Culture and Power: International Relations as Intercultural Relations
Author(s): AKIRA IRIYE
Source: Diplomatic History , SPRING 1979, Vol. 3, No. 2 (SPRING 1979), pp. 115-128
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24909929
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Culture and Power:
International Relations as Intercultural Relations*
AKIRAIRIYE
No one will dispute the contention today that international relati
are also intercultural relations. International relations, after all, a
definition relations among nations, but each nation has its disti
traditions, social and intellectual orientations, and political arrangeme
Because a nation must sustain itself as an entity, it must develop tech
to harness resources and generate energy, organize itself in social gro
for survival and defense, and develop ideas and concepts to p
meaning for its existence. A nation, in a word, is a "cultural system,"
international relations are interactions among cultural systems. There
as Leslie White has written, intrasystemic and extrasystemic ty
behavior. The former refers to movements and developments with
system, and the latter to those between one system and another.
extrasystemic behavior of a system," he says, "is a function of the in
properties of the system on the one hand, and of the thing reacted to,
other."1 To study extrasystemic relations, therefore, one must exami
essential features within the given systems and see how they affect t
interactions with one another.
1 his, arter all, is not very dinerent trom what diplomatic historians
have been doing for some time. They, too, have recognized that in order to
analyze interrelationships among national systems, they must study
national systems themselves, not simply their extrinsic interactions. This is
what Lawrence Kaplan and Morrel Heald have done, for instance, in their
recent book, Culture and Diplomacy.2 They have sought to trace what they
call "the cultural setting" of United States foreign policy. The underlying
♦SHAFR presidential address given at San Francisco, 29 December 1978. An earlier
version of this paper has been read and commented upon by Charles DeBenedetti, Harry D.
Harootunian, Lawrence Kaplan, and others. I would like to express my thanks for their helpful
suggestions.
'Leslie A. White, The Concept of Cultural Systems (New York, 1975), p. 20.
2Morell Heald and Lawrence S. Kaplan, Culture and Diplomacy (Westport, 1977).
115
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116
DIPLOMATIC
HISTORY
assumption here is that in ord
must know something about
evident. Problems immediate
specifically, the relationship i
external behavior. Can it be sa
generates a distinctive form
culture define a Nazi foreign p
basic orientations of Soviet external affairs? In the case of the United
States, do America's presumably unique values create a uniquely
American approach to foreign policy?
Put this way, it becomes obvious that the question of the relationship
between domestic culture and external affairs has been at the core of the
historical debate on the foreign policies of Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia,
Wilsonian America, and many other societies. The controversy between
A. J. P. Taylor and his critics has centered around the degree to which
Nazi culture can be said to have preconditioned Hitler's foreign policy, and
the debate between the exponents of what Daniel Yergin has called the
"Riga axioms" and the "Yalta axioms" has involved differences of opinion
regarding the cultural foundations of Soviet foreign policy. One school of
thought presupposed an intrinsic relationship between the political and
ideological orientations of the Stalinist state and its external objectives,
whereas the other school did not subscribe to such a simplistic formulation,
preferring to see Russian foreign policy as a product of many other factors.
Likewise, with regard to the United States, some writers have viewed its
diplomacy as a function of Wilsonian liberal capitalism, while others have
pointed to the importance of other determinants such as party politics,
geographical isolation, and race prejudice as equally significant generators
of policy.
In my opinion, these issues, all of which raise the fundamental
question of the relationship between a country's cultural system and its
behavior in the international system, are among the most fruitful and
interesting in the field of diplomatic history. As historians engaged in the
study of intricate interrelations among nations, I believe that we are in a
good position to contribute to elucidating these issues and to take a lead in
exploring the ramifications of that key question, for only an international
and historical perspective will safeguard us from the danger of trivializing
these problems into meaningless tautologies or parochial generalizations.
In particular, our comparative perspective and sensitivity to cultural
differences should help us in uncovering the divergent ways in which
intrasystemic orientations are linked to extrasystemic behavior. As Michel
Foucault notes in The Archaeology of Knowledge, historians must be
prepared to "describe the relations between series, thus constituting series
of series." In other words, within each system there are many series of
interrelationships, and these may in turn produce other series or sequences
when systems interact. We are thus interested in "the interplay of
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CULTURE
AND
relations,"
POWER
not
117
simply
in
descr
systems.3
A challenging task before diplomatic Historians, then, is to try to
explore various "series of series" within and among different societies.
This is a formidable task, but I would like to suggest that one means of
getting at the problem is to view "culture" and "power" as two series
interior to a cultural system, and then to explore their interplay both within
the system and with similar series in other cultural systems. These are by
no means the only series one could detect and explore, but at least such
conceptualization would spare us the endless and perchance fruitless
exercise of trying to define "culture" in the abstract. For our purposes it
seems sufficient to consider the pairing of culture and power as a heuristic
device to "uncover the whole interplay of differences," in Foucault's
words. After all, all cultural systems are held together by some mechanism
of control—or, in the words of Clifford Geertz, by "a set of control
mechanisms ... for the governing of behavior."4 It will be useful to divide
these mechanisms between those that are more formal—codified laws,
organized force as an instrument of public authority in maintaining order,
governmental institutions, etc.—and those that are more informal— un
spoken customs, religious beliefs, technology, language, symbols. Cultural
systems are what they are because they are held together both by public
authority organizing and enforcing law and order, and by significant
symbols that impose meaning on experience and provide a specific con
struction for particular individuals. These two types of control mechanisms,
of course, are in reality never totally distinct; if so, cultural systems could
not be preserved. But by viewing them as two series in a given system, we
shall be able to add specificity to our discussion. The dichotomy between
formal and informal mechanisms is similar to the distinction between
public and private, legal and moral, and other equivalent pairs that
historians have written about Nor is it very different from Carl Schmitt's
contrast between order and nature, or from Antonio Gramsci's notion of
political and civil society, a concept that has been put to brilliant use by
Edward Said in his Orientalism.5 For the purposes of this paper, I shall
refer to these two as power and culture. The terminology seems to be
relevant to our discussion, for the specific ways in which power sustains
cultural symbols, or in which culture appropriates, limits, and poses the
question of power vary from one system to another, and these differences
may also say something about extrasystemic relations.
'Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New
York, 1972), pp. 7-8,13.
"Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, 1973), pp. 44-46.
'Carl Schmitt, Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes (Hamburg,
1938): Antonio Gramsci, The Prison Notebooks: Selections, trans, and ed. Quintin Hoare
and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York, 1971); Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York,
1978).
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118
DIPLOMATIC
HISTORY
For instance, in traditional Ch
and power reinforced each oth
cultural values, and the state wa
who were well educated were
ified to act as preservers of soc
scholar-gentry elite. The stat
strument for creating a moral u
Power, in other words, was in the service of culture; there was no
distinction between guardians of culture and holders of power. Likewise
there was little distinction between public and private spheres of action. As
Tu Wei-ming has noted, "[the] idea that private morality or personal life
style is separable from public duty has not yet been fully explored in
Chinese legal thought." The notion that culture and power were virtually
synonymous and interchangeable had, of course, important social impli
cations for dissident elements in China. Revolutions in China have meant
the displacement of the elite that monopolized power because they
monopolized cultural opportunities and mechanisms. Since culture was
power, one had to transform the former in order to eliminate the latter. Thus
when the communists sought to overthrow the existing power structure,
they necessarily stressed the goal of culturally revolutionizing China. Once
a new elite comes into existence, however, it can easily appoint itself the
new guardian of cultural values. As Tu notes, "it has generally been
assumed that a Chinese intellectual should work 'within the system,'
whether Confucian or Communist."6
In some important ways the culture-power relationship distinguishes
Western, in particular American, society from Chinese. In America, for
example, it may be said that culture and power are not always compatible,
and that sometimes they form an adversary relationship. Indeed, the state
as the source and embodiment of power has not presumed to aim at the
creation of a moral order, a task that is generally left to private initiatives.
Public authority and private spheres of activity have remained separate,
and their intertwining relationships have characterized the history of the
nation. Certainly one meaning of the Enlightenment from which the early
Americans drew their sense of national experience was the constant search
for balance between public and private, between state authority and
individual activities. What Henry May has aptly called the "beauties of
balance" presupposed an orderly universe in which all things and orien
tations were found in a stable equilibrium. American government, in
particular, according to May, was to be framed in such a way that "reason
and passion, public spirit and lust for power balance each other."7 In other
words, power was something necessary to organize society, but it was also
6Tu Wei-ming, "Chinese Perceptions of America," inDragon and Eagle, ed. Michael
Oksenberg and Robert B. Oxnam (New York, 1978), pp. 102-3.
'Henry May, The Enlightenment in America (New York, 1976), p. 89.
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CULTURE
AND
POWER
119
something to be restrained so that i
human activities. To put it simply, A
a healthy skepticism toward powe
cultural objectives—artists, intell
retained a sense of distance from the
the need for some form of governme
of government was to create and pro
stability in which citizens could eng
Such varying patterns of culture-
bearings
on
societies'
dealings
with
views of the external world. In tradi
cultural greatness determined its po
superior cultural achievements was e
other states. In practice, of course, t
tribes, without any pretensions to cu
power,
power
would
would
periodically
be
combined
invade
with
the
a
c
elites, and the barbarian invaders
Confucian cultural order. They, n
dynasties, would view the world ar
values than of power. The traditio
been
as
neatly
imagined,
but
constructed
it
seems
on
C
indisputab
among countries was assumed on the
culture as expressed in the written c
rituals.
These
symbols
stressed
a
sy
morality and personal interactions, n
today, Peking's persistent refusal to
opposition
tradition.
In
the
power
to
big-power
American
politics
in
Kaplan
and
political
alliances,
"hegemon
experience,
too,
international
Heald
note,
t
rel
America
and unne
balance of power, and restrictive e
Old World, in other words, exem
international affairs, whereas Am
nomic intercourse, the abolition of
produce war, and the promotion o
everywhere."8 This was a view of fo
of power. Such an interpretation has
Hutson, for instance, has argued tha
century] operated in foreign politics
8Heald
and
frequent
Kaplan,
Culture
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and
Diploma
120
DIPLOMATIC
politics
discuss
that
these
HISTORY
dominated
contentions
Eur
in
de
Enlightenment would indica
developments before passing
May's stress on balance as a
useful as it shows that Amer
as they dealt with domestic eve
between power and culture. Th
of power in international relat
reduce such needs, for only a
domestic
and
external,
woul
pursuit of liberty. Because Am
European culture, it is not sur
the international system in th
transatlantic cultural developm
The
relationship
between
c
uniquely American fashion in
exceptionalist impulse may be
that stressed private initiative
and economic development, an
question of the power of the f
of the culture of the sout
midcentury Americans, bu
responding
preferred
What
to
definition
play
Robert
think,
be
seen
its
Beisner
in
of
role
such
has
a
fo
as
a
cha
contex
to establish a relationship be
Foreign policy was mostly in
because there was little tho
anything
else.
Toward
the
end
to Beisner's "New Diplomacy,
of national power and of the
national arena. Here again, it
situation in the context of d
Keller,
an
and
others
increasingly
problems
for
more
order
in
'James
of
have
society
efficient
the
H.
age
stresse
industrializin
of
Hutson,
and
econo
organizat
turmoil,
f
"Intellectua
Diplomatic History l(Winter 1977)
''Robert Beisner, From the Old D
"Robert Wiebe, The Search for O
State (Cambridge, 1977).
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CULTURE
AND
POWER
121
disorderly components of society.
ticipation in power politics after t
ably be linked to such development
too, were responses to a perceived thr
It is no accident that one of the most
time,
the
treatise
by
the
English
entitled The Control of the Tropics.
be subjected to more organized contr
to
be
maintained
by
establishing
f
tropics and other underdeveloped are
Whether the United btates at the t
world power or not is a question t
anew in his address last year. Accor
Spanish-American War and the G
transformation in the fundamenta
foreign policy."12 Here again the q
relationship between internal orie
was, in Wiebe's words, a "search f
corresponding
search
for
order
over
did not necessarily result in addit
participation in power politics. Th
arrangements were such as to disc
overseas from exercising power at
domestic power and external po
neering works have done much to ill
John A. Hobson's Imperialism. Accor
the late nineteenth and the early tw
of power over culture; it extended n
earlier, to enlarge spheres of metrop
only those who stood to gain from l
The nation's resources were being
because the "cultured classes," cha
their
power.
Had
they
remained
in
p
would have followed the example
Hobson wrote, brains and natural
educational
opportunities
and
suppor
character." Instead, the armed ser
dustries and professions" had come
nationalism, militarism, and empir
power.14
Whether
"Raymond
1978): 117-30.
Esthus,
or
not
this
"Isolationism
"Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy (New York, 1961 ), and American Imperialism
(New York, 1968).
"John A. Hobson, Imperialism (Ann Arbor, 1965), pp. 92-93.
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is
an
and
a
Wo
122
DIPLOMATIC
imperialism,
HISTORY
Hobson's
analysis
comparing British and other co
in the United States at the turn
cultural elites by a new power e
C.
Roland
century
Marchand,
Sondra
internationalism
indica
in civic organizations, busine
interested in internationalism
broadening networks of cultu
Culture, not power, was what t
its dealing with other countries.
wiisonianism, in sucn a context, may oe described as a conscious
attempt to redefine United States foreign policy to restructure international
order in close connection with domestic order. This time the stress was on
corporatist arrangements at home and international cooperation abroad.
As Joan Hoff Wilson, Michael Hogan, Burton Kaufman, and others have
recently noted, there was a Wilsonian symmetry in that the concept of
effective cooperation at home among government, business, labor, agri
culture, and professional groups so as to minimize both concentration of
power and anarchic competition, had a counterpart in the idea of co
operative undertaking among the advanced countries of the world to
promote economic interdependence and develop all regions of the globe.16
It is not surprising, as Robert Freeman Smith has pointed out, that the key
to Wilsonian foreign policy was the idea of orderly change in all countries.
Stable political order and gradual economic change were considered the
key to international peace as well as to the welfare and progress of
individual countries.17 Power, in the sense of control mechanism, resided in
this type of corporatist and worldwide interdependence. American capi
talist culture, in other words, called forth, and required, an international
cultural outlook in which physical force and power politics would be much
less important than economic and intellectual exchanges. As more and
more countries developed politically and economically in a growingly
interdependent world, it was thought, they would become more and more
compatible. What N. Gordon Levin has termed Wilson's "reintegra
tionist" policy was based on such an assumption of compatibility. Those
societies whose cultural and political outlooks were not compatible with
those of the United States and its associates, notably the Soviet Union,
"Warren Kuehl, Seeking World Order (Nashville, 1969); Sondra Herman, Eleven
Against War (Stanford, 1969); C. Roland Marchand, The American Peace Movement and
Social Reform (Princeton, 1972).
"Joan Hoff Wilson, Herbert Hoover (Boston, 1975); Michael J. Hogan, Informal
Entente (Columbia, Missouri, 1977); Burton Kaufman, Efficiency and Empire (Westport,
1974).
"Robert Freeman Smith, The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in
Mexico (Chicago, 1972).
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CULTURE AND POWER 123
would remain outside the reintegrationis
the anthropological sense of organized
play a more frontal role in international
be said that culture became a more impo
foreign affairs than power.
The 1920s, in such a context, emer
contemporary international affairs. In h
Joan Wilson made a powerful presentatio
about politics and foreign policy that
continued to be influential for the next
such as the Second World War and the co
the same thing would be to note that
cultural relations became closely boun
World War. Not only did a country's f
orientations—this had always been the
based relations with other countries came
economic, and cultural ties with them. In
outcome of the growing economic pow
United States. American technology, bu
popular values spread to other lands, a
spoke of the "decline of the West," act
closer together through essentially W
More important, there was a sense of
societies so that order and stability in on
order and stability in other countries.
groups in each society that controlled
symbols established a common front wit
They would have a stake in the existing
external. Charles Maier has described thi
Europe, but one could apply more or less
areas of the world.19
The problem, unfortunately, was th
national relations and intercultural relati
world economic crisis of the 1930s. For o
interdependent world was fractured by
to solving its own economic problems
internationalism was replaced by econ
the same time, in the process of domesti
corporatist cooperation within the fra
petition gave way to the vogue of plannin
power inasmuch as those who did the
Japan, or the United States—tended to c
"Joan Hoff Wilson, "Foreign Policy Tren
8 (September 1977): 1-17.
"Charles Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe
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124
DIPLOMATIC
extent
never
HISTORY
known
before.20
internally ultimately affected e
international sphere. Certainly
than before to talk of power
balance of power. Even those,
that America's commitment
unwitting witnesses to the gr
power
politics,
terms
of
temptation.
two
culture
once
liberal
the
again
bourgeois
political
greater
Probably
and
also
the
mo
power,
became
culture,
confrontation
ho
blur
and
y
betwe
racies.
Cultural differences wer
was only when Nazi Germany
that the United States and Brit
the name of Western civilizat
objectives had to be sufficien
oriented alliance with the Soviet Union.
Perhaps the most fascinating example of the intricate relationship
between intercultural and international relations was the tortuous story of
changing United States dealings with Japan. As in Germany, there were in
Japan in the 1930s political and intellectual currents that self-consciously
rejected Western civilization, calling it materialistic, selfish, and decadent.
Publicists were busy enunciating the doctrine of Asian solidarity, coop
eration, and resistance to Western domination. They posed the ideology of
Asian unity as tne antithesis ot everything tor wnicn tne west naa
presumably stood. They argued that nationalism, individualism, capi
talism, liberalism, materialism, imperialism, and all other things that, in
their view, had characterized Western culture and behavior had demon
strated their bankruptcy. Instead, they would stress themes such as regional
cooperation, coexistence and coprosperity, harmony, and the subordi
nation of the individual to the community as better alternatives for the
contemporary world. In the late 1930s Japanese politicians and intel
lectuals laid special stress on the cultural aspect of the Chinese war. As an
influential author put it, the war in China must be sustained through a
cultural effort, a guiding ideology that was fit for the new age. And this
effort, he asserted, must start by recognizing that the traditional, Western
oriented scholarly and cultural activities had not served the nation well.
Henceforth, the Japanese should understand that these activities must be
promoted solely for national ends. Culture must serve power. The Sino
Japanese war, in such a view, was as much an inner war to cleanse the
Japanese mind of Western cultural influences as a physical struggle to
20See Otis L. Graham, Toward a Planned Society (New York, 1976).
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CULTURE
AND
POWER
125
establish Japanese power on
was, of course, repeated with
hostilities
against
the
the
mo
Anglo-A
crusade to establish a "new cultural and moral order" in the world.
Government propaganda stressed the distinction between what was termed
"Anglo-American culture" and "Asian culture," asserting that the latter
emphasized unity over diversity, spirit over matter, and culture as politics
compared to culture in an adversary relationship to politics.22
All 111C kJ 111LCLI OUUCZ), LUU, WcUUUIC UllIlKlllg OllCddCU U1C UUllUlcU
aspect of the Japanese war. The attack on Pearl Harbor was seen as a
typical act of a people reared in a peculiar "national philosophy" and
characterized by certain unpleasant cultural and personality traits. A
Nathaniel Peffer wrote in February 1942, Japanese aggressivene
"springs from something deeper [than economic need]—the character and
outlook of the ruling class, the military caste, and the submissiveness of the
rest of the Japanese nation."23 Another writer noted that Japanese impe
rialism should be attributed to some "ingrown cultural, nonmaterial te
dencies" which constituted "a tremendous danger inherent in the tradition
Japanese frame of mind." They lacked "popularly accepted, advanced
ethical and humane standards."24 As Sheila Johnson has documented
scholarly and journalistic writings in wartime America were filled wit
similar attempts to explain Japanese external behavior by tracing it t
national cultural traits.25 America, in other words, was not only fighting
Japanese imperialism and aggression physically but was also engaged in
struggle with an alien cultural tradition. America's victory in Asia cou
only be ensured, then, when Japan's "national philosophy" changed, as
State Department official wrote, or when "the American way of life
prevailed in Asia, as Pearl Buck said.26
Such expressions in both Japan and the United States might provide
evidence that the war was not simply a struggle for power but also a conflic
between two irreconcilable cultures and ways of life. The two countrie
cultural incompatibility, according to such an interpretation, was at th
foundation of their incompatibility as Pacific powers; American-Japanese
antagonism in power terms reflected their deeper cultural animosity. I
actuality, however, one may well wonder if such was really the case. Soon
80.
"Uda Hisashi, Tai-Shi burtka kösaku söan (Tokyo, 1939), pp. 27-30.
"Okumura Kiwao, Sonnöjuino kessen (Tokyo, 1943), pp. 334-38, 357-63.
"Nathaniel Peffer, "The Roots of the Pacific Conflict," Asia 42 (February 1942): 7
"Ludwig F. Freund, "What about Germany and Japan?" World Affairs Interprete
16 (April 1945): 78-94.
"Sheila Johnson, American Attitudes TowardJapan (Washington, 1975).
"Far Eastern Division memo, 26 January 1942, 740.0011PW/2037 3/8, RG 59,
State Department Archives, National Archives, Washington, D. C.; Christopher Thorn
Allies of a Kind (London, 1977), p. 156.
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126
DIPLOMATIC
HISTORY
after the Pearl Harbor attack
Division of the State Departm
the ideas, the sympathetic su
Pacific—all these have gone t
possession, she has professed
waged war." An interesting poi
Japan had arisen against its ben
had
was
been
to
which
infused
make
had,
a
by
America
statement
in
a
word,
about
been
A
other memoranda, stressing tha
not subscribe to the philosophy
nation down a path of aggressio
Once
Japanese
militarism
was
reemerge in positions of influe
been, before the Americanizatio
According
there was
war was a
to
this
way
of
lo
nothing inherently c
subversion of Japane
them. Because the two societie
thing was to destroy Japanese
of
those
cultural
traits
that
had
a peaceful, interdependent re
would presumably be similar t
values and supportive of stabl
were orientations that had b
talking optimistically
were in effect saying
resume
their
of reconc
that the
cooperative
end
according to John Morton Blum
was an overwhelming yearning
that extent, there was a cohere
an
aberration
patterns
and
Whether
culture,
or
that
the
war
it
time.
past,
I
sho
relat
should
primarily
remembered
another
and
international
as
is
would
a
an
be
powe
intrig
just
like
even during the war was nei
values and orientations as the
different from the 1920s as
Japanese
militarism
"Emmerson
ment
Archives.
"John
memo,
See
Morton
also
Blum,
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5
and
ag
February
1
memo
mentio
V
for
Was
Vic
CULTURE AND POWER 127
wholesale national transformation, so
remained basically stable. Old elites r
economic power, they had formed a tem
but were ready at a moment's notice
values as productivity, efficiency, and s
as strong as ever; after all, these q
trialization, urbanization, mass mobi
sential for the prosecution of war. I
influences had remained indelibly strong
had to try to bridge the gap between
American-Japanese relations. But one m
their own propaganda very seriously. Fo
aims reveals a remarkable convergence o
by 1943 at the latest. At least those wit
began an intensive effort to define war
peace that would ensue developed a vi
that was not very different from wartim
were talking about a new order of A
political reforms, economic developm
contribute to peace and stability. Wh
mutuality or reciprocity was not ver
officials were calling interdependenc
rations as those issued at the Great East Asia Conference and on the
occasion of Burmese independence, both taking place in 1943, were almost
interchangeable with the Atlantic Charter or the joint declaration at the end
of the Teheran Conference.29
Although rhetorical similarity should not be contused with an iden
tity of ideas and interests, it is to be noted that Japanese and Americans did
in fact view the end of the war in almost identical terms, that is, that it
involved the defeat of Japanese militarism, the emergence of a new Asian
regional order, and the reintegration of postwar Japan into a system of
interdependent international relations based on the principle of peaceful
economic development. American-Japanese cultural relations, which had
been shattered by their power struggle, would return to what they had been
in the 1920s. All of this may indicate that culturally the two countries had
not really diverged much even after 1929. The major departure after 1945
was that in Japan certain cultural values came to assert themselves over
considerations of power, whereas in the United States preoccupation with
power often threatened to relegate culture to a less prominent place in its
external affairs. In an ironical twist of history, postwar Japan became an
"I have discussed these points at greater length inNichi-Bei sensö (Tokyo, 1978). For
wartime American views of the Asia-Pacific region, see two excellent recent studies:
Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind, and Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay (Oxford and New
York, 1977).
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128
DIPLOMATIC
HISTORY
embodiment of capitalist intern
country that had been its proge
power-oriented cold war strateg
As the toregoing discussion indicates, it is useful to examine inter
national relations as interactions among cultural systems and among
systems of power. The two types of relationships are not identical. There
may be global stability at the level of power, but confusion in cultural terms,
and vice versa. But one thing seems to be certain. Too deep a chasm
between intercultural and interpower relationships is destabilizing, because
there is always a tendency to try to bridge the gap. Today, the world
requires stability and order more than ever before. But a stable world order
based on a balance of power alone would not suffice. There must be also
cultural stability, both in the sense of each society's developing mech
anisms for stable development, and also in terms of a shared outlook across
national boundaries on the pressing issues of the entire world, such as
resource scarcity and nuclear proliferation. Diplomatic historians who are
engaged in a comparative study of national and international behavior may
yet make a significant contribution to promoting such cultural stability, and
thus to bringing about greater crosscultural understanding.
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