REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
SUPREME COURT
MANILA
PONCEVIC M. CEBALLOS,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. __________
-versusFOR: CERTIORARI and
PROHIBITION, with
application for urgent
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER (TRO), and/or WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION (WPI)
LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
PETITION
Poncevic M. Ceballos (petitioner) respectfully implores
this
Honorable
Court’s
expanded
certiorari
jurisdiction/expanded judicial review and avers the following:
Prefatorily,
It is settled that institutions of higher learning enjoy
ample discretion to decide for itself who may teach, what may
be taught, how it shall be taught and who to admit, being part
of their academic freedom. 1
The State, in the exercise of its reasonable supervision
and regulation over education, can only impose minimum
regulations. Thus, the power to supervise and regulate should
not stifle academic freedom in institutions of higher learning. 2
1
2
Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. Nos. 230642 & 242954, September 10, 2019.
Id.
1
Institutions of higher learning are not mere walls within
which to teach; it is a place where research, experiment,
critical thinking, and exchanges abound and are secured.3
So even if the State tries to regulate in a seemingly
harmless way, it cannot take away the academic freedom
that educational institutions have 4—the Constitution reserves
this to them.5
The Parties
1.
Petitioner is of legal age, married, Filipino, and may
be served with pleadings, notices, orders, and other legal
processes at Ceballos Law Firm, with address at No. 7, Laurel
Street, Xavierville 3 Subdivision, Barangay Loyola Heights,
Quezon City, Metro Manila. As of writing, petitioner has been
teaching in various law schools for more than thirty (30)
years.
2.
The Legal Education Board (LEB) is an
independent government agency responsible for the
regulation of legal education in the Philippines. It was created
through Republic Act (RA) No. 7662 or the Legal Education
Act of 1993.
3.
The LEB is impleaded as the sole respondent having
rendered the assailed Memorandum Order. It may be served
with court orders, notices, and other processes at its official
station in Philippine Red Cross, Carlos P. Garcia Avenue,
Quezon City.
The Case and its Antecedents
4.
This is an invocation of the Court’s expanded power
of judicial review through an action for certiorari and
prohibition with prayers for a TRO and/or WPI, under Rule 65
in relation to Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. The present
petition aims to invalidate Memorandum Order No. 30 series
of 20236 (MO 30-23), which was issued by the LEB. MO 3023 requires law schools, in disregard of their academic
freedom, to return to in-person learning modality.
3
4
5
6
Id.
Id.
Section 5, Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
A certified true copy of Memorandum Order No. 30 series of 2023 is attached here as Annex
“A” and “A-1”.
2
5.
MO 30-23 is reproduced below, to wit:
Memorandum Order No. 30
Series of 2023
SUBJECT: TRANSITIONAL RETURN to the INPERSON LEARNING MODALITY
Pursuant to the declaration by the World Health
Organization (WHO) that Covid-19 is no longer a Public
Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC),
ending the global emergency status for COVID-19 more
than three years after its first proclamation as such; and
pursuant to Legal Ed ucation Board Memorandum Order
(LEBMO) No. 1, mandating the in-person mode of
delivering the basic legal education for all Legal Education
Institutions (LEIs), which learning modality was disrupted
by the pandemic, allowing LEIs to conduct their classes
online, and subsequently, employ blended learning, the
LEB, created by Republic Act No. 7662, in pursuit of its
mandate under the said law, issues this Memorandum
Order, formalizing the transitional return to the in-person
learning modality for all LEIs.
Section 1. Transition Period. All LEIs may
continue to deliver the basic law program online until after
their calendared midterm examinations for the first
semester of Academic Year (AY) 2023-2024, which may be
extended until the end of the same semester, but only in
exceptional circumstances and/or for compelling reasons,
with prior approval by the Board.
Section 2. In-Person Learning Modality. Unless
allowed to extend their online learning modality in
accordance with Section 1, all LEIs shall design and deliver
the basic law program through the in-person learning
modality immediately after their calendared midterm
examinations.
Section 3. Hybrid. The delivery of instruction for
elective courses may be hybrid, by which at least fifty
percent (50%) of the total credit hours for a course or
subject shall be devoted to the in-person learning modality.
Thus, for a course that requires 54 credit hours in a
semester, at least 27 hours shall be spent in a physical
learning facility such as a classroom, clinic, or similar
learning spaces. The rest of the credit hours may be
delivered through other flexible learning strategies such as,
but not limited to, self-paced printed or online learning
modules, synchronous or asynchronous learning sessions,
and remotely guided peer learning approaches.
3
Section 4. Clinical Legal Education. Experiential
learning courses, such as clinical legal education, shall from
hereon be conducted primarily in-person, without prejudice
to clinical legal education activities that require the use of
remote work technologies.
Section 5. Assessment. All LEIs shall ensure that
appropriate and adequate means of assessment are in
place while they continue with their online learning
modality or adopt the hybrid method for elective courses.
Relative thereto, an Assessment Report shall be submitted
by LEIs to the LEB at the end of AY 2023-2024, and in all
cases, before the commencement of their calendared first
semester of the succeeding academic year.
Section 6. Repealing Clause. Any previously
issued rules, orders, or parts thereof, which are
inconsistent with this Issuance, are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.
Section 7. Separability Clause. If any part of this
Memorandum Order is declared invalid or unconstitutional,
all other provisions shall remain valid and effective.
Section 8. Effectivity Clause. This Memorandum
Order shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its
posting on the LEB website or complete publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation,
and deposit in the National Administrative Register of the
University of the Philippines Law Center.
Issued under the seal of the Legal Education Board
this 30th of June 2023 in Quezon City. (Emphasis in the
original; italics added.)
General contentions
I
THE
LEB
BRAZENLY
VIOLATED
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM WHEN IT ISSUED MO 30-23.
II
MO 30-23 CONTRAVENES THE MANDATE OF THE
SUPREME COURT IN MAXIMIZING THE USE OF
DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY AS A KEY COMPONENT
OF ITS STRATEGIC PLAN FOR JUDICIAL
INNOVATIONS (SPJI).
4
Arguments in detail
Certiorari and prohibition are proper
procedural remedies to assail MO 30-23.
Requisites of judicial review are present here.
The expanded power of judicial review is etched in
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. It refers to
“the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.”
6.
7.
In this case, while LEB exercised a quasilegislative—not judicial or quasi-judicial—prerogative, the
assailed MO 30-23 is still not immune to this Court’s expanded
judicial review. As will be discussed infra, LEB has stripped
itself of jurisdiction when it gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the assailed MO 30-23. By jurisprudence, certiorari
and prohibition are the appropriate remedies to trigger the
Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction.7
8.
The power of judicial review can be understood
simply as the authority to examine whether the actions taken
by other branches of the government conform with the
Constitution. For this Court to review constitutional issues,
certain requisites must be satisfied, viz.: (1) an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2)
the person challenging the act must have “standing” to
challenge; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.8
9.
An actual case or controversy is “one which involves
a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution.” A case is justiciable if the
issues presented are “definite and concrete, touching on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.” The
7
8
Bureau Of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA), et al. v. Biazon, et al., G.R. No.
205836, July 12, 2022.
Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. Nos. 230642 & 242954, September 10, 2019.
5
conflict must be ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural
or anticipatory; otherwise, this Court’s decision will amount
to an advisory opinion concerning legislative or executive
action.9
10. Closely associated with the requirement of an
actual or justiciable case or controversy is the ripening seeds
for adjudication. Ripeness for adjudication has a two-fold
aspect: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and
second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding
court consideration.10
11. In the case at bench, petitioner argues that MO 3023 violates or conflicts with the law schools’
constitutional right to academic freedom, right to
education, and the policy of the Court, as espoused in
the SPJI, to fully integrate and maximize digital
technology.
Necessarily, this petition raises an actual
controversy.
12. Inextricably attached to the actual case or
controversy requirement is the element that a party
presenting the justiciable issue must have the standing to
mount a challenge to the governmental act. Legal standing
or locus standi is the “right of appearance in a court of justice
on a given question.” To possess legal standing, parties must
show “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
[they have] sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged.” The
requirement of direct injury guarantees that the party who
sues has such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy and, in effect, assures “that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.”11
13. Here, petitioner as law professor for over thirty
years at Ateneo Law School, and currently also teaching via
online at Cor Jesu College of Law in Digos, Davao del Sur;
Manila Law College; Liceo de Cagayan College of Law in
9
10
11
Alliance of Non-Life Insurance Workers of the Philippines, et al. v. Mendoza, et al., G.R. No.
206159, August 26, 2020.
De Borja v. Pinalakas na Ugnayan ng Maliliit na Mangingisda ng Luzon, Mindanao at
Visayas, G.R. Nos. 185320 & 185348, April 19, 2017.
The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and
Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018.
6
Cagayan de Oro (where he was the former Dean); and
Philippine Christian University College of Law (where he was
the former Associate Dean), is directly affected by MO 30-23.
The challenged memorandum order will hinder petitioner from
conducting his classes efficiently and effectively in various law
schools across the country using online methods.
The
advancements in technology and digitalization have greatly
assisted him in aligning his teaching methods with the high
standards and rigorous requirements of the law curriculum.
Due to his residence in Metro Manila, it would be immensely
impractical, if not impossible, for him to teach in person at
Cor Jesu College of Law and Liceo de Cagayan College of Law.
This burden also affects numerous law professors who reside
in different locations but were selectively chosen by law
schools to be part of their faculty, all in line with the schools’
commitment to delivering quality education to their students.
14. Finally, the validity of MO 30-23 has been raised at
the earliest opportunity and it is the very lis mota of the case.
15. Direct resort to the Supreme Court on certiorari and
prohibition assailing the constitutionality of a governmental
act is justified, as explained in The Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections,12 under the following instances: (1)
when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that
must be addressed at the most immediate time; (2)
when the issues involved are of transcendental
importance; (3) in cases of first impression; (4) when the
constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court;
(5) when the exigency or time element presented in the case
cannot be ignored; (6) when the petition filed reviews the act
of a constitutional organ; (7) when petitioners have no other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law; and (8) when the petition includes questions that are
dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the
orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the
appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.
16. Apparent to the face of this petition are the above
justifications.
But worthy to stress is the issue’s
transcendental importance and the timing of its resolution. It
is important to emphasize the significant and timely
determination of this issue, as both domestic and global
12
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015.
7
societies are embarking on a digital journey that shapes the
progress of our civilization.
17. According to MO 30-23, law schools are required to
resume in-person classes after the midterm examinations of
the first semester of the academic year 2023-2024. However,
at present, law schools are already accepting enrollees for the
upcoming semester. This situation may discourage potential
law students who can only afford to study law through
distance learning from enrolling, thereby depriving them of
their right to legal education. It is crucial to recognize that
this issue holds significant importance as its resolution will
impact all legal education institutions, as well as thousands of
law students and law professors nationwide.
The concept of “Academic Freedom” and
the Constitutional right to education.
18. The concept of academic freedom was first
enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. Back then, however, it
was limited only to state universities and colleges, viz.:
SECTION 5. All educational institutions shall be under the
supervision of and subject to regulation by the State. The
Government shall establish and maintain a complete and
adequate system of public education, and shall provide
at least free public primary instruction, and citizenship
training to adult citizens. All schools shall aim to develop
moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience,
and vocational efficiency, and to teach the duties of
citizenship. Optional religious instruction shall be
maintained in the public schools as now authorized by
law. Universities established by the State shall
enjoy academic freedom. The State shall create
scholarships in arts, science, and letters for specially
gifted citizens (Section 5, Article XIII, 1935
Constitution). (Emphasis added.)
19. Thereafter, the 1973 Constitution broadened the
coverage of academic freedom and included all institutions of
higher learning, thus:
SECTION. 8. (1) All educational institutions shall be
under the supervision of, and subject to regulation by,
the State. The State shall establish and maintain a
complete, adequate, and integrated system of education
relevant to the goals of national development.
8
(2) All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy
academic freedom. (Section 8, Article XV, 1973
Constitution). (Emphasis added.)
20. And the latest, the same coverage of academic
freedom is embodied in the 1987 Constitution as follows:
SECTION 5. (1) The State shall take into account
regional and sectoral needs and conditions and shall
encourage local planning in the development of
educational policies and programs.
(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning.
(3) Every citizen has a right to select a profession or
course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable admission, and academic requirements.
(4) The State shall enhance the right of teachers to
professional advancement. Non-teaching academic and
non-academic personnel shall enjoy the protection of the
State.
(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority
to education and ensure that teaching will attract and
retain its rightful share of the best available talents
through adequate remuneration and other means of job
satisfaction and fulfillment (Section 5, Article XIV, 1987
Constitution). (Emphasis added.)
21. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Hon. Capulong,13
the Supreme Court explained the concept of academic
freedom and traced its historical basis:
More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner
university's academic freedom which has been enshrined
in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987 Constitutions.
At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential
freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the
term “academic freedom” cited in the case of Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, thus: (1) who may teach; (2) what
may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4)
who may be admitted to study. (Emphasis added.)
22. On the other hand, Section 1, Article XIV of the
1987 Constitution speaks elaborately on the right to
education:
13
G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993.
9
SEC. 1. The State shall protect and promote the
right of all citizens to quality education at all levels
and shall take appropriate steps to make such
education accessible to all. (Emphasis added.)
23. The normative elements of the general right to
education under Section 1, Article XIV, are one, to protect and
promote quality education; and two, to take appropriate steps
towards making such quality education accessible. “Quality”
education is statutorily defined as the appropriateness,
relevance, and excellence of the education given to meet the
needs and aspirations of the individual and society.
“Accessible” education means equal opportunities to
education regardless of social and economic differences. The
element of accessibility under the Constitution, thus, pertains
to both the elimination of discrimination especially against
disadvantaged groups and to the financial duty of the State
for, after all, the right to education is part and parcel of social
justice. The objective is to make quality education accessible
by appropriate means.14
24. Even in the international arena, the right to
education is given primordial consideration. Article 13 (2) of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights recognizes the right to receive an education with the
following interrelated and essential features: (a) availability;
(b) accessibility; (c) acceptability; and (d) adaptability.
Accessibility is understood as giving everyone, without
discrimination, access to educational institutions and
programs. Accessibility has three overlapping dimensions:
(1)
Non-discrimination — education must be
accessible to all, especially the most vulnerable groups,
in law and fact, without discrimination on any of the
prohibited grounds x x x;
(2)
Physical accessibility — education has to be
within safe physical reach, either by attendance at some
reasonably convenient geographic location ([e.g.] a
neighborhood school) or [via] modern technology
([e.g.] access to a “distance learning” programme);
[and]
(3) Economic accessibility — education has to be
affordable to all. This dimension of accessibility is subject
14
Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. Nos. 230642 & 242954, September 10, 2019.
10
to the differential wording of [A]rticle 13(2) in relation to
primary, secondary and higher education: whereas
primary education shall be available "free to all," States
parties are required to progressively introduce free
secondary and higher education[.] (Emphasis added.)
Supervision and regulation of legal education must be
reasonable, and the most benign approach should be
maintained.
LEB MO 30-23 is not a minimum proscription against
law schools; it is an absolute curtailment of
institutional academic freedom.
25. Admittedly, the enactment of education laws and
issuance of administrative orders relating to education is
within the police power of the State. Nevertheless, the State’s
power over educational institutions must only be supervisory
and regulatory and should not be tantamount to
control. Additionally, like all police power measures, the
State’s supervisory and regulatory powers must be exercised
reasonably.
26. This Honorable Court, in Pimentel, et al. v. the
Legal Education Board (Pimentel),15 elucidated on this point:
The rule is that institutions of higher learning
enjoy ample discretion to decide for itself who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught and
who to admit, being part of their academic freedom.
The State, in the exercise of its reasonable supervision and
regulation over education, can only impose minimum
regulations.
At its most elementary, the power to supervise and
regulate shall not be construed as stifling academic freedom
in institutions of higher learning. This must necessarily be
so since institutions of higher learning are not mere walls
within which to teach; rather, it is a place where research,
experiment, critical thinking, and exchanges are secured.
Any form of State control, even at its most benign and
disguised as regulatory, cannot therefore derogate
the academic freedom guaranteed to higher
educational institutions. In fact, this non-intrusive
relation between the State and higher educational
institutions is maintained even when the Constitution itself
15
G.R. Nos. 230642 & 242954, September 10, 2019.
11
prescribes certain
(Emphasis added.)
educational
“thrusts”
or
directions.
27. As discussed, one of the tenets of academic
freedom is the educational institutions’ choice of method of
delivering instruction or “how to teach”. Under the
principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation. This plainmeaning rule or verba legis is derived from the maxim index
animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention). The idea
rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by
the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent. Such
clear expression precludes the courts from construing it
differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning
of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have
expressed its intent using such words as are found in the
statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words
of a statute there should be no departure.16
28. To truly understand the extent and scope of “how
to teach,” resort to the basic, literal, and plain meaning of the
word “how” must be made. Merriam-Webster dictionary
defines the word “how” as “in what manner or way” and
“in what state or condition.”17 Furthermore, the word
“manner” has been defined as “mode of procedure.”18
Oxford Learner’s Dictionary similarly defines the word “how”
as “in what way or manner”, 19 while the word “manner” has
been defined as “the way that something is done or
happens.”20
29. By examining the fundamental, straightforward
meaning of the word “how” in relation to the concept of
academic freedom, law schools have complete authority over
how they teach the law, in accordance with their institutional
academic freedom. This encompasses not only the methods
of instruction, such as lectures or recitations, but also the
choice of conducting classes either online or in person.
16
17
18
19
20
Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Philippines v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 182249, March 5, 2013.
Accessed at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/how on July 17, 2023.
Accessed at https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/manner on July 17, 2023.
Accessed at https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/how?q=How
on July 17, 2023.
Accessed
at
https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/english/manner?q=manner
on
July 17, 2023.
12
30. LEB’s absolute prohibition against online classes or
even hybrid classes except in elective courses is not just a
minimum regulation. It borders on unreasonable control
contrary to the requirement of reasonable and minimum
supervisory and regulatory powers by the State against
educational institutions.
31. More, the Court, in Pimentel, held that the
requirement of a Master of Laws degree for law professors is
unreasonable given the logistical and financial constraints.
The Court emphatically explained:
Thus, the masteral degree required of law faculty
members and dean, and the doctoral degree required of a
dean of a graduate school of law are, in fact, minimum
reasonable requirements. However, it is the manner by
which the LEB had exercised this power through its
various issuances that prove to be unreasonable.
On this point, the amicus curiae, Dean Sedfrey M.
Candelaria, while admitting that the masteral degree
requirement is a “laudable aim” of the LEB, nevertheless
adds that the LEB-imposed period of compliance is
unreasonable given the logistical and financial obstacles:
The masteral degree requirement is a laudable aim
of LEB, but the possibility of meeting the LEB period of
compliance is unreasonable and unrealistic in the light of
logistical and financial considerations confronting the deans
and professors, including the few law schools offering
graduate degrees in law.
To illustrate, to the best of my knowledge there are
no more than six (6) graduate schools of law around the
country to service potential applicants. Those who have
opted for graduate studies in law find it very costly to fly to
the venue. While one or two programs may have been
delivered outside the provider's home school venue to
reach out to graduate students outside the urban centers,
pedagogical standards are often compromised in the
conduct of the modules. This is even aggravated by the fact
that very few applicants can afford to go into full-time
graduate studies considering that most deans and
professors of law are in law practice. Perhaps, LEB should
work in consultation with PALS in designing a cost-effective
but efficient delivery system of any graduate program in
law, [especially] for deans and law professors. (Emphasis
added.)
32. This case also suffers from the same grave abuse
of LEB’s power and authority. MO 30-23 does not give law
schools, law students, professors, and other stakeholders
sufficient time to adjust to LEB’s absolute and unreasonable
13
proscription against online modality of learning. MO 30-23
strictly requires the revert to full face-to-face classes not later
than after the midterms of the first semester of academic year
2023-2024. Considering that there are financial and logistical
constraints in applying such rigid requirements, the Court
should strike it down as invalid like how it ruled in Pimentel.
LEB MO 30-23 directly contravenes the Supreme
Court’s mandate to maximize the use of digital
technology under the SPJI.
33. The SPJI contains judicial reforms designed to
make justice speedy, inexpensive, and accessible. Through
SPJI, the Supreme Court targets three major outcomes:
efficiency, innovation, and access. Toward this end, the Court
has put up mechanisms and digital infrastructure to achieve
a technology-driven judiciary.
34. Under its programs on innovation, the Court seeks
to modernize court processes and operations using
technology. The Court even established a Philippine Judiciary
Learning Platform for the training of judges and judicial
personnel.
35. The issuance of LEB MO 30-23 directly contravenes
the mandate of SPJI, which maximizes technology and
promotes the use of online tools and instruction.
36. Besides, before the onslaught of Covid-19, there
was no rule nor law prohibiting the adoption of an online
modality of learning. In fact, as early as 2014, RA No. 10650,
or the Open Distance Learning Act, was signed into law. It
intends to expand and further democratize access to quality
tertiary education through the promotion and application of
open learning and the use of distance education as an
appropriate, efficient, and effective system of
delivering quality higher and technical educational
services in the country.
37. RA No. 10650 enumerates the different modes by
which information and communications may be coursed
through, such as: (a) Print – textbooks, study guides,
workbooks, course syllabi, correspondence feedback and
other print formats; (b) Audio-Visual – radio, audio cassettes,
slides, film, videotapes, television, telephone, fax, audio14
conferencing
and
video-conferencing;
(c)
Electronic/Computer
Technology
and
Virtual
Classrooms – internet, CD-ROM, electronic mail, ebulletin boards, podcasts, m-learning, i-lectures, elearning or online learning management systems; and
(d) Face-to-Face Sessions – conducted in learning and study
centers.
38. Law schools were never prohibited from adopting
open distance learning or any form of online modality of
learning. However, prior to the pandemic, it was not the
norm. The pandemic has undoubtedly brought about a new
way of conducting our daily activities, revealing inefficiencies
in how our society operates. Law schools took advantage of
the shifting paradigm and adapted to the promise of
technology. The law can be learned wherever. Law students
who hail from the provinces need not go to the cities to enroll
and study law. It cannot be stressed how costly law education
in the Philippines can be. The reduced costs of obtaining
quality legal education because of online distance learning
gives potential and aspiring lawyers more chances to realize
their dream of becoming lawyers.
39. The same can also be said for law professors living
in Luzon who can teach law even for law schools located in
Visayas and Mindanao and vice versa. Forcing law schools to
go back to the old-fashioned face-to-face classes is a
regressive policy that not only undermines academic freedom
but likewise burdens law students and law professors alike.
40. Interestingly, the Department of Education, which
initially advocated for in-person classes, has now changed its
stance and intends to establish a hybrid model of learning.21
41. Based on all the foregoing disquisitions, petitioner
humbly pleads that the petition be granted, and LEB MO 3023 be nullified and declared void.
Allegations in support of a TRO and/or WPI
42.
21
All the arguments supra are repleaded.
Accessed at https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1800128/deped-institutionalizing-hybrid-setupmay-mitigate-classroom-shortage on July 17, 2023.
15
43. The issuance of a TRO upon receipt of this petition
shall prevent grave and irreparable damage that can be
caused to numerous law schools and countless law students.
44. The extreme urgency for the Honorable Court to
issue immediately a TRO is highlighted by the fact that
enrollment in law schools has already started as of the filing
of this petition. Law students need to decide whether to enroll
or not.
45. The sustainability of law school and the possible
careers of future aspiring lawyers are placed in limbo if not
jeopardy.
46. Law schools that used to offer online classes and
want to continue offering the same will no longer be able to
do so since the effect of the challenged memorandum order
shall be for law schools not to offer online classes and instead
offer onsite or face-to-face classes.
47. Law students, on the other hand, who have gotten
used to online classes and first-time law students who are just
excited to start law school, are all in a quandary about
whether or not to enroll since they shall no longer have online
classes that gave them or would have given them numerous
advantages, as against face-to-face classes, as no law school
can offer online classes anymore.
48. The practical effect of the challenged memorandum
order is, to say the least, to have an immediate debilitating
and irreparable damage and impact on law schools and law
students, notwithstanding the fact that said memorandum
order mentioned that it shall be effective only in the second
semester.
49. Too, there is this anxiety that if no TRO shall be
issued, law schools are at great risk of losing many students
from enrolling, which can lead to their possible closure. This
is not just a looming possibility or conjecture, but a daunting
reality that must be urgently averted.
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PRAYER
WHEREFORE,
petitioner
Poncevic
M.
Ceballos
respectfully prays that the Honorable Supreme Court nullify
and declare unconstitutional the Legal Education Board
Memorandum Order No. 30 series of 2023, for violating
institutional academic freedom.
In the meantime, petitioner most humbly and earnestly
pleads for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction from the Honorable Supreme Court,
prohibiting the Legal Education Board from implementing
Memorandum Order No. 30 series of 2023.
Other
reliefs,
just
and
equitable
circumstances, are likewise sought.
under
the
Quezon City, for Manila City, July 18, 2023.
CEBALLOS
L A W
F I R M
Counsel for PETITIONER
No. 7 Laurel Street, Xavierville III
Loyola Heights, Quezon City
1108 METRO MANILA
PONCEVIC M. CEBALLOS
PTR No. 4104363 / 01-13-2023 / Muntinlupa
IBP LRN 02224 / 01-16-2001 / Caloocan City
Roll of Attorneys No. 33018
MCLE Exemption No. VII-Acad 002960
April 14, 2025
Mobile No. 0917 631 0324
E-mail: chilloutprof@yahoo.com
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Copy furnished:
THE LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD
Philippine Red Cross
Carlos P. Garcia Avenue,
Quezon City
EXPLANATION
Copies of this Petition have been served on the opposing party
or their respective counsel by registered mail in lieu of
personal service due to distance and time constraints.
July 18, 2023, Quezon City.
18