Chapter 5 Decision Making
Table of Contents
1. Decision making elements
1.1 Types
1.2 Processes
1.3 Behavioral forces
1.4 Social-loafing
2. Biases
2.1 Individual Biases
2.2 Groupthink
1. Decision Making Elements
1.1 Types
The distinctions between programmed and nonprogrammed judgments are simple. “Decisions
are programmed to the extent that they are repetitive and routine, to the extent that a definite
procedure has been worked out for handling them so that they don’t have to be treated from
scratch each time they occur” (Simon, 1977, p. 46). On the other hand, decisions are
nonprogrammed “to the extent that they are novel, unstructured and consequential” (Simon,
1977, p. 46). Nonprogrammed decisions are unique and lack clear parameters for achieving a
solution, whereas programmed decisions are based on well-understood criteria. Managers can
create rules and guidelines for pre-programmed judgments based on existing facts, allowing
them to make speedy decisions. Nonprogrammed decisions take longer to settle since additional
information, research, ideas, and views may be needed.
1.2 Processes
A decision process is a series of activities that starts with identifying a problem and finishes with
taking action. A framework might be applied to classify these activities, or patterns in the
activities can be permitted to emerge from an investigation and comparison of the examples.
Imposing a framework to arrange the data has the drawback of giving an otherwise chaotic
process the impression of order. When this type of classification schema is utilized, decision
processes may not have the tidy sequence of stages specified. The benefits of generalizability
and structure, both of which are necessary for a big data base, were deemed to outweigh the
disadvantages.
Rational decision-making model
The "flavor" of various models of rational choice is essentially determined by the assumptions
made about the "givens" or restrictions that must be met in order for rational adaptation to occur.
The set of alternatives available for selection, the relationships that determine payoffs as a
function of the alternative selected, and the preference-orderings among pay-offs are all
restrictions that come with rational decision making. The rational decision-making model's
selection of these constraints and rejection of other constraints includes implicit assumptions
about which variables the rational organism can change and hence optimize for rational
adaptation, and which variables it must accept as fixed. It also takes into account assumptions
about the characteristics of the fixed variables. When making a decision, the organism must be
able to assign specific payoffs to each conceivable outcome. This also entails the capacity to
specify the specific nature of the outcomes, eliminating the possibility of unintended
repercussions. The payoffs must be arranged in such a way that it is always feasible to indicate,
in a consistent manner, whether one outcome is better than, comparable to, or inferior to another.
If certainty or probabilistic rules are used, either the outcomes of alternatives must be known
with certainty or precise probability must be able to be attached to them.
All options are assessed in most global models of rational choice before a decision is taken.
Alternatives are frequently reviewed in order in real-life human decision-making. The
mechanism that determines the order of procedures may or may not be known. We may treat the
first satisfactory alternative that is analyzed as the one chosen when alternatives are investigated
sequentially. This concept is dynamic in the sense that the desire level at any one time is
determined by the system's previous history. The payoffs in a given trial may be influenced not
only by the option selected in that trial, but also by the options selected in previous trials. The
apparent paradox to be faced when attempting to define the rational decision-making model in an
organizational context is that the economic theory of the firm and the theory of administration
both attempt to deal with human behavior in situations where that behavior is at least intendedly
rational. Simultaneously, it can be demonstrated that if we accept the classical theory's global
forms of rationality, the problems of the firm's or other organization's internal structure are
essentially eliminated. When we substitute a selecting organism with limited knowledge and
capacity for economic man or administrative man, the paradox disappears, and the theory
emerges.
Bounded rationality model:
What is the purpose of bounded rationality? Evidence, success, approach, and scarcity in four
words. In other words, there is a lot of evidence in psychology and economics that constrained
rationality is significant. Economists that use rationality bounds in their models have a lot of
success characterizing economic behavior that isn't covered by traditional theory. Traditional
economic approach appeals work both ways; the circumstances of a given situation may favor
either bounded or unbounded rationality. Respect for scarcity is a key concept of economics, and
constrained rationality models adhere to it. Human cognition should be considered as a limited
resource.
Intuitive Decision-Making Model
In today's corporate world, making judgments based on intuition is becoming more popular. In
some situations, intuition can be helpful, and it may even be the only way to make a decision.
Intuition takes use of the way our brains are wired to think about things subconsciously and bring
them to the surface when they're needed. Employees with this expertise will be recognized by a
savvy company.
In a survey of CEOs about intuitive decision making here is the conclusions on what the intuitive
decision-making skills came from; 56 percent indicated experience-based decisions, 40 percent
said affect-initiated decisions, 23 percent said cognitive-based decisions, 11 percent claimed
subconscious mental processes, and ten percent said value-based decisions. As a result, intuition
might be considered a cognitive conclusion based on a decision maker's prior experiences and
emotional inputs. 42 percent of these CEOs learned and refined their intuitive decision-making
skills through a variety of situations. The researchers identified four types of benefits linked
with intuitive decision making: expedites decisions, enhances ultimate decisions, supports
personal development, and encourages decisions that are congruent with organizational culture.
1.3 Behavioral forces
Decision-making appears to be slowed by politics. The business firm is outside the domain of
political science by any plausible definition. Economists, likewise, have largely ignored political
systems unless they have an impact on the market. Recent research on the corporate firm as a
decision-making coalition has three important implications for political science:
1. Recent experience has shown that the business firm can be thought of as a political conflict
system; indeed, the firm serves as a useful test of how non-governmental settings affect political
phenomena.
2. The use of computer program models to analyze political systems within businesses supports
the idea that computers may be an effective tool for dealing with political conflict systems in
general.
3. The apparent theoretical resemblance between a political coalition in business and a political
coalition in government suggests that the substantive aspects of recent behavioral models of the
company could be valuable as a foundation for equivalent models of governmental decisionmaking.
According to the facts, rapid decision makers utilize more information than slow decision
makers. They also create more, not fewer, options. In contrary to popular belief, this study
discovered that while centralized decision-making isn't always quick, a layered advising
approach that prioritizes input from competent counselors is. Conflict resolution, but not conflict
itself, appears to be important for decision speed, according to the research. Finally, integrating
strategic judgments and tactical plans speeds up rather than slows down decision-making. This
type of integration aids decision-makers in overcoming the anxiety that comes with making highstakes decisions. Fast decision making, in general, allows decision makers to keep up with
change and is associated with high performance. This research revealed a pattern of emotional,
political, and cognitive processes linked to the speedy closure of key decisions.
Decision making consequences
According to numerous studies released over the years, 50% of all organizational decisions fail.
What is the reason for this? Managers who push solutions, limit the search for alternatives, and
utilize power to accomplish their goals might be blamed for failures. Failure is caused by poor
decision-making and ineffective strategy, not by factors beyond their control such as restrictions.
Here are some recommendations for making good judgments and avoiding negative
consequences:
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Take control of your decision-making processes. When you take charge, your chances of
success grow. Delegating to specialists or others who are supposed to promote your ideas
may free up time for you to do other things, but it reduces your chances of success.
Make an effort to comprehend. Signals that catch your attention can be signs of
additional problems that aren't as serious as they appear, or are more urgent than they
need to be. Careful probing can reveal a window into a landscape that provides vital
information about what needs to be fixed. The time spent thinking about the problem can
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pay off handsomely. A greater awareness of the issues that require your attention
provides better direction as well as support for the chosen course of action.
Start with an intervention and a goal to set your course. The rationale for action is
established through intervention. A goal that specifies the desired outcome broadens the
scope of the search for fresh ideas. An open search pays off by lowering the risk of
failure.
Emphasize the importance of coming up with new ideas and putting them into action.
Thinking about action and taking action should be guided by a decision-making process.
Many decision-makers understand the value of one but not the other, favoring idea
creation over managing the situation's politics. For diplomatic action, there is no
alternative for clear reasoning. The production of meaningful ideas as well as the
effective dissemination of those ideas are both necessary.
Make a list of several options. Taking into account a number of competing possibilities
increases decision-making outcomes. The options that aren't chosen aren't thrown away.
They assist in confirming the worth of a selected course of action and frequently provide
suggestions for how to improve it. To do so, use one of the most effective choice
development strategies. Consider creating a solution that includes integrated
benchmarking, cycle search, and design. This broadens your search to include a number
of ideas from other sources. The finest of them, or a combination of their best traits,
provides a solution that increases your chances of success.
Overcome impediments to action. To be successful, implementation strategies must
overcome social and political barriers to action. Intervention is the most effective
technique to overcome the social and political hurdles that can prevent a choice from
being made. When employing intervention will divert your focus away from other, more
important activities, participation is encouraged. Even if a decision appears to be urgent,
avoid edicts and persuasion.
2. Biases
2.1 Individual Biases
According to Adam Hayes, Bias is an illogical or irrational preference or prejudice held by an
individual, which may also be subconscious. A systematic distortion of the relationship between
a treatment, risk factor or exposure and clinical outcomes is denoted by the term bias.
Individual bias, on the other hand, can be either cognitive, such as overconfidence, or
motivational, such as wishful thinking. In addition, when making judgements in groups, decision
makers and experts might be affected by group-level biases. These biases can create serious
challenges to decision analysts, who need judgments as inputs to a decision or risk analysis
model, because they can degrade the quality of the analysis. We are going to discuss some of the
types of individual biases as:
Google effect
The Google effect, also known as digital amnesia, is the tendency to forget information that is
readily available through search engines like Google. We do not commit this information to our
memory because we know that this information is easy to access online. Suppose that you’re
reading a book and encounter an unfamiliar word. You decide to Google the word to see its
definition. A few days later, you encounter the word again… but you can’t seem to remember
what it means. This situation describes the Google effect, where because information is readily
available online, we do not commit it to memory.
It is so easy to “Google it”, that we may find ourselves repeatedly looking up the same
information online instead of committing it to memory. This bias exists not only for things we
look up on search engines, but for most information that is easily accessible on our computers or
phones. Do you know your parents’, or best friend’s number off by heart? The answer is
probably no — and this is caused by the Google effect.
IKEA effect
The IKEA effect, named after Swedish furniture giant, describes how people tend to value an
object more if they make (or assemble) it themselves. More broadly, the IKEA effect speaks to
how we tend to like things more if we’ve expended effort to create them. When we do things like
assemble a piece of furniture or bake a cake, it boosts our sense of self-efficacy. Not only does
this feel good in the moment, but it also fulfills a deep psychological need. This is partially why
we see items that we put together ourselves as so much more valuable than they are.
Research has provided good evidence that this self-efficacy boost plays a role in the IKEA effect.
In one experiment, researchers started out by giving participants four math problems to solve.
One group got very easy problems (e.g., “How likely is it that a fair coin that is tossed once will
come up heads?”), which the other received very difficult ones (e.g., “You have 4 coins. Three of
the coins are normal, but one of them is heads on both sides. You pick a coin at random without
looking. The coin you pick has heads on one side. What are the odds that if you flip the coin
over, the other side will be tails?”). The goal in this part of the experiment was to manipulate
people’s sense of competence: the group that got the hard problems were likely to feel stressed
out and incapable, while the easy problem group didn’t have their confidence shaken at all.
After the math problems, participants were shown a picture of a bookcase from IKEA and asked
whether they would prefer to buy it pre-assembled, or to build it themselves. The results showed
that people who had had their sense of competence challenged were more likely to say they’d
prefer to assemble the bookcase on their own. In other words, feeling like we’re incapable at
something increases our desire to prove ourselves and appear competent, leading us to inflate the
value of things we have made.
Escalation of commitment
Escalation of commitment describes our tendency to remain committed to our past behaviors,
particularly those exhibited publicly, even if they do not have desirable outcomes. The feeling
that our future behaviors must align with the things we have said and done in the past severely
compromises our ability to make good decisions. This is especially true when our initial decision
has led to unfavorable outcomes. Furthermore, it can be problematic when our past behaviors do
not align with our current values. Refusing to change one’s stance may not only lead to
undesirable results, but it can also act as a barrier to personal growth. The ability to acknowledge
flaws in our past behaviors with the goal of bettering ourselves is incredibly adaptive. It will
ultimately gain us greater self-insight and help us to make decisions in a more critical and logical
manner.
Imagine you’re wrapping up your first year of university, majoring in anatomy and cell biology.
You’ve always considered science to be your passion, so it came as no surprise to anyone when
this was the path you chose. During your first semester, you enrolled in an elective course about
the history of modern Europe. While you generally enjoyed your core anatomy classes, you
found yourself enjoying your history class above all others. You enjoyed it so much, in fact, that
you decided to take a couple of other history courses in your second semester. Throughout the
year, a voice in the back of your mind has been pushing you to change your major, and to get a
Bachelor of Arts in History. However, this decision goes against your future goals and
everything you’ve ever said about yourself. There’s nothing wrong with changing your mind, yet
you feel pressured to keep things consistent. Your hesitation to change your major, even though
it’s what you truly want to do, is the result of escalation of commitment.
Framing effect
The framing effect is when our decisions are influenced by the way information is presented.
Equivalent information can be more or less attractive depending on what features are
highlighted. Decisions based on the framing effect are made by focusing on the way the
information is presented instead of the information itself. Such decisions may be sub-optimal, as
poor information or lesser options can be framed in a positive light. This may make them more
attractive than options or information are objectively better but cast in a less favorable light. Our
choices are influenced by the way options are framed through different wordings, reference
points, and emphasis. The most common framing draws attention to either the positive gain or
negative loss associated with an option. We are susceptible to this sort of framing because we
tend to avoid loss.
Consider the following hypothetical: John is shopping for disinfectant wipes at his local
pharmacy. He sees several options, but two containers of wipes are on sale. One is called
“Bleach ox” and the other is called “Bleach-it.” Both disinfectant wipes Jon is considering are
the same price and contain the same number of wipes. The only difference Jon notices, is that the
Bleach ox wipes claim to “kill 95% of all germs,” whereas the “Bleach-it” wipes say: “only 5%
of germs survive.” After comparing the two, John chooses the Bleach ox wipes. He doesn’t like
the sound of germs ‘surviving’ on his kitchen counter.
John’s decision to buy the Bleach ox over Bleach-it wipes was informed by the framing effect.
Although both products were equally effective at fighting germs, and essentially claimed the
same thing, their claims were framed differently. Bleach ox highlighted the percentage of germs
it did kill (a positive attribute), whereas Bleach-it highlighted how many germs it did not kill (a
negative attribute).
Overconfidence
Overconfidence bias is the tendency for people to think they are better at certain abilities and
skills than they are. This false assessment of our skill levels, stemming from an illusion of
knowledge or control, can lead us to make rash decisions. For instance, an overconfident CEO
decides to acquire a startup that they see high potential in and believe will bring high returns
even though their performance indicates otherwise. Previous success or accomplishments may
lead to an inflated ego. While leading with confidence is a good thing, it’s important to not let it
get in the way of logical thinking and decision-making.
To avoid overconfidence bias, we need to consider the consequences. The decisions you make
can have an impact on your company. Before committing to a decision, determine all the
possible outcomes to ensure you’re prepared for them. We can also ask for feedback to avoid this
bias. Getting feedback from your team can help you identify areas of improvement, whether it’s
related to your performance or your ideas. Constructive criticism can keep egos in check.
2.2 Groupthink
Groupthink is defined as “A strong concurrence-seeking tendency that interferes with effective
group decision making” (Forsyth, 40). The events at Nanking occurred within an altered mode
of thinking that essentially made the Japanese soldiers incapable of making rational decisions.
From the outset, the Japanese soldiers living in the occupied city of Nanking formed an intensely
cohesive group. Sociological research suggests that members of such unified groups lose the
ability to appraise a situation and devise alternative action plans realistically. To maintain unity
within the group, the Japanese based their decision-making process on reaching a complete
agreement, resulting in tragic errors of judgment that could have otherwise been avoided. To
understand the concept of groupthink and how it relates to the events at Nanking, it is essential to
examine the symptoms and the causes of this decision-making disorder.
The Groupthink hypothesis was first proposed as a psychological phenomenon by Janis (1972).
Janis conceived groupthink as “a mode of thinking that people engage in when deeply involved
in a cohesive in-group when the members’ striving for unanimity overrides their motivation to
realistically appraise alternative courses of action” (Janis, 1972, p.8). Janis supported his
hypothesis by analyzing several political-military fiascoes and successes differentiated by the
occurrence or non-occurrence of antecedent conditions, groupthink symptoms, and decisionmaking defects. (Morehead, G., Ference, R., & Neck, C. P., 1991)
In a new volume on groupthink, Janis added more to his study of groupthink by analyzing
transcripts from the Watergate scandal and memoirs and first-hand accounts of critical
individuals and principals involved in the scandal. Janis concluded that the Watergate cover-up
decision resulted from groupthink (Janis, 1983).
Groupthink is prevalent in today’s workplaces, especially as people try to fit in or adopt the
posture of “not rocking the boat” in these scenarios, people set aside their beliefs or adopt the
opinion of the rest of the group. People who are opposed to the decisions or overriding views of
the group frequently remain quiet, preferring to keep the peace rather than disrupt the uniformity
of the crowd. Groupthink can be problematic, but even people with good intentions are prone to
making irrational decisions due to overwhelming pressure from the group.
Signs of Groupthink
Groupthink may not always be easy to discern, but some signs are present. There are also some
situations where it may be more likely to occur. Janis identified several different "symptoms"
that indicate groupthink.
1. Illusions of unanimity
This symptom leads members of a group or team to believe, albeit falsely, that everyone agrees
and feels the same way. It is often much more challenging to speak up when everyone else in the
group is on the same page. People in a group or team suffering from this symptom often think
they are doing what is best for the team by not breaking the group’s unanimity with their
differing opinions or ideas.
2. Illusions of Morality
The illusion of morality, in which members participate in the group decision-making process,
loses sight of their moral principles. Instead, belief in the overall character of the group overrides
any personal sense of right and wrong. Groups that make huge errors in judgment tend to
formulate incorrect conclusions about the group’s true intentions.
3. Rationalization
Rationalization prevents members from reconsidering their beliefs and causes them to ignore
warning signs. Excuses are made for obvious red flags. This is when team members convince
themselves that despite evidence to the contrary, the decision or alternative being presented is the
best one. "Those other people don't agree with us because they haven't researched the problem as
extensively as we have."
4. Stereotyping
As the group becomes more uniform in their views, they begin to see outsiders as possessing a
different and inferior set of morals and characteristics from themselves. These perceived
negative characteristics are then used to discredit the opposition. It leads in-group members to
ignore or even demonize out-group members who may oppose or challenge the group's ideas.
Stereotyping causes members of the group to ignore essential ideas or information.
"Lawyers will find any excuse to argue, even when the facts are clearly against them."
5. Self-Censorship
Self-censorship causes people who might have doubts to hide their fears or misgivings. Rather
than sharing what they know, people remain quiet and assume that the group must know best.
The need to conform to the group’s ideas leads individual members to censor their opinions or
views. "If everyone else agrees, then my thoughts to the contrary must be wrong."
6. Peer Pressure
When a team member expresses an opposing opinion or questions the rationale behind a
decision, the rest work together to pressure or penalize that person into compliance. Members
who pose questions and those who question the group are often seen as disloyal or traitorous.
"Well, if you feel that we're making a mistake, you can always leave the team."
7. Illusions of vulnerability
The illusion of invulnerability is another symptom of groupthink. Members of a group in which
no one voices their disagreement may perceive that their group is performing well. In essence,
group members believe that their group could not possibly perform sweeping errors in judgment.
Members are highly self-assured and confident in the group’s decision-making ability. Overconfidence in the group’s decision-making powers leads members to form an illusion of
invulnerability. Members believe they are invulnerable to any obstacle, allowing them to push
aside clear and analytical thinking.
8. Mind Guards
Mind guards also affect groupthink. A mind guard is a member of the group who, to preserve
the central group idea, omits any information which may cause doubts to arise within the group.
A mind guard assumes the responsibility of sheltering the other group members from any
“controversial” information that may disrupt the overall group dynamic. If a mind guard
receives any negative outside details, he does not relate them to the group. A mind guard also
applies pressure to dissenting members, ultimately forcing them into silence. To this end, the
mind guard may employ various strategies to persuade the dissenter to change his opinion. One
of these strategies would be to convince the dissenter that the group may disintegrate if all
members are not in total agreement. The goal of a mind guard is to prevent any questions
regarding the group’s decisions from becoming apparent to the other group members.
Causes of Groupthink
There are several leading causes of groupthink. These include group cohesiveness, overall group
isolation, group leadership, and decision-making stress. Group friction is necessary for good
decision-making because it introduces different perspectives to the decision-making process.
High levels of cohesiveness decrease the amount of verbal dissension within a tight group due to
interpersonal pressure to conform. This high level of cohesiveness also creates self-censorship
and apparent unanimity within the group. In the absence of this disagreement, choices for action
are never considered.
Another cause of groupthink is isolation. Often, the decisions being made or the actions being
carried out must remain secret in group situations. This requires that no outside opinions or
thoughts be incorporated into the decision-making process. Frequently, groups reach resolutions
and carry them out without conferring with any external sources. One result of this extreme
isolation is insulation from criticism. This absence of objection may lead to illusions of group
invulnerability and morality.
The leadership of a group can also lead to groupthink since complete control over the group by
the leader can cause an environment in which no one states their own opinions. When extremely
authoritarian leadership is implemented within a group (such as in the military), group
discussions are often tightly controlled. Suppose a leader in a group situation makes his opinion
clear at the outset of the talks. In that case, group members will, on many occasions, refrain from
expressing any disagreement with the leader’s authority. Any dissenting opinions tend to be
suppressed through intimidation or by simply not allowing the dissenter to voice his objections.
Another common cause of groupthink is decisional stress. When a group is forced to make an
important decision, everyone often harbors insecurity. Without being aware, group members will
often attempt to reduce this decisional stress since this insecurity is lessened if the decision is
made quickly. The group can easily rationalize a decision with little disagreement because there
is minimal friction. The positive consequences of the group’s decision serve as the focus, while
there is a minimization of any adverse outcomes. Concentrating on minor details of group
decisions or actions is how the group can overlook more significant issues that may need
attention. In high-pressure group decision-making, attempts by members to reduce the stress
associated with decision-making often result in groupthink.
Groupthink and the Challenger Disaster
While part of a team or group, have you ever felt pressured to do something that led to a fateful
decision? For that exact reason, in January of 1986, the orbiter Challenger exploded 73 seconds
after launch. Groupthink theory could help explain how leaders and decision-makers played a
significant part in the disaster that occurred in 1986. America was becoming disinterested in
spaceflight, and NASA saw its space shuttle program's dwindling popularity and excitement.
Decision-makers and top echelons at NASA and Morton Thiokol cared more about satisfying
and entertaining their primary customer, the American people, than the safety of the launch and
its crew members.
After the explosion, the Rogers Commission examined the causes of the blast, and one of the
"potentially catastrophic" elements was a rubber part called an O-ring. The article, Challenger
Explosion: How Groupthink and Other Causes Led to the Tragedy, states, "The O-ring was
known to be sensitive to the cold and could only work above 53 degrees." The temperature on
the launch pad that morning was 36 degrees. With this knowledge that NASA and Morton
Thiokol had, how did the launch get approved for launch? Was it a lack of communication
amongst the groups, a way to chase publicity that the companies saw was dwindling, a result of
the group's central pressure internally and externally, or all three?
National, group, and political pressure on NASA and Morton Thiokol, which built the solid
rocket boosters to get the Challenger launched on time. NASA had averaged five missions a year
after the projected frequency of the space shuttle program was 50 flights a year. How could they
keep America's interests if they could not have as many missions as initially promised? They
diversified the astronaut crews with women, people of color, and scientists, but that proved
insufficient to keep the country's attention. President Ronald Reagan was also announcing the
launch at his Union address that night. The only option that NASA and Morton Thiokol felt they
had was to continue with the launch as scheduled. As we know that faulty decision-making led to
seven people losing their lives.
The effects of groupthink could be small or big, but regardless of the impact of the flawed
decision, people need to know about it while trying to prevent it. Janis (1983) proposed a set of
prescriptions for avoiding groupthink. The drugs generally focus on helping a group examine all
relevant information and courses of action to ensure that it does not rush into making a poorly
informed and reasoned decision. "Maybe if NASA and Morton Thiokol had followed Janis' set of
prescriptions for preventing groupthink or examined all of the information before rushing into
the launch due to pressure they felt, the outcome of that day could have been different. The
Challenger tragedy led NASA to focus on a safer future in space by fixing communication and
the management of safety at the organization.
Groupthink and the Rape of Nanking
During their occupation of the city of Nanking, Japanese forces perpetrated inconceivable acts of
violence and disrespect towards human life. Our initial response to this occurrence is to question
how people can commit such atrocities on fellow human beings. To obtain a firmer grasp of what
occurred at Nanking, we must first look at the event from a sociological perspective. When
undertaken by large groups of people, the decision-making process often produces unexpected
(and illogical) results. The initial orders given to the Japanese soldiers to kill all prisoners were
brutal in and of themselves, but the soldiers went well beyond those orders. Ultimately, the
soldiers at Nanking chose to mutilate, torture, and rape the city’s inhabitants. Groupthink is a
syndrome that develops in aggregates of people that often results in unexplainable decisions.
In attempting to understand the events which culminated in the rape of Nanking, it is necessary
to examine the mental decision-making which could have led to such an unanticipated and
inhumane outcome.
Symptoms
There were many symptoms of groupthink present in the overall environment at Nanking. For
instance, within military situations, interpersonal pressures to conform are intense. Tolerance for
nonconformity is virtually non-existent, and extreme tactics to bring dissenters into line are
common.
Self-censorship was most likely another vital symptom of groupthink at Nanking. Privately,
many soldiers may have disagreed with what was occurring, but they chose to keep their doubts.
This self-censorship led to the appearance of unanimity among the soldiers.
Even though many Japanese soldiers may have inwardly objected to the events that were taking
place, there was an apparent unanimity among the group. The soldiers' objections to these events
never surfaced because of the pressure to conform. If the “norm” appeared to be the torture of
the Chinese captives, this false sense of unanimity discouraged each soldier from going against
the overall group dynamic.
Another symptom of groupthink common in military situations is an illusion of invulnerability.
Since the Japanese soldiers had conquered the entire city, their confidence in the group led them
to believe that significant errors were impossible, viewing their decision-making process as
infallible.
The Japanese soldiers may also have experienced illusions which allowed them to warp their
sense of morality. Individual morals were lost in the overwhelming group’s desire to take total
control of Nanking. Justification for the atrocities was embedded in the group’s passion for
complete submission to the Chinese. The Japanese soldiers’ illusions of morality among their
fellow citizens outweighed any personal moral thought.
The Japanese soldiers shared biased perceptions of the Chinese. They did not view the people of
Nanking as whole people. The Chinese were simply the enemy to the Japanese soldiers, and the
enemy did not deserve to live. A dehumanization occurred, resulting in countless mutilations
and rapes.
Finally, defective decision-making strategies illustrate the occurrence of groupthink in Nanking.
The decision to bury prisoners waist-high to allow dogs to attack the top half of their bodies was
cruel, as was the decision to enable soldiers to compete in decapitation contests. Numerous
people participated in arriving at these outrageous decisions. These group members lost sight of
their overall goal and became wrapped up in the individual issues surrounding the disposal of the
prisoners of war.
How to Avoid Groupthink
The challenge for any team or group leader is to create a working environment in which
Groupthink is unlikely to happen. It is also essential to understand the risks of Groupthink – if
the stakes are high, you need to make a real effort to ensure that you're making good decisions.
To avoid Groupthink, it is essential to have a process to check the fundamental assumptions
behind important decisions, validate the decision-making process, and evaluate the risks
involved. For significant decisions, make sure your team does the following in their decisionmaking process:
a) Explores objectives.
b) Explores alternatives.
c) Encourages ideas to be challenged without reprisal.
d) Examines the risks if the preferred choice is chosen.
e) Tests assumptions.
f) If necessary, go back and re-examine the initially rejected alternatives.
g) Gathers relevant information from outside sources.
h) Processes this information objectively.
i) Has at least one contingency plan.
j) Many group techniques can help.
Groupthink Mitigation Tools
Group Techniques
Brainstorming: Helps ideas flow freely without criticism.
Modified Borda Count: Allows each group member to contribute individually, mitigating the risk
that more substantial and persuasive group members dominate the decision-making process.
Six Thinking Hats: Helps the team look at a problem from many different perspectives,
allowing people to play "Devil's Advocate.”
The Delphi Technique: This Allows team members to contribute individually, with no
knowledge of a group view, and with a minor penalty for disagreement.
Decision Support Tools
Risk Analysis: Helps team members explore and manage risk.
Impact Analysis: Ensures that the consequences of a decision are thoroughly explored.
The Ladder of Inference: Helps people check and validate the individual steps of a decisionmaking process.
How to Overcome Groupthink
However, if Groupthink sets in, you must recognize and acknowledge it quickly to overcome it
and promptly get back to functioning effectively.
Follow these steps to do this:
Even with good group decision-making processes in place, be on the lookout for signs of
Groupthink so that you can deal with them swiftly.
If there are signs of Groupthink, discuss these in the group. Once acknowledged, the group can
consciously free up its decision-making.
Assess the immediate risks of any decision and the consequences for the group and its customers.
If chances are high (for example, risk of personal safety), make sure you take steps to validate
any decision before it is ratified fully.
If appropriate, seek external validation, get more information from outside, and test assumptions.
Use the bullets above as a starting point in diagnosing things that need to change.
Introduce formal group techniques and decision-making tools, such as the ones listed above, to
avoid Groupthink in the future.
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