State ex rel. Conklin v.
Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am. Jur. Sec. 279. pp.
428-429.
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the
conditional pardon extended to respondent places
him beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment
aforecited. Reliance is placed by him squarely on the
Lontok case. The respondent therein was convicted of
bigamy and thereafter pardoned by the GovernorGeneral. In a subsequent viction, this Court decided
in his favor and held: "When proceedings to strike an
attorney's name from the rolls the fact of a conviction
for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held
that a pardon operates to wipe out the conviction and
is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the
attorney after the pardon has been granted."
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the
question now before us. In making it the Court
proceeded on the assumption that the pardon granted
to respondent Lontok was absolute. This is implicit in
the ratio decidendi of the case, particularly in the
citations to support it, namely. In Re Emmons, 29 Cal.
App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 343;
and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott vs.
State the court said:
We are of opinion that after received an
unconditional pardon the record of the felony
conviction could no longer be used as a basis
for the proceeding provided for in article 226.
The record, when offered in evidence, was
met with an unconditional pardon, and could
not, therefore, properly be said to afford "proof
of a conviction of any felony." Having been
thus cancelled, all its force as a felony
conviction was taken away. A pardon falling
short of this would not be a pardon, according
to the judicial construction which that act of
executive grace was received. Ex
parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95
U.S. 149, and cases there cited; Young v.
Young, 61 Tex. 191.
And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland
quoted with approval in the Lontok case is as follows:
A pardon reaches both the punishment
prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it
releases the punishment and blots out the
existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law
the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense. It granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and
disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from
attaching; if granted after conviction, it
removes the penalties and disabilities, and
restores him to all his civil rights it makes him,
as it were, a new man, and gives him a new
credit and capacity.
The pardon granted to respondent here is not
absolute but conditional, and merely remitted the
unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the
offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland, which
was "a full pardon and amnesty for all offense by him
committed in connection with rebellion (civil war)
against government of the United States."
The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok
are inapplicable here. Respondent Gutierrez must be
judged upon the fact of his conviction for murder
without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense.
The crime was qualified by treachery and aggravated
by its having been committed in hand, by taking
advantage of his official position (respondent being
municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of
motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado
Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude
involved is such as to justify his being purged from the
profession.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to
those who measure up to certain rigid standards of
mental and moral fitness. For the admission of a
candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only
prescribe a test of academic preparation but require
satisfactory testimonials of good moral character.
These standards are neither dispensed with nor
lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue to
adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or
removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27
Law ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions,
the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws.
He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in
the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to
trample them under foot and to ignore the very bonds
of society, argues recreancy to his position and office
and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate
and dangerous elements of the body politic.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and
considering the nature of the crime for which
respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been
convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name
stricken from the roll of lawyers.
Bengzon, C.J., Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
MELVYN G. GARCIA Vs. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO A.C.
No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457 February 3, 2015
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No.
10457
February 3, 2015
MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RAUL H. SESBRENO, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr.
Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty. Raul H.
Sesbrefio (Sesbrefio). The two cases, docketed as
A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were consolidated
in the Court's Resolution dated 30 September 2014.
A.C. No. 7973
On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for
disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of the
Bar Confidant. The case was docketed as A.C. No.
7973. Garcia alleged that in 1965, he married Virginia
Alcantara in Cebu. They had two children, Maria
Margarita and Angie Ruth. In 1971, he and Virginia
separated. He became a dentist and practiced his
profession in Cabanatuan City. Garcia alleged that
in1992, Virginia filed a petition for the annulment of
their marriage, which was eventually granted.
Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan,
Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and Angie
Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his
sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the
filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39
years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The
case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from
Japan. When Sesbreño and Garcia’s children learned
abouthis return, Sesbreño filed a Second Amended
Complaint against him. Garcia alleged that he learned
that Sesbreño was convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide in
Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged that
Sesbreño is only on parole. Garcia alleged that
homicide is a crime against moral turpitude; and thus,
Sesbreño should not be allowed to continue his
practice of law.
In his Comment, Sesbreño alleged that on 15 August
2008, Garcia filed a similar complaint against him
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed
as CBC Case No. 08-2273. Sesbreño alleged that
Garcia’s complaint was motivated by resentment and
desire for revenge because he acted as pro bono
counsel for Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth.
In the Court’s Resolution dated 18 January 2010, the
Court referred A.C. No. 7973 to the IBP for
investigation, report and recommendation.
A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273)
A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July
2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against
Sesbreño before the IBP-CBD. He alleged that
Sesbreño is practicing law despite his previous
conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU31733, and despite the facts that he is only on parole
and that he has not fully served his sentence. Garcia
alleged that Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the
practice of law despite his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Upon the directive of the
IBP-CBD, Garcia submitted his verified complaint
against Sesbreño alleging basically the same facts he
alleged in A.C. No. 7973.
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that
his sentence was commuted and the phrase "with the
inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was
deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory
penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies
only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreño further
alleged that homicide does not involve moral
turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’s complaint
was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and
desire to retaliate against him for representing
Garcia’s daughters in court.
The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD
Case No. 08-2273. The parties agreed on the sole
issue to be resolved: whether moral turpitude is
involved in a conviction for homicide. The IBP-CBD
ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu found
Sesbreño guilty of murder and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal,
this Court downgraded the crime to homicide and
sentenced Sesbreño to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor
as minimum to 16 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporalas maximum. The IBP-CBD found that
Sesbreño was released from confinement on 27 July
2001 following his acceptance of the conditions of his
parole on 10 July 2001.
The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime
involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or
suspension. Citing International Rice Research
Institute v. National Labor Relations Commission, the
IBPCBD further ruled that homicide may or may not
involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of
the crime. The IBP-CBD reviewed the decision of this
Court convicting Sesbreño for the crime of homicide,
and found that the circumstances leading to the death
of the victim involved moral turpitude. The IBP-CBD
stated:
Neither victim Luciano Amparadon or his companion
Christopher Yapchangco was shown to be a foe of
respondent and neither had the victim Luciano nor his
companion Christopher shown to have wronged the
respondent. They simply happened to be at the wrong
place and time the early morning of June 3, 1993.
The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano
solely caused by respondent, bear the earmarks of
moral turpitude. Paraphrasing what the Supreme
Court observed in Soriano v. Dizon, supra, the
respondent, by his conduct, displayed extreme
arrogance and feeling of self-importance. Respondent
acted like a god who deserved not to be slighted by a
couple of drunks who may have shattered the
stillness of the early morning with their boisterous
antics, natural display of loud bravado of drunken
men who had one too many. Respondent’s inordinate
over reaction to the ramblings of drunken men who
were not even directed at respondent reflected poorly
on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession.
Respondent was not only vindictive without a cause;
he was cruel with a misplaced sense of superiority.
Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty.
Dizon where the respondent was disbarred for having
been convicted of frustrated homicide, the IBP-CBD
recommended that Sesbreño be disbarred and his
name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February
2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
1
2
3
approved the Report and Recommendation of the
IBP-CBD.
On 6 May 2013, Sesbreño filed a motion for
reconsideration before the IBP-CBD. Sesbreño
alleged that the IBP-CBD misunderstood and
misapplied Soriano v. Atty. Dizon. He alleged that the
attendant circumstances in Sorianoare disparate,
distinct, and different from his case. He further alleged
that there was no condition set on the grant of
executive clemency to him; and thus, he was restored
to his full civil and political rights. Finally, Sesbreño
alleged that after his wife died in an ambush, he
already stopped appearing as private prosecutor in
the case for bigamy against Garcia and that he
already advised his clients to settle their other cases.
He alleged that Garcia already withdrew the
complaints against him.
On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of Governors
passed Resolution No. XX-2014-31 denying
Sesbreño’s motion for reconsideration. The IBPCBD
transmitted the records of the case to the Office of the
Bar Confidant on 20 May 2014. CBD Case No. 082273 was redocketed as A.C. No. 10457. In the
Court’s Resolution dated 30 September 2014, the
Court consolidated A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No.
10457.
The only issue in these cases is whether conviction
for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude.
We adopt the findings and recommendation of the
IBP-CBD and approve Resolution No. XX-2013-19
dated 12 February 2013 and Resolution No. XX-201431 dated 11 February 2014 of the IBP Board of
Governors.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that
a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has
ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for
conviction by final judgment for a crime involving
moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes to his fellow men or to society in general,
contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
The question of whether conviction for homicide
involves moral turpitude was discussed by this Court
in International Rice Research Institute v.
NLRC where it ruled:
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of
homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide
may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on
the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not
involved in every criminal act and is not shown by
every known and intentional violation of statute, but
whether any particular conviction involves moral
turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently
depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While
x x x generally but not always, crimes mala in
seinvolve moral turpitude, while crimes mala
prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained
whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by
classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum
prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in
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1âwphi1
se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are
crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala
prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude
is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning
of which must be left to the process of judicial
inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached.
In People v. Sesbreño, the Court found Sesbreño
guilty of homicide and ruled: WHEREFORE, the
assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733 is
hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Raul H. Sesbreñois
hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and hereby
sentenced to suffer a prison term of 9 years and 1 day
of prision mayor, as a minimum, to 16 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal, as a maximum, with
accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Luciano Amparado in the
amount of ₱50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we agree
with the IBPCBD that the circumstances show the
presence of moral turpitude.
The Decision showed that the victim Luciano
Amparado (Amparado) and his companion
Christopher Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were walking
and just passed by Sesbreño’s house when the latter,
without any provocation from the former, went out of
his house, aimed his rifle, and started firing at them.
According to Yapchangco, theywere about five
meters, more or less, from the gate of Sesbreño when
they heard the screeching sound of the gate and
when they turned around, they saw Sesbreño aiming
his rifle at them. Yapchangco and Amparado ran
away but Amparado was hit. An eyewitness, Rizaldy
Rabanes (Rabanes), recalled that he heard shots and
opened the window of his house. He saw
Yapchangco and Amparado running away while
Sesbreño was firing his firearm rapidly, hitting
Rabanes’ house in the process. Another witness,
Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall down after being
shot, then saw Sesbreño in the middle of the street,
carrying a long firearm, and walking back towards the
gate of his house. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that
Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong
place and time. They did not do anything that justified
the indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño that
eventually led to the death of Amparado.
We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the
executive clemency restored his full civil and political
rights. Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio to bolster
his argument. In thatcase, Atty. Parcasio was granted
"an absolute and unconditional pardon" which
restored his "full civil and political rights," a
circumstance not present inthese cases. Here, the
Order of Commutation did not state that the pardon
was absolute and unconditional. The accessory
penalties were not mentioned when the original
sentence was recited in the Order of Commutation
and they were also not mentioned in stating the
commuted sentence. It only states: By virtue of the
authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and
upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons
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and Parole, the original sentence of prisoner RAUL
SESBREÑO Y HERDA convicted by the Regional
Trial Court, Cebu City and Supreme Court and
sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from 9
years and 1 day to 16 years and 4 months
imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of ₱50,000.00
is/are hereby commuted to an indeterminate prison
term of from 7 years and 6 months to 10 years
imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of ₱50,000.00.
Again, there was no mention that the executive
clemency was absolute and unconditional and
restored Sesbreño to his full civil and political rights.
There are four acts of executive clemency that the
President can extend: the President can grant
reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. In
this case, the executive clemency merely "commuted
to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6
months to 10 years imprisonment" the penalty
imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere
reduction of penalty. Commutation only partially
extinguished criminal liability. The penalty for
Sesbrefio' s crime was never wiped out. He served
the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason
he was released from prison. More importantly, the
Final Release and Discharge stated that "[i]t is
understood that such x x x accessory penalties of the
law as have not been expressly remitted herein shall
subsist." Hence, the Parcasio case has no application
here. Even if Sesbrefio has been granted pardon,
there is nothing in the records that shows that it was a
full and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice
of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only
to those possessing good moral character. A
violation of the high moral standards of the legal
profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate
penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of
disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Raul H. Sesbrefio is
DISBARRED effective immediately upon his receipt of
this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the
Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this
Decision be attached to the personal records of
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
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21
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
TERESITA J.
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Associate Justice
(On leave)
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M.
PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P.
BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL
CASTILLO
Associate Justice
MARTIN S.
VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL
PEREZ
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL
MENDOZA
Associate Justice
(no part)
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
ESTELA M.
PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
MARVIC M.V.F.
LEONEN
Associate Justice
FRANCIS H.
JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
Tolosa vs. Cargo, 171 SCRA 21(1989)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. 2385 March 8, 1989
JOSE TOLOSA, complainant,
vs.
ALFREDO CARGO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 7 April 1982, complainant Jose Tolosa filed with
the Court an Affidavit- Complaint dated 7 March 1982
seeking the disbarment of respondent District
Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality.
Complainant claimed that respondent had been
seeing his (complainant's) wife Priscilla M. Tolosa in
his house and elsewhere. Complainant further alleged
that in June 1981, his wife left his conjugal home and
went to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street,
Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila and that
since then has been living with respondent at that
address.
Complying with an order of this Court, respondent
filed a "Comment and/or Answer" dated 13 May 1982
denying the allegations of complainant. Respondent
acknowledged that complainant's wife had been
seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of
seeking advice from respondent (in view of the
continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital
accusations of affiant [complainant] against her),
much as complainant's mother-in-law had also
frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his
wife and mother as to what to do about the"
continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and
the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less
serious) that the latter sustained from the former."
(Rollo, p. 8).
Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to
respondent's "Comment and/or Answer" and made a
number of further allegations, to wit:
(a) That complainant's
wife was not the only
mistress that
respondent had taken;
(b) That respondent
had paid for the
hospital and medical
bills of complainant's
wife last May 1981,
and visited her at the
hospital everyday;
(c) That he had several
times pressed his wife
to stop seeing
respondent but that
she had refused to do
so;
(d) That she had
acquired new
household and
electrical appliances
where she was living
although she had no
means of livelihood;
and
(e) That respondent
was paying for his
wife's house rent.
Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982,
denying the further allegations of complainant, and
stating that he (respondent) had merely given
complainant's wife the amount of P35.00 by way of
financial assistance during her confinement in the
hospital.
By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982, the Court
referred this case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. The
Solicitor General's office held a number of hearings
which took place from 21 October 1982 until 1986, at
which hearings complainant and respondent
presented evidence both testimonial and
documentary.
The Solicitor General summed up what complainant
sought to establish in the following terms:
1. That respondent
had been courting his
wife, Priscilla (tsn, May
12, 1982, p. 9).
2. That he actually saw
them together holding
hands in l980 in Cubao
and Sto. Domingo,
Quezon City (tsn, pp.
13-15, May 12, 1983).
3. That sometime in
June, 1982, his wife
left their conjugal
house at No. 1 Lopez
Jaena Street, Galas,
Quezon City, to live
with respondent at No.
45 Sisa Street, Barrio
Tenejeros, Malabon,
Metro Manila (tsn, pp.
16- 17, May 12, 1983).
4. That while Priscilla
was staying there, she
acquired household
appliances which she
could not afford to buy
as she has no source
of income (tsn, pp. 1011, Sept. 10, 1985,
Exh. 'M', N' and 'Q').
5. That when Priscilla
was hospitalized in
May, 1982, at the FEU
Hospital, respondent
paid for her expenses
and took care of her
(tsn, pp. 18-20, June
15, 1983). In fact, an
incident between
respondent and
complainant took place
in said hospital (tsn,
pp. 5-8, Sept. 20,
1983, Exhibits 'C' and
'C-l').
6. That an incident
which was subject of a
complaint took place
involving respondent
and complainant at No.
45 Sisa Street, Barrio
Tenejeros, Malabon,
Metro Manila (tsn, pp.
8- 10, July 29, 1983;
Exh. 'B', 'B-l' and 'K').
7. That again in
Quezon City, incidents
involving respondent
and complainant were
brought to the attention
of the police (Exhibits
'F' and 'G').
8. That Complainant
filed an administrative
case for immorality
against respondent
with the CLAO and
that respondent was
suspended for one
year (Exhibits 'D' and
'E'). (Rollo, pp. 33-35).
Respondent's defenses were summarized by the
Solicitor General in the following manner:
a) That Priscilla used
to see respondent for
advice regarding her
difficult relationship
with complainant; that
Priscilla left
complainant because
she suffered
maltreatment, physical
injuries and public
humiliation inflicted or
caused by
complainant;
b) That respondent
was not courting
Priscilla, nor lived with
her at No. 45 Sisa St.,
Tenejeros, Malabon,
Metro Manila; that the
owner of the house
where Priscilla lived in
Malabon was a friend
and former client
whom respondent
visited now and then;
c) That respondent
only gave P35.00 to
Priscilla in the FEU
Hospital, as assistance
in her medical
expenses; that he
reprimanded
complainant for lying
on the bed of Priscilla
in the hospital which
led to their being
investigated by the
security guards of the
hospital;
d) That it is not true
that he was with
Priscilla holding hands
with her in Cubao or
Sto. Domingo Church
in 1980;
e) That Priscilla bought
all the appliances in
her apartment at 45
Sisa Street, Tenejeros,
Malabon, Metro Manila
from her earnings;
f) That it is not true that
he ran after
complainant and tried
to stab him at No. 1
Galas St., Quezon
City; that said incident
was between Priscilla's
brother and
complainant;
g) That it is also not
true that he is always
in 45 Sisa St.,
Tenejeros, Malabon,
Metro Manila and/or he
had a quarrel with
complainant at 45 Sisa
St., Malabon; that the
quarrel was between
Priscilla's brother,
Edgardo Miclat, and
complainant; that
respondent went there
only to intervene upon
request of
complainant's wife
(see tsn, June 21,
1984). (Rollo, pp. 3537).
The Solicitor General then submitted the following
FINDINGS
1. That complainant
and Priscilla are
spouses residing at
No.1 Lopez Jaena St.,
Galas, Quezon City.
2. That respondent's
wife was their 'ninang'
at their marriage, and
they (complainant and
Priscilla) considered
respondent also their
'ninong'.
3. That respondent
and complainant are
neighbors, their
residences being one
house away from each
other.
4. That respondent
admitted that Priscilla
used to see him for
advice, because of her
differences with
complainant.
5. That Priscilla, in
fact, left their conjugal
house and lived at No.
45 Sisa St., Barrio
Tenejeros, Malabon,
Metro Manila; that the
owner of the house
where Priscilla lived in
Malabon is a friend
and former client of
respondent.
6. That Priscilla indeed
acquired appliances
while she was staying
in Malabon.
7. That incidents
involving respondent
and complainant had
indeed happened.
8. That Priscilla
returned to her
mother's house later in
1983 at No. 1 Lopez
Jaena St., Galas,
Quezon City; but
complainant was
staying two or three
houses away in his
mother's house.
9. That complainant
filed an administrative
case for immorality
against respondent in
CLAO, where
respondent was found
guilty and suspended
for one year. (Rollo,
pp. 37-39).
In effect, WON At the same time, however, the
Solicitor General found that the respondent had not
been able to explain satisfactorily the following:
1. Respondent's failure
to avoid seeing
Priscilla, in spite of
complainant's
suspicion and/or
jealousy that he was
having an affair with
his wife.
2. Priscilla's being able
to rent an apartment in
Malabon whose owner
is admittedly a friend
and former client of
respondent.
3. Respondent's failure
to avoid going to
Malabon to visit his
friend, in spite of his
differences with
complainant.
4. Respondent's failure
to avoid getting
involved invarious
incidents involving
complainant and
Priscilla's brothers
(Exhs. 'B', B-1', 'F', 'G',
['G-1'] and ['I'])
5. Respondent's
interest in seeing
Priscilla in the evening
when she was
confined in the FEU
Hospital, in spite again
of his differences with
complainant. (Rollo,
pp. 39-40).
Thus, the Solicitor General concluded that respondent
had failed "to properly deport himself by avoiding any
possible action or behavior which may be
misinterpreted by complainant, thereby causing
possible trouble in the complainant's family," which
behavior was "unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer
of the court." (Rollo, p. 40). The Solicitor General
recommended that respondent Atty. Alfredo Cargo be
suspended from the practice of law for three (3)
months and be severely reprimanded.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the record
does not contain sufficient evidence to show that
respondent had indeed been cohabiting with
complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of
immorality. For this very reason, we do not believe
that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
may be properly imposed upon respondent.
At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent
should be reprimanded for failure to comply with the
rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required
from the members of the Bar and officers of the court.
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact
be of good moral character but must also be seen to
be of good moral character and leading lives in
accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. More specifically, a member of the Bar
and officer of the court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships or the keeping of
mistresses but must also so behave himself as to
avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief
that he is flouting those moral standards.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND
respondent attorney for conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bar and an officer of the court, and to
WARN him that continuation of the same or similar
conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.
Lizaso vs. Amante, 198 SCRA (1991)
1
Footnotes
1 Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 869
(1963); Toledo v. Toledo, 7 SCRA 747
(1963).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 2019
June 3, 1991
SHIRLEY CUYUGAN LIZASO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SERGIO AMANTE, respondent
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On 27 March 1979, Shirley Cuyugan-Lizaso filed a
sworn Complaint for disbarment against respondent
Atty. Sergio G. Amante charging the latter with
deceitful and grossly immoral conduct. The Court
required respondent Amante to file an Answer to the
complaint, and respondent did so on 25 May 1979. A
Reply dated 23 September 1980 was filed by
complainant.
By a Resolution dated 10 November 1980, the Court
referred this case to the Office of the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation.
On 18 June 1981, complainant wrote a letter to this
Court requesting an order restraining respondent from
leaving the country and an order restraining
respondent's employer, the University of the East,
from disbursing monies that may be due to
respondent on account of his retirement from the
University's service. The Court referred this request to
the Office of the Solicitor General in a Resolution
dated 15 July 1981.
The Office of the Solicitor General accordingly held
hearings at which the complainant appeared and
testified on her own behalf and submitted
documentary evidence to support her allegations of
misconduct on the part of the respondent Amante.
Respondent Amante appeared at these hearings,
testified on his own behalf and was cross-examined.
Respondent also presented documentary evidence on
his behalf, but failed to complete his presentation of
evidence despite repeated notices to do so.
Moreover, respondent Amante failed to offer formally
his documentary evidence.
The complainant's case was summarized by the
Solicitor General in his Report and Recommendation
dated 7 February 1990 in the following manner:
On August 7, 1978, complainant handed to
respondent Prudential Bank Check No.
655615 dated August 4, 1978 in the amount
of P5,000.00 (Exh. "A") payable to the latter
and which, per agreement between the two of
them, was to be invested in respondent's
business venture in the casino. Complainant
was enticed into investing in the business by
respondent's proposition that the business will
guarantee her an interest of 10% profit a day.
Complainant was further convinced because
she knows of her sister's friend who deals in
the same business in the casino and who
even accepts jewelries from gamblers who
have lost heavily. The check was encashed by
respondent as shown by his signature
appearing at the back of the check.
A written receipt (Exh. "B") for the amount of
P5,000.00 was signed by respondent on
August 7, 1978 and which states:
Mrs. Shirley Cuyugan Lizaso
entrusted the amount of P5,000.00 to
Atty. Sergio Amante to be invested in
business with a guarantee of 10% net
profit a day starting Aug. 7, 1978,
capital to be returned after two
months.
Received by:
S.M Amante
(signed)
The complainant originally prepared the check
and the receipt on August 4, 1978. She tried
to seek respondent's signature on the receipt
but it was only on August 7, 1978 when she
was able to see respondent and gave to him
the P5,000.00 check for which respondent
signed the receipt/promissory note.
Three days after August 7, 1978, complainant
tried to see respondent in order to collect the
interest on her investment but respondent
failed to give her any. For the many weeks
that followed, complainant even begged
respondent to return her money if he could not
give the interests but respondent merely made
promises.
Afraid that her investment will not be returned,
complainant sought the help of the U.E Legal
Department Head, Atty. Pedro Siojo and
presented her written complaint dated August
27, 1978 against respondent (Exh. "C"). Atty.
Siojo scheduled a confrontation but the
respondent failed to come. The second
scheduled confrontation likewise resulted in
respondent's failure to appear. In view of
these, Atty. Siojo informed her that he cannot
do anything if respondent refuses to appear.
Because of this, complainant sought the help
of Mr. Antonio Ravelo, U.E Faculty President,
but the latter was not able to help her because
respondent denied that he ever owed
complainant anything.
Again, complainant sought the help of the
University President, Conrado Aquino, by her
letter of December 11, 1978 (Exh. "D"). Mr.
Aquino, however, was of the opinion that this
was a personal agreement best left between
the two of them to settle.
Respondent Amante presented a different version of
the facts, which was substantially as follows.
Sometime in June 1978, complainant allegedly
approached respondent for a loan of P20,000.00
needed to forestall foreclosure of a mortgage on
complainant's house. Respondent Amante allegedly
lent P5,000.00 to complainant, which loan fell due a
month later. Complainant was allegedly very slow in
repaying the loan. To provide complainant with an
incentive for repaying her loan from the respondent,
the latter dangled the possibility of a second loan for
P20,000.00 to complainant, upon complainant's
repayment of her first loan. Thus, on 7 August 1978,
complainant tendered to respondent Amante the
P5,000.00 check referred to in the complaint. Amante
admitted he encashed the check, but' argued that he
did so to realize the payment of complainant's prior
obligation to him. Respondent said he had no real
intention of extending a second loan to complainant.
This outraged the complainant and she allegedly then
tried to extort money from respondent Amante by
harassing him with her false and fabricated complaint.
The respondent also denied having signed the receipt
for P5,000.00 with the wording appearing in Exhibit
"B" of the Complaint. At the same time, to
substantiate his own version of the evidence,
respondent offered in evidence Exhibits "1" and "2"
being a copy of a receipt for P5,000.00 allegedly
given in payment of complainant's loan from
respondent, and purportedly signed by complainant.
After careful examination of the records of this case,
we agree with the Solicitor General that complainant
has discharged the burden of showing, by clear and
convincing evidence, that she had delivered
P5,000.00 to respondent Amante for investment
purposes and that respondent not only failed to
deliver the promised return on the investment but also
the principal thereof, despite repeated demands
therefor. The reasoning and conclusions of fact of the
Solicitor General follow:
First. Most persuasive in lending credence to
this is the fact that the check, at the time of
encashment by respondent, already contained
the words "capital investment" at the back
thereof. The bank's microfilm copy of the
reverse side of the check confirms it. This
amply and clearly substantiate the material
fact that at the time the check was received by
respondent and presented by him to the bank,
1
the agreement between him and complainant
was to invest the amount in respondent's
business venture. It totally negates
respondent's claim that the check was in
payment of a previous loan given by him to
complainant.
Second. The receipt/promissory note (Exh.
"B") dated August 7, 1978 clearly expresses
the terms of their oral agreement that the
amount of P5,000.00 was entrusted to
respondent to be invested by him in his
business venture, that said amount has a
guarantee of 10% profit per day starting
August 7, 1978, and that the capital of
P5,000.00 shall be returned to complainant
after two months from date thereof. Said
receipt unquestionably bears the signature of
respondent. To all these terms, respondent
affixed his signature.
Third. After complainant had repeatedly
demanded the return of her P5,000.00 capital
investment which respondent failed to do, the
latter wrote a note dated November 7, 1978
addressed to a certain Mr. Resty Noriega
(Exh. "H") authorizing complainant to collect in
his (respondent's) behalf his fee from Mr.
Noriega. Complainant presented this note to
Mr. Noriega who informed her that the note is
not clear enough to entrust complainant with
payment of respondent's fee. Mr. Noriega
then returned the note to her with the advice
that she should secure a letter from
respondent to specify the amount to be
collected by complainant. Respondent's note
does not show an admission of his obligation
to return or reimburse complainant's money.
Fourth. The tenacity and resourcefulness with
which complainant repeatedly sought help
from various school officials, such as the U.E
Head of Legal Department, the U.E Faculty
President and the University President
himself, in separate written complaints, prior
to finally securing legal assistance from a
private lawyer, all directed to seeking the
return or reimbursement of her P5,000.00
investment, are evincive of the credibility and
faithfulness to the truth of complainant's cause
of action against respondent.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General found
respondent's version of the facts to be unreal and
implausible. Moreover, the exhibits submitted by
respondent Amante appeared to have been fabricated
by respondent. The analysis of respondent's evidence
by the Solicitor General follows:
xxx
xxx
xxx
1. Annex "1" — photocopy of a stub in an
actual size as short and as small as one inch
by three inches, dated August 7, 1987,
addressed to "Gigi" which is the nickname of
respondent and embodying ten words:
"Attached is check No. 655615 as payment of
my "utang'" and bearing the signature Shirley
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C. Lizaso. This evidence can only elicit
disbelief as being incredible if not
manufactured for the following reasons:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Furthermore, the situation raises the question
why complainant would give and sign such a
note of receipt when, in the ordinary course of
things as in the case at bar, it should be the
respondent who should sign and give a
receipt for the check of P5,000.00, if indeed
complainant paid her loan to respondent.
d) Finally, the stub receipt had never been
presented by respondent in any of the
investigations/confrontations set by the U.E.
Legal Department Head or the U.E Faculty
President. If there was any truth to the
genuineness of the stub receipt claimed by
respondent, he should have immediately
presented this in the scheduled confrontations
if only to dismiss the complaint outright or the
malicious rumor he claimed complainant was
spreading within the university. Instead, the
stub receipt suddenly surfaced only during the
investigation of this disbarment case.
2. Annex "2", subsequently marked as Exh.
"1", is the alleged receipt dated August 4,
1978 embodying the following words:
Received from Shirley C. Lizaso
Check No. 655615C (P5,000.00) in
payment of her loan.
[Unusually long vacant space between
the above words and signature below]
Sergio G. Amante
(signed)
Exh. "1" is fully handwritten. According to
respondent, Exh. "1" and Exh. "B" are one
and the same and that in view of the long and
big vacant space between the handwritten
words and his signature, he claimed that
complainant inserted the words in Exh. "B"
embodying the agreement that the P5,000.00
was received by respondent as her capital to
be invested in respondent's business venture
with a guarantee of 10% net profit a day
starting August 7, 1978 and the same to be
returned two months thereafter; and that
complainant allegedly cut off all the wordings
of Exh. "1" that what remained is the receipt
promissory note or Exh. "B" of the
complainant and the same signature of
respondent.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Moreover, it taxes credulity on why
respondent in Exh. "1" would affix his
signature so far away below from the
handwritten words, leaving a big void or
vacant space in between which any ordinary
layman knows may be used to another's
advantage and manipulated to the prejudice of
the signatory, even more so that respondent is
a lawyer.
Furthermore, a comparison of the edge of the
cut top portion of Exh. "B" with the last
handwritten line in Exh. "1" which consisted of
only one word "loan" would readily show that
the handwritten loops appearing on the edge
of the cut portion of the top of Exh. "B" do not,
at all, correspond to the last line of Exh. "1",
which does not contain any tail loops at all. In
other words, the last line of respondent's Exh.
"1" containing the handwritten word "loan"
does not have any tail loops that would
correspond with those appearing on the edge
of the top cut portion of complainant's Exh.
"B", if it were true that the paper showing Exh.
"B" is a physical continuation of Exh. "1" as
respondent would want the undersigned
Hearing Officer to believe. Immediately clear,
therefore, is the conclusion that Exh. "1" and
"B" are not the same and are far different from
each other.
Lastly, Exh. "1", just like Annex "1" (stub
receipt), had never been presented by
respondent in any of the confrontations set by
the university officials between complainant
and respondent, but was only presented
during the investigation at bar.
3. Respondent's claim that he enticed
complainant to pay him the alleged P5,000.00
loan he earlier gave to her, by promising to
give her P20,000.00 if she pays the P5,000.00
loan, is quite hollow and very unlikely. Any
person, the complainant no less, who knows
that she will be given a P20,000.00 loan would
very unlikely pay a previous loan of P5,000.00
but would merely partially offset said amount
and received instead the balance of
P15,000.00.
Moreover, it must be remembered that
complainant secured from the Prudential Bank
a loan of P5,000.00 on August 4, 1978 in
order to invest it on respondent's business
venture. To follow respondent's twisted
reasoning, it evokes wonder why complainant
would secure a P5,000.00 loan from the bank
just to pay a P5,000.00 loan to respondent
who promised to give her, anyway, a
P20,000.00 loan. If complainant really needed
the balance of P15,000.00, she could have
very well secured the same from the bank and
not from the respondent. In other words, there
was no necessity for complainant to obtain a
subsequent loan from respondent because
she could, just as well, get the same loan from
the bank as she was able to.
xxx
xxx
xxx
5. For a lawyer, as the respondent is, it
appears strange that he has not required
complainant to sign any receipt for the
P5,000.00 loan he allegedly gave her
"sometime in June, 1978." If complainant, who
is not a lawyer, was able to make him sign a
receipt for P5,000.00 she gave him,
respondent, with all his legal expertise, would
be doubly expected to protect his loan by a
similar receipt. And yet, respondent was not
able to, as there was actually none to secure.
Thus, it appears to the Court that respondent failed to
return and account for complainant's money
notwithstanding repeated demands of complainant for
such return and accounting. It also appears that when
finally brought before the Office of the Solicitor
General in the disbarment proceedings, respondent
tried to controvert complainant's charges by using in
evidence documents that appear to be falsified and
which try to make it appear that complainant had
delivered the P5,000.00 to respondent in payment of
a prior loan from the latter.
It is true, of course, that there was no attorney-client
relationship between respondent Amante and
complainant Cuyugan-Lizaso. The transaction that
complainant entered into with respondent did not
require respondent to perform professional legal
services for complainant nor did that transaction
relate to the rendition of professional services by
respondent to any other person.
As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In
Re Vicente Pelaez the principle that it can exercise its
power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not
involve the relationship of an attorney and client. In
that case, the respondent Vicente Pelaez, a member
of the Bar, was appointed guardian of a minor child.
As such guardian, he came into possession of certain
property, including some shares of stock in certain
corporations. Pelaez, while still guardian of the minor,
borrowed money from the Philippine National Bank
and to guarantee that personal loan, Pelaez, without
the knowledge or consent of the guardianship court,
pledged the shares of stock belonging to the minor. In
disciplining the respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm said:
. . . [A]s a general rule, a court will not assume
jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for
misconduct alleged to have been committed in
his private capacity. But this is a general rule
with many exceptions. The courts sometimes
stress the point that the attorney has shown,
through misconduct outside of his professional
dealings, a want of such professional honesty
as render him unworthy of public confidence,
and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the
legal business of others. The reason why such
a distinction can be drawn is because it is the
court which admits an attorney to the bar, and
the court requires for such admission the
possession of a good moral character.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The nature of the office, the trust relation
which exists between attorney and client,, as
well as between court and attorney, and the
statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of
attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney
shall be a person of a good moral character. If
that qualification is a condition precedent to a
license or privilege to enter upon the practice
of the law, it would seem to be equally
3
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essential during the continuance of the
practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it
is held that an attorney will be removed not
only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, which
shows him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license
and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis
supplied)
The rationale of the rule that misconduct, indicative of
moral unfitness, whether relating to professional or
non-professional matters, justifies suspension or
disbarment, was expressed by Mr. Chief Justice
Prentice in In Re Disbarment of Peck, with eloquence
and restraint:
As important as it is that an attorney be
competent to deal with the oftentimes intricate
matters which may be entrusted to him, it is
infinitely more so that he be upright and
trustworthy. Unfortunately, it is not easy to
limit membership in the profession to those
who satisfy the standard test of fitness. But
scant progress in that direction can be hoped
for if, in the determination of the qualification
of professional fitness, non-professional
dishonor and dishonesty in whatsoever path
of life is to be ignored. Professional honesty
and honor are not to be expected as the
accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in
other relations. So it is that we, in common
with other courts, hold, as did Lord Mansfield
more than a century ago, that misconduct,
indicative of moral unfitness for the
profession, whether it be professional or nonprofessional, justifies dismission as well as
exclusion from the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
The rule in this jurisdiction was stated by Mr. Justice
Malcolm in Piatt v. Abordo in the following terms: that
an attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined
"not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties, which showed
him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the
privileges which his license and the law confer to
him." Mr. Justice Malcolm went on to say:
The courts are not curators of the morals of
the bar. At the same time the profession is not
compelled to harbor all persons whatever their
character, who are fortunate enough to keep
out of prison. As good character is an
essential qualification for admission of an
attorney to practice, when the attoney's
character is bad in such respects as to show
that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with
the powers of an attorney, the courts retain
the power to discipline him.
Finally, we should refer to Rule 191 set out in Chapter
I entitled "The Lawyer and Society" of the "Code of
Professional Responsibility" which requires that "a
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." We emphasize here
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10
that "conduct," as used in this rule, is not limited to
conduct exhibited in connection with the performance
of professional duties.
In the case at bar, it is clear to the Court that the
conduct of respondent Amante in failing to account for
and return the P5,000.00 delivered to him for
investment purposes by complainant, constituted
dishonest and immoral conduct. We are compelled to
conclude that respondent attorney converted
complainant's monies to his personal uses. This
dishonest conduct was compounded by the efforts of
respondent attorney to deny and dissimulate the
transaction that he had entered into with complainant.
As far as the records of this case show, respondent
has not to date returned complainant's monies.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sergio G. Amante is
hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the
practice of law. Copies of this Resolution shall be
furnished to all courts of the land. Copies shall also be
finished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to
the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the
personal record of respondent attorney.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,
Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and
Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
1âwphi1
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty
and integrity of the profession (Lyons v. Hall
[LQ App] 90 So2d 519, 60 ALR 2d 1003 as
cited in Marcelo v. Javier, supra).
Constantino v. Saludares, 228 SCRA 233 (1993)
LUIS G. CONSTANTINO, Complainant, v.
ATTY. PRUDENCIO G.
SALUDARES, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS;
ATTORNEYS; CHARACTER AND CONDUCT
REQUIRED. — A lawyer’s professional and
personal conduct must at all times be kept
beyond reproach and above suspicion. He
must perform his duties to the Bar, to the
courts, to his clients, and to society with honor
and dignity (Marcelo v. Javier, 214 SCRA 1
[1992]) . . . Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility clearly provides
that a lawyer must not engage in unlawful,
immoral or deceitful conduct. A member of the
Bar must act with integrity, honesty and
professional decorum. He must comport
himself in a manner which will secure and
preserve respect and confidence of the public.
Both his professional and personal conduct
must be kept beyond reproach and above
suspicion. He is required not only in fact to be
possessed of good moral character, but must
also be perceived to be leading a life in
accordance with the highest moral standards of
the community. His conduct should be
characterized by candor, competence and
fairness (Roque v. Clemencio, 212 SCRA 618
[1992]) It bears stressing that a lawyer can do
honor to the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to
the courts and to his clients. No moral
qualification for bar membership is more
important than truthfulness and candor.
(Fellner v. Bar Association of Baltimore City,
131 A. 2d 729 as cited in Tan v. Sabandal, 206
SCRA 473 [1992]). To this end nothing should
be done by any member of the legal fraternity
which might tend to lessen in any degree the
2. ID.; ID.; UNWARRANTED REFUSAL TO
PAY VALID AND JUST DEBT, A CASE OF. —
There is no doubt that respondent, borrowed
P1,000.00 from Luis Constantino, Jr.
purportedly for an urgent personal need,
promising to pay it back the following day. As a
matter of fact, the respondent admits said
indebtedness but has not given any just and
valid reason for his refusal to pay this debt . . .
Granting arguendo that he failed to meet Luis,
Jr. at the appointed place of payment,
respondent does not deny the fact that he has
refused and still refuses to repay the P1,000.00
loan despite repeated demands by
complainant who was duly authorized to collect
the same. Had respondent intended to settle
his indebtedness, he could have done so in the
several instances repayment was demanded of
him. It is clear from the records that after Luis,
Jr. left the country, complainant and his wife
took turns in trying to recover the debt from
respondent, only to be repeatedly turned away
empty-handed. This prompted Luis, Jr. to write
respondent a letter dated February 3, 1978
reminding the latter of the P1,000.00 loan
extended to him and at the same time
demanding payment thereof. This however,
like the other demands, was left unheeded.
The foregoing factual antecedents compel Us
to conclude that from the very beginning,
respondent had no intention to honor and/or
pay his just debt.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT. — We cannot simply
close our eyes to the unwarranted obstinacy
displayed by respondent in evading payment of
a debt validly incurred. Such a conduct, to say
the least, is unbecoming and does not speak
well of a member of the Bar . . . The facts and
evidence obtaining in this case indubitably
establish respondent’s failure to live up to his
duties as a lawyer in consonance with the
strictures of the lawyer’s oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, thereby degrading not only
his person but his profession as well . . . In the
case at bar, it is clear to the Court that the
conduct of respondent Saludares in failing to
honor his just debt to complainant’s son
constituted dishonest and immoral conduct.
This dishonest conduct was compounded by
respondent’s act of interjecting paltry excuses
for his unwarranted refusal to pay a valid and
just debt . . . While it is true that there was no
attorney-client relationship between
respondent and complainant, it is well-settled
that an attorney may be removed or otherwise
disciplined not only for malpractice and
dishonesty in the profession, but also for gross
misconduct not connected with his professional
duties, showing him to be unfit for the office
and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him (Lizaso v.
Amante, 198 SCRA 1 [1991]).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONDUCT REQUIRED WHEN
INTEGRITY CHALLENGED BY EVIDENCE;
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO OVERCOME
EVIDENCE. — It has been held that when a
lawyer’s integrity is challenged by evidence, it
is not enough that he denies the charges
against him, he must meet the issues and
overcome the evidence for the relator and
show proof that he still maintains the highest
degree of morality and integrity which is at all
times expected of him (Quingwa v. Puno, 19
SCRA 439 [1967]). By his failure to present
convincing evidence to justify his non-payment
of the debt, not to mention his seeming
indifference to the complaint brought against
him made apparent by his unreasonable
absence from the proceedings before the
Solicitor General, respondent failed to
demonstrate that he still possessed the
integrity and morality demanded of a member
of the Bar.
R E SO L U T I O N
BIDIN, J.:
In an Affidavit-Complaint dated April 21, 1978,
complainant Luis G. Constantino charges
respondent Atty. Prudencio S. Saludares with
conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for the nonpayment of a loan which the latter obtained
from complainant’s son Luis Constantino, Jr.
It appears that sometime in August 1977,
respondent borrowed money in the amount of
P1,000.00 from complainant’s son Luis, Jr.
Respondent procured the loan purportedly for
an urgent personal obligation promising to pay
it back promptly the following
day.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Respondent failed to comply with his promise.
Subsequent demands for payment were then
made by Luis, Jr. but to no avail.
In the interim, Luis, Jr. left the country and
afterwards wrote his father, authorizing the
latter to collect the sum of money owed
by Respondent. Despite complainant’s
repeated demands however, respondent
persistently refused to pay back the said
amount, prompting the former to seek
assistance from the Civil Relations Office of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through
an affidavit-complaint. The Civil Relations
Office in turn endorsed the affidavit-complaint
to this Court on April 24, 1978. (Rollo, p. 4)
The complaint alleges that respondent lawyer,
by abusing the trust and confidence of
complainant’s son, was able to obtain a loan in
the amount of P1,000.00 which he unjustifiably
refused and still refuses to pay despite
repeated demands. This act, complainant
alleges, constitutes conduct unbecoming an
officer of the court and is a clear violation of
respondent’s oath of
office.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In compliance with this Court’s resolution date
May 25, 1979, respondent filed his comment
on the affidavit-complaint alleging among other
things that the complaint was without basis and
malicious in nature. He however, categorically
admits having borrowed money from
complainant’s son, Luis, Jr. He reasons out
that he was unable to repay the loan because
Luis, Jr. failed to appear at the appointed place
of payment. Respondent further cites the fact
of Luis Jr.’s absence from the country to justify
such act of non-payment.
Complainant, in his reply, challenged the
veracity of respondent’s contentions and
reiterated his previous allegation of
respondent’s unjustified refusal to settle his
indebtedness despite repeated demands.
On October 15, 1979, the case was duly
referred to the Office of the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation
pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 139 of the Rules
of Court and was assigned to the office of
Solicitor Jesus G. Bersamira. After the
investigation conducted by the said Solicitor,
wherein respondent failed to appear despite
due notice, the case was deemed submitted for
report and recommendation. Solicitor
Bersamira, however, was appointed to the
Bench and no report nor recommendation was
made by him. On November 8, 1984 the case
was re-assigned to another Solicitor.
On March 12, 1990, the Solicitor General
rendered its report, the dispositive portion of
which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended
that Atty. Prudencio S. Saludares be charged
with violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court of Philippines and his Lawyer’s
Oath and that he be suspended for 1 year from
the practice of law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Attached is a copy of the complaint for
suspension."cralaw virtua1aw library
(Solicitor General’s Report and
Recommendation, p.3)
The Solicitor General found that respondent’s
unjustified refusal to settle his debt was
apparent from the averments in the affidavitcomplaint and this fact was sufficiently
established during the proceedings before the
investigating Solicitor. The Solicitor General
further adds that respondent’s refusal to pay
the debt constitutes a violation of his lawyer’s
oath under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, and is therefore a proper subject for
disciplinary action.
There is no doubt that respondent, borrowed
P1,000.00 from Luis Constantino, Jr.
purportedly for an urgent personal need,
promising to pay it back the following day. As a
matter of fact, the respondent admits said
indebtedness but has not given any just and
valid reason for his refusal to pay this debt.
It has been held that when a lawyer’s integrity
is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that
he denied the charges against him, he must
meet the issues and overcome the evidence
for the relator and show proof that he still
maintains the highest degree of morality and
integrity which is at all times expected of him
(Quingwa v. Puno, 19 SCRA 439 [1967]).
By his failure to present convincing evidence to
justify his non-payment of the debt, not to
mention his seeming indifference to the
complaint brought against him made apparent
by his unreasonable absence from the
proceedings before the Solicitor General,
respondent failed to demonstrate that he still
possessed the integrity and morality demanded
of a member of the Bar.chanrobles.com.ph :
virtual law library
Granting arguendo that he failed to meet Luis,
Jr. at the appointed place of payment,
respondent does not deny the fact that he has
refused and still refuses to repay the P1,000.00
loan despite repeated demands by
complainant who was duly authorized to collect
the same. Had respondent intended to settle
his indebtedness, he could have done so in the
several instances repayment was demanded of
him.
It is clear from the records that after Luis, Jr.
left the country, complainant and his wife took
turns in trying to recover the debt from
respondent, only to be repeatedly turned away
empty-handed. This prompted Luis, Jr. to write
respondent a letter dated February 3, 1978
reminding the latter of the P1,000.00 loan
extended to him and at the same time
demanding payment thereof. (Rollo, p. 19) This
however, like the other demands, was left
unheeded.
The foregoing factual antecedents compel Us
to conclude that from the very beginning,
respondent had no intention to honor and/or
pay his just debt. We cannot simply close our
eyes to the unwarranted obstinacy displayed
by respondent in evading payment of a debt
validly incurred. Such a conduct, to say the
least, is unbecoming and does not speak well
of a member of the Bar. A lawyer’s
professional and personal conduct must at all
times be kept beyond reproach and above
suspicion. He must perform his duties to the
Bar, to the courts, to his clients, and to society
with honor and dignity (Marcelo v. Javier, 214
SCRA 1 [1992]).
The facts and evidence obtaining in this case
indubitably establish respondent’s failure to live
up to his duties as a lawyer in consonance with
the strictures of the lawyer’s oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, thereby degrading not only
his person but his profession as
well.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility clearly provides that a lawyer
must not engage in unlawful, immoral or
deceitful conduct. A member of the Bar must
act with integrity, honesty and professional
decorum. He must comport himself in a
manner which will secure and preserve respect
and confidence of the public. Both his
professional and personal conduct must be
kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. He
is required not only in fact to be possessed of
good moral character, but must also be
perceived to be leading a life in accordance
with the highest moral standards of the
community. His conduct should be
characterized by candor, competence and
fairness (Roque v. Clemencio, 212 SCRA 618
[1992])
It bears stressing that a lawyer can do honor to
the legal profession by faithfully performing his
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and
to his clients. No moral qualification for bar
membership is more important than
truthfulness and candor. (Fellner v. Bar
Association of Baltimore City, 131 A. 2d 729 as
cited in Tan v. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473
[1992]). To this end nothing should be done by
any member of the legal fraternity which might
tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of
the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity
of the profession (Lyons v. Hall [LQ App] 90
So2d 519, 60 ALR 2d 1003 as cited in Marcelo
v. Javier, supra).
While it is true that there was no attorney-client
relationship between respondent and
complainant, it is well-settled that an attorney
may be removed or otherwise disciplined not
only for malpractice and dishonesty in the
profession, but also for gross misconduct not
connected with his professional duties,
showing him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license
and the law confer upon him (Lizaso v.
Amante, 198 SCRA 1 [1991]).
In the case at bar, it is clear to the Court that
the conduct of respondent Saludares in failing
to honor his just debt to complainant’s son
constituted dishonest and immoral conduct.
This dishonest conduct was compounded by
respondent’s act of interjecting paltry excuses
for his unwarranted refusal to pay a valid and
just debt.chanrobles law library
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby ORDERS the
Suspension of Attorney Prudencio S.
Saludares from the practice of law for a period
of three (3) months from notice, with the
warning that a repetition of the same or any
other misconduct will be dealt with more
severely. Let a copy of this resolution be
spread on the records of said respondent, with
copies thereof furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and duly circularized to all
courts.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Romero, Melo and Vitug, JJ.,
concur.
CASE DIGEST:
CONSTANTINO VS SALUDARES
AC NO. 2029 DECMBER 7, 1993
FACTS:




Complainant Luis G. Constantino
charged respondent Atty.
Prudencio Saludares with conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer for the
non-payment of a loan which the
latter obtained from complainant’s
son Luis Constantino Jr.
Respondent borrowed P 1,000 from
complainant’s son Luis Jr.
sometime in August 1977
Respondent procured the loan
purpotedly for an urgent personal
obligation promising to pay it back
promptly the following day but he
failed to comply with his promise.
Subsequent demands for payment
were made but to no avail
Meanwhile Luis Jr. left the country
and wrote his father authorizing the


latter to collect the sum of money
owed by respondent. Yet despite
complainant’s repeated demands
respondent persistently refused to
pay back the said amount.
It was alleged that there was abuse
of trust and confidence; that his act
constitutes conduct unbecoming
an officer of the court and is a clear
violation of respondent’s oath of
office
Respondent filed his comment
alleging that the complaint was
without basis and malicious in
nature. He however admits that he
borrowed money from
complainant’s son. He reasons out
that he was unable to repay the
loan because Luis Jr. failed to
appear at the appointed place of
the payment. Respondent further
cites the fact of Luis Jr. absence
from the country to justify such act
of non-payment
Issue: WON Atty. Saludares guilty of the
acts unbecoming a lawyer?
Ruling: Yes


There is no doubt that respondent
borrowed the subject money; he
admitted said indebtedness but has
not given any just and valid reason
for his refusal to pay. It has been
held that when a lawyer's integrity
is challenged by evidence, it is not
enough that he denies the charges
against him,he must meet the
issues and overcome the evidence
for the relator and show proof that
he still maintains the highest
degree of morality and integrity
which is at all times expected of
him
(Quingwavs.Puno,19SCRA439[1967
]).
In this case,respondent failed to
demonstrate that he still possessed
the integrity and morality
demanded of a member of the Bar.

Granting arguendo tha the failed to
meet Luis,Jr.at the appointed place
of payment, respondent does not
deny the fact that he has refused
and still refuses to repay despite
repeated demands.

Had respondent intended to settle
his indebtedness, he could have
done so in several instances.
Clearly, respondent had no
intention to honor and / or pay his
just debt. Such a conduct, to say
the least,is unbecoming and does
not speak well of a member of the
Bar. A lawyer's professional and
personal conduct must at all times
be kept beyond reproach and
above suspicion. He must perform
his duties to the Bar, to the courts,
to his clients, and to society with
honor and dignity

In this case, respondent's failure to
live up to his duties as a lawyer in
consonance with the strictures of
the lawyer's oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the
Canons of Professional Ethics,
thereby degrading not only his
person but his profession as well.
Rule1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility clearly provides that a
lawyer must not engage inunlawful,
immoral or deceitful conduct. A member
of the Bar must act with integrity, honesty
and professional decorum. He must
comport himself in a manner which will
secure and reserve respect and
confidence of the public. Both his
professional and personal conduct
must be kept beyond reproach and above
suspicion. He is required not only in fact
to be possessed of good moral
character, but must also be perceived to
be leading a life in accordance with
the highest moral standards of the
community. His conduct should be
characterized by candor, competence and
fairness.
Manuel Yuhico vs Fred Gutierrez A.C. No. 8391,
November 23, 2010
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 8391
November 23, 2010
[Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1631]
MANUEL C. YUHICO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint dated January 10, 2006 for
disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Fred L.
Gutierrez (Gutierrez) filed by Manuel C. Yuhico
(Yuhico) for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Complainant Yuhico alleged that he met Gutierrez at
the Office of the City Prosecutor in Pasig City on May
4, 2005. Yuhico was there to testify at the preliminary
investigation of a Complaint for Estafa against one
Jose S. Chicharro, who was then being represented
by Gutierrez. He claimed that they eventually became
acquainted as they frequently saw each other during
the hearings of the case.
On June 24, 2005, Yuhico averred that Gutierrez
phoned him and asked for a cash loan of ₱30,000.00.
Gutierrez then claimed that he needed money to pay
for the medical expenses of his mother who was
seriously ill. Yuhico immediately handed the money.
In turn, Gutierrez promised to pay the loan very soon,
since he was expecting to collect his attorney's fees
from a Japanese client.
On June 28, 2005, Gutierrez again asked Yuhico for a
loan, this time in the amount of ₱60,000.00, allegedly
to pay the medical expenses of his wife who was also
hospitalized. Again, Yuhico readily issued to Atty.
Gutierrez an Equitable PCI Bank check amounting to
₱60,000.00. Again, Gutierrez promised to pay his two
loans totalling to ₱90,000.00 "within a short time."
On July 12, 2005, Yuhico asked Gutierrez to pay his
loans. Atty. Gutierrez failed to pay. In a text message
on July 12, 2005 at 2:47 p.m., Atty. Gutierrez stated:
I really don't know how to say this as I don't want to
think that I may be taking advantage of our friendship.
You see i've long expected as substantial attorney's
fees since last week from my client Ogami from japan.
It's more or less more than 5m and its release is
delayed due to tax and the law on money laundering.
From my estimate it wud be collected by me on or b4
august 5. N the meantime I am quite in a financial
difficulty as everyone is.
1
2
Later, Yuhico alleged that Gutierrez attempted to
borrow money from him again. He said Gutierrez
claimed that his daughter needed ₱70,000.00 to pay
the fees required to take the licensure examination in
the U.S. Medical Board. Gutierrez assured him that
he will pay all his debts on or before August 10, 2005.
In his text message on July 12, 2005 at 3:05 p.m.,
Atty. Gutierrez said:
As you are aware of these past few days were really
great trials 4 me. My mother died, my wife got sick
and now my bro in law died. These events led me to
struggling finances. To get me going I tried to sel my
car but my buyer backed out. Now my immediate
problem is the amt of 70thousand which my daughter
needs for her payment sa US medical board. I dnt
want her to miss this opportunity. Can u help me
again? I will pay all my debts on or b4 Aug.10 pls.
Thanks.
However, this time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez
any amount of money. Instead, he demanded from
Gutierrez the payment of his debts. Gutierrez then
sent another text message to Yuhico on July 12, 2005
and requested him to give him another week to pay
his debts. Gutierrez failed to make the payment.
Yuhico repeatedly requested the payment of loans
from Gutierrez from August to December 2005.
Gutierrez, on the other hand, for numerous times
promised to pay, but always failed to do so. At one
point, Gutierrez even asked Yuhico's account number
and promised to deposit his payment there, but he
never deposited the payment.
On December 5, 2005, Yuhico's counsel sent a
demand letter to Gutierrez to pay his debts, but to no
avail.
Thus, Yuhico filed the instant complaint against
Gutierrez before the Integrated Bar of the PhilippinesCommission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD).
On January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez
to submit his Answer on the complaint against him.
In his Answer, Gutierrez claimed that Yuhico was the
one who offered to lend him money in gratitude for the
assistance he extended to the latter when he was
under threat by his clients. He, however, admitted that
he accepted the loan due to compelling
circumstances. Gutierrez added that he has no
intention of evading his obligation to pay his debts,
but he is currently in financial distress, thus, he
cannot pay his debts yet. He claimed he will pay his
debts when his financial condition improves.
On March 24, 2006, both parties were directed to
appear at the mandatory conference before the IBPCBD. Gutierrez failed to attend on two occasions.
On June 9, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed both parties
to submit their respective position papers.
Likewise, during the clarificatory hearing before the
IBP-CBD, only the complainant's counsel attended.
There was no appearance on the part of Gutierrez.
In his Position Paper, Yuhico manifested that the
Supreme Court, in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez, had
already disbarred Gutierrez from the practice of law
for gross misconduct, in view of his failure to pay his
debts and his issuance of worthless checks.
3
4
5
6
Subsequently, in a Resolution dated December 11,
2008, the, IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of nonpayment of just debts and ordered him to return the
amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (₱90,000.00) to
Yuhico, with interest until full payment.
In view of the previous disbarment of Gutierrez, the
IBP-CBD recommended to the Court that, instead of
rendering the instant case moot, Gutierrez should be
disbarred anew effective upon the expiration of the
sanction pursuant to the March 26, 2004 Supreme
Court Decision. The IBP-CBD explained that while we
do not have jurisprudence on the issue of double or
multiple disbarment, the American jurisprudence,
however, recognizes double or multiple disbarments
as well as the minimum requirement of five (5) years
for readmission to the Bar.
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors,
in Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649, resolved to adopt
the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and
approve it with modification as to the payment of the
amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos (₱90,000.00), this
time, without interest.
We sustain the findings of the IBP, but with
modification as to its recommendations.
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may
be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of
law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration of
justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but
also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and
fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence
in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all
times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, the courts and to their clients, which include
prompt payment of financial obligations. They must
conduct themselves in a manner that reflects the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In the instant case, there is no question as to
Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan he
contracted and his failure to pay the same leaves no
room for interpretation. Neither can he justify his act
of non-payment of debt by his dire financial condition.
Gutierrez should not have contracted loans which are
beyond his financial capacity to pay.
Likewise, we cannot overlook Gutierrez's propensity
of employing deceit and misrepresentations for the
purpose of obtaining debts without the intention of
paying them. Records show Gutierrez's pattern of
habitually making promises of paying his debts, yet
repeatedly failing to deliver. The series of text
messages he sent to Yuhico promising to pay his
loans, while simultaneously giving excuses without
actually making good of his promises, is clearly
reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts demonstrate
lack of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities
and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and
as officers of the court.
We also note that in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez, the
Court had already disbarred Gutierrez from the
practice of law for gross misconduct due to non7
payment of just debts and issuance of bouncing
checks.
In view of the foregoing, while we agree with the
findings of the IBP, we cannot, however, adopt its
recommendation to disbar Gutierrez for the second
time, considering that Gutierrez had already been
previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP pointed out,
we do not have double or multiple disbarment in our
laws or jurisprudence. Neither do we have a law
mandating a minimum 5-year requirement for
readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while
Gutierrez's infraction calls for the penalty of
disbarment, we cannot disbar him anew.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649 dated
December 11, 2008, of the IBP, which found FRED L.
GUTIERREZ guilty of GROSS
MISCONDUCT, is AFFIRMED. He is ORDERED to
PAY the amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos
(₱90,000.00) to the complainant immediately from
receipt of this decision with interest.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished and properly
recorded in the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to the personal record of Gutierrez; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the
Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
This Decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
CASE DIGEST:
CASE DIGEST
MANUEL C. YUHICO vs. ATTY. FRED L. GUTIERREZ,
A.C. No. 8391, Nov. 23, 2010
FACTS:

In his Position Paper, Yuhico manifested that
the Supreme Court, in Huyssen v. Atty.
Gutierrez,[6] had already disbarred Gutierrez
from the practice of law for gross
misconduct, in view of his failure to pay his
debts and his issuance of worthless checks.

Subsequently, in a Resolution dated
December 11, 2008, the, IBP-CBD found
Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just debts
and ordered him to return the amount of
Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00) to
Yuhico, with interest until full payment.

In view of the previous disbarment of
Gutierrez, the IBP-CBD recommended to the
Court that, instead of rendering the instant
case moot, Gutierrez should be disbarred
anew effective upon the expiration of the
sanction pursuant to the March 26, 2004
1avvphi1
8
Supreme Court Decision. The IBP-CBD
explained that while we do not have
jurisprudence on the issue of double or
multiple disbarment, the American
jurisprudence, however, recognizes double or
multiple disbarments as well as the minimum
requirement of five (5) years for readmission
to the Bar.

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of
Governors, in Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649,
resolved to adopt the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve
it with modification as to the payment of the
amount of Ninety Thousand Pesos
(P90,000.00), this time, without interest.
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty of the complained
acts?
RULING:
We sustain the findings of the IBP, but with
modification as to its recommendations.
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may
be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of
law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration
of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but
also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity
and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They
must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to
society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients,
which include prompt payment of financial
obligations. They must conduct themselves in a
manner that reflects the values and norms of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.[7]
In the instant case, there is no question as to
Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan he
contracted and his failure to pay the same leaves no
room for interpretation. Neither can he justify his act
of non-payment of debt by his dire financial
condition. Gutierrez should not have contracted
loans which are beyond his financial capacity to pay.
Likewise, we cannot overlook Gutierrez's propensity
of employing deceit and misrepresentations for the
purpose of obtaining debts without the intention of
paying them. Records show Gutierrez's pattern of
habitually making promises of payig his debts, yet
repeatedly failing to deliver. The series of text
messages he sent to Yuhico promising to pay his
loans, while simultaneously giving excuses without
actually making good of his promises, is clearly
reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts demonstrate
lack of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities
and duties imposed on lawyers as professionals and
as officers of the court.
We also note that in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez,[8]
the Court had already disbarred Gutierrez from the
practice of law for gross misconduct due to nonpayment of just debts and issuance of bouncing
checks.
In view of the foregoing, while we agree with the
findings of the IBP, we cannot, however, adopt its
recommendation to disbar Gutierrez for the second
time, considering that Gutierrez had already been
previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP pointed out,
we do not have double or multiple disbarment in our
laws or jurisprudence. Neither do we have a law
mandating a minimum 5-year requirement for
readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus, while
Gutierrez's infraction calls for the penalty of
disbarment, we cannot disbar him anew.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-649 dated
December 11, 2008, of the IBP, which found FRED L.
GUTIERREZ guilty of GROSS MISCONDUCT, is
AFFIRMED. He is ORDERED to PAY the amount of
Ninety Thousand Pesos (P90,000.00) to the
complainant immediately from receipt of this
decision with interest.
Pasumbal de Chavez-Blanco vs Jaime Lumasag Jr. A.C.
No. 5195 April 16, 2009
LIA PASUMBAL DE CHAVEZBLANCO, REPRESENTED BY HER
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ATTY.
EUGENIA J.
MUÑOZ, Complainant, v. ATTY.
JAIME B. LUMASAG,
JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
This is an administrative complaint
for disbarment filed by complainant
Nelia P. de Chavez-Blanco against
respondent Atty. Jaime Lumasag,
Jr., for deceit, dishonesty and gross
misconduct.
In a Report and Recommendation
dated 11 December 2001, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Commissioner Milagros San
Juan found respondent guilty of the
charges and recommended the
penalty of disbarment.
Subsequently, the IBP Board of
Governors reduced the penalty to a
five (5)-year suspension in its
Resolution XV-2002-229 dated 29
June 2001. In a Resolution dated 9
December 2002, the Court,
however, remanded the case to the
IBP in view of its findings that no
formal hearing/investigation was
conducted.
1
Upon remand to the IBP, the case
was re-assigned to IBP
Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa and
hearings were accordingly held
thereafter.
Through her attorney-in-fact, Atty.
Eugenia J. Muñoz, complainant
alleged in her Complaint that she
was a resident of the United States
of America together with her
husband, Mario Blanco. She also
stated that she owned two (2)
adjacent parcels of land in Quezon
City, each with an area of 400
square meters, covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos.
22162 and 22163 registered in her
name. In a document dated 20
November 1989, she authorized
respondent, who were her husband's
first cousin, to sell said lots.
2
3
In a letter dated 20 March 1990,
respondent reported that he had
sold only one lot for the price
of P320,000.00 and therefrom he
deducted P38,130.00 for taxes and
commissions. And, allegedly, per
complainant's instructions, he
remitted the remaining balance
of P281,900.00 to a certain Belen
Johnnes.
4
In 1995, complainant was informed
by respondent that the other lot
remained unsold due to the
presence of squatters on the
property.
In December 1998, Mario Blanco
discovered that in truth, the two (2)
lots had been sold on 11 March 1990
to the spouses Celso and
Consolacion Martinez for the price
of P1,120,000.00, and that new
titles had been issued to the
transferees. Mario Blanco confronted
respondent with these facts in a
letter, but the latter disregarded the
same. Thus, in May 1999,
complainant, through Atty. Muñoz
sent a demand letter to respondent
directing him to remit and turn over
to her the entire proceeds of the
sale of the properties.
Soon thereafter, respondent
admitted the sale of the properties
and his receipt of its proceeds, but
he never tendered or offered to
tender the same to complainant.
Despite repeated and continued
demands, respondent has since not
remitted the amount equivalent
to P838,100.00 (P278,000.00 for
the first parcel of land
and P560,000.00 for the second).
5
Complainant also averred that the
Special Power of Attorney dated 16
January 1989, which respondent had
used to sell the lots is a forgery and
a falsified document, as the
signature therein were not the real
signatures of complainant and her
spouse. In addition, they could not
have acknowledged the document
before a notary, as they were not in
the Philippines at the time.
6
For his part, respondent vehemently
denied all the accusations of deceit,
dishonesty and gross misconduct.
7
Respondent countered that Mario
Blanco was the true owner of the
properties, which had to be titled in
complainant's name, as Mario
Blanco was a U.S. citizen. Mario
Blanco had requested him to look for
a buyer of the properties and, in the
course of selling them, respondent
claimed that he had only transacted
with the former and never with
complainant. Respondent averred
that he had been authorized in
November 1989 to sell the property,
through a Special Power of Attorney,
for a price of not less
than P250,000.00 net for the
owner.
8
Respondent also alleged that the
deed of absolute sale if the two (2)
lots had been executed on 19 March
1990 but, only one lot was initially
paid in the amount of P281,980.00,
which he immediately remitted to
Mario Blanco. The payment for the
other lot was withheld, pending the
relocation of the squatters who had
been occupying the premises. And
when respondent had finally
collected the proceeds of the second
lot more than three (3) years after,
he asked Mario Blanco if the former
could use the amount for a real
estate venture whose profit, if
successful, he would share with the
latter. Mario Blanco allegedly did not
think twice and consented to the
proposal. The venture, however, did
not push through.
9
Respondent strongly maintained
that the two (2) lots had been sold
for only P563,960.00.
10
Finally, respondent denied the
charge of falsification. He claimed
that complainant and her spouse,
Mario Blanco, had in fact signed the
Special Power of Attorney, but it was
only notarized later.
11
In his Report and Recommendation
dated 4 December 2006, Atty.
Dennis A.B. Funa arrived at the
following findings:
It appears from the records that the
two lots were sold by Respondent
for P560,000.00, not P1,120,000.00
as alleged by Complainant. The
basis is the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated March 11, 1990 which shows
that the two lots composing 800 sq.
meters being sold for P560,000.00.
There appears to be no
documentary basis for the claimed
amount of P1,120,000.00 of
Complainant. However, Respondent
in his Comment stated that the two
lots were sold by him
for P563,960.00. In any case, we
shall uphold and apply the amount
stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale.
In Respondent's letter dated March
20, 1990, he acknowledged that he
already received P320,000.00 as the
"total value of one lot". Moreover,
the computation shows that
the P320,000.00 was only for 400
sq.m. as the computation stated:
"400 sq.m. x
800p/sqm=P320,000.00."
Therefore, if the first lot was sold
for P320,000.00, then the second lot
must have been sold for P240,000 x
xx
x x x there was clear deception on
the part of Respondent when he
wrote the letter dated March 20,
1990 "informing" the Blanco spouses
that he had sold only one of the two
parcels of land for P320,000.00. This
is belied by the fact that on March
11, 1990, or 9 days before he wrote
the letter, a Deed of Absolute Sale
was executed by him selling the two
lots for P560,000.00. This Deed of
Absolute Sale was notarized on
March 19, 1990. During the hearing,
Respondent admitted that the Deed
of Sale covered two lots. Clearly,
Respondent was not forthcoming
towards the Blanco spouses.
ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
xxx
x x x Instead of representing that
two lots had been sold
for P560,000.00. Respondent only
represented that he sold only one lot
for P320,000.00 and pocketing the
balance of P240,000.00.
xxx
During the course of hearing,
Respondent claims that the Deed of
Sale referred to above is a fake, and
that there is a Deed of Sale showing
a selling price of P320,000.00 which
is the real Deed of Sale. However,
no such Deed of Sale has been
presented by Respondent and no
such Deed of Sale appears in the
records. Later in the hearing,
Respondent retracted his statement
claiming he was merely confused.
As for the alleged falsification of a
Special Power of Attorney dated
January 16, 1989, wherein the
signatures of the Blanco spouses
appear in the SPA when they were
not in the Philippines on January 16,
1989 but were allegedly in the
United States, their absence in the
country has not been satisfactorily
established since mere xerox copies
of their passports, although noted
by a notary public, cannot duly
establish their absence in the
country on that date. Other
acceptable documents such as a
certification from the Bureau of
Immigration would have been
appropriate but which, however, had
not been presented. In any case,
Respondent denies the charge of
falsification. (Citations omitted)
[Emphasis supplied]
12
Accordingly, the IBP Commissioner
recommended that, in view of the
fact that respondent was already 72
years old, he be meted out the
penalty of suspension of one (1)year suspension, not disbarment as
had been prayed for and not 5 yearsuspension as had been earlier
resolved by the IBP Board of
Governors. Moreover, the IBP
Commissioner recommended that
respondent be ordered to deliver to
Complainant the amount
of P240,000.00 plus the legal
interest rate of 6% per annum
computed from March 1990.
On 31 May 2007, the IBP Board of
Governors passed Resolution No.
XVII-2007-222 adopting and
approving the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP
Commissioner.
13
The Court agrees with the findings
and conclusion of the IBP, but a
reduction of the recommended
penalty is called for, following the
dictum that the appropriate penalty
for an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion
based on the surrounding facts.
14
A lawyer may be disciplined for any
conduct, in his professional or
private capacity, that renders him
unfit to continue to be an officer of
the court. Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
commands all lawyers to uphold at
all times the dignity and integrity of
the legal profession. Specifically,
Rule 1.01 thereof provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest and immoral
or deceitful conduct.
There is no need to stretch one's
imagination to arrive at an inevitable
conclusion that respondent
committed dishonesty and abused
the confidence reposed in him by
the complainant and her spouse.
Records show that two lots had been
sold by respondent as evidenced by
the Deed of Absolute Sale of 11
March 1990. Respondent, however,
taking advantage of the absence of
complainant and her spouse from
the Philippines and their complete
trust in him, deceitfully informed
them in a letter dated 20 March
1990 that he had sold only one. It
can be reasonably deduced from the
exchanges between the parties that
the proceeds of the first lot had
been transmitted to complainant
and her spouse. Respondent's
contention, though, that he had
been authorized to retain the
proceeds of the second is specious,
as complainant and her spouse
could not have given the same,
having been left in the dark as
regards its sale. And despite
repeated demands, to date, there is
no showing that the outstanding
amount has been paid. Thus,
respondent's deceitful conduct
warrants disciplinary sanction and a
directive for the remittance of the
remaining proceeds is in order.
As to the charge of falsification, the
Court agrees with the IBP that the
same appears to be
unsubstantiated. Settled is the rule
that, in administrative proceedings,
the burden of proof that the
respondent committed the acts
complained of rests on the
complainant. In fact, if the
complainant, upon whom rests the
burden of proving his cause of
action, fails to show in a satisfactory
manner the facts upon which he
bases his claim, the respondent is
under no obligation to prove his
exception or defense. Mere
allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof.
15
16
Respondent's actions erode the
public perception of the legal
profession. They constitute gross
misconduct for which he may be
suspended, following Section 27,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension
of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor.' A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or
for a willful disobedience appearing
as attorney for a party to a case
without authority to so do.
Complainant asks that respondent
be disbarred. The Court finds,
however, that suspension from the
practice of law is sufficient to
discipline respondent. The supreme
penalty of disbarment is meted out
only in clear cases of misconduct
that seriously affect the standing
and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the court and member of
the bar. While the Court will not
hesitate to remove an erring
attorney from the esteemed
brotherhood of lawyers, where the
evidence calls for it, the Court will
also not disbar him where a lesser
penalty will suffice to accomplish the
desired end. In this case, the Court
finds the recommended penalty of
suspension of two (2) years for
respondent to be too severe,
considering his advanced age. The
Court believes that a suspension of
six (6) months is sufficient.
Suspension, by the way, is not
primarily intended as punishment,
but as a means to protect the public
and the legal profession.
17
chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing, respondent Atty. Jaime
Lumasag, Jr. is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of
SIX (6) MONTHS, effective
immediately, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or a similar
act will be dealt with more severely.
Further, respondent is ordered to
deliver to complainant the amount
of P240,000.00 plus legal interest
rate of 6% per annum computed
from March 1990.
Let notice of this Resolution be
spread in respondent's record as an
attorney in this Court, and notice
thereof be served on the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and on the
Office of the Court Administrator for
circulation to all the courts
concerned.
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST:
CASE DIGEST
DE CHAVEZ-BLANCO v. LUMASAG JR
BP Ruling (1st time): In a Report and
Recommendation dated 11 December 2001, IBP
Commissioner Milagros San Juan found
respondent guilty of the charges and
recommended the penalty of disbarment. IBP
Board of Governors reduced the penalty to a five
(5)-year suspension. The Court, however,
remanded the case to the IBP in view of its
findings that no formal hearing/investigation was
conducted
FACTS:
Through her attorney-in-fact, Atty. Eugenia J.
Muñoz, complainant alleged in her Complaint
that she was a resident of the United States of
America together with her husband, Mario
Blanco. She also stated that she owned two (2)
adjacent parcels of land in Quezon City, which
she authorized respondent, who was her
husband's first cousin, to sell said lots.
Respondent reported that he had sold only one
lot for the price of P320,000.00 and therefrom he
deducted P38,130.00 for taxes and
commissions. Allegedly, per complainant's
instructions, he remitted the remaining balance of
P281,900.00 to a certain Belen Johnnes In 1995,
complainant was informed by respondent that the
other lot remained unsold due to the presence of
squatters on the property. In December 1998,
Mario Blanco discovered that in truth, the two (2)
lots had been sold on 11 March 1990 to the
spouses Celso and Consolacion Martinez for the
price of P1,120,000.00, and that new titles had
been issued to the transferees. Mario Blanco
confronted respondent with these facts in a letter,
but the latter disregarded the same. Thus, in May
1999, complainant, through Atty. Muñoz sent a
demand letter to respondent directing him to
remit and turn over to her the entire proceeds of
the sale of the properties. Soon thereafter,
respondent admitted the sale of the properties
and his receipt of its proceeds, but he never
tendered or offered to tender the same to
complainant. Despite repeated and continued
demands, respondent has since not remitted the
amount equivalent to P838,100.00 (P278,000.00
for the first parcel of land and P560,000.00 for
the second) Complainant also averred that the
Special Power of Attorney dated 16 January
1989, which respondent had used to sell the lots
is a forgery and a falsified document, as the
signature therein were not the real signatures of
complainant and her spouse. In addition, they
could not have acknowledged the document
before a notary, as they were not in the
Philippines at the time. Mario Blanco had
requested him to look for a buyer of the
properties and, in the course of selling them,
respondent claimed that he had only transacted
with the former and never with complainant.
Respondent averred that he had been authorized
in November 1989 to sell the property, through a
Special Power of Attorney, for a price of not less
than P250,000.00 net for the owner Respondent
also alleged that the deed of absolute sale if the
two (2) lots had been executed on 19 March
1990 but, only one lot was initially paid in the
amount of P281, 980.00, which he immediately
remitted to Mario Blanco. The payment for the
other lot was withheld, pending the relocation of
the squatters who had been occupying the
premises. And when respondent had finally
collected the proceeds of the second lot more
than three (3) years after, he asked Mario Blanco
if the former could use the amount for a real
estate venture whose profit, if successful, he
would share with the latter. Finally, respondent
denied the charge of falsification. He claimed that
complainant and her spouse, Mario Blanco, had
in fact signed the Special Power of Attorney, but
it was only notarized later
ISSUE: WON Atty. Jaime Lumasag, Jr., is held
liable for deceit, dishonesty and gross
misconduct.
BP RULING (FINAL): Under Atty Dennis A.B.
Funa
It appears from the records that the two lots were
sold by Respondent for P560,000.00, not
P1,120,000.00 as alleged by Complainant. The
basis is the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March
11, 1990 which shows that the two lots
composing 800 sq. meters being sold for
P560,000.00. There appears to be no
documentary basis for the claimed amount of
P1,120,000.00 of Complainant. However,
Respondent in his Comment stated that the two
lots were sold by him for P563,960.00. In any
case, we shall uphold and apply the amount
stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale. There was
clear deception on the part of Respondent when
he wrote the letter dated March 20, 1990
"informing" the Blanco spouses that he had sold
only one of the two parcels of land for
P320,000.00 Instead of representing that two lots
had been sold for P560,000.00. Respondent only
represented that he sold only one lot for
P320,000.00 and pocketing the balance of
P240,000.00 As for the alleged falsi6cation of a
Special Power of Attorney dated January 16,
1989, wherein the signatures of the Blanco
spouses appear in the SPA when they were not
in the Philippines on January 16, 1989 but were
allegedly in the United States, their absence in
the country has not been satisfactorily
established since mere xerox copies of their
passports, although noted by a notary public,
cannot duly establish their absence in the
country on that date
In view of the fact that respondent was already
72 years old, he be meted out the penalty of
suspension of one (1)-year suspension, not
disbarment. Commissioner recommended that
respondent be ordered to deliver to Complainant
the amount of P240,000.00 plus the legal interest
rate of 6% per annum computed from March
1990. SUPREME COURT RULING:
The Court agrees with the findings and
conclusion of the IBP, but a reduction of the
recommended penalty is called for, following the
dictum that the appropriate penalty for an errant
lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts. Canon
1 of the of the Professional Responsibility
commands all lawyers to uphold at all times the
dignity and integrity of the legal profession. Rule
1.01 — a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
There is no need to stretch one's imagination to
arrive at an inevitable conclusion that respondent
committed dishonesty and abused the
confidence reposed in him by the complainant
and her spouse. Respondent's contention,
though, that he had been authorized to retain the
proceeds of the second is specious, as
complainant and her spouse could not have
given the same, having been left in the dark as
regards its sale.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
respondent Atty. Jaime Lumasag, Jr. is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of SIX (6) MONTHS, effective
immediately, with a warning that a repetition of
the same or a similar act will be dealt with more
severely. Further, respondent is ordered to
deliver to complainant the amount of
P240,000.00 plus legal interest rate of 6% per
annum computed from March 1990.
ATTY. ROY B.
ECRAELA, Complainant, v. ATTY. IAN
RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for
Disbarment filed by Atty. Roy B. Ecraela with
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on
April 12, 2007 against Atty. Ian Raymond A.
Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic
womanizing, abuse of authority as an
educator, and "other unscrupulous activities"
which cause "undue embarrassment to the
legal profession." Complainant claims that
respondent's actions involve deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct and grossly
immoral conduct in violation of the Lawyer's
Oath.
1
The Facts
Complainant and respondent were best friends
and both graduated from the University of the
Philippines (UP) College of Law in 1990, where
they were part of a peer group or barkada with
several of their classmates. After passing the
bar examinations and being admitted as
members of the Bar in 1991, they were both
registered with the IBP Quezon City.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P.
Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three
(3) children. Complainant avers that while
married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of
adulterous and illicit relations with married and
unmarried women between the years 1990 to
2007. These alleged illicit relations
involved:
ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a.
AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague
in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to 1992,
which complainant had personal knowledge of
such illicit relations;
2
Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs. Atty. Ian Raymond Pangalanan,
A.C. No. 10676, September 8, 2015
A.C. No. 10676, September 08, 2015
b.
BBB, sometime during the period from
1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite
being already married to Jardiolin;
c.
CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin
and while also being romantically involved with
DDD;
d.
DDD, sometime during the period from
2000 to 2002, despite still being married to
Jardiolin and while still being romantically
involved with CCC;
e.
EEE, who is related to complainant,
sometime during the period from May 2004
until the filing of the Petition, while still being
romantically involved with CCC.
3
Complainant claims that respondent, with
malice and without remorse, deceived CCC and
DDD by representing himself to be a bachelor,
thereby convincing the two women to start a
love affair with him, when in truth, he was
then still married to Jardiolin.
4
cralawrednad
Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant
avers that sometime during the period of 1998
to 2000, respondent, as a lawyer of the Office
of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC),
represented the interest of Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) in cancellation
proceedings filed by MIAA against Kendrick
Development Corporation (KDC). However,
despite being a public officer and a
government counsel, respondent conspired
with Atty. Abraham Espejo, legal counsel of
KDC, and assisted KDC in its case, thereby
sabotaging MIAA's case, and, in effect, that of
the Philippine Government.
3
cralawrednad
disciplinary sanction by this Court for grave
misconduct or violation of the Revised Penal
Code.
7
cralawrednad
It was further alleged that, during the
pendency of the Senate Inquiry, respondent
even attempted to conceal the evidence by
requesting complainant's parents, spouses
Marcelo F. Ecraela and Visitacion B. Ecraela, to
have the Toyota Corolla XL parked in their
residence in Cainta, Rizal, for an indefinite
period of time. Respondent's request, however,
was refused by the spouses when they learned
that the vehicle was the subject of the Senate
Inquiry.
8
cralawrednad
It appears from the documents presented by
complainant that the Ombudsman issued a
Resolution finding probable cause against
respondent, and an Information was thereafter
filed with the Sandiganbayan for violation of
Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. (RA)
3019.
9
cralawrednad
Complainant also claims that respondent
abused his authority as an educator in Manuel
L. Quezon University, San Sebastian College,
College of St. Benilde, and Maryknoll College,
where respondent induced his male students to
engage in "nocturnal preoccupations" and
entertained the romantic gestures of his
female students in exchange for passing
grades.
10
Complainant further claims that respondent
even attempted to bribe then Solicitor Rolando
Martin of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) in exchange for the latter's cooperation
in the dismissal of the cancellation proceedings
in favor of KDC. In return for his "earnest
efforts" in assisting KDC in its case, respondent
was allegedly rewarded with a Toyota Corolla
XL with plate number ULS-835 by Atty. Espejo.
The vehicle was seen several times by
respondent's classmates and officemates being
driven and parked by respondent in his own
home and in the OGCC premises itself.
6
cralawrednad
In connection with his involvement in the MIAA
case, complainant claims that respondent was
summoned in a Senate inquiry concerning
rampant faking of land titles in the Philippines,
which included an investigation of the alleged
spurious land titles of KDC. In Senate
Committee Final Report No. 367, the Senate
Blue Ribbon and Justice & Human Rights
Committees recommended that respondent be
investigated and prosecuted by the Office of
the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for graft and
corruption, as well as disbarment or
cralawrednad
The Petition was docketed as CBD Case No.
07-1973.
In an Order dated April 16, 2007, the Director
for Bar Discipline, Honorable Rogelio A.
Vinluan, required respondent to file his verified
answer.
11
In his undated Answer, respondent opted not
to present any counter-statement of facts in
support of his defense. Instead, respondent
simply argued that the petition suffers from
procedural and substantive infirmities, claiming
that petitioner failed to substantiate the
allegations or charges against him. Respondent
pointed out that Annex "J" of the Petition
entitled "Arguments in Support of the
Disbarment" lacked formal requirements, and
thus, should be treated as a mere scrap of
paper. Respondent also asserts that the e-mail
messages attached to the petition were
inadmissible for having been obtained in
violation of the Rules on Electronic
Evidence. He claims that the identities of the
owners of the e-mail messages, as well as the
12
13
allegations of illicit relations and abuse of
authority, were not properly established.
Respondent further argues that the statements
of complainant's witnesses were merely selfserving and deserved scant consideration.
Complainant filed a Comment (to the
Respondent's Answer), stating that the
allegations in the complaint were deemed
admitted by reason of respondent's failure to
make specific or even general denials of such
in his Answer.
14
motion, arguing that based on his personal
verification with the court personnel of Branch
77 of Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
Parafiaque City, there was no case calendared
for hearing on the date of the previous setting.
Complainant also argued that this is another
ploy of respondent to delay the proceedings
because he knew that complainant worked
overseas and was only in the country for a
limited period of time. Finding merit in
complainant's opposition, respondent's motion
was denied and complainant was allowed to
present his witnesses.
23
In his Reply (to the Comment filed by
Complainant), respondent simply denied all of
complainant's accusations in the petition,
allegedly for "lack of knowledge and
information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth or falsity thereof."
15
16
cralawrednad
On August 3, 2007, 1BP-CBD Investigating
Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr.
(Commissioner Villadolid) set the case for
mandatory conference on August 28,
2007, which respondent failed to attend. It
appears that respondent filed a Motion to
Cancel Hearing, praying for the resetting of
the mandatory conference allegedly due to a
previously scheduled hearing on the same
date. Respondent's motion was opposed by
complainant and eventually denied by
Commissioner Villadolid in his Order dated
August 28, 2007. In the same order,
complainant's Manifestation praying that
subpoenas be issued to several persons who
shall be complainant's hostile witnesses was
granted by Commissioner Villadolid.
Accordingly, the case was scheduled for the
presentation of complainant's witnesses on
September 11, 2007 and the respective
subpoenas were issued.
17
18
19
20
21
A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBPCBD received respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration, praying that the Order dated
August 28, 2007 be set aside and that the
hearing be reset to sometime during the third
week of October. In said motion, respondent
informed the IBP-CBD that he has viral
conjunctivitis or more commonly known as
"sore eyes" and has been ordered by the
doctor to rest for at least one to two weeks
while his eyes are being treated. Attached to
his motion were photocopies of two medical
certificates, stating that a certain R.
Pangalangan was suffering from sore eyes.
22
During the scheduled hearing on September
11, 2007, complainant opposed petitioner's
cralawrednad
Complainant presented his witnesses, as
follows: Assistant Solicitor General Karl
Miranda (ASG Miranda), Ms. Laarni Morallos
(Ms. Morallos), Atty. Glenda T. Litong (Atty.
Litong), Atty. Emelyn W. Corpus (Atty.
Corpus), Mr. Marcelo Ecraela, and Mrs.
Visitacion Ecraela.
ASG Miranda testified on his participation in
the KDC case as reflected in the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee Report, as well as on his
recollection that the Senate Report had
recommended the disbarment of respondent.
Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus
were presented to establish that the email
messages submitted by complainant indeed
originated from respondent based on their
familiarity with respondent, particularly, the
email messages which contained references to
his daughter, his relationship with complainant,
and respondent's high blood pressure.
Atty. Litong further testified that respondent
personally introduced DDD to her as his
girlfriend and that sometime in 2002 or 2003,
she saw respondent with another girl in
Glorietta despite still being married to his wife.
Atty. Litong also recalled encountering
respondent at a party sometime in 2007 where
he was with CCC, whom she perceived to be
respondent's girlfriend at that time. She also
confirmed that respondent had, in more than
one occasion, brought with him his students
during their drinking sessions and had even
one student driving for him.
For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated
Atty. Litong's statements about respondent's
preoccupations with his students. Atty. Corpus
also testified that DDD called her at her office
sometime in 2000 or 2001 to inform her that
the latter had broken up with respondent upon
learning that he was actually married. Atty.
Corpus surmised based on her telephone
conversation with DDD that respondent did not
tell the latter his actual marital status. Aside
from this, Atty. Corpus also recalled that
during complainant's farewell party in February
2007, respondent introduced CCC as his
girlfriend of six years, or since the year 2000
or 2001.
To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela
were made to affirm the execution of their
affidavits since their testimonies were based on
the affidavits that complainant included in his
petition.
Once complainant's presentation of witnesses
was concluded, the mandatory
conference/hearing was terminated and the
parties were directed to submit their respective
verified position papers with supporting
documentary evidence within thirty (30) days
from receipt of the transcript of stenographic
notes. After which, the case was considered
submitted for report and recommendation.
On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received
complainant's Manifestation (with
Comments), pertaining to respondent's Motion
to Cancel Hearing and praying for the IBP-CBD
to formally request for records from Branch 77
of MTC, Paranaque City to verify respondent's
claim that he had a hearing in said court
during the first scheduled mandatory
conference. On the same date, the IBP-CBD
also received complainant's Compliance (with
Comments),
submitting the certified photo
copies of the Senate Committee Final Report
No. 367, the Resolution dated January 22,
2001 of the Ombudsman, and the Information
dated June 30, 2003 filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
the court and member of the bar.
On the issue of respondent's alleged violations
of the Revised Penal Code and/or RA 3019 as
reflected in the Senate Report, the
Ombudsman's Resolution, and the Information,
Commissioner Villadolid found that despite
respondent's denials, complainant was able to
present certified true copies of the relevant
documents which support his allegations in the
petition.
30
31
As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent,
Commissioner Villadolid discredited
complainant's assertion that respondent is
guilty of gross immoral conduct for his alleged
adulterous relations with EEE. Based on the
Report, complainant was not able to discharge
the burden of proving the authenticity of the
email messages pertaining to this adulterous
affair; thus, they were deemed inadmissible.
However, Commissioner Villadolid found merit
in complainant's claim that respondent
committed grossly immoral conduct by having
illicit relations with DDD, CCC, and BBB, all
while still married to Jardiolin, to wit:
ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
24
25
cralawred
On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received
complainant's Position Paper. Complainant
thereafter filed two Manifestations, asserting
that respondent is already barred from
submitting his verified position paper and that
any decision or judgment would have to be
based solely on complainant's Verified Position
Paper.
26
27
28
cralawrednad
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships,
Respondent disregarded the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by
the Constitution and affirmed by our laws,
which as a lawyer he swore under oath to
protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically
Article XV. Section 2 thereof clearly provides
that marriage, an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the state.
xxxx
4.23 Moreover. Respondent violated Rule 1.01
of Canon 1, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that "a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct" nor shall a lawyer "engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law. nor shall he, whether in public or private
life, behave in scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession".
32
Findings of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner
After the case was submitted for report and
recommendation, Commissioner Villadolid
rendered a Report, finding that there is more
than sufficient evidence establishing
respondent's gross misconduct affecting his
standing and moral character as an officer of
29
Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave
the following conclusion and
recommendation:
ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
V. Conclusion/Recommendations
5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering
that there is more than sufficient evidence
establishing Respondent's gross misconduct
affecting his standing and moral character as
an officer of the court and member of the bar.
this Commissioner respectfully recommends
that Respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years
with a STERN WARNING that Respondent
should reform his conduct in a manner
consistent with the norms prescribed by the
Canons of Professional Responsibility."
33
on/Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration with Leave dated September
12, 2013, as well as a Reply to the Comment
and/or Opposition dated September 20, 2013.
40
41
On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the
IBP passed a resolution denying respondent's
motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, the
Director for Bar Discipline forwarded the
records of this case to this Court on November
11, 2014.
42
43
cralawrednad
The Issue
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of
the IBP issued a Resolution adopting and
approving, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Villadolid.
As modified, the Board of Governors disbarred
respondent, thus:
34
ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280
CBD Case No. 07-1973
Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.
Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A", and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering
Respondent's violations of Article XV of the
1987 Constitution, Section 2, Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's
Oath, Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan is
hereby DISBARRED and his name Ordered
Stricken Off from the Roll of Attorneys.
On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's
Motion for Reconsideration dated July 3,
2013, to which complainant was required to
submit his comment.
35
36
cralawrednad
For his part, complainant filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (of the IBP-CBD Report dated
June 28, 2012) dated August 17, 2013.
Similarly, respondent was required to comment
on complainant's motion in an Order dated
August 27, 2013. On the same date,
complainant filed his Comment and/or
Opposition (to the Respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration).
37
38
39
cralawrednad
Subsequently, respondent filed a Comment
The issue in this case is whether the
respondent committed gross immoral conduct,
which would warrant his disbarment.
The Court's Ruling
After a thorough examination of the records,
the Court agrees with the Board of Governors'
resolution finding that Atty. Pangalangan's
grossly immoral conduct was fully supported
by the evidences offered.
The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW
AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL
TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in
conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those
who possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for the profession. Good moral
character is not only required for admission to
the Bar, but must also be retained in order to
maintain one's good standing in this exclusive
and honored fraternity.
44
45
We are not unmindful of the serious
consequences of disbarment or suspension
proceedings against a member of the Bar.
Thus, the Court has consistently held that
clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of administrative
penalties on a member of the Bar. This, We
explained in Aba v. De Guzman, Jr.:
ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Preponderance of evidence means that the
evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole,
superior to or has greater weight than that of
the other. It means evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than
that which is offered in opposition thereto.
Under Section 1 of Rule 133. in determining
whether or not there is preponderance of
evidence, the court may consider the
following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of
the case; (b) the witnesses' manner of
testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they
are testifying, the nature of the facts to which
they testify, the probability or improbability of
their testimony; (c) the witnesses' interest or
want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may ultimately
appear in the trial; and (d) the number of
witnesses, although it docs not mean that
preponderance is necessarily with the greater
number.
When the evidence of the parties are evenly
balanced or there is doubt on which side the
evidence preponderates, the decision should be
against the party with the burden of proof
according to the equipoise doctrine.
To summarize, the Court has consistently held
that in suspension or disbarment proceedings
against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant to prove the
allegations in his complaint. The evidence
required in suspension or disbarment
proceedings is preponderance of evidence. In
case the evidence of the parties are equally
balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a
decision in favor of the respondent.
46
The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by
preponderant evidence the grounds by which
respondent has been found committing gross
immorality in the conduct of his personal
affairs.
This Court has, in numerous occasions,
revoked the licenses of lawyers who were
proven to have not only failed to retain good
moral character in their professional and
personal lives, but have also made a mockery
of the institution of marriage by maintaining
illicit affairs.
In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was
disbarred because he showed disrespect for an
institution held sacred by the law, by having an
extramarital affair with the wife of the
complainant. In doing so, he betrayed his
unfitness to be a lawyer.
47
cralawrednad
A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate
as Atty. Eala when the Court revoked his
privilege to practice law after his philandering
ways was proven by preponderant evidence
in Arnobit v. Arnobit. We ruled:
48
ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only
in fact be of good moral character but must
also be seen to be of good moral character and
leading lives in accordance with the highest
moral standards of the community. A member
of the bar and an officer of the court is not
only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or keeping a mistress but must
also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the impression that he is
flouting those moral standards.
xxxx
The fact that respondent's philandering ways
are far removed from the exercise of his
profession would not save the day for him. For
a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for
any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the
actual practice of his profession, would show
him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges with which his license and the
law invest him. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaza,
"[t]he grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule
138. of the Rules of Court are not limitative
and are broad enough to. cover any
misconduct x x x of a lawyer in his professional
or private capacity." To reiterate, possession of
good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to the practice of law, but a
continuing qualification for all members of the
bar.
49
Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar
O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan Catindig, the Court
disbarred respondent Atty. Catindig for
blatantly and purposefully disregarding our
laws on marriage by resorting to various legal
50
strategies to render a facade of validity to his
invalid second marriage, despite the existence
of his first marriage. We said:
ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness
of a member of the bar to continue as such
includes conduct that outrages the generally
accepted moral standards of the community,
conduct for instance, which makes 'a mockery
of the inviolable social institution of
marriage.'" In various cases, the Court has
held that disbarment is warranted when a
lawyer abandons his lawful wife and
maintains an illicit relationship with
another woman who has borne him a
child. (emphasis ours.)
51
In the present case, complainant alleged that
respondent carried on several adulterous and
illicit relations with both married and
unmarried women between the years 1990 to
2007, including complainant's own wife.
Through documentary evidences in the form of
email messages, as well as the corroborating
testimonies of the witnesses presented,
complainant was able to establish respondent's
illicit relations with DDD and CCC by
preponderant evidence.
Respondent's main defense against the alleged
illicit relations was that the same were not
sufficiently established. In his answer,
respondent simply argued that complainant's
petition contains self-serving averments not
supported by evidence. Respondent did not
specifically deny complainant's allegations and,
instead, questioned the admissibility of the
supporting documents. Due to respondent's
own failure to attend the hearings and even
submit his own position paper, the existence of
respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC
remain uncontroverted.
The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found
that respondent violated Article XV, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We
agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings
that respondent violated Canon 10 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, as well as Rule
10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof.
The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:
ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR,
FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice.
xxx
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules
of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.
In the Petition, complainant alleged that
respondent was the subject of a Senate Inquiry
and had a pending case for graft and
corruption against him with the
Sandiganbayan, to wit:
ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
13. Respondent has been recommended by the
Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice & Human
Rights Committees to be investigated and
prosecuted by the Ombudsman, the same as
contained in their "Committee Final Report No.
367" herein attached as Annex D;
14. Respondent has also been recommended
by the above- mentioned committees to suffer
the penalty of disbarment, among others, as
evidenced by the herein attached Annex D-1,
and it is believed that a case for graft and
corruption against him is still pending with the
Sandiganbayan.''
53
ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships,
Respondent disregarded the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by
the Constitution and affirmed by our laws,
which as a lawyer he swore under oath to
protect. The 1987 Constitution, specifically
Article XV, Section 2 thereof clearly provides
that marriage, an inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the
State. (emphasis in the original.)
52
Instead of refuting these claims, respondent
merely pointed out in his Answer that
complainant failed to adduce additional
evidence that a case had been filed against
him, and that complainant's statements were
merely self-serving averments not
substantiated by any evidence. In his Reply,
respondent even specifically denied
complainant's averments for "lack of
knowledge and information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth or falsity thereof."
We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's
findings in the IBP-CBD Report, viz:
ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
4.8 It (sic) is thus indisputable that
Respondent's pretensions in his Answer were
made in attempt to mislead this Commission.
Respondent could have easily admitted or
denied said allegations or explained the same,
as he (sic) clearly had knowledge thereof,
however, he (sic) chose to take advantage of
Complainant" s position of being not present in
the country and not being able to acquire the
necessary documents, skirt the issue, and
mislead the Commission. In doing so, he has
violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer
owes candor, fairness and good faith to
the court" as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule
10.03 thereof which states that "a lawyer
should do no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the court to be misled by
any artifice" and that "a lawyer
shall observe the rules of procedure and
shall not misuse them to defeat the ends
of justice."
4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are
entitled to expect only complete candor and
honesty from the lawyers appearing and
pleading before them. Respondent, through his
actuations, has been lacking in the candor
required of him not only as a member of the
Bar but also as an officer of the Court. In view
of the foregoing, the Commission finds that
Respondent has violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for
which he should be disciplined.54 (emphasis in
the original.)
In denying complainant's allegations,
respondent had no other intention but to
mislead the IBP, which intention was more so
established because complainant was able to
submit supporting documents in the form of
certified true copies of the Senate Report, the
Ombudsman's Resolution, and Information.
We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's
finding that respondent violated the lawyer's
oath which he took before admission to the
Bar, which states:
ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I,__________ , do solemnly swear that I will
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; [will support its Constitution and
obey laws as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein; 1 will do
no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
court; I will not wittingly nor willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
or give aid nor consent to the same; I will
delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the
best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients; and I impose upon myself this
voluntary obligations without any menial
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me
God.
In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable
arrogance by making a mockery out of the
institution of marriage, and taking advantage
of his legal skills by attacking the Petition
through technicalities and refusing to
participate in the proceedings. His actions
showed that he lacked the degree of morality
required of him as a member of the bar, thus
warranting the penalty of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the
foregoing, the Court resolves to ADOPT the
resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
approving and adopting, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. Accordingly,
respondent Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan
is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of
violating Section 2 of Article XV of the 1987
Constitution, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01, Canon 7
and Rule 7.03, and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
Lawyer's Oath and is
hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the
personal records of Atty. Ian Raymond A.
Pangalangan with the Office of the Bar
Confidant and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Likewise, let copies of this Decision be
furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and circulated by the Court
Administrator to all the courts in the country
for their information and guidance.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De
Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, PerlasBernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ.,
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW
AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CASE DIGEST:
ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA v. ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A.
PANGALANGAN. (A.C. No. 10676; September 8,
2015).
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES
UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
FACTS: This is a case for disbarment against Atty.
Pangalangan for his illicit relations, chronic
womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and
"other unscrupulous activities" which cause "undue
embarrassment to the legal profession."
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct
that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life.
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
Complainant and respondent were best friends and
both graduated from the University of the Philippines
(UP) College of Law in 1990, where they were part of
a peer group or barkada with several of their
classmates. After passing the bar examinations and
being admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they
were both registered with the IBP Quezon City.
The practice of law is a privilege given to those
who possess and continue to possess the legal
qualifications for the profession. Good moral
character is not only required for admission to
the Bar, but must also be retained in order to
maintain one's good standing in this exclusive
and honored fraternity.
Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P.
Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3)
children. Complainant avers that while married to
Jardiolin, respondent had a series of adulterous and
illicit relations with married and unmarried women
between the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit
relations involved:
In the case at bar, complainant alleged that
respondent carried on several adulterous and
illicit relations with both married and unmarried
women between the years 1990 to 2007,
including complainant's own wife. Through
documentary evidences in the form of email
messages, as well as the corroborating
testimonies of the witnesses presented,
complainant was able to establish respondent's
illicit relations with DOD and CCC by
preponderant evidence.
1. AAA, who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP
College of Law, from 1990 to 1992, which
complainant had personal knowledge of such illicit
relations;
2. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to
1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite being already
married to Jardiolin;
3, CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while
also being romantically involved with DDD;
4. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to
2002, despite still being married to Jardiolin and
while still being romantically involved with CCC;
5. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime
during the period from May 2004 until the filing of
the Petition, while still being romantically involved
with CCC.
ISSUE: Should Atty. Pangalangan be disbarred?
HELD: Atty. Pangalangan was disbarred by the SC for
grossly immoral conduct.
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
In sum, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable
arrogance by making a mockery out of the
institution of marriage, and taking advantage of
his legal skills by attacking the Petition through
technicalities and refusing to participate in the
proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked
the degree of morality required of him as a
member of the bar, thus warranting the penalty of
disbarment.
Chu v. Guico, Jr., A.C. No. 10573, January 13, 2015
CASE DIGEST:
FERNANDO W. CHU, Complainant, - versus
- ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR.
RULE 1.02
A.C. No. 10573 January 13, 2015
Oronce vs Court of Appeals 298 SCRA 133 (1998)
Cosmos Foundry Shop Workers Union vs. Lo Bu, 63 SCRA
321
In re:1989 IBP Elections, 178 SCRA 398
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 416 SCRA 465 (2003)
DISBARMENT FACTS:
Atty. Guico’s asked Chu to prepare a substantial
amount of money to be given to the NLRC
Commissioner to insure a favorable decision.
However, NLRC ruled against their side.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not to disbar Atty. Guico or just to
suspend him.
2. Whether or not the disbarment while in the
nature of administrative proceedings can also rule
on matters pertaining to the obligation of lawyer
to restitute the complainant.
RULING:
1. Samonte v. Abellana: “Disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are designed to
ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to
practice law in this country should remain faithful
to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers
preserve their fitness to remain as members of the
Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or
deception, including adopting artifices to cover
up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and
the rest of the trusting public, evinces an
unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege
to practice law and highlights the unfitness to
remain a member of the Law Profession. It
deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary
sanctions.”
2. It did not matter that this proceeding is
administrative in character, for, as the Court has
pointed out in Bayonla v. Reyes: “Although the
Court renders this decision in an administrative
proceeding primarily to exact the ethical
responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar,
the Court’s silence about the respondent lawyer’s
legal obligation to restitute the complainant will
be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross
ethical misconduct concerning the client’s funds
or property should be required to still litigate in
another proceeding what the administrative
proceeding has already established as the
respondent’s liability. x x x”
“2. That defendant in 1961, ordered from
the plaintiff quantities of
ready made goods and delivered to her in
good condition and same
were already sold, but did not make the
full payment up to the
present time;
“3. That defendant is still indebted to the
plaintiff in the sum of
P354.85, representing the balance of her
account as the value of the
said goods, which is already overdue and
payable.”
Instead of answering the complaint against her,
Pajares, moved for a bill of
particulars to require Udharam Bazar & Co. to
itemize the kinds of goods
which she supposedly purchased from the said
company.
RULE 1.03
Pajares vs Abad Santos 30 SCRA 748 (1969)
CASE DIGEST:
November 29, 1969 G.R. No. L-29543
GLORIA PAJARES, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
JUDGE ESTRELLA ABAD SANTOS,
MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA
and UDHARAM BAZAR CO., respondentsappellees.
Teehankee, J.:
FACTS:
Udharam Bazar & Co. sued Gloria Pajares for
recovery of a certain sum of
money. The lawsuit was eventually assigned to
the sala of the respondent
Judge Abad Santos.
In its complaint the Udharam Bazar & Co.
averred, among others, as follows:
The inferior court denied the motion and her
motion for reconsideration has
been likewise denied. She then brought the
incident on certiorari
to the Court of First Instance, alleging respondent
judge acted ingrave abuse of
discretion.
Udharam Bazar & Co. filed a motion to dismiss
the petition for a writ
of certiorari and was granted. A subsequent motion
for reconsideration
having been similarly denied by the court, Pajares
undertook the present
appeal to this Court.
ISSUE:
WON counsel for petitioner failed in his d
uty to encourage amicable
settlement or a confession of judgment to accord
respect to the other party’s
claim, saving his client additional expenses and
help prevent the clogging of
court dockets.
RULING:
The circumstances surrounding this litigation
definitely prove that the appeal is frivolous and a
plain trick to delay payment and prolong liti
gation unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves
condemnation, wasting as it does, the time that the
courts could well devote to meritorious cases. This
simple collection case has needlessly clogged the
court dockets for over seven years. Had appellant
been but prudently advised by her counsel to
confess judgment and ask from her creditor the
reasonable time she needed to discharge her lawful
indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she
has incurred by way of filing fees in the Court of
First Instance, premiums for he appeal bond,
appellate court docket fees, printing of her
appellant’s brief, and attorney’s fees would have
been much more than sufficient to pay off her just
debt to appellee. Yet, here she still remains saddled
with the same debt, burdened by accumulated
interests, after having spent uselessly much more
than the amount in litigation in this worthless
cause. The cooperation of litigants and their
attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the
court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be
avoided. A litigation involves time, expense and ill
feelings, which may well be avoided by the
settlement of the action. And in those clearly
unmeritorious cases, a compromise or even a
confession of judgment will accord respect to the
just claim of the other party, save the client
additional expenses and help prevent clogging of
court dockets.
CASE DIGEST:
COBB-PEREZ vs LANTIN
GR No. L-22320
Jul. 29, 1968
FACTS
A civil case was filed by Ricardo Hermoso
against Damaso Perez for the latter’s failure to
pay a debt of Php 17,000.00. Hermoso won and a
writ of execution was issued in his favor. The
sheriff was to conduct a public sale of a property
owned by Perez worth Php 300,000.00. This was
opposed by Perez as he claimed the amount of
said property was more than the amount of the
debt. Respondent Judge Lantin, issuing judge,
found merit on this, hence he amended his earlier
decision and issued a second writ this time
directing the sheriff to conduct a public sale of
Perez’ 210 shares of stock approximately worth
Php 17,000.00.
Subsequently, Perez and his wife filed five more
petitions for injunction trying to enjoin the public
sale. The case eventually reached the Supreme
Court
where
the
SC
ruled
that
the petition of the Perez spouses are without
merit; that their numerous petitions for injunction
are contemplated for delay. In said decision, the
Supreme Court ordered petitioners to pay the cost
of the suit but said cost should be paid by their
counsels, Atty. Baizas and Atty. Bolinao. The
counsels now appeal said decision by the Supreme
Court as they claimed that such decision reflected
adversely against their professionalism; that “If
there was delay, it was because petitioners’
counsel happened to be more assertive... a quality
of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned.”
ISSUE
WON the counsels for the Spouses Perez are
excused.
Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin, 24 SCRA 291
HELD
No. A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing
with candor and honesty his client’s caus
e must be encouraged and is to be commended;
what is not tolerated is a lawyer’s insistence
despite the patent futility of his client’s position,
as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a counsel to
advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the
intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the merit or
lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his
client’s cause is defenseless, then it is his
bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and
submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims
and caprices of his client, and temper his client’s
propensity to litigate. A lawyer’s oath to uphold
the cause of justice is superior to his
duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.
Atty. Baizas and Atty. Bolinao jointly and
severally liable for the treble costs.
Castaneda vs. Ago, 65 SCRA 512
CASE DIGEST:
Topic: Not Act as Instigator of Controversy
Title: CASTANEDA vs AGO
Reference: G.R. No. L-28546
July 30, 1975
FACTS
- Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit
against Ago in the CFI
of Manila to recover certain machineries.
- Judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson
- SC affirmed the judgment;
trial court issued writ of execution; Ago’s
motion denied, levy was made on Ago’s house
and lot; Sheriff advertised the sale, Ago moved to
stop the auction; CA dismissed the petition; SC
affirmed dismissal
Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of pr
eliminary injunction to restrain Sheriff
from enforcing the writ of execution;
his motions were denied
- Sheriff sold the house and lots to Casta
neda and Henson; Ago failed to redeem
- Sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issued
writ of possession to the properties.
- Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment
rendered against him in the replevin suit saying it
was his personal obligation and that his wife ½
share in their conjugal house could not legally be
reached by the levy made;
CFI of QC issued writ of preliminary inj
unction
restraining Castaneda the Register
of Deeds and the sheriff from registering the
final deed of sale; the battle on the matter of
lifting and restoring the restraining order
continued
- Ago filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to enjoin Sheriff
from enforcing writ of possession;
SC dismissed it; Ago filed a similar petition
with the CA which also dismissed the petition;
Ago appealed to SC which dismissed the petition
- Ago filed another petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the CA
which gave due course to the petition an
d granted preliminary injunction.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Agos’ lawyer, encourage his
clients to avoid controversy.
RULINGS
No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the
complaint for the annulment of the
sheriff’s sale, justice demands that the
petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory
in the replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for the
respondents Agos abetted by their
lawyer Atty. Luison, have misused legal
remedies and prostituted the judicial process to
thwart the satisfaction of the judgment, to the
extended prejudice of the petitioners. Forgetting
his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and
his exalted position as an officer of the court,
Atty. Luison has allowed
himself to become an instigator of controv
ersy and a predator of
conflict instead of a mediator for concord
and a conciliator for compromise,
a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct
of litigation instead of a true exponent of the
primacy of truth and moral justice. A counsel’s
assertiveness in espousing with candor and
honesty
his client’s cause must be encouraged and
is to be commended;
what the SC does not and cannot counten
ance is a lawyer’s
insistence despite the patent futility of his client’s
position. It is the duty of the counsel to advice his
client on the merit or lack of his case. If he finds
his client’s cause as defenseless, then he is his
duty to advice the latter to acquiesce and submit
rather than
traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must
resist the whims and caprices of his client, and
temper his client’s propensity to litigation.
defrauded her of the sum of P5,863.00, which amount he
induced her to entrust to him on the misrepresentation that
it represented the cost of fees and other miscellaneous
expenses in connection with the suit that he promised to
suit on her behalf, but which promised suit he never filed
nor did he return the said amount despite repeated
demands.
The Court required respondent to answer the complaint
and to show cause why he should not be suspended from
the practice of law during the pendency of the case. Upon
receipt of respondent's answer which substantially bore
out the averments of the complaint, the Court issued its
Resolution of March 14, 1980 referring the case to the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation and suspending respondent from the
practice of law effective immediately and during the
pendency of the case.
On December 15, 1982, the Office of the Solicitor
General submitted its report and recommendation and
therewith filed its complaint against respondent, charging
him with having committed deceit and misrepresentation
in office as a lawyer, as follows:
Munar v. Flores, A.C. No. 2112, May 30, 1983
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. 2112 May 30, 1983
REMEDIOS MUNAR, complainant
vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO B. FLORES, respondent.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The herein administrative sworn complaint was filed on
January 9, 1980 by complainant Remedios Munar against
respondent Atty. Ernesto B. Flores of Baguio City,
charging that respondent attorney had deceitfully
That during the period comprised
between August 3, 1979 and August 22,
1979, in Baguio City, Ernesto B. Flores,
with deceit and intent to defraud,
represented to one Remedies Munar, who
was then facing an ejectment suit before
the City Court of Baguio, as lesseeoperator of the U.P. College Baguio
Canteen, that he would file an action
before the CFI of Baguio that would stop
the ejectment proceedings against her,
and that in consequence, she could
continue managing the said canteen for
as long as she pleased, well knowing said
action to be absolutely groundless,
thereby inducing the said Remedios
Minar to give him, as in fact she did give
him the amount of P5,863.00, which he
falsely alleged to be the cost of fees and
other miscellaneous expenses in
connection with the filing of said suit,
and once in possession of the said
amount, never filed the promised suit
with the Baguio CFI, and despite demand
made upon him to return the said amount,
refused to do so, as said Ernesto B. Flores
was nowhere to be found and efforts of
said Remedios Munar to contact him
proved futile.
and praying that respondent "be suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months, in addition to his
suspension during the pendency of this case."
On January 26, 1983, the Court issued its Resolution
requiring "(a) the Bar Confidant to serve respondent with
a copy of the complaint of the Solicitor General; and (b)
the respondent to file an answer thereto pursuant to Rule
139, Section 5, within fifteen (15) days from notice
hereof."
Respondent filed on March 14, 1983 his answer,
reiterating the denials and justifications for his actions
that he had made during the investigation, but which had
been rejected by the Solicitor General and stating that
"respondent has no wish anymore to submit additional
evidence or testimony on his behalf and is willing to have
it immediately submitted for resolution by the Honorable
Court. "
The charge against respondent has been duly established
as set forth in the pertinent portions of the Solicitor
General's report which are hereinbelow reproduced:
This case was initially set for
investigation on June 30, 1980, but upon
agreement of the parties, the same was
reset on September 5, 1980.
At the scheduled hearing on September
5, 1980, the parties appeared, and
complainant presented an affidavit dated
September 5, 1980, which was
eventually subscribed and sworn to
before the undersigned investigating
Solicitor. The Affidavit states in part —
'That I am no longer
interested in pursuing
my said complaint
considering that I have
decided
to
forgive
Ernesto B. Flores upon
his repeated pleas and
after returning to me the
amount of P6,300.00
only, despite all the
troubles and expenses I
have gone through since
the beginning, believing
as I do in the divine
saying, 'To err is human,
to forgive divine.'
in consequence of which the complainant asks that her
complaint be considered withdrawn or dropped. She
confirmed the restitution of her money and her desire to
withdraw her complaint on the witness stand.
Thereafter, the respondent, with
permission first obtained, took the
witness stand and presented a copy of the
complaint for nullification, mandamus
and injunction which, he said, he was
supposed to have filed. He adopted the
allegations stated in paragraph 2 of his
answer as his reasons for failing to file
the said complaint with the CFI of
Baguio. In a letter dated September 13,
1979 (Exhibit 2) he had informed the
complainant of his decision not to file the
complaint. He denied having personally
received
complainant's
letter
of
September 21, 1979 (Annex B,