NAVAL AIR TRAINING COMMAND
NAS CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
CNATRA P-882 (New 01-18)
FLIGHT TRAINING INSTRUCTION
ADVANCED MARITIME COMMAND
AND CONTROL (ADVANCED MC2)
CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
2018
Distribution: This instruction is cleared for public release and is available electronically via
Chief of Naval Air Training Issuances Website, https://www.cnatra.navy.mil/pubs-patpubs.asp.
FLIGHT TRAINING INSTRUCTION
FOR
ADVANCED MARITIME COMMAND AND CONTROL (ADVANCED MC2)
CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
P-882
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LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES
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INTERIM CHANGE SUMMARY
The following changes have been previously incorporated in this manual:
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REMARKS/PURPOSE
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ENTERED BY
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SAFETY/HAZARD AWARENESS NOTICE
This course does not require any special safety precautions other than those normally found on
the flight lines.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES .................................................................................................. iv
INTERIM CHANGE SUMMARY...............................................................................................v
SAFETY/HAZARD AWARENESS NOTICE .......................................................................... vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................... vii
TABLE OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................x
CHAPTER ONE - FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE ............ 1-1
100. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 1-1
101. COMPOSITE WARFARE DOCTRINE ................................................................... 1-1
102. WARFARE COMMANDERS .................................................................................. 1-4
103. FUNCTIONAL GROUP COMMANDERS .............................................................. 1-5
104. COORDINATORS .................................................................................................... 1-6
105. CWC CONCEPT’S PLACE WITHIN THE UNIFIED COMM. STRUCTURE...... 1-7
CHAPTER TWO - U.S. NAVAL PLATFORMS/MISSIONS OVERVIEW ....................... 2-1
200. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 2-1
201. NAVAL AIRCRAFT PLATFORMS ........................................................................ 2-1
202. SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE PLATFORMS .................................................. 2-11
CHAPTER THREE - TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND BREVITY...................... 3-1
300. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 3-1
301. CALL SIGNS AND WEAPON/WARNING STATUSES........................................ 3-1
302. BREVITY CODES .................................................................................................... 3-2
303. QUERIES AND BRIEFINGS ................................................................................... 3-2
CHAPTER FOUR - DATA LINK AND TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS
INTEGRATION ......................................................................................................................... 4-1
400. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 4-1
401. DATA LINK MANAGEMENT CONCEPT ............................................................. 4-1
402. LINK 16 AND TACTICAL COMMUNICATION ................................................... 4-3
403. EMCON ..................................................................................................................... 4-4
CHAPTER FIVE - SURFACE WARFARE (SUW) CONCEPTS ........................................ 5-1
500. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 5-1
501. SURFACE WARFARE ............................................................................................. 5-1
502. OPERATIONAL GROUPS ....................................................................................... 5-5
CHAPTER SIX - SURFACE THREATS AND MISSIONS .................................................. 6-1
600. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 6-1
601. SAMS......................................................................................................................... 6-1
602. SURFACE THREATS OVERVIEW ........................................................................ 6-8
603. CENTCOM AOR SURFACE THREATS................................................................. 6-9
604. PACOM AOR SURFACE THREATS .................................................................... 6-12
605. IDENTIFYING SURFACE CONTACTS WITH ISAR IN THE MCS .................. 6-17
vii
CHAPTER SEVEN - SUW SENSORS AND EMPLOYMENT ............................................ 7-1
700. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 7-1
701. SURFACE WARFARE SENSORS .......................................................................... 7-1
702. SURFACE WARFARE SENSOR CHARACTERISTICS ....................................... 7-1
CHAPTER EIGHT - SURFACE SEARCH, LOCALIZATION, AND TRACKING
METHODS ................................................................................................................................. 8-1
800. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 8-1
801. SURFACE WARFARE SEARCH METHODS ........................................................ 8-1
802. SURFACE WARFARE LOCALIZATION METHODS .......................................... 8-4
803. SURFACE WARFARE TRACKING METHODS ................................................... 8-6
CHAPTER NINE - SURF. WARFARE WEAPONS AND DELIVERY PLATFORMS ... 9-1
900. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 9-1
901. SURFACE WARFARE WEAPONS ......................................................................... 9-1
CHAPTER TEN - STRIKE COORDINATION AND ASSET MANAGEMENT ............ 10-1
1000. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 10-1
1001. STRIKE PLANNING AND COORDINATION ..................................................... 10-1
CHAPTER ELEVEN - STRIKE SUPPORT OPERATIONS ............................................. 11-1
1100. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 11-1
1101. STRIKE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT ............................................................................ 11-1
1102. UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS........................................................................ 11-6
CHAPTER TWELVE - AIRCRAFT SELF-DEFENSE CONCEPTS ............................... 12-1
1200. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 12-1
1201. AIRBORNE THREATS .......................................................................................... 12-1
1202. LARGE AIRCRAFT SUSCEPTIBILITIES ............................................................ 12-2
1203. THREAT DETECTION AND COUNTERMEASURES ....................................... 12-4
CHAPTER THIRTEEN - MARITIME STRIKE ................................................................. 13-1
1300. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 13-1
1301. MARITIME STRIKE MISSION PLANNING ....................................................... 13-1
1302. THE DYNAMIC TARGETING PROCESS ........................................................... 13-3
1303. MARITIME TACTICAL CONTROL ..................................................................... 13-6
1304. SSC CONSIDERATIONS ..................................................................................... 13-10
1305. AR/AI/SCAR ......................................................................................................... 13-12
1306. WAS STRIKE ........................................................................................................ 13-13
1307. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT ................................................................... 13-14
CHAPTER FOURTEEN - SEARCH AND RESCUE .......................................................... 14-1
1400. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 14-1
1401. SEARCH AND RESCUE MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES .................................. 14-1
1402. SEARCH AND RESCUE EQUIPMENT................................................................ 14-2
1403. SEARCH AND RESCUE ASSET COORDINATION ........................................... 14-3
1404. SEARCH PATTERNS............................................................................................. 14-4
viii
1405. RESCUE/RECOVERY REPORTS ......................................................................... 14-4
1406. SEARCH AND RESCUE MISSION PLANNING ................................................. 14-5
APPENDIX A - GLOSSARY ................................................................................................... A-1
ix
TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1-1
Figure 1-2
Figure 1-3
Figure 1-4
Figure 1-5
Figure 1-6
Composite Warfare Doctrine Diagram ............................................................ 1-1
Specialized Warfare Commanders ................................................................... 1-3
Functional Group Commanders ....................................................................... 1-6
Coordinators ....................................................................................................... 1-6
UCP Operational and Administrative Chains of Command ......................... 1-7
US Geographic Combatant Commands........................................................... 1-9
Figure 2-1
Figure 2-2
Figure 2-3
Figure 2-4
Figure 2-5
Figure 2-6
Figure 2-7
Figure 2-8
Figure 2-9
Figure 2-10
Figure 2-11
Figure 2-12
Figure 2-13
Figure 2-14
Figure 2-15
Figure 2-16
Figure 2-17
Figure 2-18
Figure 2-19
E-6B Mercury ..................................................................................................... 2-1
P-3C Orion .......................................................................................................... 2-2
P-8A Poseidon..................................................................................................... 2-3
EP-3E Aires ........................................................................................................ 2-4
E-2 Hawkeye ....................................................................................................... 2-5
F/A-18 Hornet..................................................................................................... 2-6
EA-6B Prowler ................................................................................................... 2-7
E/A-18G Growler ............................................................................................... 2-8
MH-60R Seahawk .............................................................................................. 2-9
MH-60S Knighthawk ....................................................................................... 2-10
C-2A Greyhound .............................................................................................. 2-11
Aircraft Carrier, Nuclear ................................................................................ 2-12
Amphibious Assault Ship ................................................................................ 2-13
Cruiser .............................................................................................................. 2-14
Destroyer ........................................................................................................... 2-15
Littoral Combat Ship ....................................................................................... 2-16
Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine ................................................................... 2-17
Attack Submarine ............................................................................................ 2-18
Guided-Missile Submarine.............................................................................. 2-19
Figure 3-1
Figure 3-2
Figure 3-3
Figure 3-4
Figure 3-5
Figure 3-6
Check-in Brief (MNPOTTA) ............................................................................ 3-4
Surface Contact Report ..................................................................................... 3-4
Maritime Air Control (MAC) Baseline Comm Format ................................. 3-5
Checkout Briefing (In-Flight Report) .............................................................. 3-5
Surface Picture Report (SURPIC) Page 1 ....................................................... 3-6
Surface Picture Report (SURPIC) Page 2 ....................................................... 3-7
Figure 4-1
Data Link Terminology ..................................................................................... 4-2
Figure 5-1
Figure 5-2
Figure 5-3
Figure 5-4
Figure 5-5
Ocean and Airspace Divisions........................................................................... 5-5
Bullseye Position Reporting .............................................................................. 5-7
Carrier Strike Group Airspace......................................................................... 5-8
Expeditionary Strike Group Airspace ............................................................. 5-9
Operational Area ............................................................................................. 5-10
x
Figure 5-6
Figure 5-7
MNPOTTA Check-in Brief ............................................................................. 5-11
Surface Contact Report ................................................................................... 5-11
Figure 6-1
Figure 6-2
Figure 6-3
Figure 6-4
Figure 6-5
Figure 6-6
Figure 6-7
Figure 6-8
Figure 6-9
Figure 6-10
Figure 6-11
Figure 6-12
Figure 6-13
Figure 6-14
Figure 6-15
Figure 6-16
Figure 6-17
Figure 6-18
Figure 6-19
Figure 6-20
Figure 6-21
Figure 6-22
Figure 6-23
Figure 6-24
Figure 6-25
Figure 6-26
Figure 6-27
Figure 6-28
Figure 6-29
Figure 6-30
Figure 6-31
Figure 6-32
SA-2 GUIDELINE ............................................................................................. 6-1
FAN SONG Target Acquisition Radar ............................................................ 6-2
SA-3 GOA ........................................................................................................... 6-2
LOW BLOW Fire Control Radar .................................................................... 6-3
SA-5 GAMMON................................................................................................. 6-3
SQUARE PAIR Fire Control Radar ................................................................ 6-4
SA-6 GAINFUL .................................................................................................. 6-4
STRAIGHT FLUSH Radar .............................................................................. 6-5
SA-8 GECKO with LAND ROLL Radar ........................................................ 6-5
SA-10 GRUMBLE ............................................................................................. 6-6
FLAP LID Fire Control Radar ......................................................................... 6-6
SA-20 GARGOYLE ........................................................................................... 6-7
TOMB STONE Fire Control Radar ................................................................ 6-7
MANPADS.......................................................................................................... 6-8
Houdong .............................................................................................................. 6-9
Kaman (Mod La Combattante II) .................................................................. 6-10
Vosper MK 5 .................................................................................................... 6-10
MK III Class Patrol Boat ................................................................................ 6-11
Kilo Class Diesel-Electric Submarine ............................................................ 6-11
Huangfen Guided Missile Patrol Craft .......................................................... 6-12
Sariwon Class Patrol Boat............................................................................... 6-13
Komar Missile Boat ......................................................................................... 6-13
Najin Class Frigate .......................................................................................... 6-14
Shantou Class Patrol Boat............................................................................... 6-15
Chaho Class Patrol Boat ................................................................................. 6-15
Romeo Class SS ................................................................................................ 6-16
Sang O Submarine ........................................................................................... 6-16
Group I Example.............................................................................................. 6-17
Group II Example ............................................................................................ 6-18
Group III Example .......................................................................................... 6-18
ISAR Interpretation Example in the MCS .................................................... 6-19
Corresponding EO Imagry ............................................................................. 6-19
Figure 7-1
Figure 7-2
Figure 7-3
Figure 7-4
Figure 7-5
Surface Warfare Aircraft Sensors .................................................................... 7-1
Airborne Asset Sensor Capabilities.................................................................. 7-2
Surface Warfare Sensor Detection Range ....................................................... 7-3
Radar Horizon .................................................................................................... 7-4
Visual Horizon.................................................................................................... 7-4
xi
Figure 8-1
Figure 8-2
Figure 8-3
Figure 8-4
Figure 8-5
Figure 8-6
Figure 8-7
Figure 8-8
Parallel Search Pattern...................................................................................... 8-2
Bar Scan Search Pattern ................................................................................... 8-2
Expanding Square Search Pattern ................................................................... 8-3
Sector Search Pattern ........................................................................................ 8-4
Confidence Levels .............................................................................................. 8-6
Orbit Flight Pattern ........................................................................................... 8-7
Racetrack Flight Pattern ................................................................................... 8-7
Figure Eight Flight Pattern ............................................................................... 8-8
Figure 9-1
Figure 9-2
Figure 9-3
Figure 9-4
Figure 9-5
Figure 9-6
Figure 9-7
Figure 9-8
Figure 9-9
Zone Defenses ..................................................................................................... 9-1
MAC Comm. Format......................................................................................... 9-2
MK-15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System Characteristics .......................... 9-3
MK-38 25-mm Machine Gun System Characteristics .................................... 9-4
SM-2 Characteristics ......................................................................................... 9-5
AGM-84 Harpoon Missile Characteristics ...................................................... 9-6
AGM-65 Maverick Missile Characteristics ..................................................... 9-7
AGM-84K SLAM-ER Missile Characteristics ................................................ 9-8
Weapons Overview Chart ................................................................................. 9-9
Figure 10-1
Figure 10-2
Strike Planning Cycle ...................................................................................... 10-1
Defense In Depth Strategy............................................................................... 10-4
Figure 11-1
Figure 11-2
Figure 11-3
Figure 11-4
Figure 11-5
Figure 11-6
Figure 11-7
Figure 11-8
Figure 11-9
Figure 11-10
Figure 11-11
Figure 11-12
Figure 11-13
Figure 11-14
Figure 11-15
Figure 11-16
Figure 11-17
E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System ......................... 11-1
Airborne Warning and Control System E-3 Sentry ..................................... 11-2
U-2 ..................................................................................................................... 11-2
RC-135 Rivet Joint ........................................................................................... 11-3
Drogue Refueling Apparatus .......................................................................... 11-3
Boom Refueling Apparatus ............................................................................. 11-4
KC-135 .............................................................................................................. 11-4
KC-10 ................................................................................................................ 11-5
KC-130 .............................................................................................................. 11-5
F/A-18 ................................................................................................................ 11-6
Omega K-707 .................................................................................................... 11-6
Q-4 Global Hawk ............................................................................................. 11-7
MQ-4 Triton ..................................................................................................... 11-7
MQ-1 Predator ................................................................................................. 11-8
MQ-9 Reaper .................................................................................................... 11-8
MQ-8 Fire Scout ............................................................................................... 11-9
Scan Eagle ......................................................................................................... 11-9
xii
Figure 12-1
Figure 12-2
Figure 12-3
Figure 12-4
Figure 12-5
Figure 12-6
Missile Guidance Systems ............................................................................... 12-1
Surface-to-Air Missile Flyout Phases ............................................................. 12-2
Components Producing IR Signatures .......................................................... 12-3
Flight Phases and Threats ............................................................................... 12-3
Antenna Placement of Radar Warning Receivers ........................................ 12-4
Onboard Countermeasures ............................................................................. 12-6
Figure 13-1
Figure 13-2
Figure 13-3
Figure 13-4
Figure 13-5
Figure 13-6
Figure 13-7
Figure 13-8
Figure 13-9
Figure 13-10
Weather Planning Rules of Thumb ................................................................ 13-2
Targeting Process ............................................................................................. 13-4
MAC Baseline Comm. Format ....................................................................... 13-6
Communication Nets ....................................................................................... 13-8
Target/Engage Comm. Examples ................................................................. 13-10
Investigate Tasking Example ........................................................................ 13-10
Rigging Example ............................................................................................ 13-11
Escalatory Response Options ........................................................................ 13-12
SCAR Targeting Example............................................................................. 13-13
Standard Mission Report .............................................................................. 13-14
Figure 14-1
Figure 14-2
Figure 14-3
Figure 14-4
Figure 14-5
Figure 14-6
Figure 14-7
Figure 14-8
Figure 14-9
Figure 14-10
Figure 14-11
Figure 14-12
Figure 14-13
Figure 14-14
Figure 14-15
Figure 14-16
Search and Rescue Drop Kit ........................................................................... 14-2
International Search and Rescue Distress Frequencies ............................... 14-3
On-Scene Search and Rescue Frequencies .................................................... 14-4
Parachute Drift Table ...................................................................................... 14-6
Visual Search Altitude Table .......................................................................... 14-7
Sweep Width Determination ........................................................................... 14-7
Fixed Wing – Uncorrected Visual Sweep Width (300 – 750 ft) ................... 14-8
Fixed Wing – Uncorrected Visual Sweep Width (1000 – 2000 ft) ............... 14-8
Fixed Wing – Uncorrected Visual Sweep Width (2500 – 3000 ft) ............... 14-9
Weather Correction Table .............................................................................. 14-9
Sweep Width for Daylight Detection Aids ................................................... 14-10
Sweep Width for Handheld Orange Smoke ................................................ 14-10
Sweep Width for Night Detection Aids ........................................................ 14-10
Sweep Width Life Jacket White Strobe ....................................................... 14-11
Altitudes for Forward Looking Infrared ..................................................... 14-11
Sweep Width for Forward Looking Airborne Radar ................................. 14-12
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xiv
CHAPTER ONE
FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE
100. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an overview of the basic USN fleet organizational and command structure,
which includes the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC), warfare commanders, functional group
commanders, and coordinators.
101. COMPOSITE WARFARE DOCTRINE
The post-Cold War has seen a rapid growth in the potential air, surface, and subsurface threats
facing our naval forces. This increased threat resulted, in part, from the numerous advanced
weapon systems, sensors, and delivery platforms now available on the open market.
Some of the countries supplying these advanced systems include North Korea, People’s Republic
of China, and the former Soviet Union. With more and more third world countries in possession
of these improved weapon systems, the reaction time available for friendly forces operating in
sensitive areas (e.g., Persian Gulf) decreases. The post-Cold War requires a realignment of
surveillance and reaction responsibilities with a much greater emphasis on decentralized
authority. The Composite Warfare Doctrine (Figure 1-1) provides a more effective means for
using the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) resources for tactical sea control.
Figure 1-1 Composite Warfare Doctrine Diagram
This section summarizes the key roles and terms associated with the Composite Warfare
Doctrine, including OTC responsibilities, composite warfare structure, and Composite Warfare
Commander (CWC) responsibilities.
FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE
1-1
CHAPTER ONE
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) Duties
The OTC is the senior officer with command authority over all forces within a maritime
Operational Area (OA). The OTC is the theater commander and is normally the numbered fleet
commander (e.g., 7th Fleet, 5th Fleet, etc.). Some of the more pertinent duties the OTC must
perform without delegations are:
1.
Designate a force-wide CWC and alternate.
2.
Direct and monitor operations.
3.
Establish and (with the assistance of appropriate warfare commanders and coordinators)
promulgate policies for the force.
4.
Establish C3 guidance; and establish force task organization if not already tasked by higher
authority. Specify chain of command between OTC, CWC, warfare commanders, and
coordinators.
5.
Promulgate a force communications plan, including alternate plan; designating circuits and
frequencies and establishing guard requirements and circuit priorities.
Composite Warfare Command Structure and Capabilities
The Composite Warfare Command is a three-tiered structure that consists of warfare
commanders, functional group commanders, and resource coordinators. The OTC and CWC
lead the Composite Warfare Command with the CWC assigned by and directly subordinate to
the OTC. At times, the same commander/individual may share these roles. The CWC is
normally the CSG commander. Both of these commanders can assign specialized warfare
commanders based on mission requirements. In deciding the assignments and location of
warfare commanders and coordinators, the CWC should take into account the tactical situation,
size of force, and the capabilities of the available assets to cope with the expected threat.
The specialized warfare commanders (Figure 1-2) within the Composite Warfare Command are
the Air Missile Defense Commander (AMDC), Information Operations Warfare Commander
(IWC), Antisubmarine Warfare Commander (ASWC), Surface Warfare Commander (SUWC),
Sea Combat Commander (SCC), and Strike Warfare Commander (STWC). The CWC structure
enables offensive and defensive combat operations against air, surface, undersea, electronic, and
land-based threats. With respect to a carrier strike group, the CWC can best control combat
operations from the carrier itself. Methodologically speaking, the CWC doctrine provides a
structure around which tactics can be executed.
1-2
FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
CHAPTER ONE
Figure 1-2 Specialized Warfare Commanders
CWC Limitations
The CWC doctrine is designed for macro CSG or task force level operations. Smaller task units
or elements may allow a separate Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) to fulfill all sea control
functions him or herself. Tightly structured rules of engagement (ROE) may require the CWC to
maintain even more direct control of assets. Within the CWC doctrine, the multiple tasking of
CSG platforms without clear definition of priorities exists. The CWC and warfare commanders
must understand their responsibilities and how they may change in different tactical situations.
Composite Warfare Commander Responsibilities
The CWC is the officer to whom the OTC has assigned all of his/her authority and assigned
functions for the overall direction and control of the force. The OTC retains the power to negate
any particular action taken by the CWC.
CWCs have the following responsibilities:
1.
Control the specialized commanders by providing guidelines for operational conduct.
2.
Must remain cognizant of the tactical picture in all warfare areas and must be able to
correlate information from external sources that develop locally.
3.
Role of the central command authority to designate plan execution to subordinate warfare
commanders for various missions.
FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE
1-3
CHAPTER ONE
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
102. WARFARE COMMANDERS
This section introduces the responsibilities and functions of the warfare commanders that consist
of the AMDC, IWC, ASWC, SUWC, SCC, and STWC.
Air Missile Defense Commander (AMDC) Responsibilities and Functions
The AMDC is responsible for the measures taken to defend a maritime force against attack by
airborne weapons. The AMDCs duties include defense against air and ballistic missile threats
unless a separate command has been designated. The AMDC reports to the CWC and collects,
evaluates, and disseminates surveillance information.
The AMDC carries out the following functions:
1.
Recommends air defense warning conditions and weapons control status to the CWC
2.
Recommends the air Surveillance Area (SA) to the CWC
3.
Develops and implements the air surveillance and defense plan
4.
Designates link management units
5.
Issues criteria for weapons release and expenditure (using a matrix if applicable)
6.
Coordinates and controls air surveillance
Information Operations Warfare Commander (IWC) Responsibilities and Functions
The IWC is responsible for shaping and assessing the information environment, achieving and
maintaining information superiority, developing and executing information plans, and supporting
other warfare commanders. The IWC is located onboard the carrier.
Antisubmarine Warfare Commander (ASWC) Responsibilities and Functions
The ASWC is responsible for denying the enemy the effective use of submarines. The ASWC
collects, evaluates, and disseminates antisubmarine surveillance information to the CWC. The
ASWC is normally the Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) commander.
Surface Warfare Commander (SUWC) Responsibilities and Functions
The SUWC is responsible for surface surveillance coordination and war-at-sea operations. The
SUWC’s responsibilities encompass operations conducted to destroy or neutralize enemy naval
surface forces and merchant vessels. The SUWC can best perform his/her duties from on board
the carrier due to superior command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I)
and the proximity to surface surveillance coordination (SSC) and war-at-sea (WAS) tactical air
assets.
1-4
FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
CHAPTER ONE
The SUWC establishes aircraft alert requirements, and the OTC retains alert launch authorization
unless specifically assigned.
Sea Combat Commander (SSC) Responsibilities and Functions
The responsibilities of the ASWC and the SUWC are combined into the sea combat commander
(SCC) role whenever the level of activity and the complexity of the various mission areas are
deemed manageable. The SCC establishes sea combat guidance and controls assigned assets to
implement the sea combat plan. The tactical DESRON commander normally assumes the role as
SCC.
Strike Warfare Commander (STWC) Responsibilities and Functions
The STWC’s responsibilities are to conduct operations to destroy or neutralize enemy targets
ashore. These actions include attacks against strategic, operational, or tactical targets from
which the enemy is capable of conducting air, surface, or subsurface support operations. The
overall mission of the STWC is typically offensive. The STWC is located on the carrier and is
normally the carrier air wing commander (CAG).
103. FUNCTIONAL GROUP COMMANDERS
Warfare commanders may designate temporary or permanent functional groups or components
to conduct a specific activity that supports the overall mission. The establishing authority
determines the command authority of the functional group commanders.
Functional groups are subordinate to the CWC and are usually established to perform duties that
are more limited in scope and duration than those performed by warfare commanders. Their
duties generally span assets normally assigned to one or more warfare commanders. See
Figure 1-3 for the specific functional group commanders.
FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE
1-5
CHAPTER ONE
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Figure 1-3 Functional Group Commanders
104. COORDINATORS
Coordinators are asset and resource managers who carry out policies of the CWC and respond to
specific tasking of either warfare or functional group commanders. Coordinators are highlighted
in Figure 1-4.
Figure 1-4 Coordinators
1-6
FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
CHAPTER ONE
Air Resource Element Coordinator (AREC): provides organic carrier air resources as tasked by
warfare commanders and the CWC.
Helicopter Element Coordinator (HEC): promulgates air and air plans for non-logistical
helicopters to support CSG operations.
Submarine Operations Coordinating Authority (SOCA): acts as principle advisor to the SCC for
submarine matters when an SSN is assigned in direct support of the CSG.
Force Over-the-horizon Track Coordinator (FOTC): manages and collates all source (organic
and non-organic) contact information and designates contacts of critical concern to the CSG.
105. CWC CONCEPT’S PLACE WITHIN THE UNIFIED COMMAND STRUCTURE
The National Security Act of 1947 and Title 10 of the United States Code provide the basis for
the establishment of combatant commands. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) established the
missions and responsibilities for commanders of combatant commands and establishes their
general geographic areas of responsibility (AOR’s) and functions.
The commander of a combatant command that includes a geographic AOR is a “geographic
combatant commander.” The commander of a combatant command with trans-regional
responsibilities is a “functional combatant commander.”
Figure 1-5 UCP Operational and Administrative Chains of Command
FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE
1-7
CHAPTER ONE
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
As of 2013, the UCP contains 6 geographical and 4 functional combatant commands:
1.
2.
Geographical combatant commands (Figure 1-6):
a.
US Central Command
b.
US European Command
c.
US Northern Command
d.
US Pacific Command
e.
US Southern Command
f.
US African Command
Functional combatant commands:
a.
US Joint Forces Command
b.
US Special Operations Command
c.
US Strategic Command
d.
US Transportation Command
Within any geographical combatant command, the Naval Component Commander is subordinate
to the combatant commander and may designate a CWC.
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FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
CHAPTER ONE
Figure 1-6 US Geographic Combatant Commands
FLEET ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE
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CHAPTER TWO
U.S. NAVAL PLATFORMS/MISSIONS OVERVIEW
200. INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the characteristics of U.S. naval aircraft plus U.S. naval surface and
subsurface platforms.
201. NAVAL AIRCRAFT PLATFORMS
This section provides an overview of the mission areas, systems, and weapons of U.S. naval
aircraft.
E-6B Mercury Characteristics
The E-6B Mercury (Figure 2-1) is a communications relay and strategic airborne command post
aircraft that provides survivable, reliable, and endurable airborne C3. The aircraft is equipped
with an Airborne Launch Control System (ALCS) for the remote launching of land-based
missiles. The mission range of the E-6B is 6600 nautical miles (NM).
Although this aircraft does not carry direct weapons systems, it is able to transmit a signal to
launch land-based missiles when required. The mission areas of the E-6B include C3, strategic
airborne command, and communications relay. The sytems that the E-6B carries are very low
frequency (VLF) communications with dual Trailing Wire Antennas (TWAs), Military Strategic
and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR), ALCS, Satellite Communication (SATCOM), and Digital
Airborne Intercommunications and Switching System (DAISS).
Figure 2-1 E-6B Mercury
U.S. NAVAL PLATFORMS/MISSIONS OVERVIEW
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ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
P-3C Orion and P-8A Poseidon Characteristics
The P-3C Orion (Figure 2-2) is a four-engine, turboprop, antisubmarine and maritime
surveillance aircraft. The P-8A Poseidon (Figure 2-3) has the exact same capabilities as the
P-3C, but with more advanced sensors. The P-8A, which is based on the Boeing 737
commercial aircraft, should replace the P-3C by the end of this decade.
Originally designed as a land-based, long-range antisubmarine warfare (ASW) patrol aircraft, the
P-3C now provides surveillance of land and sea battle space. This aircraft also carries a mixed
weapons payload with a mission range of 2380 NM.
The mission areas of the P-3C include ASW patrol, battle space surveillance, maritime patrol,
deterrence, sea control, maritime security, and SAR.
These aircraft carry a Surface Search(SS) radar (APS-137 [P-3C] and APY-10 [P-8A]),
Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR), Identification Friend
or Foe (IFF) equipment, Electronic Support Measures (ESM), Magnetic Anomaly Detector
(MAD), acoustic processing capability, sonobuoy launch capability, Electro-Optical/Infrared
(EO/IR) camera, Radar Warning Receiver (RWR), countermeasures, data link, Multi-Mission
Advanced Tactical Terminal (MATT), Automatic Identification System (AIS) (receive only),
and SATCOM.
The P-3C may carry such weapons as the AGM-84 Harpoon, AGM-84H/K Standoff LandAttack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER), AGM-65F Maverick, MK 46/50/54 torpedoes,
Zuni rockets, mines, and bombs.
Figure 2-2 P-3C Orion
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CHAPTER TWO
Figure 2-3 P-8A Poseidon
EP-3E Aires Characteristics
The EP-3E Aries II (Figure 2-4) is a land-based multi-intelligence reconnaissance aircraft based
on the P-3 Orion airframe. Recently upgraded from signal intelligence (SIGINT) to multiintelligence, the EP-3E is the Navy’s only land-based reconnaissance aircraft.
The EP-3E aircraft provide near real-time tactical SIGINT and full-motion video intelligence to
fleet and theater commanders worldwide. With sensitive receivers and high-gain dish antennas,
the EP-3E can exploit a wide range of electronic emissions from deep within a targeted territory.
The crew combines the collected intelligence with off-board data and disseminates the
collaborated information for direct threat warning, indications and warning (I&W), information
dominance, battle space situational awareness (SA), Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
(SEAD), destruction of enemy air defense, Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), and ASW applications.
The mission areas of the EP-3E include I&W, Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations (SRO),
SAR, and Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP).
This aircraft carries radar, IFF, ESM, EO/IR camera, data link, MATT, AIS (receive only), and
SATCOM systems. However, it has no weapons capability.
U.S. NAVAL PLATFORMS/MISSIONS OVERVIEW
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Figure 2-4 EP-3E Aires
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CHAPTER TWO
E-2C/D Hawkeye Characteristics
The E-2C/D (Figure 2-5) is the Navy’s all-weather, carrier-based, tactical battle management
Airborne Early Warning (AEW) C2 aircraft. It is a twin-engine turboprop aircraft whose main
feature is a 24-ft diameter rotating radar dome on top of the aircraft. The E-2C/D does not carry
weapons.
The mission areas of the E-2C/D include all-weather AEW, airborne battle management, C2,
surveillance coordination, air interdiction, counter-air control, Close Air Support (CAS)
coordination, time-critical strike coordination, search and air rescue (SAR) airborne
coordination, and communications relay.
These aircraft carry computerized radar (APS-145 [E-2C] and APY-9 [E-2D]), IFF, ESM, data
link, SATCOM, and AIS (receive only) systems.
Figure 2-5 E-2 Hawkeye
U.S. NAVAL PLATFORMS/MISSIONS OVERVIEW
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ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
F/A-18C/D and F/A-18E/F Hornet Characteristics
The F/A-18C/D and F/A-18E/F (Figure 2-4) are all-weather fighter-and-attack aircraft designed
for day/night strikes with precision-guided weapons, AAW, SEAD, CAS, and Forward Air
Controller Airborne [FAC(A)].
The mission areas of the F/A-18C/D and F/A-18E/F include air interdiction, CAS, fleet air
defense, strike, reconnaissance, and tanking (F/A-18E/F only).
These aircraft carry the APG-65 radar (F/A-18C only), APG-73 radar (most F/A-18C/D aircraft),
APG-79 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar (most F/A-18E/F aircraft),
Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared (ATFLIR) pod, RWR, countermeasures, Joint
Helmet Mounted Cueing System (JHMCS) (F/A-18E/F only), advanced data link
(multifunctional information distribution system [MIDS]), and multi-sensor integration.
Some of the weapons carried by these aircraft include the M61A1/A2 Vulcan, AIM-9
Sidewinder, AIM-7 Sparrow, AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile
(AMRAAM), AGM-84H/K SLAM-ER, AGM-84 Harpoon, AGM-88 HARM, AGM-65
Maverick, Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), and Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM).
Figure 2-6 F/A-18 Hornet
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CHAPTER TWO
EA-6B Prowler Characteristics
The EA-6B (Figure 2-7) provides protection for strike aircraft, ground troops, and ships by
jamming enemy radar, electronic data links, and communications. This aircraft, whose mission
areas include EW and SEAD, is a long-range, all-weather aircraft with advanced electronic
countermeasures capability.
The EA-6B carries such systems as communications jamming, EW, APS-130 radar (Search,
Ground Mapping, and Terrain-Avoidance radar), LITENING targeting pod (USMC only), RWR,
countermeasures, data link, MATT, and Improved Data Modem (IDM). The weapons that the
aircraft may carry are AGM-88 HARM, jamming pods, and bulk chaff pods.
Figure 2-7 EA-6B Prowler
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E/A-18G Growler Characteristics
The E/A-18G (Figure 2-8), the fourth variant of the F/A-18 family of aircraft, is built with a
sophisticated EW suite to perform a wide range of enemy defense-suppression missions. The
aircraft is an Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) aircraft that integrates the latest EA technology.
The mission areas of this aircraft include EW, SEAD, and multi-mission capabilities (fight
escort, reconnaissance, tanking, and air defense suppression) shared with the F/A-18 Super
Hornet.
The systems that the E/A-18G carries are communications jamming, electronic warfare (EW),
APG-79 AESA radar, RWR, countermeasures, data link, and SATCOM.
Weapons carried onboard this aircraft include jamming pods, AIM-120 AMRAAM, AGM-88
HARM, and AGM-154 JSOW.
Figure 2-8 E/A-18G Growler
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CHAPTER TWO
MH-60R Seahawk Characteristics
As the Navy’s next generation submarine hunter and Surface Warfare (SUW) helicopter, the
MH-60R Seahawk (Figure 2-9) will be the cornerstone of the Navy’s Helicopter Concept of
Operations (CONOPS).
The MH-60R and its mission systems, which will replace the fleet’s legacy SH-60B and SH-60F,
is designed to operate from both small ships (cruisers, destroyers, and frigates) and carriers. This
aircraft combines the capabilities of the SH-60B and SH-60F, but does not carry the MAD sensor
that the SH-60B incorporated.
The mission areas of this aircraft include ASW, SUW, SAR, surveillance, Vertical
Replenishment (VERTREP), VHF/UHF/link communications relay, naval surface fire and
gunfire support, logistics (LOG) support, personnel transport, and medical evacuation.
The MH-60R carries SS radar, ISAR, IFF, ESM, acoustic processing with sonobuoy release
capability, dipping sonar, Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) camera, RWR, countermeasures,
data link, and Hawklink (helicopter-to-ship streaming video and data) systems.
The weapons carried on this aircraft include the MK 54 Torpedo, AGM-114 Hellfire, and a 7.62mm or .50-caliber (cal) machine gun.
Figure 2-9 MH-60R Seahawk
U.S. NAVAL PLATFORMS/MISSIONS OVERVIEW
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ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
MH-60S Knighthawk Characteristics
The MH-60S is designed to perform VERTREP, Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR), special
operations support, mine countermeasures, and SUW. Originally designed to replace the aging
H-46D heavy-lift helicopter in the VERTREP role, the MH-60S also replaced the HH-60H with
its CSAR role.
With expanded capabilities, the mission roles have increased beyond VERTREP and CSAR to
include special operations support, transport, SUW, combat support, humanitarian disaster relief,
aeromedical evacuation, and mine countermeasures.
The systems that the MH-60S carries are ESM, FLIR camera, mine detection, RWR,
countermeasures, data link, and SATCOM. The weapons carried by the MH-60S are the
AGM-114 Hellfire, rockets, and machine guns.
Figure 2-10 MH-60S Knighthawk
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CHAPTER TWO
C-2A Greyhound Characteristics
The mission areas of the C-2A consist of providing critical LOG support to CSGs and
transporting high-priority cargo, mail, and passengers between aircraft carriers and shore bases.
The C-2A does not carry any specialized systems or weapons.
Figure 2-11 C-2A Greyhound
202. SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE PLATFORMS
This section provides an overview of the surface and subsurface platforms and their mission
areas, systems, and weapons.
Aircraft Carriers, Nuclear (Nimitz Class) Characteristics
Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carriers (CVNs) (Figure 2-12), the world’s largest warships, are
surface platforms that serve as the centerpiece of USN forces. They carry over 60 aircraft of
various types and have the capability to deploy these aircraft over a wide area.
The mission areas of these carriers include power projection, forward presence, humanitarian
assistance, deterrence, sea control, and maritime security.
CVNs use air traffic control (ATC) radar, Air Search radar, ESM, EW, countermeasures, data
link, AIS, SATCOM, and various aircraft systems.
Sea Sparrow missiles, Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), and Rolling Airframe
Missiles (RAMs) are the typical weapons carried on the CVNs.
U.S. NAVAL PLATFORMS/MISSIONS OVERVIEW
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CHAPTER TWO
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Figure 2-12 Aircraft Carrier, Nuclear
2-12 U.S. NAVAL PLATFORMS/MISSIONS OVERVIEW
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
CHAPTER TWO
Amphibious Assault Ships (Wasp Class and Tarawa Class) Characteristics
The amphibious assault ship classes (LHD/LHA) (Figure 2-13) are capable of hosting
Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing (V/STOL) aircraft operations. These ships are designed to
support the USMC tenets of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) and Ship to
Objective Maneuver (STOM).
These classes of ships, which must be able to sail in harm’s way, provide a rapid build-up of
combat power ashore in the face of opposition. The mission areas include humanitarian
operations, amphibious warfare, and sea strike.
These ships use SS radar, 3D Air Search, MK 23 Target Acquisition System, ATC, EW,
countermeasures, data link, AIS, SATCOM, and various aircraft systems.
The weapons carried on these ships include Sea Sparrow missiles, Phalanx CIWS, RAMs,
.50-cal machine guns, and MK 38 25-mm machine guns.
Figure 2-13 Amphibious Assault Ship
U.S. NAVAL PLATFORMS/MISSIONS OVERVIEW
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CHAPTER TWO
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Cruisers (Ticonderoga Class) Characteristics
Cruisers (CG) (Figure 2-14), which are large combat vessels with multiple-target response
capabilities, perform in a battle force role. These classes of ships are surface combatants capable
of supporting carrier battle groups and amphibious forces in multiple missions and operating
independently as flagships of Surface Action Groups (SAGs).
The mission areas include AAW, ASW, SUW, Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS), Strike
Warfare (STW), and ballistic missile defense (BMD).
These ships carry the Air Search radar, Fire Control radar, SS radar, Aegis Combat System
(SPY-1), ESM, active and passive sonar (hull-mounted), passive towed array, acoustic
processing, sonobuoy launch capability, EW, two MH-60R or SH-60B LAMPS helicopters,
BMD (some ships), countermeasures, data link, AIS, Hawklink, and SATCOM systems.
The weapons that these ships carry include the MK 41 Vertical Launching System (VLS);
vertical launch Antisubmarine Rockets (ASROCs); Tomahawk cruise missiles; MK 46
torpedoes; MK 45 5-in, .54-cal, lightweight guns; and Phalanx CIWS.
Figure 2-14 Cruiser
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CHAPTER TWO
Destroyers (Arleigh Burke Class) Characteristics
This class of destroyer warships (DDGs) (Figure 2-15) provides multi-mission offensive and
defensive capabilities. These ships can operate independently or as part of CSGs, ESGs, SAGs,
amphibious ready groups, or underway replenishment groups. The mission areas include AAW,
ASW, SUW, and STW.
These warships carry the Air Search radar, Fire Control radar, SS radar, Aegis Combat System
(SPY-1), ESM, active and passive sonar (hull-mounted), passive towed array, acoustic
processing, sonobuoy launch capability, EW, two MH-60R or Sh-60B LAMPS helicopters,
BMD (some ships), countermeasures, data link, AIS, Hawklink, and SATCOM systems.
The weapons that destroyers may carry include Standard Missiles (SM-2MRs); vertical launch
ASROCs; Tomahawk cruise missiles; Phalanx CIWS; MK 46 torpedoes; MK 45 5-in, .54-cal,
lightweight guns; and evolved Sea Sparrow missiles.
Figure 2-15 Destroyer
Littoral Combat Ships (Independence and Freedom Class) Characteristics
U.S. NAVAL PLATFORMS/MISSIONS OVERVIEW
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ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
The littoral combat ship (LCS) (Figure 2-16) is a new family of surface ships for the US Navy,
and is a fast, highly maneuverable, networked surface combat ship, which is a specialized variant
of the family of US future surface combat ships known as DD(X).
LCSs are designed to satisfy the emergent requirement for shallow draft vessels that can operate
in the littoral (coastal waters) to counter the increasing potential threats of coastal mines, quiet
diesel submarines, and the potential of terrorists to carry explosives on small, fast, armed boats.
The two designs are quite different, although both satisfy the top level performance requirements
and technical requirements of the LCS program. Both achieve sprint speeds in excess of 40
knots and transit distances of more than 3500 miles. The ships can carry out aircraft launch and
recovery in conditions up to sea state 5. A core capability will be the deployment of Fire Scout
unmanned air vehicle and the unmanned ribbed boat.
Both classes of vessels are armed with the BAE Systems Land and Armaments (formerly United
Defense) mk110 57-mm naval gun system. The MK 110 fires MK 295 ammunition at a rate of
220 rounds per minute out to a range of nine miles.
Figure 2-16 Littoral Combat Ship
Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines (Ohio Class) Characteristics
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CHAPTER TWO
The fleet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) class (Figure 2-17) serves as an undetectable launch
platform for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). These vessels, whose mission area is
strategic deterrence, are designed specifically for stealth and the precise delivery of nuclear
warheads.
The systems on these vessels include SS radar, ESM, active and passive sonar (bow-mounted),
passive towed array, acoustic processing, and countermeasures.
The Trident II submarine-launched ballistic nuclear missiles, Tomahawk cruise missiles, and
MK 48 torpedoes are the types of weapons carried on this class of submarines.
Figure 2-17 Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine
Attack Submarines (Los Angeles, Seawolf, and Virginia Class) Characteristics
U.S. NAVAL PLATFORMS/MISSIONS OVERVIEW
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This class of attack submarines (SSNs) (Figure 2-18) possessing booth speed and stealth is
designed to destroy enemy submarines and surface ships with their MK 48 torpedoes. Their
mission areas include ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), MIW, battle group
operational support, special operations support, and STW.
The systems carried on these vessels are SS radar, ESM, active and passive sonar
(bow-mounted), passive towed array, acoustic processing, and countermeasures.
Figure 2-18 Attack Submarine
Guided-Missile Submarines (Ohio Class) Characteristics
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CHAPTER TWO
This class of guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) (Figure 2-19), with its superior
communications systems, provides a combination of strike and special operation mission
capabilities within a stealth platform.
In order to meet the needs of the nation’s strategic force, the U.S. required only 14 of its 18 Ohio
Class SSBNs. Taking advantage of the existing submarine technology, the decision was made to
transform the remaining four Ohio Class SSBN submarines into conventional land attack and
special operations support platforms, redesignating these submarines as SSGNs. The mission
areas include Special Operations Forces and STW.
The systems that these submarines carry are SS radar, ESM, active and passive sonar
(bow-mounted), passive towed array, acoustic processing, and countermeasures. The weapons
that these vessels may carry are the Tomahawk cruise missiles and MK 48 torpedoes.
Figure 2-19 Guided-Missile Submarine
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CHAPTER THREE
TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS AND BREVITY
300. INTRODUCTION
This chapter includes a discussion of warfare commander call signs, weapon control statuses,
threat warnings, brevity codes, queries, and briefings.
301. CALL SIGNS AND WEAPON/WARNING STATUSES
Call signs and threat warning/weapon control statuses provide an efficient and timely reference
to the commander in question or to the targeting instructions in the field.
A warfare commander is typically assigned a two-letter call sign associated with his or her
respective assigned duty. The call sign, which provides a clear picture of the command
organization, is a quick and easy reference for a commander to use in cross-warfare area
communications. The first letter (prefix) of each call sign signifies a specific composite warfare
organization. The second letter (suffix) of each call sign signifies a specific commander or
coordinator within a composite warfare organization
Each warfare commander has a primary commander in charge and a designated alternate
commander. If the primary commander is not able to take control of their particular warfare
area, the alternate commander takes control. The warfare commander, functional commander,
and coordinator have their own call signs the same as a primary commander and an alternate
commander. The prevalent composite warfare commanders/coordinators introduced in chapter
21 and their call signs are as follows:
OTC: The theater commander’s call sign is (AA). Normally the OTC is the numbered fleet
commander (e.g., Commander 5th Fleet) and is usually the rank of, Vice Admiral.
CWC: Delegated authority by the OTC for the overall direction and control of the force. The
CWC is normally the CSG Commander, call sign (AB), and is a Rear Admiral Lower Half
(one-star).
AMDC: Call sign (AW) is normally the CSG Cruiser CO with the rank of Captain (O-6).
IWC: Call sign (AQ) is normally the senior O-6 onboard the CSG staff.
SCC: Call sign (AZ) is normally the DESRON commander with the rank of Captain (O-6).
STWC: Call sign (AP) is normally the Carrier Air Group (CAG) Commander (CAG) with the
rank of Captain (O-6).
FOTC: Call sign (AF) is normally the Joint Interface Control Officer (JICO), a limited duty
officer (LDO) onboard the CSG staff specializing in multi-tactical data link interface
architecture, planning, and operation.
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Weapon Control Status
The OTC or the relevant warfare commander issues a weapon control status. This weapon
control status provides the commander’s general direction or policy for weapon employment for
all or part of a specific warfare area such as SUW, ASW, and AAW. The weapon control
statuses are: Weapons Free (open fire on any target that is not identified as friendly), Tight (Do
not open fire unless target is identified as hostile), and Safe (Do not open fire except in selfdefense or in response to a formal order).
Threat Warnings
Since threat warnings are informative, force or individual unit actions are not automatically
linked to the warning. Sometimes, an OTC orders temporary actions based on a certain
situation; however, threat warnings are typically issued as a direct result of detections and enemy
reports. The color codes that are applied to threat warnings denote the severity of the evaluated
threats. These color codes are Warning White (attack is unlikely without adequate warning),
Yellow (attack is probable), and Red (attack is imminent or has already begun).
Threat warnings apply to principal warfare areas and include, but are not limited to, AAW,
SUW, and ASW.
302. BREVITY CODES
Multi-service brevity codes are used by various military forces and, by design, are a universal
language not tied to any one particular branch of service. Brevity codes convey complex
information in simplified terms. They are intended to shorten, rather than conceal, the content of
a message. The latest edition of the Common Universal Brevity Code Manual is available for
download at the Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA) Website. The hyperlink is
http://www.alsa.mil/library/mttps/brevity.html and CAC login is required. It is highly
recommended that each student downloads and studies the terms found in the ALSA Common
Universal Brevity Code Manual. These terms will be discussed in the CAI and MIL lessons
associated with this chapter and will be utilized regularly during simulator events. Students are
responsible for the knowledge of ALSA brevity words covered in this chapter’s CAI and MIL
presentations.
303. QUERIES AND BRIEFINGS
Knowing how to respond to a query challenge (depending on location) is very important within
naval aviation. Knowledge of standardized briefs and reports is also critical to mission success.
Maritime Query Challenge Procedures
Freedom of the high seas includes the right of aircraft of all nations to use the airspace over the
high seas. The sovereignty of a state extends beyond its land area to the outer limit of its
territorial seas. The U.S. recognizes territorial sea claims up to 12 NM from a state’s land
3-2
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CHAPTER THREE
boundaries. When U.S. military aircraft personnel experience different maritime situations,
specific procedures exist as described below.
A U.S. military aircraft that receives a challenge from an international authority while operating
in international airspace should advise the challenging authority that it is a U.S. military aircraft
and continue its planned route of flight. If a U.S. military aircraft is intercepted by foreign
aircraft, established DoD Flight Information Procedures and International Intercept Procedures
should be followed.
If intercepted in the territorial airspace of a foreign country, a U.S. military aircraft should
comply with the foreign authority’s directions to depart territorial airspace or directions to land
(provided a safe landing can be accomplished). If the aircraft lands, the crew should
immediately contact the applicable U.S. embassy for assistance.
Briefs and Reports
Standardized briefs and reports provide useful information regarding assets, capabilities, targets,
actions, and other data. The briefing formats that should be used are the Check-in (MNPOTTA)
Brief, Surface Contact Report, Maritime Air Control (MAC) Comm Format, Checkout Briefing
In-Flight Report (INFLTREP), and/or Surface Picture (SURPIC) Report.
The MNPOTTA check-in format (Figure 3-1) is used in conjunction with Maritime Air Control
communication which replaced the outdated MAS tactic and is used in armed reconnaissance/air
interdiction/strike coordination and reconnaissance (AR/AI/SCAR) missions with dynamic
targets requiring quick reaction times.
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Figure 3-1 Check-in Brief (MNPOTTA)
The Surface Contact Report (Figure 3-2) provides standardized information on vessels or tracks
of interest. Line numbers are not transmitted.
Figure 3-2 Surface Contact Report
The baseline air-to-surface communications format for MAC (Figure 3-3) has been aligned to
closely resemble the one used for Tactical Air Intercept Control (TACAIC).
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Figure 3-3 Maritime Air Control (MAC) Baseline Comm Format
The Checkout Briefing (INFLTREP), shown in Figure 3-4, recaps actions taken during air
operations in maritime surface warfare (AOMSW) missions. Line numbers are not transmitted.
Figure 3-4 Checkout Briefing (In-Flight Report)
The SURPIC Report (Figures 3-5 and 3-6) is a two-page guide with standardized information
about surface contacts. AOMSW assets complete the first page by using information from the
second page that best matches the details of the surface contact.
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Figure 3-5 Surface Picture Report (SURPIC) Page 1
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DATA LINK AND TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATION
400. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will explore data link and tactical communications integration terms, procedures,
and limitations. This includes discussions on data link management concept, limitations, tactical
communication, intelligence information reporting, transmission security, and emission control
(EMCON).
401. DATA LINK MANAGEMENT CONCEPT
In a multi-sensor environment, there is a need to organize data processing to achieve accuracy,
timeliness, and proper communication resource management. A poorly managed picture can be
confusing and lead to possible fratricide and/or incorrect target prosecution. A properly
managed picture improves situational awareness builder and acts as a force multiplier.
Proper data link management involves correct track reporting including maintaining one track
number for the life of the track. Link management is an all-operator responsibility. The JICO
heads the Joint Interface Control Cell and manages the complexity of the data link and electronic
battlefield and works to maintain successful continuous data exchange. This function, as
previously discussed, is normally assigned to a limited duty officer (LDO) attached to the CSG
staff.
Data link management, as performed by the JICO, consists of actions needed to dynamically
establish, maintain, and terminate Link 16 communications among participants. Some of the
ICO functions include monitoring network configuration, performing general link
administration, and assigning network roles to JUs.
The following terminology (Figure 4-1) is pertinent to data link management:
Term
Definition
Reporting
Responsibility (R2 )
The responsibility assigned to a Joint Tactical Information
Distribution System (JTIDS) JTIDS Unit (JU) reporting a particular
track for that track. It is the objective to only have one unit report a
particular track. The JU with the highest track quality has this
responsibility. The JU with R2 is responsible for performing
calculations to keep track information up-to-date.
Track Quality (TQ)
The number that a JU calculates and transmits to express reliability
of its information about the track.
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Term
Definition
Conflict Resolution
Procedures that a JU may use to ensure only one unit has R2 and
that a solution is reached for conflicting track reports by different
units.
EMCON
A procedure used to minimize the likeliness of detection,
identification, and location of friendly forces by an enemy. It is
also used to reduce electromagnetic interference among friendly
systems.
Figure 4-1 Data Link Terminology
Track Origination
A track entry is built by an operator who initiates the entry from synthetic sensor data that
provides the following primary information: position, course, speed, and altitude. Each JU must
evaluate all tracks for which it has R2. Unknown, unevaluated tracks being reported in the link
are unacceptable.
Track Reporting
The JU that originates a track assumes R2 for the track unless a more appropriate JU (one that
holds a higher track quality) is available. It is incumbent upon operators to coordinate with the
FOTC as necessary to resolve R2 and other data link reporting issues.
Track Quality
Each JU’s data link tactical computer calculates its specific positional accuracy range. This data
is then used to develop a TQ value that ranges from 0-15. This TQ value is then used to assign
R2 .
Conflict Resolution
If a track conflict arises, such as two units reporting different identification and track information
for the same track, the FOTC voice network, designated (AF), is used to resolve the conflict.
Link managers use the AF net to communicate proper track information via the FOTC to the
appropriate R2 JU.
Data Link Management Limitations
Multiple platforms may be participating in the data link at any given time. Each automatically
generates tracks and assigns TQ to those tracks. This requires constant vigilance on the part of
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the operator to properly manage the track data and ensure that it is reported correctly. Care must
be taken to follow proper procedures to avoid issues such as a split net or data loop.
402. LINK 16 AND TACTICAL COMMUNICATION
Link 16 improves upon the existing tactical data link (TDL) network by providing more
complete and more accurate tactical information, superior communications technology, and an
introduction of intelligence information reporting capability to the navy.
Specific Link 16 tactical communication improvements include greatly improved friendly force
location, identification and status reporting capability, positional accuracy improvements through
relative navigation (RELNAV), integrated voice and plain-text features, and improved
transmission security and anti-jam features.
Intelligence Information Reporting
Amplifying link reported tracks (real-time or non-real-time) with information gained by
intelligence sources other than traditional means is known as intelligence information reporting.
Any intelligence source can report this information and tie it to a data link track regardless of R2.
Intelligence information reporting sources include the EP-3E Airborne Reconnaissance
Integrated Electronic System (ARIES) II, RC-135 Rivet Joint, and the Ship Signals Exploitation
Space (SSES).
The EP-3E ARIES II is the navy’s only land-based SIGINT reconnaissance aircraft. The 11
aircraft in the navy’s inventory provide fleet and theater commanders with near real-time tactical
SIGINT. With sensitive receivers and high-gain dish antennas, the EP-3E exploits a wide range
of electronic emissions from deep within targeted territory. Intelligence information from the
EP-3E can be quickly disseminated to airborne and surface command and control (C2) platforms
and incorporated into Link 16 track data.
The RC-135V/W Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft supports theater and national level
consumers with near real-time on-scene intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination
capabilities. The Rivet Joint’s on-board sensor suite allows the mission crew to detect, identify,
and geolocate signals throughout the electromagnetic spectrum. The mission crew can then
forward gathered information in a variety of formats to a wide range of consumers via Rivet
Joint’s extensive communications suite.
In many navy ships, intelligence information used to amplify Link 16 tracks is gained in SSES.
SSES provides indications and warning support to the tactical watch standers and strike group
planners as well as real-time reporting and dissemination of time-sensitive products to national
and tactical-level decision makers.
Acceptance of the intelligence information for inclusion in track reports is at the discretion of the
tactical operators.
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Link 16 Data Transmission Security
There are two layers of communication security provided by the JTIDS KGV-8 Secure Data Unit
(SDU); message security (MSEC) and transmission security (TSEC). MSEC is the encryption of
the message prior to transmission. TSEC is the encryption of the transmission itself. The SDU
stores both of these cryptovariables.
In addition to encryption of the transmission (time jitter and random noise), the TSEC
cryptovariable helps determine the frequency hopping pattern that spreads the signal across 51
discrete UHF frequencies at approximately 77,000 hops per second. This makes the transmitted
signal extremely difficult to both detect and jam.
Transmission of a Link 16 message includes the following: The terminal sends the message to
the Digital Data Processor (DDP). The DDP uses the MSEC cryptovariable from the SDU to
encrypt the message prior to the TSEC application. The DDP then “Encapsulates” the message
using the TSEC crypto-variable from the SDU.
A receiving JU whose SDU contains the identical MSEC and TSEC cryptovariables will be able
to unpack the transmitted message, decrypt the scrambled message within, and present it to the
operator as usable data.
403. EMCON
EMCON is the managing of the electromagnetic spectrum which covers everything from infrared
signals to satellite communications. EMCON operations are primarily conducted to conceal the
location of the carrier. Enemy ships have the ability to detect the carrier’s electronic emissions.
The EW module (AQ) is responsible for limiting the enemy’s effectiveness. To keep the CSG
from being detected, AQ can enact various EMCON procedures. There are four conditions or
levels of EMCON, each with its own plan delineating how the EMCON level is to be set.
EMCON DELTA: normal underway sailing. There are no emissions restrictions in condition
DELTA and the ship can transmit any mission-essential radiation.
EMCON CHARLIE: Set to disguise the carrier. All emitters unique to an aircraft carrier are
secured in order to keep an adversary from identifying the “mission essential” unit.
EMCON BRAVO: Further limits the ship’s electronic emissions, but still allows for
communication and data transfer.
EMCON ALPHA: The most restrictive EMCON level. Alpha is set when the ship wants to
disappear electronically. During EMCON Alpha, no emissions are allowed. To assist with
launch and recovery, a modified condition, EMCON Alpha-1, is put into effect when necessary.
Under EMCON Alpha, the carrier will be completely passive in Timber. An entity outside of the
EMCON circle (specified radius from the carrier) will assume Net Time Reference (NTR). The
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carrier can still receive the surveillance picture and other data link information while operating in
data silent mode. If necessary, Link 16 will allow the carrier to transmit necessary voice or text
data with a very low detection probability due to JTIDS spread spectrum frequency hopping.
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DATA LINK AND TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATION
CHAPTER FIVE
SURFACE WARFARE (SUW) CONCEPTS
500. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will examine SUW and Operational Groups. The terms and limitations associated
with SUW will be discussed here as well.
501. SURFACE WARFARE
There are five missions specific to SUW that are covered in MC2 Common Core. Advanced
MC2/Common Core focuses on three of these: Surface Surveillance Coordination (SSC),
AR/AI/SCAR, and WAS strike.
Surface Surveillance Coordination (SSC)
SSC in maritime SUW provides reconnaissance and/or surveillance in support of the maritime
commander’s objectives. The SSC mission plays a critical role in establishing and maintaining
the common operating picture (COP).
The planning documents used for the SSC mission include Air Plans, Airspace Control Order
(ACO), Special Instructions (SPINS), Comm Card/Card of the Day, and various OPTASK
messages.
Air plans are published by the carrier air wing (CVW) and ESG. These plans are graphical
representations of flight operations that list the following: Call signs, tactical frequencies, launch
and recovery times, flight composition, and fuel and ordnance loads. Air plans contain navy
direct support (organic) sorties and common use sorties (when operating in a joint or coalition
environment with an air operation center and maritime component commander.
An ACO is an order implementing the airspace control plan, providing the details of the
approved requests for airspace coordinating measures. The airspace control authority (ACA)
establishes a dedicated airspace planning team to develop the ACO for CSG/ESG operations.
SPINS are used as the primary means to supplement and broadcast information contained in the
other planning documents. SPINS clarify any special instructions that are needed by the aircrew
to safely accomplish their mission. These instructions are published as baseline SPINS, weekly
SPINS, and daily SPINS. They include a section on airspace procedures and other sections, such
as tanker and cruise missile procedures, if they are required. SPINS may also include ROE and
combat identification criteria for air defense, including any additional guidance, directives, or
information for weapons systems operators and aircrew. These instructions could include host
nation restrictions, base defense zone procedures, and special weapons systems control
procedures.
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The Card of the Day or Card of the Week contains SPINS and maritime-specific daily code
words, system status base numbers and TACAN channels of Navy units. Comm Cards contain
the frequencies J Voice net numbers and names of the various communications networks
OPTASK messages convey detailed information about specific aspects of individual areas of
warfare and about tasking of resources. Types of OPTASK messages include communications,
LINK, LINK ID, air defense, SUW/SCC, Area of Operations (AO), commander’s guidance and
intentions, and preplanned response (PPR) documents.
Communications OPTASK messages define the satellite communications channels and the
secure and clear radio frequencies the CSG uses. As previously discussed, LINK OPTASK
messages provide all of the parameters for the use of the LINK capabilities, including net
assignments, track limitations, and crypto information. LINK ID OPTASK messages delineate
the appropriate LINK symbology for track assignments. Air defense OPTASK messages are
also called Air Defense Center (ADC) Daily Intentions Messages (DIMs). This type of message
outlines the naval vessels designated as firing units, Aircraft Control Units (ACUs), and
additional fleet air defense responsibilities. SUW/SCC OPTASK messages are also referred to
as SCC DIMs. This type of message contains the priority contact set for the Contacts of Interest
(COI), Critical Contacts of Interest (CCOI), and Vessels of Interest (VOI).
AO OPTASK messages contain the defined vital area (VA); SA; and the criteria needed for the
Classification Identification Engagement Area (CIEA). The commander’s guidance and
intentions OPTASK messages for prosecuting contacts contain various information including
engagement authority, Positive Identification (PID) requirements, methods to disseminate target
identification, Acceptable Levels of Risk (ALR), ROEs, target priorities, and restricted targets.
PPR OPTASK messages are the guiding documents for strike groups to follow in response to
numerous situations. Often, the PPR document drives the DIMs and provides guidance for assets
working with strike groups.
SSC assets may be scheduled on the Air Plan or reassigned from other missions real-time. For
preplanned SSC missions, detailed unit-to-unit coordination is critical. For reassigned SSC
assets, in-flight briefings should be conducted by the aircraft control unit (ACU). The ACU, for
SSC, AR/AI/SCAR and WAS missions is also known as the maritime air controller (MAC).
Maritime Air Support (MAS)
MAS is an SUW mission that is no longer used. It was defined as air action against hostile
surface targets at sea requiring detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and
movement of maritime forces. MAS was a cumbersome and time-consuming mission and
became ineffective because the navy’s reaction time to today’s threat has significantly decreased.
MAS utilized complicated tactics and a detailed MAS 9-line briefing format. Streamlined and
updated tactics became necessary in order to effectively cope with the pop-up dynamic threats in
today’s maritime environment which require quick reaction times and dynamic targeting.
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Maritime Air Control (MAC)
MAC is used when directing air action against hostile or potentially hostile surface targets at sea
that due to their inherent mobility and may require air assets to be quickly reassigned from other
missions. MAC utilizes a streamlined check-in process and a comm format similar to that of air
intercept control and the maritime dynamic targeting terms: INVESTIGATE, TARGET, and
SMACK for directive. The Maritime Air Controller uses Maritime Air Control when conducting
SSC, AR.AI/SCAR, and WAS strike missions. The MAC comm format replaces the MAS 9-line
brief and is far more universal in its application.
AR/AI/SCAR
AR/AI missions locate and attack targets of opportunity (TOO) in assigned areas. The SCAR
role may be air plan assigned or situationally assumed. The SCAR is primarily responsible for
the deconfliction of aircraft and weapons in an assigned area. AR/AI missions differ from the
outdated MAS mission in that detailed integration with surface forces is not required.
Since AR/AI missions do not require detailed tactical integration with maritime surface forces,
they can be tasked in the maritime domain. Maritime surface targets are considered dynamic
targets due to their inherent mobility.
SCAR missions in the maritime environment could be directed by the Strike Coordination and
Reconnaissance Coordinator, also known as the SCAR or the Sea Combat Commander (AZ) in
the SPINS or DIM.
WAS Strike
WAS strike differs from AR/AI in that it is the execution of DELIBERATE attacks, which are
offensive in nature, against symmetric enemy surface combatants and materiel. WAS may be an
airplan assigned mission or airborne assets may be re-roled to execute or support a WAS against
a recently located target.
Targets of Interest
VOI is usually assigned to specific vessels whose interest is derived from intelligence sources.
Certain surface contacts may be classified as COI and CCOI. COIs have tactical significance,
but may not be a threat to the force and have no real impact on mission completion. For
example, a COI may be defined as naval combatants operating in a particular area or unknown
surface contacts operating in a designated area. CCOI present a threat to the force, and their
locations must be identified for successful completion of the mission. CCOI could be potential
adversaries suspected of either terrorist or smuggling activity.
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Airspace Designation
International law provides general provisions for the divisions between National and
International Airspace. National airspace extends to 12 NM off the coast of the respective
country, including any island or group of islands. While ships enjoy rights of innocent passage,
there are no automatic rights of entry for aircraft. Consent to fly into national airspace requires a
diplomatic clearance. Diplomatic clearances require full disclosure of aircraft contents and the
purpose of the proposed overflight. Aircraft in international airspace normally have freedom to
conduct all types of military operations subject to the requirements of due regard as defined by
the DoD Instruction 4540.01.
The U.S. does not recognize a specific altitude where airspace ends and outer space begins.
Every country has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory, and
their domestic laws apply to activities in its territorial airspace. There are no legal requirements
for a nation’s airspace controlling agency to provide safety of flight.
Any activities conducted in the airspace of another country require the approval of that country.
Although several coastal nations have asserted claims intended to prohibit foreign warships and
military aircraft from operating in security zones extending beyond their territorial sea (12 NM
from their coast), these claims have no basis in international law and are not recognized by the
U.S. Operating in the national airspace above another country without permission would likely
be viewed as an infringement on that country’s sovereign rights and a violation of its territorial
integrity.
As military aircraft transit international straits, they are afforded the right of transit passage
through the international straits. Military aircraft must operate with due regard for safety of
navigation and monitor the guard or the appropriate international distress RF. While in the strait
exercising this right, aircraft must proceed without delay and refrain from any threat or use of
force against nations bordering the strait.
The Law of the Sea Convention
The divisions of the oceans and airspace per the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea are
shown in Figure 5-1. The United States has not ratified the 1982 Law of the sea Convention due
to objections over part XI which establishes an international sea bed authority in order to
authorize sea bed exploration and mining and distribute royalties. The United States has,
however, expressed agreement with the remaining provisions of the convention.
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Figure 5-1 Ocean and Airspace Divisions
502. OPERATIONAL GROUPS
Knowledge of operational groups, their AO, and how to approach them is essential to SUW.
Surface Action Group (SAG)
A SAG is a temporary or standing organization of combatant ships, other than carriers, tailored
for a specific tactical mission. A SAG may consist of one or more naval surface vessels with
rotary wing aircraft or unmanned aerial systems (UASs) that usually operate at low altitudes.
Airspace control and deconfliction will occur using the ship’s call sign on a pre-briefed
frequency. In the absence of a pre-briefed frequency, the ship should expect to be queried on the
international emergency frequency, guard. Aircraft should maintain a 5 NM standoff from Navy
SAGs unless cleared otherwise.
Carrier Strike Group (CSG)
A CSG consists of one CVN supported by other naval surface vessels with a significant number
of fixed-wing and limited rotary wing aircraft. A typical CSG might include one cruiser, a
destroyer squadron of at least two destroyers and/or frigates, and a CVW consisting of 65 – 70
aircraft. A CVW, previously called a Carrier Air Group (CAG), is typically made up of two
F/A-18F squadrons, a C-2A detachment, and one squadron each of F/A-18Es, F/A-18Cs, EA18Gs, E-2Cs, and SH-60s. A CSG may also include submarines, attached logistics ships, and
supply ships.
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Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG)
An ESG consists of air-capable amphibious ships supported by other naval surface combatants.
Like a CSG, an ESG conducts both rotary and fixed-wing aircraft operations. This strike group
also allows U.S. naval fleets to provide highly movable and self-sustaining forces for missions in
various parts of the globe.
Approaching a Strike Group
Air assets approaching CSGs or ESGs must establish contact with the initial controlling agency
responsible for detection and identification as soon as they are within radio range.
REDCROWN supports the maritime AMDC and is responsible for detection and identification
of aircraft approaching a CSG’s airspace and delousing friendly aircraft from enemy aircraft.
Marshalling, recovering, and launching of aircraft may occur within 5 NM of the carrier.
GREENCROWN is responsible for detection and identification of aircraft approaching an ESG’s
airspace.
Contact with REDCROWN or GREENCROWN must be established as soon as practical and in
accordance with the applicable theater operating procedures. When checking in with
REDCROWN or GREENCROWN, at a minimum the aircraft call sign (number and type of
aircraft), mission number, and position and altitude are required, if not already coordinated by
C2 aircraft for individual fighter and bomber flights. To provide the needed information for C2,
the BULLSEYE, TACAN cuts, established Geographic References (GEOREFs), and latitude
and longitude in accordance with SPINS should be used.
REDCROWN or GREENCROWN will verify AOMSW aircraft for IFF Mode 2/4. The IFF
Mode 2/4 will be either valid or invalid for the aircraft. If it is valid, AOMSW aircraft should
expect to receive SWEET, SWEET from REDCROWN or GREENCROWN. This indication
allows them to proceed on their mission. If IFF Mode 2/4 is not coming up as valid with
REDCROWN or GREENCROWN, AOMSW aircraft will receive a report of SOUR for Mode 2,
4, or both. Unless specifically addressed in the SPINS, AOMSW aircraft without valid IFF
MODE 2/4 will normally not be allowed to continue their mission.
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Charlie, Pelican 01,
Standing by, Alpha Check.
.
MACIE
Pelican 01, Charlie, Alpha
Check, MACIE 270/20.
Figure 5-2 Bullseye Position Reporting
Bullseye is an established reference point from which a contact can be located using bearing
(degrees magnetic) and range (nm). Command and control of maritime patrol and
reconnaissance (MPR) aircraft such as a P-3 or P-8 is typically regulated using bullseye
communication format. Bullseye reference points are published in the ACO and the current
bullseye in use is promulgated via card of the day, message traffic, or voice situation report
(SITREP) through AZ or AW. An example of bullseye position reporting is shown in
Figure 5-2.
CSGs and ESGs differ in their approach areas and procedures. Because of the large volume of
traffic within close proximity to a CVN, caution must be exercised when approaching CSG
airspace. The Carrier Control Area (CCA) is a circular airspace within a 50 NM radius of the
carrier extending from the surface upward to infinity under the control of Carrier Air Traffic
Control Center (CATCC). The Carrier Control Zone (CCZ) is a circular airspace defined by a
5NM horizontal limit from the carrier normally extending from the surface to 2500 feet. Nonorganic aircraft transiting the CCA must contact Strike and must be in positive control of the
tower inside of the CCZ. A diagram of CSG airspace is shown in the next figure.
SURFACE WARFARE (SUW) CONCEPTS 5-7
CHAPTER FIVE
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Figure 5-3 Carrier Strike Group Airspace
STRIKE controls aircraft within 50 NM of a CSG. If an aircraft is transiting within 50 NM of a
CSG, it will check in with STRIKE, using the same format as REDCROWN. STRIKE has the
ability to provide radar control, but their primary duties are administrative accounting and IFF
verification of aircraft in CSG airspace.
TOWER controls airspace within a 10 NM radius of the CVN from the surface to an unlimited
altitude. Contact TOWER on the land/launch frequency. No aircraft should approach closer
than 10 NM without being in positive control of TOWER.
MARSHAL provides services for the CVN that are similar to an approach control. MARSHAL
establishes holding and airspace deconfliction during recovery at night and in poor weather
conditions. AOMSW aircraft may have to contact MARSHAL for deconfliction within an
approach area.
ESG airspace is similar in structure to the CCA/CCZ. It extends out to 50 NM and control is
provided by the Tactical Air Command Center (TACC) call sign ICEPACK, amphibious ATC
call sign CENTER, and TOWER control. A diagram of ESG airspace is displayed in the next
figure.
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Figure 5-4 Expeditionary Strike Group Airspace
If transiting less than 50 NM from the ESG, aircraft check in with ICEPACK using the same
format as GREENCROWN. ICEPACK controls aircraft within 50 NM of the Amphibious
Assault Ships that may include LHDs and/or LHAs.
CENTER, which controls aircraft within 10 NM from the LHA/LHD, is responsible for
providing IMC (Instrument Meteorological Conditions) approach and departure services. While
the LHA/LHD conduct operations, no aircraft should approach closer than 10 NM without being
under positive control of CENTER.
TOWER controls airspace within 5 NM of the LHA/LHD. Contact TOWER on the land/launch
frequency. No aircraft should approach closer than 5 NM without positive control from
TOWER.
Operational Area
A typical CSG/ESG operational area includes the VA, CIEA, and SA with specific criteria
required for classification and identification. The VA is centered on the high value unit. It is
possible to have more than one VA. The ability to escort, cover, and/or engage must be
maintained within the VA(s). Any potential threat must be monitored prior to entering the VA.
The CIEA is the area outside the VA, but inside the SA. Classification, identification, and
monitoring must be accomplished for all contacts detected within the CIEA. The SA,
determined by the CSG/ESG commander, is the area where organic and inorganic sensors keep
track of activity to prevent surprise contacts from entering the CIEA. A diagram of the
CSG/ESG operational area is displayed in the next figure.
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ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Figure 5-5 Operational Area
Aircraft Control Unit
Maritime tactical air C2 is normally conducted by air and surface units under the broad category
of ACUs. ACUs must efficiently utilize assets to maximize search volume while maintaining
separation for controlled assets. In most cases, SSC assets will be controlled by a designated
ACU. Typical ACUs include airborne platforms (E-2/E-3) and surface vessels. ACUs support
SAGs, CSGs, and ESGs. The ACU for SSC, AR/AI/SCAR, and WAS strike missions is also
known as the maritime air controller (MAC).
Maritime Air Controller (MAC)
For preplanned SSC missions, detailed unit-to-unit coordination is critical. In addition, specific
remarks should be included in the SCC DIM, surface SITREP, and Air Plan. For dynamically
reassigned SSC assets, the controlling unit should conduct in-flight briefings. At a minimum, the
position, course, speed, and description of the contact, including type, class, name, and flag, if
known, should be briefed at a minimum, as well as the search area. Amplifying remarks, such as
known hazards, friendly or neutral forces, and threats should also be briefed.
Assigned search areas may be provided in sector search, directed, or autonomous formats. In
sector search format, bearing and range are received from a GEOREF or Bullseye. In directed
format, the MAC provides specific coordinates or bearings to the contact. In autonomous
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format, the pilot controls the search. Assigned search areas can also be provided by Common
Geographic Reference System (CGRS) or Global Area Reference System (GARS) boxes.
MACs must efficiently utilize assets to maximize search volume and maintain deconfliction for
controlled assets. In most cases, SSC assets will be controlled by a designated MAC.
SSC flight leads check into the MAC using the MNPOTTA check-in brief (Figure 5-6). The
MNPOTTA brief is used to report assets and capabilities to the MAC. Aircraft checking in
should also pass any Alibis to include change in published or “FRAGGED” weapon load-out and
any degraded sensors or other systems. SSC assets must be prepared to transition to a SCAR,
WAS mission, or follow the indicated target (SHADOW).
Figure 5-6 MNPOTTA Check-in Brief
SSC assets also report contacts via a Surface Contact Report, as displayed in the next figure.
Figure 5-7 Surface Contact Report
SURFACE WARFARE (SUW) CONCEPTS 5-11
CHAPTER FIVE
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Area of Operations Deconfliction
SSC assets should perform a number of actions in an AO deconfliction of surface contacts. They
should consult current ROE, SPINS, or intelligence reports for published stand-off distances and
pay particular attention to any other possible manned and unmanned aircraft in the area that may
be on Link-16, but not on the same frequency. SSC assets should also confirm deconfliction
methods with the airspace controller and maintain a 10 NM minimum standoff from a CVN
unless explicitly authorized. CVNs are generally referred to as MOTHER. The onboard
TACAN is referred to as FATHER. FATHER is the primary method of locating the ship;
however, the airspace controller will provide the CVN location information upon request.
SSC assets should assume that all surface contacts have a man-portable air defense system
(MANPADS) along with small arms. Assets should honor these threats by providing a sufficient
stand-off distance to the maximum extent possible. The self-defense systems for allied/coalition
ships may differ from those of the U.S. Navy. SSC assets will avoid crossing the bow of any
surface vessel, which is a threatening posture, to the maximum extent possible.
During an AO deconfliction, SSC assets should be aware that the method of friendly
identification is via the IFF Mode 4 or Link-16 PPLI (Precise Participant Location and
Identification). Approach will not be closer than 500 ft. from any surface contact, unless
directed otherwise in the SPINS or ROE. Friendly aircraft operating in the vicinity of Blue
Naval forces, equipped with the Phalanx CIWS, should be aware that certain aircraft flight
profiles may cause the CIWS to engage.
SSC assets should consider flying with digital cameras and binoculars to maximize search
volume, accuracy, and documentation of surface contacts. This consideration does not supersede
command or service guidance that may restrict the use of digital cameras and binoculars in
aircraft.
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600. INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses various threats to United States naval platforms to include surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs) and surface threats found in the CENTCOM and PACOM AORs (Areas of
Responsibility). This chapter also covers how to discern among gross naval vessel classes and
appearance groups as well as how to interpret ISAR imagery in the Multi-Crew Simulator
(MCS).
601. SAMs
A SAM is a missile designed destroy airborne aircraft or airborne missiles that is launched from
the ground. As airborne weapon system operators, it is important to be able to recognize the
various threat SAMS and their associated emitters represent. Knowledge of each system’s
emitters is helps identify the system using ESM.
SA-2 GUIDELINE
The SA-2 GUIDELINE Missile (Figure 6-1) is a Soviet designed, high-altitude, air defense
system. It is credited with the shoot-down of Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 while he was overflying
the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960. The system uses a SPOON REST Early Warning Radar and a
FAN SONG Target Acquisition Radar (Figure 6-2).
Figure 6-1 SA-2 GUIDELINE
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Figure 6-2 FAN SONG Target Acquisition Radar
SA-3 GOA
The SA-3 GOA Missile (Figure 6-3) is a Soviet missile system that has a short effective range
and relatively low engagement altitude. It also flies slower than many other SAM systems.
However, its two-stage design makes it very effective against maneuverable targets. Iraq shot
down an F-16 using this system during Desert Storm in 1991. The SA-6 uses a FLAT FACE or
SQUAT-EYE Target Acquisition Radar and a LOW BLOW Fire Control Radar (Figure 6-4).
Figure 6-3 SA-3 GOA
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Figure 6-4 LOW BLOW Fire Control Radar
SA-5 GAMMON
The SA-5 GAMMON Missile (Figure 6-5) was designed for the defense of the most important
administrative, industrial, and military instillations from all types of air attack. It is a very long
range threat. The SA-5 uses a BAR-LOCK Radar for target detection and tracking with
integrated IFF and a SQUARE PAIR Fire Control Radar (Figure 6-6) for target tracking and
illumination.
Figure 6-5 SA-5 GAMMON
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Figure 6-6 SQUARE PAIR Fire Control Radar
SA-6 GAINFUL
The SA-6 GAINFUL Missile (Figure 6-7) is a mobile, low- to medium-altitude surface-to-air
system of Soviet design. It was designed to protect ground forces from air attack. It has a short
range and uses the STRAIGHT FLUSH Radar (Figure 6-8) for target illumination.
Figure 6-7 SA-6 GAINFUL
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Figure 6-8 STRAIGHT FLUSH Radar
SA-8 GECKO
The SA-8 GECKO Missile (Figure 6-9) is a highly mobile, short-range system. It is the first
mobile SAM system to incorporate its own engagement Radars on a single vehicle. The LAND
ROLL system is mounted on the front of the vehicle and is a derivative of the naval “POP
GROUP” system.
Figure 6-9 SA-8 GECKO with LAND ROLL Radar
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SA-10 GRUMBLE
The SA-10 GRUMBLE Missile (Figure 6-10) is a Soviet long-range system designed to defend
against aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. It is regarded as one of the most potent
anti-aircraft missile systems currently in use. It also has the capability of being fitted with a
nuclear warhead. The system uses a TIN SHIELD Surveillance Radar and a FLAP LID Fire
Control Radar system (Figure 6-11).
Figure 6-10 SA-10 GRUMBLE
Figure 6-11 FLAP LID Fire Control Radar
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SA-20 GARGOYLE
The SA-20 GARGOYLE Missile (Figure 6-12) is a variant of the SA-10. It is a newer, larger
missiles with performance improvements such as increased speed and range. It uses the
TOMB STONE Fire Control, Illumination, and Guidance Radar (Figure 6-13).
Figure 6-12 SA-20 GARGOYLE
Figure 6-13 TOMB STONE Fire Control Radar
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MANPADS
These systems are primarily shoulder-fired weapons which are light and portable (Figure 6-14).
The missiles are about 5 to 6 feet in length and weigh anywhere from 37 to 40 pounds depending
on the model. Shoulder-fired SAMs generally have a target detection range of about 6 NM and
an engagement range of about 4 NM. Thus any aircraft flying at an altitude 20,000 ft or higher
are relatively safe.
Figure 6-14 MANPADS
602. SURFACE THREATS OVERVIEW
Several advances in technology have allowed warship identification to progress significantly
beyond where it was just a few decades ago. We now have thermal imagery, acoustic signatures,
electronic emission analysis, imaging radar, and even wake detection devices.
In spite of these advancements in technology, the classification criteria which must be met before
a weapon can be released at an intended target remain difficult to achieve. The drawback to
technological solutions is that they are seldom 100% reliable. Often, they cannot tell with
absolute certainty that the contact under surveillance is the right target or even a target at all.
At some point during the targeting process, a positive recognition of the target is necessary.
Usually, only an accurate visual recognition (eyes on the target or using an EO/IR system) can
resolve this problem.
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603. CENTCOM AOR SURFACE THREATS
Houdong
The Houdong (Figure 6-15) is a Chinese missile boat. It is based off of the Huangfen missile
boat, which is itself a copy of the Russian Osa class missile boat. It is armed with a four round
launcher for the C-802 cruise missile, as well as a turreted twin 30mm cannon and a crewed 23mm cannon for self-defense. Emitters associated with the Houdong are the SR-47A, DECCA
RM 1070A (Surface Search), and the Type 341 RICE LAMP Fire Control Radars. Crews may
also be carrying MANPADS.
Figure 6-15 Houdong
Kaman
The Kaman (Mod la Combattante II) class PCG (Patrol Craft Guided Missile) (Figure 6-16)
features a small-bridge superstructure forward of amidships. It has a 35mm 90 gun mounting on
the bow and a tall lattice mainmast aft of the superstructure. Four surface-to-surface missile
(SSM) launchers are installed aft of the superstructure with the forward two trained forward and
starboard while the aft two are trained forward and port. The Kaman is RGM-84A Harpoon and
C802 capable. Emitters associated with the Kaman are the UPZ-27N, DECCA 1226 surface
search, and the SIGNAAL WM-28 Fire Control Radar which is unique to the vessel.
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Figure 6-16 Kaman (Mod La Combattante II)
Vosper MK 5
The Vosper MK 5 (Figure 6-17) features a long forecastle with 4.5-inch gun mounted forward.
It has a short pyramid mainmast just forward of amidships. It has a low-profile sloping funnel
well aft with distinctive gas turbine air intakes forward of the funnel. Sited on its afterdeck from
forward to aft are a C802 SSM launcher, Limbo A/S mortar and 35-mm/90 twin gun turret
mounting. Emitters associated with the Vosper MK 5 are the AWS-1 Air/Surface search radar,
DECCA 1226 Surface Search, DECCA 629 Navigation, and the SEA HUNTER Fire Control
Radars which is unique to the Vosper MK 5.
Figure 6-17 Vosper MK 5
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MK III Class Patrol Boat (PB)
The MK III Class Patrol Boat (Figure 6-18) has as speed of 30 knots and a 500 NM range at 28
knots. It has a 20-mm gun mounted forward. Its emitter is the RCA LN-66 Surface Search
Radar. Its crew likely carries MANPADS.
Figure 6-18 MK III Class Patrol Boat
Kilo Class Diesel-Electric Submarine
The Kilo Class Diesel-Electric Submarine (Figure 6-19) features a blunt, rounded bow and a flattopped casing that tapers toward the aft end. It has a long, low fin with vertical leading and after
edges and a flat top. Its hull-mounted diving planes are not visible and its rudder is barely
visible. It has a SNOOP TRAY MRP-25 emitter and is capable of launching Novator SSN-27
SIZZLER anti-ship missiles.
Figure 6-19 Kilo Class Diesel-Electric Submarine
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604. PACOM AOR SURFACE THREATS
Huangfen Guided Missile Patrol Craft
The Huangfen Guided Missile Patrol Craft (Figure 6-20) is a Chinese copy of the popular Soviet
Osa I Class missile boat. Armed with the SS-N-2 Styx SSM, it boasts a low-profile rounded
superstructure. It has a pole mainmast just forward of amidships with a surface search radar
aerial atop. It has four large, distinctive Styx SSM launchers, two outboard of the mainmast, and
two outboard of the fire control director. Its emitters are the SQUARE-TIE Surface Search
Radar, ROUND BALL Fire Control Radar, and SQUARE HEAD/HIGH POLE IFF. Its crew is
likely armed with MANPADS.
Figure 6-20 Huangfen Guided Missile Patrol Craft
Sariwon Class Patrol Boat
The Sariwon Class Patrol Boat (Figure 6-21) has a long aft section with a composite
superstructure sectioned both forward and amidships with a tall lattice mast forward and a large
funnel stack amidships. It has 2 twin 57/80 cannons, 2 twin 37mm guns, 4 quad 14.5mm
machine guns, 2 five-tube antisubmarine mortar launchers and 2 rails for depth charges. Its
emitters are the POT HEAD Surface Search Radar and SKI POLE IFF. Its crew is likely armed
with MANPADS.
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Figure 6-21 Sariwon Class Patrol Boat
Komar
The Soviet Project 183R Class, more commonly known as the Komar (Meaning mosquito)
(Figure 6-22), is a class of missile boats, the first of its kind, built in the 1950s and 1960s.
Notably, they were the first to sink another ship with anti-ship missiles in 1967. The Komar has
two distinct launchers mounted aft facing forward used to launch either the STYX missile or
CSS-N-1 SCRUBBRUSH missile. It has twin 25-mm/80 or twin 14.5mm machine guns. Its
surface search radar is the SQUARE TIE and it has SQUARE HEAD IFF.
Figure 6-22 Komar Missile Boat
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Najin Class Frigate
Bearing a striking resemblance to the ex-Soviet Kola Class Frigates, the Najin (Figure 6-23) is
unrelated to any Russian or Chinese design. It is a long composite group II with two distinct
funnels one just forward of amidships and one just aft of amidships. It was originally fitted with
a trainable triple 21-inch torpedo launcher which was replaced in the mid-1980s with fixed
STYX missile launchers which were taken from Osa Class Missile Boats. This redesign is
inherently dangerous and even a minor missile malfunction would result in significant damage to
the ship. The Najin carries SS-N-1 SCRUBBRUSH Missiles and its crew likely carries
MANPADS. It has a SQUARE TIE Air Search Radar, a POT HEAD Surface Search Radar, a
POT DRUM Navigation Radar, and a DRUM TILT Fire Control Radar.
Figure 6-23 Najin Class Frigate
Shantou Class Patrol Boat
The Shantou Class PB (Figure 6-24) has as speed of 45 knots, a 450 NM range at 30 knots, and a
600 NM range at 15 knots. It has two twin 25-mm/80 or two 37-mm or six 14.5-mm guns
(SINPO). All variants except SINPO have two 533-mm torpedo tubes. Its emitters are the SKIN
HEAD Surface Search Radar and the DEAD DUCK/HIGH POLE IFF. Its crew likely carries
MANPADS.
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Figure 6-24 Shantou Class Patrol Boat
Chaho Class Patrol Boat
The Chaho Class Patrol Boat (Figure 6-25) has a speed of 37 knots and a range of 1300 NM at
18 knots. Its armament is one twin 23-mm/87 cannon, one twin 14.5-mm gun, one BM-21
multiple rocket launcher. It uses the POT HEAD Surface Search Radar and its crew likely
carries MANPADS.
Figure 6-25 Chaho Class Patrol Boat
Romeo Class SS
The Romeo Class SS (Figure 6-26) is a class of Soviet Diesel-Electric Submarines built in the
1950s. By today’s standards, they are considered obsolete but are still used by adversary nations
in the PACOM AOR for patrol and surveillance missions. The Romeo’s top speed is 15.2 knots
surfaced, 13 knots submerged, and 10 knots snorkeling. It carries 533-mm torpedoes and has
SNOOP PLATE and SNOOP TRAY Radar.
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Figure 6-26 Romeo Class SS
Sang O Submarine
The Sang O (Figure 6-27) is a simple submarine for use in the covert insertion of Special
Operations Forces (SOF), mining, and/or SUW. The submarine comes in two different variants,
one with torpedo tubes, and the other without. Both variants have the capability to lay mines.
The Sang O’s top speed is 7.5 knots on the surface, 8.8 knots submerged, and 7.2 knots
snorkeling. It has a range of 2700 nm at 7 knots. Variant 1 has up to four 533-mm torpedo tubes
and both variants can carry 16 bottom mines. The Sang O has a FURUNO Surface Search
Radar.
Figure 6-27 Sang O Submarine
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605. IDENTIFYING SURFACE CONTACTS WITH ISAR IN THE MCS
Today’s weapon system operators are trained to use specific methodologies to classify ships
using imaging sensors, such as ISAR. The classification process requires highly trained
operators and is platform exposure time intensive.
A two-step approach is taken for target classification. During step one, incoming imagery is
enhanced and "focused" to provide an integrated, multi-frame summed target image, where key
features are extracted from the sensor video imagery. Target features are then compared to
feature sets of known ship types to derive a classification.
Ships are normally classified in a hierarchical fashion using the following levels:
Perceptual/Gross, Naval Fine, and Type/Class/Unit level.
During MCS simulator events, ISAR imagery will be used by the operator to identify the Gross
Class of a surface contact. Examples of Gross Classes are Combatant, Minor Combatant,
Submarine, Merchant, and Small Craft. Merchant vessels are further broken down into
Appearance groups which are determined by the size, shape, and location of the superstructure.
Appearance Groups
A Group I Merchant Vessel (Figure 6-28) has a superstructure greater than one-third the total
length of the ship. Passenger Ships generally belong in this appearance group.
Figure 6-28 Group I Example
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A Group II Merchant Vessel (Figure 6-29) has a composite superstructure less than one-third of
the total ship length that is located amidships. These ships generally have a small block-like
superstructure with deck spaces devoted to cargo-handling equipment and hatches.
Figure 6-29 Group II Example
A Group III Merchant Vessel (Figure 6-30) has a stack aft. Stack aft means that the ships have
funnels located in the aft third of the ship; however, if should the superstructure exceeds onethird the overall ship length, the ship will be considered a Group 1 vessel.
Figure 6-30 Group III Example
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MCS ISAR Imagery
When ISAR Imagery of a surface contact is displayed on the MCS Tactical Plot (TACPLOT),
there will be two images (Figure 6-31). The image in the lower left corner is the raw ISAR. The
one in the upper right corner represents the digitized image of the contact that has been
processed, enhanced, and focused to show the vessel’s features with more clarity.
In the MCS, the perpendicular profile aspect of the vessel of interest will provide the best ISAR
imagery. When imaging using ISAR in the real world, a front or rear quartering aspect is
preferred. The following two figures depict an MCS ISAR image compared to its real world
image.
Figure 6-31 ISAR Interpretation Example in the MCS
Figure 6-32 Corresponding EO Imagry
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CHAPTER SEVEN
SUW SENSORS AND EMPLOYMENT
700. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss SUW sensor types and characteristics.
701. SURFACE WARFARE SENSORS
SUW sensors are found on a variety of U.S. naval platforms and include radar, ESM, EO/IR, and
Visual.
Anti-Surface Warfare Sensor Types
No single sensor works alone, but rather each works together to detect, localize, identify, and
track SUW targets of interest. Different aircraft carry a variety of SUW sensors (Figure 7-1).
Aircraft
SUW Sensor
P-3C
P-8A
E-2D (E-2C)
MH-60R (SH-60B)
Radar, ESM, EO/IR, and Visual
Radar, ESM, EO/IR, and Visual
Radar, ESM, and Visual
Radar, ESM, IR, and Visual
Figure 7-1 Surface Warfare Aircraft Sensors
Frigates, destroyers, and cruisers also carry SUW sensors. These three types of naval ships all
utilize radar, ESM, and Visual sensors. Modern naval ships are now being outfitted with various
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to enhance EO/IR capabilities.
In addition to the SUW sensors, frigates, destroyers, and cruisers usually carry up to two
helicopters onboard. To enhance over-the-horizon (OTH) SUW, sensors onboard the helicopter
can be directly linked to the ship so that sensor data can be viewed in real time.
702. SURFACE WARFARE SENSOR CHARACTERISTICS
This section will discuss SUW sensor characteristics.
Naval Platform Sensors
The various sensors onboard the different naval platforms (e.g., ships and airborne assets) have
very similar characteristics. The platform’s speed and altitude contribute to the effectiveness of
various sensors.
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Sensors differ for ships and airborne assets. Ship sensors are limited by OTH capability that
results from the ship’s limited position at the surface (Figure 7-2). They are also limited by
slower speed that reduces the ship’s ability to cover large search areas.
Airborne assets vastly enhance the SUW sensors by using altitude to increase SUW sensor range
and airspeed to maneuver across larger search areas. Compared with helicopters, fixed-wing
aircraft, such as the P-3C and E-2D, enhance SUW sensor capabilities by traveling at higher
speeds, covering larger search areas in a shorter amount of time, gaining higher altitude,
exhibiting longer endurance, and consisting of larger crews.
Figure 7-2 Airborne Asset Sensor Capabilities
Surface Warfare Sensor Range and Limits
Each SUW sensor has a theoretical limit to its maximum range of effectiveness (Figure 7-3).
The limiting factor in all cases is the altitude of the platform. ESM sensors have the farthest
detection range, followed by radar sensors, and lastly visual sensors.
Visual and EO/IR are difficult sensors to compare with regards to theoretical ranges because
these sensors are highly dependent on weather phenomena, such as moisture in the air, clouds,
temperatures, and haze.
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Figure 7-3 Surface Warfare Sensor Detection Range
Equations representative of the theoretical effective limits of radar, and Visual sensors are
described below. ESM theoretical distance is greater than that of radar.
The equation for the effective radar limit is distance (in NM) = 1.237 x square root of the
aircraft’s altitude (in feet). The next figure shows an example of the different theoretical sensor
ranges for radar based on altitude. A good rule of thumb is at 15,000 feet AGL, the radar
horizon is approximately 150 NM. For every 1000 feet above 15,000, add 5 NM to 150 to obtain
the approximate radar horizon. Below 15,000 feet AGL, subtract 5 NM from 150 for every 1000
feet to obtain the approximate radar horizon. For example, at an altitude of 18,000 feet, the radar
horizon is approximately 165 NM, while at an altitude of 10,000 feet the radar horizon is
approximately 125 NM.
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Figure 7-4 Radar Horizon
An approximate estimate for the Visual horizon is distance (in NM) = 1.05 x square root of the
altitude (in feet). The next figure shows an example of the different theoretical visual sensor
ranges based on altitude.
Figure 7-5 Visual Horizon
Depending on the size of the target, Visual detection and identification is not very effective
above 3000 feet because eyesight is limited in its ability for picking up small contacts, such as
small boats, life rafts, and personnel in the water.
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Primary Sensor
When utilizing SUW sensors, a primary sensor must be identified. The primary sensor chosen
will affect the altitude of the aircraft. This predetermined altitude must be maintained in order to
maximize the effectiveness of the primary sensor. Throughout an SUW mission, a primary
sensor may change; therefore, subsequently altitudes will change in order to optimize the
theoretical effectiveness of a primary sensor. When a primary sensor changes, fuel endurance
must be considered due to the resulting change in altitude. If a mission has to leave on station
early due to improper fuel management, then a gap in SUW search coverage may occur.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
SURFACE SEARCH, LOCALIZATION, AND TRACKING METHODS
800. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss the basic terms, procedures, and limitations associated with SUW
search, localization, and tracking methods.
801. SURFACE WARFARE SEARCH METHODS
A discussion of SUW search methods must include surveillance, type of instruments used, and
search patterns utilized.
Surface Warfare Surveillance
SUW begins with the surveillance of a defined area. The purpose of SUW surveillance is to
search a predetermined area to locate and classify a target of interest. A naval asset is usually
assigned a search area set by geographical parameters; however, a search area could
geographically move relative to a particular ship’s movement.
The search area is defined as the Operational Area (OA). Relative to ships, airborne assets are
typically given larger OAs due to their ability to cover more area because of their higher speeds
and increased Radar/Visual/ESM horizons due to altitude. The purpose of SUW searches is to
identify potential threats to naval forces in an expeditious manner.
Primary Sensors
Search methods are defined by the primary sensor to be utilized. Primary sensors used during a
search are Radar, Visual, or EO/IR.
Radar, an active sensor that can be detected by hostile units using ESM, is the most often used
primary sensor. In cases where an active system, such as radar, is not desired, Visual or EO/IR
(sector scan) is used as the primary sensor. Visual and EO/IR sensors are passive; therefore, they
are undetectable by hostile forces; although, shorter Visual ranges can make the aircraft
vulnerable to the potential target’s various weapons’ envelopes. EO/IR sensors are typically
used as secondary sensors to identify surface contacts from ranges where the surface contact
cannot hear or see the aircraft. Weather and atmospheric conditions can limit the effectiveness
of the EO/IR system. EO/IR cameras typically have normal condition, haze penetration, and
polarizer optical filters to help reduce certain environmental disturbances.
Search Patterns
One of the search patterns utilized in SUW is the Parallel search. This search pattern is used in
large search areas where uniform coverage is desired. The Parallel search pattern may be
utilized for either Radar, Visual, or EO/IR sensors. An example of a Parallel search pattern is
displayed in the next figure with “S” equal to track spacing.
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Figure 8-1 Parallel Search Pattern
Other search patterns include Bar Scans, Expanding Squares, and Sectors. These search methods
are primarily used for visual searches, but may be utilized in conjunction with radar.
The prevailing weather conditions and their effect on visual detection ranges forms the basis for
calculating search pattern spacing requirements in a Bar Scan search. The visual detection range
must also be adjusted to account for the physical size of the search object. For example, if the
prevailing visibility is estimated to be 6 NM, and this distance is deemed an acceptable range for
identifying the search object (based on its size), then search aircraft should establish 12 NM
spacing (or twice the visual detection range) between search pattern legs. An example of a Bar
Scan search pattern is displayed in the next figure.
Figure 8-2 Bar Scan Search Pattern
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The Expanding Square search pattern, shown in the next figure, employs the visual detection
range calculation noted previously in the Bar Scan search pattern description. However, the
Expanding Square search pattern typically originates directly over the Last Known Position
(LKP) of the search object. The first two legs are flown at twice the calculated visual detection
range; the next two legs are at four times the visual detection range, and so on. Each turn to a
subsequent leg in the search pattern will be flown in the same direction (e.g., left), and the new
heading will be 90° offset from the previous one.
Figure 8-3 Expanding Square Search Pattern
The Sector search pattern is performed so that the LKP of the search object is overflown during
each leg of the pattern. Each turn to a subsequent leg in the search pattern will be flown in the
same direction (e.g., right), and the new heading will be 120° from the previous one. Following
three passes over the LKP, the pattern is shifted 30° and flown in the same manner as the first.
An example of a Sector search pattern is displayed in the next figure.
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Figure 8-4 Sector Search Pattern
802. SURFACE WARFARE LOCALIZATION METHODS
SUW localization methods involve the knowledge of the type of contact, what sensor is used,
ESM classification, and confidence level.
Localization
The localization process includes the employment of sensors to determine a contact’s position,
course, speed, and classification. Radar, Visual, EO/IR, and ESM sensors are used during
localization. Radar obtains the position and creates a course and speed for the surface contact.
For Visual or EO/IR sensors, position and movement of the contact are identified by visually
observing the course and estimating the speed based on the wake of the ship. Visual or EO/IR
sensors allow the operator to ID a surface contact by seeing what the contact is. The EO/IR
sensor has the obvious advantage over Visual with its ability to detect at longer ranges. ESM
may be used to triangulate the position of a potential threat by obtaining at least two ESM lines
of bearing for the same surface ship emitter. The characteristics of the specific emitter also aids
in the classification of surface contact.
With a radar contact, position, course, and speed can be easily obtained. Other sensors used in
conjunction with radar can assist in further classifying the surface contact.
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Visual or EO/IR sensors are typically used in conjunction with radar to not only identify surface
contacts, but obtain designations/declarations such as friendly, neutral, or hostile.
ESM is a passive system utilized to classify surface contacts. The characteristics of specific
radar emission by surface contacts are detected and analyzed by the ESM. Co-locating a radar
contact with ESM classification allows the possibility of designating the vessel a contact of
interest and prioritizing the contact for identification.
In order to obtain an ESM Area of Probability (AOP), two SUW assets must report the
associated ESM emitter at the same time. The position where the two bearings intersect creates
an AOP. The AOP can be further refined by obtaining a third or fourth bearing line from other
SUW assets. An ESM AOP can also be defined by a single SUW asset receiving multiple ESM
bearings from the same emitter offset by at least 30°.
Surface Contacts
Visual, EO/IR, ISAR, and ESM sensors aid with classifying and identifying a surface contact.
The classification of a surface contact includes the previously discussed levels:
Perceptual/Gross, Naval Fine, and Type/Class/Unit level. Examples of Type/Class/Unit level
would be merchant types (e.g., Container Ship, Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO)) and combatant types
(e.g., patrol craft, destroyer) and class (e.g., Houdong, Houbei). Identification of a surface
contact is obtained from Visual or EO/IR sensors and includes hull number, name, and flag.
Confidence Levels
The five levels of confidence when reporting the identification of a surface contact are Unknown
(UNK), Non-COI/CCOI, Possible (POSS LOW/POSS HIGH), Probable (PROB), and Certain
(CERT). Confidence levels are decided by the Mission Commander (MC), and his or her
expertise coupled with experience are used in making the decision of the confidence level to
report to controlling units. Different confidence levels are described in the next figure.
Confidence Level
Definition
UNK
Insufficient data exists to classify the contact
Non COI/CCOI
After investigation, the contact has shown to have characteristics
that exclude the possibility of it being the COI/CCOI
POSS
A contact is assigned “Possible” if the available information on it
indicates a likelihood of it being the COI/CCOI but there is
insufficient evidence to justify a higher classification.
A POSS LOW contact cannot be regarded as a non-COI and
requires further investigation
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Confidence Level
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Definition
A POSS HIGH contact is firmly believed to be the COI/CCOI but
does not meet the criteria established for PROB
PROB
The contact has not been visually identified, but displays strong
cumulative evidence of being the COI/CCOI through multiple
sensors.
CERT
Contact sighted and positively identified as the COI/CCOI by a
competent observer. If any doubt exists about the certainty of the
observation, the contact should not be classified as CERT.
Figure 8-5 Confidence Levels
Specific requirements for establishing these confidence levels may be delineated in the OPTASK
SUW OTC or warfare function command supplement. Consideration should be given to aircraft
capability and which elements/confidence level may be solved with onboard systems. As a
technique, a PID matrix may be developed based on these elements, but will likely require
approval from higher authority prior to use.
803. SURFACE WARFARE TRACKING METHODS
Tracking methods involve following a target, assessing its threat level, and choosing a suitable
flight pattern.
Tracking is defined as maintaining the position, course, and speed of the target. In the event a
surface contact must be tracked, the level of danger the surface contact poses to an aircraft must
be evaluated. For surface combatants, a standoff will need to be respected due to the ship’s
ability to launch SAMs or for smaller boats to utilize MANPADS.
With the utilization of imaging sensors, such as ISAR and EO/IR, the airborne unit can maintain
significant standoff distance from the surface contact. Utilizing a standoff distance, the surface
contact is tracked by utilizing the orbit (Figure 8-6), racetrack (Figure 8-7), or figure eight
(Figure 8-8) airborne flight patterns, as displayed in the figures on the following pages. For
MPR aircraft, the radar plot must be updated at least every 5 minutes, and EO/IR sensors are
used to track the ship’s activity.
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Figure 8-6 Orbit Flight Pattern
Figure 8-7 Racetrack Flight Pattern
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ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Figure 8-8 Figure Eight Flight Pattern
8-8
SURFACE SEARCH, LOCALIZATION, AND TRACKING METHODS
CHAPTER NINE
SURFACE WARFARE WEAPONS AND DELIVERY PLATFORMS
900. INTRODUCTION
This chapter covers the descriptions of SUW weapons and delivery platforms. The basic terms
and limitations of SUW weapons and employment are also covered.
901. SURFACE WARFARE WEAPONS
SUW weapons and delivery platforms include the MK-15 Phalanx CIWS, MK-38, SM-2,
Harpoon Missile, AGM-65 Maverick Missile, and the SLAM-ER Missile.
Zone Defense
During maritime combat operations, U.S. naval surface combatants operate in the following
three layered zone defenses (Figure 9-1): the Missile Engagement Zone (MEZ), Joint
Engagement Zone (JEZ), and the Fighter Engagement Zone (FEZ). Each zone employs weapon
systems tailored for optimal performance based upon range. Additionally, shipboard weapon
systems exist that possess dual anti-surface and anti-air capabilities.
Figure 9-1 Zone Defenses
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WARNING
In order to eliminate fratricide, aircrews operating in the vicinity of
surface combatants must understand that surface ships may operate
in a self-defense mode during maritime operations.
Types of Kills
Types of kills that aircrews may be instructed to achieve include Mobility Kill, Firepower Kill,
and Catastrophic or K-KILL. A Mobility Kill refers to disabling a ship’s ability to maneuver
(e.g., propulsion, steering mechanism, and personnel). A Firepower Kill refers to the damage
inflicted on a ship that destroys the ship’s weapons systems or substantially reduces its ability to
deliver weapons effectively. K-KILL refers to damage inflicted on a ship that renders it both
unusable and irreparable.
MAC Comm. Format
The MAS mission no longer exists. It has been replaced by multiple AOMSW missions that use
maritime dynamic targeting principles. This is necessary due to the nature of pop-up dynamic
maritime threats which require quick reaction times.
MAC is the updated Comm. format that is used to quickly reassign and direct air assets onto
maritime threats. The MAC Comm. format (Figure 9-2) closely resembles the format used for
TACAIC.
Figure 9-2 MAC Comm. Format
MK-15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS)
The MK-15 Phalanx CIWS is a fast-reaction, detect-through-engage, radar-guided, 20-mm gun
weapon system. This system provides U.S. naval ships with an inner layer point defense
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capability against those threats that have penetrated other fleet defenses, such as ASMs, aircraft,
and littoral warfare threats. The MK-15 Phalanx CIWS automatically detects, evaluates, tracks,
engages, and performs kill assessments on ASMs and high-speed aircraft threats.
The characteristics of the MK-15 Phalanx CIWS are described in the next figure.
Characteristic
Description
Primary function
Fast-reaction, detect-through-engage, radar-guided 20-mm gun
weapon system
Contractor
Raytheon
Weight
13,600 lbs. or 6120 kilograms (kg) (Block 1B)
Type fire
ASM and aircraft: 4500 rounds/min; Asymmetric threats: 3000
rounds/min
Magazine
capacity
1550 rounds
Caliber
20-mm
Ammunition
Armor Piercing Discarding Sabot
Type
M-61A1 Gatling Gun
Figure 9-3 MK-15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System Characteristics
MK-38 25-mm Machine Gun System
The MK-38 is a 25-mm machine gun installed for ship self-defense to counter High Speed
Maneuvering Surface Targets (HSMST).
The MK 38 was first employed aboard combatant and auxiliary ships conducting Mid-East Force
escort operations and during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Following the October
2000 attack on USS Cole (DDG 67), an improved MK 38 Machine Gun System (MGS) was
developed as a means to increase shipboard self defense against small boat threats. Installed
aboard several ships, the MK 38 Mod 2 MGS is a low cost, stabilized self-defense weapon
system that dramatically improves ships' self-defense capabilities.
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The characteristics of the MK-38 25-mm Machine Gun System are described in the next figure.
Characteristic
Description
Primary function
Ship board self defense against small boat threats.
Contractor
Crane Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center
Max Rate of Fire
180 rpm
Range
2700 meters
Caliber
25-mm
Figure 9-4 MK-38 25-mm Machine Gun System Characteristics
Standard Missile-2
The SM-2 is a medium- to long-range shipboard SAM, which is launched from the MK 41 VLS.
It is the USN’s primary surface-to-air defense weapon and is an integral part of the Aegis
Weapon System (AWS) aboard the Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class
destroyers. The SM-2’s primary missions are fleet area air defense and ship self-defense.
SM-2 Blocks currently in service with the USN are III, IIIA, and IIIB. These and other variants
of SM-2 are also in service with 15 allied navies.
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The characteristics of the SM-2 are described in the next figure.
Characteristic
Description
Primary
function
SAM
Contractor
Raytheon
Propulsion
Dual thrust, solid fuel rocket
Length
15 ft. 6 in or 4.72 m
Diameter
13.5 in or 34.3 cm
Wingspan
3 ft. 6 in or 1.08 m
Weight
1558 lbs. or 708 kg
Range
Up to 90 NM or 104 Statute Miles (SM)
Guidance
system
Semi-active radar homing (IR in Block IIIB)
Warhead
Radar and contact fuse, blast-fragment warhead
Figure 9-5 SM-2 Characteristics
AGM-84 Harpoon Missile
The AGM-84 Harpoon Missile is an all-weather, OTH, Anti-ship missile (ASM) system. The
features that ensure the high survivability and effectiveness of the AGM-84 Harpoon Missiles
include active radar guidance, warhead design, low-level cruise trajectory, and terminal mode
sea-skim and pop-up maneuvers. Surface ships, submarines, shore batteries, and aircraft
(without the added booster) are assets capable of launching Harpoon Missiles. In 1979, the airlaunched version of the Harpoon Missile was deployed on the USN’s P-3C aircraft. The
Harpoon Missile has been adapted for use on USAF B-52H bombers, which can carry 8 - 12
missiles.
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The characteristics of the Harpoon Missile are described in the next figure.
Characteristic
Description
Primary
function
Air, ship, submarine, and land-based coastal defense battery-launched antiship cruise missile (ASCM)
Contractor
The Boeing Company
Unit cost
$1,200,000 for Harpoon Block II
Propulsion
Teledyne Turbojet/solid propellant booster for surface and submarine launch
Thrust
Greater than 600 lbs. or greater than 272.2 kg
Length
Air launched – 12 ft. 7 in or 3.8 m; Surface and submarine launched – 15 ft.
or 4.6 m
Diameter
13.5 in or 34.3 cm
Wingspan
3 ft. or 91.4 cm, with booster fins and wings
Weight
1523 lbs. or 690.8 kg, with booster
Speed
High subsonic
Range
OTH, in excess of 67 NM or 124 kilometers (km)
Guidance
system
Sea-skimming cruise monitored by radar altimeter/active radar terminal
homing
Warhead
Penetration/high-explosive blast (488 lbs. or 224 kg)
Figure 9-6 AGM-84 Harpoon Missile Characteristics
AGM-65 Maverick Missile
The AGM-65 Maverick Missile is an Air-to-Surface (A/S) tactical missile designed for CAS,
interdiction, and defense suppression. This missile is effective against tactical targets such as
armor, air defenses, ships, ground transportation, and fuel storage facilities. The USN, USMC,
and USAF use variations of the AGM-65 Maverick Missile. The USN uses the AGM-65F
Maverick Missile on the P-3 and F/A-18 aircraft. The P-3’s AGM-65F variant uses infrared (IR)
targeting optimized for ship tracking. The USMC uses the AGM-65E Maverick Missile on the
AV-8 and F-18A aircraft. The AGM-65E Maverick Missile has a larger (300-lb or 126-kg)
penetrating warhead than other Maverick Missiles and is laser guided. The USAF uses the
AGM-65A/B/D Maverick Missiles on the F-16 and A-10 aircraft. The AGM-65A/B/D Maverick
Missiles use a 125-lb or 57-kg charge and are electro-optical (EO) guided.
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The characteristics of the AGM-65 Maverick Missile are described in the next figure.
Characteristic
Description
Primary
function
A/S guided missile; attacks and destroys armor, air defenses, ships, ground
transportation, and fuel installations
Contractor
Raytheon
Unit cost
$180,000
Propulsion
Thiokol SR 109-TC-1 solid-propellant rocket motor; Thiokol SR 114-TC-1
(or Aerojet SR 115-AJ-1) solid-propellant rocket motor
Length
98 in
Diameter
12 in
Wingspan
28 in
Weight
462 – 670 pounds, depending on the model
Speed
Supersonic
Range
17 NM
Guidance
system
EO (e.g., TV) in A and B models; Imaging IR (IIR) in D, F, and G models;
laser guided in the E model
Warhead
300-lb penetrating blast-fragmentation warhead; 125-lb shaped-charge
Figure 9-7 AGM-65 Maverick Missile Characteristics
AGM-84K Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response Missile (SLAM-ER)
The AGM-84K SLAM-ER Missile is an air-launched, day or night, adverse weather, OTH, and
precision strike missile. This missile is an evolutionary upgrade to the combat-proven Standoff
Land Attack Missile (SLAM). There are significant capabilities of the AGM-84K SLAM-ER
Missile. It has a highly accurate GPS-aided guidance system, IR seeker, and two-way data link
with the AWW-13 Advanced Data Link pod for the Man-in-the-Loop (MITL) control. Other
significant capabilities include improved missile aerodynamic performance characteristics that
allow both long-range and flexible terminal attack profiles, ordnance section with good
penetrating power and lethality, and user-friendly interface for both MITL control and mission
planning. The AGM-84K SLAM-ER Missile can be launched and controlled by naval assets,
including the F/A-18C/D, P-3, and F/A-18E/F. This missile is extremely accurate, and has the
best circular AOP in the USN’s inventory. It is also the only precision Standoff Outside of Area
Defense (SOAD) weapon used by the USN.
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ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
The characteristics of the AGM-84K SLAM-ER Missile are described in the next figure.
Characteristic
Description
Primary
function
Long-range, air-launched precision land-and-sea attack cruise missile
Contractor
The Boeing Company
Date deployed
June 2000
Unit cost
$500,000
Propulsion
Teledyne Turbojet
Thrust
Greater than 600 lbs.
Length
172 in or 4.4 m
Diameter
13.5 in or 34.3 cm
Wingspan
7.2 ft. or 2.2 m
Weight
1488 lbs. or 674.5 kg
Speed
High subsonic
Range
OTH, in excess of 135 NM or 250 km
Guidance
system
Ring laser gyro INS with multi-channel GPS; IR seeker for terminal
guidance with MITL control data link from the controlling aircraft;
upgraded missiles incorporate Automatic Target Acquisition (ATA)
Figure 9-8 AGM-84K SLAM-ER Missile Characteristics
9-8
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Weapons Overview
The chart in Figure 9-9 provides a compare/contrast overview of the primary functions of the
weapons discussed in this topic.
Figure 9-9 Weapons Overview Chart
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9-10 SURFACE WARFARE WEAPONS AND DELIVERY PLATFORMS
CHAPTER TEN
STRIKE COORDINATION AND ASSET MANAGEMENT
1000. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will identify the terms, procedures, and limitations associated with strike
coordination and asset management. This will include a look at the deliberate strike planning
process, strike timeline coordination process, Defense In Depth strategy, Force Concentration,
and strike coordination fuel planning.
1001. STRIKE PLANNING AND COORDINATION
Strike Planning Process
Initial strike planning is dynamic and interactive. The Air Wing practices this process during
land- and carrier-based exercises (e.g., Air Wing Fallon) prior to deployment. Each squadron
representative provides a particular expertise that allows the strike team to quickly brainstorm a
complete, but rough, high-level plan. The strike planning process consists of the strike planning
cycle, strike planning functions, Aircraft Carrier Intelligence Center (CVIC) intelligence
gathering and support functions, and automated support systems.
The strike planning process occurs within the context of a sequence of events called the strike
planning cycle (Figure 10-1). This repetitive cycle begins with the receipt of tasks and ends with
the collection of strike assessment data.
Figure 10-1 Strike Planning Cycle
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The strike planning function includes the creation of the strike plan and has the following steps:
1.
Determine targets and target characteristics.
2.
Assign weapons to achieve an objective level of damage.
3.
Assess threats to ensure safe weapon delivery.
4.
Determine which strike elements are needed.
5.
Determine strike timing and Launch Sequence Plan (LSP).
6.
Determine Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs).
7.
Rehearse the strike.
Aircraft Carrier Intelligence Center (CVIC)
CVIC intelligence personnel acquire, analyze, and integrate data into usable intelligence
products. Carrier Air Wing strike planning teams use additional planning software and systems
within CVIC to mold the intelligence products into a comprehensive strike plan. The Strike
Intelligence Analysis Cell (SIAC) allows cohesion between Carrier Air Wing strike planning
teams and CVIC intelligence personnel.
Automated Support Systems
Automated support systems are used to process the extensive amount of data that influence strike
planning decisions. These systems and programs, such as weaponeering and weather prediction
software, combine strike operations with intelligence and support data to produce an executable
strike plan.
Strike Timeline Coordination Process
To coordinate strikes properly, timeline analysis is critical. Timing during and between strikes
must be carefully choreographed to account for weather, adversary reaction time, friendly fire
avoidance, and effective execution of a strike. Each phase of the timeline must be carefully
coordinated through TTPs. The timeline phases to be coordinated consist of the ingress phase,
target area phase, and egress phase.
Ingress Phase
In the ingress phase, the focus is on finding the target, and avoiding and/or suppressing threats.
The plan in this phase should aim for compromise among the required number of strike sorties,
the safety of the carrier, and the desire to achieve tactical surprise.
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CHAPTER TEN
Rendezvous Point: the point near the beginning of the strike route where all strike assets will
meet. The E-2 will complete “Alpha” checks with all assets. The strike lead will get a roll call
from the entire strike package and take note of any “alibis.”
(TCP): A point along the dogleg portion of the route that can be shortened in order to adjust the
time-on-target (TOT) so that it occurs as planned.
Initial Point (IP): The point at which the strike package sets their attack formation.
Target Area Phase
In the target area, terrain masking (if possible) and high speed should be used to minimize
exposure to threats. Deconfliction is accomplished by taking into account altitude, geographic
location, time, and weapon selection. Variance in time on target and post-delivery maneuvers
are important to avoid damage from blast fragments. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) also
begins in this phase.
Decision Point (DP): The DP is often colocated with the IP. It is the point at which the strike
lead makes the decision to transition from air-to-air mode to air-to-ground mode to attack the
target.
Target: The object being attacked. The bullseye is often colocated with the target.
Egress Phase
In the egress phase, aircraft regain mutual support quickly and use briefed procedures for
identifying returning aircraft. This process is especially important in the event of an equipment
failure. A higher probability of blue on blue targeting during egress exists, specifically for
strikes that are disrupted because of enemy aircraft or SAMs.
When necessary, jettison areas and pickup points are used in conjunction with combat search and
rescue (CSAR) efforts.
Egress Control Point (ECP): The last point on the strike route. A strike route can have multiple
ECPs in order to offer a choice of egress routes.
Tactical Strike Coordination Module and Joint Mission Planning Software
The Tactical Strike Coordination Module (TSCM) and the Joint Mission Planning Software
(JMPS) have preview modes to help uncover any timeline problems. These systems incorporate
smart algorithms to optimize timelines, thereby minimizing risks from threats and enabling
strikes to achieve greater success.
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Additional Strike Planning Considerations
Other strike planning considerations include the decision to use Defense In-Depth and Force
Concentration strategies as well as fuel planning.
Defense In Depth Strategy
A defense-in-depth strike incorporates the coordinated use of multiple layers to protect the
integrity of the strike package. In Figure 10-2, the Sweeps push several minutes ahead of the airground portion of the strike package in order to draw out and attrite any air threats.
Figure 10-2 Defense In Depth Strategy
Force Concentration
Force Concentration is the act of using overwhelming force over a smaller enemy force. By
enacting such overwhelming force, the disparity between the two forces alone acts as a force
multiplier in favor of the concentrated forces.
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Strike Coordination Fuel Planning
Fuel planning considerations are an important part of strike coordination and planning. The
initial planning process includes a fuel usage calculation. The amount of fuel necessary at
launch depends on the weight of aircraft that are heavily loaded with munitions and the length of
the route. Airborne refueling with tankers is carefully planned. The fuel plan must be robust
enough to accommodate unexpected events ranging from undetected SAM sites to tanker fallout.
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10-6 STRIKE COORDINATION AND ASSET MANAGEMENT
CHAPTER ELEVEN
STRIKE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
1100. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will discuss the roles of strike support aircraft and UASs.
1101. STRIKE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
This section will discuss the roles of strike support aircraft, including E-8C Joint Surveillance
and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)
E-3 Sentry, U-2, RC-135 Rivet Joint, and tankers.
E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
The E-8C JSTARS (Figure 11-1) is an airborne battle-management Command and Control,
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (C2ISR) platform that provides theater ground and air
commanders with ground surveillance to support attack operations and targeting.
The information gathered by the aircraft is relayed in near real time to the common ground
stations and to other ground Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
(C4I) nodes. The JSTARS is being outfitted with blue force tracking capability.
Figure 11-1 E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
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Airborne Warning and Control System E-3 Sentry
The AWACS E-3 Sentry aircraft (Figure 11-2) provides all-weather surveillance and C3. The
AWACS E-3 Sentry radar subsystem permits surveillance from the Earth’s surface up into the
stratosphere over land or water.
Figure 11-2 Airborne Warning and Control System E-3 Sentry
U-2
The U-2 (Figure 11-3) provides continuous day/night, high-altitude, and all-weather surveillance
and reconnaissance in direct support of U.S. and allied ground and air forces. The U-2 is capable
of collecting various types of imagery, including multi-sensor photo, EO, IR, and radar.
Figure 11-3 U-2
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
RC-135 Rivet Joint
The RC-135 Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft (Figure 11-4) provides near real-time, on-scene
intelligence capabilities to support theater missions, including collection, analysis, and
dissemination.
Figure 11-4 RC-135 Rivet Joint
Tankers
Aerial refueling, also referred to as air refueling, in-flight refueling (IFR), air-to-air refueling
(AAR), and tanking, is the process of transferring fuel from one aircraft (the tanker) to another
(the receiver) during flight. The procedure allows the receiving aircraft to remain airborne
longer, extending its range or loiter time on station. Tankers offload a portion of their total fuel
capacity to receivers. This is called “Give.” Tankers use two types of refueling apparatus to
offload fuel to receivers. These two types of apparatus are the drogue and the boom.
Drogue
The drogue is the Navy’s primary method of refueling. It hangs freely from the tanker as
depicted in Figure 11-5.
Figure 11-5 Drogue Refueling Apparatus
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Boom
The boom apparatus is commonly used by the Air Force. Most Air Force tanking is done along
the spine of the aircraft. An operator onboard the tanker aircraft drives the boom and maneuvers
it into place. This method can also be used by Navy aircraft. The boom apparatus is shown in
Figure 11-6.
Figure 11-6 Boom Refueling Apparatus
The various fuel tanker aircraft supporting strike missions are presented below:
1.
The KC-135 (Figure 11-7), which may carry up to 200,000 pounds of fuel, has the ability
to refuel aircraft using either a drogue or boom. This aircraft operates with the USAF and four
foreign nations.
Figure 11-7 KC-135
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ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
CHAPTER ELEVEN
2.
The KC-10 (Figure 11-8), which may carry over 350,000 pounds of fuel, also has the
ability to refuel aircraft using either a drogue or boom. This aircraft operates with the USAF and
the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF).
Figure 11-8 KC-10
3.
The KC-130 (Figure 11-9), a tanker variant of the C-130 transport aircraft, carries over
45,000 pounds of fuel and refuels aircraft only using a drogue. The aircraft operates with the
USN, the USMC, and 11 foreign nations.
Figure 11-9 KC-130
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4.
Some models of the F/A-18 (Figure 11-10) may act as tactical tanker aircraft, carrying
29,000 pounds of fuel and refueling aircraft via a drogue. They operate with the USN and Royal
Australian Air Force (RAAF).
Figure 11-10 F/A-18
5.
The Omega K-707 (Figure 11-11) refueling tankers may carry up to 160,000 pounds of fuel
and refuel aircraft using a drogue. The Omega KDC-10, which is identical to the KC-10, has
two wing pods and a 243,000 pound capacity, refueling using either a drogue or boom. Both the
preceding aircraft operate commercially with Omega Aerial Refueling Services, Inc.
Figure 11-11 Omega K-707
1102. UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS
This section will discuss the roles of UAS platforms, including RQ-4 Global Hawk, MQ-4 Broad
Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS), MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper, MQ-8 Fire Scout
Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV), and Scan Eagle.
11-6 STRIKE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
CHAPTER ELEVEN
RQ-4 Global Hawk
The RQ-4 Global Hawk (Figure 11-12) is a land-based, high-altitude, long-endurance UAS used
for wide area ground surveillance. Sensors on the RQ-4 Global Hawk include SAR, Ground
Moving Target Indicator (GMTI), and EO/IR cameras.
Figure 11-12 RQ-4 Global Hawk
MQ-4 Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Triton
The MQ-4 Triton (Figure 11-13) UAS includes long range ISR and global coverage and is
capable of maritime surveillance and reconnaissance, land target surveillance and
reconnaissance, strike support, SIGINT collection, and communications relay.
Figure 11-13 MQ-4 Triton
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MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper
The MQ-1 Predator (Figure 11-14) and the MQ-9 Reaper (Figure 11-15) UASs were developed
to have the same roles and sensors. Both are land-based, medium-altitude, long-endurance UASs
used for interdiction and armed reconnaissance against critical moving targets. Sensors for the
MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper include a nose camera, daytime variable aperture TV camera,
nighttime variable aperture IR camera, and SAR. The primary differences between the Predator
and the Reaper are power and payload. The Predator has a 115 horsepower, 4-cylinder piston
engine and can carry up to 2 Hellfire Missiles. The Reaper has a 900 horsepower turboprop
power plant, is faster than the Predator, and can carry up to 4 Hellfire Missiles.
Figure 11-14 MQ-1 Predator
Figure 11-15 MQ-9 Reaper
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
MQ-8 Fire Scout Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
(VTUAV)
The MQ-8 Fire Scout VTUAV (Figure 11-16) provides SA and precision targeting support. It
has the ability to take off and land autonomously on any aviation-capable warship. The MQ-8
Fire Scout VTUAV has an endurance of longer than 6 hours and is capable of continuous
operations 110 NM from the launch site.
Figure 11-16 MQ-8 Fire Scout
Scan Eagle
The Scan Eagle (Figure 11-17) is a long-endurance, fully autonomous UAV that provides ISR
support during operational missions. It contains an EO/IR camera that transmits streaming video
and Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) communications.
Figure 11-17 Scan Eagle
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11-10 STRIKE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
CHAPTER TWELVE
AIRCRAFT SELF-DEFENSE CONCEPTS
1200. INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the concepts of aircraft self-defense and covers the topics of airborne
threats, susceptibilities of large aircraft, and threat detection and countermeasures.
1201. AIRBORNE THREATS
Airborne threats include air-to-air and surface-to-air threats. Air-to-Air Missiles (AAMs) are
fired from an aircraft with the intent of destroying another aircraft. A typical guided missile has
a propellant/motor, guidance system, and warhead. While there are numerous types of guidance
systems in use, this chapter will focus on Active, semi-active, and IR.
Short-range AAMs are typically designed for within visual range engagements with enemy
aircraft and home in on emissions from a target. Medium- and long-range AAMs are typically
employed for BVR engagements. Medium- and long-range AAMs rely on active or semi-active
guidance systems while short range missiles typically use an IR seeker for homing guidance.
These missiles and their guidance systems are described in the next figure.
Guidance
System
Description
Active
Active guidance systems have their own small radar system built into the
missile. There is no need for external data or command to be followed.
Semi-Active
Semi-active guidance systems have a receiver that accepts signals
transmitted by a ground- or air-defense system radar.
IR
In IR guidance systems, the missile homes in on heat signatures from the
target, such as heat from an engine. It uses a seeker for homing guidance.
A seeker is an onboard antenna sensitive to a specific energy source. The
most easily detectable energy source is IR or heat energy.
Figure 12-1 Missile Guidance Systems
SAMs are designed to be launched from the ground or a surface platform and are designed to
destroy airborne aircraft or missiles. SAMs are used for shooting down enemy combatants and
preventing the enemy from executing its mission. Almost all SAM systems go through three
phases of flight from launch to impact. These phases are boost phase, mid-course, and terminal
phase. During the boost phase, the guidance systems are usually disabled to allow the missile to
travel away from the launch platform safely. The missile spends most of its flight time in the
mid-course phase. Using the guidance system, the missile makes slight adjustments to intercept
its target. In the terminal phase, the missile maintains accurate tracking to intercept the target.
These three phases are depicted in Figure 12-2.
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Figure 12-2 Surface-to-Air Missile Flyout Phases
Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) is another type of anti-aircraft system. AAA consists of powerful,
high-caliber guns and rapid-fire machine guns mounted to moving vehicles.
1202. LARGE AIRCRAFT SUSCEPTIBILITIES
All aircraft have vulnerabilities in their defenses. This section focuses on the susceptibilities of
large aircraft.
Large aircraft are capable of carrying large payloads for different kinds of missions. One of
might be the carrying of large fuel loads to increase on-station time, operating in all weather
conditions, and performing multiple missions. Attributes of large aircraft generally include slow
speeds, poor maneuverability, and very large fuel capacity.
Due to the size of their bodies and number of engines, larger aircraft give off RF and IR
signatures that are easy to detect. The next figure details the areas of the aircraft that tend to give
off IR signatures.
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Figure 12-3 Components Producing IR Signatures
Different kinds of SAMs threaten the different phases of flight. Vulnerabilities change according
to the mission types and components. Larger aircraft are more vulnerable to SAMs, especially
during the takeoff and landing phases of flight. The next figure illustrates the flight phases and
threats.
Figure 12-4 Flight Phases and Threats
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1203. THREAT DETECTION AND COUNTERMEASURES
An aircraft’s best countermeasure is to avoid a threat. To accomplish this, a threat must first be
detected. Warning systems help the aircrew to take effective evasive actions and to employ
countermeasures against the threats as required.
Threat Detection
In order to have advanced notice of a missile attack, or even to detect the presence of a radar
system, the aircraft may carry a radar warning receiver (RWR). An RWR is designed to monitor
the RF environment continuously and alert crews about radar threats to aircraft. The pilot is then
able to take evasive action to defeat the threat based on RWR indications. The next figure
illustrates the typical RWR antenna placement.
Figure 12-5 Antenna Placement of Radar Warning Receivers
Providing timely warning against IR missiles is a challenge. IR missiles do not give any warning
of their presence prior to launch. Once airborne, they have a small, but visible, radar signature
based on their cross-section and an IR signature created by their burning propellant. IR missiles
are short range and can lock on and destroy a target in seconds. Missile Warning Systems
(MAWs) are used to provide timely, reliable warning of IR missiles in flight so that an
appropriate countermeasure response can be initiated. The challenge with MAW is to provide a
near-100% accuracy in detection and warning while minimizing false alarm rates.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
Laser Warning Receivers (LWRs) detect laser signatures from threats. The basic steps used by
LWRs to detect laser signatures are as follows:
1.
Detect the signal.
2.
Discriminate the real signal from false signals.
3.
Characterize the laser.
4.
Localize the source.
Countermeasures
Offboard countermeasures, also known as expendables, are countermeasures used to deceive a
threat by deploying offboard objects capable of reflecting signals, transmitting RF signals, and
emitting an IR signature.
Chaff is the oldest method of radar countermeasure. When ejected from an aircraft, chaff forms
the electromagnetic equivalent of a visual smoke screen that temporarily hides the aircraft from
radar detection. Chaff also serves to decoy radar allowing aircraft to maneuver or egress from
the area. It consists of small, precisely cut pieces of aluminum or aluminum coated glass that
disperse widely in the air when ejected from the aircraft and are designed to effectively reflect
specific radar signals based on their frequencies. In the air, the initial burst from a chaff bundle
forms a sphere that shows up on radar screens as an electronic cloud. The aircraft is obscured by
the cloud, which confuses enemy radar.
Flares are used against IR-tracking threats. Flares are effective against early types of IR
missiles, which utilize passive guidance and employ hot spot trackers. Emitting a high-intensity
radiant, a flare will lure a missile for a few seconds by providing a temporary alternative target.
Decoys receive a signal, modify it, and then retransmit an amplified signal. This process makes
decoys different from chaff, which only reflects the signal. Decoys were developed when
home-on-jam types of threats increased. The ALE-50 decoy is towed behind the host aircraft,
protecting the aircraft and its crew against RF-guided missiles by luring the missile toward the
decoy and away from the intended target. The ALE-50 has successfully countered numerous
live firings of both surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles.
In addition to offboard countermeasures, there are several types of onboard countermeasures that
serve as another method of defense. The number of missiles to be engaged is one important
consideration in determining which of these systems to use. The next figure describes the
different onboard countermeasures.
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Onboard
Countermeasure
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Description
RF Jammers
RF jammers attempt to foul a missile’s radar with noise, preventing it
from detecting the target. The jammer must cover the full radar
frequency band. For larger aircraft targets, more jamming power is
needed.
Active IR
Active IR countermeasures add modulated IR energy to the aircraft’s
signature in an attempt to jam an IR-guided missile. The detector
receives the energy sources, and the signal processor determines the
position of the target. The missile seeker tracks the highest radiant
intensity.
Jamming and
Chaff (JAFF)
With JAFF, an onboard jammer illuminates the offboard dispensed chaff
with either deception or a noise signal. Chaff can reflect two Doppler
effects, one from the tracking radar and the other from the onboard
jammer.
Laser
Laser countermeasures have a short duration and low repetition rates, but
a high intensity. A laser has a plasma spark effect in the seeker head
close to the detectors. The energy from this plasma effect causes
jamming and blinding consequences. In addition to the possibility of
negatively affecting the electronics near the seeker, this energy may also
cause pits and scratches in optics, and debris formation.
Evasive
maneuvering
Evasive maneuvering is a countermeasure that is controlled by the pilot.
Some examples include route changing, agile flying, changing speed,
maneuvering in corkscrews, low flying, within-cloud flying, night flying,
and terrain masking.
Figure 12-6 Onboard Countermeasures
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN
MARITIME STRIKE
1300. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will cover Maritime Strike Mission Planning, the Dynamic Targeting Process,
Maritime Tactical Control, SSC, AR/AI/SCAR, WAS Strike, and Battle Damage Assessment
(BDA).
1301. MARITIME STRIKE MISSION PLANNING
The national airspace and maritime domain, as defined by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,
is the foundation for maritime strike mission planning. The DOD General Planning FLIP
contains information concerning ICAO procedures and procedures for operations and firings
over the high seas.
NWP 1-14M (The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations [July 2007]) sets
out fundamental principles of international and domestic law governing U.S. naval operations at
sea.
Additionally, Commander’s intent, the existence of timely and accurate intelligence, weather,
threat environment, aircraft capabilities, and effective communications must all be considered
when planning maritime strike operations.
Commander’s Intent
Commander’s intent should be detailed in a separate SUW section of SPINS or conveyed in the
DIM. This section should include specific guidance such as desired end state, objective
(including kill criteria), ALR, target priorities, restricted targets, amplifying PID requirements,
and delegation of weapons release/PID authority that are applicable to the mission at hand.
Intelligence
Timely and accurate intelligence is crucial when planning maritime strike missions. This
includes obtaining threat information, target descriptions, and the recognized maritime picture
(RMP).
Obtain threat information: Information regarding the threat’s air-to-air, air-to-surface, surfaceto-air, and surface-to-surface capabilities is essential for selecting the appropriate tactics and
planning support assets for SUW force protection.
Obtain target description: This includes obtaining locating data and surface-to-air/surface-tosurface weapon system information in the vicinity of the target or targets.
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Obtain the RMP: Access to an updated and accurate RMP is crucial for a maritime strike plan to
be successful. The RMP will show all located COI/CCOI as well as friendly surface contacts
and neutral/commercial shipping within the CSG/ESG/SAG OAs.
Weather Considerations
Weather conditions may complicate the SUW mission. Poor weather conditions affect target
search/ID, targeting, and post mission assessment. Low ceilings and limited visibility can
degrade or inhibit the capabilities of EO/IR systems among others. Figure 13-1 covers some
general weather planning rules of thumb.
Figure 13-1 Weather Planning Rules of Thumb
Strong surface winds can generate rough seas that complicate low-altitude acquisition of surface
targets. Sea spray can reduce/negate the capabilities of the EO/IR systems for low-altitude
operation. Ships in heavy sea states can pitch vertically as much as 30 ft or more in addition to
having a roll component. Large vessel pitch and roll during heavy sea states can have a
significant impact on a weapon’s effectiveness against ships. Decreased impact angle and
moving laser spot are potential factors that must be considered.
Temperature differential: IR systems are thermal imagers that convert invisible thermal energy
into a visible image. IR systems operate as differential temperature measuring systems. They do
not display the actual temperature of a given area or object, but they accentuate the differences in
temperature between them. Thus, there must be a difference between the temperature received
from the object and the temperature received from the background for an IR system to display
the object effectively. Radical changes in water temperature (shallow versus deep water, gulf
stream, etc.) will affect thermal imaging systems.
Threat Environment
Threat levels within an AO will vary depending upon the threat and its capabilities against a
particular airframe. Planners should balance this threat level with the acceptable level of risk set
forth in the commander’s intent when determining the preferred aircraft tactics and weapon
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employment techniques. Defining the threat environment should not be done without full
knowledge and consideration for the observed threat level and accepted level of risk.
Permissive threat environment: For the purposes of maritime strike missions, a permissive
threat environment is defined as one in which a sanctuary exists in the immediate vicinity of the
target. Typically, a permissive threat environment will facilitate a broader set of choices when
selecting aircraft type and weapons platforms.
Nonpermissive threat environment: For the purposes of maritime strike missions, a nonpermissive threat environment is defined as one in which a sanctuary does NOT exist in the
immediate vicinity of the target. A nonpermissive threat environment may dictate the use of
standoff weapons and/or alternate tactics such as low-altitude ingress and delivery.
Local Air Superiority: Theaterwide air superiority or supremacy is not required to conduct SUW
operations. However, local air superiority IS a key enabler. Air superiority may range from
local or temporary control to control over the entire theater. Multirole aircraft with the capability
to conduct self-escort (air-to-air and HARM capable as well as air-to-ground) into the target area
may be necessary in the absence of local air superiority. Range limitations, aircraft loading,
and/or tactics may degrade the effectiveness of aircraft in completing their mission.
SEAD is an activity that neutralizes, destroys, or temporarily degrades surface-based enemy air
defenses by destructive and/or disruptive means. The level of SEAD effort is determined by the
threat level and the degree to which the threat must be reduced in order to engage a target.
Aircraft Capabilities
Maritime strike missions require aircraft that are capable of solving the F2T2EA kill chain
(which will be discussed in section 1302, THE DYNAMIC TARGETING PROCESS).
Typically, no single platform will be capable of accomplishing this alone and maritime strike
missions will require fused capabilities from multiple assets to ensure mission success.
Consideration should be given to each platform’s weapons carriage, weapons delivery, target
location, PID, C2, time on station, and communications capabilities.
Effective Communications
Communication nets between C2 and maritime strike assets must be clearly established and
consideration should be given to establishing dedicated frequencies when developing a
communications plan. Ideally, a frequency will be associated with each mission to enable asset
coordination.
1302. THE DYNAMIC TARGETING PROCESS
Targets that are identified too late, or not selected for action in time to be included in the
deliberate targeting cycle discussed in Chapter 30 of this FTI titled: STRIKE COORDINATION
AND ASSET MANAGEMENT, must be prosecuted using a process known as dynamic
targeting. Dynamic targeting is normally used to quickly service pop-up threats or those threats
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that present themselves during the course of conducting preplanned “deliberate” targeting.
Figure 13-2 illustrates how dynamic targeting fits into the overall targeting process.
Figure 13-2 Targeting Process
The dynamic targeting process consists of six distinct phases. They are Find, Fix, Track, Target,
Engage, and Assess. This process is commonly referred to as F2T2EA and is colloquially
known as the “Kill Chain.” Some of these phases can be accomplished simultaneously under
certain circumstances and the process is not necessarily linear, meaning some of the steps may
have to be accomplished over and over before being able to move on to subsequent steps.
Find Phase
The “find” phase involves ISR detection of an emerging target. The find phase requires clearly
designated guidance from commanders, especially concerning target priorities. The detections of
objects that meets sufficient criteria (established with commander’s guidance) to be considered
and developed as targets are known as “emerging targets.” Time sensitivity and importance with
respect to emerging targets may be initially undetermined.
Fix Phase
The “fix” phase positively identifies an emerging target as worthy of engagement and determines
their position and other data with sufficient fidelity to permit engagement. Data correlation and
fusion confirms, identifies, and locates the target resulting in its classification as either Unknown
(not a target), probable target (not time-sensitive target), or probable time sensitive target (TST).
If a target is detected by the aircraft or system that will engage it (e.g., a Predator armed with
Hellfire Missiles) or a battle management C2 platform such as an E-2C/D, this may result in the
find and fix phases being completed near-simultaneously without the need for “traditional” ISR
input. Today’s sensor technology permits “nontraditional” ISR sources to supplement the find,
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fix, and track phases by integrating data from other-than-traditional intel platforms and helping
to build the RMP and COP which commanders can use to shorten the kill chain.
Track Phase
The “track” phase takes a confirmed target and its location, maintains a track on it, and confirms
the desired effect against it. This phase requires relative reprioritization of ISR assets, just as the
fix phase might, in order to maintain SA on the target. If track continuity is lost, it will probably
be necessary to re-accomplish the fix phase and, possibly, the find phase. For this reason,
warfare commanders also emphasize the importance of maintaining one data link track number
for the life of the track in their DIMS and SITREPs.
Target Phase
The “target” phase takes an identified, classified, located, and prioritized target, finalizes the
desired effect and targeting solution against it, and obtains required approval to engage it.
During this phase, target restrictions, such as collateral damage, ROE, and clear field of fire
(CFF) requirements are reviewed. This phase accomplishes the equivalent of “target validation.”
Engage Phase
In the “engage” phase, the target is confirmed as “hostile” and engagement is ordered and
transmitted to the pilot, aircrew, or operator of the selected weapon system. The engagement
orders must be sent to, received by, and understood by the “shooter.” The engagement should be
monitored and managed by the engaging component (in the maritime domain, this is call sign
AZ). In the joint maritime environment, it is the Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander
(JFMCC). The desired result of this phase is successful action against the target.
Assess Phase
In the “assess” phase, predetermined assessment requests are measured against actions and
desired effects on the target. ISR assets collect information about the engagement according to
the collection plan and attempt to determine whether desired effects and objectives were
achieved. In the cases of most fleeting targets, quick assessment may be required in order to
make expeditious re-attack recommendations.
Additional Considerations
Engagement Authority: the authority to engage should be delegated to the C2 node that has the
best information or SA to execute the mission and direct communications to the operators and
crew of the engaging weapon system. At the tactical level, engagement authority usually resides
with the “shooter” for planned events being executed.
Managing increased risk: With compression of the decision cycle comes increased risk due to
insufficient time for more detailed coordination and deconfliction that takes place during
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deliberate targeting. Commanders must assess risk early, determine what constitutes acceptable
risk, and communicate their intent.
1303. MARITIME TACTICAL CONTROL
As previously discussed, airspace and aircraft control is normally conducted by air and surface
units under the broad category of ACUs. ACUs must perform contact identification and
maintain deconfliction among aircraft. Typical ACUs perform these functions fulfilling roles as
airspace managers.
MAC
The MAC is an ACU serving as an extension of the SCC and is charged with providing C2 to
airborne assets operating within a designated maritime area of operations. MAC responsibilities
will primarily be determined by mission requirements, threat environment, as well as
commander’s intent.
Platforms capable of filling the MAC role are the E-2 Hawkeye, E-3 AWACS, P-3 Littoral
Surveillance Radar System (LSRS), P-3 ASUW Improvement Program (AIP), P-8 Poseidon, E-8
JSTARS, MH-60R, and surface combatants.
MAC Communications
Controllers must have a level of tactical understanding on par with the aircraft assets under their
control. In order clearly communicate and achieve consistent and effective control, a
standardized communication format is required. This is the previously discussed MAC Comm.
Format that is depicted in Figure 13-3. Each line of this format, which has been aligned to
closely resemble TACAIC Comm. format, is broken down and discussed further.
Figure 13-3 MAC Baseline Comm. Format
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Line 1 (Call sign)
This is simply the call sign of the tasked platform followed by the MAC’s call sign in “you, this
is me” format.
Line 2 (Dynamic Targeting)
Although there are several forms of tasking that can be issued via line 2, the focus here is on the
three dynamic targeting brevity terms: Investigate, Target, and Smack.

Investigate: Verify specified elements of ROE, PID, CFF, and/or coordination of
forces on the referenced target/track.

Target: ROE, PID, coordination of forces, and commander’s guidance have been
satisfied. Correlation and CFF still need to be accomplished prior to weapons release.

Smack: Clearance to employ ordnance/fires on surface target. ROE, PID, CFF,
coordination of forces, and commander’s guidance requirements on the referenced
target have all been satisfied.
Line 3 (Group Name)
“Surface track number XXXX” with referenced Link 16 (TIMBER) track number. If MAC or
asset is negative TIMBER, the format will be “surface contact.” Any number of surface contacts
within a one nautical mile radius of each other will be reported as a GROUP.
Line 4 (Anchor Point and Location)
Bearing and range of target from digital bullseye.
Line 5 (Fill-ins)
Track Direction: cardinal/subcardinal and speed if known
Declaration:
SKUNK:
Contact that has not yet been identified
ROBBER: Vessel identified as an enemy IAW theater criteria but does not necessarily
imply clearance to engage
HOSTILE: A contact identified as an enemy upon which clearance to fire is authorized
IAW theater ROE
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NEUTRAL: A positively identified aircraft, ship, or friendly
position whose
characteristics, behavior, origin, or nationality indicate it is neither supporting
nor opposing friendly forces.
Identification: If known, will be passed utilizing code words delineated via CSG Card of the
Day, Week, or SPINS. Pass information based on highest threat with regard to the weapon being
employed.
Strength: Pass if known any tactically relevant amplifying remarks:
Attack Axis (used when the MAC is required to Solve CFF for standoff weapons)
Location of friendly, neutral, and other hostile Surface contacts (if tactically significant)
Any additional information deemed tactically significant by the MAC
Communication Nets
Numerous communication nets are applicable when conducting maritime strike operations.
Figure 13-4 Communication Nets
Command Net: This net links the OTC and CWC with the various warfare commanders and
coordinators. Additionally, command nets provide a circuit to coordinate actions.
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C2 Coordination Net: A circuit for C2 assets to communicate and coordinate C2-specific items
within an AOR
SCC Coordination and Reporting (C&R): A dedicated circuit between SSC/SCC
(SUWC/ASWC)/and operating forces. This net allows the warfare commander to maintain SA
and provide guidance and intentions for assigned assets. Also known as the AZ net.
Information Warfare Commander C&R: A dedicated circuit between the IWC and ISR assets.
Allows the IWC to maintain SA and provide guidance and intentions in order to coordinate with
assigned ISR assets to expedite the PID process.
Voice Production Net (VPN)/Special Reporting and Coordinating (SPRAC): Used for timesensitive tactical voice reports.
SSC Air Coordination: Used for the coordination and control of aircraft assigned to the SCC for
SSC.
Tactical Air Direction (TAD) Net: Used for control of tactical assets.
Communication Flow
The MAC is an extension of the SCC and must remain in communication with the warfare
commander on that specific coordination and reporting net. The specific communication nets the
MAC will be responsible for will vary based on both the mission and the MAC’s system
capabilities. After checking out with the applicable CSG/ESG administrative agencies, maritime
air assets will check in with the MAC using the MNPOTTA check-in brief on their assigned
frequency. This frequency will be based on the assigned mission and will most likely be found
on the CSG/ESG air plan.
All assets checking in with the MAC should expect a current SITREP including the status of
engagements, current threats, and airspace coordinating measures (ACMs). Depending on the
mission, the MAC will either maintain control of the asset or turn them over to the next
appropriate agency. The MAC may be able to request and/or receive information from
supporting ISR platforms to assist in or solve for PID and to better establish/maintain the
RMP/CTP/COP.
The MAC’s Contribution to the Kill Chain
Find, Fix, Track: The MAC will utilize onboard systems as well as supporting assets to conduct
a search of the operating area in accordance with commander’s intent in order to establish and
maintain the RMP/CTP/COP.
Target, Engage: All surface contacts meeting PID/ROE shall be prosecuted in accordance with
commander’s intent. MAC responsibilities during the engagement phase will vary based on
capabilities as well as the threat and operating environment. The MAC may direct assets to use
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persistent surveillance (SHADOW) a target or direct jamming (MUSIC/BUZZER) when
airborne EA is required to support an engagement. Communication examples are in Figure 13-5.
Figure 13-5 Target/Engage Comm. Examples
Assess: MAC will collect inflight reports (MISREPS) from TACAIR as well as collect
information from ISR assets in order to provide commanders an accurate and current
RMP/CTP/COP. An important factor in the assessment phase is determining BDA. The MAC
must use onboard systems as well as supporting assets to make the best possible assessment.
This information will be used for follow-on decisions such as a re-strike.
1304. SSC CONSIDERATIONS
SSC may encompass all steps of the F2T2EA process. However, it focuses primarily on the
Find, Fix, and Tack phases. In most cases, assets will be controlled by the MAC. The MAC
must efficiently utilize assets to maximize search volume and maintain deconfliction for
controlled/assigned assets.
Flight leads will check in with the MAC using the MNPOTTA format. Upon check-in, SSC
assets can expect to be tasked to either investigate specific COIs/CCOIs or to scan their
respective search areas. Assigned scan search areas may be provided as a sector search using
bearing and range from a GEOREF/bullseye, a directed search where the MAC will give specific
coordinates or bearings to the contact, an autonomous or pilot-controlled “free-lance” search, or
a grid search where a specific GARS box will be delineated.
Figure 13-6 Investigate Tasking Example
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Search patterns that aircraft can employ to locate surface contacts include the previously covered
search patterns; Bar Scan, Expanded Square, and Sector Search. Type/Class/Unit level
classification of surface contacts should include the two categories (Merchant or Combatant),
Type (patrol craft, destroyer), and class (Houdong, Houbei) as provided in the theater ship
recognition guide.
Identification of a surface contact requires obtaining the vessel’s name, hull number, and flag.
Rigging is a close approach overt procedure dependent on time available threat conditions and
commander’s intent (CCOI, COI, or VOI requirements). Rigging procedures allow SSC aircraft
to obtain critical ID of contacts in a non-threatening manner (e.g., not crossing the contact’s
bow)
Figure 13-7 Rigging Example
The ability and level to which a SSC asset can classify and identify a surface contact will depend
upon its sensors and certain environmental factors. The confidence levels: Unknown, Non-COI,
Possible (Low/High), Probable, and Certain are applied.
Even with PID established, the intent of an approaching vessel may not be known. In order to
ascertain the vessel’s intent, the MAC or on-scene commander can utilize escalatory response
options. The entire series of events do not have to be conducted during a single encounter with a
contact. The situation will dictate required actions. The contact’s response will help fill in the
elements of ROE.
MARITIME STRIKE 13-11
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Figure 13-8 Escalatory Response Options
SLEDGEHAMMER is a request for immediate air support. Once SLEDGEHAMMER is called
by the defended surface unit, air assets will be reassigned from other mission sets to identify
threat intentions and employ in an AR/AI/SCAR role if necessary. If an asset determines that a
surface contact poses an imminent threat to friendly or neutral surface forces, then they can
recommend surface forces declare “SLEDGEHAMMER.”
1305. AR/AI/SCAR
AR/AI is an airplan-assigned mission in which assets locate and attack TOO in assigned areas.
AR/AI aircraft can either support a SCAR mission or perform SCAR if required. Much like
SSC, AR/AI assets may be directed to scan designated areas. If AR/AI assets are able to locate
enemy surface contacts and ROE on those contacts is solved, then AR/AI platforms may employ
as necessary to attrite the threat. If a SCAR is coordinating engagements, then the SCAR may
issue TARGET or SMACK tasking to AR/AI assets.
For the purposes of AR/AI/SCAR in the maritime environment, the MAC is responsible for
channeling AR/AI/SCAR assets to designated scan areas or ongoing engagements. At a
minimum, the MAC should provide AR/AI/SCAR platforms procedural control, an appropriate
situation update, applicable sensor data or tracks of interest, and SA to other air assets and
surface-to-surface fires within the AO.
On initial check-in, the AR/AI assets will pass call sign, mission number, and position. If AR
assets are directed to support a SCAR in an ongoing engagement, the SCAR will need to provide
deconfliction between AR assets engaged in attacks. The SCAR can deconflict aircraft utilizing
vertical, lateral, or timing measures, or a combination of the three. If an AR platform detects
13-12 MARITIME STRIKE
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
targets and PID/ROE are solved, the AR platform will employ per platform TTP to attrite the
threat. In the event that more targets are detected than can be serviced by the locating platform,
the locating AR/AI platform will assume the responsibility of the SCAR and request more assets
through the MAC.
After receiving tasking to TARGET or SMACK from the SCAR, assets must ensure that they are
correlated (surface contact correlation is defined as 1 NM) prior to weapons release. The SCAR
will never clear an AR/AI/ SCAR asset “hot.”
Figure 13-9 SCAR Targeting Example
AR/AI/SCAR assets will provide the SCAR with timely MISREPS to include BDA or remaining
threats. The SCAR will then make a determination whether additional assets should be assigned
to the target set for employment. Once all targets are serviced, the SCAR will return to the role
of an AR platform.
1306. WAS STRIKE
WAS strike is the execution of deliberate attacks which are offensive in nature against symmetric
enemy surface combatants and material. WAS strikes can be executed against maritime dynamic
targets by air, surface, and/or subsurface assets. WAS strike may also be an airplan-assigned
mission against deliberate targets selected during the conventional strike planning process. For a
preplanned WAS, all participating assets should attempt to be involved in the mission planning
process and flight briefing to the maximum extent possible.
Due to the dynamic nature of targets in the maritime environment, there are also times where
AZ, via the MAC, will retask aircraft to execute or support a WAS strike against a recently
located threat. Because the target is moving and is most likely operating in a nonpermissive
threat environment, the Find, Fix, Track portion of the kill chain will need to be updated by the
MAC. To accomplish this, the MAC will utilize both onboard and offboard sensors from ISR,
UAS, and MPR assets assigned to support AZ.
When accomplishing the target phase, in most cases, AZ will be designated as the weapons
release authority. AZ may choose to delegate weapons release authority to the mission
MARITIME STRIKE 13-13
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
commander if PID and ROE are solved. Whether the WAS strike mission is preplanned or
dynamically tasked, the MAC will be responsible for updating the mission commander with
amplifying strike information.
Engagements will be IAW theater specific SPINS and individual service TTPs. For U.S. Navy
WAS strike TTP, reference NTTP TOPGUN Manual Chapter 48, “Maritime Employment.”
BDA assessment may prove difficult due to employment and standoff considerations in a
nonpermissive threat environment. In certain cases, BDA may require the use of theater or
national level ISR assets.
1307. BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
BDA is the timely and accurate estimate of damage to a target or target system resulting from the
lethal or nonlethal application of military force. BDA consists of assessments of physical and
functional damage, as well as the target system. Video, FLIR, or visual identifications are often
the means of recording BDA.
Aircrews may be instructed to achieve a Mobility Kill, Firepower Kill, or Catastrophic Kill
(K-KILL). A Mobility Kill refers to disabling a ship’s ability to maneuver (e.g., propulsion,
steering mechanism, and personnel). Mission Kill refers to the damage inflicted on a ship that
destroys the ship’s weapons systems or substantially reduces its ability to deliver weapons
effectively. K-KILL refers to damage inflicted on a ship that renders it both unusable and
irreparable. K-KILL is also referred to as a SINK KILL.
Standard Mission Report
Standard Mission Reports are critical for the passage of BDA and Bomb Hit Assessment (BHA)
during Maritime Strike. These reports are collected and evaluated by airborne C2. An example
Standard Mission Report is displayed in the next figure.
Figure 13-10 Standard Mission Report
13-14 MARITIME STRIKE
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
SEARCH AND RESCUE
1400. INTRODUCTION
This chapter covers terms, concepts, and procedures associated with airborne SAR mission
responsibilities, SAR equipment, SAR asset coordination, search patterns, rescue/recovery
reports, and SAR mission planning.
1401. SEARCH AND RESCUE MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES
The mission responsibilities for SAR are divided among the Rescue Coordination Centers
(RCCs), SAR Mission Coordinator (SMC), and On-Scene Commander (OSC).
The RCCs are SAR facilities established worldwide by geographic location. The SAR
Coordinator is the individual with the overall responsibility for providing or arranging for SAR
services within the RCCs. Even if not directly involved in the search operation, the SAR
Coordinator must be informed and kept abreast of the progress of the search and rescue.
The SMC, designated by the SAR Coordinator, is responsible for the specific SAR mission (in
the case of a military search). In the case of a SAR effort by military personnel, the OTC or the
unit designated by the OTC shall assume the duties of the SMC.
The responsibility of the OSC, who is designated by the SMC, is to assist in ensuring that the
search plan is carried out properly by evaluating and making recommendations to the SMC to
alter the plan (if necessary). If the SMC is on scene, the SMC may handle the duties of the OSC.
Generally, the first search unit to arrive on scene or the unit with the best capability is designated
OSC.
The SAR Checklist is located in the Commander, Training Air Wing Six (CTW-6) In-Flight
Guide. The SAR Checklist contains instructions for Squawk 7700, reporting on currently
assigned ATC frequency or UHF/VHF Guard (243.0/121.5), establishing a BINGO fuel and
watching the fuel state, recording pertinent information, remaining on SAR common (282.8), and
designating and briefing the relief before leaving station.
When reporting on currently assigned ATC frequency or UHF/VHF Guard (243.0/121.5), it is
necessary to provide identification, situation (chutes, survivors), position (NAVAID,
Radial/DME), and intentions (assume OSC duties). Recording pertinent information includes
aircraft fire, number of survivors, access to site (via air, ground, or water), and assistance
currently on scene. When remaining on SAR common (282.8), the crew should assign/request
communications relay as required, assign aircraft to guide recovery team to the scene, provide
zone brief to incoming SAR, and control traffic in and around scene.
SEARCH AND RESCUE
14-1
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
1402. SEARCH AND RESCUE EQUIPMENT
Crew requirements for SAR missions are in accordance with the appropriate aircraft
Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) NATOPS manual.
MPR aircraft may be directed to assist in SAR, primarily in the search phase, because of their
sensors and due to the fact they are capable of deploying a SAR kit. The P-3C lends itself to this
task with fast enroute speeds and good on-station endurance capability. To assist survivors when
located at sea, a SAR drop kit, consisting of two seven-man life rafts and an emergency
equipment container, has been developed for use by MPR units. The next figure illustrates how
the SAR drop kit should be delivered where Vs is the aircraft’s stall speed.
Figure 14-1 Search and Rescue Drop Kit
Survivor position-marking devices are used for marking positions or determining wind direction.
All pyrotechnic survivor position-marking devices should be stored in a dry, well-ventilated
magazine and out of direct sunlight or excessive/variable temperatures.
WARNING
Pyrotechnic devices (e.g., survivor position-marking devices)
should not be used in areas where flammable fluids or other
combustible materials may be ignited.
14-2 SEARCH AND RESCUE
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
Survivor position-marking devices include the MK 25 smoke (marine marker), MK 58 smoke
(marine marker), MK 18 smoke (land marker), MK 79 MOD 0 and MK 79 MOD 2 (personnel
distress signal kits), MK 124 MOD 0 (marine smoke and illumination signal), SDU-36/N
(electric marine marker light), (SAR sonobuoy), and Datum marker (sonobuoy).
1403. SEARCH AND RESCUE ASSET COORDINATION
Assets must be coordinated recognizing their capabilities to support the operation of the SAR
mission. The frequency used to communicate during SAR depends on the situation. Distress
signals and on-scene communications have specified frequencies. The next figure lists the
communication frequencies and functions for international recognized SAR distress frequencies.
Frequency
Function
500 kHz
International Continuous Wave (CW)/Modulated Continuous Wave
(CW/MCW) distress and calling
2182 kHz
International voice distress, safety, and calling
8364 kHz
International CW/MCW lifeboat, life raft, and survival craft
40.5 MHz
USA FM distress
121.5 MHz International voice aeronautical and shipboard emergency (VHF Guard)
156.8 MHz International FM voice distress, emergency (VHF)
243.0 MHz
Joint/combined military voice aeronautical emergency and international survival
craft (UHF Guard)
406.0 MHz International voice aeronautical and shipboard emergency (UHF)
Figure 14-2 International Search and Rescue Distress Frequencies
The next figure lists commonly used on-scene SAR frequencies and their functions.
Frequency Function
2670 kHz
Coast Guard HF working frequency
3024.4
kHz
International voice SAR on scene (3023)
5680 kHz
International voice SAR on scene
123.1 MHz
National aeronautical SAR scene of action. International SAR scene of action
in U.S. and Canadian ICAO regions of responsibility in Atlantic and Pacific
SEARCH AND RESCUE
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Frequency Function
138.78
MHz
U.S. military voice SAR on scene and direct finding (DF)
155.16
MHz
FM frequency used by some states and local agencies for coordinating SAR
operations
157.1 MHz Coast Guard VHF-FM working frequency (CH 22A)
282.8 MHz Joint/combined on scene and DF (UHF)
243.0 MHz Motor whaleboat/rescue helicopter communications
381.8 MHz
Coast Guard Command net (working frequency between Coast Guard aircraft,
and cutters)
Figure 14-3 On-Scene Search and Rescue Frequencies
1404. SEARCH PATTERNS
SAR Recovery Units (SRUs) team aircraft and vessels together for the most advantageous use of
search patterns. Aircraft provide rapid coverage of the search area from a good search platform.
Vessels may provide better navigation, and may be able to quickly rescue a survivor sighted
from the aircraft. General types of search patterns include, but are not limited to, track line,
parallel, creeping line, square, sector, flare, homing signal, and contour.
Coordinated search formulas assist in the execution of coordinated search patterns. These
formulas take into account ship speed, aircraft turn diameter, general half searchleg timing, into
the wind half searchleg timing, downwind half searchleg timing, crossleg timing, and bowtie
solution.
Coordinated search patterns include the Creeping Line Single-Unit Coordinated (CSC) and
Creeping Line Single-Unit Radar (CSR). These patterns are variations of the Creeping Line
pattern. If the only available surface craft is a boat or larger vessel untrained in directing or
coordinating aircraft, the CSC pattern is used. If the surface craft is a Navy vessel or a Coast
Guard cutter, trained in directing or coordinating aircraft, the CSR pattern is normally used.
Search pattern considerations for aircraft and vessels include vessel heading and track, vessel
speed, aircraft heading and speed, aircraft turn diameter, aircraft crossleg time, aircraft searching
time, and pattern timing.
1405. RESCUE/RECOVERY REPORTS
A Search Unit Report occurs 10 – 20 minutes before arrival at the search area. The OSC
receives the report of the current weather at the scene on arrival. In a Search Unit Report, the
SRU reports to the OSC. The report includes call sign, ETA on scene, on-scene communications
capability, planned search speed, and on-scene endurance.
14-4 SEARCH AND RESCUE
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
When an aircraft SRU reports to the OSC, the OSC accepts responsibility for flight-following
service. It is essential, therefore, that each aircraft SRU makes “OPS normal” reports to the OSC
at regular intervals. Normally, multi-engine aircraft will make reports every 30 min and singleengine aircraft and helicopters, every 15 min. Upon completion of the assigned search period,
the SRU reports the results of the search to the OSC. If unable to report directly to the OSC over
an on-scene channel, then the report should be relayed through another SRU.
The Briefing Officer conducts a thorough briefing using the items on the Search Briefing
Checklist. If the search craft has already been scrambled, then this checklist should be used as a
guide for radio briefing. The brief should be condensed, as appropriate.
Search aircraft should contact the OSC 10 – 20 minutes prior to ETA on-scene. The OSC will
request that the search aircraft either confirm or provide the information in the On-Scene
Procedures section.
Situation Reports (SITREPs) must be transmitted by the OSC to the SMC upon arrival at the
search area, when change occurs, or every 4 hr. A SITREP includes number (numerically by
OSC); date/time group; search unit’s on-station arrival time, with an estimated off-station time;
on-scene weather, wind, and sea conditions; pertinent new developments; major modifications to
the search plan; requests for additional assistance; summary of the search areas with the
probability of detection; and recommendations.
Search aircraft should always keep a drift signal, smoke float, or sea dye marker ready for
immediate jettison. When any sighting is made, then a smoke float should be dropped
immediately. If survivors are sighted, or the scene of distress is located, then observe the
Survivor Sighting Procedures. If survivors are sighted, it is important to provide the OSC with
information from the Sighting Reports.
1406. SEARCH AND RESCUE MISSION PLANNING
Naval units must constantly be equipped to perform SAR responsibilities. Although the limiting
factor in most situations will be shortage of available space, commands are encouraged to add
authorized rescue equipment as necessary to increase mission readiness.
SAR mission planning (maritime) is an eleven-step process, of which five of the steps are
mandatory. These mandatory steps are one, four, nine, ten, and eleven. The following are the
steps for SAR mission planning (maritime):
1.
Determine the type of incident and select a response based on the situation:
a.
If an aviation incident and a bailout or an ejection have occurred: Go to Step 2.
b.
If a surface position is known, or the incident involved a surface craft: Go to Step 4.
SEARCH AND RESCUE
14-5
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
2.
3.
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Obtain or estimate the following aircraft information (if applicable):
a.
Ejection position
b.
Ejection altitude
c.
Aircraft direction of travel
d.
Average wind speed, direction from parachute, and opening altitude to the surface
Determine the parachute drift. Follow the steps below to determine the parachute drift:
a.
Enter the table (Figure 14-4) at the closest altitude to the parachute opening AGL
(vertical column).
b.
Move across to the intersection of the appropriate average winds aloft speed. This
number represents the distance in NM that the parachute drifted.
Figure 14-4 Parachute Drift Table
4.
Determine the visual search altitude. From the visual search altitude table below,
determine the recommended visual search altitude for the search object. As a general rule,
difference in sweep widths of less than 10% should be ignored when making altitude decisions.
14-6 SEARCH AND RESCUE
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
Figure 14-5 Visual Search Altitude Table
–
The sweep width is the width of a swath centered on the SRU’s track, where the
probability of detecting the search object (if it is outside the swath) is equal to the
probability of missing the search object if it is inside that swath (Figure 14-6).
i.
If visually searching: Go to Step 5.
ii.
If searching for a daylight visual distress signal: Go to Step 7.
iii.
If searching for a night visual distress signal: Go to Step 8.
iv.
If searching using any other sensors (e.g., IR, Radar): Go to Step 9.
Figure 14-6 Sweep Width Determination
SEARCH AND RESCUE
14-7
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
5.
Determine the uncorrected maritime visual sweep width. The following tables (Figures
14-7 thru 14-9) provide the uncorrected values (Wu) for sweep width for various search objects.
To determine the Wu, do the following:
a.
Select the table for the type of SRU and enter the column, indicating the selected
search altitude and visibility.
b.
Move down the column to the search object that most closely identifies the actual
search object and interpolate as required. This value is the Wu in NM.
c.
Go to Step 6
Figure 14-7 Fixed Wing – Uncorrected Visual Sweep Width (300 – 750 ft)
Figure 14-8 Fixed Wing – Uncorrected Visual Sweep Width (1000 – 2000 ft)
14-8 SEARCH AND RESCUE
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
Figure 14-9 Fixed Wing – Uncorrected Visual Sweep Width (2500 – 3000 ft)
6.
Determine the visual sweep width correction factors. Apply the correction factors to the
Wu, correcting the sweep width for flotation, fatigue, weather, and aircraft speed (as applicable):
a.
Correcting for flotation (search altitudes) – For up to 500 ft. only, the values given for
sweep width for a Person In Water (PIW) may be increased by a factor of four
(multiply Wu by 4) if it is known that the person is wearing a personal flotation
device.
b.
Correcting for fatigue – The degradation of detection performance during a search
can be significant. If feedback from the on-scene SRUs indicates that the search
crews were excessively fatigued, reduce the sweep width values by 10% (multiply Wu
by 0.9).
c.
Correcting for weather – The table below can be used to determine the weather
correction factor. If weather conditions in more than one row apply, use the lower of
the two correction factors.
Figure 14-10 Weather Correction Table
SEARCH AND RESCUE
14-9
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
d.
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Correcting for search aircraft speed – Enter the speed correction table with aircraft
type (fixed-wing or helicopter) and the speed flown. Move down the column to the
search object. This value is the speed correction. Interpolate as required. There is no
speed correction for surface SRUs. Go to Step 10.
7.
Determine the visual distress signaling devices sweep width for day (Figure 14-11). The
estimated sweep widths for handheld orange smoke provided in the table (Figure 14-12) are for
winds of 10 kts or less. For winds over 10 kts, the smoke tends to dissipate and the sweep width
degrades to less than 2 NM. Go to Step 10.
Figure 14-11 Sweep Width for Daylight Detection Aids
Figure 14-12 Sweep Width for Handheld Orange Smoke
8.
Determine the visual distress signaling devices sweep width for night (Figure 14-13 or
14-14). Go to Step 10.
Figure 14-13 Sweep Width for Night Detection Aids
14-10 SEARCH AND RESCUE
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
Figure 14-14 Sweep Width Life Jacket White Strobe
9.
Determine the sensor sweep width and altitude – IR (Figure 14-15). Sweep widths should
be approximated, using the operator’s best estimate of effective detection ranges for other target
types and FOV/scan width limits. The definition of the effective detection range is the range at
which the target will certainly be detected under prevailing conditions. The sweep width should
not exceed the effective azimuthal coverage of the IR system in use, regardless of target size. Go
to Step 10.
Figure 14-15 Altitudes for Forward Looking Infrared
Determine the sensor sweep width and altitude – Radar. The airborne radar with ISAR provides
high resolution, small-target detection, weather avoidance, sea surveillance, and Doppler display.
The sweep width ISAR system has special selectable features that enhance system performance
against weak targets. The sweep widths for conducting and planning airborne ISAR searches are
summarized in the table below (based on the following general recommendations):
SEARCH AND RESCUE
14-11
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
a.
Search altitude – 1500 ft. or lower
b.
Search speed – 180 – 220 Knots Indicated Air Speed (KIAS)
c.
Life raft searches – 16 NM range
d.
Search full radar display – Search not limited by the distance between two parallel
searchlegs
e.
Search cursor – May hide weak targets
f.
Radar screen – Refresh when 1/4 of display in front of aircraft is off-screen
Figure 14-16 Sweep Width for Forward Looking Airborne Radar
10. Determine the track spacing. For any search area, the RCC and the SMC will specify the
required Probability of Detection (POD) and determine the Coverage Factor (C) accordingly.
Prior to direction from the RCC/SMC and to ensure that survivors are included, plot a search
area large enough, and use a coverage factor of 1.0. Use the equation C = W ÷ S, where W is the
sweep width, and S is track spacing (distance between two parallel searchlegs). This spacing
directly influences target electability. The optimum S yields maximum POD during the time
available, consistent with the economical use of available SRUs.
11. Select a search pattern. Follow the steps to select a search pattern and then determine an
applicable search pattern to use. Once on the scene, begin the search. It is important to continue
to monitor the situation on scene as it develops. If it is necessary, adjust the search plan.
14-12 SEARCH AND RESCUE
APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY
Acronym
Definition
µsec
microsecond
3D
Three-dimensional
A/A
Air-to-Air
A/FD
Airport/Facility Directory
A/G
Air-to-Ground
A/S
Air-to-Surface
AAA
Anti-Aircraft Artillery
AAR
Air-to-Air Refueling
AAM
Air-to-Air Missile
AAW
Anti-Air Warfare
ACA
Airspace Control Authority
ACC
Area Control Center
ACM
Airspace Coordinating Measures
ACO
Airspace Control Order
ACU
Aircraft Control Unit
ADC
Air Defense Center
ADF
Automatic Direction Finder
ADIZ
Air Defense Identification Zone
ADS-B
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
Advanced MC2
Advanced Maritime Command and Control
AEA
Airborne Electronic Attack
AESA
Active Electronically Scanned Array
AEW
Airborne Early Warning
AFB
Air Force Base
AFCS
Automatic Flight Control System
AGL
Above Ground Level
AGM
Air-to-Ground Missile
AI
Air Interdiction
GLOSSARY
A-1
APPENDIX A
Acronym
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Definition
AIM
Aeronautical Information Manual
AIP
ASUW Improvement Program
AIRMET
Airmen’s Meteorological Information
AIS
Automatic Identification System
ALCS
Airborne Launch Control System
ALR
Acceptable Levels of Risk
ALSA
Air Land Sea Application Center
AM
Amplitude Modulation
AMDC
Air Missile Defense Commander
AMRAAM
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile
AMTI
Airborne Moving Target Indicator
AO
Area of Operations
AOMSW
Air Operations in Maritime Surface Warfare
AOP
Area of Probability
AOR
Area of Responsibility
AP
Area Planning
AR
Armed Reconnaissance
AR
Air-Refueling Track
AR/AI/SCAR
Armed Reconnaissance/Air Interdiction/Strike Coordination
and Reconnaissance
AREC
Air Resource Element Coordinator
ARIES
Airborne Reconnaissance Integrated Electronic System
ARTCC
Air Route Traffic Control Center
ASBM
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
ASCM
Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
ASM
Anti-Ship Missile
ASR
Airport Surveillance Radar
ASROC
Antisubmarine Rocket
ASW
Antisubmarine Warfare
ASWC
Antisubmarine Warfare Commander
A-2 GLOSSARY
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Acronym
APPENDIX A
Definition
ATA
Automatic Target Acquisition
ATC
Air Traffic Control
ATFLIR
Advanced Targeting Forward Looking Infrared
ATIS
Automatic Terminal Information Service
AWACS
Airborne Warning and Control System
AWS
Aegis Weapon System
BAMS
Broad Area Maritime Surveillance
BBC
British Broadcasting Corporation
BDA
Battle Damage Assessment
BHA
Bomb Hit Assessment
BMD
Ballistic Missile Defense
BR
Bearing Resolution
BRAA
Bearing, Range, Altitude, and Aspect
BUNO
Bureau Number
BVR
Beyond Visual Range
BW
Beam Width
BWE
Beam Width Error
C
Central
C
Coverage Factor
C/A
Coarse Acquisition
C&R
Coordination and Reporting
C2
Command and Control
C2ISR
Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance
C2P
Command and Control Processor
C3
Command, Control, and Communications
C4I
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and
Intelligence
CA
Crab Angle
CAG
Carrier Air Group
Cal.
caliber
GLOSSARY
A-3
APPENDIX A
Acronym
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Definition
CAP
Combat Air Patrol
CAS
Close Air Support
CATCC
Carrier Air Traffic Control Center
CB
Citizen Band
CCA
Carrier Control Area
CCZ
Carrier Control Zone
CCOI
Critical Contact of Interest
CENTCOM
Central Command
CERT
Certain
CFF
Clear Field of Fire
CGRS
Common Geographic Reference System
CH
Compass Heading
CIEA
Classification, Identification, and Engagement Area
CIRVIS
Communications Instructions for Reporting Vital Intelligence
Sightings
CIWS
Close-In Weapons System
CIU
Concurrent Interface Unit
cm
centimeters
CNATRA
Chief of Naval Air Training
CND
Computer Network Defense
CNO
Chief of Naval Operations
CO
Commanding Officer
COI
Contact of Interest
COMINT
Communications Intelligence
COMNAVAIRFOR
Commander, Naval Air Forces
COMSEC
Communications Security
CONOPS
Concept of Operations/Concurrent Operations
CONUS
Continental United States
COP
Common Operating Picture
CPD
Crypto Period Designator
A-4 GLOSSARY
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Acronym
APPENDIX A
Definition
CPS
Cycles Per Second
CRC
Cryptologic Resource Coordinator
CRM
Crew Resource Management
CRT
Cathode Ray Tube
CS
Coarse Synchronization
CSAR
Combat Search and Rescue
CSC
Creeping Line Single-Unit Coordinated
CSG
Carrier Strike Group
CSR
Creeping Line Single-Unit Radar
CTPM
Common Tactical Picture Manager
CTW-6
Commander, Training Air Wing Six
CVIC
Carrier Intelligence Center
CVW
Carrier Air Wing
CW
Continuous Wave
CWC
Composite Warfare Commander
DA
Decision Altitude
DA
Drift Angle
DAISS
Digital Airborne Intercommunications and Switching System
DAMA
Demand Assigned Multiple Access
DAP
Downlinked Air Parameter
DCT
direct (code type)
DDP
Digital Data Processor
DESRON
Destroyer Squadron
DEWIZ
Defense Early Warning Identification Zone
DF
Direction Finder
DH
Decision Height
DIM
Daily Intentions Message
DINS
Defense Internet NOTAM Service
DLRP
Data Link Reference Point
DME
Distance Measuring Equipment
GLOSSARY
A-5
APPENDIX A
Acronym
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Definition
DOA
Direction of Arrival
DoD
Department of Defense
DP
Decision Point
DP
Departure Procedure
DP/SID
Departure Procedure/Standard Instrument Departure
DPG
Digital Processing Group
DR
Dead Reckoning
DSN
Defense Switched Network
DST
Daylight Saving Time
E
East (when used with latitude and longitude)
E
Eastern
EA
Electronic Attack
ECHUM
Electronic Chart Updating Manual
ECM
Electronic Countermeasures
ECP
Egress Control Point
EET
Estimated Elapsed Time
ELINT
Electronic Intelligence
EM
Electromagnetic
EMC
Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMCON
Emissions Control
EO
Electro-Optical
EOB
Electronic Order of Battle
EOBT
Estimated Off-Block Time
EO/IR
Electro-optical/Infrared
EP
Electronic Protection
ES
Electronic Signature
ES
Electronic Support
ESA
Emergency Safe Altitude
ESG
Expeditionary Strike Group
ESM
Electronic Support Measures
A-6 GLOSSARY
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Acronym
APPENDIX A
Definition
ETA
Estimated Time of Arrival
ETE
Estimated Time Enroute
EW
Electronic Warfare
F2T2EA
Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess
FA
Aviation Area Forecast
FAA
Federal Aviation Administration
FAC(A)
Forward Air Controller (Airborne)
FACSFAC
Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility
FAR
Federal Aviation Regulations
FDC
Flight Data Center
FDOA
Frequency Difference of Arrival
FEZ
Fighter Engagement Zone
FIC
Flight Information Center
FIH
Flight Information Handbook
FIR
Flight Information Region
FIS
Flight Information Service
FJU
Forwarding JTIDS Unit
FL
Flight Level
FLIP
Flight Information Publication
FLIR
Forward Looking Infrared
FM
Frequency Modulation
FMS
Flight Management System
FONOP
Freedom of Navigation Operations
FOTC
Force Track Coordination
FOV
Field of View
fpm
feet per minute
FRS
Fleet Replacement Squadron
FS
Fine Synchronization
FSS
Flight Service Station
Ft
feet or foot
GLOSSARY
A-7
APPENDIX A
Acronym
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Definition
FTC
Force Track Coordinator
FWB
Flight Weather Briefer
GARS
Global Area Reference System
GEOREF
Geographic Reference
GHz
gigahertz
GMT
Greenwich Mean Time
GMTI
Ground Moving Target Indicator
GNC
Global Navigation and Planning Chart
GP
General Planning
GPS
Global Positioning System
GS
Groundspeed
HAA
Height Above Airport
HARM
High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile
HAT
Height Above Touchdown
HEC
Helicopter Element Coordinator
HF
High Frequency
Hr
hour or hours
HSI
Horizontal Situation Indicator
HWD
Horizontal Weather Depiction
Hz
hertz
I&W
Indications and Warnings
IAF
Initial Approach Fix
IAP
Instrument Approach Procedure
IAS
Indicated Airspeed
ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organization
ICBM
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICO
Interface Control Officer
ICS
Intercommunications System
IDM
Improved Data Modem
IEJU
Initial Entry JTIDS Unit
A-8 GLOSSARY
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Acronym
APPENDIX A
Definition
IEM
Initial Entry Message
IFF
Identification Friend or Foe
IFR
Instrument Flight Rules
IIR
Imaging Infrared
ILS
Instrument Landing System
IMC
Instrument Meteorological Conditions
in
inch or inches
in Hg
inches of mercury
INCSEA
Incidents On or Over the High Seas
INFLTREP
In-Flight Report
INFOCON
Information Operations Condition
INS
Inertial Navigation System
IP
Initial Point
IR
Infrared
IRU
Inertial Reference Unit
ISAR
Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar
ISR
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
I&W
Indications and Warning
IWC
Information Operations Warfare Commander
JAFF
Jamming and Chaff
JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDAM
Joint Direct Attack Munition
JEZ
Joint Engagement Zone
JFMCC
Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
JHMCS
Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing System
JICO
Joint Interface Control Officer
JMPS
Joint Mission Planning System
JNC
Jet Navigation Chart
JNL
JTIDS Network Library
JRFL
Joint Restricted Frequency List
GLOSSARY
A-9
APPENDIX A
Acronym
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Definition
JSOW
Joint Standoff Weapon
JSTARS
Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System
JTIDS
Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
JU
JTIDS Unit
kbps
kilobits per second
kg
kilogram
kHz
kilohertz
KIAS
Knots Indicated Airspeed
K-KILL
Catastrophic Kill
km
kilometers
kt
knot
kts
knots
kW
kilowatt
LAC
Launch Area Coordinator
LAT/LONG
Latitude and Longitude
lbs
pounds
LCS
Littoral Combat Ship
LDO
Limited Duty Officer
LKP
Last Known Position
LO
Low Observable
LOG
Logistics
LOP
Line of Position
LOS
Line-of-Sight
LSP
Launch Sequence Plan
LSRS
Littoral Surveillance Radar System
LWR
Laser Warning Receiver
M
meters
M
Mach
m2
square meters
MAC
Maritime Air Control or Controller
A-10 GLOSSARY
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Acronym
APPENDIX A
Definition
MAD
Magnetic Anomaly Detector
MAG VAR
Magnetic Variation
MANPADS
Man-Portable Air Defense Systems
MAS
Maritime Air Support
MATT
Multi-Mission Advanced Tactical Terminal
MAW
Missile Warning System
mb
millibars
MC
Magnetic Course
MC
Mission Commander
MC2
Maritime Command and Control
MCA
Minimum Crossing Altitude
MCS
Multi-Crew Simulator
MCW
Modulated Continuous Wave
MDA
Minimum Descent Altitude
MEA
Minimum Enroute Clearance
MEZ
Missile Engagement Zone
MH
Magnetic Heading
MHQ
Maritime Headquarters
MHz
megahertz
mi
mile or miles
MIDS
Multifunctional Information Distribution System
MILDEC
Military Deception
MILSTAR
Military Strategic and Tactical Relay
min
minute or minutes
MIOC
Maritime Interception Operations Commander
MITL
Man-In-The-Loop
MIW
Mine Warfare
MIWC
Mine Warfare Commander
MLA
Mean Line of Advance
mm
millimeters
GLOSSARY
A-11
APPENDIX A
Acronym
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Definition
MN
Magnetic North
MOA
Military Operations Area
MOCA
Minimum Obstruction Clearance Altitude
MPA
Maritime Patrol Aircraft
MPR
Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance
MPRF
Medium Pulse Repetition Frequency
MRA
Minimum Reception Altitude
MRBM
Medium Range Ballistic Missile
ms
millisecond
MSA
Minimum Safe Altitude
MSA
Minimum Sector Altitude
MSEC
Message Security
MSL
Mean Sea Level
MTI
Moving Target Indicator
MTOT
Mean Time on Target
MTR
Military Training
MWWA
Military Weather Warning Advisory
MWS
Missile Warning System
N
north
NADGE
NATO Air Defense Ground Environment
NAFC
Naval Aviation Forecast Center
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATOPS
Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures Standardization
NAVAID
Navigational Aid
NCCOSC
Naval C2 and Ocean Surveillance Center
NC
Navigation Controller
NCS
Net Control Station
NDB
Nondirectional Beacon
NDD
Network Description Document
NDF
Network Design Facility
A-12 GLOSSARY
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Acronym
APPENDIX A
Definition
NFDC
National Flight Data Center
NFO
Naval Flight Officer
NGA
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NM
Nautical Mile
NMS
Network Management System
NOTAM
Notice to Airmen
NPG
Network Participation Group
NRaD
Naval Research and Development Division
NSFS
Naval Surface Fire Support
NTAP
Notices to Airmen Publication
NTR
Net Time Reference
NWS
National Weather Service
O
Immediate (message type)
OA
Operational Area
OARS
Omega Aerial Refueling Services, Inc.
OJT
On-the-Job Training
OMFTS
Operational Maneuver From the Sea
ONC
Operational Navigation Chart
ONSTA
On Station
OPAREAS
Operating Areas
OPARS
Optimum Path Aircraft Routing System
OPNAVINST
Chief of Naval Operations Instruction
OPR
Other Performance Reports
OPSEC
Operations Security
OPTASK
Operation Task
OPTASK LINK
Operational Tasking Data Links
ORM
Operational Risk Management
OROCA
Off-Route Obstruction Clearance Altitude
OSC
On-Scene Commander
OTC
Officer in Tactical Command
GLOSSARY
A-13
APPENDIX A
Acronym
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Definition
OTH
Over-the-Horizon
P
Precision (code signals only)
P
Priority (message type)
PA
Public Announcement
PACOM
Pacific Command
PAR
Precision Approach Radar
PB
Patrol Boat
PCG
Patrol Craft Guided-Missile
PD
Pulse Doppler
PD
Pulse Duration
PHA
Preliminary Hazard Analysis
PIC
Pilot-in-Command
PID
Positive Identification
PIW
Person In Water
PL
Pulse Length
PLE
Pulse Length Error
PMSV
Pilot-to-Metro Service
POB
Persons on Board
POD
Probability of Detection
POS
Protection of Shipping
POSS
Possible
POSS HIGH
Possible-High
POSS LOW
Possible-Low
PPE
Personal Protective Equipment
PPI
Planned Position Indicator
PPLI
Precise Participant Location and Identification
PPR
Preplanned Response
PPS
Precise Positioning Service
PR
Position Reference
PRF
Pulse Repetition Frequency
A-14 GLOSSARY
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Acronym
APPENDIX A
Definition
PRI
Pulse Repetition Interval
PROB
Probable
PRT
Pulse Repetition Time
PRU
Primary User
PW
Pulse Width
QSL
Query Station Location
R
Routine (message type)
R2
Reporting Responsibility
R/S
Reed-Solomon
R/T
Receiver/Transmitter
RAAF
Royal Australian Air Force
RAC
Risk Assessment Code
RADALT
Radar Altimeter
RAM
Rolling Airframe Missile
RB
Relative Bearing
RCC
Rescue Coordination Center
RCIED
Radio Controlled Improvised Explosive Device
RCS
RADAR Cross Section
RELNAV
Relative Navigation
RF
Radio Frequency
RM
Risk Management
Rmax
Maximum Range
Rmin
Minimum Range
RMP
Recognized Maritime Picture
RNAV
Area Navigation
RNLAF
Royal Netherlands Air Force
ROE
Rules of Engagement
RP
Reference Point
RPG
Rocket-Propelled Grenade
RR
Range Resolution
GLOSSARY
A-15
APPENDIX A
Acronym
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Definition
RSI
Radiation Status Indicator
RTB
Return to Base
RTF
Return to Force
RTT
Round Trip Timing
RVSM
Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum
RWR
Radar Warning Receiver
RWY
Runway
S
south
S/N (Ratio)
Signal-to-Noise
SA
Selective Availability
SA
Situational Awareness
SA
Surveillance Area
SAG
Surface Action Group
SAM
Surface-to-Air Missile
SAR
Search and Rescue
SAR
Synthetic Aperture Radar
SATCOM
Satellite Communications
SC
Screen Commander
SCAR
Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance (Coordinator)
SCC
Sea Combat Commander
SDP
Signal Data Processor
SDU
Secure Data Unit
SEAD
Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
Sec
seconds
SEC
Submarine Element Coordinator
SIAC
Strike Intelligence Analysis Cell
SID
Subscriber Identifier
SID
Standard Instrument Departure
SIF
Selective Identification Feature
SIGINT
Signals Intelligence
A-16 GLOSSARY
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Acronym
APPENDIX A
Definition
SIGMET
Significant Meteorological Information
SIPRNet
SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SITREP
Situation Report
SLAM
Standoff Land Attack Missile
SLAM-ER
Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response
SLMM
Submarine Launched Module Mine
sm
Statute Mile
SM
Standard Missile
SM
Statute Mile
SMC
SAR Mission Coordinator
SOAD
Standoff Outside of Area Defense
SOCA
Submarine Operations Coordinating Authority
SOF
Special Operating Forces
SOI
Signal of Interest
SOP
Standard Operating Procedure
SPINS
Special Instructions
SPRAC
Special Reporting and Coordinating
SPS
Standard Positioning Service
SR
Scan Rate
SR
Slow Speed Low Altitude Training Route
SRO
Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations
SRU
SAR Recovery Unit
SS
Conventional Submarine
SS
Surface Search
SSBN
Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine
SSC
Surface Surveillance Coordination
SSE
Spot Size Error
SSES
Ship Signals Exploitation Space
SSM
Surface-to-Surface Missile
ST
Scan Type
GLOSSARY
A-17
APPENDIX A
Acronym
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Definition
STAR
Standard Terminal Arrival
STOM
Ship to Objective Maneuver
STW
Strike Warfare
STWC
Strike Warfare Commander
SURPIC
Surface Picture
SUW
Surface Warfare
SUWC
Surface Warfare Commander
TACAIC
Tactical Air Intercept Control
TACAN
Tactical Air Navigation
TACC
Tactical Air Command Center
TACON
Tactical Control
TACPLOT
Tactical Plot
TAD
Tactical Air Direction
TADIL
Tactical Digital Information Link
TAS
True Airspeed
TB
True Bearing
TC
True Course
TCAS
Traffic Collision Avoidance System
TCN
Terminal Change Notice
TD
Transponder
TDC
Track Data Coordinator
TDD
Target Detection Device
TDL
Tactical Data Link
TDS
Tactical Data System
TDMA
Time Division Multiple Access
TDOA
Time Difference of Arrival
TF
Task Force
TG
Task Group
TH
True Heading
TLAM
Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
A-18 GLOSSARY
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Acronym
APPENDIX A
Definition
T/M/S
Type/Model/Series
TN
True North
T/O
Takeoff
TOC
Table of Contents
TOO
Targets of Opportunity
TOT
Time on Target
TPC
Tactical Pilotage Chart
TQ
Track Quality
TSCM
Tactical Strike Coordination Module
TSEC
Transmission Security
TSR
Time Slot Reallocation
TST
Time Sensitive Target
TTP
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
TTY
Teletype
TVM
Track Via Missile
TWA
Trailing Wire Antenna
UAS
Unmanned Aerial System
UAV
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UCP
Unified Command Plan
UHF
Ultra-High Frequency
UIR
Upper Flight Information Region
UMFO
Undergraduate Military Flight Officer
UN
United Nations
UNK
Unknown
URG CDR
Underway Replenishment Group Commander
USA
United States Army
USAF
United States Air Force
USMC
United States Marine Corps
USN
United States Navy
USNO
United States Naval Observatory
GLOSSARY
A-19
APPENDIX A
Acronym
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Definition
UT
Universal Time
UTC
Universal Time Coordinated
V/STOL
Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing
VA
Vital Area
VERTREP
Vertical Replenishment
VFR
Visual Flight Rules
VHF
Very High Frequency
VIP
Very Important Person
VLF
Very Low Frequency
VLS
Vertical Launching System
VMC
Visual Meteorological Conditions
VOI
Vessels of Interest
VoIP
Voice over Internet Protocol
VOR
VHF Omnidirectional Radio Range
VORTAC
VHF Omnidirectional Radio Range and Tactical Air
Navigation
VPN
Voice Production Net
VR
VFR Military Training Route
Vs
Stall Speed
VSI
Vertical Speed Indicator
VTUAV
Vertical Takeoff and Landing Tactical Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle
W
watt or watts
W
West (when used with latitude and longitude)
W
Western
WARM
War Reserve Mode
WAS
War at Sea
WEZ
Weapons Engagement Zone
WGS 84
World Geodetic System 1984
WPT
Waypoint
WSM
Waterspace Management
A-20 GLOSSARY
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
Acronym
APPENDIX A
Definition
WSO
Weapons System Operator
WW
Severe Weather Watch Bulletin
yd
yard or yards
Z
Zulu
Z
Flash (message type)
GLOSSARY
A-21
APPENDIX A
ADVANCED MC2 CORE FLEET OPERATIONS
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A-22 GLOSSARY