Crimlaw Case Digest May 27, 2023
1.
Bunag, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 101749, July 10, 1992
FACTS: Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, he invited her to take their merienda at the
Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila, to which plaintiff obliged. But instead to Aristocrat he brought plaintiff
to a motel or hotel where he raped her. Later that evening, defendant brought plaintiff to the house of
his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived together as
husband and wife for 21 days. Defendantappellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective
applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. October 1,
1973 Defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license.
However, Defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never returned, humiliating plaintiff and compelled her to go
back to her parents. Plaintiff was ashamed when she went home and could not sleep and eat because of
the deception done against her by defendants-appellants. Petitioner filed a complaint for damages for
alleged breach of promise to marry. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and against petitioner,
but absolved his father.
ISSUE: Did the trial court erred in awarding damages.
RULING: Yes. Generally, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff
has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof. However, the award
of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219,
any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. Article 21 was adopted to
remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically provide for in the statutes. Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of
petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her
will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege
on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to
morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which
indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to
Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Articles 2229 and 2234 of the Civil Code.
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere
resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in
any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense
because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action.
2.
Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 190793, June 19, 2012
Facts: On 2 July 2009, Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed a Petition for Registration with
the COMELEC, as a regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in
the 2010 Elections. MAGDALO was represented by its Chairperson, Senator Trillanes IV, and its Secretary
General,. Acedillo. MAGDALO complied with all COMELEC’s requirements for its registration, however
COMELEC denied their petition due to the events that happened on June 27,2003, the Oakwood Mutiny.
It renders that the party employs violence and uses unlawful means to achieve their purpose, being
violative to the Art IX-C Sec 2 of the Constitution. The petitioners filed for Manifestation of Intent to
Participate in the Party-List System of Representation and subsequently filed for Motion for Early
Resolution, in which it clarified its intention to participate in the May 2010 Elections, the COMELEC
denied it, thus, the instant petition. MAGDALO argues that the COMELEC resolution was not based on
the record or evidence, it is mere conjecture and pure baseless presuppositions. The resolutions also
preempted the current pendency of the trial of the criminal case and violates the presumption of
innocence in favor of founders of the Magdalo for being forgiven from the mutiny through amnesty.
Issue: Does the COMELEC resolution violate the presumption of innocence of MAGDALO’s founders?
Ruling: Yes, pursuant to the amnesty given by the Legislative Department on their concurring resolution
to the Proclamation No.75 of the President, it stated on its provisions that “Professionalism in the armed
forces and adequate remuneration and benefits of its members shall be a prime concern of the State.
The armed forces shall be insulated from partisan politics. No member of the military shall engage
directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote.”. The founders who are not
members of the military are now entitled to participate in any partisan political activity in accordance
with the law. The court held that in view of the subsequent amnesty granted in favor of the members of
MAGDALO, the events that transpired during the Oakwood incident can no longer be interpreted as acts
of violence in the context of the disqualifications from party registration.
3.
People v. Conrado Aglahi, G.R. No. L-42818 March 25, 1935
The provincial fiscal of Laguna filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of that province under Act No.
1524 inviting attention to the fact that appellant had been given a conditional pardon by the GovernorGeneral on the 3d of November, 1910, and had been convicted of the offense of estafa committed in 1929.
As appellant at that time was in Bilibid Prison, the court in order to avoid the inconvenience and expense
to the Government of bringing him to Laguna for the hearing, directed that appellant should show cause in
writing why he should not be committed to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence. Appellant
demurred to the complaint, and the trial court thereafter ordered his recommitment to serve the unexpired
portion of his original sentence. Appellant appeals from that order.
Section 3 of Act No. 1524, which provides for a court hearing and determination of an alleged violation of
a conditional pardon, provides in part: "* * * The Court of First Instance shall issue the order of arrest and
proceed with the investigation of the facts, in the presence of the accused and the proper prosecuting
official."
The Solicitor-General admits that the record conclusively shows that the court did not comply with the
statute and therefore the orders of the court were improper. In this contention of the Solicitor-General we
are forced to concur.
The Solicitor-General asks .that the order appealed from be set aside and the case remanded to the court
below for proper proceedings.
What are those proper proceedings? In general, a violation of a condition in the pardon renders the pardon
void, and normally a court of general jurisdiction has authority upon such a condition being brought to its
notice, to rule to show cause why the original commitment should not be again placed in full force and
vigor.
Where the Legislature by statute has prescribed a procedure, the procedure should be followed although the
statute was possibly unnecessary. However, in this case we have the peculiar situation that section 4 of this
Act has been expressly repealed by article 367 of the Revised Penal Code. Why the Legislature saw fit to
repeal section 4 is not clear, but nevertheless it has expressly so done.
Section 4 of Act No. 1524 provides what the court shall do should it find that respondent has in fact
violated his conditional pardon. Does this repeal mean that the Legislature ip. of the opinion that the court
shall not have the power to order the recommitment of a person at large on a conditional pardon made void
by the wrongful acts of the respondent? As this question was not argued, it will be reserved for future
consideration should occasion arise.
Attention is invited in this connection to section 64, paragraph (i), of the Revised Administrative Code of
the powers and duties of the Governor-General, which reads:
" (i) To grant to convicted persons reprieves or pardons, either plenary or partial, conditional, or
unconditional; to suspend sentences without pardon, remit fines, and order the discharge of any convicted
person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose; and to authorize the arrest and re incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or
conditions, of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence."
If, therefore, the administrative officers believe that respondent has violated the conditions of his pardo n
and should be re-incarcerated to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence, there exists a speedy and legal
method of determining that question.
The order appealed from is reversed and vacated and the case dismissed. Costs de ofttio. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Vickers, and Diaz, JJ., concur.
Order reversed and case dismissed.
4.
People vs. Estibal, G.R. No. 208749, November 26, 2014
Facts: On February 6, 2009, the accused Estibal was charged for raping his 13 year old daughter, on
which the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignmend. His wife during pre-trial disclaimed any further
interest to pursue the case because she took pity on her husband and the minor victim had forgiven him,
However the court refused their desistance. At the trial, four witnesses were presented, the medico legal
officer, the arresting barangay tanods, and the police officer of the women’s desk PO3 Cobrado. Cobrado
took down the statement of the minor victim (AAA) on the night of the affidavit complaint was filed. PO3
Cobrado narrated that during her investigation of AAA and the wife were both crying, that without being
coached by her mother revealed in detail the years of abuse of the accused and how he raped her. The
accused defended mainly on denial, he testified that the brothers of his wife were the one influencing
AAA to file against him. On the pendency of this case, AAA and the wife did not attend in trial, their
subpoenas were unserved because they move out to their address. The trial court relied on PO3
Cobrado’s statements even without AAA’s statement in court, thus an appeal to CA. The accused
appealed that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt his crime. The OSG counter
argued that PO3 Cobrado’s investigation is part of res getae (start to end period of felony). CA affirmed
and agreed with OSG thus the accused filed the instant petition.
Issue: Can the accused be pardoned by the offended party?
Ruling and Basis: No, in People v Bonagua it is stated that rape is no longer considered a crime against
chastity, in line with the Anti-Rape Act of 1997. It was reclassified as a crime against persons which
cannot be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the aggrieved party. Thus,pardon by the
offended party of the offender will not extinguish his criminal liability. Doctrine: Presumption of
Innocence An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights
guarantees.Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable
doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused
from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that
burden the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as excluding the
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is
responsible for the offense charged.
5.
Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, Februaru 9, 1989
The principal question raised in this petition for review is whether or not a public officer, who has been
granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive is entitled to reinstatement to her former p osition
without need of a new appointment.
In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto
(then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day prision mayor as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,500. They were further ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the
government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs
proportionately.
Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which subsequently affirmed the same. She then
filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended on December 17,
1984 by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984.
By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to
her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant.
Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution in view of the provision of
the Local Government Code transferring the power of appointment of treasurers from the city governments
to the said Ministry. In its 4th Indorsement dated March 1, 1985, the Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner
may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she
was extended the absolute pardon. It also directed the city treasurer to see to it that the amount of
P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had required to be indemnified in favor of the government as well as
the costs of the litigation, be satisfied.[1]
Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry on A pril 17, 1985 stressing
that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the
government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the
date of her preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire
period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount
of P4,892.50.[2]
The Ministry of Finance, however, referred petitioner's letter to the Office of the President for further
review and action. On April 15, 1986, said Office, through Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr. held:
"We disagree with both the Ministry of Finance and the petitioner because, as borne out by the records,
petitioner was convicted of the crime for which she was accused. In line with the government's crusade to
restore absolute honesty in public service, this Office adopts, as a juridical guide (Miranda v. Imperial, 77
Phil. 1966), the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, 2nd Division, in People v. Lising, Crim. Case No. 6675,
October 4, 1985, that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for
reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments
due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite.
"In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before he can reassume
his former position. x x x.
"Anent the civil liability of Monsanto, the Revised Penal Code expressly provides that 'a pardon shall in no
case exempt the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.' (Sec. 36,
par. 2).
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office holds that Salvacion A. Monsanto is not entitled lo an
automatic reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon granted her but must secure an appointment to
her former position and that, notwithstanding said absolute pardon, she is liable for the civil li ability
concomitant to her previous conviction."[3]
Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition in her
behalf. We gave due course on October 13, 1987.
Petitioner's basic theory is that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact
that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in this Court.
There having been no final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant ci ty treasurer
could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited. In other words, without that final judgment of
conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not attach and the status of her employment
remained "suspended." More importantly, when pardon was issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was
an acquittal because there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the President has declared her not guilty of
the crime charged and has accordingly dismissed the same.[4]
It is well to remember that petitioner had been convicted of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification
of public documents and sentenced to imprisonment of four years, two months and one day of prision
correccional as minimum, to ten years and one day of prision mayor as maximum. The penalty of prision
mayor carries the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the principal penalty.[5]
Temporary absolute disqualification bars the convict from public office or employment, such
disqualification to last during the term of the sentence.[6] Even if the offender be pardoned, as to the
principal penalty, the accessory penalties remain unless the same have been expressly remitted by the
pardon.[7] The penalty of prision correccional carries, as one of its accessory penalties, suspension from
public office.[8]
The propositions earlier advanced by petitioner reveal her inadequate understanding of the nature of pardon
and its legal consequences. This is not totally unexpected considering that the authorities on the subject
have not been wholly consistent particularly in describing the effects of pardon.
The benign mercy of pardon is of British origin, conceived to temper the gravity of the King's wrath. But
Philippine jurisprudence on the subject has been largely influenced by American case law.
Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws,
which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he
has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual
for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court. xxx. A pardon is a deed, to
the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance."8 -a
At the time the antecedents of the present case took place, the pardoning power was governe d by the 1973
Constitution as amended in the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The pertinent provision reads:
"The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant, reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit
fines and forfeitures, and with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty."[9]
The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended only upon final
conviction, implying that cIemency could de given even before conviction. Thus, petitioner's
unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal was pending in the High Court. It is worth
mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the former limitation of final conviction was restored. But be
that as it may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed,
whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having accepted the pardon,
petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan
assumed the character of finality.
Having disposed of that preliminary point, we proceed to discuss the effects of a full and absolute pardon
in relation to the decisive question of whether or not the plenary pardon had the effect of removing the
disqualifications prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
In Pelobello v. Palatino,[10] we find a reiteration of the stand consistently adopted by the courts on the
various consequences of pardon: "x x x we adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal v. Labrador, G.R.
No. 47941, December 7, 1940, that subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning
power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an absolute pardon not only blots out the
crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction. x x x. (W)e are of the opinion
that the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict
or impair the power of the Chief Executive who, after an inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at
liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the extent of relieving completely the party x x x concerned from
the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction."
The Pelobello v. Palatino and Cristobal v. Labrador cases,[11] and several others[12] show the
unmistakable application of the doctrinal case of Ex Parte Garland,[13] whose sweeping generalizations to
this day continue to hold sway in our jurisprudence despite the fact that much of its relevance has bee n
downplayed by later American decisions.
Consider the following broad statements:
"A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offendor; and when
the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the
law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it
prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted a fter
conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as
it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity."[14]
Such generalities have not been universally accepted, recognized or approved.[15] The modern trend of
authorities now rejects the unduly broad language of the Garland case (reputed to be perhaps the most
extreme statement which has been made on the effects of a pardon). To our mind, this is the more realistic
approach. While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the
eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for
all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It
does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the
moral stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.[16]
The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not based on the offender's innocence) as
relieving the party from all the punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the disqualifications or
disabilities based on the finding of guilt.[17] But it relieves him from nothing more. "To say, however, that
the offender is a 'new men', and 'as innocent as if he had never `committed the offense;' is to ignore the
difference between the crime and the criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted
criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of punishment, though left unpunished; and the law may
regard him as more dangerous to society than one never found guilty of crime, though it places no
restraints upon him following his conviction."[18]
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective.[19] It makes no amends for the past. It affords no
relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation
to make reparation for what has been suffered. "Since the offense has been established by judicial
proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been
rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required."[20] This would explain wh y
petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
Petitioner maintains that when she was issued absolute pardon, the Chief Executive declared her not guilty
of the crime for which she was convicted.
ln the case of State v. Hazzard,[21] we find this strong observation: "To assume that all or even a major
number of pardons are issued because of innocence of the recipients is not only to indict our judicial
system, but requires us to assume that which we all know to be untrue. The very act forgiveness implies
the commission of wrong, and that wrong has been established by the most complete method known to
modern civilization. Pardons may relieve from the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a
conviction, but they cannot erase the stain of bad character, which has been definitely fixed."[22]
In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point: While we are prepared to concede that pardon
may remit all the penal consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to the fiat that a
pardon, being presidential prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action, we do not
subscribe to the fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and that onc e he is
absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent. For whatever may have been the judicial dicta in the
past, we cannot perceive how pardon can produce such moral changes" as to equate a pardoned convict in
character and conduct with one who has constantly maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.
Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are "historical" facts which, despite the public
manifestation of mercy and forgiveness implicit in pardon, "ordinary, prudent men will take into account in
their subsequent dealings with the actor."[23]
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores
him all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (which is rare), it cannot
bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[24] This must be constantly kept in mind
lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of the privilege.
Thus, notwithstanding the expensive and effusive language of the Garland case, we are in full agreement
with the commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office
necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction[25] although such pardon undoubtedly
restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.[26]
The rationale is plainly evident. Public offices are intended primarily for the collective protection, safety
and benefit of the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private interests. To insist on
automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the
offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the
appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk,
or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public
office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of
public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were
expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply
for reappointment to the Office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering her
qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offe nse must be and should be
evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with
public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post
as assistant city treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new
appointment.
Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the
sentence. The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal
Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by
pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the
same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt,
merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.[27]
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of former Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
dated April 15, 1986, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
6.
Aglibot vs. Santia, G.R. No. 185945, December 5, 2012
FACTS: Engr. Ingersol L. Santia (Santia) loaned the amount of P2,500,000.00 to Pacific Lending & Capital
Corporation (PLCC), through its Manager, petitioner Fideliza J. Aglibot (Aglibot). The loan was evidenced
by a promissory note. Allegedly as a guaranty for the payment of the note, Aglibot issued and delivered
to Santia eleven (11) post-dated personal checks drawn from her own account maintained at Metrobank.
Upon presentment of the checks for payment, they were dishonored by the bank for having been drawn
against insufficient funds or closed account. Santia thus demanded payment from PLCC and Aglibot of
the face value of the checks, but neither of them heeded his demand. Consequently, eleven Informations
for violation of B.P. 22 were filed before the MTCC. MTCC acquitted Aglibot. On appeal, the RTC rendered
a decision absolving Aglibot and dismissing the civil aspect of the case on the ground of "failure to fulfill
a condition precedent of exhausting all means to collect from the principal debtor." Hence the filing on
this instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Did the RTC erred when it dismissed the civil aspect of the case? Is Aglibot personally liable on the
checks?
RULING: Yes. Appellate Court ruled that the RTC erred when it dismissed the civil aspect of the case.
Hence, the CA ruled that Aglibot is personally liable for the loan. Aglibot is an accommodation party and
liable to Santia. The appellate court ruled that by issuing her own post-dated checks, Aglibot thereby
bound herself personally and solidarily to pay Santia, and dismissed her claim that she issued her said
checks in her official capacity as PLCC’s manager merely to guarantee the investment of Santia. The facts
present a clear situation where Aglibot, as the manager of PLCC, agreed to accommodate its loan to
Santia by issuing her own postdated checks in payment thereof. She is what the Negotiable Instruments
Law calls an accommodation party and therefore the civil liability is immediate and direct.
7.
International Flavors and Fragrances, Inc., G.R. No. 130362, September 10, 2001
FACTS:
Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda, general manager and commercial director respectively of the
International Flavors and Fragrances Incorporated (IFFI) filed a libel case against Hernan H. Costa, the
managing director of IFFI after being described by the latter as pesona non grata in his Personal
Announcement after termination of their services. They later filed a separate civil case for damages against
Costa and IFFI in its subsidiary capacity as employer with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig wherein IFFI
moved to dismiss the complaint. The Regional Trial Court granted IFFI’s motion to dismiss for
respondent’s failure to reserve its right to institute a separate civil action. Upon a motion for
reconsideration, the Regional Trial Court granted Argos and Pineda’s petition which was later affirmed by
the appellate court.
ISSUE: Could private respondents sue petitioner for damages based on subsidiary liability in an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, during the pendency of the criminal libel cases
against petitioner's employee?
RULING: No. IFFI, petitioner contends that respondents did not allege that IFFI was primarily liable for
damages and on the contrary, the complaint was replate with references that IFFI was being sued for its
subsidiary capacity. Article 33 of the New Civil Code provides that in cases of defamation, a civil action
for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by th e injured party.
As ruled in Joaquin vs. Aniceto however, article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his
primary capacity. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability
as such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee
adjudged guilty of the wrongful act. Thus, the Supreme Court granted IFFI’s petition for dismissal.
8.
Pangonorom vs. People, G.R. No. 143380, April 11, 2005
FACTS: The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City finds accused Olimpio Pangonorom guilty of the crime
of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple slight physical injuries and sentenced him to suffer an
imprisonment of 30 days of arresto mayor, to indemnify the offended parties of the damages incurred by
their motor vehicle and reimbursement of medical expenses. An appeal was made before the CA to which
subject decision was affirmed by the latter. CA held that MMTC was already estopped in assailing the
RTC’s decision. Hence another petition by petitioner MMTC noting in their defense that procedure of the
company in hiring applicant driver and the requirements to be submitted by appellant Pangonorm is under
internal control in due diligence and proper supervision.
ISSUE: Is petitioner MMTC subsidiarily liable with Pangonorom considering its due diligence in the
selection and supervision upon its employees
RULING: YES. Due diligence under selection and supervision of its employees is not a valid defense at the
present case. Such was held under the provision of Article 103 of the RPC, in relation to Articles 100 and
102 of the same code which states that: “The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their
duties.” Pursuant to Article 103, an employer may be subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in
a criminal action when there is adequate evidence establishing that he is indeed the employer of the
convicted employee; that he is engaged in some kind of industry; that the employee committed the offense
in the discharge of his duties; and that the execution against the employee has not been satisfied due to
insolvency. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability - Articles 102 and 103 - are
deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of
its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. The
subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. In
the present case, there exists an employer-employee relationship between petitioners, the MMTC is
engaged in the transportation industry, and Olimpio has been adjudged guilty of a wrongful act and found
to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. However, there is no proof here of Olimpio's
insolvency. The judgment of conviction against Olimpio has not attained finality. This being so, no writ of
execution can issue against him to satisfy his civil liability. Only after proof of the accused -employee's
insolvency may the subsidiary liability of his employer be enforced.
9.
Cruz III v. Go, G.R. No. 223446, November 28, 2016
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari 1 filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court wherein
petitioners assail the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 27 August 2015 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 135263, dismissing their appeal for being an improper remedy. The petitioners seek to
reverse and set aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 204, Muntinlupa
City in SP. Proc. Case No. 14-004 dated 28 April 2014, which granted a Writ of Habeas Corpus in
favor of respondent Rolito T. Go (Go).
The antecedents of this petition follow.
By virtue of the 4 November 1993 Decision of the RTC, Branch 168 Pasig City in Criminal Case No.
87411, respondent Rolito T. Go was convicted of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. He began serving his sentence on 30 April 1996 at the New Bilibid Prison.
On 30 July 2008, in carrying out the Resolution and Certificate of Eligibility by then Bureau of
Corrections (BuCor) Director Oscar C. Calderon, the New Bilibid Prison Classification Board
granted Go, along with other 24 inmates, a colonist status. Accordingly, in view of his
commuted sentence, Go filed a petition for habeas corpus on 30 January 2014, pleading for his
release. He posits that his original prison sentence which shall expire on 31 January 2022 instead
should have expired on 21 August 2013 upon deduction of lawful and proper allowances for good
conduct, colonist status, and preventive imprisonment based on the provisions of Act No. 2489,
otherwise known as "An Act Authorizing Special Compensation, Credits, and Modification in the
Sentence of Prisoners as a Reward for Exceptional Conduct and Workmanship and for Other
Purposes."
In opposition to Go's release, petitioners maintained that Go's sentence neither has expired nor
was commuted. According to petitioners, the grant of colonist status on Go did not carry with it
the automatic commutation of his sentence from the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua to
thirty (30) years because only the President has the power to commute a sentence. Sans the
signature of the President, any commutation is ineffectual.
On 28 April 2014, the R TC granted the petition and issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus. The RTC
found that Go's sentence was validly commuted from reclusion perpetua to 30 years pursuant to
Section 7, Chapter 3 of the BuCor Manual:
Section 7. Privileges of ll colonist. A colonist shall have the following privileges:
a. credit of additional GCTA of five (5) days for such calendar month while retains said
classification aside from the regular GCT A authorized under Article 97 of the Revised
Penal Code;
b. automatic reduction of life sentence imposed on the colonist to a scntcucc of thirty (30)
years; (Emphasis supplied)
The BuCor Manual is very clear. No ambiguity attends that provision that once an inmate is
granted a colonist status, his life sentence is commuted to 30 years. The RTC further held that,
"[w]hile it is true that the President may commute the service of sentence of a prisoner, the law
also recognizes partial reduction of sentences under Art. 97 of the Revised Penal Code which
provides for allowances of good conduct." Contrary to petitioners' contention that the penalty of
reclusion perpetua cannot be commuted to 30 years, the RTC cited Article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code, which specifically provides that for perpetual penalties like reclusion perpetua, the
duration shall be computed at 30 years. Clearly, it is not correct that only the President can
commute a sentence as these provisions, i.e. Articles 70 and 97, warrant partial extinguishment
or commutation of sentence.
The pertinent portion of the Decision of the R TC granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus reads:
The court adheres therefore, to the computation of GO's expiration of sentence on August 21,
2013 which is based on the 30 year reduction of his life sentence. His further detention beyond
this period to the mind of the court is illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petitioner ROLITO GO y
T AMBUNTING is ordered released from custody having fully served his sentence unless detained
for some other legal cause.
Let notices of this Decision be served personally to the petitioner and to the public respondents
by the Process Server or Sheriff of this court.
SO ORDERED.4
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to the CA via ordinary appeal through Rule 41 of t􀁢e
Rules of Court. On 27 August 2015, the CA in a Decision dated 27 August 2015, dismissed the
appeal as an improper remedy. The CA resolved that because the appeal raised only pure
question of law, as the sole issue involved in the present case is whether the BuCor may validly
commute a sentence, the proper recourse should have been a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme Court (SC).
The Motion for Reconsideration was also denied in a Resolution dated 14 March 2016. Hence,
the present Petition which argues that the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing
petitioners' appeal filed under Rule 41 for improper remedy. Petitioners also aver that the
commutation of Go's prison sentence is ineffective because it has no prior approval by the
President in violation of Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, which mandates that only the
President has the power to exercise executive clemency.
First, the issue of whether or not the proper remedy is an appeal via Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Judgments of the RTC may be appealed either through (1) an ordinary appeal to the CA in cases
decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction which may involve either questions
of fact or mixed questions of fact and law; (2) a petition for review before the CA in cases decided
by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction raising questions of fact, of law, or both;
and (3) a petition for review on certiorari directly filed with the SC where only questions of law
are raised. Adherence to the principle of judicial hierarchy of court dictates that recourse must
first be made to the lower ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. At
the outset, therefore, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, regardless whether the issue
involves a question of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law, an appeal to the CA is in
order.5 This rule however, admits of certain exceptions. As already held, when the case does not
involve factual, but purely legal questions, the appeal may be elevated directly to the SC.6 Such
is the attendant circumstance in the present case.
The facts surrounding the case are undisputed and the sole issue raised is a pure question of law,
i.e., whether or not the BuCor has authority to commute a prison sentence. As succinctly resolved
by the CA, petitioners never disputed Go's "classification as a colonist status, the pertinent
portions of the BuCor Operating Manual, and the refusal of respondents-appellants to apply the
privileges provided therein were never questioned by either parties. [Petitioners] were only
assailing the correctness of the RTC's interpretation of Section 7, Chapter 3 of the BuCor
Operating Manual, the conclusions drawn therefrom, and its application to the settled facts
surrounding [Go's] case. There is therefore no need to evaluate the evidence on record to
determine the power of the BuCor, or its lack thereof, to commute an inmate's sentence."
Indeed, the CA is correct in dismissing the appeal for improper remedy because the issue raised
before it is purely a question of law, which is within the jurisdiction of this Court.
Now, the main issue.
Petitioners aver that Go's commutation of sentence as a result of the grant of penal colonist
status, deduction of lawful and proper allowances for good conduct, and preventive
imprisonment of Go is ineffective without prior approval by the President because it violates
Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution, which mandates that only the President has the power
to exercise executive clemency. 7
We deny the petition.
As correctly resolved by the 'trial court, while only the President can commute a prison sentence,
Articles 70 and 97 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) recognize partial reduction or commutation
of sentences by providing that "for penal penalties, the duration shall be computed for 30 years
and the allowances of good conduct must be applied on top of the [good conduct time allowance]
accorded to an inmate with a colonist status." Accordingly, to implement the provisions of Article
97, the law has granted the Director of Prisons the power to grant good conduct allowances. The
mandate of the Director of Prisons embodied in Article 99 of the RPC is clear and unambiguous.
In fact, once granted, such allowances shall not be revoked. Article 99 of the RPC explicitly states:
Art. 99. Who grants time allowances. - Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of Prisons shall
grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked.
(Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, after crediting his preventive imprisonment of nine (9) months and sixteen ( 16) days,
and the regular Good Conduct Time Allowance (GCTA) u􀁢der Act No. 3815 and Special Credit
Time Allowance (SCTA) under Act. No. 2409 granted upon him, Go has completed serving his
sentence of thirty (30) years on 21 August 2013, which he commenced to serve on 30 April
1996.10
The intent and spirit of the law in affording persons the remedy of writ of habeas corpus is to
devise a speedy and effective means to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.11 To rule
otherwise would render Article 99 of the RPC as a mere surplusage and would unduly impose
excessive imprisonment on inmates in violation of the basic right to liberty.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. This Resolution is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. The Director
of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to immediately RELEASE petitioner Rolito T. Go from
detention unless he is detained for any other lawful cause no part due to his prior action as
Solicitor General;
(Jardeleza, J., Bersamin, J., additional member.)
JO II
SO ORDERED.
10.
People v. Vergara & Inocencio, G.R. No. 177763, July 3, 2013
Before this Court is an appeal of the March 30, 2007 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CR.H.C. No. 02387,[3] affirming with modification the December 29, 2001 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City in Crim. Case No. 01-0275, entitled People of the Philippines v. Gary
Vergara y Oriel alias "Gary" and Joseph Inocencio y Paulino alias "Joseph," finding accused-appellants
Gary Vergara (Vergara) and Joseph Inocencio (Inocencio) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder as
principal and accomplice, respectively.
On February 13, 2001, an Information for the crime of murder qualified by treachery was filed against
accused-appellants.
On March 12, 2001, upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.[5]
Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution established that at around midnight of February 10, 2001, accused -appellants were causing
a ruckus on Libertad-Colayco Streets, Pasay City by throwing water bottles at passers-by. At around 2:00
a.m., the victim, Miguelito Alfante, who was seemingly drunk, walked down the street. Vergara
approached Alfante and told him: "Pare, mukhang high na high ka." Alfante retorted: "Anong pakialam
mo?" At this juncture, Vergara threw his arm around Alfante's shoulder, received a knife from Inocencio,
and suddenly stabbed Alfante. Vergara then said "Taga rito ako." Thereafter, Vergara and Inocencio ran
from the scene but were pursued by several witnesses. Alfante, meanwhile, was brought to the Pasay City
General Hospital where he died.[6]
The autopsy report conducted on the cadaver of the victim revealed that Alfante sustained eight stab
wounds: five located on the chest area and three on the left forearm. The victim sustained two fatal
wounds: one which severed the left ventricle of the heart and another wound puncturing the lower lobe of
the left lung. The Autopsy Report N-01-151[7] signed by Dr. Dominic Agbuda, medico-legal officer of the
National Bureau of Investigation who conducted the autopsy, stated that:
CAUSE OF DEATH: MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS, CHEST, LEFT ARM.
The common-law wife of the victim, Gina Alfante,[8] testified that she incurred the following expenses in
connection with the death and burial of Alfante:
a) P17,000.00 for the coffin
b) P3,000.00 for the nicho
c) P250.00 for the mass
d) P15,000.00 for food and drinks for the wake; and
e) P16,000.00 for the burial lot.
Gina further testified that Alfante had been working as a mason prior to his death earning P500.00 a day.[9]
In his defense, Vergara denied the version of the prosecution. He testified that on February 10, 2001, at
around midnight, he and Inocencio went to a convenience store to buy salted eggs for "baon" the following
day. When they passed by Libertad corner Colayco Streets in Pasay City to go to the 7-11 convenience
store, they saw Alfante together with nine other persons. Contrary to the testimony of prosecution
witnesses, it was Alfante who approached Vergara, knife in hand and proceeded to stab him. He was ab le
to evade the attack and grappled with Alfante for possession of the knife and, in the course of their
struggle, Alfante sustained his injuries. Inocencio stood by his side for the duration of the incident.[10]
Thereafter, he fled the scene. He went to the nearest police station and was subsequently brought to the
Ospital ng Maynila for treatment for the injury on his right palm sustained during the tussle.[11]
Dr. Oliver Leyson, Medical Officer III of the Ospital ng Maynila, testified to his medical examination and
treatment of Vergara's injury caused by a bladed weapon which he sustained on February 11, 2001.[12]
After evaluating the respective evidence of the contending parties, on December 29, 2001, the RTC found
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code. The decretal portion of the Decision stated:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing premises and considerations, this Court hereby renders
judgment finding the accused GARY VERGARA Y ORIEL alias GARY and JOSEPH INOCENCIO Y
PAULINO alias JOSEPH both GUILTY as principal and accomplice, respectively, for the crime of Murder,
as this felony is defined and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as ame nded by R.A.
7659, and appreciating in favor of the accused Gary Vergara y Oriel alias Gary the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the Court hereby sentences
said accused Gary Vergara y Oriel alias Gary to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the other
accused Joseph Inocencio y Paulino alias Joseph to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Fourteen (14) Years,
Eight (8) Months and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and for them to pay, jointly and
severally the Heirs of the deceased Miguelito Alfante the sums of Php51,250.00, as actual damages,
Php1,020,000.00, as indemnity for loss of earnings of the same deceased, Php250,00.00 as moral damages,
plus costs (sic).[13]
Accused-appellants filed their notice of appeal on February 5, 2002 to the Supreme Court.[14] The appeal
was accepted by this Court in its Resolution[15] dated September 4, 2002 but was subsequently transferred
to the Court of Appeals pursuant to People v. Mateo.[16]
As in the Court of Appeals, accused-appellants challenge the court a quo's finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. They averred that the elements of the crime of murder were not proven.[17] On March
30, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification as to the award of damages the Decision of the
RTC. The Court of Appeals thus disposed of the appeal in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the Decision dated December 29, 2001, of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 116, Pasay City is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that the accused-appellants are jointly and severally held liable to pay the heirs of the victim, to the
exclusion of his common-law-wife, the following amount, to wit:
a. P50,000.00 as civil indemnification;
b. P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
c. P51,250.00 as actual damages.[18]
Hence, this appeal.[19] Accused-appellants' confinement was confirmed by the Bureau of Corrections on
April 11, 2007.[20]
The appellee[21] manifested that it would not file a supplemental brief.
On May 13, 2008, accused-appellant Joseph P. Inocencio filed a motion to withdraw his appeal stating that
he is no longer interested to pursue an appeal.[22] This Court, in a Resolution dated June 25, 2008,
granted the motion of appellant Inocencio and declared the case terminated as far as he is concerned.[ 23]
Due to the failure of accused-appellant Vergara's counsel to file a supplemental brief, the Court, in a
Resolution dated November 19, 2008, resolved to dispense with its filing.[24]
We affirm the March 30, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals with modification respecting the award of
damages.
The pertinent provision in this case is Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another,
shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1) With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means
to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity[.] (Emphasis added.)
Jurisprudence is consistent in reiterating that the trial court is in a better position to adjudge the credibility
of witnesses especially if it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[25] People v. Clores[26] reminds us that:
When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding rules some of which are that
(1) the Appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower Court, unless there is a showing
that it had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance
that would have affected the result of the case, which showing is absent herein; (2) the findings of the Trial
Court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to
examine his demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern if such witness is
telling the truth or not[;] and (3) a witness who testifies in a categorica l, straightforward, spontaneous and
frank manner and remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness. (Citations omitted.)
The rationale for these guidelines is that, having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed
firsthand their deportment and manner of testifying under grueling examination, the trial courts are in a
better position to decide the question of credibility.[27] On the other hand, this Court is far detached from
the details and drama during trial and relies only on the records of the case in its review. On the matter of
credence and credibility of witnesses, therefore, this Court admits to its limitations and acknowledges the
advantage of the trial court whose findings we give due deference.
We see no need to depart from the aforestated rules. A careful review of the records reveals that accusedappellant Vergara failed to negate the findings of the trial court with concrete evidence that it had
overlooked, misconstrued or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would
have affected the result of the case. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it stated that:
The death of the victim, Miguelito Alfante, is directly caused by the stab wounds inflicted by [appellant
Vergara] when he placed his left arm on the shoulder of the victim and stabbed him repeatedly in his chest
and left forearm with a knife handed [to him] by [appellant Inocencio]. This is an overwhelming evidence,
and in stark contrast, all [appellant Vergara] could offer are denial and self-defense. Denial is an
intrinsically weak defense, which the accused must buttress with strong evidence of non -culpability to
merit credibility. Having failed to satisfy, the denial must necessarily fail.[28] (Citation omitted.)
Anent accused-appellant Vergara's claim of self-defense, the following essential elements had to be proved:
(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting
to self-defense.[29] A person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof. He must prove all the
elements of self-defense. However, the most important of all the elements is unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self -defense to be successfully
pleaded, whether complete or incomplete.[30]
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a
person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause
injury. It "presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger - not merely threatening and
intimidating action." It is present "only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one's
life."[31]
In the present case, the element of unlawful aggression is absent. By the testimonies of all the witnesses,
the victim's actuations did not constitute unlawful aggression to warrant the use of force employed by
accused-appellant Vergara. The records reveal that the victim had been walking home albeit drunk when
he passed by accused-appellants. However, there is no indication of any untoward action from him to
warrant the treatment that he had by accused-appellant Vergara's hands. As succinctly stated by the RTC:
[T]he victim was just walking, he [was] neither uttering invectives words nor provoking the [appellants]
into a fight. [Appellant Vergara was] the unlawful aggressor. He was the one who put the life of the victim
in actual peril. This can be inferred from the wounds sustained by the victim."[32]
It is thus clear that there being no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the act of accused appellant Vergara of taking a knife and stabbing the victim was not made in lawful self -defense.
We also agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the acts of accused-appellant Vergara constituted
treachery qualifying the crime committed to murder. As we have previously ruled upon, treachery is
present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms
in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[33]
Here, accused-appellant Vergara after exchanging words with the victim, threw his arm around the victim's
shoulder and proceeded to stab him. The victim was totally unaware of the evil that would befall him. The
number and severity of the wounds received by the victim indicated that he was rendered immobile and
without any real opportunity to defend himself other than feebly raising his arm to ward off the attack. We,
thus, sustain the trial court and the Court of Appeals in finding that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery is present in the commission of the crime.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Though there was an appreciation of voluntary
surrender as a mitigating circumstance, following the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the RTC, as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph
2, of the Revised Penal Code.[34]
However, to conform to existing jurisprudence the Court must modify the amount of indemnity for death
and exemplary damages awarded by the courts a quo.
Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages;
(4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases .[35]
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the heirs of the victim was able to prove before the trial court,
actual damages in the amount of P51,250.00 based on the receipts[36] they submitted to the trial court.
We also agree with the Court of Appeals when it removed the RTC's award respecting the indemnity for the
loss of earning capacity. As we have already previously ruled that:
Damages for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages, which as a rule must be duly
proven by documentary evidence, not merely by the self-serving testimony of the widow.
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work no
documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less
than the minimum wage under current labor laws.[37] (Citations and emphasis omitted.)
In this case, we are constrained to uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals since no documentary
evidence was presented to buttress the claim for the loss of earning capacity of the victim as claimed by his
common-law wife. Neither was it shown that the victim was covered by the exceptions mentioned in the
above-quoted case. The Court of Appeals stated:
Settled is the rule that actual damages, inclusive of expected earnings lost caused by the crime, [must] be
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty and on the best evidence to pro ve obtainable by the injured
party. The prosecution failed to meet this criteria, no witness was presented to support the contention of the
common-law-wife of the victim that the latter is a self-employed mason earning P500.00 a day. Hence, this
Court cannot rely on the uncorroborated testimony of the common-law-wife of the victim which lacks
specific details or particulars on the claimed loss earnings.[38] (Citation omitted.)
Moreover, we deem it proper that an award for exemplary damages be made. We have ruled as follows:
Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is
likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense
for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating
circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature
of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather
than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating
circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary
damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.[39] (Emphasis omitted.)
We, thus, award exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 to conform to existing jurisprudence.[40]
We increase the award for mandatory civil indemnity to P75,000.00 to conform to recent
jurisprudence.[41]
Lastly, we sustain the RTC's award for moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 even in the absence of
proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim's heirs.[42] As borne out by human nature and
experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part
of the victim's family.[43] While no amount of damages may totally compensate the sudden and tragic loss
of a loved one it is nonetheless awarded to the heirs of the deceased to at least assuage them.
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages
interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.[44]
WHEREFORE, the March 30, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02387 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Gary Vergara y Oriel alias "Gary" is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of murder, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant
is further ordered to pay the heirs of Miguelito Alfante the amounts of P51,250.00 as actual damages,
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. All
monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of
this Decision until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.