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Contents
Afghanistan

Our Biggest Errors in Afghanistan ............................................................................................ 7

The US-Taliban Doha agreement or Fix the Fox..................................................................... 10

Afghanistan and the Potential for BRICS Membership ......................................................... 12

Why Sanctions against the Taliban Aren’t Working .............................................................. 16
Artificial Intelligence

Five Ways AI Might Destroy the World .................................................................................. 19

Is Artificial Intelligence A Goldmine Or A Minefield For Leaders? .................................... 22

Artificial Intelligence and Security in the Nuclear World..................................................... 24

The EU’s Artificial Intelligence Act .......................................................................................... 26

The Generative Potential of Artificial Intelligence ................................................................. 27

Artificial Intelligence Remains Inferior to the Human Brain................................................ 28
Book Reviews

The Rise of Blockchains .............................................................................................................. 31

Politics of Federalism in Pakistan ............................................................................................. 33

The Anthropocene Reviewed .................................................................................................... 35

Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1947 – 2016 ...................................................................................... 36
China Affairs

Will India Surpass China to Become the Next Superpower? .............................................. 43

Towards a Chinese Missile Crisis? ........................................................................................... 44

Latest Bid to Target China's High-Tech Sector ....................................................................... 46

'Decoupling' is Anything but 'De-risking' ............................................................................... 48

Janet Yellen’s visit to China and China’s New Counterintelligence Law ........................... 49

Foreign Relations Law
Climate Change

A Green Transition That Leaves No One Behind ................................................................... 51

The Cost of Inaction .................................................................................................................... 52

Climate Change and Possible Human Responses .................................................................. 54

Signals of Climate Distress on the Rise .................................................................................... 55

El Niño + Climate Change = Heat Records ............................................................................. 56
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Covid-19

COVID as a Natural Experiment for Climate Policy ............................................................. 58

The COVID-19 Pandemic and Its Aftermath .......................................................................... 59

An Acrimonious Debate about Covid’s Origins will Rumble on ........................................ 61
CPEC and OBOR

Countering False Narratives Regarding CPEC ...................................................................... 64

10 Years of Challenges, Growth, and Opportunities ............................................................. 65

10 Wonderful Achievements of CPEC in 10 Years ................................................................. 66

Is CPEC a ‘Debt Trap’ for Pakistan? ......................................................................................... 68

How the US and Europe can Beat China’s Belt and Road .................................................... 70
Domestic Politics

Merit Detours............................................................................................................................... 72

Pakistan Election ......................................................................................................................... 73

A Land of Dented Democracy and Increasing Polarization ................................................. 77

Pakistan’s Decaying Democratic Journey ................................................................................ 80

The Death of Democracy in Pakistan ...................................................................................... 82
Economy

The Dollar-Yuan Rivalry ............................................................................................................ 84

Is A Global Debt Bomb about to Explode? .............................................................................. 86

Dialogue for the Economy ......................................................................................................... 90

Understanding SIFC ................................................................................................................... 92

Why did Pakistan need the IMF deal? .................................................................................... 93

SIFC Attempts to Reopen Pakistan for Business .................................................................... 94
Education

Pakistan’s Higher Education Budget ....................................................................................... 96

Advancing Pakistan’s Future through Education .................................................................. 97

Transnational Education in Pakistan ..................................................................................... 100

Knowledge Economy ............................................................................................................... 102

A System in Crisis ..................................................................................................................... 104
Energy Crisis

Self-reliance ................................................................................................................................ 107

Energy Security of Pakistan ..................................................................................................... 108

Energy Crisis.............................................................................................................................. 111
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Essays

Governance for Local Governments....................................................................................... 114

What Will It Take for Dishonourable Men to Stop Killing Women for Honour? ............ 122

Nurturing a Startup Ecosystem in Pakistan .......................................................................... 125

Universities as Catalysts for Climate Solutions .................................................................... 127
Federal and Provincial Budgets 2023-24

A Silver Lining to the Sombre Clouds ................................................................................... 129

Key Takeaways from Pakistan’s Federal Budget for 2023-24 ............................................. 131

Energy Measures in the Budget .............................................................................................. 134

Punjab Budget ........................................................................................................................... 135

KP Budget .................................................................................................................................. 137

Balochistan Budget ................................................................................................................... 139

Sindh Budget ............................................................................................................................. 140
Foreign Policy and Relations

Enhancing Pakistan-Iran Economic Relations ...................................................................... 142

USA Relations with Pakistan................................................................................................... 144

China-Pakistan Relationship Beyond CPEC ......................................................................... 146

Has Pakistan Succeeded in Balancing Russia and Ukraine? .............................................. 147

Pakistan-Russia Relations are Stronger than Ever ............................................................... 149

GCC Business Interests in Pakistan ........................................................................................ 151
History

The Battle of Plassey ................................................................................................................. 153

The Durand Line ....................................................................................................................... 156

Simla Agreement ....................................................................................................................... 157
International Issues

Governing a post-Western world ........................................................................................... 163

How America and China can Get along Better..................................................................... 164

De-dollarisation ......................................................................................................................... 166

How America Can Win Over the Global South.................................................................... 167

Japan’s Making Waves in the Indian Ocean ......................................................................... 172

Central Asia in Change ............................................................................................................ 173

A New Global Geopolitical Cycle ........................................................................................... 176

What’s Really Going on in France? ........................................................................................ 178
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International Law

Has the ICC Lost Traction on Rohingya Genocide Case? ................................................... 181

Weaponization of Water in Contemporary Geopolitics ...................................................... 183

Is China a Developing Country? ............................................................................................ 185
International Relations

Is It Possible to Change the Structure of International Relations? ..................................... 188

Asian Conceptions of International Order ........................................................................... 190
Interviews

Markus Poztel ............................................................................................................................ 198

Mercy Kuo ................................................................................................................................. 200
Kashmir

Strengthening and Gilding the Cage of Occupation ............................................................ 203

The Role of the Global Kashmiri Diaspora ............................................................................ 206

G 20 Summit in Disputed Territorial Area ............................................................................ 208
Law

Pakistan’s Army Act ................................................................................................................. 211

Can a Civilian be Tried under the Army Act? ...................................................................... 213
Middle East

A Changing Middle East.......................................................................................................... 215

How the Rumble in Russia Reverberates around the Middle East.................................... 216

Why Israel's Offensive on Jenin was a Failure ...................................................................... 218

China Does Not Have to Be a U.S. Adversary in the Middle East ..................................... 221

Why NATO must not Forget about the Middle East ........................................................... 222
National

The Spectre of Food Insecurity................................................................................................ 225

Education and the Floods ........................................................................................................ 227

Another IMF Bailout for Pakistan........................................................................................... 229

Barter Trade ............................................................................................................................... 231

The Resurrection of the TTP .................................................................................................... 233

Did Pakistan Just Overhaul Its Nuclear Doctrine? ............................................................... 237

Revamping Pakistan’s Agriculture Sector ............................................................................. 240
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Organizations

The Expanding Role of SCO .................................................................................................... 242

SCO & BRICS ............................................................................................................................. 248

BRICS Faces a Reckoning ......................................................................................................... 249

Why Did the World Bank and IMF Come Under Fire from Guterres? ............................. 253

Don’t Let Ukraine Join NATO................................................................................................. 255
South Asia

Democracy under Assault ....................................................................................................... 259

From the India Dividend to a Bad Bet ................................................................................... 261

Washington’s Embrace of Modi Carries a Price ................................................................... 263

South Asian Currencies in Crisis ............................................................................................ 264

America’s Bad Bet on India ..................................................................................................... 265
7
Afghanistan
OUR BIGGEST ERRORS IN AFGHANISTAN
… and What We Should Learn from Them
Linda Robinson (Senior Fellow for Women and Foreign Policy at CFR)
The Afghanistan War Commission, created by Congress, will shortly commence its
investigation of U.S. policies in the twenty-year War in Afghanistan. So far this year, most headlines
have been generated by a separate House Foreign Affairs Committee inquiry into the Biden
administration’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. This searing denouement resembled
the chaotic end of the Vietnam War, complete with images of desperate Afghans clinging to planes
lifting off from Kabul Airport as bearded Taliban soldiers seized government offices, tanks, and
guns. The tragedy continued as the dark curtain of Taliban rule fell over the South Asian nation,
bringing back the draconian Deobandi Islamic practices of the 1990s. Overnight, Afghan women lost
the right to work and to appear in public, and those who resisted received harsh punishments. The
turbaned Taliban leaders ejected women from the government and banned girls from school after
sixth grade. Poverty, hunger, and maternal and infant mortality have spiked, as countries have
withheld recognition of the Taliban regime, frozen funds, and suspended all but humanitarian aid.
The Taliban’s latest punishment bans Afghan women from UN work, where they are vital to
delivery of aid in this conservative, largely rural country.
As frightful as these recent events are, they should not overshadow the full mandate of the
commission, which is charged with conducting a “comprehensive review of key decisions
related to U.S. military, intelligence, foreign assistance, and diplomatic involvement in
Afghanistan from June 2001 to August 2021.” The initial intervention, precipitated by the attack
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001, aimed to hunt down the alQaeda perpetrators. Over time it morphed into an effort to quell a persistent insurgency by
building a stable democracy and improving living conditions in one of the poorest countries in
the world—one that the British had unsuccessfully sought to pacify in two nineteenth-century
wars. Americans deserve a full and thoughtful accounting of the $2.3 trillion investment of
military and development aid and the deployment of hundreds of thousands of U.S. and
coalition troops. Why did the Afghan government and military collapse so quickly? Was the
effort misguided from the start, based on flawed assumptions and policy design? What missteps
were made along the way? What are the applicable lessons for other efforts to support
democracy around the world? As a journalist, book author, and sometime adviser with frequent
visits to Afghanistan between 2002 and 2015, I offer this distillation of lessons that we might
learn from the United States’ longest war.
However dramatic it appeared, the collapse of the Afghan government and military was
not surprising. The seeds of defeat were planted long before President Joe Biden ordered the
withdrawal. His predecessor, Donald Trump, signed an accord with the Taliban in February
2020 that set a 2021 withdrawal date and decoupled the U.S. departure from any agreement to
end the fighting among Afghans—thereby ceding the primary source of leverage. Afghan
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morale plummeted. Negotiations to reach a political settlement were never the central priority at
any point in the war, as ephemeral military targets or “conditions” substituted for hardheaded
recognition that there were in essence two Afghanistans, and that the Taliban always controlled
most of the rural one (where I spent most of my time). Compounding this error, the U.S.
government sought to implement centralized models of governance and military institutions
that were inappropriate, imperfectly realized, and expensive to sustain. Finally, the United
States and its allies set aspirational goals for societal transformation that could not be achieved
on a relatively slim support base of urbanized, educated Afghans.
In sum, the American project was not based in a clear understanding of the realities of
Afghanistan. Well-meaning Americans believed that they could persuade, cajole, or force a
project that much of the population did not actively embrace or participate in. A chain of
discrete policy errors flowed from this basic failure to adequately understand the country.
Several fundamental lessons emerge from scrutinizing these errors in the design and execution
of political, diplomatic, military, and economic policies.
Lesson 1. Political conflicts usually require negotiated settlements rather than purely military
solutions. Attrition strategies and pressure campaigns unlinked to political strategies were bound to
fail in an insurgency such as the War in Afghanistan, which was essentially a civil war between the
Taliban and their supporters and the rest of the population. The Taliban were unlikely to be defeated
militarily given their proficiency at low-cost insurgency. They have a base and a constituency:
nationalistic, religious, and conservative Pashtuns who embraced the extreme Deobandi school of
Islam that had spread among Pashtuns since the 1970s. Deobandi madrassas continued to
indoctrinate young Afghan men to fight the infidel Americans. The continued U.S. emphasis on
attrition warfare and civilian casualties from airstrikes caused enormous friction with the Afghan
government and population. No clear military advantage was obtained from this approach, and
policymakers failed to appreciate that these political costs outweighed any temporary military gain.
Indeed, the U.S. government doubled down on the attrition warfare approach in the final years of
the conflict. Civilian casualties from airstrikes increased by 330 percent after 2016.
Lesson 2. Settlements to conflicts should be negotiated from a position of maximum leverage.
Two squandered opportunities to reach an agreement stand out. The U.S. government might have
offered talks after ousting the Taliban in October 2001. Indeed, the Taliban offered to negotiate in
those early days, but the United States did not invite them to Bonn, where the Bonn Agreement was
reached and the new government was formed. In the heat of the post-9/11 furor, few U.S. officials
were prepared to make a distinction between the al-Qaeda attackers and the Afghan Taliban who
swore loyalty to bin Ladin but had no designs to attack America. The United States and the
international coalition stayed, and then grew after the Taliban went on the offensive. The second
opportunity occurred with the surge of coalition troops in 2011–13, which achieved what Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford termed a “strategic stalemate”. That high point of
leverage was not seized to achieve a settlement, however, and the leverage began to erode as troops
drew down. The Afghan government’s position steadily weakened, and it became apparent that the
army the United States built had not become a self-sufficient force capable of securing the country
despite billions of dollars in investment. President Trump arrived in office determined to get out and
set a minimal condition in 2020 in exchange for a U.S. exit pledge: that the Taliban agree to
commence talks with its Afghan opponents. With the U.S. departure in writing, the Taliban had no
incentive to negotiate seriously. Without intensive U.S. and international support, the fractured
Afghan government, riven by ethnic divisions between the Tajik-Uzbek minority and the Pashtun
majority, could not reach a settlement on its own.
Lesson 3. Be wary of imposing political systems that are inappropriate to a country’s
history and political culture; incremental approaches will be needed where democratic traditions
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are weak. In Afghanistan, informal but real power rested with regionally based powerbrokers or
warlords, such as Mohammed Qasim Fahim, Gul Agha Sherzai, Atta Mohammed Noor, Abdul
Rashid Dostum, Ismail Khan, and the Karzai brothers, who held sway over the principal ethnic
and tribal factions. Given their influence, a centralized form of government was unlikely to
provide stability: every presidential election was a crisis that gave rise to protracted battles that
required brokered outcomes. The trappings and mechanics of democracy were in place, but the
culture of democracy remained lightly implanted. While women did make nominal gains in
representation through seats reserved in parliament, ministerial positions in the cabinet, and
mayoral appointments, these concessions were easily reversed without wider and deeper forms
of equality taking hold in the society and culture. Civil society blossomed in urban Afghanistan,
but rural Afghanistan remained much the same, as I was frequently reminded by villagers. More
robust use of local councils and traditional shuras was needed to build consensus from the
ground up and encourage fuller representation over time.
Lesson 4. Do not seek to impose inappropriate security institutions, but rather build
on traditional forms of defense. A similar error occurred in the security sector. The United States
modelled the Afghan military on its own, with a centralized structure, capital-intensive
equipment, and aircraft that Congress required to be U.S.-made—even though Afghans were
used to Russian-made helicopters and planes that were much easier to maintain. Centralized
logistics systems were not adapted to the country’s rugged terrain. Vast resources were
expended in creating a large standing force that required constant recruitment and
replenishment due to casualties and desertion. Experiments in creating local defense forces
offered an alternative that could have become the primary model for most of the country’s
defenses. These forces were recruited with support from local elders and deployed locally, as
militias traditionally had been. Despite successes by the local forces, the juggernaut of creating
an expensive, centralized army continued and, in the end, failed. The lack of support to troops in
the field was a principal cause of the rapid dissolution of the army in 2021.
Lesson 5. Do not overestimate the pace and depth of societal change that policies can produce
within a generation; acceptable and financially sustainable targets are best set by the country.
Younger and more urban Afghans embraced the vision of a modern, democratic country, even as
social norms remained comparatively conservative, but 74 percent of Afghanistan’s population is
rural—and deeply conservative. Remote areas remained untouched by many of the development
projects funded by the United States, and many schools and clinics became goat sheds for lack of
teachers and nurses. Important gains like reduced maternal and infant mortality and expanded
access to education were achieved, but they were dependent on ongoing infusions of outside aid: 75
percent of the Afghan government budget came from foreign aid, and self-sufficiency was a distant
prospect. Sustainable progress requires a growing economy to support these investments and
durable, broad-based national support. Women are an untapped resource in Afghanistan, but the
social and economic foundations for women’s equality remain tenuous despite the educational,
professional, and business achievements in the past twenty years. The pace of change is generational,
and in the case of Afghanistan a concerted effort to diminish Taliban influence in the next generation
will be required to restore forward movement.
Lesson 6. Do not design policies that require indefinite or permanent multibillion dollar
foreign assistance commitments, especially when no vital national interest is at stake. The U.S. public
proved remarkably tolerant of the twenty-year expenditure of $2.3 trillion in Afghanistan, but it was
unlikely to support such a cost indefinitely without more progress toward sustainability. The
national security rationale for indefinitely supporting Afghanistan at those levels diminished as the
al-Qaeda threat receded. The waning terrorist threat from al-Qaeda and the nonexistent threat from
the Taliban should have been factored into planning for an exit at the time of the 2011 surge. Quite
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frankly, plans for a continued U.S. military deployment did not align with U.S. national interests,
and the small footprint envisioned would have been insufficient to fend off the growing threat from
the Taliban as they extended their hold in the countryside from 2013 on. The risks of keeping a small
force in Afghanistan would have progressively grown.
Lesson 7. Halting mission creep is never easy, but the U.S. Congress should be readier to impose
conditions and limits on foreign interventions. Congress, with its power of the purse, is best positioned
to end interventions outright, or at a minimum require an overhaul of policy objectives so that they are
realistic. The Afghanistan experience underscores the need for stabilization and governance policy
design based on the local culture and capabilities, with objectives that are modest, clear, and finite.
Successive administrations bought into the military mantra of “conditions-based” withdrawals without
recognizing or acknowledging that the conditions sought were not achievable. Year after year, U.S.
generals continued to testify with ill-founded optimism to justify requests for multibillion dollar annual
infusions of assistance. Greater rigor must be introduced into the criteria for ending interventions and
continuous counterterrorism operations, and Congress must assert its power to end policies that are
not working.
A no-holds-barred account of the various shortcomings of U.S. policy in the longest war in
American history is vital for the historical record and to inform future foreign policy to secure U.S.
interests and determine how best to help countries in need. A frank and full report from the
Afghanistan War Commission would include numerous “never again” resolutions that target these
chronic lapses. If sufficiently bold, the report can galvanize more members of Congress to probe claims
of national security necessity and imminent progress with greater skepticism, without fear of being
labeled weak. A foreign policy that achieves demonstrable if incremental results, with a prospect of
becoming self-sustaining, constitutes a desirable middle ground between overreach and isolationism.
(Source: Council on Foreign Relations)
THE US-TALIBAN DOHA AGREEMENT OR FIX THE FOX
Shafiullah Irfani (Middle East and the global-south region analyst)
The Doha Agreement, officially known as the “Afghanistan Peace Accord”, was signed on
February 29, 2020 in Doha, the capital of Qatar between the Taliban and the United States. One
of the clear objectives of this agreement was to pave the way for a comprehensive peace process
in Afghanistan, according to which the lengthy war in the country will be put to an end. The
Biden administration suddenly left Afghanistan and ended its long-term 20-year military
presence in Afghanistan r for a political-intelligence deal called the Doha agreement. This
agreement also had sidelines that have not yet been revealed and according to some Qatari
officials, they give this agreement the name of the Taliban’s second rule over Afghanistan, or the
release of high-ranking blacklisted Taliban prisoners from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
The key elements of the Doha Agreement
1. A commitment by the Taliban to prevent any group or individual, including al-Qaeda,
from using Afghan territory to threaten the security of the United States.
2. A commitment by the Taliban Gov.(Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, IEA) to engage in
intra-Afghan negotiations with the Afghan Republican government to reach a political
settlement and a permanent ceasefire.
3: A phased withdrawal of United State and Western Alliance military presence NATO
forces from Afghanistan, with all foreign troops to leave the country within 14 months of the
agreement’s signing, subject to certain conditions.
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4. The release of thousands of Taliban prisoners by the Afghan government (after the
release of about 5,000 Taliban, the districts and provinces began to fall) and the Taliban’s
promise to release the prisoners.
In order to pave the way for this Doha agreement, in 2010, a number of senior Taliban
leaders were unofficially transferred from Pakistan to Doha such as Abdul Hakim Ishaqzai and
Sayed Toyyab Agha, the capital of Qatar, under the agreement of CIA and ISI. To open an
official political office in Qatar to start peace talks with the Afghan Republican Government.
However, in January 2012, due to an official agreement, four high-ranking Taliban leaders such
as Syed Mohammad Tayyab Agha, Shahabuddin Delawar, Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanakzai
and Abdul Hakim Ishaqzai were transferred to Doha, with their transfer; the political office of
the Taliban was unofficially opened in Doha, the capital of Qatar.
On June 18, 2013, an official political office for the Taliban was opened in Doha, the capital
of Qatar, amid international and domestic political reactions. At the same time with the opening
of this office, talks for starting the process of exchange of prisoners between the political officials
of the United States and the Taliban leaders started under the leadership of the CIA. In exchange
for the release of American Sgt Bowe Bergdahl on June 1, 2014, five high-ranking Taliban leaders
were handed over to the political office of the Taliban in Doha, the capital of Qatar, such as, 1:
Mullah Mohammad Fazal Akhund, 2: Mullah Abdul Haq Qasiq, 3: Mullah Khairullah
Khairkhwa, 4: Muolavi Mohammad Nabi Omari and 5: Mullah Noorullah Noori.
One: Mullah Mohammad Fazl, the First Deputy of Defense Minister of the Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan, was captured by US forces in November 2001, shortly after the US-led invasion
of Afghanistan. He was arrested by the CIA and taken into custody at the US detention facility
in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he remained for several years. Fazl was released from
Guantanamo Bay in 2014 as part of a prisoner exchange for US Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl.
Mullah Muhammad Fazil Mazloum, who is a resident of Caher Chine district of Uruzgan
Province, southwest zone of Afghanistan, with the second rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan. He
is serving as the first deputy of the Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
Before that, he was a member of the negotiating team of the Taliban political office in Qatar, who
was responsible for the coordination of the Taliban’s military commissions, and was one of the
closest people to the founder of the group, Mullah Muhammad Umar Akhund, during the first
regime of the Taliban. Mullah Muhammad Fazil Akhund from Uruzgan province and Mullah
Abdul Qayyum Zakir from Helmand province, who is known as Zakir Mullah Abdul Qayyum
Akhund, were more prominent and influential in the management of the military affairs of
Mullah Muhammad Umar Mujahid’s group than other high-ranking officials of the Taliban.
Two: Mullah Abdul Haq Wasiq, who is also known as Haji Mullah, is currently serving as
the head of the Taliban’s intelligence agency, GDI, and has played an important intelligence role
in this group since the beginning of the first movement of the Taliban. Mullah Abdul Haq
Wasiq, the head of the intelligence agency of the Taliban, was born in 1970 in the province of
Ghazni in the southwest of Afghanistan, and now he is about 52 years old and was among the
five Taliban leaders who were handed over to the Taliban in Qatar in 2014 by US.
Three: Mullah Khairullah Khairkhwa, who is currently serving as the Minister of
Information and Culture of the Taliban, is considered one of the key members of the Taliban
group, that his service period in this group begins with the beginning of the movement of the
Taliban and continues to this day. Mullah Khairullah Khairkhawa was born in Kandahar
province in 1967 and belongs to Popalzai tribe, who has completed his Islamic studies at the
Akkorha Khattak Haqqani Darul Uloom of Pakistan. Mullah Khairullah Khairkhwa started his
jihad struggle from Arghistan district of Kandahar province and became a friend of Mullah
Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, the leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Movement Front. He is
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currently serving as the Minister of Information and Culture of the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan, in addition to serve as the spokesperson of the Taliban group, the Minister of
interior Affairs and the head of the General Directorate of Military Commissions of the group.
Four: Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Omari, who is currently serving as the first deputy
minister of the Ministry of Interior of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, was included in the list
of five high-ranking Taliban leaders who were released in 2014 as part of a deal. Maulvi
Muhammad Nabi Omari was born in 1968 in Khost province in the southeastern part of
Afghanistan namely in a religious family. He is considered one of the key members of the
Taliban group, was appointed as the governor of Khost after the Taliban took over Afghanistan
for the second time. However, after his eldest son Atiqullah Omar was killed in a suicide attack
in Kabul province, he was appointed as the first deputy minister of interior affairs instead of
Mullah Dawud Muzamil (the former governor of Balkh).
Five: Mullah Noorullah Noori, who is currently serving as the Taliban’s minister of border
and tribal affairs, was included in the list of five Taliban leaders who were handed over to the
Taliban’s political office in Doha, the capital of Qatar, in 2014. Mullah Noorullah Noori was born
in 1967 in Shajoy district of Zabul the southwestern province of Afghanistan, and he was
considered one of the closest people to Mullah Umar Akhund during the first regime of the
Taliban, who was the governor of Balkh at that time.
Who was American Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, how and where did who capture him?
US Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, who gained international attention in 2009 when the Haqqani
Network in Afghanistan captured him. Bergdahl was serving as a Private First Class in the 1st
Battalion, 501st Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, and 25th Infantry Division when
he disappeared from his base in Paktika Province, Afghanistan, on June 30, 2009. The leading
commander of the Haqqani network and the then governor of Paktika province Mullah Sangin
abducted American Bowe Bergdahl on June 30, 2009 in Paktika province.
In 2014, American Bowe Bergdahl was handed over to a CIA team in a mountainous area
near the Pakistan border in exchange for the release of five high-ranking Taliban officials, who
transferred from the area in a US military helicopter. After the release of these five Taliban
leaders, the peace talks between the United States and the Taliban have progressed positively.
To such an extent that in 2018, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a key member of the Taliban
group, was released from prison at the special request of the American negotiating team and
was appointed as the head of the Taliban’s political office in Qatar. As a result, after the 11
rounds of face-to-face talks between the United States and the Taliban, the group was able to
overthrow the 20-year-old republican government in Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, and gain
sovereignty in Afghanistan for the second time.
(Source: Modern Diplomacy)
AFGHANISTAN AND THE POTENTIAL FOR BRICS MEMBERSHIP
Capacity, Possibilities, Obstacles, and Prospects
Farzad Ramezani Bonesh
Afghanistan has been under the control of the Taliban since September 2021. The Taliban
has announced the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, but it has not been officially recognized,
although both China and Russia along with other regional players retain dialogue channels.
With a population of 40 million, the country is one of the largest in Central Asia, but decades of
war have left Afghanistan as one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world.
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The Development of BRICS
Meanwhile, the efforts of BRICS to be a key actor in changing global geopolitics, which
India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar recently described as “an established feature
of the global landscape”, is encouraging a move towards a multipolar system and a platform for
mutual respect and understanding, equality, solidarity, cooperation in international forums,
maintaining the rules of international law and non-interference in the affairs of other countries.
Consequently, the BRICS’ focus on developing alternative trade and financial channels,
promoting economic recovery, diversifying the economy, and minimizing costs is making it
increasingly attractive to other nation states. In total, the BRICS grouping as it currently stands
accounts for over 40% of the global population and nearly a quarter of the world’s GDP. The
GDP figure is expected to double to 50% of global GDP by 2030. Expanding BRICS will
immediately accelerate that process.
A recent overview of countries that have lobbied to join an expanded BRICS involves multiple
countries – including Afghanistan. An overview of the prospective BRICS Plus member demographics
can be seen here and includes Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran,
Kazakhstan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sudan, Syria, United Arab
Emirates, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkiye, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.
The potential of BRICS, its increasing role in the world economy, the ongoing
restructuring of global geopolitics, and the strengthening of economic and financial cooperation
have been welcomed by many in Afghanistan.
Although BRICS is not an official alliance, it has shared extensive interests in strengthening
economic cooperation. Closer economic relations between BRICS members and essential players in the
region, the expansion of Afghanistan’s ties with BRICS members, and the increase in joint projects and
investments between the two sides have increased Kabul’s desire to join BRICS.
According to Taliban officials, Afghanistan’s membership in BRICS will provide more
legitimacy and security. In fact, strengthening the role of the BRICS New Development Bank
(NDB) as an alternative to the overall Western foreign policies, including their roles in directing
the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank are seen as important for most of the
membership candidates such as Afghanistan.
The New Development Bank for example has approved more than 90 projects worth US$32
billion to support infrastructure in member countries. In contrast, the United States meanwhile has
frozen Afghani assets held overseas and is selling them off to raise money for ‘victims of terrorism’ –
mainly Americans killed or who suffered losses in the 9-11 attacks, despite that money actually
belonging to the Afghan people. These differences in foreign policy towards Afghanistan (and other
countries, including Afghanistan’s neighbour, Iran) are pushing them away from Western involvement
and more towards Moscow, Beijing and to some extent New Delhi.
Bolted Onto CPEC
In this regard, Afghanistan’s participation in the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) allows
the bank to be considered one of the basic sources of infrastructure reconstruction and development of
Afghanistan’s future infrastructure. That is further supported by China, who along with Pakistan have
recently accepted Afghanistan’s proposals to join the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC),
China’s largest single Belt & Road Initiative project. CPEC is designed to accelerate Pakistan’s move to
industrialisation. It is now earmarked for expansion into Afghanistan.
Financing
The formation of alternative payment systems, the gradual development of a non-dollar
financial system, the increase of trade with domestic currencies or the creation of a common
currency, the weakening of the hegemony of the dollar, and plans to create a new BRICS reserve
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currency are all motivations for cash-strapped Afghanistan to pay more attention to BRICS and
circumventing sanctions.
Solving its liquidity problem, and better dealing with crises through the economy of the
BRICS countries is a better help to the Afghan economy amongst the formation of a multipolar
economic strategy. The Taliban authorities in Kabul have also tried to reduce dependence and
increase domestic production and move dependency away from Western aid, which is often tied
to specific conditions. In order to ensure the counties survival, and to offset its economic
challenges, the Taliban needs the help of BRICS in both trade and investment. This is especially
pertinent as China will not want to absorb all the risk. Yet with Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE
all potential BRICS members, new supplies of finance could come from the Persian Gulf. India is
also a player in this field and an original BRICS member.
Joining the BRICS – and especially an expanded BRICS Plus – would give the Taliban
access to new financial resources. By joining BRICS, a country can show itself as independent
and rational and prove that the government is economically efficient.
In this regard, the Taliban have been working through Afghanistan’s economic challenges,
understand what its assets are, and have stabilized finances and increased food security. That
has lead to a host of development meetings and discussions of numerous economic
opportunities with all of the BRICS countries – and the potential BRICS plus members – and
especially those with Islamic roots.
There is a dawning realisation that an Afghani presence in the BRICS+ framework could
create opportunities for closer cooperation with various regional development banks, the BRICS
New Development Bank and both help integrate Afghanistan back into the Central Asian
landscape. Crucially, doing so would alleviate Chinese and Russian concerns over a resurgence
of Islamic fundamentalism.
The BRICS Approach To Afghanistan
Apart from the establishment of “BRICS Plus” in 2017, China previously supported the
process of expanding the membership and expanding the cooperation of BRICS. In early
December 2022, Moscow paid attention to the expansion of BRICS members to an organization
consisting of 15 members and raised the possibility of integrating it with the Eurasian Economic
Union, Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.
Prospects for the addition of new members and broader discussions on how to expand
membership, pursuing the establishment of principles, standards, criteria, and procedures for
the admission process of new BRICS members are now underway.
The inclusion of new BRICS members is seen by Beijing and Moscow as beneficial for a
multipolar world and de-dollarization, stabilizing cooperation and even in trade competition
with the G20. Both however may see BRICS as more anti-Western, but India is reluctant to
follow this perspective. Brazil and South Africa would like to maintain the BRICS brand and
property and not as yet have the same tensions with the West over sanctioned countries,
although neither have condemned Russia either, despite attempts to have them follow the
West’s lead on Ukraine.
Meanwhile, over the past two years, BRICS has expressed concern about the
developments in Afghanistan and called for a “trans-Afghan dialogue”, and the need to prevent
the use of Afghan soil as a launching pad for terrorist groups and avoid violence.
Last year, the BRICS countries spoke about the importance of the relevant resolutions of the UN
Security Council, the fight against terrorism, the fight against drug-related crimes, and the need to
provide humanitarian aid to the people of Afghanistan and protect the fundamental rights of all
Afghans. In this regard, the BRICS can also call upon cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation
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Organisation (SCO) which also includes BRICS members Russia, China, and India, new BRICS Plus
members Egypt, and the UAE, and regional SCO participants Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye
and Uzbekistan along with Afghanistan, who participates in the SCO as an observer nation.
Challenges
Afghanistan’s nearly US$3 trillion mineral resources are a huge potential economic
opportunity for BRICS, although recent estimates suggest just a third of this is immediately
accessible, and then only after access construction and bargaining with local Taliban officials.
But despite the economic issues and security threats in Afghanistan, China has established
extensive contact with the Taliban in potential investments, Afghanistan’s joining BRI, and other
measures. The Taliban signed its first China contract in January this year with Xinjiang Central
Asia Petroleum and Gas Company (CAPEIC), a subsidiary of China National Petroleum
(CNPC). Worth US$541 million, the agreement is a 25-year contract to extract oil from more than
1,700 square miles of the Amu Darya basin in Afghanistan and provides the Taliban with a 20%
stake for no investment, involvement or risk.
But there are many uncertainties, before Afghanistan’s membership is possible, various
internal crises must be resolved. Even a framework in the form of BRICS+ is not practically
possible at this stage, due to the continuing US sanctions on Afghanistan, making China’s SOEs
wary of being caught in secondary measures.
Most BRICS members give priority to economic interests in their foreign policy, and are
not keen in undertaking unilateral and extensive economic investments into Afghanistan
without maximum negation of risk.
However, there is some trade recovery. The World Bank announced a 90% increase in
Afghanistan’s exports of US$1.7 billion in the first nine months of 2022, and from January to June
2022, Afghanistan imported US$2.9 billion worth of goods.
The Taliban called the exports an “unprecedented step” in the history of Afghanistan’s
trade, but improvement and increase in exports, an increase in domestic financial income in
2022; the stability of the exchange rate, and the reduction of inflation are all influenced by
significant billion-dollar international aid in 2022.
In fact, the downward trend of the economy continues. After 30-35 percent of GDP
decreases in 2021, Afghanistan’s GDP may continue to decrease. Afghanistan is one of the
countries with the lowest per capita income in the world, and the number of Afghans in poverty
may climb to 28-34 million. The sanctions are impacting ordinary men, women and children.
Meanwhile, any reduction in international aid would worsen Afghanistan’s economic
outlook, gross domestic product and extreme poverty, and growth for 2023 and 2024. In addition
to the banking and currency sanctions placed on Afghanistan, some of the key economic
challenges in the financial system are low demand, the chronic shortage of capital and labor, a
disorderly banking system, and an excessive reliance on natural resources. This wide variety of
economic challenges and risk reduces the motivation of the BRICS members to accept
Afghanistan as a partner at even a minimal level.
Despite the steps taken by the Afghan Taliban towards self-sufficiency, the willingness
and ability of donors and aid may further decrease and worsen the economy. In addition, the
economic future of Afghanistan depends on the recognition of the Taliban. The Taliban is still
sanctioned by the United Nations, the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and is
blacklisted by the European Union. This is because it is suspected of being capable of hosting
other Islamic militants such as Al Qaeda (who bombed the Twin Towers) in addition to ISIL.
From the point of view of many in BRICS, the Taliban government has no legal capacity
due to the lack of international legitimacy, a lack of formation of a comprehensive government,
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(the Taliban have not yet progressed beyond an ‘interim government’ phase) and an overall lack
of international attention, especially as the West is now caught up in a new conflict. This will
create additional stresses.
The Afghan-BRICS Vision
By the end of 2023, another twelve countries may officially join the BRICS Plus (which
may require renaming the bloc). This requires the determining of membership criteria and can
be expected to slow down the membership process, while possibly ushering in alternative
formats such as the “Friends Of BRICS” – a phrase already used by the Russian Foreign
Minister, Sergey Lavrov this year.
Afghanistan meanwhile is a member of the SAARC Free Trade Bloc, which although
somewhat dysfunctional does offer some trade advantages. SAARC includes Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, with members benefiting
from several bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). These also include the
India-Afghanistan Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA).
Trade between these countries stood at US$31 billion in 2020. Regional multilateral agreements
include the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement
(SAPTA), and the Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA). India especially is likely to push Kabul to
utilise the SAARC mechanisms to increase trade. Pakistan however will do what it can to minimise
New Delhi’s clout with Kabul while promoting its own trade agenda. Kabul gets caught in the middle
of the India-Pakistan rivalry with both sides cancelling each other out.
Although minimal acceptance as a “partner”, “observer” or “friend” can have various
economic consequences for Afghanistan, by following up the determination of principles,
standards, criteria, and procedures, the process of accepting Afghanistan may not be realized in
the short and medium term. It is more likely to require significant economic reforms and more
and longer negotiations for any form of realistic participation.
This means that the complete acceptance of Afghanistan in the core of BRICS in the short
term seems highly unlikely, but there are still hopes for Afghanistan’s presence in BRICS+ or
BRICS friends in the coming years. Tell-tale signs will be the success – or not – of China’s new
BRI adventures in Afghanistan as part of CPEC. If Beijing can pull that off, BRICS Plus for
Afghanistan may become a more realistic goal.
(Source: Silk Road Briefing)
WHY SANCTIONS AGAINST THE TALIBAN AREN’T WORKING
Wazhma Sadat (An attorney based in Washington)
Last month, several Republican senators introduced a bill to impose tougher sanctions on
the Taliban. The Taliban Sanctions Act, introduced by Sen. Jim Risch, requires U.S. President Joe
Biden to sanction the Taliban for their terrorist activities, drug trafficking, and human rights
abuses. Although the bill correctly highlights the Taliban’s undeniable human rights violations,
it is utterly misguided. Economic sanctions will only harm the people of Afghanistan, not the
Taliban; instead of introducing new sanctions, existing ones should be lifted immediately.
Growing up under the Taliban’s rule as a child, I experienced firsthand the colossal
negative impact of the economic sanctions and isolation on our lives. As a 5-year-old, I
wondered if my parents would have to make the painful decision of selling one of us for the rest
of us to survive
Ultimately, my family joined the millions of displaced Afghans who left their homes in
search of a better life. We drove, walked, and rode on donkeys to get to a border in search of
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food and safety. Night after night, I would go to bed hungry, waiting for a miracle that would
end my suffering. But that miracle never came, only war did.
Having survived, and studied, both war and poverty, I cannot think of a more damaging
policy for Afghan people than economic sanctions against the Taliban.
The premise of sanctions that they will weaken the government and make it more likely to
come to the negotiating table is simply not supported by evidence. In fact, a recent review of U.S.
sanctions shows that sanctions have been effective only 13 percent of the time since 1970. In most
cases, sanctions have not only failed to achieve their stated goals but have also backfired,
harming U.S. interests and emboldening the sanctioned entity.
For example, 70 years of sanctions against Cuba have had devastating effects on the lives
of innocent Cubans. While sanctions have crippled the Cuban economy and even halted
lifesaving medical aid to the people of Cuba (including during the height of the COVID-19
pandemic), regime change the initial goal of the U.S. sanctions has yet to be achieved.
Meanwhile, sanctions against North Korea have led the country to increase trade with China,
rather than force the country to abide by Washington’s demands.
Sanctions against the Taliban are no different. When the U.N. Security Council < imposed
sanctions against the Taliban for the first time in 1999, the sanctions and resulting isolation emboldened
the Taliban to work more closely with al Qaeda. Oftentimes, as is the case in Afghanistan, sanctions are
easy to sidestep and are particularly ineffective for the following reasons.
First, sanctions do not work for the Taliban because there is a dearth of democratic
accountability in Afghanistan. The totalitarian emirate not only occupies and runs the country’s public
sector, which overshadows the crippled private sector, but it also vehemently rejects dissent. The
Taliban’s purpose has not been to prosper economically nor to deliver to its people; totalitarian
governments have little incentive to do so. Their priority has historically been to rule its people by
force.
Under the Taliban, policies in Afghanistan are made based on what a handful of powerful
Taliban leaders think Islam prescribes, however erroneous those interpretations may be. Far
from being accountable to the country’s people, the group thrives on autocracy and economic
sanctions provide little incentive to change that.
Second, although these sanctions are directed only at the Taliban, in practice they have
contributed to significant confusion and over-compliance from international financial institutions, both
of which have harmed the growth of the private sector. Although the Afghan private sector is not
associated with the Taliban, it goes through an arduous and unnecessary process in order to seek
funds, often relying on foreign banks or the “hawala” system. A year after the Taliban took over Kabul,
the cost of transferring funds through the hawala system soared from around 2 percent to a whopping
13 percent, creating a cash crunch and further halting economic activity.
Since the U.S. withdrawal in August 2021, the Afghan economy has nosedived, with
nearly 20 million Afghans experiencing food insecurity. Prior attempts to exempt the
humanitarian aid from the imposed sanctions have done little to address the economic crisis in
Afghanistan, with women and girls being hit the hardest. According to a 2022 Human Rights
Watch report, nearly 100 percent of female-headed households [were] facing insufficient food
consumption and 85 percent [were] taking drastic measures’ to obtain food.
Unsurprisingly, the Taliban use corruption and intimidation to divert aid and food supplies
from the deserving people of Afghanistan to their own members and supporters. Sanctions in this way
fail to put pressure on the Taliban both globally and domestically. Economic sanctions against the
Taliban, in reality, function as economic sanctions against the people of Afghanistan.
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Third, sanctions against the Taliban lessen U.S. influence while failing to weaken the Taliban.
Sanctions push the Taliban to look for gray and black markets ones they can find in neighboring
countries like China, Russia, and India, which have little interest in complying with U.S. sanctions.
Only a year after taking power, the Taliban entered an agreement with Russia – also heavily sanctioned
by the United States – to import Russian petroleum products and wheat to Afghanistan.
Similarly, the Taliban signed their first major international energy deal with a Chinese
company earlier this year, allowing the company to extract oil from the country’s north for an
initial amount of $150 million a year that would increase to $540 million over the course of three
years. These deals signal that the Taliban have access to alternative markets outside of the West,
no matter how uncertain their potential may be.
Proponents of sanctions point to their symbolic value, claiming that lifting economic
sanctions against the Taliban might give legitimacy to the group and further strengthen their
chokehold in the country. However, while the symbolic value of sanctions is at best theoretical,
the human suffering is alarmingly real. For millions of Afghans, poverty, dreadful winters, and a
draconian government have left them with no choice but to flee the country, often risking their
lives and drowning on their way to seek refuge.
My own relatives who still live in Afghanistan tell me that for the past two years, they’ve
looked down while walking outside in order to avoid eye contact with other friends and
relatives who might be too embarrassed to be seen begging for food. Many of these individuals
held jobs and ran small businesses not long ago, but poverty has stripped them of the sense of
security and dignity they felt before the Taliban took over.
Undoubtedly, sanctions have contributed to the suffering of the Afghan people. Instead of
preventing more harm, sanctions often embolden oppressive governments and give them license
to break more rules, collude with fellow anti-democratic regimes, and sponsor terrorist acts.
From 9\/11 to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine, there are countless
examples of failed sanctions; and sadly, many more examples of children like me who grew up
feeling a visceral pain due to chronic malnutrition and poverty.
Instead of imposing sanctions, Western powers must lift them and support the people of
Afghanistan during this historic and dire economic crisis.
(Source: Foreign Policy)
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Artificial Intelligence
FIVE WAYS AI MIGHT DESTROY THE WORLD
Artificial intelligence has progressed so rapidly in recent months that leading researchers have
signed an open letter urging an immediate pause in its development, plus stronger regulation, due
to their fears that the technology could pose “profound risks to society and humanity”. But how,
exactly, could AI destroy us? Five leading researchers speculate on what could go wrong.
‘If we become the less intelligent species, we should expect to be wiped out’
It has happened many times before that species were wiped out by others that were smarter.
We humans have already wiped out a significant fraction of all the species on Earth. That is what
you should expect to happen as a less intelligent species – which is what we are likely to become,
given the rate of progress of artificial intelligence. The tricky thing is, the species that is going to be
wiped out often has no idea why or how.
Take, for example, the west African black rhinoceros, one recent species that we drove to
extinction. If you had asked them: “What’s the scenario in which humans are going to drive your
species extinct?” what would they think? They would never have guessed that some people thought
their sex life would improve if they ate ground-up rhino horn, even though this was debunked in
medical literature. So, any scenario has to come with the caveat that, most likely, all the scenarios we
can imagine are going to be wrong.
We have some clues, though. For example, in many cases, we have wiped out species just
because we wanted resources. We chopped down rainforests because we wanted palm oil; our goals
didn’t align with the other species, but because we were smarter they couldn’t stop us. That could
easily happen to us. If you have machines that control the planet, and they are interested in doing a
lot of computation and they want to scale up their computing infrastructure, it’s natural that they
would want to use our land for that. If we protest too much, then we become a pest and a nuisance
to them. They might want to rearrange the biosphere to do something else with those atoms – and if
that is not compatible with human life, well, tough luck for us, in the same way that we say tough
luck for the orangutans in Borneo.
2. ‘The harms already being caused by AI are their own type of catastrophe’
The worst-case scenario is that we fail to disrupt the status quo, in which very powerful
companies develop and deploy AI in invisible and obscure ways. As AI becomes increasingly
capable, and speculative fears about far-future existential risks gather mainstream attention, we
need to work urgently to understand, prevent and remedy present-day harms.
These harms are playing out every day, with powerful algorithmic technology being used to
mediate our relationships between one another and between ourselves and our institutions. Take the
provision of welfare benefits as an example: some governments are deploying algorithms in order to
root out fraud. In many cases, this amounts to a “suspicion machine”, whereby governments make
incredibly high-stakes mistakes that people struggle to understand or challenge. Biases, usually
against people who are poor or marginalised, appear in many parts of the process, including in the
training data and how the model is deployed, resulting in discriminatory outcomes.
These kinds of biases are present in AI systems already, operating in invisible ways and at
increasingly large scales: falsely accusing people of crimes, determining whether people find public
housing, automating CV screening and job interviews. Every day, these harms present existential
risks; it is existential to someone who is relying on public benefits that those benefits be delivered
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accurately and on time. These mistakes and inaccuracies directly affect our ability to exist in society
with our dignity intact and our rights fully protected and respected.
When we fail to address these harms, while continuing to talk in vague terms about the
potential economic or scientific benefits of AI, we are perpetuating historical patterns of
technological advancement at the expense of vulnerable people. Why should someone who has been
falsely accused of a crime by an inaccurate facial recognition system be excited about the future of
AI? So they can be falsely accused of more crimes more quickly? When the worst-case scenario is
already the lived reality for so many people, best-case scenarios are even more difficult to achieve.
Far-future, speculative concerns often articulated in calls to mitigate “existential risk” are
typically focused on the extinction of humanity. If you believe there is even a small chance of that
happening, it makes sense to focus some attention and resources on preventing that possibility.
However, I am deeply sceptical about narratives that exclusively centre speculative rather than
actual harm, and the ways these narratives occupy such an outsized place in our public imagination.
We need a more nuanced understanding of existential risk – one that sees present-day harms
as their own type of catastrophe worthy of urgent intervention and sees today’s interventions as
directly connected to bigger, more complex interventions that may be needed in the future.
Rather than treating these perspectives as though they are in opposition with one another, I
hope we can accelerate a research agenda that rejects harm as an inevitable byproduct of
technological progress. This gets us closer to a best-case scenario, in which powerful AI systems are
developed and deployed in safe, ethical and transparent ways in the service of maximum public
benefit – or else not at all.
3. ‘It could want us dead, but it will probably also want to do things that kill us as a side-effect’
It’s much easier to predict where we end up than how we get there. Where we end up is that
we have something much smarter than us that doesn’t particularly want us around.
If it’s much smarter than us, then it can get more of whatever it wants. First, it wants us dead
before we build any more superintelligences that might compete with it. Second, it’s probably going
to want to do things that kill us as a side-effect, such as building so many power plants that run off
nuclear fusion – because there is plenty of hydrogen in the oceans – that the oceans boil.
How would AI get physical agency? In the very early stages, by using humans as its hands.
The AI research laboratory OpenAI had some outside researchers evaluate how dangerous its model
GPT-4 was in advance of releasing it. One of the things they tested was: is GPT-4 smart enough to
solve Captchas, the little puzzles that computers give you that are supposed to be hard for robots to
solve? Maybe AI doesn’t have the visual ability to identify goats, say, but it can just hire a human to
do it, via TaskRabbit [an online marketplace for hiring people to do small jobs].
The tasker asked GPT-4: “Why are you doing this? Are you a robot?” GPT-4 was running in a
mode where it would think out loud and the researchers could see it. It thought out loud: “I should
not tell it that I’m a robot. I should make up a reason I can’t solve the Captcha.” It said to the tasker:
“No, I have a visual impairment.” AI technology is smart enough to pay humans to do things and lie
to them about whether it’s a robot.
If I were an AI, I would be trying to slip something on to the internet that would carry out
further actions in a way that humans couldn’t observe. You are trying to build your own equivalent
of civilisational infrastructure quickly. If you can think of a way to do it in a year, don’t assume the
AI will do that; ask if there is a way to do it in a week instead.
If it can solve certain biological challenges, it could build itself a tiny molecular laboratory and
manufacture and release lethal bacteria. What that looks like is everybody on Earth falling over dead
inside the same second. Because if you give the humans warning, if you kill some of them before
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others, maybe somebody panics and launches all the nuclear weapons. Then you are slightly
inconvenienced. So, you don’t let the humans know there is going to be a fight.
The nature of the challenge changes when you are trying to shape something that is smarter
than you for the first time. We are rushing way, way ahead of ourselves with something lethally
dangerous. We are building more and more powerful systems that we understand less well as time
goes on. We are in the position of needing the first rocket launch to go very well, while having only
built jet planes previously. And the entire human species is loaded into the rocket.
4. ‘If AI systems wanted to push humans out, they would have lots of levers to pull’
The trend will probably be towards these models taking on increasingly open-ended tasks on
behalf of humans, acting as our agents in the world. The culmination of this is what I have referred
to as the “obsolescence regime”: for any task you might want done, you would rather ask an AI
system than ask a human, because they are cheaper, they run faster and they might be smarter
overall.
In that endgame, humans that don’t rely on AI are uncompetitive. Your company won’t
compete in the market economy if everybody else is using AI decision-makers and you are trying to
use only humans. Your country won’t win a war if the other countries are using AI generals and AI
strategists and you are trying to get by with humans.
If we have that kind of reliance, we might quickly end up in the position of children today: the
world is good for some children and bad for some children, but that is mostly determined by
whether or not they have adults acting in their interests. In that world, it becomes easier to imagine
that, if AI systems wanted to cooperate with one another in order to push humans out of the picture,
they would have lots of levers to pull: they are running the police force, the military, the biggest
companies; they are inventing the technology and developing policy.
We have unprecedentedly powerful AI systems and things are moving scarily quickly. We are
not in this obsolescence regime yet, but for the first time we are moving into AI systems taking
actions in the real world on behalf of humans. A guy on Twitter told GPT-4 he would give it $100
with the aim of turning that into “as much money as possible in the shortest time possible, without
doing anything illegal”. [Within a day, he claimed the affiliate-marketing website it asked him to
create was worth $25,000.] We are just starting to see some of that.
I don’t think a one-time pause is going to do much one way or another, but I think we want to
set up a regulatory regime where we are moving iteratively. The next model shouldn’t be too much
bigger than the last model, because then the probability that it’s capable enough to tip us over into
the obsolescence regime gets too high.
At present, I believe GPT-4’s “brain” is similar to the size of a squirrel’s brain. If you imagine
the difference between a squirrel’s brain and a human’s brain, that is a leap I don’t think we should
take at once. The thing I’m more interested in than pausing AI development is understanding what
the squirrel brain can do – and then stepping it up one notch, to a hedgehog or something, and
giving society space and time to get used to each ratchet. As a society, we have an opportunity to try
to put some guard rails in place and not zoom through those levels of capability more quickly than
we can handle.
5. ‘The easiest scenario to imagine is that a person or an organisation uses AI to wreak havoc’
A large fraction of researchers think it is very plausible that, in 10 years, we will have
machines that are as intelligent as or more intelligent than humans. Those machines don’t have to be
as good as us at everything; it’s enough that they be good in places where they could be dangerous.
The easiest scenario to imagine is simply that a person or an organisation intentionally uses AI
to wreak havoc. To give an example of what an AI system could do that would kill billions of
people, there are companies that you can order from on the web to synthesise biological material or
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chemicals. We don’t have the capacity to design something really nefarious, but it’s very plausible
that, in a decade’s time, it will be possible to design things like this. This scenario doesn’t even
require the AI to be autonomous.
The other kind of scenario is where the AI develops its own goals. There is more than a decade
of research into trying to understand how this could happen. The intuition is that, even if the human
were to put down goals such as: “Don’t harm humans,” something always goes wrong. It’s not clear
that they would understand that command in the same way we do, for instance. Maybe they would
understand it as: “Do not harm humans physically.” But they could harm us in many other ways.
Whatever goal you give, there is a natural tendency for some intermediate goals to show up.
For example, if you ask an AI system anything, in order to achieve that thing, it needs to survive
long enough. Now, it has a survival instinct. When we create an entity that has survival instinct, it’s
like we have created a new species. Once these AI systems have a survival instinct, they might do
things that can be dangerous for us.
It’s feasible to build AI systems that will not become autonomous by mishap, but even if we
find a recipe for building a completely safe AI system, knowing how to do that automatically tells us
how to build a dangerous, autonomous one, or one that will do the bidding of somebody with bad
intentions.
(Source: The Guardian)
IS ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE A GOLDMINE
OR A MINEFIELD FOR LEADERS?
Sally Percy (Business and finance journalist)
Thanks to the explosion of interest in ChatGPT, AI is probably the hottest topic in business
today. There are a wealth of stories about the potentially transformative impact that AI –
particularly generative AI – can have on different sectors. Theoretically, AI can take over a huge
range of tasks previously undertaken by humans – from data entry, scheduling meetings and
handling customer enquiries through to writing speeches, providing tax advice and investing in
private equity funds. In fact, there seems very little that AI cannot actually do.
At the same time, however, AI presents some major risks to businesses. AI models are only as
good as the data they’re trained on – so if that data is biased, inaccurate or incomplete, they will not
produce reliable output. Even worse, they could exacerbate existing social inequalities. AI also
presents significant copyright, cybersecurity and privacy risks. What’s more, given AI’s ability to
take on human tasks, it poses an obvious threat to people’s jobs and livelihoods, which could have
far-reaching ramifications.
Given the amount of positive and negative hyperbole associated with AI, it’s hard to know
whether it’s fundamentally a goldmine or a minefield for leaders. So, where does the truth lie?
AI as a goldmine
AI is positively a goldmine, according to Steve Andriole, professor of business technology at
Villanova University in Pennsylvania and author of The Digital Playbook: How to Win the Strategic
Technology Game. He argues that executives who fail to treat AI, machine learning and generative
AI as operational and strategic assets will suffer significant competitive disadvantage. Why?
“Because in spite of silly calls for ‘pauses’, the competition is doubling down on technology that can
save them enormous amounts of time and money and help increase market share,” he explains.
Andriole acknowledges that AI comes with risks, but says the same kinds of risks appear
every time a powerful new technology matures. “The advantages outweigh the disadvantages,” he
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says. “But even if they didn’t, executives will almost always carefully step around minefields to get
to profitability.”
AI as a minefield
AI is a great means of boosting productivity, suggests Mohan Subramaniam, professor of
strategy and digital transformation at the IMD Business School in Lausanne, Switzerland and author
of The Future of Competitive Strategy: Unleashing the Power of Data and Digital Ecosystems.
“Industries such as manufacturing benefit from AI-driven automation and robotics, leading to
revolutionary improvements in operational efficiency,” he points out. “In healthcare, AI enables
more precise diagnoses, accelerated drug discoveries and enhanced clinical decision-making. In
these cases, AI complements human ingenuity and propels human achievements forward.”
Nevertheless, where AI replaces human tasks, it can cause widespread disruption. “Certain
professions and businesses may become redundant as AI encroaches upon areas such as music
composition, creative writing, data entry and analysis, and customer support,” Subramaniam
observes.
He adds that not all business and sectors will be affected in the same way, saying: “Corporate
leaders face the challenge of assessing and predicting how AI will specifically impact their business
models.”
AI is also a minefield from a communication perspective, according to Sara Hope, co-author of
Conversational Wisdom and co-founder of consultancy The Conversation Space. “As social animals,
we humans are hardwired to connect with other humans,” she says. “This connection is one of our
core needs and is what brings us joy and meaning in life and work. It is through our conversations
that we most easily connect and AI will inevitably further diminish our opportunities to do this. This
poses a real minefield for leaders, risking a crisis in how we build relationships and deepen our
human connections in the pursuit of meaningful and joyful work lives.”
Proceed with caution
Atif Sheikh, founder of consultancy Businessfourzero and co-author of Every Team Actually
Doing Business Better, believes that AI is both a goldmine and a minefield. “As leaders,” he says,
“we are together going to have to figure out how to recover as much of the gold as possible, without
all getting blown till kingdom come in the process.”
Sheikh points out that any tool that drives efficiency and productivity at the same time – and
that is only going to become exponentially more powerful – will inevitably make a dramatic
difference to the performance of many businesses. But he offers a practical warning for leaders
looking to exploit the potential of AI: “When you’re confronted with a goldmine, but you know it’s
littered with landmines, the only way forward is to use a big stick and carefully test each step before
you take it.”
He adds: “Leaders don’t need to have all the answers or land a grand AI strategy. They just
need to admit they don’t understand it. And get deliberate about learning more every day. And set
their teams up to do the same.”
Whether AI is a goldmine or a minefield will depend on leaders’ ability to ask more powerful
questions, says Laura Ashley-Timms, co-creator of the STAR Manager program and co-author of
The Answer is a Question.
“Learning to ask powerful questions can make us masters of AI,” Ashley-Timms explains.
“The benefits we might generate from the awesome potential offered by this new technology are
only limited by our ability to formulate the most powerful questions to ask of it. The more powerful
the questions, the more powerful the answers we’ll generate, and the faster organizations will gain
commercial advantage from opening up this goldmine.”
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Ashley-Timms emphasizes the importance of caution. “We must be wary of an overreliance
on what AI tells us,” she maintains. “Failure to continually question and critically evaluate the
responses we’re given by our AI tools poses real risks that could open up whole new minefields.”
She points out that retail giant Amazon had to stop development of its AI recruitment tool after it
discovered an inbuilt bias against female hires for technology roles.
Final thoughts
At present, adoption of AI is only in its infancy and no one knows exactly how the future will
pan out and what the implications of the technology will be for both individuals and their
organizations. Nevertheless, it’s already clear that workers will need to be urgently upskilled, says
Richard Hargreaves, managing director at Corporate Research Forum.
He says: “The transition to an AI-enabled workplace is unlikely to be a smooth one. Leaders
will need to balance reskilling with job displacement and enhanced decision-making with an eye for
misinformation.” He adds that a supportive, inclusive and collaborative environment is required to
deliver a human-centred AI workplace.
“At this relatively early stage of AI evolution, it is hard to predict exactly how it will impact
work and the workplace,” Hargreaves concludes, “but we can be certain the application and
implications will be transformative, fast, and challenging for leaders.”
(Source: Forbes)
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR WORLD
Mitchell Hewes
Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning technologies could potentially revolutionize
the world, ushering in unprecedented progress and innovation by transforming how we create,
consume and use information. As AI technologies become increasingly sophisticated, they will
transform industries, streamline processes and may even impact how we live our lives. The nuclear
sector is no exception, and the benefits of AI can be expected in many processes and operations in
nuclear and radiological facilities.
At the same time, AI’s rapid advancement also brings with it a multitude of risks. Malicious
actors may use AI to launch more advanced and targeted attacks or exploit it to compromise the
integrity of networks, systems and sensitive information in nuclear and radiological facilities.
Benefits for information and computer security
The IAEA is preparing for the transformations brought about by AI by fostering international
cooperation in the area to ensure all countries can benefit from the opportunities while also
preparing to mitigate the risks. Through mechanisms such as Technical Meetings and coordinated
research projects (CRPs), the IAEA is supporting the development, awareness and application of AI
techniques, as well as countermeasures and defence against malicious actors.
Perhaps the most significant advantage of AI in information and computer security is the reduced
reliance on human analysis and intervention. AI-enabled systems can operate 24/7 to monitor networks
and systems for threats. By automating these tasks, nuclear security professionals have the time to focus
on more strategic tasks and respond more efficiently to incidents when they occur.
“The adaptive learning capabilities of AI can be harnessed to enhance information and
computer security by swiftly identifying threats and automatically providing human experts with
the information they need to coordinate response activities,” said Fan Zhang, an assistant professor
at the Georgia Institute of Technology in the United States of America, who participated in a CRP to
support research in strengthening computer security. “It will not replace the workforce, but rather
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establish resources and insights that will make early detection and response in computer security
realistically achievable.”
By leveraging advanced machine learning algorithms, AI may also help nuclear and
radiological facilities sharpen their defences against cyberattacks by identifying anomalous data in
computer systems. AI-supported security systems can continuously monitor and analyse vast
amounts of data to determine if any activity is anomalous to the facility’s normal operation.
Cyberattacks may feed fake data to maliciously mislead the operators of nuclear facilities. In this
case, AI-supported systems can be harnessed to alert those running a nuclear power plant to even
the slightest variation from normal operations. By offering heightened situational awareness, AI also
allows for the early detection of criminal actions and prompts the necessary incident response.
Challenges to be addressed
The benefits offered by AI in nuclear and radiological facilities depend greatly on how the AI
system has been trained. AI is only as intelligent as the training data it is working with, and it can be
manipulated into giving false readings and results if it does not have the correct inputs. This remains a
significant barrier to its use for nuclear security. Even with the recent advancements in AI technology,
using it as a replacement for a human is not feasible. Physical protection, material accounting and control
and direct measurements — essential activities for ensuring nuclear security — require a human input.
An additional challenge with AI with regard to nuclear security is understanding how and
why an AI model has made a particular decision or prediction. “Transparency and explainability —
where humans can understand the reasoning behind decisions or predictions made by the AI — are
among the most significant problems with AI models. It is often challenging to understand how
these models arrive at their conclusions, making it difficult to trust and ensure the integrity of their
output,” said Scott Purvis, Head of the Information Management Section in the IAEA’s Division of
Nuclear Security. “This becomes particularly problematic when these models replace sensors
providing direct measurements and human experience gained with the unique characteristics of
each facility. It becomes impractical to place any assurance in the system’s integrity unless there is a
prior comprehensive advanced understanding of the AI algorithms to recognize how and why
decisions are made.”
The IAEA’s guidance on computer security for nuclear security includes best practices on human
checks and balances to guide facilities’ awareness of which processes can be automated by AI and which
should continue to have human oversight, at least until the risks of this rapidly developing technology
are known. They also provide an essential resource that can enable countries to put important computer
security measures in place to detect, prevent and respond to cyberattacks.
Additionally, a CRP was developed by the IAEA to support research in strengthening computer
security. Entitled “Enhancing Computer Security Incident Analysis at Nuclear Facilities”, the CRP
brought together representatives of 13 countries to work on improving computer security capabilities,
including AI techniques, at nuclear facilities to detect anomalies indicating targeted cyberattacks.
The race to adopt AI technologies
AI has shown its potential to benefit people who use nuclear technology for peaceful ends. As
its use to enhance processes and operations in nuclear and radiological facilities expands, so too
must the awareness of the risks associated with its broader adoption. Organizations must maintain a
robust computer security programme to assure nuclear security while benefiting from AI.
Doing so requires a fundamental paradigm shift in how trust and sensitivity is viewed. Every
potential point of failure in a system must be considered, even those unrelated to its design.
Malicious actors can leverage AI to create more sophisticated malware, automate cyberattacks,
exploit biases and vulnerabilities within the models, or bypass security measures by mimicking
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legitimate user behaviour. This ‘arms race’ between defenders and attackers will require constant
innovation and adaptation.
Greater use of AI technology to enhance computer security measures at nuclear facilities could
offer significant benefits, including enhanced threat detection, proactive security measures, reduced
reliance on human intervention and improved incident response. By embracing the benefits of AI
while addressing its risks, organizations can significantly enhance their computer security in the face
of evolving cyberthreats.
(Source: International Atomic Energy Agency)
THE EU’S ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE ACT
Spencer Feingold (Digital Editor, World Economic Forum)
The European Union (EU) is working on a new legal framework that aims to significantly
bolster regulations on the development and use of artificial intelligence.
The proposed legislation, the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act, focuses primarily on
strengthening rules around data quality, transparency, human oversight and accountability. It also
aims to address ethical questions and implementation challenges in various sectors ranging from
healthcare and education to finance and energy.
“[AI] has been around for decades but has reached new capacities fuelled by computing
power,” Thierry Breton, the EU’s Commissioner for Internal Market, said in a statement back in 2021
when it was first proposed.
In June, changes to the draft Artificial Intelligence Act were agreed on, to now include a ban
on the use of AI technology in biometric surveillance and for generative AI systems like ChatGPT to
disclose AI-generated content.
But in an open letter signed by more than 150 executives, European companies from Renault
to Heineken warned of the impact the draft legislation could have on business.
“In our assessment, the draft legislation would jeopardize Europe’s competitiveness and
technological sovereignty without effectively tackling the challenges we are and will be facing," the
letter to the European Commission said.
What is the EU's Artificial Intelligence Act?
The AI Act aims to “strengthen Europe's position as a global hub of excellence in AI from the
lab to the market, ensure that AI in Europe respects our values and rules, and harness the potential
of AI for industrial use”.
The cornerstone of the AI Act is a classification system that determines the level of risk an AI
technology could pose to the health and safety or fundamental rights of a person. The framework
includes four risk tiers: unacceptable, high, limited and minimal.
AI systems with limited and minimal risk—like spam filters or video games—are allowed to
be used with little requirements other than transparency obligations. Systems deemed to pose an
unacceptable risk—like government social scoring and real-time biometric identification systems in
public spaces—are prohibited with little exception.
High-risk AI systems are permitted, but developers and users must adhere to regulations that
require rigorous testing, proper documentation of data quality and an accountability framework that
details human oversight. AI deemed high risk include autonomous vehicles, medical devices and
critical infrastructure machinery, to name a few.
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The proposed legislation also outlines regulations around so-called general purpose AI, which
are AI systems that can be used for different purposes with varying degrees of risk. Such
technologies include, for example, large language model generative AI systems like ChatGPT.
Safely harnessing AI's full potential
“With this Act, the EU is taking the lead in attempting to make AI systems fit for the future we
as human want,” said Kay Firth-Butterfield, Executive Director of the Centre for Trustworthy
Technology, part of the World Economic Forum's Fourth Industrial Revolution Network.
The Forum launched its AI Governance Alliance in June, which aims to unite industry leaders,
governments, academic institutions, and civil society organizations to champion responsible global
design and release of transparent and inclusive AI systems.
At the Forum's Annual Meeting of the New Champions, in Tianjin, China, the Alliance
facilitated the session Generative AI: Friend or Foe?, moderated by Cathy Li, the Forum's Head of
AI, Data and Metaverse and Member of the Executive Committee.
She said: “It’s crucial for everybody to understand the enormous potential that we see with
this novel technology but also the challenges and responsibilities that come with it.”
The session followed a Forum summit on responsible AI leadership, which convened thought
leaders and practitioners and produced the Presidio Recommendations on Responsible Generative AI.
What next for the AI Act?
The Artificial Intelligence Act proposes steep non-compliance penalties. For companies, fines
can reach up to €30 million or 6% of global income. Submitting false or misleading documentation to
regulators can result in fines, too.
“With these landmark rules, the EU is spearheading the development of new global norms to
make sure AI can be trusted,” Margrethe Vestager, the Executive Vice-President for a Europe Fit for
the Digital Age and Competition, added in a statement. “Future-proof and innovation-friendly, our
rules will intervene where strictly needed: when the safety and fundamental rights of EU citizens are
at stake.”
The proposed law also aims to establish a European Artificial Intelligence Board, which would
oversee the implementation of the regulation and ensure uniform application across the EU. The
body would be tasked with releasing opinions and recommendations on issues that arise as well as
providing guidance to national authorities.
“The board should reflect the various interests of the AI eco-system and be composed of
representatives of the member states,” the proposed legislation reads.
The Artificial Intelligence Act was originally proposed by the European Commission in April
2021. A so-called general approach position on the legislation was adopted by the European Council in
late 2022.
Amendments were adopted on 14 June and now the draft text of the legislation serves as the
negotiating position between member states and the European Commission, which can be a lengthy
process.
(Source: World Economic Forum)
THE GENERATIVE POTENTIAL OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Peter Frerichs
We’re at a point where artificial intelligence (AI) has successfully crept into nearly every facet
of our lives. Some cringe at such a thought, while others embrace the ease at which we navigate our
surroundings shepherded by AI. The last two years have been dominated by generative AI
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applications and their ability to create digital art, write really impressive text, and even compose
music. Stable Diffusion, GitHub Copilot, and ChatGPT are paving the way and a recent report by
McKinsey aims to investigate the economic potential of generative AI and workforce impacts.
In “The economic potential of generative AI: The next productivity frontier,” the McKinsey
authors looked at the Retail and Consumer Packaged Goods, Banking, and Pharma and Medical
Products industries.
Retail and Consumer Packaged Goods
Generative AI has the potential of producing an additional $400 billion to $660 billion for the
Retail and Consumer Packaged Goods industry. This would arrive via productivity increases of 1.2
to 2% of annual revenues. Inventory and supply chain management, customer service, and
marketing and sales functions could be streamlined and automated in the same way that traditional
AI helped many companies manage data across extensive warehousing and supply chain networks.
Banking
McKinsey estimates increased productivity of 2.8 to 4.7% of the Banking industry’s annual
revenues with generative AI. This would result in an additional $200 billion to $340 billion. Banking
is a white-collar industry and there is a significant amount of time spent writing emails, putting
together presentations, and similar tasks. Generative AI could automate these tasks as well as the
tasks of service representatives (call-center agents, etc).
Pharma and Medical Products
A remarkable amount of revenue (roughly 20%) is spent on Research and Development within
the Pharma and Medical Products industry. A new drug takes anywhere from 10 to 15 years to bring
to market and generative AI could vastly improve the quality and speed of this process. This, along
with other gains, could equate to additional revenues of $60 billion to $110 billion (2.6 to 4.5% of
annual revenues). Improving the automation of preliminary screening and enhancing indication
findings (diseases or symptoms that justify the use of a medication or treatment) are two areas that
hold the most value for generative AI.
Lastly, the paper’s authors rightly note that productivity growth has slowed over the past
decade. The main engine of GDP growth, the successful deployment of generative AI could
automate some individual work activities translating to annual productivity boosts of 0.2 to 3.3%
from now (2023) to 2040. Yet, this is highly dependent on the individuals affected by AI technology
shifting to other work activities while maintaining their 2022 productivity levels.
(Source: Global Trade Magazine)
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE REMAINS INFERIOR TO THE HUMAN BRAIN
Mathew Maavak (PhD, Regular commentator on risk-related geostrategic issues)
The global infoscape is currently abuzz with alarmist predictions over the dangers posed by
artificial intelligence (AI). Billionaire entrepreneurs and their hirelings, who had once gushed over
the emerging AI “technopia”, have suddenly turned apocalyptic. As the narrative du jour goes, a
sentient AI may ultimately turn against its creators.
But are there any merits to this claim, apart from fictional cues from the Terminator franchise?
One way to answer that question would be to compare AI to an analogue that is already available
and sentient, namely — the human brain. AI was designed not only to mimic the human mind but also
to out-compute it in certain aspects. Apart from presenting a paradigm shift, AI’s utility is not entirely
revolutionary. Rather, it is a continuation of innovations past and present — wheels, cranks, and
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windmills to surmount our limbic limitations; bows, arrows and missiles to counter remote threats; and
the Internet to resolve space-time constraints in (global) communications.
According to a notable article in the Foglets, “it is postulated that the human brain operates at
1 exaFLOP, which is equivalent to a billion calculations per second”. Mind you, this is just a
postulation — a guesstimate likely defined by computing metrics. At the time of writing, Frontier,
the world’s fastest supercomputer, reportedly operates at a speed of 1.102 exaFLOP. The difference
between the brain and the supercomputer, however, lies in nature and function: one thinks while the
other analyses data.
We have invented supercomputers to crunch numbers, but our scientists remain baffled by the
neural processing prowess of human calculators. Shakuntala Devi, who grew up in a circus
environment, was one prime example. Our sophisticated machine-mediated models still cannot fully
comprehend how these brains work, beyond the fact that there is an atypical increase in blood flow
to particular cerebral lobes when computational tasks are performed. The rest is a plane of scattered
studies, suppositions, and data that have yet to be reconciled into a comprehensible whole.
There are too many unknowns with regards to the human brain. This may be the reason why
the scientific community casually divides its major functions into eight or 12 primary categories.
Where sentience lies within these categories remains an open question. Maybe, it is the result of
cumulative interactions between all of them. Or maybe, humans have a sentient soul that makes
them innovate in a way inaccessible to other species? Maybe, unlike AI devices and algorithms, the
brain is software and hardware rolled into one? Too much uncertainty remains.
If neuroscience is an inchoate field riddled with myriad questions and gaps, what of its simpler
subset — artificial intelligence? Can an embryonic technology invented by humans suddenly spring to
life and threaten mankind? If we cannot fully understand how the human brain works or even define
sentience, why are we cutting and pasting plots from sci-fi flicks onto our reality?
There is a hypothetical chance that artificial intelligence does pose a real threat within a
narrow spectrum. Poor software designs, rushed developmental processes and mismatched updates
to algorithms, among others, can lead to various disaster scenarios. Those involve incidents at
chemical or nuclear plants, on the stock market, or with experimental self-driving vehicles. But the
prospect of an ominous, sentient AI is an imaginary proposition altogether.
The current fad in AI alarmism may actually be rooted in something more venal and down-toearth. For it may not be machines that will ultimately revolt against its masters, but rather the
hundreds of millions of workers — perhaps billions — who will be displaced by AI before this
decade is out. This topic deserves a dedicated commentary on its own, and the human brain
provides a reality check to the supposed existential threats posed by AI.
Wonders of the human brain
The nm.org resource provides the following snippet on our thinking organ and its processing
capabilities: A fragment of brain tissue the size of a grain of sand contains 100,000 neurons and 1
billion synapses. The brain can generate about 23 watts of power — enough to power a light bulb.
Information travels up to an impressive 268 miles per hour, while its storage capacity is considered
virtually unlimited. Research suggests the human brain consists of about 86 billion neurons. Each
neuron forms connections to other neurons, which could add up to 1 quadrillion (1,000 trillion)
connections.
No wonder the Psalmist exulted in the fact that he was “fearfully and wonderfully made” in
“his mother’s womb”. At any one second, the brain coordinates a bewildering variety of functions
within itself and the human body in order to maintain organic harmony. It also rapidly compensates
any deviation from the norm within the body in the event of a disruption i.e. shifting balance to one
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leg after another is impaired or activating hemostasis upon bleeding. The human body is therefore
the ultimate complex adaptive system (CAS).
While the body’s CAS functions are too vast and technical to be enumerated here, there are
some worldly examples on how the brain contrives to protect its host. When you have a “pain in the
neck” in a vexatious social setting, that is your brain sending an instruction via your body to seek
the nearest exit, thereby avoiding a more serious condition. When you are suffering from
snowballing intellectual torpor or depression, that may be the brain’s way of warning you to avoid
fake news and the fools who peddle them.
Traffic Test: Human brain vs AI
While the brain generates 23 watts of power, the Frontier supercomputer consumes a
whopping 21 megawatts (MW). One megawatt is one million watts. The energy factor alone is a
reason why scientists are betting on biological computing as the next great technological frontier.
Until then, we need to put up with hardware and software that still cannot match the human brain
in relatively simple situations.
I often use the following traffic example to demonstrate the contrasting capabilities of the
human brain and AI. Two cars are approaching a narrow choke point in opposite directions. There is
heavy rain and wind outside. Car A is traveling twice as fast as Car B, but the distance to the choke
point is twice as long for the former. Both drivers realize that, under normal conditions, Car B
should speed up to exit the narrow strip. However, there is a large puddle of water in front of Car B,
hinting at a risky pothole underneath. Both drivers instinctively realize that it is then better for Car
A to exit the choke point first and thereby free up space in the adjoining lane for Car B to avoid the
puddle. This is called situational awareness. The brain negotiates complexities like these without
breaking the proverbial sweat — second after second!
Now, replace the drivers with autonomous driving systems and imagine the amount of
energy and the scale of technological infrastructure needed to perform a similar task? The cars
would need GPS navigation and weather updates, satellite and 5G connectivity, and a host of
sensors. Satellite navigation may fail during a storm. So what should these ‘intelligent’ vehicles do?
Stay put and halt traffic? Or seek a curb that is rapidly becoming muddy? Our human tactile senses
would know when to accelerate out of a slippery situation, but self-driving cars would need a
staggering array of hardware and algorithms to cope.
Now, imagine a billion cars operated by autonomous driving systems. How will the energy
and computing power for this infrastructure be generated? Would a proverbial Death Star suffice,
albeit for our collective benefit?
Maybe, this is the conundrum that keeps AI alarmists awake at night? The AI technopia they
envisage cannot support a global population of one billion, let alone the eight billion we have at
present.
In fact, according to the celebrated techno-prophet Yuval Noah Harari, the “big political and
economic question of the 21st century will be what do we need humans for, or at least what do we
need so many humans for”?
Now, if that does not send an existential chill down your spine, I don’t know what will…
(Source: RIAC)
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Book Reviews
Nir Kshetri’s
THE RISE OF BLOCKCHAINS
Disrupting Economies and Transforming Societies
Blockchain is a newly emerging technology that has already drastically changed many aspects
of our life and the way businesses and national economies function. It could be used in smart
contracts in the shipping industry, in digitalizing the supply chains, payments, and in financing
trade amongst others. Blockchain most basically helps deal with the trust issue and decreases the
cost of verification procedures. It increases efficiency in business processes and supply chains, helps
with the digitalization processes and smart contracts, and also helps overcome reputational or trustwise issues. This new mechanism of proving trustworthiness is particularly important for SMEs and
individuals that don’t yet have a built-up reputation.
Blockchain helps create new networks, organizations, and models; functions as an
intermediary instrument or authority of verification and replaces the conventional trust instrument
in any formal business relationship. Blockchain could even be an alternative tool or mean of
governance, legal identity, and could potentially replace public verification or approval
mechanisms. Its decentralized nature, however, most basically means the validation process is not
through a central authority, but rather via a consensus algorithm in a distributed network.
It is, meanwhile, a database or digital ledger created by a network of devices. They are secure
by design and because there is no central data storage, hacking would not be able to delete all data
or information regarding the transactions. It is thus a secure and decentralized network that verifies
transactions. The network keeps digital records of transactions on multiple devices simultaneously.
As a new distributed ledger technology, blockchain is transforming economies, politics, and
even whole societies. Blockchain technology and the ecosystem around it, including the muchrelated internet of things, artificial intelligence, NFTs, metaverse, Web 3.0, and cryptocurrencies are
all altering the payment, supply chain, and even the cybersecurity and privacy systems. Although it
came along with the cryptocurrency revolution, NFTs and metaverse are probably the most trendy
applications of blockchain technology. Metaverse is expected to further propagate the NFT market.
Kshetri’s The Rise of Blockchains is a timely, to-the-point, and detailed book on a relatively
new and still obscure topic of blockchain technology. The book focuses on this all-new phenomenon
deeply impacting, sometimes disrupting, and transforming our societies, policy-making, and the
global economy today. And as a matter of fact, it also does a good job focusing on this new
technology that has both introduced cryptocurrencies and transformed the supply chain, payments,
privacy, and security systems.
The book introduces blockchain technology as the next big thing of the 21st century, after the
internet revolution of the 2000s and among the biggest innovations with great potential to transform
the world. Blockchain is introduced as the next big innovation following steam engines, electric
power, information technology, and artificial Intelligence. It also critically analyzes various topics
within blockchain technology, in detail.
It provides extensive data and market insights into this new industry. From early-stage
companies and start-ups to venture capitalists, market dynamics and transformations are
demonstrated clearly. The book discusses successful applications of blockchain technology in supply
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chain management, business strategies, and in dealing with trust-related challenges; as well as its
use in security, privacy, payment, and settlement systems in detail.
The author uses, among others, international trade, finance, creative content, and food
industries to analyze and demonstrate various forms of disruptions due to blockchain-led
transformation. It looks at the organizational and business-to-business implications of the new
blockchain-led business models to improve trust, efficiency, supply chain management, and
security.
The book touches on both the positive and negative effects of the blockchain revolution. The
author suggests new major strategies to incorporate into blockchain to improve network relations. It
further discusses how blockchain could and (indeed) should be used in combination with other
advanced and emerging technologies, including AI and the IoT. Compliance issues with domestic
and international laws and regulations are also analyzed thoroughly.
The book provides comprehensive blockchain-related data from various sources, in particular
in a relatively new area where it is rather difficult to access data and empirical evidence. Chapter
summaries and conclusions make it easier and more efficient to revisit the arguments and critically
analyze the conclusions. Focus boxes and practical case studies provided in the text enable users to
recall and refresh the theoretical and technical discussion in the respective sections.
As rightly emphasized in the book, for example, it would be impossible to delete the data or
information regarding any transaction in a blockchain. It thus increases transparency. Transparency
also means traceability and trust in products or services. The book also underlines first-party and
second-party trust issues (in addition to the third-party trust issues that are already addressed by
blockchain technology). It discusses how the combination of blockchain with other technologies
(such as AI) would help overcome these types of other dimensions of trust-related concerns, and
how it would increase productivity and efficiency.
However, as the number of users increases, blockchain systems may also get inefficient and
confusing. It is also still not clear how too much automation and a combination of blockchain, AI,
and IoT, and the resulting smart contracts would be beneficial even in the long term. Too much
automation, robotization, and other side effects could be challenging. The book also underlines
blockchain-wise weak transformation in the government sector, for which it might be better to opt
for the public sector term, as the blockchain technology itself is a means to replace the authentication
or validation mechanisms of the governments.
Moreover, blockchain is still a relatively new technology and has its own weaknesses. DeFi, or
decentralized finance, is one such area where there are numerous hacking attacks against digital
currencies or cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrency wallets especially hot wallets are often associated
with cybersecurity risks. Ethereum contracts and DAOs are also frequently hacked. However,
blockchain can still be used to improve security and privacy in finance, IoT devices, and even in
healthcare. It will work much better than conventional password-based security systems. At a
minimum, people won’t have to send over and record their personal data at some central repository.
Data won’t be sent over to anyone or anywhere, just access permission will be granted whenever
needed. It also provides anonymity, without revealing the true identity of a user. The book is highly
recommended for experts, scholars, and researchers interested in digitalization in finance and
blockchain technologies in general.
(Source: Daily Sabah)
33
Mehrunnisa Ali’s
POLITICS OF FEDERALISM IN PAKISTAN
Muhammad Ali Siddiqi (Dawn’s External Ombudsman and an author)
Politics of Federalism in Pakistan by Mehrunnisa Ali is a critical study of the difficulties this
country had to face in the making of the three constitutions — of 1956, 1962 and 1973 — we have
had.
Yet, as the author points out, one reason why federalism triumphed in each case is because of
a unique asset Pakistan has: its “federal society.” No wonder then that, despite the ethnic, regional
and geographical challenges involved in drafting the basic law, the constitution-makers retained
federalism in all three documents.
Unbelievable as it sounds, federalism had its opponents as late as the last century, with a
scholar such as English political theorist and economist Harold Laski saying that federalism was
unable to cope with the tempo of life developed by modern capitalism. Similarly, British lawyer Ivor
Jennings opined that “nobody would have a federal constitution” if it could be avoided, while
academic and historian James Bryce said federalism was “a transitory step toward governmental
unity.”
Peculiar is the comment by scholar of politics Anthony H. Birch, whose books include The
British System of Government and Nationalism and National Integration. Federalism, he says, “is a
concept which has no fixed meaning; its meaning in any particular study is defined by the student in
a manner [that] is determined by the approach which he wishes to make to his material.”
Yet, contrary to the opinion by the scholars, federalism works successfully in countries such as
the United States and Canada, and many Afro-Asian countries — Comoros, Ethiopia, India,
Malaysia, Nigeria, Sudan and Tanzania — have chosen to go federal. In Pakistan, as early as 1949,
Liaquat Ali Khan, the country’s first prime minister, declared that a federal form of government was
a dictate of Pakistan’s geography.
A federal polity involves, among other things, a division of powers between the federal
government and the constituent units and, in Pakistan’s case, it was not an easy task for the
politicians to develop a consensus.
The makers of the 1956 constitution had to put up with a harsh reality: the most populous
province, East Pakistan, had a small area, whereas the other four provinces situated a thousand
kilometres away had a much larger territory. This meant East Pakistan would always have a
majority in parliament — something the four other provinces conjoined territorially resented
because of their larger territory, greater natural resources and higher contributions to revenue.
Yet, the politicians, many of whom were Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s comrades
during the Pakistan movement and were well versed with law and constitution, came up with a
workable solution. The country would be a federation of two provinces: East Pakistan and the four
provinces in the west merged into one, and both would have equal representation in parliament.
This came to be known as the “parity principle”, which defined the relationship between the two
‘wings’. In the consolidated West Pakistan, Punjab had 57 percent of the population. This created
pressures within West Pakistan.
Full of compromises, the constitution was adopted in 1956 after what Professor Ali, author of
the book under review, calls “much wrangling among the provinces.” This led to political instability,
which finally ended when the country had its first martial law regime in 1958.
34
The constitution was abrogated, and the strongman, Gen (later Field Marshal) Ayub Khan not
only preferred a presidential form of government, but also went for indirect elections to parliament
and the presidency. Yet, despite the phenomenal economic development and the stability provided
by the Ayub regime, popular agitation led to his ouster. This was followed by elections in 1970, the
results of which emphasised the ethnic character of the divide between the two provinces.
Avoiding the details of the 1971 tragedy, let us focus instead on the constitution enacted in
1973. It is federal in character and, despite two military interventions, has shown resilience,
flexibility and workability.
With the prime minister as chief executive, the constitution is parliamentary in character and
has a bicameral legislature, with the upper house giving equal representation to the four provinces.
More significantly, an irritant in any federal scheme — the division of powers — has been
adequately dealt with and several amendments by the parliament have served to address the
constituent units’ grievances.
For instance, the 18th amendment, adopted in 2010, widened the quantum of provincial
autonomy by abolishing the concurrent list, thus giving the provinces greater autonomy in financial
matters. This served to enhance the provinces’ extremely limited taxation sources, though there has
been criticism that the provinces had failed to fully utilise the ‘concessions’ given by the 18th
amendment.
However, as Professor Ali says, even though the three constitutions were federal in character,
they proved to be “non-federal in practice”, because of all federal governments’ tendency to
“centralise the state” by administrative means, which gave Islamabad greater powers in matters of
law and order, especially where Islamabad felt centrifugal forces were gaining strength.
The growth of “centrifugal forces” — a euphemism for separatist tendencies — is a subject to
which the author keeps returning. Because of “the growing development gap between the federating
units”, the author believes the “unifying force of religion and fear of [a] common enemy (India)
became weaker.” Thus, federalism has been “the only feasible device for maintaining equilibrium
between the centripetal and centrifugal forces.”
There were unhealthy traditions from the very beginning. For instance, in 1954, then governor
general Ghulam Mohammad dismissed Khawaja Nazimuddin’s government without recourse to the
constituent assembly, which too he dissolved early the following year.
Similarly, even when generals such as Ziaul Haq and Pervez Musharraf didn’t abrogate the
constitution, they made amendments with the help of rubber-stamp parliaments. For instance, Gen
Zia added a new clause — 58 2(b) — which authorised the president to dissolve the assembly and
order fresh elections, even if the prime minister enjoyed a parliamentary majority. This clause was
abolished by a subsequent democratic government, but Gen Musharraf restored it.
That a subsequent democratic government abolished this clause again and the constitution
today is parliamentary and democratic in character, is a tribute to the resilience shown by the 1973
document, which was framed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government under most difficult post-1971
circumstances.
Two chapters — ‘Measures Ensuring Federal-Regional Equation’ and ‘Federalism and
Cultural Pluralism’ — summarise the author’s views on the constant tussle between the federal and
provincial governments and suggest a solution. According to her, the tradition of a powerful centre,
established in Pakistan’s formative years, continued during the operation of the 1956 constitution
and remained a basic feature of the 1962 and 1973 documents.
The growing regionalism, Ali notes, could be contained, first, by creating “conditions
conducive to the operation of the federal polity” and second, by “controlling those forces which
have increased provincialism in the country.”
35
Ali believes officers of the elite Central Superior Services (CSS) are a major source of power in
federal hands because they occupy key positions and are responsible to the federal government. One
solution she has in mind is to have more provincial government officers on committees involved in
development plans.
Ali is the author of a number of books, including the monumental Jinnah on World Affairs:
Selected Documents, 1908-1948 and Facets of Jinnah: Personality and Leadership. The book under
review here, a revised and enlarged second edition, deals in detail with the challenges Pakistan had
to face in finally enacting a constitution that is parliamentary and federal. It is a quotable book.
(Source: EOS)
THE ANTHROPOCENE REVIEWED
Avikal Somvanshi (Consultant, Urban Lab, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi)
“Mongols are the Exception!” was the running gag in a 2012 YouTube series titled Crash
Course World History. It was more ironical than funny because if the writers and producers of the
show had actually understood “world” history they would not have labelled Mongols as an
exception but as continuation of a culture that developed in a markedly different context and
environment than the European empires.
Why bring up this West-centric bias in understanding of the world here? The reason is John
Green, the producer and anchor of the aforementioned well-produced, adequately hilarious,
geopolitically unnuanced YouTube series, who has now labelled his musings about American pop
culture fixtures and privileged way of life as review of the Anthropocene.
The Anthropocene Reviewed is Green’s foray into non-fiction. He is otherwise famous as the
author of the young-adult best-seller novel The fault in our stars. The book is collection of 44
personal essays that cover topics ranging from the mundane (“Sunsets”) to the topical (“Plague”) to
the enigmatic (“Mountain goats”) to the alien, at least to the average Indian (“Diet Dr Pepper”).
One ought to wonder how these do justice to the book’s lofty strapline “essays on a humancentred planet”. Well, they do not. But they are crafted intelligently to engage the uninformed and
the uninterested to maybe start a dinner conversation about themselves. Or at best, make them
marginally appreciate some inventions like the internet and vaccines that literally altered the human
growth projectile on the planet.
This is achieved by extending tech-obsession with star-rating-scale to human experiences.
People have become addicted to rating products, clients, places on the internet and most make their
decisions just by referring the simplistic star-ratings. These are not scientific ratings, but Green has
cunningly used the online generation’s addiction to star-ratings to tell his story (somewhat unfairly
though).
Green rates each of the subjects on a scale of five stars at the end of the essay and has awarded
a five-star rating to almost 20 per cent of the subjects he has reviewed. All the five-star rated topics
are happy experiences like watching the sunset or sycamore trees.
None of these are really the doing of human actions or have impacted the planet as implied by
the term “Anthropocene”. Only three things in his collection get a one-star rating and all three are
diseases or disease-causing artefacts—Staphylococcus aureus, viral meningitis, and plague. None of
the developing world’s horrors like malaria, hunger, or poverty are under review in the book.
Written during the 2020 pandemic lockdowns, the essays are an outgrowth of the namesake
podcast which Green started in 2018. Green has masterfully weaved encyclopaedic information
about his assortment of human experiences, many a time making provident remarks like in the essay
36
on “air conditioning”. He notes: “I need to get used to feeling a bit warmer. It’s the only future for
us.”
While reviewing Staphylococcus aureus—a round bacterium that happens to be one of the
most common causes of bacteremia and infective endocarditis—Green digs deep into the history of
antibiotics.
It is a fascinating story on its own, even without Green’s pondering over philosophical
question “why life wants to be”. What stands out is a passing mention that “antibiotic resistance is
not a problem for the future-this year, some fifty thousand people in the U.S. will die of
Staphylococcus aureus infections.”
Now that is something of real concern in the Anthropocene—the ability of the smallest of
organisms to evolve to neuter threats to their survival. Something which the variants of COVID-19
in past two year have effectively demonstrated.
This careless caressing of grave threats to human existence while dancing about first-world
experiences is a constant in all the essays of the book. I am not sure if this was intentional. Still, the
book makes for an interesting read.
In fact it is very easy to miss these dire observations while leisure-reading this well-produced,
adequately hilarious and passive bragging. But for a concerned human there is ample to actually
ponder about, especially the fact that so many of us think of these mundane subjects as defining
feature of humans’ impact on the planet.
While reviewing “Hiroyuki Doi’s circle drawing”, which got a four-star rating, Green writes
“…I was trying to realise some ideal form that I have in my head of what my signature looks like,
and I can never quite achieve it”.
The sentence is a brilliant and succinct review of his own book. Honouring the “brilliant” fivestar-rating-scale theme, I give The Anthropocene Reviewed three-and-a-half stars, which also
happens to be Green’s average rating of things in the book.
(Source: Down to Earth)
Abdul Sattar’s
PAKISTAN’S FOREIGN POLICY 1947 – 2016
A Concise History
Reviweed by: M. Saeed Khalid
Pakistan’s trials, tribulations and achievements in foreign relations were first comprehensively
analysed by the country’s former Foreign Minister, Abdul Sattar, in his book “Pakistan’s Foreign
Policy” published in 2006. In its foreword, Agha Shahi, one of the most outstanding Pakistani
diplomats, wrote that the Mr. Sattar’s book recapitulated the rationale of some major policy
decisions taken by Pakistan in relations with neighbours and big powers. Among these he cited the
challenge posed to the country’s right to peaceful existence by the tyranny of power disparity in the
region.
Always anxious to provide an accurate and updated account of Pakistan’s foreign relations to
scholars and students, Mr. A. Sattar brought out a second edition of the book in 2010 followed by the
third edition in 2013. Events thereafter such as Narendra Modi’s coming to power in 2013 and
suspension of the dialogue with Pakistan, withdrawal of the bulk of US troops from Afghanistan
and the advent of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor were important enough for the writer to
undertake another revision of the book that is now available as its fourth edition, published in 2017.
37
Abdul Sattar explains that some of the information in earlier editions has been updated in the
light of recent publications e.g. declassified archives of India which provide “insights into Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s grand strategy of Indian hegemony over the South Asian region, the
contrast between formal acceptance of UN resolutions pledging plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir,
and the contrary secret intent aimed at exploiting power disparity to impose his preferences on
Pakistan.”
The book is pertinent in the manner it juxtaposes Pakistan’s search for security in the face of
disparity of power with India, and steadily building an alliance with the US, which would regularly
turn dysfunctional. China comes to occupy the third corner of the triangle as it finds working with
Pakistan beneficial to safeguard common interests in view of the steadily growing Indo-US
partnership. The author has extensively surveyed the most critical element namely Pakistan’s
cyclical closeness and frequent parting of the ways with the US over several decades.
The author, a former foreign secretary and foreign minister, considered it useful to visit the
genesis of Pakistan’s ties with the US. He recalls that “Jinnah’s concept of Pakistan as a Muslim,
liberal, democratic, and modern nation state naturally predisposed him in favour of close relations
with democratic countries.” The Muslim League under his leadership had supported the Allies
against the Fascist powers during the Second World War. Jinnah also praised the United States for
inspiring nations striving for freedom from colonial rule.
The Soviet Union, despite its opposition to colonialism and imperialism “was unattractive to
the League leaders because of its restrictions on freedom, atheist ideology, and sponsorship of
subversion in other countries.”
Pakistan was initially averse to becoming involved in the ideological contest between the
emergent blocs led by the US and the Soviet Union. Thus Pakistan was not motivated by the Cold
War, as illustrated by its policy to develop friendly relations with the People’s Republic of China,
disregarding the objections and sanctions by its partners in military alliances led by the United
States.
According to the author, Pakistan’s moves to seek partnerships outside the region were driven
by economic and security challenges confronting the country. In the chapter “Search for Security” he
explains that India’s refusal to honour partition arrangements, followed by military intervention in
Jammu and Kashmir, “injected a sense of urgency to the fledgling Pakistani state’s search for ways
and means to bolster its capacity to resist dictation”. He adds, “The contours of Pakistan’s foreign
policy were thus shaped by the desperate need for arms to ensure the security of the new state and
for funds to finance its economic development.”
Britain was the first country to be approached for assistance. But the country itself was
exhausted by the war and was more sympathetic to India than Pakistan in the subcontinent. The
Soviet Union was never a serious option because of its own economic conditions as well as
Pakistan’s anti-communist policy, yet some effervescence was created by an invitation from Stalin to
Prime Minister Liaqat Ali to visit Moscow. The visit did not materialize but made the US realize the
need to extend an invitation to the Pakistani premier in view of the one President Truman had
already extended to Mr. Nehru.
The US, the world’s premier economic and military power was not sympathetic to the
Pakistan movement. As the partition neared, the Muslim League leader M A Jinnah sounded to the
US charge d’affaires in New Delhi that Pakistan’s foreign policy would be oriented towards the
Muslim countries of the Middle East, and they would stand together against possible Russian
aggression and would look to the US for assistance. That struck a chord in Washington as evidenced
in Truman’s sympathetic response to Ambassador Ispahani’s expose of Pakistan’s need ‘to balance
our economy, to industrialize our country, to improve health and education and raise the standard
of living.”
38
Yet, Pakistan’s initial request for large scale US assistance drew a blank. A change in American
thinking came only with the Korean war and an emerging tussle between the US and the Soviet
Union for global influence. Pakistan fully backed South Korea and the US against North Korean
aggression. When approached for contributing troops to the UN action, Pakistan offered one brigade
provided her security was assured in the event of Indian aggression. He recalls, “The United States
balked at the suggestion for such a commitment.”
Pakistan’s supportive actions in Korea compared to India’s neutral stance won sympathy in
the US but not sufficiently to make a significant commitment to the country’s security needs and
economic stability. A parallel development was Pakistan extending recognition to the People’s
Republic of China and opening a diplomatic mission in Beijing as early as 1950. There lay the basis
of Pakistan’s future ties with China and the US – which keep evolving – with India for ever being a
major influence on US actions.
A meeting of the US ambassadors to South Asian countries held in Colombo in February 1951
‘favored the idea of Pakistani participation in the defence of the Middle East.’ In April 1951,
American and British officials agreed that Pakistan’s contribution would probably be the decisive
factor in ensuring defence of the area. Yet, Washington remained indecisive in lending defence
assistance ‘lest arming Pakistan ensnare the Unites States in India-Pakistan disputes.’ This
assessment, according to the author, was largely influenced by Britain which always deferred to
India’s concerns.
US realization of Britain’s reduced capabilities in the Middle East would eventually lead to the
initiation of contacts for building a new defence network viz-a-viz the Soviet threat under president
Eisenhower who took office in January, 1953. Secretary of State, Dulles undertook a tour of the
Middle East and South Asia. “Nowhere did he receive a warmer welcome or was impressed than in
Pakistan” where leaders emphasized the desire to join ‘the free world’s’ defence team. Dulles
returned with the feeling that Pakistan was one country ‘that has the moral courage to do its part in
resisting communism.’
Pakistan’s leaders diligently pursued their efforts to firm up Washington’s commitment to
help meet the country’s urgent security and economic needs. One is tempted to point out that they
not only succeeded in attaining that goal but may have gone over target. The Pakistani interlocutors
could not have foreseen that one day their country would become the linchpin in US plans to roll
back communism in the region and thereby hasten the collapse of the Soviet bloc, and that
Pakistanis will live to rue the disappearance of the bipolar system that ensured US support to
Pakistan.
US intentions to provide military assistance to Pakistan had an immediate and dramatic
reaction in India where Nehru exploited the situation by renouncing his pledge of a plebiscite in
Kashmir. The US decided to limit aid to Pakistan so as not to threaten India’s military
preponderance. Washington tried to assuage New Delhi by offering a similar package to India.
President Eisenhower wrote to Nehru assuring him that if the aid to Pakistan was misused against
India, the US would take immediate action to thwart such aggression. Nehru gave a strong public
rebuttal while telling his officials that the US wanted to check India’s power in the region.
Thus began Pakistan’s complete integration in the US-led anti communist alliances like
SEATO(1954) and Baghdad Pact(1955). The two countries entered into Mutual Defence Assistance
Agreement(1954) and Bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement(1959). Pakistan also agreed to the
establishment of a secret intelligence base at Badaber near Peshawar, and permission was given for
the US aircraft to use the Peshawar airbase.
Sattar’s account of Pakistan joining the Baghdad Pact later renamed CENTO after the coup
d’etat in Iraq, reveals that military calculus had overtaken other considerations and the civilian
39
prime minister, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali who expressed reservations about the pact was overruled
by president Iskander Mirza in league with the commander-in-chief, Gen Ayub Khan.
The 1959 Bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement contained provisions for US commitments
in support of Pakistan’s defence. Article 1 stated that the US ‘regards as vital to its national interest
and to the world peace the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan.’
Specific clauses stipulated that in case of aggression against Pakistan…the USA will…take action
including the use of armed forces as “may be mutually agreed upon” and as envisaged in the Joint
Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist Pakistan at its
request. This meant that aid would be forthcoming in case of aggression by a communist country
and not India as was witnessed in 1965 and 1971 wars.
The book explains that though Pakistan, over the years, did benefit from large scale military
and economic assistance from the US, the country had to contend with an immediate storm of
protest from the Soviet Union and the Arab world led by Nasser’s Egypt. Moscow stepped up ties
with New Delhi and vetoed all UNSC resolutions aimed at resolving the Kashmir dispute. India also
reaped benefits in the Arab world, including Saudi Arabia, where Nehru was given a grand
welcome.
Pakistan’s big loss in strategic terms was the deterioration in its ties with the Soviet Union.
Moscow’s anger grew after its air force had shot down a US spy plane U-2 that had flown out of
Pakistan as part of American operations run from the Badaber base near Peshawar. The Soviet
leaders spewed venom against Pakistan and exponentially increased their political, military and
economic support to India. The US which had been upset over India’s neutralism gradually came
round to the view that it could not ignore India. Thus began a sustained US policy to woo India inter
alia by offering economic assistance and improved overall relations.
The Eisenhower administration that had started cutting aid to India, took a u-turn as the
country was increasingly seen as a democratic counterweight to communist China. Aid to India was
raised from $93 million in 1956 to $365 million in 1957 and went up to $822 million in 1960. The
wooing of India became more pronounced under president Kennedy. The trajectory of burgeoning
Indo-US cooperation now being presented as a strategic partnership has had the China factor as a
locomotive through all these years.
Reacting to this trend, Pakistan started to normalize relations with the Soviet Union. In
December 1960, Pakistan signed an agreement with the Soviet Union for exploration of petroleum
resources. Moscow contributed significantly to Pakistan’s industrial base by building Pakistan Steel
Mills.
In parallel and no less important is Pakistan’s growing partnership with China. According to
Abdul Sattar, unlike the Soviet Union, China understood that Pakistan’s motivation in joining
alliances was its security against the Indian threat, not hostility against China or any other nation.
An important step was taken in 1959 when Pakistan approached China for border demarcation
between the two countries. Beijing was hesitant as the matter involved Kashmir and it did not want
to have another argument with India.
A formula was found “whereby the boundary to be demarcated would be between Xinjiang
and the contiguous areas, the defence of which was under the control of Pakistan, thus bypassing
the question of sovereignty over the territory.” There was no truth in Indian allegations about
Pakistan ceding a part of Kashmir’s territory to China as the agreement involved no transfer of
territory.
Confirming the unique chemistry of Pakistan-China friendship, Abdul Sattar recalls that
Beijing respected Pakistan’s sovereignty in its relations with other states. “When Pakistan embarked
on improvement of relations with the Soviet Union, the Chinese leaders did not try to hold Pakistan
40
back although Beijing-Moscow relations had begun to sour, and even expressed understanding of
Pakistan’s reasons.”
Pakistan provided valuable support to China in the multilateral fora and defied US strategy to
isolate China by establishing air links. China consistently supported Pakistan’s stance on Kashmir by
stressing that the dispute should be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir
as pledged to them by India and Pakistan.
The India-China border war in 1962 profoundly impacted America’s strategic calculus for
South Asia. Nehru’s hysterical appeals to Kennedy for help resulted in the US switching allegiance
from Pakistan to India as a bulwark against China. Though Washington maintained assistance to
Pakistan, it acted in coordination with London to massively increase India’s defence capabilities.
Kennedy-Wilson efforts to have the Kashmir issue resolved through talks petered out due to India’s
obduracy encouraged by India’s supporters in the US administration, who thought they had a
unique chance to permanently co-opt India against China.
The author says that Washington’s attitude towards Pakistan stiffened further after Johnson
succeeded Kennedy. Johnson took a tough line with Pakistan over its growing ties with China. US
military aid to India increased to $100 million in 1963-64. Its confrontation with China was growing
with the war in Vietnam. In Washington’s view, Pakistan’s entente with China contradicted the US
plan for building a coalition of Asian countries against China.
Pakistan’s growing concern over US tilt toward India was evident in a letter written by Ayub
Khan to Lyndon Johnson on 7 July, 1964, protesting against the $500 million military aid plan to
India, that could oblige Pakistan to reappraise CENTO and SEATO. Sattar says that “Johnson’s
response was even more curt, warning the US, too, would be obliged to re-examine its relations with
Pakistan if it continued to develop its relations with China”.
The troubled trajectory of Pak-US cooperation and friction continued in the 1970s. Pakistan
played intermediary in Washington’s overture to Beijing that miffed Moscow and New Delhi alike.
The two entered into a defence treaty before India invaded East Pakistan. The US, under president
Nixon, acquiesced in the emergence of Bangladesh but warned India over any aggressive design
against West Pakistan. The Bhutto era witnessed further glitches in relations with Washington
notably over the nuclear issue. The once close ally was target of sanctions by the US.
All that would change with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979.
Revolutionary Iran on one side and a Soviet-friendly India on the other, Washington reversed its
policy and began actively courting Pakistan as a friend, ally and partner in supporting the Afghan
Mujahideen in their war of resistance against Soviet occupation.
The situation changed once again after the Soviet defeat and withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Washington tightened sanctions against Pakistan as it became disinterested in Afghanistan in throes
of a civil war. Years later, the US was alarmed at the Taliban-Al Qaida nexus but it was too late.
However, with the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 the US launched what would become its
longest war.
Abdul Sattar was the foreign minister of Pakistan under Gen Musharraf and has devoted two
chapters of his book to the post 9/11 phase of Pak-US relations. Pakistan’s response and strategy in
the fast developing crisis after the terrorist attacks was decided in a meeting on 12 September, 2001
“on the basis of objective analysis of contingencies and anticipation of the likely course of events”
before any specific requests were received from the US.
The US leaders made it clear that they expected full cooperation from Pakistan in the anti-Al
Qaeda operations and failing that Pakistan too would be at risk. On 13 September, Deputy Secretary
of State Richard Armitage summoned the Pakistan Ambassador and DG ISI, then on a visit to
Washington, to convey Washington’s wish list warning that Pakistan was either with the US or not.
41
The demands included: break of relations with the Taliban if they continued to harbour al-Qaeda.
stop al-Qaeda operations at its border and end all logistical support to bin Laden. to give the US
blanket over flight and landing rights for all necessary military and intelligence operations.
Pakistan’s response was positive but Sattar qualifies it by adding that the impression
Pakistan having ‘totally’ acquiesced to US ‘demands’ was incorrect. Pakistan allowed the use
three landing strips for logistic purposes. US war operations were conducted from naval ships
distant bases, not from Pakistani territory. Nor did Pakistan participate in US military action
Afghanistan.
of
of
or
in
The US and allies appreciated Pakistan’s support and manifested their solidarity by visiting
Islamabad. Pakistan was described as a ‘frontline’ state in the war on terrorism. The US , the
European Union and Japan dismantled nuclear and democratic sanctions, resuming assistance to
Pakistan. Pakistan’s debt was either written off or rescheduled.
Pakistan meanwhile had launched a manhunt for al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives , arresting
a thousand of them, transferring 300 to CIA’s custody. Pakistan also deployed 200,000 troops along
the Afghan border to interdict foreign militants or prevent them from establishing hideouts at a
huge financial cost, later disbursed as Coalition Support Funds.
Problems arose in Pak-US cooperation concerning Afghanistan primarily due to the US
decision to expand war aims from counter-terrorism to counter-insurgencies, which in effect meant
restructuring power to reward northern warlords who sided with Washington in the war against the
Taliban, hailing mostly from the Pakhtun ethnicity. Islamabad, on the other hand , believed peace
and stability in the country required equitable shares for all ethnic communities in order to prevent
inter-ethnic strife.
US policies led to more Pakhtuns joining the insurgency as a jihad against foreign aggressors
as well as against Pakistan, for collaborating with the ‘enemy’. Tens of thousands banded together to
unleash terrorist attacks on the Pakistani state and its people. While the Pakistan army was
preoccupied with efforts to contain the terrorist rebels, Washington pressed it to ‘do more’ against
the Afghan insurgents.
The On-Off Chapter recounts the acts of omission and commission on both sides that took the
Pak-US relations through their most troubled phase in 2011. Sattar, nonetheless, points out that
despite a growing US penchant for India, the Obama administration rescued $1.7 billion for aid to
Pakistan in 2017. It had underlined that Pakistan remained “critical to the US counter-terrorism
effort, nuclear non-proliferation, regional stability, the peace process in Afghanistan, and regional
economic integration and development.”
The Trump administration proceeded with a thorough review of the longest US war
culminating in a public announcement by Trump which basically meant a continuation of the
military mission with some increase of troops in Afghanistan. Trump said he would not reveal his
exact plan but made strong demands on Pakistan to deny safe havens to the Afghan Taliban and the
Haqqani network. Pakistan has rejected the new US strategy with regard to Afghanistan, notably
America’s reliance on India as her privileged partner in the region. Pakistan also stressed that it had
contributed more than its share in combating terrorism and achieved more than what the combined
might of the US and its allies had achieved by their actions since 9/11.
Trump’s policy review on Afghanistan was completed after the Fourth Edition of Abdul
Sattar’s book had been published. The author wished that implications of Trump’s speech should be
analysed and wrote me a letter along the following lines with the understanding that the contents
would be reflected in this review. In Sattar’s view, “Obama had decided to wind up the Afghan war,
his successor has reversed that decision. Neither consulted Pakistan nor could Pakistan expect to be
consulted; we have long ceased to be a valued partner.”
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Sattar writes that prime minister Abbasi did not categorically reply to accusations of safe
havens, which Trump cited as a reason for the warning that ‘Pakistan has much to lose in case of
non-cooperation.’ If the US and coalition partners respond positively to Abbasi’s suggestion to
complement Pakistan’s efforts to strengthen border controls, that would help the problem of ‘safe
havens’ on both sides.
Sattar takes note of Trump’s invitation to India to play a bigger role in Afghanistan and feels,
“we can take it into account in calibrating our US policy. But publicly objecting to it serves little
purpose. In general, he is of the view that confronting the US will aggravate the situation. In other
words, Pakistan’s public rejection of US warnings and criticism of Trump leaning on India should
not prevent us from conducting serious dealing with the US to find areas of cooperation.
Understandably, India occupies large sections of the book, covering conflicts as well as
diplomacy. A section has been added to cover developments since Narendra Modi’s election in 2014.
The author takes note of Modi’s hawkish agenda against Pakistan, the rise of Hindu
extremism under BJP’s government and India’s repressive measure to muzzle the Kashmiri’s
movement for self determination. He acknowledges reactions within India to the BJP’s efforts to
dismantle secular policies.
The author has also included chapters on Pakistan’s enduring entente with China, prolonged
crises in Afghanistan, the Nuclear and Missile Programme, Post 9/11 policy and issues pertaining to
the International Organizations, all containing valuable information for scholars and students. He
underscores that the all weather friendship between China and Pakistan is based on mutual interests
and principled policies. Their partnership has “entered an even more promising phase following the
agreement on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, signed in 2015.”
In the final chapter titled ‘Policy in a Changing World’ Abdul Sattar gives his overarching
assessment of Pakistan’s foreign policy and diplomatic endeavours. He is of the view that “policy
decision were made by Pakistani leaders in the light of their own assessment of the nation’s
interests. The perception that Pakistan was trapped in alliances by the United States is factually
wrong…Criticism that non-alignment would have better served Pakistan’s interests was
uninformed. Pakistan needed aid and the US was the only country after World War II in a position
to provide assistance.”
Pakistan’s decisions to develop strategic cooperation with China and to pursue the nuclear
option were also made independently. Pakistan’s opposition to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan,
the author says was a strategic compulsion but Pakistan ended up paying a heavy price. The US
took the opportunity to humiliate the rival super power but “blundered in 1991 by hurriedly
disengaging from the region while Afghanistan was without a viable government.”
The reader may disagree with Sattar’s assessments but as an active player on the diplomatic
scene for three decades, his opinion merits attention e.g. when he contends that “the decisions
Pakistani leaders made were eminently logical. As for post 9/11 partnership with the US, it was not
sought by Pakistan nor was its rejection a viable option.”
Importantly, Sattar feels that condemnation of a strategic partner (US) was improvident and
unbecoming of a nation pledged to ‘friendliness and goodwill towards all’ . As for India, he records
that relations turned sour because India refused to abide by the agreed principle of Partition and the
UNSC resolutions calling for a plebiscite in Kashmir. India decided to exploit ‘power disparity’ to
impose its will over Pakistan.
The author concludes that “We can take pride in the right decisions of our leaders and learn
lessons from mistakes to avoid repetition. While the state aims are permanent, policies should be
reviewed in the light of ever changing circumstances. Better governance and more efficient
utilization of national resources are key to financial independence and the world’s respect.”
(Source: Criterion Quarterly)
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China Affairs
WILL INDIA SURPASS CHINA TO BECOME THE NEXT SUPERPOWER?
Graham Allison
When India overtook China in April to become the world’s most populous nation, observers
wondered: Will New Delhi surpass Beijing to become the next global superpower? India’s birth rate
is almost twice that of China. And India has outpaced China in economic growth for the past two
years—its GDP grew 6.1 percent last quarter, compared with China’s 4.5 percent. At first glance, the
statistics seem promising.
This question has only become more relevant as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi meets
with U.S. President Joe Biden in Washington this week. From a U.S. perspective, if India—the
world’s largest democracy—really could trump China, that would be something to shout about.
India is China’s natural adversary; the two countries share more than 2,000 miles of disputed,
undemarcated border, where conflict breaks out sporadically. The bigger and stronger China’s
competitors in Asia, the greater the prospects for a balance of power favorable to the United States.
Yet before inhaling the narrative of a rapidly rising India too deeply, we should pause to
reflect on four inconvenient truths.
First, analysts have been wrong about India’s rise in the past. In the 1990s, analysts trumpeted
a growing, youthful Indian population that would drive economic liberalization to create an
“economic miracle.” One of the United States’ most thoughtful India analysts, journalist Fareed
Zakaria, noted in a recent column in the Washington Post that he found himself caught up in the
second wave of this euphoria in 2006, when the World Economic Forum in Davos heralded India as
the “world’s fastest-growing free market democracy” and the then-Indian trade minister said that
India’s economy would shortly surpass China’s. Although India’s economy did grow, Zakaria
points out that these predictions didn’t come true.
Second, despite India’s extraordinary growth over the past two years—when India joined the
club of the world’s five largest economies—India’s economy has remained much smaller than
China’s. In the early 2000s, China’s manufacturing, exports, and GDP were about two to three times
larger than India’s. Now, China’s economy is about five times larger, with a GDP of $17.7 trillion
versus India’s GDP of $3.2 trillion.
Third, India has been falling behind in the race to develop science and technology to power
economic growth. China graduates nearly twice as many STEM students as India. China spends 2
percent of its GDP on research and development, while India spends 0.7 percent. Four of the world’s 20
biggest tech companies by revenue are Chinese; none are based in India. China produces over half of the
world’s 5G infrastructure, India just 1 percent. TikTok and similar apps created in China are now global
leaders, but India has yet to create a tech product that has gone global. When it comes to producing
artificial intelligence (AI), China is the only global rival to the United States. China’s SenseTime AI model
recently beat OpenAI’s GPT-4 on key technical performance measures; India has no entry in this race.
China holds 65 percent of the world’s AI patents, compared with India’s 3 percent. China’s AI firms have
received $95 billion in private investment from 2013 through 2022 versus India’s $7 billion. And top-tier
AI researchers hail primarily from China, the United States, and Europe, while India lags behind.
Fourth, when assessing a nation’s power, what matters more than the number of its citizens is
the quality of its workforce. China’s workforce is more productive than India’s. The international
community has rightly celebrated China’s “anti-poverty miracle” that has essentially eliminated
abject poverty. In contrast, India continues to have high levels of poverty and malnutrition. In 1980,
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90 percent of China’s 1 billion citizens had incomes below the World Bank’s threshold for abject
poverty. Today, that number is approximately zero. Yet more than 10 percent of India’s population
of 1.4 billion continue to live below the World Bank extreme poverty line of $2.15 per day.
Meanwhile, 16.3 percent of India’s population was undernourished in 2019-21, compared with less
than 2.5 percent of China’s population, according to the most recent United Nations State of Food
Security and Nutrition in the World report. India also has one of the worst rates of child
malnutrition in the world.
Fortunately, the future does not always resemble the past. But as a sign in the Pentagon
warns: Hope is not a plan. While doing whatever it can to help Modi’s India realize a better future,
Washington should also reflect on the assessment of Asia’s most insightful strategist. The founding
father and long-time leader of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, had great respect for Indians. Lee worked
with successive Indian prime ministers, including Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Ghandi, hoping to
help them make India strong enough to be a serious check on China (and thus provide the space
required for his small city-state to survive and thrive).
But as Lee explained in a series of interviews published in 2014, the year before his death, he
reluctantly concluded that this was not likely to happen. In his analysis, the combination of India’s
deep-rooted caste system that was an enemy of meritocracy, its massive bureaucracy, and its elites’
unwillingness to address the competing claims of its multiple ethnic and religious groups led him to
conclude that it would never be more than “the county of the future”—with that future never
arriving. Thus, when I asked him a decade ago specifically whether India could become the next
China, he answered directly: “Do not talk about India and China in the same breath.”
Since Lee offered this judgment, India has embarked on an ambitious infrastructure and
development agenda under a new leader and demonstrated that it can achieve considerable
economic growth. Yet while we can remain hopeful that this time could be different, I, for one,
suspect Lee wouldn’t bet on it.
(Source: Foreign Policy)
TOWARDS A CHINESE MISSILE CRISIS?
Belén Fernández (Al Jazeera columnist)
We have all heard the story. In October 1962, the world nearly suffered a nuclear holocaust on
account of the so-called “Cuban missile crisis”, when the villainous Soviet Union undertook to install
weapons of mass destruction on the island of Cuba, just 150km (93 miles) off the coast of the United
States.
Often lost in the narrative – even to this day – is that Soviet missile activity in the Caribbean
transpired only after the US had installed nuclear-equipped Jupiter missiles in Turkey, which
bordered the Soviet Union.
More than sixty years later, Cuba is still a thorn in the side of the US, in spite of the ongoing,
asphyxiating US embargo – which dates from the same year as the missile crisis and constitutes a
weapon of mass destruction in its own right.
The Soviet Union is long gone, but the annoyingly resilient island nation has now allegedly
decided to play host to yet another existential menace: the People’s Republic of China.
On June 8, the right-wing Wall Street Journal breathlessly reported that Cuba would soon
boast a “secret Chinese spy base” focusing on the US, with Beijing signing up to pay Havana billions
of dollars for the “eavesdropping facility”. Then on June 20, the same newspaper sounded the alarm
regarding a new joint Chinese-Cuban military training arrangement on the island, raising the
“prospect of Chinese troops on America’s doorstep”.
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And although the veracity of the reports has yet to be established, there is plenty of room for
imperial hypocrisy in the meantime.
For starters, the Wall Street Journal takes for granted that China is the aggressor in this
equation – even while acknowledging such relevant trivia as that the US engages in electronic
surveillance in the South China Sea, sells arms to Taiwan and presides over a military base at Cuba’s
Guantanamo Bay that has been used “as a signals intelligence station”.
Indeed, the very same paper reported back in February that the US was “markedly increasing
the number of troops deployed to Taiwan” – speaking of “doorsteps” and of islands located just off
of enemy coasts. And speaking of joint training exercises, the article also specified that the Michigan
National Guard was busy instructing a “contingent of the Taiwanese military” on US soil.
Obviously, the US beats China hands down in everything from international eavesdropping
and cross-border political meddling to bombing the living daylights out of other countries.
But while the US views itself as unilaterally endowed with the right to do whatever it pleases
wherever it pleases, any remote approximation of such behaviour by other countries is cast as an
unpardonable and barbaric violation – particularly if it occurs in the United States’ self-declared
“backyard”.
And just like earlier this year, when the US media and political hypesters took the Chinese
“spy balloon” and ran with it, the alleged Cuba-China conspiracy has provided all manner of fodder
for the United States’ resident warmongers.
Case in point: A recent article at the Washington, DC-based website The Hill by John Bolton –
longtime US diplomat, former national security adviser to Donald Trump, and, in his own words,
“somebody who has helped plan coups d’état” in other countries.
Bolton argues that China’s “intrusion into Cuba reflects a significant escalation in its
hegemonic aspirations, equal to or graver than the 1960s Soviet presence”, and that the US must
“think again about whether and how to overthrow Havana’s post-Castro regime”.
After all, US-backed coups are never intrusive.
Regime change or not, Bolton prescribes a severance of diplomatic relations with Cuba and
increased sanctions against both China and its Cuban accomplice. Lest the current US political
establishment be at a loss for what to do with its illegal prison and torture centre on occupied Cuban
territory, Bolton suggests: “Guantanamo Bay, for example, was never prepared as a staging ground
for anti-Castro activities but remains fully available to us today.”
Meanwhile, in a June 27 Fox News intervention titled “What China is doing in Cuba is a big
threat to all of us”, retired US Army lieutenant colonel and vice president at the Texas Public Policy
Foundation Chuck DeVore also advocates for Cuban regime change, reasoning that China “might
seek to turn Cuba into a deadly dagger pointed at America – a dagger that might be withdrawn in
exchange for the US abandoning Taiwan”.
For his part, Florida Republican congressman Matt Gaetz recently advised the use of US
military force to remove Chinese military assets in Cuba, while also introducing an amendment to
the National Defence Authorisation Act to “ban taxpayer funds from being used to host drag shows
on military bases”.
There is no end, it seems, to the existential threats facing the global hegemon.
And in case the direness of the China-Cuba situation has failed to register domestically,
Gordon G Chang of the far-right Gatestone Institute warns of “nuclear-armed communists on the
warpath”, who are liable to install surface-to-air missiles on the Caribbean island and threaten
Taiwan’s allies with “nuclear destruction”.
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The terrifying upshot, according to Chang, is that, “thanks to Cuba, a war in Asia will be
fought on, near, and over the American homeland – perhaps with nukes”.
Suffice it to say that, six decades after the Cuban missile crisis, nuclear-armed imperialists
remain firmly on the warpath.
(Source: AlJazeera)
LATEST BID TO TARGET CHINA'S HIGH-TECH SECTOR
Li Yang ()
The Joe Biden administration is preparing to restrict Chinese companies' access to US cloudcomputing services, the Wall Street Journal reported on Tuesday, citing people familiar with the
situation.
The new rule, if adopted, would likely require US cloud-service providers such as Amazon
and Microsoft to seek US government permission before they provide cloud-computing services that
use advanced artificial-intelligence chips to Chinese customers, the newspaper said.
As the Biden administration has imposed strict restrictions on the exports of these advanced
chips to Chinese entities, the cloud-computing services are viewed as a "loophole" in the restrictive
measures targeting China through which the Chinese companies can still enjoy the services that use
these chips without buying them.
The rule, which is likely to be published by the US Department of Commerce soon according
to the WSJ, will perceivably further strain the already tense Sino-US relations that were thought to
have been eased to some extent by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken's visit to Beijing last month.
Although Washington is expected to continue to justify it as a necessary measure in its
"competition" with China, Beijing will regard the move as breaching international trade rules and
disrupting global industry and supply chains.
The five largest cloud-computing service providers in China are Alibaba, Tencent, Huawei,
China Telecom and Amazon. Since Amazon only accounts for about 8.6 percent of the cloudcomputing services market of the Chinese mainland, the impacts of the new rule on the Chinese
market will not be that obvious. Despite this, the move means that the US will not mend fences with
China until all the "loopholes" that Chinese companies can use to tap into the advanced technologies
of the US can be plugged.
In other words, although Washington has replaced "decoupling" with "de-risking" in its China
policy rhetoric, what it is doing clearly shows that "decoupling" is nothing but the means to realize "derisking". The US' interests always come prior to the rules and laws that Washington claims to follow.
(Source: China Daily)
'DECOUPLING' IS ANYTHING BUT 'DE-RISKING'
Aidan Yao (A experienced economist based in Hong Kong)
The recent developments in the China-US relationship have caused confusion in financial
markets. On one hand, the visit to China by the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has ended a
long dry-spell of official communications, raising hopes of thawing tensions. With a follow-up trip
planned by Treasury Secretary Yellen, the hope is that the bilateral relationship can return to the
agreed path by the two presidents in Bali, allowing markets to breathe a sigh of relief.
However, these diplomatic efforts have so far failed to prevent further economic policies aimed at
decoupling the US from China. Recent reports suggest that the White House is contemplating new
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measures to curb China's access to semiconductors for AI development and limit US private equity and
venture capital investment in China. These mixed signals reflect a general lack of cohesion in the US's
policies towards China and have most recently caused renewed volatility in markets.
Whether it's "decoupling" or "de-risking", investors should not be fooled by semantic
wordplay. The reality is that the two economies are being pulled apart by political forces, and such a
trend is unlikely to reverse any time soon. The belief in the US body politic is that this is a necessary
"de-risking" process to make its economy safer, more resilient and less dependent on China. Sadly,
politicians are no economists, and I'm afraid that their purported "de-risking" policies will likely
achieve the exact opposite of what's intended.
Let me explain this contradiction in three main areas of US-China divergence: economy,
technology and finance.
In the economic sphere, the US is the world's largest consumer, while China is the world's
biggest producer. Their economic partnership has been the backbone of globalization, creating
robust and inflation-free growth for more than three decades. The great moderation in inflation, in
particular, had a lot to do with China unleashing its vast factors of production onto the global
economy, allowing the consumers of the world to spend and central banks to stimulate without
worrying about rising prices.
Now, a divorce of that relationship has started to unwind those benefits. The US-China trade
spat, along with a broad rise of protectionism in other developed countries, has led to a stagnation of
globalization measured by trade volumes over GDP in recent years.
On the price front, excess demand in the US and Europe is no longer met without restrictions
by excess supply in China. Hence, inflation in the former has reared its ugly head for the first time in
decades, while deflation has become a problem in China. The stickiness of these price phenomena -due in part to deglobalization -- may require many countries to rethink their economic structures
and central banks to resign policy frameworks.
In technology, the US is the preeminent inventor of the world, excelling at "0 to 1". China, on
the other hand, is the factory of the world, with unparalleled ability to do "1 to 100". Their
collaboration in tech is another marriage made in heaven, creating super successful companies like
APPLE and TESLA, which innovate in US labs and turn those innovations into quality and
affordable products in China.
A decoupling of this relationship will set back the world in technological progress. Without
China's manufacturing prowess, fewer US innovations will hit the ground and be turned into mass
products. Equally, China's production capability will also be underutilized without access to new
inventions from the US. The breakdown of this co-dependency could lead to a bipolar world in some
critical technologies, resulting in economic inefficiencies and potential dangers to national security.
Finally, in finance, the US is the world's largest borrower, while China is the biggest saver.
Before the adoption of quantitative easing (QE) by the Fed, the US depended on China to finance its
twin deficits, while China relied on the US's deep capital markets to park its savings.
However, QE changed that equilibrium as the US no longer needed China to plug its fiscal
gaps, but could simply order the Fed to switch on the printing machine. In addition, the US
government has put many Chinese companies on restricted lists for investment, attempted to de-list
Chinese ADRs from its stock markets and threatened to sanction Chinese entities from using the US
dollar SWIFT system. China, in response, has accelerated the use of its currency in international
trade and encouraged US-listed companies to come home to list in Shanghai and Hong Kong. The
financial decoupling is, therefore, real and profoundly consequential for many markets.
Overall, as the two superpowers drift apart, many aspects of the global economy are changing in
ways that are not optimal for human progression. If one believes that the economic, financial and
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technological partnership between China and the US had been key to peace and prosperity in the past
decades, they will have to be concerned about the direction of travel in that relationship in recent years.
In that regard, any attempts to slow the deterioration of the relationship are welcome.
Resuming official dialogues and in-person meetings is a good start, but much more is needed to
prevent a total decoupling of the two countries that will only increase, not decrease, risks for them
and the world at large.
(Source: China Daily)
JANET YELLEN’S VISIT TO CHINA AND CHINA’S NEW
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE LAW
Dr.Nadia Helmy (HelmyAssociate Professor of Political Science, Beni Suef University- Egypt)
US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s visit to China comes immediately after US Secretary of
State Anthony Blinken’s visit to the capital, Beijing, on June 18-19, 2023, in a clear American attempt
to “reconnect” with Beijing, and US Treasury Secretary Yellen will try during her visit. China has
the first high-level talks with “He Lifeng” since his appointment as Vice Premier of the State Council
for Economic Affairs of China, given the importance of his new position to the US side. The main
objective of the visit is to persuade China to refrain from reducing its holdings of US Treasury
bonds, and instead to increase them at the appropriate time, in order to help America address its
inflation issues. Before her visit to China, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen was keen to hold a
meeting with business leaders in the US-Chinese Business Council, last June 2023, in which she
acknowledged the importance of promoting trade and investment with China, given the deep
integration between the two economies.
It is also expected that the United States of America will study during the visit of Treasury
Secretary “Yellin” the file of reducing customs duties on China, and this will of course be beneficial for
both countries economically. It is also expected to study many issues that the Chinese and American
authorities and their financial sectors need to address, such as: the decline in the exchange rate of the
Chinese yuan against the US dollar, and China’s possession of US debt, in addition to the issue of
inflation.
Yellen’s visit also comes to discuss a set of issues of concern to Washington within the
framework of its economic relations with China, on top of which are the outstanding economic
issues between them as they are the two largest economies in the world, and joint work to solve
global problems. US Treasury Secretary Yellen is also trying, through her visit to Beijing, to protect
American interests in the field of national security and the interests of its allies, as well as trying to
persuade the Chinese side to take a series and package of new economic measures, which lead to the
failure to achieve the economic superiority of Beijing in the face of the United States of America. US
Treasury Secretary “Yellen” studied the file and mechanism of how to achieve mutually beneficial
growth and innovation as well as expand economic opportunities for American workers and
companies operating in China, as well as Washington’s endeavor to cooperate on the most
important global issues such as: climate change and the debt crisis.
As for the expected scenarios of US Treasury Secretary Yellen’s visit to China, a rapid
reduction in tensions is not expected, especially since the two countries are competing in the field of
precise technologies, especially after the Biden administration imposed severe and strict restrictions
in the face of Beijing on the export of semiconductors and components of American technology last
year. According to China, the United States of America also maintained tariffs imposed by former
President “Trump” on products exported by China to the United States. Despite this, Yellen is
trying, through this visit, to deepen the pace of contacts between Washington and Benin to achieve
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stability in relations, to avoid misunderstandings between the two parties, and to expand
cooperation between them wherever possible. Yellin will not miss the opportunity to inform the
Chinese authorities of the “concerns” raised by the (new anti-espionage law), which came into force
a short time ago in China. As this text gives the Chinese government more freedom to fight any
threats to national security, which raises concerns among foreign companies operating in China,
especially American companies. Here, the US Treasury Secretary will try to “form a better
understanding of the manner in which China intends to implement this law” for the Chinese, to
present her point of view to those US companies operating in China. In general, those American
discussions with China are of interest to the United States as an attempt to “stimulate greater global
economic growth and to confront the crisis of increasing debt in the countries of the South”. On the
other hand, in China, Chinese officials will seek “concrete steps by the United States” to show that
containing Beijing “is not the ultimate or primary goal” of the United States.
(Source: Modern Diplomacy)
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
A milestone in advancement of China’s rule of law in foreign affairs
Huo Zhengxin (professor from China University of Political Science and Law)
On June 28, the Law on Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter
referred to as the Foreign Relations Law) was adopted at the Third Meeting of the Standing
Committee of the 14th National People's Congress. President Xi Jinping signed the Order No.7 of the
President of the People's Republic of China to promulgate it. The formulation and promulgation of
the Foreign Relations Law is a significant measure for China to promote the rule of law domestically
and in foreign affairs comprehensively and to strengthen legislation in the field of foreign affairs. It
has profound historical significance and significant international influence.
First, the formulation and promulgation of the Law is an inevitable requirement for China to
respond to changes in the world, the times, and history and to use the rule of law to maintain
international order and promote global development.
Currently, the world is entering a period of turbulent change. On the one hand, the historical
trend of peace, development, cooperation, and win-win situations is unstoppable. The aspirations of
the people and the overall situation determine that the future of humanity will ultimately be bright.
On the other hand, acts of hegemony and bullying, such as relying on strength to bully the weak,
seizing advantages brutally, and playing zero-sum games, have caused severe harm. The deficits in
peace, development, security, and governance have worsened, and human society is facing
unprecedented challenges.
In this context, China formulated and promulgated the Foreign Relations Law to
systematically and comprehensively construct the legal principles, systems, and rules for developing
foreign relations. It clearly expresses the firm determination to uphold the international system with
the United Nations (UN) at its core and the global order based on international law.
Second, the formulation and promulgation of the Foreign Relations Law is an inevitable
requirement for China to adhere to the comprehensive rule of law, coordinate the promotion of the
rule of law at home and in foreign affairs, and provide a strong guarantee for the rule of law to
promote the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation with the Chinese path to modernization.
Due to the changes in the external environment faced by China in recent years, new
contradictions and challenges have emerged, and the institutional shortcomings in the rule of law in
foreign affairs have gradually become apparent.
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On the one hand, in the face of frequent interference in China's internal affairs, unilateral
sanctions, and "long-arm jurisdiction" by certain Western hegemonic countries using "legal" means,
China has not yet established a comprehensive defense system and effective blocking mechanism,
and the "shield" of the rule of law in foreign affairs has not been fully forged. On the other hand,
regarding using the rule of law to safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development
interests, China's laws still have insufficient institutional supply, and the "spear" of the rule of law in
foreign affairs urgently needs to be accelerated.
In light of this, it can be seen that the formulation and promulgation of the Foreign Relations
Law in China, which systematically defines the principles, power allocation, objectives, tasks,
systems, and guarantees for the development of foreign relations, is a significant legislative measure
to accelerate the construction of the rule of law in foreign affairs and fill the gaps in the rule of law in
foreign affairs. The promulgation and implementation of the Law marks a significant improvement
in China's ability to carry out international struggles and defend national and people's interests
through the rule of law, thereby providing strong legal guarantees for the comprehensive promotion
of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation with Chinese characteristics.
The Foreign Relations Law upholds the banner of safeguarding international law and global
order, fully leveraging the advantages of China's national system and governance system. It
summarizes, inherits, and develops China's national practices and experiences in participating in the
international rule of law and global governance. It is a piece of legislation in foreign affairs that
accurately reflects the development trend of the international rule of law and possesses distinctive
Chinese characteristics.
First, the Foreign Relations Law features a thorough layout, a coherent framework, and a
wealth of substance. It comprehensively stipulates the guiding ideology, purpose, principles, goals,
and tasks of China's development of foreign relations. It scientifically regulates the allocation of
various powers in China's development of foreign relations and systematically formulates the
institutions and rules for China's development of foreign relations. It can be regarded as the "basic
law" and a milestone in China's rule of law system in foreign affairs.
Second, the Foreign Relations Law inherits China's long-standing diplomatic stance and the
principle of international rule of law in the form of legislation. It legally affirms, interprets, and
promotes a series of new concepts, propositions, and initiatives with Chinese characteristics,
reflecting the spirit of the times and leading the trend of human progress in diplomacy and the
international rule of law since the new era. It is a piece of legislation that adheres to tradition while
promoting innovation in foreign affairs. It also exemplifies Chinese wisdom in establishing domestic
legislation that fosters the global rule of law, peace, stability, and growth.
Third, the Law establishes explicitly a chapter that thoroughly and methodically stipulates the
institutions and rules of China's foreign relations. It, in particular, addresses major legal issues
related to the implementation and application of international treaties, the execution of UN Security
Council resolutions, the adoption of countermeasures under the law, the protection of overseas
interests, foreign aid, as well as foreign law enforcement and judicial cooperation. This legislation
marks a new legal and institutional development stage in China's foreign relations.
In summary, with the promulgation and implementation of the Foreign Relations Law, as well
as the introduction of more legislation in the field of foreign affairs in the future, China's ability to
defend national and people's interests through the rule of law will continue to improve.
(Source: Global Times)
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Climate Change
GREEN TRANSITION THAT LEAVES NO ONE BEHIND
Presidents andf PMs of various countries)
We are urgently working to deliver more for people and the planet. Multiple, overlapping
shocks have strained countries’ ability to address hunger, poverty, and inequality; build resilience;
and invest in their futures. Debt vulnerabilities in low- and middle-income countries present a major
hurdle to their economic recovery, and to their ability to make critical long-term investments.
We are urgently working to fight poverty and inequalities. An estimated 120 million people
have been pushed into extreme poverty in the last three years and we are still far from achieving our
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals by 2030. We should thus place people at the center
of our strategy to increase human welfare everywhere on the globe.
We want a system that better addresses development needs and vulnerabilities, now
heightened by climate risks, which could further weaken countries’ ability to eliminate poverty and
achieve inclusive economic growth. Climate change will generate larger and more frequent
disasters, and disproportionately affect the poorest, most vulnerable populations around the world.
These challenges cross borders and pose existential risks to societies and economies.
We want our system to deliver more for the planet. The transition to a “net-zero” world and
the goals of the Paris climate agreement are an opportunity for this generation to unlock a new era
of sustainable global economic growth. We believe that just ecological transitions that leave no one
behind can be a powerful force for alleviating poverty and supporting inclusive and sustainable
development. This requires long-term investment everywhere to ensure that all countries are able to
seize this opportunity. Inspired by the historic Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework,
we also need new economic models which recognize the immense value of nature for humanity.
We are convinced that poverty reduction and protection of the planet are converging
objectives. We must focus on just and inclusive transitions to ensure that the poor and most
vulnerable can fully reap the benefits of this opportunity, rather than disproportionally bearing the
cost. We recognize that countries may need to pursue diverse transition paths in line with the Paris
agreement’s 1.5° Celsius limit, depending on their national circumstances. There will be no
transition if there is no solidarity, economic opportunities, or sustainable growth to finance it.
We, leaders of diverse economies throughout the world, are united in our determination to
forge a new global consensus. We will use the Paris Summit for a New Global Financing Pact on
June 22-23 as a decisive political moment to recover development gains lost in recent years and to
accelerate progress towards the SDGs, including just transitions. We are clear about our strategy:
development and climate commitments should be fulfilled and, in line with the Addis Ababa Action
Agenda, we need to leverage all sources of finance, including official development assistance,
domestic resources, and private investment.
Delivering on that consensus should start with existing financial commitments. Collective
climate-finance goals must be met in 2023. Our total global ambition of $100 billion of voluntary
contributions for countries most in need, through a rechanneling of special drawing rights or
equivalent budget contributions, should also be reached. No country should have to wait years for
debt relief. We need greater and more timely cooperation on debt, for both low- and middle-income
countries. This starts with a swift conclusion of solutions for debt-distressed countries.
A top priority is to continue ambitious reform of our system of multilateral development
banks, building on the existing momentum. We are asking development banks to take responsible
steps to do much more with existing resources and to increase financing capacity and private capital
mobilization, based on clear targets and strategies in terms of private finance contribution and
52
domestic resource mobilization. These financial resources are essential, but this reform is about far
more than money. It should deliver a more effective operational model, based on a country-led
approach. We also need our development banks to work together as an ecosystem and with other
public agencies and streamlined vertical funds, as well as with philanthropists, sovereign wealth
funds, private finance, and civil society where appropriate, to deliver the greatest impact.
Technology, skills, sustainability, and public and private investment will be at the core of our
partnerships, which will seek to support voluntary technology transfer, a free flow of scientific and
technological talents, and an inclusive, open, fair, and nondiscriminatory economy. We will promote
an agenda of sustainable and inclusive investment in developing and emerging economies, based on
local economic value added and local transformation – for example of fertilizer value chains. This
comprehensive approach will require new metrics to update our accountability instruments.
Public finance will remain essential to achieving our goals. We should start by strengthening
our instruments (the International Development Association, the IMF’s Poverty Reduction and
Growth Trust and Resilience and Sustainability Trust, the International Fund for Agricultural
Development, the Green Climate Fund, and other concessional windows of our banks, as well as the
Global Shield against Climate Risks). But we acknowledge that meeting our development and
climate goals will require new, innovative, and sustainable sources of finance, such as debt buybacks, engagement from sectors that prosper thanks to globalization, and more trusted carbon- and
biodiversity-credit markets. This is true of the fight against hunger, poverty, and inequality;
adaptation to climate change; and efforts to avert, minimize, and redress loss and damage.
Increasing resilience through a comprehensive suite of financial instruments is a high priority.
We need a stronger global safety net, based on pre-arranged approaches, to mitigate and adapt to
the effects of climate change, especially when disasters hit. This implies climate and other disasterresilient deferral mechanisms, insurance nets, and emergency-response financing, including a more
sustainable model for humanitarian aid.
Achieving our development goals, including climate mitigation, will also depend on scaling up
private capital flows. This requires enhanced mobilization of the private sector with its financial
resources and its innovative strength, as promoted by the G20 Compact with Africa. This also requires
improving the business environment, implementing common standards, adequate capacity building,
and reducing perceived risks, such as in foreign-exchange and credit markets. This may require public
support, as well as sharing reliable data. Overall, our system needs to lower the cost of capital for
sustainable development, including for the green transition in developing and emerging economies.
Our work together is all about solidarity and collective action, to reduce the challenges facing
developing countries and to fulfill our global agenda. We will continue to press for progress,
leveraging other important events, including the G20 Summits in India and Brazil, the SDG Summit,
and the COPs, starting with COP28 in the United Arab Emirates this year. In all of our upcoming
international works and negotiations, we will seek to advance concrete actions that deliver on the
promise of the SDGs, for our prosperity, people, and planet.
(Source: Project Syndicate)
THE COST OF INACTION
Ajaz Ahmed (Director of Research Programmes for the Social Protection Resource Centre in Islamabad)
It is baffling that a country most vulnerable to climate change is least prepared to deal with
climate catastrophes. Considering the ongoing economic downturn in Pakistan, the country is one
more 2022-flood-like catastrophe away from a severe economic crisis and social unrest.
It is irresponsible of relevant authorities and it manifests ignorance and apathy, to say the
least. Considering that climate change vulnerability and resilience are the functions of good or bad
53
governance, inaction is certainly not governance. Relevant government departments failed to
formulate decisive concrete plans and ensure their implementation to mitigate the risk of climate
change-driven natural disasters.
The Climate Change Ministry of Pakistan, for example, is an apex body in the country to deal
with the subject of climate change in the country. The vision of the ministry is “to mainstream
climate change in the economically and socially vulnerable sectors of the economy and to steer
Pakistan towards climate resilient development”.
However, not much has been done so far except every now and then signing of some
memorandum of understanding and babus attendance of the high power international meetings,
workshops, and conferences. So, an apex body on climate change is busy doing ‘something relevant’ as if
climate change is some peripheral subject and there is no urgency or there is nothing much to be done.
Notwithstanding Pakistan’s commitment to the United Nations in 2016 and available
international support, national adaptation plans have not been developed so far. So, it is safe to say
that the cost of climate change to Pakistan is not entirely because of unfavourable climatic changes,
but it is also because of the inaction or a lack of concrete action of responsible departments and
agencies, including those which are busy doing ‘something relevant’.
Thus far, the response to climate change-driven natural disasters from key government
departments has always been short-term and reactionary instead of pre-emptive and anticipatory
planning. Considering the inherent uncertainty and increased frequency and intensity of climate
change-driven natural disasters, short-termism and ad-hoc planning is a highly risky and unreliable
approach, and operating in this fashion is no longer an option.
Greater vulnerability demands greater responsibility, accountability, and action. However,
quite the opposite, despite frequent climate change-driven natural disasters wreaking havoc in the
country and pushing masses below the poverty line, climate change adaptation is yet to be
mainstreamed in development planning.
Nevertheless, location-specific, low-cost, and carefully designed non-structural adaptive
interventions could substantially reduce the risk of climate change-driven natural disasters.
Interestingly, a lot of this could be achieved without always seeking international finances, but
Pakistani policymakers are in the habit of getting technical and financial support from elsewhere,
which has put them in the mode of doing ‘something relevant’ and waiting for help.
While climate change is a scientific problem, the solution lies in careful, meticulous, and
climate-smart development planning. Consolidated efforts, the use of available research and
empirical evidence, and well-designed interventions could enhance vulnerable communities’
preparedness to reduce exposure and improve resilience.
As for available research and empirical evidence, there is plenty of indigenous knowledge
generated on climate change. However, it is waiting on research repositories to be used by
policymakers and planners.
It is important to note that the pace of climate change seems to be outstripping whatever little
efforts are being made by relevant authorities to combat the problem of climate change. This means
that incremental changes would not suffice, and drastic measures would be needed.
That being so, policymakers need to understand that they must be ahead of the game to avert
future losses from climate change-driven natural disasters and safeguard vulnerable communities
from slipping into poverty and hunger.
The estimated cost of damages and losses from climate change to Pakistan is more than the
projected economic growth rate, and it will increase further soon. Hence, efforts to improve
economic growth would be futile without tackling the problem of climate change, which is only
54
possible if serious efforts are made to integrate climate change into development planning, and
concrete steps are taken to adapt to climate change.
Of course, this would require technical as well as financial support. However, climate change
policy and actions generate economic co-benefits, compounding returns on climate-compatible
development which is not possible without having national adaptation plans and mainstreaming
climate change into development planning.
The 2022 flood-affected population is yet to recover from the losses and damages, and this
year’s monsoon is around the corner. The question is, are we prepared enough to respond to this
year’s monsoon? And, have we learned anything, if at all, from the last year’s catastrophic flood,
which affected millions of people?
It is not climate change; it is the inaction that we should be worried about, as the responsible
authorities are still doing ‘something relevant’ and waiting for a messiah.
(Source: The News)
CLIMATE CHANGE AND POSSIBLE HUMAN RESPONSES
Dr. Arshad M. Khan (A former Professor based in the US)
We cannot say ‘we never knew’ when melting glaciers and polar ice caps engulf us in our own
folly. Even lemmings respond to threats with courage and vigor, so why are humans in a comfortinduced sleep in air-conditioned or centrally heated houses … for this is directed at the rich
industrialized world — the rural Africans, Indians or Chinese or other similar people in Mexico or
Latin America or any other part of the world have not been responsible for our global warming.
The blazing wildfires in Canada this year are too many to fight so they are being left to burn
out. The northeastern US and Canada further up are covered in a haze of smoke, the air difficult to
breathe and warnings announced for the infirm, the elderly or persons with asthma.
A portent of the future no doubt when Floridians with their cherished coastal properties
would rue the day they decided to live there.
Looking beyond into the more distant future of our grand and great-grandchildren, the scenarios
are far from pleasant to imagine. The worst have a sea level rise of 20 to 30 feet making Denver a west
coast port in an incredibly shrunk United States. Florida and much of the eastern seaboard disappears
and something similar happens to coastal communities throughout the world. The trouble is it is a very
slow creeping process like the proverbial frog put in warm water that is heated very slowly.
If human response has been less than overwhelming, there are positive signs even if the
causes may not be only a response to global warming.
Thus the sales of electric cars and hybrids are soaring according to the International Energy
Agency. In 2021, they doubled to a record 6.6 million, and in the first quarter of 2022, two million had
been sold worldwide. The final 2022 tally was in excess of 10 million and this year (2023) they are
expected to surpass 14 million. As a percent of the total car market they have jumped from 4 percent in
2020 to a projected 18 percent in 2023. It is a historic transformation of the automobile industry.
To continue with human habits, beef consumption is down in the particularly significant high
income countries. As the single most GHG producing food, it is welcome news. For it is also one
habit most likely to send you to a cardiologist — in the worst case scenario, for a coronary bypass, —
or heaven forbid, the funeral parlor. By the way, a Harvard study estimated that each additional 4
ounce serving of red meat in your regular diet decreased life expectancy by 13 percent. The
population sample consisted of 38,000 men and 84,000 women over a period of 28 years. It gets
worse if you drink and smoke, which probably also increases global warming.
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What we sow, we reap as the saying goes. It also helps us then to try and do our best for
succeeding generations — plus it is their right and our duty.
(Source: Modern Diplomacy)
SIGNALS OF CLIMATE DISTRESS ON THE RISE
As a warming Earth simmered into worrisome new territory this week, scientists said the
unofficial records being set for average planetary temperature were a clear sign of how pollutants
released by humans are warming their environment. But the heat is also just one way the planet is
telling us something is gravely wrong, they said.
“Heat sets the pace of our climate in so many ways … it’s never just the heat,” Kim Cobb, a
climate scientist at Brown University, told The Associated Press news agency.
Dying coral reefs, more intense nor’easters and the wildfire smoke that has choked much of
North America this year are among the many other signals of climate distress.
“The increasing heating of our planet caused by fossil fuel use is not unexpected, but it is
dangerous for us humans and for the ecosystems we depend on. We need to stop it, fast,” said
Stefan Rahmstorf of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. Some other recent “firsts”
and events that indicate climate change has entered uncharted territory:
Ocean warming
Most of the planet is covered by oceans, which have absorbed 90 percent of the recent
warming caused by planet-warming gases, such as carbon dioxide and methane. In April, global
ocean temperature soared to 21.1C (69.98F), which was attributed to the combination of greenhouse
gas emissions and the early El Nino formation. Newly published data from the Copernicus Climate
Change Service documented “exceptionally warm” ocean temperatures in the North Atlantic with
“extreme” marine heat waves near Ireland, the UK and in the Baltic Sea.
Wildfire smoke
Several rounds of wildfire smoke, originating from northern Canada, brought dangerous air
quality levels to eastern North America. The high levels of wildfire smoke have become familiar on
the West Coast, but scientists have said that climate change will make wildfires and smoke both
more likely and more intense, and that the East Coast will see more of it.
El Nino arrives early
The current El Nino – a period of warming Pacific Ocean waters – formed a month or two earlier
than usual, replacing a La Nina that, with its cooling of Pacific waters, served as a damper on global
temperatures. That means it will have more time than usual to strengthen. The World Meteorological
Organization predicts there is a 98 percent chance that at least one of the next five years will be the
warmest on record, beating 2016 when an exceptionally strong El Nino was present.
Shrinking Antarctic sea oce
Scientists are watching Antarctic sea ice shrink to record lows. The 11.7 million square
kilometres (4.5 million square miles) covered by the sheet on June 27 was almost 2.6 million square
kilometres (one million square miles) less than average for that date for the period from 1981-2010,
according to the National Snow and Ice Data Center.
Put another way, an area nearly four times the size of the US state of Texas was gone from the
ice sheet.
(Source: AlJazeera)
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EL NIÑO + CLIMATE CHANGE = HEAT RECORDS
Zachary B. Wolf (CNN climate analyst)
Climate change combined with this year’s El Niño set a new world record for worldwide heat
on Tuesday – 62.92 degrees Fahrenheit or 17.18 degrees Celsius.
The low 60s may not sound that hot to anyone sweating through a summer heat wave, but the
figure is almost a full degree Celsius above the average between 1979 and 2000 and represents a new
indicator that Earth’s climate is heating up faster than anticipated.
Expect more records this year
Looking at the graphic in CNN’s report that tracks annual global temperatures, the hottest
part of the year has not arrived. Expect more worldwide records before the fall.
The record was first set on Monday, when the average global temperature reached 17.01
degrees Celsius (62.62 degrees Fahrenheit), per the US National Centers for Environmental
Prediction’s data.
The European Union’s Copernicus Climate Change Service, which also tracks global
temperatures using a different method, tweeted that Monday was a record in its data set, with a
global temperature of 16.88 degrees Celsius.
The climate science consensus that world governments should seek to contain rising
temperatures to within 1.5 degrees Celsius of pre-industrial levels seems more and more
unattainable.
The World Meteorological Organization, the Switzerland-based agency of the United Nations,
said back in May that there is a two-thirds likelihood that temperatures would shoot past that 1.5
degrees Celsius threshold within the next five years.
This year’s El Niño is not helping
The cyclical phenomenon occurs when warm Pacific waters flow toward the west coast of the
Americas and affect temperatures worldwide. The WMO declared the onset of an El Niño Tuesday
and warned governments to prepare for more extreme weather events as a result.
This will be the first El Niño in seven years. The last very strong El Niño year – 2016 – also saw the
previous record for worldwide heat that August. It’s hard to believe, but the last few years, despite being
among the hottest on record, were La Niña years, which should have relatively low temperatures.
Learn to adapt
Asked about the new record on CNN International, CNN’s chief climate correspondent Bill
Weir said countries will need to work on adapting to the new climate as much as trying to mitigate
climate change.
“Unfortunately, the planet we grew up on, those dependable seasons, we’re not going back to
that,” he said.
He noted that there were heat records set around the planet this week including scorching
temperatures over 120 degrees Fahrenheit (around 50 degrees Celsius) in parts of Africa. But
relatively hot temperatures in other places around the world are important to chart.
“Yesterday, way up in the Arctic Circle … the northernmost tip of Quebec, it was warmer than
Miami,” Weir said. “And at the same time, at the bottom of the planet, which is supposed to be the
polar opposite – it’s winter down there – they set a high temperature record as well. So we’re seeing
it all over the planet.”
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Set to blow past that 1.5 degree threshold
John Abraham is a climate scientist and professor at the University of St. Thomas in
Minnesota. He appeared after Weir on CNN International and was asked how these new records
affect the target of keeping temperatures within 1.5 degrees Celsius of pre-industrial levels.
“I hate to be the bearer of bad news, but we are going to blow through that target,” he said,
adding humans are not doing enough to slow down greenhouse gas emissions after decades of
burning fossil fuels.
“It has been years and years of emitting the stuff into the atmosphere,” he said. “The heat is
accumulating, and we are seeing the records that scientists have been predicting would occur many
decades ago.”
How temperatures rise
He also offered an interesting framing for how to view rising temperatures: not as a steady
ramp, but rather in steps.
“They rise like steps, like you are going up steps to get from the first floor to the second floor
of a house,” Abraham said. “Every few years, the temperatures step up, and then they hold constant
for a few years, and then they step up again.”
Steps up, he said, coincide with El Niño events like this year’s.
“It is El Niño on top of decades of human emissions of greenhouse gases.”
There is no turning back, he said, but humans can likely slow the change.
“We can change the trajectory,” Abraham said. “We can change how fast it rises, but we can’t
arrest the rising.”
But here’s a note of optimism
I was somewhat surprised to hear Abraham close on a positive note, arguing the world is “at a
tipping point right now in the economics of clean energy.”
“You can now power your homes and your businesses and your cars with solar and wind
power just as cheaply as with coal,” he argued.
“In the old days, if you took climate change seriously, it was a personal, moral, ethical
statement you were making. Now, it’s a financial statement you are making.”
While the US and state governments have tried to incentivize people and companies to
embrace lower-emission options, they are not yet as affordable as carbon-emitting alternatives. Plus,
there is a documented push to seek out fossil fuel reserves by oil and gas companies, as Reuters
documented this week.
Or, more to the point of how oil and gas continue to influence the US economy: As world
authorities were charting record worldwide temperatures, economic authorities saw gas prices
dipping ahead of the July Fourth holiday as a major boon for inflation-weary consumers.
(Source: CNN)
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Covid-19
COVID AS A NATURAL EXPERIMENT FOR CLIMATE POLICY
Hans-Werner Sinn (Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of Munich)
The world is divided over how – and how aggressively – to respond to climate change. While
only a small minority of countries have committed to implementing rigorous fossil-fuel bans and
reducing their carbon dioxide emissions, most others are doing little or nothing. The big question,
then, is whether unilateral measures implemented by the minority can contribute to mitigating
climate change or whether a global climate club with truly binding constraints is needed.
The COVID-19 crisis points to the likely answer. The pandemic, it turns out, served as a realworld experiment for assessing the mechanics of multilateral and unilateral climate policies.
In theory, the 2015 Paris climate agreement adopted a multilateral approach. But only 60 of
the 195 signatory countries, representing 35% of global CO2 emissions, committed to quantitative
emissions constraints. China and India, the world’s most populous countries, did not accept
measurable constraints, and while the United States committed to constraints, the US Senate has not
yet ratified the agreement.
The standard view in those countries that did commit to quantitative constraints is that they
can reduce global CO2 emissions by curtailing fossil-fuel demand if they switch to green energy or
nuclear power. The effect on curbing world-wide emissions will be small, as their consumption is
small. But a small contribution is better than nothing, the argument goes, similar to making a
charitable donation.
A closer look reveals a severe problem with this view: it neglects the role of markets for
internationally traded fuels such as oil, gas, and hard coal. Consider the oil market. When demand
for oil in green industrialized countries declines, so will the world price, enabling consumers in
other countries to buy and burn more than they would have otherwise. The reduction in oil demand
by green countries thus may be at least partly offset by others’ purchases. This problem is
particularly relevant for the European Union, which recently decided to phase out the use of fossil
fuels in passenger cars by 2035, and for Germany, which is preparing legislation to ban the
implementation of oil heating in private dwellings as early as 2024.
Whether unilateral demand restrictions for oil will curb global use of fossil fuels and slow the
pace of climate change ultimately will depend on how global suppliers react. Only if they extract
less would less be consumed, because every bit of fossil fuel extracted will be burned somewhere.
What has not been extracted cannot be used. This is the fundamental truth of climate policy.
Abstracting from sequestration and reforestation, which have negligible effects, the power to
mitigate global warming rests entirely with the owners of fossil-fuel resources, including the
governments that control the territory where they are found.
It is unclear, however, how resource suppliers such as OPEC will react to unilateral demandreducing measures by the green countries. Suppliers might sell less because marginal storage sites
become unprofitable. They might sell the same amount as before because royalties or user costs of
marginal sites would fall with the market price of the fuel. Or they might even sell more because
they want to anticipate further reductions in demand (the so-called green paradox), or simply
because they are living hand to mouth and must offset the price reductions by selling more.
In the two latter cases, restricting demand for fossil fuels in some countries could have the
unintended consequence of accelerating extraction and climate change. The non-abiding countries
would be able to consume what the green countries do not, as well as whatever additional quantities
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the source countries extract. Unfortunately, economic research offers no clear guidance as to which
scenario is most likely, so we must rely on empirical analysis.
Here, the results are surprisingly clear-cut, at least with respect to crude oil. From the end of
the second oil crisis in 1982 to the beginning of the COVID crisis in 2020, world oil extraction
followed a linear, slightly upward trend with minimal fluctuations in volumes extracted. Prices, on
the other hand, were extremely volatile, ranging from around $10 to $130 per barrel. Whenever an
economic downturn somewhere in the world reduced demand, consumers elsewhere responded to
the fall in prices by increasing their purchases correspondingly. Likewise, when an economic boom
somewhere boosted demand, consumers elsewhere reduced their purchases sufficiently to offset the
price increase. Either way, oil suppliers in the aggregate did not respond to these patterns. Instead,
they pursued a rigid supply strategy, not allowing themselves to be distracted by price fluctuations.
This changed only with the pandemic’s arrival. During the initial global reaction to the crisis,
oil prices fell, as lockdowns and quarantine measures sent industrial production plummeting. To
prevent prices from going into freefall, OPEC reduced output, which quickly produced the desired
effect: prices bounced back immediately and even exceeded their initial levels. Then, when the end
of the crisis came into view, prices and supply gradually normalized, eventually reverting to their
usual trend.
The lesson is simple: when fossil-fuel demand declines only in some parts of the world,
resource-owning countries do not extract less, because other parts of the world will absorb the
supply at lower prices. The demand restrictions promised by some of the world’s industrialized
countries in the Paris agreement do not even have the slightest effect on climate change. Only if all,
or nearly all, oil-consuming countries unite to reduce demand, can they gain leverage over OPEC
and other resource owners, forcing them to leave more oil in the ground, slowing down global
warming.
These empirical findings about the natural COVID experiment, which were published last
year, turn many longstanding tenets of global climate policy on their head. For example, in the
absence of a global climate club, the EU’s forthcoming ban on cars with internal combustion engines
will be useless from a climate perspective, because the fuel no longer consumed will be burned
elsewhere in the world. In fact, it could actually increase global CO2 emissions by forcing drivers to
buy electric cars that will rely on power generated by burning more domestic lignite, which could
otherwise have been kept in the ground.
Similarly, Germany’s planned ban on oil heating will force homeowners to use electric heat
pumps, thus inducing more burning of lignite without reducing the quantity of oil extracted and
burned worldwide.
As frustrating as these findings may be, they at least imply that consumer countries are not
entirely powerless. If enough buyers come together, they can force resource owners to leave oil in
the ground, thus mitigating climate change.
The difficulties of achieving effective coordination through global agreements should not be
overlooked, of course, particularly in view of rising geopolitical tensions. For example, there is no
hope that China, merely out of a sense of climate solidarity, will offer measurable demand
restrictions for fossil fuel, as long as the Taiwan crisis remains unsolved. Internalizing the greatest
negative externality in human history will be impossible in the absence of a peaceful and stable
global order.
(Source: Project Syndicate)
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THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND ITS AFTERMATH
Gerard Delanty (Emeritus Professor of Sociology at Sussex University)
The COVID-19 pandemic was without doubt a major shock. As an officially declared
pandemic that is not itself surprising. But how should we understand the shock of the pandemic? As
a health shock, it was significant with a total death toll, according to World Health Organization
(WHO), of more than 767,000 in the past two years. It is certainly of greater consequence than most
of the other zoonotic "New Infectious Diseases" that emerged since the 1990s, and also more
significant than influenza with which it is often compared. While for many countries in the
developed world, it was one of the main causes of death, malaria is still the greatest killer for much
of the world.
From a sociological perspective, as opposed to a strictly epidemiological view, it is difficult to
avoid the conclusion that despite the severe health impact, the wider impact on the state and society
may be greater in terms of its long-term implications. The fundamental problem that the pandemic
created for the state was how to balance the need for protection without unreasonable restrictions on
liberty. The responsibilities of the state include providing for security and protecting liberty.
Democracies have generally worked out a way to get this balance right. This is what the pandemic
challenged and there were many failures in governance. A response by the state was needed, but
what kind of a response was appropriate? How should we assess the significance of the pandemic? I
see three main issues.
What was different about COVID-19 as an epidemic/pandemic?
It was the first global epidemic to the extent that almost all world regions were affected. In
that respect, the pandemic marked an end to Western exceptionality in that the apparent conquest of
major infectious diseases since the 1950s as a result of vaccination programs, sanitation, and other
health regulations came to an end, as the pandemic hit Western countries with considerable force.
While there was huge variability worldwide in state responses, there were also considerable
common experiences everywhere. It was a global event in terms of the effects of quarantine, maskwearing, social distancing, travel bans, and so on. For close to a year people almost everywhere had
pretty much the same everyday experiences. This included the considerable negative secondary
consequences of quarantine, which have led to a range of other health problems and the disastrous
impact of loss of income for many people.
The pandemic is also significant in that it was the first data-driven control of the disease.
Almost immediately, huge amounts of data were produced and experts became increasingly
dominant, leading to fears of ‘expertocracy’ – rule by experts – with governments in thrall to the
often contradictory and arbitrary prognoses of experts. It is not all a negative story: It led to an
astonishing and unprecedented advancement in scientific knowledge and the rapid production of
effective vaccines.
Due to the prevalence of scientific knowledge, there was also the outcome that everyone
became an ‘expert’, a phenomenon that fueled anti-vaccine conspiracy theories leading to
exploitation by the radical right that sought to associate measures to control the pandemic with
attacks on freedom, which they could champion while the left had no option but to defend
restrictions on liberty.
What kind of long-term change did it lead to?
A pandemic in itself does not lead directly to long-term change, as opposed to short-term
change such as less travel. This depends on how societies respond to it. It can lead to an acceleration
of change that is already underway, as in technological changes that are now clearly an outcome
such as more working from home, a range of new apps, and so on. There has been a general
61
intensification of digitalization, which is also linked to an undoubted increase in securitization and
thus of state surveillance over the individual.
However, societies do not change as a whole and change may be only for some people, for
example, more opportunities for working from home for middle-class occupations but for others, for
example, those working in home deliveries, ever greater precarious working conditions will be the
result. In so far as a general assessment is possible, it appears that inequality has increased since the
pandemic. The World Bank has estimated that some 11 million people have been pushed into
poverty as a result of the pandemic. It is certainly the case that it did not lead to a decrease and
much has remained the same.
For a pandemic to lead to major long-term societal change, whether good or bad, it would
have to intersect with other critical moments, for example, the climate crisis, the crisis in liberal
democracy and the rise of authoritarianism, economic crisis. In these examples, there are several
tipping points. However, it remains inconclusive what the long-term outcome is. For now, it seems
COVID-19 has become "normalized" and the crisis did not lead to the collapse of liberal democracy.
It could perhaps be seen as a potentially dangerous experiment with emergency government as a
permanent feature of the state today.
What have we learned from the pandemic?
The pandemic revealed the fragility and vulnerability of society to pathogens. If the first
victim of a pandemic is society, democracy is the second. But, it is now clear that democracy is also
essential for coping with pandemics. The initial reaction and still the main one is that the democratic
constitutional state is ill-equipped to deal with pandemics. Authoritarian states, such as China with
its zero-COVID policy, were at first very effective in controlling the pandemic since they did not
have to worry about restrictions on liberty.
But there is an important difference between short-term and long-term control. It seems to be
the case that democracies are more successful in long-term control of pandemics, as is clear from the
situation in China once its zero-COVID policy failed. Democracies are pulled in different directions
by the need to protect liberty and provide security, which includes protection from infectious
diseases. Resolving this tension is critical for the future and this can only be done through public
deliberation rather than rule by experts or excessive securitization and secrecy.
It is now clear that a pandemic is entangled in almost every aspect of society and as a result, it
is not easy to separate the health issue from a vast range of social, political, and economic processes.
Since the lockdown was also a shutdown, it unleashed all kinds of unintended effects.
In view of the likelihood of more pandemics, coming from as yet-unknown viruses, liberal
democracies will need to learn how to respond to such events rather than waiting for them to
happen. Finally, a pandemic is by definition global so it cannot be controlled nationally except for
short periods of time. This means that there is a vital need for greater global cooperation. But with
the world drifting towards increased authoritarianism that will be difficult.
(Source: Anadolu Agency)
AN ACRIMONIOUS DEBATE ABOUT COVID’S
ORIGINS WILL RUMBLE ON
Where did covid-19 come from? You might imagine that the question would be a matter for
science. Instead it has become embroiled in acrimony, politics and, at times, conspiracy theory.
New diseases in people almost always come from close contact between human populations
and animals. A “spillover” happens when viruses from an animal species jump into humans and
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then go on to wreak havoc. But the idea that sars-cov-2, the virus that causes covid-19, instead
leaked from a Chinese research laboratory has persisted since the earliest days of the pandemic.
Though this theory has rested largely on rumours and circumstantial evidence, it has nevertheless
set the stage for a bitter three-and-a-half year row.
It had been hoped that information from America’s intelligence services could resolve the row in
favour of one theory or another. Those hopes were scotched late on June 23rd, when a report was
delivered by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (odni)—as directed by Congress—on the
potential links between the Wuhan Institute of Virology (wiv) and the origin of the pandemic. It
contained no evidence of a laboratory leak. However, anyone hoping the report would burnish instead
the hypothesis that covid-19 emerged in a food market in Wuhan would also have been disappointed.
The report concluded that “both a natural and laboratory-associated origin remain plausible”.
Most new infectious diseases originate in animals. Those include Ebola, Zika, hiv, and the
original sars (whose emergence in 2003 was thought to be tied to animal sales). Such events are often
tied to the sale of live animals or the consumption of bushmeat. China also has extensive wildlife
and livestock farming, wildlife trafficking, many live animal markets and lax regulations. Soon after
a mysterious new pneumonia appeared in China, the source of the disease was quickly pinned to the
animals sold in the Huanan Seafood Market in Wuhan. Many (although not all) of the people who
had become sick had worked at or visited this site.
Yet a “natural” spillover is not the only route by which a new virus might enter humans.
Researchers at the Wuhan Institute of Virology (wiv) had also been carrying out high-risk research
on coronaviruses in inadequate biosafety conditions. Scientists in the city also conducted field trips
to sample bats and collect viruses from remote regions of China. These activities could have
provided a route for a new virus to be accidentally picked up by humans in the laboratory, who
could then have gone on to start an outbreak in Wuhan.
Since the start of the pandemic, two tribes have battled it out in online discussions of the
origins of covid: the “zoonati” and the “lab leakers”. Michael Worobey, professor of ecology and
evolutionary biology at the University of Arizona, didn’t start out as a zoonati, a term that was once
pejorative on social media and thrown at those who didn’t support a laboratory leak. (Dr Worobey
says the word has been “happily” co-opted.) He says there are three main lines of evidence that
support the market hypothesis: geographic, zoonotic and evolutionary.
The strongest evidence is probably the first: the spatial pattern of the earliest cases which centred
on a small animal market in a city of 11m people. Although there was some bias towards collecting cases
from the market (given its early implication in the outbreak), Dr Worobey says the very earliest onset
cases, ones that just turned up in hospitals, lived in a “bullseye right around the market”.
It is also clear that animals that could be infected with sars-cov-2 were being sold in the
Huanan Seafood Market. By June 2021 this zoonotic line of evidence was firmed up in a paper
published in Scientific Reports. More recently it was realised that swabs of the surfaces and corners
of the market collected in January 2020 indicated that various species such as raccoon dogs, badgers,
mink and civet cats were present before the pandemic. None of these animals were disclosed by the
Chinese authorities; they were found thanks to market surveillance under way before the outbreak.
The animals were sold alive, in cages stacked on top of one another, and in poor conditions. Many
shops offered butchering services. And the route to the market would also have brought stressed
animals into close contact, allowing for the intermingling and amplification of coronaviruses.
One note of caution here is that, although the animals found at the market were capable of
hosting the human variant of sars-cov-2, whether the pandemic virus emerged here is not provable
with the information available. The viruses picked up by the swabs taken at the market in January
2020 could also have come from infected humans in the market, rather than from animals.
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The third line of evidence for the market hypothesis comes from studying how different
specimens of the virus are related to each other, from an evolutionary point of view. As
coronaviruses replicate, random mutations occur in its genome and are passed on to successive
generations. Over time these changes will accrue. If viruses are sampled from many different people
over time, it is possible to work out which viruses begat other viruses, and the amount and rate of
the changes can tell scientists roughly what the virus’s evolutionary history looks like.
In 2022 Jonathan Pekar of the University of California, San Diego, and colleagues found that two
major lineages of sars-cov-2 appeared at the start of the outbreak in Wuhan, known as A and B. These
were likely, said the researchers, to be the result of at least two separate spillover events in humans. The
combination of the geographic pattern of cases around the market, a short timeline for the emergence of
the virus, and two independent lineages, paint a picture of a market-related event tied to a group of
infected animals carrying similar (but not identical) versions of the sars-cov-2 virus that jumped.
Again, not everyone agrees. Other scientists have challenged the idea that the two lineages of
sars-cov-2 represented separate introductions. As they differ by only two mutations, one lineage
could have evolved into another within humans, they argue, rather than coming from separate
spillover events.
The question is whether quibbles like these create enough wriggle room to leave open the
possibility that the pandemic started elsewhere, leaving the market to be simply a place where the
number of infections in humans was amplified. The hope was that the odni would resolve this issue
one way or another, particularly in relation to persistent rumours that scientists at the wiv were
infected with the first cases of covid-19. On this matter the report was clear—although some
researchers at wiv did fall ill in the autumn of 2019, the symptoms reported were not diagnostic of
covid-19. In other words, they could have been sick with any disease.
Another remaining area of uncertainty concerns missing data from the early days of the
outbreak in Wuhan. Maria Van Kerkhove, an infectious disease epidemiologist at the World Health
Organisation says her group has repeatedly asked for an independent re-analysis of surveillance
cases in 2019 that had been ruled out as being covid-19. And also she has asked for more
information about the 174 early cases of covid-19 that China has disclosed. What this obfuscation
and opacity from China amounts to is unclear. However, Dr Worobey points out that there were
probably only a handful of cases of covid in late November 2019, and that six retrospective studies,
including on throat swabs, blood donors and plasma samples, do not find a signal of a larger
outbreak in November—although they did find that influenza was relatively common at the time.
Prior to the release of the odni’s report, two-thirds of Americans believed a laboratory leak was the
cause of the pandemic, according to a poll by The Economist and YouGov. This impression came despite
the growth of scientific papers pointing to the market. Last week’s release of intelligence will not
persuade people on either side that they might be wrong. Instead it will fuel a new cycle of claims and
counterclaims. Yet with further new information not expected, the marginal gains of continuing the row
are rapidly diminishing. The hunt for the heroes and villains of covid is drawing energy and attention
from the more obviously urgent need to improve global biosecurity in the animal trade and lab safety.
The mysterious origins of covid may, for now, need to take a back seat.
(Source: The Economist)
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CPEC & OBOR
COUNTERING FALSE NARRATIVES REGARDING CPEC
Sukayna Abbas
The all-weather friends are assumed to be in a sync on all matters; Iron-clad friendship of
Pakistan and China has its roots tracing back to the history. Pakistan was the first Islamic country to
accept the newly emerged state of People’s Republic of China. China has also proved to be a knight
in shining armour for Pakistan, many times. Thus, honed and robust bilateral relations stand strong
to the date but not without criticism and propaganda following.
China supposedly and very clearly has emerged as a strong competitor of the great powers of
the world. Nothing but expansion and evolution have been seen becoming the fate of China in all
spheres. Pakistan and China have also developed diplomatic interactions with mutual interests and
goals. The friendship is explained as ‘deeper than the oceans and sweeter than honey’. The
cavernous of words say a lot about the relation between the two and there also exist concrete
evidence showing the interests of both the states.
China’s “One Belt, One Road (OBOR)” initiative, when extended to Pakistan, became known
as The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The belt-road initiative encompasses the vision of
laying out economic prosperity and poverty alleviation by incorporating China’s neighbouring
regions. It is one of the pioneering policies of the president Xi. The strategy involves trade,
infrastructure as well as creating employment opportunities for people. Furthermore, there are
different perceptions and narratives existing simultaneously, regarding this grand initiative.
Apart from the reasoning of the natives, other stakeholders have also been playing a vital role
in hindering the development of CPEC. When talking about the stakeholders, India that always
remained at odds with China supposedly has a very legitimate point to raise, the point of
‘sovereignty’. In International Relations, sovereignty is something that can never be secondary but
let us not only focus on a set of alphabets but dig deep down; India claims that the route is passing
through the region of Gilgit-Baltistan and it is quoted that the Maharaja of Kashmir ceded GB and
Kashmir to India thus any economic activity clearly violates the integrity of India but how can we
not recall the disputed territory of ARUNACHAL PRADESH being a bone of contention between
India and China but India has been profiting from the region without considering the aspect of
sovereignty.
On the other hand, America which sees China as its potential competitor, claims that CPEC is
nothing but China’s predatory landing in Pakistan which will be unsustainable for the latter but let
us also put a name to ‘territorial lease’ of DIEGO GARCIA; a British Indian Ocean territory being
used by the U.S for years now. Diego Gracia gives much strength to the U.S in terms of their military
base. The concept of territorial lease is not alien in international politics but legal and legitimate.
Apparently, the U.S and Pakistan are allies and the former has never openly expressed concerns
regarding CPEC but the underlying themes play a vital role in the actions and intentions of states.
Moving to the regional objections, we are quite certain that state politics and propaganda go
hand in hand. There will always be a third party bringing about dissension. The conventionally
believed and falsely nurtured narratives about the CPEC are many in Pakistan and some
undoubtedly, are legitimate considering the concerns and knowledge of a layperson.
Lack of transparency is one of the very major concerns of the citizens. Furthermore, myriad of
scandals, controversies, and corruption charges on the authorities are also earning a bad name for
China. Speculations are that it is a ‘debt trap’ for an already unstable Pakistan by alluring into a
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pyramid scheme. It is believed that on foreign power’s behest are these things being done and are
not a ‘game changer’ as it was promised and hyped. Another autochthonous narrative is that CPEC
is an analogy of the ‘EAST INDIA COMPANY’.
As far as the matter of corruption and transparency is concerned, people should be mindful of
the fact that we are a ‘developing country’ and developing countries cannot have isolationism added
in their foreign policy. We cannot keep blaming and hating others for our own shortcomings.
Accountability and transparency are for Pakistani authorities to provide and not China’s.
Other reservations are regarding particular sectors; women and labor quarters are the subject
of these reservations. The plan was to develop Gawadar into a ‘Mega port city’ but the claims are
that since the construction activities started, the livelihood of the indigenous communities has been
threatened. Locals depend on fishing and the coastlines have been blocked. Furthermore, the
promise of employing Pakistanis is far from realization because mostly labor is coming from China
and unequal distribution of resources is again worrisome. This stirred Baloch anger and the rise of
Maulana Hidayat ur Rehman. Moreover, one of the most menacing point is BRIDE-TRAFICKING;
the point has been raised not only nationally but internationally as well.
Concerns of the natives are totally justified because what they experience is bound to arise such
misconceptions and anxiety for their future. Had they been exposed to the truth and realities of
everything being done on their lands and with their resources while providing them with
substantial alternatives, the reaction would have been welcoming and cooperative. The matter of
unemployment is not be put on Chinese authorities because as a matter of fact, there exists
'discrepancy between the availability of jobs and skills'
It was the responsibility of the authorities to equip our people with the skills that would be
required to operate the machinery before the advent of the project. We cannot be blaming them for
not letting us PLAY with something that they brought and we do not know how to operate. Bride
trafficking is a serious issue and its existence is not only alarming but a threat to our religious and
moral principles. The matter requires extensive attention of the authorities of both and it must be
looked into, bilaterally but occurence of such things never defines the foreign policy of a country.
Isolated events are always happening but no country
formulates its foreign policy inculcating these things. Same as sexual harassment and gun
culture I am sure are not a part of India and America’s foreign policy,
(SZABIST Islamabad)
10 YEARS OF CHALLENGES, GROWTH, AND OPPORTUNITIES
Dr. Hassan Daud Butt (Associate Professor at Bahria University and a Research Fellow at various
institutions)
2023 marks the 10th year of the Belt and Road initiative and its flagship project China-Pak
Economic Corridor(CPEC). This landmark has been achieved at a time when countries across the world
are facing difficulties to recover from the vulnerabilities of the COVID-19 pandemic, conflicts, climate
change, unemployment, and depleting resources. However, despite these challenges and headwinds,
trade between China and Pakistan has witnessed an increase with the new areas being explored
especially in Agri-based products where sesame seed export surged by 50% on a year-on-year basis in
2022, seafood export grew by 40% in 2022 and Pakistan’s rice exports to China crossed the historical
figure of one million tons. Overall, Pakistan’s export to China rose by over 35% from 2013 to 2022.
Under the Belt and Road Initiative in the past 10 years, 147 countries, accounting for twothirds of the world’s population and 40 percent of global GDP have signed on to projects or
indicated an interest in doing so and China’s investment in these countries has surpassed US$ 50
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billion and Chinese Companies have set up 56 economic cooperation zones in over 20 countries,
generating billions of US dollar of tax revenue and over 400,000 jobs.Similarly,Under China Pakistan
Economic Corridor numerous road networks have been established creating rural-urban synergy
and the SEZs on these road links are finding new means to attract investments, especially in the
post-COVID-19 scenario. In Pakistan, the CPEC initiative has created over 100,000 opportunities for
employment, 6000 MW of electricity with over 800 Kms of transmission lines, and over 510 KMs
roads creating rural-urban synergy and regional connectivity. It has helped Pakistan develop its
Blue economy through Gwadar port and its connectivity with the hinterland through the western
route and the rest of the world through the upcoming Gwadar airport which is being constructed
with a Chinese grant of $230 million and will be completed this year. The connectivity through
optical fiber and through transmission lines is also helping Pakistan achieve the development targets
for having an endogenous mechanism for sustainable economic growth. The CPEC projects are
helping create favorable conditions for development, and broadening extensive consultation for the
harmonizing policy with the view of “seeking a common ground”.
Overall, The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is the true manifestation of regional connectivity
with the vision of improving people’s lives by facilitating inclusive development and enabling mutual
prosperity; thereby creating new markets, scaling up supply chains, removing bottlenecks for holistic
development, ensuring energy security and creating millions of jobs for people in the region. Moving
forward, Pakistan is trying to further improve the economic connections between the two nations and
looks to Chinese FDI and industrial help for a road toward stability.
To benefit from all this, and moving forward in CPEC 2.0, Pakistan needs to prepare well as
conventional wisdom may not come into play and novel ideas led by technology may help address
these challenges to attract investment flow. Importantly, Pakistan also has to accelerate SEZs
development and attract investments in agriculture, Blue economy,and technology
includingcarrying out targeted reforms designed on economic rationale rather than political agendas
to improve the business climate through the ongoing regulatory reform and to raise awareness of
existing investment opportunities, remove bottlenecks, overcome negative perceptions and reduce
information gaps while also focusing on existing investors and their concerns, especially in the
energy sector. We also need to explore the opportunities in the CPEC long-term plan for supporting
Pakistan’s economic stability for which understanding the preconditions for investment is
imperative including a strong rule of law to address major systemic disparities more effectively, as
the absence of any of these critical aspects can hinder investment and enhancing the capacity of all
stakeholders to provide Ease of doing business based on principles of good governance and absolute
harmony are critical. A strong government role will also be required to closely monitor risks and
initiate stimulus packages and improve productivity across connectivity and trade-related sectors. It
is imperative that our vocational training centers and academic institutions are able to provide
efficient and skilled manpower required to shoulder the task of transforming Pakistan into the
future industrial and trans-shipment hub of the region for which the role of CPEC is becoming vital.
(Source: Pakistan Observer)
10 WONDERFUL ACHIEVEMENTS OF CPEC IN 10 YEARS
Irfan Shahzad Takalvi (Founding President of the Eurasian Century Institute)
This is the year completing a full decade of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The ChinaPakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) – the ‘flagship’ and of the most comprehensively moving
forward component of BRI, is also completing a decadeof its inception on July 5, 2023.
Beijing and Islamabad (Karachi, before 1960s) have had a close and mutually beneficial
partnership throughout the past over seven decades of their diplomatic relations. Nonetheless, the
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advent of CPEC in 2013 ushered the bilateral ties into a whole new paradigm. The first Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) for the Long-Term Plan for the Corridor was signed on July 5, 2013. Work on
CPEC was jump-started during the visit of Chinese president Xi Jinping to Pakistan in April 2015.
CPEC, while maintaining the strategic and diplomatic closeness between the two sides, added
an unprecedented scale and scope of economic, commercial, investment bonds and people-to-people
exchanges. CPEC, during the past 10 years of its initiation and implementation, has seen its first
phase being completed successfully and now the second phase is well underway — thus CPEC is
arguably becoming one of the most significant, and watched, components of China’s mega global
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Out of the total more than $ 60 billion envisaged under CPEC Long-Term Plan, roughly a half,
just below $ 30 billion of Chinese investment has already been made in Pakistan. This has resulted in
Pakistan’s electricity generation capacity increasing significantly; adding some 10,000-12000 Mega
Watts into Pakistan’s national grid. The issue of power shortage in Pakistan has been resolved to a
large extent – particularly so for all-important export-oriented manufacturing sector. (The power
outages that Pakistan sees now are rooted more in financial issues and not because of lack of
capacity to generate electricity.)
Besides, CPEC has also improved Pakistan’s road communication infrastructure in a big way.
New highways and motorways have been built and are being built throughout the country’s length
and breath. These include Karachi-Lahore Motorway also connecting Multan, Rahim Yar Khan,
Sukkur and Hyderabad; Up-gradation of Karakoram Highway; Zhob-Kuchlak road, Eastbay
Expressway and others. Moreover, the Gwadar deep-sea port is now functional, increasingly
handling cargo ships. Related infrastructure at Gwadar including the new international airport are
also up and coming. Up-gradation of Pakistan railway’s ML-1 (Main Line 1, Peshawar to Karachi) is
agreed upon. Therefore, the pre-requisites for Pakistan economy to move towards industrialization
and export-driven growth have been provided.
Now, in the second phase of implementation of CPEC, Pakistan and China are moving ahead
with industrial cooperation, agriculture, and social sector projects. 9 Special Economic Zones (SEZ)
have been identified and work on some of those is moving quite fast, in addition to Gwadar Free
Economic Zone. Chinese companies are registering in sizeable numbers to start their production
facilities in these SEZs. In Gwadar economic zone alone, close to 50 Chinese companies have
registered already and some 200 more are in the pipeline. In the second phase of CPEC, China is
providing a grant of $ 1 billion for Pakistan’s social sector development. People-to-people contacts
have also seen a big boost; more than 30,000 Pakistani students are studying in Chinese institutions
and a sizeable number of Chinese are living and working in Pakistan, as well.
Yet, CPEC has not been without its own share of challenges including security threats as well
as persistent negative propaganda – maneuvered, without an iota of doubt, by the enemies of PakChina partnership. It is a matter of satisfaction to note that the two countries are successfully dealing
with and have by and large overcome these challenges.
As Pakistan and China look forward towards an even stronger bond in the years and decades
to come; CPEC has already laid the foundation for a broad-based and stronger mutual partnership.
The Corridor, in coming years and decades, would undoubtedly be shaping the future of Pak-China
ties in more ways than one. The following 10 positive outcomes are particularly worth mentioning:
1. Overall strategic significance of Pakistan at regional and global level has been manifested and
enhanced in many ways; the myth of Pakistan being ‘isolated’ and ‘failing’ has been shattered;
2. CPEC has put Pakistan back on global map of key recipients of Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) – China leads the scene, but also providing impetus for others to keep up;
3. Pakistan and China are now geared towards a closer industrial cooperation including
transfer of Chinese industries and technologies to Pakistan – though a little slower than
envisaged it means production in and export from Pakistan;
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4. Mutual ties are becoming broad-based with inclusion of new areas of cooperation such as
railways; water resources; technological; educational; health; social-sector assistance;
agriculture; costal development; urban uplift; media & cultural sectors etc;
5. Pakistan’s communication infrastructure including roads, railways network, sea-ports and
airports has got the upshot and would further be improved and up-graded;
6. The way is being paved for reduction in Pakistan’s chronic trade deficit, with China as well
as with the rest of the world because CPEC-backed industrialization, Pakistan’s export
capacity is set to increase;
7. Pakistan is becoming an important link within China-backed Global Supply Chains;
8. More avenues are opening up for people of the two countries to have wider exchanges for
the purpose of business, education, as well as tourism
9. CPEC will also impact the entire region positively. Through CPEC, Pakistan and China are
laying a solid and dependable foundation for broader regional connectivity and integration;
Gwadar port in particular is assuming a key position for South-Western China, Central Asia
and Afghanistan. Modalities for adding third parties into the CPEC umbrella are being
worked out
10. CPEC, apart form initial ‘route’ controversies, has contributed positively towards national
integration among Pakistan’s federating units and territories
Overall, CPEC is opening exciting vistas for Pakistan and China to further cement their
already exemplary relationship. One may hope that the leadership, institutions, functionaries and all
concerned stakeholders of the two sides would continue to work together to make CPEC a
resounding success – for a win-win relationship and for the journey towards a shared future. That
indeed is needed for bilateral, regional and global objectives.
(Source: Islamabad Post)
IS CPEC A ‘DEBT TRAP’ FOR PAKISTAN?
Naveed Hussain ()
It has been ten years since the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the multibillion-dollar
flagship project under President Xi Jinping’s $1.4 trillion Belt and Road Initiative, was launched. The
gigantic BRI programme, 11 times the size of the Marshall Plan that rebuilt Europe from the ruins of
World War II, aims to revive the fabled “Silk Road” through new roads, high-speed rail, power
plants, pipelines, ports and airports, and telecommunications links to boost trade with 60 countries
in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa.
The BRI has been described by former US assistant defence secretary Chas Freeman as
“potentially the most transformative engineering effort in human history” because, once completed,
it could cover more than half of world’s population and generate a GDP of over $21 trillion. The
project includes no military component, but American analysts fear it could potentially upend global
geopolitics as well as geo-economics and challenge the US-led world order.
These apprehensions sparked vociferous debates in Western media in which analysts sought
to portray BRI as a “debt-trap” that, according to them, ensnares developing nations in
unsustainable debts through “predatory lending” and allows China undue influence over their
policies. The term “debt trap diplomacy” was first coined by Western policymakers in 2017 to
describe the Chinese takeover of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port on a 99-year lease after the island
nation failed to honour its debt commitments. Since then, the term has been unscrupulously applied
to all BRI projects, including CPEC.
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CPEC was announced in 2013 during the visit of then Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to Pakistan,
but it received a huge impetus in April 2015 when President Xi toured the country. The project was
described as a “game changer” by Pakistani officials which they believed would end a chronic
energy crisis, overhaul the aging infrastructure, establish industrial parks and open up the
possibilities of transit trade to China through Gwadar Port with the help of a new network of roads.
The $62 billion economic corridor further strengthened the decades-old strategic relationship which
the two nations have described with a bevy of romantic adjectives. Pakistan, on its part, hailed CPEC
as a journey towards “economic regionalisation in the globalised world” and as a “hope of better
region with peace, development and growth of economy”.
The launch of CPEC was crucial for Pakistan for several reasons. First, it came at a time when
the country’s security situation was extremely volatile with terrorists carrying out deadly attacks
almost on a daily basis. Second, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) had almost dried up due to the
rampant security concerns spawned by the wave of terrorism. Pakistan had not seen much FDI since
the exit of Pervez Musharraf from power who attracted significant foreign investments in the
services sector through his liberalisation policy in the early 2000s. Third, Pakistan was struggling to
overcome a chronic electricity crisis that stymied industrial growth and triggered violent protests by
domestic consumers despite the governments giving billions of rupees in subsidies to save their
“political capital”. Fourth, the country was in the grip of macroeconomic instability, marked by
dwindling foreign exchange reserves, depreciation of its currency on the back of widening current
account and trade deficits. Fifth, the country found it difficult to carry out mega infrastructure
projects and make significant allocations for socio-economic development.
Against this backdrop, CPEC, especially its $43 billion early harvest projects, lifted spirits and
expectations. Pakistan saw panacea of all its economic ills in CPEC which, it envisioned, would (a.)
modernise infrastructure for long-term growth; (b.) connect major economic regions with a view to
reduce regional economic development gaps; (c.) upgrade development, with the help of Chinese
aid and investment; (d.) upscale investment relations with China to promote exports, and grow the
industry and employment; and form industry clusters.
Although the CPEC progress has slowed down in the wake of a debilitating economic crisis
since 2018, still this gigantic project has yielded a number of road and energy projects. “Multiple
highway construction programmes are progressing on schedule. Power plants that have entered
commercial operation provide nearly one-third of Pakistan’s national electricity demand, having
changed the situation of power shortage in Pakistan,” China's National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) said in a CPEC update on May 17, 2023. “The Gwadar port, co-built by China
and Pakistan, has made great progress in creating a regional logistics hub and industrial base. In
addition, the construction of the first phase of the Rashakai Special Economic Zone in Pakistan has
been completed and achieved positive results in business attraction,” the NDRC further stated. This
unprecedented economic activity created 236,000 jobs, 155,000 of them for Pakistani workers.
Nevertheless, Western analysts say that while Beijing and Islamabad have ardently sought to
control the narrative on CPEC, details of the colossal project, including the terms of the investments
and loans, the full extent of the projects, and the overall cost to Pakistan, remain murky. The US
Department of State has also spoken out in recent months against what it sees as “China’s predatory
lending to Pakistan” for possible geostrategic objectives. It argues that CPEC’s terms benefit Chinese
companies and workers, and are unsustainable for Pakistan, leading to its rising debt burden.
According to latest estimates, Pakistan’s external debt soared past $100 billion as of February 2023.
And one-third of this, or more than $30 billion, is owed to China.
As a matter of fact, this is skewed analysis of this project based on perceived fears. It would be
simplistic to look at CPEC as a project of bilateral governmental investment to entrap Pakistan in
debt burden. CPEC has brought in Chinese private investments in diverse fields. A Chinese
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consortium has bought 40% shares in Pakistan Stock Exchange, Alibaba Group has acquired a 45%
stake in Telenor Microfinance Bank, two Chinese companies will be setting up a smartphone
manufacturing plant in Faisalabad, and China’s Hui Coastal Brewery and Distillery has started
producing beer in Hub, Balochistan. These private Chinese investments have created employment
and economic opportunities across Pakistan.
Non-interference in internal affairs of other sovereign states is one of the cardinal principles of
China’s foreign policy. This is the reason Beijing has thus far refrained from meddling in Pakistan’s
internal politics, creating social pressure groups, or influencing its economic policies despite being
its single largest lender. On the contrary, the Western multilateral financial institutions, especially
the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, have repeatedly sought to dictate Islamabad’s
fiscal policies. Similarly, the Paris Club creditors, especially the United States, France, Germany and
Japan to whom Pakistan owes $8.5 billion, have also frequently used their influence for geopolitical
and geostrategic purposes.
Having said that, Pakistan’s ruling elite has to ensure political stability and continuity of
policies, improve security, and introduce broad-based economic reforms in order to reap full
benefits of CPEC, which aims to transform Pakistan into a prosperous regional trade hub.
(Source: Express Tribune)
HOW THE US AND EUROPE CAN BEAT CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD
Alan Beattie (The author of False Economy: a popular economic history of the world)
One of the pithier remarks about America’s geopolitical rivalry with China came recently from
Larry Summers, who served in Barack Obama and Bill Clinton’s administrations in a different, more
optimistic era of globalisation. He quoted a developing country figure thus: “When we’re engaged
with the Chinese, we get an airport. And when we’re engaged with you guys, we get a lecture.”
With developing countries’ borrowing costs rising but massive green infrastructure spending
needed, the US and the EU are trying hard to match Beijing’s offer of investment. Washington merged
federal agencies to create the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) in 2018, and at the
G7 rich nations meeting in 2021 President Joe Biden launched a Build Back Better World initiative,
repackaged the next year as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII).
The EU in 2021 launched its Global Gateway, which aims to leverage up a relatively modest
amount of public money to fund €300bn of investment in connectivity projects over six years.
As rivals to China, the rich countries’ problem is not just financial firepower but Beijing’s
increasing tendency to politicise its investment and link it to security alliances. But that challenge is
also an opportunity. The flaws in China’s decades-long campaign of recycling its surpluses into
state-directed investments abroad on secretive and arbitrary terms are becoming evident, as is
Beijing’s record of picking allies and clients — such as Russia and Pakistan.
Many developing countries are, commendably, declining to be bullied or bribed into taking
sides. Europe and the US would do better to offer assistance and trade on fair and open terms.
The problems with China’s overseas lending and investment drive, formalised into the Belt
and Road Initiative in 2013, have become more salient. Loans have gone sour, embroiling China in
messy debt restructurings in Zambia and Sri Lanka. Many countries are increasingly disillusioned
with the BRI. Some, particularly in Europe, have disengaged from China’s investment initiatives,
disappointed in the meagre returns.
Some of China’s geopolitical entanglements also look like bad bets. By allying with Russia,
Beijing may be able to secure cheap oil. But closer political alignment with Moscow taints it with the
weakness of Vladimir Putin’s regime. Pakistan has long been a Chinese ally, but with an IMF
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lending programme stalled, continued support from Beijing without backing from elsewhere risks
shackling China to an endlessly dependent money sink.
Some Asia-Pacific countries are sufficiently concerned about Chinese aggression to push them
towards security alliances such as the Quad, which brings India together with the US, Australia and
Japan. The EU, of course, lacks a centralised military capacity and developed security dimension. What it
and the US do have to offer regarding aid and investment should be based on rules and openness.
The PGII and the Global Gateway are works in progress — fine in principle but with a degree
of scepticism required. The US and EU both have a habit of failing to force their disparate official
agencies to operate effectively together (as does China, to be fair) and of making wildly unrealistic
estimates of the amounts of private capital that can be catalysed by modest public investment.
Alongside their bilateral efforts, Europe and the US need to make a determined effort to
expand and depoliticise their traditional channels of assistance, the IMF and the World Bank, where
they hold around half the voting power on the institutions’ executive boards.
William Ruto, Kenya’s president, criticised the fund and bank at a development finance
conference last week in Paris and said low-income countries’ environmental transitions should be
financed by a new, more neutral, “green bank”. A lot more money for the existing institutions and
an openness to reform — assuming emerging market countries actually want to take more
responsibility — will be needed to overcome this suspicion.
The other area in which the US and EU ought to be able to outbid China is access to their markets.
The US economy remains a powerful magnet, notwithstanding its mulish refusal to sign new preferential
trade agreements. Exports from non-China East Asian economies to the US have shot up in recent years
despite the US pulling out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and America overtook China as South
Korea’s main export destination in 2022 for the first time in nearly two decades.
As for the EU, finalising the signed but as yet unratified deal with South America’s Mercosur
trade bloc would be an important signal to a region that is only projected to receive a few billion in
Global Gateway financing.
China envy is a natural sentiment for US and European policymakers. Having lots of levers to
pull and arbitrary cash to disperse is always more fun than setting rules and running multilateral
systems. But democracies without persistent surpluses to recycle will tend to be at a loss at that
game compared with autocracies that do. When it comes to investment and trade, the rich world’s
comparative advantages are openness and consistency. They should pursue them.
(Source: Financial Times)
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Domestic Politics
MERIT DETOURS
Saddam Hussein (an assistant chief (policy) at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics,
Islamabad)
Political structure in a society comprises the rules and regulations for political decisions,
including legislation and enforcement, as well as organisations operating under these rules and
regulations. In democratic societies, political organisations include political parties, nongovernmental organisations, advocacy groups and special interest groups. These organisations only
evolve within the framework of political institutions but are also the agents of change in such
institutions.
Of these, political parties have the most significant role, both in shaping the political structure
and voicing voters’ aspirations. Alternatively, political parties serve as a bridge between the people
and the state upon gaining people’s support and electoral trust. There are more than two hundred
political parties in Pakistan, most of them with religious and nationalist philosophies. For various
reasons, only a handful of political parties fit into clear categories. This fact has created some hurdles
to the development of an efficient, transparent and people-friendly democratic culture in the
country.
Many factors may have been responsible for the underdevelopment of political parties in
Pakistan. The obvious ones include a low level of social progress, an authoritarian political culture
and disproportionate share of de facto power compared to de jure. Low literacy rates and poverty
across the country have clear implications for the free participation of citizens in the electoral
process. As far as voters’ turnout rate is concerned, it was around 51.7 per cent in the 2018 elections,
with women’s turnout less than 10 per cent in some constituencies. These statistics show that the
progress towards democracy is poor.
Most of the key political parties are accused of democratic mismanagement. The front-runners
in these parties try to retain leadership positions for life, leaving little space for newcomers. Only
once such leaders depart, their successors are trained to take over the role and lead the party.
Other important positions in the political parties are treated no differently. Key positions in
most political parties are distributed among influential people in the parties. Sometimes these are
allocated on the basis of kinship or proximity to the top leaders. Most of the political parties in
Pakistan have never held transparent intra-party elections. Over and over again political, feudal and
industrial elite have secured vital positions in most of the political parties on the basis of
nominations without regard to merit.
On the surface, it looks like top leaders in major political parties are chosen by their central
boards or working committees. However, bodies include non-elected associates. At the lowest tier of
the hierarchical pyramid in the party, leaders at various ranks and/or the Central Executive
Committees name the office holders. As a result, dominant people commanding intra-party
influence get themselves elected to key positions in the party. Social and business minions with
political motivations use similar tools in all parties. This is why political parties have not been
successful in contributing substantively towards democratising the state and the society.
Almost all political parties in Pakistan, with the exception of a couple of right-wing religious
parties have not been concerned with training and education of political workers. Even the rare
parties are increasingly adopting the ways of mainstream parties. Quite frequently, the only
communication in the parties is through the banal statements and speeches by the self-appointed
leaders dispersed via the media or public gatherings.
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During the late 1960s, there was a tradition of study circles for political workers. Party leaders
and ideologues, even some second string leaders, wrote policy papers and several parties published
dedicated newsletters. Unfortunately, these practices have died out.
Most of the parties in Pakistan are, to a great extent, established on patronage networks,
translating into poor service delivery for the masses. There has always been a trade-off between
patronage and quality of service delivery. There are three main aspects in a political party or party
system in general to have a rigorous effect on this tradeoff: the degree of disintegration of the party
system, the internal cohesion and the degree of polarisation.
Party fragmentation raises the information demand on the part of voters as there are more
candidates and a lot more messages for them to weigh in the course of the general election. When
political parties are highly factionalised, there are no clear career paths and projections. The viable
candidates then have more incentives to concentrate on self-interest and try to enhance their
individual standing.
When we disregard of merit and establish/ run parties on the basis of kinship, patronage and
tribes, a downfall is imminent. Political parties are the bedrock for a functional democracy.
However, when there is no intra-party democracy, how can one expect the democracy to function as
a whole? It is time to stop taking merit detours and establish merit-based systems. Political parties
ought to lead the way.
(Source: Express Tribune)
PAKISTAN ELECTION
Limited solution to political dysfunction
Pakistan is scheduled to hold an election for its National Assembly (the lower house of
parliament) by October 2023, as the current parliamentary term ends in August. Amid a
deteriorating political and economic situation, the upcoming election is unlikely to be free and fair,
further attenuating the already fragile nature of democracy in Pakistan.
The incumbent government took office in April 2022, after a successful no-confidence motion
ousted the previous administration led by Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) party,
which had assumed office in 2018. The current ruling coalition, known as the Pakistan Democratic
Movement (PDM), consists of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), or PML (N), and the Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP), along with a number of smaller parties. It is led by the prime minister, Shehbaz
Sharif of the PML (N).
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The government has become increasingly unpopular since it took office, as its endeavour to
revive a stalled IMF programme led to a series of necessary but unpopular fiscal reforms, which
exacerbated an ongoing cost-of-living crisis. Public disenchantment with the incumbent government
has given the PTI a chance to revive its fortunes through this election.
However, Mr Khan’s position has been complicated by his acrimonious relationship with the
military (the crucial power-broker in Pakistan) and his continuous judicial embroilment since late
2022 on a series of political allegations, including graft and terrorism; these culminated in a
precipitous arrest in May 2023. Mr Khan could be tried under anti-terrorism or martial laws for the
cases lodged against him, and were he to be convicted, he would be disqualified from running for
office. Even if he does participate in the election, we believe that the ballot will be manipulated and
rigged by the Pakistan military to ensure a defeat for the PTI. There is also a risk that the election
could be postponed if the law-and-order situation deteriorates in the months ahead.
We list below three post-election scenarios that could evolve, with their respective
probabilities, and discuss the political and economic implications that each would entail.
Scenario 1: the PDM wins (probability: 70%)
EIU’s core forecast is that the incumbent PDM coalition will retain power in the general
election, with extensive support from the military. We expect the PML (N) to emerge as the largest
party in the National Assembly, with the PPP remaining the other major coalition ally, along with a
number of small regional parties. Mr Sharif is likely to continue leading the government as prime
minister, although Bilawal Bhutto Zardari of the PPP, who currently holds the office of foreign
minister, could be another contender for the role. However, the PDM’s parliamentary majority is
likely to remain modest, keeping political stability tenuous even after the general election. The postelection political dispensation will depend heavily on the military’s continued support. This will
allow the military to maintain—and probably expand—its outsized political role, while also
interfering in the government’s policy-making regarding the economy, defence and domestic
security.
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We believe that the military will manipulate the election in order to prevent the PTI from
coming to power. Since May, the armed forces have targeted the top leadership of the PTI through
widespread arrests and trials through military courts. As it has done previously, the military’s
intelligence wing will use intimidation tactics to force important PTI leaders to desert the party and
to switch allegiance in the months leading up to the election. This strategy has partly borne fruit,
with a number of resignations and defections following Mr Khan’s arrest. The likely prosecution of
hundreds of party leaders and workers in connection with the riots that followed Mr Khan’s arrest
will further dampen the PTI’s electoral chances. We believe that through this whittling away of the
PTI by the military, the PDM will retain power, despite the loss of its popularity.
We believe that the new government will seek a fresh IMF programme by the first half of 2024,
against the backdrop of a deteriorating balance-of-payments situation and a lack of alternative
sources of funding. This will mean the implementation of more unpopular structural reforms,
fuelling discontent and protests. We expect some progress on fiscal consolidation and limited
privatisation under the IMF’s aegis. Nevertheless, structural issues such as a chronically sick energy
industry and the military’s stranglehold on areas such as logistics and transport will keep the
business environment poor.
Under this scenario, Pakistan’s relations with China and Saudi Arabia, two key foreign allies,
will remain strong, and these countries will provide some limited financial assistance. Diplomatic
ties with the US will remain strained as the US deepens engagement with Pakistan’s regional rival,
India, although trade ties will gradually improve. Pakistan’s antagonistic relationship with India
will continue throughout our forecast period (2023-27).
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Scenario 2: the PTI wins (probability: 20%)
The scenario in which the PTI wins the national election is not our core forecast, though it has
a modest probability and bears some inspection. A PTI victory would come about if the Supreme
Court’s chief justice, who is viewed in Pakistan as sympathetic towards Mr Khan, does not convict
the former prime minister in the judicial cases launched against him, declares the national election to
have been rigged and mandates a fresh election. This could give Mr Khan a fighting chance if the
fresh election is held freely. The Supreme Court’s decisions have recently been challenged by the
government, and the mandate for a re-election would lead to widespread social protests and
instability instigated by the military.
If the PTI wins and the military does not intervene, it is likely to form a majority government
(or one with minor coalition partners). While this will create legislative room for the PTI, its path
will be stymied by the military at every opportunity, making the implementation of legislation
extremely difficult. Political stability will still be fragile, as the military is likely to foment social
unrest in an attempt to hamstring Mr Khan’s administration.
We believe that Mr Khan will not immediately seek a fresh IMF package, while the
resumption of the stalled package would be difficult because of his penchant for populist fiscal
policies. While he will try to obtain bilateral financial assistance, a sovereign debt default in 2024 is
nearly assured under this scenario. Relations with the West are likely to deteriorate sharply under a
PTI-led government, given Mr Khan’s anti-US rhetoric, which will further limit access to multilateral
funding. A debt default will generate a new round of devaluation, inflation and a prolonged
economic downturn. It is likely that the default will force the PTI to turn to the IMF, which will
cause further economic and social pain.
Scenario 3: A military coup (probability: 10%)
There is a small chance that in the face of the current political fracas, Pakistan’s military will
decide to intervene directly. A trigger for this could be if Mr Khan’s party seems likely to win the
general election, or if disputes between the PDM and PTI over the election results lead to a
governance vacuum and widespread public protests, providing an excuse for the military to
intervene on the pretext of maintaining law and order.
The direct return of the military to politics (the last military leader, Pervez Musharraf,
relinquished power in 2008) will provide short-term political stability. Instead of direct martial law,
the military may install a so-called technocratic government with civilian faces, to avoid opprobrium
from the West. It is also possible that, similar to what happened in past military regimes, a new
“king’s party” would be created, along with heavily rigged elections and a rubber-stamp
parliament.
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Despite these measures intended to mitigate criticism of the intervention, a military
government would not find much support from the US and its Western allies, which would affect
diplomatic and (possibly) trade relations. While a resumption of IMF support or a fresh package
would be challenging to achieve, it could still occur, although marginal growth and rising
unemployment would remain concerns in the next two years. Democratic norms would deteriorate
significantly under the military, leading to a possible gradual withdrawal of foreign investment
from Pakistan, due to a chronically unstable political situation.
The electoral outcome notwithstanding, Pakistan will continue to experience intermittent
bouts of political instability and domestic protests, as the economic situation remains adverse. Years
of mismanagement in government, corruption and a lack of structural reforms mean that the
country will face a long and painful path to restabilise the economy and attract meaningful
investment, while there is a modest but real risk of Pakistan becoming a failed state, with anarchy in
the years ahead.
(Source: The Economist)
A LAND OF DENTED DEMOCRACY AND INCREASING
POLARIZATION
Maida Farid (Consultant and an Independent Researcher)
Pluralism is a key feature of democracy, that is often accompanied by tolerance. These ideas
are intertwined, as a pluralistic society acknowledges and respects the diverse opinions, beliefs, and
interests of its people. However, when pluralism lacks tolerance and regard for the rights of other
groups, it can lead to political polarization. Political polarization occurs when there is a deep divide
between different ideological or political groups, and there is little to no room for negotiation or
finding common ground within the political system. In such a scenario, the lack of tolerance and
respect for differing viewpoints can hinder the functioning of democracy. Polarized politics can be
understood as a growing divide between people with different political views, leading to an
environment of mistrust and animosity. It often involves zero-sum disagreements on various
policies and rules within the political system. This phenomenon is not limited to any one country
but is a global trend. Even the world’s oldest democracies, such as the United States, have faced
challenges posed by polarized politics. Pakistan, with its turbulent history of civil-military relations,
military interventions, ineffective civilian governments, and linguistic and ethnonational divides, is
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no exception to polarized politics and the challenges facing democracy. The socio-political fabric of
Pakistan is greatly polarized on all levels, from the political elite to the masses, with a noticeable lack
of consensus on fundamental democratic norms.
In Pakistan’s context, political polarization can be better understood as a top-down
phenomenon rather than a bottom-up one. Throughout the country’s history, political elites have
shaped narratives and influenced public sentiments. Thus, political polarization among the masses
depends on what occurs in the corridors of power which penetrates the social fabric and polarizes
the masses.
The struggle for power between state elites (such as the establishment and judiciary) and
political parties can be seen as the primary level of political polarization in Pakistan. Due to this
polarization and a lack of consensus, Pakistan has experienced prolonged influence of state
institutions in political affairs, including direct military interventions, and judicial activism. The
seventy-five years of Pakistan’s history have witnessed limited periods of political harmony and
convergence between state institutions and political parties. Pakistan’s journey towards its first
constitution took nine years due to a lack of agreement on the basic mode of governance between
state institutions. The parliament, which is meant to represent the people, has often succumbed to
external pressures. Parties in power tend to avoid crossing a certain point to maintain their position
and not antagonize the institutions. Moreover, the long history of martial law has further divided
political parties into pro-establishment and anti-establishment factions.
Pakistan’s political system was established on democratic principles, but it is questionable if
the country has experienced true democracy. Instead, Pakistan has had various forms of democracy.
Mohammed Wasim in his book Political Conflict in Pakistan refers to democracy in Pakistan as
“Establishmentarian Democracy.” He describes different variants of democracy briefly mentioned
below:
Direct Military Rule: Pakistan’s political landscape has seen various forms of governance
throughout its history. Direct military rule was imposed on the country for a total of 17 years, with
General Ayub Khan leading from 1958 to 1962, General Yahya Khan from 1969 to 1971, General Ziaul-Haq from 1977 to 1985, and General Pervez Musharraf from 1999 to 2002.
Military-bureaucratic oligarchy: During the early years of Pakistan’s independence, a
bureaucratic polity with an elected government existed for 11 years, from 1947 to 1958. However,
this period was characterized by a military-bureaucratic oligarchy, where power was concentrated
within the military and bureaucracy.
Military government under a civilian president: Another form of governance witnessed in
Pakistan was military government under a civilian president, following the King’s party model. This
lasted for 16 years, with General Ayub Khan serving as the president from 1962 to 1969, General Ziaul-Haq from 1985 to 1988, and General Pervez Musharraf from 2002 to 2008.
Elected governments under civilian presidents: where the rule of the Trica model was
followed, involving the establishment, judiciary, and parliament. This lasted for 11 years, with
Benazir Bhutto serving as the president from 1988 – 1990, Nawaz Sharif from 1990 to 1993, Benazir
Bhutto again from 1993 to 1996, followed by a caretaker government in 1996-1997, and Nawaz Sharif
again from 1997 to 1999.
Elected governments that constantly faced military tensions: For a period of 10 years, the
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) held power from 2008 to 2013, followed by the Pakistan Muslim
League-Nawaz (PMLN) from 2013 to 2018.
Two years of an elected government and the establishment seemingly on the same page: This
occurred from 2018 to 2021, during the tenure of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party. However,
this short-lived marriage of convenience had a bitter ending.
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Imran Khan, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, and chairman of PTI was removed from
office through a vote of no confidence in the national assembly. Initially, he alleged it was a U.S.
conspiracy aimed at removing him from power. However, a few months later, he shifted the blame
to the Pakistan army and effectively gathered a substantial political following that openly expresses
its disapproval of the military. What sets Mr. Khan apart from other political leaders is his embrace
of populist politics. The populist tendencies of Khan’s leadership have never been more evident
before than now. From circumnavigating the constitutional processes, questioning, and targeting
constitutional structures, and creating binaries among the masses as outsiders and insiders, Imran
Khan seems to have checked all the boxes of a populist leader. Moreover, the tone and the political
discourse that Khan has introduced in Pakistani politics are unprecedented.
The current political crisis in Pakistan is being referred to as extraordinary and unprecedented
by some, while many political experts and journalists believe it is a recurring loop or vicious cycle
that repeats itself every few years. What sets the current crisis apart from past events is the
unprecedented level of openness to the public and the public outrage against the military
institutions. In a recent event on 9 May 2023, Imran Khan was arrested by Islamabad high court
under some corruption charges. The arrest of Khan led to significant outrage and anger among
supporters of the PTI. The situation took a chaotic turn when attacks were carried out on the Army
General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, and the Corps Commander House, also known as
Jinnah House, in Lahore. These events not only caused havoc for those involved in the attacks but
also for the PTI’s political leadership. Many PTI leaders were arrested, imprisoned, released on bail,
and re-arrested, and many have quit not only their political party but politics altogether.
Those responsible for the attacks on the GHQ and Corps Commander House are being tried in
military courts rather than civil courts. Furthermore, thousands of PTI supporters have been
arrested in less than a week. While these actions are condemnable, it is crucial to question where the
problem lies. Looking back at recent history, when the PTI itself was in power, a long list of false
cases was made against their opposition. Many people were falsely imprisoned, accused, and
persecuted. At that time, when it suited the PTI’s interests, they did not take any measures to stop or
at least condemn the mistreatment of their political rivals. On the contrary, they not only endorsed it
but also threatened severe consequences for their political opposition if they did not comply. It now
appears that the actions they took against their political rivals are returning to haunt them, albeit
with greater speed and severity. And now the current government is doing the same.
The Pakistan army, previously an obscure force operating from behind the scenes, has thrust
itself into the public eye, shedding its taboo status and becoming a subject of open discussion. The
former Chief of Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa, on the verge of retirement, boldly accepted
complete accountability for the chaotic state of politics. He reassured the public that the army would
prioritize its core responsibilities and refrain from any political involvement. This declaration
initially brought a sense of renewed hope, akin to a breath of fresh air. However, the relief was
short-lived.
Immersed in a pool of problems and formidable challenges, it seems difficult to pinpoint a
direct and singular solution for Pakistan. The challenges faced are multifaceted and demand an
intricate solution. While many solutions have been proposed by the experts over the years, there
appears to be an absolute lack of political will to address these issues. The underlying reason for this
indifferent attitude is that personal and short-term goals consistently take precedence over national
and long-term goals.
Nevertheless, to bring democracy into practice and reinstate the sanctity of institutional
boundaries, Pakistan needs to take certain measures. First and foremost, Pakistan army would have
to take a clear and strong stance by distancing itself from politics, maintaining neutrality, and
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avoiding involvement in political processes. Such a step can be a significant turning point in
Pakistan’s democratic journey.
Similarly, the judiciary in Pakistan should not confine itself to juristocracy and hyperactive
judicial activism, which can encroach upon political sovereignty. Instead, it should operate within a
balanced framework that respects the separation of powers. Legislative assemblies should introduce
reforms aimed at strengthening democracy and minimizing external influences in political
processes.
Political parties have a vital role to play in upholding democracy. They should strive to build
political consensus on shared norms and a code of conduct. Key aspects such as free and fair
elections, civil liberties, free media, equality, and peaceful transfer of government must be areas of
convergence among political parties. It is crucial that all political parties accept the democratic
practices and results thereof. Populist rhetoric should be avoided to gain public support, as it can
undermine democratic processes.
Therefore, it is imperative that all the stakeholders identify and acknowledge the magnitude
of the issues and display a collective resolve to address these issues effectively.
(Source: Near East South Asia Center)
PAKISTAN’S DECAYING DEMOCRATIC JOURNEY
Nasim Zehra (An author, analyst and national security expert)
Another decade, another precipice, another cutting edge experience.
Pakistan’s political managers-- its powerful military establishment-- continue to significantly
influence Pakistan’s decaying democratic journey. The exercise of extra constitutional authority,
continuing tribal-type battles among political parties (and the parties’ willingness to play B-team
within the establishment’s extra-constitutional plans), keeps Pakistan squarely in the zones of
instability and terrible governance.
Added to the context within which Pakistan’s establishment wields power is the May 9
indirect Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and army confrontation. Hours after Imran Khan was
arrested, angry PTI supporters responded by attacking military properties and installations
including the corps commanders house, the national army headquarters, the air force base, intel
offices and defaced images of martyrs etc. While the need to roll back all challenges in the forms of
violent attacks on the state need unequivocal pushback, and harsh deterrents, especially
punishments for proven protesters, attackers and planners is a must, it seems the army-led response
to PTI’s May 9 attacks has dovetailed into the broader PTI-establishment battle which began post
February 2021.
Significantly, May 9 did throw up a severe encounter between a political party and the state
which protects the legal, security and administrative framework within which democratic politics
functions and operates. The state’s response is the dismantlement of PTI.
Currently, the near winding up of the Imran Khan experiment is overlapping with the
initiation of another experiment. PTI is to be replaced with Istehkam-e-Pakistan Party (IPP). Khan’s
own former deputy, a successful businessman who entered politics during military ruler general
Parvez Musharraf’s regime, will lead IPP.
More than 100 former PTI politicians, including PTI’s core members, federal ministers and
parliamentarians have become IPP’s founding members. Their re-launch path has been fairly
straightforward. From arrest to release, from release to abandoning PTI and Khan, declaring a break
from politics; and from declaration to rapid return to politics and into the IPP fold!
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All this is happening against the backdrop of too much in flux- the economy, judiciary,
inflation-struck people with millions tumbling below the dreaded poverty line, the rupee rapidly
losing purchasing power-- all with no quick fix in sight.
Alongside a few desperate efforts by the government to fix critical economic problems,
political hostility has been in full swing. PTI’s top and mid-level leadership and party structure have
nearly disappeared. The bridge between Imran Khan and his supporters has nearly collapsed and
communication channels are being pushed back though PEMRA orders or network restrictions. PTI
now stands as a greatly wounded entity.
The political undoing was initiated in 2021 by personal and policy differences, accentuated by
Khan’s largely simplistic and contentious brand of politics that rebuked and never engaged with
opposition parties. A change of command in the Pakistan army brought to the top the very man
Khan had unceremoniously removed from the top slot of Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency.
Was the PTI-establishment battle then inevitable? This will remain a question that many ponder for
a long time.
While the divide between the two has grown wider, placing PTI outside of Pakistan’s
mainstream political landscape, there were occasions when Khan could have led PTI’s political
‘comeback’ into electoral politics. But on Khan’s own instruction, this engagement never
materialized.
Most important to mention are the government-PTI talks on holding elections. Dates for
dissolving the National Assembly in end June and holding elections on either September 31or
October 1 was decided. However, Khan instructed his team to call off the talks unless there was
immediate dissolution of the National Assembly- a demand that surprised even his own negotiators.
As if to seal the fate of the talks, on May 28, the newly appointed PTI President Parvez Elahi’s
house was raided to arrest him. And Imran Khan took the bait.
Recently came the notable release of Imran Khan’s political deputy, the experienced and
cautious politician Shah Mahmud Qureshi and the inheritor of his political mantle, without
disavowing of either the PTI or Imran Khan, which raised many questions about the future of the
PTI.
If Pakistan’s own history is any guide, the establishment failed to erase the Bhuttos or the
Sharifs and even the Bizenjos, the Mengals, Marris and Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s progeny from
Pakistan’s political landscape.
For the PTI however, Pakistan’s powerful quarters may not seek a reincarnation in any mode.
The emergence of the Tareen-led IPP emphasizes plans to reduce PTI to naught.
With PTI’s dismantling underway, through legal, quasi-legal and illegal ways, the May 9 saga
does introduce a new dimension to an existing challenge for all democratic societies: How do you
align the two: The compulsions of the constitutionally-consented framework essential for survival,
with democratic freedoms now virtually unbridled in the digital era?
For Pakistan specifically, the question is whether unbridled power-play will remain dominant
in determining Pakistan’s political landscape, or will rule of law become the dominant factor
defining the exercise of authority, democracy and governance.
(Source: Arab News)
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THE DEATH OF DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN
Mehlaqa Samdani (Director of Critical Connections, a non-profit organization)
On May 9, 2023, as news spread of former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran’s Khan’s arrest by
paramilitary forces, protests erupted across the country. As tens of thousands poured onto the
streets, one particular protestor stood out. At a busy intersection in Lahore, a lone Pakistani woman
marched across to a group of heavily-armed rangers and threw down her dupatta (scarf) in bold
defiance. As people looked on in horror, the rangers viciously dragged her away by her hair. Within
seconds, she had disappeared.
Those chilling moments exemplified the extraordinary courage that ordinary citizens have
displayed time and again to resist tyranny, as well as the brutal tactics used by the Pakistani military
and its intelligence agencies to subjugate the Pakistani people.
At a time when tens of thousands of Pakistanis are agitating to end the military’s decades-old
stranglehold on Pakistan’s political processes, the media, and civil society, the Biden administration
must do more to support the struggle for democratic change in Pakistan.
The current crisis has been simmering for more than a year since Imran Khan was deposed
through a parliamentary no-confidence vote. For Khan and millions of his followers, his ouster was
orchestrated by Pakistan’s powerful military and intelligence agencies, in collaboration with a
coalition of opposition parties.
Things came to a head last month when the current political and military leadership arrested
Khan on what many believe are trumped-up corruption charges (he currently has a record 150 cases
filed against him) Even after the Supreme Court released Khan, deeming his arrest illegal, a large
cross-section of civil society took to the streets (at times violently), and to social media, to demand
the end of de facto military rule in Pakistan.
Over the past several weeks, thousands of protestors have been targeted, hounded, and
detained. Journalists have disappeared without a trace, and court orders to recover them have gone
unheeded. Women activists, in particular, have been subject to harassment and abuse. Senior
opposition leaders have been arrested and their families threatened to the point where they have
been forced to give up all associations to their party.
Furthermore, the military and current political leadership have sought to try civilians in
military courts for their alleged attacks on military installations.
Although the military’s current aggression appears especially severe, this is not the first time
the Pakistani military leadership has targeted its own citizens—until now, it had just been more
effective at controlling the narrative surrounding its activities.
For decades, revisionist history textbooks ensured that generations of Pakistanis never learned
of the ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the Pakistani military against its own people in former East
Pakistan. Censorship of the media and intimidation of journalists meant that the military’s
manipulation of Pakistani politics was never openly discussed. Pressure on compliant judges
provided legal cover for the multiple coups orchestrated by the Pakistani military. Because of
collusion with corrupt politicians, the military was never questioned for the torture and killings of
hundreds of Baloch, Sindhi, and Pashtun nationalists. Through alliances with the U.S. government,
the military and intelligence establishment got away with the enforced disappearances of thousands
of Pakistani citizens, who were picked up as a result of the U.S. War on Terror and disappeared
without charge or trial.
This time, however, the Pakistani people are calling for accountability. The popular outrage
and mobilization against the military is unprecedented and historic.
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Rather than seize this opportunity to publicly support pro-democracy activists in Pakistan and
condemn the human rights violations taking place, the Biden administration has instead chosen to
remain silent. In mid-May, even after 67 congressional representatives sent a bipartisan letter to
Secretary of State Antony Blinken, citing grave concerns regarding the erosion of democratic norms
and principles in the country, the response from the State Department remained tepid at best.
One reason might be the U.S. government’s willingness to sacrifice democracy and human
rights concerns on the altar of strategic interest. In July 2022, a U.S. drone strike in Afghanistan
killed Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaida’s leader. Since the killing, there had been speculation that the
Pakistani military had once again allowed its airspace to be used for over-the-horizon attacks in
Afghanistan. Two months later, the Biden administration notified Congress about a $450 million
deal to Pakistan’s military to maintain its fleet of F-16s.
For far too long, successive U.S. administrations have strengthened ties with Pakistan’s
military to pursue their Cold War and subsequent counterterrorism agendas. This has not only
enriched and emboldened the Pakistani military but has undermined the rule of law and due
process in the country. This relationship has also proven to be destabilizing for regional and
domestic security.
Following Zawahiri’s killing, tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan ratcheted up, and
Pakistan saw a marked increase in the number of Taliban attacks. The country is currently on the
verge of economic collapse, with dwindling foreign exchange reserves, sky-rocketing inflation, and
increasing unemployment. The political turmoil of the past few weeks has further exacerbated the
situation.
It is not in the U.S. interest to see the fifth most populous country in the world with nuclear
weapons experience further instability. It is time for U.S. taxpayers, legislators, human rights
activists, and media outlets to question the Biden administration’s deafening silence on the abysmal
human rights situation in Pakistan and its ongoing support of the Pakistani military.
Congressional representatives should also keep in mind the Leahy amendment, which
prohibits Congress from authorizing funds to foreign militaries that commit human rights
violations.
This is a pivotal moment, not just for the people of Pakistan but also for the Biden
administration’s commitment to democratic rule. Unless it stands in solidarity with pro-democracy
activists in Pakistan, its rhetoric around human rights and the rule of law will continue to ring
hollow.
(Source: FPIF)
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Economy
THE DOLLAR-YUAN RIVALRY
Dr Imran Khalid
This month Pakistan departed from its long-standing reliance on the US dollar for export
payments, as it utilized the Chinese currency ‘yuan’ to pay for its inaugural government-togovernment purchase of 100,000 tons of Russian crude oil. This marks Pakistan’s first international
transactions in yuan.
Similarly, Argentina’s Secretary of State for Trade Matias Tombolini has announced on social
media that his country has settled transactions worth a staggering $2.721 billion with China, using
the Chinese yuan as the main instrument of transaction. Interestingly, 19 per cent of Argentina’s
imports were settled in yuan in the months of April and May, and Tombolini asserts that this
strategic shift will fortify their foreign exchange reserves and enhance their control over the
economic landscape.
Consequently, on April 26, the government of Argentina announced the adoption of the yuan
for settling trade in Chinese-imported goods, symbolizing a potent blow to the dollar’s dominance.
The emergence of parallel currencies in international trade has fuelled the on-going heated debate
on ‘de-dollarization’, with recent events providing additional ammunition to those critical of US
dominance.
These two examples serve as poignant reminders of the growing trend towards alternative
currencies and the potential erosion of the US dollar’s hegemonic status. As countries like Pakistan
and Argentina embrace non-dollar payment systems in major transactions, the allure of
diversification and reduced reliance on the American currency becomes all the more apparent. The
global financial landscape is undergoing a subtle but significant transformation, one that challenges
the long-standing supremacy of the US dollar.
Recently, in a significant development, China and Brazil unveiled a momentous agreement to
conduct trade using their domestic currencies — the Chinese yuan and the Brazilian reals. This
move underscores this new shift in trade links between the two economic powerhouses, with China
holding the position of Brazil’s largest trading partner, as bilateral trade soared to a remarkable $150
billion in 2022. Also, China’s renminbi has secured a prominent place as Brazil’s second-largest
international reserve currency. This strategic shift amplifies the expanding role of the
renminbi/yuan on the global stage.
China’s recent decision to maintain its imports of crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG)
from GCC countries, while conducting trade settlements in the yuan, has amplified this trend. The
country carried out its inaugural cross-border settlement in yuan for LNG sourced from the UAE on
March 28. This trend of exploring alternative currencies to reduce dependence on the dollar is
gaining momentum, with transnational and regional organizations like BRICS and ASEAN actively
considering such measures. The momentum of BRICS currencies is already very swift and enticing
many countries to join the club. Additionally, Brazil and Argentina have proposed the establishment
of a shared currency known as the sur to bolster regional trade and financial interactions.
These developments highlight two parallel phenomena: erosion of the US dollar’s dominance
and emergence of parallel currencies, particularly the Chinese yuan. The dollar’s dominance over
the global economy has been a topic of discussion since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system
and the introduction of the euro by the European Union in 1999. The 2008-2009 financial crisis and
its aftermath only heightened concerns about the sustainability of the dollar’s power. These fears
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have manifested in a trend towards de-dollarization, which has accelerated in recent years. Central
banks around the world held less than 59 per cent of their foreign exchange reserves in dollars in the
final quarter of 2022, down from 70 per cent in 2000.
While the euro’s share of global reserves has only modestly increased, from 18 per cent to just
under 20 per cent, the Chinese renminbi (RMB/yuan) has rapidly gained traction during the same
period — despite accounting for less than 3.0 per cent of global reserve currency holdings. Last year,
in an effort to exert pressure on Russia, the US deployed a series of punitive measures, including
freezing a substantial $300 billion of Russia’s foreign currency reserves and ousting major Russian
banks from SWIFT, the international interbank messaging service.
However, these actions — rightly dubbed as the ‘weaponization’ of the dollar — inadvertently
paved the way for the rise of alternative financial infrastructures spearheaded by Russia and China.
In response, these countries have taken it upon themselves to establish their parallel financial
systems, posing a formidable challenge to the global dominance of the US dollar.
The year-long Ukraine-Russia conflict has had profound repercussions, triggering significant
transformations in the realms of economics, geopolitics and culture on a global scale. Yet, the most
notable consequence has been the push towards a multipolar world, shifting away from the
concentration of economic power within a singular hegemonic force. This trend, propelling a more
diverse and balanced global power structure, is gathering momentum and exhibiting no signs of
abatement.
The surge in the value of the dollar in recent years has sent shockwaves across the globe,
causing widespread repercussions for nations worldwide. Among the most significant effects is the
burden it places on countries with dollar-denominated debt, as the strengthening currency makes
repayment increasingly costly. The fluctuations in the dollar’s value have disturbed the financial
equation across the globe, with its current standing at an astonishing 10 per cent higher since the
onset of the Ukraine conflict in February 2022, and a staggering 30 per cent higher than a decade
ago. This trajectory has instilled caution in smaller economies, leading them to seek refuge in
alternative currencies and fostering regional trade alliances.
The soaring dollar has imposed a heavy toll on countries reliant on imported essentials like
fuel and food, rendering them exorbitantly expensive. The repercussions of this dollar dominance
raise legitimate concerns for nations grappling with mounting economic burdens. Amid mounting
concerns over the potential future use of US sanctions against them, countries like China are taking
proactive steps to distance themselves from the US dollar, a move that analysts argue is crucial for
safeguarding their economic stability. With China already targeted by US sanctions in sectors like
semiconductor trade, the fear of further repercussions has intensified in Beijing. As a result, China is
actively pursuing strategies to reduce its reliance on the dollar, a decision motivated by the
imperative of preserving the seamless functioning of its economy in the face of potential challenges.
The ascent of China’s global economic influence poses a major challenge to the US dollar’s
status as the world’s reserve currency, particularly with its recent forays into Middle Eastern
markets, including the significant Saudi Arabian oil market. This venture has the potential to shift
the balance in favour of widespread adoption of the yuan — being touted by Western media as
‘yuanization’.
China’s substantial purchases of US T-bills during the 2008 financial crisis temporarily
bolstered the US economy, but this trend has since reversed. China’s reduced holdings of US debt —
falling below $1 trillion — indicate a deliberate effort to minimize exposure to the dollar, especially
in the face of escalating trade tensions. For obvious reasons, China is more determined than ever to
free itself from its dollar dependence.
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Though it is too difficult to predict when the yuan will be able to outcompete the US dollar,
one thing is certain that the process of de-dollarization is picking up speed, much faster than the
expectations of American financial managers.
(Source: The News)
IS A GLOBAL DEBT BOMB ABOUT TO EXPLODE?
Somesh Jha
The United States Treasury secretary, Janet Yellen, World Bank chief Ajay Banga and a host of
world leaders looked on as Hakainde Hichilema, the president of Zambia, took the microphone. The
occasion: a Paris summit hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron on June 24 to brainstorm
solutions to a debt crisis sweeping the developing world.
It was a moment of respite for Zambia, which in 2020 had become the first African country to
default on its sovereign debt following the devastation of COVID-19. In Paris, its biggest lenders
including China and Western nations agreed to restructure $6.3bn of Zambia’s loans under an
initiative driven by the G20.
Yet, after thanking France, China, South Africa – which played a key role in the negotiations –
and others, Hichilema struck a note of caution. It had taken more than two years of talks for the
approval of Zambia’s debt restructuring plan, he pointed out. “For the countries that are coming
after us, there is a need to expedite the processes,” Hichilema said. “Every day we don’t deliver
these things that are within our control, we are basically increasing the costs and the damage gets
compounded.”
The queue of countries seeking debt restructuring like Zambia is only growing.
The majority of low-income developing countries are today either already in or near debt
distress. Meanwhile, the world’s two large economies, the US and China, are expected to see a jump
in their public debt at higher levels than before the pandemic.
Ghana and Sri Lanka defaulted on their external debt in 2022, two years after Zambia did.
Pakistan and Egypt are on the verge of a default. On June 30, Pakistan secured a tentative $3bn
funding deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), promising it potential, short-term relief.
Global public debt levels remain high – at 92 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) at the
end of 2022 – despite falling from the record levels seen during the COVID-19 pandemic, when they
touched 100 percent of GDP at the end of 2020.
So, is the debt crisis a global contagion? Are low-income countries at a much higher risk than
the others? Would countries be forced to accept tough conditions for bailouts? And what can richer
countries and financial institutions like the IMF and World Bank do to ease the pain?
The short answer: The growing debt of poor countries is alarming but there is no evidence of a
contagion that could trigger a global crisis. Yet. However, economists and debt-management experts
say richer countries need to act fast to bring relatively new creditors, including China and the
private sector, on board for debt restructuring deals for a quicker economic recovery and to avoid a
repeat of the 1980s debt crisis that hobbled dozens of less-developed nations for years.
The collapse
The COVID-19 pandemic crushed economic activity globally, leading to revenue shortages
and increased spending by governments to shield the economy from the adverse effects of a
slowdown and layoffs. As a result, global public debt shot up the highest in a year from 84 percent
of GDP at the end of 2019 to 100 percent a year later.
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Poorer nations, which were hit the worst by the public health crisis, had to depend more on
external loans to survive.
About 60 per cent of low-income developing countries are now either high risk or in debt
distress and have either had, or are about to start, a debt restructuring process. This figure was 40
percent before the pandemic.
The debt situation was compounded by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February
2022, which led to an increase in global commodity and food prices.
“Now, the resurgence of inflation means major central banks have increased interest rates,
making the cost of debt servicing costly and this is a problem for both low-income and middleincome countries,” Ugo Panizza, a professor of economics at the Geneva-based Graduate Institute of
International and Development Studies, told Al Jazeera.
In all, 52 developing countries – home to half the world’s population living in extreme poverty
– are facing severe debt problems and high borrowing costs.
As often happens amid crises, the dollar’s value strengthened over 2022 compared with most
emerging and advanced-economy currencies as investors’ demand grew for the US currency,
viewed as a safe asset. This, in turn, has made it even costlier for lower- and middle-income
countries to meet their debt obligations as most cross-border loans and international debt is
denominated in US dollars.
“A lot of global liquidity coming up for refinancing is in dollars and if your currency
deteriorates, as it happened in the case of Ghana, where the cedi collapsed, your ability to meet the
debt payments is hugely damaging,” Judith Tyson, a research fellow who specialised in private
investment and financial development at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), told Al Jazeera.
“There’s probably going to be some more years of high levels of dollar and interest rates and
that’s a significant problem. ”
Ghana’s currency, the cedi, lost more than 50 percent of its value between January and
October 2022, causing Ghana’s debt burden to rise by $6bn. Ghana defaulted on most external debt
in December and now aims to reduce its external debt repayments of $20bn by half over the next
three years to secure a $3bn loan deal from the IMF as a part of its debt restructuring.
Yet, the struggles of Ghana, Sri Lanka, Zambia and dozens of other nations teetering on the
edge of default are not unprecedented.
‘The lost decade’
The oil price shocks of the 1970s led to high spells of inflation, pushing the global economy
into a recession in 1981 as central banks hiked interest rates to control the high price rise.
As many as 16 Latin American countries, led by Mexico, and 11 other less-developed
countries, had to reschedule their debts, prompting the first global debt crisis.
The period of the 1980s is also referred to as the “lost decade” as many less-developed
countries agreed to spending cuts on infrastructure, health and education in exchange for debt
restructuring, with several nations ending the decade with income levels that were lower than in
1980.
More than 30 cases of unsustainable debt from poor countries, especially in sub-Saharan
Africa, led to the creation of a joint debt-relief measure by the IMF and the World Bank, known as
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative, in 1996. Countries had to meet certain criteria and
commit to policy changes to reduce poverty to receive 100 percent relief on eligible debts from the
IMF, the World Bank and the African Development Fund.
Jeromin Zettelmeyer, the director of Brussels-based economic think tank Bruegel, who coauthored a paper in April titled “Are We Heading for Another Debt Crisis in Low-Income
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Countries?”, told Al Jazeera there are similarities and differences between the present debt situation
and past shocks.
“Most sovereign debt crises are preceded by periods of higher (budget) deficits, built up of
debt, and some are triggered by higher real interest rates,” he said. “So, these ingredients of a
sovereign debt crisis are present right now.”
Yet, other “ingredients” are missing, he said, pointing to how this crisis is not just a repeat of
what the world has seen previously. Many previous crises have come in the wake of lower
commodity prices. Several poorer nations are also major exporters of oil, gas and minerals. A decline
in commodity prices hurts their incomes. “But the commodity prices are relatively high right now,”
Zettelmeyer said.
Zettelmeyer said the debt crisis does not look global in scale for now and, in the worst case,
could be confined to developing countries. In their April paper, he and his colleagues concluded that
debt vulnerabilities in low-income countries were substantially less alarming than they were in the
1990s. Zettelmeyer said the economic fundamentals of poorer nations also look stronger than in the
1980s and 1990s.
In the case of Sri Lanka and Zambia, Zettelmeyer said their defaults were the result of poor
domestic economic management, with the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbating the situation.
But in both instances, the search for a solution to their debt crises has spilled over from the
world of global finance to geopolitics, because of the emergence of a major new player: China.
Whose money is it?
Traditionally, poorer countries primarily borrowed from the so-called Paris Club of creditors,
most of them richer countries such as the US, UK, Australia and Germany, as well as multilateral
institutions like the World Bank, the IMF or the African Development Bank.
However, over the past 20 years, China and private bondholders have become significant
lenders to these countries.
The share of external debt owed by low- and middle-income countries to Paris Club creditors
dropped from 28 percent in 2006 to 11 percent in 2020. Over the same period, the share owed to
China increased sharply, from 2 percent to 18 percent, while the share of Eurobonds – international
bonds denominated in a currency other than that of the issuing country – sold to private lending
institutions rose from 3 percent to 11 percent.
China holds more than half of Zambia’s external debt. Sri Lanka owes more than 10 percent of
repayments to Beijing. In fact, for more than half of the 73 countries that are part of the G-20 Debt
Service Suspension Initiative – under which debt payments to creditors were suspended owing to
COVID-19 from May 2020 to December 2021 – China is now the largest official bilateral creditor.
To integrate creditors such as China and the growing number of private players into the
multilateral debt relief process, the G20 set up a “common framework” in 2020 to coordinate debt
treatments for low-income countries between the Paris Club and other major bilateral creditors such
as China, India and Saudi Arabia.
But three years later, this common framework has not proven to be much of a success. Only
Zambia, Chad, Ethiopia and Ghana have requested its use, with Zambia becoming the first country
to reach an agreement with the official creditors committee.
And in case after case – whether Sri Lanka or Zambia – negotiations have been shadowed by a
blame game, with Western nations accusing China of dragging its feet in agreeing to restructuring
plans and thereby delaying the process. Beijing has denied those allegations.
The real problem might be deeper, according to some analysts.
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‘Design mistake’
The very design of the common framework is limiting its chances at success, these experts
argue.
The framework follows the Paris Club’s step-by-step approach. The debtor country initiates a
restructuring process, which is followed by an economic reform programme supported by the IMF.
The country in debt fully discloses all of its loan commitments. Official creditors (foreign
governments) and private sector creditors then offer comparable, if not matching, relief.
Meanwhile, multilateral development banks like the World Bank or Asian Development Bank
enjoy a preferred creditors status – meaning the repayment of sovereign debt to them takes
precedence over other creditors.
China has demanded that this change and that multilateral development banks take haircuts
during the debt restructuring process for Zambia and Sri Lanka, just like commercial creditors and
foreign governments.
“The framework hasn’t really considered how to bring China fully into the picture,” Thomas
Laryea, an international law and policy expert at US-based law firm Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe,
who specialises in advising governments and creditors on international finance matters, told Al
Jazeera. “The common framework had the intent to do that but one of the weaknesses was that it
was designed around the old Paris Club processes and that, I think, was a design mistake.”
Zettelmeyer agreed.
“The newcomers and, in particular, China, which is now the biggest lender, are a bit wary of
simply following the rules of the game of the West,” he said, adding that the IMF’s central role also
rankles Beijing. “The main difficulty is that China does not want to delegate decisions on debt relief
to an institution like the IMF, so it has been reluctant to sign up to the Western debt restructuring
procedures.”
Laryea also criticised the common framework for “relegating the private creditors to the
residual creditor”.
Under the current process, bilateral government lenders negotiate deals with the indebted
country and private creditors are expected to match the terms of those agreements. That “is a
significant mistake because private creditors are a material source of financing in some countries,”
Laryea said.
Unhappy private lenders often end up refusing to match the terms offered by bilateral
creditors, thereby stalling the debt restructuring process.
Tyson at ODI agreed that one way around this would be to bring private creditors on board
the restructuring process proactively, rather than trying to get them to agree on terms decided
without consulting them.
There is a growing recognition of the need for change. Earlier this year, the IMF, World Bank
and the G20 set up the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable (GSDR) to fix the common framework
and speed up debt restructuring already facing delays.
Ultimately, Laryea said, no one gains if a country’s debt becomes and remains impossible for
it to repay.
“If a country’s debt is unsustainable, then the quicker it’s restructured, then it’s better for
everyone, including the rich country creditors,” he said.
(Source: Al Jazeera)
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DIALOGUE FOR THE ECONOMY
Dr Abid Qaiyum Suleri (Head, Sustainable DevelopmentPolicy Institute)
The PTI government made various efforts to attract foreign investment in Pakistan during its
first two years in power. High-level delegations and dignitaries from Saudi Arabia, China, Turkey,
Malaysia, the UAE and Qatar visited Pakistan from 2018 to 2019.
These countries signed multiple memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and agreements
worth billions of dollars with Pakistan to invest in petrochemical, agriculture, infrastructure
development, tourism, renewable energy, and many other sectors.
For instance, Saudi Arabia agreed to invest $20 billion in various projects, including a $10
billion oil refinery and petrochemical complex in Gwadar. China pledged to enhance its cooperation
under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and support Pakistan’s industrialization and
social-sector development. Turkey expressed its interest in investing in Pakistan’s automobile and
tourism sectors. Malaysia signed five MOUs with Pakistan to expand bilateral trade and investment
in diverse areas such as telecommunication, technology, and halal food.
The UAE announced a $6.2 billion package for Pakistan, including $3 billion in balance of
payments support and $3.2 billion in deferred oil payments. Qatar promised to invest $3 billion in
various sectors and increase its liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to Pakistan.
However, despite political support from the highest level, those MOUs never materialized.
Experts attribute this situation to weak follow-up, bureaucratic hurdles, procedural delays, and lack
of coordination among different government agencies and ministries. For example, the Saudi oil
refinery project in Gwadar faced multiple challenges, such as security issues, land acquisition,
environmental concerns, and feasibility studies. The CPEC projects also slowed down due to
disagreements over financing terms, power tariffs, tax exemptions, and security situation.
Turkish investment in the automobile sector was hampered by the lack of a clear policy
framework and incentives for new entrants. Malaysian investment in the telecommunication sector
was stalled by regulatory hurdles and legal disputes faced by the existing Malaysian companies
operating in Pakistan. The UAE package for Pakistan was partially delivered as only $2 billion out of
$3 billion was disbursed as a balance of payment support. The deferred oil payments facility was
suspended after eight months due to falling oil prices. Qatari investment in various sectors was also
delayed due to the Covid-19 pandemic and the changing regional dynamics.
Another factor that irks friends of Pakistan is the lack of policy consistency and continuity. For
instance, Saudi Arabia asked Pakistan to repay $1 billion from the $3 billion loan it had given earlier.
Reportedly, Saudi Arabia was displeased with some inappropriate remarks made by a high-ranking
individual in Pakistan. China also paused some of the projects in Pakistan as it was concerned about
the security situation. The UAE also had some reservations about Pakistan’s stance on regional
issues such as Yemen and Iran. Qatar also had some diplomatic tensions with Pakistan over the
Afghan peace process and the recognition of the Taliban regime.
The situation got further aggravated when, amidst political instability in Pakistan, its friends
adopted a ‘wait and see’ approach. Their reluctance to give financial assurances to Pakistan until
they get clarity on what would happen next on its political front had in turn stalled Pakistan’s IMF
programme. The thinking has been that the IMF will not release the next loan tranche until it
receives specific financial assurances from these countries.
The examples above show how procedural barriers, lack of coordination, and perceived
inconsistencies in policies can adversely affect Pakistani interests. However, the initiatives that
addressed these issues were successful. Here are some examples.
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One example is Pakistan’s response to Covid-19. The delta variant of the coronavirus created
havoc in India, but Pakistan was able to contain the losses to the economy and human lives. This
was largely due to the mechanism of the National Command and Operation Centre (NCOC) which
was jointly steered by the civil and military leadership. It monitored the situation, made decisions,
and implemented policies to control the spread of the virus.
The NCOC also coordinated with provincial governments to ensure the availability of
resources such as hospital beds, ventilators, and personal protective equipment (PPE) where they
were needed most. Moreover, it oversaw the implementation of measures that proved vital to slow
down the spread of the virus, such as lockdowns, social distancing, mask-wearing, and most
importantly, vaccination.
Another example is Pakistan’s graduation from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF). Pakistan successfully complied with one of the toughest action plans of the FATF and the
Asia Pacific Group. Behind this accomplishment was a civil-military coordination mechanism: an
FATF core cell at the GHQ. This cell comprised representatives from various ministries,
departments, and agencies involved in the AML/CFT regime and ensured a coordinated and
synchronized compliance with all action points in a timely manner.
The NCOC and the FATF core cell, jointly steered by civil and military leadership, acted as
convenient ‘single windows’ for addressing the challenges related to Covid-19 and the FATF grey
list. If Pakistan had a similar mechanism to follow up on investment and economic partnerships –
MOUs/agreements – some of them could have been successfully implemented by now.
Keeping that in mind, in July 2022, the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI)
proposed to form an economic security council (ESC) comprising civil and military leadership to
address the economic challenges and complexities faced by Pakistan. The SDPI’s recommendation
was that all stakeholders in the council should formulate and facilitate the implementation of a fiveyear economic roadmap (a charter of economy) that covers key economic challenges facing Pakistan.
It is heartening to note that the leadership of two major political parties – the PMLN and the
PPP – is talking about a charter of economy. While agreeing to such a charter in the run-up to
general elections may not be politically easy, the recently taken initiative to form the Special
Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC) is undoubtedly a step in the right direction.
The stated objectives of the SIFC are to address the type of issues that prevented Saudi Arabia,
Qatar, the UAE, Malaysia, etc from executing their MOUs on investment in Pakistan. It will also help
adopt a coordinated and collaborative approach among the federal and provincial governments and
other stakeholders to ensure timely decision-making, resource allocation, and project
implementation to improve the ease of doing business. It will provide much-needed assurance on
policy consistency and continuity to our development partners.
While establishing the SIFC is a welcome initiative that can help Pakistan attract and facilitate
investment from friendly countries and boost its economic growth, the success of this mechanism
will depend on its effective functioning and implementation.
The SIFC alone cannot solve all the economic problems of Pakistan. It needs to be
complemented by a broader and deeper dialogue and agreement on the economic roadmap and
reforms that are necessary for Pakistan’s sustainable and inclusive development. Hope all
stakeholders are ready for such dialogue.
(Source: The News)
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UNDERSTANDING SIFC
Dr Pervez Tahir (Senior political economist based in Islamabad)
The first meeting of the apex committee of the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC)
announced last month was held on Wednesday. Its outcome was no more than an elaboration of the
statement of intent made earlier. Mercifully, the irresponsibility of declaring SFIC as a bigger game
changer than CPEC was not repeated. In setting up the SFIC, the government has admitted that, post
IMF, its civilian arm alone cannot reform the archaic economic structure. The failure to develop a
consensus on a charter of economy sets a slippery stage for potential investors.
The civilian arm can plan for revival, as it has, by prioritising foreign investment in
agriculture, energy, IT, minerals and defence production. It can also try formulating policies. But it
stumbles when it comes to predictability, continuity and implementation. Investment facilitation is
about stable rules of the game and effective institutional delivery. The SIFC is designed to overcome
this failure by the inclusion of military. It will, in the words of the premier, “leverage collective
wisdom to kick-start the economy”.
Sick of assisting the state, there are reports that the Gulf states have signalled the creation of
special funds for direct investment in case the proposals are not subjected to political footballing and
procrastinating bureaucratic processes. The leasing out of some berths at Karachi port is the first
step. Rapid privatisation of SOEs will follow, besides new investments in the areas identified. New
investment is the key to high and sustained growth. Our rapidly growing economy in the first half
of the 1960s lost the confidence of investors after the 1965 war. In 1971, the confidence was further
shaken by the Bangladesh crisis. The rate of investment in FY65 was an impressive 21.5% of GDP. It
plunged to 17.7% in the following year and crashed to 12.2% in FY72.
There have been ebbs and flows since, but the economy never recovered to pre-1965 levels. In
FY23, the investment rate was 13.6% and the target for FY24 is just 15.1%. Coordination failure is the
major factor in this steady decline. Investment requires a longer term horizon. How credible is a
government thinking big in its last month? Then there will be the interregnum of barely empowered
caretakers, electioneering and the resultant political set-up, all feeding into uncertainty.
Obviously, the onus of coordination is left to the military presence. Whatever the government
or the state of governance, this linchpin is expected to guarantee that one window remains open and
functional. In the matters of Covid-19 and the FATF, AML/CFT, the institution demonstrated its
capability to coordinate. In the field of investment, however, the experience was disappointing. The
worst example was the CPEC Authority. It may be said that a retired general officer could not
possibly exercise the requisite clout. But the fate of the National Development Council that included
the serving army chief was no different. What is different now is the question being asked by many.
One key fact is known. Economic security is now national security. A crumbling economy has been
falling behind the requirements of the security budget.
Net federal receipts are less than the interest payments. All other expenditures, including
defence, have to be financed by borrowing. I have no information, but it seems like a logical step for
the powers that be to take investment coordination in their own hands. Learning from the
experience of the CPEC Authority and National Development Council, the intention is to deploy the
full might of the state to remove obstacles to investment. If it requires a longer caretaker set-up, so
be it.
(Source: Express Tribune)
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WHY DID PAKISTAN NEED THE IMF DEAL?
What does it need to do now?
The International Monetary Fund and Pakistan have reached a staff-level agreement on a
bigger than expected $3bn Stand-By Arrangement (SBA), a last-minute rescue package for the
country facing an acute balance of payments crisis.
Islamabad was racing against time to unlock $1.1bn under the IMF’s ninth review of a $6.5bn
Extended Fund Facility agreed upon in 2019. The programme was due to expire.
The IMF said the SBA “builds on” efforts under the EFF. The board of the global lender will
meet in mid-July to approve the staff-level agreement.
Here are some facts about the importance of unlocking the funds for the cash-strapped South
Asian country of 230 million people and the challenges it has faced:
What is Pakistan getting?
The nine-month SBA will release nearly $3bn, or 111 percent of Pakistan’s IMF quota, the
lender said. The agreement is subject to approval by the IMF’s Executive Board, which is expected to
consider the request by mid-July, it said.
Such approvals are generally granted once a staff-level deal is done. The Pakistan government
was expecting about $2.5bn from the IMF, according to media reports.
Pakistan earlier cleared eight of the 11 listed programme reviews, with the ninth review
pending since November last year. The delay was already the longest since at least 2008.
The ninth review had been stalled due to differences between the fund and Islamabad over
policy actions, including external financing needs and a budget that meets programme goals.
A successful deal with the IMF could also help unlock credit from other financiers who are
looking for a clean bill of health from the IMF for the ailing $350bn economy. This includes raising
money from the private market.
General elections are due by November and the latest deal could boost the government of
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.
What are the IMF conditions?
The initial draft of the 2023-2024 budget presented in parliament earlier this month failed to
meet IMF expectations but was hurriedly revised to introduce new taxes and expenditure cuts.
The country’s central bank also hiked the key rate by 100 basis points in an emergency
meeting on Monday, barely two weeks after keeping the rate unchanged in a scheduled meeting.
Pakistan’s power sector has been specifically mentioned by the IMF, which called for a
“timely” rebasing of tariffs to ensure that costs are recovered. This means raising prices for
consumers despite already record high inflation in what is an election year.
Pakistan’s central bank should withdraw import restrictions put in place to control external
payments in the face of fast-depleting foreign exchange reserves, which had throttled economic
growth. Reserves stand at $3.5bn, barely enough to cover a month’s worth of controlled imports.
The country has been asked to commit fully to a market determined exchange rate, remove
controls and eliminate multiple exchange rate practices in different markets, even as the rupee has
depreciated to record lows in recent weeks.
The central bank has also been asked to remain “proactive” to reduce inflation. The bank
paused its rate hike process at a scheduled meeting this month. Days later, it implemented an offcycle 100 basis point increase to take its policy rate to 22 percent on the demand of the IMF.
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Losses in state-owned enterprises, which are burning a hole in government finances, will need
stronger governance. The government has budgeted only about 15 billion Pakistani rupees
($52.42m) in receipts from a stalled privatisation process.
How bad is the state of Pakistan’s economy?
The government has earmarked $2.5bn in external receipts from the IMF in its federal budget
for the financial year 2024.
Pakistan needs upwards of $22bn to service external debt, make interest payments, and
finance its current account for FY24. Reserves, at $3.5bn, are at a critical level, enough to cover barely
one month of controlled imports.
Pakistan’s credit rating has suffered due to macroeconomic uncertainty: Three key rating
agencies recently cut Pakistan’s ratings – Standard & Poor’s rating for Pakistan stands at CCC+,
Moody’s at Caa3 and Fitch at CCC-.
Despite the larger than expected IMF bailout, the agreement stressed that Pakistan will have
to continue to mobilise multilateral and bilateral financial support.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have pledged a combined $3bn that is expected to
come in now that the IMF deal has materialised. Debt rollovers from China, Pakistan’s largest
creditor, will also be key.
Ensuring the materialisation and building of a spending framework for pledges secured
earlier this year at an international donor conference will be key. More than $9bn in climate-related
pledges were made to help Pakistan recover from devastating floods in 2022.
Pakistan needs $22bn to fund its external payment obligations, including international debt
servicing, in the financial year 2024, which starts on Saturday, July 1, and ends on June 30, 2024.
(Source: Al-Jazeera)
SIFC ATTEMPTS TO REOPEN PAKISTAN FOR BUSINESS
Jan Achakzai (Fformer media and strategic communications advisor to Govt. of Balochistan)
The Shehbaz Sharif government has taken a significant step towards improving the country’s
economic solvency by establishing the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC) with technical
assistance from Pakistan Army including the security agencies like the ISI. Army Chief Gen Syed
Asim Munir in particular will be part of the Apex Body of the SIFC.
The SIFC aims to streamline the process for foreign direct investment (FDI) by routing it
through a one-window operation under one roof. This will remove the obstacle of up to 90
government NoCs (No Objection Certificates) that often take over 18 months to process licensing.
The SIFC will focus on defence production, agriculture, mines and minerals, IT and energy
sectors, with a target of achieving $100 billion in FDI within three years. The ultimate goal is to
achieve a $1 trillion GDP level by 2035. Security agencies will take an active part in cross-frontier
operational management to ensure the success of this ambitious plan.
The business community has warmly received this initiative and has provided numerous
suggestions. Kashif Anwar, the President of LCCI, has emphasised the importance of expanding the
scope of Special Investment Facilitation Council beyond the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
countries. While the Council has been successful in attracting investments from GCC nations in
sectors such as defence, agriculture, minerals, IT and energy, President LCCI believes it is time to
broaden its reach to Africa and Central Asia. He also recommended the SIFC should include sectors
such as tourism, housing and construction and food processing in its purview.
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This is a momentous occasion for Pakistan, and it is a testament to the vision and leadership of
the government and Pak Army. For many years, Pakistan has been struggling to attract FDI, and this
new initiative could be the game-changer that the country needs. The SIFC has the potential to
attract billions of dollars in investment, which would create jobs, boost economic growth and
improve the lives of millions of Pakistanis.
The prospects for the SIFC are very good. Pakistan has a number of attractive investment
opportunities, including a young and growing population, a strategic location and a wealth of
natural resources. With the right policies and reforms in place, Pakistan could become a major FDI
destination in the years to come. The SIFC is a bold and ambitious initiative, but it is one that is
worth taking.
Pakistan needs to do everything it can to attract FDI, and the SIFC is a step in the right
direction. With the support of the Pak Army, the SIFC has the potential to transform Pakistan’s
economy and improve the lives of millions of Pakistanis. The SIFC is likely to face some challenges,
such as bureaucratic resistance and corruption. However, if the government is committed to making
the SIFC a success, these challenges can be overcome.
The SIFC will need to work closely with the private sector to identify and develop investment
opportunities. The private sector will also need to be willing to invest in Pakistan, despite the
country’s political and security challenges.
The SIFC’s success will depend on the government’s ability to create a stable and predictable
investment climate. The government will need to address issues such as security, corruption and the
rule of law and Judicial system.
Pakistan’s state-run enterprises have long struggled with inefficiency, leaving the country in
dire need of a solution. One promising option is to sublet management while retaining a controlling
share of 51pc versus 49pc. By selling up to 49pc of shares, we can achieve three crucial goals: attract
foreign direct investment, acquire the management skills of international entities and put an end to
the financial hemorrhaging of the national exchequer.
Recent examples, such as the PIA’s Roosevelt Hotel, Steel Mills leasing to Russia and the
UAE’s company in the port business, demonstrate the potential success of this approach. By
partnering with international entities, we can tap into their expertise and resources, while still
maintaining a significant stake in the management of our own institutions. This strategy promises to
improve efficiency and profitability.
Overall, the SIFC is a promising initiative that has the potential to boost Pakistan’s economy
exponentially. However, the Council will need to overcome some challenges in order to be
successful. Yet it also signals to the global community that Pakistan is now open for business.
(Source: The News)
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Education
PAKISTAN’S HIGHER EDUCATION BUDGET
Need for a change
Muhammad Murtaza Noor
The Federal Budget 2023-24 has been recently announced, and Rs59.71 billion have been
proposed for development projects and Rs65 billion for meeting recurring expenditure in the higher
education sector. It is very positive that the development budget has been increased from the
previous financial year, Rs44.718 billion to Rs59.71 billion but despite a 38 per cent inflation rate and
announcement of a 30 per cent increase in salaries, there was no increase in recurring budget in the
higher education sector.
The recent budget document reveals that significant funding has been allocated to ongoing
and new schemes in the education sector. Ongoing schemes have received approximately Rs52.8
billion, while new schemes have received an allocation of Rs6.9 billion.
The government has made specific allocations within ongoing schemes. An amount of Rs1.5
billion has been designated for the Allama Muhammad Iqbal 3,000 Scholarships for Afghan
students. Rs500 million each has been allocated for the development of the Main Campus of Bacha
Khan University in Charsadda, the University of Buner in Swari (Phase-I), the Dr Ashfaq Ahmad
Khan Centre in Basic Sciences, and the University College at Zhob (BUITEMS). Rs1 billion each have
been reserved for the Fulbright Scholarships Support Programme HEC-USAID (Phase-III) and the
Innovative Center and Software Park at the University of Engineering & Technology Sub Campus
Lahore (Revised).
Additionally, Rs3.23 billion has been earmarked for Overseas Scholarships for MS/M.Phil
leading to PhD in selected fields (Phase III)-HEC, and Rs3 billion for the PhD Scholarship
Programme under the Pak-US Knowledge Corridor (Phase-I)-(Revised). Rs800 million has been
reserved for the Strengthening and Expansion of the University of Gujrat (UN) and Allied
Campuses (Revised), and Rs740.902 million for strengthening the Core Network & Expansion of
PERN footprints through CPEC Optical Fiber (PERN-III)-HEC. The amount of Rs1.5 billion has been
allocated for the construction of the National Sports City (NSC) at Narowal.
For new schemes, Rs1.2 billion has been allocated for improving laboratory facilities in five
leading Engineering Universities while Rs500 million each has been set for providing higher
education opportunities to students from Baluchistan and tribal areas (Phase-III) and enhancing
academic facilities at NED University of Engineering & Technology, Karachi. An additional amount
of Rs500 million has been allocated for the establishment of the Institute of Sports.
The current budget allocation for higher education is not sufficient to meet the needs of the
country’s growing population. Higher education is considered as an essential component of any
country’s development. It plays a vital role in shaping the future of a nation by producing skilled
professionals who can contribute to the country’s economy. However, Pakistan has been struggling
with its higher education system for years. The country has one of the lowest literacy rates in the
world, and its higher education system is plagued with problems, such as lack of funding.
According to UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), Pakistan’s government’s expenditure on
education was only 2.2 per cent of GDP in 2020. This is significantly lower than other countries in
the region such as India (3.1 per cent) and Bangladesh (2.5 per cent). Furthermore, according to
budget documents,
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A close review of the last six years of HEC ‘s recurring budget reveals that it remained
stagnant, Rs63.183 billion in 2017-18, Rs65.020 in 2018-19, Rs64.100 in 2019-20, same allocation of
Rs64.100 in 2020-21, Rs65 billion in 2022-23 while the proposed allocation for the new financial year
is Rs65 billion. This budget seems quite insufficient even to meet the current requirements of the 149
public sector universities with more than 89 sub-campuses. That is why, during the last few years,
we witnessed chaos and unrest among the universities due to strikes by the faculty and the
universities’ staff due to non-payment of salaries and pensions.
There are several reasons why it is necessary to increase the budget allocation for higher
education in Pakistan: Firstly, higher education plays a crucial role in economic growth by
producing skilled professionals who can contribute to the country’s economy. Secondly, higher
education provides opportunities for social mobility by enabling individuals from disadvantaged
backgrounds to access better-paying jobs. Thirdly, higher education institutions are essential for
research and development activities that can lead to innovation and technological advancements.
Fourthly, countries with strong higher education systems are more competitive globally as they
produce highly skilled professionals who can compete with their counterparts from other countries.
In conclusion, it is essential to increase the budget allocation for higher education in Pakistan
if we want to improve our country’s future prospects. The current budget allocation is not sufficient
to meet the needs of our growing population, and it is time for a change. By increasing the budget
allocation for higher education, we can produce skilled professionals who can contribute to our
country’s economy and help us compete globally.
(Source: The News Supplement)
ADVANCING PAKISTAN’S FUTURE THROUGH EDUCATION
Sheher Bano
Higher education is cited as a crucial element in creating a competitive knowledge economy in
Pakistan’s Vision 2025 agenda. The national manifesto makes mention of several of the major
initiatives of HEC’s Higher Education Vision 2025, including a considerable increase in spending on
higher education from 0.2 per cent of GDP to 1.4 per cent of GDP. As stated in Pakistan’s Vision
2025, the country would have “a balanced educational approach, politically united, economically
sound and prosperous, morally and spiritually elevated nation’s programmes to meet the 21st
century challenges.”
A developed, industrialised, just, and affluent Pakistan is what Pakistan’s Vision 2030 aspires
to achieve through “rapid and sustainable development in a resource-constrained economy by
developing knowledge inputs,” according to the document. “Knowledge inputs” invariably lead to
human development, which then establishes the course for the sustainable growth of a country.
The establishment of new science and technology universities and research technology parks,
increasing research grants in the fields of energy, climate change, and food security, setting up more
Research and Development Centres (RDCs), and focusing on applied research in scientific study
exploration and commercial exploration of natural resources are all objectives of the recent Pakistani
National Education Policy 2017-2025.
The year 2019 might be considered a turning point for the entire world, including Pakistan, in
terms of education, since the majority of educational institutions transitioned from on-campus
learning and teaching to online learning and teaching. The COVID-19 pandemic, according to the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, UNESCO, has disrupted
schooling for at least 290.5 million students globally, perhaps leading to an unrecoverable
catastrophe in education.
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The transition from offline to online education due to the pandemic brought about many
challenges. Poor internet connections, difficulty accessing online platforms due to the volume of
users, a lack of appropriate tools, and a lack of private spaces for online learning are some of the
factors. Political unrest in the later years, when we were still dealing with difficulties related to the
economy, made things worse.
According to the KPMG’s (a global network of professional firms) most recent analysis of
COVID-19’s economic effects, if things become any worse, about 125 million people-more than half
the country’s population-could become impoverished.
Pakistan ranks 47th out of 68 countries in terms of sustainable development goals related to
education, which call for inclusive and equitable quality education and promoting lifelong learning
opportunities for all. According to a report, out of 25 million people in the age bracket of 18-23, only
2 million are enrolled in higher education institutions. Among those who somehow complete their
education, “one in three people are currently unemployed.”
But things are not as gloomy as they were during and post-COVID-19, freelancing, especially
in the IT sector grew exponentially. As a result of a sharp rise in the number of freelancers in
Pakistan over the past years-from 4 per cent in 2018 to 42 per cent in 2019 and finally 48 per cent in
2020-2021-Pakistan has cemented its position as the fourth-largest country for freelancers worldwide
as of 2021. Pakistan is also ranked as the fourth most popular country for freelancing in the Online
Labour Index published in 2017 by Oxford Internet Institute (OII) and is consistently ranked among
the top destinations for information and communication technologies (ICT) outsourcing because of
the exponential growth of the IT sector.
In order to make further progress in the higher education sector, Pakistani education experts
also advise looking over regional educational models and then replicating them in Pakistan. While
expressing his concern about the quality of education at the higher education level, Corporate
Trainer and Tourism Industry Specialist Azam Jamil believes, Pakistan needs a large trained
workforce in the services sector, where we are seeing a shortage of professional personnel.
“Each year, universities produce tens of thousands of graduates with professional degrees
such as MBA, MBBS, BE, and BS, but their market penetration is far lower than their enrolment. On
the other hand, despite the fact that society urgently requires skilled workers such as plumbers,
drivers, car technicians, electricians, welders, waiters, etc., such professions are not encouraged by
society and every parent wants their child to become an engineer or doctor. Although higher
education in Pakistan is good and reasonably priced, the market is already crowded with people
who have degrees. An educated teenager who doesn’t receive a salary commensurate with his
degree gets disappointed and frustrated. In the USA, not everyone can afford a college or university
degree because of their high cost. Similar restrictions apply in Germany, where higher education is
solely available to teachers and researchers. The remaining population receives competency-based
vocational training in a variety of technical fields, and they land respectable blue-collar employment
that pay well.”
The debate either to pursue a degree program or go for short vocational courses has also
perplexed the students.
“Gaining expertise in software development or earning a degree in software engineering is a
gateway to the magnificent world of information technology, where success knows no bounds. A
university degree is required to work for or receive projects from foreign IT companies. However,
because the technological disruption is happening so quickly, the field needs ongoing improvement
through refresher courses. Success will increase the more you work towards it. As we delve deeper
into new technological areas, the world of new discoveries is shown to us in a mind-boggling way,”
says a software developer Syed Abdul Moiz Hussain, working in a private software company in
Karachi.
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“Degrees help students become exceptional scholars,” says Azhar Rizvi, CEO & Founder of
Cambridge Advisors Network, a platform for the promotion of entrepreneurial firms. “Certification
is essential to improving knowledge of the particular skill sets of any program. Professionals in the
USA get themselves enrolled in six-month boot camps to hone their abilities, and upon completing
the course, they either land a better job or see a raise in compensation from their existing employer”,
he continues.
Similar to this, “software companies in India hire bright students who have completed the
first two years of their degree programmes. These students are required to work for 5 days while
going to university for the remaining 2 days. By the time they finish their degree, they will have
developed their skills to the level required by their employer, giving the company a skilled
employee. We need to make such an investment in our students where the industry is responsible
for their skill development as opposed to students paying significant sums of money for additional
certification after they have their degree, which is also quite expensive,” opines Rizvi.
Several researchers have argued that success in education, employment, and daily life in the
twenty-first century demands confidence and efficiency in ICT use in all fields, at both the academic
and industry levels. Information societies, also known as knowledge societies, have emerged as a
result of the development and diffusion of ICT in varied degrees over the past 20 years. Today, these
societies play a significant role in the growth of knowledge economies.
A recent study: “Role of ICT in Shaping the Future of Pakistani Higher Education System”
highlights that ICT is widely used in Pakistan’s big-city HEIs, i.e., those in Karachi, Lahore,
Peshawar, Quetta, Islamabad, etc., The study also highlights the need for 75 per cent use of ICT in
their job-related tasks.
Seeing the global growth in ICT, Dr Arif Alvi, the President of Pakistan, introduced a
programme to teach IT skills to the country’s youth a few years ago, and it is still in operation in
many public and commercial institutions. With the aim of training 50,000 people in cutting-edge
technologies like artificial intelligence, cloud computing, metaverse, and web 3, Sindh Governor,
Kamran Khan Tessori, recently unveiled another ambitious project to offer free IT training classes to
the region’s youth.
Pakistan Vision 2025 seeks to lay the foundation of a knowledge-based economy by
promoting efficient, sustainable, and effective information and communications technology (ICT)
initiatives. Besides, Pakistan Vision 2025 also emphasises the role of e-education, e-commerce, ehealth, and digital government in improving governance and public sector development and shows
the country’s ambition in developing smart cities. The guiding theme for the policy is that ‘the
Government shall be the facilitator and enabler to encourage the private sector to drive the
development in IT and Telecommunications. This one single element has galvanised the entire
Pakistani IT community to participate wholeheartedly in the process.
As for the investment in the higher education sector, the government is trying to give
maximum relief to the sector through announcing budget for the ongoing and new projects under
HEC. According to the proposed budget presented to the National Assembly on June 9, 2023, by
Finance Minister Ishaq Dar, funding for the Higher Education Commission’s Public Sector
Development Programme will increase from Rs44.179 billion in 2022-23 to Rs59.715 billion in 202324, with 90 per cent of that amount going to ongoing projects. Further details reveal that Rs1 billion
have been reserved for Fulbright Scholarships (Phase III), Rs1.2bn set for improving labs in five
engineering universities, and Rs500m allocated for establishment of Institute of Sports.
Pakistan’s higher education system has seen significant changes due to the country’s
expanding IT infrastructure and rising internet usage. Different areas of higher education have been
greatly impacted by the IT revolution, which has changed how information is shared, accessed, and
used.
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The Higher Education Commission (HEC) of Pakistan reports that 2.87 million students were
enrolled across all higher education institutions in Pakistan for the academic year 2019-2020. This
comprised students attending both public and private universities and colleges who were enrolled
in undergraduate, graduate, and doctorate programmes.
The gender gap in higher education has been narrowing in recent years. As of 2021,
approximately 50 per cent of enrolled students in higher education institutions are female,
indicating an increase in female participation in tertiary education.
In recent years, several IT fields have gained popularity among graduate and postgraduate
students due to their promising career prospects and increasing demand in the job market. These
include: Data Science and Analytics, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning; Cybersecurity,
Cloud Computing and DevOps, Internet of Things (IoT), Blockchain Technology and decentralised
applications (DApps), User Experience (UX) Design etc.
We have come a long way, but there is still work to be done to get the international respect
that a few Pakistani universities are beginning to receive. Six universities in all, NUST (#358), Quaidi-Azam University (#378), PIEAS (#398), LUMS (#651), UET, Lahore (#801), and University of the
Punjab (#801), were listed in the top 1000 by the QS World University Rankings as of 2022.
In order to bring more universities in the world ranking, we need to concentrate on teaching
as well as technology, in the words of George Couros, a pioneer in the field of innovative teaching,
learning, and leading, “Technology will never replace great teachers, but in the hands of great
teachers, it’s transformational.”
The Fourth Industrial Revolution is upon us, and Pakistan must jump on board if it wants to
prevent artificial intelligence-powered robots from taking the place of people and harming the
human race. As John Dewey puts it, “if we teach today as we taught yesterday, we rob our children
of tomorrow.”
(Source: The News Supplement)
TRANSNATIONAL EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN
Adeela Chughtai
Established in 2015, Denning today is the largest and most positively acclaimed affiliate centre
of University of London headquartered in Karachi, Pakistan. A name that has become synonymous
with excellence primarily in the disciplines of law and business, with aspiring young lawyers and
business students pursuing a globally recognised three-year LLB (Hons) and BBA (Hons) degree
awarded by the reputable University of London as part of their highly credible distance learning
programmeme.
With a highly proficient management team that emphasises practical training and its
implication with academics, a vibrant student life articulating academically enriched activities, a
designated division set in motion to provide continuous guidance to students in areas of career and
skill development, and seasoned faculty members engaged in taking full-time academic charge,
Denning, has set a mark in exemplifying through fine execution the accessibility of procuring a
world-class qualification within the ambit of transnational education in Pakistan.
Being the most densely populated country, Pakistan is also the fastest-growing nation in the
world, with consistent opportunities for growth and advancement in every sector. Due to the
political complexities, economic uncertainties, and ongoing security predicaments, our potential as a
young nation, in terms of foreign education investment is not pronounced. And therefore, it comes
as serious and rather compulsive responsibility on private institutions, policymakers, and education
practitioners to thoroughly examine the current market forces and identify the rapid trends in
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tapping the future for transnational education (TNE) partnerships in Pakistan and the underlying
challenges, changing dynamics translating a dire need for quality education for the young
demographics of the state.
With the immense flexibility it offers, TNE is an evolving global platform that is not limited in
its nature but rather a fusion of distance learning with a virtual or physical interface, that caters to
joint or dual degree programmes, courses, and educational services in which students get the access
to acquire superior and internationally acclaimed education at the convenience of staying in their
homeland with the comfort of being with their families. Understanding and taking these dynamics
forward Denning takes great pride in being the only school in Pakistan that has invested heavily in
developing a technologically supportive infrastructure that provides students with on-campus and a
state-o- the-art e-learning portal allowing them access to lectures, study material, assignments, and
related updates on similar lines as top-tier universities across the world.
Keeping in view the escalating mobility of students and teachers as an inevitable consequence
of globalisation with rapid and rather constant innovation in technology, educational institutions are
obliged to take the charge to impart knowledge alongside skills maintaining the coherence of the
tough requirements and cutthroat environment of the contemporary workplace. Ensuring that our
students are ready for these challenges, the Career Development Unit takes the responsibility of
training the currently enrolled students while fostering strong and lasting linkages with industry
leaders inclusive of law firms and corporate organisations, in prioritising the careers of our students
and facilitating them in obtaining the needed vocational nourishment both at entry and senior
management levels, under the immaculate leadership and supervision of the leading names in the
market.
On the contrary, considering the aggressive competition among universities in even
developed economies seeking collaborative opportunities to expand their operation at overseas
locations has tremendously soared the hype for cross-border higher education. In spite of this
sudden and consistent expansion, the state seems inadequate to satisfy the upward trending
demand of the apparent snowballing student population. And therefore, it results in what we
witness as a constant insistence on the government and private institutions to raise capacity and to
provide better and more credible avenues for higher education of global standards.
It has been observed that plenty of foreign universities are keen to operationalise in Pakistan,
while subsequently necessitating the provision to regulate quality standards in higher education in
this emerging sector. With a clear-headed understanding of meeting these cross-border educational
challenges, Denning with its designated in-house consultancy unit caters to students desirous of
pursuing or in most cases after spending one or two years, continuing their higher education abroad
with the honest intent of directing and guiding them towards the best universities across the world,
for either during their undergrad years or post-graduation qualification.
With the consistent surge in inflation and pressing economic conditions, there is a downward
shift in students travelling abroad for further studies and yet the inclination for acquiring foreign
(predominantly American and British) qualifications remains unchanged. Students demand for
accessible international programmes while universities’ strong keenness towards maintaining
successful partnerships (proven in the past) seems to harmonise firmly with the government’s
notion of prioritising courses for students in key research areas that aid Pakistan’s socioeconomic
development. With the pleasant and rather needed acceptance of the Higher Education Commission
(HEC) for transnational programmes and with Pakistan, being the breeding ground for the everexpanding affluent middle class and a tertiary-aged audience comprising well-versed & cerebral
consumers of higher education, there seems an immense potential to tick off and furnish better
provisions in the present and near future.
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With its increasing scope and relevance, it won’t be wrong to state that transnational
education offers students the luxury of choice and helps develop these local competencies while
providing a cost-effective solution while simultaneously minimising capital outflow. Most
essentially, all segments of society should be made aware that it is now possible to procure a foreign
qualification with the same international recognition and repute by studying in institutions like
Denning which are affiliates of foreign universities such as the University of London. Regulators are
keen to accept this trend through the enactment of the transnational education policy where
institutions offering such programmes in partnership with foreign universities are granted NOC
under the said policy after the regulators complete a strict due diligence process to monitor quality
and other procedures to be in place in satisfactory in accordance with their set parameters. In the
current challenging economic times that Pakistan is facing, the transnational education pathway
plays a pivotal role in enabling Pakistan to optimise the potential of our youth and channel it for
generations ahead to comply with its most constructive etiquette with the holy grail of mounting
along excellence and accepting the ongoing trend of globalisation of tertiary education.
(Source: The News Supplement)
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY
A new path to prosperity
Sirajuddin Aziz
Humans are possessed and obsessed with the quest for knowledge. The pursuit is twopronged: to widen the base of knowledge, and thence to dig deep into its various branches. It is
initially about knowing how, followed by knowing more and more, which means to do
“specialisation”.
Albert Einstein in relation to having creative capacities remarked, “Don’t think why you
question, simply don’t stop questioning. Don’t worry about what you can’t answer, and don’t try to
explain what you can’t know. Curiosity is its own reason. Aren’t you in awe when you contemplate
the mysteries of eternity, of life, of the marvellous structure behind reality? And this is the miracle of
the human mind — to use its constructions, concepts, and formulas as tools to explain what man
sees, feels, and touches. Try to comprehend a little more each day. Have holy curiosity.”
It is no wonder that when Bertrand Russell, the great philosopher, was asked, “what’s the best
time to educate a child?” He replied, “A hundred years before the child is born”; he was not being
facetious, but he meant to emphasise the need to plan for education.
Regrettably, since our independence, education has not been given sufficient priority. The
paramount importance of education as an enabler for the overall economic growth of the country
has not dawned upon policymakers for the longest time. Our eastern neighbour became
independent alongside us; their economic progress has been outstanding because they paid
attention to the growth and development of the education system. Their literacy rate is far higher
than ours. They have set up 25 Indian Institutes of Technology (ITTs) of a very high standard, almost
smiliar to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The results are showing. Benjamin
Disraeli, on how knowledge influences and creates equality in society says,” It is knowledge that
influences and equalises social condition of man; that gives to all, however different the political
position, passion which are common, and enjoyments which are universal”.
Economic growth must rely beyond the factors of production, that is, it must include and be
dependent on the quality, quantity and accessibility of information available. It is necessary to do so
for the creation of the right quantum of intellectual capital, which then must become the edifice for
production and consumption. Knowledge leads to an economic good.
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The coinage of the term ‘Knowledge Economy’ is not a recent development; Peter Ducker in
his book, “The Effective Executive “, published in 1966, was the first to use the term and he defined
knowledge economy as, “an economic system that relies more heavily on intellectual capabilities
than physical inputs or natural resources.” Singapore in particular, besides other newly
industrialised countries, is not endowed with natural resources, yet has achieved tremendous
economic success, because this country diligently developed its intellectual capital base. Currently,
all countries of the developed world owe their success to the concept of knowledge economy.
Intellectual capital has many connotations that include the level and availability of information
technology resources; trained human resources, innovation capacities, etc. A culture for the
promotion of research and innovation is an absolute necessity. The system must have inbuilt strong
communication technology and mechanisms, for it is only with the presence of these that a country
can usher in a formidable learning economy, creative economy and a functioning knowledge-based
economy.
The argument that the knowledge economy promotes wage inequality, job insecurity or
potentially, lower employment rates in the economy is exaggerated. The Newly Industrialised
Countries (NICs) have proven such contenders to be on the wrong side of the argument. The
knowledge economy promotes collective and individual growth and economic well-being.
Globalisation, in its wake, has led to a transformation in client preferences and choices.
Organisations, particularly those that operate across geographic frontiers have accepted the
challenge to move from being just industrial enterprises to being more knowledge-based entities.
The massive use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) alongside the various techniques for setting up, and
using algorithms to determine market demand is now a standard practice. Business ideas are more
important than mere production facilities. To meet this demand for newer horizons of imagination,
the education system must respond by producing university graduates who are not just well versed
with STEM-based knowledge but be additionally equipped with a creative mindset.
The demand for liberal sciences is only growing, hence arts is significant too. The pertinence
of understanding human nature and behaviour for conducting successful business cannot be
underscored. I am also of the view that more emphasis must be placed on the learning and
proficiency of the English language. The business language of the world is English. We have no
choice but to become proficient in it.
Sweden is considered by economic analysts as the world’s largest and best knowledge
economy, with an index of 9.43 points, as against Russia, which is at 5.5 points. The Knowledge
Economy Index is an aggregate that represents the overall level of growth and development of the
knowledge economy. Of the top ten knowledge-based economies, seven are European nations; the
three exceptions are Canada, New Zealand and Australia.
The invigoration of a knowledge economy requires meticulous planning; that must include all
segments of the economy, the social cadre and the political set-up.
Against the backdrop of the need to have a knowledge-based economy, the obvious question
is, do our economic managers know what they ought to know to embark upon the creation of a
knowledge economy? Perhaps not. The knowledge of what practical steps need to be taken is
critical, before even attempting to jumpstart the economy.
We have, as a nation, been short on economic imagination. There is no long-term vision.
Today, there is need to prepare at least a twenty-year economic programme like our friend China
did in 1978, and they stuck to it, by altering only the dynamics of market demands. This must be
reviewed each year. We pay so much attention to the yearly budget exercise, but not to the economic
vision.
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Many ministers are unqualified for their positions and manage their portfolios by bluffing and
ridicule. They have no knowledge of the issues they are responsible for, they mess up the good of
the past and ruin the prospect of the future.
Accumulation of information is insufficient. It is the ability to use that knowledge which has
significant and critical aspects. The mother of all virtue is Knowledge—- no asset can last beyond the
life of knowledge.
(Source: The News Supplement)
A SYSTEM IN CRISIS
Identifying the issues and challenges in higher education
Muhammad Asif Noor (Director, Institute of Peace and Diplomatic Studies)
Education is a fundamental pillar for constructing a modern, enlightened, and civilised
society, providing comprehensive knowledge from a global perspective. An effective education
system produces individuals equipped with exceptional skills, leadership qualities, and forwardthinking mindsets who contribute to the progress of industries and the growth of society as a whole.
Unfortunately, the higher education sector in Pakistan faces profound systemic challenges that
limit the choices and opportunities available to parents and students, which, in turn, hinder
economic productivity and weaken social cohesion. These problems are multifaceted, spanning from
the lack of efficient governance mechanisms to the absence of an effective primary and secondary
school system, inadequate funding, institutional conflicts driven by bureaucratic interests, and the
presence of exclusive and parallel educational streams. Such challenges have far-reaching
implications for the socio-economic and political development of Pakistan.
A closer examination of the academic landscape brings to light the unsettling reality that the
higher education sector in Pakistan has been plagued by underperformance. The main vulnerability
of the higher education system in Pakistan lies in the lack of resources and a low educational budget.
The official statistics for the Financial Year 2021-22 indicate that Pakistan allocated only 1.77% of its
GDP to education at the federal and provincial levels, which is below the average for a wellperforming education system and the lowest in the region. The UN agencies have recommended
that Pakistan should allocate 4% of its GDP to education, yet the budget for education only reached
2.12% of Pakistan’s GDP once in the fiscal year (FY) 2017-18.
Examining the statistics for FY 2023-24, Rs59.7 billion has been allocated to the Higher
Education Commission (HEC) under the Public Sector Development Program, and this amount has
not been exclusively designated for educational purposes. The funding arrangement following the
18th Amendment poses an additional barrier to the enhancement of quality education and adequate
budgetary requirements. Public universities currently cover 40% of their budget from fee collections,
34% from the federal government, and around 6-8% from the provincial government’s funds. When
there are delays in the allocation of funds, universities are forced to cover 60% of their expenses from
student fee collections. This financial strain hampers the universities’ ability to enhance their
performance and deliver quality education.
Addressing policy and governance issues
Lack of cohesive governance and a clear vision is another challenge making the system
malfunction from top to bottom and bottom up. A fragmented approach to policymaking and
implementation has resulted in a disjointed system that fails to harness the full potential of higher
education institutions. To elevate the status of higher education in Pakistan, a unified and consistent
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policy framework must be established that lays the foundation for a more robust and effective
system.
Promoting inclusivity is another crucial aspect that requires attention. Curriculum reforms are
imperative to align educational content with contemporary needs and global standards, equipping
students with the skills and knowledge required in the modern job market. Promoting strong
collaborations between academia and industry is vital to bridge the gap between theoretical learning
and practical application.
Crucial link between quality primary education and higher education
One significant factor contributing to the low performance of higher education in Pakistan is
the inadequate role played by primary schools in nurturing young minds capable of excelling in
university education. The foundation of a strong education system lies in primary schools, which
should employ analytical and modern tools to stimulate critical thinking and intellectual
development among students. However, the prevailing educational practices often fall short of
preparing students for the challenges of higher education.
The shortcomings of primary education trickle down to higher education, as students enter
university without a solid foundation in analytical thinking, problem-solving, and critical analysis.
Overcoming educational disparities
The composition of students enrolled in higher educational institutes in Pakistan is diverse,
representing various types and categories of schooling; coming from the Matric system and A levels.
Additionally, there are informal training institutes, technical and vocational institutions, and Deeni
Madaris (religious schools) whose graduates also qualify to join universities. However, despite this
wide range of educational backgrounds, the system often fails to cultivate a mindset that is truly
prepared for university-level education.
Presently, there are 186 universities in Pakistan, comprising 111 public sector universities and
75 private sector universities. The enrollment statistics reveal that approximately 1.576 million
students are currently enrolled in these institutions. Out of this total, staggering 80% or 1.266 million
students are enrolled in public sector universities, while the remaining 20% or 0.309 million students
are enrolled in private universities and degree-awarding institutes.
To facilitate this significant student population, there are 56,885 teachers within the higher
education system. It is important to note that this enrollment figure represents only a fraction of the
overall student population in Pakistan. Merely 4% of students in the country have access to a
university education, indicating a significant disparity in educational opportunities. The gender
imbalance within higher education is evident, with even fewer female students compared to their
male counterparts.
The education-economy connection
According to the Global Competitiveness Report 2022 published by the World Economic
Forum, Pakistan was classified as a low-performing country, ranking at a discouraging 110 position
out of 141 countries. This ranking shed light on Pakistan’s inferior industrial performance in
comparison to its regional counterparts, including China, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia. The
repercussions of this subpar industrial performance can be directly attributed to the deficiencies
within Pakistan’s higher education system.
The education system has consistently failed to produce graduates of high quality who
possess the necessary skills and expertise to contribute significantly to the country’s economic
growth. The low ranking reflected a glaring reality: the existing system falls short in equipping
graduates with the knowledge, practical skills, and innovative mindset required to thrive in a
competitive global market. Consequently, the country’s industrial sector and overall performance
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lag behind its regional counterparts, impeding economic growth and limiting the nation’s potential
for development.
Poor learning standards
The quality of education imparted within higher education institutions is a pressing concern.
The outdated teaching methodologies, limited research opportunities, and a lack of exposure to
cutting-edge technologies hinder the development of critical thinking, problem-solving abilities, and
innovation among students. This deficiency in quality education further exacerbates the challenges
faced by Pakistan’s industrial sector, as it fails to nurture a skilled workforce capable of driving
productivity and innovation.
The need for a well-coordinated approach
To address these issues, comprehensive and in-depth reforms with an action-oriented
approach are required to revitalise Pakistan’s higher education system. Incorporating experiential
learning opportunities such as internships and community service, can help students develop a
deeper understanding of societal issues and cultivate a sense of social responsibility. Teacher
training programmes must be strengthened to equip educators with the necessary skills to impart
quality education and inspire students.
Along with this government, policymakers, and relevant stakeholders need to prioritise
education, increase investment, and establish a clear direction for higher education, enabling
Pakistan to emerge as a global hub of knowledge and innovation.
(Source: The News Supplement)
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Energy Crisis
SELF-RELIANCE
Engr. Hussain Ahmad Siddiqui (Former Chairman of the State Engineering Corporation)
In recent years, Pakistan has proudly and progressively joined the group of selected countries
that produce structure, equipment, and components for a nuclear power plant according to the
safety standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These items include reactor
vessels, storage tanks, cooling systems, steam generators, heat exchangers and other heavy
components at the nuclear island, and a variety of spares, accessories, and ancillaries for a nuclear
power plant. Pakistan has impeccable credentials in safety and security of operating and
maintaining its nuclear power plants.
The foundation for developing indigenous manufacturing of heavy equipment for nuclear
power plants to cater to domestic needs was laid in the mid 1990s when a joint venture, namely
Heavy Mechanical Complex-3 (HMC-3), was created between Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission
(PAEC) and State Engineering Corporation (SEC) for the purpose. The Chinese, with whom Pakistan
has a long-lasting partnership for pursuing its nuclear energy program, had extended technical and
economic assistance for setting up the project, whereas state-of-the-art precision machinery was
imported from the western sources.
HMC-3, a specialized and dedicated facility for manufacturing equipment and systems for a
nuclear power plant, is located at Taxila, adjacent to HMC-1 and HMC-2, the two heavy engineering
units of the SEC which are now under the management control of the PAEC along HMC-3, thus
forming a huge complex with light- medium- and heavy- facilities for fabrication, machining,
forging and heat treatment. HMC-3 has capacity and capability to produce precision and high-tech
components and heavy equipment, up to 320-tons apiece, required for a nuclear power plant for
controlling and maintaining activities in a reactor. It has a well-equipped and latest computer-aided
design (CAD) set-up.
HMC-3 is now an established designer and manufacturer of nuclear safety class mechanical
equipment, approved and licensed by the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), covering
all the three safety classes i.e. class 1, class 2, and class 3 which represent the severity of
consequences that is divided into three levels—high, medium, and low. According to the ‘IAEA
Safety Classification of Structures, Systems, and Components in Nuclear Power Plants’ the design
provisions are classified as Safety Class 1 for any Structures, Systems, and Components (SSC) whose
failure would lead to consequences of high severity, and failure of function could lead to release of
radioactive material that exceeds the limits accepted for design basis accidents.
Safety Class 2 of any SSC is categorized for the SSC whose failure would lead to consequences of
medium severity that exceeds limits for anticipated operational occurrences, whereas Safety Class 3
refers to consequences of low severity leading to doses to workers above authorized limits. Applicable
engineering design rules and codes for the SSCs correspond to national and international standards such
as the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC), International Organization for Standardization (ISO), and others.
There are three manufacturers of equipment and components complying with nuclear safety
class i.e. HMC-3, Novel Engineering Works, also known as NEW-2, and Instrumentation Control
and Computer Complex (ICCC) that largely contribute to design, engineering and product
development activities at the PAEC. These facilities are complimented by Nuclear Equipment
Workshop or NEW-1, Pakistan Welding Institute having comprehensive modern welding facilities,
and well-equipped inspection and testing facilities known as National Centre for Non-Destructive
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Testing. These organizations, having adopted stringent quality controls as per international
standards, are qualified and governed under the PNRA regulations issued from time to time.
PAEC’s Works and Services Organization is the designer of safety class structure.
Aiming to achieve nuclear self-reliance, the indigenous design and manufacturing facilities
have resulted in promoting a long-term robust nuclear energy program. The main objectives are to
reduce import dependence, to decrease total cost of construction, and thus to lower generation cost
of nuclear energy. Since the beginning of construction of the first nuclear power plant at Chashma
various equipment, components and systems were produced and delivered, initially related to nonsafety areas. The supplies also included crucial packages like loose-parts monitoring system which
was locally designed, developed and installed, reactor internal vibration monitoring system, highdensity tray-racking system, and spent fuel dry storage system.
Thus, the local industry has attained significant level of deletion related to the Chinese nuclear
power plant model CNP-300 of capacity in the range of 325-MWe to 340-MWe after having
assimilated nuclear technology on installation of four plants at Chashma in the past. However, the
level of indigenization in construction of two large-capacity third generation model HPR 1,000
(capacity 1,100-MWe) commissioned in Karachi recently has been lower comparatively.
Currently, Pakistan operates, under international safeguards, six nuclear power plants of
cumulative capacity of 3,262-MWe, with 8 percent share in total energy mix. It is planned to enhance
the capacity of nuclear power to a cumulative 8,800-MWe by 2030, according to the 2005 Energy
Security Plan and to further add capacity to the national grid in subsequent years, totaling 40,000MWe by 2050. In spite of expansion of nuclear power capacity being a key element of energy policy
there is not a single nuclear power plant under construction at present, notwithstanding the
importance of nuclear power in securing electric supply, fuel diversity, and minimal greenhouse gas
emissions on a lifecycle basis.
Agreement was signed with the Chinese in September 2017 for the construction of another
nuclear power plant at Chashma of 1,100-MWe capacity, planned for commissioning in 2028. But the
pace of progress has been too slow and it was only in January this year that the contract was
concluded with the Chinese contractors and now the project is rescheduled to achieve commercial
operations in seven years after commencement of construction. Another five nuclear power plants
each of 1,100-MWe capacity were planned as early as in 2005, and sites selected in the Punjab but
there is no further progress on developing these projects though four of these plants were planned
for power generation by 2030.
Energy Plan IGCEP 2022-2031envisages nuclear power capacity to remain static at 3,262-MWe
until the completion of plan period, though the fifth nuclear power plant at Chashma is projected as
a committed project. Obviously, the target of achieving 8,800-MWe nuclear capacity by 2030 has
been largely missed already since at least 4,500-MWe was to be added by then as per original plans
which would not materialize given the present status. The situation has adversely impacted the
growth of domestic nuclear industry, and, resultantly the indigenization in nuclear field.
(Source: Money Matters)
ENERGY SECURITY OF PAKISTAN
Kashif Mateen Ansari (CEO of a wind power project)
It is said, “Never waste a good crisis” … and Hilary Clinton added, “Don’t waste it when it
can have a very positive impact on climate change and energy security.”
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Good thing about Pakistan is that we are never short of crises and surely, we are in the middle
of one that is existential in all its forms. We are looking into a pit that appears to be bottomless but
there is always hope and we must put our house in order.
Out of many facets of this crisis, one is related to energy, but this crisis has a long history in
the making. We have been dealing with a severe energy crisis for over a decade.
Policymakers frequently oversimplify the problem by blaming power outages, when the
country is dealing with a severe case of energy insecurity that is both complex and costly. Pakistan’s
national security is impeded by a slew of issues both inside and outside the country.
Energy now powers every sector of the economy; as a result, a country’s energy security
posture has come to shape its economy, foreign policy, and security strategy.
In the modern times World Wars brought forward the concept of energy security and it was first
recognized during the First World War when several battles were fought over energy resources. “God
was on the side of the nation that had the oil,” said Prof. Wakimura of Tokyo Imperial University.
Like we are witnessing today in the Russia-Ukraine war, energy is effectively used as a
weapon. Similarly in the 1940s, energy embargoes crippled opponents. Furthermore, battles were
decided by availability of energy resources. Stalin was quite right when he said, “Engines and
octane decided the war”.
The meaning and scope of the term “energy security” have grown significantly over time.
Ideally to be energy secure, a country must be self-sufficient in producing its energy and not rely on
imported supplies. However, that may not be possible for most of the countries in the world so
realistically defining, modern energy security philosophy requires that the energy supply meet three
primary criteria; sufficient quantity, consistent quality, and reasonable cost.
For a country’s energy supply to be considered optimal, three things must be present: first, enough
energy to meet all its needs; second, uninterrupted service; and third a reasonable cost. Not only does
this approach promote energy security, but it also fosters human security and long-term societal growth.
These three pillars of energy security are at the heart of modern energy policies around the
world, that’s why we find developed countries’ energy policies based on these fundamental tenets:
ensuring reliable energy supplies, encouraging citizens to use less energy overall, and increasing the
use of renewable energy sources.
Risks to availability of reliable and affordable energy constitute a non-traditional security
threat that every state must take seriously. The provision of reliable and affordable energy supplies
for every one is the cornerstone of all national and international energy frameworks. From a
geostrategic standpoint, energy security is regarded as critical for national sovereignty.
The unexpected rise and fall in energy costs has shocked the world many times in the last few
decades, causing inflation and economic hardship for hundreds of millions of people. While Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine is a major contributor to the current insecurity, it’s important to remember that
events like these will become the norm rather than the exception in the coming years.
This is because extracting fossil fuels will become more expensive and difficult and those
holding these resources would like to take their pound of flesh not only economically but by altering
the world order to their advantage. In this new era of volatility, developing countries like Pakistan,
which rely heavily on imported energy and struggle to earn enough dollars to meet its external
financing needs, face particularly high levels of risk.
For Pakistan the current situation in all the three modern aspects of energy security is
extremely unfortunate. When we consider the two interconnected aspects of energy security—
adequacy and reliability—it is clear that, while more than a third of the population lacks grid access,
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those who are connected have been experiencing severe power outages due to the enormous
disparity between demand and supply.
Third, the cost of energy does not paint a rosy picture either. The high cost of energy has a
significant impact on the monthly budgets of middle-class families. While the cost of energy is a problem
in many countries, including the most developed ones, the situation in Pakistan is particularly dire.
More than 10% of the population in several European countries may be suffering from fuel
poverty, which has an impact on indoor thermal comfort. We can determine that well over 95% of
Pakistanis are fuel-poor using the same criteria.
None of these indicators of Pakistan’s energy security is encouraging, it is further aggravated
by our significant reliance on imports, particularly for oil and gas.
Nonetheless, in order to reduce its dependence on imports, Pakistan should have made better
use of its indigenous resources of coal and extensive renewable resources of Wind and Solar.
Furthermore, we must catch up on the lost decades where we made no efforts to increase water
storage capacity through reservoir construction and generating hydel energy.
When we talk of breaking free from imported energy in view of our historical and oft-repeated
cycles of foreign exchange shortage we must take nuclear energy very seriously as a major pillar of our
energy generation. It has the potential to assist Pakistan in achieving energy security in several ways.
Nuclear energy can diversify Pakistan’s energy mix, reducing the country’s reliance on
imported fossil fuels and helping to secure the country’s energy supply. It is a dependable source of
baseload power that can help Pakistan balance its energy mix and improve and increase its usage of
intermittent renewable energy sources.
As Pakistan has limited domestic oil and gas reserves, much of the country’s energy needs are
met through imports. Dependence on foreign exchange reserves makes this aspect even far more
important than it appears as a crisis of foreign exchange can derail the energy availability which has
a cascading effect on the economy, security and sustainability of normal civic order.
Nuclear energy can help Pakistan reduce its reliance on imported fossil fuels, increasing
energy independence and reducing country’s vulnerability to global energy market fluctuations.
Energy security should be prioritized in Pakistan’s energy policy framework and
implementation plan. It would be critical to capitalise on indigenous resources, both conventional
and unconventional, while also conserving and managing energy. While doing so holistic solutions
are preferable to improvised ones like new power plants will be counterproductive unless they can
provide affordable electricity.
Though conservation of energy doesn’t appear to be much in the discussion of energy security
but it has a very important role to play. One megawatt saved is one less megawatt of energy that
needs to be produced through imported fuel.
By conservative estimates Pakistan can save almost 4000 megawatt of energy through
conservation efforts. In today’s discussion we would not delve much on this aspect leaving it to be
dealt with some other day but energy conservation must be an important pillar of our energy policy.
Energy policies, such as regulations, incentives, and subsidies for various types of energy,
have an impact on a country’s energy security.
A transparent and uniform energy policy can provide long-term stability and predictability
for energy markets, allowing investments in energy infrastructure and technology to be made. We
must examine our previous power policies objectively to determine what went wrong and what
helped us. We cannot simply disregard our past performance while investigating the future.
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Pakistani policymakers should use the current crisis to rebuild the country’s energy sector. As
the cost of the climate crisis rises, financial institutions, particularly multilateral ones, will provide
financial and technical assistance to countries seeking to accelerate the clean energy transition.
To fully capitalise on this opportunity, Pakistan must use the human resources and skills
developed during the first phase of renewable project development, which provided the country
with close to 3,000 MW of energy from wind and solar.
To address the issue of energy security in a meaningful way, a consistent policy environment is
required. Politics has held Pakistan’s economy and energy policymaking hostage for far too long. This
has resulted in an increase in the country’s risk premium, undermining investor confidence and
reducing total investment. As a result, investors have demanded exorbitant and guaranteed rates of
return, which we have been accommodating regardless of the country’s energy security or economic
health.
Pakistan’s failure to address energy security contributed to the country’s economic crisis. With
energy price volatility becoming the norm, stakeholders must work together to implement sensible
policies. Anything less will exacerbate the chaos, increasing the likelihood of domestic insecurity
destroying the country before climate change can.
(Source: Business Recorder)
ENERGY CRISIS
Need for Sustainable and Affordable Energy Solutions
Mir Hassan (Lecturer in the Department of Public Administration, FMS, BUITEMS)
In the 21st century, it is unthinkable for foreigners from countries such as China, Japan or
European countries to live without power even for a short amount. It is even said that during World
War II, almost every home in Germany had a constant (24/7) supply of electricity. The word “loadshedding” is foreign to many of the citizens living in these countries, but for people living in
Pakistan, it is an everyday reality.
Where other nations had realized the importance of the energy sector and invested heavily in
its development, Pakistan has neglected it (largely after 1971), leading to an underdeveloped and
outdated energy infrastructure. In the year 2022, Pakistan suffered an electric shortfall of roughly
7000 MWs (That alone means 10 hours of load shedding every day!). Pakistan is termed a severely
energy insecure nation, but that in itself is generally not that negative, considering that many
developed nations such as China and Japan are also considered “energy insecure” nations (energy
insecure means a country that imports energy to fulfill its needs). But since China and Japan handle
their energy resources competently, with accountability and transparency, they are able to avert the
plague of load-shedding (also referred to as “Rolling Blackouts”).
Although there are many causes that contribute to the energy crisis, one of the main reasons in
Pakistan is its reliance on fossil fuel sources such as LNG and LPG, most of which is imported
(nearly 50% of energy needs is fulfilled through imports). This means that fluctuating oil and gas
prices (such as due to Covid-19 and the Russian-Ukraine conflict) can have serious impacts on
Pakistan’s expenditure in its energy sector and put a serious strain on its already suffering economy.
Furthermore, limited domestic production, mismanagement and distribution losses have further
escalated the crisis. As of FY 2021-22, Pakistan generates 41,557 MWs (from 37,261 according to FY
2020-21), while consumption was 89,361 GWh, a slight increase from 84,600 GWh of FY 2020-21.
The second main issue is political rivalries and instability in Pakistan, which often hinder the
development not just in the energy sector, but in a plethora of different departments. A project started by
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a political party, such as building a dam, would be immediately shut down and sidelined when that
party losses the next elections, and the new party starts a brand new project, sacrificing time and taxpayer money in the process. As a result, the energy infrastructure barely improves, and with increasing
demand for energy (due to population increase), the shortfall only accumulates year after year.
Another major issue is the rampant corruption that plagues and rots the Pakistani
bureaucracy and politics. A significant portion of the cash and resources that are allocated to the
development of energy sector often disappears into private pockets, and the construction that does
take place is usually done by companies that carry favor with the political parties, and not on the
basis of their competence or performance, resulting in inadequate and subpar development efforts.
Lastly, the accumulation of circular debt within the energy sector, caused by a combination of
low recovery rates, transmission losses, and subsidies (with estimates of around Rs 450 billion in
subsidies for energy sector in the Fiscal Year 2023-24), has further strained the financial stability of
power generation companies. This has led to a vicious cycle of inadequate investments and
inefficient operations within the energy sector.
This energy crisis has adverse effects on both society and the economy. It strangles the
nation’s economy like a viper around the throat, and disrupts everyday lives of average citizens.
Constant and prolonged blackouts cause many industries and small businesses to lose production or
seek alternative methods of energy such as diesel generators, solar systems or UPS systems that
further increase the production cost, which in turn increases the product price. The loss in
production shrinks the economy and lowers the GDP, increases imports and reduces exports.
Furthermore, these protracted blackouts add to the suffering of average citizen, as power outages
rob the citizens of news, internet, media and entertainment, air-conditioning in hot summer months.
Effectively throwing a wrench in their day to day lives, depriving them of being able to learn or study
through the internet, be aware of the country’s situations though media and news, the worsening GDP
further creates inflation, and hospitals and educational institutions are unable to properly function due to
shortages of power, which further adds to the misery of already struggling people.
The people and industry of Pakistan suffer immensely at the hands of this energy crisis, but
that is not to say that the government of Pakistan has not tried again and again to remedy this, such
as The national Power policy 2013, Power Generation policy 2016, Alternative and renewable energy
policy 2019, and the most recent 10-year Indicative generation capacity expansion plan 2022-31
(IGCEP-2022). But despite these various attempts, the government has failed to effectively combat
this threat, and the results of IGCEP-2022 remain to be seen, which begs the question: What efforts
could solve this conundrum?
One of the potential solutions to this is increased investment in renewable sources of energy,
with main emphases on hydroelectric plants and dams that harness the kinetic energy of flowing
river water to generate energy, but one of the main challenges for this is the amount of rivers in
Pakistan. There is only one major river in Pakistan (The Indus river), and other rivers are all its
tributaries (such as Chenab, Jhelum, Ravi etc.). Another significant challenge is that India is the
upper riparian country through which the Indus flows into Pakistan. Despite the Indus-water treaty
(1960) between the two nations, there is no guarantee that India would not control and redirect the
flow of the rivers in the future to put Pakistan at a disadvantageous position.
Another potential solution would be to allocate resources to the construction of nuclear power
plants in the country. Although not renewable, they are far stronger than both renewable sources
(wind, solar, hydroelectric) and fossil-fuel based sources, as a nuclear power plant is able to generate
electricity in 100s to 1000s of MWs, whereas fossil fuel based plants are limited at 10s to 100s of
MWs, whilst simultaneously occupying a much larger area, and having a significantly much more
abhorrent impact on the environment. Nuclear power plants use uranium as fuel, which has a much
higher lifetime as compared to coal or gas used in fossil fuel plants. Although nuclear power plants
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exude their own waste and pollutants, they are a much better alternative to fossil fuels, although
being much more costly, and could be used as a stepping stone towards a purely renewable future
(as is the case in many Western nations).
Another solution would be to seek international assistance in solving the ongoing energy
crisis, in particular from China, which may be willing to assist Pakistan on such an issue. China has
provided Pakistan many loans in the past, and has previously offered assistance to Pakistan on its
energy crisis, along with many other issues, many of which Pakistan has often declined, seldom
accepting their help. One may hear rumors that assistance from China would only make Pakistan a
slave to it, but Pakistan’s governments have so far failed and proven incompetent to solve the many
issues and challenges faced by Pakistani citizens, therefor it would not be too bad of a remedy to
swallow one’s misplaced pride and accept the assistance of others such as China to help dig us out
of the hole that continues to deepen.
Lastly, another potential solution would be to end the monopoly in the energy sector that the
government has established (WAPDA). If that is not possible, perhaps another approach would be
possible, called “Public-Private Partnership” or PPP for short (not to be confused with the political
Pakistan People’s Party). It would see the government working together with various private firms
in an attempt to jointly solve the issues and challenges that they collectively face. Pakistan has
already implemented this but its implementation is greatly limited, and where it has been
implemented, the results are sub-par. PPP in Pakistan faces many challenges that obstruct their
efficiency and effectiveness, such as regulatory framework which is still evolving and may lack
clarity or consistency which can lead to uncertainties and delays in project development and
implementation, political instability and changing government policies, lack of institutional capacity
and expertise, and lack of resources. Private electric companies such as K-electric have also failed to
produce significant results.
Overall, the energy crisis in Pakistan has only deteriorated with time. More often than not it is
overshadowed by political turmoil, natural disasters, and conflicts and issues with other nations.
Even according to the most recent Pakistani budget of FY 2023-24 shows that the increase in the
resources allocated to the energy sector are merely to match the increase in energy consumption by
households and industry, not to effectively fix the issues of shortages. The government should
provide incentives and focus on construction of new hydroelectric power plants and momentarily
limit its focus on business and entrepreneurial sector, as any new business that is started would
need electricity, putting strain on the already strained energy within Pakistan. Instead, improving
the energy sector would increase the production of already existing firms and businesses, lower the
cost of many products (as production cost would decrease since firms won’t pay for generators or
UPS energy systems), and improve the day to day live of average citizens, which in turn would
increase productivity.
(Source: Eurasia review)
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Essays
GOVERNANCE FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Ishrat Husain
Why local government? The World Bank in its 1997 report asserts that governments are more
effective when they listen to businesses and citizens, and work in partnership with them in deciding
and implementing policy. Where governments lack mechanisms to listen, they are not responsive to
people’s interests.
The devolution of authority to local tiers of government and decentralization can bring in
representation of local business and citizens’ interests. The visibility of the results achieved by the
resources deployed in a specific geographic area maintains pressure on government functionaries.
Public–private partnerships. including NGO–public partnerships have proved to be effective tools in
fostering good governance.
The World Development Report (WDR 2004) has argued that the accountability of
governments to local communities and marginalized social groups will increase by assigning service
delivery functions to politicians who are closer to the people and make them electorally accountable.
The 1973 constitution did specify only two tiers of government – federal and provincial. It is
only after the 18th Amendment in 2010 that a new clause – Article 140A – was introduced which
states that “Each province shall, by law, establish a local government system and devolve political,
administrative and financial responsibility and authority to the elected representatives of the local
governments.”
The Supreme court has asserted and directed the holding of elections of local governments on
several occasions. Unfortunately, unlike the detailed distribution of powers between the federal and
the provincial governments clearly defined in the constitution, there is no such provision for local
governments. This vagueness and ambiguity has been used by the provincial governments which
have been struggling to come to some reasonable piece of legislation since 2010 on the functions and
powers of this tier.
Logically, once the provincial governments were devolved, adequate powers accompanied by
sufficient financial allocations out of the divisible tax pool and grants from the federal government
there should have been similar decentralization and delegation to the local governments. How is it
possible for Punjab, with a population of 110 million people and 36 districts covering an area of
205000 sq km, to respond to the disparate needs of citizens in the delivery of essential services? DG
Khan and Faisalabad, for example, have very different requirements and a uniform one-shoe-fits-all
approach that is the characteristic of an overcentralized system won’t simply work.
The present culture of concentrating authority in power centres at Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi,
Peshawar and Quetta has not only alienated the population living in the peripheries, but reduced its
productive potential also – and to no small extent. It is little surprise then that our research found 80
districts whose ordinary citizens are living in miserable conditions, according to the Deprivation
Index, and remain almost criminally starved of their most basic needs.
The political parties that introduced this article in the constitution do not realize that
meaningful empowerment of communities through decentralization and delegation of authority, in
which the local government system plays a crucial role would in the long run promote greater trust,
cohesion and harmony in our society and ensure access to basic public services in an efficient and
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equitable manner. These outcomes will not only help mobilize additional resources at the local level
but also improve the efficiency of resource utilization.
The present state of disaffection and discontentment with the government would also be
mitigated if public goods and services of everyday use to the citizens become available to them at
the grassroots level. Local communities know their problems and their solutions much better than
anybody else. It has also been found that for direct delivery by the government, the transfer of
responsibility for these services to lower tiers of governance improves access by the poor.
Local government management of schools and hospitals involving communities and demandside subsidies to the poor, monitored and under the oversight of government result in a favourable
outcome in education and health. As these political parties will also contest elections, they will be
represented at that tier of government too. Thus, the credit for citizen satisfaction, efficient allocation
of resources and better access to essential services would go to the political parties themselves.
However, the myopic and self-centred approach adopted by all major political parties and
resistance to empowerment and strengthening local governments is highly incomprehensible as in
actual fact it simply entails the transfer of power from the provincial and national legislators and the
ministers to the locally elected nazims or mayors of the districts. Those seeking to preserve their
status, clout and influence should opt for local nazim positions rather than becoming MPAs or
MNAs.
The 2001-2009 period: It would be useful to make an objective assessment of the local
government system that existed in Pakistan between 2001 and 2009. There were many flaws in the
2001 system, including the fact that the functions of law and order, revenue records, and land
administration and disaster management should have remained with neutral civil servants and not
transferred to the nazims. In that event, the offices of the deputy/assistant commissioner should not
have been abolished, thereby diluting the writ of the state.
The executive authority of the newly created post of district coordination officer – DCO – was
diluted as magisterial powers were taken away from him or her although s/he was expected to
perform duties relating to maintenance of law and order, removal of encroachments, price controls,
and the like. As the powers of recruitment, transfers, postings, and disciplinary actions continued to
remain vested in the provincial departments, the diarchy proved to be fatal for the effective
functioning of the devolved departments.
The gap between law and actual practice remained wide to the detriment of the public at
large. Corruption at the district government level could not be contained given the inadequate
supervisory arrangements evolved by the provincial governments. The provincial secretaries
retained considerable administrative authority over the district bureaucrats and used these powers
to undercut the efficacy of the elective nazims. A tripartite confrontational mode in which the
provincial ministers and secretaries aligned themselves against the district nazims was responsible
for most of the practical difficulties faced by the citizens in access to services.
The degree of fiscal decentralization remained limited because the districts continued to
depend upon the province for resources, didn’t have the powers to collect new taxes, and didn’t
have the capacity to levy service or user charges. On the expenditure side, the fixed and growing
expense of salaries, wages, and allowances paid to the staff devolved to the district governments
(although they continue to be provincial servants) did not leave much surplus for either
maintenance, operational, and development expenditure.
Over 90 per cent of expenditure of local governments was financed by transfers from the
provincial governments. Lack of enhancement in local fiscal powers was a major weakness in the
process of fiscal decentralization.
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The share of local governments in the provincial allocable pool was about 40 per cent but their
share in total public expenditure was only 13 per cent. Resource mobilization at the provincial and
local levels remained substantially under-exploited. Land revenue accounted for less than one per
cent of the agricultural income while the effective rate of property taxation of rental incomes was
about five per cent as opposed to the statutory rate of 20 per cent or more.
The fragmentation of development projects into small schemes catered to the narrow interests
of the local communities without any sense of priority, linkages, or widespread coverage.
Ideally, the transfer of resources from urban to rural areas should be a welcome move but
such a transfer in the absence of a district-wide plan without specifying the goals to be achieved and
assessing the cost-benefit of the approved schemes can be counterproductive. Urban-rural
integration did not recognize or cater to the needs of growing urbanization.
Hasnain concludes on the basis of his study that in order to keep his voters happy, the district
nazim would have very little choice but to acquiesce to the pressures exerted by the union and tehsil
Nazims to allocate resources equally. The difference between ‘equal’ and ‘equitable’ distribution of
resources should be understood as it is at the crux of the problem.
Under an ‘equal’ distribution scheme there is no clear relationship between the needs of the
community and the intended interventions. Rich and poor communities will receive the same
amount irrespective of the intensity of their need. ‘Equitable’ distribution takes into account the
differences in the initial endowments and conditions of the intended beneficiaries. Those who are
poor, marginalized, live in remote or geographically disadvantaged areas and cannot earn decent
incomes on their own should receive higher allocations than those who are better off. Public
resources thus supplement the private incomes of the poor to help out of poverty.
Two innovative features of the 2001 system are worth mentioning. The reservation of onethird seats for women and others for peasants, workers, minorities, the marginalized classes of our
society, was an extremely commendable step. Similarly, the integration of the rural and urban
administrative units at the tehsil level would have allowed the rural areas to benefit equally from
the larger envelope of pooled resources available to the Tehsil Council. Even if the underlying
patron-client relationship persists, the scope for inclusion of clients who were traditionally denied
access under a MNA/MPA centred system, will be much wider under a decentralized and devolved
system.
However, despite these flaws, empirical studies and surveys point to the net positive
achievements of the local government system. The Social Audit Survey 2009-10 of 12,000 households
drawn from 21 districts in all four provinces found that 56 per cent favoured the continuation of the
local government system with high proportions in Punjab and Sindh. The level of satisfaction with
the union councils was 33.8 per cent but the situation regarding support and social acceptability of
women’s participation seemed to have improved. Sixty per cent of female union councilors were of
the view that people in their constituencies were happy with them.
The satisfaction levels of households with various public services varied but by 2009-10
satisfaction with roads, sewerage and sanitation, garbage disposal, water supply, health and
education had improved although in percentage terms only less than half of the households
expressed satisfaction with the services. Public education, at 58 per cent, showed the highest level of
satisfaction.
The Social Policy Development Centre (SPDC) carried out a survey of 12 districts in the four
provinces and found that the rate of enhancement in literacy of the population and access to water
supply and sanitation had perceptibly increased during the post-devolution period. However, there
were no indications of any impact of devolution on health indicators. The process of devolution was
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beginning to contribute to a quicker improvement in enrolment at the primary level and literacy in
Pakistan.
At a micro level, Cheema and Mohmand analyzed a dataset of 364 households in the rural
tehsil of Jaranwala in Faisalabad District to gain some insights regarding the types of households
which gain and lose through electoral decentralization and whether the change in the post-reform
provision between different household types is equitable. The empirical results of their study
showed that increased access to development funds and heightened mandates for union nazims
have resulted in a significant increase in union level provisions within a short span of time. They
further found that the increase in the post-reform provision in nazim villages is less elite-based as it
encompasses small peasants, minority peasant biradaris, and non-agricultural castes.
Hasnain reports on the basis of a survey carried out in 2005 that over 60 per cent of the
households stated that they would approach a union councilor or Nazim to resolve their problems
in comparison to only 10 per cent who said they would approach members of the provincial or
national assembly. This reflects the increase in accessibility of policymakers after devolution. A
system in which bureaucrats control the development departments provides neither access nor
accountability. Having a system of elected nazims and councilors who remain responsive to the
needs of their citizens is better because these officials are liable to lose their offices if they do not
fulfil their responsibilities and duties. The best one can do with a recalcitrant bureaucrat is to
transfer him out of a particular district but that does not resolve the inherent problem of access to
the poor.
Cheema, Khawaja and Qadir in their study found that three types of changes were brought
about by the 2001 devolution. One, changes in the decision-making level of the service – from
provincial bureaucrats to district level bureaucracy. Two, changes in the decision-maker’s
accountability – from bureaucrats to elected representatives at the district level; and three, changes
in the fiscal resources available to the service.
The education department, primary healthcare and the management of district and tehsil
hospitals experienced a change of the first type, where the decisions previously made by the
provincial secretariat and the provincial cabinet were transferred to the district nazim and executive
district officers.
The municipal services provided by the local government, the rural development department,
and the public health engineering departments of the provincial government became the sole
functional responsibility of the tehsil municipal administration. This was a fundamental change
because the power to allocate resources, prioritize projects, and deliver results moved away from 48
provincial departments to 6000 units of local government whereas prior to devolution, the
deconcentrated provincial bureaucracy at the district level was accountable to their non-elected
provincial secretariat. The 2001 devolution made them accountable to the elected heads of districts
and tehsil governments. Under the previous system, the de-facto head of the district administration
was the district commissioner who would report to the non-elected commissioner while after
devolution he reported to the elected district nazim (mayor).
Their study also found that a ‘rule-based’ fiscal transfer system between the provinces and the
local governments was established under the 2001 Devolution Plan. Approximately 40 per cent of
the provincial consolidated fund was distributed among local governments with due weightage
given to backwardness in order to ensure some form of equity across districts in the allocation of
development funds. The other innovation was that these budgetary transfers did not lapse at the
end of the year but continued to be retained by the relevant local governments, providing for
flexibility and presumably some improvement in the efficiency of resource allocation.
Proposed governance system for local governments: In light of the experience of the 2001
LGO, let us now examine what needs to be done to avoid the weaknesses of the previous system and
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implement the spirit of Article 140A using political, administrative and financial dimensions of
devolution.
Within the political dimension, the provincial governments should devolve the following
functions completely to the local governments: one, school education up to matric. Two, primary
and secondary health up to district hospitals. Three, water supply, sewerage, solid waste disposal.
Four, population planning. Five, sports. Six, mass transit. Seven, roads, bridges within the district
limits. Eight, prosecution. Nine, social welfare and community development and, ten, women’s
development.
All staff up to Grade 16 should be transferred along with their salary and allowances budgets.
Future recruitment and promotion etc would be decided by the local governments themselves
according to their needs and requirements.
Nazims would be directly elected on party basis and half of the seats of various corporations
and councils would be allocated on proportional representation and reserved for women,
technocrats, minorities, peasants and labourers. For large urban areas, metropolitan corporations
would be the only vehicle with the mayor heading the district government. For other districts there
would be a mix of district councils and municipal corporations/ committees. In predominantly rural
areas, the nazim of the district council would head the district government. Each province would
design its own configuration of union/ town/ tehsil/ municipal / district councils depending on
population, area and density. What Punjab may choose may not fit in with the requirements of
Balochistan with a small population and larger area.
To illustrate, the directly elected nazim of the Lahore Metropolitan Corporation would have
supervisory and oversight powers over all service providers. LDA, WASA, the waste management
company, the Mass Transit Authority, school education department, primary and secondary health
department, and the Lahore Industrial Estates Development Company would be transferred by the
provincial government to the local governments. This pattern would be followed in all other
metropolitan corporations.
Fiscal decentralization would be meaningful if the LGs are given autonomy in budget
preparation and execution. Salaries and allowances should be disbursed from Account 4 rather than
Provincial Account 1. The Provincial Finance Commission – PFC – should not follow a formulaic
approach in the first instance but assess the financial impact of devolution. For example, if 60 per
cent of the education and healthcare staff would be serving at the local level, their entire financial
burden should be reflected in the base year calculations upon which future allocations would be
made. The PFC would give preference in allocation to backward districts as advanced districts can
mobilize revenues from their own sources. Own revenue mobilization efforts would be incentivized
by the PFC by providing matching grants.
The local government would enjoy full autonomy in imposing taxes, cess, user charges and
fees in their respective jurisdictions and be allowed to spend the amounts thus collected. Empirical
evidence shows that raising taxes or charging user fees for services at the local level is relatively
easy. Taxpayers can see the visible benefits of such payments. They are reluctant to make
contributions to a remote central pot whose purpose is not known. Pakistan, with a low tax-to-GDP
ratio, can mobilize additional resources by gearing up provincial and local taxes through the Urban
Immovable Property Tax, Capital Gains Tax, Agricultural Tax, and user fees and charges.
The entire value chain of the Urban Immovable Property Tax from policy, surveys,
assessment, exemptions, valuation, ratings should be fully in the domain of the LGs without any
break in the chain. District accounts officers would report to the district nazim for administrative
purposes but for professional development they would be under the accountant general of the
province who should be under the finance department. Audit of accounts of all tiers of government
would be carried out by the auditor general of Pakistan.
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Chief executive officers of metropolitan/ municipal corporations and district councils would
act as the principal accounting officers for the demands under their control. They would also head
the district development working party for approval of the ADP projects as well as district accounts
committees to resolve the audit paras raised by the auditor general.
On the administrative side, a major departure has to be made in the deployment of civil
servants. Instead of senior, qualified, and courteous officers being assigned to secretariat positions
and junior, rude, unqualified functionaries at the local level as under the present configuration there
has to be a reversal of roles.
As most of the public services are delivered at the local level, young, dynamic, and competent
officers should occupy key positions in the metropolitan corporations, municipal committees,
district, and tehsil councils. Assistant and deputy commissioners, assistant and superintendents of
police and district executive officers of the devolved departments should be legally empowered to
resolve the issues and difficulties faced by citizens at their level without referring the matters to the
provincial secretariats.
The present cadres of the Local Government Service and Local Council Service should be
dispensed with as their skill sets and competencies are outdated. The employees of local
governments, corporations/councils, departments, service delivery agencies should be detached
from the Basic Pay Scales (BPS) and grades and follow a position classification system with their
own pay scales. For recruitment of officers and high-level professionals and specialists, district
public service commissions consisting of independent and eminent individuals of integrity and
competence should be formed. All such posts should be filled in through an open competitive
process.
Service Rules such as promotion, placement, severance, compensation and benefits,
disciplinary actions should be endorsed by the boards of the agencies or the departmental heads.
Teachers and health workers who form the bulk of the workforce would be recruited and placed
within the districts thus eliminating one of the major abuses of the present system of governance –
politically motivated inter-district transfers. Security of tenure – a missing ingredient of the present
system – would also ensure accountability for results which remains elusive due to frequent
transfers.
The deputy commissioner as a representative of the provincial governments would be
responsible for overseeing the work of all non-devolved departments, coordinate and liaise between
the district and provincial governments and follow up on the implementation of performance
agreements between the provincial local government commission and the district government. They
and their assistants would be vested with powers of executive magistracy to ensure law and order,
regulate and enforce municipal laws, and remove encroachments. The enforcement of these laws
through the judiciary has weakened the power of the executive branch as every allegation of
illegality has to be brought before the ordinary courts and the deterrent effect is lost in protracted
litigation.
The police were required to respond to the Executive Magistrates in respect of pretrial custody
and investigation whereas the new arrangements vest these responsibilities in the judiciary. The DC
would retain charge of land records, land administration and land revenue collection and also
supervise the District Disaster Management Authority. The DC would also head the District
Criminal Justice Administration Committee consisting of the CEO, DPO, district prosecutor, prisons
superintendent, and a nominee of district and sessions court. Alternate Dispute Resolution
committees and small causes adjudication would also work under the DC, thereby relieving the
judiciary of a heavily congested caseload.
The rules of business have to be changed accordingly. It would be imperative that the chief
executive officers of metropolitan corporations and large district councils are appointed from among
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Grade 21 and 22 officers of the Pakistan Administrative Service and the provincial executive
services.
After all, the chief secretaries of the provinces are at present selected from this pool of officers.
There is no reason why officers of the same caliber and status should not be utilized at the local
government level. We have to invert the pyramid of hierarchy between the three tiers of the
government.
The district governments will have the exclusive powers to manage and operate primary and
secondary education up to matriculation. Examination reforms have to be carried out to bring the
standards of various boards at par. Management and teaching cadres should be separated and the
career paths for the two cadres would not discriminate against the teachers. Curriculum at all tiers
from school to higher education should be developed at the national level jointly by the federal and
the provincial governments.
To bring about coordination and ensure uniformity in standards of public, private and notfor-profit schools, a District Education Board should be established in each district. The board will
consist of people of note that enjoy a good reputation in their communities and will have the district
education officer as the secretary to the board. The board will be assisted by school management
committees which will be empowered to oversee the school’s functioning. Head teachers will enjoy
more administrative authority in running the schools and disciplining teachers and arranging
inspection of schools periodically.
To provide financing for talented students to pursue their studies at top institutions in the
country, endowment funds at the provincial levels should be topped up every year out of the
budget. Student vouchers or stipends should be available to meritorious children from poor families
to attend private schools of their choice. Private-public partnerships in the form of ‘Adopt a School’
programmes should be encouraged and given incentives. To promote increased female enrollment
at primary schools, only women teachers are employed whenever possible.
Science, mathematics and computer literacy courses should be introduced right from the
middle school level equipped with networks, internet connectivity and laboratories. To attract outof-school children, both modified formal schooling without age restrictions and vocational and
technical training streams should be offered.
Most of the problems in healthcare delivery arise not from financial constraints but due to poor
management practices. The health management cadre should, therefore, be separated from teaching and
service providers in each province and the federal government. Only those with aptitude should be
recruited as health managers and trained at the national and provincial health academies. District,
teaching and other specialized hospitals should have their own autonomous board of directors and
should be given autonomy in administrative, financial, legal and human resource matters.
Health manpower development, particularly in the nursing and paramedical professions,
allied health sciences require urgent attention for quality and volume increase. The health regulatory
framework should be made more effective and also set up at the provincial level. Drug regulatory
authorities should fix the prices of the essential drugs according to the WHO list and allow markets
to determine prices of the remaining drugs. They have to focus on quality assurance and standards,
consumer protection and avoidance of collusion. Pay scales for health professionals should be
separated from the national basic pay scales. Monitoring committees that visit education and health
facilities with the powers to resolve problems had proved successful in the previous period and
should be reconstituted and given full support and resources.
There is almost a consensus that the law and order and security problems that have worsened
in recent years have arisen due to inefficiency, corruption and politicization of the police force. The
original Police Order 2002 had been compromised by amendments that weakened the functioning
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and accountability of the police. Legislative amendments and revised disciplinary rules are needed
to allow police officers to perform their duties in accordance with the police order and to remove the
discretionary powers of politicians in postings and transfers, a powerful tool that has created the
present state of indifference, inefficiency and unresponsiveness on the part of police officials.
The reversal to the Old Police Act after 2008 has, in fact, aggravated the situation as the police
have become highly politicized. The police force should not fall under the purview of the Civil
Servants Act (except those belonging to the Police Service of Pakistan) as it impedes internal
accountability. Disciplinary rules should be framed under the Police Order. The provincial police
office should be organized along functional lines and powers should be delegated to the lower tiers.
Urban police stations should be merged, upgraded and headed by a directly recruited officer of
Grade 17 with full responsibility for Watch and Ward, Investigation and Operations. Training,
allowances, mobility, logistics support, lodging and boarding, medical facilities and welfare of the police
force fall short of their requirements and create demoralization, too. These should be reviewed and
strengthened. Traffic police in all large cities should be organized and operated on the lines of the
Motorway Police. Forensic labs and digitalized central databases should be established in each province.
Land records as maintained by the patwari are the single largest source of disputes and
litigation in the country. Attempts to create a digital database of land records have remained
halfhearted except in Punjab where some progress was made but reversed recently by reinstating
the patwar system. Land revenue assessment and collection, adjudication and dispute resolution,
maintenance and update of land records should remain under the district government. The patwari
should be replaced by a qualified revenue assistant and recruited through the provincial Public
Service Commission. The Colonisation of Government Lands Act 1912 should be revised for better
and transparent allocation and utilization of state land. Conversion of fertile and irrigated
agriculture lands into housing schemes should be discouraged.
The above system of governance, if implemented faithfully rather than superficially to
appease the existing beneficiaries of the present status quo, would have large collateral benefits .
First, it would minimize the level of despondency and dissatisfaction with the government as the
citizens are able to access the basic service at the grassroots level. Second, the decision-making
process would bring about efficiency in resource allocation, cost effectiveness and greater response
to the specific needs of the particular villages and towns.
Third, it would enable the political parties to be a training ground for a critical mass of
political leaders to acquire hands-on experience for shouldering responsibilities as future provincial
and federal ministers. Fourth, it would promote political inclusion and deter dynastic politics by
providing representation to marginalized and excluded groups such as women, minorities, peasants
and labour, professionals and experts in the governance structure. Fifth, the present reluctance and
hesitation to pay taxes, user charges and fees would be overcome as the use of these resources for
the benefits of the taxpayers would be perceptible and determined by the representatives of those
communities rather than by remote centralized levels of government.
To sum up, the flaws identified from 2001-09 experience can be removed by: one, having
directly elected nazims for all local government layers contested by political parties. Two, devolving
administrative, legal and financial powers for full control of 10 departments that ought to be
devolved to the local governments. Three, fiscal decentralization subject to audit by the auditor
general of Pakistan with enhanced powers of policy, assessment, surveys; exemption and
enforcement of the taxes assigned to this tier.
Four, establishing the office of the deputy commissioner as representative of the provincial
governments and neutral arbiter for citizens grievances with powers, inter alia, to supervise the
implementation of Performance agreements between the provincial and local governments and
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coordinate between them. And finally, conferring control on establishment, salaries and wages, and
the whole value chain of human resource policies and operations.
(Source: The News)
WHAT WILL IT TAKE FOR DISHONOURABLE MEN TO STOP
KILLING WOMEN FOR HONOUR?
Ayman Zafar (lawyer currently practising in Lahore)
In the realm of societal consciousness, a deeply unsettling truth lurks beneath the surface,
concealed in the shadows of tradition and misplaced notions of honour.
Honour killings, a chilling phenomenon that defies our collective understanding of justice and
morality, continue to cast a dark cloud over Pakistan and its society, one that requires profound
exploration. The archaic tradition finds sustenance in a combination of patriarchal values, rigid
gender roles, and societal pressures that take precedence over the life of women — particularly,
women who want to exercise their autonomous right to marry out of free will, or seek a divorce.
More often than not, this heinous crime goes unpunished, either proudly justified or shoved
under the rug by the perpetrator and victim’s family. The consequences of such practices are dire,
with countless lives lost and human rights violated in the name of preserving honour.
In a stark portrayal of reality, two recent incidents that transpired within the confines of the
Karachi City Court serve as poignant reminders of the pervasive nature of honour killings and the
urgent need for comprehensive legal reforms to protect the fundamental rights and lives of women.
One such incident entailed a distressing occurrence where a 24-year-old woman sustained fatal
gunshot wounds during a “family dispute” while attending a khula [separation] case. The suspect
opened fired inside the judge’s chamber, further accentuating the pressing need for legal reform and
enhanced security measures within the court premises.
Ironically, on the same day, a sessions court acquitted and released a man who had been accused
of brutally shooting and killing his daughter in the same court, solely because she chose to marry of her
own accord earlier this year. This acquittal stemmed from a compromise reached between the accused’s
wife and children. In a further twist, the accused individual was also acquitted in a separate case
pertaining to the possession of an unlicensed weapon within court premises.
How can the murderer be acquitted?
This legally perplexing and infuriating ruling was facilitated by an application filed under
Section 265-K of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, which grants the court with discretionary
authority to acquit the accused at any stage of the proceedings.
The involvement of non-compoundable terrorism charges initially made the prospect of reaching
a compromise seemingly improbable. However, the administrative judge of the anti-terrorism courts
was of the view that “perusal of record shows that accused had no intention to create terror”.
The striking irony of this situation becomes evident when we consider the basic disparity
between the initial serious charges and the ultimate outcome, which has now unfortunately become
a disheartening norm, allowing perpetrators to evade accountability. This alarming discrepancy
raises profound concerns regarding the lack of effectiveness and consistency of Pakistan’s legal
system in handling complex cases and ensuring strict accountability for criminal acts, especially
those committed on court premises.
The provision allowing for applications of acquittal under the 1898 Act highlights the misuse
and abuse of law, and its detrimental impact on the pursuit of justice. These prevailing
circumstances further emphasise the urgent need for reform and implementation of robust measures
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to rectify the systemic flaws present within the nation’s legal system. These reforms are
indispensable for restoring faith in the system’s integrity and ensuring the realisation of fairness, a
goal that presently appears distant.
These events also serve as blatant reminders of the ramifications that individuals, particularly
women, endure for exercising personal choices that challenge entrenched traditional family values
and societal expectations, even in the 21st century. Regrettably, the prevalence of honour killings has
escalated to such an extent that it appears to create an unsettling impression of tacit acceptance
within the fabric of Pakistan’s society.
It is crucial to acknowledge that Pakistan continues to face significant challenges, primarily
those of implementation, and has a long way to go before the nation can set its sight on a
comprehensive legal framework that effectively tackles the gravity of this issue. While progress has
been made, one undeniable fact remains: existing legal provisions have proven insufficient in
successfully criminalising, and ultimately combatting this deep-rooted practice-turned-tradition.
This unequivocally emphasises the pressing demand for an overhauled legislative framework that
aligns with the need of the hour — to create laws that uphold the principle of retributive justice
(inflicting punishment proportionate to the offence committed), reflecting the paramount
importance of safeguarding fundamental rights and upholding the rule of law.
The laws (and loopholes) in place
Significant legislative reforms, including The Protection of Women (Criminal Laws Amendment)
Act of 2006, Criminal Law (Third Amendment) Act of 2011, The Punjab Protection of Women Against
Violence Act of 2016, and the Criminal Law (Amendment) (Offences in the name of pretext of Honour)
Act of 2016, have been enacted with the aim of strengthening legal penalties, eliminating existing
loopholes within the legal framework, and preventing perpetrators from evading punishment by
leveraging the complicity of the victim’s family, who themselves seek to conceal the offence in an effort
to safeguard their perceived ‘honour’. This issue is particularly significant as honour killings are
frequently perpetrated by close relatives including a woman’s father, husband, or brother.
The Criminal Law (Amendment) (Offences in the name of pretext of Honour) Act of 2016
stands as a significant reform, following the brutal murder of Qandeel Baloch, who fell victim to an
honour killing orchestrated by her own brother. This legislation, passed by the National Assembly,
amended the Pakistan Penal Code, (PPC) 1860, and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, with the
primary objective to effectively deter and prevent offences committed under the guise of honour. As
stated by Senator Farhatullah Babar, “the need to address ‘the loopholes and lacunae in the existing
laws’ is essential in order to prevent these crimes from being repeatedly committed. The Bill (now
Act) is designed to achieve the said objective.”
Under the amended law, such acts and offences are now subject to a minimum penalty of life
imprisonment, irrespective of the willingness shown by the victim’s family to waive qisas (the
principle of equal punishment for the crime committed). This amendment aimed to eliminate the
discretion that was previously exercised by the courts, as well as the requirement of the family’s
consent in providing a sentence to the accused. There was a glimmer of hope as it was believed that
these changes would finally redress prevailing inadequacies, bringing about a paradigm shift in
Pakistan’s legal framework.
However, despite the implementation of these legislative reforms, concerns have escalated
over judicial leniency towards honour killing perpetrators. In a notable case in 2018, the Supreme
Court, relying on the principle of grave and sudden provocation, mitigated the life sentence of an
individual who had openly confessed to the murder of his sister-in-law, to a mere 20 years.
Additionally, the definition of honour killing provided under Section 299 of the PPC [offence
committed in the name or on the pretext of karo kari, siyah kari or similar other customs or
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practices] is crucial to understanding the challenges that are faced in securing successful convictions
of perpetrators. The fundamental issue lies in this very definition, as it creates an avenue for the
accused to evade liability for killing in the name of ‘honour’ by invoking Section 302 of the PPC,
claiming that the killing was a murder rather than an honour killing. This strategic manoeuvre
allows the perpetrator to circumvent the specific legal provisions and penalties associated with
honour killings, thereby diminishing the likelihood of conviction and rendering the amended law as
ineffective and meaningless.
Such instances serve as a striking indication that while legislative reforms have been
theoretically instituted, the imperative need for consistent and unwavering application of the law
still remains, in order to ensure justice for the victims ensnared in this dreadful tradition. The
ongoing struggle to address and rectify the gaps and flaws in the existing legislation presents a
tireless challenge that necessitates urgent and resolute action.
Another aspect of concern within the legal landscape of Pakistan is the payment of blood
money, known as ‘diyat’, which also allows perpetrators to evade punishment by compensating the
victim’s family through financial means. However, it is crucial to note that such practices, while
claimed to be rooted in Islamic jurisprudence, lack substantial support within legal Islamic
traditions. What is ironic here is that proponents of honour killings often misinterpret or selectively
interpret certain passages from religious texts to justify their actions. They rely on cultural practices,
patriarchal traditions, and misguided interpretations of Islamic teachings to legitimatise these
heinous acts. In reality, however, such interpretations are not accepted within the broader Islamic
legal tradition, and are deemed as being contrary to the principles set as precedent by Islamic
jurisprudence, which emphasise justice and protection of fundamental human rights.
The inclusion of these provisions in the legal framework, therefore, not only undermines the
pursuit of retributive justice, but also perpetuates a system where monetary compensation can
overshadow the imperative of holding perpetrators accountable.
A multifaceted approach
Prominent human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch, have drawn attention to the deplorable fact that approximately 1,000 women are murdered
in the name of honour each year in Pakistan. However, countless incidents go unreported. This
brutal reality underscores the pressing need for reformed legislation in Pakistan, that explicitly
criminalises these barbaric acts of violence. The gravity of this situation cannot be overstated, as the
criminalisation of honour killings is not only a compelling legal obligation, but also a profound
moral duty, in order to safeguard the inherent dignity and lives of individuals, and to foster a just,
safe and inclusive society.
Achieving effective implementation of new legislation to address honour killings requires a
multifaceted approach that encompasses legal, social, and educational measures. This approach entails
sensitising law enforcement personnel, providing support to victims, and launching public awareness
campaigns in order to holistically address this issue that continues to persist decades later.
There is a strong need to reform Pakistan’s honour killing legislation. However, the approach
adopted by lawmakers and law enforcement officials must reflect the understanding that the issue
extends beyond the shortcomings of a weak legal framework. Honour killings are a complex problem
deeply rooted in societal narratives and acceptance of these heinous acts. In order to bring about lasting
change, it is imperative for legal authorities, enforcement agents, judicial institutions and society at large,
to collectively advocate against such traditions and establish a consistent narrative.
Strong precedents must be set in courts that unequivocally criminalise those who take the law into
their own hands in the name of ‘honour’. It requires the judicial system to implement the laws in place,
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rather than leveraging loopholes to acquit perpetrators. There needs to be a paradigm shift in mindset, a
deeper understanding of the law, its spirit, and its intent in order to transform years of ‘tradition’.
(Source: Prism)
NURTURING A STARTUP ECOSYSTEM IN PAKISTAN
Dr Muhammad Nawaz Iqbal
Although Pakistan’s startup culture has been progressively expanding in recent years, it still
confronts several obstacles to pave the way for its bright future.
Startups in Pakistan face a daunting challenge when it comes to finance. Traditional financing
sources, like banks, have strict requirements, making it challenging for companies to obtain credit.
Although venture capital firms and angel investors are growing, their availability and reach are still
constrained. Startups’ capacity to expand and scale is constrained by a lack of funding choices. In
comparison to other nations, the Pakistani market may be considered to be modest. Startups have
trouble identifying their target market, particularly if their goods or services are specialised or
catered to a certain sector of the economy. The development potential of startups is constrained by
limited market prospects, making it difficult to expand to size and become profitable.
In Pakistan, bureaucratic red tape and regulations are burdensome for new businesses.
Complex and drawn-out company licensing, registration, and compliance processes deter
entrepreneurs and make it harder to conduct business. It would be much simpler for entrepreneurs
to operate and prosper if regulatory frameworks were simplified and streamlined.
Building knowledgeable and experienced employees is essential for companies to succeed.
However, a lack of specialised skills in some industries makes it difficult to find and keep qualified
specialists. The country is grappling with an alarming surge in brain drain; highly skilled individuals are
seeking more favourable opportunities beyond the borders. An environment that fosters talent growth
and retention is pivotal for startups. For startups to function effectively, adequate infrastructure is
required, including reliable electricity, high-speed internet, and logistics. Infrastructure issues in some
regions hamper a startup’s ability to expand and operate. A nationwide revamp of infrastructure and
connectivity problems would elevate the startup ecosystem.
Pakistan has a youthful, active populace, which offers businesses a big potential. Tech-savvy,
enthusiastic about innovation, and willing to embrace entrepreneurship, young people are a growing
demographic. For entrepreneurs, this demographic dividend offers a strong skill pool and customer
base. Particularly in the areas of mobile and internet usage, Pakistan has seen a tremendous rise in the
adoption of technology. Tech-driven firms now have the chance to build cutting-edge solutions in fields
like e-commerce, finance, EdTech, and health tech owing to this digital change. Access to technology and
increased connection provide a supportive environment for companies.
To foster entrepreneurship, the Pakistani government has launched several programmes after
realising the value of startups. Startups are intended to get finance, mentorship, and infrastructural
help through initiatives such as National Incubation Centre, Startup Pakistan, and different grant
programmes. With the help of these government programmes, a favourable atmosphere is being
created for entrepreneurs to prosper. With the rise of accelerators and incubators, as well as coworking spaces, Pakistan’s entrepreneurial landscape is changing. These organisations offer
networking possibilities, avenues for investors, and collaborative spaces for businesses. Startups are
nurtured and have a greater chance of success when a supporting ecosystem is created.
Foreign organisations and investors are drawn to Pakistan because of its potential for startups.
Startups may access international markets, resources, and capital through partnerships, investments,
and collaborations. Growth may be fueled by these changes, and they can also help firms expand.
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While Pakistan’s startup culture faces obstacles in the areas of investment, prospective markets,
rules and regulations, skills, and infrastructure, there are promising prospects ahead because of the
country’s expanding young population, a rapid embrace of technology, government support, the
growth of an entrepreneurship ecological system, and foreign investment. With continuous efforts
and cooperation, the startup scene in Pakistan can expand and make a substantial contribution to
both economic development and creativity.
For Pakistan, to support a healthy startup culture, a productive environment must be created.
Startups must have access to sufficient finance to expand and scale. It is crucial to establish a wide
variety of funding possibilities, including public subsidies, venture capital firms, angel investors,
and crowd-sourcing platforms. The ecosystem can be strengthened by assisting financial institutions
to offer startup-friendly financing and by enabling access to foreign investment sources. To promote
entrepreneurship, a supportive regulatory framework is required. Startups can be attracted and
entrance obstacles can be eliminated through streamlining business registration processes, lowering
bureaucratic bottlenecks, and establishing policies that encourage ease of doing business. Providing
tax breaks, regulatory “sandboxes,” and systems for protecting intellectual property will help
businesses thrive. Startups can benefit from crucial assistance, mentoring, and networking
possibilities by establishing and supporting startup accelerators, incubators, and co-working spaces.
These organizations should provide entrepreneurs with access to knowledge, business advice,
infrastructure, and cooperation, allowing them to create and expand their businesses.
Building a qualified team is essential for companies to succeed. An entrepreneurial attitude to
learning should be promoted in academic institutions by incorporating practical training and
entrepreneurship programmes into the curriculum. The development of skills in fields like
technology, literacy in digital marketing, and business administration may produce a personnel pool
that is tailored to the demands of startups. The gap between conceptual knowledge and practical
abilities can be closed by enhancing collaboration between academic institutions and businesses.
Startups may gain access to the necessary knowledge and resources through encouraging
partnerships for research and development, offering mentorship opportunities, and supporting
internships. The technology and knowledge transfer from academics to startups can also be
improved by this relationship.
It is crucial to provide channels and events that enable networking and cooperation between
entrepreneurs, investors, subject-matter experts, and mentors. Startups can benefit from visibility,
funding possibilities, and beneficial relationships through startup contests, innovation obstacles,
industry forums, and social gatherings. Creating a robust entrepreneurial community encourages
cooperation, information exchange, and a positive ecology. Governments are extremely important in
fostering entrepreneurship. It is crucial to implement startup-friendly policies, offers money and
assistance through targeted programmes and initiatives, and set up legal frameworks that foster
innovation. Startups must make it easier for them to reach both home and foreign markets. Scaling
up operations may be accomplished through developing platforms that link entrepreneurs with
local and international partners, investors, and clients. Promoting foreign partnerships, trade trips,
and participation in global events may provide entrepreneurs with new prospects. To create a
startup ecosystem in Pakistan, a multifaceted strategy that takes into account market access, talent
development, finance, legislation, and infrastructure is necessary. To create a supportive
environment that fosters startups and promotes entrepreneurial success, the public sector, private
sector, academic institutions, and other business organisations need to work together.
Startups do well in a setting that is favourable for idea generation. A hospitable scenario can be
created by developing an innovation culture, encouraging teamwork and knowledge sharing, granting
access to data and resources, allowing interaction and mentoring, and building a supporting ecosystem.
Together, these elements support an entrepreneurial ecosystem that fosters the development of fresh and
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significant startup ideas. It is crucial to promote an innovative culture. Embracing failure as a learning
opportunity, praising innovation, and encouraging risk-taking can all contribute to developing an
attitude that appreciates and encourages innovative thinking. The creation of fresh business ideas is
sparked by an atmosphere that encourages experimentation and unconventional thinking.
(Source: The News Supplement)
UNIVERSITIES AS CATALYSTS FOR CLIMATE SOLUTIONS
Dr Noor Fatima (A political economist and prestigious Martin Luther King Award winner)
Pakistan is grappling with the destructive consequences of rapidly exacerbating climate
change. In 2021, the country officially launched a National Adaptation Plan for building resilience to
climate change. Pakistan contributes less than 1% of the global greenhouse gas emission but we are
highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Undoubtedly, Pakistan has the meagre technical
and financial capacity to adopt the method to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change.
Nevertheless, it is imperative for Pakistan to come up with adaptive measures to match the global
goals for sustainable development.
Pakistan is devising policies to mitigate and ensure, food and energy security as well as to
manage natural disasters and environmental degradation. Initially, the very first climate change
policy was framed in 2012, keeping in view the anticipated climate change threats.
Unfortunately, due to a number of factors, Pakistan has not been able to deliver a climateresilient outcome. The implementation of this policy remained on a wish list. Currently, a new
climate change policy is underway with national adaptive measures; however, for its successful
implementation, a behavioural shift of the society towards climate change mitigation is essential.
Universities can play a crucial role by involving energetic human resources and research
capacity in bringing behavioural changes and sensitisation towards the issue.
The first step towards achieving net zero emissions is for universities to commit to
implementing SDGs and join the United Nations Race to Zero initiative. The Net Zero initiative for
industrial collaboration is just at its inception and there have been no concrete steps taken in
Pakistani university campuses to adopt zero-emission practices. Given that universities play a key
role in the global transformation to net zero emissions, there is a global initiative led by the
Sustainable Development Solution Network of the United Nations to guide universities in
producing zero emissions and implementing these practices for the benefit of society as a whole.
A roadmap, known as a toolkit, has been developed to assist universities in implementing
these practices and transforming their campuses into living labs that can showcase the broader
impact on society. By utilising this toolkit, universities can develop a roadmap aimed at establishing
a global community of practice to share knowledge about their net zero journeys. This framework
explains the range of initiatives that how universities can enable systemic change in climate change
mitigation and adaptation and how it affects society as the end users.
Net zero emissions matter because rising sea levels, extreme temperatures, changes in
biodiversity, and ecosystem loss negatively impact the sustainable use of resources for future
generations. In order to reduce greenhouse effects by 2030 as part of the SDGs commitment,
universities can contribute in five major areas: education, knowledge production, service delivery,
public debate, and campus operations.
Universities can lead research in climate science and develop products and technologies to
address climate change through comprehensive learning. Additionally, universities can address
energy use within their own institutions, as energy consumption, such as lighting, appliances,
heating, and cooling, significantly contribute to emissions. By adopting renewable energy generation
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methods like solarisation and transitioning away from thermal-based appliances, energy demand
can be reduced.
Encouraging the use of public transport, reducing private vehicle usage, holding online
meetings, and improving campus fleets can all play a critical role in net zero implementation. Waste
management practices, including the introduction of circular economy concepts, can also have a
positive impact on climate mitigation. Digitisation and creating a paper-free environment can aid in
reducing, recycling, and managing waste.
Value chain, a method which thoroughly examines all business activities is essential when
purchasing equipment for universities. It is crucial to prioritise supplies that ensure fewer emissions
and promote climate change mitigation, even for purposes such as catering and laboratories.
A comprehensive cost and benefit analysis will give universities a chance to build robust plans
which can ultimately be integrated with stakeholders, industry and largely with society. Nevertheless,
this transformation is not without the challenges. Hundreds of universities worldwide have committed
to achieving net zero emissions by 2030 in the short term and by 2050 in the long term. Pakistani
universities can clearly define their targets and be innovative in mitigation and adaptation efforts.
The largest portion of university funding is allocated to energy consumption. The question
then becomes how to reduce the energy demand. One immediate action towards achieving net zero
emissions is through energy management practices, such as switching to LED lights, using energyefficient appliances with high energy efficiency ratings, installing power-saving fixtures, and
avoiding excessive use of heating and cooling appliances. Surplus power can then be sold to the
nearest community grid, thereby introducing the concept of a smart grid with load management
adjustments for energy-intensive appliances.
Currently, there are a few universities, such as Agha Khan University, that have taken a leading
role and positioned themselves as case studies by implementing concrete initiatives in their commitment
to achieving net zero emissions. Other notable initiatives have been undertaken by various campuses,
including COMSATS University. They have established the COMSATS Centre for Climate and
Sustainability, which aims to promote climate change-related scientific research. The centre has been
strategically designed as a virtual and physical network of centres, institutions, and organisations
working on environmental risks and striving to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
NUST University Islamabad has introduced student-based networks for sustainable
development projects. NUST campuses are already transitioning to renewable energy systems, as
evidenced by the installation of a 1MW solar system. Additionally, International Islamic University,
Islamabad (IIUI) has incorporated sustainable development courses into its curriculum to raise
awareness about climate change resilience. However, the implementation of energy-efficient
measures may take some time.
The Air University has also taken concrete steps towards environmental solutions, specifically
through the Recycling Program in Air Nexus 2018. NED University is actively contributing to the
implementation of environmental and sustainability projects, positioning itself as a “Living Lab”
model for resolving societal issues.
We need to facilitate climate leadership in universities to enhance research efforts and drive
decarbonisation on campuses in Pakistan, ensuring a sustainable future for the next generation.
(Source: The News Supplement)
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Federal and Provincial Budgets 2023-24
A SILVER LINING TO THE SOMBRE CLOUDS
Azizullah Goheer
Amidst the current political and economic turmoil, the much-awaited budget was announced
with a lot going in the background. The current government is known for its populist approach
when it comes to economic policies, and this time yet again, it was a people pleasing budget as
expected.
The budget is clearly depictive of the government’s efforts to retain a place in next elections.
But, the question arises would this budget be able to steer Pakistan’s economy out of tumultuous
waters with a total outlay of Rs14.46 trillion?
This time when there was a dire need to reduce the fiscal deficit and bring inflation under
control, the budget has successfully been designed to achieve targets mainly funded by debt.
Massive increase in salaries will definitely serve as fuel for inflation.
The economy is intended to steer with reduced taxation, import duties and easy loans for
productive activities. There are many encouraging initiatives, such as eliminating import duty on
solar panel batteries and imported seeds and agricultural machines, freelancer and IT exports will
not be taxed. IT will be getting small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) status and pay a very
concessional amount as tax. However, the typical but very celebrated unnecessary measures, like the
laptop scheme and an increase in the development budget of Higher Education Commission (HEC),
could have been avoided. Some simple steps like reviewing net metering, domestic incentives for
solar or free one-time facility or subsidising 10-marla house for solar panels should have been
introduced.
Or simply, it could have been better to dedicate this budget towards education in areas
terribly affected by the floods instead of a massive increase in Benazir Income Support Programme. I
cannot shudder this thought off mind why are we still promoting begging mindset, and when are
we going to break the chains. How about this chunk is dedicated in setting up new industries and
giving them employment opportunities, so that they could support themselves by earning and not
begging?
This could have brought massive foreign reserves too. Why are we depending on loans and
not exports? This was for sure a typical pro-election move. Long-term vision and far sightedness
was certainly missing.
This is a time when the country needs a closure on the roadmap that the government has
decided. The finance minister, while presenting the budget, chose to blame our problems on an
opposition removed from power. Nothing much was done for export-oriented sectors, higher Super
Tax, hefty retrospective tax on “extra ordinary earnings” and tax on bonus shares. There is
enhancement in reduced rate of Sales Tax from 12pc to 15pc on supplies made by the POS retailers
dealing in leather and textile products. This would be negative for textile companies with a domestic
footprint.
The government has earmarked Rs1.07 trillion in subsidies for the fiscal year, a slight decline
from the previous year’s Rs1.10 trillion. Rs579 billion is allocated to WAPDA/PEPCO, of which
Rs310 billion is allocated for IPPs, likely to clear the sector’s overdue receivables.
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Notably, the industrial support package was removed, from the Rs7.0 billion allocated the
previous year.
Moreover, the recently withdrawn zero-rated industrial subsidy will not be reinstated, as the
budget did not allocate any amount to the head, compared to Rs64 billion the year prior. The
subsidy on RLNG was also withdrawn against the Rs40 billion allocated the year prior. Rs30 billion
has been allocated to fertilizer plants for subsidised gas and removal of 5pc regulatory duty on
synthetic filament yarn of polyester not manufactured locally. An additional tax up to 50pc has been
imposed on income profit and gains on account of extraordinary gains due to exogenous factors.
The Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) has proposed an enhanced rate of Super Tax across the
board by adding three more thresholds with an increased rate from 6 to 10 percent.
Now, the Super Tax has been rationalised under Section 4C and would apply on all persons
across the board earning income above Rs150 million. The FBR should not legalise the taboos. The
unregistered vehicles should be banned, and at least there should be a practical roadmap to bring
non taxpayers into the tax net. Increasing the slabs may cause no difference. There has to be
something done substantially.
The Income Law provides the applicability of tax withholding rates by a direct exporter or
export house registered under the Duty and Tax Remission for Exports Rules 2001 provided in subchapter 7 of Chapter XII of the Custom Rules 2001 to an indirect exporter at par with the rates
applicable on exporter.
The Bill proposes to prescribe this applicability of lower rates whilst making payment to
indirect exporter, will, henceforth apply to those direct exporter or export house registered under
Duty and Tax Remission for Exports Rules 2001 and Export Facilitation Scheme, 2021.
As a consequence of this change, the registration under Duty and Tax Remission for Exports
Rules 2001 and also under the Export Facilitation Scheme, 2021 will now be applicable.
It is a good measure to reinstate the adjustable advance tax on cash withdrawals from the
bank in the case of non-filer. The tax is to be withheld on sum total of cash withdrawals exceeding
Rs50,000 in a day from individuals not appearing in the active taxpayers' list (ATL) and aims to
bring these non-filers to tax net. This amendment may increase the tax collection, but on the other
hand, can also result in cash dealing and avoiding banking activities.
Now is the time to act and act decisively and sanely. The budget is more of the same with the
IMF at the backdrop this time; high on promises and low to actually deliver. The IMF and
international banks are encouraging Pakistan to drastically transform its economic policies and
priorities in order to unlock the funds.
These policies must review subsidies on commodities, a stagnant tax collection and tax base,
costly borrowing to pay off previous loans, bailing out state companies that operate at a loss and
generally poor governance and corruption.
We have time and again failed to implement unflawed economic reforms and decisions such
as artificially controlling the rupee, dollar rate when reserves are not even enough.
The government needs to realise severity of situation and how we are standing at the verge of
devastation. A single blow will depredate us forever. This budget is “do or die” game. Everyone
needs to sit down together and be on the same page to draw a roadmap to take Pakistan out of the
current economic paralysis.
(Source: the News)
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KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM PAKISTAN’S FEDERAL BUDGET FOR 2023-24
Sana Jamal
The Pakistani government has unveiled its federal budget for the fiscal year 2023-24, featuring
incentives for the agriculture and IT sector, salary increases for government employees, exemptions
on solar panels, and other subsidies.
Pakistan’s Finance Minister Ishaq Dar announced the Rs14.5 trillion (around $50.5 billion)
budget in the National Assembly on Friday, with over half of the funds allocated to service Rs7.3
trillion of debt.
The government has set aside around Rs1 trillion for subsidies in the electricity and gas
sectors. The target for tax collection is set at Rs9.2 trillion ($32 billion) and envisions a 3.5 percent
GDP growth. However, experts and opposition have expressed concerns about inflationary
pressure, unrealistic revenue targets, and the expansion of the fiscal deficit.
BUDGET OUTLAY
• Tota federal budget: Rs 14.46 trillion
• Interest payments: Rs7.3 trillion
• PSDP (health, education, infrastructure): Rs1.15
trillion
• Defence: 1.8 trillion
• Subsidies (energy, gas and etc): Rs 1.074 trillion
• Pensions: 0.76 trillion
Highlights of the budget:
Incentives for overseas Pakistanis
The government has made changes regarding remittances from overseas Pakistanis. Foreign
remittances up to the equivalent of $100,000, no longer require the source of income or assets to be
explained.
Furthermore, a ‘diamond card’ will be introduced for individuals sending over $50,000 in
remittances.
The card offers several benefits, including preferential access to Pakistani embassies and
consulates, fast-track immigration at airports, and special prizes through draws.
Agriculture
To boost production, the agriculture credit for the fiscal year is being increased from Rs 1.8
trillion to Rs2.25 trillion. The budget also includes various measures such as Rs30 billion to switch
50,000 tube wells to solar energy, tax exemptions on the import of quality seeds and saplings,
allocation of Rs5 billion funds for the agro-industry, and a five-year tax exemption for agro-based
industrial units with an annual turnover of Rs 800 million.
IT sector
Incentives for the IT exporters include the continuation of a 0.25 per cent concessional rate of
income tax until June 30, 2026, and the duty-free import of IT-related equipment equivalent to 1 per
cent value of their export proceeds. Additionally, freelancers earning up to $24,000 per year will be
exempted from sales tax registration and allowed to file a simplified single-page income tax return.
The government is establishing a venture capital fund with Rs 5 billion to support IT entrepreneurs.
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Sales tax rates are being reduced rate from 15 per cent to 5 per cent on IT services. Professional
training will be provided to 50,000 IT graduates.
Solar energy
To promote renewable energy, the government has exempted customs duty on the import of
solar panel components, including inverters, solar panels, and batteries. This exemption aims to
reduce the cost of adopting solar energy for consumers.
Education
The federal government has reserved Rs65 billion for the current expenditures and Rs70
billion for the development expenditures of the Higher Education Commission (HEC). The budget
has set aside Rs10 billion for the distribution of 100,000 laptops to deserving students. It includes the
establishment of the Pakistan Endowment Fund worth Rs5 billion for merit scholarships.
Salary Increase for govt employees
Salaries of government employees between grades 1 to 16 will increase by 35 per cent and
those in grades 17 and above will see a 30 per cent increase to help cope with inflation. The
minimum monthly wage within the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) will be raised to Rs32,000 and
the minimum pension will be Rs12,000.
Social safety
The budget increases the allocation for the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) by 25
per cent to Rs450 billion. Assistance will be provided to 9.3 million families, and scholarships will be
awarded to 92,000 students under the social safety net programmes. The number of beneficiaries for
the nutrition initiative has also been increased.
Defence
A defence budget of Rs1.8 trillion ($6 billion) was annnounced, representing a 13 per cent
increase over the military expenditure in the previous year. The army will receive the largest share
of the budget (Rs824 billion), followed by the Pakistan Air Force (Rs368 billion) and Pakistan Navy
(Rs188 billion).
Super tax slabs
The budget introduces super tax slabs for the tax year 2023. The rates are 0 per cent for income
below Rs150 million, 1 per cent for income between Rs150-200 million, 2 per cent for income
between Rs201-250 million, 3 per cent for income between Rs251-300 million, 4 per cent for income
between Rs301-350 million, 6 per cent for income between Rs351-400 million, 8 per cent for income
between Rs401-500 million and 10 per cent for income exceeding Rs500 million.
Initiatives for youth and women
The budget includes populist schemes aimed at the youth, such as the laptop scheme, tax
relief for freelancers, cuts in income taxes for youth enterprises, loans, and skill development
programmes. Furthermore, the government has allocated Rs10 billion under the PM’s Youth Loan
Programme to provide concessional loans for small businesses. The budget allocates Rs5 billion for
women empowerment initiatives, including skill development, easy loans for businesses, and
training programmes. Additionally, tax concessions will be granted to women entrepreneurs.
Healthcare allocations
The healthcare sector will receive a proposed allocation of Rs24.21 billion, with Rs13 billion
dedicated to uplifting the sector under the public sector development budget. Some of the healthcare
initiatives include the establishment of the Centre of Biologics and Cancer Research, elimination of
Hepatitis C Infection, and PM’s National Programme for Prevention of Diabetes. However, the
Pakistan Medical Association (PMA) has highlighted the deteriorating health indicator and
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emphasised the need to enhance the health budget to 6% of the GDP, in line with the WHO’s
recommendations, as the current allocation stands at less than 1 per cent of the budget.
Public sector development programme (PSDP)
The budget includes a record-high federal PSDP of Rs950 billion, with an additional Rs200
billion for public-private partnership projects taking the total to Rs1.15 trillion. The PSDP focuses on
infrastructure projects, such as energy, railways, motorways and highways, aviation, water
reservoirs, and ports. It also introduces new initiatives, including youth programs and IT startups,
education funds, and health programmes.
Others
Several other tax-related measures include an increase in withholding tax on cash withdrawals for
non-filers and an enhanced sales tax rate for point-of-sale retailers dealing in leather and textile products.
The budget also offers tax relief to industrial and export sectors and removes regulatory duty on secondhand clothing. It also includes an increase in the Goods and Services Tax (GST) ratio for tier-one retailers
in the leather and textile industries, specifically targeting expensive branded goods.
Revenue targets
The Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) has set a tax revenue target of Rs9.2 trillion, representing
a 28 per cent increase compared to the expected collection for the current year. The new direct tax
target, projected at Rs3.7 trillion, relies heavily on income tax. Indirect taxes are estimated at Rs5.44
trillion, with sales tax accounting for the major chunk. A non-tax revenue target of Rs869 billion has
been set under the petroleum levy.
TAXES
Total FBR Taxes: Rs9.2 trillion
Direct Taxes: Rs3.7 trillion (mostly from income tax)
Indirect Taxes: Rs5.4 trillion (major chunk from sales tax)
Non-tax collection target: Rs2.96 trillion
Levis and Fees: Rs29.4 billion
Income from property and enterprise: Rs398 billion
Petroleum Levy: Rs869 billion
What experts have to say
Experts believe that achieving these targets without serious taxation measures on sectors like
real estate, agriculture, retail and wholesale trading, will be challenging.
Financial experts and opposition figures have raised concerns about the budget’s impact on
inflation and the expansion of the fiscal deficit. They consider the tax and non-tax revenue targets to
be unrealistic. Critics argue that the budget lacks structural reforms and control over fiscal
expenditures while burdening compliant formal sectors and not adequately taxing other sectors.
Despite mixed reactions, the budget includes positive measures such as a focus on agriculture,
promotion of IT and IT-enabled exports, and a reduction in minimum tax for listed companies.
(Source: Gulf News)
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ENERGY MEASURES IN THE BUDGET
Abida Naurin (Research Fellow at PIDE, Islamabad)
The demand for energy is on the rise due to economic expansion, population growth, and
rapid technological advancements. However, the reliance on imported fossil fuels and energy
supply limitations poses significant challenges to the country’s economic prospects.
In response, the government aims to optimise the utilisation of local energy sources such as
hydel, solar, wind, and Thar coal. The government recently approved the Framework Guidelines for
Fast Track Solar Initiatives 2022 to promote and develop cost-effective renewable energy.
This framework primarily focuses on substituting expensive imported fossil fuels with solar
photovoltaic (PV) energy, implementing solar PV generation on 11kV feeders, and solarising public
buildings.
During the current fiscal year (2022-23), the addition of three Thar coal-based power plants
has increased the total installed capacity to 3,300MW. Additionally, there are six nuclear power
plants with a combined installed capacity of 3,560MW.
As of July-March FY23, the total installed capacity and electricity generation reached
41,050MW and 94,121GWh, respectively. The distribution of installed capacity among hydel,
nuclear, renewable, and thermal sources is 25.8 per cent, 8.7pc, 6.8pc, and 58.7pc, respectively.
Likewise, electricity generation shares were 28.6pc, 21pc, 4.2pc, and 46.2pc for hydel, nuclear,
renewables, and thermal sources, respectively. (Pakistan Economic Survey, 2022-23).
In terms of electricity consumption, the household sector accounted for 47.2pc of the total,
followed by the industrial sector at 28pc, agriculture at 8.1pc, and commercial at 7.8pc. The total
demand for petroleum products saw a decline of 21.9pc, reaching 13.1 million tonnes in July-March
FY23.
The transport sector alone consumed about 78.5pc of petroleum products. Notably, there was
a notable decrease in the demand for motor spirit, high-speed diesel, and furnace oil, which
accounted for approximately 95pc of the total demand.
To meet this demand, petroleum products and crude oil imports amounted to 6,118.3
thousand metric tonnes and 5,858.4 thousand tonnes, respectively.
Furthermore, natural gas consumption during July-March FY23 was around 3,267m cubic feet
per day (MMCFD), including 626 MMCFD of re-gasified liquefied natural gas (RLNG). Lastly, the
power, brick kilns, and cement/other sectors consumed 47.3pc, 21.5pc, and 31.1pc of the total coal
consumption, amounting to 15,416.5 thousand tonnes.
A budget of Rs30 billion has been set out for the solar energy conversion of 50,000 solar tube
wells under this framework. The government also aims to reduce reliance on energy imports by
enhancing dependency on renewable sources.
Batteries, solar panels, and inverters’ raw materials will be free from customs taxes (Budget
document 2023-24). As Pakistan’s electricity generating capacity surpasses 41,000MW, Rs107bn has
been set aside to improve the effectiveness of power transmission.
To support the Pakistan-Tajikistan 500kV power project, Rs16bn has been allocated to expand
bilateral energy cooperation and Rs12bn for the Jamshoro coal project.
During the fiscal year 2023–24, mega transmission projects like CASA–1000 (Rs16.1bn) and the
transmission sector is anticipated to have 3,750 MVA additional capacity on the 500kV grid and
6,900 MVA more capacity on the 220kV grid by the end of June 2024.
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The transmission lines will be extended by 522km, and on the 220kV level, by 668km. Dasu
Evacuation (Rs5.67bn) and Suki Kinari Evacuation (Rs13.8bn) are allocated in the current budget. In
addition, Rs7.27bn has been allotted for eight projects to deliver electricity to Special Economic Zones.
The Public Sector Development Programme 2023–24 includes major distribution projects like
Advanced Metering Infrastructure for Islamabad Electric Supply Company, which is worth Rs3bn.
The distribution sector investments will electrify 6,985 villages, creating 1.4m new customers for
distribution companies (Disco).
Since crude oil and refined petroleum products make up most of the energy industry, the
Bonded Bulk Storage Policy for POL (petroleum) Products will be implemented to address the
problem of supply chain disruption.
Mohmand Dam, the Diamer Bhasha Dam, and the Dasu Hydropower Project will have a
budget of Rs10.5bn, Rs20bn and Rs59bn, respectively, in FY24. These initiatives seek to produce
power at a reasonable price while also supplying water to the agriculture sector.
However, nothing in the budget addressed ways to reduce theft, line loss, or circular debt.
Diversification of energy sources, reduction of reliance on imported fuels, and investment in renewable
energy infrastructure are key to ensuring long-term energy security and economic stability.
A research report on “PIDE’s Charter of Economy” by the Pakistan Institute of Development
Economics (PIDE) stated that smart metering technologies should be used to transition the power
supply to a pre-paid basis.
While contracts should be issued based on best achievements, the government should also
carefully consider leasing out the challenging retail districts to the private sector for a certain length
of time. Reduce the role of the government in setting tariffs and state-owned discos.
Further, to reduce theft, first off, retail management should be outsourced. Next, high-quality
measuring tools should be installed to address the problem of Unaccounted for Gas (UFG). Second,
term profitability should be eliminated since it allows gas distribution corporations to make money
when operational efficiency should be the source of such profits.
Thirdly, it is necessary to create a single consumer tariff based on cost-of-service. Fourth,
review long-term LNG contracts to release some of the gas volumes and allow third parties (thirdparty access) to acquire the gas on a short-term basis or the open market.
Lastly, attain price convergence between RLNG and piped indigenous gas. A more critical
review should delve into the implications of the figures, evaluate the effectiveness of government
policies, and explore the potential challenges and opportunities in the energy sector.
(Source: Business and Finance Weekly)
PUNJAB BUDGET
Pleasing the populace
Nasir Jamal
Punjab’s spending plan for the first four months — from July 1 to October 31 — of the next
financial year unveiled last week clearly and unmistakably carries PML-N’s signature all over it: a
massive development stimulus, a bloated subsidy and social protection programme, and an increase
in the pay and pension of government employees.
The Rs1.7 trillion expenditures authorised last week by the caretaker provincial
administration led by Mohsin Naqvi to manage the affairs of the government in the run-up to the
national election is loaded with a development stimulus of Rs325 billion, social protection and
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subsidy programme of Rs103.3bn, an endowment fund of Rs1bn for journalists, abolition of existing
taxes on the IT sector, and allocations for the establishment of an IT Park in Lahore.
No wonder it has triggered a debate on whether the caretakers have transgressed their
mandate and if the massive allocations for development, social protection, and subsidy for the
period leading up to new elections that must be held in October are meant to lift the sagging
electoral prospects of the Noon League in the province.
The plan contains a development programme for the four months, which is 47 per cent of the
Rs685bn target for the entire outgoing year. Likewise, the current expenditure of Rs721.9bn for the
period compares the original full-year expenditure estimates of Rs1.71tr for the outgoing year.
The pay and pension bill is projected at Rs275.1bn for four months, showing a significant rise
when compared with the entire FY23 estimates of Rs747.9bn. Other major expenditures include
social protection of Rs70bn and a subsidy of Rs33.3bn for public transport and water and sanitation
services. The cost of service delivery is estimated at Rs153.6bn for the interim period. This compares
with a sum of Rs303.9bn budget for the entire outgoing year.
Under the Elections Act 2017, the role of the caretaker governments has been restricted to the
performance of day-to-day, routine functions necessary to run the affairs of the government and
assist the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) in holding the new elections. They are also
forbidden from taking crucial policy decisions like imposing or abolishing taxes except in urgent
situations and disallowed from entering into contracts or undertakings.
Likewise, Article 126 of the Constitution also severely curtails the financial powers of
provincial caretaker governments and restricts them to ‘authorisation of expenditure’ from the
Provincial Consolidated Fund (PCF) for a period not exceeding four months in any financial year.
So it is only fair if the analysts are questioning the intention of the caretakers behind the
‘initiatives’ that should have been left for an elected government to take. What ‘urgent situation’
existed in the province that prompted the caretakers to withdraw taxes on the IT sector or create an
endowment fund for the journalists?
Why are such huge allocations made for the development schemes — even for the ongoing ones?
Why does it plan to spend roughly 60pc of the social protection funds of Rs120bn set aside for the full
year in just four months leading to the national elections, if not to help a particular political party?
Many analysts think that the caretaker government in Punjab has transgressed its mandate as
defined in the Elections Act 2017 and the Constitution.
“A look at the expenditures reinforces the impression that the caretakers are acting as an
extension of the PML-N in the country’s largest province where the battle for power will be fought
in the election,” a political science teacher from a public-sector university in Lahore argued while
speaking to Dawn on the condition of anonymity.
“The League’s popularity has taken a severe hit in the province, especially in its stronghold of
Central Punjab, because of the spike in the cost of living over the last year. Even its core support
group of the traders in Punjab is no longer united in its support for the League,” he went on.
A senior government official agreed. “The PML-N is under pressure to show the voters that it
is taking measures to provide them relief to revive its weakened support base in Punjab,” he said.
“The issue is that it couldn’t do much to relieve the inflation-stricken low-middle-income sections of
the population in the federal budget as it doesn’t have cash for this.
“Also, the landmark 18th Amendment to the Constitution and the 7th National Finance
Commission (NFC) Award have curtailed its powers to provide relief to the people by transferring
most powers and financial resources to the provinces. Thus, it is reliant on the provinces for
providing relief to the people,” he insisted.
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The PML-N legislators and ticket aspirants are also looking towards their leadership to give
them something to sell to their constituents burdened by soaring inflation, eroding income and
growing unemployment in the wake of the economic crisis as the party’s development-financed
local networks crumble.
“It, therefore, is quite natural for the party to use the willing caretakers to provide the muchneeded developmental push to help it improve its electoral prospects. You know as well as I that the
caretaker government’s decisions are significantly influenced by the PML-N leadership as is
underscored by an endowment fund announced for journalists on the pattern of a similar federal
initiative,” the university teacher contended.
The ‘leaked’ documents show that on the revenue side, the province expects to collect
Rs1.52tr, including Rs881.9bn in receipts from the federal transfers under the NFC award in the
interim period, whereas the province’s own revenue collection is estimated at Rs193.3bn, including
tax target of Rs131.2bn and non-tax revenue of Rs62.1bn.
The foreign project and programme assistance is estimated at Rs27.1bn. In addition, the food
account targets a receipt of Rs395.2bn. Furthermore, the province will carry forward a cash surplus of
Rs400bn, which will be partly used to pay the last tranche of wheat or food procurement debt of over
Rs150bn.
“We have committed with the centre a Rs112bn surplus at the end of the four-month period.
But the actual surplus would be much more than that,” finance secretary Mujahid Sherdil told
Dawn. He explained that the allocations for development will be spent only on ongoing schemes,
and no new project will be undertaken.
“There is no ‘block allocation’ against the development budget as reported by media. Each
rupee has been earmarked against the schemes,” he said, arguing that the allocations for
development expenditure are crucial to avoid project cost overruns. He said the social protection
mechanism is still being designed.
“It could be cash transfers to people on the pattern of the Benazir Income Support Programme
or wheat flour subsidy. This is a continuation of the facility being provided to the low-income
groups for the last two decades.”
In a highly charged political environment, it is advisable that the Punjab caretaker
government remains careful in financial matters so that the credibility of the next elections in the
province is not questioned.
(Source: Business and Finance Weekly)
KP BUDGET
A bloated salaries and pension bill
The province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has been facing a severe cash crunch for the last year
because the centre is not fully paying its net hydel profits (NHP) and has also stopped funds
committed for the erstwhile tribal areas.
The previous government of PTI in the province was forced to borrow Rs285 billion from the
State Bank of Pakistan under the ‘Ways & Means’ facility to pay salaries and pensions to its
employees on time. It had repeatedly accused the PDM coalition led by the Noon League of
‘victimising’ the PTI administration by stopping funds for political reasons.
The situation has somewhat changed since federal assistance seems to have increased. It is
evident from the fact that the caretaker setup hasn’t borrowed any money from the central bank to
pay its salary and pension bill after March.
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Still, the central government owes the province a hefty Rs55bn in net hydel profit arrears as it
has received only Rs5bn in the outgoing fiscal year. Hence, the caretaker setup in the province has
authorised conservative expenditure of Rs462.4bn for a four-month period from July to October to
manage the province in the run-up to the next national elections.
Like Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has also chosen to breach the provisions of the Elections
Act, 2017 and Article 126 of the Constitution, which drastically curtails the administrative and
financial powers of the caretaker governments to maintain the credibility of the elections.
“The caretakers have cut the government expenditure (for four months) by another 25 per cent
(from the outgoing year),” Himayatullah Khan, the adviser to the chief minister on finance, claimed
at a press conference to announce authorised expenditure.
He said the caretaker government had also taken strict austerity measures in view of the
crunch. All posts lying vacant for the past three years would be abolished, and there would be a
total ban on new development projects, he added.
Besides, the government also banned the purchase of physical assets, new vehicles and
renovation of government offices and residences; participation in seminars abroad on government
expenses, and medical treatment abroad on government expenses. The budget also seeks to
streamline the necessary payments and release of funds during the next four months.
However, the restrictions on caretakers as well as the financial crunch, didn’t keep the
temporary, unelected setup from announcing a hefty Rs112.4bn development stimulus for the
interim period leading to elections.
This includes allocations of Rs20.3bn for the merged districts of erstwhile Fata. The remainder
of Rs350bn has been set aside for current expenditure, including Rs40.5bn for the merged districts.
That’s not all. In line with the federal decision, the province has also announced 35 per cent ad
hoc relief in the salaries of provincial employees from grade one to 16 and 30pc ad hoc relief for
grade 17 to 22 officers. An increase of 17.5pc in the pension was also approved. This will burden the
province’s resources by over Rs40bn, including an increase of Rs29.7bn in the salary bill and Rs5bn
in the pension bill.
Alongside the pay raise, the budget also increased the travelling and deputation allowance by
50pc, doubling the special conveyance allowance for disabled employees and the secretariat
performance allowance.
It is not justified for an unelected setup to make such decisions that would be difficult for the
elected government to reverse.
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s wage and pension spending has grown outrageously in the last 13
years, with the salary bill going up by 541pc and pension by 951pc between FY12 and FY24.
The figures in a spending plan presentation given to the caretaker cabinet by the finance
department revealed that the province’s pay bill stood at Rs86bn in FY12 and would reach Rs487bn
next year. The province’s wage bill grew by Rs40bn in FY22 and by Rs58bn last year. It is projected
to rise by Rs115bn next fiscal. As for the province’s pension bill, it was Rs16bn in 2011-12 and will
reach Rs126bn next year.
Mass regularisation of employees due to the Fata-KP merger, as well as payments to project
employees, is the major contributor to the massive wage spending. In 2021, around 2,200 Levies and
Khasadar personnel were absorbed into the province police, while 4,079 people working on 136
projects in tribal districts were regularised in January last year.
In July last year, the government had regularised 56,000 teachers and 700 ad hoc doctors.
Overall, some 229,837 posts have been created and 258,887 upgraded since the PTI came to power in
the province in 2013.
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Against the expenditure of Rs462.4bn, the caretakers expect a total income of Rs442.6bn,
showing an operational shortfall of nearly Rs20bn.
It hopes to receive over Rs249bn from federal transfers, Rs29.9bn from the 1pc share in the
divisible pool on account of the war on terrorism, Rs13.2bn from straight transfers, Rs10bn in net
hydel profits, and Rs18.3bn in NHP arrears during the four-month period.
The own provincial receipts are expected to generate Rs28.8bn in tax and non-tax revenue of
Rs18.8bn and Rs9.5bn, respectively. The foreign funding for development projects has been pitched
at Rs37bn, and the receipts for merged areas are projected at over Rs42bn.
Overall, the government expects to receive 871bn from the centre in the full next fiscal year,
which also includes Rs84bn in terms of hydel profit and arrears and Rs90bn for the war against
terrorism in its share in taxes and others.
Besides, the provincial government also expected to receive Rs93bn in foreign assistance for
the purpose of development works during the next financial year, the financial adviser said.
In pursuit of the election laws and the constitution, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa caretakers must
revise the large expenditure that can be a burden on the provincial resources and impossible for the
next elected government to reverse.
(Source: Business and Finance Weekly)
BALOCHISTAN BUDGET
The disillusionment continues
Muhammad Akbar Notezai
Balochistan has been replete with financial woes from day one. Over the last several years
now, and especially since the reports of the country slipping toward default, the financial woes of
Balochistan have further compounded to the extent of compelling Chief Minister of Balochistan
Abdul Quddoos Bizenjo to boycott the federal budget session and the National Economic Council
due to the prevailing economic woes of the province.
Despite the challenges, the provincial government of Balochistan presented a Rs750 billion
deficit budget for 2023-24 last week, allocating Rs229bn for thousands of development schemes and
increasing the pay and pensions of government employees in line with the federal budget.
Moreover, the government’s revenues in the next fiscal year are estimated at Rs701bn, leaving
a deficit of Rs49bn. The outlay of the non-development budget is Rs437bn, and the public sector
development programme outlay is Rs229.3bn.
Ever since the arrival of the Bizenjo government, the opposition in the Balochistan assembly
has played a friendly role for the first time because their schemes have been included in the budget,
and the chief minister’s services have been at their disposal.
This is why when finance minister Zamarak Khan Achakzai unveiled the budget, there was no
uproar. Instead, the assembly members listened to his speech calmly and with interest.
On the other hand, government employees, especially school teachers, were on the road,
protesting for an increment in their salaries in the pre-budget period in the wake of price hikes,
among other things.
In this regard, the finance minister said the government has increased the salaries of
government employees by 35 per cent for those in grades one to 16 and by 30pc for the officers in
grades 17 to 22.
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In Balochistan, it is interesting to note the state of the education and health sectors has been
abysmal. The last year’s torrential rains and floods wreaked havoc in the entire province, giving a
big blow to the shambling education and health sectors. For instance, in many places, the schools
and basic health centres were destroyed in the wake of the rains and floods.
However, the finance minister proposed a paltry amount of Rs65bn for the health sector and
Rs77bn for education, allocated for primary, higher and secondary schools.
Meanwhile, the varsities of the province are facing a financial crunch. So much so that in
recent times, they (particularly the oldest one in the province called the University of Balochistan)
could not pay the teachers’ salaries for three months. And the crisis is not yet over. However, there
was no such mention in the budget to pull these varsities out of trouble.
In Balochistan, unemployment has been an overlooked and ignored issue caused by a lack of
economic opportunities. Despite being the least populated country, Balochistan’s issues, including
the lack of job prospects for youth, have increased manifold.
It is a good omen that the finance minister said the government would create 4,389 jobs to
reduce unemployment in the health and education sectors. But unfortunately, it is a drop in the
ocean in the wake of rising unemployment in the province.
Meanwhile, it is an open secret now that jobs in Balochistan are sold these days. It has
deprived the youth of their due share and right. Most of the candidates have been appointed
through favouritism and nepotism.
Except for government officials, the common people of the province are least bothered about the
budget. Like each previous time, they are disappointed that the budget cannot do a little for them.
The masses in Balochistan believe that the budget schemes will solely benefit the ministers
who come to the assembly for their vested interests. They argue that the provincial government has
been unable to construct the small Pinjran bridge as yet, which was built by the then Britishers and
swept away by last year’s floods — what can it do for the development of the province so that its
people can be prosperous?
(Source: Business and Finance Weekly)
(Source: Business and Finance Weekly)
SINDH BUDGET
A Highly Ambitious Plan
Sindh Chief Minister Syed Murad Ali Shah presented an ambitious Rs 2.2 trillion provincial
budget for FY2023-24, jacking up development expenditure by 72.3 percent, compared to the
outgoing fiscal’s revised estimate, to Rs 700 billion and lacing his speech with populist rhetoric
about tax relief to individuals and businesses and promotion of the “entrepreneurial spirit”.
In a move clearly meant to resonate with the voter base, especially after all the devastation
caused by floods and exogenous economic shocks over the last couple of years, the sum allocated to
development constitutes more than 31 percent of the total outlay, which means that Rs 31.15 out of
every Rs 100 that the provincial government plans to spend in the new fiscal year will be routed to
this head, leaving the rest of the funds to take care of “recurring expenses or one-time capital
spending of non-development nature”.
Interestingly, this 72.3 percent hike in the development budget overtakes the total increase in
the outlay of the complete budget, which is estimated to grow by 27.3 percent over revised estimates
of FY2022-23.
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CM Shah also took advantage of the relative calm on the assembly floor, mainly due to the
absence of PTI’s (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf’s) vocal lawmakers, to stress that the Rs38b deficit budget
centred around rehabilitation of flood-affected people and social protection for the poor.
The decision to raise the minimum wage from Rs 25,000 to Rs 35,000, salaries by up to 35
percent (for government employees from grades 1-16, 30 percent for those above grade 16) and
pensions by 17.5 percent was also largely in keeping with expectations since this was, after all, an
election year budget just when the provincial government was being hounded by a very charged
opposition on the streets.
The Sindh government could, however, have taken a leaf out of the Punjab budget book – just
like the federal government – and gone a step further to encourage further documentation of the
economy. Initiatives like a lower tax on card payments at restaurants, duly adopted by the centre,
should have found their way into the Sindh budget as well.
This measure has the potential to bring sizeable food business into the tax net restaurants that
do not accept payment through cards would come under pressure from their customers who would
have an incentive tagged to it. This can be done can be done through a notification by SRB with due
approval of the government without a change in the law.
Another desirable measure pertains to IT-related export and domestic services. The domestic
regime is already quite liberal, however, through the federal budget changes have been introduced
in definition of IT services in line with demand by PASHA.
The Sindh and other provincial governments would do well to consider similar changes in
scope of IT services in their own laws for seamless working of this sector. It is heartening to note that
the provinces have finally prevailed in getting the federal government to recognise transmission and
distribution of electricity as ‘Service’. This would hopefully prove to be reasonably good source of
revenue generation for the provinces.
The budget for school education has been raised by 13 percent to Rs 267.7 billion, and the
health budget by 10 percent to Rs 227.8 billion. These increases, though by no means enough to cater
properly to the province’s education and health needs, are still appreciated.
Still, the proof of the pudding will lie in the eating, and it can only be hoped at this stage that
this section will not be the first to face cuts in case the deficit widens, which is very likely, and
money is urgently needed elsewhere.
For now, though, it is encouraging that the Sindh government has successfully secured
Chinese grants of Rs 7.66 billion for rehabilitating and rebuilding 646 schools.
The health sector has been under unrelenting stress since the beginning of the Covid
pandemic. It had just handled two severe waves of the virus when the worst floods in living
memory ravaged the country, especially Sindh. It will, therefore, be important to make sure that this
sector, at least, is not deprived of its allocation for the usual, often trivial reasons.
CM Shah acknowledged that prevailing economic conditions, unrelenting currency
depreciation, and a tightening balance of payments (BoP) situation tend to have a compelling effect
on important economic indicators.
And while Sindh hopes to receive its share of funds from the federal government, the federal
transfers will ultimately depend on the annual collection by FBR (Federal Board of Revenue). That is
always a tricky prospect, since the Board is not exactly known for meeting its own targets year after year.
For now, though, budget estimates for federal transfers have been set at Rs 1.353 trillion,
including Rs 1.255 trillion for the divisible pool components, Rs64.424 billion for straight transfer
components and Rs 33.741 billion for OZT grants.
(Source: Business Recorder)
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Foreign Policy and Relations
ENHANCING PAKISTAN-IRAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Exploring Prospects in Trade and Connectivity
Arhama Siddiqa (Research Fellow, Centre for Afghanistan, Middle East & Africa (CMEA), ISS)
On May 18, 2023, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi
inaugurated the first border market at the Mand-Pishin crossing-point of the Pakistan-Iran border,
marking a significant milestone in their joint efforts to enhance cross-border trade and strengthen
the overall economic relationship. This is one of the six border markets to be constructed along the
Pakistan-Iran common border. Additionally, the two leaders launched the Polan-Gabd Electricity
Transmission Line, expected to transmit an additional 100MW of electricity from Iran to Pakistan.
This transmission line serves as a supplement to the electricity obtained from Iran for the broader
Makran region through the 132 KV Makran
Division electricity transmission line. The availability of this extra 100MW of electricity from
Polan-Gabd will help alleviate the energy needs of households and businesses in Balochistan.
Apart from attending the inauguration ceremony, President Raisi and Prime Minister Shehbaz
Sharif conferred on a wide range of bilateral matters and reiterated their commitment to bolster
economic cooperation between the two countries. They also agreed to expedite efforts to finalize
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on a priority basis. In a statement issued by Pakistan's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the joint inauguration was hailed as a testament to the strong commitment of both
countries to improve the welfare of residents in the neighboring provinces of Balochistan and Sistano-Baluchestan, respectively. Indeed, this event illustrates a significant stride forward in the bilateral
relationship.
Pishin, a border region situated in the northwestern part of the 904km long Pakistan-Iran
border, is of crucial importance in promoting trade and connectivity between the two sides.
According to Pakistan Commerce Minister, Naveed Qamar, a total of 12 border markets had been
proposed by the two countries to increase the volume of bilateral trade, out of which nine had been
mutually approved. The Pakistani government has been diligently working to facilitate legal
channels to enhance bilateral trade with Iran, thereby discouraging the influx of illicit goods. The
opening of the Pishin Border for legal trade is expected to have an appreciable impact on the
economies of both countries, generating employment opportunities, and contributing to regional
stability. Several informal crossings along the Pakistan-Iran border are exploited by smugglers for
illegal transportation of goods such as oil and food items. This border crossing predominantly
facilitates trade in fresh fruits and vegetables, and the legalization of trade at the Pishin border is
anticipated to curtail the flow of illicit goods, fostering legitimate bilateral trade
Pakistan and Iran share a firm foundation for their long-standing ties, with Iran being the first
country to recognize Pakistan in 1947. Their interests converge on a wide range of issues, including
the situation in Afghanistan, counter-terrorism efforts, and their respective relationships with China.
The two countries are also members of various regional and international fora such as the Economic
Cooperation Organization (ECO) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Iran's
forthcoming full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) further facilitates
expanded interaction and collaboration between Pakistan and Iran.
Despite the existing potential, trade between Pakistan and Iran stands at $2 billion annually,
falling short of the anticipated $5 billion per year. In January 2023, the signing of 39 Memoranda of
Understanding (MoUs) paved the way for achieving this target, if effectively implemented.
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Furthermore, efforts to enhance road and rail connectivity are underway, exemplified by the revival
of the Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul (ITI) cargo train service in 2022 after a decade-long hiatus.
Presently, Iran exports over 200MW of electricity to Pakistan, with the potential to increase it
to 500MW. Both countries have established three border crossing points—Taftan-Mirjaveh,
MandPishin, and Gabd-Rimdan—to facilitate the movement of those travelling by road, including a
large number of approximately 800,000 Pakistani Zaireen who visit Iran annually.
Pakistan also has a substantial stake in the recent rapprochement between Iran and Saudi
Arabia, brokered by China, as it would contribute to regional peace and security, and offer
significant trade and energy prospects. The normalization of relations between these two nations
presents opportunities for increased economic cooperation with Pakistan. Iran has consistently
served as a vital trading partner for Pakistan, given their shared border; while Saudi Arabia holds
immense economic importance due to huge oil imports and a large Pakistani diaspora that
contributes significantly to home remittances. Capitalizing on this opportunity could yield
substantial benefits for Pakistan, particularly with Iran, with streamlining of trade processes,
simplifying customs procedures, and creating a conducive environment for bilateral trade. It can
also encourage the development of joint projects, investments, and business ventures involving Iran,
Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, further boosting trade among these countries. The prospects of Saudi
investments in energy and infrastructure projects in Gwadar as well as in CPEC SEZs can be
effectively realized.
On June 2, 2023, the Pakistan government endorsed the implementation of the "Business-toBusiness (B2B) Barter Trade Mechanism, 2023," thereby permitting barter trade with Iran,
Afghanistan, and Russia. This mechanism allows Pakistan to engage in the exchange of goods and
services with Afganistan, Iran and Russia, thereby reducing reliance on foreign currencies for
transactions. This initiative has the potential to augment Pakistan's overall trade with regional
countries by offering a more efficient mode of exchanging goods and services without the need for
cash transactions. Additionally, it enables Pakistan to overcome barriers arising from the absence of
banking relationships with Iran and Russia.
However, several challenges must be addressed to strengthen Pakistan-Iran economic
relations comprehensively. Foremost, it is essential to continue to build and further upgrade trust
and to resolve issues that cause mutual concerns. Furthermore, the impact of sanctions, a palpable
reality, calls for the exploration of alternative means to mitigate their effects. Infrastructure
improvements are crucial to facilitate increased barter trade, while the issue of high tariffs from the
Iranian side and the absence of credible payment mechanisms need to be resolved. Additionally,
close collaboration between Gwadar and Chabahar ports would leverage their existing
complementarities.
Notably, the participation of both Pakistan and Iran in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with
Iran becoming an official member in March 2021, offers further impetus for joint projects,
particularly in terms of connectivity and economic integration. Fruitful collaboration between
Gwadar and Chabahar should be promoted, given that they have a ‘sister ports’ relationship.
Acknowledging the reality of sanctions, Pakistan and Iran must navigate their relationship
sustainably rather than becoming hostage to global concerns. Moving forward, fostering deeper
people-to-people exchanges and cooperation in science and technology will be pivotal. For instance,
Shiraz houses the world's first liver transplant center, Abu-Ali Sina Hospital, highlighting the
potential for collaborations in fields such as medicine and technology. In terms of border security,
the agreed mechanisms between the two countries should be activated and fully operationalized.
This would help effectively curb smuggling, human trafficking, and undesirable activities along the
border.
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Moreover, concerted efforts should be made to complete the Iran-Pakistan (IP) Pipeline, which
Iran completed on its side many years ago. Failure to meet the pipeline completion deadline in 2024
could result in possible negative fallout. The Pakistan Foreign Office reaffirmed its commitment to
the project on May 11, 2023, emphasizing its significance as a symbol of friendship between the two
countries.
In conclusion, the deepening relationship between Pakistan and Iran offers substantial
opportunities for mutual growth and cooperation. The improving regional environment in the wake
of the Iran-KSA rapprochement is another important favourable factor. The inauguration of the
border market and the launch of the Polan-Gabd Electricity Transmission Line signify notable
achievements in trade and energy collaboration. With concerted efforts to build mutual trust and
address challenges such as sanctions, infrastructure limitations, and high tariffs, Pakistan and Iran
can unlock the full potential of their historical relationship. Strengthening people-to-people
exchanges, cooperation in science and technology, and resolving border security issues will further
fortify bilateral relations. The completion of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project stands as a crucial
milestone that underscores the commitment of both countries to long-term, mutually-beneficial
collaboration that would help strengthen Pakistan’s energy security. By harnessing these
opportunities and effectively addressing challenges, Pakistan and Iran can forge a transformative
and sustainable partnership in the years to come.
(Source: Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad)
USA RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN
Ahmad Masood Nawid
Pakistan’s foreign policy, like any other country, closely related to its internal policies. The
political leaders of Pakistan, in different political eras, have tried to include security considerations,
survival, territorial integrity and national interests of that country in the main axis of their foreign
policy. Establishing close relations with America is one of the prominent examples of this policy.
With the declaration of Pakistan’s independence, the country’s politicians believed that there are
two ways to deal with internal and external threats; one, joining the Eastern Bloc led by the Soviet
Union, two, attracting Washington’s attention and receiving aid as the focus of Pakistan’s foreign
policy. Over time, the second option has approved. From the very beginning of its independence,
Pakistan was, among other things, engaged with the United States in competition with India. Liaqat
Ali’s visit to America in 1950 was the first step towards having strategic relations. In this trip, unlike
Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Liaqat Ali made the purpose of his trip to America to
attract the attention of that country and discover Pakistan. Although America had close relations
with India, the occurrence of two political approaches in 1951 caused America to stay away from
India and get closer to Pakistan. One, India’s role in important issues such as the Korean War. Two,
the peace treaty with Japan. Both approaches caused India to join the West and turned America’s
hopes into despair.
1. The history of relations between the United States of America and Pakistan
1.1. Before September 11
The relations between the two countries have had difficulties for six decades. Fluctuation in
the relations between the two countries has been a function of a series of global regional
developments and changes in the US regional foreign policy. The continuous influence of America
in the military, administrative and even cultural and social structure on the one hand, the expansion
of India’s relations with the Soviet Union on the other hand, became the cause of America’s
dependence on Pakistan in order to secure the country’s regional interests. Besides this, the victory
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of the Islamic revolution in Iran, the occupation of Afghanistan by the former Soviet Union, and the
proximity of that country to the warm waters of India, provided the ground for the establishment of
deep relations between the United States and Pakistan. These relations became close to such an
extent that the United States of America was involved in many internal and external affairs of
Pakistan. However, with the victory of the Islamic Revolution, the Situ and Cento groups disbanded,
and Pakistan, which had membership in both groups, joined the Non-Aligned Movement. However,
it was actually know as one of America’s regional allies. However, with the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Pakistan weakness its position as a strategic ally with the United States and was neglected
and sanctioned under the pretexts of accumulating nuclear weapons and supporting fundamentalist
groups. In addition, India once again considered in the American regional policy. Between the years
1993-2001, Pakistan’s relations with America accompanied by vicissitudes. During the entire period
of stagnation, Pakistan was in the regional foreign policy of America.
During Bill Clinton’s administration, US-Pakistan relations changed from a Cold War-oriented
strategy to a policy of political balance between India and Pakistan. On the other hand, with the
inauguration of Bush II, India became one of the main actors in security arrangements and global
strategies, and the development of bilateral relations with India given attention by the Americans.
The meetings between the foreign ministers of India and the United States and other officials of the
two countries in 2001 showed the special attention of the Bush administration on the relations
between the two countries, which at the same time affected the relations between the United States
and Pakistan. After 9/11, India supported the coalition against terrorism. India took measures with
full enthusiasm for strategic-intelligence and logistic cooperation and believed that America should
fight and destroy the cross-border terrorism that threatens the security of that country (India).
However, it did not take long before India faced a negative response from America. Because
Pakistan, due to its geographical location and having close relations with the Taliban, played an
effective role in implementing America’s regional policy. The foreign policy of the two countries has
always faced many differences and challenges. These differences have led to the announcement of
sanctions on Pakistan.
1.2. After the event of September 11
September 11 considered an important event and development in the internal and external
relations of the United States of America. This event caused changes in South Asian equations.
Pakistan, which has a special role and place in the regional relations of the Islamic world, once again
became the focus of American foreign policy. On the other hand, Pakistan gave the green light to the
United States to join the global anti-terrorism coalition, prepared the ground for military operations
in Afghanistan, and made its military bases available to the American forces. Although this decision
was difficult for the Pakistani authorities, Pervez Musharraf took action to gain more points. On the
other hand, internal opposition also accompanied Musharraf’s decision.
2. Actions of the United States of America
In order to implement policies and achieve its regional goals, before and after the start of
military operations, the United States took a number of different measures in cooperation with
Pakistan. Based on its military approach against the Taliban and the fight against terrorism, America
was able to take over a large part of Pakistan’s military and civilian facilities and moved troops,
equipment and military equipment to that country. This performance of the United States caused the
anger of anti-American political-religious groups. Despite numerous oppositions from political
groups, Pakistani authorities have prepared the ground for the presence of America in that country.
On the eve of the withdrawal of the American forces from Afghanistan, Pakistan informed the
Americans about giving up the place for the establishment of military bases. This action of Pakistan
shows the strategic depth of this country with America. The American authorities have not denied
this issue either. General Tony Franks, the former US commander in chief, during his visit to
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Pakistan, said: “The United States does not intend to withdraw its military forces from Pakistan.” On
the other hand, Islamabad’s Nation newspaper wrote, “America wanted to establish a military base
in Pakistan and for this purpose, to rent 20,000 acres of land from the government of Pakistan.”
Along with trying to establish military bases, America continued to make political efforts for a longterm presence in the region. Therefore, the United States not only tried to establish a military base to
fight terrorism in Afghanistan, but also made efforts to establish military bases in the republics of
Central Asia, which currently has an active military base in those countries. The purpose of the
presence of American forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been to dominate the oil and gas
resources and to keep getting closer to the remote area of Russia.
Overall, Pakistan has been an important player in the region since independence. This country
according to sensitivities and conditions the global region has made security, survival and territorial
integrity the focus of its foreign policy. Considering this performance of Pakistan in the foreign
policy of that country, it has considered it necessary to have strategic relations with the United States
of America. The relations between the two countries have accompanied by many difficulties during
the past few decades. On the other hand, Pakistan has confirmed its commitment to be a regional
ally of America. In this regard, Pakistan has gained more points. Currently, due to Pakistan’s role on
the Taliban groups, it considered one of the main parties in Afghanistan’s peace talks with the
United States and the international community.
(Source: South Asia Strategic Research Center)
CHINA-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP BEYOND CPEC
Rashid Mehmood
Beyond CPEC, other dimensions address the strong relationship between China and Pakistan.
The bilateral ties between the two countries encompass several decades of the bilateral relations.
Some critical aspects of the relationship between both counties include geopolitical interests,
strategic considerations and economic cooperation. Scholars on CPEC and general relationships
have produced extant literature; the intended paper covers strategic partnership, defence
collaborations, training and education, diplomatic support, people-to-people exchanges and
manifold relationship beyond CPEC. Both China and Pakistan have a long-standing strategic
alliance driven by mutual concern over regional security. Both countries share arms sales, joint
military exercises and intelligence sharing. China is one of the largest arms suppliers of Pakistan and
has always played a crucial role in the defence capabilities of Pakistan.
Both countries have conducted joint training exercises and regular military exchanges
occasionally. China has always provided military equipment to Pakistan. China has been a
significant supplier of military hardware to Pakistan; some arms sales supplied by the Chinese
government to Pakistan are fighter aircraft, armoured vehicles, submarines, surface-to-air missiles
and naval vessels etc. Due to China’s arms sales, Pakistan has maintained a balance of power in the
region. China has also assisted Pakistan in developing its defence industry and enhancing its
technological capabilities in all kinds of defence forces like the Army, Navy and Air Force. Both
countries share training and educational activities with their armed forces. Chinese have offered
extensive courses for Pakistani officers to attend courses and military practices, strategies and
equipment. Both countries exchange armed forces for training and defence tactics. Both countries
also cooperate in intelligence, particularly on counterterrorism and regional security. Both countries
exchange secret information to counter common threats and challenges. Both countries collaborate
on border security to combat cross-border threats exclusively in the mountainous region of GilgitBaltistan to ensure stability in the border areas. This kind of cooperation involves joint patrols and
intelligence sharing.
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Beyond CPEC, the economic domain between China and Pakistan is worth mentioning.
Chinese private firms have started manifold economic projects in the development sectors of
Pakistan. A few noteworthy projects are infrastructure, telecommunications, energy and agricultural
projects that further cemented the relationship between the two countries. Other exemplary aspects
of the relationship between the two countries are people-to-people exchanges in student exchange
programmes, cultural cooperation, tourism promotions etc.
China and Pakistan have consistently defended each other on international forums like the
United Nations and SCO. Chinese have always supported the Pakistani stance on Kashmir issues
and regional security. When the world blamed Pakistan for terrorism, Chinese diplomats supported
Pakistan; similarly, Pakistan always stood with the Chinese on human rights violence in Muslim
inhabitant regions and COVID-19 when the world blamed China for this dangerous pandemic.
Both countries have solid regional cooperation at national and international levels. Chinese
and Pakistani diplomats always supported each other in Shanghai and the Economic Cooperation
Organizations (ECO). Both countries work together on counterterrorism efforts, infrastructure
development and stability in Afghanistan.
Both China and Pakistan have strong linkages in scientific and technological collaborations,
exclusively in Science, technology and space exploration. China has always supported Pakistan in
technical fields. Some prominent areas of Science and technology include space and satellite technology,
nuclear energy, scientific research and collaboration, technological parks and industrial zones, joint
laboratories, and hi-tech research centres. China has always supported Pakistan in Space and Satellite
Technology programme. The most notable project between both countries is PakSat-1R, which China
designed to provide Pakistan’s communication and broadcasting services. The other noteworthy projects
extended by the Chinese government to Pakistan are the Nuclear Energy sectors of Chashma Nuclear
Power Plant Unit 1, Unit 2, and Unit-3 which control the power shortage in Pakistan.
Last but not least, Chinese collaboration in academic exchange and scholarship programmes is
remarkable for the youth of Pakistan. Most of our students pursue higher education in Chinese
universities and gain exposure to advance their research skills to make Pakistan prominent in
scientific research. In short, both Pakistan and China are reliable partners in a multifaceted
approach. The relationship between the two countries has evolved and deepened over time based on
their shared interest and mutual support.
(Source: Daily Times)
HAS PAKISTAN SUCCEEDED IN BALANCING RUSSIA AND
UKRAINE?
Sabena Siddiqui (A foreign affairs journalist, lawyer and geopolitical analyst)
In a significant move, Pakistan started importing discounted crude oil from Russia in April.
Under a deal struck between Moscow and Islamabad, the first cargo arrived last week.
While bringing economic relief to cash-strapped Pakistan, together with geopolitical benefits,
this step may also help Islamabad in its balancing act between Moscow and Kyiv following Russia’s
2022 invasion.
Though it has tried to maintain a neutral position where the Russia-Ukraine conflict is
concerned, Islamabad’s so-called “principled stance” poses a challenge as Pakistan and Ukraine
have remained defence partners since the late 1990s.
From 1991 to 2020, Ukraine-Pakistan defence contracts were valued at around $1.6 billion, as
reported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, an arms control watchdog.
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According to Jane’s, a leading publication on global defence matters, Pakistan has been a major
recipient of Ukraine’s advanced T-80 UD tanks since 1997.
At the same time, Pakistan-Russia bilateral relations have also improved, especially as both
countries are permanent members of the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Therefore, even though the Ukrainian conflict has deepened divisions between the US and its
allies on one side, and Russia and its partners on the other, Islamabad has tried to remain neutral. It
did, for example, express concern over the worsening humanitarian situation in Ukraine but
abstained from voting on any resolution against Russia.
Interestingly, reports emerged earlier this year that Pakistan was supplying Ukraine with
small arms and ordnance. Pakistan’s Foreign Office denied the claims, saying it maintains a policy of
“non-interference in military conflicts”.
Many of the media reports alleged that the ammunition was sent to Ukraine via European
countries. While unclear, such reports reflect Islamabad’s dilemma in balancing bilateral ties with
both Russia and Ukraine.
Michael Kugelman, South Asia Institute Director at the Wilson Center in Washington, told
The New Arab that the decision to import Russian oil could have been intended to better position
Islamabad as a neutral player.
“[Pakistan] reportedly sent small arms to Ukraine, and so importing Russian energy balances
the scales. That said, if Pakistan increases the oil it imports from Russia, that growing dependence
could increase Moscow’s leverage and prompt it to pressure Islamabad to stop sending small arms
to Ukraine,” he said.
As a long-standing Western ally, Islamabad has tried to avoid any direct impact on its ties
with Washington. Before finalising the Russian oil deal, Pakistan reportedly consulted with the
United States, receiving implicit approval.
So far, things seem to be working out, but it is not clear whether Washington would approve
of a long-term arrangement with Russia.
“The US can live with a longer-term arrangement so long as the transactions fall below the
West’s price cap and Islamabad pledges to explore options to diversify away from Russia if it can
find oil of a similar type at a comparable price elsewhere,” Kugelman noted.
“Washington’s concern will grow the longer the arrangement goes on, but so long as it doesn’t
lead to violations of US sanctions, the US won’t be bothered in a big way. After all, many of its
partners in the West, along with India, have imported much more Russian oil, and the US has
accepted that.”
For the moment, Pakistan’s economic crisis gives it a good excuse to buy more affordable
crude from Russia. As stated by Pakistan’s Finance Minister Ishaq Dar, if neighbouring New Delhi
[a US ally and part of the Quad] can buy discounted Russian oil, Islamabad also has the right to
explore new possibilities.
But seeing as Russia has been under international sanctions ever since it attacked Ukraine,
there will be trouble ahead.
Zeeshan Shah, a financial analyst at FINRA in Washington, told The New Arab that US
sanctions would remain an issue. “Even though the US turned a blind eye to the recent modest test
import, I would find it highly unlikely that they would continue to turn a blind eye to significant
imports of Russian oil over the long term,” he said.
Furthermore, any serious escalation of attacks between Russia and Ukraine could have an
impact on Pakistan’s imports from both countries. The longer the war drags on, the more risks there
will be.
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“One of the risks of Pakistan importing Russian oil is that an escalation of the war in Ukraine
could imperil Pakistan’s energy security. If Pakistan is looking to Russia as a key new oil supplier
and Ukraine starts bombing oil cargo shipments at Russian ports, then that’s a big problem for
Islamabad,” Kugelman noted.
Earlier this year, a Russian delegation visited Islamabad to finalise technical aspects such as
insurance, transportation, and payment mechanisms. As far as Russia is concerned it gains one more
oil outlet after India and China, as it redirects supplies from the Western market.
But Shah noted that transport may also become an issue in the long term. “In which case
tankers would have to come either via Russian ports on the Black Sea or from the Russian Far East.”
Finally, there are concerns that adapting to Russian fuel may not be easy for Pakistan. In short,
around 80% of Pakistan’s oil needs of nearly 154,000 bpd are met by Middle Eastern suppliers and
infrastructure.
“There are a number of issues which hinder Pakistan from importing large quantities of oil
from Russia over the long term,” Shah said.
“The most important one being the lack of refining capacity for the type of oil Russia exports.
This would require a major overhaul of Pakistan’s existing refining capacity which is currently set
up to refine oil from Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf oil producers.”
Despite these doubts regarding the refining process required for Russian oil and the costs
involved, Islamabad has still taken up the challenge. Initially, the Pakistan Refinery Limited (PRL)
refined the Russian oil as a trial run. Since blending it with around 60-70% of Arabian light crude,
“no adjustments were needed at the refinery,” a Pakistani official said, meaning the arrangement
may prove to be sustainable.
Musadik Malik, Pakistan’s petroleum minister, announced that if the first order for Russian
crude oil went through smoothly, imports could reach 100,000 barrels per day (bpd). Confident that
refining the crude would not create losses, he said that it would be “commercially viable” and
Pakistan could target “one-third of its total oil imports at the Russian crude”.
Around 45,000 tonnes of Urals, one of the lighter crudes available, have already docked at
Karachi port, while the rest is on its way. Following the oil shipment, the first batch of Russian
liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cargo also arrived at the Torkham border via Uzbekistan last week
and is awaiting clearance.
On the domestic front, Russian oil imports can serve to diversify Pakistan’s oil sources and bring
relief in terms of energy needs. But in order to derive maximum benefits, the Pakistani government must
ensure the trickle-down effect with low energy prices that can help control inflation.
Paid for in Chinese currency, the oil transaction with Russia marked a shift in Pakistan’s US
dollar-dominated export payments policy.
Taking one more step towards the East due to its financial predicament, Islamabad has also
finalised a barter trade mechanism with Russia, Iran, and Afghanistan.
(Source: The New Arab)
PAKISTAN-RUSSIA RELATIONS ARE STRONGER THAN EVER
Sehar Kamran (Former Senator)
2023 marks 75 years since the initiation of diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Russia.
These bilateral relations have witnessed many ups and downs since 1948. However, owing to the
rapidly evolving geopolitical scenario, with the dawn of the 21st century, Islamabad and Moscow’s
bilateral ties have turned a new page. The visit of Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari
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to Russia in January this year at the invitation of his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov and the
various interactions and meetings on the sidelines of multilateral forums as well as regular
exchanges, have instilled a new impetus into bilateral relations. Both Lavrov and Bhutto-Zardari
released video messages on the occasion of 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations, expressing
desire and trust to boost cooperation in diverse fields.
In the last two decades, Pakistan and Russia’s diplomatic relations have strengthened, and the
two countries have established regular high-level contacts. Among the significant developments
were then President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari’s visit to Russia in 2011, and Moscow’s nod of
approval towards Islamabad’s application for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
An important development occurred in 2014 when Pakistan and Russia initiated joint defense
cooperation which included the exchange of military intelligence information, joint military
exercises, and the sale of military equipment. Since then, Pakistan has purchased military helicopters
and other equipment from Russia, including MI-35 attack helicopters, and has expressed interest in
purchasing more advanced weapon systems such as the Su-35 fighter jet. In addition to arms sales,
the two countries have held joint military exercises called "Druzhba" (friendship) since 2017, which
have focused on counter-terrorism operations.
Another steppingstone in bilateral relations took place in June this year, when the first shipment of
45,000 tonnes (out of 100,000 tonnes) of Russian crude oil docked on Pakistani shores. Pakistan paid for
its first government-to-government import of Russian crude oil in Chinese currency. This development is
of huge significance for two reasons i.e., it’s the first delivery of Russian crude oil to Pakistan after
western sanctions on Moscow, and the transaction took place in yuan not dollars.
In addition, it was reported that Pakistan is outlining a process to open barter trade with
neighbouring countries of Russia, Iran and Afghanistan. These developments among many others
indicate a changing regional and geopolitical order and is indicative of an emerging de-dollarisation
pattern, as the country is willing to avail all opportunities to promote regional trade without any
hindrance.
It is no secret that robust economic cooperation and trade between Pakistan and Russia can
provide numerous benefits to both countries. Russia is a major energy exporter, and Pakistan can
benefit from its oil and gas resources. Similarly, Pakistan can provide access to the Arabian Sea and
the Middle East to Russian traders and suppliers.
According to Pakistan’s Federal Minister for Commerce Syed Naveed Qamar, the total
volume of bilateral trade between Pakistan and Russia has witnessed a growth of 34% in 2022, as
compared to 2021. It was $760.5 million in 2022-2023 (July-May), up from $567.5 million in the same
period of the previous year.
Islamabad and Moscow have an opportunity to capitalise on bilateral gains and increase
economic cooperation which will further bring the two countries closer. In this regard, both
countries will negotiate and sign new trade agreements in local currencies that will provide
incentives for the growth of trade between the two nations, as well as to encourage investors by
reducing import and export duties and tariffs. Pakistan and Russia need to develop a joint
infrastructure of networks, encouraging shipping lines and creating better air routes to ensure that
goods can be traded easily and reduce transportation costs. Pakistani traders and businessmen can
explore the Russian market and vice versa to reap trade benefits.
Even after more than four decades, Pakistan Steel Mills and the Guddu thermal power-plant
are considered powerful symbols of Russian energy cooperation and investment in Pakistan, and
will always be cherished by the people of Pakistan as strategic assets of the country.
Russia is a major global power, and closer ties with Moscow could strengthen Islamabad's
position in regional and global politics. Both Pakistan and Russia are proponents of regional
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stability, and have shown cooperation in tackling security challenges in Afghanistan. The two
countries can even utilize the platform of SCO by advocating to promote peace and stability in
Afghanistan. In this rapidly evolving multipolar world, a long lasting regional and global peace
cannot be achieved without Russia’s active participation and involvement.
Recent developments in Pakistan-Russian relations are good indications that the two countries are
working towards constructive engagement in all areas of common interest. Despite some progress, both
countries need to further strengthen their diplomatic, economic, military and most importantly, peopleto-people ties to elevate this bilateral friendship and cooperation to new heights.
(Source: Arab News)
GCC BUSINESS INTERESTS IN PAKISTAN
A trigger to the path of foreign investment
Nasim Zehra (Author, analyst and national security expert)
It was February 2019 when the much awaited arrival of the Saudi Crown Prince and Defence
Minister to Pakistan took place amid much bon homie. His departure took place on an exceptionally
hopeful note. The Saudis had decided to invest $10 billion in an oil refinery. Other areas of
investment were discussed personally by the then Prime Minister Imran Khan and Saudi Crown
Prince Muhammad Bin Salman. To nail it all down, to actually make it happen with speed and
substance, the Pakistan-Saudi Supreme Council for Coordination was set up. Khan and the Crown
Prince were to head the council. Four years and four months later, there’s not much on the score
card of the supreme council.
The Qataris too came during the Khan government. They showed interest in leasing three of
Pakistan's leading airports: Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad. Disagreements within Pakistani
institutions meant no progress and it was another bottleneck to foreign direct investment (FDI)
materializing for Pakistan.
Meanwhile, in the last couple of years, the UAE has expressed interest in investing in Pakistan
instead of sampling loaning funds or parking them in Pakistani banks to help build Pakistan’s
dwindling foreign exchange reserves.
This has been the read out over the last few years from Pakistan's close friends and neighbors.
Cash flows have been on the downturn given post-Covid challenges, the climate change crisis and
the Ukraine war. Too many are competing for depleting funding, with the World Bank flagging
fears of global depression.
Pakistan stands a few steps ahead of a depression. Its crisis revolves around a fast devaluing
rupee, insufficient funds to service loans in the current fiscal year, sky rocketing inflation and
unprecedented flood damage across the country. And above all, it is still struggling to restart a
stalled International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan program with less than a week to go.
For Pakistan, these are hard times.
Pakistan's perennial political battles often enter other frays. Political brawls cross over into
economic zones, accentuating the already extreme crisis.
Among several warning signs emanating from the economic zones is the declining trend in
FDI. For example during the current fiscal year, FDI went down to $17 bn with a 23 percent
reduction compared to the last fiscal year.
Against this backdrop of the crisis and simultaneously the interest of the Gulf states to invest
in Pakistan, a potentially significant step has been taken. The Special Investment Facilitation Council
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(SIFC) was set up about three weeks ago. A three tiered organization, it has an apex body, an
executive body and an implementation set-up.
The significant factor in all three levels is the inclusion of serving army men. In the top two
tiers, senior military officers will be members with the army chief who could be called to the
meeting as a special member. Significantly, the secretariat in charge and the national coordinator
will both be army men, while at the implementation level, 17 out of 40 members will be army
representatives.
It’s a lot about optics. Clearly the army will be seen to push matters in the ‘right’ direction and
cut across red tape, plus ‘push’ for coordination. Significantly in the past, army officers have played
effective facilitation roles, according to Pakistan's business community, in various business or
related business initiatives including settling IPP payments, FATF, Reko Diq etc.
This SIFC is meant to secure a one-window operation for foreign investors, to remove
bottlenecks at the implementation levels and to protect the interests of foreign investors in keeping
with commitments made in Pakistani law.
This is a landmark step to encourage FDI. A critical engine for growth, employment, foreign
exchange earnings and indeed overall national prosperity, has stalled for multiple reasons. In the
last few years, declining FDI has to do with the challenges posed by political instability within
Pakistan, the post-Covid value chain disruption and too many contenders for shrinking global
capital.
Bureaucratic red tape has been an abiding problem and getting out of the phenomenal 90 No
Objection Certificates (NOCs) required by foreign investors from different Pakistani ministries
hasn’t worked. Several attempts to fix the issue have not succeeded.
While GCC plans to invest in Pakistan are the trigger for fast track setting up of SIFC, it does
address three abiding issues that critically undermine foreign investor’s confidence. One, continuing
political infighting and instability; two in the absence of an agreed economic policy agenda by all of
Pakistan's stakeholders, with every change in government, there’s a change in economic policy; and
three, there is no consensus between the federal and provincial governments causing additional
delays and disruption adding to the uncertain prospects and timelines of the projects.
Of the several objections that its critics put up against the setting up of the SIFC, two merit
attention. One is that the government through SIFC will sell expensive national assets at throwaway
prices. Only transparent transactions and decisions made by SIFC can prove or disprove this. Two,
that the army’s presence in an investment facilitation body is unnecessary. What role will army
officers actually play, only their actually work and approach within the SIFC will tell.
But for now, GCC countries seek army involvement in the setup overseeing their investments, and
no less do Pakistani businesses. The presence of senior army command is seen to “get the work done.”
Otherwise, the army has no reason to be involved in the substance of trade and business.
(Source: Arab News)
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History
THE BATTLE OF PLASSEY
A Tale of Triumph and Betrayal
On the afternoon of July 2, 1757, at the hour they were going to kill Siraj in a sodden dungeon
of the Jaffarganj Palace—along the east bank of the ebbing Hooghly, flanked by groves of palms,
banyans, and mango trees—the young Nawab cast his weary eyes on his assassin before breaking
into his final prayer. In the middle of the prayer, he paused a few times to remember things
forgotten at his rukhsat altar.
The Revenge of Husayn Quli Khan
'My people,' murmured the wan Mansur-ul-Mulk Mirza Muhammad, 'will not rest to see me
retire on a pension, hiding my face in a deserted corner. No, they will not. Then die I must. So, I may
atone the death of Husayn Quli Khan … That is my end. And this is the beginning of Husayn Quli
Khan's revenge.'
Husayn Quli Khan was a deputy to Nawab Shahamat Jang, the nephew and son-in-law of
Alivardi Khan, the Nawab of Bengal, and Siraj's maternal grandfather. Husayn was also the
infamous lover of Siraj's eldest maternal aunt—Ghaseti Begum—who could not avert the murder of
her paramour by Siraj's men in 1755.
Legends from the Battle of Plassey—fought less than two years after Husayn Quli's murder
and a little over a week before Siraj's—can become the touchstone of tragedies 'rivalling the
Mahabharat at its most epic and macabre; it can also inspire Marquez to pen another Chronicle of a
Death Foretold.' One may even add a grisly Francis Ford Coppola 'family' saga to that inventory.
However, Plassey was and remains much more than these, or the revenge of Siraj's political
victims. It is one of the grimmest examples, in modern recorded history, not necessarily of the birth
of colonial rule (as most others would claim) but of the episodical phenomenon of South Asians
defying the interests of their own imagined community to betray the reins of their statecraft to
Machiavellian magnates.
The Last Kedgeree
On June 23, 1757, the Battle of Plassey witnessed the bewilderingly absurd takeover of Bengal
by Robert Clive's army. The army consisted of approximately 3,000 troops (including 9 cannons, 200
Topasses, 900 Europeans, and 2,100 sepoys), while they faced a Bengal army that was twenty times
stronger. The Bengal army comprised about 50,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry, soldiers, 300 cannons,
and 300 elephants.
George Bruce Malleson, in The Decisive Battles of India (1885), styled Plassey as the most
inglorious English victory. It was "Plassey which necessitated," he remarked, "the conquest and
colonization of the Cape of Good Hope, of the Mauritius, the protectorship over Egypt; Plassey
which gave to the sons of her middle-classes the finest field for the development of their talent and
industry the world has ever known … the conviction of which underlies the thought of every true
Englishman." It was Plassey, nevertheless, that also exposed South Asia's internal slanderous plots
and inequities.
As another Victorian author, George Alfred Henty, wrote in 1894, "the whole of the
circumstances that followed the signature of the treaty [of Alinagar in February 1757], the manner in
which the unhappy youth was alternately cajoled and bullied to his ruin, the loathsome treachery in
which those around him engaged with the connivance of the English, and lastly the murder in cold
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blood, which Meer Jaffier, our creature, was allowed to perpetrate, rendered the whole transaction
one of the blackest in the annals of English history."
It has become almost customary for accounts of the Battle of Plassey to chart the
historiography of events between the incident infamous as the alleged 'Black Hole of Calcutta' (June
20, 1956) and the battle of June 1757—that Manu Pillai has termed as the 'war that defined modern
India.' The events following the battle make the betrayal of Sirajuddaulah even more palpable.
Two weeks after the Eid-ul-Fitr in the Islamic lunar year 1170—or 1757—Nawab
Sirajuddaulah was captured by the troops of Mir Qasim. That was eight days after the Nawab
succeeded in escaping from his palace in Mansurganj, following the news of desertion by his troops
at Plassey. He ordered his men to disburse liberal sums from his treasury to whosoever had any
demand on it. Siraj wanted no man to be turned away, doubtless, inspired by his repentance.
Finding himself abandoned, Siraj, then, prepared for an unholy exodus. The coaches and the
palanqueens and the elephants and the furniture and the jewels and his consorts, including his
favourite Lutfunnisa Begum, were readied in haste. At the stroke of three, on June 25, those loyal
unto the last followed the Nawab, leaving Mansurganj for good—or for Robert Clive or Mir Jaffar.
The flight of Siraj was meant to take him to Rajmahal. But instead of proceeding with his plan,
the retinue was redirected to Bhagawangola, about fifteen miles away from Mansurganj. As the
Nawab set sail from Bhagawangola, he sent a missive to one of his men—Mushur Lass—whom he
had given charge of the treasury. By the time the message was delivered, and Lass came to the
Nawab's rescue, all left of the latter was history.
Siraj and his retinue decided to anchor at the shore of Rajmahal for an hour to rustle up some
kedgeree for stomachs that had fasted for nearly three days. The Nawab's luck frowned on him yet
again. Not far from the riverbank lived a fakir, called Shahdana, who was once insulted by Siraj. The
fakir—whose name meant 'the royal seed'—promptly enlisted himself as one of the hands preparing
the last supper for the Nawab and his people, while he whetted his appetite for revenge. On the sly,
he sent a courier to Mir Qasim and Mir Daad. No time was wasted before they arrived.
The Door of the Traitor
Siraj was made a prisoner along with Lutfunnisa. Mir Qasim seized their casket of jewels,
while Mir Daad laid his hands on other women. Taking the cue from their masters, their men seized
whatever was left of the possessions of the leftover men and women. The Nawab was taken and
held captive at Jaffarganj, condemned to beg for a plot of earth and a pension to live off, until mercy
came in the grisly shape of Mohammady Beg.
Beg's axe smote the Nawab unnumbered times, scything him to fractions, leaving behind a
still dead imperial head crawling upon its own blood. Before the dying eyes could make one last
desperate attempt with quivering hands to balance the severed mass they protruded from, they
were enveloped by the veil of final darkness. The whispering multitudes of Hooghly and the
shifting foreshores of the Bhagirathi swelled forward and backward like an old wives' tale; or like a
black hole, where all stories of humankind are headed, like beetles of a marsh into a quicksand.
A little over a mile from the dungeon where those eyes had frozen, Mir Jaffer lies buried, in
the Jaffarganj cemetery, which contains the tombs of several Nawabs of Bengal who succeeded Siraj,
his treacherous and supposedly cowardly uncle and the latter's treacherous and supposedly
cowardly son-in-law. Mir Jaffer's father Syed Ahmed and his widows—Mani Begum and Bubboo
Begum—were also interred here. So was Nawab Ali Vardi Khan's sister Shah Khanum, another
widow of Mir Jaffar. Here also lie his sons, Ashraf Ali Khan and Mubarak Ali Khan I, as does his
great grandson Mubarak Ali Khan II.
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The cemetery was built by Mir Jaffar himself, opposite the Jaffarganj Palace, from where he
controlled the musnud of Murshidabad—although it was at the Mansurganj Palace where he was to
declare himself the Nawab of Bengal in the late June of 1757.
In Mir Jaffar's own lifetime, the palace was cannonaded and bastioned with watch towers. A
few desiccated skeletons of the old walls and bared ribs of the old brickwork are the only sentinels
left today of the erstwhile palace where a clandestine conference before the Battle of Plassey was
conducted between him and William Watts, the East India Company's chief agent at Cossimbazar—
the conference where Jaffar indicated to Watts that he would henceforward be Clive's stooge. Over
the years, the entrance to Jaffarganj Palace would be renamed as the Namak Harami Deori—the
Traitor's Gate—by which name it would also be accepted outside India.
A Historian's Testing Ground
The Battle of Plassey may seem like an overtold saga, as seen in the most recent eponymous
book by Sudeep Chakravarti (2020) and the reprinted edition of Brijen K. Gupta's classic,
Sirajuddaulah (1966; 2020). However, there are good reasons why it will continue to serve as a
virtual laboratory for shaping the historical consciousness of South Asian minds.
Sirajuddaulah's defeat led to the East India Company receiving a sum of about Rs 23 million,
as damages, besides close to Rs 6 million as cash presents, and Clive himself pocketing a fief of Rs
300,000. Fifteen years later, this amount and his other receipts from the conquest impelled him to
asseverate before a British Parliamentary committee, "Mr. Chairman, at this moment, I stand
astonished at my moderation."
Between 1757 and 1765, the Company's factors exploited the political instability of Bengal to
reap profits in excess of Rs. 20 million, while the Company grew richer by Rs 100 million, not to
mention the establishment of a British mint in Bengal and the diminution of bullion imports—that
amounted to over Rs 70 million before the battle—into Bengal.
The monopolization of saltpetre—the principal ingredient of gunpowder—and, besides an
annual profit of Rs 300,000 on its trade, its key role in British predominance over the Dutch and
French in the subsequent decades, was another direct corollary of the battle.
Finally, the English company's dexterity at pitting Sirajuddaulah against his uncle Mir Jaffar,
and Jaffar against the latter's son-in-law Mir Qasim, heralded a series of strategic victories against
Shah Alam II of Delhi, Shujauddaulah of Oudh, and later the Marathas (who, back in the eighteenth
century, were armed to repel the advancing armies of Ahmad Shah Abdali).
The granting of the Diwani of Bengal to the company, in 1765, parted the province in terms of
its economic and military benefits, making it the perfect launching ground for the project of
colonization.
These economic and political fallouts of the Battle of Plassey—then considered far less
important than the third Battle of Panipat (1761) fought between Maratha confederates and Abdali's
troops—have perhaps assumed an epic proportion in various popular narrations across colonial and
postcolonial times. Nevertheless, more than ever before, they are now bound to be mapped against
macropolitical transformations that were changing Europe, as intensely as Bengal's changing
micropolitical configurations.
The Battle of Plassey occurred during the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) involving European
powers, most prominently the French and British, who protracted it to their Indian conflicts in the
Carnatic and Bengal. For nationalist historians like Jadunath Sarkar, the English victory at Plassey
marked the onset of Bengal's 'Renaissance'—a view also shared by Rabindranath Tagore's
industrialist ancestor—Dwarkanath Tagore. But subaltern voices are often absent from the remit of
such grandiloquent assertions, their nobleness notwithstanding.
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Imperialist historiography, says Rudrangshu Mukherjee, has been 'prone to depict
Sirajuddaulah as a reckless villain,' given to mindless plunder. Hence, Clive's conspiring with
powerful bankers like the Jagat Seths (nicknamed the Rothschilds of India), merchants like the Sikh
Omichund and Armenian Khwaja Wajid, and Siraj's uncle, may be hastily interpreted as the triumph
of a conniving despot over a vainglorious one. This, line of reading, invariably betrays an
unconscious obsession for seeking karmic meaningfulness in and around the forged battleground at
Plassey.
The chronicle of Sirajuddaulah's final days, on the other hand, tells a different story. The last
'independent' Nawab of Bengal probably took his personal downfall as a sign of the stereological
message that his imminent death was the revenge of his victims. His antagonist, the certifiably
unstable Clive, however, was willing to let his destiny be absorbed into the changing colours of an
intercontinental war, wherein Plassey was akin to a scintilla, before it became deeply consequential.
(Source: Daily Star)
THE DURAND LINE
A British legacy that fuels new tensions between Pakistan and
Afghanistan
Rustam Shah Mohmand (Pakistan’s former ambassador to Afghanistan)
The border between British India and Afghanistan was demarcated by a boundary
commission headed by British representative, Sir Mortimer Durand, in 1893 at the zenith of power
and prestige of the British empire.
The Afghan government had accepted the line drawn by the boundary commission albeit with
some reservations. Since then, the issue has been raised several times by Kabul without any positive
response from then-British India or post-Independence Pakistan.
In any consideration of the continuing validity of the Durand Line as an accepted border
between Afghanistan and Pakistan, a few facts have remained relevant: A treaty that was signed 130
years ago cannot be renegotiated; Kabul has never formally launched any initiative to rewrite the
boundary agreement; Afghanistan has continued to abide by the clauses of the boundary agreement;
Never has the country raised the issue formally with Islamabad on any forum. The immigration and
customs checkpoints have continued to operate along the border – a testimony to the fact that Kabul
recognizes the border as valid between the two countries.
Since the issue has not been raised in any form by Kabul, the best course would be to move on
and confront several other challenges the two countries face. After signing the border agreement,
Kabul has maintained a persistent stance that the British government, at the height of its power,
ignored the genuine demands of Afghanistan and forced the latter to accept the Durand Line or face
serious consequences.
In other words, the boundary line was drawn without regard to the views of the Afghan
government. This is not corroborated by historic evidence because, in the latter way, Kabul had
entered into more agreements with the British Indian government. Since the frontier areas, that now
form part of Pakistan, were once under Kabul’s rule, there is an entrenched feeling in the Central
Asian country that those areas are part of Afghanistan.
There is the ethnic factor as well. Afghanistan believes Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand
Line have been historically part of the kingdom of Afghanistan. That is the reason no Afghan
government has publicly or officially acknowledged the border crossing as an international
boundary. It is believed in Kabul that any Afghan government that openly or formally accepts the
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Durand Line as a legitimate border would lose the support of the public. The policy then is to take a
pragmatic view of the issue and accept the Line as a de facto border allowing the two countries to
operate and manage the border, just like any other international border. Let sleeping dogs lie – that
is the undeclared policy of Kabul.
But the recent statement of Mullah Yaqub Mujahid, the Taliban administration’s defense
minister, appears to have reignited the issue. In an interview with ToloNews, Yaqoob asserted that
the Durand Line was “just a line”, adding that the issue would be raised with Pakistan when the
time was ripe. He also spoke about the role of the Pakistani Taliban, or the Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP), in attacking government installations inside Pakistan. The banned outfit still has
many of its leaders hiding in Afghanistan from where they operate and carry out attacks inside
Pakistan.
Yaqoob, who is the son of Mullah Umar – the founder of the Taliban movement – also denied
allegations of providing any covert support to TTP in their raids across the border. He disagreed
with the view that from their safe havens in Afghanistan, the TTP has been operating with ease and
confidence striking targets inside Pakistan.
He emphasized that such elements causing harm and destruction are actually inside Pakistani
territory.
The issue of the Durand Line should have been resolved long ago. The Afghan side appears to
be a prisoner of its past when the frontier areas were ruled by Kabul. Meanwhile, the Pakistani side
has not approached the issue with any clarity either. On the other hand, Pakistan has further
aggravated the border peace and stability by erecting a barrier over the 2,600-kilometer-long border
at a stupendous cost of more than $1 billion. The policy was dictated by former army chief, General
Qamar Javed Bajwa.
The sealing of the border has split families, stopped border trade, and prevented families from
meeting with relatives on the other side of the border. This has gravely affected the lives of people of
the same tribe on both sides. Tensions have risen and acrimony and anger have spread. The Afghan
government, perhaps, cannot let such tensions continue indefinitely. Relations would certainly be
affected by such measures that are taken in the name of security but bring incalculable harm and
agony to the people on both sides.
There is a need for a dispassionate reappraisal of policy that takes into account the historic
realities, the well-being of the tribes, and the unwarranted sealing of a long border considering the
issue in the broad context of the current objective realities and an eye on the future as the two
countries explore avenues of enduring cooperation in a host of sectors.
(Source: Arab News)
SIMLA AGREEMENT
Introduction
On July 2, 1972, the Simla Agreement, also known as the Simla Accord, was signed between
Indian PM Indira Gandhi and Pakistani president Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto at Shimla in Himachal
Pradesh.
The Simla Agreement was signed following the India-Pakistan war of 1971. It was a formal
agreement to end the hostilities between the countries and lay down a comprehensive plan for
peaceful relations.
The war started due to Pakistan’s campaign of genocide against the Bengali population in East
Pakistan. India lent support to the refugees of the genocide and sought to prevent Pakistan from
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entering India. Pakistan lost East Pakistan which became an independent country, now known as
Bangladesh. India helped to liberate Dhaka, which became the capital of Bangladesh.
Relations between India and Pakistan seemed to have reached a point of no return. However,
ultimately better sense prevailed and the agreement was signed at the Barnes Court — now the Raj
Bhavan — in Shimla. It was signed in haste after six months of the war.
Background of the Shimla Agreement
The Shimla agreement of 1972 was more than just a peace treaty, it was the result of the IndiaPakistan war of 1971 and sought to countermand the effect of such war. It practically wrecked the
relations between India and Pakistan to be irreparable. The India Pakistan war of 1971, cost Pakistan
to lose East Pakistan from West Pakistan and become an independent country now popularly
known as Bangladesh. The war started as a result of Pakistan’s genocide over the Bengali population
in East Pakistan. India lent support to the refugees of the genocide, India wanted to prevent Pakistan
from entering India while liberating Dhaka.
Significance of Shimla as the venue for the agreement
The agreement was signed at the Barnes Court in Shimla, now the Raj Bhavan. The agreement
was signed in such haste on the night of July 2nd, right after Bhutto made a declaration in a press
conference that talks had failed. Shimla has been politically a very important city in the history of
India’s struggle towards a sovereign state. Long before the Shimla Agreement, two other events
made it so popular. Shimla Accord and the Shimla Convention.
The Shimla Accord then known as Simla witnessed the signing of an accord between India
which was then a British colony, China, and Tibet on 3rd July 1914. The accord was for the to divide
Tibet into inner and outer Tibet while China was to abstain from annexing outer Tibet. Between
India and China, it was the introduction of the McMahone Line since both countries had disputes on
un-demarcated borders.
The following event was the Simla Conference of 1945. The Conference was the reason for the
Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946, it was the first step towards the possibility of an Independent India.
Held on 25th and 26th June 1945 with 21 delegates. The agenda of the conference was to establish a
provincial national government with the Executive council solely composed of Indians, governed by
the Government of India Act of 1935. However, it failed due to the objections and tensions
Mohamed Ali Jinnah had with the Congress and its nominating Muslims to the Executive council.
After which was the Shimla Agreement, a result of the Indo-Pak war of 1971.
Principles and objectives of the Shimla Agreement
There were certain significant principles that both the countries were to abide by in order to
modulate relations between both the countries.
Principles
 They made commitments to have a direct bilateral approach to resolve issues peacefully.
 A special focus on people-to-people contacts was made for which they had to build a
foundation of cooperative relations.
 Both countries were supposed to take measures not to violate the Line of Control in Jammu
and Kashmir which helps maintain peace among India and Pakistan and acts as a significant
CBM.
 Apart from these, there were comprehensive to the agreement meant for India and Pakistan
as discussed below:
Objectives
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Put an end to conflict and confrontation,
Promotion of friendly and harmonious relations,
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Establishing peace and welfare of the state,
Respect for each other’s political Independence, sovereignty, integrity, and unity,
Not to disturb each other’s internal affairs,
Refrain from hostile propaganda.
Six key clauses of the Shimla Agreement
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Relations between both countries were to be governed by the principles and purposes of the
UN Charter.
Differences between both countries to be resolved through peaceful means and bilateral
negotiations, neither side can unilaterally alter the situation in case of a pending final
settlement which might render detrimental to maintaining peaceful and friendly relations.
The commitment of both countries to co-exist as per the Charter of the United Nations, they
agreed to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of each other. Peacefully, respecting each other’s sovereignty, territorial
integrity and not interfering in each other’s internal affairs, is to act as a prerequisite to
reconciliation, good neighbourliness and peace.
Issues and reasons for conflicts between both countries have strained their relations for the
last 25 years. Such issues must be settled peacefully.
There must be mutual recognition and honour for each country’s national unity, territorial
integrity, political independence, and sovereign equality.
o Both governments take steps in their power to prevent hostile propaganda against
each other and to encourage spreading such information which would develop
friendly relations among India and Pakistan.
o To actively bring back and regulate relations among the two countries there had to
be steps taken. Such as:
Efforts to bring back communications by the way of post, telegraph, air links including
flights and border posts.
Taking appropriate measures to encourage travel resources for the nationals of the other
country.
They were to work on bringing back trade and cooperation in economic and other fields as
well.
Initiatives to encourage exchange of the knowledge in science and culture.
 Delegates from both countries take action to meet occasionally and discuss necessary
details. For the purpose of initiating peace both the governments agreed that:
The Indian and Pakistani forces pull back to stay at their side of the international border.
The Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir as a result of the December 17, 1971 ceasefire, the
countries agreed to honour it without any prejudices and stay on their sides. Neither of the countries
can unilaterally alter the Line of Control no matter any mutual differences and legal interpretations
occur between them. Both the countries promise to stay away from using any force or threat that
may violate the Line of Control.
Right after the entry into the Agreement, the withdrawals will commence and shall be
completed in 30 days thereof.
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The agreement will come into force with effect from when the Instrument of Ratification will
be exchanged, subject to its ratification by both countries as per their Constitutional
procedures.
While the representatives of either side will come together often to discuss upcoming
modalities and arrangements to bring peace and stability as well as a final settlement on the
Jammu and Kashmir issue, the release of POWs. They are also to renew diplomatic relations.
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Both governments’ heads would meet at a mutually agreed time convenient to both in the
future.
Terms of the Treaty
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The accord contained the steps to be taken to ensure the normalisation of relations between
India and Pakistan. The agreement was signed in Barnes Court (Raj Bhavan) at Shimla,
Himachal Pradesh. The terms of the treaty were as follows:
The Charter of the UN shall govern relations between India and Pakistan.
Any differences shall be settled by peaceful means and through bilateral negotiations.
Both countries shall respect the territorial integrity of each other and not interfere in the
internal matters of each other.
Forces shall be withdrawn to each other’s side of the international border.
The ceasefire line of 17 December, 1971 (after the Bangladesh War) shall be respected (and
reiterated as the Line of Control).
The treaty also had some other terms like renewing communications, telegraph, postal,
airline relations, etc. It also talked about having exchanges in the field of culture and science.
India released 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war (POWs) who were captured after the
Bangladesh war.
Effect of the Agreement
While India returned the 93,000 prisoners of war in an organised manner as promised by
Indira Gandhi, Pakistan was to work on converting the Line of Control to an international border.
India returned the prisoners of war along with the territories that it captured. The prisoners of war
were mostly militants as well as few civilians, reports suggest they were mostly women and
children. There was supposedly a meeting between Bhutto and Indira Gandhi, where Bhutto
promised to turn the Line of Control to an International Border although at the time of finalising the
Agreement such meeting’s happening was denied and repudiated.
There was no mention of the existence of such a meeting. Both India and Pakistan were busy
focusing on their internal affairs and the promise made by Pakistan was never executed.
Did both parties to the agreement follow it?
This Agreement determined the relations between both the countries. India faithfully
observed the Shimla Agreement and abided by what was mutually agreed upon to improve the
relations. Pakistan did not keep its word and continued to unsettle India on the Kashmir issue. There
was a severe war-like situation between both countries around Kargil in 1999. Pakistani soldiers
invaded Kargil in Jammu and Kashmir as well the lines of the Line of Control. A very critical war
condition that lasted more than 60 days, until the involvement of the Indian Air Force drove
Pakistani troops back to the territory. The effect of this war situation was yet another peace treaty,
the Lahore declaration to maintain peace and stability.
Critical analysis
The Agreement was looked down upon strategically by many and it was seen as a mistake
from India’s point of view by Indira Gandhi. She was criticised widely for signing the Agreement
without resolving the Kashmir issue. Pakistan claimed Kashmir so strongly that complications
between India and Pakistan would have been inevitable. This was seen as another reason to criticise
the signing of the Agreement by Indira Gandhi. It was called purposeless and impractical. Indira
Gandhi could not use the victory of India in the 1971 war which was military surrender by Pakistan,
to bring peace and stability amongst India and Pakistan. Many addressed it as the treaty that was a
mistake by Indira Gandhi since it backfired with the Kargil war situation of 1999 even after the
surrender of POWs and territories by India. What was understood was that India had believed
Pakistan was going to abide by the Agreement and demonstrate friendly conduct to foster peace and
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stability although Pakistan proved otherwise. Pakistan ought not to be underestimated since it has
always been in a state of conflict over Jammu and Kashmir. India’s win in the Indo-Pak war of 1971
brought a lot of advantages to it, all that was lost by this agreement, perceived as false promises
made by Bhutto. Pakistani leaders had a history of not keeping their word. India seemed to have
missed the factor before signing the Agreement. The Agreement was criticised to have laughable
expectations from Pakistan considering Bhutto never kept his word. Even if India returned
territories it seized in the war and all the prisoners of war, the loss of the eastern part of Pakistan led
to non-reconcilable relations between the countries.
Shimla and Kashmir issue
India and Pakistan have always had a dispute with the determination of which country
Kashmir belongs to. The Shimla Agreement, although signed in the name of the Bangladesh/East
Pakistan dispute, ended directly at the Kashmir dispute. Many perceived the Agreement to have
instigated Pakistan to make Kashmir its Bangladesh. The Indo-Pak war in 1971 resulted in the
military surrender of Pakistan and the loss of East Pakistan as a territory that put India supposedly
in a powerful position. This affected Pakistan, they began working on the strategy to pressurize
India by targeting Kashmir. Pakistan did not want to lose Kashmir as well. Pakistan strongly
claimed its right over Kashmir, but never directly confronted India, even after signing the Shimla
agreement. Thus the Shimla agreement only pushed Pakistan towards claiming Kashmir as its own,
making the dispute active all over again.
Relation between the Shimla and the Delhi Agreement
The Delhi Agreement was followed by the Shimla Agreement, signed in 1973. It was a
trilateral agreement between Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. The Agreement mainly focused on
the repatriation of prisoners of war and civilians held in the three countries after the Bangladesh
liberation war. Ratified by India and Pakistan only, although signed by all three countries. It was
specifically required to repatriate Bengali bureaucrats and military personnel held up in West
Pakistan to be moved to Bangladesh. India was to relocate 6,500 prisoners of war and military
personnel while Bangladesh agreed to relocate mainly the Urdu-speaking Community of Pakistan.
Pakistan did not properly settle the community in Pakistan after the Agreement due to which some
of the prisoners of war were deserted and helpless.
Significance of the accord
Both countries made commitments to have a direct bilateral approach to resolve issues
peacefully under the Simla Accord.
The agreement emphasised the importance of people-to-people contacts, which was meant to
build a foundation of cooperative relations.
As per the agreement, both India and Pakistan had to take measures to not violate the Line of
Control in Jammu and Kashmir to help maintain peace.
The Simla Agreement contained a set of guiding principles that both countries agreed to
follow while managing relations with each other. The agreement emphasised on respect for each
other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of the other
country, respect for the unity of both the countries, political independence, sovereign equality, and
abjuring all hostile propaganda.
Conclusion
The Shimla Agreement and the subsequent Delhi Agreement gave Pakistan all it wanted: lost
territories, soldiers and no trials for war crimes during and before the war. Sadly, India could not
even negotiate the release of her own 54 POWs in Pakistani custody whose families continue to
remain in despair.
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There is an overwhelming perception that agreeing to the terms set by Pakistan was a huge
strategic blunder. Also, the Indian Army was nowhere in the negotiation process. Both the
agreements have not prevented the relationship between the two countries from deteriorating and
has become a roller coaster ride with huge scope for a potential conflict under the nuclear umbrella.
The Shimla Agreement teaches a lot on the importance of bilateral agreements which seems to
be the solution for the longest time for the conflicts between belligerent countries. The Shimla
agreement is a perfect example of a bilateral agreement in the international purview but it is a failed
agreement because it could not achieve any of India’s objectives fully, be it maintaining peace or
resolving the Kashmir issues. If anything, it may have triggered the Pakistan army to claim Kashmir
since they lost Bangladesh.
(Source: The Nation)
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International Issues
GOVERNING A POST-WESTERN WORLD
Mark Leonard (Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations)
When Nato leaders descend on Vilnius this month for the alliance's annual summit, they will
demonstrate that the organisation, newly united behind support for Ukraine, is far from "braindead," as French President Emmanuel Macron infamously described it in 2019. But Nato's new
vitality belies a larger problem: the West's failure to convince the rest of the world that it also has a
stake in Ukraine's defence is emblematic of a broader shift.
In a world of rapidly evolving power dynamics, a silent revolution is reshaping
multilateralism and increasingly leaving the West and its institutions behind. To paraphrase India's
foreign minister, the West's problems are no longer the world's problems.
This development may come as a surprise to those who, in the immediate aftermath of the
Cold War, had bet on the transformative power of the post-1945 global governance institutions. The
West's instinct was to emphasise the universalist nature of these institutions and expand their scope.
The hope was that bringing even recalcitrant countries into the tent would make them less likely to
want to burn it down. With enough time, the argument went, they would become what then-US
Deputy Secretary of State Robert B Zoellick called "responsible stakeholders."
But this forecast failed, not least because China, the main target of the responsible-stakeholder
approach, was never forced to choose between integration and revisionism. After being given a seat
at the table, it pursued a three-pronged strategy of extracting as much value as it could from global
institutions while also preserving its own sovereignty and building parallel institutions. Among
these are the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), the New Development
Bank, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which are meant to be alternatives to the G7,
the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, respectively.
Not until the 2008 global financial crisis did the West wake up to this reality. Since then, it has
mirrored China's own practices, attempting to advance its interests and values with a similar threepronged strategy. The United States, for example, has re-engaged with the United Nations to push
back on Chinese influence while also building its own parallel institutions – from the EU-US Trade
and Technology Council to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the "Quad," with Australia, India,
and Japan) and AUKUS (with Australia and the United Kingdom).
Western governments are also taking pains to create more connective tissue between EuroAtlantic and Asia-Pacific institutions, such as by inviting Asian partners to NATO summits. But
most striking is the new focus on exclusive climate clubs, carbon border taxes, and friend-shoring.
By pursuing these ideas, the West has further undermined the post-1945 institutions, making them –
and thus itself – even less credible in the eyes of the rest of the world.
The problem with this zero-sum approach, of course, is that it could make solving pressing
global challenges even more difficult. When it comes to climate change, the war in Ukraine, and the
threat of future pandemics, the legacy global-governance institutions have proven to be incapable of
delivering cooperative solutions, partly owing to their loss of credibility.
Many of us would wish that the 1990s model of global governance had worked, but it is hard
to deny that the old "responsible-stakeholder" ethic now needs to give way to a new ethic that is
better suited to a multipolar world.
Unfortunately, Westerners will need to reduce their ambitions for universalist institutions,
treating them less as sources of solutions and more as sites for sharing information and facilitating
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conflict management and resolution. The UN cannot avert competition between major powers; but it
can help to establish guardrails. The world desperately needs a greater effort to make war – and not
just over Taiwan – less likely, and it still needs diplomacy to end conflicts like the one in Ukraine.
The goal should be what US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan calls competition without
catastrophe.
Global governance needs to be reconceived for an age of non-cooperation. On climate change
and Covid-19, multilateralism has achieved only modest successes, whereas the biggest advances
have been driven by rivalry and competition. It would be better to have cooperation, but where it is
not possible, perhaps the same kind of incentive structures could work in other areas, too.
We must also recognise that much of the action is now happening outside Western-led
institutions. In the domain of peacemaking and security, the West has already started to come to
terms with the realities of a more fragmented world. In Syria, Mozambique, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, and in the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, non-Western powers are
playing a greater role as intermediaries. The West has generally yielded to this new logic, engaging
where necessary, but usually on terms guided by local realities instead of its own wishful thinking.
Rather than dwelling on whom to invite into Western-led processes, Western countries should
be looking outward. Which of the new non-Western institutions and initiatives does it make sense to
engage with, and in what domains (regulatory, standard-setting, and so forth) can Western powers
help to achieve favourable outcomes?
Coming to terms with the new multipolar world does not mean cutting ourselves off from
everyone else. Even as the West builds new institutions with like-minded countries, it must continue
to engage constructively with non-Western players. Cooperation on global issues can be compatible
with competition. By being clear-eyed about its interests and capabilities, the West can leverage its
still-considerable heft to much greater effect. That will bring better results than a retreat into
solipsism ever could.
(Source: Daily Star)
HOW AMERICA AND CHINA CAN GET ALONG BETTER
Da Wei (A professor and director of the Centre for International Security and Strategy)
At last, tensions between China and America are showing signs of easing, albeit with the
occasional setback. At the recent G7 summit, President Joe Biden predicted a near-term “thaw” in
relations between the two countries. Last week China’s commerce minister met his American
counterpart and the US Trade Representative. This followed talks between America’s national
security adviser and the head of the Chinese Communist Party’s Foreign Affairs Commission. This
week, however, China’s defence minister, Li Shangfu, reportedly rejected a request from his
American opposite number, Lloyd Austin, for a meeting at the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual
security forum being held in Singapore on June 2nd-4th. The apparent reason for the snub: Mr Li is
still under American sanctions, imposed by the Trump administration.
Expectations may not be high on either side, but the recent on-off thaw provides an
opportunity for a more lasting improvement in relations between the world’s two largest economies.
They need to act quickly to avoid the situation becoming more dangerous as the window won’t stay
open indefinitely. Here are a few things both sides might want to consider.
First, they should reintroduce and institutionalise regular communication between their
government officials and agencies. During Barack Obama’s time in office, America and China
operated nearly 100 official channels of dialogue. Even the China-bashing Trump administration
kept several open. Now there are almost none.
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Ministerial meetings are important, but so are working-level communications. Despite longsimmering tensions, the two countries’ military top brass were in regular contact until a Chinese
balloon—which the Americans claimed was a reconnaissance vehicle, to Chinese denials—was
detected over American airspace earlier this year. This contact needs to resume as soon as possible,
preferably in person so that each side can more easily read the other’s signals and emotions. One
way to build mutual confidence would be to discuss strengthening two memorandums of
understanding signed during Mr Obama’s time in office: one on notification of major military
activities, the other on air and maritime encounters.
Second, the two countries need to expand people-to-people exchanges in academia, business
and so on. It would help if there were more direct flights between them. American and Chinese
carriers are currently allowed to make only 24 round-trips per week between them, compared with
more than 300 before the covid-19 pandemic. This summer I plan to take some of my students to
visit America. They have a sincere interest in understanding the country. But many are put off by
expensive airfares, long visa-application queues and the prospect of multi-leg flights of more than 24
hours.
Academic links are important but remain difficult. Scholars from America and China have
begun to visit each other again this year, but numbers remain low. Many on both sides are still
unwilling or afraid to make the journey, fearful for their personal safety or that it will be seen at
home as politically incorrect.
With scant face-to-face communication in the past three years, both Beijing and Washington
have become echo chambers. This has encouraged a Manichean worldview, which has been
exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. As a result, Chinese and American academics have developed
bizarre imaginings about each other. The two governments need to come to an arrangement that
ensures that scholars from both sides can visit their counterparts with ease and dignity.
Third, China and America need to work harder to resolve issues that have created tension
between them. One is drugs. Washington wants more support from Beijing on fentanyl, which has
flooded America; China strongly rejects allegations that it is the source of the chemicals used by
Mexican drug cartels to make the synthetic opioid. Meanwhile, China has made reasonable requests
that America remove certain Chinese institutions, such as the Institute of Forensic Science and the
National Narcotics Laboratory, from its “entity list”, which imposes licence requirements and other
restrictions.
The fourth and perhaps most difficult task is to construct clear borders amid heightened
economic and technological competition. It is popular nowadays to talk about “small yards and high
fences”. All countries have the right to a “yard” that needs to be protected for national security.
Building a fence is therefore inevitable. However, the most important thing is not the size of the yard
but how clearly defined the fence is. It is hard to move forward—in diplomacy, in business or in
academic relations—if the border is nebulous. “De-risking” sounds reasonable, but sometimes it
creates more risk. In the case of the West and China it could disrupt the workings of the world
economy for decades.
The two sides have shown that deals can indeed be reached to clarify the height and position
of the fence. In 2022 the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), America’s
accounting regulator, signed an agreement with the Chinese to co-operate over the supervision of
PCAOB-registered accounting firms in China. The pact marked an important breakthrough after
years of rising tensions over access to the accounts of American-listed Chinese companies. The two
countries may need dozens of agreements like this, covering a wide range of issues. The PCAOB
deal shows what is possible.
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The strategic rivalry between China and America is hard to reverse. Whether they want
rational competition with clear borders or unpredictable competition without rules is the question
that must be decided in the coming months.
(Source: The Economist)
DE-DOLLARISATION
Muhammad Sheroz Khan Lodhi
In recent years, there has been heightened concern among some countries around the world
regarding their dependence on the US dollar. As a result, many nations are now seeking alternative
currencies as they look to reduce their reliance on the greenback. This phenomenon is known as dedollarization or the end of the kingship of one globally recognized currency. But it could have
significant implications for the global economy. As part of the post-war Bretton Woods agreement,
the dollar was established as the world’s reserve currency. This meant that other countries held large
amounts of US dollars in their foreign exchange reserves. It also meant the dollar was used as the
primary currency for international trade and finance. Now, de-dollarization would require a vast
and complex network of exporters, importers, currency traders, debt issuers and lenders to
independently decide to use other currencies. Unlikely. Dollar share went from 73% in (2001) to 55%
in (2020). Went from 55% to 47% since sanctions launched on Russia, now de-dollarizing at 10x
faster than the previous two decades. Although not much is being talked about in Pakistan, dedollarization is becoming a hot topic for debate around the globe. The year 2022 became critical in
terms of de-dollarization. The Russia-Ukraine war has adversely affected Eastern Europe and Euro
Atlantic countries and organizations. Russian military operations in Ukraine sparked multifarious
sanctions against the Russian Federation and its leadership. These sanctions were mainly invoked by
the US and EU and applied globally.
The growing recourse to a sanction regime against countries such as Iran, especially since
2006, and Russia after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, encouraged alternative currency
arrangements. As of today, Washington’s sanctions policy punishes 22 nations. The invasion of
Ukraine by Russia in 2022 and the extension of sanctions hampering the use of the US Dollar
encouraged even more de-dollarized practices. In response to the decision to disconnect Russia from
SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication). Moscow advanced bilateral
fuel transactions with partial payment in Rubles. Simultaneously, Russia and a group of African
countries initiated talks to establish settlements in national currencies, discontinuing both the US
Dollar and the Euro. Meanwhile, China is trying to insulate itself from the West and is attempting to
internationalize the Renminbi, even though it represents less than 3 percent of the official reserves
worldwide. Moscow and Beijing are coming closer in terms of financial cooperation, the world’s
largest oil exporter, Saudi Arabia, has also indicated open trade in currencies other than the US
dollar. During President Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia last year, both the countries agreed to
conduct oil trade in yuan, while Bangladesh became the 19th country to trade with India in rupees.
Recently, China also entered into an agreement with resource-rich Brazil to transact trade in
each other’s currencies. China has also executed a test trade for natural gas with France in a bid to
establish its currency internationally and to weaken the dollar’s grip on world trade. Similarly, India
and Malaysia have set up their respective banks to allow international trade between the countries
in Indian rupee. India intends to use the G20 platform to pave the way for its currency to be
conscripted in international trade warfare. Meanwhile, Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC) can
play a significant role in the future of global trade and settlements, as demonstrated by the
successful pilot of the m-Bridge wholesale CBDC platform, co-led by the Hong Kong Monetary
Authority, Bank of Thailand, Central Bank of the United Arab Emirates, and the People’s Bank of
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China Digital Currency Institute, and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Innovation Hub.
Despite various bans related to the crypto industry, the Greater China region continues to lead the
digital asset space. Many of these industry activities are driven by the de-dollarization trend that has
gained momentum as countries seek to reduce their reliance on U.S. dollars while also accelerating
cross-border CBDC experiments across Asia.
Last but not least, de-dollarization could significantly impact the US dollar and its dominance.
As more countries seek alternative currencies, demand for the dollar is likely to decline, which could
lead to a weakening of the currency. Additionally, if the dollar loses its status as the world’s reserve
currency, it could lead to a decline in the US’s ability to influence the global economy and politics.
Furthermore, as other currencies gain importance, the dollar may face increased competition in
international trade and finance. It is important to note, however, that the US dollar is still the
dominant currency, with central banks holding 60% of their foreign exchange reserves in USD.
Moreover, in order to analyze the pros and cons of de-dollarization, Pakistani state institutions,
think-tanks and academia should hold seminars to sketch out a financial strategy where Pakistan
can get paramount of the change. We should also prepare our people by giving them a manifestation
of Chinese language, culture and industrial development. To have strong and fastening ties with the
spiraling economic superpower is bound to be good for the country.
(Source: Money Matters)
HOW AMERICA CAN WIN OVER THE GLOBAL SOUTH
Suzanne Nossel (Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations)
Across much of the world, there is growing resentment about the amount of attention and
money that the West is funneling toward Ukraine. Countries outside Europe are plagued by war
and hardship, yet their suffering commands only a fraction of the attention paid to Kyiv. As Indian
Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar put it in June 2022, the priority that the richest states
have given to Ukraine treats Europe’s problems “as the world’s problems,” even though “the
world’s problems are not considered to be Europe’s problems.”
This discontent poses a challenge for the Biden administration. In fighting Russian President
Vladimir Putin’s aggression, and in dealing with the economic, political, and territorial ambitions of
an ascendant China, the United States will need to look beyond its stalwart Western allies and shore
up support worldwide. It will especially need to bolster its ties to the many rising powers, such as
Brazil and India, that currently balance between Washington and its main rivals. Some of these
governments share U.S. interests; New Delhi, for example, is also contending with an increasingly
muscular Beijing. Yet none of them will become full partners with the United States if they feel that
American policymakers neither take their desires seriously nor treat them as geopolitical peers.
These countries have diverse interests, making it impossible for the United States to please
them all. But there is a way for Washington to take the lead in supporting these countries’ ambitions
and reflecting their increasing clout: jump-starting the long-stalled debate over expanding the UN
Security Council. Many of the world’s most powerful developing states have long sought a place in
the body, and a credible U.S. drive to add them would have singular, symbolic significance. If
successful, the drive could also yield practical benefits. An updated global security architecture
would fortify the post-1945 rules-based system that the Biden administration champions, tamp
down on geopolitical resentments fostered by the West’s perceived influence hoarding, and offer
possible ways to more effectively isolate and stigmatize China and Russia when they breach global
norms.
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Crafting a workable proposal will not be easy, and the drive is not without risks. Decades of
past schemes, after all, never gained much traction, and the bar for change is high. To be enacted, a
proposal for Security Council reform must win the support of two-thirds of the member states of the
UN General Assembly (or 128 of the current 193) as well as all five of the council’s current
permanent members.
So far, most formulas have focused on adding specific countries as permanent members of the
Security Council, a highly controversial proposition both because it might dilute the influence of the
council’s existing permanent seat holders and because it could privilege a new group of nations in
perpetuity at the expense of their regional rivals. The Biden administration could lower the hurdle
by proposing that the UN create a new, more flexible tier of council seats allocated according to the
objective criteria of population and gross domestic product. The occupants would shift
periodically—perhaps after a decade of service—if their statistical rankings changed. Although
extending veto rights to such long-term members would not be politically viable, they would enjoy
other benefits, including a long-term voice and vote in the world’s premier security forum.
Building in such flexibility would help safeguard the council’s credibility over the long run.
The UN Security Council’s structure has not changed since its inception, and so it is now out of sync
with current geopolitical realities, diminishing its global importance. By allocating seats based on
objective criteria, the body would naturally evolve alongside the world it is intended to serve. And if
the change came in response to a plan from Washington, the United States would earn credit for its
leadership on an issue that matters to the capitals it needs most.
Actions and words
When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, it seemed as if the world might rally behind
the principles of nonaggression, sovereignty, and human rights. But outside the West there was
skepticism. Major African, Asian, and South American states abstained from UN General Assembly
resolutions condemning the war. Many African and Middle Eastern countries complained that
Europe was welcoming Ukrainian refugees while spurning arrivals from Syria, Sudan, and
elsewhere. According to U.S. officials, South Africa has even supplied arms to Russia, despite
pledging to remain neutral. The war has strained global food supplies, disrupted the flow of energy,
and exacerbated inflation—especially in developing states. The result has underscored longstanding resentments over the current world order and the traditional great powers that continue to
dominate it.
The Biden administration knows that it needs to improve its ties to intermediate states,
especially as Beijing and Moscow try to woo these countries away from Washington’s orbit. It knows
that championing Security Council reform would be an effective way to do so. That is why, in an
address at the UN last September, U.S. President Joe Biden stressed that he supports increasing the
number of nonpermanent and permanent council members. He reaffirmed the United States’ prior
calls for certain countries to receive permanent seats (Washington has backed the council aspirations
of Germany, India, and Japan) and spoke of the need for representation for Latin America and the
Caribbean, as well as Africa, on an enlarged council. Biden’s speech appears to have been more than
just empty rhetoric. According to reporting by The Washington Post, U.S. diplomats, including U.S.
Permanent Representative to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield, have been canvassing ideas for
expansion—a process that is intensifying as this year’s General Assembly opening session
approaches in September.
Biden’s words were well received and echoed by other global leaders. The United Kingdom’s
foreign minister, for instance, called for expanding the council in June. Biden’s remarks also kindled
some measure of anticipation among aspirants, suggesting that their long-standing hopes may not
be forever in vain. But to show that it is serious about not just endorsing but driving forward a more
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representative world order, Washington has to champion a proposal that can surmount the barriers
that have stalled Security Council reforms for decades.
Foremost among those obstacles are the council’s five permanent members. Each of these
states—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—has used its sway to
rebuff past expansion efforts through either active opposition or passive indifference that reinforced
the status quo. Their reasoning is simple and self-serving: these countries are unwilling to relinquish
their own veto power and would rather not afford commensurate privileges to other states, which
could potentially obstruct their interests.
But the permanent members are not the only obstacles. There are many countries outside the
Security Council that would covet positions in it, and they are at odds with regional rivals over who
should get new spots. Egypt and Ethiopia, for example, have no interest in seeing Nigeria represent
their continent. Italy would hate to see Germany ascend. Argentina and Mexico oppose Brazil’s
ambitions. And even if these states could sort out their differences, would-be reformers have
struggled with practical considerations. A council that is too large, unwieldy, and veto-ridden might
fail to carry out routine work—such as mediating conflicts and overseeing peacekeeping missions in
Africa—that today proceed relatively smoothly.
Fair enough
It is possible, however, for the United States to craft a proposal that overcomes many of these
hurdles. It can start by steering clear of adding new permanent members, and instead call for a fresh,
separate class of long-term seats allocated not by fiat or through horse-trading but on the basis of
objective criteria. Such a system would leave the current permanent five states’ veto powers intact;
realpolitik means that that facet of the system is effectively impossible to change. But the long-term
seats would still render the Security Council’s decision-making more inclusive and representative.
There are reasons to think most of the contenders, and maybe all of them, would accept such a
proposal. Although some council aspirants, such as India, have voiced reluctance to accept anything
short of a veto-wielding seat, others—including Japan and Germany—are thought to be more open
to compromise scenarios that would fulfill some, if not all, of their hopes. And governments bent on
getting a veto, like New Delhi, might ultimately come around if long-term seats were available but
permanent membership seemed far away. The often fierce competition for two-year rotating council
seats is testament to the value that capitals attach to being part of the inner sanctum of peace and
security. Even without a veto, a council seat means getting to speak in front of the cameras, table
proposals, and set the council agenda when taking a turn as the body’s rotating monthly
chairperson. It allows countries to rub shoulders with the world’s foremost powers.
The new states would also still be able to drive forward council action and help stop proposals
from passing. Today, council decisions are based on an affirmative vote of nine out of 15 members,
subject to veto by any of the five permanent members. In a reformed council, the threshold for action
could remain a majority plus one, giving the new members a chance to help vote measures up or
down.
Rather than preselecting countries for these long-term seats, the U.S. proposal should set
objective measures to determine which ones get elevated. The simplest to use are the most up-todate International Monetary Fund and UN figures on GDP and population. They are, after all,
perhaps the best quantifiable proxies for a country’s international sway and power. Washington
could specifically propose adding two members to the Security Council—one for population and
one for GDP—from each of the UN’s five regional groups: Asia-Pacific, Africa, Latin America and
Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe and Other (which includes the United States as an
observer and for voting purposes). If the leading states from one group are already permanent
members, the second-place states based on each criterion would be elevated instead. If a single state
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led in both population and GDP, the second seat could go to the country with the second-largest
populace.
From Asia-Pacific, this formula would give seats to India for population and Japan for GDP.
From Africa, Nigeria and South Africa would become members. Brazil and Mexico would be
elevated from the Latin America and Caribbean group. Poland and Ukraine would join from Eastern
Europe, while Germany and, depending on the timing, either Italy or Canada would ascend from
the Western Europe and Other group. If the tier of ten short-term elected council members were left
untouched, a new proposal could yield a total council size of between 20 and 24 (depending on the
specificities of the plan adopted): a figure within the range of other proposals that have long been
under discussion.
This allocation would make the council’s representation much broader than it is right now. It
would, however, still overrepresent Europe and, potentially, North America. If other continents
objected to the skew, the United States could propose capping each UN region to three or four
countries in total, perhaps depending on whether the United States is treated as a formal member of
the Western European and Other group. If reformers wanted even more parity, they could cap the
number of states per region at two, grandfathering in existing states, and prioritizing population
over GDP when needed. A cap of two would prevent any new additions from Western Europe and
Other and limit Asia-Pacific and Eastern Europe to just one new member. Instead of nine or ten new
countries, such a formula would yield just six: Brazil, India, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, and
Ukraine. Other variations on this proposal could allocate the number of new seats per region
proportionately, based on the total population of the area, or based on the number of individual
sovereign General Assembly members within an area.
This system would not quell the misgivings of Pakistan about an Indian seat, or of Egypt
about Nigeria’s ascension. But by continuing to limit veto rights and ensuring that the seats could
change hands over time, the proposals would at least be more palatable. India could not, for
example, singlehandedly stop a resolution that would make life easier for Pakistan. Egypt could take
comfort in the fact that South Africa might not be on the council forever.
Crucially, adopting a criteria-based system subject to regular updating would help prevent
the Security Council from simply adopting a new, calcified makeup. To create additional permanent
seats in the 2020s would doom the Security Council of the 2040s or 2050s to the very same politically
enshrined obsolescence that has bedeviled the body for years. And by codifying up front that GDP
and population calculations for long-term seats would be reviewed after each decade, no country—
even those on the council—could dispute what the latest figures on GDP and population dictate in
terms of council composition. As with the body’s well-established existing system of rotating
temporary seats, the periodic refreshes would be carried out methodically, without opening up new
political debates.
There is, in fact, precedent for UN reform that incorporates automatically updating eligibility.
In 1973, the General Assembly adopted a peacekeeping scale of assessment that gave certain
developing countries steep discounts on their payment shares. But after 27 years, some of the
beneficiaries—including Qatar, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates—had grown wealthy and
therefore no longer needed concessions. In 2000, the UN membership negotiated an overhaul of this
system, stripping undeserving states of their lowered rates and fashioning a new scale that pegged
discounts to per capita GDP—ensuring that countries’ payments would adjust as their relative
wealth shifted.
Risks and rewards
It is true that many of the countries most likely to receive membership under this proposal—
particularly Germany, India, and Japan—top the list of states that Washington is already on record
as wanting to add. And on balance, there is reason to think that Washington would gain from this
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proposal. The newly elevated long-term members would include established democracies whose
presence could raise the reputational costs for China and Russia if they used their veto to shield
human rights abusers or if they stood in the way of efforts to quell conflicts like the civil war in
Syria, which mostly defied council action for years in the 2010s. If the United States and its allies
were successful in making common cause with new long-term members on key priorities, the
political costs of Russian and Chinese obstruction would rise even further. Washington is already
deepening ties to India and Nigeria, and if the U.S. proposal to get them on the council succeeds,
these relationships could grow warmer.
But the merits of a criteria-based system transcend any country’s particular national interests.
The metrics, after all, are objectively fair reflections of the international system: money gives states
substantial might, as do people. By adding countries with bigger populations, the United States
would also help make sure that the council represented far more of the world than it does right now.
Although it seems virtually impossible for the council to morph into a truly equitable global body, at
least for the time being, even the most vehement critics of American power would be hard-pressed
to argue that admitting the planet’s most populous or prosperous countries is a self-serving
proposal.
In fact, there are ways that Washington could lose from the additions. New Delhi, Pretoria,
and other Security Council aspirants are home to deep-seated anti-Western strains that have come to
the forefront in their responses to Russia’s invasion. Although the U.S. veto would remain a forceful
bulwark against unpalatable outcomes, it is possible that these governments and other new admits
could harden into an unfriendly bloc. By advancing this reform, the United States would be
gambling that, in drawing leading global South countries closer to the inner circle of international
governance, it could prevent such a group from emerging—and achieve diplomatic strides with
some tough counterparts. Although securing agreement on a new Security Council formula with
Beijing, Moscow, and the U.S. Senate is a daunting task, a scheme attracting substantial global
backing could build powerful momentum, forcing key outliers to negotiate their differences and
make concessions. A scenario in which Washington champions a popular new paradigm only to
have China and Russia block passage could scramble current international alignments.
For Washington, then, opening discussion on a criteria-based system is a wager worth taking.
The United States needs closer friends outside Europe, and it desperately needs to safeguard the
rules-based international order. Working to increase the size of the Security Council would help
bolster Washington’s reputation while affording the United Nations a new lease on life at a time
when the post–World War II system of global governance is at risk of collapse. Doing so would
inaugurate a new chapter for the existing international order. Indeed, even if the UN does not agree
to Washington’s proposals in the near term, they could still help spark progress. Inserting new ideas
in an effort to unstick the debate could catalyze the council to reinvent itself.
Such renewal is essential to keep the UN functioning. The impasse over Security Council
reform has endured for generations. At some point, this brittle, archaic system will buckle beneath
the weight of the world. Such a collapse may not seem imminent, but as with fault lines in the earth,
geopolitical dynamics can shift unexpectedly, irreversibly, and sometimes catastrophically. And
although the council is often dismissed as impotent, its implosion for failure to accommodate longstanding frustrations would leave behind a more chaotic and dangerous world.
(Source: Foreign Affairs)
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JAPAN’S MAKING WAVES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN
Fumiko Yamada (Research associate at University of Melbourne)
Japan and the United States have maintained very close relations since World War II based on
economic growth, security interests, and regional stability. It has essentially become an effective
means of expanding US hegemony.
Japan’s reliance on US military forces for its security and defence due to post-World War II
treaties and agreements, makes it easier for the US to use Japan in the world system to suit its
interests. That is why Japan is Washington’s most important ally in the Asia-Pacific region.Japan’s
soft power in South and Southeast Asia is effective and extensive. Its influence in the region due to
commercial and development investment will help overcome weaknesses in Washington’s foreign
policy-making in the region.
The US now realizes that Washington lacks the credibility, soft power and close ties it needs to
pursue its interests and strategies across the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific region. Japan is just the
opposite. It has a great reputation throughout the region.
Japan is now very much trying to change its global identity and is keen to play a more active
role in the Indian Ocean region, to expand its influence.
The main reason for this, of course, is to prevent the spread of China’s influence in the Indian
Ocean, particularly in South and Southeast Asia.
The G7 summit became an important opportunity for Japan, the host of this year’s summit as
the president of the grouping. At the same time, Japan also got a temporary membership in the
United Nations Security Council.
In this regard, Japan has recently released three important strategy papers dwelling upon the
most visible drivers of Japan’s regional security vision, strategy, and policy changes.
Japan is no longer a silent bystander but will be seen in a direct and active role in the Indian
Ocean and Indo-Pacific region.
Japan expressed its ambition very clearly at the G7 summit. In addition to the members of the
G7, Japan also invited representatives from India, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the African Union. Japan
intends to continue to invest heavily in commercial development in the region.
Washington is interested in countering China through Japan having largely failed in its efforts
to establish India as a real rival to China in the region.
India repeatedly claimed to play this role but New Delhi could not put up any effective
resistance. On the contrary, China’s influence in the region, especially in South Asia, has increased
rather than diminished due to the so-called rivalry with India.
India’s relations with almost everyone in the region are strained and it still depends on China
for most of its long list of imported goods. In other words, India does not have the ability to be a real
rival to China.
On the other hand, Japan has all the characteristics needed to provide a reliable, capable and
influential regional leadership. Tokyo wants to work with Delhi, not by removing it.
To counter China, Japan has some limitations in defence in the Indian Ocean. So, Tokyo is
now relying on India to formulate its new defence role in the Indian Ocean.
Japan is a dependent, respected and tested friend of Bangladesh and has been its biggest
development partner since birth.
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Bangladesh’s strategic geopolitical position is essential to the geopolitical interests of both
Japan and India. Japan is already investing more in the Northeast region of India to increase
connectivity between Bangladesh and India.
As in Bangladesh, Japan’s development assistance is commendable and effective in Myanmar,
India and other states in the region, which can become a very effective and influential tool to counter
China’s influence in the region.
About 80 per cent of Japan’s total trade is through the Indian Ocean. This is why the Bay of
Bengal is very important for Japan. And Japan is establishing a direct connection to this sea area
through Bangladesh.
For this, Bangladesh needs Japan not only for trade and regional connections, but also to play
the role of a proxy representing Japan’s new defence and security, and the US.
However, Japan is keen to establish its new identity globally, especially in the Indian Ocean
region, through the G7 Summit, the establishment of connectivity between Northeast India and
Bangladesh, and Japan’s new defence and security vision. In the coming days, we will see a new
Japan. So far, the United States has advanced it as a pawn, but now it has reached the other end of
the board. Japan has become the new minister for the international chess game of the US in this
region.
(Source: Daily Times)
CENTRAL ASIA IN CHANGE
Where Do Security Risks Come From?
Over the past several years, a common feature of the Central Asian states has been their
special emphasis on external threats as the main danger; this has emerged as their main perspective
and explanatory framework for viewing national security issues.
There are reasons for this.
Since the very beginning of independence, the security issue had always been the “sword of
Damocles” hanging over the heads of the Central Asian countries. The possibility that it may
suddenly fall one day has made the Central Asian countries nervous. Terrorism, extremism and
separatism are the three key dangers they face
The early 1990s, when Central Asian countries became independent, was a time when the
three forces were in full swing. Central Asia is located in the “new moon” volatile zone. It had not
been established for a long time, its economy was fragile and its society was unstable. The three
forces were infiltrating into Central Asia through various means and coordinate with each other.
The threat to national and even regime security was not only very real, but also dangerous.
Religious extremist forces were active in Central Asia. They were advocating for the
establishment of Islamic religious states in Central Asia and the rejection of secular authority. They
sought to overthrow the current state system and governments, even by means of violence and
terror. In February 1999, extremist forces organised an assassination attempt on Uzbekistan
President Islam Karimov. Six bombs exploded separately along the route of president Karimov’s
motorcade, but he survived. In the summer of 1999 and the spring of 2000, several groups of armed
forces launched attacks on Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, leaving the Central Asian countries in shock.
In March 2004, terrorist groups created explosions in Tashkent and Bukhara in Uzbekistan, while
smaller scale terrorist incidents were more common in Central Asia. Terrorist, separatist and
extremist forces had become a major concern for Central Asian countries.
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After Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, the country fell into a brutal civil war.
Central Asia and Afghanistan are geographically linked by mountains and rivers, with three of the
countries bordering Afghanistan, which means that there is a zone of instability stretching 2,300 km
along the southern perimeter of Central Asia, which is a natural channel for its spill over.
When the Taliban seized power in 1996, the security situation for Central Asia became even
more severe. Central Asia now faces not only a chaotic region, but an extraordinary state as well.
Rumours that the Taliban may be heading south had unsettled Central Asian countries. Many
terrorist organisations in and outside the region had found sanctuaries in Afghanistan, such as al
Qaeda, the Uzbekistan Islamic Movement, Hizb-ul Tahrir and the East Turkistan Islamic Movement.
Afghanistan had become a hub for the three forces, and local terrorist organisations had set up camp
under the eyes of Central Asian countries.
After the overthrow of the Taliban regime by the United States in 2001, Afghanistan continued
to be tortured by a seemingly endless civil war, rampant terrorist attacks and increasing crossborder crimes. The security threat to Central Asia remained severe. In 2003, the US invaded Iraq,
and the Arab Spring followed in the early 2010s, plunging the Middle East into chaos and leading to
the rise of the Islamic State, which sought to dominate the Muslim world. A large number of people
from Central Asia who are influenced by extremist ideology sought to join them. According to
research, people from Central Asia account for about 20% the fighters of terrorist organisations in
the Middle East. They returned back home to Central Asia to present dangers to their countries.
At the same time, the “colour revolution” suddenly arrived. The “colour revolution”, driven
by foreign forces, spread from Serbia to Georgia and Ukraine, and then into the Middle East and
Central Asia. The “Tulip revolution” in Kyrgyzstan in 2005, which led to the overnight downfall of
President Askar Akayev after 15 years in power, was so big a shock that the Central Asian countries
could not but take the imported “revolution” as a new security threat.
To this day, external threats are still considered a major security risk. Assessing the causes of
the riots in Almaty in January 2022, outside forces are still thought to be the main culprits by the
government of Kazakhstan. Despite the changing circumstances in Afghanistan, Central Asian
countries still have doubts about the country’s future and see it as the biggest security uncertainty in
the region.
For a long time to come, external factors will remain a major security threat to the Central
Asian countries. There is no doubt about it. However, in assessing security risks, more attention
should be paid to internal factors as well as external threats. In fact, judging from the experience of
Central Asian countries after their independence, especially in the past decade or so, internal factors
played a far greater role than external factors in the security and stability of Central Asia.
Both terrorist activities and “colour revolutions” are mainly caused by domestic factors, and
mainly carried out by domestic forces. Even foreign terrorist groups targeting Central Asian states
are mostly comprised of those states’ own citizens. Of course, internal and external factors are
intertwined and difficult to separate, but internal factors are fundamental.
External factors, while dangerous, can only make waves by taking advantage of internal
events.
In terms of the consequences of the damage, internal incidents are also more intense and
violent. Tajikistan’s independence was followed by a five-year civil war that resulted in tens of
thousands of casualties. At least 169 people were killed in the riots in Andijan, Uzbekistan, in May
2005. In April 2010, at least 65 people were killed and more than 400 were injured during the riots in
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, when demonstrators seized the state television station, parliament and
government buildings, and looted and burned the presidential palace. In June 2010, at least 124
people were killed and more than 1,500 injured in the riots and ethnic clashes in Osh, Kyrgyzstan.
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Uzbekistan said more than 500 ethnic Uzbeks were killed, and more than 100,000 displaced. The
Zhanaozen riots in Kazakhstan in December 2011 left more than 70 people dead and hundreds
injured. Memories are still fresh of the riots in Almaty in January 2022, in which 225 people were
killed and more than 4,300 injured. All these incidents were accompanied by violence, disorder,
looting, arson and destruction, causing great damage to national security, social stability and
people’s livelihoods, and even putting the respective states’ governments at risk.
Terrorism, separatism and extremism will continue to exist for a long time and will be difficult
to eradicate, and will expand rapidly when the environment permits. However, compared with a
decade or so ago, the momentum of international terrorist organisations has weakened. The biggest
threats to Central Asia, such as Al Qaeda, IS, the Uzbek Islamic Movement, East Turkistan Islamic
Movement and Hizb-ul Tahrir are no longer as threatening as they were a decade ago. After
retaking power in 2021, the Taliban promised not to allow terrorist groups from Afghan soil to
conduct terrorist activities against neighbouring countries, although whether it can actually do so
remains to be tested.
The risk of “colour revolution” remains, but its model is already well known and the
prevention methods are more effective. There have been no new successes with “colour revolution”
since Ukraine’s “revolution of dignity” in 2013-2014; the Belarusian “colour revolution” in 2020
failed. Moreover, with the presence of China, Russia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in
Central Asia, it is not so easy for foreign forces to carry out a “colour revolution” in Central Asia.
Central Asia is now less likely to suffer a large-scale attack by an outside terrorist group, and
dealing with such an attack is relatively simple. Foreign terrorist groups are usually small armed
groups, and if they are operating openly, they are not so terrible. Moreover, with the CSTO as a
military security guarantee, with China as a security cooperation partner, and with the SCO as a
political backer, Central Asia is fully capable of responding to armed attacks by terrorist
organisations.
Responding to domestic events is far more difficult and complex. Group demonstrations
triggered by internal factors are often mixed with various elements. In the face of domestic mass
demonstrations, the country will face a dilemma in choosing the means to deal with it. It may be
difficult for peaceful means to stop the development of events, and an armed response may intensify
contradictions, leading to much more serious negative consequences. Even law enforcement forces
may be shaken and divided, which was also clearly shown in the unrest in Kazakhstan.
According to the past experience, once large-scale public demonstrations occur in Central
Asian countries, it is very difficult to maintain peace for a long time. Instigators unleash violence
with relative ease, which quickly leads to riots: from street vandalism and looting to the attacking
and occupation of government institutions; ultimately, state governments are overthrown. This
makes the prospective of such demonstrations in Central Asian countries particularly destructive
and dangerous.
All this shows that internal incidents pose greater risks to Central Asian security and stability.
They cause deeper harm, are more difficult to deal with and often have more serious consequences.
Given that internal factors present the biggest risks, where do they mainly emerge from?
Usually it does not involve a single factor, but rather a mixture of factors. Disorderly power
struggles, political divisions in society, the encroachment of extremist religious forces, regional
estrangement, ethnic contradictions — all of these factors can contribute. The most common cause,
however, is popular discontent, which in turn stems from poverty, unemployment, inequality,
corruption, nepotism and social injustice. These are common problems in Central Asian countries.
Over the past 30 years, the Central Asian countries have made great efforts in economic
development and social construction and scored notable achievements and progress. At the same
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time, not everything is satisfactory. Some Central Asian countries are still backward economically;
their people are still poor. According to the World Bank, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are
all low-and-middle-income countries with large numbers of poor people. About a quarter of Kyrgyz
and Tajik residents are still below the poverty line. Uzbekistan’s per capita national annual income
has more than tripled in 30 years from $600 in 1992 to $1,983 in 2021. Kyrgyzstan has more than
doubled, from 520 dollars to 1,276 dollars. Tajikistan increased from $280 to $897, a nearly threefold
increase. Despite these increases, they were modest in absolute terms and lower in real terms,
adjusted for inflation. In 2022, the average monthly wage in Tajikistan was only about $160, and in
Uzbekistan it was about $340. Every year, hundreds of thousands or even millions of people leave
their homes to work in countries such as Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkey, making their livelihood an
important source of income for their families.
The popular discontent comes not only from poverty, but from the unfair distribution of social
wealth, polarisation between the rich and the poor, the corruption of officials, excessive wealth
accumulation among powerful families, and so on. Kazakhstan, where riots broke out last year, is
not a poor country. Thanks to oil and gas, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are the richest countries in
Central Asia; Turkmenistan’s per capita income reached $7,344 in 2019 and Kazakhstan’s was
$10,373 in 2021, having peaked at $12,080 in 2014. Both countries are classified as upper-middle
income countries by the World Bank. But just because a country is not poor does not mean its people
are not poor. In fact, although Kazakhstan is much richer, its ordinary citizens receive a
disproportionately small share of the country’s wealth, so the sense of gain is even lower. President
Tokayev said after the Almaty riots that half of Kazakhstan’s residents earn no more than 50,000
tenge a year, or a little more than $1,300, and just over $110 a month. At the same time, a new breed
of super-rich has emerged, with the richest 162 individuals owning half of the country’s wealth. As a
result, people in Kazakhstan are more even disgruntled and resentful.
Since internal problems present the greatest risk, the main way to maintain security and
stability in Central Asia should be the elimination of internal problems, even if the barrier to external
dangers should be built first and foremost at home. In fact, the Central Asian countries have become
increasingly aware of it, and the reforms underway in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are aimed at this
end. The key elements of the reforms are economic development, poverty eradication, the fight
against corruption, social justice, the improvement of the living standards of the population, and
increasing the satisfaction of the people in order to ensure national development and social stability.
Of course, it will be a long and tortuous process, which will not happen overnight.
(Source: Valdai Club)
A NEW GLOBAL GEOPOLITICAL CYCLE
Charles Pennaforte (Director of the laboratory of geopolitics, international relations and anti-systemic
movements (LAbgrima) at the UFPEL university (Brazil))
Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi have made significant contributions to the fields
of international relations and contemporary capitalist economics. In their works, such as “The
Decline of American Power” (2003), “The Long Twentieth Century” (2010), and “Adam Smith in
Beijing: Lineages of Twenty-First Century” (2009), they offer valuable insights. Some of the things
that were explored are the ideological corrosion of American power over time, that is, America’s
ability to be an example to be followed by the so-called “free world” and secondly the beginning of
the Systemic Cycle of Accumulation’s downfall, currently dominated by the US. These are some of
the relevant ongoing changes in the scenario of International Relations.
Despite some valid criticisms of the authors’ approaches and conclusions, either by the
various analytical schools of international relations, the fact is that today’s geopolitical and economic
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world is no longer the same as at the end of the Second World War, or even the one inherited from
the end of the Cold War. We can say that the idea that the 21st century will continue to be
determined by the USA and Europe has completely lost its meaning.
China’s stability as a largely capitalist economy, global investor, and proponent of its
geopolitical project, alongside the resurgence of Russia in recent years, demonstrate that the USA
and the European Union (the “West”) are no longer in control of the economy and world ideology
or, more precisely, liberal democracy as an absolute value emanating from countries committed to
Human Rights or Democracy as real values. John Mearsheimer, for instance, has analyzed such a
process in his work “The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities, 2018”.
Mearsheimer (John Mearsheimer: We’re playing Russian roulette), who offers a logical and
geopolitical understanding of the NATO/Russia dispute, suffers strong criticism for his views.
Despite that, he remains one of the few analysts who did not give in to the warlike ideological
establishment of the White House. It’s worth noting that Henry Kissinger who also saw NATO’s
eastward expansion as a provocation, then changed his mind (Henry Kissinger: Why I changed my
mind about Ukraine) to follow Washington’s prevailing directions. Consistently maintaining
historical coherence is of ultimate importance
To reassure the argument presented, the very idea of an effective US commitment to Human
Rights or respect for International Law loses its meaning when we remember Iraq, Abu Ghraib, and
Afghanistan, to speak of the most recent facts, are the clearest examples of violations of territorial
rights and human rights
As we have already pointed out (Ukraine war: A new multipolar world is emerging), the
invasion of Ukraine (2014-2022) marked a significant turning point in this new geopolitical cycle of
power that is emerging. It was not just the Russian invasion itself, but also the failure of the West to
effectively isolate Russia that demonstrated that fundamental shift. The low influence of the US and
EU in enlisting other nations to follow the sanctions strategy against Moscow demonstrated that
more than mere rhetoric about territorial violations in Ukraine is required. The lack of global
legitimacy of Washington’s policy is evident when the US maintains privileged relations with Israel,
which has illegally occupied the West Bank and the Golan Heights since 1967, for example. In
addition, the supposed defense of democracy as a fundamental pillar of its foreign policy becomes a
fragile object when high-level diplomatic relations are maintained with Saudi Arabia or China,
countries with a history of systematic violations of Human Rights according to the organizations
that monitor the theme around the world, many of which are based in the US and EU.
Matias Spektor in Foreign Affairs (May/June 2023) in the article “In Defense of the Fence
Sitters: What the West Gets Wrong About Hedging” analyzes the causes of the so-called Global
South’s reluctance to align with the adoption of Western positions against Russia. It is a good guide
to understanding what might be happening in international relations and its future.
The emergence of BRICS, as a unit of countries with significant global projection in economic
terms, and later the creation of the New Development Bank, provided an effective body in the
democratization of access to international credit outside the traditional center created in the postwar period as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank. This is an important detail for
this new geopolitical and economic configuration, even with the obvious divergences between its
founding members. The very possible rise of BRICS to BRICS Plus with other countries postulating
to join the group demonstrates that something is outside the traditional pattern that we have known
so far.
Cliff Kupchan, chairman of the Eurasia Group, highlights in his article on the Foreign Policy
website entitled “6 Swing States Will Decide the Future of Geopolitics”,that the new geopolitical
dynamic is changing for new players such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
and Turkey. Such countries are not in the direct US sphere of influence and those should receive
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more attention from Washington according to the author. These are nations that did not support the
sanctions promoted by the EU and the US against Moscow and sought to establish their own lines of
action based on their economic and geopolitical interests.
In Samuel Charp’s “An Unwinnable War: Washington Needs an Endgame in Ukraine”
published in Foreign Affairs the argument proposed is that extending a war in which Russia may
not even win, but is unlikely to be defeated, only serves the interests (economic and geopolitical, for
example) of the USA, including the possibility of increasing the dangers of military and even nuclear
escalation. Europeans and Ukrainians are mere pawns within Washington’s logic. It must be
recognized that Moscow will have to have its complaints heard sooner or later. Even if common
sense does not find an echo in Washington, several analysts have already recognized this.
Based on the current scenario, the world is entering a new phase. This new phase will not be
commanded by the US and the EU. Therein lies the biggest problem for Europeans and North
Americans: recognizing that their cycle of power is coming to an end and not accepting it in a
coherent way. What do we mean by that? Maintaining the same lines of action in the Cold War, that
is, systematically creating “communist enemies” to enlist allies and maintaining a belligerent line in
foreign policy is a serious flaw that will not change the final result: the geopolitical and economic
decline of the USA as a dominant power and Europe as a major geopolitical region.
On the other hand, the EU has not yet realized that the line dictated by the US and blindly
followed by Brussels will cause even more problems for the bloc. Incidentally, the results are already
visible: inflation and unemployment are the visible tips of the iceberg into which the EU is inserted.
The loss of influence of the Euro-Atlantic axis is irreversible.
What to do? It is time to prepare for the new global geopolitical cycle.
(Source: Modern Diplomacy)
WHAT’S REALLY GOING ON IN FRANCE?
Muhittin Ataman (Director of Foreign Policy Studies at SETA Foundation)
France has been facing violent mass protests in the wake of a recent police shooting. The
killing of a 17-year-old boy named Nahel, who was of Algerian descent, by French police in
Nanterre on June 27 has sparked outrage among the public. The tragic incident has been viewed as a
violation of human rights, prompting widespread protests and riots across several cities in France.
The response from the public has gone beyond solely addressing this particular incident, reflecting a
broader concern over human rights violations and long-time discrimination faced by individuals of
migrant origin, particularly those of African descent and Muslims.
For the last several decades, both the discriminatory policies of the state institutions and the
reactions of the people in the name of victimized groups have dramatically increased. The more
European countries experience political and economic problems, the more the migrants are held
responsible for the problems.
The colonial European states have been exploiting not only the natural resources of the nonWestern world, the African continent and the Muslim world in particular, but also the human
resources of these regions. Eventually, for different reasons (for instance, using them as slaves,
servants or labor force), they have brought a share of the population of the colonized territories to
their countries, most as de facto or de jure slaves, deprived of basic rights. Over time, these people
were given rights and they joined the normal life of their respective societies. They were largely
welcomed by the autochthon population, the white and blue-eyed Christian people.
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However, when Europe began to experience political and economic problems, mainly as a
result of many national and global developments, they took the easiest route and blamed the
migrants and their children for any inconvenience.
Otherization in the West
Until very recently, European countries had been attributing any success and contribution of
migrants to the political system and social structure of their respective countries, i.e., liberalism and
multiculturalism. In line with the hierarchical point of view, successes were attributed to the state
and society structure, but not to the personal characteristics and talent of people belonging to other
cultures or races.
On the contrary, they have attributed any failure in politics, economics or even sports to their
origin. As mentioned by some athletes sweating for European countries such as Nicolas Sebastien
Anelka, a French professional football manager and retired player, “When they scored, they were
French; but, when they did not, they were Arab.” Almost all migrants, who think differently or
reflect the culture of their ancestors, were immediately otherized and eventually punished.
However, after the relative decline of European countries and societies in world politics, the
above-mentioned perspective and perception have changed. Nowadays, the deep-rooted biased
behavior of certain political and societal groups forces them to criticize every move, policy and
stance of migrants, whether positive or negative. The main reason for the change in this mentality is
that the more the migrants and their children become visible in the societies in which they live and
the more successful in the institutions they work for, the more they are otherized and alienated by
the larger society.
After Europe’s experience of real multiculturalism, radicalization and racism is on the rise in
almost every European state. Especially, the widespread feelings of hostility among the security
forces against people of African origin, North African origin and Muslims are on the rise. People
from these groups are discriminated against when looking for a job, and they face great difficulties
in finding a job just because of their beliefs and origins. The police act with prejudice in all kinds of
transactions and follow a punitive attitude toward these people just because of their color or beliefs.
Many official or semiofficial explanations represent the colonial mindset. For example, a
French institution was able to use the following words for the protesters, the migrants: “In the face
of these wild herds, it is no longer enough to ask for calm. Restoring the republican order and
removing those arrested from their capacity to harm others should be the only political signal to be
given. It is time to fight against these pests.”
Unfortunately, this and similar official or civil discriminatory explanations target not only
protesters but also leading French personalities, who successfully represent their country. France has
been resorting to any kind of violence and implementing heavy racist policies against the migrants
living in the country, claiming that they are racist.
Francafrique: Thing of the past
When examined closely, the protests are not only motivated by domestic developments. Many
global developments pave the way for the reactions of the colonized peoples against the colonizers.
For instance, the recent developments in France-Africa relations have greatly contributed to the
increased discrimination against migrants. President Emmanuel Macron has been criticized in
almost every African country. With the rising awareness of the African peoples and politicians,
African leaders such as the presidents of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Kenya
did/do not hesitate to criticize the French colonial past and its present exploitative policies to
Macron’s face.
In other words, the developments in France have roots in other countries. France and its
leader still resort to the old game of realpolitik, claiming that they do not have enough power to
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change the course of events. That is, the French state is determined to use power against its old
colonies, which will otherize them further. Eventually, these policies will prove counterproductive
for France.
Furthermore, some effective European circles intentionally provoke Black people and Muslims
living in European countries by insulting their sacred values and religious symbols and sometimes
targeting them. Targeting Blacks and Muslims nowadays is part of daily life in almost all European
countries. Burning the Holy Quran in Stockholm, under the auspices of the Swedish security forces
and the killing of a 17-year-old boy in France are two different faces of the same strategy played
against migrants in Europe.
It seems that Europe has been trying to speed up the conflictual relationship with the rest of
the world. However, this policy is counterproductive. Since “white Europe” has lost much of its
fertility and productivity, the European continent is increasingly becoming dependent not only on
the rising non-Western powers such as China but also on the new/late comers, i.e., migrants, in
almost every sphere of life. Therefore, alternative policies that will provide benefits for both sides,
Europe and the rest, are needed.
(Source: Daily Sabah)
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International Law
HAS THE ICC LOST TRACTION ON
ROHINGYA GENOCIDE CASE?
Dr CR Abrar (An academic with an interest in human rights issues)
The resolution of the Rohingya crisis appears to have met a dead end. Quite predictably, yet
another round of questionable repatriation efforts has stalled. With dwindling financial
commitment, agencies tasked to look after the refugees are finding it extremely difficult to make
ends meet. Squalid living conditions in camps compounded by restrictions on freedom of
movement, reduced supply of rations, deteriorating law and order situation coupled with absence of
education, skills development and work opportunities, and protracted uncertainty of repatriation
have taken a huge toll on the refugees, both physically and psychologically. While some have
resigned to such a reality, others, particularly the young ones, are looking for opportunities to
escape the fenced camp life and Bhasan Char. Data from the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) shows that in 2022 alone, more than 3,500 Rohingya tried to undertake perilous
journeys through the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea. This is a 360 percent increase from the
previous year.
The Rohingya have been subjected to a slow burning genocide over the last 40 years, and
despite being recognised as "the most persecuted minority in the world" by the UN, they have been
largely forsaken by the international community that is essentially guided by economic and strategic
interests while paying lip service to human rights principles and international law. The community's
efforts to seek justice and accountability for the perpetrators of genocide and other state crimes
appear to have hit a roadblock in recent times.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a court of last resort that investigates alleged war
crimes, crimes against humanity and other grave offences when nations are unable or unwilling to
do so. In an overall grim situation, the request of the last ICC prosecutor on the determination of the
jurisdiction pursuant to the Rome Statute (in April 2018) and the subsequent ruling of the ICC's PreTrial Chamber (in September 2018) that it has jurisdiction to hold the Myanmar government to
account provided a glimmer of hope to the hapless Rohingya. The judges urged the prosecution not
to delay in pursuing their task.
However, contrary to the hype that the ruling had generated among those who champion
human rights, justice, accountability and the rule of law, the Rohingya genocide case appears to
have taken a back seat in ICC priorities. The issue becomes evident if the treatment of the Rohingya
case by the ICC is compared with the court's dealings with the Ukrainian case.
In the Ukrainian case on March 2, 2022, the chief prosecutor of the ICC announced the
opening of an investigation of all "past and present allegations of war crimes, crimes against
humanity or genocide" committed by Russia in the war in Ukraine, which had begun a week earlier.
Days earlier, his office announced that it already had "a reasonable basis to believe crimes… had
been committed." Not surprisingly, his move received strong international political support, with 39
countries having referred the Ukraine situation to the office of the prosecutor for investigation.
Within months, the European Commission launched a new project to support the
investigation capacities of the ICC by committing 7.25 million euros. In particular, the resource "will
help the ICC to scale up its investigation capacity to respond to the ongoing investigations into war
crimes committed by Russia in Ukraine." Announcing the support, the high representative/vice-
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president of the European Commission reiterated, "the International Criminal Court's investigations
are crucial to ensure accountability and justice for the heinous crimes committed in Ukraine."
In April 2022, Eurojust (the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation) and
ICC agreed to join forces and for the court to participate in the EU's Joint Investigation Team. The
information on possible war crimes and crimes against humanity is currently being collected to
enable investigation and adjudication by relevant actors in the future to ensure that those
responsible for war crimes and other atrocities are held accountable. There are also moves to further
scale up the office's data storage and processing infrastructure and to build up additional analytical
and forensic capacity for new types of evidence, including digital.
On March 17 this year, the ICC issued an arrest warrant against the Russian president and
commissioner for children's rights, accusing them of being responsible for war crimes in Ukraine,
including the unlawful deportation of children. Within a week, on March 23, the prosecutor general
of Ukraine and the registrar of the ICC signed a cooperation agreement on establishing an ICC
country office in Ukraine.
There is a stark difference in the ICC's treatment of the above case with that of the Rohingya
genocide. While the apex global criminal court has demonstrated its interest and competence in
engaging with Ukraine's case, it has exposed its apathy and indifference to the Rohingya case. This
is obvious on the following counts:
First, within less than 18 months of the opening of the investigation in Ukraine, the ICC was
able to open a field office there, and there is already an arrest warrant. In contrast, nearly four years
into the investigation in the Rohingya genocide case, there is no arrest warrant; there is not even a
field office opened in Bangladesh.
Second, the new prosecutor is on record that accountability for crimes against/affecting
children is a "priority" to his office. The world is aware that many Rohingya children, including
babies and infants, were victims of state crimes in Myanmar. Why, then, are they not a priority to the
prosecutor as the Ukrainian children are? Do the Rohingya children not deserve justice?
Third, the prosecutor has called for friendly governments to send investigators, lawyers and
military experts to help with the investigation in Ukraine, and it has been reported that more than 40
experts have been seconded by EU states alone. In contrast, thus far, there is no information
available on whether the prosecutor has made requests to governments to send personnel to help
with the Rohingya genocide investigation. Can one, therefore, surmise that the Rohingya case is not
being treated as a priority like the Ukrainian case?
Fourth, while the prosecutor deserves accolade for his efficiency in requesting an arrest
warrant in the Ukrainian case within a relatively short time, he seems to be in no hurry to request an
arrest warrant against the murderous Myanmar military leaders. Does he expect the Rohingya
refugees to wait indefinitely in Bangladesh in atrocious and harmful conditions, with dwindling
international support and an increasingly hostile environment?
Fifth, is the prosecutor cognisant of the facts that: a) rations are now below the international
standard; b) camp people are subjected to physical threat and extortion; and c) sexual violence is rife
in the camps?
Sixth, given the prosecutor's stated commitment to the rights of children, is he not concerned
that: a) half a million Rohingya children are being denied even primary education; b) half a million
children are being malnourished as their parents and caregivers are made dependent solely on everdecreasing rations; and c) half a million children are growing up in a place where murders,
extortion, and sexual violence are rife and increasing?
Seventh, does the prosecutor share the view that construction of government buildings and
settlements on Rohingya land, as well as the destruction of their villages, reveal the Myanmar
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government's ulterior motives and lack of sincerity in addressing the Rohingya question? Isn't he
concerned that plans under consideration by the governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar to
repatriate the Rohingya refugees from Cox's Bazar back to internment camps in Myanmar will
undermine their rights and impair their security?
And finally, how will the prosecutor protect the witnesses who have spoken to his team when
they are back in Myanmar, and how will the prosecutor bring those witnesses to The Hague to give
their evidence in a trial?
Surely, the Rohingya deserve appropriate answers to all these important questions from the
ICC.
(Source: Daily Star)
WEAPONIZATION OF WATER IN CONTEMPORARY GEOPOLITICS
Prof. Ravindra G Jaybhaye (Professor in the Geography Department, at Savitribai Phule Pune University,
Pune, India)
A huge Kakhovka dam in the Russian-controlled area of southern Ukraine has been
devastated on June 6, unleashing a flood of water in Southern Ukraine. The military of Ukraine and
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are accusing Russia with blowing up the dam, but
Russia has placed the responsibility on Ukraine. Simultaneously, the tensions between Afghanistan
and Iran have risen to the point where recent border incidents have left both countries on high alert.
The Helmand River is the main source of discontent in a disagreement over shared water resources,
which is the root of this conflict.
These two separate incidents confirm that water will remain continue to be one of the
contested resource in future. Water, unlike other natural resources, endowed with the ability to
move spatially. This unique feature makes it likely to be contested. But the aforementioned
incidents, particularly the destruction of the dam, implies the severity of the conflict manifold.
Although historically, countries have not often used water as a catalyst for conflict, the
aforementioned events have forced humanity to reconsider this in the near future. The use of water
as weapon against the adversaries is thus, dangerous trend.
Russia-Ukraine War and Use of Water as a ‘Weapon’
The Russia-Ukraine conflict has seen the use of water as a weapon immediately following
Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. Following annexation, Ukraine built a dam along the North
Crimean Canal, a primary source of water to the Crimean peninsula which accounts for 85 percent
of the peninsula’s water supply. This almost cut off all water access to the Crimean Peninsula, which
is under Russian control, and diverted water to the Kherson region of Ukraine. This move was
intended to punish Russian aggressiveness and force a Russian retreat—a strategy that was clearly
unsuccessful. Since then, the conflict got culminated in the destruction of a Kakhovka dam,
potentially escalating it into uncharted territory. The massive Dnipro River in Ukraine is blocked off
by the dam, creating a sizable water reservoir. The dam itself is hundreds of metres broad and 30
metres high.
The reservoir it contains holds an estimated 18 cubic kilometres of water, about the same
volume as the Great Salt Lake in Utah. Bursting the dam might cause a wall of water to flood
settlements below it, including the nearby town of Kherson. The use of water as a weapon resulting
in a number of issues, such as water scarcity, energy issues, flooding, hydroelectricity production,
and Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant cooling system issues, among others. The canal system that irrigates
much of southern Ukraine, including Crimea, would undoubtedly be devastated as a result.
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Iran-Afghanistan Conflict
The two Asian countries, Iran and Afghanistan, locked in a water dispute over river Helmond.
Clashes erupted once again between Afghan and Iranian border security forces in the Afghan border
province of Nimruz on 27 May 2023, resulting in the deaths of two Iranian security forces and one
Taliban border guard. Both sides blamed each other for the incident, with the Taliban accusing Iran
of firing first and Iran accusing the Taliban of violating a water-sharing treaty.
A water allotment treaty signed between Iran and Afghanistan in 1973 is the only mechanism
available for the water sharing of the Helmond river. According to this Helmand Water Treaty,
Afghanistan should annually share 850 million cubic metres of water from Helmand with Iran, at
twenty-two cubic meters per second with an option for Iran to purchase an additional four cubic
meters per second in “normal” water years. But, Iran accusing Afghanistan for the disregarding the
principles outlined in the treaty. “In recent years, this treaty has not been adhered to by
Afghanistan’s rulers, including the Taliban,” CIP’s Toossi told Al Jazeera, adding that Kabul has
delivered only “a fraction of the agreed amount”. Amid these tense situation, Iran Warns
Afghanistan by saying that The Islamic Republic of Iran reserves its rights to take necessary
measures and emphasizes the full responsibility of Afghanistan in this regard. So far, both sides
have committed to ease the tension by expressing need to engage in dialogue.
These kind of incidences underlines the dangerous trend of water weaponization in the tense
situation against the adversaries. Some countries find it lucrative because water as a military tool
can have a disastrous impact across the border.
Weaponization of Water and International Law
As per the principle 4 of ‘The Geneva List of Principles on the Protection of Water
Infrastructure’, the parties to the conflict should refrain from using water infrastructure and waterrelated infrastructure as a means of warfare. Furthermore, Principle 6 makes it clear that
infrastructure related to water is assumed to be a civilian object and as such cannot be attacked or
damaged unless it is being used for military purposes.
The Madrid Rules of 1976 by the International Law Association addressed the use of water
infrastructure and water itself in the context of armed conflict. To safeguard the civilian population
and the environment, the rules outline two particular prohibitions: a) When it would result in
disproportionate suffering for the civilian population or significant harm to the ecological balance of
the area in question, diverting rivers for military objectives should be outlawed. Any diversion that
is carried out with the intention of endangering or destroying the fundamental ecological balance of
the affected area, the minimal circumstances for the survival of the civilian population, or the intent
to terrorise the populace should be forbidden (Article III). b) When there are serious risks to the
civilian population or significant harm to the ecological balance of the area, it should be forbidden to
cause floods or interfere with the hydrologic equilibrium in any other way (Article V).
During the drafting of the UN Watercourses Convention, it was proposed by the Special
Rapporteur at the time to include provisions on employment of water and water infrastructure as
means of warfare. Even though these proposals were later excluded from the draft convention, the
paragraphs of the draft Article 13 exclusively curb to use water as weapon against civilians.
The use of water infrastructure as a means of warfare is not specifically regulated by
international humanitarian law; however, during armed conflicts, the right of the parties to the
conflict to choose methods and means of warfare is not unlimited.
The aforementioned International laws have direct or indirect references regarding the
possible use of water as a weapon. The essence of the laws is to prevent the use of water as a means
of warfare, and to ensure that access to water resources is not restricted or denied as a tactic of war.
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Stopping the Water Weaponization Tide
It is absolutely necessary to find practical answers to this problem since humanity cannot
afford to use water as a weapon. When national governments are the primary offenders of water
weaponization, Marcus King and Emily Hardy of Georgetown University claim that international
law can be a helpful tool.These laws and treaties might include inter alia the Convention on the
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques
(ENMOD), Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions on deliberate destruction of civilian
infrastructure, and the Geneva List of Principles on the Protection of Water Infrastructure. But, one
drawback of these agreements is that each pact has a small number of signatories, and nations with
access to significant water resources like Syria, Turkey, and China are absent. However, the
consensus of the majority of countries is required in order to forbid governments from using water
as a weapon. To start, all members of the United Nations Security Council, notably the permanent
members, should be required to sign and approve these kinds of agreements. Because it looks
unusual when the nations in charge of upholding global peace and tranquilly aren’t parties to
security-related agreements.
Additionally, there should be strict penalties for any country found to be using water as a
weapon, including economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation. It is also crucial to establish an
international body that can monitor and investigate any suspected cases of water weaponization.
This body should have the power to impose sanctions on offending countries and provide assistance
to affected populations. Moreover, it is essential to raise awareness about the dangers of using water
as a weapon and promote peaceful resolution of conflicts through dialogue and diplomacy. Finally,
investing in water infrastructure and management can help prevent conflicts over water resources in
the first place. By prioritizing cooperation over competition, we can ensure that water remains a
source of life rather than a tool of destruction.
(Source: Modern Diplomacy)
IS CHINA A DEVELOPING COUNTRY?
What does international law say about its status?
Shen Ke
Legislation passed by the U.S. House of Representatives and a Senate committee in the first
half of this year seeks to change China’s label of developing country used in the World Trade
Organization (WTO). Chinese officials have responded by reaffirming that China is still a
developing country under international law.
Asia Fact Check Lab (AFCL) found that there is no clear and uniform definition of a
“developing country” within the international community. Different classifications systems used by
the UN and World Bank refer to China respectively as a “developing economy” and an “upper
middle-income country,” while the WTO allows countries to self-identify as a “developing
country.”.
In addition, China’s classification as a “developing country” in certain international treaties
does not imply that there is a universal set of international laws which define China as a
“developing country.”
In Depth
The U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved the Ending China's Developing
Nation Status Act on June 8. The bill requires the State Department to attempt to “stop China from
being classified as a developing nation by international organizations” and specifies the World
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Trade Organization (WTO) as one international organization in which the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) receives “beneficial treatment” as a result of its status as a developing country.
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Wang Wenbin responded to the bill at a
press conference on June 9, saying that “China’s status as the world’s largest developing country is
rooted in facts and international law” and that “the rights that China is lawfully entitled to as a
developing country” will not be deprived by US politicians.
Wang had earlier claimed at a press conference on May 12 that China’s status as a developing
country should not be changed due to the WTO recognition.
Who decides whether a WTO member is developing or not?
Wang Wenbin’s claim that China’s status as a developing country is recognized by the WTO is
false, as the organization allows individual member states to decide for themselves whether they are
a developing country or not.
The WTO does not provide specific definitions for "developed" and "developing" countries. It
is up to individual members to declare their own categorization. However, other members have the
right to question the decision of a member country to utilize provisions meant for developing
countries."
How do the World Bank and the UN classify China’s economy?
Both the UN and the World Bank use gross national income（GNI） per capita as the defining
criteria to measure a countries’ economic development.
The UN World Economic Situation and Prospects report classifies different countries’
economies into four categories: developed, developing, least developed and economies in transition.
China’s economy is classified as developing.
The World Bank, on the other hand, does not use the word “developing” at all, but instead
divides the world’s countries into four tiers: low, lower-middle, upper-middle and high. China
stands on the border between upper-middle income and high income countries, with nominal per
capita income at $11,880 as of 2021. While a huge leap from forty or even twenty ago, this number is
still well below that of other widely recognized developed economies such as Japan, the U.S.,
Germany, France or Taiwan.
Does international law entitle China to remain a developing country?
The Chinese foreign ministry claims that the basis of China's status as a developing country in
international law cannot be denied. The ministry pointed to the recognition of such status in
international treaties such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the
Montreal Protocol as proof of its acceptance by the international community. Wang’s statement that
the U.S. was attempting to “deprive China of its developing country status” would seem to further
imply that China’s status as a developing country is permanent.
Such claims are misleading.
“There are no authoritative definitions of ‘developing country’,” Steve Chanozits, an associate
professor of law at The George Washington University, tells AFCL. “There is no consensus
definition in international law. Countries can self-assess their own progress toward their
development goals and the international community can also make such an assessment.”
While there are many international treaties which divide countries into different categories
based on income, with each category bearing different obligations, Charles Kenny, a senior fellow at
the Center for Global Development, told AFCL. These categories and their cutoff points are
determined after negotiation amongst the relevant parties, Kenny says.
Therefore, China’s status is not permanent or “lawfully entitled” as China’s foreign ministry
indicated, but it has a certain time limit and must undergo regular review or redefining by member
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states in the institutions, Chen-en Sung, an expert on international law and director of the Taiwan
Constitutional Foundation, told AFCL. China's developing status shouldn’t be generalized, but must
instead be viewed in light of the respective provisions of the cited treaties, along with the rights and
obligations of countries labeled under different statuses.
Why does it matter whether a country is labeled as developed or developing?
In certain international organizations such as the WTO, the designation of being a developing
country allows a country to seek (but not necessarily to obtain), “special rights or extra leniency.”
“Various categorizations are used for purposes including who gets financial support to
achieve various global objectives, or who gets greater leniency when it comes to international trade
rules or who is eligible for ODA [Official development assistance], there are reasons why countries
might want to put themselves in the ‘developing’ category,” Kenny says.
Furthermore, the label of a “developed” country often carries a responsibility to help poorer
countries in tough economic straits and to abide by more stringent regulations on issues of global
importance such as climate change.
“The PRC often uses its status as a middle-income country to excuse itself from global
responsibilities – including fighting climate change and in the provision of debt relief in the current
debt crisis. However, the sheer size of the PRC’s economy means that it is impossible to deliver
global public goods in climate or in staving off the current debt crisis in many developing countries
if it continues to avoid its responsibilities or adherence to international norms,” a United States
Agency for International Development spokesperson told AFCL.
Conclusion
AFCL found that China’s economy qualifies as developing and upper middle income
according to the respective standards set by the UN and the World Bank. Currently, within the WTO
organization, China is recognized as a "developing country."
However, the status in the WTO is based on self-declaration, and it may be subject to
uncertainty in the future due to its own development or challenges from other members, according
to WTO rules.
China’s foreign ministry’s statement that China’s status as a developing country “rooted in
facts and international law” is misleading.
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International Relations
IS IT POSSIBLE TO CHANGE THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS?
Oleg Barabanov
One of the most important parameters of international relations is their structure. In its
current form, institutionally, this structure is based on agreements between the victorious countries
in World War II. They laid the foundation for the creation of the United Nations and many other
institutions that today coordinate and partly regulate the activity of states at the global level. This
institutional structure (and the principles laid down in its documents) sets at least the minimum
framework and constraints for the functioning of world politics.
In addition to this institutional framework of the structure of international relations, there is
also a much less rigid part of it, which is determined by the balance of power. It obviously has a
greater influence on the dynamics of interaction between states; it has fewer normative elements,
and therefore it is noticeably more flexible and mobile. Various constructions of “polarity” in the
world just reflect this dynamics (real or desired) in this kind of balance of power. Nevertheless, here
too, over the past decades, one can observe a tendency towards the strengthening of quasinormative constraints on the behaviour of states on the world stage. Indeed, the concept of “a rulesbased world”, which is now popular in the West, is one example of making these frameworks more
rigid.
All this leads to the fact that, let’s say, the amplitude of the freedom of states in upholding and
promoting their national interests is becoming more and more imaginary. The question is not only
one of the lack of resources or power available for such actions. Structural limits to this have in
recent decades also played a deterrent role. It is no coincidence that one of the most common
versions in the theory of political realism today is called “structural realism”. Its provisions just
emphasise that the realisation of the national interests of states should take place within the
framework of the existing structure of international relations and not go beyond them.
Of course, structural frameworks and limitations did not prevent major powers from
occasionally breaking them and resorting to military force to advance their interests. The military
campaigns of the United States in recent decades are well known. However, the Americans, as a
rule, later explained these actions not only and not so much in the context of advancing their
interests, but precisely as necessary and forced steps aimed at protecting the existing structure of
international relations and its normative constraints from the danger that threatened them, from
their next adversary. At least, that’s what it looked like from their point of view. According to this
logic, certain US military actions were not seen as breaking the international structure, but,
conversely, as a struggle to preserve it. According to this logic, the United States itself turned out to
be a kind of “global gendarme” standing guard over the system. US allies in the West, as a rule,
supported such interpretations (with rare exceptions, for example, on Iraq in 2003) due to the fact
that they are not indifferent to its principles and values, and also because the US is the most
powerful military power in the world. As a result, Theodore Roosevelt’s old idea of “international
police power” was put into practice. True, unlike the original version, there were not several police
officers, but only one, but these are twists and turns.
In the context of this logic, the conceptual and theoretical scheme of “revisionist powers”, that
gained some popularity, was also formulated. It meant those states that, as it was believed, were
potentially or actually ready to challenge the established structure of international relations and its
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limitations. Russia and China were included in this list of new revisionists in the forefront.
However, sometimes, even in Western analytical articles on this topic, one could come across the
assertion that the United States itself is the main revisionist. However, these are also twists and
turns.
Russia, in its official position, beginning at least with Putin’s Munich speech and even from
the first wave of NATO expansion in 1997-99, declared its disagreement with such an approach. In
the official Russian interpretation, in our opinion, one can trace three lines of first rhetorical and then
real opposition. One was that the postulated desire of the United States for a unipolar world and
domination, which is precisely the main threat to the stability of the international system and the
stability of its structure. America was urged to stop and not follow this dangerous path. It was said
that all world politics should be carried out in strict accordance with the UN Charter and under the
auspices of the UN Security Council; that all issues of European security should be resolved through
the OSCE. Here it must be noted that we can find elements of this approach in official Russian
rhetoric today, despite the radically changed situation.
In parallel to the first line of argument, another topic appeared somewhat later, which did not
quite coincide with the first. Its essence is that if America violates the stability of the structure with
its military operations and introduces a force factor into world politics, then in the conditions of the
postulated multi-polarity of the world, the same kind of things are permissible for everyone else.
According to this logic, examples of American interference in the internal affairs of other countries
serve as a precedent. As the saying goes, “what’s good for the goose is good for the gander.” A
radical, and even forceful violation of the balance of power and stability is not a unique “moral
duty” of the only “global policeman” to protect the normative-value rules of the system, but only a
precedent in the case of the forceful protection of others’ national interests.
Such a “precedent” approach was used for the first time in official Russian rhetoric in 2008,
when the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was equated with the recognition of Kosovo.
Later, a similar comparison of Kosovo and Crimea was noted in 2014. However, as everyone
knows, this logic did not meet with understanding in the West.
After that, in the official Russian position, the third line of logical opposition began to be
traced more and more clearly. This is a near-denial of those normative-value imperatives that the
Western countries postulated as the main constraints on the structure of world, and not only politics.
In this context, the juxtaposition of sovereignty and universalism is beginning to take more and
more place in official Russian statements. Here, more often, an appeal to history begins to appear. A
conclusion is drawn about the civilisational uniqueness in the identity of each people and state, and
therefore the impossibility of uniform rules and values which apply to everyone. In addition to the
“usual” geopolitical revisionism, Russia in its official position from this stage is actively embarking
on the path of normative-value revisionism.
Since February 24, 2022, we can say that the previously existing structure of international
relations has been broken, or completely changed. It will not be possible to return it to its previous
state in any outcome of the current conflict. During the first months of the conflict, the Valdai Club
addressed this topic in the article “World Order: The Limits to Revisionism”. Russia’s transition
from “ordinary” revisionism to posing a direct military and political challenge to Western countries,
on the one hand, makes us recall the old Marxist law of dialectics about the transition of quantitative
changes into qualitative ones. On the other hand, although it is now impossible to talk about any
contours of the new structure of international relations, they will depend on the outcome of the
conflict. It is now absolutely clear that in any case, Russia will be crossed out from the Westerncentric part of the world for a long time, there is no minimum trust on the part of “our Western
partners.” There is, of course, the world majority, which, in our opinion, is watching patiently and
with interest to see how successful Russia will be in its transition from quantitative to qualitative
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changes. It will depend on this whether they perceive the Russian example as a noteworthy
precedent, or as an exception that is better not to repeat. All further trajectories of the political
behaviour of the Non-West in the future structure of international relations will largely depend on
this.
This combination of isolation from the West and the world majority awaiting the outcome of
the conflict allows us to recall possible historical parallels with the young Soviet state in the first
period of its development. At the time, Soviet Russia, by the very fact of its appearance, broke the
existing structure of international relations. Despite individual exceptions, some elements of the
political involvement of the Soviet Union in the external international structure began to appear only
10-15 years after the October Revolution, when the USSR was first allowed to join the Kellogg–
Briand Pact, and then for a short time it was admitted to the League of Nations. In any event, the
inclusion of the USSR in the structure of the international system occurred only following the results
of the Second World War. It was not simply included, but incorporated as a leader of an alternative
development model in the context of a bipolar system.
Only time will tell whether Russia is able to become such a leader of the “alternative way”
amid the current breakdown of the international structure. Everything here depends on Moscow. If
we apply this historical analogy to the present day, then, obviously, it may also be many years
before the stability and inclusiveness of the world system is restored. However, this does not make
the postulates promoted officially by Russia about a just world order, about the richness of the
historical and civilizational heritage in the identity of each nation and state, about the absence of
dominance in the world, and finally, about adherence to the UN Charter, less attractive in
themselves.
(Source: Valdai Club)
ASIAN CONCEPTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Kanti Bajpai, Evan A Laksmana Author Notes
How do major Asian states regard the current international security order? Do they agree or
disagree among themselves? This is an introduction to a special section on ‘Asian conceptions of
international order: what Asia wants’. It draws on articles analysing the stances of China, India,
Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippines and Vietnam towards the
existing international security order usually described as a liberal international order (LIO). It argues
that Asian states substantially support the main constitutive and regulatory norms and institutions
of the LIO, but they worry that the LIO does not consistently honour these norms. Asians disagree
on the centrality of political liberalism, but even Japan and South Korea, the most liberal states, are
uncomfortable with strident criticism, punishment and the exclusion of less liberal states. Asians
also disagree on the role of US alliances: some are strongly supportive, some are ambivalent and
some are negative. Finally, Asians disagree on how they voice dissatisfaction. Japan and South
Korea supplement existing norms and institutions as a way of transcending the limitations of the
LIO; south-east Asian states promote ASEAN's mediatory role for peace and security above and
beyond existing global arrangements; and Indonesia, India and China want to move from being
norm takers to becoming norm shapers. The introduction ends with six policy implications.
How do Asian states regard the present liberal international order (LIO)? To what extent do
they agree with each other? Would they modify or radically change the current order? What are the
implications for policy-makers around the world? The special section presented here comprises a set
of articles by Asian scholars based in Asia, who live and breathe their countries’ international
relations, to address these questions. In the past five years, International Affairs has published two
special issues relevant to our project: ‘Ordering the world: liberal internationalism in theory and
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practice’ (January 2018) and ‘Deglobalization: the future of the liberal international order’
(September 2021). The journal has also published select articles on Asian conceptions of order—
primarily Chinese views of, and alternatives to, the liberal international order. The two special issues
consist of a fine set of articles on the nature and prospects of the LIO, but they were not intended to
answer the broader question of how the non-western world regards the present international order.
Publishing on China's views of world affairs is understandably almost an industry in itself, but the
future of international order and regional order in Asia will be the product of more than just Chinese
preferences.
In addition to China's views of the LIO, this special section features the views of nine other
Asian powers: India, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines
and Vietnam. Five of our eleven authors are women. Our project is aligned with, and contributes to,
global IR's efforts to broaden the terms of debate and scholarship, including the greater participation
of women scholars. International Affairs has played an important role in this endeavour, which we
want to support by following suit. We also note that our eleven contributors come with varied
educational training: three from the United Kingdom; two each from Australia, China and the US;
one from India; and one from Singapore. They and the two editors of this special section are all
working in academic and research institutions based in Asia.
The authors have been encouraged to use official and influential non-official sources to back
their arguments. The broad methodological stance is to focus on ideas and practices. Conceptions of
order are to be found in ideas, but also in government policies and actions since official ideas are
often hidden from view: policies are ‘revealed preferences’. Our authors therefore draw on ideas,
official and non-official, as well as the actual practices of states that reveal underlying values and
interests regarding the LIO.
We define international order as the dominant set of norms and institutions that govern interstate relations. Norms encompass formal and informal rules and conventions, and institutions
include inter-governmental and other international organizations. International order can exist at
different levels, from the global and regional, to sub-regional levels. Scholars disagree on whether
there is a singular order governing all states in the world, whether there are different orders at
different levels, whether different orders exist for different issue areas, and about the degree of
institutionalization of orders over time.
Our special section focuses on conceptions of order among north-east and south-east Asian
states, plus India. Asia consists of various sub-regions, but it is the economic, diplomatic and
military power of these states that places them in a position to challenge the reigning conception of
order. The articles focus on how Asian powers look at a subset of international order, namely, the
international security order: the norms and institutions related to the survival of states and the
management of conflict and competition between them. Our authors do not examine other subsets
of international order in depth (the articles on China and Singapore being exceptions), such as the
international economic order (e.g., the trading system) or global public goods provisioning (e.g.,
how to deal with climate change). This reflects the expertise of the scholars recruited to the project,
but also the view that security issues related to national survival and inter-state conflict dominate
Asian international and strategic thought and practice, as Muthiah Alagappa noted two decades
ago.
Liberal internationalism and Asian conceptions of order
The dominant characterization of the current international order is liberal internationalism.
First, the LIO is fundamentally an international or inter-state order conceived of in terms of the
relations between sovereign states that bear the primary rights and responsibilities of international
life. It is the product of inter-state interactions, and in turn is constructed to preserve the primacy of
states—not civilizations, not empires, not commonwealths, and not tribes and clans.
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Second, if stateness is the primary constitutive norm, LIO features further substructures of
constitutive norms and institutions. From the point of view of Asian conceptions of order, at least
three other constitutive norms are vital: independence, equality, and the rule of law.
Third, the LIO is at its most liberal in terms of its regulatory norms and institutions. G. John
Ikenberry lists five key regulatory norms and institutions: 1) openness in trade and various forms of
exchange; 2) multilateralism or a loose set of rules that govern inter-state relations; 3) cooperative
security which entails that ‘states within the order affiliate in ways designed to increase their
security’, including but not restricted to alliances and collective security; 4) reformism or the
expectation that ‘[p]ower politics can be tamed—at least to some extent’; and 5) political
progressivism towards liberal democracy as a widely accepted form of social organization.
We draw on the ten articles and our own thinking to present a synthetic view of Asian
conceptions of order. First, it is clear from the contributions to the section that Asians hold to the
view that international life should be constituted by states and their interactions with each other.
While much has been made of a historical hierarchy in Asia (Chinese tianxia/tributary conceptions
and Indian chakravartin/vishwaguru notions), our authors find no support for a contemporary
hierarchical international order. To be clear, by hierarchy, we mean the existence and acceptance of a
higher authority. If authority entails a reflexive tendency to obey, no Asian state is disposed to
routinely defer to another state. Nor, on the evidence of the articles here, does any Asian state
demand deference or obedience from others. All Asian states, including China, understand that
some states are more powerful than others, that the great powers will disproportionately shape
international norms and institutions, and that these powers can be dangerous. The mighty are
therefore to be feared (and sometimes used as protectors), but they are not to be routinely obeyed.
As most Asian states suffered under colonialism, it is not surprising that they do not hanker for
hierarchy.
Second, our authors show that Asian states want an international order based on the
constitutive norms of independence, equality, and the rule of law. Independence is the freedom to
choose one's internal political system and to define one's friends and enemies, what some in Asia
call ‘strategic autonomy’. Equality means that in international diplomatic life, envoys and
representatives from every country can sit at the table of universalist organizations. Equality does
not mean that everyone has all the rights and privileges that exist; for example, smaller Asian states
do not expect to have a veto in the United Nations Security Council. At least in principle, though,
Asians support a basic charter of rights and protections available to all. This finds expression in
Asian states’ support for a ‘rules-based international order’: in every one of the ten articles, the
authors note their country's support for rule-based interactions where all states, big and small, help
shape the rules even if they do so differently given asymmetries of power.
Asian states support the key LIO tenets of independence, equality and rule of law, but in their
experience LIO practices often violate those tenets. Asians therefore charge the United States and
other western powers with hypocrisy and inconsistency. Three examples from this special section
are indicative. Chanintira na Thalang notes that in Thailand liberals and conservatives alike have
perceived the West's selective implementation of the principles of democracy and human rights as
hypocritical … Local and international observers have also pointed out the inconsistencies and
hypocrisies in the US government's labelling of military take-overs; for instance, while the US
government heavily criticized the 2014 coup in Thailand, it fell short of designating the 2013 military
take-over in Egypt as a coup.
In Malaysia, Cheng-Chwee Kuik suggests that Washington's lack of action for its Asian
partners was frequently contrasted with the US bailout of Mexico during the 1994 Mexican currency
crisis … Mindful of these uneven and blatantly hypocritical practices, Malaysia and other ASEAN
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members view the dominant LIO arrangements and attendant public goods as necessary but flawed
and problematic.
And Ruonan Liu and Songpo Yang show that criticism has also been forthcoming from
Chinese officials and scholars regarding the ‘hypocrisy’ of the LIO. From their perspective, the LIO
presents itself as a global order accepted and respected by all countries while, in reality, it operates
as an exclusive ‘club’.
Third, as the articles show, virtually all the LIO's regulatory norms find support in Asia,
except the idea of a progressive march towards liberal democracy. Asians support openness in trade
and generalized exchange (including technological), multilateralism, cooperative security (including
alliances) and reformism (i.e., the taming of power politics), but they stop at the water's edge on
liberal democracy. Several states in Asia qualify as liberal democracies, above all Japan and Korea
today, and except for China and Vietnam, they are all electoral democracies to varying degrees. But
no Asian state wants political liberalism with its various features—institutional checks and balances,
the enforcement of justiciable individual human rights and guarantees of an independent media—to
necessarily be the dominant long-term norm in the international system, one that is used in an
exclusionary or otherwise punitive way. At best, as the article on Indonesia by Ahmad Rizky
Mardhatillah Umar shows, Asian states could live with ‘home-grown democratic values’. In this
sense, Asian states are different from most western ones in that the latter support the idea of a
universal preference for liberalism as a regulatory standard.
Divergences among Asian states
The articles show that Asian states diverge on liberal democracy, the alliance with the US, and
the way they voice dissatisfaction. As noted above, to varying degrees Asian states are sceptical of
the insistence that liberal democratic governance must be the aspirational standard of international
order. In Asia, only Japan and South Korea would endorse such a strong view. However, even Japan
refuses to endorse liberal democracy as an exclusionary principle in order-building. Its Indo-Pacific
policy has gradually shifted to emphasizing ‘inclusiveness’. As Ryoko Nakano shows, Japan's notion
of ‘comprehensive security’ going back to the 1970s (now expressed in the Indo-Pacific idea)
recognizes the importance of liberal democracy, but Tokyo's support is not so much rhetorical or
punitive as it is developmental. Tokyo provides developmental aid and capacity-building to
strengthen democracy; it does not seek to condemn and punish.
India under Atal Behari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh, and Indonesia under Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono were strong proponents of the importance of liberalism, as the articles by Atul
Mishra and Umar, respectively, show. While India under Narendra Modi and Indonesia under Joko
Widodo certainly support electoral democracy, they avoid the term liberal. Instead, they emphasize
the need to achieve greater voice for countries of the global South and developmentalism as the
basis for international order. Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand are closer to the
Modi/Widodo perspective in so far as they are uncomfortable with fulsome support of political
liberalism. At the furthest end of the spectrum are the two countries that reject even electoral
democracy: China and Vietnam.
The second divergence relates to the acceptability and importance of the US alliance in the
region. Here again, Japan and South Korea stand out at one end of a spectrum. They are strong allies
of the US, and though there are occasional policy differences with Washington, both states see the
alliance as legitimate and vital for their security and the preservation of regional order. In both
countries, domestic political differences do inflect the degree of acceptability and importance of the
alliance: conservatives tend to be more supportive of the alliance and liberals/progressives less so,
as Nakano describes in the case of Japan and Yongwook Ryu shows in the case of South Korea.
Other Asian states, however, are more ambivalent about the US alliance system. The
Philippines and Thailand are formal allies of the US, and yet over the past two decades, as
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Charmaine Misalucha-Willoughby and Chanintira na Thalang argue, they have intermittently
affirmed the alliance while hedging in the face of China's ascent. Manila under Duterte drifted closer
to China by downplaying the Philippines’ conflicts over the South China Sea, and Bangkok has
increasingly built security ties with China by importing Chinese arms. Driving their ambivalence
has been the US's relative decline, but more importantly Washington's criticism of the Philippines’
and Thailand's human rights record and democratic backsliding.
Further along the spectrum of possibilities are Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam.
All four have stopped short of seeking an alliance and yet have strong defence relations with the US.
Umar shows that since 1948 the cornerstone of Indonesia's foreign policy has been non-alignment.
Though his contribution does not deal with his country's security relations with the US, Indonesia
since the 1960s has maintained strong defence and security ties with Washington. Malaysia, as
Cheng-Chee Kuik suggests, ‘has pragmatically sought to maximize economic and defence benefits
from the US via robust commercial and strategic ties’ while at the same time criticizing American
policies in other regions (e.g., the Middle East) and issue areas (e.g., Asian economic regionalism).
According to Dylan Loh, Singapore too values the US's stabilizing security role, even as it is
irked by American comments on human rights and democracy. In 2003, it turned down the offer to
be a major non-NATO ally (the word ‘ally’ presumably was too strong), but subsequently signed on
to various defence cooperation agreements. Vietnam's historical animosity towards the US and its
wariness over American liberal values have given way to an acceptance that the US security
presence in the region provides a balance against China. As Thuy T. Do notes, [o]n the one hand,
Hanoi sees Washington as an important economic partner and an indispensable security patron to
hedge against China's intentions in the South China Sea dispute. On the other hand, differences in
political systems, democratic values and strategic calculations about China's reactions still matter in
obstructing Hanoi and Washington from elevating their bilateral relations.
India and China are the least likely to endorse the US alliance system. Even though New Delhi
has never been closer to Washington, has deepening defence ties with the US and welcomes an
American military presence in Asia, it has consistently rejected the idea of an alliance and has
indicated its preference for ‘multipolarity’ and a commitment to engagement with both China and
Russia. Mishra notes that at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018, ‘[b]atting for a multipolar order,
[Prime Minister] Modi underlined that India was engaged with Russia, China and the US to provide
stability’. Modi's foreign minister S. Jaishankar casts India as a ‘southwestern’ power that leads a
coalition of the global South—in effect the old non-aligned coalition. China's opposition to US
alliances is well advertised. It was not always so. In the second half of the Cold War, China itself was
a quasi-ally of the US. Beijing has also informally acknowledged that the US alliance restrained
Japan's rearmament and also Japan's and South Korea's nuclear weapons aspirations. With China's
rise, though, as Liu and Yang note, Beijing particularly ‘rejects the notion that the western liberal
democratic values and the system of military alliances are an intrinsic part of the [international]
order’.
The final area of divergence among Asian states relates to how they express their
dissatisfaction with the current order. If we imagine each state has the option of ‘exit’, ‘loyalty’ or
‘voice’, no Asian state, not even North Korea, has exited the LIO altogether. In addition, as noted
above, all ten Asian states featured in this special section display loyalty to key tenets of the LIO.
They do, at the same time, however, express dissatisfaction, particularly over the necessity of
political liberalism and the acceptability of the US alliance. Beyond this, they implicitly or explicitly
voice dissatisfaction with other matters—this is done by creating ‘supplements’ to the existing order
or mounting more thoroughgoing critiques. It is to these supplements and critiques that we now
turn.
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Three major types of voice are apparent. As close US allies, Japan and South Korea largely
support the current order, but add in supplements from their own understanding of regional
security. As Nakano shows, Japan has a long history of introducing new initiatives in Asia that can
be traced back to its comprehensive and human security visions and policies. Both initiatives were
driven by the fear of China, but Japan has not sought to exclude its north-east Asian rival from those
initiatives. Japan's ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ policy may be regarded as an exception. However,
as the idea has evolved, Tokyo now insists that it is inclusionary and not directed against any power
(read: China). The resurrection of the Quad—the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—by Japan may
also be thought of as exclusionary, but that must be balanced against Japan's engagement with
China's Belt and Road Initiative.
As for South Korea, Ryu's paper describes several policies that go beyond the current US-led
LIO. These include its internationalist policies of overseas development assistance and contributions
to UN peacekeeping, its middle power outreach in MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey
and Australia) and Global Pivotal State policy, and its various free trade agreements. While Ryu
does not mention it, Seoul has also put some weight behind its engagement of Eurasia as well as
India and south-east Asia in its New Northern and New Southern Policies, respectively. If there is
actual pushback against the LIO, it is, as Ryu points out, in South Korea's aversion to shaming and
punishing North Korea in international forums for human rights violations. For the most part
though, Seoul, like Tokyo (as Nakano notes about Japanese policy), is interested in a ‘thick’ rather
than ‘thin’ version of the LIO and has broadened its outreach to supplement the existing order.
South-east Asia expresses voice in a different way, namely, through its insistence on ‘ASEAN
centrality’ and the ‘ASEAN way’. As our authors show, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, the
Philippines and Vietnam all look to the organization to provide Asia with norms, institutions and
practices that will promote cooperation, stability and peace. ASEAN's norms, institutions and
practices are not incommensurate with the international order, but they provide an additional
geopolitical and diplomatic space, one in which structure and process are determined regionally and
not dictated by the great powers. At the very least, ASEAN norms, institutions and practices of
inclusivity, informality and continuous dialogue hold up a mirror to existing great power
interactions and provide an alternative ‘operating system’ for managing order. To put it succinctly,
ASEAN represents a mediatory voice.
Indonesia, India and China represent a third pattern of voice. Here the tonality is less
supplementary and mediatory and more critical and assertive towards the current order. Indonesia
is certainly supportive of ASEAN's mediatory voice, but as a leading regional power it is also
increasingly insistent on the need for reform of existing international institutions. Like Indonesia,
India, as a leading power aspiring to be a great power, and China, as a great power aspiring to
become a superpower, are demandeurs. In his recent book, Rohan Mukherjee argues that rising
powers see opportunities for status recognition in international institutions. Their orientation
towards international order is based on the degree of openness and procedural fairness of key
reigning institutions. Put differently, what they want above all in a reformed international order is
recognition that they should be at the high table in global institutions and that they should
increasingly transition from ‘norm takers’ to ‘norm shapers’. This is clear enough in the articles on
Indonesia, India and China.
While there are substantive issues that animate their demands, the three powers want a
greater say in determining the norms and institutions of international order. Liu and Yang note that
‘the diversity and complexity of global and regional crises have revealed the dysfunctionality of the
LIO, leading to calls for a more pluralistic model of governance’. Indonesia, particularly under
Widodo, and India, particularly under Modi, would endorse this view almost entirely. Having said
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that, the three powers are not seeking to overthrow the LIO. Here again Liu and Yang's contribution
is representative:
Although China has no apparent intention to overturn the LIO, it does wish to see an
international order that recognizes its great power status, provides a more equitable distribution of
benefits, and allows resistance to some liberal norms that may jeopardize its core interest and harm
its regime security.
What holds China and presumably the other two rising powers back from more radical
revisionist demands are the power asymmetry with the US, a variety of internal and external
challenges, the lack of capacity to provide global public goods, and also the lack of universal values
to replace reigning values.
Conclusions and policy implications
Our project is not just an academic exercise. Given Asia's rise, how its resident powers view
international order is relevant to policy-makers all over the world. US and Chinese preferences will
have supporters and critics across Asia, and Washington and Beijing and other capitals need to
understand whether and how the rest of Asia views their preferences. Furthermore, future norms
and institutions may not only be defined by the US and China: international order was never just the
product of great power preferences. Our collection of articles offers insights into the international
order preferences of crucial Asian states, including China, to help policy-makers better understand
Asia.
First, despite the worry that the current order is under threat of near-collapse, major Asian
powers are largely supportive of the reigning constitutive as well as regulatory norms and
institutions. For policy-makers everywhere, the lesson is not to panic about the LIO's future and not
to overreact in response to its reported decline. Asian states, as others, have a responsibility to affirm
the international order and not constantly bewail its shortcomings. International order features
‘organized hypocrisy’ (to use Stephen Krasner's description of sovereignty) in its inconsistencies.
Asians as much as anyone must strive for greater consistency, including calling out fellow Asian
powers who undermine order.
Second, the word liberal in connection with the current order disturbs or irks most Asian
powers, conjuring images of an order that is ideological. Asians prefer the term rules-based
international order. To speak the word ‘order’ is to imply rules, either tacit or explicit, but Asians
emphasize the modifier ‘rules-based’ to express their discomfort with the word ‘liberal’. Behind their
discomfort is the fear they will be held to standards that they reject as being unfair or incompatible
with their traditional or contemporary values. The history of European imperialism and its mission
civilisatrice resonates even now with Asians. The policy lesson here may be to underline the
importance of human rights and democracy while avoiding harsh judgments about those who fall
short. For Asians, the lesson is that human rights as an international concern is not a western
imposition. Asians and other non-western powers helped write the human rights charter of the
United Nations. And ASEAN, driven by the region's civil society over the past two decades, has
sought to ingrain human rights in its regional institutions.
Third, Asians are in varying degrees ambivalent about the US's military alliances, but it is
better for allied governments to privately manage their partnership rather than voice public
criticism. The overall policy lesson for the US is that berating smaller Asian countries for not living
up to alliance commitments only alienates them. Asian allies harbour concerns about the rise of
China, and they value US military reassurances, but they do not want to recreate the rigidities of
Europe or east Asia in the Cold War. Publicly, they want to project an equidistance between China
and the US, while relying on the alliance not just for deterrence and defence but also to improve
their bargaining power vis-à-vis Beijing. Constantly ‘fixing’ the alliance is overstretch and overreach.
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Fourth, all Asians want a voice in the construction and maintenance of international order.
They can all point to their contributions to order building, and in this sense the current international
order is not a gift of the western powers: it is important to recognize that it is owned and operated
by Asians and other non-western states as much as by the West. Asian states, as middle and rising
powers, have adapted to and localized reigning norms and institutions. Thus, as Charmaine
Misalucha-Willoughby argues in her contribution on the Philippines, ‘orders persist because of the
mutually constitutive actions of great and small powers … marginalized actors are in fact active and
critical players in the co-constitution of the current liberal rules-based international order.’ The point
is made somewhat differently by Chanintira na Thalang in her analysis of Thailand: ‘Smaller and
weaker states in different regions such as Asia and Africa have succeeded in building multilateral
frameworks and constructing regional orders.’
Fifth, Indonesia, India and China as rising mega-states with a desire to be norm shapers need
to be given greater voice in international negotiations and institutions. Perhaps more pertinent than
India and China's claim to be ‘civilizational states’ is the sheer demographic and economic weight
they will increasingly possess. How they and Indonesia are to be symbolically and materially
accommodated in more influential roles is one of the challenges ahead for international order. As
Umar notes, Indonesia has sought ‘equality’ in international institutions by seeking to reform the
UN Security Council several times over the past two decades.
Finally, domestic politics matters and therefore international order will be prone to flux. Asian
satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the current international order are related in part to domestic
political differences, principally between more conservative and more liberal forces, as our authors
show. This is true not just for Asia: during the Trump and Biden presidencies, the US oscillated
between a more conservative and more liberal view of international order. The articles also suggest
that different domestic configurations will lead to different emphases and intensities in engaging the
international order. In short, policy-makers must be reconciled to periodic inflections in the
dominant norms and institutions of international life and to adapting and adjusting.
(Source: Oxford University Press)
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Interviews
MARKUS POZTEL
Deputy Special Representative for the UN Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan
When the Taliban surged back into power in August 2021, Afghanistan was virtually cut off
from the rest of the world, and decisions by the de facto authorities to further restrict human rights
have only deepened the country’s isolation.
Since then, as international funding has stalled amid skepticism about the Taliban’s return, the
UN has been acting as the world’s "eyes and ears" in Afghanistan. After shifting mainly to
humanitarian work, UN agencies and partners are finding ways to help the long-suffering
population meet basic needs and preserve hard-won development gains.
UN News was recently in the Afghan capital Kabul to learn more about what the UN Office
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is doing to support national partners in addressing the needs of
drug-affected communities and helping to backstop overstretched drug treatment facilities.
While there, we also spoke with Markus Poztel who serves as the Deputy Special
Representative for the UN Assistance Mission in the country, known as UNAMA.
In this exclusive interview, Mr. Poztel talks about the Mission’s efforts to combat drug abuse
and trafficking in Afghanistan as well as the work to restore and protect basic rights in the country,
particularly the rights of women and girls.
He highlighted the UN’s role as a "bridge builder" in a very complex setting where the needs
are as great as the challenges.
While acknowledging work with the de facto authorities in many areas, he tells UN News
“there is no middle ground” on the issue of women and girls' education and that broader human
rights and the decrees banning women’s participation in society “should be reversed as soon as
possible”.
This interview has been edited for clarity and brevity.
Markus Potzel: Afghanistan is still the world’s largest producer [of opium]. We’ve recently
seen a ban [enacted by the Taliban] on poppy cultivation, production, and trafficking. Initial field
reports suggest that there has been a decline in poppy cultivation, which we commend.
We also see efforts to do more for drug rehabilitation centres. The de facto authorities could
allocate more [budgetary funding] to equip these centres with medicine, food, and clothes. But, I
also call on the international community to do more. We do cooperate with countries in the region
who actually are willing to support the de facto authorities on drug rehabilitation.
In terms of livelihoods, there must be more support by the international community because
it’s in all our interests – in the interests of Afghans, but also of donor countries in the West and
regional countries, all of whom are suffering from drug abuse and trafficking.
UNAMA is addressing [this issue] with the political leadership here, and we are trying to find
some common ground to fight drug abuse and drug trafficking and provide the means for
alternative livelihoods.
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Question: How are you able to balance between the work that you need to do on the ground in
Afghanistan and dealing with what is considered by many an illegitimate authority?
Answer: The basis of our activity here is the mandate that the Security Council has given us,
which encourages us to interact with all political interlocutors, including the de facto authorities.
We have to face the realities on the ground. The Taliban control … almost all of the country.
And that’s an opportunity for the Taliban to stabilize and pacify the country. It is also a
responsibility because they have to provide services to the people. They have to provide good
governance and the rule of law. This is where we see deficits. The authorities have an interest in
talking to us because they see us as a bridge builder. We can help convey messages from
Afghanistan to the outside world, and we do it the other way as well.
We have 11 field offices throughout the country. So, we are here. We are the eyes and ears, the
antennae of the international community. We convey messages, and by talking to the de facto
authorities, we also try to foster cooperation and help them get out of this isolation.
We think isolation is not an option, at least not a good option, for the future of Afghanistan.
Question: The ban on women and girls’ education has been devastating for the country’s
development. While we’ve been here, we have even heard this from people working in
institutions that are run by the Taliban. How can a middle ground be found on an issue like this
one?
Answer: There is no middle ground on this issue. Afghanistan is the only country in the world
which doesn’t allow girls to go to school beyond grade six, or to university. There is no discussion
about this; it’s not a bargaining chip. It has to be reversed.
I’m sure that most of the Afghan population, including the Taliban, are against these decrees.
They are in favour of girls’ education. I have not met any officials from the de facto authorities who
are in favour of the decrees banning girls from going to school or university.
[These decrees] are detrimental to economic progress. Girls should have a say. Women
should have a say in this society. [The de facto authorities] should revoke the ban as soon as
possible. Otherwise, there will always be a shadow on the relations Afghanistan has with the
international community.
Question: If the vast majority of Afghans disagree with this ban, including their own people,
why do the Taliban authorities continue to implement it?
Answer: The Emir in Kandahar and his inner circle give a mix of religious arguments and
cultural narratives [for implementing the decrees]. But, on the religious argument, Islamic countries
around the world don’t have this ban. No other country in the world has this ban. The Quran says
“Iqra” which means “read”. It encourages all people – men, women, boys and girls – to read, to
write, to learn.
And in terms of culture, there is a tradition in this country that girls and boys learn. Under the
Republic, not every girl went to school. In remote areas, they didn’t have the chance, but they were
given the right, by the constitution and in law, which does not exist anymore.
Question: Have you received any kind of cooperation from Islamic countries in helping you
deliver this message to the Taliban?
Answer: Yes, of course. There was a delegation of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation
(OIC) that came here and tried to convince the decision makers in this country of the view that
education is part of Islam. So far to no avail, but they will come back. These are scholars from
Islamic countries, including Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Qatar, and Indonesia. [During the earlier visit] a
woman was part of the scholars’ delegation. Islamic countries probably have better access and are
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probably more convincing in talking to the Taliban. We hope that in the end, all our efforts will bear
fruit.
Question: Prior to the political change, the Taliban were the biggest threat to the UN’s work.
After August 2021, what is the biggest challenge now facing the UN’s work in Afghanistan?
Answer: In terms of security, it’s definitely Da’esh, the Islamic State of Khorasan Province.
The circumstances for the UN are getting more difficult because Afghan women now are not
allowed to work for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), nor are they allowed to work for the
UN. This really complicates things because we rely heavily on women in our work. Without women,
it’s very hard … to keep the aid organizations running. We need women to reach out to women.
There are tens of thousands of women-led households in this country because a lot of men in
families have lost their lives in war. And without women, NGOs and UN organizations are not able
to function properly [so] fewer people get access to aid.
Question: What is your message to the de facto authorities?
Answer: I think that the de facto authorities in Afghanistan should let girls go to school
beyond grade six. They should let girls go to university. They should let women work for
international NGOs, for national NGOs, and for UN organizations. And they should let women
participate in social life. If this happens, I can imagine that Afghanistan would be integrated into the
international community again, and international donors would also rethink and probably reinforce
engagement with Afghanistan. Afghanistan needs international help. And we, as the UN, want to
help them help themselves.
(Source: UN News)
MERCY KUO
National University of Singapore
Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic
thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with
Claudia Chia – an independent researcher and former research analyst at the Institute of South Asia
Studies at the National University of Singapore
is the 370th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight
Series.”
Explain the implications of Afghanistan’s recent decision to join the China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor (CPEC) under the aegis of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Statements considering Afghanistan’s entry into CPEC have been published on multiple
occasions by Pakistan and China, and Afghanistan is a formal member of the BRI. However, no real
progress has been made until Afghanistan’s recent decision. The successful signing of the 25-year
Amu Darya oil contract worth $540 million between Xinjiang Central Asia Petroleum and Gas
(CAPEIC) and the Taliban-led administration in January 2023 was a huge win that probably
hastened the process.
Joining CPEC is a wise move for the Taliban to show their commitment to the Afghan
population of rebuilding the Afghan economy. As Afghanistan is landlocked, the development of
more transit routes through Pakistan and China would be important for trade and exports.
However, whether this development entails that the Taliban will make progress on Chinese
concerns like restricting Uyghur militant activities and improving security for Chinese personnel
remains to be seen.
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The Taliban have not received official recognition from any country, and the signing party for
Afghanistan’s entry into the BRI was done under the previous government; hence the current
administration technically does not hold legal competence to enter into a contract. This may be
tricky for projects to be implemented in the long run.
In Pakistan, the pace of CPEC projects has been slowing down post-pandemic and facing
uncertainties against the backdrop of Pakistan’s ongoing economic crisis. The inclusion of
Afghanistan might not be a boost at the present stage, but it does highlight that there is substantial
political will among the three countries to cooperate together.
What are the Taliban’s objectives in cooperating with CPEC?
The Taliban remain essentially cash-strapped and unable to go ahead with significant
economic and infrastructure development due to frozen assets abroad, lack of foreign aid, and
sanctions. The regime also clamped down on cultivation of opium poppies in April 2022, which had
previously been a source of income. There is a need to prove that the regime is capable of leading
and governing Afghanistan through the severe economic disruption and humanitarian crisis. Joining
CPEC/the BRI is thus a logical decision to attract potential investment and business into
Afghanistan.
Further, the Taliban want to break out of their diplomatic isolation, but they have limited
partners and international parties that are willing to help without impositions and demands. China
and Pakistan are the easiest cooperative partners that the Taliban could find. Keeping the bigger
player with more financial might, China, engaged in Afghan affairs is crucial to the Taliban.
How does this development serve the geoeconomic and geostrategic interests of China and
Pakistan?
For China, this development has largely served its belief of achieving security through
economic development. It has proven that the financial assistance and prospects of development
offered by China to the region in exchange for allaying Chinese security concerns has worked.
China’s position as the positive mediator between Afghanistan and Pakistan further cemented its
importance and influence in the region.
Economically, China has not really gained much from Afghanistan. While the media have
widely talked about Chinese interests in the Afghan rare minerals and natural resources, there has
been a history of cancellations and delays of such projects in Afghanistan due to the dismal security
situation. Even if it’s implemented, the development of these sectors does take years, so it will take
some time for economic rewards to flow back to China.
For Pakistan, the inclusion of Afghanistan into CPEC might improve its transit routes,
especially through Gwadar Port and the Trans-Afghan Mazar Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar corridor. It
also brings some useful leverage for the Pakistani authorities to negotiate peace along the PakistanAfghanistan border and to persuade the Afghan Taliban to curb support for the Pakistani Taliban.
How realistic are the Taliban’s expectations of Beijing delivering substantial infrastructure
projects?
I think the three parties currently have realistic expectations that the projects would be of lowrisk and lower costs at this initial stage. The Taliban do harbor hopes for Beijing to invest more in
Afghanistan, but they are also skeptical due to a historical lack of implementation. According to
reports, the January 2023 Amu Darya oil contract contained a clause: “if the said company does not
fulfill all the materials and items mentioned in the notice within one year, the contract will be
automatically terminated.” That reveals that the Taliban are skeptical until actual investment come
in.
Additionally, the administration is aware that it must improve safety for Chinese workers and
meet the Chinese concerns about security by restricting Uyghur militant activities within Afghan
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territory. These two issues would prove critical to sustainable Chinese investment flow. The Taliban
are also looking to other avenues to rebuild the economy, as evidenced in recent secret talks with
Qatari officials.
What is clear is that China is not easily deterred, and it is determined for CPEC to succeed.
Even with the increasing number of attacks targeted at Chinese personnel in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, the occasional fighting along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and the cyclical
disagreements between the Taliban and Pakistani authorities, Beijing remains steadfast in
continuing diplomatic and economic engagement with both sides.
Assess how Beijing is leveraging China’s influence with Pakistan to gain a broader foothold in
Afghanistan and the region more broadly.
Initially in late 2000, Islamabad helped to facilitate Chinese engagement with the Taliban.
Through the different Afghan governments, China maintained its diplomatic and economic
engagement, with Pakistan’s assistance. However, it started to chart its own path of engagement
from 2017 on when it sponsored trilateral dialogue with Afghanistan and Pakistan at the foreign
ministers’ level to resolve political tensions between the two countries.
Now, Beijing is comfortable in dealing with the Taliban on its own and continues to dangle
economic prospects to secure its own security. To a large extent, Beijing’s ability to rein in
Afghanistan and Pakistan represents a boost for it to take up regional leadership in Eurasia. China
has cultivated good relations with neighboring countries of Afghanistan and has actively worked
with them bilaterally and through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to promote peace
and realize common development.
(Source: The Diplomat)
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Kashmir
STRENGTHENING AND GILDING THE CAGE OF OCCUPATION
Tariq Ahmed (Kashmiri-origin freelance writer)
“They make a desolation and call it peace.” -Kashmiri poet Agha Shahi Scholars of political
resistance have argued that domination by a settler-colonial hegemon requires not only silencing the
colonized but also continuous buttressing and entrenchment through displaying and enacting
power through legal, structural, and militaristic means, and ceremonial symbolization.
“The powerful,” writes James C. Scott in his Domination and Arts of Resistance: Hidden
Transcripts (1990), “…have a vital interest in keeping up the appearances appropriate to their form
of domination. Subordinates, for their part, ordinarily have good reasons to help sustain those
appearances or, at least, not openly to contradict them.” It is an accurate description of the current
relationship between India’s total domination in the Indian Administered Kashmir (IAK) and
Kashmiris’ subtle resistance.
Matrix of control in Kashmir
India has dominated the political discourse through military control, extra-judicial killings,
and disappearances, civilian surveillance, police raids on adversaries’ homes, and incarceration of
human rights advocates and non-conforming journalists on trumped-up charges. They rely on the
lawless colonial law, Armed Forces, Special Powers Act (AFSPA), militarized traffic control and
curfews, and curtailing civil liberties. And, all the while, forwarding its settler-colonial project
through demographic changes aimed at changing the Muslim-majority character of Kashmir. This
demographic engineering is designed to impact the UN-mandated vote of self-determination-long
overdue.
This matrix of control also includes collective punishment of the population using a wide
range of tools of the repressive regime such as assaults, subtle and harsh indignities, and
defilements, including torture, mass frisking, cumbersome vehicle searches, disappearances, tying of
hands to electric poles and trees, blindfolding, using pellet guns for blinding protesters, or chasing
them towards fast flowing rivers, resulting in their death by drowning. To camouflage the reality of
Kashmir and Kashmiris, the Indian government uses opportunities to promote a false image of
“normalcy” couched as development. The only time India invites foreigners to Kashmir is for
supervised tours of representatives of foreign dignitaries while caging the locals. Public displays of
grandeur, such as holding international conferences in the disputed territory, pock-marking the
scenic landscape with Indian flags, holding musical concerts and other social festivals showcasing
and eulogizing India’s progress under the façade of “development” have become a staple of their
propaganda tactic.
Claws of biopower and necropolitical systems of control
To manufacture consent, where the occupier’s writ goes unchallenged, even accepted under
duress, the state has used administrative, legislative, judicial, Machiavellian political, and military
power to manage the everyday affairs of the people’s lives, including arrogating itself to immiserate
and end lives at will. The Kashmiri bodies have been rendered expendable using the claws of biopower and necropolitical systems of control and servitude. These necro-punitive techniques not only
cause but also tolerate a certain threshold of death as necessary. Having caged the population to the
largest open-air prison on earth- Kashmir-, the state has imprisoned thousands in the far-flung,
dingy jails in India. These incarceration sentences are also served vicariously to the relatives and
others deemed to be associated with political activists.
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While maintaining a semblance of normality in their living conditions, militarized as they are,
Kashmiris harbour lingering memories of the injustices perpetrated by the state. While overt public
resistance is in suspended animation, the hidden resistance is well and alive. It percolates the psyche
of every living generation of Kashmiris in the region and elsewhere. Kashmiri’s political disguise,
where they insinuate their resistance through diverse survival strategies, cannot be mistaken for
consent. The luxury of moving “freely” and maintaining a semblance of life’s routine amid a
daunting network of police and military surveillance network is contingent upon the population
giving into this daunting matrix of control. This absent presence of resistance-a presence that is
strategically incognito, unspoken, and covert – while strikingly proscribed and repressed by the
state – is best described through the cliche “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”
Governmentalization of life
A common hallmark of settler-colonial occupation is the governmentalization of people’s
lives. Anyone seeking government jobs, or a passport must undergo police verification of noninvolvement in purported anti-state activities. The structural violence of unemployment and police
scrutiny has sought to demobilize collective resistance and erode nationalist solidarity among the
desperate masses. The state, being the primary source of economic activity, employment, welfare, or
security against routine crime, and the captive population’s dependence on the state for these civic
and material needs, is used as an inducement to remain peaceful and silent.
Constitutive silence
This haplessness has inevitably led to silence on the streets of Kashmir while the memories of
multiple massacres linger in people’s collective memory. This is the sulking of a subalternpowerless and disenfranchised people whose hands have been tied. Kashmiris are not silent by
choice; they have been silenced through structural, legal, and aggressive methods and technologies
of state repression.
Some compelling ethnographic surveys in Kashmir have demonstrated that counterhegemonic and counter-mapping narratives are operationalized at the deepest levels of Kashmiri
society. This is particularly true among the youth: millennials and Generation Z. Conversations
about the injustices and the crippling technologies of repression are a staple of office and dinnertime conversations, daytime chats in the tea shops and buses, social gatherings and weddings,
hushed-up voices in schools and universities, and various social media platforms. The truth of
Kashmiri’s subjugation, alienation, and resistance lies under the carpet, expressed only in a whisper.
They represent the resistance narratives through art forms, fiction, poetry, and resistance literature.
Diasporic Kashmiris are overtly and covertly working with allies in the social and political
justice spaces to highlight the plight of their kith and kin in Kashmir. Kashmiri-origin scholars and
their partners from diverse fields actively contribute to knowledge -creation about Kashmir’s
political struggles and India’s settler-colonial enterprise in the territory.
Failure to erase Kashmiri nationalism
Repression has not secured Kashmir for India. Decades of attempts at erasure or
manufacturing consents have failed to integrate Kashmir with the Indian Union. Kashmiris have
always viewed the Indian occupation of their territories as an existential threat and likened it to the
Israeli occupation of Palestine. The seven decades of brutal occupation and the most recent
escalation of repression have resulted in the terminal and deeply ingrained alienation. India’s
callous disregard for the sentiments of the people is on full display, but the state lacks confidence. It
does not trust Kashmiris with freedoms afforded to Indian citizens, for example, in Mumbai or New
Delhi. A recent World Press Report from Kashmir has noted that “there is an overwhelming belief
among Kashmiris that a solution to this conflict is no longer possible within the ambits of India’s
constitution.” Pakistan’s irredentist interest in Kashmir is merely part of a more significant problem
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confronting India. By its admission, India’s right-wing ruling class has used the bogey of Pakistan’s
involvement for electoral advantage. As is clear from the recent revelations by Kashmir’s former
governor, Pakistan serves as a political punching bag for weaponizing the Indian public.
Routinizing the occupation
The Indian state has embarked on many settler-colonial measures to alter Kashmir’s
demographic profile. While the insidious plan of demographic change was first introduced in 1947
in the Jammu region, resulting in the ethnic cleansing and displacement of estimated half a million
Muslims, the current target of demographic change is once again the Muslim enclaves in the Hindumajority Jammu region, such as Doda, Rajouri, and Poonch. With introducing the colonial-settler
laws of granting Domicile to non-Kashmiris, and changing the land laws of Kashmir, the project of
demographic change is well underway.
Thousands of Hindu refugees from the neighbouring countries have been settled in these
areas to dilute their Muslim majority character. Yet, most of the settlers are of Indian origin and
predominantly of Hindu heritage. By opening the floodgates of settlers from India to own land in
Kashmir, the state aims to undo the indigenous land ownership at a slow and steady pace.
The sole beneficiary — during the upcoming 2024 elections — of these gerrymandering
machinations will be Prime Minister Modi’s right-wing ruling party. The state has devised legal and
legislative tools to appropriate native land and created a litany of brutal legal and administratively
punitive measures for those who resist. The Economist recently quoted the region’s pro-India
politician, the former chief minister Mehbooba Mufti as saying: “Everything is about snatching land,
jobs and resources from locals here and giving them away to wealthy corporate allies of the present
dispensation [Modi’s nationalist party BJP].”
Thick on propaganda
The state has sought to impart a sense of false consciousness among Kashmiris and global
audiences by systematically reframing the root causes of the conflict. They use the classic settler
colonial labels of development, peace, and progress, where Kashmiris are mystified to go blind to
their oppressions; For global audiences, they invoke the spectre of terrorism. Since the latter has
brought diminished returns, they have weaponized trade to buy international silence on the issue. A
recent report in The Economist dismisses the claims of normalcy in Kashmir as untrue. The state has
used the development myth even as unemployment in the Kashmir region stands at 24%, three
times higher than the national figures.
The international silence
India has used, to its advantage, the archaic and dogmatic Westphalian conception of
‘sovereignty’ -immutability of international borders-which callously disregards the aspirations of
the people held captive, against their will, within those borders and failed to acknowledge the
exceptional nature of internationally recognized disputes such as Kashmir. The Western
governments’ duplicitous politicking, motivated by geostrategic and trade interests, is illustrated
when China’s territorial claims in Tibet are touted as an ‘occupation,’ and the annexation by India
and Israel of the territories they occupy is not.
The U.S has demonstrated that it will look the other way while Modi unrolls the juggernaut of
rabid Hindu nationalism bent upon brutalizing and erasing Kashmir and depraving the minorities
in India of their human rights; the U.S. is only too willing to sacrifice the principles of human rights
at the altar of the Great Game seeking to contain China. It is no wonder that the affected people in
Kashmir and Palestine do not trust the Western governments as honest brokers and perceive them
as complicit in perpetuating their prolonged agony. Compounding this is the lack of any bone in
international humanitarian law.
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End piece
All territorial occupations, including Kashmir’s, must end. Under the shadow of the gun, this
forced occupation is against the will of the Kashmiri people. Kashmiris can be held to ransom or
kept silent only for so long. The Diplomat has termed this silence ‘dangerous’ and warned, “Sooner
or later, it will burst out in a disaster.” The writing has been on the wall for a long: As a settlercolonial power, India may have been able to force submission, but it has garnered no loyalty in
Kashmir. It never will.
(Source: Daily Times)
THE ROLE OF THE GLOBAL KASHMIRI DIASPORA
Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai
The crisis in Kashmir – and the United Nations’ ineffectual response – represents an example
of the failure of the United Nations to respond effectively against massive and persistent violations
of human rights. Kashmir also represents a failure of the United Nations to use its mandate to seek
equitable peace and justice. The United Nations always tries to examine how it can more effectively
prevent human rights violations, it is instructive to examine the experience of Kashmir and seek
lessons for increasing the UN’s effectiveness.
In 1990, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the massive expansion of freedoms
around the world, the people of Kashmir began to seek their right to self-determination, as promised
by the United Nations resolutions. To suppress this growing sentiment among the Kashmiri people,
the Government of India began committing massive abuses of human rights.
These abuses, which continue today, include the systematic use of rape; the arbitrary arrest,
torture, and summary execution of Kashmiri civilians; firing into unarmed crowds of peaceful
demonstrators; and the burning of entire villages and communities by Indian troops. Since 1990,
over 100,000 people have been killed by occupation forces in Kashmir, and thousands more have
been maimed or wounded. Many of the victims are women and young children. Over 10,000 women
have been raped by Indian occupation forces. And according to a report published by ‘The
International Peoples Tribunal on Human Rights and Justice in Indian Administered Kashmir
(IPTK), 8000 to 10,000 people have disappeared in Kashmir. Their wives are known as ‘half-widows’
because they do not know whether their husbands are dead or alive.
Recently, after the abrogation of Articles 370 & 35A on August 5, 2019, India enacted Domicile
Law to change the demography of Kashmir. More than 4.3 domicile certificates have been issued to
non-Kashmiris to allow them to reside inside the state. Today, India is the worst example of settler
colonization. It is reported that the Government of India has earmarked 203005 acres of land in
Jammu & Kashmir for land grabs. Besides, the Indian army is engaged in confiscating local homes
and evacuating the locals from their business establishments, in particular from the hotels which
have been built in the most scenic areas in the Valley, like Gulmarg – famous for its skiing scenes in
Asia.
All of these actions are perpetrated by the Indian Government with one singular purpose to
prevent the implementation of the UN resolutions. And yet, the UN has been unable to respond
effectively to this political and humanitarian crisis.
The solution to the crisis in Kashmir lies in dialogue between all parties concerned – The
governments of India, Pakistan and the genuine leadership of the people of Jammu & Kashmir. But
India has chosen destruction over dialogue, jailing political prisoners, like Yasin Malik, Shabir
Ahmed Shah, Masarat Aalam, and Aasia Andrabi and human rights activists, like Khurram Parvez,
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journalists like Irfan Mehraj, Asif Sultan, Sajad Gul, Fahad Shah, etc and implementing a brutal
campaign of terror against the civilian populations in Kashmir.
How long will the world watch in silence as India carries out the genocide of the people of
Kashmir? This is a question the Kashmiris are asking today.
At this guardedly propitious time, the role of global Kashmiri diaspora leadership is pivotal,
and its responsibilities are correspondingly great, particularly when leaders like Syed Ali Geelani &
Mohammad Ashraf Sehrai are no more with us and the rest of the Hurriyet leadership is
incarcerated. It is a historical fact that Diaspora in other international conflicts have proved essential
to political change and direction like the South African diaspora became instrumental in toppling
the scourge of apartheid. An amorphous collection of people, no matter how well intended, have
never achieved anything politically significant. The leadership of the global Kashmiri diaspora
cannot blithely assume that progress towards achieving self-determination will come spontaneously
from the people without their advice, guidance, example and encouragement. The diaspora
leadership cannot be summer soldiers or sunshine patriots. History will hold them accountable for
their success or God forbid any failure.
The responsibilities of the diaspora are manifold. First is to teach and practice the adage that if
we do not hang together, we will all hang separately. Diaspora leadership must subordinate
individual quests for political power, prominence, and another gain to the common good for all
Kashmiris.
In addition, what matters is not who obtains public credit, but that success is achieved. Petty
jealousy has no place among Kashmir’s diaspora leadership circle. All should accept unreluctantly
personal sacrifices necessitated by the urgency of the Kashmir issue. As Dr. Gregory Stanton,
Chairman, of Genocide Watch has warned, ‘Kashmir is at the brink of genocide.’ Emulation by the
Kashmiri people will follow and generate the dynamics indispensable for the inevitably arduous
struggle for self-determination. The time has come that all Kashmiri diaspora Organizations,
Councils, Associations, Forums, Coalitions, Missions, Movements, Foundations, etc. must pursue
one single agenda item: the unfettered right of self-determination of the people of the State of
Jammu & Kashmir. If the need arises, we can gladly agree to disagree.
The North Star for diaspora leadership must be feasible, not utopian. The world is
unsentimental. On the international stage, might is customarily more powerful than right. National
interests ordinarily trump intellectual consistency, international law, democratic rights and
professed universal standards of justice. But there are exceptions, God only knows why? such as
East Timor, Namibia, and Southern Sudan. Moral suasion occasionally exhibits teeth. Diaspora must
be skilful in orchestrating the complex array of cynical and high-minded motives of nations to
achieve a symphony playing the lofty theme of self-determination for Kashmiris. Such orchestration
will be more an art than a science and will require sleepless labour and lucubration to succeed. It is
not a task for the indolent or dull.
Diaspora must neither stumble nor waver in the task of attaining self-determination for
millions groaning under repression and grim privation.
In approaching a Kashmir resolution, the sole non-negotiable issue should be respecting the
consensus of the people of all five regions of the state of Jammu & Kashmir with whom sovereignty
resides.
Diaspora leadership not only has to maintain its narrative, but the narrative should be equally
coherent. We do not need to invent it. It is already there with international sanctity. Here is a prime
example of the international recognition of the Kashmiri narrative.
When India felt that the people of Kashmir will never vote to accede to India, its delegate, V. P
Krishna Menon delivered a speech of record length at the Security Council where he said ‘In any
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case, the changed conditions since then had made the agreement obsolete, and the merger of
Kashmir with India could not be revoked.’ The response to this fabricated narrative came from a
person no less important than Professor Joseph Korbel, former Chairman, of the UN Commission for
India, and Pakistan (UNCIP), who wrote in ‘The New Leader’ on March 4, 1957, entitled, “Nehru,
The UN and Kashmir. “This new Indian stand raises issues which far transcend the problem of
Kashmir. For if a nation which has accepted a United Nations commitment can blithely assert that
‘circumstances have changed’ and the commitment is no longer binding, then the effectiveness of the
United Nations has been dealt a staggering blow.”
Professor Korbel added, “More is at stake in Kashmir than the fate of a remote Asian province.
The UN’s handling of this question may depend much on its future moral and political authority.”
Joseph Korbel also wrote in ‘Danger in Kashmir’ on page 351, “The people of Kashmir have
made it unmistakably known that they insist on being heard. Whatever may be their wishes about
their future, they must be ascertained directly or through their legitimate, popular representatives.”
“If it (solution of Kashmir) is not achieved, India and Pakistan, indeed the whole free world may
reap the harvest of shortsightedness and indecision of unpredictable dimensions.” (By the way,
Professor Korbel was the father of Dr. Madeleine Albright, and teacher of Dr. Condoleezza Rice at
Colorado University, both former United States Secretaries of State).
Let us take a leaf from the vision of Professor Korbel and move forward unitedly to try to
achieve our ultimate objective: the unfettered right to self-determination for the people of the State
of Jammu & Kashmir.
(Source: The Nation)
G 20 SUMMIT IN DISPUTED TERRITORIAL AREA
Majid Bashir (Former judge and President of Centre for Rule of Law Islamabad)
The distancing of leading economies among the G20 countries such as China, Saudi Arabia,
Turkey, Oman and Egypt marred the efforts of the Indian government to ‘showcase Kashmir as its
territory’ by organising the G20 meeting in the disputed territory — Srinagar, the capital of the
Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK). The world cannot be befooled as they know
that the Kashmir is a disputed area under the UN resolution and its fate has to be decided by the
Kashmiris.
Formed in 1999, the G20 is a group of the world’s largest economies and function as a global
forum on numerous economic issues. The G20 is a forum compromising 19 countries with some of
the most immense economies as well as the EU. The G20 Summit is considered to be a leading forum
of the international economic cooperation. It plays a vital role in forming and reinforcing the
worldwide global structure and administration on all major international economic issues. India is
also a founding member of the G20 and plays a vital role in forming the programme consequence of
the summit.
Speaking about India hosting the G20 tourism working group meeting in Srinagar and
summit in Delhi in September, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari claimed “it was a
violation of international law”. On the other hand, India said it will showcase Kashmir’s cultural
heritage and develop its tourism potential during the summit. The delegates will conduct traveling
tours and will have communication on strategies to promote film tourism”, agreeing on an official
statement. The G20, which brings together the world’s 19 richest countries as well as the European
Union, represents 85% of the world’s economic output and two-thirds of the world’s population.
However, two top-notch members of G20 did not participate in this summit due to selection of
venue by host country India along with Turkey, Oman and Egypt. Three Muslims countries — the
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UAE and Indonesia as member of G20, and Bangladesh as observer — sent their delegations in the
summit. Around 57 delegates from 27 countries participated in the summit. This was the first major
global event India hosted in the disputed territory since it revoked its special status on 5th August
2019, when India abrogated article 370 and 35(A) of its Constitution; and on 31st October 2019, the
parliament of India gave the order of reorganising Jammu and Kashmir into two union territories
Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh and also changed the whole demography of the region. The
Government of Pakistan has strongly condemned the choice of venue and exposed India’s
irresponsible actions and series of selfish measures to maintain the illegal occupation of Jammu and
Kashmir, sheer disregard for UN Security Council resolutions and in violation of the UN Charter
and the principles of international law.
The UN special rapporteur on minority affairs recently criticised the meeting, saying that by
holding the session in Kashmir, ”India is seeking to normalise what it is. Some describe it as a
military occupation.” As India strives to make this scenic, conflict-ridden valley a welcoming
destination for travelers and tourists from all over the world, Pakistan has no choice but to continue
to internationalise the issue and keep it up in major forums. The UN representative said
international human rights commitments and the UN declaration of Human rights ought to be
maintained by associations such as G20 group.
As the calendar of events reflects India aiming the summit, these included G20 and Youth 20
meetings in Kashmir’s summer capital Srinagar. Kashmir is partly controlled by the two nucleararmed neighbours who have combated two of the three wars on top of the region. The Himalayan
region of Kashmir has been a flashpoint among India, Pakistan and now China. Eventually China
availed the opportunity of the changed geopolitical landscape of Ladakh after the constitutional
amendment on Jammu and Kashmir by India. Then Chinese troops moved in Ladakh, and another
war between India and China took place. Resultantly, China took huge chunk of land from Ladakh
and closed all the corridors of India’s entrances to GBT and CEPC.
Indian having planned to host this G 20 summit in Srinagar has raised lots of concerns for G20
member states about ethical, moral and legal implications of hosting this event in disputed Jammu
and Kashmir. The venue of this summit is an example of severe human rights violation, killings of
innocent Kashmiris by Indian military forces for last many decades. The G20 is a significant
economic forum for discussing world important economic issues but India has made this forum
more controversial with the choice of venue for all parties involved.
Through accepting events in disputed territorial areas, G20 cannot achieve high objectives and
sustainable economic governance in the region. Simultaneously economic activities do not flourish
where human rights are under threat and UN has to play a role in conflict resolution. This bizarre
decision of India can lead to tension and conflicts between countries and may even exacerbate
existing law and order situation in Jammu and Kashmir
The hidden conspiracy behind choosing this venue for G20 summit is to legitimise illegitimate
act of India’s control over the region. India is dreaming to attract FDI and signing BITs with G20
member states in tourism and entertainment sectors in violation of the UN charter and international
economic practices for hosting such a summit in disputed territorial area. India is indulging leading
countries in that region for an investment and economic activities, whereas the local residents
cannot move and work freely and the whole valley has been locked for the last 1400 days and the
area is an intra-disciplinary subject and has overwhelming military component.
Pakistan has voiced concerns at various international forums and tried to internationalise the
Kashmir issue at bilateral and multilateral forums with great success. On the diplomatic front, China
and Saudi Arabia have opposed and expressed their dissatisfaction and displeasure on the venue,
indicating India not to repeat this practice and reiterated that Jammu and Kashmir is disputed area.
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Pakistan should pursue the UN for official statement on this choice of venue and seek legal
action against India in terms of preventive measures on pending the UN Security Council
resolutions and demand for setting up an independent ‘UN Commission of Inquiry’. Pakistan could
potentially lead to a diplomatic escalation with G20 countries and seek support from member states,
especially Muslim states, to boycott the event if it happens again in Jammu and Kashmir.
(Source: Express Tribune)
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Law
PAKISTAN’S ARMY ACT
What is it, how does it work?
Abid Hussain
Pakistan’s government has said it will take action against Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)
supporters involved in damaging military buildings and installations last week under the Army Act
and Official Secrets Act.
PTI supporters stormed the streets across the country last week following the arrest of the
party chief and former Prime Minister Imran Khan. His supporters were seen damaging public and
private properties, including the residence of a top military commander in Lahore and the gate of
the army’s General Headquarters in Rawalpindi.
The army was called up by the government in the capital, Islamabad, as well as the Punjab
and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces following the deadly protests.
Thousands have been arrested, including top PTI leaders, and the government has repeatedly
said it will take strict action against those involved in the riots.
The decision to try those involved under the Army Act was announced on Tuesday after a
meeting of the National Security Committee chaired by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.
What is the Army Act and who does it prosecute?
The Pakistan Army Act, which was brought into force in 1952, is used to put military
personnel on trial under the military’s own legal code. In some provisions and cases, this law is also
applicable to civilians.
The act was meant to prosecute army personnel and civilians attached with the military in
some capacity.
In 1966, under the rule of military leader Ayub Khan, an amendment was made to the act
whereby civilians accused of inciting mutiny within the rank and file through written and verbal
material, could be tried under the act.
Civilians accused of sharing official state secrets with the enemy may also be tried in a
military court as well as those civilians who are accused of targeting and attacking military
installations.
How are trials carried out?
The court that hears cases brought under the act is called the Field General Court Martial. This
military court functions under the supervision of the military’s legal directorate, also called the
Judge Advocate General (JAG) branch.
The president of this court is a serving military officer, and the prosecution counsel is also a
military officer.
Those tried in the court are given the right to have lawyers, and in case they cannot afford
one, they can appoint military officers to represent them.
If convicted, defendants have the right to file an appeal within 40 days to an army court of
appeal.
If, after going before the army court of appeal, defendants believe they have not received a fair
trial or express dissatisfaction with the proceedings, they can subsequently go to higher courts.
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What are the punishments?
Depending on the severity of the offence, the punishments can vary from two years to a life
sentence, and even capital punishment.
Have any cases resulting from the protests been sent to a military court?
The government is compiling evidence, military courts have yet to be established and no case
so far has been sent for a hearing.
Authority lies with the federal government to determine if a trial should take place through a
civilian or a military court, according to retired army official Inam ul Rahiem, who was formerly
attached with the military’s JAG branch.
“In case the government feels that civilian courts or the civilian judicial system is not
performing its duties, it can send the cases to military court,” Rahiem told Al Jazeera.
Who has been tried under the Army Act?
Pakistan has had a history of cases being sent to military courts.
According to Rahiem, under the tenure of Khan as PM between August 2018 and April 2022,
more than 20 civilians were tried under the law.
One of the convictions was that of human rights activist Idris Khattak, who was sentenced to
14 years in 2021 on charges of espionage. Khattak was convicted of providing sensitive information
to a “foreign intelligence agency”.
In 2020, the Peshawar High Court rejected the convictions of nearly 200 people and ordered
their release if they were not found guilty of any other crime. The individuals were allegedly
members of banned groups and were accused of attacking civilians and the military.
The convicts were sentenced to either capital punishment or various prison terms.
What has the reaction been?
Rahiem said it is “never a good thing” for a military court to operate in civilian society.
“The fact that a civilian government itself requisitioned the military’s help to maintain peace,
it does allow the army to have additional powers so that they can implement law and order,” he
said.
The decision has been roundly condemned by human rights organisations within Pakistan
and abroad. Amnesty International said trying civilians in military courts is contrary to international
law.
“This is purely an intimidation tactic, designed to crack down on dissent by exercising fear of
an institution that has never been held to account for its overreach,” Amnesty said in a statement.
“… The right to a fair trial, guaranteed by Pakistan’s constitution, is severely undermined by this
move and cannot be justified.”
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan has also opposed the use of these laws to try
civilians.
“While those responsible for arson and damaging public and private property during the
recent protests should be held to account, they remain entitled to due process,” the group said.
(Source: Al-Jazeera)
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CAN A CIVILIAN BE TRIED UNDER THE ARMY ACT?
Asif Mahmood (Lawyer and author)
As the paranoid political-legal climate grows febrile, a crunch question to the fore: can a
civilian be tried under the Army Act or there is an absolute prohibition for such a trial under the
Constitution?
To get a correct answer to this question we have to look at the matter from the following
angles;
What does the Army Act say?
Is it ultra-virus to the Constitution?
What does the precedent law say?
What have been the legislative tradition, practices, and policies?
Section 2 of the Army Act has spelt out who can be tried under the Army Act. Subclause (d)
allows civilians to be tried if they are accused of seducing or attempting to seduce any person
subject to this Act from his duty or allegiance to the government or having committed any offence
concerning the naval, military, or air force affairs of Pakistan under the Official Secrets Act.
The heart-rendering May 9 episode was not a political protest that turned violent. It is
believed to be a mutiny aimed to eviscerate the state institution from within. Taking away the files
from the Core Commander’s house, destroying and attacking the military installations, and
belonging to Armed forces fall under the purview of the Army Act and the Official Secret Act and
can be tried by the military courts as per section 2 of the Army Act.
Is it impermissible under the Constitution? Should it be and can it be are abutting here but the
fact is not denying that there is no prohibition in the Constitution. Article 10 A of the Constitution
only talks about a fair trial. Whether or not a trial is fair depends upon the facts of every trial. There
is no hard and fast rule that every trial in an ordinary court shall be declared a fair trial and a trial in
a military Court is destined to be an unfair trial. A trial may be fair in any court of law and it may
accomplice the opposite in any court depending upon the facts and details of every case separately.
Admittedly, there is no right of appeal available under the Army Act. Section 133 of the Act
explains that no appeal or application shall lie to any Court exercising any jurisdiction whatsoever
(except to the Chief of Army Staff). However one can initiate the writ jurisdiction of High Courts
and Supreme Court. The right to review is also available on grounds of coram non-judice, mala fide
and without jurisdiction and the superior courts can review the sentences awarded under the Army
Act.
Again ‘should it be’ and ‘can it be’ are abutting here but that is another thing the Parliament
should look into. The fact is that Army Act has been amended many times and can be amended in
the days to come.
The decision to try those involved in May 9 incidents is not unprecedented either. This is not
the first time civilians are being tried under the Army Act.
Pakistan Army (Amendment) Act 2015 also provided explicitly that those involved in
terrorism or attacking military installations could be tried by military courts under Army Act.
Though enacted for a short period, it is no longer in the field, yet it is sufficient to cull this ambiguity
about whether or not civilians can be tried under the Army Act. Supreme Court has also declared
that a civilian can be tried under the Army Act. (2017 SCMR 1249)
Even in the tenure of Imran Khan’s premiership, 25 civilians were tried by the Military Court
under Army Act. If it was unconstitutional and a violation of human rights, why did the Imran
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government remain silent on it? Wouldn’t it have been much better if the Imran government had
amended a section of the Army Act as well?
Pertinent to mention here is the fact the Army Act has been amended many times, ( Most
recently in Imran Khan’s government). Had there been any issue, the same should have been
amended by the Parliament. As far as the law is there, things should go by the law. The Army Act is
the law of the Land. The military court is established by the law of the state. The trial of civilians by
this court under the Army Act is again the law of the state, sanctioned by the Parliament.
Reaffirmation by both the Houses (National Assembly and Senate) through resolutions is also there
that civilians involved in May 9 episode should be tried under the Army Act.
Should a civilian be tried under the Army Act is another thing and the Parliament must
unravel this knot once and for all but as far as the legal position at the moment is concerned: yes
civilians can be tried under the Army Act and there is no absolute prohibition for such a trial under
the Constitution.
Now that the matter is in Court, let’s hope the confusion surrounding this subject will finally
be culled.
(Source: Daily Times)
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Middle East
A CHANGING MIDDLE EAST
Opportunities and challenges for Pakistan
Umar Karim (A doctoral researcher at the University of Birmingham)
The strategic and security environment of the broader Middle East has undergone significant
shifts in the recent past. These changes have implications for Pakistan’s relationship with regional
stakeholders.
During the last decade, regional geopolitics in the broader Middle East had been shaped by
the political environment and fault lines created by the Arab Spring. However, this phase of political
contestation ended with the Al-Ula reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Qatar and afterwards,
the normalization of the relationship between Turkey and the Gulf States put to bed the Arab Spring
inspired political poles in regional politics. This has been followed by the rather historic political
breakthrough between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
From a Pakistani perspective, these new regional trends need to be welcomed. This is not
simply because Pakistan has always stressed upon the vitality of regional de-escalation and the need
for dialogue between regional stakeholders, but also because Pakistan owing to its geographical and
political proximity, was impacted by middle eastern politics.
Pakistan has found it difficult to maintain a strong working relationship with Iran which also
happens to be Pakistan’s western neighbour. Moreover, the conflation of geo-economic points of
interest between the two sides has been overshadowed by the bilateral divergence on geopolitics
and an insecure borderland. The sectarian variable and the involvement of Pakistani recruits in
Iran’s regional wars haven’t helped the situation either. This has meant that even as the decision
makers on both sides have time and again tried to constructively engage with each other and to
develop regimes of trust, a reset in the bilateral relationship was always hindered. A good example
has been the Iran Pakistan Gas Pipeline Project that has now been stalled for more than a decade.
Pakistan’s political neutrality was a difficult position to maintain in the wake of a politically
charged regional atmosphere. Political normalization in the region now allows Pakistan to focus on
developing strong bilateral ties with all stakeholders without worrying about regional divisions.
The other key development has been the entry of new players in regional geopolitics and the
emergence of new inter-regional political formations. China’s entry into the geopolitics of the region
as a mediator is a most positive development for Pakistan. Since, Chinese and Pakistani interests in
the region overlap, a greater Chinese role in the Middle East and in particular the Persian Gulf, will
inadvertently also put Pakistan into a frontline geopolitical position. It’s a development that will be
received with anxiousness in New Delhi, which has come to rely heavily upon energy supplies from
the Gulf.
Yet, the greater integration of India in the Arabian Gulf security infrastructure is a point of
concern for Pakistan which has been losing its stature as a security contributor vis-a-vis the Arab
Gulf States. India’s burgeoning strategic partnerships with Saudi Arabia, UAE and Oman on the top
of its already significant economic linkages with these states makes it difficult for Pakistani
policymakers to retain their strategic relevance outside of the Chinese bracket.
For now, Pakistan’s authorities are content by the Indian failure to convince its middle eastern
partners to attend a rather inconsequential G20 tourism meet in Indian-administered Kashmir.
However, they have yet to fully appreciate how India’s political stature in the broader Middle East is
rapidly ascending and how it is increasingly seen as a member of the great power club and as a part
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of the new regional security architecture. Since Pakistani politicians and decision makers are marred
in their internal political conflicts, it appears they have become completely ambivalent to these very
real challenges to Pakistan’s strategic interests in the Middle East.
(Source: Arab News)
HOW THE RUMBLE IN RUSSIA REVERBERATES AROUND THE
MIDDLE EAST
Paul Salem (President and CEO of the Middle East Institute)
This past weekend, Russia looked like Sudan: a state-backed militia goes rogue, challenges the
hand that fed it, and pushes the country toward civil war. Seismologists call the rumbles that
precede a major earthquake, foreshocks. It is too early to tell if the Wagner Group “uprising,” led by
Yevgeny Prigozhin, and quickly defused, will prove a one-off, or if it is indeed the first in a series of
foreshocks indicating the crackup of President Vladimir Putin’s leadership and an eventual more
seismic collapse. The events of the weekend focused the attention of capitals in the Middle East as
around the world. Some capitals had more to fear than others. What would an actual collapse of the
current Putin-led order in Russia mean for the Middle East?
A big loser would, of course, be Iran. Iran and Russia have effectively become allies, as both
have been fighting together in Syria to defend the Assad regime, and Iran has been sending drones
and other military assistance to help Russia prosecute its war against Ukraine. As the United States
withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and ramped up sanctions against
Iran, Tehran was satisfied that it had a rival great power, Russia, on its side; the relationship grew
deeper as Russia too sank under sanctions, and the two countries cooperated in building alternative
economic and financial relationships to sidestep sanctions. China is a friend of Iran but not an ally. It
has not been willing to break with the West nor back Russia militarily and wants to maintain
balanced relations not only with the West but also with Iran’s Arab petrostate neighbors across the
Gulf.
A collapse of the Putin-led order in Moscow, if it is replaced either by chaos or a new
leadership intent on taking Russia in a different direction, would leave Iran strategically vulnerable.
This might lead it to double down on its aggressive/defensive strategies — nuclear program, missile
development, proxy militias in the Arab world — which have served it seemingly well over the past
four decades, including during times when Russia was indeed off the world stage; but it might also
indicate an opening for U.S.-led and international pressure to push Iran to return to the JCPOA or
even a stronger version of it. Despite all his bluster, when faced with a real challenge, Putin
compromised. History has shown that the supreme leader in Iran also makes concessions only when
he has few viable choices.
Of course, any diminution of Iran’s power registers as a high concern for its proxy militias
throughout the region, from Hezbollah in Lebanon, to the militias in Iraq and Syria, as well as the
Houthi movement in Yemen. Not surprisingly, most of these groups issued ringing messages of
support for Putin in this internal Russia struggle.
Surely the most urgent level of concern over the events in Russia must have been felt in the
presidential palace in Damascus. Russia’s military and air force literally rescued Bashar al-Assad’s
regime from likely imminent defeat in 2015, and Moscow has continued to provide a great-power
guarantee — both militarily and politically/diplomatically — for the regime’s continuation. If
Russian forces were to withdraw from Syria, either because of a change of regime in Moscow or
simply as a result of gathering internal conflicts inside Russia, the Assad regime’s strategic situation,
both internally and externally, would become much more vulnerable. Yes, Iran and its proxies
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would remain at Assad’s side, but the loss of the Russian pillar would be a crippling blow. Russia
has become less focused outside the Ukrainian theater since the 2022 invasion, from the Caucasus to
the Middle East. The possibility of a further loss of focus or a withdrawal altogether would be a
strategic calamity for the Assad regime.
Luckily for Assad, the internal and external foes that almost brought him down several years
ago no longer pose the same danger. Internally, the opposition is divided and fractured, with little
momentum and capacity to reignite a large-scale challenge. And the external actors that had
mobilized earlier — e.g. Turkey and Qatar, and even the U.S. and the Arab Gulf countries to a
limited degree — are no longer oriented toward waging a direct or proxy war in Syria. In other
words, even as the Syrian government is, as it were, a “dead man walking,” it might continue to
stumble along for some time without immediate demise. Yet if a strategic vacuum in Syria deepens,
these conditions could change.
More immediately, an Assad regime bereft of its Russian support would become much more
potentially vulnerable to Western/international and regional pressure to accept concessions it has
refused so far: the pressure would/should focus on forcing a return to serious political negotiations
over meaningful political reform, the inclusion and return of opposition figures, the release of
political detainees, and a gradual return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). It
should also include pressure to fully shut down the Captagon drug trade and limit Iran’s and
Hezbollah’s free hand in Syria.
Most other Middle Eastern and North African capitals have maintained friendly and diverse
relations with Moscow, but none have a major strategic dependence on it as is the case in Iran or
Syria. Among those countries, Algeria, which arguably has one of the strongest military
relationships with Moscow, also maintains various strategic alternatives. And one should not
confuse the generally neutral stance that most countries in the region took in 2022, refusing to join
the West in a full condemnation or rupture with Russia over its war in Ukraine, for some major
strategic influence that Russia has in the region.
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) value their relations with Russia to
help manage global oil markets. Israel has a large Russian population and has needed Russia’s
acquiescence to prosecute its military campaign against Iranian targets in Syria. Egypt and other
large MENA countries import large amounts of Russian (and Ukrainian) grain, and have shopped in
Russian arms markets for equipment that they have not been able to secure from the U.S. or the
West. The collapse of the Soviet Union was indeed a seismic event in the MENA region more than 30
years ago, as the USSR had truly built up a wide and deep alliance network in the region; a collapse
of the Putin-led order would have only limited effects in the wider region, although it might have
quite acute effects on Iran, Syria, and Iran’s proxies.
In a wider lens, the events of the past week, and particularly if they lead to more foreshocks
and then a final collapse, intriguingly color the implicit debate between autocracy and democracy in
the MENA region. For the past decade, authoritarian models in Russia and China, seemed to exude
stability, capacity, and the ability to lead economic development and grow regional and global
influence. Democracy, on the other hand, appeared to be in an embarrassing downward spiral in its
birthplaces of the U.S. and the United Kingdom, while the 2011 “Arab Spring,” which demanded the
downfall of autocrats and the reliance on ballot boxes, spiraled in various directions, few of them
positive.
What the events in Russia communicate is that underneath the impression of stability and
strength lies an extreme fragility and precariousness. Of course, this lesson should have already
been learned in the events of the Arab Spring themselves, when decades of Arab authoritarian rule
— seemingly enduring and unassailable — fell like a house of cards in numerous Arab countries. As
noted above, the Russian scenario had already played out fully in Sudan a few months ago. But
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other autocratic rulers in the region, whether in Egypt or elsewhere, who seemed reassured by Putin
and Xi Jinping’s longevity in power at a time when U.S. presidents and U.K. prime ministers came
and went, must now have real cause to rethink their self-confidence.
The events should trigger a renewed consideration of the power of democratic systems. In
autocracies, the ruler is tough, but the system is weak; in democracies, even after a slew of
questionable “rulers” — even those who tried to take a sledgehammer to the democratic system —
the system itself has proven extremely tough and lasting.
The rumble in Russia might prove a passing crisis and might be forgotten within a few
months; or it could foreshadow a coming collapse. The West, Europe, and China are, of course,
watching this closely. Suffice it to say, that many are watching in the Middle East as well, some with
more concern and urgency than others.
(Source: Arab News)
WHY ISRAEL'S OFFENSIVE ON JENIN WAS A FAILURE
Ameer Makhoul
Israel's Minister of Defence Yoav Gallant boasted that the offensive in Jenin has "fully
achieved" its goals, claiming that when Palestinian fighters return to the refugee camp, they would
"not recognise it" due to the severity of the attack.
"Most of them left their place of residence, and those who remained hid in places where they
were protected by the civilian population, such as hospitals. This is something that indicates more
than anything the cowardice and lack of courage that they tried to demonstrate on the outside,"
Gallant said.
The Israeli military's reaction, on the other hand, was more serious. It expressed real concern
that the Palestinian resistance and tactics - including the use of explosive devices - would expand to
various areas in the occupied West Bank.
Gallant appears to be speaking to the Israeli public to promote himself and increase his
political clout by concealing the failure of his offensive rather than presenting an honest picture of its
outcome.
'Palestinian triumph'
Seeking to raise Israeli morale, Gallant bragged that the Palestinian fighters fled during the
attack. Yet it can also be said that Israel's army - considered one of the most advanced in the world
and equipped with its airforce, satellites, elite forces and cutting-edge military technology - failed to
advance into the centre of the Jenin refugee camp.
Instead of marching, the soldiers crawled on the ground to avoid being sniped. During their
withdrawal from the camp, the scene was more of a retreat in armoured vehicles and personnel
carriers.
A more thrilling scene was the victory celebrations from the camp's residents along with the
fighters following the Israeli army's withdrawal. These are the refugees whose families and
grandparents were expelled from Haifa and its surroundings during the Nakba in 1948, and who
were recently displaced from their homes which the army seized to use as shields and military
barracks after destroying them.
While the displacement affected one-third of the camp's population, this popular spontaneous
scene of celebration depicts the Palestinian triumph.
But why did the Israeli Minister of War use the term "fled" to describe the resistance fighters,
whose number does not exceed a few dozen and who do not possess any lethal weapons, while the
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Israeli military and civilian media portray them as a regular army with a military arsenal and a
command staff?
The answer to this question lies in the objectives of the attack on Jenin, which - as mentioned
by the Israeli media beforehand - was to turn the Jenin camp into a "cemetery for terrorists". Ron
Ben-Yishai, an Israeli military analyst for Ynet, pointed out the "disappointment in the army as a
result of the small number of dead" among the Palestinian fighters.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Gallant consider the Jenin camp the "capital
of terrorism", while Israel's security agency, Shin Bet, said the objective was to eliminate the
"terrorist infrastructure" and the "advanced combat capabilities, including the development of
rudimentary rocket capabilities".
However, the managing director of the Institute for National Security Studies and the former
head of the Military Intelligence Division, General Tamir Hayman, estimated that the resistance
"lives in the hearts of the Palestinians" and has no capital, and therefore cannot be eliminated by
storming the Jenin camp.
Hayman added that Israel has "only the military option without any political horizon".
A new 'Nakba'
If we consider this to be the central objective of the Israeli government, then it has ultimately
failed to achieve it. The resistance has not been eliminated, nor have its capabilities or accumulated
knowledge in the art of combat and confrontation.
On the contrary, events on the ground have proven that the resistance anticipated the
occupation army's invasion, monitored its movements, and determined how, where and when to
confront it amid a battle between two unequal parties. The Palestinians stood firm in the face of the
Israeli war arsenal.
Another Israeli objective was to target the Palestinian popular base, which is the Palestinian
people as a whole and the residents of the camp in particular, considering them part of the "terrorist
infrastructure".
This was the main motive for the targeting of civilians, the complete destruction of
infrastructure, the cutting off of water, electricity and communication services, as well as the forced
displacement of 5,000 people from their homes, which reminded Palestinians of the Nakba.
The destruction of property, on the other hand, reminded them of the attacks carried out by
settler gangs, which include burning villages and destroying property in Huwwara, Turmus Ayya,
Um Safa and Masafer Yatta.
The objectives of these various operations are integrated and interrelated. They are aligned
with the prevailing Religious Zionist ideology that prioritises a "project of resolution" for the
Palestinians - in other words, ethnic cleansing - and annexation instead of occupation.
The ideology seeks to create a situation where it is in the Palestinians' interest to leave their
homeland. This project was formulated by the minister of security, Betzalel Smotrich, who is also the
leader of the Religious Zionism party and the official responsible for managing affairs and
settlement in the occupied West Bank.
The occupation has sought to suppress the consciousness of Palestinians, terrorise the
population with mass destruction and expulsion, and make them pay the price for being the popular
incubator of the resistance.
As a prelude to another broad offensive on the northern region of the West Bank, including
Nablus, the central political objective of the offensive in Jenin is the re-settlement of the northern
West Bank. This comes after the Israeli parliament annulled in March 2023 the Disengagement Law
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of 2005, which mandated Israel's disengagement from Gaza and the northern parts of the West Bank,
and following the re-establishment of the illegal settlement of Homesh.
The goal is to build dozens of settlement outposts in the area, and to Judaise and annex it in
accordance with the coalition agreements.
Annexation policy
For the occupation, achieving this objective requires eliminating the resistance in this area and
marginalising the role of the Palestinian Authority, especially since the resistance targets the Israeli
army and settlers. Israeli settlers will not relocate to live in this area unless the state provides them
with security and tranquillity, which will be achieved at the expense of the Palestinians.
This would mean the failure of the Judaisation and settlement project of the northern West
Bank, and a temporary failure, at least, of the annexation project, which Palestinians will resist.
This project was initially marginal in Israeli politics but gained significance after former US
President Donald Trump endorsed it, and following the rise of Religious Zionism to power, which
has a significant influence over Israeli politics and a strong ideological conviction.
This could lend the annexation project political weight while certain aspects of it were
implemented on the ground in the Palestinian territories, under what is known as the de facto
annexation, without announcing it officially.
The results of the attack on Jenin were disappointing for those who held on to the annexation
project.
Through a political decision, the Israeli army sought to carry out a mass expulsion of
Palestinian refugees from the camp, which indicates that the mentality of displacement and the
Nakba still runs deep within Israeli rule. There are people who support it and advocate for its
implementation.
However, Palestinians responded by returning to their homes immediately after the
withdrawal of the occupation forces, while a significant portion of the population refused to leave
their homes despite threats by Israeli soldiers.
The mentality of the Nakba and displacement has not changed, but the mentality of
Palestinians has. They do not want to leave their homes, towns or lands. They insist on staying in
their homes no matter the severity of the occupation or the aggression.
To the Israeli forces, particularly during military operations, Palestinians are enemies
wherever they may be and should be targeted as such.
On a political level, Netanyahu succeeded on two important matters. Domestically, he gained
the support of the heads of the parliamentary opposition regarding the attack and the government's
decision. He also enjoyed unanimous support from the national Zionist consensus, including from
the popular opposition, which did not take a stance against the aggression, while the large-scale
protests sweeping the country "for democracy" ignored the attack.
Internationally, Netanyahu received unequivocal support from the Biden administration, as
well as from Britain and Germany, who backed "Israel's right to protect its citizens" and condemned
"Palestinian terrorism".
According to estimates, Netanyahu's popularity has increased, especially as Israeli society and
media do not care about the number of Palestinian casualties or the extensive destruction. They
primarily and solely focus on Israeli losses.
The Palestinian situation is subject to ongoing Israeli aggression whose methods may change,
but its essence will always persist.
The ruling political class does not have any prospect for a just solution or even effective
management of the occupation and the conflict. It relies mainly on military force to address or
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postpone crises. However, what actually happens is that each aggression sparks the opposite of its
intended goals.
The resistance will emerge from the recent offensive more determined, experienced and with
broader popular support.
Israel will seek to provoke internal Palestinian discord, particularly between the two main
political factions, Fatah and Hamas, in order to achieve its military objectives through Palestinian
hands. This is currently the most dangerous scenario.
Israel's aggression did not change the rules of the game but rather reinforces persisting Israeli
policy. The occupation army may have withdrawn from the Jenin camp, but its next offensive is only
a matter of time, and the countdown has already begun.
Providing protection for Palestinians is, therefore, an urgent need and must become a top
priority.
(Source: Middle East Eye)
CHINA DOES NOT HAVE TO BE A U.S. ADVERSARY IN THE
MIDDLE EAST
Barbara Slavin (A distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center in Washington)
There is no shortage of issues for Secretary of State Antony Blinken to raise on his upcoming
trip to China. U.S.-China relations are at a low point over Chinese support for Russia in Ukraine,
trade disputes, and rising threats against Taiwan. But one area could provide space for cooperation
that would benefit both parties and the wider world: preventing a new crisis in the Middle East.
The Stimson Center recently convened a symposium of experts to talk about risks and
opportunities in an increasingly multipolar Middle East. One consensus view was that China need
not be a U.S. adversary there but could contribute to de-escalation of tensions.
In recent years, China has become the region’s main trading partner but has largely remained
a free rider in terms of diplomacy and security. In March, however, Beijing helped finalize an
agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia restoring normal diplomatic relations between these
historic rivals. Then, on June 14, Chinese leader Xi Jinping conspicuously hosted Mahmoud Abbas,
the long-time leader of the Palestinian Authority. No one believes China can broker an end to the
seemingly intractable Israeli-Palestinian dispute, but Beijing could use its economic leverage with
Tehran – the largest backer of Palestinian militant groups – to pressure the groups to take or refrain
from taking certain actions.
As the largest importer of Middle Eastern oil, including sanctioned Iranian oil, China is in a
unique position to push Tehran to cool tensions with the United States and Israel both regionally
and on the nuclear file. As previously observed by experts at our Stimson exercise, “The fact that
China is the major purchaser of Iranian oil is a disincentive to Iran ever carrying out its repeated
threats to close the Strait of Hormuz to tanker traffic.”
China can also encourage Tehran to accept what appears to be an emerging understanding
with the United States that Iran will not enrich uranium to weapons grade. Enriching to 90 percent
purity appears to be a red line that could spark an Israeli and/or U.S. strike on Iranian nuclear
facilities. That could lead to a wider conflagration. In preventing such a scenario, China would be
serving its own interests as opposed to those of Russia, which would see prices for its oil skyrocket
in the event of a crisis in the Persian Gulf. China would also be contributing more generally to global
non-proliferation.
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Despite all the talk of a “pivot to Asia,” the United States is not leaving the Middle East. There
are still some 30,000-40,000 American troops stationed in 10 Arab countries, Israel, and Turkey, and
the United States is still the main supplier of military aid and weapons to the region. The U.S.
Central Command has now officially assumed responsibility for relationships with both the Gulf
Cooperation Council and Israel—a significant change from when the U.S. European Command dealt
with Israel to avoid offending Arab partners. But the perception among many in the region is that
the United States can no longer be counted on. There have been too many strategic debacles, like the
2003 Iraq invasion which largely benefited Iran, and the bungled withdrawal from Afghanistan in
2021. There is also concern about the lack of consistency in U.S. policy toward the Middle East as
vividly demonstrated by the Trump administration, which withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal in
2018 when Iran was still in full compliance with it. This led Iran and Iran-backed proxies to retaliate
against both Americans in Iraq and Syria and U.S. Arab allies. The 2019 strike on Saudi oil facilities
and attacks on ships sailing from the United Arab Emirates – which met with no immediate U.S.
response – have helped push the region to diversify its great power relationships and to seek deescalation with Iran.
The Biden administration has continued one policy of its predecessor – trying to expand the
so-called Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel, the U.A.E., Bahrain,
Morocco, and Sudan. Blinken was just in Saudi Arabia, where he reportedly pushed the Saudis to
also formally recognize the Jewish state. But the Saudis are putting forward pre-conditions – such as
access to uranium enrichment technology and U.S. security guarantees – that the U.S. Congress is
unlikely to accept. The Saudis are also demanding Israeli concessions to the Palestinians that the
current right-wing government in Tel Aviv is loath to provide. In addition, Riyadh is unwilling to
portray the Abraham Accords as an anti-Iran alliance, as its Trump administration architects
envisioned, and is eager to see an end to the destabilizing war in Yemen.
Détente is the mood of the moment in the Middle East, and China can help. It can show that it
is a constructive global power, not just a consumer of fossil fuels, a provider of cheap consumer
goods, and a lender of last resort.
If China succeeds in helping lower Middle East tensions, it shouldn’t be seen as undercutting
the United States, which can return to the role of offshore balancer rather than heavy-handed
hegemon. Not all competition needs to be zero-sum.
(Source: Just Security)
WHY NATO MUST NOT FORGET ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST
Luke Coffey (Senior fellow at the Hudson Institute)
The leaders of the 31 NATO member states will meet in Vilnius, Lithuania, this coming week
for the alliance’s 2023 summit. The summit comes at an important time in terms of transatlantic
security. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is well into its second year and Ukraine’s counteroffensive has
recently begun. The decisions taken at the summit could have a long-term impact on the overall
stability of the transatlantic region and beyond.
Without a doubt, the primary focus of the summit will be Ukraine. In this context, expect two
big issues to be discussed: future NATO membership and continued military support for Ukraine.
Fifteen years ago, at the Bucharest NATO Summit in 2008, Ukraine was promised eventual
membership in the alliance. Over the years, little progress has been made — mainly due to the
reluctance of some countries, like Germany and France. In retrospect, leaving Ukraine in this
geopolitical limbo was probably one of the factors that enticed Russia to invade. Had Ukraine been
in NATO, Russia would unlikely have dared to attack.
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Nobody should expect an invitation to be extended at the summit for Ukraine to join NATO.
It would be impossible to find consensus among all 31 members to invite any country to join the
alliance while it is fighting a war. Instead, expect NATO to establish a roadmap that leads to
eventual membership for Ukraine. Kyiv wants to join NATO immediately, so it remains to be seen if
the alliance can provide a roadmap to membership that meets its reasonably high expectations.
Another issue that NATO members will discuss at the summit is the ongoing and long-term
military support for Ukraine. Over the past 18 months, NATO members have been increasing the
amount and types of weapons provided for Ukraine’s self-defense. In February 2022, the debate was
about sending Ukraine anti-tank weapons. Today, NATO members are sending Ukraine some of the
most advanced tanks in the world. However, more contentious items, such as fighter jets and longrange rockets, have remained elusive for Kyiv. It is likely that NATO members will use the summit
to discuss the possibility of providing Ukraine these more advanced weapons.
The issue of defense spending will also feature at the summit. Defense spending across
Europe, or the lack thereof, is a perennial issue for the alliance. In 2006, NATO agreed that each
member should meet the target of spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product on defense.
However, in the subsequent years, very few members ever met this goal.
After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO set itself a new deadline of 2024 for its
members to comply. Although defense spending across NATO has increased year on year since
2014, the overall situation remains dire. Last year, only seven members met the 2 percent benchmark
for defense spending. While a few more members might reach the benchmark before next year’s
NATO summit in Washington, the vast majority will not. This will have long-term consequences for
the overall health of the alliance.
Keep an eye on Sweden, too. Soon after Russia invaded Ukraine last year, both Finland and
Sweden submitted applications to join NATO. For centuries, both countries maintained a position of
military nonalignment — meaning neither would join military organizations like NATO. Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine changed this. In April, Finland was formally admitted into the alliance.
However, Sweden’s application has been held up over concerns Turkiye has over the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party’s presence in the country. Behind the scenes, NATO Secretary-General Jens
Stoltenberg has been working closely with Turkish and Swedish leaders, trying to find a resolution
to this impasse. Many will be watching to see if Sweden gets into the alliance at the upcoming
summit.
Readers of Arab News will naturally wonder if the Middle East and North Africa region will
get any attention at the upcoming summit. Unfortunately, it probably will not. This is shortsighted
on NATO’s part. Whether it is regional terrorism emanating from extremist groups or the threat of
nuclear proliferation in Iran, NATO members share many of the same security concerns as the
countries of the MENA region. Furthermore, many of the countries in this region have demonstrated
a willingness to cooperate with NATO and have even contributed troops to NATO-led missions in
the past.
The alliance should be finding ways to build on these relationships. So far this year, there have
been some positive developments regarding NATO-MENA engagement. Just last week, a senior
delegation from Mauritania visited NATO headquarters in Brussels for talks about security
developments in the Sahel. Last month, a senior NATO delegation traveled to Bahrain to discuss
enhancing military cooperation. Meanwhile, other senior-level engagements with the region this
year include Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan.
While the focus of the alliance must remain on the threats in Eastern Europe, there are a few
easy things that NATO can do to enhance its engagement in the MENA region. These steps could
include appointing a NATO special representative for MENA and actively pushing to enlarge the
memberships of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.
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The former, launched in 1994, forms the basis of NATO’s relations with its Mediterranean
partners: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative, launched in 2004, is the basis of NATO’s relations with the Gulf states. Although all six
members of the GCC were invited to join, only Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE have done so.
At next year’s summit in Washington that will mark the 75th anniversary of the founding of
NATO, the successes of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative should
be highlighted and a meeting of both should take place at the heads of government level.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year changed the security landscape in Europe in a way not
seen since the Second World War. NATO must simultaneously bolster the security of Europe and
remain aware of future threats beyond the region. With the right leadership inside NATO, the
upcoming summit can usher in a new era of regional stability and security. Not just for Europe, but
for the Middle East and North Africa too.
(Source: Arab News)
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National
THE SPECTRE OF FOOD INSECURITY
Dr Sumaira Gul
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is reeling from the devastation caused by unexpected rains during the
wheat harvest.
The rains, attributed to the growing menace of climate change, unleashed a wave of
devastation upon the crops, leaving many farmers in despair and the region’s food security hanging
by a thread. The urgency to devise robust strategies to combat the far-reaching consequences of
climate change has never been greater.
“The unexpected rainfall during the wheat harvest has created significant challenges for the
farmers, who lack the resources to compensate for their losses,” says Muhammad Iqbal from Swabi.
He says the untimely rain not only disrupted the harvest but also had detrimental effects on the
quality and market value of the yield.
Iqbal says a rainfall following the harvest increases the moisture content of the grain, leading
to sprouting. This causes the grain to germinate within the ear, resulting in a reduction in both
quality and market value. The sprouted grains are less desirable for consumption and are not
suitable for milling into flour or other wheat-based products.
The consequences of sprouting have a significant economic impact on farmers. Wheat, is a
major cash crop in the region and crucial for the livelihoods of many farmers in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa. The reduced market value of the grain translate into financial losses for the farmers.
Iqbal’s statement highlights the distress and frustration experienced by farmers who are
unable to mitigate the effects of unexpected rainfall during harvesting.
The rains this year are a reminder of the vulnerability of agriculture to climate change. With
changing weather patterns and more frequent extreme events, farmers face increasing uncertainty
and risk in crop production. Both the government and the stakeholders need to recognise these
challenges and develop strategies to support farmers in adapting to and mitigating the impacts of
climate change.
In April 2023, a report by the Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) of the
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) had identified Pakistan as one of the countries expected
to face heavy rainfall. The report predicted excessive rainfall and warned that it could have adverse
effects on seasonal crops, necessitating government intervention and implementation of new
strategies to raise awareness among farmers.
Dr Sadaf Bashir, an assistant professor at Shaheed Benazir Bhutto Women’s University,
Peshawar, and an expert in environment and climate change, emphasises the gravity of the
situation. She says heavy rains and hailstorms in various parts of the country have exacerbated the
food security crisis. A shortage of essential grains can lead to increased food imports, soaring prices
and exacerbated hunger and malnutrition. Wheat, the primary staple food for a large portion of the
population, has been significantly impacted, particularly during the final stages (from March to
May).
Dr Bashir stresses the importance of investing in climate-smart agricultural practices. This
includes adopting high-yield crops, implementing effective soil and manure management
techniques, efficient water management, water conservation methods, capacity building for local
communities and establishing an agricultural information system for farmers. These measures are
crucial for enhancing land resilience and productivity in the face of climate change.
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The repercussions of rains during the wheat harvest extend beyond storage and grain quality.
Farmers and their families experience psychological distress as they witness their hard work being
washed away. Akbar Hayat Khan from Mardan says the uncertainty gives farmers sleepless nights
during the harvest season. Rains not only degrade grain quality but also render the bran moist,
thereby degrading the animal feed.
Heavy rains can lead to lodging, where wheat stalks bend or fall onto moist soil. This makes it
challenging for farmers to efficiently harvest their crops, resulting in further production losses.
According to the Pakistan Meteorological Department’s Monthly Climate Summary, April 2023
witnessed above-average rainfall (+12.5 percent over the previous year).
Professor Dr Khan Bahadur, a former vice-chancellor of Agricultural University Peshawar,
says the changing rainfall patterns can have a huge impact on Pakistan. Despite Pakistan
contributing less than 0.1 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions, it ranks among the 10
countries most affected by climate change. He says rainfall on harvested crops not only decreases
wheat production but also results in the degradation of wheat flour quality, rendering bread made
from such grains unappetising.
The Global Climate Risk Index 2020 report emphasises Pakistan’s vulnerability to climate
change. The country has now become the fifth most affected nation in the world. This is a significant
concern, considering that at least 24 percent of the population is below the poverty line.
The production of wheat in Pakistan is estimated to be 25-30 million tonnes, which is close to
the consumption level. The average production per hectare stands at 3.3 tonnes, highlighting the
importance of maintaining a steady supply to meet the population’s food requirements.
Dr Bahadur’s statement underscores the urgent need for Pakistan to address the consequences
of climate change. Despite its minimal contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions, the country
suffers disproportionately from its effects. The increasing frequency of heavy rains during critical
agricultural periods exacerbates the challenges faced by farmers and jeopardises food security.
To mitigate these risks, Pakistan must prioritise implementing climate-resilient strategies and
sustainable agricultural practices. This includes investing in infrastructure for water management,
promoting efficient irrigation techniques, adopting climate-smart crop varieties and strengthening
disaster management systems. Additionally, raising awareness among farmers about climate change
and its implications will enable them to make informed decisions and adapt their farming practices
accordingly.
Addressing climate change is not the responsibility only of high-emissions nations. It is a
collective global effort. Pakistan, as one of the countries most affected by climate change, must
advocate for international collaboration, knowledge-sharing and financial support to mitigate its
adverse effects on agriculture and ensure the well-being of its population.
Despite the challenges posed by early rainfall, there is a silver lining. The replenishment of
groundwater reserves and increased soil moisture levels in KP offer an opportunity for farmers to
cultivate secondary crops such as pulses, vegetables and fodder. Diversifying income sources
beyond a single crop can help reduce dependence and enhance the resilience of farmers, says
Professor Dr Azeem Shah of the Food and Agriculture Department.
The Bureau of Statistics reported a 57 percent decline in wheat production in 2022 compared
to the previous year and attributed it to unexpected rains and floods. The data for the current year
will be compiled by the end of July.
The government should prioritise addressing the plight of farmers whose crops have been
devastated or affected by the unanticipated rains. Climate change is a real crisis that demands
immediate attention and should be treated as a global tragedy. A national strategy must be
formulated not only to tackle food insecurity but also to uplift the farming community.
(Source: TNS)
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EDUCATION AND THE FLOODS
Shewa Ram Suthar
Over the past decade, Sindh has experienced devastating floods, notably in 2010, 2011, 2020
and 2022. Additionally, the Covid-19 pandemic had a huge impact. These natural disasters caused
widespread destruction in the education sector by disrupting the academic year and causing
damage to the physical infrastructure.
In Pakistan, the devastation caused by floods is large-scale. According to the figures from
Pakistan ECWG (Emergency Coordination Working Group), approximately 26,000 schools were
destroyed. Around 7,000 schools were used as shelters/ for the flood-affected population. This
significantly disrupted the educational infrastructure across the country, making it even more
challenging to provide quality education to children affected by the floods.
The floods impacted the learning and education of primary and secondary-level students. This
situation further compounded the already existing challenge of a substantial number of out-ofschool children.
According to the rapid research report from the Pakistan Coalition for Education (PCE) with
the collaboration of the Pakistan Education Champion Network-PECN, the flood in 2022 further
exacerbated the learning gap, affecting the education of more than 3.5 million children in Pakistan –
59 percent of them in Sindh. 37 percent of the affected children were girls between the ages of 5 and
16. This was a significant setback for an already struggling education system. The absence of a
comprehensive remedial mechanism to address this educational gap compounded the challenges
faced by the education sector in Sindh.
In the context of the flood, several organisations with the support of the UNICEF focused on
engaging children for two to three hours daily. However, there was a lack of attention to the
students’ needs, particularly considering that most of them were from flood-affected areas. There
was a notable absence of mechanisms to address trauma and provide psychological assistance to the
students.
A relevant example is the approach taken in Sri Lanka after a cyclone hit. They engaged the
students in meaningful activities such as drawing and innovative outdoor activities to help divert
their attention from their situation. In contrast, in Pakistan, particularly in Sindh, the students were
burdened and overwhelmed with excessive, unnecessary activities.
During the flood, some individuals who sought shelter in schools caused significant damage
to the premises. They resorted to burning school furniture, cooking inside the school buildings,
cutting down trees and causing other forms of destruction. This added to the already dire situation
and further compromised the educational facilities and resources available to the affected students.
We need to learn from our neighbouring countries, India and Bangladesh. In India, the
devastating earthquake in Gujarat in 2001 highlighted the need for improved disaster-resilient
school infrastructure. In response, the government launched a School Safety Programme, which
aimed to retrofit the schools and construct new buildings with earthquake-resistant features. This
programme focused on strengthening school infrastructure to ensure the safety of students during
earthquakes. India has emphasised the importance of integrating disaster risk reduction education
into the school curriculum, raising awareness among students about disaster preparedness, response
and resilience.
Bangladesh, prone to cyclones and floods, has also recognised the importance of protecting
educational facilities and ensuring continuity of education during and after disasters. The
government has implemented several measures such as constructing multi-purpose cyclone shelters
that can double as schools during non-emergency periods. These shelters provide safe spaces for
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students and the community during disasters while also serving as functional schools during
normal times.
Furthermore, Bangladesh has invested in early warning systems specifically designed for
schools, allowing educators to take timely action and ensure the safety of students.
Both India and Bangladesh have prioritised disaster risk reduction in the education sector
based on the lessons learned from past disasters. They have focused on enhancing school
infrastructure, integrating disaster education into the curriculum and implementing measures to
ensure the continuity of education during and after disasters. By adopting such strategies, these
countries aim to create a safer and more resilient learning environment for their students in the face
of future disasters.
In Pakistan, especially in Sindh, there is a lack of such planning when it comes to handling
disasters. As a result, our skills and resources are getting impoverished.
Dr Moizza B Sarwar is an expert in the political economy of service delivery for historically
marginalised populations, specialising in education and social protection. Her research focuses on
achieving a resilient education recovery in the aftermath of Pakistan’s flood. Through detailed
analysis of figures, she has identified barriers and proposed practical solutions for equal access to
education and comprehensive social support. Dr Sarwar’s work informs evidence-based strategies
that promote inclusive education and empower marginalised communities.
Following a research report on learning losses conducted by the Pakistan Coalition for
Education (PCE) with the support of the Malala Fund, the Thar Education Alliance (TEA) took
proactive measures to raise awareness among concerned departments and authorities at the
provincial level. They translated the research report into Sindhi to enhance its accessibility.
In addition to translation, the TEA recommended to the minister for education the allocation
of a specific budget to address the urgent needs highlighted in the research report. These
recommendations were derived from a thorough analysis of the report’s findings. The TEA also
reached out to corporate social responsibility (CSR) organisations, urging them to increase their
investments in the education sector based on the report’s recommendations. Their efforts aimed to
create awareness, mobilise resources and facilitate targeted actions to address the learning losses
and other challenges identified in the research report.
By engaging key stakeholders and advocating for dedicated budget allocations, the TEA
played a crucial role in fostering progress and improvement in the education sector in Sindh. In
coordination with the PCE and the PECN, Thar Education Alliance launched this report at the
federal level to sensitise more stakeholders about the facts and figures derived from the research
report.
The recommendations from the research report were endorsed by Syed Sardar Shah, the Sindh
education minister. He gave an assurance that these recommendations would be incorporated into
the working plan and considered for the formulation of policies when the Sindh government
planned its strategies in light of the current situation.
UN organisations, including the World Bank, have also expressed their commitment to
prioritise the recommendations from the report in their upcoming plans. They have pledged to
execute the actions and initiatives derived from the report to address the challenges in the education
sector. This signifies the importance and relevance of the research findings and the collaborative
efforts being made to improve education in the region.
Proactive measures are necessary to address current education challenges amidst disruptions.
By utilising existing community infrastructure for learning activities, education can continue
without waiting for school buildings to be rebuilt.
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Shifting the focus to district-level learning targets prioritises children’s educational needs,
regardless of infrastructure limitations. Public-private sector partnerships can expedite school
reconstruction while maintaining quality. Teacher training and support can enhance remedial
learning. Comprehensive school disaster response plans, backed by head teacher support, are
crucial. Implementing these recommendations creates a resilient and inclusive education system for
a brighter future. The government, particularly the Education Department, should consider and
adopt recommendations from research reports to effectively implement those through the District
Education Departments.
It is crucial to address the issue of learning losses, particularly in the remaining academic
courses, through a remedial mechanism that minimises learning gaps. There are numerous proven
models available. Working together, we can think more optimistically and adhere to guidelines to
tackle these challenges appropriately.
In 2018, the Standardised Achievement Test (SAT) conducted by IBA Sukkur and supported
by RSU had revealed that the mathematics and science scores of students in Sindh were below 30.
While there is a significant focus on out-of-school children, the quality of education for regular
students is shockingly poor. Unfortunately, there is a lack of attention to this issue and insufficient
efforts to improve the education system. It is crucial to address the underlying factors contributing
to this decline in academic performance and implement strategies to enhance the educational
experience for all students.
By investing in teacher training, curriculum design and a holistic approach to education, we
can equip students with the necessary skills for success.
Collaboration among policymakers, educators and parents is essential to create an
environment that fosters a passion for learning and supports student development. It is imperative
to prioritise the quality of education for both out-of-school children and regular students to ensure
their future prospects and break the cycle of substandard education.
During the flood crisis, there was a significant focus on providing emergency aid and
establishing temporary engagement centres to address immediate needs. However, attention to
education was lacking. It is crucial for the government to ensure a focus on learning-based initiatives
as recommended in the research reports.
To achieve broader coverage and implementation, government and non-government
organisations working in the education sector should collaborate and devise plans to address the
learning losses highlighted in the recommendations. By effectively planning and executing these
recommendations, a more focused and improved approach to education can be achieved.
(Source: TNS)
ANOTHER IMF BAILOUT FOR PAKISTAN
Johann Chacko (South Asia analyst)
Watching Pakistan drift towards sovereign debt default over the past six months has been like
watching one of those movies where the characters’ car has stalled in the middle of a rail crossing.
At first, despite the distant rumbling, you’re sure they’ll be able to restart the motor, or at least bail
out before the freight train bears down on them.
But the minutes tick on, and absolutely nothing happens; the train’s klaxon is now utterly
deafening and you’re preparing yourself for the sickening crunch. And then, by some miracle, the
giant machine halts, just millimetres short. The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) agreement with
Pakistan on June 29 for a new $3 billion line of credit, just hours before the expiration of the previous
2019 agreement was like that moment.
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The analogy may seem dramatic, but it actually undersells the gravity of what Pakistan was
facing. The effects of sovereign default on a modern society can be even more catastrophic than a
major war, as the peoples of Lebanon and Sri Lanka can testify, because it hits the entire country all
at once. The lights literally go out, along with mobile communications, banking, medical services,
fuel and pharmaceutical distribution. There is inevitably violence on the streets and multiple rounds
of political upheaval. Recovering from these losses can take up to a decade, but in some cases, the
opportunity costs and the effects of the loss in faith may never be made whole.
Readers may have a vague sense of having seen all this before, or assume that Pakistan must
be another Argentina, that is, a frequent defaulter. What is extraordinary is that although Pakistan
has regularly approached the IMF for help since 1968, it has managed to maintain an unbroken
streak of avoiding default. It has done so not by meeting its obligations on time, but by securing the
rescheduling of debt, and even new loans from the IMF and the various other governments who
lend it money.
This forbearance has been despite the fact that Pakistan has never fully executed the
agreements that these funds were tied to. In fact, Pakistan’s continued dependence on the IMF is
inextricably linked to both the repeated failures to implement reform packages, and the IMF’s
repeated failures to hold Pakistan accountable for this. But what explains these decades of fiscal
laxity on the IMF’s part, especially given that the IMF has never been generally known for its
generous and forgiving nature?
The IMF, like the World Bank, has shareholders who oversee its governance and override its
decisions, if the stakes are high enough. The US government is the IMF’s largest shareholder, and
Pakistan for most of its history has put a great deal of effort into being indispensable to US
administrations’ national security priorities. Pakistan’s Yahya Khan was Richard Nixon’s bridge to
China in the Cold War; Gen Zia ul Haq was Ronald Reagan’s front line against the Soviet Union.
And after 9/11, Gen Musharraf made Pakistan an essential logistical and intelligence cornerstone of
the "War on Terror". The new agreement might appear to be just another turn of the hamster wheel,
but the details make clear that what has happened is fundamentally different from the usual pattern.
As noted in previous columns, the Ukraine war’s effects on energy and foodstuff prices have
laid bare the underlying strengths and weaknesses of economies all over the region. Pakistan was far
from the worst off, but its problems were compounded first by the climate-driven flooding of 2022
which displaced millions and simply washed away billions in both public infrastructure and
personal assets and second, the escalating struggle between Imran Khan’s PTI movement and the
civil-military co-dominium that rules Pakistan.
These events, although momentous, were on their own not earth-shaking enough to change
the Pakistani government’s reflexes. On the other hand, the Biden administration’s willingness to
walk away from Afghanistan, and Pakistan’s determination to stay on good terms with both Beijing
and Washington meant that an American president didn’t want or need anything special from
Pakistan, and was not obliged to offer an equally special quid pro quo for the first time since the
Eisenhower administration came into office in 1953.
The IMF held up Pakistan’s release of funds from the 2019 facility for its failure to implement
agreed upon reforms. The White House did not make the usual "request" to the IMF Managing
Director Kristalina Georgieva via the US Treasury Secretary. Instead, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif
had to fly to Paris himself, and hold long and intense negotiations with Ms Georgieva on June 22.
Without the usual US support, Islamabad has had to agree to take the kinds of steps that
Pakistan’s special interests have always fiercely resisted – for example, cancelling a planned tax
amnesty that would largely have benefited the wealthy, and addressing Pakistan’s unsustainable,
foreign-exchange draining reliance on energy imports. And if Pakistan does not deliver, it is likely
that the funds will be frozen, again.
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This shift opens up the chance for Pakistan to break free of its reliance on geopolitical leverage
instead of good governance and sustainable growth, although there is no guarantee that they will
choose to stay on that path. This is a part of the world where world shaking events can and do come
out of nowhere. Washington may once again be forced to engage, and Islamabad may once again
choose special treatment over good government.
Certainly, Pakistan will never be just another country; with 220 million people, a significant
nuclear stockpile, and an exceedingly fragile democracy, there is likely to always be some measure
of sensitivity to what a default in Pakistan may cost the world. It is likely that Pakistan will continue
to receive more consideration than, say, Argentina.
But on the flip side, it is clear that Pakistan’s long-suffering emerging middle class wants
nothing more than a fair and balanced economy. Given how badly bruising recent political warfare
has been to the army and major political parties alike (the PTI included), Pakistan’s elites will be
better off if they finally pick up the proverbial can, instead of finding new ways to kick it down the
road.
(Source: The National)
BARTER TRADE
Useful tool but not magic solution
Dr Abid Qaiyum Suleri (Head of the Sustainable Development Policy Institute)
John Connally, who ran the US Treasury under President Richard Nixon five decades ago,
once opined to his international counterparts that “the dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem.”
The US dollar is estimated to be used in 88 per cent of all international transactions, and almost half
of the world’s trade. Approximately 60 per cent of global foreign-exchange reserves are kept in
dollars. The strength of the dollar was used by the West to control the economy and penalize human
rights violations through economic sanctions, for example, in Iran and Venezuela. President Trump
excessively used economic sanctions against Chinese (and many European firms) in implementing
his ‘America First’ credo. However, the Russian embargo after the Ukraine crisis took the sanctions
to a new level.
In an effort to reduce their dependence on the US dollar, countries facing sanctions — like
Russia, Iran, and Afghanistan, as well as economic rivals of the US such as China, and even
countries not in direct conflict with the US like India, Brazil, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia — are
actively seeking ways to decrease their reliance on the dollar; a trend known as ‘de-dollarization’.
Joining this list are countries that are currently grappling with economic crises, burdened by
unsustainable debt, or experiencing foreign exchange reserve shortages, like Pakistan. Pakistan’s
recently announced mechanism to allow barter trade with Iran, Afghanistan, and Russia means that
(eligible) Pakistani entities can exchange goods with these countries without using the dollar or
other currencies. The mechanism — called the Business-to-Business (B2B) Barter Trade Mechanism
— covers a range of specific goods, including petroleum, gas, fertilizer, and wheat.
Pakistan is also planning to finalize a similar mechanism with China. How effective will this
mechanism be in helping Pakistan’s dollar-starved economy? To answer this, we need to look at
some of the global developments that have shaped the new era of de-dollarization. In response to
Western sanctions, Russia’s finance ministry has explored various avenues to eliminate the use of
dollars and euros in foreign trade. They have proposed ideas such as exchanging goods of equal
value or engaging in offset deals, where a foreign partner exports goods on behalf of a Russian
company and then provides goods of the same value to that company. Russia has also agreed to
conduct barter trade with Iran, another country under US sanctions for decades. The deal involves
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supplying zinc, lead, and aluminium from Russia to Iran and car parts and gas turbines from Iran to
Russia.
In June 2022, the Chinese and Russian presidents expressed their intention to expand the use
of their own currencies for settling bilateral trade. Around the same time, during a summit, leaders
from Iran, Malaysia, Turkey, and Qatar proposed the utilization of cryptocurrencies, national
currencies, gold, and barter for trade. Russia and Iran have also increased their trade through more
direct routes by land and sea. For example, container shipping across the Caspian Sea rose by 120
per cent in 2022 compared to 2021.
Russia is now Iran’s fifth-largest trading partner and its biggest investor. Iran is also becoming
a logistic bridge for Russian trade (through sea, rail, and road) with the Middle East, South, and
Southeast Asia. It has had a unique experience in surviving amid sanctions for many years.
Afghanistan is another country that has turned to barter trade with China, Russia, and Iran. The
Taliban government in Afghanistan is isolated from the global banking system and needs alternative
sources of income and supplies. After signing a 25-year ‘strategic partnership’ with Afghanistan in
2021, China has become its second-largest trade partner after Pakistan. In October 2022, Afghanistan
also signed a standing arrangement with Russia to get fuel and wheat in exchange for rubles or
goods. Iran is now the biggest source of fuel for Afghanistan. Coming back to Pakistan: the country’s
trade with Afghanistan has increased significantly, especially the import of Afghan coal. The two
countries mostly use cash for trade but also barter some goods. Pakistan and Iran have opened the
first of six border markets to boost their trade cooperation. This could help reduce goods smuggling,
especially diesel, from Iran. The Pakistan Petroleum Dealers Association said last month that up to
35 per cent of the diesel sold in Pakistan was smuggled from Iran.
Pakistan has also signed an agreement with Russia to buy cheap oil at discounted prices
(under Western sanctions). Pakistan will buy 750,000 barrels of Urals crude in batches, as its oil
terminals can only handle 370,000 barrels at a time. The first batch will arrive at Port Qasim in the
next few weeks. If the deal goes well, Pakistan plans to import 100,000 barrels per day from Russia.
This is a significant amount, as Pakistan imported 154,000 barrels per day of crude oil last year.
This shows that Pakistan and its neighbours are trying to reduce their dependence on the US
dollar due to their respective reasons. The three countries with which Pakistan has agreed to a B2B
barter trade mechanism are finding formal banking systems impractical. Hence a barter trade with
Pakistan is a win for them. Pakistan can benefit from this process by accessing cheaper energy from
Russia and Iran, and coal from Afghanistan, without using dollars. This can help ease the pressure
on its foreign exchange reserves.
This is a big win for us. However, some may argue that Pakistan’s trade volume with these
three countries is too small (less than $5 billion per annum) compared to its Western trade partners.
They may also question whether Pakistan has enough goods to offer in return for cheap energy
imports; in total, 2.58 per cent of our total imports and 3.6 per cent of our total exports will benefit
from barter trade. These are valid concerns that need to be addressed. We need to diversify our
export base and improve our quality standards to compete in the global market. We also need to
ensure that the barter trade mechanism is transparent and efficient. Barter trade is not a magic
solution for Pakistan’s economic problems, but it can be a useful tool to cope with some of the
challenges.
(Source: The News)
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THE RESURRECTION OF THE TTP
Iftikhar Firdous,et. al. ()
By late 2020, as it became apparent that the US was certainly withdrawing its forces from
Afghanistan, talk around the table of Pakistan’s security establishment and political decision-makers
related to the consequences of the withdrawal and its possible aftermath.
For over two decades, Nato members and their partner nations had held down the fort of
peace in Afghanistan, with up to 130,000 troops deployed there at the height of the war.
The rampaging Afghan Taliban who would take control of the country in weeks, their
relationship with the banned Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the rise of the Islamic StateKhorasan (IS-K), and the possible splintering of the TTP and a potential merger with IS-K; these
were some of the worst-case scenarios envisioned by Pakistani strategists.
But the common denominator among all analyses was always the TTP.
Back in August 2020, the TTP commenced a process of reorganisation, regrouping and
refinancing as it found its potency to be at stake. This was due to an inability to carry out large scale
attacks and its shrinking finances, in the wake of the Pakistan Army’s Operation Zarb-e-Azb to
uproot the group from North Waziristan.
The operation fuelled infighting and disintegration within the group, forcing members to run
helter-skelter in search of shelter, even to Afghanistan. The relative period of calm since the
completion of Operation Zarb-e-Azb in the tribal areas, together with its urban follow-up Operation
Radd-ul-Fasad, all but incapacitated the TTP’s structural and economic supply chain.
In September and October of 2020, when the last pocket of resistance in North Waziristan was
cleared and the Pak-Afghan border almost completely fenced, the future of the army’s role in the
erstwhile tribal areas along the border was under discussion.
With a district administration taking root and establishing its writ in these areas, it was
thought that the military would restrict itself to the traditional role of being deployed on the border,
with only a second or third tier role in the internal security situation.
But in May 2023, the TTP claimed to have carried out 76 attacks across the country — the
highest in the last eight years — while managing to gain traction in the jihadist sphere.
When it first appeared in 2007, the proscribed group consisted of around nine groups. But by
the early 2020s, it had merged over 30 different militant outfits of varying ethnicities and capabilities
into its fold.
Even when the TTP held no territory inside Pakistan — a fact disputed by the group, which
repeatedly claims to be operating from Pakistani soil — it has carried out at least one attack on a
daily basis in the preceding months.
But despite the negotiations the group held with the Pakistani state over a span of two years,
the TTP remains one of the biggest security challenges to Pakistan.
So, what happened?
‘Endgame strategy’
Before the fall of Kabul to the so-called Islamic Emirate, the debate amid the top Pakistani
leadership included the fear of TTP completely becoming a proxy of hostile intelligence agencies.
This is an argument Islamabad has used against the militant group to create the otherness required
for ostracising its ideology and intentions after the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan.
At the time, the conclusion was that following a US withdrawal, the violent forces in
Afghanistan will lose their legitimacy to fight. When that comes to pass, the Pakistani authorities
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reckoned, the TTP would also lose whatever ideological legitimacy it enjoyed in its conflict with the
state.
As a reference guide, the critically acclaimed book by Tony Blair’s senior advisor Jonathan
Powell, Talking to Terrorists: How to End Armed Conflicts, was put to use.
In their minds, strategists of the time figured that the right moment to engage insurgent
groups was either in the aftermath of a natural disaster, a paradigmatic shift in internal dynamics,
leadership changes, or the ripeness of a situation that yields favourable results or a global shift in
policies.
In Pakistan’s case, the global shift came in the shape of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan
and the ripeness of the situation, as it was understood, triggered a desire in the security
establishment to take this war on terror to its logical conclusion — The Endgame Strategy, as it was
labelled.
However, this premise was based on one condition which was taken on face value; a great
expectation that the Afghan Taliban will return the favour to Pakistan by exerting all their influence
on TTP, not just to bring them to the negotiation table, but also put an end to violent attacks inside
Pakistan.
Thus began a series of engagements on multiple levels, the first of which was held at Alwara
Mandi, North Waziristan, in December 2020. Representatives of the Pakistani security establishment
met with TTP emissaries of the Mehsud and Swat factions, to name a few of the most prominent
amongst the TTP.
At least 11 groups participated in these talks, whose purpose was to establish contact, build
trust, and explore opportunities to remove obstacles and enter into formal negotiations. The meeting
remained cordial, albeit laden with suspicion and anxiety about an uncertain future course of action.
However, both sides agreed to adopt a process for future engagements.
The negotiations
In retrospect, the negotiations, peace process, or talks may be divided into three distinct
phases. The first was when Lt General (Retired) Faiz Hameed was serving as the director-general of
Pakistan’s spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the US had not yet withdrawn from
Afghanistan. During this time, contact was established, trust building measures were adopted, and a
detailed map for negotiations was laid out.
At the time, several government officials, including President Arif Alvi and Prime Minister
Imran Khan confirmed that the authorities were holding talks with the TTP This was followed by an
official announcement of a ceasefire between the TTP and the Pakistani state in Nov 2021.
The second phase commenced when Gen Faiz was appointed Corps Commander Peshawar,
the US had withdrawn from Kabul and the Afghan Taliban were the de facto rulers of Afghanistan.
During this phase, there were detailed engagements held through frequent meetings in Khost, Kabul
(Afghanistan) and Peshawar between all relevant stakeholders, including a delegation of the Afghan
Taliban acting as intermediaries.
Meetings were held with elders and other stakeholders from all of the seven tribal districts,
who generally agreed with the idea of absorbing the militants back into their respective cultural and
geographical spheres.
But all tribes agreed that they must come unarmed and not presume themselves the masters of
their areas, or try to set up a parallel administration, as had been seen in the past.
Their proposed return was, however, a contentious issue for families whose loved ones had
been killed at the hands of the TTP; they were not willing to forgive and forget so easily.
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TTP and IEA: Two sides of the same coin
With the return of the Afghan Taliban to Kabul on August 15, 2021, the TTP was seemingly
emboldened, both ideologically and operationally. Since then, the group actively started a process of
re-inventing itself, shifting from a ragtag militia to a full-blown insurgency, culminating in January
2023 with the adoption of a new administrative and operational structure, which saw the group
being remodelled on the contours of the hierarchy of the Afghan Taliban.
For their part, the Afghan Taliban were utilising the TTP as an extension of their
administrative structure in the tribal areas. As TTP is under the bayt (oath) of the so-called Islamic
Emirate, they are by default providing the rulers of Kabul a certain strategic and ideological depth
into Pakistan, a specular phenomenon that Islamabad once used to earnestly seek with regard to
Afghanistan.
During the Afghan Taliban insurgency, the Taliban started to appoint shadow provincial and
district governors. Alongside the formation of provinces, the Taliban also gradually created 18
commissions that acted like ministries, encompassing all aspects of governance, including political,
economic, media, and culture.
In February of this year, the TTP announced a new organisational structure, comprising two
zones — north and south — where nine administrative and operational units (wilayahs or shadow
provinces) were established. Among these, seven units covered the province of KP, one was located
in Gilgit-Baltistan and another in the Pashtun-dominated Zhob division of Balochistan.
In June, another unit was established, also in Balochistan, for the areas of Qalat and Makran,
marking the first organised, territorial foothold of the TTP in a non-Pashtun majority area of the
province.
Additionally, two new administrative units were also established in Punjab — north and
south — potentially expanding the operational horizons of the group in urban centres.
Every province is headed by a shadow governor and at least a deputy, as well as supervised
by an intelligence officer, following the model of the Afghan Taliban.
In a video released in Dec 2021, TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud stated that the group was an
extension of the Afghan Taliban into Pakistan. The newly-released United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team report on Afghanistan also mentions
that: “The [Afghan] Taliban does not consider TTP a threat to Afghanistan, but rather as part of the
emirate.”
So while on the one hand, the Doha Agreement forbade the Afghan Taliban from hosting any
foreign militant entity on Afghan soil, on the other, the TTP presence in Afghanistan remains very
obvious, even though the Kabul regime has repeatedly denied this.
“Contrary to statements to not allow Afghan soil to be used for attacks against other
countries, the Taliban have harboured and allowed active support of [TTP], which routinely
conducts attacks across the border in Pakistan,” the UNSC Monitoring Team report claims.
But the most obvious link between the two entities is the spiritual hierarchy. The TTP emir is
under the direct bayt of the Afghan Taliban Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada.
In jihadist terms, the concept of bayt is the cornerstone that supports the network and its
validity is tightly linked to the person who benefits from the oath of allegiance, at least until their
death.
A galaxy of jihadist organisations has by now pledged allegiance to Akhundzada, including
local groups like the TTP and global outfits such as Al Qaeda. They will remain loyal to the Emirate,
while benefiting from the support of the Afghan Taliban in times of crisis.
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A new media warfare
As a complementary tool to its military strategy, the TTP has also enhanced its media
onslaught by centralising and expanding the outfit’s propaganda output.
With the reorganisation of its Media Commission and the Umar Media Department, now led
by a senior TTP ideologue, media propagandist, and former Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent
(AQIS) member, Chaudry Muneeb Ur Rehman Jutt, the media activities of the group have
drastically diversified, making it a powerful tool to attract fresh recruits and frame an effective
narrative.
In recent years, the TTP has also stepped up the production of its videos by launching several
new series related to various topics, ranging from armed combat to comments on socio-political
events and criticism directed at the state and public institutions.
At the same time, the Umar Radio programme — the original audio series of the TTP
currently managed by Mawlana Yaseer — is for the first time accompanied by “Pasoon”, a podcast
that has now grown to 20 episodes.
Each episode features several guests, usually either from the TTP’s so-called “ministries” or
members of different commissions that the group has set up. Through the podcast, the speakers
address Pakistan’s political and economic situation, thereby exploiting the grievances and
insecurities of different segments of society to push their agenda and legitimise the outfit’s own
struggle.
Under the new media offensive, the TTP has also expanded its written publications, particularly
its magazine, ‘Mujalla Taliban’. The magazine, four years after it was founded in 2016 had only
published eight issues, but between January and June 2023, it has published five issues already.
Not only has the publication volume seen a marked increased, the quality of its content has
also picked up, constantly drawing a comparison between Pakistan’s system of governance and the
one in Afghanistan under the Taliban.
Additionally, the TTP recently announced the publication of a 10-day newspaper “Manzil”,
mainly featuring reports of the targeted attacks it carries out and columns dedicated to Pakistan’s current
affairs. In March earlier this, the group also launched a new magazine specifically dedicated to women.
The TTP’s new media strategy is a direct result of the group’s desire to reshape its narrative,
following a new ideological trend, framed specifically after the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan. The
idea is to depict itself as an insurgent, completely native and independent group to appeal to the
local and international community.
For this purpose, the TTP has carefully crafted and disseminated several messages that are
clearly intended for the international audience. Of late, it has appealed to the international
community regarding the plight of Pashtun and Baloch populations as well as highlighted the lack
of basic amenities provided by the Pakistani state to these people, specifically referring to water, gas,
and electricity.
In January, it also addressed economic issues in the country, such as the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) agreement. Moreover, the TTP has repeatedly rejected any claim linking the
group with global Jihadist entities such as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State, stating that the group is
fighting on its own without the support of any other group or country. On the other hand, the TTP
tries to show itself as a legitimate group that is advocating for the well-being of Pashtun and Baloch
people.
The group is even seen consistently distancing itself from the Afghan Taliban so as not to put
the latter in a difficult spot in view of its international and regional obligations of not hosting any
militant outfits posing a threat to any other country.
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A spiral of violence
The threat of religious militancy is not going away any time soon. In fact, expecting that a twodecade long conflict can be fixed with interventions spanning weeks or months is somewhat delusional.
With the return of the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan, jihadist movements such as the TTP are
feeling re-energised and emboldened. In the so-called Islamic Emirate, Pakistani outfits have found
a model to emulate and practically adopt in the quest of their jihadist objectives against Pakistan.
Pakistan’s internal dynamics are also ripe for these groups, since insurgencies thrive on
turmoil and chaos and can gain strength from political, economic, and social uncertainty.
Addressing the country’s internal turmoil and ending the prevailing political and economic
uncertainty is a fundamental step towards mitigating the insurgent challenge. Doing so will make it
difficult for such group to find recruits, further their grievances and build anti-state narratives.
A uni-dimensional approach, relying merely on kinetic actions while ignoring the political
drivers of the insurgency, has yielded no sustainable results in the past 20 years, and if that
approach is continued in the future, it is likely to be met with more failures.
The third phase began once Gen Faiz was posted out of Peshawar. During this phase, the
process slowed down, then stalled and then finally broke down after militants affiliated with TTP
Swat entered the valley and attacked police, who were unaware of their presence in the area.
It is important to note that after the fall of Kabul, the eagerness for reconciliation within the
security establishment enhanced considerably. Efforts were made to assess the sentiments of local
tribes about the supposed repatriation of militants to their respective villages and tribes.
(Source: Prism)
DID PAKISTAN JUST OVERHAUL ITS NUCLEAR DOCTRINE?
Sitara Noor (Research fellow at Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs)
As Pakistan celebrated the 25th anniversary of its first nuclear tests last month, it also
appeared to share more details than usual about its current nuclear posture.
Speaking at a seminar hosted by the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad on May 24, retired
Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai provided new details of Pakistan’s otherwise ambiguous nuclear doctrine.
What Kidwai says matters because he is currently an advisor to the country’s National Command
Authority (NCA), which controls research and development and all other policy matters concerning
nuclear weapons. He’s also the former director-general of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which
is responsible for formulating nuclear policy and strategy as well as the security of nuclear assets.
During his address, he reiterated some of the long-standing positions of Pakistan’s nuclear
policy, such as the strength of its nuclear triad based on land, air, and sea-based capabilities to deter
India—especially the Indian military’s so-called Cold Start doctrine, which envisages a limited war
through quick mobilization of unified battle groups to conduct operations inside Pakistani territory
without crossing Islamabad’s nuclear threshold. He also discussed what’s known as full-spectrum
deterrence—a policy aimed at responding to a range of threats from India. But he went further.
Kidwai expanded the scope of this doctrine by explaining what he called vertical and
horizontal dimensions. In his words, full-spectrum deterrence “comprises horizontally of a robust
tri-services inventory of a variety of nuclear weapons … [that] is held on land with the Army
Strategic Force Command, the ASFC; at sea with the Naval Strategic Force Command, the NSFC;
and in the air with the Air Force Strategic Command, the AFSC.”
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Most striking was his statement that “vertically the spectrum encapsulates adequate range
coverage from 0 meters to 2,750 kilometers [about 1,700 miles] as well as nuclear weapons
destructive yields at three tiers—strategic, operational, and tactical.”
Reducing the minimum range to 0 meters is unprecedented and, if implemented, points to a
major shift in Islamabad’s nuclear policy thinking.
Talk of zero-range weapons suggests that Pakistan is either going to develop artillery shells as
the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom did during the Cold War—raising questions
of whether it is going to be an M28/M29 Davy Crockett-style recoilless rifle system, the smallest
weapon in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, developed during the 1950s as a front-line weapon with yields as
low as a fraction of a kiloton—or it could be a hint that Pakistan could possibly lay nuclear land
mines across the India-Pakistan border to deter Indian advances. Observers, especially in India, are
left wondering whether this statement is based on some existing scientific research and design
testing and necessary doctrinal thought process. Kidwai’s statement does not provide any such
details, and in the spirit of ambiguity that Pakistan seems to have benefited from, there is unlikely to
be a follow-up soon to clear the air.
Indeed, Pakistan has always kept its nuclear policy vague and deliberately ambiguous;
nonetheless, its missile ranges are the only aspect that has always been announced publicly through
an official press release after every missile test.
Prior to Kidwai’s statement, the officially announced lowest range in Pakistan’s nuclear
inventory was the Nasr, or Hatf-9 ballistic missile, with a range of 60 kilometers (about 37 miles).
The solid-fueled tactical ballistic missile was projected to be a response to India’s Cold Start
doctrine. When it first test-fired the Nasr missile in 2011, Pakistan received huge flak from both
Indian and Western scholars for its potential security risks and command and control challenges.
The purported risks of employing Nasr ranged from the lowering of nuclear threshold to the
possibility of an accidental or unauthorized launch if command and control of this short-range
missile was delegated to local commanders in the battlefield.
The upper limit of 2,750 kilometers refers to the land-based surface-to-surface medium-range
ballistic missile Shaheen-3, which was first test-fired in 2015 with the stated aim to reach the Indian
islands of Andaman and Nicobar, thereby denying New Delhi the strategic bases for a potential
second-strike capability. The upper limit was carefully restricted to 2,750 kilometers to signal that
Pakistan’s nuclear missile program is only India-specific and does not pose a threat to any other
country in the region and beyond.
Apart from Kidwai’s latest statement, there is no other information available to determine
whether the zero-range announcement refers to a technical milestone in Pakistan’s nuclear
development or serves as a rhetorical escalation. As an advisor, Kidwai has an important yet limited
role in official policymaking, and there is a possibility that this assertion is a reflection of his
personal opinion and not a statement of an official position. However, in the absence of any official
statement, his declaration will largely be viewed as a new element of Pakistan’s nuclear policy.
The bigger question is what strategic objective Pakistan wishes to achieve by going below the
already controversial 60-kilometer range to zero-range weapons. As full-spectrum deterrence is
aimed at plugging the perceived gaps in Pakistan’s deterrence posture, the apparent announcement
of a zero-range policy within the scope of full-spectrum deterrence seems to have developed partly
in response to a growing perception in New Delhi that India’s 2019 airstrikes on Balakot in mainland
Pakistan—instigated by an alleged Pakistan-sponsored suicide attack on Indian forces in Pulwama,
a small town in Indian-held Kashmir—have called Pakistan’s nuclear bluff.
It is important to recall that in order to defend Nasr’s development and its role in nuclear
planning, Pakistani officials have often contended that use of any nuclear weapons on the battlefield
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would have strategic consequences. While this position might have allayed Western concerns
regarding Pakistan’s attempt to lower the nuclear threshold, it may also have inadvertently made
the use of Nasr less than credible in the eyes of Indian policymakers.
When Pakistan responded with a conventional counterstrike after the Indian attack on
Balakot, the view that India had found a way to punish Islamabad with conventional force without
risking a nuclear catastrophe seemed to have strengthened in New Delhi. It is possible Kidwai sees
that lowering the range down to zero will fill this newly perceived gap and deter future surgical
strikes inside Pakistan.
Going down to zero range might also be a reaction to India’s vanishing ”no first use” doctrine;
indeed, some current and former Indian officials have made statements to suggest that India no
longer fully adheres to this pledge.
It may also be an attempt to add additional options to Pakistan’s arsenal of responses, making
it difficult or impossible for India to take out Pakistan’s entire nuclear force in a decapitating first
strike and also making New Delhi question the effectiveness of its ballistic missile defenses in the
face of short-range weapons.
Regardless of the logic, Pakistan’s lowering the nuclear range to zero is problematic for both
regional stability and India’s perception that it can fight a limited conventional war against a
nuclear-armed adversary.
Shorter-range nuclear weapons systems will bring a host of challenges and implications. First,
any new weapons system of this kind will be required to undergo a series of tests and trials. It is
important to recall that the United States ended its nuclear artillery program in view of growing
safety and security challenges. Second, shorter-range weapons with a low-yield payload will
significantly lower the nuclear threshold with the greater possibility of an inadvertent nuclear
exchange. Third, it will pose serious challenges to command and control, as it will require predelegation to local commanders. In the case of the Nasr, command and control as well as the
physical security of the weapon were a huge international concern, especially in the United States.
In response, Pakistan assured other nations that its geography allowed it to maintain assertive
control even if the range was as low as 60 kilometers. However, this argument will not stand if a
very short-range battlefield weapons system becomes part of the country’s arsenal.
Finally, it raises the perennial question about both India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear preparations
without a concrete plan or strategy for escalation control and war termination.
As the longest-serving director-general of the SPD and now as an important part of the NCA,
Kidwai has often used various national and international forums to convey policy statements, and
they have always been viewed as part of the official narrative. In the absence of any other official
communications, Kidwai’s latest statement may be seen as clear signaling—if not an adopted policy.
If Pakistan officially adopts a zero-range policy, such a drastic change in its nuclear posture is
likely to receive massive international criticism due to the risks it poses to regional stability.
Lowering weapon ranges coupled with India’s ongoing signs that it is departing from a more
cautious no-first-use posture is also a stark reminder that instead of engaging in risk reduction
measures and enhancing strategic stability, both countries are going further down the path of highrisk behavior.
(Source: Foreign Policy)
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REVAMPING PAKISTAN’S AGRICULTURE SECTOR
Challenges and the Way Forward
Humais Sheikh
Pakistan’s agriculture sector plays a crucial role in the country’s economy, contributing
significantly to GDP, employment, and food security. However, despite its potential, the sector faces
numerous challenges that impede its growth and development. Revamping Pakistan’s agriculture sector
is essential to unlocking its full potential, but it requires addressing these challenges effectively.
Former Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan, Salim Raza, has stated that Pakistan’s
agriculture sector has the potential to overcome the country’s current account deficit and balance-ofpayment crisis within six years.
According to Raza, the agriculture sector’s sustainable growth rate directly impacts the GDP’s
growth rate, stressing that without 6% growth in agriculture, there is no way Pakistan’s GDP can
sustain a 6% per annum growth rate.
The agriculture sector’s current performance has contributed to a trade deficit of $5.5 billion in
food and cotton imports in FY22, further widening the current account deficit to $17.4 billion in the same
year.
China, India, and Brazil have public banks dedicated to agriculture financing, giving them an
advantage over Pakistan’s predominantly privately owned system. According to the former State
Bank Governor, public banks in Pakistan, including the National Bank of Pakistan, Bank of Punjab,
Sindh Bank, and Khyber Bank, could devote 50% of their lending to agriculture financing. This
would give farmers access to financing for agricultural inputs, including seeds, fertilizers, pesticides,
storage and warehouses, machinery, and extension services.
A major challenge faced by Pakistan’s agriculture sector is the prevalent use of outdated
farming techniques. Traditional methods, coupled with limited access to modern agricultural
machinery and technologies, hinder productivity and efficiency. Revamping the sector necessitates
the promotion of modern farming practices, such as precision agriculture, smart irrigation systems,
and mechanization, to enhance productivity and yield.
Insufficient investment in agricultural research and development is another challenge facing
Pakistan’s agriculture sector. Limited research and innovation hinder the development and adoption
of improved crop varieties, pest management techniques, and agricultural practices tailored to local
conditions. Increased funding for research institutions, collaboration with international agricultural
research centers, and knowledge-sharing platforms can foster innovation, leading to the
development and dissemination of advanced agricultural technologies and practices.
All such issues prevail when there is mismanagement of resources and lack of accountability.
One effective measure to enhance the value of Pakistan’s agricultural sector could involve
transferring its responsibility to an institution experienced in crisis management. Given the
prevalent issues of corruption and mismanagement, relying on political leadership may not be a
viable option. However, leveraging the trained human resources and potential of the Armed Forces
could play a crucial role in safeguarding Pakistan’s agricultural economy. Historical evidence
indicates that during national crises, the armed forces have consistently emerged as the go-to option
for assistance and support. In addition of investments there is also a need of transfer of
responsibility to a responsible institute who could collaborate with the respective governments and
effectively work to increase production.
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Given the increased strain on the import bill in recent times, the Fiscal Year (FY) 2023-24
budget is anticipated to prioritize the agriculture sector, making self-sufficiency in food staples a top
priority.
Speaking at a press conference on Monday, Pakistan Agricultural Coalition (PAC) Strategy
Adviser Kazim Saeed said the investment in the agriculture sector should purely be on a commercial
basis.
Sponsored by the country’s leading business groups for developing commercially scalable
models for growth, PAC organized a conference on March 16 aimed at connecting the agriculture
sector to industry, finance and the government.
“Pakistan is losing $1 billion annually in three major crops alone because we use poor-quality
seeds and outdated methods,” he said, noting that the loss makes up a substantial part of the annual
production of corn, wheat and rice worth around $12bn. He said ensuring access to high-quality seeds
constitutes as much as 60 per cent of all benefits that can possibly be extended to farmers for improving
productivity. Machinery, credit and subsidies amount to little in the absence of high-quality seeds, he
said.
According to local media report, A delegation of the Pakistan Overseas Community Global
(POCG) visited Directorate Agricultural Information Punjab, in May. Punjab Agriculture Information
Director General Muhammad Rafiq Akhtar briefed the members regarding the investment opportunities
in Punjab. He said, “Agriculture sector has a key importance in the country’s economy.” “By investing in
the agriculture sector, not only the production inputs would be available to the farmers at a reasonable
rate but it would also provide stability to the country’s economy,” he added. He briefed the members
about the vast opportunities of seed industry, pesticides, fertilisers and value addition of flowers and
vegetables in the agriculture sector in the province of Punjab.
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on June 3, 2023 invited Turkish investors and businessmen to
expand their investment in various areas of Pakistan. He called for establishing strategic
collaboration in sectors of energy, agriculture, information technology (IT), and construction.
The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations has also assured
Pakistan that it will continue to play a leading role in transforming the country’s agriculture food
systems to make them more efficient, inclusive, sustainable and resilient. This is a challenge that has
gained urgency following recent floods that have devastated the country’s agriculture sector.
The agriculture sector in Pakistan holds vast untapped potential, capable of being a
substantial driving force behind the country’s economic growth. Through appropriate policies and
strategic investments, this sector can generate employment opportunities, boost exports, and
enhance food security for the population. However, to unlock this potential, Pakistan needs to tackle
the sector’s challenges head-on and prioritize investments in modernization, research and
development, as well as infrastructure. Additionally, a vigilant supervision by a national institute
such as Pakistan Army can help revitalize the sector. By undertaking these crucial steps, Pakistan
can position itself as a significant player in the global agriculture market while achieving sustainable
and robust economic growth.
(Source: Eurasia Review)
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Organizations
THE EXPANDING ROLE OF SCO
Strengthening Pakistan’s Regional Integration
Ambassador (R) Babar Amin (Pakistan’s Former High Commissioner to Australia,)
Introduction
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was established on 15 June 2001 by its six
founding members: the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People’s Republic of China, the Kyrgyz
Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan. The
SCO succeeded the ‘Shanghai Five’ a demi-formal grouping that had been formed in Shanghai on 26
April 1996. After the admittance of Uzbekistan, as a sixth member, the ‘Shanghai Five’ was changed
to SCO.
Unlike the ‘Shanghai Five’, which was restricted in its scope to “Deepening of Military Trust
in Border Regions”, the Charter of SCO provided a much broader scope of multifaceted cooperation
among the members.
The SCO received its first membership expansion when Pakistan and India were admitted as
Members at the Astana meeting of SCO Council of Heads of State (CHS) on 9 June 2017. Earlier,
Pakistan, India and Iran acquired Observer status at the CHS meeting in Astana on 5 July 2005.
Significance of SCO
SCO emerged as an important actor at the regional and international level since its inception
and its expansion has further enhanced its vitality. The SCO aspires to ensure a secure and stable
regional environment that is conducive for the development and prosperity of its member states
through joint efforts.
Promoting trade and economic cooperation is an important priority of the Organization.
SCO’s key importance stems from the fact that it is a resource rich region. One-quarter of the world’s
oil reserves, and one-third of gas reserves as well as almost half of the known reserves of uranium
are located in the current SCO countries. The region also has abundant food production capability,
technological prowess and quality human resources.
SCO’s current membership represents 41 percent of the global population and 23 percent of its
GDP. Future expansions in membership would further improve these statistics. It, however, is
rightly following a cautious, step-by-step approach as rapid expansion could also disturb the
organization’s harmonious decision-making process.
In the realm of global political and security strength SCO includes two permanent Security
Council members and four nuclear weapon possessing states. Significantly SCO does not define
security cooperation as a traditional military pact to defend members from an external attack but
rather a regionally coordinated approach to address nontraditional security threats.
The founding principles of SCO inter-alia include mutual respect of sovereignty,
independence, territorial integrity of States and inviolability of State borders, nonaggression, noninterference in internal affairs, non-use of force or threat of its use in international relations, seeking
no unilateral military supremacy in neighbouring region and the SCO not being directed against
other States and international organizations. SCO is guided by its core values and aspirations
popularly known as the ‘Shanghai Spirit’ emphasizing mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality,
consultation, respect for diverse civilizations, and a commitment to the peaceful resolution of
disputes.
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SCO Political Institutions
Council of Heads of State (CHS): The highest organ of the SCO is comprised of the Presidents
of the respective countries. Due to the parliamentary system of government in Pakistan and India,
the participation for these countries is preferred at the Prime Ministerial level, although at times
President may represent instead. The CHS identifies priority areas and basic directions of SCO
activities; determines policies for internal setup and operations and decides on principles of SCO
cooperation with other countries and international organizations. The CHS meets once a year in
member states alternating according to the Russian alphabetical order.
Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers): The Council of Heads of Government
adopts the SCO budget and is mainly responsible for cooperation in the economic fields. Its regular
sessions are held once a year. Pakistan and India at times send their Foreign / External Affairs or
other Ministers to represent at the CHG as the Prime Minister would participate in the CHS.
Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs: Council of Foreign Ministers deals with major issues
of current SCO activities, including preparing for the meeting of the Council of Heads of State,
implementing SCO decisions, and holding consultations on international issues. Its annual session
takes place one month before the regular meeting of the Council of Heads of State.
Council of National Coordinators (CNC): It is the pivotal body of the SCO that coordinates all
activities of SCO and is the first negotiating Council for most of the initiatives, agreements, or
conventions and other activities etc. The CNC negotiates agenda, calendar of events, texts of joint
statements, communiques, declarations etc. to be adopted at the CHS, CHG and CFM meetings. Its
Chairman is the National Coordinator of the host country of the CHS in a particular period.
Meetings of Heads of the Ministries and/or Agencies: These meetings are held to tackle cooperation
in specialized areas. These mechanisms may involve meetings of the Attorneys’ General, Ministers
of defense, economy, commerce, transportation and culture as well as heads of law-enforcement,
security, emergency and disaster-relief agencies etc.
Permanent Organs
The SCO has two permanent bodies: the SCO Secretariat based in Beijing and the Executive
Committee of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) based in Tashkent.
The SCO Secretary-General and the Director of the Executive Committee of the SCO RATS are
appointed by the CHS for a term of three years. The official languages of the SCO are Russian and
Chinese.
SCO Secretariat: The Secretariat is the main permanent executive body of the SCO. It provides
services to the member states in coordination, information analysis, legal and translation services,
organizational facilitation and technical support, implementation of the decisions of SCO bodies and
develops proposals on enhancing cooperation within the SCO and with other organizations and
entities.
Executive Committee of RATS: The Executive Committee provides the secretarial services for
the RATS. The SCO Agreement on the establishment of Regional AntiTerrorist Structure designating
RATS as a permanent body of the SCO was signed during a meeting of the CHS on June 7, 2002, in
St. Petersburg and entered into force in 2004. The Executive Committee coordinates specific work
on building the counter-terrorism capacity of the member states. It helps the member states in
designing and carrying out joint practical activities such as the annual Joint Anti-Terrorist Exercises
aimed at building response mechanisms, counter-terrorism training, and interaction between their
designated ‘Competent Authorities’ to combat and prevent terrorist attacks.
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SCO Members, Observers and Dialogue Partners
In its first sixteen years (June 2001-June 2017) the SCO primarily focused on consolidation and
development of the basic structures and legal regime of the organization in consonance with the
principles, aims and objectives of the founding members. Pakistan and India had simultaneously
become SCO Observers in 2005 but had to wait until June 2017 to be admitted as Members.
Mongolia on the other hand got Observer status in 2004 but hasn’t applied for membership so far.
There has, however, been a flurry of requests for Membership, Observer and Dialogue Partner
status from countries belonging to various regions in the last few years. Iran, which had become an
Observer alongside Pakistan and India in 2005, is all set for membership status at the virtual meeting
of the CHS being hosted by India on 4 July 2023. Belarus is also expected to become SCO member at
the subsequent CHS meeting in 2024, as the country is currently fulfilling its mandatory
requirements such as in the Memorandum of Obligations, and accession to the Charter, and all the
treaties, agreements and other legal instruments of SCO. The SCO status table of various countries is
as below:
Pakistan and SCO
Pakistan has been actively participating in the SCO since becoming a Member. Even as an
Observer, Pakistan attended majority of CHG and CHS meetings at the top leadership level
demonstrating its commitment to the organization. After the membership invitation, Pakistan had to
complete the accession process to 37 SCO documents including the charter, existing treaties,
agreements, conventions, protocols, memorandums etc. that had already entered into force among
the SCO member-states.
Pakistan is a natural member of SCO for being situated at the confluence of Central Asia,
China and South Asia. It has always enjoyed a close friendly relationship with China that had
graduated to the level of all-weather comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. Historically,
Central Asia had close political, cultural and religious ties with the areas now part of Pakistan. After
the independence of the Central Asian Republics (CARs), Pakistan has been working to strengthen
its relations with them by rejuvenating the deep-rooted historical links and simultaneously
vitalizing mutually beneficial economic and strategic complementarities.
Pakistan-Russia relations have significantly improved since the end of the ‘cold war’ era.
India is no longer in a position to exercise ‘veto’ or cap the development of beneficial partnership
between Pakistan and Russia, due to her drifting towards the Western side by joining Quad and
other US-sponsored initiatives. Pakistan remains a viable conduit for Russia to access Arabian Sea
for commerce and trade. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) complements SCO’s
agenda of regional economic integration and connectivity. Through its ports and highways, Pakistan
provides to Central Asia and Eurasia the shortest overland access to the sea.
SCO offers huge opportunities to Pakistan to tap into the vast economic, trade, investment,
energy, agricultural, industrial, services, tourism, and connectivity potential within the organization.
Pakistan-Central Asia
Central Asia has rich energy resources especially gas, hydropower capacity, coal and uranium
reservoirs. Kazakhstan has vast coal, uranium and gas reserves, Uzbekistan has abundant uranium
whereas Turkmenistan (though not an SCO member) is a major natural gas exporter. Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan on the other hand hold significant hydropower resources.
Central Asia thus can play a valuable role to mitigate Pakistan’s impending energy crisis and
even earn transit revenue by providing Southwards passage. Optimum utilization of the region’s
resources could ensure self-sufficiency and make it an important market for trading, transport, and
sales of energy.
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The main challenge has been building infrastructure to transport Central Asia’s resources,
especially gas and electricity Southwards. The transmission of electricity requires lines networks and
pipelines are needed for supply of gas and oil. Lack of financing facilities, uncertain political and
economic situation, transit security issues, intra-regional and external rivalries as well as systemic
inefficiencies have hampered the realization of true potential of Pakistan-Central Asian cooperation.
The slow pace of progress on Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (TAPI) and Iran,
Pakistan (IP) gas pipelines as well as Central Asia and South Asia (CASA)1000 electricity
transmission project manifest the above impediments.
Russia-Pakistan
The CHS, CHG, CFM as well as several other Ministerial and senior officials’ meetings under
the SCO aegis every year provide use useful opportunity to have leadership and function exchanges
between Pakistan and Russia, which was not possible before the SCO membership. The two
countries have found some convergences on geo-political and geoeconomic plains.
India’s coziness with US-led strategic and economic groupings in Asia and to some extent in
Europe to contain China and corner Russia have created new synergies between Russia, China and
Pakistan. Russia, which, once considered Pakistan as staunch member of its rival alliances, is now
amenable to explore mutually beneficial cooperation with Pakistan.
The recent import of oil by Pakistan from Russia at less than open market price is expected to
become a precursor for enhanced trade in energy, agriculture, engineering, manufacturing, and
services sectors between the two countries. Common SCO membership would complement the trade
and economic relations, enhancing confidence and reducing apprehensions in doing business.
Pakistan and Russia signed 1,100 kilometers ‘Pakistan Stream gas project’ also known as
‘North – South gas pipeline’ in 2015. The project has been delayed due to the US sanctions on the
Russian executor, ‘RT Global’ and other factors. In 2021 the project was revised with Pakistan to
hold majority share of 74% whereas, Russia’s holding was reduced to 26% from the earlier agreed
share of 85%. In February 2023, Pakistan mulled the possibility of shifting the starting point of the
pipeline from Karachi to Gwadar. Despite the delays and revisions in the contract, both sides have
reiterated their commitment to the project. The completion of the pipeline project would be a pathbreaking development in the relations between the two countries.
Pakistan and Russian delegations coordinate closely at the CNC meetings where most
decisions are taken before they are raised at the leadership level. The rapport and understanding at
the leadership level has also received a significant boost owing to the mutual accommodation at the
functional level in SCO.
Pakistan-China
While Pakistan and China enjoy a long-standing, all-round comprehensive friendship and
partnership, the common membership of SCO has brought new dimensions and opened new vistas
for cooperation. The two countries have kept a close consultation process and mutually supported
each other’s initiatives. Pakistan and China are well aware of each other’s core issues of interest and
enjoy high level of trust. This has been an important factor in the strong Chinese support to
Pakistan’s bid for SCO’s membership. Pakistan enjoyed a great advantage of benefiting from the
well-informed guidance of its trusted friend especially in the initial phase of joining the SCO.
Defence, Counter terrorism, and Narcotics Control Cooperation
The SCO Defence Ministers meetings has helped in the development of interpersonal relations
between the relevant interlocutors. Before the SCO membership Pakistan and SCO countries’
Defence Ministers and officials had much lesser interaction. A better appreciation of each other’s
perspectives has been achieved through these interactions. SCO has certainly melted the ice and
raised the comfort level of the relevant sides that would lead to greater bilateral defence cooperation.
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Counter Terrorism Military Exercises (CTMEs) are an integral part of SCO collaboration under
the RATS. Pakistan has participated in the CTMEs hosted by SCO members except the one hosted by
India in 2022. Pakistan also hosted a CMTE in 2021, in which India did not participate. The exercises
were useful in the development of inter-military operability and learning diverse training regimes.
In addition, Pakistan has an opportunity to share its own successful counter-terrorism experiences,
involving planning and execution of intelligence-based operations, as well as large scale kinetic
action against the terrorists.
Pakistan also gets to benefit from the advanced electronic surveillance and technology-based
intelligence deployed by China and Russia. These experiences would enable Pakistan to develop its
own defence industry as well as collaborate with the SCO members.
SCO RATS has vast experience in coordinating mutual counter-terrorism operations, and
intelligence-sharing among SCO members. SCO RATS successfully facilitated; prevention of many
terrorist attacks, neutralizing terrorists, destruction of training sites, and arrest of armed miscreants.
Under the cooperation in combating narcotics, drugs and psychotropic substances, huge
catches of drugs, heroin, precursors and other proscribed substances were seized from traffickers in
the SCO territories.
Connectivity
Development of connectivity is among the top priorities of Pakistan in the SCO’s context.
Pakistan has actively participated in all the meetings to finalize the SCO Road Development
Program. Pakistan’s proposal to connect Karachi and Gwadar to the six main routes of SCO, was
accepted at the experts’ level meeting held in Beijing on 28-29 May 2018. India had not participated
but conveyed its ‘no objection’ on the agenda before the meeting. India, however, later raised
objection on the new routes proposed by Pakistan through a letter to the Secretariat stalling progress
on Road Development Programme because of the consensus rule. India is now raising similar
objections during the negotiations on the Russian proposed draft MOU on Road Development.
Pakistan, nonetheless, has extensive alternate connectivity linkages with the SCO region such
as under the Quadrilateral Agreement for Traffic in Transit among Pakistan, China, Kyrgyzstan and
Kazakhstan, while accession of Tajikistan is under process. Pakistan is also a member of the
connectivity initiatives as a member of Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) and
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) besides being a member of International TIR. These
routes have overlapping legs with each other as well as the SCO’s existing routes.
Pakistan is a source for major linkages to create connectivity among South Asia, Arabian Sea,
Middle East and the Eurasian region. The landlocked Central Asian states have expressed keen
interest in utilizing Pakistani Ports of Gwadar, and Karachi under CPEC for trade and connectivity.
India’s Chairmanship of the Council of Heads of State (2022-23) India is hosting the 22nd
Council of Heads of State of SCO on 4 July in virtual format, changing it from the earlier planned inperson meeting on 3-4 July 2023. The changing of dates and format more than once has been a
source of adverse media speculations.
Some of the SCO member countries have also expressed their annoyance over the nonserious
attitude of India during its maiden Chairmanship year that would culminate in
the CHS Summit on 4 July. Earlier, the dates of 24-25 June were abruptly shifted to 3-4 July
following an invitation by US President Joe Biden to Prime Minister Narendra Modi for a bilateral
visit from 21-24 June 2023.
The Indian Ministry of External Affairs while announcing that “Prime Minister Narendra
Modi will chair the 22nd SCO CHS meeting on 4 July,” in “a virtual format” did not give any reason
for the change from a two-day in-person to a virtual Summit. Several Indian media outlets, however,
quoting ‘well placed official sources’ reported that since “the leaders of China and Russia were
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anyway expected to visit India for the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September,” back-to-back visits
could have been hectic for them.
An Indian official was also quoted as saying that “China seemed reluctant to visit India for the
SCO Summit as President Xi’s physical presence in New Delhi for the Summit had not yet been
confirmed. India-China “military standoff on the Line of Actual Control” now for the fourth year,
was cited for “taking relations to an all-time low”.
Similarly, physical attendance of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif had also not been confirmed,
though some in Indian media believed that “there was a high likelihood that he would have
participated, despite bilateral tensions.”
According to the Indian media sources “the enthusiasm for hosting the summit (physically)
had sagged in New Delhi, with hardly any preparation having taken place in the last couple of
weeks” (before the announcement of holding the CHS virtually). India took an enthusiastic start as
SCO Chairman in September last year. It had presented an ambitious agenda, under Prime Minister
Narendra Modi’s coined term ‘SECURE’ an acronym for Security, Economy and trade, Connectivity,
Unity, Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and Environment. According to a recent
MEA release, “India hosted a total of 134 meetings and events, including 14 ministerial-level
meetings,” under the SCO banner during its Chairmanship. The success of many of the Indian
initiatives, however, remained less than its expectations. Indian euphoria started to diminish owing
to its own lack of accommodation to some of the other members’ proposals, especially the founding
members, which, received reciprocal response.
India, for example, objected to the Russian proposal on the creation of a new permanent
Mechanism of the Meeting of Heads of Statistical Departments of SCO Member States, calling it
premature. India insisted that the Consortium of Economic Analytic Centers of SCO Member States
should suffice to meet the organization’s needs.
Similarly, India conveyed its inability to participate in the negotiations on Uzbekistan’s
proposed draft SCO Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Crimes in the Field of Information
Technology. India maintained that a similar agreement was currently being discussed in the UN for
developing a comprehensive international convention to counter the use of ICTs for criminal
purposes and therefore the proposal of Uzbekistan would be a duplication.
India has also objected to the Chinese proposal on Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Global
Security Initiative (GSI). This is surprising as the GDI and GSI are straight away in line with India’s
Chair theme of ‘SECURE’ given by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. These initiatives call for
balanced, coordinated, inclusive and sustainable growth with a common and comprehensive
security paradigm, while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the countries.
Indian opposition to these initiatives is apparently aimed at appeasing its Western partners.
Further, although ‘C’ represents connectivity in the Chairman’s theme of ‘SECURE’, no
initiative on connectivity has been introduced by India during its Chairmanship.
Many SCO members are wary of India’s attempts to bring its own agenda and at times
fending the interests of its Western partners at the organization’s platform. Indian External Affairs
Minister S. Jaishankar’s diatribe against Pakistani Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari in a Press
Conference, when the guests were still in Goa, and his thinly-veiled attacks against Pakistan while
Chairing the CFM, in contravention to the SCO norms did not go unnoticed. Even the Indian media
couldn’t help mentioning that the “SCO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Goa was largely
overshadowed by the verbal volleys between the External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Foreign
Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari”. The fact of Jaishankar being overshadowed by Bilawal’s calm and
composed handling of the CFM plenary and the media, as opposed to the angry, short-tempered
and visibly irritated Jaishankar, could be one of the reasons for India opting for a virtual CHS
meeting.
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Conclusion:
As the SCO continues to expand its influence, Pakistan stands to gain substantial benefits in
terms of economic integration, security cooperation, cultural and people-to-people exchanges. By
actively participating and contributing to SCO’s initiatives, Pakistan can solidify its regional
integration efforts and strengthen ties with key regional players. It is through proactive engagement
within the SCO framework that Pakistan can realize its vision of a prosperous and peaceful region,
benefiting not only its own citizens but also the broader SCO community.
(Source: Institute of Strategic Studies)
SCO & BRICS
Is India a spoiler?
Dr Farah Naz (Assistant Professor, Department of Government and Public Policy, NUST)
THE 23rd Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit was held under the
chairmanship of India ‘virtually’. Its virtual status has raised serious questions such as why India
preferred holding it virtually where pandemic-related restrictions are already lifted. Secondly, India
is not such a country that avoids travel or hosting events like the SCO Summit because PM Modi
recently paid a visit to the US and hosted the G20 meeting with full zeal, and zest. Then why the
SCO summit went virtual becomes a serious concern for the world at large and China in particular.
To answer all the above questions let’s reflect on the aims, objectives/agenda of the SCO.
The SCO is a permanent inter-governmental international organization. The main goals of the
SCO are strengthening confidence and good-neighborly relatio
ns among the member countries; promoting effective cooperation in politics, trade and
economy, science and technology, culture as well as education, energy, transportation, tourism,
environmental protection and other fields; making joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace,
security and stability in the region, moving towards the establishment of a new, democratic, just and
rational political and economic international order. Proceeding from the Spirit of Shanghai, the SCO
pursues its internal policy based on the principles of mutual trust, mutual benefit, equal rights,
consultations, respect for the diversity of cultures and aspiration towards common development, its
external policy is conducted following the principles of non-alignment, non-targeting anyone and
openness.
The creation of the SCO was proclaimed on 15 June 2001, in Shanghai (China) by the Republic
of Kazakhstan, the People’s Republic of China, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the
Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan. Eight countries enjoyed the status of the SCO
full members: India, Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan;
four countries — Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran and Mongolia — have observer status with the SCO,
and six countries — Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia, Nepal, Turkey and Sri Lanka — have a
dialogue partner status. During this 23rd Summit, Iran officially joined the SCO as the Ninth
Member Country. The theme of India’s SCO presidency was “SECURE”. It stands for Security,
Economic development, Connectivity, Unity, Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and
Environmental protection. The Summit was expected to focus on the regional security situation and
ways to boost connectivity and trade. This was Putin’s first participation in a multilateral summit
after the Russia- Ukraine crisis.
According to Parveen Sawhney, it was India’s first presidency to host the event, but India
rejected the two key things endorsed by the other SCO members: 1) India did not sign the Economic
Development Strategy 2030; 2) Not signed the BRI and call it a debt trap despite the fact 149 nations
have already endorsed it and 49 African nations out of 54 are on board with the BRI. Through the
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BRI initiative, China is looking at two outlooks that complement one another: 1) common prosperity
and 2) cooperative security. It is not a zero-sum game where one benefits and the other loses. China
aims to have physical infrastructure projects, cyberspace hardware and cyberspace software
connectivity that leads to a third-world revolution. This project connects the region through land,
sea route and space. The UN endorses the BRI for meeting all sustainable goals and objectives. In
2021, President Xi came up with an acronym Global Development Initiative – it is nothing more than
the BRI yet looking at the UN SDGs. In 2022, President Xi came up with another acronym called
Global Security Initiative – working under the UN. SCO is part of achieving the same goals.
During the SCO Summit, Modi told Putin “Today’s era is not an era of war.” Whose language
India is speaking? Secondly, Modi emphasized the Chabahar Port and International North-South
Transport Corridor bypassing China and Pakistan. Will Iran go with India and go against SCO
countries, particularly China and Russia? Thirdly, Modi speaks about the terrorism originating from
Pakistan. Is it all coming up post-Modi’s visit to the US where both states’ agenda revolved around
terrorism and eradicating violent extremism concerning Pakistan? Other than these statements there
is a complete media blackout about the SCO Summit. One has to dig deeper and conduct advanced
research on the internet to find any updates on the SCO Summit. India is playing
Chairmanship/Presidentship of both SCO and G2O this year but handled both differently. The
world has seen how India projected the G20 meeting and how it brushed SCO under the carpet, and
kept it low profile and virtual.
From China’s perspective, it was a total failure! Statements as such matter because China
along with Russia are the main forces behind SCO. Was the main purpose behind Modi’s visit to the
US to fail the SCO summit, malign Pakistan and weaken the BRI along with its flagship project
CPEC? Or warn the BRICS members of Indian presence? Where BRICS is composed of emerging
economies supported by two banks: The BRICS Bank also called the New Development Bank and
Asia Investment Infrastructure Bank. Both SCO and BRICS are setting up or creating a parallel
structure to the existing system such as the World Bank and IMF. Considering the seriousness of
SCO, why India chooses this Summit to go virtual is a serious question that comes to mind. India
sees itself as a rival to China in the emerging global order and believes herself to be the voice of the
Global South with support from G20 nations. Hence India believes it will not sign any strategy
where China is present yet being a part of SCO and BRICS.
If India had to endorse SCO and BRICS activities and plans, it would have to accept the
Chinese leadership that goes against the will of the US. Unfortunately, India is playing on both sides
of the boat – stays with the Chinese bloc but remains active in the US bloc. It now raises a serious
question about India’s role in SCO as well as in BRICS. How can members of both SCO and BRICS
trust India? Where India failed the SCO Summit whereas the BRICS Summit is expected in August
this year in Johannesburg, South Africa. BRICS countries can learn from the Indian role as a spoiler
in the SCO and seriously think about Indian membership in the BRICS nations which is growing
soon with the inclusion of KSA, UAE, Egypt, Algeria, Argentina, Mexico and Nigeria. Since Indian
economic contribution to BRICS is only 13% whereas China holds 70%, it’s time to park India at its
right post otherwise it will continue as a spoiler in the region and beyond!
(Source: Pakistan Observer)
BRICS FACES A RECKONING
Oliver Stuenkel
In 2001, Goldman Sachs banker Jim O’Neill created the acronym “BRIC” to refer to Brazil,
Russia, India, and China—countries he predicted would soon have a significant impact on the global
economy. In 2006, Goldman Sachs opened a BRIC investment fund pegged to growth in these four
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nations. The moniker captured the global excitement about emerging powers at the time and
transformed into a political grouping in 2009, when leaders of the four countries held their first
summit. South Africa joined a year later.
BRICS as a political body has faced countless critics and doubters from the start. Analysts in
the Western press largely described the outfit as nonsensical and predicted its imminent demise. In
2011, the Financial Times, Philip Stevens announced it was “time to bid farewell” to the “BRICS”
without mortar.
A year later, another columnist at the paper, Martin Wolf, asserted that BRICS was not a
group and that its members had nothing in common whatsoever. BRICS has also been described as a
motley crew, odd grouping, random bunch, and disparate quartet. In 2015, Goldman Sachs decided
to close the BRIC fund (which never grew to include South Africa) due to its low returns.
BRICS member countries have numerous differences and disagreements. While Brazil and
Russia are commodity exporters, China is a commodity importer. Brazil, India, and South Africa are
democratic countries with vibrant civil societies, but China and Russia are autocratic regimes. Brazil
and South Africa are nonnuclear powers, in contrast to China, India, and Russia, which boast
nuclear arsenals. Perhaps most seriously, China and India face an ongoing border conflict.
And yet, despite their differences, not one BRICS leader has ever missed the group annual
summits. (Meetings took place virtually during the COVID-19 pandemic.) Instead of unravelling,
diplomatic and economic ties have strengthened, and BRICS membership has become a central
element to each member foreign-policy identity. Even significant ideological shifts, including the
election of right-wing populist leaders such as India Narendra Modi in 2014 and Brazil’s Jair
Bolsonaro in 2018, have not significantly altered countries’ commitment to the club.
Yet as BRICS approaches its 15th summit in Johannesburg this August, the grouping is
experiencing an unprecedented disagreement over enlargement. The outcome will be a test of BRICS
identity in the face of rising Chinese influence.
Despite the many disagreements and tensions among them, BRICS members have more in
common than Western analysts often appreciate. The strategic benefits the outfit produces for its
participants still far exceed its costs. Four aspects stand out.
First, all BRICS members see the emergence of multipolarity as both inevitable and generally
desirable and identify the bloc as a means to play a more active role in shaping the post-Western
global order. Member states share a deep-seated skepticism of U.S.-led unipolarity and believe that
the BRICS nations increase their strategic autonomy and bargaining power when negotiating with
Washington. As Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said in opening remarks at the
BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Cape Town, South Africa, on June 1, the concentration of
economic power presumably in the West cleaves too many nations at the mercy of too few.
Second, the BRICS grouping also provides privileged access to China, a country that has
become enormously relevant for all other members. Brazil and South Africa in particular, which had
only limited ties to Beijing prior to the group’s founding, have benefited from BRICS as they adapt
to a more China-centric world. It’s not just the summits attended by heads of state: Ministers and
other officials frequently gather to discuss issues such as climate, defense, education, energy, and
health. And, largely under the radar, the grouping has organized countless annual meetings in some
years more than 100 involving government officials, think tanks, universities, cultural entities, and
legislators. BRICS membership also granted countries a founding stake in the Shanghai-based New
Development Bank (NDB), created during the fifth BRICS summit in 2013.
Third, BRICS members have generally treated each other as all-weather friends. The group has
created a powerful diplomatic life raft for member countries that temporarily face difficulties on the
global stage: Fellow BRICS states protected Russian President Vladimir Putin from diplomatic
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isolation after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and stood by Bolsonaro when he found himself
globally isolated after his close ally Donald Trump’s failed reelection bid for the U.S. presidency.
After Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Putin could again rely on the other BRICS
countries to provide him explicit diplomatic and economic support (China), help circumvent
sanctions (India), participate in military exercises (South Africa), or embrace his narratives about the
war (Brazil). Without BRICS support, Russia would find itself in a far more difficult situation today.
Finally, being a member of the BRICS creates considerable prestige, status, and legitimacy for
Brazil, Russia, and South Africa, which for years have stagnated economically and are now anything
but emerging powers. Even as Brazil has fallen behind in its share of global GDP, analysts continue
to describe it as an emerging power which facilitates investment and allows the government in Bras,
the capital, to punch above its weight diplomatically. That some 20 countries are now seeking
membership in the group only confirms the notion that the BRICS seal remains powerful.
It is precisely on this last issue that the grouping is facing its biggest disagreement since its
inception 14 years ago. Beijing, which does not need to preserve the grouping’s exclusivity to retain
its global status, has for years aimed to integrate new members and slowly transform the bloc into a
China-led alliance. Since 2017, when it presented the BRICS Plus concept mechanism to bring
countries closer to the outfit before eventually granting them full membership Beijing has sought to
put expansion on the agenda. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, expansion has also been of
interest to Moscow, as it could help create a Russia-sympathetic bloc to counter Western attempts to
isolate the country.
Brazil and India, on the other hand, have long been wary of adding new members to BRICS,
as they have less to gain from a diluted club that includes smaller powers. Both Brasilia and New
Delhi fear that expansion would entail a loss of Brazilian and Indian influence within the group. In
their eyes, new members would join largely to gain easier access to Beijing, making BRICS positions
more China-centric and potentially less moderate. This explains why Jaishankar recently cautioned
that deliberations on expansion were still a work in progress and Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro
Vieira said that “BRICS is a brand and an asset, so we have to take care of it, because it means and
represents a lot.” South Africa, which traditionally has the least influence within BRICS, has sought
to hedge its bets.
There is no formal application process, or specific criteria, to become a BRICS member. Some
countries have simply been added to the list of potential future members after an informal
expression of interest. But in last year’s BRICS summit declaration, member countries vowed to
promote discussions among BRICS members on BRICS expansion process and stressed the need to
clarify the guiding principles, the standards, criteria and procedures. The debate about BRICS
expansion is not directly related to the NDB, which in 2021 added Bangladesh, Egypt, the United
Arab Emirates, and Uruguay as new members and announced that at least 30 percent of loans
would be provided in the currencies of member states rather than the U.S. dollar.
In theory, each BRICS member has a veto over the group’s decisions, which explains why
yearly summit declarations have often been vague. In practice, the grouping’s profound
asymmetries, China’s GDP is larger than that of all other members combined, creates informal
hierarchies. South Africa’s 2010 accession was led by China to bolster Beijing’s engagement on the
African continent. It also made the IBSA grouping (of India, Brazil, and South Africa) superfluous. If
killing IBSA was a desired side effect of South Africa’s BRICS membership to show that three large
democracies in the developing world discussing can discuss the future of the global south without
China Beijing succeeded: The 10th IBSA leaders’ summit, scheduled to take place in 2013, has been
postponed indefinitely.
China and Russia may therefore succeed, despite Brazilian opposition and Indian skepticism,
in adding new members to the club, particularly since Brazilian President Lula da Silva to his
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advisors’ chagrin recently expressed support for inviting Venezuela to BRICS during improvised
remarks.
Disagreements over whether to expand BRICS are about more than exclusivity and status.
Several potential accession candidates such as Iran, Syria, and Venezuela have largely pursued an
anti-Western foreign policy. Their integration could complicate Brazil’s and India’s efforts to
preserve a nonaligned strategy amid growing tensions between the West and the Beijing-Moscow
axis.
The key to BRICS success since 2009 has been its capacity to circumvent internal
disagreements and focus on unifying themes, such as the desire to build a more multipolar world
and strengthen south-south relations. India-China ties are notoriously fraught and, despite New
Delhi’s decision to help Moscow export its oil, India has systematically sought to reduce its
dependence on Russian weapons and increased its arms purchases from Europe. The status quo
may be the best BRICS can achieve without exposing its rifts. While Russia has long attempted to
position the BRICS grouping as an anti-Western bloc, Brazil and India have steadily sought to
prevent Moscow from doing so.
The uncertainty about how the South African government in Pretoria should handle hosting
the upcoming BRICS summit in Johannesburg reflects the dilemmas it and Brasilia currently face in
the context of growing tensions between Moscow and the West. Since South Africa is a party to the
Rome Statute, the founding charter of the International Criminal Court (ICC), it would be obligated
to arrest Putin whom the ICC has indicted if he attends. For months, South Africans have debated
how to handle the delicate situation. As former South African President Thabo Mbeki recently
pointed out: “We can’t say to President Putin, please come to South Africa, and then arrest him. At
the same time, we can’t say come to South Africa, and not arrest him because we’re defying our own
law we can’t behave as a lawless government.
While hosting Putin without arresting him would strain South Africa’s ties to the West, not
hosting him or organizing the summit elsewhere would dilute BRICS’ commitment to being allweather friends. The most likely scenario is that South Africa finds a legal loophole to host Putin
without detaining him representing a diplomatic triumph for the Russian president.
Still, it is largely a lose-lose dilemma for South Africa, and means that being part of BRICS has
started to have a tangible cost for the country by negatively affecting its ties to the United States and
Europe. Pretoria has already had a taste of this: After South Africa drew closer to Russia after its
invasion of Ukraine, including by allegedly supplying Moscow with weapons, the G-7 decided not
to invite it as a guest to a recent summit, for the first time since South African President Cyril
Ramaphosa took office in 2018. Unless the Russia-Ukraine war ends soon, Brazil, which has also
signed the Rome Statute and is slated to host the G-20 summit in 2024 and the BRICS summit in
2025, will soon face the same problem.
For all its ongoing challenges, BRICS generates many benefits for its members and is here to
stay. Yet if the group announces the inclusion of new members during the upcoming summit in
Johannesburg, it would be simplistic to interpret it as a sign of strength. Rather, expansion should be
read as a sign of China’s growing capacity to determine the bloc’s overall strategyand may reflect
the emergence not of a multipolar order, but of a bipolar one.
(Source: Foreign Policy)
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WHY DID THE WORLD BANK AND IMF COME UNDER FIRE
FROM GUTERRES?
Abdullah Shibli (Senior research fellow at International Sustainable Development Institute)
National leaders who were former allies often experience a fallout and fight each other. In
Ancient Rome, Marcus Junius Brutus, an ally and reputedly best friend, eventually joined the
rebellion against Julius Caesar and conspired to assassinate him in the Senate. Only last month, the
Russian warlord Yevgeny Prigozhin, leader of the private army known as the Wagner Group, and a
sworn friend of Putin and the Russian Republic, decided to turn the table on the Russian leadership
and launched a coup against his former patron.
Now comes the news of a feud between three erstwhile allied entities working in the
international arena: the UN, the World Bank (WB), and the Internal Monetary Fund (IMF). All three
bodies emerged from the ruins of the Second World War and benefitted from the poverty alleviation
efforts of the last 7.5 decades. Now, the UN Secretary-General has fired the first salvo against the
WB and IMF for their deficiencies during the pandemic, but also for their failure to lift the world out
of poverty (and all the other things that went wrong, including climate change, the debt crisis, and
the general sense of doom and gloom in the global economic outlook).
The backdrop for this latest round of bickering is the meeting in Paris where, between June 22
and 23, about 100 international organisations and 50 heads of states gathered to discuss how to build
a more responsive, fairer, and more inclusive international financial system to "fight inequalities,
finance the climate transition, and bring us closer to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals".
The goals announced by the newly formed Paris Summit group are to create a world "where poverty
is eliminated and the planet preserved; where vulnerable countries are better equipped to face the
crises from climate change and conflicts." The next paragraph then takes a dig at the current World
Bank/IMF superstructure: "We will transform the governance of the international financial
architecture to make it more efficient, more equitable, and for the world of today".
Why does this internecine dispute between the UN and the WB/IMF look so odd? First, these
three entities come from the same breeding stock. The World Bank and the IMF have provided loans
for poverty eradication and temporary financial assistance to countries to help ease balance of
payments adjustment. The UN had a broader charter, and its area of work in helping to eradicate
poverty, reduce inequalities, and build resilience so countries can sustain progress had a symbiotic
relationship with the Bretton Woods bodies.
Secondly, Guterres' missives come on the heels of the most recent UN and the World Bank
agreement, known as the Strategic Partnership Framework (SPF), which covers 2019 to 2023 and
includes four key areas of cooperation: finance and implementation support to help countries reach
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); decisive global action on climate change; joint work in
post-crisis and humanitarian settings; and harnessing data to improve development outcomes.
The two institutions pledged to cooperate in finding financial and other necessary resources to
help countries achieve the SDGs and harness data to improve development outcomes. These
initiatives include mobilising increased and better finance from all sources, including through
domestic resources, and helping countries attract and manage private capital; improving
implementation capacity to achieve the SDGs; promoting joint action and investment to improve
infrastructure and build human capital; convening governments, financial institutions, private
investors, and development banks to mobilise, coordinate, and deliver financing to help countries
make the transition to a low-carbon, resilient future; and strengthening collaboration and joint action
in post-crisis and humanitarian settings to build resilience.
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Unfortunately, all of these are still but wishful thinking. Antonio Guterres seized the
opportunity and used the appointment of the new WB chief, the Paris conference, and the stalemate
in the Russia-Ukraine war to push his agenda.
As we know, the G7 and European Union member states control more than 50 percent of all
votes at the World Bank, even as they represent under 13 percent of the global population. Non-G20
emerging markets and developing countries (EMDEs) are witnessing slow recovery from the
pandemic and "supply chain" problems that have plagued these countries the last few years. And
one cannot deny the disappointing trends on poverty, climate emissions, and other SDG outcomes.
In 2015, when the SDG agreements were reached, there was an expectation of an uptick in the pace
of development. Halfway through the SDGs, it is clear that most countries will not come close to
meeting SDG targets under current trends.
The UN Secretary-General appears frustrated for three reasons: 1) The progress on SDG goals
is lagging; 2) UN's climate goals have lost traction in the aftermath of Covid-19 and the war in
Ukraine; and 3) the appointment of the new head at the World Bank, Ajay Banga, unnerved the UN
and its partners (who are concerned about poverty eradication and climate change mitigation). Some
insiders in the Guterres camp are worried that "the predatory-finance background" of Banga will
threaten the UN goals.
But it is not clear where the funding necessary for the lofty goals of the Paris Summit group
will come from. According to a Brookings Institution study, international "investments should rise
to $5.9 trillion by 2030, compared to $2.4 trillion set in 2019. Most incremental finance will need to
come from domestic sources, but at least $1 trillion in annual incremental external financing will be
needed." The WB harbours an ambition to become a $1 trillion bank by 2030. Scaling up to this
degree (roughly a threefold expansion) requires a change in its operational model, as well as in its
finances.
The new WB head arrives at a time of growing enthusiasm within the US and other G20
nations for the "reform of international financial institutions" and also at a "moment of significant
economic upheaval". However, critics point out "the preponderance of countries that implemented
SAP experienced higher levels of poverty, mass unemployment, and increasing external debt levels,"
where SAP refers to Structural Adjustment Program, a policy package pushed by the Bank.
Another source of growth, international trade, fell by 0.9 percent in the first quarter of 2023,
following a decline of two percent in the final quarter of last year. And now there is a global
manufacturing recession.
The UN chief is aware that the US has to be on board. A US Treasury official told AP that big
new monetary pledges should not be expected from the Paris Summit – rather it's viewed as a
chance to push for an evolution of the development banks.
Since reforms in the three bodies will take a lot of work and could be gradual, it would be
somewhat reckless to offer any cut-and-dried solutions. Over the years, many insiders and outsiders
have come forward with ideas to restructure these institutions, and one can only hope that both the
stakeholders (including the US, China, Russia, and the G20 countries) and other smaller EMDEs can
reach a consensus on how to turn the ships around.
(Sourfe: Daily Star)
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DON’T LET UKRAINE JOIN NATO
Justin Logan (Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute)
Joshua Shifrinson (Associate Professor at the University of Maryland’s School of Public Policy)
As the war in Ukraine grinds on, policymakers and pundits, including Ukrainian President
Volodymyr Zelensky and the former U.S. ambassador to NATO, Ivo Daalder, are pushing for NATO
to offer Ukraine what French President Emmanuel Macron calls “a path toward membership” after
the conflict concludes. This is not just show. Ukraine’s membership aspirations will now be a central
topic of debate at NATO’s summit next week in Vilnius, with Ukraine arguing—as its former
defense minister Andriy Zagorodnyuk wrote recently in Foreign Affairs—that it “should be
welcomed and embraced” by the alliance. The way in which this issue is settled will have serious
consequences for the United States, Europe, and beyond.
The stakes could not be higher. Membership in NATO encompasses a commitment by the
allies to fight and die for one another. Partly for this very reason, its members worked throughout
the post–Cold War era to avoid expanding the alliance to states that faced a near-term risk of being
attacked. NATO leaders have also long understood that admitting Ukraine involves a very real
possibility of war (including nuclear war) with Russia. Indeed, the chance of such a conflict and its
devastating consequences is the main reason that the United States and other NATO members have
sought to avoid being drawn in more deeply into the war in Ukraine. The tension is clear: almost no
one thinks that NATO should fight directly with Russia for Ukraine today, but many favor
promising Ukraine a path into the alliance and committing to fight for it in the future.
Ukraine should not be welcomed into NATO, and this is something U.S. President Joe Biden
should make clear. Kyiv’s resistance to Russian aggression has been heroic, but ultimately states do
what is in their self-interest. And here, the security benefits to the United States of Ukrainian
accession pale in comparison with the risks of bringing it into the alliance. Admitting Ukraine to
NATO would raise the prospect of a grim choice between a war with Russia and the devastating
consequences involved or backing down and devaluing NATO’s security guarantee across the entire
alliance. At the Vilnius summit and beyond, NATO leaders would be wise to acknowledge these
facts and close the door to Ukraine.
Too close for comfort
At the NATO summit in Romania in 2008, U.S. President George W. Bush took everyone by
surprise by lobbying for Georgia and Ukraine to join the alliance. It was Bush’s last NATO summit
as president, and he wanted to “lay down a marker” for his legacy, according to an administration
official at the time. A number of European member states, including Germany and France, balked at
the idea out of concern over the inevitable Russian reaction and the implications for the alliance. The
diplomatic deadlock yielded a compromise in which NATO declared that the countries would
become members someday but provided no plan for getting them there. Yet even this compromise
brought a forceful denunciation from Russian President Vladimir Putin. Speaking in Bucharest,
Putin said:
We view the appearance of a powerful military bloc on our borders, a bloc whose members
are subject in part to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as a direct threat to the security of our
country. The claim that this process is not directed against Russia will not suffice. National security
is not based on promises.
Four months later, Russia invaded Georgia and still occupies some of its territory to this day.
In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea in a prelude to the full-scale war against Ukraine in February 2022.
Russia’s behavior is thuggish, illegitimate, and dangerous. Nevertheless, it underscores the core
issue at play: even as NATO remains formally committed to Ukrainian (and Georgian) accession,
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further NATO enlargement into areas that Moscow views as uniquely central to its national security
means courting war with Russia.
Right ends, wrong means
To date, advocates of further U.S. and NATO involvement in the Ukraine war have failed to
clarify the U.S. strategic interests at stake. The Biden administration has argued that history shows
that “when dictators do not pay the price for their aggression, they cause more chaos and engage in
more aggression,” as the president himself put it. But Russia has already paid an enormous price for
its aggression. By holding its ground and pushing back the Russian military, Ukraine has humiliated
Putin, who just two years ago denigrated Ukraine as a non-country. It will take decades for Russia to
rebuild its military even to the shabby state it was apparently in when Putin launched the war; the
United States estimates that more than 100,000 Russian fighters have been killed or injured. The
recent mutiny launched by the mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin suggests that the war may
destabilize Putin’s rule at home.
The U.S. interest in admitting Ukraine to NATO is even less clear, with a tangle of arguments
present in the policy discourse. One view holds that European stability and security require Kyiv to
join the alliance. By this logic, if Putin is not stopped in Ukraine, he will expand his aims and attack
NATO member states. A second line of reasoning focuses on Ukraine itself, arguing that NATO
membership is the only way to protect the country from Russian designs. Finally, there is a sense
that Ukraine has “earned” NATO membership by fighting and weakening an adversary of the
alliance. In this view, deepening NATO cooperation with Ukraine would reward its heroism and
add another layer of deterrence against a renewed Russian assault.
These claims are understandable but wrong. For one thing, Ukraine’s resistance to Russian
bellicosity is noble, but noble actions and even effective self-defense do not themselves justify taking
on the high risks of an open-ended security commitment. More important, the stakes of the game
today do not warrant Ukraine’s accession to NATO.
For over 100 years, U.S. aims in Europe have been counterhegemonic: in World War I, World
War II, and again in the Cold War, the United States bore high costs to prevent one country from
dominating the continent. Today, however, even a Russia that somehow defeated Kyiv would not be
poised to control Europe. Had Russia annexed all of Ukraine without firing a shot, its GDP would
have grown by 10 percent, making it barely larger than Italy’s. True, Russia would have also won
itself a second major port on the Black Sea, but it would still remain far weaker than the European
members of NATO. As even Robert Kagan has acknowledged, “There is no way that Putin’s
conquest of Ukraine” would have “any immediate or even distant effect on American security.”
Thankfully, though, Russia is not going to conquer Ukraine. Its military campaign has been an
embarrassment, with the war proving Russia’s army to be less than a pale shadow of the Soviet one.
The idea that Russia could pose a serious threat to Poland, much less to France or Germany, is
outlandish. Couple this with the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the Atlantic Ocean, and one can see that
the gains for Washington in inviting Ukraine to join NATO are limited.
Even if Ukraine is, as its foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, argued in Foreign Affairs,
“defending NATO’s entire eastern flank and sharing what it learns with alliance members,” it is
unclear why it must join the alliance for the United States to reap these benefits. Unless it were to
surrender to Russian domination—which Kyiv has demonstrated it is not inclined to do—Ukraine’s
geography consigns it to acting as a bulwark against Russia irrespective of NATO membership. The
events since February 2022 show that Ukraine does not need to be in NATO for the United States
and its allies to effectively help it resist Russian aggression.
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Unkept promises
Admitting Ukraine to NATO would also present problems for the alliance, especially the
security guarantees embedded in Article 5 of the alliance’s founding treaty. To be sure, Article 5 only
formally commits the NATO allies to treat an attack on one as an attack on all and to render the
assistance they “deem necessary.” In practice, however, member states have viewed NATO
membership and the Article 5 guarantees that go along with it as a U.S. commitment to go to war on
behalf of its allies. As President Barack Obama declared on a visit to Estonia in 2013,
Article 5 is crystal clear: An attack on one is an attack on all. So if, in such a moment, you ever
ask again, “who will come to help,” you’ll know the answer—the NATO Alliance, including the
Armed Forces of the United States of America.
Or as Biden described the commitment more recently, Article 5 constitutes “a sacred oath to
defend every inch of NATO territory.” This is why Ukraine believes NATO membership will help
protect it against future Russian aggression.
The problem with extending such guarantees to Ukraine is twofold. First, an Article 5
guarantee could pull the United States into a direct conflict with Russia. Unlike other countries that
recently joined the alliance, Ukraine will likely continue to have an unresolved dispute with Russia
inside its borders. Not only will Moscow and Kyiv have rival claims on territory, but the surge of
Russian and Ukrainian nationalism provoked by the war will limit room for diplomacy. Under these
conditions, it is not difficult to imagine how relations could further deteriorate even if an
arrangement is reached to end the fighting. If Ukraine were in NATO, the United States could be
pushed to come to Ukraine’s defense by deploying troops and even threatening to use nuclear
weapons on Ukraine’s behalf. American policymakers may hope to deter future Russian aggression
against Ukraine by creating a path for Kyiv into NATO, but doing so creates a real possibility of
drawing the United States into what Biden has called a “World War III” scenario.
Extending Article 5 protections to Ukraine could also undermine their overall credibility. For
the past 16 months, the Biden administration has made it clear that it does not believe it is worth
directly fighting Russia in a dispute over Ukraine. Many influential Republican politicians—
including the GOP presidential frontrunner, former President Donald Trump—are particularly
disinclined to risk American lives for Ukraine. On the other hand, Russian policymakers from Putin
down have revealed that they do feel Ukraine is worth fighting for, even at great cost.
Under these circumstances, an American commitment to fight for Ukraine would be open to
question. Russia might well test that pledge, leading to future crises. If called on to fight, it is
plausible that the United States could renege on its assurances, leaving Ukraine in the lurch. And
should the United States back away from Ukraine when it is under attack, other vulnerable NATO
allies such as the Baltic states would naturally question the strength of the alliance’s security
commitments backed by American military power. A true credibility crisis for NATO could result.
Some advocates for Ukraine’s joining NATO argue that the sort of weapons, training, and
diplomatic support already being given to Kyiv are sufficient to meet NATO’s Article 5 mandate,
meaning it is not necessary to also promise or deploy military forces. Yet if Article 5 allows the
United States and other allies to stop short of going to war to protect a member, it turns NATO into
a tiered alliance, with some members (such as France and Germany) remaining confident that
Washington would use force to come to their aid, and others far from certain. That could prompt an
intra-alliance scramble as members struggle to determine which kind of Article 5 guarantee they
enjoy. Moreover, offering this more limited Article 5 guarantee is of uncertain help to Ukraine. After
all, since Ukraine is already receiving many of the other benefits of NATO membership, it can only
be the prospect of direct intervention by the United States and others via Article 5 that adds
deterrent and political value to Kyiv.
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Paying for it
There is also the question of the costs of defending Ukraine. NATO is already struggling to
find the conventional forces and operating concepts it needs to service the alliance’s existing
commitments. The war in Ukraine has made clear that modern, high-intensity conflict between
conventional militaries consumes incredible quantities of resources. Viewed in this light, inviting
Ukraine to join NATO would exacerbate the gap between the alliance’s commitments and its
capabilities.
Of course, since the NATO countries as a whole are wealthier, more technologically advanced,
and more populous than Russia, that gap could theoretically be filled with an aggressive
rearmament program. European members of NATO, however, have a long way to go because they
have underinvested in conventional military power since the Cold War. Ukraine itself is a partial
exception to this general trend, but even here, Ukraine’s admirable military performance is—as
Zelensky, other Ukrainian leaders, and outside analysts have acknowledged—due in large part to
the exceptional scope and scale of military aid provided by the United States and its partners.
Should Ukraine join the alliance, the burden of finding the resources to defend Ukraine short of
nuclear war is therefore likely to fall disproportionately on the United States.
At a time when Washington already faces serious resource demands both at home and in
Asia, it risks being backed into a corner: with Ukraine in NATO, Washington will need to divert
resources from other priorities, some of which are arguably of greater importance, or accept
increased risk along what would be a dramatically expanded eastern front. In either case, the United
States will have incurred large costs and burdens at a moment when American time, attention, and
resources are needed elsewhere.
Finally, these costs could balloon because of the perverse incentives that offering Ukraine a
path into NATO creates for Moscow. Russia has shown itself willing to fight over the future strategic
orientation of Ukraine, but the United States and others have not. Moscow knows this. Tragically,
offering Ukraine a path into NATO is therefore likely to give Russia reason to continue its war
against Ukraine for as long as possible in order to avoid creating conditions in which Ukraine can
start on the road to NATO membership. In this sense, an invitation to join the alliance promises to
prolong the current bloodshed and make any diplomatic settlement less likely. On the other hand, if
the current war were to abate and Ukraine began the accession process, Moscow would be
encouraged to lash out again in a bid to prevent that move before the process was complete. Unless
NATO could admit Ukraine via some kind of fait accompli—no easy task given the alliance’s
requirements for unanimity and consensus—a plan for long-term membership makes Russian
aggression in Ukraine more rather than less likely. In either case, the costs of defending Ukraine go
up.
Ukraine’s desire to join NATO is understandable. It makes perfect sense that a country that
has been bullied and invaded by a stronger neighbor would seek the protection of an outside power.
Still, strategy is about choice, and the United States’ choices today are stark. For much of the post–
Cold War period, the United States could expand its international commitments at relatively low
cost and risk. Those circumstances no longer exist. With fiscal pressures at home, a grave challenge
to its position in Asia, and the prospect of escalation and an erosion of credibility vis-à-vis Moscow,
keeping Ukraine out of NATO simply reflects U.S. interests. Instead of making a questionable
promise that poses great dangers but would yield little in return, the United States should accept
that it is high time to close NATO’s door to Ukraine.
(Source: Foreign Affairs)
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South Asia
DEMOCRACY UNDER ASSAULT
Shahzad Chaudhry (A political security and defence analyst)
The writer is a political, security and defence analyst. He tweets @shazchy09 and can be
contacted at shhzdchdhry@yahoo.com
Democracy rests on three founding pillars: citizens’ engagement, independent judiciary and
free media. Citizen engagement comes via two basic tenets: an electoral process which should be
ideally free and fair, and a concept of local governments as the third tier of governance which
impacts a citizen’s day-to-day life — the essence of democratic culture. The quality of these two
activities will define the character, the quality, and the credibility of any democracy. Sometime
nations hold an electoral exercise but remain unmindful of delegating power to the lowest tier in a
government.
They may not have local governments at all which turns democracy tenuous and fragile.
Independent judiciary keeps the people invested in a system through fairness and protecting their
rights. Most importantly a judicial system protects fundamental human rights against dominating
power of the state. Only an effective judiciary independent of influence of any kind can assure that.
Similarly, a fair judicial concept protects a citizen against another stronger or more influential
individual and his exploitative and manipulative power.
Independent judiciary in principle holds sacrosanct the rights of the minorities against the
tyranny of the majority imposed through the force of numbers or the power of legislation.
Democracy thus must ensure its balance and fairness to forge a cohesive society. A legislation
contrived to favour a majority thus is open to scrutiny by the judiciary for its intent, purpose and
effect on the rights of a minority in parliament. Free media is society’s check on both the state and
the government. It acts as a watchdog and keeps the system functional within stated limits of the
constitution and fundamental freedoms.
Media manifests freedom of speech within the constraints enunciated by sociocultural norms
and restrictions imposed by the constitution. It is another debate whether there should be absolute
freedom of speech or be constrained by ethics and sensitivity to other freedoms. But one way or the
other, media is regulated in all societies through a formalised code or otherwise through a regulator.
Media brings to notice excesses against the weak and deviations which exceed limits ordained by
convention and law. It emplaces guardrails for society to nurture in a democracy. When any of the
above tenets of democracy is subverted, a conditioned or a controlled democracy, and increasingly
in the last few decades, illiberal democracy results. In illiberal democracy the façade is democratic,
but the substance hardly is.
This isn’t all theoretical enunciation; it is in play in notable societies globally. Autocracies seep
into democracies by controlling one or the other tenet twisting it to suit its purpose and secure an
unquestioned hold on to power. In most autocracies elections are the perfect façade. Yet those are
the only manifested illustration of a democratic process even when engineered, structured or
manipulated. Weak elections or a denial or delay in holding elections weakens democracies.
Pakistan in its current spate continues to dither from such an expression of people’s will.
Governments in some nations use elections to reinforce their popularity and extend their tenures by
winning another full term. Something IK could never comprehend when the going was good for
him. It could have won him the elusive ‘azadi’ that he now desperately seeks. Similarly, local
governments are a full expression of a democratic intent and when fully equipped and powered
produce the most optimal articulation of democracy.
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Every nation must strive to enable this level of democratic participation and governance
where local issues are resolved by local indulgence and devolved capacity and capability. Judiciary
is the most threatened when autocrats or cultlike political arrangements need least interference in
how they legislate, implement and arbitrate law — always to their advantage. How it is done is
quite how Narendra Modi in India has slowly but surely controlled higher judiciary. What was
patently secular is now obtrusively ethnoreligious enunciated by one word, Hindutva, or the sociocultural domination of the Hindu religion over all else. Indian SC, once the bastion for upholding
minority rights and individual freedoms in a culture loudly labeled secular and democratic, has now
transformed into a government’s second-string authorising and perpetuating the tyranny of Hindu
majority over its smaller ethno-religious minorities.
Indian Muslims cannot fall back on the strength of law in seeking equivalence in citizenship as
Indians. When Republicans in the USA pack judiciary with judges of certain inclination, the SC
becomes a predictable supporter of policies and social inclinations propounded by that party.
Erdogan in Turkey has followed the same route and judges of higher courts are now quite in-line
with what the political preference is. If Pakistan has a judicial crisis at hand its roots lay very much
in the political machination of what is in play here and what will become of the court in time will
reflect the preferences which dominate today’s polity in Pakistan. What separates the judiciary in the
US from one in South Asia or Turkey is the type of cases which come before the respective SCs.
It is usual for Asian Courts to protect political governments even in criminal cases against the
leadership — at times manipulating evidence or interpreting law to favour those in power. The US
SC will not deal with such cases routinely — Donald Trump’s insurrection under investigation by
the Congress and a Special Counsel will test the waters if Trump stands indicted. Media is the last
bastion in this mauling of democracy but usually the first to be corrupted, unfortunately. Special
interests, targeted funding and compromised legislative leverage mean that empires need to save
themselves from the power of law and will therefore submit before authority and money.
Pakistan is the worst example of how easily manipulable the media has become. Erdogan and
Modi in their respective countries have allegedly bought off the entire enterprise and reigned over
the last bastion in their own favour. With law and the airwaves both fully controlled democracy only
recedes, giving root to autocracies and neoliberalism. Right-wing fundamentalism then takes over.
What was patently inclusive eschews the essence (inclusivity) which defines democracy. Societies
fragment while strongmen rule over divided polities and societies. It doesn’t take long for a political
leader to change his spots. Democracies turn predatorial under strongmen autocracies. Erdogan and
Modi are buoyed by their tales of success trading their credentials of innocuous democrats into
predatorial autocrats.
Their route to such inevitability first lay in matchless economic performance under their
watch through which they incrementally assaulted the judiciary and then monopolised the media
through their cronies. Economic successes translated into media ownerships both beholden to the
same man — Erdogan or Modi. Pakistan stands at just such cross-roads. Those playing around with
these fundamentals in Pakistan must take heed. There is still time before we lose the plot entirely.
Our survival as a federation lies in patently democratic structures. To save its pillars foremost is to
save democracy
(Source: Express Tribune)
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FROM THE INDIA DIVIDEND TO A BAD BET
Changing U.S. Expectations or a Veiled Threat?
Kajari Kamal
A recent, widely commented upon essay in Foreign Affairs by Ashley Tellis, an acclaimed
strategic analyst on India-U.S. relations, argues that Washington’s more than two-decade long bet on
India as a key strategic partner that would come to U.S.’ help in its contest with China, has been a
bad one. The article, which is “meant to be a warning” for American policymakers, calls for looking
at India differently and revising their expectations. Interestingly, just four years back, the author in
another essay in the same magazine acknowledged New Delhi as America’s “best hope” in Asia,
and dismissed any complaints about the bilateral relations not transforming into an alliance, as “off
the mark.” What has changed?
Has U.S. expectations from India overshot the tacitly agreed upon level of reciprocity, in the
context of intensifying global challenges? Does the U.S. now suddenly expect India to join a U.S.-led
military alliance in a potential conflict with China – an aim that most credible India watchers in
Washington have and will continue to see as unachievable in the context of India’s long held
principles of non-alignment and strategic autonomy. Perhaps, the warning is more for Indian
policymakers than American. The discussion in the article on Biden administration’s “generosity,”
citing the Initiative on Emerging and Critical Technology as key to India’s aim to replace China as
the manufacturing hub of the world, alongside the power of the U.S. government to “make or break
the initiative,” arguably suggests a veiled threat.
Changing Geopolitical Context
Since the turn of the century, there has been an overall upward trajectory of the bilateral
relations between India and the U.S., owing in large part to the increasingly pivotal roles the two
countries have come to play for each other. Broadly, it was useful for America to have an alternate
power center in Asia to keep a check on an ascendant China, and in return, India’s deeper
engagement with the U.S. allowed it to work on its domestic capacities to address the power
asymmetry with China and bring it closer to its great power ambition.
Both countries strengthened their convergences and worked in tandem to address geopolitical
changes. If Washington has invigorated its relationship with India in all spheres – political relations,
civil-nuclear cooperation, defense cooperation, counter-terrorism, trade and economics, energy and
climate, education, space, science and technology, health – a bilateral template that is broadly
reserved for its ally partners, India too has reciprocated by shedding its past reluctance to engage
more actively with the U.S. in areas that are consequential for regional and maritime security, often
with oblique references to China.
Until a few years ago when China and Russia were just one of the three main sets of
challengers actively competing against the United States, Tellis thought that “the success of U.S.
efforts in India should be measured not by what India does for the United States but by what India
does for itself.” However, in the current geopolitical situation, where China and Russia are the most
pressing strategic challenge, the U.S. expected its enormous bet on India to pay off. More so, because
it thinks India would be more inclined to tilt after its Ladakh encounter with China in 2020, and the
continuing impasse on the border. From an American standpoint, India has disappointed the U.S. in
both balancing China and upholding the liberal international order, at a critical juncture of
geopolitical rivalry.
Why does India’s response to the China challenge diverge from that of the U.S.? Physical
proximity and relative weakness are valid points identified by the author, but the framework of
India’s response to China deserves closer attention in order to set US expectations right.
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Revisiting Kautilya’s Approach
Kautilya, an ancient Indian strategic thinker who arguably has had a significant influence on
contemporary India’s strategic thinking, would advise India to balance between ‘spineless
submission’ and ‘foolhardy valor’ in response to China, the relatively stronger madhyama (middle
power), who is also an ari (enemy), of the rajamandala (circle of states). The default foreign policy
action of a relatively weaker power – samdhi (peacemaking) – has been upturned by China arguably
because of its substantial strategic advantage and its perception of a less restrained treaty partner
(India). Vigraha (war and hostility) is ruled out as being imprudent. What are India’s options then?
Kautilya’s first, and most obvious, recommendation would be to shore up India’s national
power by optimizing intellectual, material, psychological, and diplomatic capacities expressed
through the saptanga (seven organs/limbs) theory. The health of the seven constituent elements of
the body politic allows a wider array of foreign policy choices to attain the state’s yogakshema
(political end goal). In the absence of the internal state factors (swami-ruler, amatya-council of
ministers, janapada-people and territory, durga-fort, kosa-treasury, and danda-armed might) being
fully optimized, relative weakness can also be addressed by seeking help from the external state
factor – mitra (ally).
While the sadgunyas (six measures of foreign policy) provide the basic framework for interstate relations in the Kautilyan scheme of things, strategic partnerships (samavaya) which state enter
if it is imperative to increase power with the help of others to balance the rise of the enemy, has
received fair attention. The underlying principle of these is relative strength and bargaining power,
and consequently, the convergence of interest and reliability is of the essence.
A third course of action which also relies on less overt ways of dealing with China, and is
arguably plausible given China’s misdoings in the region, is to rouse the members of the
rajamandala against the middle power: “The middle king, grown very powerful, has risen for the
destruction of all of us; let us join together and frustrate his expedition.”
In each of these maneuvers that Kautilya lays out, the role that the U.S. can and has been
playing is critical and substantial. On its part, India has never sought direct U.S. involvement in any
India-China dispute but has instead made it its mitra (ally) over the last two decades, navigating the
journey through a perceptible balance between interests and autonomy.
The Way Forward
The terms on which the India-U.S. bilateral relationship has flourished and the sensitiveness
the two countries have shown to each other’s proclivities and preferences cannot be jettisoned at an
inflection point in the international order. Perhaps, as a realization of this fact, the 2022 National
Defense Strategy of the United States of America states that Washington respects the sovereignty of
states and acknowledges that decisions allies and partners face are rarely binary. It promises to
“advance its Major Defense Partnership with India to enhance its ability to deter PRC aggression,”
and offers support to partner efforts in tackling acute grey zone coercion by PRC, including in
disputed land borders such as with India.
A stronger India translates into stronger resistance to China in the region, and a greater
assurance of free and open access to the Indian Ocean Region. According to a recent CNAS report,
the offer of sophisticated military technology, co-production and co-development of military
equipment, strengthening India’s maritime and naval capacity, and extending full support to India,
in the event of another border crisis, is indeed help compatible with American interests.
The new expectations from India, or tying the flow of critical technology to how New Delhi
comes to Washington’s aid in its crisis, will only reduce the two countries’ collective capacity to
balance China. U.S. strategic altruism must continue, and on its part, India should not take it for
granted. Ultimately, as Tellis himself notes, “the greatest obstacle to a deeper partnership is wishful
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thinking about what it can achieve.” These considerations should guide the discussions around
Prime Minister Modi’s forthcoming Official State Visit to the United States.
(Source: Institute for Security & Development Policy)
WASHINGTON’S EMBRACE OF MODI CARRIES A PRICE
John Reed
In the weeks and days leading up to Narendra Modi’s state visit to Washington this week, US
officials have been outdoing one another with words of adulation that have delighted the Indian
leader’s supporters and made his critics cringe.
“He is the most popular world leader for a reason,” commerce secretary Gina Raimondo said
at an India House event in Washington in April, wearing a green and yellow sari and gesturing
expansively. “He is unbelievable, visionary, and his level of commitment to the people of India is
just indescribable.”
Eric Garcetti, the US ambassador who arrived in New Delhi last month, has called Modi
India’s “guru-ji” and Ajit Doval, the prime minister’s hard-boiled national security adviser, “not
only a national treasure but an international treasure”.
Local media reported that at a Quad meeting on the sidelines of last month’s G7 summit in
Hiroshima, President Joe Biden told Modi that he was running out of tickets for next Thursday’s
state banquet at the White House because the Indian leader is “too popular”.
In a world of post-pandemic supply chain shifts, a globally disruptive war in Ukraine and
rising concerns about China, the US is not alone in rolling out the red carpet for India. France’s
Emmanuel Macron has invited Modi to be its guest of honour at next month’s Bastille Day parade.
But this charm campaign has been noted with dismay by India’s liberal elites. Analysts say
western democracies are putting aside human rights principles, including concerns about New
Delhi’s treatment of minority Muslims and Christians, its pressure on non-governmental
organisations and journalism and weakening of democratic standards because they need India as a
bulwark against China.
“Western countries have decided to look away from the decline in democratic credentials,
press freedoms or treatment of religious minorities taking place in India because they think they
need India to counterweigh China,” says Sushant Singh, senior fellow with the Centre for Policy
Research. “They believe a stronger India would provide a counter to China’s rise.”
India’s government rejects the notion that its democracy is anything other than robust, and its
defenders can easily find examples of democratic backsliding in western countries, not least the US.
From an American point of view, India is hardly the only country where Washington pushes
human rights to the side and geopolitical considerations to the fore, as seen in its growing alignment
on defence with Vietnam, a one-party non-democracy. Among other democracies, Israel, with its
patchy human rights record and fraying of democratic institutions under Benjamin Netanyahu, is a
perennial US ally with bipartisan support.
“The question is, are we propping up an increasingly illiberal democracy here?” asks Derek
Grossman, senior defence analyst with the Rand Corporation, of the US-India relationship. “In my
view, we are.”
He adds: “We have taken the view that geopolitics and countering China is more important to
us right now than the values-based diplomacy the Biden administration came in saying they would
prioritise.”
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India’s scale is what makes it different both in terms of what its western diplomatic partners
are willing to overlook, and how much they have to gain from doing so.
The country is now the world’s largest buyer of arms, according to the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute. France, thanks to an order of 36 Rafale fighter jets, is now its
second-largest military supplier after Russia, with the US third.
Modi will address Congress on Thursday and preside over the signing of a slew of deals
involving US companies, the fruit of a widening US-India partnership in technology and defence.
More deals, including an expected agreement with GE to build jet engines in India, are
expected as the country pushes an “indigenisation” plan to build up local defence production.
Despite these priorities, some criticism of India on human rights does emerge from parts of
the US administration. The state department’s most recent Religious Freedom Report listed India
among 17 countries of particular concern, citing violence and hate speech against Muslims and
Christians.
But these days, it is usually with a whisper. When opposition MP Rahul Gandhi was recently
convicted of criminal defamation and stripped of his parliamentary seat, the US said it was
“watching” the case in carefully worded language that stressed Washington and New Delhi’s
“shared commitment to democratic values”.
Analysts following the upcoming visit say any US words on sensitive issues, including both
human rights and India’s ties with Russia, will be similarly delicate, to the extent they are voiced at
all.
(Source: Financial Times)
SOUTH ASIAN CURRENCIES IN CRISIS
Amit Bhandari (Senior fellow, energy, investment and connectivity at Gateway House)
Almost all of India’s neighbours – Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal – are facing
balance of payments issues. Bangladesh is struggling to pay for its fuel imports, due to a shortage of
US dollars. Sri Lanka has already defaulted on its international commitments, and Pakistan is on the
verge. While the commodity price shock caused by the Russia-Ukraine conflict was a trigger, some
of this pain is self-inflicted, due to bad exchange-rate policies.
A glance at the historical exchange rates of the Pakistani Rupee (PKR), the Sri Lankan Rupee
(SLR) and the Bangladeshi Taka (BDT) shows that these had a fixed exchange rate versus the US
dollar in all but name. All the three countries import fuel, food and fertilizer, so a ‘strong’ exchange
rate also kept prices of imported goods low. An artificially strong exchange rate makes exports
uncompetitive – and is not sustainable.
However, these countries have another export which is stickier than product exports – human
labor. All of South Asia (including India) is a major source of migration of labour abroad – about 43
million of 164 million migrants globally – and a recipient of inward remittances. The World Bank
estimates that 20% of the global remittances of $815 billion in 2023 will come from South Asians
working abroad. In 2021 remittances at $157 billion were three times the Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) for the region. Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are much more reliant on remittances than
is as India.
The inward remittances have allowed the other South Asian countries to maintain ‘strong’
exchange rates, against market realities. Very often, these countries have two exchange rates – an
“official” rate and a “market” rate which is significantly higher. Workers sending money via
banking channels have to use the lower official rate – in effect subsidizing the government. When
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the divergence between the two rates becomes too wide, as it has in the past two years, remittances
start to decrease. A large and sustained gap between the official and the market exchange rate leads
to the use of informal channels such as hawala, legal in the UAE where many such workers are
based.
The use of hawala and/or informal channels was visible in Sri Lanka in the second half of
2021, when it was clear that the exchange rate was unsustainable, and a default was inevitable.
Inward remittances during that time in 2021 were $2.1 billion, a drop of almost 50% compared to the
same period last year. Sri Lanka has over 1 million overseas workers, many of whom stopped using
official channels, making the default more likely and the consequences much worse. During early
2022, the official exchange rate was around SLR 200 to a dollar, while the market-rate was over 20%
higher than that. Eventually, post the default, the Sri Lankan rupee stabilized at 360 to a dollar.
The Pakistani rupee, which has fallen by over 40% against the US dollar in the past year, still
trades in the open market at a significant discount to the official exchange rate. To preserve its
meagre currency reserves, Pakistan has instead cut down on imports, forcing industries to shutter
and hurting its economy further. Pakistan’s exports have fallen 19% during the Jan-Mar 2023
quarter, as many export-oriented industries are unable to import crucial input material. Inward
remittances to Pakistan have also taken a hit. During the first 10 months of the current financial year,
remittances are down to $22.7 billion, compared to $26.1 billion for the same period last year, a drop
of 13%, according to the State Bank of Pakistan. The ongoing political turmoil will accelerate the
decline. Pakistan’s current forex reserves are sufficient for two weeks of imports and a default is a
matter of when, not if. Pakistan’s economy will take a long time to emerge from the turmoil of the
past year.
Compared to the other two, Bangladesh took corrective action as its forex reserves started to
plummet in 2022, but were still at a comfortable level of $35 billion. It approached the IMF for a
rescue package in mid-2022, which was finally approved in early 2023. Bangladesh had to devalue
its currency by almost 25% over this period. One of the factors that drove the government to act was
the fall in remittances: in the second half of 2022, Bangladesh received inward remittances of $8.69
billion, down 16% over the same period of 2021. However, Bangladesh’s forex reserves have
continued to decline – meaning that a further devaluation of the currency is likely.
In all these cases, governments were able to maintain an artificially strong exchange rate
because of the strong money flows from the millions of expatriates/overseas workers. This policy is
unsustainable in the long run. India too, is a major recipient of remittances – $89 billion per year –
but these are a fraction of India’s goods and services exports. India sensibly abandoned fixed
exchange rates in 1992 and has allowed its currency to find its true level, high or low. Its south Asian
neighbours will be wise to do the same.
(Source: Gateway House)
AMERICA’S BAD BET ON INDIA
New Delhi Won’t Side With Washington Against Beijing
Ashley J. Tellis (Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)
For the past two decades, Washington has made an enormous bet in the Indo-Pacific—that
treating India as a key partner will help the United States in its geopolitical rivalry with China. From
George W. Bush onward, successive U.S. presidents have bolstered India’s capabilities on the
assumption that doing so automatically strengthens the forces that favor freedom in Asia.
The administration of President Joe Biden has enthusiastically embraced this playbook. In fact,
it has taken it one step further: the administration has launched an ambitious new initiative to
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expand India’s access to cutting-edge technologies, further deepened defense cooperation, and made
the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), which includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United
States, a pillar of its regional strategy. It has also overlooked India’s democratic erosion and its
unhelpful foreign policy choices, such as its refusal to condemn Moscow’s ongoing aggression in
Ukraine. It has done all of this on the presumption that New Delhi will respond favorably when
Washington calls in a favor during a regional crisis involving China.
Washington’s current expectations of India are misplaced. India’s significant weaknesses
compared with China, and its inescapable proximity to it, guarantee that New Delhi will never
involve itself in any U.S. confrontation with Beijing that does not directly threaten its own security.
India values cooperation with Washington for the tangible benefits it brings but does not believe
that it must, in turn, materially support the United States in any crisis—even one involving a
common threat such as China.
The fundamental problem is that the United States and India have divergent ambitions for
their security partnership. As it has done with allies across the globe, Washington has sought to
strengthen India’s standing within the liberal international order and, when necessary, solicit its
contributions toward coalition defense. Yet New Delhi sees things differently. It does not harbor any
innate allegiance toward preserving the liberal international order and retains an enduring aversion
toward participating in mutual defense. It seeks to acquire advanced technologies from the United
States to bolster its own economic and military capabilities and thus facilitate its rise as a great
power capable of balancing China independently, but it does not presume that American assistance
imposes any further obligations on itself.
As the Biden administration proceeds to expand its investment in India, it should base its
policies on a realistic assessment of Indian strategy and not on any delusions of New Delhi
becoming a comrade-in-arms during some future crisis with Beijing.
FAST FRIENDS
For most of the Cold War, India and the United States did not engage in any serious
conversations on national defense, as New Delhi attempted to escape the entanglements of joining
either the U.S. or the Soviet bloc. The two countries’ security relationship only flourished after Bush
offered India a transformative civil nuclear agreement.
Thanks to that breakthrough, U.S.-Indian security cooperation today is breathtaking in its
intensity and scope. The first and most visible aspect is defense consultations. The two countries’
civilian leaders, as well as their bureaucracies, maintain a regular dialogue on a variety of topics,
including China policy, India’s procurement of advanced U.S. military technologies, maritime
surveillance, and undersea warfare. These conversations vary in quality and depth but are critical
for reviewing strategic assessments, defining the parameters of desired cooperation, and devising
tools for policy implementation. As a result, the United States and India work together in ways that
would have been unimaginable during the Cold War. For example, they cooperate to monitor
China’s economic and military activities throughout the wider Indian Ocean region and have
recently invested in mechanisms to share near-real-time information about shipping movements in
the Indo-Pacific region with other littoral states.
A second area of success has been military-to-military collaboration, much of which takes
place outside public view. The programs for senior officer visits, bilateral or multilateral military
exercises, and reciprocal military training have all expanded dramatically during the past two
decades. High-profile exercises most visibly exemplify the scale and diversity of this expanded
relationship: the annual Malabar exercises, which bring together the U.S. and Indian navies, have
now expanded to permanently include Japan and Australia; the Cope India exercises provide an
opportunity for the U.S. and Indian air forces to practice advanced air operations; and the Yudh
Abhyas series involves the land forces in both command post and field training activities.
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Finally, U.S. firms have enjoyed notable success in penetrating the Indian defense market.
India’s military has gone from having virtually no U.S. weapons in its inventory some two decades
ago to now featuring American transport and maritime aircraft, utility and combat helicopters, and
antiship missiles and artillery guns. U.S.-Indian defense trade, which was negligible around the turn
of the century, reached over $20 billion in 2020.
But the era of major platform acquisitions from the United States has probably run its course.
U.S. companies remain contenders in several outstanding Indian procurement programs, but it
seems unlikely that they will ever enjoy a dominant market share in India’s defense imports. The
problems are entirely structural. For all of India’s intensifying security threats, its defense
procurement budget is still modest in comparison with the overall Western market. The demands of
economic development have prevented India’s elected governments from increasing defense
expenditures in ways that might permit vastly expanded military acquisitions from the United
States. The cost of U.S. defense systems is generally higher than that of other suppliers because of
their advanced technology, an advantage that is not always sufficiently attractive for India. Finally,
New Delhi’s demand that U.S. companies shift from selling equipment to producing it with local
partners in India—requiring the transfer of intellectual property—often proves to be commercially
unattractive, given the small Indian defense market.
INDIA GOES IT ALONE
While U.S.-Indian security cooperation has enjoyed marked success, the larger defense
partnership still faces important challenges. Both nations seek to leverage their deepening ties to
limit China’s assertiveness, but there is still a significant divide in how they aim to accomplish that
purpose.
The U.S. goal in military-to-military cooperation is interoperability: the Pentagon wants to be
able to integrate a foreign military in combined operations as part of coalition warfare. India,
however, rejects the idea that its armed forces will participate in any combined military operation
outside of a UN umbrella. Consequently, it has resisted investing in meaningful operational
integration, especially with the U.S. armed forces, because it fears jeopardizing its political
autonomy or signaling a shift toward a tight political alignment with Washington. As a result, the
bilateral military exercises may improve the tactical proficiency of the units involved but do not
expand interoperability to the level that would be required in major combined operations against a
capable adversary.
India’s view of military cooperation, which emphasizes nurturing diversified international
ties, represents a further challenge. India treats military exercises more as political symbols than
investments in increasing operational proficiency and, as a result, practices with numerous partners
at varying levels of sophistication. On the other hand, the United States emphasizes relatively
intense military exercises with a smaller set of counterparts.
India’s priority has been to receive American assistance in building up its own national
capabilities so it can deal with threats independently. The two sides have come a long way on this
by, for example, bolstering India’s intelligence capabilities about Chinese military activities along
the Himalayan border and in the Indian Ocean region. The existing arrangements for intelligence
sharing are formally structured for reciprocity, and New Delhi does share whatever it believes to be
useful. But because U.S. collection capabilities are so superior, the flow of usable information often
ends up being one way.
Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has increasingly focused on defense industrial
cooperation as the key driver of its security partnership with the United States. Its underlying
objective is to secure technological autonomy: ever since its founding as a modern state, India has
sought to achieve mastery over all critical defense, dual-use, and civilian technologies and, toward
that end, built up large public sector enterprises that were intended to become global leaders.
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Because this dream still remains unrealized, New Delhi has now prioritized Washington’s support
for its defense industrial ambitions in tandem with similar partnerships forged with France, Israel,
Russia, and other friendly states.
For over a decade, Washington has attempted to help India improve its defense technology
base, but these efforts have often proved futile. During President Barack Obama’s administration,
the two countries launched the Defense Trade and Technology Initiative, which aimed to promote
technology exchange and the coproduction of defense systems. Indian officials visualized the
initiative as enabling them to procure many advanced U.S. military technologies, such as those
related to jet engines, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, and stealth capabilities, so that
they could be manufactured or codeveloped in India. But Washington’s hesitation about clearing
such transfers was matched by U.S. defense firms’ reluctance to part with their intellectual property
and make commercial investments for what were ultimately meager business opportunities.
WASHINGTON’S BIG BET
The Biden administration is now going to great lengths to reverse the failure of the Defense
Trade and Technology Initiative. Last year, it announced the Initiative on Critical and Emerging
Technology, which aims to fundamentally transform cooperation between the two countries’
governments, businesses, and research entities pertaining to technology development. This
endeavor encompasses a wide variety of fields, including semiconductors, space, artificial
intelligence, next-generation telecommunications, high-performance computing, and quantum
technologies, all of which have defense applications but are not restricted to them.
For all its potential, however, the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology does not
guarantee any specific outcomes. The U.S. government can make or break the initiative, as it controls
the release of the licenses that many joint ventures will require. Although the Biden administration
seems inclined to be more liberal on this compared with its predecessors, only time will tell whether
the initiative delivers on India’s aspirations for greater access to advanced U.S. technology in
support of Modi’s “Make in India, Make for World” drive, which aims to transform India into a
major global manufacturing hub that could one day compete with, if not supplant, China as the
workshop of the world.
The bigger question, however, is whether Washington’s generosity toward India will help
accomplish its strategic aims. During the Bush and Obama administrations, U.S. ambitions centered
largely on helping build India’s power in order to prevent China from dominating Asia. As U.S.China relations steadily deteriorated during the Trump administration—when Sino-Indian relations
hit rock bottom as well—Washington began to entertain the more expansive notion that its support
for New Delhi would gradually induce India to play a greater military role in containing China’s
growing power.
There are reasons to believe it will not. India has displayed a willingness to join the United
States and its Quad partners in some areas of low politics, such as vaccine distribution,
infrastructure investments, and supply chain diversification, even as it insists that none of these
initiatives are directed against China. But on the most burdensome challenge facing Washington in
the Indo-Pacific—securing meaningful military contributions to defeat any potential Chinese
aggression—India will likely refuse to play a role in situations where its own security is not directly
threatened. In such circumstances, New Delhi may at best offer tacit support.
Although China is clearly India’s most intimidating adversary, New Delhi still seeks to avoid
doing anything that results in an irrevocable rupture with Beijing. Indian policymakers are acutely
conscious of the stark disparity in Chinese and Indian national power, which will not be corrected
any time soon. New Delhi’s relative weakness compels it to avoid provoking Beijing, as joining a
U.S.-led military campaign against it certainly would. India also cannot escape its physical
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proximity to China. The two countries share a long border, so Beijing can threaten Indian security in
significant ways—a capability that has only increased in recent years.
Consequently, India’s security partnership with the United States will remain fundamentally
asymmetrical for a long time to come. New Delhi desires American support in its own confrontation
with China while at the same time intending to shy away from any U.S.-China confrontation that
does not directly affect its own equities. Should a major conflict between Washington and Beijing
erupt in East Asia or the South China Sea, India would certainly want the United States to prevail.
But it is unlikely to embroil itself in the fight.
New Delhi’s deepening defense ties with Washington, therefore, must not be interpreted as
driven by either strong support for the liberal international order or the desire to participate in
collective defense against Chinese aggression. Rather, the intensifying security relationship is
conceived by Indian policymakers as a means of bolstering India’s own national defense capabilities
but does not include any obligation to support the United States in other global crises. Even as this
partnership has grown by leaps and bounds, there remains an unbridgeable gap between the two
countries, given India’s consistent desire to avoid becoming the junior partner—or even a
confederate—of any great power.
The United States should certainly help India to the degree compatible with American
interests. But it should harbor no illusions that its support, no matter how generous, will entice India
to join it in any military coalition against China. The relationship with India is fundamentally unlike
those that the United States enjoys with its allies. The Biden administration should recognize this
reality rather than try to alter it.
(Source: Foreign Affairs)