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State of Western Australia v R [2007] WASCA 42
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R was a truck driver. On 4 April 2004 he drove a truck from South Australia into Western
Australia with 1.8 kilograms of cannabis located in a sealed cardboard box in the rear of his
truck. His evidence at the trial was that he believed that the contents of the box were shoes or
clothing. His counsel contended that he could not be said to have been in possession of a
prohibited drug as he had been unaware of its existence.
He had a suspicion/expectation that the box contained cannabis but decided to deliver it as he
was getting paid a higher amount than the job usually gets paid for
that in order to establish "possession" for the purposes of s 6(1)(a) of the WA Act the prosecutor
must prove that R had knowledge of the prohibited drug
To prove this element the state must prove beyond reasonable doubt that … [R] had control or
dominion over the cannabis and that he knew what he had in his possession was a prohibited
drug.
The state needs to prove that … [R] knew that what he had in his possession was a prohibited
drug. The state does not need to prove that he knew the prohibited drug was cannabis."
R v Jason Lee Gardiner [2012] SASC 160
- The crime of murder is committed when a person deliberately and unlawfully causes the death
of another person while at the same time intending to cause death or grievous bodily harm. The
matters which the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt are:
- 1.That the act or acts of the accused caused the death of Katherine Towner;2.That the act or
acts of the accused which caused the death of Katherine Towner were conscious and voluntary,
that is to say that they were the result of the exercise of the accused’s will and were not the
result of an accident;
- 3.The act or acts of the accused which caused the death were carried out with the intention of
either killing Katherine Towner or at the very least causing grievous bodily harm. By the term
grievous bodily harm I mean really serious bodily harm. The intention necessary for the crime of
murder must exist at the time when the act or acts which caused the death were carried out;
- 4.Finally that the killing was without any lawful justification or excuse such as lawful selfdefence.
- Ms McDonald, who appeared for the Director of Public Prosecutions, submitted that in the
event that I could not find beyond reasonable doubt an intention by the accused of either killing
Katherine Towner or at the very least causing grievous bodily harm I could nevertheless proceed
to convict the accused for murder on the basis that he was reckless.
R v Holzer [1968] VR 481
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At the trial of an accused upon a charge of manslaughter, the evidence showed:-- (a) that a
companion of the accused picked a fight with a companion of the deceased on the footpath
outside a cafe; (b) that the deceased, who was standing on the nature strip with his back to the
gutter, was thereupon punched in the mouth by the accused; (c) that the punch caused the
deceased to fall backwards and strike the back of his head on the roadway and to sustain
injuries from which he died; (d) that the punch also caused a tear half an inch long in the
membrane of the inside the of deceased's lip.
The accused gave evidence and was asked what he was hoping to effect by this punch. He
replied: "I didn't hope to cause any real serious harm but when I threw the punch at him I hit
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him in the mouth and it would have cut his lip or bruised his lip or something." He also said: "In
my opinion, it would have just cut his lip to tell him to wake himself up".
At the conclusion of the evidence, argument was heard as to the appropriate direction to be
given in relation to manslaughter.
F G Fitzgerald, for the Crown: The jury should be directed in accordance with observations in
Mamote-Kulang v R (1964) 111 CLR 62; [1964] ALR 1046, and they should also be told that it is
manslaughter to cause death by an unlawful act which is dangerous in the sense that a
reasonable man would have realized that it would create a risk of some bodily injury, albeit not
serious injury.
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Reg V Solomon [1980] 1 NSWLR 321
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In October 1978, four people were drinking in the pool room and bar room of a country
hotel, namely, Mr and Mrs Tomkinson, Beatrice Orcher, who was Mrs Tomkinson's
sister; and Frank Solomon, with whom, until recently, Orcher had been living; and, at the
relevant time, they were all intoxicated. In the course of a quarrel between Solomon and
Orcher, Solomon got a pair of shears
from outside in the yard. He attempted to stab Orcher with the shears and, when
Tomkinson intervened, he stabbed the latter, inflicting fatal injuries.
At the trial of Solomon for murder, the Crown prosecutor, in opening the case to the
jury, deliberately confined his case to exclude murder based on “reckless indifference to
human life”
He took the
view that the case was one in which it was open to the jury to convict of murder on the
basis of reckless indifference to human life,
R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35
- While he was being carried by another soldier to the medical reception station, he was dropped
twice. When he was eventually brought into the reception station, about an hour after he was
stabbed, the seriousness of his condition was not at first realised. There was no time for a
careful medical examination, as the medical officer and his orderly were dealing with a number
of other cases, and the treatment which C received was, in the light of subsequent knowledge,
inappropriate and harmful. He died about two hours after being stabbed. There was evidence
that, if he had received immediate and different treatment, he might not have died, and, if a
blood transfusion had been administered, his chances of recovery would have been about
seventy-five per cent; but facilities for blood transfusion were not available at the medical
reception station.
Sarangan v New South Wales (Sydney Local Health District) [2023] NSWPIC 100
- as the motor vehicle accident suffered on 20 March 2022 is a novus actus interveniens, breaking
the chain of causation from the work injury suffered on 8 April 2021.
Huynh v The Queen [2013] HCA 6 [31]
- At the time of his death, Thea Kheav was attending an 18th birthday party held at a family home
in suburban Adelaide (“the Vartue Street premises”). He died as the result of a stab wound that
was inflicted in the course of an assault carried out by a number of persons. His assailants were
part of a larger group that had arrived at the Vartue St premises following an hostile incident at
the party involving Sem.
- One of these ways required the prosecution to prove that the appellant was a party to an
agreement with others, including the principal offender, to kill or to inflict really serious bodily
injury on a person or persons at the Vartue St premises, and that while that agreement was on
foot the principal offender stabbed the deceased intending thereby to kill or to do really serious
bodily harm to him. Liability on this case depended on the doctrine variously described as
“common purpose”, “concert” or “joint criminal enterprise”.
Another way in which the case was put engaged the doctrine described as “extended common
purpose” or “extended joint enterprise”. Liability on this basis would be established,
notwithstanding that the agreement was to do no more than to assault a person or persons at
the Vartue St premises, provided that the prosecution proved that the appellant contemplated
that, in carrying out the agreement, a party to it might use a knife or similar weapon intending
thereby to kill or to inflict really serious bodily harm.
- The case of each appellant was that he had not been a party to an agreement to kill or to inflict
really serious bodily harm and that the stabbing of the deceased was the unforeseen act of
another.
The directions given to the jury respecting liability for a joint enterprise to commit murder were
favourable to the appellants in that they required the prosecution to prove that the agreement
to kill or to inflict really serious bodily harm involved the use of “a knife or similar bladed
weapon”
That awareness was the basis for the inference in each case that the appellant had come to an
understanding with other members of the group that a knife would be used to kill or to inflict
really serious bodily harm on one or more persons at the Vartue St premises or, at least, that he
contemplated that a knife might be used intentionally to inflict injury of that kind
Powell, English [1999] 1 AC 1 (HL)
- It was sufficient to found a conviction for murder for a secondary party to a killing in the course
of a joint enterprise to have realised that the primary party might kill with intent to do so or
with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.
Rahman [2008] UKHL 45, [2009] 1 AC 129 (HL)
- The Crown argued (p 282) that since there was an intention to inflict grievous bodily harm, and
that satisfied the mens rea requirement of murder, the deliberate killing of the victim was not
very different in kind from what Douglas and McKee contemplated. But Carswell J did not accept
that. He said:
Clayton [2006] HCA 58
- That is, the prosecution alleged that each applicant had participated in a joint enterprise.
Alternatively, the prosecution argued that each applicant was guilty of murder because each
had agreed to assault the deceased using weapons, and reasonably foresaw the possibility that
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death or really serious injury might be intentionally inflicted on the victim by one of them in the
course of their carrying out the agreed assault.
Finally, the prosecution argued that the two applicants who did not inflict the fatal wound had
aided and abetted the person who did, by intentionally helping, encouraging or conveying their
assent to that person in his or her commission of the murder.
The allegation of injustice or disconformity, though variously expressed, fastened upon the fact
that applying principles of extended common purpose could result in a person being found
guilty of murder where that person did not agree or intend that death should result, but
foresaw only the possibility that an assault with intent to kill or cause really serious injury might
be made in the course of the joint enterprise. The applicants sought to compare this outcome
with the case of a person assaulting another, knowing of the possibility, but not intending, that
death or really serious injury might result. Such a person, the applicants submitted, would be
guilty only of manslaughter.
A person who does not intend the death of the victim, but does intend to do really serious injury
to the victim, will be guilty of murder if the victim dies.
If a party to a joint criminal enterprise foresees the possibility that another might be assaulted
with intention to kill or cause really serious injury to that person, and, despite that foresight,
continues to participate in the venture, the criminal culpability lies in the continued
participation in the joint enterprise with the necessary foresight.5 That the participant does not
wish or intend that the victim be killed is of no greater significance than the observation that the
person committing the assault need not wish or intend that result, yet be guilty of the crime of
murder.
Ms Rodwell gave evidence of the applicants coming to the door of her house, assaulting her and
one of them then detaining her at knifepoint while there was a prolonged assault on Mr Borg.
The applicants disputed her account of what happened. But the injuries done to Mr Borg were
consistent with her account of an attack lasting 30 to 40 minutes in which he was severely
beaten with poles and stabbed a number of times. One of the stab wounds caused fatal injuries.
Miller v The Queen (2016) 259 CLR 380 [29]
- presley took hold of a baseball bat and said “let’s go back and see what these people — go and
see what the problem is”. The appellants and Betts left the Hayles Road premises. Betts was
armed with a 332 mm long knife. On the prosecution case Smith, was brandishing a shovel. The
appellants and Betts made their way to the scene of the earlier altercation. The deceased, King
and some of their neighbours were still gathered in Grant Street. King was assaulted by Betts
and Presley. The deceased was struck from behind with the shovel. A witness described a “hand
coming at him like at the back of him and hitting him” just below the shoulder blade. On the
prosecution case, this was the fatal knife blow struck by Betts. Miller, Smith and Presley were all
convicted of the murder of Clifford Hall following a trial in the Supreme Court of South Australia.
Liability for the murder of the deceased was on the basis of either joint criminal enterprise or
extended joint criminal enterprise
Gillard v The Queen (2003) 219 CLR 1 109-110
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