Digest of cases penned by Supreme Court
Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa
BAR OPERATIONS COMMISSION
Hermosura, Rea May G.
Chairperson
Orcena, Janine Nicole C.
Vice Chairperson for Academics
Tan, Kent Limmuel
Commissioner - Political And International Law
Dela Cruz, Adrian G.
Commissioner - Criminal Law
Alonzo, Patricia Marie C.
Commissioner - Civil Law
Alvaro, Jovan Keff S.
Commissioner -Taxation Law
Jonieca, Mary Joy O.
Commissioner - Labor Law
Del Mundo, John John L.
Commissioner - Commercial Law
Pamittan, Daewin M.
Commissioner - Remedial Law
Castillo, Donald Adrian M.
Commissioner - Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises
Abitria, Cresel
ALAS and BOC CONTRIBUTORS
Estenor, Nheslyn
Nayve, Lynssey Allaine M.
Aldemita, Marla Romayne C.
Fabian, Ryan Nicolas D.
Obmerga, Sherrie Mieko M.
Andal Jr., Francisco U
Galvez, Sarah Mae G.
Perez-Sonido, Grace
Antonio, Christian Joseph B.
Gaño, Cheryl P.
Quiambao, Leisaiah Yvonn
Bueno, Geron G.
Garner, Ma. Dhelltria G.
Ramos, Maureen N.
Cabanting, Sharmaine F.
Gesmundo, Anne Frances G.
Ranoco, John Albert A.
Cabungcal, Janela B.
Gutoman, Elvin M.
Ravanera, Justine Angelie Q.
Capulong, Kleurence Glydel N.
Hinanay, Kenon Joseph M.
Red, Gloria M.
Capulong, Noel M.
Igdanes, Jobeluz P.
Reyes, Ma. Patricia Nicole G.
Capuz, Ian Keith N.
Lamanilao, Ariel V.
Reyes, Rogienel L.
Casimero, Airess C.
Leones, Lorille J.
Roque, Gio Vincent B.
Clamosa, Charisse Ayra C.
Loo, Lissa G.
Rosete, Rowell M.
Cordero, Mikyla Janiene V.
Loro, Seifred I.
Royo, Diane R.
Cordova, Louie Aeron
Lucena, Jerrison Pierce A.
Sabater, Rhod Jeran S.
Cuellar, Stephanie Kaith
Madrid, Ma. Luisa Cashelle P.
Salomon, Charity S.
Custodio, Joshua L.
Magtibay, Charity L.
Santos, Valerio Paolo N.
David, Christine Joy O.
Maingat, Trisha Alexis R.
Siayngco, Zachary Pacino V.
Dela Cruz, Marvin Eric O.
Mananghaya, Elena Angela J.
Sinson, Angelo John L.
Diano, Kenneth A.
Manuel, Hazel Mitz D.
Tanaka-Montefrio, Shann Jevi V.
Dimalaluan, Nancy C.
Mendoza, Hazel Eliza L.
Tumbali, Felix B.
Dioquino, John Freko B.
Montante, Milky R.
Velayo, Raezel Louise
Dutosme, Berl Stephen Reeves S.
Mora, Noli C.
Vidal, Miguel Lorenzo M.
Ersando, Christine Danielle B.
Morales, Nikka Mae B.
Viola, Mara Franchesca S.
Cover Page and Design by:
Del Castillo, Bryan L.
PART 1
FIRST LEVEL COURTS
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
C. Principle of judicial hierarchy
Roy III vs. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016
1
D. Doctrine of non-interference/judicial stability
E. Jurisdiction
5. Original Jurisdiction of various Philippine courts
Republic vs. Heirs of Paus, G.R. No. 201273, August 14, 2019
3
6. Aspects of jurisdiction
b. Jurisdiction over the subject matter
Spouses Rebamonte vs. Spouses Lucero, G.R. No. 237812, October
2, 2019
9. Jurisdiction over cases covered by Barangay Conciliation, Small Claims
Cases and cases covered by Summary Procedure
Spouses Belvis vs. Spouses Erola, G.R. No. 239727, July 24, 2019
5
6
II. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. General provisions (Rule 1)
Pimentel vs. Adiao, G.R. No. 222678, October 17, 2018
9
B. Cause of action (Rule 2)
Gatmaytan vs. Misibis Land, Inc.,G.R. No. 222166, June 10,2020
10
C. Parties to civil actions (Rule 3)
Roy III vs. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016
BDO Leasing & Finance, Inc. vs. Great Domestic Insurance Company
of the Philippines, Inc, G.R. No. 205286, June 19, 2019
Spouses Rebamonte vs. Spouses Lucero, G.R. No. 237812, October
2, 2019
Republic vs. Heirs of Bernabe, G.R. No. 237663, October 6, 2020
D. Venue (Rule 4)
Pillars Property Corporation v. Century Communities Corporation,
G.R. No. 201021, March 04, 2019
E. Pleadings
1. Kinds (Rule 6)
G. Holdings, Inc. vs. Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc., G.R.
No. 226213, September 27, 2017
1
11
13
15
16
16
2. Parts and Contents of a pleading (Rule 7)
Dizon vs. Matti, Jr., G.R. No. 215614, March 27, 2019
BDO Leasing & Finance, Inc. vs. Great Domestic Insurance Company
of the Philippines, Inc, G.R. No. 205286, June 19, 2019
17
11
G. Summons
2. Rule 14
Susan A. Yap, vs. Elizabeth Lagtapon, G.R. No. 196347, January 23,
2017
Spouses Rebamonte vs. Spouses Lucero, G.R. No. 237812, October
2, 2019
K. Intervention (Rule 19)
Yu v. Miranda, G.R. No. 225752. March 27, 2019
Republic vs. Heirs of Paus, G.R. No. 201273, August 14, 2019
Tirol v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 230103, August 27, 2020
19
13
19
3
21
T. Motion for New Trial or Reconsideration
1. Rule 37
Valencia (Bukidnon) Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc., v. Heirs of Amante Cabotaje, G.R. No. 219984, April 03, 2019
Del Rosario vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp., G.R. Nos. 202481,
202495, 202497, 210165, 219125, 222057, 224879, 225101 _
225874., September 8, 2020
U. Execution, satisfaction, and effect of judgments (Rule 39)
Soliva vs. Taleon A. M. No. P-16-3511, September 06, 2017
Republic vs. Roguza Development Corp., G.R. No. 199705, April 03,
2019
Valencia (Bukidnon) Farmers Cooperative Marketing Association,
Inc., v. Heirs of Amante Cabotaje, G.R. No. 219984, April 03, 2019
Eufemia Abad vs. Heirs of Gallardo, G.R.No. 229070, November 10,
2020
Jebsens Maritime, Inc., Sea Chefs Cruises Ltd. Effel T. Santillan, vs.
Lordelito B. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 244098. March 3, 2021
22
23
25
26
22
27
28
III. PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
B. Preliminary attachment (Rule 57)
Yu v. Miranda, G.R. No. 225752. March 27, 2019
C. Preliminary injunction (Rule 58)
AMA Land, Inc. vs. Wack Wack Residents_ Association, Inc, G.R. No.
202342, July 19, 2017
SM Investments Corp. vs. Mac Graphics, G.R. Nos. 224131-32 _
224337-38, June 25, 2018
Philippine Investment Two (SPV-AMC), Inc. vs. Mendoza A.M. No.
RTJ-18-2538, November 21, 2018
19
29
30
32
IV. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
B. Interpleader (Rule 62)
Republic v. Heirs of Cruz, G.R. No. 208956, October 17, 2018
D. Prohibition, Certiorari, and Mandamus
Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
218901, February 15, 2017
Republic vs. Dimacurot, G.R. No. 202069, March 7, 2018
Davao ACF Bus Lines, Inc. vs. Ang, G.R. No. 218516, March 27, 2019
Marzan vs. City Government of Olongapo, G.R. No. 232769,
November 3, 2020
Pahkiat v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, November 3, 2020
Del Monte Land Transport Bus Co. v. Abergos, G.R. No. 245344,
December 2, 2020
People v Sandiganbayan and Abalos - G.R. No. 228281, June 14,
2021
33
34
35
36
37
37
38
40
F. Expropriation
National Transmission Corporation vs. Bermuda Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 214782, April 3, 2019
H. Partition (Rule 69)
Logrosa vs. Spouses Azares, G.R. No. 217611, March 27, 2019
41
42
V. SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AND SPECIAL WRITS
A. Settlement of estate of deceased persons
1. Venue and process (Rule 73)
Tirol v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 230103, August 27, 2020
20
2. Summary settlement of estates (Rule 74)
Fajardo vs. Cua-Malate, G.R. No. 213666, March 27, 2019
43
Republic vs. Macabagdal, G.R. No. 203948, January 22, 2020
43
E. Change of name (Rule 103)
Santos vs. Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. 250520, May 05,
2021
Bartolome v. Republic, G.R. No. 243288, August 28, 2019
Segovia vs. Climate Change Commission, GR No. 211010, March 27,
2017
Mercado et. al vs Lopena, G.R. No. 230170, June 6, 2018
VI. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
B. Prosecution of offenses (Rule 110)
45
46
47
49
People vs. Alglen Reyes y Paulina, G.R. No. 225736, October 15,
2018
C. Prosecution of civil action (Rule 111)
Pili, Jr. vs. Resurreccion ,G.R. No. 222798, June 19, 2019
Javier and Tumamao vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 237997, June 10,
2020
F. Bail (Rule 114)
Reynaldo Arbas Recto vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
236461, December 5, 2018
People vs. Tanes y Belmonte G.R. No. 240596, April 3, 2019
50
51
52
53
54
H. Motion to quash (Rule 117)
Lazaro vs. People, G.R. No. 230018, June 23, 2021
56
J. Trial (Rule 119)
Republic vs. De Borja, G.R. No. 187448, January 9, 2017
57
M. Search and seizure (Rule 126)
Picardal y Baluyot vs. People, G.R. No. 235749, June 19, 2019
58
People vs. Sapla y Guerrero, G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020
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VII. EVIDENCE
B. Admissibility
2. Exclusionary rules
People vs. Sapla y Guerrero, G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020
C. Object (Real) Evidence (Rule 130, A)
Heir of Cardenas v. The Christian and Missionary Alliance Churches
of the Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 222614, March 20, 2019
E. Testimonial Evidence (Rule 130, C)
59
62
6. Hearsay and exceptions to the hearsay rule
People vs. XXX, G.R. No. 205888. August 22, 2018
63
F. Burden of proof and presumptions (Rule 131)
Mendoza v. Spouses Palugod, G.R. No. 220517, June 20, 2018
J. Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC)
RCBC Bankard Services Corp vs. Oracion Jr., G. R. No. 223274, June
19, 2019
64
65
PART 2:
APPELLATE PRACTICE, PROCEDURE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, AND
THE SUPREME COURT
II. POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES OTHER THAN APPEAL
B. Annulments of judgment by the Court of Appeals (Rule 47)
Heirs of Cullado vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 212938, July 30, 2019
66
D. Rule 65 as a remedy from judgment
Pfleider v. Court of Appeals, G.R.-No. 196058, November 12, 2018
BDO Leasing & Finance, Inc. vs. Great Domestic Insurance Company
of the Philippines, Inc, G.R. No. 205286, June 19, 2019
Spouses Rodriguez vs. Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, G.R.
No. 183324, June 19, 2019
Ancheta vs. Villa, G.R. No. 229634, Jan 15, 2020
Padayhag vs. Director of Lands, G.R. Nos. 202872 _ 206062,
November 11, 2017
III. APPEALS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE: MODES OF APPEAL FROM JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS
OF VARIOUS COURTS/TRIBUNALS
B. Rule 41 – Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts
Iluminada Bernardo vs. Ana Marie Soriano, G.R. No. 200104, June
19, 2019
Philippine Bank of Communications vs. The Register of Deeds for the
Province of Benguet, G.R. No. 222958, March 11, 2020
E. Rule 45 – Appeals by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
Cabuguas vs. Tan Nery G.R. No. 219915 (Resolution), April 3, 2019
Mandin-Trotin vs. Bongo, G.R. No. 212840, August 28, 2019
PNOC Alternative Fuels Corp. vs. National Grid Corporation of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 224936, September 04, 2019
F. Rule 64 – Review of judgments or final orders of the Commission on Audit and the
Commission on Elections
Collado vs. Villar, G.R. No. 193143, December 01, 2020
67
11
68
69
70
71
72
74
75
76
78
IV. APPEALS IN CRIMINAL CASES: MODES OF APPEAL FROM JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS
OF VARIOUS COURTS/TRIBUNALS
A. Rule 122
People vs. Dy y Sero, G.R. No. 229833, July 29, 2019
B. Appeals from the Office of the Ombudsman
79
Gatchalian vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 229288, August
1, 2018
80
V. PROCEDURE IN TAX CASES
A. Tax Remedies under the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Systems Technology Institute,
Inc, G.R. No. 220835, July 26, 2017
Procter Gamble Asia Pte. Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
G.R. No. 205652, September 6, 2017
Sitel Philippines Corp. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R.
No. 201326, February 8, 2017
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Co, G.R. 241424, February 26,
2020
Mindanao I Geothermal Partnership vs. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 197519, November 8, 2017
C. The Court of Tax Appeals (R.A. 1125, as amended, and the Revised Rules of the
Court of Tax Appeals)
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Hedcor Sibulan, Inc., G.R. No.
209306, September 27, 2017
81
82
83
84
85
86
VI. PROCEDURE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
A. Rule 44 – Ordinary Appealed Cases
B. Rule 46 – Original Cases
Racion vs. MST Marine Services PH, G.R. No. 219291, July 04, 2018
87
Cabuguas vs. Tan Nery G.R. No. 219915 (Resolution), April 3, 2019
74
LEGAL ETHICS
I. THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A. To society (Canons 1 to 6)
Ready Form Inc vs. Castillon Jr. A.C. 11774 March 21, 2018
88
Malecdan vs. Baldo,G.R.No. 12121, June 27, 2018
89
Ko vs. Uy-Lampasa, A.C. No. 11584, March 6, 2019
90
Cayabyab v. Pangilinan, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-20-2584, July 28,2020
91
B. To the legal profession (Canons 7 to 9)
Pabalan vs. Salva, A.C. No. 12098, September 06, 2017
92
Canete vs. Puti, A.C. No. 10949, August 14, 2019
93
Reyes vs. Gubatan, A.C. 12839, November 3, 2020
95
C. To the courts (Canons 10 to 13)
Macapagal vs. Young, A.C. No. 9298.,July 29, 2019
96
Canete vs. Puti, A.C. No. 10949, August 14, 2019
93
Zamora vs. Mahinay, A.C. No. 12622, February 10, 2020
96
D. To the clients (Canons 14 to 22)
Aguilar-Dyquiangco vs. Arellano, A.C. No. 10541, July 12, 2016
Sorongon v Gargantos - A.C. No. 11326 (Formerly CBD Case No. 144305)
Reyes vs. Gubatan, A.C. 12839, November 3, 2020
98
99
95
E. Lawyer’s Oath
Pantanosas, Jr. vs. Pamatong, A.C. No. 7330, June 14, 2016
100
REMEDIAL LAW> General Principles> Principle of Judicial Hierarchy
REMEDIAL LAW> Civil Procedure> Parties to Civil Actions
COMMERCIAL LAW > General Principles> Nationality of Corporations> Control Test
POLITICAL LAW> National Economy and Patrimony> Organization and Regulation of
Corporations, Private and Public
POLITICAL LAW> Judicial Department> Judicial Review
JOSE M. ROY III, Petitioner vs. CHAIRPERSON TERESITA HERBOSA, THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMP
ANY,, Respondents
x-----------------------x
WILSON C. GAMBOA, JR., DANIEL V. CARTAGENA, JOHN WARREN P. GABINETE,
ANTONIO V. PESINA, JR., MODESTO MARTINY. MAMON III, and GERARDO C. EREBAREN,
Petitioners-in-Intervention,
x-----------------------x
PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. Respondent-in-Intervention,
x-----------------------x
SHAREHOLDERS' ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent-in-Intervention.
G.R. No. 207246, April 18, 2017
(En Banc)
FACTS: The petitions are special civil actions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Roy
III, filed the initial petition and prayed that the Court declare SEC-MC No. 8 unconstitutional and direct
the SEC to issue new guidelines regarding the determination of compliance with Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution in accordance with the decision in Gamboa v. Finance Secretary Teves (Gamboa
Decision).
On June 28, 2011, the Court issued the Gamboa Decision, which reads: “the term ‘capital’ in Section
11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding capital
stock (common and non-voting preferred shares). Respondent Chairperson of the Securities and
Exchange Commission is DIRECTED to apply this definition of the term ‘capital’ in determining the
extent of allowable foreign ownership in respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, and
if there is a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, to impose the appropriate sanctions
under the law.”
On May 20, 2013, the SEC issued SEC-MC No. 8 entitled "Guidelines on Compliance with the FilipinoForeign Ownership Requirements Prescribed in the Constitution and/or Existing Laws by Corporations
Engaged in Nationalized and Partly Nationalized Activities." Section 2 of SEC-MC No. 8 provides:
“Section 2. All covered corporations shall, at all times, observe the constitutional or statutory ownership
requirement. For purposes of determining compliance therewith, the required percentage of Filipino
ownership shall be applied to BOTH (a) the total number of outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote
in the election of directors; AND (b) the total number of outstanding shares of stock, whether or not
entitled to vote in the election of directors. Corporations covered by special laws which provide specific
citizenship requirements shall comply with the provisions of said law.”
Roy, as a lawyer and taxpayer, filed the Petition, assailing the validity of SEC-MC No. 8 for not
conforming to the letter and spirit of the Gamboa Decision and Resolution and for having been issued
by the SEC with grave abuse of discretion. Roy seeks to apply the 60-40 Filipino ownership requirement
separately to each class of shares of a public utility corporation, whether common, preferred nonvoting, preferred voting or any other class of shares. Roy also questions the ruling of the SEC that
respondent Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company ("PLDT") is compliant with the constitutional
rule on foreign ownership. He prays that the Court declare SEC-MC No. 8 unconstitutional and direct
the SEC to issue new guidelines regarding the determination of compliance with Section 11, Article XII
of the Constitution in accordance with Gamboa.
1
ISSUE #1: Whether the SEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing SEC-MC No. 8 in light
of the Gamboa Decision.
HELD #1: No. The Court finds SEC-MC No. 8 to have been issued in fealty to the Gamboa Decision
and Resolution. In the Gamboa ruling, the term "capital" in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors. The dispositive portion of the
Court's ruling is addressed not to PLDT but solely to the SEC, which is the administrative agency tasked
to enforce the 60-40 ownership requirement in favor of Filipino citizens in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution.
Section 2 of SEC-MC No. 8 clearly incorporates the Voting Control Test or the controlling interest
requirement. In fact, Section 2 goes beyond requiring a 60-40 ratio in favor of Filipino nationals in the
voting stocks; it moreover requires the 60-40 percentage ownership in the total number of outstanding
shares of stock, whether voting or not. The SEC formulated SEC-MC No. 8 to adhere to the Court's
unambiguous pronouncement that "[f]ull beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital
stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights is required."
ISSUE #2: Whether the SEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that PLDT is compliant
with the constitutional limitation on foreign ownership.
HELD #2: No. SEC already clarified that it "has not yet issued a definitive ruling anent PLDT's
compliance with the limitation on foreign ownership imposed under the Constitution and relevant laws.
Thus, in the absence of a definitive ruling by the SEC on PLDT's compliance with the capital requirement
pursuant to the Gamboa ruling, any question relative to the inexistent ruling is premature.
ISSUE #3: Whether judicial review may be exercised.
HELD #3: No. Petitioners' failure to sufficiently allege, much less establish, the existence of the first
two requisites for the exercise of judicial review warrants the perfunctory dismissal of the petitions.
The requisites are: (1) there is an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the petitioner has standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance, i.e., he has a
personal and substantial interest in the case that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the act or issuance; (3) the question of constitutionality is raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case.
ISSUE #4: Whether or not the rule on the Hierarchy of Courts has been violated.
HELD #4: Yes. Petitioners' invocation of "transcendental importance" is hollow and does not merit the
relaxation of the rule on hierarchy of courts. There being no special, important or compelling reason
that justified the direct filing of the petitions in the Court in violation of the policy on hierarchy of courts,
their outright dismissal on this ground is further warranted. The Court may act on petitions for the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when
serious and important reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.
ISSUE #5: Whether or not the petitioners failed to implead indispensable parties.
HELD #5: Yes. The petitioners should have impleaded not only PLDT but all other corporations in
nationalized and partly nationalized industries because the propriety of the SEC's enforcement of the
Court's interpretation of "capital" through SEC-MC No. 8 affects them as well. This is evidenced by the
number of intervenors. Under Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, an indispensable party is a partyin-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. Indispensable parties are
those with such a material and direct interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily
affect their rights, so that the court cannot proceed without their presence.
Other than PLDT, the petitions failed to join or implead other public utility corporations subject to the
same restriction imposed by Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. These corporations are in danger
of losing their franchise and property if they are found not compliant with the restrictive interpretation
2
of the constitutional provision under review which is being espoused by petitioners. They should be
afforded due notice and opportunity to be heard, lest they be deprived of their property without due
process.
REMEDIAL LAW >General Principles>Jurisdiction>Original Jurisdiction of various
Philippine courts
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Intervention (Rule 19)
POLITICAL LAW>Judicial Department>Judicial Review>Requisites
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al, Petitioners vs. HEIRS OF IKANG PAUS, et al,
Respondents
G.R. No. 201273, August 14, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) issued a Resolution granting
Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT) to the heirs of Ikang Paus, respondents herein. An Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-CALT-37 was thus granted to them.
Subsequently, petitioner Republic, through the OSG, filed a suit before the RTC for the reversion,
nullification and cancellation of the OCT No. 0-CALT-37. Petitioner allege, among others, that the CALT
was issued erronneously because the land covered by said Certificate forms part of the Baguio Stock
Farm (BSF) which is an agricultural land of the public domain protected from or ancestral land claims.
The RTC dismissed the complaint because of lack of jurisdiction. The RTC explained that the CALT and
the corresponding OCT were issued on the basis of Resolution issued by the NCIP. Thus, any challenge
against the CALT and the OCT necessarily calls for a review of the NCIP Resolution. However, NCIP is
a quasi-judicial body with a rank and stature equal to that of the RTC; hence, it cannot review the
Resolution of the NCIP or any document that flows from its proceedings.
The Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. The CA, however, affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Republic then filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC. In said petition,
the heirs of Mateo Cariño and Bayosa Ortega filed a petition-for-intervention seeking to declare Section
53 of the IPRA as unconstitutional as it failed to provide sufficient standards to guide the assessment
and approval of ancestral land claims.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the reversion, nullification and
cancellation of an OCT issued by virtue of Certificate of Ancestral Land Title granted by the
NCIP?
HELD #1: Yes. Tthe RTC has the original jurisdiciton over the complaint based on the following
reasons:
First, the suit filed by the Republic requires a factual determination of whether the land is indeed of
public domain. This then raises the issue of whether a CALT may be issued over it, and whether an
OCT may be issued arising from the CALT. This is therefore a complaint for the reversion of a land to
the public domain and the cancellation of a Torrens title covering a public land, both matters being
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.
Second, the nature of a reversion suit belong to the class of cases that 'involve the title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein' and where the assessed value of the property exceeds
P20,000.00, fall under the jurisdiction of the RTC. In a reversion suit, the attack is directed not against
the judgment ordering the issuance of title, but against the title that is being sought to be cancelled
either because the judgment was not validly rendered, or the title issued did not faithfully reflect the
land referred to in the judgment, or because no judgment was rendered at all.
3
Third, the NICP or any Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties. Thus,
it may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which is not bound by any
prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations. In this case, the RTC also has to rule on
whether the Register of Deeds of Baguio City acted correctly in issuing OCT
Fourth, the NICP has no jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner (Republic, Register of Deeds of
Baguio, and LRA). Under the IPRA law, the NCIP is only vested with jurisdiction to determine the rights
of ICCs/IPs based on customs and customary law in a given controversy against another ICC/IP, but
not the applicable law for each and every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an opposing nonICC/IP. Thus, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to this special and limited jurisdiction of the NCIP even
if the dispute involves rights of ICCs/IPs since the NCIP has no power and authority to decide on a
controversy involving, as well, rights of non-ICCs/IPs which may be brought before a court of general
jurisdiction within the legal bounds of rights and remedies.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not the petition-for-intervention by the heirs of Cariño and Ortega
was proper?
HELD #2: No. The intervention lacks basis. The requisites for intervention of a non-party are as
follows:
1. Legal interest
a. In the matter in controversy; or
b. In the success of either of the parties; or
c. Against both parties; or
d. Person is so situated as to be adveresly affected by a distribution or other disposition
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof;
2. Intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights of orginal parties
3. Intervenor’s rights may not be fully protected in a separate proceeding
In this case, the Heirs of Cariño and Ortega failed to prove a legal interest in the controversy. The
petition was filed to determine the jurisdiction over the Republic’s complaint; however, the issue
submitted in the intervention is the constiuttionality of Section 53. Furthermore, in determining the
constitutionality, it will delay the adjudication of the original complaint.
ISSUE #3: Whether or not the SC may review the issue of the constitutionality of Section
53 of IPRA?
HELD #3: No. The constitutionality of Section 53 of IPRA is not the very lis mota of the petition
Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review.
First, there must be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second,
the question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the validity
of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of constitutionality must have been
raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.
Here, it is unnecessary to rule on the constitutionality of Section 53 of the IPRA in order to arrive at
the conclusion that the RTC has jurisdiction over the Republic's Complaint.
4
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Jurisdiction over the subject matter; Summons (Rule
14); Parties to Civil Actions
SPS. LINO REBAMONTE, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS NAMELY:
LUZVIMINDA R. PANISA, TERYLI M. REBAMONTE, NAIDA R. CERVANTES, JOEREL M.
REBAMONTE, AND HEIRS OF JEMUEL M. REBAMONTE, REPRESENTED BY JUDITH ANN O.
REBAMONTE, AND TERESITA M. REBAMONTE, PETITIONERS, V. SPS. GUILLERMO
LUCERO AND GENOVEVA S. LUCERO, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 237812, October 02, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: Respondent Guillermo's parents, Marcos and Tomasa, obtained a loan from the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and mortgaged the subject portion of the land as security. Then, the
spouses defaulted and the said lot was foreclosed in favour of DBP. However, the spouse was able to
repurchase such. After the said repurchase, they sold it to their son, Guillermo, evidenced by a Deed
of Absolute Sale on Lot No. 1305-A.
However, prior to such sale, three separate unregistered sales in favor of Tomasa's cousin, petitioner
Lino, allegedly took place over certain portions of Lot No. 1305-A. As petitioner Lino took possession of
the aforementioned portions, respondent Guillermo was unable to possess the entire lot. Respondent
Guillermo repeatedly made demands for petitioner Lino to vacate the aforementioned portions of the
lot, but petitioner Lino refused to do so. Hence, Guillermo and his wife instituted a Complaint for
Recovery of Real Estate Property, Recovery of Possession, Quieting of Title, Damages, and Attorney's
Fees against the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte. The case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Tacurong City, Branch 20 (RTC).
On the other hand, the petitioner Sps. Rebamonte also avers that there was defective service of
Summons. The court's process server resorted to substituted service without complying with the
requirement in connection thereto. Thus, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Teresita
Rebamonte. Also, they stated that even up to now the counsel for the respondents Sps.Lucero have
yet to inform the court about the fact of death of Guillermo and the failure to effect substitution renders
the Decision of the [RTC] null and void.
ISSUE#1: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the Complaint filed by the respondents
Sps. Lucero, considering that the assessed value of the subject portions establish that the
jurisdiction of the Complaint falls within the Municipal Trial Court of Tacurong City (MTC)
and not the RTC.
HELD#1: No, the RTC has no jurisdiction over this case. According to Section 33(3) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. (BP) 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic
Act No. (RA) 7691,24 the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title
to, or possession of, real property located outside Metro Manila, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed P20,000.00.
As admitted by the respondents Sps. Lucero in their Complaint, Lot No. 1305-A "has a total market
assessed value of P11,120.00[.]"
Hence, on the question of jurisdiction, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte are correct in saying that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant case. Considering that the assessed value
of the subject property, as alleged by the respondents Sps. Lucero in their Complaint, is well below
P20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction over the Complaint. However, in this case, the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over subject matter is already barred by laches considering the 22 years that have elapsed
from the filing of the complaint.
IMPORTANT NOTE: Please check new jurisdictional amounts under RA 11576
5
ISSUE#2: Whether there was a defective service of summons and, consequently, whether
all the proceedings conducted by the RTC are considered null and void.
HELD#2: No, there was no defect in the service of summons. Under Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules
of Court, the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons.
In the instant case, it cannot be seriously disputed that the Sps. Rebamonte fully and actively
participated in the proceedings before the RTC and CA. After very actively participating in the
proceedings, and after almost three decades of litigation, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte cannot now
allege for the first time that their right to be heard was transgressed. The petitioners Sps. Rebamonte's
insistence that there was a violation of their right to due process due to the alleged defective service
of summons is outright nonsense. The argument is clearly unmeritorious.
ISSUE#3: Whether the failure to effect substitution for the death of respondent Guillermo
in 2000 violated Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court.
HELD#3: No. In any case, the Court has ruled that [m]ere failure to substitute a deceased party is
not sufficient ground to nullify a trial court's decision. The party alleging nullity must prove that there
was an undeniable violation of due process. When due process is not violated, as when the right of the
representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with
the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision.
In the instant case, there is absolutely no allegation that the right to due process of the respondents
Sps. Lucero was violated due to the non substitution of respondent Guillermo after the latter's death.
No one disputes that the respondents Sps. Lucero were fully able to participate and present their
evidence during the trial.
REMEDIAL LAW > General Principles > Jurisdiction > Jurisdiction over cases covered by
Barangay Conciliation, Small Claims Cases and cases covered by Summary Procedure
CIVIL LAW > Part II > Property > Ownership > Rules on accession > rights of
builder/planter/sower in good faith
CIVIL LAW > Part II > Property > Actions to Recover Property > Accion Interdictal
(unlawful detainer)
SPOUSES BELVIS, et al Petitioners vs. SPOUSES EROLA, Respondents
G.R. No. 239727, July 24, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: This case involves a land located in Pontevedra, Capiz, registered in the name of respondent
Conrado V. Erola. Respondent Conrado allegedly allowed her sister petitioner Cecilia Belvis to possess
the lot, subject to the condition that they would vacate the same upon demand. Petitioner Cecilia and
her family possessed and cultivated the lot for over 34 years. On July 2, 2012, respondents sent
petitioners a letter requiring the latter to vacate the property within 30 days. Petitioners, however,
refused to comply. This led the respondents to file a complaint for unlawful detainer before the MCTC.
In Petitioners’ Answer, they contend that the complaint should be dismissed because respondents failed
to personally appear during the barangay conciliation proceedings, and were merely represented by
their attorney.They also claim that Cecilia Belvis owns ½ of the subject property by hereditary share
since the land was purchased by their mother. They also argue that they have the right of possession
over the land because they were builders in good faith under Article 448 of the Civil Code.
The MCTC, RTC and CA unanimously ruled in favor of respondents. On the procedural issue, the courts
held that respondent’s non-appearance during barangay conciliation was a mere irregularity and that
the same did not affect the jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, the parties were referred to Philippine
Mediation Center (PMC) during pre-trial and even before the court during Judicial Dispute Resolution
(JDR), but still failed to settle amicably. On the substantive issue, the courts held that petitioners failed
6
to prove that Cecilia was a co-owner of the land. Hence, petitioners had no right to retain possession
of the property under Article 448 because petitioners could not have built improvements on the subject
lot in the concept of owner since their possession was by mere tolerance of respondents.
ISSUE #1: Whether the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of non-appearance
of the respondent during barangay conciliation proceedings.
HELD #1: No. The SC ruled that the respondents have substantially complied with the law.
Sec. 412 of the RA 7160 requires, when applicable, prior resort to barangay conciliation proceedings
as a pre-condition for the filing of a complaint in court. In relation thereto, Section 415 of the same law
holds that the parties must personally appear in said proceedings, without the assistance of counsel or
any representative. Failure to comply with the barangay conciliation proceedings renders the complaint
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss for prematurity under Section 10, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
In Lumbuan v. Ronquillo, the Court explained that the primordial objective of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Rules, is to reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the
quality of justice which has been brought about by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts.
Although mandatory, non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law
is not jurisdictional in nature, and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a
motion to dismiss or in a responsive pleading.
In this case, aside from the barangay conciliation proceedings, the parties underwent mediation before
the PMC and JDR before the court. Still, no settlement was reached. Given the foregoing, the Court
finds that the purposes of the law, i.e., to provide avenues for parties to amicably settle their disputes
and to prevent the "indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts," have been sufficiently met. Considering
that the instant complaint for unlawful detainer, an action governed by the rules of summary procedure,
has been pending for 6 years, the Court finds it proper to relax the technical rules of procedure in the
interest of speedy and substantial justice.
ISSUE #2: Whether petitioners were builders in good faith under Art. 448 of the Civil Code.
HELD #2: Yes. The SC reversed the decision of the CA and the lower courts. The SC explained in this
case the application of Art. 448 which provides:
"Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such a
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building
or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof."
General Rule in applying Art. 448:
The Court has ruled that Art. 448 covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or planters believe
themselves to be owners of the land or, at least, to have a claim of title thereto. It does not apply when
the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary. From these
pronouncements, good faith is identified by the belief that the land is owned; or that — by some title
— one has the right to build, plant, or sow thereon.
Art. 448 is not applicable to co-owners:
Even assuming that petitioner Cecilia was a co-owner of the subject property, Article 448 would still be
inapplicable. As previously held by the SC, Article 448 may not generally apply to a co-owner who
builds, plants, or sows on a property owned in common, "for then he [(the co-owner)] did not build,
7
plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-owner. The co-owner
is not a third person under the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of coownership."
The reason for this rule is clear. Under Article 445 of the Civil Code rights of accession with respect to
immovable property apply to "whatever' is built, planted or sown on the land of another." A co-owner
of a parcel of land, however, builds on his own land and not that of another as "a co-owner of an
undivided parcel of land is an owner of the whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of
dominion; but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly ABSTRACT." More
importantly, co-ownerships are governed by Articles 484-501 of the Civil Code, which already specify
the rights and obligations of a co-owner who builds, plants, and sows on a co owned property and the
rules for the reimbursement thereof.
Exception to the GR in applying Art. 448:
In exceptional cases, the Court has applied Article 448 to instances where a builder, planter, or sower
introduces improvements on titled land if with the knowledge and consent of the owner. In Department
of Education v. Casibang, Article 448 of the Civil Code was applied beyond the recognized and limited
definition of good faith. The Court ruled therein that the structures were built in good faith in those
cases that the owners knew and approved of the construction of improvements on the property.
The instant case falls into the exception:
In the instant case, while respondents may have merely tolerated petitioners' possession, respondents
never denied having knowledge of the fact that petitioners possessed, cultivated and constructed
various permanent improvements on the subject lot for over 34 years. In fact, the records are bereft
of any evidence to show that respondents ever opposed or objected, for over 34 years, to the
improvements introduced by petitioners, despite the fact that petitioner Cecilia and respondent Conrado
are siblings and that both parties reside in Pontevedra, Capiz. As such, the Court finds that respondents
likewise acted in bad faith under Article 453 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or sowed on the
land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the other shall
be the same as though both had acted in good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done with
his knowledge and without opposition on his part.
Pursuant to the aforementioned article, the rights and obligations of the parties shall be the same as
though both acted in good faith. Therefore, Article 448 in relation to Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil
Code applies.
Under Article 448 in relation to Articles 546 and 548, respondents as landowners have the following
options: 1) they may appropriate the improvements, after payment of indemnity representing the value
of the improvements introduced and the necessary, useful and luxurious expenses defrayed on the
subject lots; or 2) they may oblige petitioners to pay the price of the land, if the value is not considerably
more than that of the improvements and buildings. Should respondents opt to appropriate the
improvements made, however, petitioners may retain the subject lot until reimbursement for the
necessary and useful expenses have been made.
The case was remanded to the MCTC to determine the proper application of Art. 448 in relation to Art.
546 and 548 of the Civil Code.
With regard to the determination of ownership:
The SC gave emphasis that the case is a complaint for an unlawful detainer. Thus, the sole issue for
resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of
8
ownership by any of the parties. The determination of the ownership of the subject lot is merely
provisional and is without prejudice to the appropriate action for recovery or quieting of title.
REMEDIAL LAW> Civil Procedure> General provisions (Rule 1)
JOANNE KRISTINE G. PIMENTEL, Petitioner, vs. REYNALDO ADIAO, CRISTY ADIAONIERVES AND CHRISTIAN ADIAO, Respondents
G.R. No. 222678, October 17, 2018
(Second Division)
FACTS: Joanne filed with the RTC a complaint for damages against Reynaldo Adiao (Reynaldo),
Christian Adiao (Christian) and Cristy Adiao-Nierves (Cristy). Joanne alleged that she entered into a
Construction Agreement with Reynaldo and Christian whereby Reynaldo, as contractor, agreed to
undertake the renovation of Joanne's bungalow house. However, Reynaldo did not complete the
renovation of Joanna's house and left the project unfinished.
The RTC issued a Notice of Preliminary Conference (Notice of PC) which set the case for preliminary
conference (PC) on February 14, 2014 and required the parties to file their respective pre-trial (PT)
briefs and serve the same on the adverse party in such manner as to ensure the latter's receipt thereof
at least three days before the scheduled date. A Notice of Pre-Trial (Notice of PT) was also issued
on January 30, 2014 setting the case for PT on March 17, 2014 and the directive anent the filing of the
PT brief was reiterated.
On February 12, 2014, Cristy filed her PT brief and furnished Joanna a copy thereof by registered mail.
During the PC held on February 14, 2014, all the parties and their counsels appeared. Reynaldo and
Christian filed their PT brief and furnished Joanna a copy thereof on the said date. The parties premarked their respective exhibits. On March 17, 2014, the PT hearing was held and attended by the
parties and their respective counsels. Joanna filed her PT brief, which was objected to by the counsels
of the other parties for being filed late.
The RTC dismissed the case because Atty. Patricio violated the mandate found in Section 6, Rule 18 of
the Rules in relation to Section 5 of the same Rule. Joanna filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging
that her counsel received on February 12, 2014 a copy of the Notice of PC and the Notice of PT and it
was improbable for Joanna's counsel to submit the PT brief at least three days prior to February 14,
2014.
ISSUE: Whether Joanne’s complaint was correctly dismissed for the latter’s failure to file
her PT brief on time.
HELD: No. Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules mandates that "[t]hese Rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding."
Given the realities obtaining in this case, the liberal construction of the Rules will promote and secure
a just determination of the parties' causes of action against each other. As the court of the last resort,
justice should be the paramount consideration when the Court is confronted with an issue on the
interpretation of the Rules, subject to the petitioner's burden to convince the Court that enough reasons
obtain to warrant the suspension of a strict adherence to procedural rules.
The Court is convinced with the explanations of Joanna for her plea to relax the application of the Rules
in her case. The Court notes that the untimely filing of her PT brief was so far the only procedural lapse
that she committed. She had been diligent in the prosecution of her cause against respondents, and
had not demonstrated a proclivity to delay the proceedings. As she pointed out, several matters that
would be taken up in the PT hearing had actually already been accomplished in the PC. In fact, even
the trial dates had been agreed upon by the parties. In turn, as Joanna correctly observes, respondents
9
were themselves not fully compliant with the Rules as observed by the RTC, and to the Court's mind,
they will not suffer substantial prejudice if the case is litigated on the merits.
Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would be best served if the parties are given the full
opportunity to thresh out the real issues and litigate their claims in a full-blown trial. Besides,
respondents would not be prejudiced should the RTC proceed with the hearing on the merits, as they
are not stripped of any affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure> Cause of Action (Rule 2)
MERCEDES S. GATMAYTAN AND ERLINDA V. VALDELLON, Petitioner vs. MISIBIS LAND,
INC., Respondent
G.R. No. 222166, June 10, 2020
(First Division)
FACTS: On December 9, 1991, Petitioners purchased from Oscar and Cidra Garcia (Spouses Garcia) a
parcel of land (disputed lot) in Misibis, Cagraray Island, Albay with an area of 6.4868 hectares, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-77703 issued in the latter's name. Petitioners paid the taxes
arising from the transaction. On April 6, 1992, Petitioners, armed with the original owner's duplicate
copy of TCT No. T-77703, attempted to register the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale dated
December 9, 1991 (1991 DOAS) with the Register of Deeds of Albay (RD). They were successful in
having the 1991 DOAS duly annotated on TCT No. T-77703, but they were not able to cause the transfer
of the Torrens title in their name since they lacked the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) clearance
necessary to do so. In 2010, when Petitioners resumed processing the transfer of the Torrens title to
their names, they discovered that the disputed lot had been consolidated by Misibis Land, Inc. (MLI)
with other adjoining lots in Misibis, and sub-divided into smaller lots covered by several new Torrens
titles. Upon further investigation, Petitioners learned that TCT No. T-77703 had been stamped
"cancelled", and replaced by different Torrens titles issued on the basis of the following transactions:
Date
February 21, 1996
Transaction
Deed of Absolute Sale
(1996 DOAS)
April 21, 2005
Deed of Absolute Sale
(2005 DOAS)
Parties
Spouses Garcia as
sellers and DAA Realty
Corporation
(DAA
Realty) as buyer
DAA Realty as seller
and MLI as buyer
Resulting Titles
TCT
No.
T-97059
issued on February 22,
1996
TCT No. T-1382
With this discovery, Petitioners immediately caused, on September 1, 2010, the annotation of their
Affidavit of Adverse Claim on MLI's Torrens titles. On December 10, 2014, Petitioners filed a complaint
before the RTC (Complaint) against Spouses Garcia, DAA Realty and MLI, as well as Philippine National
Bank (PNB) to whom the disputed lot had been mortgaged. In their Complaint, Petitioners stated their
causes of action, as follows: (1) Declaration of Plaintiffs' Ownership and Nullity of the [1996 DOAS,]
[2005 DOAS] and [the April 21, 2005 MLI-PNB Mortgage], (2) Accounting and Remittance, if any, of
[a]ll [of MLI's] Income and Profits vis-a-vis the [disputed lot], (3) Exemplary Damages, (4) Moral
Damages, and (5) Attorney's Fees and Litigation Expenses. MLI claimed, among others, that it was an
innocent purchaser for value since it relied on DAA Realty's TCT No. T-97059 which did not bear any
defects.
ISSUE: Whether Petitioners' Complaint should be allowed to proceed for trial on the
merits.
HELD: Yes. The Complaint should be allowed to proceed for trial. Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court allows parties to plead as many separate claims as they may have, provided that no rules
regarding venue and joinder of parties are violated. A complaint which contains two or more alternative
causes of action cannot be dismissed where one of them clearly states a sufficient cause of action
against the defendant. Here, recovery of ownership is not restricted to the mere fact that a Torrens
10
title had been issued in favor of DAA Realty, and later, MLI. The above allegations show that the
recovery of ownership is predicated on the nullification of the underlying mode of transfer of title of
the disputed lot — the issuance of the Torrens titles to DAA Realty and then to MLI being merely the
result of the 1996 DOAS sought to be nullified. Here, Petitioners mainly argue that their Complaint
should be allowed to proceed since it is an action "primarily for [the] declaration of nullity of the [1996
DOAS],"and alternatively, for quieting of title. Hence, the material allegations in Petitioners' Complaint,
including the possession by Petitioners of the owner's duplicate title of Spouses Garcia's TCT No. T77703 and the annotation of the 1991 DOAS in both original and owner's duplicate title covering the
disputed lot, are deemed hypothetically admitted.
REMEDIAL LAW > Civil Procedure > Pleadings > Parts and Contents of a Pleading (Rule
7)
REMEDIAL LAW > Post-Judgment Remedies other than Appeal> Rule 65 as a remedy from
judgment
REMEDIAL LAW > Civil Procedure > Parties to civil actions (Rule 3)
BDO LEASING & FINANCE, INC. (FORMERLY PCI LEASING & FINANCE, INC.), Petitioner
vs. GREAT DOMESTIC INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., AND SPOUSES
KIDDY LIM CHAO AND EMILY ROSE GO KO, Respondents
G.R. No. 205286, June 19, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: Sps. Chao obtained from BDO Leasing & Finance, Inc. (BDO), formerly known as PCI Leasing
and Finance, Inc., loans evidenced by two promissory notes. As security for the payment of these loans,
Sps. Chao executed in favor of BDO a Chattel Mortgage. Subsequently, Sps. Chao failed to fully pay
their monthly amortization payments. Hence, a Complaint for Recovery of Possession of Personal
Property, with an application for the issuance of a writ of replevin (Complaint) was filed by BDO before
the RTC. The RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of replevin upon the posting of a bond by BDO in the
amount of P10,000,000.00. BDO posted the said bond and the writ of replevin was issued. Sps. Chao
posted a counter-replevin bond (counter-bond) in the same amount which was issued by Great
Domestic Insurance Company of the Philippines, Inc. (Great Domestic). The RTC granted the Complaint.
The CA denied Sps. Chao’s appeal and the Supreme Court further denied the subsequent appeal.
When the Supreme Court’s resolution attained finality, BDO filed a Motion for Writ of Execution before
the RTC, which was granted by the latter. However, the writ of execution was not satisfied. Hence,
BDO filed a Motion to Order Sheriff to Serve Writ of Execution on the Counter Bond. The RTC granted
BDO's Motion. However, it clarified that the liability of Great Domestic is only P5,000,000.00.
Thus, BDO filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Certiorari Petition) before
the CA arguing that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that respondent Great
Domestic's liability on the counter-bond is only P5,000,000.00. The CA dismissed the Certiorari Petition
outright solely on the following procedural grounds:
First, it held that BDO failed to satisfy the rule on filing the proper certification against forum shopping,
as the latter failed to disclose and mention the pendency of another case involving BDO and Sps. Chao,
i.e., Civil Case No. CEB-24675 pending before the RTC, Branch 51 for nullification of chattel mortgage
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Second, it found that BDO failed to attach vital pleadings and documents needed in deciding whether
to grant the Certiorari Petition. Important pleadings and documents such as the Complaint, writ of
replevin, writ of execution, and other issuances and orders of the RTC were not attached to the
Certiorari Petition. This was in violation of Rule 65, Section 1, Paragraph 2 of the Rules of Court.
11
Lastly, it held that BDO had no legal capacity to file the Certiorari Petition, considering that when PCI
Leasing and Finance, Inc. changed its name to BDO Leasing and Finance, Inc., BDO should have sued
under its new name "in order to avoid confusion and open door to frauds and evasions and difficulties
of administration and supervision."
ISSUE #1: Whether BDO's failure to disclose Civil Case No. CEB-24675 in the
Verification/Certification accompanying the Certiorari Petition merits the outright
dismissal of the said Petition.
HELD #1: According to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the plaintiff or principal party shall
certify in a sworn certification:
a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action
or claim is pending therein;
b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof;
and
c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending,
he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint
or initiatory pleading has been filed.
While BDO failed to disclose the status of Civil Case No. CEB-24675 in its Verification/Certification, it
must be stressed that, despite involving the same parties, the aforesaid case and the instant case
involve two completely different issues. On the one hand, in Civil Case No. CEB-24675, the issue was
on the validity of the chattel mortgage executed by BDO and Sps. Chao that accompanied the loan
transactions entered into by the parties. On the other hand, in the Certiorari Petition, the matter in
focus is the execution upon the counter-bond filed in lieu of the final and executory Decision of the RTC
in Civil Case No. CEB-24769. Either decision will not have any bearing as to the other.
There was an "absence of identity of causes of action and reliefs being sought between the instant
case and Civil Case No. CEB-24675." Jurisprudence holds that "an omission in the certificate of nonforum shopping about any event that would not constitute res judicata and litis pendencia is not fatal
as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings, given that the evils sought to be
prevented by the said certification are not present."
ISSUE #2: Whether the Certiorari Petition should be dismissed outright because of the
failure of BDO to attach certain documents.
HELD#2: No. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states that a petition for certiorari must be
accompanied with copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto.
In Air Philippines Corp. v. Zamora, while it is a general rule that a petition lacking copies of essential
pleadings and portions of the case record may be dismissed, such rule, however, is not petrified. As
the exact nature of the pleadings and parts of the case record which must accompany a petition is not
specified, much discretion is left to the appellate court to determine the necessity for copies of pleading
and other documents. There are, however, guideposts it must follow.
According to the aforementioned case: x x x not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to
be attached to the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test
of relevancy is whether the document in question will support the material allegations in the petition,
whether said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince
the court to give due course to the petition.
Applying the foregoing in the instant case, the documents that BDO failed to attach in its Certiorari
Petition, i.e., the Complaint, the writ of replevin, and the writ of execution, are not documents that will
make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion. To stress, the instant case is centered solely
on the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC when it held that the liability of Great
Domestic is only P5,000,000.00. Statements or details found in the Complaint, the writ of replevin, and
12
the writ of execution will not determine whether grave abuse of discretion was attendant in the RTC's
issuance of its Order.
ISSUE #3: Whether the change of name of BDO from PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. to BDO
Leasing and Finance, Inc. affected its capacity to sue and be sued, and the authority of its
authorized signatory, Vicente C. Rallos (Rallos), to file the Certiorari Petition.
HELD #3: No. The corporation, upon such change in its name, is in no sense a new corporation, nor
the successor of the original corporation. It is the same corporation with a different name, and its
character is in no respect changed. A change in the corporate name does not make a new corporation,
and whether effected by special act or under a general law, has no effect on the identity of the
corporation, or on its property, rights, or liabilities. The corporation continues, as before, responsible
in its new name for all debts or other liabilities which it had previously contracted or incurred.
Hence, with BDO's change of name from "PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc." to "BDO Leasing and Finance,
Inc." having no effect on the identity of the corporation, on its property, rights, or liabilities, with its
character remaining very much intact, the Board Resolution and Special Power of Attorney authorizing
Rallos to institute the Certiorari Petition did not lose any binding effect whatsoever.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Jurisdiction over the subject matter; Summons (Rule
14); Parties to Civil Actions
SPS. LINO REBAMONTE, SUBSTITUTED BY HIS COMPULSORY HEIRS NAMELY:
LUZVIMINDA R. PANISA, TERYLI M. REBAMONTE, NAIDA R. CERVANTES, JOEREL M.
REBAMONTE, AND HEIRS OF JEMUEL M. REBAMONTE, REPRESENTED BY JUDITH ANN O.
REBAMONTE, AND TERESITA M. REBAMONTE, PETITIONERS, V. SPS. GUILLERMO
LUCERO AND GENOVEVA S. LUCERO, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 237812, October 02, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: Respondent Guillermo's parents, Marcos and Tomasa, obtained a loan from the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and mortgaged the subject portion of the land as security. Then, the
spouses defaulted and the said lot was foreclosed in favour of DBP. However, the spouse was able to
repurchase such. After the said repurchase, they sold it to their son, Guillermo, evidenced by a Deed
of Absolute Sale on Lot No. 1305-A.
However, prior to such sale, three separate unregistered sales in favor of Tomasa's cousin, petitioner
Lino, allegedly took place over certain portions of Lot No. 1305-A. As petitioner Lino took possession of
the aforementioned portions, respondent Guillermo was unable to possess the entire lot. Respondent
Guillermo repeatedly made demands for petitioner Lino to vacate the aforementioned portions of the
lot, but petitioner Lino refused to do so. Hence, Guillermo and his wife instituted a Complaint for
Recovery of Real Estate Property, Recovery of Possession, Quieting of Title, Damages, and Attorney's
Fees against the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte. The case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Tacurong City, Branch 20 (RTC).
On the other hand, the petitioner Sps. Rebamonte also avers that there was defective service of
Summons. The court's process server resorted to substituted service without complying with the
requirement in connection thereto. Thus, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Teresita
Rebamonte. Also, they stated that even up to now the counsel for the respondents Sps.Lucero have
yet to inform the court about the fact of death of Guillermo and the failure to effect substitution renders
the Decision of the [RTC] null and void.
ISSUE#1: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the Complaint filed by the respondents
Sps. Lucero, considering that the assessed value of the subject portions establish that the
jurisdiction of the Complaint falls within the Municipal Trial Court of Tacurong City (MTC)
and not the RTC.
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HELD#1: No, the RTC has no jurisdiction over this case. According to Section 33(3) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. (BP) 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic
Act No. (RA) 7691, the MTC has exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to,
or possession of, real property located outside Metro Manila, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property or interest therein does not exceed P20,000.00.
As admitted by the respondents Sps. Lucero in their Complaint, Lot No. 1305-A "has a total market
assessed value of P11,120.00[.]"
Hence, on the question of jurisdiction, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte are correct in saying that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant case. Considering that the assessed value
of the subject property, as alleged by the respondents Sps. Lucero in their Complaint, is well below
P20,000.00, the MTC has jurisdiction over the Complaint. However, in this case, the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over subject matter is already barred by laches considering the 22 years that have elapsed
from the filing of the complaint.
IMPORTANT NOTE: Please check new jurisdictional amounts under RA 11576
ISSUE#2: Whether there was a defective service of summons and, consequently, whether
all the proceedings conducted by the RTC are considered null and void.
HELD#2: No, there was no defect in the service of summons. Under Rule 14, Section 20 of the Rules
of Court, the defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons.
In the instant case, it cannot be seriously disputed that the Sps. Rebamonte fully and actively
participated in the proceedings before the RTC and CA. After very actively participating in the
proceedings, and after almost three decades of litigation, the petitioners Sps. Rebamonte cannot now
allege for the first time that their right to be heard was transgressed. The petitioners Sps. Rebamonte's
insistence that there was a violation of their right to due process due to the alleged defective service
of summons is outright nonsense. The argument is clearly unmeritorious.
ISSUE#3: Whether the failure to effect substitution for the death of respondent Guillermo
in 2000 violated Rule 3, Section 16 of the Rules of Court.
HELD#3: No. In any case, the Court has ruled that [m]ere failure to substitute a deceased party is
not sufficient ground to nullify a trial court's decision. The party alleging nullity must prove that there
was an undeniable violation of due process. When due process is not violated, as when the right of the
representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with
the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision.
In the instant case, there is absolutely no allegation that the right to due process of the respondents
Sps. Lucero was violated due to the non substitution of respondent Guillermo after the latter's death.
No one disputes that the respondents Sps. Lucero were fully able to participate and present their
evidence during the trial.
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REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Parties to Civil Actions (Rule 3)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF MA. TERESITA A. BERNABE and
COOPERATIVE RURAL BANK OF BULACAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 237663, October 6, 2020
FACTS: The complaint involved parcels of lands which are portions of Clark Air Base. The specific lot
involved in this case is one allegedly owned and acquired by Francisco Garcia. Said lot was subject to
a cadastral case instituted by the Bureau of Lands. While the case was pending, respondents Heirs of
Bernabe mortgaged the subject property to Cooperative Rural Bank of Bulacan (CRBB). After being
informed of the mortgage, the Republic, through the OSG, filed an Amended Complaint impleading
CRBB as defendant. CRBB filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that the Republic never renounced its
ownership over the Clark Air Force Base, hence, the proper party to initiate a case for reversion is the
Director of Lands.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss of CRBB. The Court of Appeals denied the Republic's appeal. It
agreed with the RTC that the Republic is not the real party in interest because, from the allegations of
the Republic's Second Amended Complaint, the subject property being located inside the Fort
Stotsenburg Military Reservation, which is presently known as Clark Air Base, is under the direct control
and ownership of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority (BCDA). Thus, the BCDA, by virtue
of its ownership over the subject property, is the party which stands to be benefited or injured by the
verdict in the instant case, and, being the real party in interest, the instant case for reversion and
cancellation of title must be lodged in its name as the plaintiff.
ISSUE: Whether it is BCDA which is the real party in interest and not the Republic.
HELD: No. As defined in Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Section 2 adds that unless otherwise authorized by law or the Rules of Court, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. To determine who is the real
party in interest, the nature or character of the subject property and who has present ownership thereof
have to be inquired into.
The subject property was inside the Fort Stotsenburg Military Reservation (now Clark Air Base), which
was being used as a target range by the Clark Air Force Military personnel. In 1993, then President
Fidel V. Ramos, series of 1993 (Proc. 163), created the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), which
"shall cover the lands consisting of the Clark military reservations, including the Clark Air Base proper
and portions of the Clark reverted baselands (CAB Lands) x x x.” Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7227 or the
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992 created the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority (BCDA). It expressly provides that the BCDA is to own, hold and/or administer the military
reservations and other properties transferred to it. However, the BCDA is a mere trustee of the Republic.
The transfer of the military reservations and other properties — the CAB Lands — from the CSEZ to the
BCDA was not meant to transfer the beneficial ownership of these assets from the Republic to the
BCDA. The purpose was merely to establish the BCDA as the governing body of the CSEZ.
Being the beneficial owner of the CAB Lands, the Republic is the real party in interest in this case. With
these pronouncements, the Court now abandons its ruling in Shipside Incorporated that the Republic
is not the real party in interest in cases involving the title to and ownership of the military reservations
and their extensions, including the CAB Lands and Camp Wallace, transferred to the BCDA. Henceforth,
in cases involving the title to and ownership of the military reservations and their extensions, including
the CAB Lands and Camp Wallace, transferred to the BCDA, the Republic, being the beneficial owner,
is the real party in interest and not the BCDA.
15
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Venue> (Rule 4)
PILLARS PROPERTY CORPORATION, Petitioner v. CENTURY COMMUNITIES
CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 201021, March 04, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: PPC filed a Complaint for sum of money against Century Communities Corporation (CCC) for
unpaid progress billings in connection with a construction contract where PPC agreed to deliver 210
housing units at Canyon Ranch, Cavite, among others to CCC at an agreed consideration. PPC also sued
People’s General Insurance Corporation (PGIC), which issued the bonds in favor of CCC to guarantee
the performance of PPC’s obligations, to exculpate PPC from any liability under the bonds since PPC
intended to prove that it was not at fault in the performance of its obligations under the construction
contract. CCC filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that the contract states that the venue of action in
case of litigation shall be the Court of Makati to the exclusion of others. CCC moved for the dismissal
of the Complaint on the ground that the venue was improperly laid pursuant to Section 1(c), Rule 16
of the Rules because the filing of the instant case before the court of Parañaque City was in
contravention of the express and exclusive agreement of the parties that in case of litigation, the case
should be filed in the court of Makati to the exclusion of other courts. PPC filed an Opposition to Motion
to Dismiss arguing that the inclusion of PGIC as co-defendant of CCC took away the case from the
jurisdiction of Makati courts because the general rule on venue (Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules) should
then apply, PGIC not being a party to the Contract. The RTC issued its Order granting the Motion to
Dismiss filed by CCC. The CA in its Resolution dismissed PPC’s Petition for Certiorari which sought to
set aside the Order of the RTC for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
and/or excess of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether venue was improperly laid.
HELD: No. Given the stipulation on venue in the Contract, where exclusivity is provided, the RTC had
enough legal basis to apply Section 4(b), Rule 4 and not Section 2, Rule 4.
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that all other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the
election of the plaintiff. However, the exceptions are provided in Section 4, Rule 4, (a) In those cases
where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or (b) Where the parties have validly agreed in
writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.
To recall, the RTC applied Section 4(b) of Rule 4 on exclusive venue since the Contract of PPC and CCC
provides “that in case of litigation, the parties hereby agree that the venue of said action as the Proper
Court of Makati to the exclusion of others,” and not the general rule on venue which is the place of
residence of plaintiff or defendant at the election of plaintiff under Section 2 of Rule 4.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure> Pleadings>Kinds (Rule 6)
G. HOLDINGS, INC., Petitioner, vs. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY,
INC. (CEPALCO) and FERROCHROME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.
G.R. No. 226213, September 27, 2017
(Second Division)
FACTS: CEPALCO filed a collection suit against FPI. RTC rendered a decision in favor of CEPALCO
ordering FPI to pay CEPALCO. FPI appealed the Decision of the RTC-Pasig to the CA but CEPALCO
moved for execution pending appeal, which was granted by RTC-Pasig. FPI filed before the CA
a certiorari petition with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction.
16
The CA issued an initial TRO and then a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of
the Order granting execution pending appeal.
Later, GHI filed a case against Sheriff Baron, CEPALCO and FPI for Nullification of Sheriffs Levy on
Execution and Auction Sale, Recovery of Possession of Properties and Damages before the RTCCDO. GHI claimed that the levied ferro-alloy smelting facility, properties and equipment are owned by
it as evidenced by a Deed of Assignment dated March 11, 2003 (the Deed of Assignment) executed by
FPI.
CEPALCO filed its answer with counterclaim and cross-claim. In its counterclaim, CEPALCO assailed the
validity of the Deed of Assignment executed by FPI in favor of GHI. CEPALCO contended that the Deed
of Assignment was null and void for being absolutely simulated and, as a dacion en pago, it did not
bear the conformity of the creditor.
RTC-CDO rendered judgment in favor of CEPALCO against GHI.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in not dismissing CEPALCO's counterclaim for non-payment
of docket fees.
HELD: No. CEPALCO’s counterclaim and prayer for rescission of the Deed of Assignment can only be
viewed, as it is indeed, a compulsory counterclaim because it “arises out of or is connected with the
transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.”
Being a compulsory counterclaim, as of the filing of CEPALCO’s Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim
and Cross-Claim, it was not liable to pay filing fees on its compulsory counterclaim.
REMEDIAL LAW> Civil Procedure> Parts and Contents of a Pleading (Rule 7)
CARMELITA V. DIZON, Petitioner, v. JOSE LUIS K. MATTI, JR., Respondent.
G.R. No. 215614, March 27, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: Matti, Jr. alleged that Zenaida Acleto together with Mrs. Basilica C. Estaris, offered him a
townhouse for sale that belonged to Dizon. They made a physical inspection of the said townhouse and
was shown all the original documents including the original Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title
registered in the name of Dizon. After Matti, Jr. photocopied the alleged original Owner's Duplicate
Certificate of Title and brought it to the Register of Deeds, he personally verified that it was the same
with the one filed with the Register of Deeds hence he agreed to purchase the property. A Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed and was duly notarized and Matti, Jr. then paid Dizon. Matti, Jr. then
personally went to Assessor's Office to update the real estate taxes and to get a new Tax Declaration
for the property only to be told that all of the documents in his possession were falsified. Matti, Jr. went
back to the Register of Deeds to have the Owner's Duplicate copy authenticated by the said office.
Thereafter, Matti, Jr. was told verbally that said title is fake.
In order to protect his rights and to avoid any fraudulent transfer of the said property to an innocent
third party, he caused the annotation of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim. Despite oral and written
demand, Dizon has not rectified her alleged wrongdoings by delivering the authentic Owner's Duplicate
Copy. Thus, Matti, Jr. asked that Dizon be ordered to: a) Deliver the Owner's Duplicate certificate to
him or if Dizon refuses to do so, that the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel the TCT and issue a
new one in Matti, Jr.'s favor; b) that physical possession of the property be surrendered to him; c) that
Dizon be ordered to pay. Dizon alleged that Matti, Jr. has no cause of action because she did not
encumber and/or transfer ownership of her property to him. Dizon also claimed that she did not execute
nor signed the Deed of Absolute Sale nor did she participate in the negotiation, preparation and
execution of it. She also stated that she does not know Matti, Jr. nor a certain Zenaida Acleto and
Basilica Estaris. RTC dismissed Matti, Jr.’s complaint but CA granted his appeal.
17
ISSUE #1: Whether Dizon’s instant Petition should be dismissed outright based on the
defective Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
HELD #1: No. The instant Petition reveals that it was the brother of Dizon (Wilfredo) and not Dizon
herself, who executed the Certification. According to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, and as
held by a catena of cases decided by the Court, it is the plaintiff or principal party who should execute
the certification of non-forum shopping under oath. However, this rule is not entirely inflexible. The
Court has held that if, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign the
certification, another person may be authorized to execute the certification on his or her behalf through
a Special Power of Attorney. Dizon claims that she, a senior citizen, was suffering from sickness while
in United Kingdom at around the time of the filing of the instant Petition, disabling her from traveling
to the Philippine Embassy to personally execute a certification of non-forum shopping. She presented
a Medical Certificate and a Statement of Fitness Work for Social Security or Statutory Sick Pay to show
that she was in poor medical condition, preventing her from personally executing the Certification. At
the time of the filing of the instant Petition, a Special Power of Attorney authorizing Wilfredo to execute
the Certification was not attached but Dizon was able to belatedly submit before the Court a Special
Power of Attorney fully signed by her and duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy in London. The
Court has held that the belated submission of an authorization for the execution of a certificate of nonforum shopping constitutes substantial compliance with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
The Rules of Civil Procedure should be applied with reason and liberality to promote its objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure
are used to help secure and not override substantial justice. The dismissal of an appeal on a purely
technical ground is frowned upon especially if it will result in unfairness.
ISSUE #2: Whether the CA erred in issuing its assailed Resolution insofar as it dismissed
outright Dizon’s Motion for Reconsideration due to the failure of her counsel to sign the
said pleading is concerned.
HELD #2: Yes. In the assailed Resolution, citing Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the CA held
that every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him and that an unsigned
pleading produces no legal effect. While the CA is correct in invoking the aforesaid Rule, the rest of
Section 3, Rule 7 elucidates that the court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied
if it shall appear that the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. In this case,
the Court accepts Dizon's explanation that the failure of her counsel to affix his signature in the Motion
for Reconsideration was due to an honest inadvertence without any intention to delay the proceedings.
The Court is not inclined to dismiss outright an appeal on a purely technical ground, especially if there
is some merit to the substantive issues raised by the petitioner. It is settled that liberal construction of
the rules may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error
in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and it at least
connotes a reasonable attempt at compliance with the rules.
18
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure> Summons> Rule 14
SUSAN A. YAP, Petitioner, v. ELIZABETH LAGTAPON, Respondent.
G.R. No. 196347, January 23, 2017
(First Division)
FACTS: Respondent Elizabeth Lagtapon filed a civil suit against Susan A. Yap for a sum of money.
Summons were issued by process server Ray Precioso to Yap who refused to acknowledge its receipt.
Lagtapon filed a motion to declare Yap in default which was granted. Lagtapon presented her evidence
ex-parte resulting to the court rendering judgment in her favor. The Provincial Sheriff issued a Notice
of Sale on execution on Yap’s property. Joey Dela Paz, who mortgaged the property, found out that
the annotated title of the said property is in a Notice of Embargo. Yap discovered that she was sued
by Lagtapon and a judgment by default against her had long been issued. Yap filed a Petition for
Annulment with the CA, assailing the RTC’s decision because the Summons was not validly served on
her, alleging when the Summons was served on the said address she already moved out of the same.
However, in the Return, the Summons showed that the same was served personally on Yap and that
she refused to sign the same, which prompted Precioso to leave a copy of the Summons with Yap. The
CA denied the Petition for Annulment and upheld the validity of the service of Summons on Yap ruling
that Yap's evidence failed to rebut the presumption of regularity.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC validly acquired jurisdiction over Yap’s person through service of
summons.
HELD: Yes. It is axiomatic that a public official enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge
of one's official duties and functions. In the absence of clear indicia of partiality or malice, the service
of Summons on Yap is deemed regular and valid. The Return of Service of constitutes prima facie
evidence of the facts set out therein. The Return of Service states that the summons was duly served
personally to Yap but she refused to sign the same. Moreover, Precioso subsequently executed an
Affidavit supplying the place of service, which, to the mind of this Court, constitutes substantial
compliance with the Rules. Based on the said documents, it would be impossible for the Court to
determine where Yap had her residence at the time Summons was served on her person. Following
Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., self-serving assertions made by an aggrieved party are insufficient to disregard
the statements made in the sheriff's certificate after service of Summons. The Court upholds the finding
of the CA in its questioned Decision that petitioner Yap’s evidence does not constitute a clear and
convincing evidence to overturn the presumption of regularity attendant to the Returns of Service.
Therefore, the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction over Yap's person, which renders the RTC Decision
valid.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure> Intervention (Rule 19)
REMEDIAL LAW> Provisional Remedies>Preliminary Attachment
SEVERINO A. YU, RAMON A. YU, AND LORENZO A. YU, Petitioners, v. DAVID MIRANDA,
MORNING STAR HOMES CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION - SAN JOSE BIÑAN - HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, INC., TIMMY RICHARD T. GABRIEL, AND LILIBETH GABRIEL,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 225752, March 27, 2019
FACTS: Morning Star sought to establish a housing project to be financed by the Home Development
Mutual Fund or Pag-IBIG through the Group Land Acquisition and Development (GLAD) Financing
Program. Miranda entered into a contract with Morning Star for the supply and financing of the
backfilling material for the latter's housing project. However, Morning Star defaulted on its obligation
to pay Miranda. Thereafter, Miranda filed on on March 8, 2012 a Complaint for a Sum of Money with
Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Attachment. Miranda prayed for the issuance of preliminary
attachment over 1.56 hectares of land registered under the name of Morning Star. On March 12, 2012,
the RTC granted Miranda’s prayer for preliminary attachment.
19
On April 29, 2013, Yu, et.al. filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene, claiming that they have legal
interest in the properties subject of the preliminary attachment. They claimed that Morning Star is a
mere nominal owner of the subject properties and that they were the real owners. On May 19, 2013,
the RTC granted Miranda's Complaint. The said Decision eventually became final and executory.
Thereafter, in an Order dated July 29, 2013, the RTC denied the petitioners Yu's Motion for Leave to
Intervene, stating that they are not the registered owners of the properties, and that their rights may
be protected in a separate proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether the denial of the Motion for Leave to Intervene was proper.
HELD: Yes. Foremost, the RTC's Decision dated May 19, 2013 is already final and executory. The case
where the Yu, et.al. seek to intervene in has already ceased. Jurisprudence has made it clear that
"intervention can no longer be allowed in a case already terminated by final judgment.”
Furthermore, The only purpose of Yu, et.al.’s attempt to intervene is to question the inclusion of the
subject properties in the coverage of the preliminary attachment imposed by the RTC. It is apparent
that the involvement of the Yu, et.al. in the instant case is incidental to the cause of action, i.e., recovery
of sum of money based on an obligation to pay. The issue on the ownership of the subject properties
and the propriety of their inclusion in the preliminary attachment is not determinative whatsoever as
to whether Miranda has a cause of action for recovery of money. In other words, Yu, et.al. are not
parties in interest without whom no final determination of the recovery of sum of money case can be
had — they are not indispensable parties. At most, the petitioners Yu may only be considered necessary
parties as they are not indispensable, but who ought to be joined as a party if complete relief is to be
accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject
of the action. The non-inclusion of necessary parties does not prevent the court from proceeding in the
action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such necessary
party.
In fact, under the Rules of Court, the filing of a motion for intervention was not even absolutely
necessary and indispensable for Yu, et.al. to question the inclusion of the subject properties in the
coverage of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment.
Under Rule 57, Section 14 of the Rules of Court, if the property attached is claimed by any third person,
and such person makes an affidavit of his title thereto, or right to the possession thereof, stating the
grounds of such right or title, and serves such affidavit upon the sheriff while the latter has possession
of the attached property, and a copy thereof upon the attaching party, the sheriff shall not be bound
to keep the property under attachment, unless the attaching party or his agent, on demand of the
sheriff, shall file a bond approved by the court to indemnify the third-party claimant in a sum not less
than the value of the property levied upon. No such affidavit was filed by the petitioners Yu.
Jurisprudence has held that a writ of preliminary attachment is only a provisional remedy issued upon
order of the court where an action is pending; it is an ancillary remedy. Attachment is only adjunct
to the main suit. Therefore, it can have no independent existence apart from a suit on a
claim of the plaintiff against the defendant. In other words, an attachment or garnishment is
generally ancillary to, and dependent on, a principal proceeding, either at law or in equity, which has
for its purpose a determination of the justice of a creditor's demand. Any relief against such
attachment could be disposed of only in that case.
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REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Intervention (Rule 19)
REMEDIAL LAW> Settlement of estate of deceased persons>Venue and process (Rule 73)
MARTIN ROBERTO G. TIROL, Petitioner, vs. SOL NOLASCO, Respondent
G.R. No. 230103, August 27, 2020
(First Division)
FACTS: On October 10, 1991, Gloria Tirol (Gloria) died testate. She was survived by her husband
Roberto Tirol, Sr. (Roberto Sr.) and their six children namely: Ruth, Cecilia, Marilou, Ciriaco, Anna and
Roberto Jr. On April 16, 1995, Roberto Jr. died intestate, and was survived by his four children from
his marriage with Cecilia Geronimo. At the time of his death, Roberto Jr.'s marriage with his wife had
been annulled. On January 8, 2002, Roberto Sr. died testate and was survived by his remaining children
Ruth, Cecilia, Marilou, Ciriaco and Anna and his four grandchildren from Roberto Jr.
On April 2, 2002, Martin, Cecilia and Ciriaco filed before RTC-218 a petition to probate the wills of Gloria
and Roberto Sr. On February 25, 2011, Sol Nolasco (Sol) filed a Motion for Intervention stating that
she has a legal interest in the estate of Gloria and Roberto Sr. because she is the surviving spouse of
Roberto Jr. having married him on July 15, 1994. RTC-218 denied said motion to intervene.
On March 15, 2011, Sol also filed a Motion for Intervention in the intestate settlement of Roberto Jr.'s
estate proceedings pending before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101 (RTC-101). This time, RTC-101
granted said motion to intervene. Zharina has been appointed as Administratrix in the intestate estate
of Roberto Jr.
ISSUE: Whether Sol’s Motion to Intervene in the probate proceedings of Gloria and Roberto
Sr.’s wills before RTC-218 should also be granted despite Sol’s claim that she is Roberto
Jr.’s surviving spouse is still disputed.
HELD: No. In the settlement of a deceased's estate, Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:
"The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." Given the exclusivity of jurisdiction granted to the court
first taking cognizance of the settlement of a decedent's estate, RTC-101 has the exclusive jurisdiction
over the intestate estate of Roberto Jr. while RTC-218 has exclusive jurisdiction over the testate estates
of Gloria and Roberto Sr. Thus, only RTC-101, the court where the settlement of Roberto Jr.'s estate
proceeding is pending, has jurisdiction to determine who the heirs of Roberto Jr. are.
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides when and to whom the residue of the decedent's
estate is distributed, and how a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent is resolved.
The court which has jurisdiction to hear and decide any controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of
Roberto Jr. or as to the distributive shares to which each is entitled under the law is undoubtedly RTC101 because it is the court which has first taken cognizance of the settlement of the intestate estate of
Roberto Jr. RTC-218, where the probate proceeding is pending, cannot rule on the issue of who are
the heirs of Roberto Jr. even if the share of Roberto Jr. in the estates of Gloria and Roberto Sr. is to be
determined therein. The probate court must yield to the determination by the Roberto Jr.'s estate
settlement court of the latter's heirs. This is to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a
decedent's estate by co-equal courts.
As to protection and preservation of the share of Roberto Jr.'s shares in the testate estates of Gloria
and Roberto Sr., the same is now the look out of the administrator of his estate, Zharina. Section 2,
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court provides: "For the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the
deceased, an executor or administrator may bring or defend, in the right of the deceased, actions for
causes which survive." Thus, the intervention of Sol in the probate proceeding will be superfluous
because she has an available remedy in the settlement of Roberto Jr.'s estate proceeding to question
any action of the administrator therein which is detrimental to the said estate.
Since intervention is not a matter of right but depends on the sound discretion of the court, Sol's
intervention in the probate proceeding is unnecessary because her right or interest in the estate of
21
Roberto Jr. can be fully protected in a separate proceeding — namely, the settlement of Roberto Jr.'s
estate proceeding pending before RTC-101. The second parameter to be considered in granting of
intervention under Section 1, Rule 19 — whether the intervenor's right may not be fully protected in a
separate proceeding — is wanting in the instant case.
Another reason in disallowing the intervention of Sol in the probate proceeding is the legal precept that
an independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit by intervention, viz.: x x x In general, an
independent controversy cannot be injected into a suit by intervention, hence, such intervention will
not be allowed where it would enlarge the issues in the action and expand the scope of the remedies.
It is not proper where there are certain facts giving the intervenor's case an aspect peculiar to himself
and differentiating it clearly from that of the original parties; the proper course is for the would-be
intervenor to litigate his claim in a separate suit. Intervention is not intended to change the nature and
character of the action itself, or to stop or delay the placid operation of the machinery of the trial. The
remedy of intervention is not proper where it will have the effect of retarding the principal suit or
delaying the trial of the action. The issue as to whether Sol is a lawful heir of Roberto Jr. will definitely
enlarge the issues in the probate proceeding and involve determination of facts peculiar only to her,
which have nothing to do with the original parties. The other heirs of Gloria and Roberto Sr. are not
interested in who are the lawful heirs of Roberto Jr. The respective shares of such other heirs in the
estates of Gloria and Roberto Sr. will in no way be affected by who are declared as the lawful heirs of
Roberto Jr. in the proceeding for the settlement of his estate.
With this extraneous issue being injected into the probate proceeding, the first parameter that has to
be considered whether to allow an intervention under Section 1, Rule 19 — no undue delay or prejudice
in the adjudication of the rights of the original parties — is not met. Thus, the intervention of Sol in the
probate proceeding should be denied.
REMEDIAL LAW> Civil Procedure> Motion for Reconsideration (Rule 37)
REMEDIAL LAW> Civil Procedure> Execution, Satisfaction, and Effect of Judgments (Rule
39)
VALENCIA (BUKIDNON) FARMERS COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC.,
REPRESENTED BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF FARMERS COOPERATIVE MARKETING
ASSOCIATION (FACOMA) AS TRUSTEES, Petitioner v. HEIRS OF AMANTE P. CABOTAJE,
Respondents
G.R. No. 219984, April 03, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: FACOMA represented by its Directors instituted an action for quieting of title and recovery of
ownership and possession of parcel of land, and damages against the heirs of Cabotaje and Estrada.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ordered the Annulment and Cancellation of the Deed of Sale executed
by Estrada in favor of Cabotaje and all the Transfer Certificates of Titles issued. Aggrieved, the Heirs
of Cabotaje filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied.
Subsequently, the Heirs of Cabotaje filed a Notice of Appeal. Incidentally, FACOMA filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Notice of Appeal averring that the Motion for Reconsideration earlier filed by the Heirs of
Cabotaje did not toll the running of the reglementary period to appeal for the reason that the Motion
was but pro forma and raised no new issue. The RTC denied the Notice of Appeal for being filed out of
time.
The Heirs of Cabotaje filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
During the pendency of the Certiorari Petition, FACOMA filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment, which
was initially denied by the RTC but was subsequently granted after FACOMA’s filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration. The CA granted the Certiorari Petition filed by the Heirs of Cabotaje. Moreover, the
CA found that the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Heirs of Cabotaje is not a pro forma motion.
22
ISSUE #1: Whether respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration was a pro forma motion.
HELD #1: No. The Court has decided in a catena of cases that the mere reiteration in a motion for
reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed upon by the court does not make a
motion pro forma. In Department of Agrarian Reform v. Uy, citing Security Bank and Trust Company,
Inc. v. Cuenca, a motion for reconsideration is not pro forma just because it reiterated the arguments
earlier passed upon and rejected by the appellate court. A movant may raise the same arguments
precisely to convince the court that its ruling was erroneous.
Hence, the Heirs of Cabotaje's Motion for Reconsideration on the RTC's Decision is not a pro forma
motion that prevented the tolling of the reglementary period to file an appeal.
ISSUE #2: Whether the Certiorari Petition is already moot and academic considering that
the RTC had granted the Motion for Execution of Judgment filed by FACOMA during the
pendency of the Certiorari Petition.
HELD#2: No. The alleged execution of the RTC judgment cannot be considered as a supervening
event that would automatically moot the issues in this petition. Rule 39, Section 5 of the Rules of Court
states that where the executed judgment is reversed totally or partially, or annulled, on appeal or
otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution or reparation of damages as
equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances.
In the eventuality that the appeal of the Heirs of Cabotaje will prosper, contrary to the mistaken view
of FACOMA, the RTC may still order the restitution or reparation of damages in favor of the Heirs of
Cabotaje. Hence, the argument raised by FACOMA is erroneous; the appeal filed by the Heirs of
Cabotaje would not be a futile and purely hypothetical exercise that has no practical use or value.
REMEDIAL LAW> CIVIL PROCEDURE> Motion for Reconsideration
LABOR LAW>Termination of Employment>Termination by employer> Illegal Dismissal
ALBERT B. DEL ROSARIO, et. al., Petitioners, vs. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING
CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 202481, September 08, 2020
(En Banc)
FACTS: This case involves eight consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court. ABS-CBN is a domestic corporation that owns a wide network of television and
radio stations. It was granted a franchise to operate as a broadcasting company. This franchise,
however, expired. ABS-CBN adopted a system known as the Internal Job Market (IJM) System, a
database which provided the user with a list of accredited technical or creative manpower and/or talents
who offered their services for a fee. The persons included are considered as independent contractors
and were paid hourly.
All workers were then asked to sign a contract that would place them under the IJM Work Pool, which
deprived them of particular pays and benefits. Aggrieved, the workers formed the ABS-CBN IJM
Workers’ Union and demanded recognition as regular employees. Additionally, in a memorandum, ABSCBN reclassified the status of its regular employees to mere talents or contractual employees. Fearful
of losing their jobs, the workers signed the said contract. Furthermore, ABS-CBN required the workers
in ABS-CBN Corporation v. Payonan, et. al. to sign an employment contract, which stated that they
were "freelance employees." Those who refused to sign were deprived of their benefits. This prompted
the workers to file a complaint for regularization and claim benefits due to regular employees. The
workers refused to comply so ABS-CBN effected a series of mass dismissals on various dates. No notice
of termination was given to the workers and were forthwith barred from entering the company
premises. From these series of summary dismissals sprung numerous complaints filed before the LA.
Over a span of almost eight years, various rulings have been rendered by the LA, the NLRC, and the
CA involving these instant petitions.
23
ISSUE #1: Whether the petitions should be dismissed on procedural grounds due to the
failure of the workers to file a motion for reconsideration.
HELD #1: No. As a general rule, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition
for filing a special civil action for certiorari. However, this rule is not iron-clad, and is subject to wellknown exceptions. [1.] Where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
[2.] Where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; [3.] Where
there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice
the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
[4.] Where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; [5.] Where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; [6.] Where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; [7.] Where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; [8.]
Where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and [9.]
Where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. The second exception
applies here. Considering that the very livelihood of the workers is hanging by a thread, the ends of
justice will be better served by ruling on the merits of the case, rather than summarily dismissing the
petition on account of a procedural flaw.
ISSUE #2: Whether the workers are regular employees of ABS-CBN.
HELD #2: Yes. In ascertaining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the Court has
invariably adhered to the four-fold test, which pertains to: (i) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (ii) the payment of wages; (iii) the power of dismissal; and (iv) the power of control over
the employee's conduct, or the so-called "control test."
Time and again, it has been ruled that the test to determine whether employment is regular or not is
the reasonable connection between the activity performed by the employee in relation to the business
or trade of the employer. As cameramen/editors and reporters, petitioners were undoubtedly
performing functions necessary and essential to ABS-CBN's business of broadcasting television and
radio content. In the same vein, the workers received their salaries from ABS-CBN twice a month, as
proven through the pay slips bearing the latter's corporate name. Their rate of wages was determined
solely by ABS-CBN. ABS-CBN likewise withheld taxes and granted the workers PhilHealth benefits.
These clearly show that the workers were salaried personnel of ABS-CBN, not independent contractors.
Likewise, ABS-CBN wielded the power to discipline, and correspondingly dismiss, any errant employee.
The workers were continuously under the watch of ABS-CBN and were required to strictly follow
company rules and regulations in and out of the company premises.
Finally, consistent with the most important test in determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, ABS-CBN wielded the power to control the means and methods in the performance of the
employees' work. The workers were subject to the constant watch and scrutiny of ABS-CBN, through
its production supervisors who strictly monitored their work and ensured that their end results are
acceptable and in accordance with the standards set by the company. Likewise, ABS-CBN controlled
their schedule and work assignments (and re-assignments). Furthermore, the workers did not have
their own equipment to perform their work. ABS-CBN provided them with the needed tools and
implements to accomplish their jobs.
ISSUE #3: Whether the “Talent Contract and/or Project Assignment Form” was valid.
HELD #3: No. The fact that the workers signed a "Talent Contract and/or Project Assignment Form"
does not ipso facto make them talents. It is settled that a talent contract does not necessarily
prevent an employee from acquiring a regular employment status . The nature of the
employment does not depend on the will or word of the employer or on the procedure for hiring and
the manner of designating the employee, but on the activities performed by the employee in relation
to the employer's business. Besides, it must be remembered that labor contracts are subject to the
police power of the State and are placed on a higher plane than ordinary contracts. This means that
24
the Court shall not hesitate to strike down any contract that is designed to circumvent an employee's
tenurial security. Accordingly, ABS-CBN's Talent Contract, which deprives the workers of regular
employment, cannot stand.
ISSUE #4: Whether the workers in the cases were illegally dismissed by ABS-CBN and are
entitled to backwages and other benefits.
HELD #4: Yes. As regular employees the employer shall not dismiss them except for a just or
authorized cause provided in the Labor Code. The facts show that ABS-CBN failed to prove the existence
of just or authorized causes for terminating the services of the workers, save for its claim that they are
talents. Without any notice or warning, the workers were simply barred from entering the company
premises. Hence, the dismissed workers are entitled to the twin reliefs of reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights, and payment of backwages computed from the time their compensation was withheld
up to the date of their actual reinstatement.
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure>Execution, satisfaction, and effect of judgments (Rule
39)
OLANDO SOLIVA, Complainant, v. REYNALDO TALEON, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 10, DIPOLOG CITY, ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, Respondent.
A.M. No. P-16-3511 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 14-4346-P), September 06, 2017
(Second Division)
FACTS: Soliva was one of the defendants in a Civil Case for forcible entry and damages before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The MCTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Soliva filed a petition for
annulment of judgment and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction. Soliva alleged that, while
the said urgent motion was pending, Sheriff Taleon issued notices of garnishment to several banks in
Dipolog City. Soliva argued that Sheriff Taleon should have first made a demand on the judgment
obligors before resorting to garnishment and/or levy. Further, he alleged that Sheriff Taleon filed an ex
parte request/manifestation to put Soliva’s properties under levy on execution. The Sheriff also caused
the publication of a Notice of Sale on Levy on Execution. Soliva also alleged that the MCTC directed
Sheriff Taleon to follow the procedure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court by first making a demand
on the defendants to vacate the subject land and to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiffs.
However, instead of complying with the court’s directive, Sheriff Taleon proceeded with the levy.
ISSUE: Whether Sheriff Taleon’s levy on execution was proper.
HELD: No. Sheriff Taleon disregarded the procedure for execution. Pursuant to Section 10(c) of Rule
39 of the Rules of Court, in enforcing the writ of execution in ejection cases, the sheriff shall give notice
thereof and demand the defendant to vacate the property in three (3) days. Moreover, in the execution
of a judgment for money, the sheriff must make a demand first on the judgment obligor, before
resorting to garnishment and/or levy. As found by the OCA, while Sheriff Taleon argued that he first
made a demand on the defendants, such claim is not supported by a Sheriff’s Return.
25
REMEDIAL LAW > Civil Procedure > Execution, Satisfaction, and Effect of Judgments
(Rule 39)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner, v. ROGUZA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 199705, April 03, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: RDC was awarded the construction of a 2.10[-] kilometer diversion road by DPWH. However,
the project was suspended due to DPWH's failure to secure the required Environmental Clearance
Certificate (ECC) and to settle the attendant right of way (ROW) problems. The suspension lasted for
almost 32 months. Upon completion of the project, DC made its claim upon DPWH for the idle time of
equipment and other expenses incurred due to the suspension of work on the project in the amount
of P93,782,093.64.
DPWH’s Ad Hoc Committee recommended payment of RDC's claim but only in the reduced amount of
P26,142,577.09 and subject to the condition that RDC should waive or no longer claim the balance of
its claim including damages. Prompted by DPWH's repeated refusal to heed its demand for additional
compensation, RDC filed a Complaint against the DPWH before the CIAC to which the latter ruled in
favor of RDC.
DPWH filed with the CA a petition for review (DPWH's CA Petition) under Rule 43 seeking the reversal
of the Arbitral Award. Meanwhile, RDC filed two Motion for Reconsideration with CIAC but both
Motions were denied. Aggrieved, RDC filed a petition for review before the CA via Rule 43 (RDC's CA
Petition). Notably, RDC's CA Petition proceeded independently of DPWH's CA Petition, which had
already been pending with another division of the same court. The CA 7th Division granted DPWH's
CA Petition. However, months later, the CA Special 17th Division also granted RDC's CA Petition.
ISSUE: Whether res judicata applies.
HELD: Yes. Res judicata is commonly understood as a bar to the prosecution of a second action
upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. The principle of res judicata precludes the relitigation of a conclusively settled fact or question in any future or other action between the same
parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of concurrent
jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action.
For the principle to apply: (i) the issue or fact sought to be precluded must be identical to the issue
or fact actually determined in a former suit; (ii) the party to be precluded must be party to or was in
privity with a party to the former proceeding; (iii) there was final judgment on the merits in the
former proceedings; and (iv) in compliance with the basic tenet of due process, that the party against
whom the principle is asserted must have had full and fair opportunity to litigate issues in the prior
proceedings.
All the foregoing requisites are present. As between CA-G.R. SP No. 104920 (DPWH's CA Petition)
and CA-G.R. SP No. 107412 (RDC's CA Petition) which has given rise to the present case, there is an
identity of facts, issues and parties. There is likewise no allegation on the part of RDC that it had
been deprived of a fair and full opportunity to litigate the issues in CA-G.R. SP No. 104920.
The Decision rendered by the CA 7th Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 104920 (DPWH's CA Petition) had
become final on July 30, 2011. Thus, it could not have been disturbed, let alone reversed, by a coequal division of the same court.
26
REMEDIAL LAW> Civil Procedure> Execution, satisfaction, and effect of judgments (Rule
39, Section 47 on Res Judicata)
EUFEMIA ABAD AND SPS. FLORDELIZA ABAD-CEZAR AND POLLIE CEZAR* WHO ARE
HEIRS OF ENRIQUE ABAD, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF JOSE EUSEBIO ABAD GALLARDO
NAMELY: DOLORES LOLITA J. GALLARDO, JOCELYN A. GALLARDO, JUDITH A. GALLARDO
AND JONAH GALLARDO, ALL REPRESENTED BY DOLORES LOLITA J. GALLARDO AND
JONAH GALLARDO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 229070, November 10, 2020
(First Division)
FACTS: The case involves a parcel of land, Lot 5826-B (subject lot) covered by Original Certificate
of Title No. (OCT) P-2769 registered in the names of Sps. Miguel and Agueda. Subsequently, OCT P2769 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. (TCT) T-131684 was issued in the name of
Enrique Abad (Enrique).
In their complaint for specific performance, surrender of title, redemption and consignation with
damages, the Heirs of Jose Eusebio averred that upon the death of Sps. Miguel and Agueda, the land
covered by OCT P-2769 was inherited by their three children Dionisio, Isabel and Enrique. They all
took possession of the land as co-owners.
Previously, the land became the subject of Civil Case No. 0591 filed before the RTC Branch 21
entitled Dionisio Abad and Isabel Abad v. Enrique Abad for annulment of deed and TCT T-131684
with damages. Said case was dismissed on the Manifestation of Dionisio and Isabel that a compromise
agreement had been forged between them and Enrique. A deed of partition was notarized and
executed whereby said land was divided. Isabel died leaving Lot 5826-B to his son Jose Eusebio,
married to Dolores Lolita. Later, Dolores Lolita, then widowed, obtained a P75,000.00 loan from
Eufemia Abad, which was secured by Lot 5826-B or the subject lot.
Upon demand, Eufemia refused to give the title of the subject lot unless the loan was paid. Eufemia
also refused to receive the payment of the loan and demanded instead P350,000.00, and would
return only one-fourth of the subject lot.
Respondents in the complaint filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The RTC found that
judgment on the pleadings was proper and res judicata attached in the present case in view of the
proceedings in the earlier Civil Case No. 0591, which the RTC took judicial notice of.
ISSUE: Whether res judicata has already attached in the present case.
HELD: No. Res judicata did not attach as there was no judgment on the merits in Civil Case No. 0591.
In Bardillon v. Barangay Masili of Calamba, Laguna, the Court observed: “The following are the
requisites of res judicata: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) the court that rendered it had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is
— between the first and the second actions — an identity of parties, subject matter and cause of
action.”
The Manifestation filed submitting an amicable settlement was not attached to the Manifestation and
no such amicable settlement was ever submitted. Since no compromise agreement was filed with the
RTC Branch 21 and formed part of the records of the prior case, there was no compromise agreement
that was ever judicially approved and no judgment thereon was entered in the prior case. Thus, there
was no judgment on the merits in the prior case. Without a judgment on the merits in the prior case,
the rule of res judicata was incorrectly applied by the RTC in this case.
Besides, there is also no identity of causes of action in the prior case and in the present case. While
the prior case concerned the ownership of the subject lot, the present case does not only involve said
cause of action, but also possession and consignation.
27
REMEDIAL LAW>Civil Procedure> Execution, satisfaction, and effect of judgments (Rule
39)
JEBSENS MARITIME, INC., SEA CHEFS CRUISES LTD./EFFEL T. SANTILLAN, Petitioners,
vs. LORDELITO B. GUTIERREZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 244098. March 3, 2021
(First Division)
FACTS: Lordelito B. Gutierrez (respondent) was hired as Third Cook for the vessel MV Mein Schiff I by
Jebsens Maritime, Inc. for its foreign principal, Sea Chefs Cruises Ltd. (collectively, petitioners). On
June 19, 2014, while on board, respondent experienced severe pain on the right paralumbar area,
accompanied by paresthesia on the lower right extremity, and difficulty in movement. He consulted
with the ship doctor and underwent MRI scan of the lumbosacral spine. Thereafter, respondent was
diagnosed with Disc Prolapse L4-L5 and medically repatriated on July 2, 2014. Two days after, he was
examined by the company-designated physician at Shiphealth, Inc. and was diagnosed with L4-L5
Herniated Nucleos Pulposus and was recommended to undergo physical therapy. He was given his Final
Medical Report which diagnosed that his condition had become asymptomatic and declared that he was
"FIT TO WORK FOR THE CONDITION REFERRED, CASE CLOSURE."
After receiving the fit to work diagnosis, respondent applied for re-engagement, but his application was
denied by petitioners because he failed the pre-employment medical examination (PEME). The
examining physician during the PEME declared that there was a '"high probability of recurrence' of
respondent's previous illness." He underwent an x-ray of the lumbar spine which showed a mild
dextroscoliosis of the lumbar vertebrae. Thus, respondent filed a complaint before the LA for
continuation of medical treatment, underpayment of sick leave pay, payment of sickness allowance,
and attorney's fees (First Case). LA Napiza dismissed the First Case due to the absence of contrary
medical findings from respondent's personally appointed physician to refute the fit to work diagnosis
of the company-designated physician. On July 3, 2015, respondent filed a second complaint, this time
for total permanent disability benefits, medical expenses, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees (Second Case). Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res judicata, arguing that
the dismissal of the First Case barred respondent from claiming total and permanent disability benefits
in the Second Case. The CA overturned the findings of the NLRC, holding that the Second Case was
not barred by the First Case as they had different causes of action, issues, and reliefs sought
ISSUE: Whether res judicata is applicable.
HELD: No. The literal interpretation of res judicata is "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon
or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." It is anchored on the principle that parties should
not be allowed to re-litigate the same issue in multiple suits. Once a right or fact has been tried and
established or an opportunity for trial has been provided to the parties, the final judgment of the court
shall be conclusive as between the parties and their privies.
There are two concepts of res judicata, (1) bar by prior judgment, and (2) conclusiveness of judgment.
Res judicata as a bar by prior judgment applies when the following requisites are present:
1. The prior decision must be a final judgment or order;
2. The court rendering the same must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and over parties;
3. There must be identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the two cases; and
4. It must be a judgment or order on the merits.
The CA correctly ruled that the Second Case is not barred by res judicata as the third element is lacking;
the two cases are based on different causes of action. The present case is a claim for total and
permanent disability benefits while the First Case was a claim for continuation of medical treatment,
payment of sickness allowance, and underpayment of sick leave pay.
28
REMEDIAL LAW > Provisional Remedies > Preliminary Injunction (Rule 58)
AMA LAND, INC., Petitioner
vs. WACK WACK RESIDENTS' ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent
G.R. No. 202342, July 19, 2017
(First Division)
FACTS: In mid-1990s, Ama Land, Inc. (AMALI), proposed a commercial and residential building project
located at EDSA corner Fordham Street in Wack Wack Village, Mandaluyong City. In 1996, AMALI
notified Wack Wack Residents' Association, Inc. (WWRAI), of its intention to use Fordham Street as an
access road and staging area of the project. As AMALI received no response from WWRAI, the former
temporarily enclosed the job site and set up a field office along Fordham Street. AMALI then filed a
petition before the RTC, wherein it sought the temporary use of Fordham Street belonging to WWRAI
as an access road to AMALI's construction site of its AMA Tower project pursuant to Article 656 of the
Civil Code, and to establish a permanent easement of right of way in its favor over a portion of Fordham
Street pursuant to Article 649 of the Civil Code. The RTC granted the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction directing WWRAI to allow AMALI to use Fordham Street through a temporary easement of
right of way.
In 1998, due to financial crisis, the construction of the project was put on hold. In 2002, AMALI filed a
petition for corporate rehabilitation which was later on approved. As AMALI resumed the project,
WWRAI filed in January 2010 an "Urgent Motion to Set for Hearing" its application for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC ruled against the motion. A motion for
reconsideration was filed but was denied, hence, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA
was filed. Subsequently, after a clarificatory hearing, the CA granted WWRAI's application for a
temporary restraining order, and, accordingly, AMALI was commanded to cease and desist from further
committing the act complained of, which is the construction of the commercial and residential
condominium project located along EDSA comer Fordham Street in Wack Wack Village. Then, the
application of WWRAI for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was granted as well pending
resolution of the petition for certiorari before the CA.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction by the CA in favor of WWRAI
was proper.
HELD: No. A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which is adjunct to a main suit, as
well as a preservative remedy issued to maintain the status quo of the things subject of the action or
the relations between the parties during the pendency of the suit. The purpose of injunction is to
prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to the parties before their claims can be
thoroughly studied and educated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case
are fully heard.
To be entitled to the injunctive writ, the petitioner must show that: (1) there exists a clear and
unmistakable right to be protected; (2) this right is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined;
(3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and (4) there is an urgent and paramount
necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.
WWRAI's allegation that its members' right to live in a peaceful, quiet and safe environment will be
violated in the event that the condominium project of AMALI will be erected is untenable. The alleged
noise and dust that may be caused by the construction is the natural consequence thereof. However,
this annoyance that may be brought by the construction is not permanent in nature but is merely
temporary and once the building is completed, said members' right to live in a peaceful, quiet and safe
environment will be restored without noise and dust. As to the allegations that said members' privacy
may be invaded for the reason that they may be photographed or videotaped without their knowledge,
these fears are merely speculative and cannot be taken into consideration.
29
Indeed, WWRAI was unable to convincingly demonstrate a clear and unmistakable right that must be
protected by the injunctive writ. The apprehensions of its members are speculative and insufficient to
substantiate the element of serious and irreparable damage.
REMEDIAL LAW > Provisional Remedies > Preliminary Injunction (Rule 58)
SM INVESTMENTS CORPORATION, et al, Petitioners vs. MAC GRAPHICS CARRANZ
INTERNATIONAL, Respondent
G.R. Nos. 224131-32 & G.R. Nos. 224337-38, June 25, 2018
(Second Division)
FACTS: This case involves a 20-year period Lease Contract between Mac Graphics and Makro for
exclusive use of the latter’s billboard sites located in Cubao and Makati City, commencing on 15 January
2007. In the Lease Contract, Mac Graphics was obliged to secure necessary permits and licenses for
the use of the billboard, and Macro has the right to pre-terminate the contract immediately in case of
failure to do so. It also provides for a 90-day notice before terminating the contract in case of noncompliance with any of its obligations. On 06 October 2008, Makro sent a letter to Mac Graphics
terminating the lease contract effective immediately for failure to obtain permit from MMDA.
Subsequently, Makro and its majority stockholder, SMIC, removed Mac Graphic’s billboards in order to
convert Makro outlets to SM Hypermart outlets. This led Mac Graphics to file a complaint for Permanent
Injunction with the RTC, with application for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The RTC
granted the application on the ground that the lease contract was pre-terminated by Makro without
giving Mac Graphics the chance to remedy any alleged violation thereof within the 90-day remedy
period; as such, it has resulted to loss of profit and goodwill on the part of Mac Graphics. The CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC; hence, Makro and SMIC filed a petiton before the SC contending that
Mac Graphics has no right in esse that warranted issuance of a WPMI.
ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in affirming the RTC’s grant of a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction against Makro and SMIC.
HELD: No.
Definition of Preliminary Injunction:
As defined by Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary injunction is an order granted at
any stage of an action or proceeding prior to judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court,
agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts or require the performance of a particular
act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.
Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction:
(a) the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in
restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;
(b) the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or
(c) a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting
the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual
Requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction:
(1) there exists a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
(2) this right is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined;
(3) the invasion of the right is material and substantial; and
30
(4) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious and irreparable damage.
Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is justified only in a clear case,
free from doubt or dispute. When the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed, he does not have a
clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is improper.
Irreparable Damage as a requirement:
With regard to the injury or damages, a writ of preliminary injunction should be issued only to prevent
grave and irreparable injury. The injury must be actual, substantial, and demonstrable. Damages are
irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of injunction where there is no
standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. "An irreparable
injury which a court of equity will enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing
kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only by
conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement." An irreparable injury to
authorize an injunction consists of a serious charge of, or is destructive to, the property it affects, either
physically or in the character in which it has been held and enjoined, or when the property has some
peculiar quality or use, so that its pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the owner of the
loss thereof.
Application in this case:
Mac Graphics failed to comply with the requisites for issuance of a preliminary injunction.
First, the damages suffered by Mac Graphics is not irreparable because the loss of profit is easily subject
to mathematical computation and, if proven, is fully compensable by damages. Thus, a preliminary
injunction is not warranted
Second, Mac Graphics has no clear and unmistakably right. Mac Graphics admits its non-compliance
with the licenses/permits and insurance stipulations in the lease contract, but invokes the 90-day
"remedy period." The petitioner argue that the outright pre-termination of the lease contract is justified
because Mac Graphics failed to obtain the stipulated licenses/permits and insurance on the
commencement date of the lease contract. Also, the insurance obtained was not compliant and
obtained beyond the 90-day "remedy period." In this case, the Petitioner has presented a substantial
challenge against or contradiction of Mac Graphic's position. A genuine doubt, which is more legal than
factual. Being more of a legal than factual determination, the lower courts should have been more
circumspect before making an "initial" resolution thereof. When the complainant's right is doubtful or
disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction is improper. While it is not required that the right claimed by applicant, as basis
for seeking injunctive relief, be conclusively established, it is still necessary to show, at least tentatively,
that the right exists and is not vitiated by any substantial challenge or contradiction.
31
REMEDIAL LAW>Provisional Remedies> Preliminary injunction (Rule 58)
PHILIPPINE INVESTMENT TWO (SPV-AMC), INCORPORATED, Complainant, vs. HON.
BERNABE B. MENDOZA, Presiding Judge, Branch 23, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Roxas,
Isabela, Respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-18-2538, November 21, 2018
(Second Division)
FACTS: PI TWO, a corporation which operates as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), is empowered to
acquire or purchase assets from banking and financial institutions. One of the properties it acquired
from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-374946 (Subject Property).
The Heirs of Wilson Nuesca filed a complaint for quieting of title alleging that the subject property
belonged to their father and the sale of the latter to Samonte, who then used the said property as
collateral for the loan she obtained from DBP, was null and void for lack of consideration and for being
prohibited by law.
Judge Mendoza issued an order directing the issuance of a 72-hour TRO, upon the posting of a bond
by the Heirs of Nuesa. On September 20, 2017, Judge Mendoza issued the disputed Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and was received by the sheriff. On September 25, 2017, Judge Mendoza
issued an Order extending the validity of the TRO until October 12, 2017. PI TWO filed an Ex Abundanti
Ad Cautelam Manifestation raising its objections to the said Orders issuing the TRO and extending its
validity. According to PI TWO, it never received the summons for the Quieting of Title Case thus, the
Court did not have jurisdiction over them. Subsequently, PI TWO filed the instant administrative
complaint for Gross Ignorance of the Law and Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment, assailing the
judiciousness of the following orders issued by Judge Mendoza: September 20, 2017 TRO and
September 25, 2017 Order extending the TRO up to October 12, 2017.
Judge Mendoza averred that he immediately issued the 72-hour TRO because he honestly believed that
there appeared an extreme urgency and that the Heirs of Nuesa would suffer grave injustice and
irreparable injury since they were the present possessors of the property subject of the writ of
possession. Furthermore, he insisted that sufficient evidence was established for the extension of the
life of the TRO up to October 12, 2017, twenty (20) days from September 22, 2017, the day the sheriff
received the 72-hour TRO dated September 20, 2018.
ISSUE: Whether the extension of the TRO was proper.
HELD: No. A temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte "to preserve the status quo until the
hearing of the application for preliminary injunction, which cannot be issued ex parte." Otherwise
stated, a trial court may issue a temporary restraining order even without a prior hearing for a limited
period of 72 hours "if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and
irreparable injury." In this instance, a summary hearing, separate from the application of the
preliminary injunction, is required only to determine if a 72-hour TRO should be extended.
A trial court may also issue ex parte a TRO for 20 days "if it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits
or by the verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the
matter can be heard on notice." The trial court has twenty (20) days from its issuance to resolve the
application for preliminary injunction. If no action is taken on the application for preliminary injunction
during this period, the temporary restraining order is deemed to have expired.
In this case, Judge Mendoza's failure to serve the summons on PI TWO after the issuance of the assailed
72-hour TRO cannot be cured by his claim that it was received by the sheriff, the person enjoined from
implementing the writ of possession. Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules, as bolstered by Administrative
Circular No. 20-95, is explicit that the adverse party should be immediately served with the summons
and a copy of the complaint.
32
Furthermore, the supposed extreme urgency of the issuance of the 72-hour TRO was belied by Judge
Mendoza's setting of summary hearing for the extension of the same, five (5) days after the issuance
thereof. Section 5, Rule 58 clearly states that such summary hearing must be conducted within the 72hour period. Instead, Judge Mendoza set the hearing on September 25, 2017, two (2) days beyond the
effectivity of the 72-hour TRO.
To make matters worse, Judge Mendoza extended the 72-hour TRO, which had already expired, into a
full 20-day TRO. An already expired TRO can no longer be extended. The TRO was issued on September
20, 2017. Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules clearly provides that "in no case shall the total period of
effectivity of the TRO exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours provided." The
effectivity of the 72-hour TRO issued by Judge Mendoza on September 20, 2017 therefore could only
be extended until October 10, 2017, twenty (20) days after its issuance. Thus, Judge erroneously
extended the effectivity of the 72-hour TRO until October 12, 2017, two (2) days beyond the period of
effectivity of a TRO explicitly provided by the Rules.
REMEDIAL LAW> Special Civil Actions> Interpleader (Rule 62)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner, v. HEIRS OF ELIGIO CRUZ, REPRESENTED BY
CRISANTA OLIQUINO, AND HEIRS OF ELIGIO CRUZ, REPRESENTED BY MAXIMINO
AGALABIA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 208956, October 17, 2018
(Second Division)
FACTS: In 1977, DPWH conducted the widening of Visayas Ave., Quezon City. The construction
encroached upon Lot 643, the disputed portion. This portion was subdivided, and thereafter registered
in the name of the Republic without payment of just compensation. Subsequently, Crisanta Oliquino
filed with the DPWH a claim for payment of the just compensation for and on behalf of the heirs of
Eligio Cruz. The Republic released the partial payment of P39,533,239.12 out of the expected amount
of P71,355,000 in Crisanta’s favor. Confronted with conflicting claims of ownership over Lot 643, the
Republic withheld further payments and demanded the claimants to settle their opposing claims. Since
the claimants failed to do so, the Republic was constrained to file an Interpleader, impleading as
defendants the following claimants: (1) Oliquino Group, (2) Agalabia Group; (3) Estate of V. Uichanco;
and (4) Atty. Borja. Subsequently, the De Leon Group filed a Motion for Intervention, also claiming just
compensation as heirs of Eligio Cruz which was granted by the RTC.
The Oliquino group presented before the RTC a Compromise Agreement which allocated the remaining
balance of just compensation corresponding to the disputed portion for approval. The approval of the
agreement was opposed by the De Leon group and Atty. Borja. Notwithstanding such opposition, the
RTC issued a Partial Judgment Based on Compromise Agreement. Consequently, a Writ of Execution
and Order of Delivery of Money were issued. Aggrieved, the Republic filed before the CA a Petition for
Certiorari which averred that the orders directing the execution of the partial judgment are premature
and were issued without legal basis since the same did not adjudicate nor settle the conflicting
adversarial claims of the other impleaded defendants who are not parties to the Compromise
Agreement, namely, Atty. Borja and De Leon Group. CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. CA
held that since the Partial Judgment had attained finality, it may neither be amended nor corrected.
According to the CA, it is immaterial that the issue raised in the Interpleader has yet to be resolved, as
this does not derogate the judgment’s susceptibility to execution.
ISSUE: Whether the Compromise Agreement may be immediately executed despite not all
impleaded defendants are parties thereto.
HELD: No. Art. 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise as a “contract whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced.” A
compromise intended to resolve a matter under litigation is referred to as a judicial compromise. It has
the effect and authority of res judicata, although no execution may issue until it would have received
33
the corresponding approval of the court where the litigation pends and its compliance with the terms
of the agreement is thereupon decreed. In the instant case, the Compromise Agreement divides the
Republic's entire remaining balance between and among the defendants, in accordance with the terms
agreed upon by the Oliquino and Agalabia groups. The allocation of the remaining balance was
determined without the participation of all other claimants who likewise stand as parties to the
Interpleader. Clearly, the immediate execution of the Partial Judgment approving the Compromise
Agreement facilitates the premature distribution of the Republic's remaining balance without affording
the De Leon group and Atty. Borja of the opportunity to establish their entitlement, if any, to
compensation beyond the amounts unilaterally set by the Oliquino and Agalabia groups. This defeats
the very purpose for which the Republic's Interpleader had been filed, as it opens the portals to
protracted litigation not only among the opposing claimants, but also between said claimants and the
Republic.
REMEDIAL LAW > SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION > Certiorari
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
HONORIO E. GUANLAO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Makati City, Branch 56, TRAYELLER KIDS INC., CELY L. GABALDON-CO and JEANNIE L.
LUGMOC, Respondents
G.R. No. 218901, February 15, 2017
(First Division)
FACTS: PBCOM filed for collection of a sum of money in the amount of P8,971,118.06 against Trayeller
Kids, Inc., Gabaldon-Co, and Lugmoc. The private respondents moved for the dismissal of the Complaint
alleging that their obligation had already been paid in full and that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
case because PBCOM failed to pay the correct docket fees. PBCOM paid the additional docket fees but
filed its Compliance a month later. RTC issued an Order dismissing PBCOM’s complaint. PBCOM filed a
Motion for Reconsideration stating that it had paid the additional docket fees within the period
prescribed by the court as evidenced by the Official Receipt but again dismissed by RTC. PBCOM filed
a Notice of Appeal but the RTC denied it on the ground that said appeal is not the proper remedy.
PBCOM then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with the CA. CA then denied the petition and
reasoned that, apart from availing itself of a wrong mode of appeal, PBCOM failed to comply with the
mandatory requirement of a motion for reconsideration. The CA emphasized that the filing of a motion
for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for a petition for certiorari to prosper.
ISSUE: Whether PBCOM’s petition for Certiorari and Mandamus must be denied for noncompliance of the prior motion for reconsideration requirement.
HELD: No. While it is a settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie
unless a motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent court; there are well-defined
exceptions established by jurisprudence, such as:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(e) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by
the trial court is improbable;
(f) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(g) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(h) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
34
Here, the first exception applies. The power of the RTC to dismiss an appeal is limited to the instances
specified in the Rule 41. In other words, the RTC has no jurisdiction to deny a notice of appeal on an
entirely different ground - such as “that an appeal is not a proper remedy.” The authority to dismiss an
appeal for being an improper remedy is specifically vested upon the CA and not the RTC. The RTC
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Hence, the Order issued by the RTC is reversed and set
aside and the RTC is directed to give due course to petitioners Notice of Appeal and to elevate the case
records to the Court of Appeals for the review of petitioner’s appeal.
REMEDIAL LAW>Special Civil Actions>Certiorari
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. ALVIN C. DIMARUCOT and NAILYN
TAÑEDO-DIMARUCOT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 202069, March 7, 2018
(Second Division)
FACTS: Alvin filed a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage (RTC Petition) against his
wife Nailyn. In his RTC Petition, Alvin alleged that Nailyn suffers from psychological incapacity which
renders her incapable of complying with the essential requisites of marriage. Hence, Alvin prayed that
his marriage with Nailyn be declared null and void pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC
rendered a Decision declaring Alvin and Nailyn’s marriage null and void. The Republic, through the
OSG, filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that Alvin failed to prove the juridical antecedence,
gravity, and incurability of his wife’s alleged psychological incapacity. The RTC denied the Republic's
MR through the August 2010 RTC Order for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 15, sections
4, 5 and 6. Thus, the Republic filed a Notice of Appeal, which was denied in the September 2010 RTC
Order on the ground again that the MR did not comply with the requirements set forth under Rule 15,
Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Rules. Subsequently, the Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari (CA Petition)
before the CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for issuing the August and
September 2010 RTC orders. The CA held that the CA Petition warrants outright dismissal because it
was filed without the benefit of a motion for reconsideration - an indispensable requirement for the
filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
ISSUE: Whether CA’S outright dismissal of the CA Petition was proper as it was filed
without the benefit of a prior motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order.
HELD: No. It is true that the Court has ruled that “certiorari, as a special civil action will not lie unless
a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to
correct its assigned errors.” However, this general rule is subject to well-defined exceptions, thus:
[i]
[ii]
[iii]
[iv]
[v]
[vi]
[vii]
[viii]
[ix]
where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action
is perishable;
where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief
by the trial court is improbable;
where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
The denial of the Republic's Notice of Appeal was premised on the RTC's earlier finding that the MR
was a pro-forma motion due to non-compliance with Rule 15. Clearly, the Republic's direct resort to
the CA via certiorari was warranted under the circumstances, as it was led to believe that seeking
reconsideration would have been a useless exercise. The CA thus erred when it caused the outright
35
dismissal of the CA Petition solely on the basis of the Republic's failure to file a prior motion for
reconsideration.
REMEDIAL LAW > Special Civil Actions> Certiorari
Davao ACF Bus Lines, Inc. v. Ang
G.R. No. 218516, March 27, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: The present controversy is a consequence of the execution of judgment in the case of "People
of the Phils. vs. Rodolfo Borja Tanio," for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Serious Physical Injuries.
In that case, driver Rodolfo Tanio, driving a bus registered under the name of Davao ACF, was charged
with reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. MTCC convicted Tanio and awarded in
favor of Ang the damages. No appeal from the judgment was interposed, and in time, the decision
became final and executory. In view of its finality, the prosecution filed a Motion for Execution against
the accused Tanio which was granted. However, the writ was returned unsatisfied as the latter had
allegedly no properties that can be levied to satisfy the money judgment. Hence, upon motion, the
MTCC issued a writ of execution against ACF, being the employer of accused Tanio. ACF moved to
quash the writ.
The MTCC denied the motion to quash, but held in abeyance the execution pending the determination
of the existence of the requisites for subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code to
attach. AFC filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 to the RTC. This was, however, denied by the
RTC.
On appeal, the CA held that the RTC did not err in holding that the MTCC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in issuing its Order denying ACF's Motion to Recall and/or Quash the Writ of Execution and
ordering the conduct of a hearing to determine whether ACF should be held subsidiarily liable under
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code for the civil liability ex delicto of its employee, accused Tanio.
ISSUE: Whether the CA was correct in affirming the RTC's holding that the MTCC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion.
HELD: Yes. ACF ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC for ordering the execution
upon ACF for subsidiary civil liability ex delicto of the latter's employee based on a judgment that is
supposedly void.
Firstly, MTCC held the execution in abeyance pending the determination of the existence of the
requisites for subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code to attach." In fact, the
MTCC ordered the conduct of a hearing where both, the prosecution and ACF shall be required to
present evidence to prove or disprove the existence of the foregoing elements. Hence, with the very
act alleged to be stained with grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC, having not been
committed at all, on this point alone, the instant Petition should already be dismissed for lack of merit.
Further, it must be stressed that, as correctly held by the CA, certiorari is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an
error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error
was committed. Otherwise, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and
every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed.
In the instant case, the primary argument of ACF is centered on the supposed erroneous award of
damages against the ACF's employee, accused Tanio, made by the MTCC convicting the latter. But,
such supposed errors merely pertain only to mistakes of law and not of jurisdiction, thus putting them
beyond the ambit of certiorari.
36
REMEDIAL LAW> Special Civil Actions> Mandamus
MAREY BETH D. MARZAN, Petitioner, vs. CITY GOVERNMENT OF OLONGAPO, HON. ROLEN
C. PAULINO, ANGIE SOCORRO S. BARROGA, and ARCHITECT TONY KAR BALDE III,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 232769, November 3, 2020
(First Division)
FACTS: Marey Beth D. Marzan filed with the RTC a petition for Mandamus against the City Government
of Olongapo, Mayor Paulino et al., for her removal as City Budget Officer of the City Budget Office.
Marzan was initially appointed by former Mayor James Gordon, Jr. as City Government Head II of the
City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) of Olongapo City but the latter issued a Memorandum
which facilitated her lateral transfer as City Budget Officer. Mayor Paulino was later elected into office
and appointed respondent Balde to Marzan's former position as Department Head II of the CPDO.
However, the CSC informed Mayor Paulino of the disapproval of her appointment due to a supposed
discrepancy issue. A letter of termination was sent to Marzan, where she then wrote a letter to the CSC
Regional Office inquiring the disapproval of her appointment. Marzan wrote back that nowhere in the
CSC letter was it mentioned that her services were being terminated and the reason for her disapproval
was the accountable officer's failure to perform the latter's ministerial duty of facilitating her
appointment. Marzan continued to report to work and the CSC Director advised her to await the regional
officer’s reply. However, upon going to work the Civil Security Service Unit were there with Balde. She
was instructed to remove her things immediately. The next day she received a text message that men
were instructed to prevent her from coming to work. Thus, her petition for Mandamus. The RTC
dismissed Marzan’s petition for Mandamus because she failed to exhaust her available administrative
remedies. The RTC explained that mandamus cannot be issued to compel Marzan's reinstatement since
such act is discretionary on the part of the appointing authority. Aggrieved, Marzan filed an appeal with
the CA via Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. The CA affirmed the RTC. Hence, this Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether mandamus will lie to compel respondents to reinstate Marzan as
Department Head of the CPDO.
HELD: No. The writ of mandamus shall only issue to compel the performance of a ministerial act, or
"one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon
the propriety or impropriety of an act done." Considering that Section 13, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules
does not apply, and that Marzan freely and knowingly vacated her former position as Department Head
of the CPDO, Marzan's reinstatement thereto constitutes a discretionary act which cannot be compelled
through a writ of mandamus.
REMEDIAL LAW>Special Civil Actions>Certiorari (Rule 65)
ALMA CAMORO PAHKIAT, MAHALITO BUNAYOG LAPINID AND FE MANAYAGA LOPEZ,
PETITIONERS, VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO AND COMMISSION ON
AUDIT - XII, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 223972, November 03, 2020
(En Banc)
FACTS: An information on the alleged falsification of disbursement vouchers (DV), missing DVs,
unrecorded check issuances and other irregularities in the financial transactions of Barangay Poblacion
was received by the Kidapawan City State Auditor. They conducted a 10-day audit on the cash accounts
and financial transactions to which they found several anomalies such as: transactions of disbursements
were not recorded, tampered records and checks, unauthorized disbursements, missing checks, and
improper handling of government funds by the Barangay Treasurer of Kidapawan City.
37
The Commission on Audit recommended that criminal and administrative proceedings be instituted to
the involved persons. The Special Audit Report was then adopted as the complaint for Complex Crim
of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public or Commercial Documents and violation
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. The complaint was instituted together with the administrative complaint
for Dishonesty, Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service.
The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found substantial evidence establishing the charges of
Dishonesty, Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service and ordered the
Kidapawan personnel, including the petitioners, dismissed from service. However, ruling on the
separate motions for reconsideration of petitioners, the Office of the Ombudsman reversed its earlier
decision and absolved them from liability.
As for the criminal charges, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was summarily
denied only because it had been filed beyond the 5-day reglementary period under Section 7 Rule II of
the Ombudsman Administrative Order (A.O) No. 7, as Amended by A.O. No. 15-01. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao committed grave abuse of
discretion in summarily denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners.
HELD: Yes. Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "an act too patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law"
or that the tribunal, board or officer with judicial or quasi-judicial powers "exercised its power in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility." The Court finds the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao to have hastily and arbitrarily denied the motion for reconsideration of
petitioners.
While procedural rules are important since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to
remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the administration of
justice, such rules may be relaxed for the most persuasive of reasons in order to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed. Thus, if only the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao had entertained the motion for
reconsideration instead of denying it cursorily and only on the basis of it being late, it would have
realized that there was a compelling reason to overturn its earlier Resolution finding probable cause
against petitioners.
Here, the same set of officers who determined that petitioners had no participation in the anomalies a determination, in so many words, that petitioners were completely innocent of any wrongdoingessentially allowed, in the same breath, the continuance of the criminal prosecution against them based
on the same factual circumstances and subject matter. This denial of the motion for reconsideration
on a pure technicality in the face of their own unqualified exoneration of petitioners in the administrative
case is nothing but grave abuse of discretion - for certainly, if petitioners were already found not to
have had any participation in the anomalies, then these finding merits their exoneration as well from
the criminal case.
REMEDIAL LAW>Special Civil Actions> Certiorari
LABOR LAW>Jurisdiction and Reliefs> National Labor Relations Commission
DEL MONTE LAND TRANSPORT BUS COMPANY and NARCISO O. MORALES, Petitioners,
vs. CARLITO T. ABERGOS, respondent.
G.R. No. 245344, December 2, 2020
(First Division)
FACTS: A complaint for constructive dismissal and payment of damages and attorney's fees was filed
before the Labor Arbiter by Carlito Torres Abergos (Abergos) against DLTB Co. and Narciso Morales
(Morales). He prayed in his complaint that he be declared as illegally dismissed from work and that
DLTB Co. and Morales, collectively, be ordered to reinstate him to his former position with payment of
38
full backwages and other benefits, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The Labor
Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of Abergos. Abergos filed a partial appeal before the NLRC only
insofar as the Labor Arbiter's finding of strained relations and order for payment of separation pay, in
lieu of reinstatement, were concerned. The NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter's ruling after determining
that there was no evidence or allegation of strained relations between the parties. After reconsideration,
the NLRC reinstated the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Without moving for
reconsideration, Abergos filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for certiorari is proper despite failure to move first for a
reconsideration of the NLRC’s resolution.
HELD: No. A motion for reconsideration, when allowed to be filed, is an indispensable condition to the
filing of a petition for certiorari. As the Court held in Sim v. National Labor Relations Commission: Under
Rule 65, the remedy of filing a special civil action for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal;
or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A "plain" and "adequate
remedy" is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or resolution, the filing of which is an
indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. This is to give the lower court
the opportunity to correct itself. There are, however, exceptions to this rule, as follows:
(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would
prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action
is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief
by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process;
(h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.
Here, the CA should have dismissed the petition for certiorari outright. There is nothing on record to
justify a relaxation of the rules. Abergos failed to provide any justification for not filing a motion for
reconsideration or that his case falls under any of the exceptions. Abergos, who sought the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, must apply for it in the manner and strictly in accordance with the
provisions of the law and the Rules of Court. He failed to show any concrete, compelling and valid
reason for dispensing with the motion for reconsideration.
The only remedy available to a party aggrieved in a decision of the NLRC is a petition for certiorari
before the CA, and for which the petitioner must show that such remedy is the only plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy. As shown above, Abergos's failure to file a motion for reconsideration meant that
when he filed his petition for certiorari, it was not the only plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
available.
39
REMEDIAL LAW> Special Civil Actions> Certiorari
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, VS. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH
DIVISION) AND BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 228281, June 14, 2021
(First Division)
FACTS: This case involves the Contract for the Supply of Equipment and Service for the National
Broadband Network Project (NBN Project) between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), and Zhing Xing
Telecommunications Equipment, Inc. (ZTE), a Chinese corporation doing business in the People's
Republic of China. Abalos was a public officer, being then the Chairman of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC).
Abalos was charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No. 3019.
According to the prosecution's theory, Abalos, while occupying the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC, wielding his powers and influence as such, for a fee or commission, brokered in favor of
ZTE for the implementation of the NBN Project, a project of the Philippine Government and requiring
approval by the NEDA. Abalos also purportedly offered bribes to Sec. Neri in relation to approving ZTE's
NBN proposal, and to Jose Perez De Venecia III, in consideration of the withdrawal of of another
company’s NBN proposal.
Sandiganbayan ruled that because of the prosecution's failure to prove such fact, Abalos was acquitted
of the crime charged. The Petitioner then filed Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
before the SC alleging that Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion effectively denying petitioner its right to due process when it disregarded the whole picture
portrayed by the prosecution's evidence.
ISSUE: Whether the filed Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is proper.
HELD: No. The extraordinary remedy of certiorari cannot be resorted to in order to correct perceived
errors of fact or law by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers where said tribunal is not
shown to have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Jurisprudence instructs that where a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleges grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner should
establish that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. That an abuse in
itself to be "grave" must be amply demonstrated since the jurisdiction of the court, no less, will be
affected.
Petitioner's grievances against the Sandiganbayan certainly fail to meet the above threshold. Its
protestations that the Sandiganbayan "refused to consider the plain and accepted meaning [of Abalos'
acts]" and "disregarded the whole picture portrayed by the prosecution['s] evidence" are essentially
disagreements with the Sandiganbayan's understanding, evaluation and appreciation of the evidence
presented. The Petition does not demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan's conclusions are utterly baseless
or arbitrary. In fact, a perusal of the Assailed Decision reveals that the Sandiganbayan exhaustively
discussed every testimony offered by the prosecution to support its case.
Corollary thereto, the alleged misapplication of facts and evidence, and whatever flawed conclusions of
the Sandiganbayan, is an error in judgment, not of jurisdiction, and therefore not within the province
of a special civil action for certiorari. Erroneous conclusions based on evidence do not, by the mere fact
that errors were committed, rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion. For as long as a court acts
within its jurisdiction, any supposed error committed in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing
more than an error of judgment reviewable and may be corrected by a timely appeal.
40
REMEDIAL LAW>Special Civil Actions>Expropriation
NATIONAL TRANSMISSION CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. BERMUDA DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 214782, April 3, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: Bermuda Development Corporation (BDC) filed a case for Unlawful Detainer against National
Transmission Corporation (TransCo) with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao. The MTC
rendered judgment in favor of BDC and ordered TransCo to vacate the subject lot. TransCo interposed
an appeal before the RTC. In the meantime, TransCo filed a Complaint for Expropriation of the parcel
of land before the RTC. TransCo deposited the amount of P10,704,000 with the Landbank of the
Philippines, purportedly representing the provisional value of the property sought to be expropriated.
Consequently, the RTC issued an Order granting the Ex Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession. Meanwhile, the RTC dismissed TransCo’s appeal in the unlawful detainer case for being
“moot and academic” that with the filing of an expropriation proceeding covering the subject property,
the issue in the appealed case which is also possession has become moot and academic. In filing the
said expropriation proceeding, Transco may be considered to have abandoned its appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC erred in dismissing TransCo’s appeal allegedly because it has
become moot and academic with the filing of the expropriation complaint involving the
same property subject of the unlawful detainer case
HELD: Yes. It is well-settled that a case filed by a landowner for recovery of possession or ejectment
against a public utility corporation, endowed with the power of eminent domain, which has occupied
the land belonging to the former in the interest of public service without prior acquisition of title thereto
by negotiated purchase or expropriation proceedings, will not prosper. Any action to compel the public
utility corporation to vacate such property is unavailing since the landowner is denied the remedies of
ejectment and injunction for reasons of public policy and public necessity as well as equitable estoppel.
The proper recourse is for the ejectment court: (1) to dismiss the case without prejudice to the
landowner filing the proper action for recovery of just compensation and consequential damages; or
(2) to dismiss the case and direct the public utility corporation to institute the proper expropriation or
condemnation proceedings and to pay the just compensation and consequential damages assessed
herein; or (3) to continue with the case as if it were an expropriation case and determine the just
compensation and consequential damages pursuant to Rule 67 (Expropriation) of the Rules of Court, if
the ejectment court has jurisdiction over the value of the subject land.
Here, the subsequent filing by TransCo of the expropriation proceedings could not have rendered the
unlawful detainer case moot and academic inasmuch as the MTC erred in proceeding with the unlawful
detainer case and not dismissing it following the prevailing jurisprudence.
41
REMEDIAL LAW>Special Civil Actions>Partition
CIVIL LAW>Lands Titles and Deeds>Certificate of title
CIVIL LAW>Property>Co-ownership
ROGELIO LOGROSA, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES CLEOFE and CESAR AZARES, SPOUSES
ABUNDIO, JR. and ANTONIETA TORRES, SPOUSES NELSON SALA and ARLENE ANG, and
SPOUSES BONIFACIO, JR., and WELHELMINA BARUIZ, Respondents.
G.R. No. 217611, March 27, 2019
FACTS: A verified complaint for partition was filed by petitioner Logrosa. He alleged that he, together
with the other respondents are co-owners of eight (8) parcels of lands (subject properties). The
Transfer Certificates of Titles of the subject properties all indicate that petitioner Logrosa, together with
the respondents, are co-owners of the subject properties.
Respondents Sps. Azares contended that while it may be true that petitioner Logrosa's name appeared
in the titles of the properties, they belied petitioner Logrosa's claim that he is a co-owner of the same,
as he never contributed as to its acquisition and never contributed for their maintenance, much less
paid the taxes due thereon. Respondents Sps. Azares further alleged that they purchased all the
properties to provide one place for all the parties herein to live near each other for easy access and
mutual security.
ISSUE #1: Whether petitioner Logrosa is one of the co-owners of the subject properties as
evidenced by the transfer of certificate of titles.
HELD #1: Yes. Petitioner Logrosa does not rely merely on his own testimony to prove that he is a coowner of the subject properties. No one disputes the fact that there are eight certificates of title all of
which clearly and unequivocally identify petitioner Logrosa as one of the co-owners of the subject
properties.
It is a fundamental principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. It becomes the best proof of ownership of a parcel of land. Such principle of indefeasibility has
long been well-settled in this jurisdiction and it is only when the acquisition of the title is attended with
fraud or bad faith that the doctrine finds no application. In the instant case, there is no accusation
whatsoever that petitioner Logrosa was included as co-owner in the TCTs through means of fraud or
bad faith.
ISSUE #2: Whether petitioner Logrosa can demand for partition.
HELD #2: Yes. A person may exercise the right to compel the partition of real estate if he/she sets
forth in his/her complaint the nature and extent of his title and subsequently proves the same. The law
does not make a distinction as to how the co-owner derived his/her title, may it be through gratuity or
through onerous consideration. In other words, a person who derived his title and was granted coownership rights through gratuity may compel partition. Respondents Sps. Azares maintain that there
was no gratuitous granting of title and co-ownership rights to petitioner Logrosa and that they only
intended to designate petitioner Logrosa as a mere trustee of the subject properties. However, to
reiterate, this self-serving testimony of respondents Sps. Azares based on their mere say-so cannot
stand, vis-á-vis the strong legal presumption created by the certificates of title and the notarized Deed
of Absolute Sale that petitioner Logrosa is a co-owner of the subject property.
42
REMEDIAL LAW > Special Proceedings and Special Writs> Settlement of state of deceased
persons> Summary settlement of estates (Rule 74)
VICTORIA T. FAJARDO, Petitioner vs. BELEN CUA-MALATE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 213666, March 27, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: Belen filed an Amended Complaint for Partition and Accounting with Damages against her
siblings. She prayed that judgment be issued ordering the partition and distribution of Ceferina's entire
estate. Her siblings alleged that they were willing to settle the partition case amicably. Thereafter, the
case was referred to mediation. A meeting was then scheduled for the signing of the Agreement. On
said date, only Victoria did not appear. Victoria was not able to attend the meeting as she did not have
enough money to travel from Manila to Calabanga. Belen and the other siblings proceeded to sign the
Compromise Agreement and submitted the same before the RTC for approval. RTC rendered a Decision
issuing a judgment on compromise. Feeling aggrieved, Victoria appealed the RTC's Decision before the
CA. She alleged that the Compromise Agreement cannot be binding as to her considering that she did
not sign it and supposedly did not consent to its execution. CA denied Victoria's appeal, holding that
RTC did not err when it approved the Compromise Agreement. Motion for Reconsideration was
thereafter denied.
ISSUE: Whether the Compromise Agreement does not bind Victoria as she did not sign the
same.
HELD: No. The proceedings during the mediation conferences indubitably show that Victoria and her
siblings actually came to an agreement as to the partition of the estate of Ceferina. Hence, that an oral
partition has been entered into by the parties is a factual finding that must be left undisturbed. The
fact that Victoria failed to sign the written document bearing the terms of the parties' agreement is of
no moment. Nothing can be inferred from Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court that writing or other
formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.
The Court further added that the partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of
them is not exactly a conveyance of real property because it does not involve transfer of property from
one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir
renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance. Hence, an oral partition is
not covered by the Statute of Frauds.
Therefore, even if the document titled Compromise Agreement was not signed by Victoria, there was
already an oral partition entered into by the parties that bound all of the siblings. The written agreement
only served to reduce into writing for the convenience of the parties the terms of the agreement already
entered into during the mediation conferences. In fact, the Court has likewise previously held that,
independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it
has been completely or partly performed. In the instant case, there is no refutation on the part of
Victoria as to Belen's assertion that the terms of the Compromise Agreement have already been partially
performed by the parties.
REMEDIAL LAW>Special Proceedings and Special Writs>Settlement of Estate of Deceased
Persons>Summary Settlement of Estates (Rule 74)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, Petitioner, V. LEONOR A. MACABAGDAL, REPRESENTED BY
EULOGIA MACABAGDAL-PASCUAL, Respondent.
G.R. No. 203948, January 22, 2020
FACTS: Petitioner Republic, represented by the DPWH, filed a Complaint seeking to expropriate a
parcel of land located in Barangay Ugong, Valenzuela City (subject property). The complaint initially
43
impleaded an unidentified owner named in the title as "John Doe YY." Upon deposit of the Republic
with the trial court a check representing the 100% zonal value of the property, the RTC issued a
corresponding writ of possession. Meanwhile, a certain Atty. Conrado E. Panlaque appeared before the
RTC, praying that one Elena A. Macabagdal (Elena) be substituted as party defendant, alleging that
she is the real party in interest, being the registered owner of the subject property. The Republic then
filed a Motion to set the case for hearing to enable Elena to substantiate her claim. But on the day of
the supposed hearing, neither Elena nor her counsel appeared. Atty. Ricardo C. Pilares, Jr. (Atty. Pilares)
filed an Omnibus Motion for Substitution of Party, Admission of Answer and Hearing, averring that Elena
already died as shown in her death certificate. He also prayed that the sole heir, one Leonor A.
Macabagdal (Leonor), represented by Eulogia Macabagdal-Pascual by virtue of a Special Power of
Attorney, be substituted in Elena's place. Atty. Pilares presented as witnesses Eulogia MacabagdalPascual and one Nenita Pascual Ramota, and marked in evidence a copy of a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement and other pertinent documents, as Exhibit "1" to "Exhibit "13-A," respectively, in support of
Leonor's claim as the registered owner of the subject property and proof of her ownership. The Republic
argues that the substitution of Leonor was improper as the extrajudicial deed of partition, the evidence
for allowing her to be substituted as the sole heir, was neither registered in the Register of Deeds of
Valenzuela City nor published in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether the unregistered Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement is not sufficient to
establish Leonor’s interest over the subject property.
HELD: No. The fact that the said Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was not registered before the
Register of Deeds does not strip away the document's evidentiary value with respect to Leonor's status
and interest over the subject property. The RTC appreciated the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement in
relation to Leonor's claim that she is the only surviving sister of Elena and that the latter had no other
heirs, thus giving Leonor sufficient standing to be a party defendant in the expropriation case. The RTC
did not hold whatsoever that the subject property was indeed adjudicated solely to respondent Leonor
by virtue of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement. While the Republic is correct insofar as saying that
under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an unregistered affidavit of self-adjudication or
extrajudicial settlement does not bind third persons with respect to the adjudication of property, the
CA is also correct in its holding that there is no provision in the Rules of Court which states that "the
instrument cannot be used to prove that one is an heir” due to the sheer fact that it was not registered
before the Register of Deeds.
Furthermore, the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, which states that Elena has no other heirs and that
Leonor is Elena's only surviving sister, was duly notarized, the fact of notarization not disputed by
Republic. A notarized document has in its favor the presumption of regularity and the truthfulness of
its contents. A notarized document, being a public document, is evidence of the fact which gave rise to
its execution. Hence, the burden of disproving what is borne in the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement,
i.e., that Leonor is the sole surviving heir and sister of Elena, falls on the Republic. However, such
burden was not met. Solely focusing on the non-registration of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement,
the Republic does not provide any evidence, nor does it even make any allegation whatsoever, that
Leonor is not the sole surviving heir and sister of Elena.
44
REMEDIAL LAW>Special Proceedings and Special Writs>Change of Name (Rule 103)
FRANCIS LUIGI G. SANTOS, Petitioner vs. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, THE CIVIL REGISTRAR
GENERAL, AND ALL INTERESTED PERSONS, Respondents
G.R. No. 250520, May 05, 2021
(First Division)
FACTS: Luigi filed a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court seeking to
change his surname from "Santos" to "Revilla" in his Certificate of Live Birth. He alleged that his parents,
Lovely Maria T. Guzman (Lovely Guzman) and Jose Marie Bautista, Jr. also known as Ramon Bong
Revilla, Jr. (Bong Revilla), met and engaged in an intimate relationship. He was later born in Quezon
City as "Francis Luigi Guzman." Lovely Guzman and Bong Revilla were never married as the latter was
already married to Lani Mercado. Thus, Luigi's Certificate of Live Birth did not bear the Revilla surname
and his father was marked as unknown. Later on, Bong Revilla executed an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment recognizing petitioner as his son. In 1999, Lovely Guzman married Patrick Joseph P.
Santos (Patrick Santos), who, in turn, legally adopted Luigi. Thus, Luigi's name was changed from
"Francis Luigi Guzman" to "Francis Luigi G. Santos." Although Luigi lived with his mother, he grew up
close to Bong Revilla and the latter's wife and children and was treated by the family as a legitimate
son. He also claimed that he used the name "Luigi Revilla" when he entered show business. Thus, he
filed the instant petition in order to "avoid confusion," "to show his sincere and genuine desire to
associate himself to [Bong Revilla] and to the Revillas," and to ensure that his records show his true
identity as Bong Revilla's son.
RTC denied the petition and held that a change of name was not a matter of right and could be granted
only for compelling reasons. RTC held that petitioner failed to show that there was any valid or
justifiable ground for change of name. As an adopted child, the RTC held that petitioner was bound to
use the surname "Santos" as adoption legally severs the legal tie between the adoptee and his or her
biological parents.
ISSUE #1: Whether Luigi should be allowed to change his name.
HELD #1: No. To justify a change of name, a person "must show not only some proper or compelling
reason x x x but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name." The following
have been considered as valid grounds for change of name: "(a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is
no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest."
In the instant case, the reasons proffered do not fall under any of the jurisprudential grounds for change
of name. They cannot even be considered as "akin to" any of the aforementioned grounds. The mere
fact that Luigi began using a different name, i.e., "Luigi Revilla," when he joined show business does
not constitute a proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize a change of name. Any confusion
created by the use of said name is mainly due to the unauthorized use of a name other than Luigi’s
true legal name. Convenience is not a recognized ground for change of name, which may be allowed
only for compelling reasons that must be alleged and proved.
ISSUE #2: Whether Rule 103 is the proper remedy and not Rule 108.
HELD #2: Yes. Rule 103 is the correct remedy in the instant case. Rule 108 is inapplicable as Luigi
does not allege or identify any erroneous entry that requires substantial rectification or cancellation.
45
A person seeking 1) to change his or her surname or 2) to change both his or her first name and
surname may file a petition for change of name under Rule 103, provided that the jurisprudential
grounds discussed in Republic v. Hernandez (G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996) are present.
Luigi does not seek to correct any clerical or substantial error in his birth certificate or to effect any
changes in his status as an adopted child of Patrick Santos. As such, neither Rule 108 nor R.A. 9048 as
amended applies. Rather, Luigi merely desires to change and replace his surname "Santos" with the
surname "Revilla" in order to "avoid confusion," "to show his sincere and genuine desire to associate
himself to Bong Revilla, Jr. and to the Revillas, and to show that he accepts and embraces his true
identity." He alleges that while he grew up close to his biological father and his family and was
purportedly publicly known as "Bong Revilla's son," "there is nothing in his name that would associate
him and identify him as one of the Revillas." These allegations show that Luigi ultimately seeks to "alter
the 'designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known'"
and not to effect any clerical or substantial corrections. Thus, he properly availed himself of the
procedure prescribed under Rule 103.
REMEDIAL LAW>Special Proceedings and Special Writs>Change of Name (Rule 103)
DR. RUBEN C. BARTOLOME, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 243288, August 28, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: Bartolome filed a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court before the
RTC, seeking to correct the name ‘Feliciano Bartholome’ appearing in his birth certificate. He stated
that he has been using the name ‘Ruben (Cruz) Bartolome’ since childhood and he presented various
documents to support his claim. As regards Bartolome's first name, the RTC held that Bartolome availed
of the wrong procedure. The RTC explained that a petition for change of first name should have been
filed in accordance with Republic Act (R.A.) 9048, which vested the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name with the city or municipal registrar or consul general concerned. As
regards the prayer for correction of Bartolome's surname, the RTC denied the petition for improper
venue. The RTC held that the Regional Trial Court of Manila where the corresponding civil registry is
located was the proper venue, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In either case,
the RTC found that the evidence adduced was not sufficient to support Bartolome's claim that he had
been habitually and continuously using the name 'Ruben C. Bartolome' since childhood. Bartolome
appealed to the CA claiming that Rule 103 was the applicable remedy. The CA denied the appeal and
held that Bartolome should have filed a petition for the correction of entries in his birth certificate under
R.A. 9048, instead of a Rule 103 petition for change of name.
ISSUE: Whether the change/correction sought in Bartolome’s first name, middle name,
and surname, as appearing in his birth certificate, should have been filed under R.A. 9048.
HELD: Yes. The administrative proceeding under R.A. 9048 applies to all corrections sought in the
instant case.
The Court summarized the rules as follows:
(1) A person seeking:
1. to change his or her first name,
2. to correct clerical or typographical errors in the civil register,
3. to change/correct the day and/or month of his or her date of birth, and/or
4. to change/correct his or her sex, where it is patently clear that there was a clerical or
typographical error or mistake, must first file a verified petition with the local civil registry office
of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept, in
accordance with the administrative proceeding provided under R.A. 9048 in relation to R.A.
10172.
46
A person may only avail of the appropriate judicial remedies under Rule 103 or Rule 108 in the
aforementioned entries after the petition in the administrative proceedings is filed and later denied.
(2) A person seeking
1) to change his or her surname or
2) to change both his or her first name and surname
may file a petition for change of name under Rule 103, provided that the jurisprudential grounds
discussed in Republic v. Hernandez are present; and
(3) A person seeking substantial cancellations or corrections of entries in the civil registry may file a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries under Rule 108. As discussed in Lee v. Court of
Appeals and more recently, in Republic v. Cagandahan, R.A. 9048 "removed from the ambit of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register."
In the instant case, petitioner seeks to change his first name from "Feliciano" to "Ruben," on the
ground that he has been using the latter since childhood. This change sought is covered by R.A. 9048
and should have been filed with the local civil registry of the city or municipality where the record being
sought to be corrected or changed is kept.
Petitioner also prays hat his middle name, "Cruz," be entered. A prayer to enter a person's middle name
is a mere clerical error, which may be corrected by referring to existing records. Thus, it is primarily
administrative in nature and should be filed pursuant to R.A. 9048 as amended.
As petitioner's allegedly misspelled surname, "Bartholome," may be readily corrected by merely
referring to the existing records of the civil registrar, such as the surnames of petitioner's parents and
immediate family members, the petition should have been filed under R.A. 9048 and not under Rule
103 of the Rules. It likewise follows that the petition should have been filed with the local civil registry
office of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept, in
accordance with Section 3 of R.A. 9048 and not in accordance with the venue provided in Rule 103.
In sum, all changes sought by the petitioner fall within the ambit of R.A. 9048. Petitioner may only avail
of the appropriate judicial remedies when the changes/corrections sought through the administrative
proceeding are denied. By "appropriate," if the prayer to administratively change petitioner's first name
is denied, the same may be brought under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. If the prayers to
administratively correct petitioner's middle name and surname are denied, the same may be brought
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
REMEDIAL LAW > Special Proceedings > Writ of Kalikasan, Writ of Continuing Mandamus
VICTORIA SEGOVIA, et. al, Petitioners, vs. The Climate Change Commission,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 211010, March 27, 2017
(En Banc)
FACTS: This is a petition for the issuance of Writs of Kalikasan and continuing mandamus to compel
the implementation of the following environmental laws and executive issuances - Republic Act No.
(RA) 9729 (Climate Change Act), and RA 8749 (Clean Air Act); Executive Order No. 774 (BO 774); AO
254, s. 2009 (AO 254); and Administrative Order No. 171, s. 2007 (AO 171).
In gist, petitioners contend that respondents' failure to implement the foregoing laws and executive
issuances resulted in the continued degradation of air quality, particularly in Metro Manila, in violation
of the petitioners' constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology,14 and may even be
tantamount to deprivation of life, and of life sources or "land, water, and air" by the government without
due process of law.
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Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, assert that petitioners are not entitled to a
writ of kalikasan because they failed to show that the public respondents are guilty of an unlawful act
or omission; state the environmental law/s violated; show environmental damage of such magnitude
as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants of two or more cities; and prove that nonimplementation of Road Sharing Principle will cause environmental damage.
ISSUE #1: Whether the petitioners have standing to file the petition.
HELD #1: No, the petitioners do not have standing to file the petition, being representatives of a
rather amorphous sector of society and without a concrete interest or injury.
The RPEC did liberalize the requirements on standing, allowing the filing of citizen's suit for the
enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental laws. However, it bears noting that there is
a difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the
person filing represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the
writ; and a petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus, which is only available to one
who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission.
ISSUE #2: Whether the petition should be dismissed for failing to adhere to the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts.
No, the petition should not be dismissed for failing to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Given that the RPEC allows direct resort to the Supreme Court, it is ultimately within the Court's
discretion whether or not to accept petitions brought directly before it. Under the RPEC, the writ
of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering environmental damage of such magnitude that will
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for
a narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming, among
others, to provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the violation of one's
constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology that transcends political and territorial
boundaries, and to address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats. At the
very least, the magnitude of the ecological problems contemplated under the RPEC satisfies at least
one of the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct resort is allowed where it is
dictated by public welfare.
ISSUE #3: Whether a writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should issue.
No, Writ of Kalikasan and/or Continuing Mandamus should not be issued. For a writ of kalikasan to
issue, the following requisites must concur:
1. there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology;
2. the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity; and
3. the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan has to show
that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated. In this case, apart from repeated
invocation of the constitutional right to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology and bare
allegations that their right was violated, the petitioners failed to show that public respondents are guilty
of any unlawful act or omission that constitutes a violation of the petitioners' right to a balanced and
healthful ecology.
As to the Continuing Mandamus,
SECTION 1. Petition for continuing mandamus.-When any agency or instrumentality of the government
or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
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duty resulting from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an
environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or
enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an
environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent,
under the law, rules or regulations.
First, the petitioners failed to prove direct or personal injury arising from acts attributable to the
respondents to be entitled to the writ. While the requirements of standing had been liberalized in
environmental cases, the general rule of real party-in-interest applies to a petition for
continuing mandamus.
Second, the Road Sharing Principle is precisely as it is denominated - a principle. It cannot be considered
an absolute imposition to encroach upon the province of public respondents to determine the manner
by which this principle is applied or considered in their policy decisions. Mandamus lies to compel the
performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary, and the
official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other. The duty being
enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided in the law itself. Thus, the
recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the
corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other.
REMEDIAL LAW>Special Proceedings and Special Writs> Rules of Procedure on
Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC)
MERCADO ET. AL., Petitioner, vs. HON. LOPENA ET AL., GO ET. AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. 230170, June 6, 2018
(Second Division)
FACTS: The root of this controversy is a domestic dispute between estranged spouses Mercado and
Go. Such dispute eventually led to the filing of numerous suits by both parties against each other.
Mercado avers that the cases filed by Go against them are forms of Strategic Lawsuits against Public
Participation (SLAPP) intended to harass, intimidate, and silence them. Mercado claim that the subject
cases are false and baseless complaints that were filed to emotionally, psychologically, and financially
drain them and ultimately to pressure them to give up custody of Mercado's minor children. Mercado
also argue that the filing of the subject cases falls within the definition of "abuse" and "violence against
women" under R.A. No. 9262. In this regard, Mercado claims that Lopena committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in taking cognizance of the subject cases even
though Mercado is a "judicially declared victim of domestic violence" and in whose favor a PPO has
been issued.
Lopena stress several procedural infirmities in the petition, namely: (i) that the requisites for judicial
review are not present in this case; (ii) that the filing of the petition is premature because there are
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedies available to petitioners; and (iii) that there was also a
failure to observe the hierarchy of courts.
With respect to the substantive issue, Lopena further aver that they did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance of the subject cases as the same cannot be considered as SLAPPs
because such rule applies specifically to environmental cases only.
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ISSUE: Whether the cases filed against the petitioner constitutes SLAPP.
HELD: No. The concept of SLAPP is inapplicable to cases of domestic violence against women and
children under R.A. No. 9262.
The concept of SLAPP was first introduced to this jurisdiction under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC). SLAPP refers to an action whether civil, criminal or
administrative, brought against any person, institution or any government agency or local government
unit or its officials and employees, with the intent to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any
legal recourse that such person, institution or government agency has taken or may take in the
enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights.
SLAPP, as a defense, is a mere privilege borne out of procedural rules; accordingly, it may only be
exercised in the manner and within the scope prescribed by the Court as a rule-making body. Here,
petitioners cannot, under the guise of substantial justice, rely on a remedy that is simply not available
to them. In fact, by invoking the Court's rule-making power in their Petition, petitioners have admitted
that the instant action has no basis under any of the rules promulgated by the Court. The Court takes
this occasion to remind petitioners that rules of procedure are not a "one-size fits-all" tool that may be
invoked in any and all instances at the whim of the litigant as this would be anathema to the orderly
administration of justice.
REMEDIAL LAW> Criminal Procedure> Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ALGLEN REYES Y
PAULINA, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 225736, October 15, 2018
(Second Division)
FACTS: An Information was filed against Reyes in this case, the accusatory portion of which reads as
follows:
“That on or about 12:15 in the early dawn of July 5, 2011 in Brgy. Malindong, Binmaley, Pangasinan
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there,
willfully and unlawfully sell Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or "shabu", a dangerous drug, without
any authority to sell the same.
Contrary to Section 5, Article II, of RA 9165.”
The RTC ruled that the prosecution proved all the essential elements of the crimes charged. It held
that the prosecution witnesses gave an unequivocal account of the sale, thus proving that the
transaction took place. It further traced the chain of custody of the seized items from the apprehending
officer, to the officer who conducted the inventory, to the forensic chemist who conducted the
examination and subsequently transmitted the said items to the court.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s conviction of Reyes, holding that the prosecution was able to prove the
elements of the crimes charged.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Reyes.
HELD: Yes. At the outset, it bears pointing out that the Information filed against Reyes in this case
was defective, for which reason alone Reyes should be acquitted. The importance of sufficiency of
the Information cannot be more emphasized; it is an essential component of the right to due process
in criminal proceedings as the accused possesses the right to be sufficiently informed of the cause of
the accusation against him. This is implemented through Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9 of the Rules of
Court, which provide: SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. —The complaint or information shall state
the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense,
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and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense,
reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. The test in
determining whether the information validly charges an offense is whether the material
facts alleged in the complaint or information will establish the essential elements of the
offense charged as defined in the law. In this examination, matters aliunde are not considered.
The purpose of the law in requiring this is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense, as he
is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
In the case at bar, the Information filed against Reyes failed to sufficiently identify therein all the
components of the first element of the crime of sale of dangerous drugs, namely: the identity of the
buyer, the object, and the consideration. Therefore, the prosecution in this case deprived Reyes of his
right to be informed of the offense charged against him. For this reason alone, Reyes should already
be acquitted.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure> Prosecution of Offenses (Rule 110) and
Prosecution of Civil Action (Rule 111)
ALFREDO PILI, JR., Petitioner, vs. MARY ANN RESURRECCION, Respondent
G.R. No. 222798, June 19, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: Mary Ann Resurreccion (Mary Ann) entered into an agreement with Conpil Realty Corporation
(Conpil) for the purchase of a house and lot and issued two checks in favor of the latter. When Conpil
deposited the checks, the same were dishonored and stamped as "Account Closed." A criminal
complaint for violation of B.P. 22 was filed before the MTC, which was as titled, "People of the
Philippines v. Mary Ann Resurreccion". Although the checks were issued in favor of Conpil, the criminal
complaint for B.P. 22 was signed by Alfredo C. Pili, Jr. as "Complainant", who was at that time, the
President of Conpil. Among the documentary exhibits presented by Conpil Realty were the Affidavit of
Alfredo Pili Jr., the president, and the Secretary’s Certificate for the purpose of proving that Alfredo Jr.
was the authorized representative of the complainant corporation, and that he was authorized to file
the case, adduce evidence and testify on behalf of Conpil.
After trial, the MTCC acquitted Mary Ann of the criminal charge, but found her civilly liable to Conpil.
The appeal that Mary Ann filed was titled, “People of the Philippines v. Mary Ann Resurreccion. The
appeal, however, was dismissed, hence Mary Ann went up to the CA via petition for review. In the CA,
Mary Ann’s case was titled “Mary Ann Resurreccion v. Alfredo Pili,”, and in there, she argued that Alfredo
Jr. is not the real party in interest and cannot file the criminal complaint in his personal capacity.”
The CA found respondent's petition for review under Rule 42 meritorious. It held that held that the
criminal case was not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest as Conpil was not included
in the title of the case even if it was the party: 1) that signed the contract and 2) in whose favor the
checks were issued.
ISSUE: Whether the criminal case was not prosecuted in the name of the real party-ininterest as Conpil was not included in the title of the case.
HELD: No. It has long been settled that “in criminal cases, the People is the real party-in-interest and
the private offended party is but a witness in the prosecution of offenses, the interest of the private
offended party is limited only to the aspect of civil liability.” While a judgment of acquittal is immediately
final and executory, “either the offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspect of the
judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The real parties-in-interest in the civil aspect of a
decision are the offended party and the accused.”
There is no doubt that the People is the real party-in-interest in criminal proceedings. As the criminal
complaint for violation of B.P. 22 was filed in the MTC, necessarily the criminal case before it was
prosecuted “in the name of the People of the Philippines.” This very basic understanding of what
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transpired shows ineluctably the egregious error by the CA in ruling that the Conpil should have been
“included in the title of the case.”
The private complainant is the real party-in-interest only as regards the civil aspect arising from the
crime. In the instant case, the civil aspect of the criminal case was, in fact, appealed by Mary Ann and
that it was Conpil, being the victim of the fraud, that was the private complainant therein.
The CA grossly erred when it faulted Alfredo for not having included Conpil in the title of the petition
for review under Rule 42, given that the criminal case was correctly titled "People of the Philippines v.
Mary Ann Resurreccion" and that the title was changed by Mary Ann when she filed her petition for
review with the CA, to "Mary Ann Resurreccion v. Alfredo Pili, Jr."
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Preliminary Investigation
PETE GERALD L. JAVIER AND DANILO B. TUMAMAO, PETITIONERS, VS.
SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 237997, June 10, 2020
(First Division)
FACTS: In 2004, the Province of Isabela procured, by direct contracting, 15,333 bottles of liquid organic
fertilizer.The Commission on Audit (COA), found that the procurement was done without open
competitive bidding, and that the procured items were overpriced. Thereafter the Task Force Abono of
the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) filed a complaint against the public officers involved in
the subject transaction, including Javier and Tumamao, who were the Provincial Accountant and
Provincial Agriculturist of Isabela, respectively.
On August 5, 2011, the Ombudsman directed the public officers to file their respective counter
affidavits. Javier filed his counter affidavit on November 14, 2011, while Tumamao filed his on
November 23, 2011.
After almost five years, or on September 19, 2016, the Special Panel on Fertilizer Fund Scam of the
Ombudsman issued its Resolution finding probable cause to indict Javier and Tumamao, along with
Provincial Vice Governor Santiago P. Respicio (Respicio), for violation of Section 3(e), of Republic Act
No. 3019 (R.A. No. 3019). Thereafter, an Information dated June 14, 2017 was filed against Javier and
Tumamao for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
The Sandiganbayan set the date of the supposed arraignment. Javier and Tumamao, however,
manifested that they were not ready for arraignment as they intended to file a motion to quash on the
ground of inordinate delay. Arguing that the period constituting five years and four months from the
filing of the complaint to the approval of the resolution finding probable cause constituted delay which
violated their right to speedy disposition of cases. The Sandiganbayan ordered the Ombudsman to file
a Comment on the Motion to Quash. The Ombudsman filed its Comment wherein it prayed for the
dismissal of the motion, arguing that the case had voluminous records, and that there were an endless
number of cases being filed in their office.
The Sandiganbayan then denied the motion to quash. While the Sandiganbayan conceded the amount
of time which constituted the delay, it simply held that the Ombudsman had valid justifications for such
delay. The Sandiganbayan adopted the Ombudsman's justifications, despite the latter's failure to
substantiate its claims.
ISSUE #1: Whether there is an inordinate delay in the Preliminary investigation.
HELD #1: Yes. For purposes of computing the length of delay in the present case,
the Cagang guidelines will be followed, and the case against Javier and Tumamao would be deemed
initiated only upon the filing of the complaint, or on April 27, 2011. Javier and Tumamao were given
the opportunity to be heard, and were therefore able to file their counter-affidavits on November 15,
52
2011 and November 22, 2011, respectively. After these dates, it appears from the record that the case
had become dormant until December 5, 2016 when the Ombudsman approved the resolution finding
probable cause against Javier and Tumamao. There is thus an unexplained delay of five years from the
time the counter-affidavits were filed to the termination of the preliminary investigation through the
approval of the Ombudsman's resolution finding probable cause.
ISSUE #2: Whether the prosecution has the burden of proof to explain the delay in the
Preliminary investigation.
HELD #2: Yes. Accordingly, Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that the investigating prosecutor has 10 days "after the investigation to determine whether or not there
is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial." Thus, as the preliminary investigation was
terminated beyond the 10-day period provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the burden
of proof thus shifted towards the prosecution to prove that the delay was not unreasonable. In any
event, the period of delay in this case — five years — was extraordinarily long that there could
conceivably be no procedural rule that would justify said delay. Undoubtedly, therefore, the burden
was on the prosecution to provide justifications for the delay.
ISSUE #3: Whether the petitioner timely asserted their rights
HELD #3: Yes. the Court holds that Javier and Tumamao timely asserted their rights because they
filed the Motion to Quash at the earliest opportunity. Before they were even arraigned, they already
sought permission from the Sandiganbayan to file the Motion to Quash to finally be able to assert their
right to speedy disposition of cases. To the mind of the Court, this shows that Javier and Tumamao did
not sleep on their rights, and were ready to assert the same given the opportunity. Certainly, this could
not be construed as acquiescence to the delay.
REMEDIAL LAW > Criminal Procedure< Bail (114)
REYNALDO ARBAS RECTO, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 236461, December 05, 2018
(Second Division)
FACTS: An information was filed against Reynaldo Arbas Recto (Recto) for the death of Margarita
Carlosita (Carlosita). Recto’s counsel filed a petition for bail with the RTC, however, it was denied as
the RTC gave credence to the testimony of prosecution’s witness Joshua Emmanuel Rabillas (Rabillas),
son of Carlosita, that Recto was the one who killed his mother. The RTC, in denying the Petition for
Bail, noted that “without, however, prejudging in any way the result of the case, the Court is of the
impression that the evidence of guilt is strong, and it is incumbent on the part of the accused to take
the witness stand to show otherwise.”
Trial on the merits then ensued. After the prosecution rested its case, Recto filed a demurrer to evidence
for insufficiency of evidence to hold him guilty of the crime of Murder. The RTC, however, denied the
said demurrer. Subsequently, Recto filed a Motion to Fix Bail alleging that the prosecution was able to
show that the crime charged should be Homicide only and not Murder. The RTC denied the said Motion
to Fix Bail. The RTC reiterated that it was of the impression that the evidence of guilt is strong and that
it was incumbent on Recto to take the witness stand and show otherwise. As Recto had not taken the
witness stand, then the RTC ruled against the Motion to Fix Bail.
ISSUE: Whether the RTC should have granted Recto’s Motion to Fix Bail.
HELD: Yes. As a rule, all persons charged with a criminal offense have the right to bail. Only persons
charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua cannot avail of this right if the evidence of
guilt is strong.
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In the present case, Recto was charged with Murder — an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua.
Thus, the RTC was acting within its powers or jurisdiction when it denied Recto’s initial Petition for Bail.
The RTC possesses sufficient discretion to determine, based on the evidence presented before it during
the bail hearing, whether the evidence of guilt is strong. However, after the prosecution had rested its
case, Recto filed a Motion to Fix Bail on the ground that bail had become a matter of right as the
evidence presented by the prosecution could only convict Recto of Homicide, not Murder.
In the case of Bernardez v. Valera, the Court emphasized that the "evidence of guilt is strong" standard
should be applied in relation to the crime as charged. Thus:
“While the charge against petitioner is undeniably a capital offense, it seems likewise obvious that the
evidence submitted by the prosecution to the respondent judge for the purpose of showing that the
evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong, is not sufficient to establish that the offense committed by
petitioner, if any, was that of murder. On the basis of the sworn statement of Benedito himself petitioner
could only be held liable for homicide. It must be observed in this connection that a person charged
with a criminal offense will not be entitled to bail even before conviction only if the charge against him
is a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt of said offense is strong. In the present case, as already
stated, the evidence submitted by the prosecution in support of its opposition to the motion for bail
could prove, at most, homicide and not murder, because it does not sufficiently prove either known
premeditation or alevosia.”
Hence, the RTC should have determined whether the evidence of guilt is strong for Murder, as opposed
to simply determining if the evidence that Recto was responsible for Carlosita's death was strong. Since
the evidence of Recto's guilt - for Murder - was not strong, the RTC should have granted Recto's Motion
to Fix Bail.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Bail (Rule 114)
CRIMINAL LAW> Special Penal Law> Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 (R.A.
No. 9165 as amended by R.A. No. 10640)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs. NOVO TANES y BELMONTE, Respondent
G.R. No. 240596, April 3, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: On April 6, 2011, an information was filed against Tanes for violating Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165, selling of prohibited drugs. A buy bust operation was conducted on December 14, 2010
wherein Tanes sold 0.0296 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride to a poseur buyer. Afterwards
an inventory was made where the three witnesses from the media, Department of Justice, and an
elected official was made to sign the inventory sheet. Respondent applied for bail and was granted by
the trial court on the basis that the evidence of his guilt is not strong, hence, this petition.
ISSUE #1: Whether the presence of the three witnesses need to be at the actual buy bust
operation and not only during the inventory.
HELD: Yes. Section 21, Article II of R.A. 91651 lays down the following procedure to be
followed in order to maintain the integrity of the confiscated drugs used as evidence: (1) the seized
items must be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation;(2) the physical
inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her representative
or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative
from the DOJ, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
The phrase “immediately after seizure and confiscation” means that the physical inventory and
photographing of the drugs were intended by the law to be made immediately after, or at the place of
1
Amended by Republic Act No. 10640 which became effective on August 7, 2014.
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apprehension. It is only when the same is not practicable that the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of R.A. 9165 allow the inventory and photographing to be done as soon as the buy-bust team
reaches the nearest police station or the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team. In this
connection, this also means that the three required witnesses should already be physically
present at the time of the conduct of the physical inventory of the seized items which, as mentioned,
must be immediately done at the place of seizure and confiscation –a requirement that can easily be
complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its nature, a planned
activity. In the present case, it appears that the buy-bust team committed several procedural lapses
concerning the chain of custody of the seized drug. In particular:
A. there was no representative from the DOJ present during the buy-bust operation and the inventory;
B. the two other witnesses (i.e., the media representative and the elected public official) were not
present during the apprehension and seizure of the illegal drug but were merely called to sign the
inventory sheet; and
C. no photograph was presented showing the inventory of the seized shabu in the presence of Tanes
and the witnesses.
These lapses in the chain of custody created doubt as to the identity and integrity of the seized drug.
Consequently, the evidence as to Tanes’ guilt cannot be characterized as strong.
ISSUE #2: Whether Tanes is entitled to bail.
Yes. Before conviction, bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty
lower than reclusion perpetua. Bail becomes a matter of discretion if the offense charged is punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment — that is, bail will be denied if the evidence of guilt
is strong
In this case, Tanes was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 which carries the
penalty of life imprisonment. Hence, Tanes' bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion if the evidence
of his guilt is not strong.
There being non-compliance with the rule on chain of custody of the drug seized during the buy-bust
operation, the evidence of guilt for the crime of illegal sale of drugs against Tanes is deemed not strong.
Accordingly, he is entitled to bail.
NOTE: The present ruling, however, should not prejudge the RTC's ruling on the merits of the case.
Indeed, there are instances when the Court had ruled that failure to strictly comply with the procedure
in Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items
void. In such cases, the prosecution must still satisfactorily prove that: (a) there is justifiable ground
for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved. The prosecution must be able to adequately explain the reasons behind the procedural
lapses.
The Court emphasizes that no part of this Decision should prejudice the submission of additional
evidence for the prosecution to prove Tanes' guilt in the main case. After all, a grant of bail does not
prevent the RTC, as the trier of facts, from making a final assessment of the evidence after full trial on
the merits.
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REMEDIAL LAW > Criminal Procedure > Motion to Quash (Rule 117)
NORMAN ALFRED F. LAZARO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 230018, June 23, 2021
(First Division)
FACTS: The deceased father of Gian Dale Galindez filed a criminal complaint for Giving Assistance to
Suicide under Article 253 of the Revised Penal Code against Lazaro and Escalona. An Information was
filed against the two before the RTC. Escalona filed a Motion to Quash, alleging that the facts charged
in the Information do not constitute an offense. RTC granted the motion in an Order dated October 23,
2013. However, the OCP Pasig was given ten (10) days from receipt of the Order to file an Amended
Information. OCP Pasig filed a Compliance/Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information with the
Amended Information attached, notably dropping Escalona from the charges. The filing of the Amended
Information was done 17 days from the OCP Pasig's receipt of the RTC's Order dated October 23, 2013,
and therefore beyond the ten-day period provided in the said Order. Subsequently, the OCP Pasig
pointed out that the dispositive portion of the RTC's Order dated October 23, 2013 contained
contradictory statements, i.e., granting Escalona's Motion to Quash, while at the same time giving the
prosecution an opportunity to correct the defect in the Information. RTC concurred with the observation
of the private prosecutor that the assailed Order is indeed inconsistent if not vague. Lazaro filed a
Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the RTC's Order dated October 23, 2013 granting Escalona's
Motion to Quash had already become final and immutable when the prosecution did not file an Amended
Information ten days from receipt of said Order. Hence, it can no longer be amended or clarified by
the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the Motion to Quash can no longer be amended or clarified by the RTC.
HELD: No. When there is a conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of a decision and the opinion
of the court contained in the body of the decision, the fallo will prevail. However, this rule is not without
exception. Where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the decision is so clear as to show that
there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail. In this case, the
body of the Order dated October 23, 2013 discourages any conclusion that the intent of the RTC was
to dismiss the case against Lazaro. The RTC's reference to Sections 4 and 5, Rule 117 2 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure further buttresses the conclusion that it never intended to dismiss the case
pending before it. In sum, when an accused files a motion to quash on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, the trial court is mandated to deny the motion and give the
prosecution an opportunity to amend the information. The RTC, based solely on the vagueness of the
fallo of its Order, cannot be presumed to have dismissed the case in direct contravention of the
foregoing provisions of the Rules and relevant jurisprudence. This is especially so given the unequivocal
language of the body of its Order dated October 23, 2013. The conclusion that must be made, therefore,
is that the RTC never dismissed the case against Lazaro and Escalona; hence, no such dismissal could
have become final and immutable.
It must immediately be noted that the Rules do not prescribe a period for filing an amended information
by the prosecution when so ordered by the trial court in response to a motion to quash. In this case,
the ten-day period was set by the RTC in its discretion. Indeed, the RTC could also validly set a shorter
or longer period within reason, in the sound exercise of its discretion. All the more should the RTC be
2
Section 4. Amendment of the complaint or information. — If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or
information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity
to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or
information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.
Section 5. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. — If the motion to quash is sustained, the court may order that another complaint or
information be filed except as provided in section 6 of this rule. If the order is made, the accused, if in custody, shall not be discharged
unless admitted to bail. If no order is made or if having been made, no new information is filed within the time specified in the order or
within such further time as the court may allow for good cause, the accused, if in custody, shall be discharged unless he is also in custody
for another charge.
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empowered to allow or admit the amended information despite being filed beyond the period it initially
fixed in its Order dated October 23, 2013.
REMEDIAL LAW>Criminal Procedure>Trial (Rule 119)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. ALFREDO R. DE BORJA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 187448, January 9, 2017
(First Division)
FACTS: The case stems from a complaint filed by Petitioner Republic before the Sandiganbayan for
the recovery of ill-gotten assets allegedly amassed by the individual respondents therein, during the
administration of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Geronimo Z. Velasco, one of the defendants
in the case, was the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC) in which respondent De Borja is Velasco' s nephew.
It appears from the records that PNOC would regularly enter into charter agreements with vessels and,
pursuant to industry practice, vessel owners would pay "address commissions" to PNOC as charterer,
amounting to five percent (5%) of the total freight wherein during the tenure of Velasco, allegedly, no
address commissions were remitted to PNOC.
Petitioner Republic claimed that it was De Borja who collected these address commissions in behalf of
Velasco, basing its allegation on the testimony of Epifanio F. Verano (Verano). De Borja was further
alleged to have acted as Velasco's dummy, nominee, and/or agent for corporations he owned and/or
controlled, such as DRMC.
On April 15, 2005, respondent De Borja filed his Demurrer to Evidence of even date, stating therein,
among others: (i) that Verano, on two (2) occasions, testified that he delivered an envelope to Velasco
who, in turn, instructed him to deliver the same to De Borja; (ii) that Verano admitted that the envelope
was sealed; (iii) that Verano did not open the envelope and therefore had no knowledge of the contents
thereof; (iv) that Verano did not deliver the envelope personally to De Borja; and (v) that Verano did
not confirm whether De Borja in fact received the said envelope.
Ruling of the SB: The SB found that the evidence presented was insufficient to support a claim for
damages against De Borja, thereby granting respondent De Borja's Demurrer to Evidence. Upon crossexamination, witness Verano admitted that although he was instructed to deliver two envelopes to the
office of De Borja, he did not know for a fact that De Borja actually received them. Moreover, witness
Verano testified that after he delivered the envelopes, he did not receive any word that they did reach
De Borja, nor did Verano confirm De Borja's receipt of them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SB committed reversible error in granting respondent De Borja's
Demurrer to Evidence.
HELD: No. A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
It is a remedy available to the defendant, to the effect that the evidence produced by the plaintiff is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain an issue. The question
in a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff, by his evidence in chief, had been able to establish
a prima facie case.
In the face of the foregoing testimony, the insinuations of petitioner Republic in the instant Petition can
best be described as speculative, conjectural, and inconclusive at best. Nothing in the testimony of
Verano reasonably points, or even alludes, to the conclusion that De Borja acted as a dummy or conduit
of Velasco in receiving address commissions from vessel owners.
The Court joins and concurs in the SB's observations pertaining to Verano's want of knowledge with
respect to the contents of the envelopes allegedly delivered to respondent De Borja's office, which
remained sealed the entire time it was in Verano' s possession. As admitted by Verano himself, he did
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not and could not have known what was inside the envelopes when they were purportedly entrusted
to him for delivery. In the same vein, Verano did not even confirm respondent De Borja's receipt of the
envelopes, despite numerous opportunities to do so. Relatedly, it was further revealed during the crossexamination of Verano that in the first place, Velasco did not even deal directly with brokers.
All told, the Court finds that the evidence adduced is wholly insufficient to support the allegations of
the Complaint before the SB. Thus, for failure of petitioner Republic to show any right to the relief
sought, the Court affirms the SB in granting the Demurrer to Evidence.
REMEDIAL LAW> Criminal Procedure> Search and seizure (Rule 126)
RAMON PICARDAL Y BALUYOT, PETITIONER VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT
G.R No. 235749, June 19, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: On March 27, 2014, at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, together with his companion PO1
William Cristobal and PO1 Rodrigo Co, while they were on a beat patrol back to the station, they
chanced upon a person urinating against the wall. The police officers approached said person who was
later identified as accused-appellant Ramon Picardal. The place is well-lighted since it is within the main
road. PO1 Peniano told accused-appellant that it is forbidden to urinate in public. In view of said
violation, they invited accused-appellant to go with them to the precinct. When PO1 Peniano is about
to handcuff him, accused-appellant attempted to run. His attempt failed since PO1 Peniano was able
to get hold of his hand. Once caught, PO1 Peniano frisked accused-appellant and was able to recover
a caliber .38 revolver from his waist. Accused-appellant was brought to the police station, after PO1
Cristobal apprised him of his constitutional rights. At the police station, PO1 Peniano referred accusedappellant to the officers in-charge for the purpose of medical examination and the recovered items
were surrendered to P/Chief Insp. William Santos for safekeeping. The following morning, the items
were retrieved back by PO1 Peniano and gave the same to the assigned investigator, PO3 Anthony
Navarro, for proper marking. Accused Picardal denied the charges against him. After trial on the merits,
in its Decision dated September 24, 2015, the RTC convicted Picardal of the crime charged. CA affirmed
in toto the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Is the .38 revolver obtained by the Policemen admissible as evidence.
HELD: No. The act supposedly committed by Picardal — urinating in a public place — is punished only
by Section 2 (a) of Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) Regulation No. 96-009. The MMDA
Regulation, however, provides that the penalty for a violation of the said section is only a fine of five
hundred pesos (PhP500.00) or community service of one (1) day. The said regulation did not provide
that the violator may be imprisoned for violating the same, precisely because it is merely a regulation
issued by the MMDA. Stated differently, the MMDA Regulation is, as its name implies, a mere regulation,
and not a law or an ordinance. Therefore, even if it were true that the accused-appellant did urinate in
a public place, the police officers involved in this case still conducted an illegal search when they frisked
Picardal for allegedly violating the regulation. It was not a search incidental to a lawful arrest as there
was no or there could not have been any lawful arrest to speak of. Thus, as the firearm was discovered
through an illegal search, the same cannot be used in any prosecution against him as mandated by
Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. As there is no longer any evidence against Picardal
in this case, he must perforce be acquitted.
One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be affected is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before
a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. Any evidence obtained in violation thereof is
therefore inadmissible as evidence.
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REMEDIAL LAW > Criminal Procedure > Search and Seizure (Rule 126)
REMEDIAL LAW > Evidence > Admissibility > Exclusionary rules
POLITICAL LAW > Bill of Rights > Arrests, Searches and Seizures > Warrantless Searches
and Exclusionary rule
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plainiff-Appellee vs. JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO A.K.A.
ERIC SALIBAD Y MALLARI, Accused-Appelant
G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020
(En Banc)
FACTS: Accused-Appellant Sapla was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act for allegedly
possessing four (4) bricks of marijuana leaves. According to the prosecution, on 10 January 2014, an
officer on duty at the Regional Public Safety Batallion (RPSB) in Tabuk City received a phone call that
a certain individual would be transporting marijuana from Kalinga to Isabela. In this regard, the RPSB
conducted a joint operation with Kalinga Provincial Police. At around 1:00 in the afternoon, the RPSB
received a text message which stated the description of the person, who was then a passenger of a
jeepney with plate number AYA 270. Subsequently, a joint checkpoint was strategically organized at
the Talaca command post. When the jeepney arrived, the police officers flagged down the vehicle, and
approached accused Sapla. The police officers asked Sapla if he was the owner of the blue sack, to
which he answered in affirmative. The said blue sack was opened and the police officers saw 4 bricks
of dried marijuana leaves. Thereafter, the police seized the marijuana, and arrested Sapla. Both the
RTC and the CA convicted Sapla on the ground that the police operation was a valid warrantless search
of a moving vehicle.
ISSUE #1: Whether there was a valid warrantless search and seizure of a moving vehicle.
HELD #1: No, the warrantless search is invalid.
In a search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle must be intentionally used as a means to
transport illegal items. Applying the foregoing to the instant case, the target of the search conducted
was not the jeepney nor the cargo or contents of the said vehicle. The target of the search was the
person who matched the description given by the person who called the RPSB. Thus, warrantless search
of a moving vehicle is inapplicable in this case.
ISSUE #2: Whether a tip or information creates probable cause that enables authorities to
conduct an extensive and intrusive search within a search warrant.
HELD #2: In this case, the SC ruled and “settled the issue once and for all” that information or tip
alone does not create probable cause.
Rule on probable cause with regard to tip/information:
Probable Cause is an indispensable requirement for an extensive and intrusive warrantless search of a
moving vehicle. Vehicles can be stopped at a checkpoint and extensively searched only when there is
"probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that either the
motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of some
offense.
The Court stressed that in engendering probable cause that justifies a valid warrantless search, it is the
police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a
person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary
to justify that the person suspected to be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this
would be an infringement upon one's basic right to security of one's person and effects. The Court
explained that "the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must observe the acts leading to
the suspicion of an illicit act, and not merely rely on the information passed on to him or her.
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The SC explained that law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information.
A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause
in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion. The sole information relayed by an
informant was not sufficient to incite a genuine reason to conduct an intrusive search on the accused.
In this case, the police merely adopted the unverified and unsubstantiated suspicion of another
person, i.e., the person who sent the text through the RPSB Hotline. Apart from the information passed
on to them, the police simply had no reason to reasonably believe that the vehicle contained an item,
article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. The police did not even endeavor
to inquire how this stranger gathered the information. The authorities did not even ascertain in any
manner whether the information coming from the complete stranger was credible. After receiving this
anonymous text message, without giving any second thought, the police accepted the unverified
information as gospel truth and immediately proceeded in establishing the checkpoint. To be sure,
information coming from a complete and anonymous stranger, without the police officers undertaking
even a semblance of verification, on their own, cannot reasonably produce probable cause that warrants
the conduct of an intrusive search. Surely, probable cause justifying an intrusive warrantless search
and seizure cannot possibly arise from double hearsay evidence and from an irregularly-received tipped
information.
ISSUE#3: Whether the search and seizure conducted against Sapla was reasonable.
HELD # 3: No. The search was unreasonable.
The Court laid down the following conditions in allowing a reasonable search of a bus while in transit:
(1) the manner of the search must be least intrusive; (2) the search must not be discriminatory; (3) as
to the purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety; and (4) the courts must be
convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against
the accused
In this case, the search undertaken on accused-appellant Sapla was extensive, reaching inside the
contents of the blue sack that he allegedly possessed. Second, the search was directed exclusively
towards accused appellant Sapla; it was discriminatory. Third, there is no allegation that the search
was conducted with the intent of ensuring public safety. At the most, the search was conducted to
apprehend a person who, as relayed by an anonymous informant, was transporting illegal drugs. Lastly,
the Court is not convinced that sufficient precautionary measures were undertaken by the police to
ensure that no evidence was planted against accused-appellant Sapla, considering that the inventory,
photographing, and marking of the evidence were not immediately conducted after the apprehension
of accused-appellant Sapla at the scene of the incident.
ISSUE #4: Whether Sapla waived his consitutional right against unreasonable searches
and seizures when he admitted he was the owner of the bag and consented to open the
same.
HELD #4: No There was no effective waiver.
The Court held that there can only be an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures if the following requisites are present:
1. It must appear that the rights exist;
2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and
3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Considering that a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, the Court has held that
the fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these circumstances to
constitute a valid waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights;
60
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. The fact that a person failed to
object to a search does not amount to permission thereto.
The consent to a warrantless search and seizure must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and
unattended by duress or coercion. Mere passive conformity to the warrantless search is only an implied
acquiescence which does not amount to consent and that the presence of a coercive environment
negates the claim that the accused consented to the warrantless search.
In this case, Sapla's apparent consent to the search conducted by the police was not unequivocal,
specific, intelligently given, and unattended by duress or coercion. It cannot be seriously denied that
accused-appellant Sapla was subjected to a coercive environment, considering that he was confronted
by several armed police officers in a checkpoint.
The SC, in this case, also explained the nature of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
According to SC, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is "at the top of the hierarchy
of rights, next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property, for the right
to personal security which, along with the right to privacy, is the foundation of the right against
unreasonable search and seizure.
Hence, as a rule, a search and seizure operation conducted by the authorities is reasonable only when
a court issues a search warrant after it has determined the existence of probable cause through the
personal examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses presented before
the court, with the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized particularly described.
Because of the sacrosanct position occupied by the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
in the hierarchy of rights, any deviation or exemption from the aforementioned rule is not favored and
is strictly construed against the government.
ISSUE #5: Whether the evidence seized is admissible.
HELD #5: No. Applying the exclusionary rule, the confiscated marijuana is no longer admissible.
The Exclusionary Rule or Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine
The necessary and inescapable consequence of the illegality of the search and seizure conducted by
the police in the instant case is the inadmissibility of the drug specimens retrieved.
According to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Known as the exclusionary rule, "evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures is deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding."
Therefore, with the inadmissibility of the confiscated marijuana bricks, accused-appellant Sapla is
acquitted of the crime charged.
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REMEDIAL LAW> Evidence> Documentary Evidence (Rule 130, B)> Secondary Evidence
HEIR OF PASTORA T. CARDENAS AND EUSTAQUIO CARDENAS, NAMELY REMEDIOS
CARDENAS-TUMLOS, REPRESENTED BY HEIR ATTYORNEY-IN-FACT JANET TUMLOSQUIZON, Petitioner, v. THE CHRISTIAN AND MISSIONARY ALLIANCE CHURCHES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., REPRESENTED BY REO REPOLLO AND LEOCADIO DUQUE, JR.,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 222614, March 20, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: Remedios, heir of Spouses Cardenas, represented by Janet, filed a Complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Use of Real Property against The Christian and Missionary Alliance Churches of the
Philippines, Inc. (CAMACOP), Repollo and Leocadio Duque Jr., before the RTC. Janet is the daughter of
Remedios. CAMACOP is a religious corporation. It is represented by Repollo and Duque, Jr. Janet alleged
that her mother Remedios is the heir of the late Spouses Cardenas, who are registered owners of Lot
90 and that the subject property is adjacent to Lot 3924-A owned by CAMACOP where its church is
located and constructed. Janet further alleged that sometime in 1962, CAMACOP unlawfully occupied
the subject property for their church activities and functions and that CAMACOP failed to accede to the
demands and continues to occupy the subject property. Thus, Remedios, through Janet, was
constrained to file the case. In their part, respondents admitted that Cardenas is the registered owner
of the subject property. However, they aver that their occupation is not illegal since they had lawfully
purchased it from its registered owners. The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. According
to the RTC, CAMACOP was able to provide sufficient documentary and testimonial evidence that the
subject property was indeed sold to it by Pastora. Hence, the RTC found as a fact the existence of a
sale transaction between CAMACOP and the predecessor-in-interest of Janet and Remedios. In appeal,
the CA held that the Heir of Spouses Cardenas failed to overcome the burden of proving her claim by
preponderance of evidence and found that the court a quo did not err in its appreciation of the evidence
and in ruling that there was in fact a sale.
ISSUE: Whether the Heir of Spouses Cardenas has a better right to possess the subject
property.
RULING: Yes. It is an admitted fact that the property Lot 90 is still registered in the names of
Pastora and Eustaquio Cardenas. As a general rule, a certificate of title serves as evidence of an
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears
therein. Given this fact, the burden has then shifted to CAMACOP to provide sufficient evidence
establishing ownership of the subject property. CAMACOP relies on the existence of a Deed of Sale
purportedly executed in 1962. However, it maintains that, since all of the copies of this alleged Deed
had been supposedly lost, it had to resort to the presentation of secondary evidence. According to
Section 5, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, when the original document has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and
the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by presenting
secondary evidence. These secondary evidence pertain to: (1) a copy of the lost document, (2) by a
recital of the contents of the lost document in some authentic document, or (3) by a testimony of a
witnesses, in the order stated. Upon close examination of the evidence on record, the Court holds that
CAMACOP was not able to provide any sufficient secondary evidence to establish the existence and
contents of the supposed 1962 Deed of Sale. First, CAMACOP was not able to present even a photocopy
or any other copy of the purported Deed of Sale. Also, CAMACOP could not even provide a single shred
of credible evidence as to the existence of the purported Deed of Sale in the notarial register of Atty.
Calud. Third, documents presented did not contain any recital of the contents of the purported Deed
as required under the Rules. To make matters worse, the secondary evidence presented by CAMACOP
are all inauthentic and inadmissible documents. Thus, without any copy of the purported Deed of Sale
and any authentic document containing a recital of the contents of the purported Deed of Sale,
CAMACOP should have provided a credible, convincing witness to prove the existence and contents of
the purported Deed of Sale. No such witness was provided by CAMACOP.
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REMEDIAL Law>Evidence> Testimonial Evidence (Rule 130, C)> Hearsay and exceptions
to the hearsay rule
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. XXX, * accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 205888. August 22, 2018
(Second Division)
FACTS: Four (4) separate informations for Rape and one (1) information for Attempted Rape were
filed in the RTC against XXX. Upon arraignment, XXX pleaded "not guilty" to all charges. Trial on the
merits ensued thereafter. During trial, the victim, AAA, died on January 4, 2003 before she could be
subjected to cross-examination. However, inspite of the death of [AAA] and her direct testimony having
been expunged from the records, the prosecution presented other prosecution witnesses, namely:
Gelmie [Calug], [EEE], Lovella Opada and Vicente Tiengo, and in an effort to salvage the cause for the
state, the prosecution adduced evidence of res gestae through the testimonies of its witnesses, Gelmie
Calug and [EEE].
[EEE], an aunt of [AAA], testified that at noontime on April 16, 2001, [AAA] arrived at her house. She
noticed that [AAA] was sad and crying. Upon her inquiry, [AAA] told her that she was raped by her
father on April 8, and three (3) times hours ago on April 15, 2001. During the few days of [AAA]'s stay
at her house, she often saw [AAA] crying. A few days after, [AAA] went to the house of Pedro de los
Santos to work as a house helper. Her employer, Pedro de los Santos, helped her in instituting these
rape cases, and [EEE] and de los Santos accompanied [AAA] to report the incident to the police.
Gelmie Calug testified that on April 18, 2001, [AAA] reported for work for the first time as a house
helper in the house of Pedro de los Santos. He noticed that [AAA] was sad and lonely, and often saw
her crying. She confided to him her problems, and revealed to him that she was raped by her own
father on April 8 and 15 of that year 2001.
In the RTC Decision, XXX was found guilty only for the three (3) counts of Rape committed on April 15,
2001. In his appeal, XXX mainly argued that the RTC erred in considering the testimonies as res gestae
and instead claimed that such statements were purely hearsay as they were offered in court only after
two (2) years from the date of the alleged incident. The CA rendered the questioned Decision, affirming
the RTC Decision. Hence, the instant appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the testimonies of Calug and EEE pertaining to the statements of AAA can
be considered part of the res gestae and thus produce a conviction.
HELD: Yes, as to the testimony of EEE but not that of Calug.
As a general rule, hearsay evidence is inadmissible in courts of law. As an exception, however, Section
42 of Rule 130 allows the admission of hearsay evidence as part of the res gestae.
The following requisites must, thus, be satisfied for the exception to apply: (i) that the principal act,
the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (ii) that the statements were made before the declarant had
the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (iii) that the statements must concern the occurrence
in question and its immediate attending circumstances.
Applying the above rule, it is clear that at the time AAA uttered her statements to EEE — a few hours
after the incidents — the effect of the occurrence on her mind still continued. Her demeanor, as narrated
by EEE, showed that she was still suffering as a result of the violation of her person and honor by her
father, herein accused-appellant XXX.
Meanwhile, with respect to Calug’s testimony, which consisted of statements given by AAA on April 18,
2001, or three (3) days after the April 15, 2001 incidents, the Court finds that the RTC and CA incorrectly
considered the same as part of the res gestae.
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Remedial Law > Evidence > Burden of proof and presumptions (Rule 131)
LOLITA ESPIRITU SANTO MENDOZA and SPS. ALEXANDER
and ELIZABETH GUTIERREZ, petitioners, vs. SPS. RAMON, SR.
and NATIVIDAD PALUGOD, respondents.
G.R. No. 220517. June 20, 2018
(Second Division)
FACTS: Lolita and Jasminia constructed a residential house on the subject lot. Although Lolita has no
receipts, she shared in the cost of the construction of the house from her income in the catering
business and selling of various products. Thereafter, Jasminia executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor
of Lolita, who eventually mortgaged subject property to petitioner Elizabeth Gutierrez as a security for
a loan. This was contested by the respondents. According to them, Lolita, taking advantage of her
relationship with Jasminia, caused the latter to sign a Deed of Absolute Sale in her favor. The former
erred it for registration with the Office of the Registry of Deeds. Thus, the original TCT in the name of
Jasminia was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in the name of Lolita. Respondents then filed a
complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
with the RTC.
The lower court held that the respondents were able to prove by preponderance of evidence that the
Deed of Sale involved no actual monetary consideration. The RTC ruled that the Deed of Sale is void
for being simulated, hence, the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed therein by Lolita in favor of
petitioners Spouses Gutierrez is likewise void, since, in a real estate mortgage, it is essential that the
mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property to be mortgaged.
ISSUE: Whether the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner over the subject property
is void.
HELD: No. The Deed of Absolute Sale is deemed valid since the respondents have not discharged their
burden of proof to rebut either the presumption of sufficient consideration of the DAS or the evidence
of petitioner Lolita.
Under the Rules of Court, as amended, the presumption that there was a sufficient consideration for a
contract is satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. A
contract is presumed to be supported by cause or consideration. The presumption that a contract
has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a mere assertion that it has no
consideration. To overcome the presumption, the alleged lack of consideration must be shown by
preponderance of evidence. The burden to prove lack of consideration rests upon whoever alleges it,
which, in the present case, is respondent. Here, petitioners' evidence has superior weight. While
petitioner Lolita could not present receipts to show her payments to the late Jasminia, her sworn
testimony which in certain portions were corroborated by pertinent documents, remains more credible
than that of respondent. Indeed, the lack of receipts may be explained by the "close friendship"
between petitioner Lolita and Jasminia.
Consequently, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Jasminia in favor of petitioner Lolita over the
subject property is valid, the presumption that it has sufficient consideration not having been rebutted.
The same holds true regarding the Real Estate Mortgage between petitioner Lolita and petitioner’s
spouses Alexander and Elizabeth Gutierrez.
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REMEDIAL LAW > Evidence > Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC)
RCBC BANKARD SERVICES CORPORATION, Petitioner
vs. MOISES ORACION, JR. AND EMILY* L. ORACION, Respondents
G. R. No. 223274, June 19, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: Moises Oracion Jr. and Emily Oracion (Spouses Oracion) applied for and granted by RCBC
Bankard Services Corp (RCBC) credit card accommodations with the issuance of a Bankard PESO
Mastercard Platinum. On various dates, Spouses Oracion used the credit card in purchasing different
products. However, they failed to pay RCBC the total amount of P117,157.98, inclusive of interest and
penalties despite the receipt of Statement of Accounts (SOA) and written letter of demand sent by the
latter. Hence, RCBC filed a complaint for sum of money against Spouses Oracion.
In their complaint, RCBC attached “duplicate original” copies of the SOAs and the Credit History Inquiry.
The MeTC, without delving into the merits of the case, dismissed for failure of RCBC to discharge the
required burden of proof in a civil case, which is to establish its case by preponderance of evidence.
According to the MeTC, the records of the case shows that the signature in the attachments in support
of the complaint are mere photocopies and absent a clear showing that the original writing has been
lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the photocopies must be disregarded being unworthy
of any probative value and being an inadmissible piece of evidence.
RCBC filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. In its appeal, it argued that what it attached to the
complaint were “duplicate original copies” and not mere photocopies. However, the RTC affirmed the
decision of the MeTC and also denied RCBC’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, RCBC filed the instant
appeal on certiorari under Rule 45.
In its petition, RCBC invokes for the first time on appeal the Rules on Electronic Evidence.3 It argues
that since the attachments to its complaint are wholly computer-generated print-outs which it caused
to be reproduced directly from the computer, they qualify as electronic documents which should be
regarded as the equivalent of the original documents.
ISSUE: Whether the pieces of documentary evidence in question are the equivalent of
original documents.
HELD: No. The Court cannot just concede that the pieces of documentary evidence in question are
indeed electronic documents, which according to the Rules on Electronic Evidence are considered
functional equivalent of paper-based documents and regarded as the equivalent of original documents
under the Best Evidence Rule if they are print-outs or outputs readable by sight or other means, shown
to reflect the data accurately.
For the Court to consider an electronic document as evidence, it must pass the test of admissibility.
According to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, "[a]n electronic document is
admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and
related laws and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by these Rules." Rule 5 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence lays down the authentication process of electronic documents. Section 1 of Rule 5
imposes upon the party seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal proceeding the burden
of proving its authenticity in the manner provided therein. Section 2 of Rule 5 sets forth the required
proof of authentication.
As to method of proof, Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence provides: SECTION 1.
Affidavit of evidence. — All matters relating to the admissibility and evidentiary weight of an
3
The Supreme Court ruled that the RCBC, “by its acts and representations, is now estopped to claim that the
annexes to its complaint are not duplicate original copies but electronic documents. It is too late in the day for
RCBC to switch theories.” However, it still ruled on the issue of the admissibility of the documents as electronic
evidence.
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electronic document may be established by an affidavit stating facts of direct personal knowledge of
the affiant or based on authentic records. The affidavit must affirmatively show the competence of the
affiant to testify on the matters contained therein.
Evidently, petitioner could not have complied with the Rules on Electronic Evidence because it failed to
authenticate the supposed electronic documents through the required affidavit of evidence. As earlier
pointed out, what petitioner had in mind at the inception (when it filed the complaint) was to have the
annexes admitted as duplicate originals as the term is understood in relation to paper-based documents.
Thus, the annexes or attachments to the complaint of petitioner are inadmissible as electronic
documents, and they cannot be given any probative value.
REMEDIAL LAW>Procedure in the Court of Appeals>Post-judgment remedies other than
appeal>Annulments of judgment by the Court of Appeals (Rule 47)
CIVIL LAW>Property>Actions to Recover Property>Accion Publiciana
THE HEIRS OF ALFREDO CULLADO, namely LOLITA CULLADO, DOMINADOR CULLADO,
ROMEO CULLADO, NOEL CULLADO, REBECCA LAMBINICIO, MARY JANE BAUTISTA and
JIMMY CULLADO, petitioners, vs. DOMINIC V. GUTIERREZ, respondent.
G.R. No. 212938, July 30, 2019
FACTS: An accion publiciana was filed by the respondent Dominic Guiterrez against the petitioner
before the RTC. Petitioner interposed the special and affirmative defenses of his actual possession and
cultivation of the subject parcel of land in an open, adverse and continuous manner. RTC ruled in favor
of the petitioner and ordered the respondent to reconvey the property to the petitioner. Respondent
filed a petition for relief from judgment before the RTC but was denied. Respondent filed a petition for
annulment of judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction before the CA. CA
granted appeal by reason that the defense of the petitioner constitutes a collateral attack against
Dominic's title, which cannot be allowed in an accion publiciana.
ISSUE #1: Whether the petition for exceptional remedy of annulment of judgment filed by
Dominic before CA was proper.
HELD #1: Yes. A petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a remedy granted only under
exceptional circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, had failed to avail of the ordinary
or other appropriate remedies provided by law; and such action is never resorted to as a substitute for
a party's own neglect in not promptly availing of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies. The Court
detailed that considering that the respondent had already availed himself of the remedy of a petition
for relief from judgment under Rule 38, raising the issue of extrinsic fraud with the trial court, he is
effectively barred from raising the same issue via his petition for annulment of judgment. However, the
same cannot be said for the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court explained further that if
the respondent is able to prove that the regional trial court indeed went beyond its jurisdiction in issuing
its decision, nothing prevents him from asking for its annulment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
In this case, the regional trial court was proven to have acted beyond its jurisdiction when it ordered
the reconveyance of the property to the petitioner.
ISSUE #2: Whether the RTC can rule with finality on the issue of ownership given the fact
that the original complaint was accion publiciana.
HELD 2: Yes. An accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of
possession of real property independently of title. In such proceedings, when the issue of ownership is
raised by the defendant in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue
of possession. The Supreme Court clarified that in an accion publiciana, the defense of ownership (i.e.,
that the defendant, and not the plaintiff, is the rightful owner) will not trigger a collateral attack on the
plaintiffs Torrens or certificate of title because the resolution of the issue of ownership is done only to
determine the issue of possession. In such a case, the adjudication is not a final and binding
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determination of the issue of ownership and will not bar the parties or even third persons from filing
an action for the determination of the issue of ownership.
In view of the foregoing, the RTC was clearly without jurisdiction to order reconveyance of the land to
the petitioner, because that can be done only upon a definitive ruling on the said issue - something
that cannot be done in an accion publiciana.
REMEDIAL LAW > Post-Judgment Remedies Other Than Appeal> Rule 65 as a Remedy
from Judgment
JAMES S. PFLEIDER, Petitioner, V. HON. COURT OF APPEALS – CEBU CITY, ATTY. MARIE
LUISE PFLEIDER ALBA, AS SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, NAMELY: DAVID JOHN
THADDEUS P. ALBA, FERDINAND REY P. ALBA AND JOHANNA A. BILBAO, AND THE
FORMER REGISTER OF DEEDS OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, ATTY. MILAGROS S. DELA CRUZ,
Respondents
G.R. No. 196058, November 12, 2018
(Second Division)
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were siblings and among the compulsory heirs who inherited the
properties of Fred G. Pfleider. Such inherited parcels of land were used as collaterals in the Real Estate
Mortgage in favor of PNB.
Petitioner averred that respondent volunteered to represent all of Fred's compulsory heirs before the
PNB upon agreement that all siblings must prepare their share on the amortization payments. After
some time, petitioner was shocked when he learned that the entire lot, including his share in the
inheritance, was consolidated, and registered in the name of the respondent. Petitioner maintained that
respondent’s action was not only tainted with fraud but also violated the implied trust created between
respondent and her siblings. Hence, the filing of the instant Complaint.
Respondent sought the dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint on the ground of litis pendentia. Respondent
contended that there was another case pending between them involving the same issues, the same
properties and even the same pieces of documentary evidence. RTC rendered its Order finding that litis
pendentia did not obtain in the instant Complaint but later reversed on motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. Appealed to the CA,
petitioner’s appeal was denied outright for availing of a wrong remedy, stating that the instant
Appeal merits outright dismissal.
In questioning the correctness of the assailed Decision and Resolution issued by the CA, petitioner filed
a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed petitioner's
appeal outright.
HELD: No. The Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal, using mandatory language, in establishing the
rule that an appeal raising pure questions of law erroneously taken to the CA shall not be
transferred to the appropriate court, but shall be dismissed outright.
Under Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, there are two (2) modes of appealing a judgment or
final order of the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction:
(a) If the issues raised involve questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, the proper recourse
is an ordinary appeal to the CA in accordance with Rule 41 in relation to Rule 44 of the Rules of
Court; and
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(b) If the issues raised involve only questions of law, the appeal shall be to the Court by
petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Corollary, under Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, an appeal under Rule 41 taken from the RTC
to the CA raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, as issues purely of law are not reviewable
by the said court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from the
appellate judgment of an RTC shall be dismissed.
The Court thus agrees with the CA's decision to dismiss petitioner’s appeal outright. The appeal of
Pfleider, as correctly held by the CA, essentially raised issues purely of law.
REMEDIAL LAW > Post-Judgment Remedies Other Than Appeal> Rule 65 as a Remedy
From Judgment
REMEDIAL LAW>Jurisdiction> Original Jurisdiction of various Philippine courts
SPOUSES JOSE and CORAZON RODRIGUEZ, Petitioners, vs. HOUSING AND LAND USE
REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB), SPS. JOHN SANTIAGO and HELEN KING, IMELDA
ROGANO and SPS. BONIE GAMBOA and NANCY GAMBOA, represented by JOHN
SANTIAGO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 183324 June 19, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: A verified Complaint was filed by the Sps. Balbino and the Sps. Nicolas against the Sps.
Rodriguez before the HLURB which issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Cease and Desist Order
against the Sps. Rodriguez. The aforementioned Complaints deal with the Ruben San Gabriel
Subdivision, which is located at Barangay Wakas, Bocaue, Bulacan. In the said subdivision, the Sps.
Rodriguez acquired several parcels of land, thereby closing an inner road. It was alleged by the
complainants that they are residents of the subject subdivision. They asserted that the subject road lot
being claimed by the Sps. Rodriguez as their own property cannot be closed or conveyed without the
prior approval of the court because it is an existing road lot subject to the provisions of Republic Act
No. 440.
The HLURB Field Office and the Board of Commissioners both decided against the Sps. Rodriguez.
Without filing an appeal before the Office of the President (OP), the Sps. Rodriguez filed a Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA against the
HLURB, the Sps. Santiago, Rogano and the Sps. Gamboa. The CA dismissed the Petition outright for
failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.
Also, the Sps. Nicolas filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt before the Supreme Court against the Sps.
Rodriguez and Manlulu, alleging that “despite vigorous protestation on the part of the Sps. Nicolas, and
after having been warned of the existence of the Cease and Desist Order issued by the HLURB, the
Sps. Rodriguez, in complete defiance of the injunction issued by the HLURB continuously, maliciously
and feloniously dumped filling materials that would ultimately block the road lot leading to the inner
lots of the subdivision.
ISSUE #1: Whether the outright dismissal by the CA of the Rule 65 petition was correct.
HELD #1: Yes. As held time and time again by the Court, for a writ of certiorari to issue, a petitioner
must not only prove that the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. He must also show that there is no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law against what he perceives to be a legitimate grievance. An
available recourse affording prompt relief from the injurious effects of the judgment or acts of a lower
court or tribunal is considered a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
To emphasize, under the Rules of Procedure of the HLURB, “any party may, upon notice to the Board
and the other party, appeal a decision rendered by the Board of Commissioners to the Office of the
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President within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, in accordance with P.D. No. 1344 and A.O. No.
18, Series of 1987.” In the instant Petition, the Sps. Rodriguez failed to provide any explanation
whatsoever to justify their failure to seek prior recourse before the OP. To stress, the special civil
action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which petitioner has lost.
Certiorari lies only when there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
ISSUE #2: Whether the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction in the petition for indirect
contempt for contumacious acts committed against quasi-judicial bodies such as the
HLURB.
HELD #2: No. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction. The Court holds that the Sps. Nicolas’ Petition
for Indirect Contempt should be dismissed.
Section 12, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal in stating that, with respect to
contumacious acts committed against quasi-judicial bodies such as the HLURB, it is the
regional trial court of the place where the contemptuous acts have been committed, and
not the Court, that acquires jurisdiction over the indirect contempt case.
There is absolutely no basis under the Rules of Court to support the Sps. Nicolas’ theory that the Court
has jurisdiction over a case for indirect contempt allegedly committed against a quasi-judicial body just
because the decision of the said quasi-judicial body is pending appeal before the Court. To the
contrary, the Rules of Court unambiguously state that it is the regional trial courts that
have jurisdiction to hear and decide indirect contempt cases involving disobedience of
quasi-judicial entities.
In the instant Petition for Indirect Contempt, the Sps. Nicolas pray that the Court conduct a hearing
and receive evidence on the supposed disobedience and resistance being committed by the Sps.
Rodriguez and Manlulu. In other words, the Sps. Nicolas would want the Court to conduct a fact-finding
hearing to determine whether the Sps. Rodriguez and Manlulu committed indirect contempt. Obviously,
such a prayer cannot be seriously entertained. As held time and time again, it is elementary that the
Court is not a trier of facts. It is within the province of the lower courts, and not the Court, to receive
evidence and to make factual findings based on such evidence.
REMEDIAL LAW>Post-Judgment Remedies Other Than Appeal> Rule 65 as a Remedy From
Judgment
ATTY. AROLF M. ANCHETA, Petitioner, V. FELOMINO C. VILLA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 229634, January 15, 2020
(First Division)
FACTS: Felomino C. Villa (Villa) was the winning party in a case before the CA. He filed a Motion for
Writ of Execution. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), Arolf Ancheta, issued an Order
granting Villa's motion, but this was opposed by the other party. Subsequently, Villa learned from close
friends that Ancheta was given money to issue a resolution or order reversing the writ of execution
earlier issued in his favor. Thus, Villa filed a Motion for Inhibition against Ancheta, which was granted.
The case was then indorsed to the DARAB Regional Office.
However, Villa alleged that the supposed Order by Ancheta granting the quashal of the writ was secretly
added to the records of the case to influence the Regional Adjudicator. Thus, Villa filed a case against
Ancheta for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct and for violation of R.A. 3019. The Ombudsman found
Ancheta guilty of simple neglect of duty and imposed on him a fine in lieu of suspension. It ruled that
Ancheta either neglected to tear or pierce the printed unofficial order or delete the same in his computer
files.
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On appeal, the CA dismissed the petition outright for the following procedural defects: 1) The assailed
Decision and Resolution stemmed from an administrative disciplinary complaint before the
Ombudsman; hence, a petition for review under Rule 43 was the proper remedy, not a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65; 2) payment of docket and other legal fees is short.
ISSUE: Whether Ancheta availed of the correct remedy of petition for certiorari under Rule
65.
HELD: Yes. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, Ancheta correctly filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 instead of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 43. Appeals from the decisions of the
Ombudsman rendered in administrative disciplinary cases should be filed before the CA through a Rule
43 petition. However, the CA failed to consider that Ancheta was meted the penalty of a fine equivalent
to one-month salary by the Ombudsman. Such penalty was final, executory, and unappealable under
Section 7, Rule III, of Administrative Order No. 07, issued by the Ombudsman to implement Section 27
of R.A. 6770, which reads in part: “SEC. 7. Finality and execution of decision. — Where the respondent
is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one-month salary, the
decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed
to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth
in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the
Decision or Order denying the motion for Reconsideration.”
Given the final, executory and unappealable nature of the Ombudsman’s decision, Ancheta’s remedy is
a Rule 65 Petition, as held in Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman: x x x In Republic v. Francisco, we
ruled that decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final
and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of
gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies
grossly misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not
hesitate to reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed,
modified or reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it
had no jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.
Ancheta was therefore correct in filing a petition for certiorari before the CA to assail the Ombudsman
decision considering that the same was final, executory and unappealable and he was able to show
that the Ombudsman grossly misappreciated the evidence so as to compel a contrary conclusion.
REMEDIAL LAW > Post-Judgment Remedies Other Than Appeal> Rule 65 as a Remedy
from Judgment
LOURDES M. PADAYHAG (or HEIRS OF LOURDES M. PADAYHAG), Petitioner
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and SOUTHERN MINDANAO COLLEGES, represented by its
President, Respondents
G.R. Nos. 202872 & 206062, November 11, 2017
(Second Division)
FACTS: This case involves six (6) parcels of land, which are claimed by two (2) parties: The Heirs of
Lourdes Padayhag, and Southern Mindanao Colleges (SMC). The Director of Lands instituted a cadastral
case pursuant to the government's initiative to place all lands under the Cadastral System.
On May 30, 2006, the RTC, sitting as Land Registration Court, rendered a Decision in favor of SMC. The
Padayhags filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the RTC. Aggrieved, SMC appealed
to the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and then further denied the Motion for
Reconsideration.
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On February 5, 2013, SMC filed with the Supreme Court an "Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to
File Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court". In a Resolution, the Supreme
Court resolved to deny SMC's motion for extension for lack of payment of docket fees. Thereafter, an
Entry of Judgment was issued certifying that the said Resolution had become final and executory.
On March 8, 2013, SMC filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether SMC's Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to assail
the CA Decision.
HELD: No. A petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45 is the proper
remedy of a party desiring to appeal by certiorari a judgment, final order or resolution of the CA.
SMC is not justified to avail itself of a Rule 65 certiorari petition after its earlier attempt to avail of a
Rule 45 certiorari petition had failed. SMC, prior to the filing of the SMC Petition, attempted to comply
with a Rule 45 certiorari petition when it filed an "Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court".
Given that SMC resorted to successive Rule 45 and Rule 65 certiorari petitions to question the CA
Decision and Resolution and that the Rule 45 certiorari petition had already been denied, the denial of
the SMC Petition is in order because certiorari is not and cannot be made a substitute for an appeal
where the latter remedy is available but was lost through fault or negligence as in this case where the
appeal was lost due to non-payment of docket fees.
REMEDIAL LAW> Appeals in Civil Procedure: Modes of Appeal from Judgments or Final
Orders of Various Courts/Tribunal> Rule 41 – Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts
ILUMINADA C. BERNARDO, Petitioner, vs. ANA MARIE B. SORIANO, Respondent
G.R. No. 200104, June 19, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: Iluminada C. Bernardo filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus praying that Evangeline Lawas, Head
Social Worker of the DSWD in Mandaluyong City, be ordered to produce the person of her minor
granddaughter, Stephanie Verniese B. Soriano, before the RTC of Mandaluyong City. According to
Bernardo, Stephanie was being deprived and restrained of her liberty while under the custody of the
DSWD, and despite demand by Bernardo, the DSWD refused to release the minor under Bernardo’s
custody and care. Soriano, the surviving parent of Stephanie, for her part, filed a Complaint-inIntervention seeking to be granted custody of her child, and thus, the battle for the permanent custody
of Stephanie between Bernardo and Soriano ensued.
The RTC in its Decision dated 05 August 2010, upheld Soriano's right to parental custody and parental
authority but ruled that, in the meantime, it will be for the best interest of the minor to stay with
Bernardo for one school year while studying. Bernardo filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
On 31 August 2010, the RTC issued an Order denying Bernardo’s Motion for Reconsideration. This
prompted Bernardo to file a Notice of Appeal. On the very same day, Soriano timely filed through
registered mail her Comment with Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
The RTC's denial of Bernardo's Motion for Reconsideration on August 31, 2010 prompted Bernardo to
file a Notice of Appeal on 08 September 2010. However, the Notice of Appeal of Bernardo was denied
due course. The RTC ruled that the assailed 05 August 2010 Decision and the 31 August 2010 Order
denying the Motion for Reconsideration have not yet attained finality, and thus, may not be the subject
of an appeal.
The RTC ratiocinated that Soriano, who received a copy of the 05 August 2010 Decision on 13 August
2010, timely filed her Comment with Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
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Accordingly, through an Order dated 22 October 2010, the RTC granted Soriano’s Motion for Partial
Reconsideration and allowed Soriano to take custody of her minor child immediately.
ISSUE: Whether the pendency of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of Soriano
precluded Bernardo from filing her own Notice of Appeal.
HELD: No. Bernardo's Notice of Appeal should have been deemed perfected as to her.
With respect to Bernardo, the RTC's Decision did not cease to be an appealable judgment, transforming
into a mere interlocutory order, for the sole reason that the opposing party, Soriano, filed her own
Motion for Partial Reconsideration. With Bernardo's own Motion for Reconsideration having been denied
by the RTC, according to Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, Bernardo already had 15 days to file a Notice
of Appeal regardless of Soriano filing her own Motion for Reconsideration.
There is nothing in the Rules which makes a party's right to appeal dependent or contingent on the
opposing party's motion for reconsideration. Similarly, a party's undertaking to file a motion for
reconsideration of a judgment is not hindered by the other party's filing of a notice of appeal.
Jurisprudence holds that "each party has a different period within which to appeal" and that "[s]ince
each party has a different period within which to appeal, the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration
by one party does not interrupt the other or another party's period of appeal."
Hence, a party's ability to file his/her own appeal upon receipt of the assailed judgment or the denial
of a motion for reconsideration challenging the said judgment within the reglementary period of 15
days is not affected by the other parties' exercise of discretion to file their respective motions for
reconsideration.
If the RTC granted due course to Bernardo's Notice of Appeal, the RTC would not have been divested
of jurisdiction to decide Soriano's Motion for Partial Reconsideration and that Soriano's right to file her
own Motion for Reconsideration would not have been defeated whatsoever. This is the case because
under Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, in appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction
over the case only upon the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
REMEDIAL LAW > Appeals in Civil Procedure: Modes of Appeal from Judgments or Final
Orders of Various Courts/Tribunals> Rule 41 – Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts
CIVIL LAW > Land Titles and Deeds > Certificate of Title
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, Petitioner, V. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR
THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET, Respondent.
G.R. No. 222958, March 11, 2020
(First Division)
FACTS: The case involves two successive petitions for replacement of lost owner's duplicate Transfer
Certificate of Title. The first petition was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court for insufficiency of
evidence, i.e., for failure to prove the fact of loss, while the second petition was dismissed by the RTC
on the ground of res judicata. The present case is an offshoot of the second petition.
In 2011, PBCOM filed a petition for issuance of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 21320 in lieu of
the lost one (first petition). After PBCOM's ex parte presentation of evidence, the RTC dismissed the
first petition for insufficiency of evidence. PBCOM filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and
prayed that it be allowed to present additional evidence to prove the allegations in its first petition. The
RTC, Branch 62 gave PBCOM five (5) days to file a supplemental motion but failed to comply and did
not bother to set its foregoing motions for hearing. Thus, the RTC considered the omnibus motion for
reconsideration as well as the Manifestation as abandoned.
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Instead of filing an appeal from the order, PBCOM filed the second petition, docketed as LRC Case No.
12-AD-1401, raffled to RTC, Branch 63. The allegations in the second petition were essentially the same
as that contained in the first petition. The RTC-Branch 63 dismissed the second petition, motu proprio,
on the ground of res judicata. As the first petition was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, i.e., an
adjudication on the merits, the RTC-Branch 63 held that the second petition involving the same parties
and cause of action was barred by prior judgment.
PBCOM sought reconsideration, which was, however, denied. It then filed a notice of appeal, which it
later withdrew. Thereafter, it filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, claiming that the respondent
judge therein committed grave abuse of discretion (1) in dismissing the second petition on the ground
of res judicata and (2) in dismissing, without first determining, whether the evidence presented in the
first petition was identical to the evidence intended to be presented in the second petition. PBCOM
claimed that the dismissal of the first petition did not bar the filing of a second petition, for otherwise,
it would be forever barred from securing a "replacement copy of the missing title."
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and held that: (1) PBCOM availed of the wrong remedy as
the dismissal of the second petition on the ground of res judicata was a complete disposition and was
thus reviewable via appeal; and (2) all elements of res judicata were attendant, given that PBCOM
sought the issuance of the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 21320 in both petitions.
PBCOM thus filed the instant Petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging, among others, that:
(1) the Rules of Court and the concept of res judicata do not apply to land registration; and (2) it
availed of the correct remedy.
ISSUE #1: Whether PBCOM availed of the correct remedy to challenge the dismissal of the
second petition.
HELD: No. PBCOM availed of the wrong remedy when it filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari to
challenge the dismissal of the second petition on the ground of res judicata. A Rule 65 petition
for certiorari is not the correct remedy to challenge the dismissal of the second petition. Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court governs ordinary appeals from the Regional Trial Courts.
In Medina v. Spouses Lozada, the Court explained: An order or a judgment is deemed final when it
finally disposes of a pending action, so that nothing more can be done with it in the trial court. In other
words, the order or judgment ends the litigation in the lower court. An order of dismissal, whether
correct or not, is a final order. It is not interlocutory because the proceedings are terminated; it leaves
nothing more to be done by the lower court. Therefore, the remedy of the plaintiff, except when
otherwise provided, is to appeal the order.
Applying the foregoing, there is no question that (1) a dismissal on the ground of res judicata is a final
order that completely disposes of the case and leaves nothing more to be done in the RTC and (2) such
dismissal does not fall within the enumeration of orders from which no appeal may be taken. In fact, a
dismissal on the ground of res judicata is expressly declared to be appealable under Rule 16, Section 1
in relation to Section 5.
Evidently therefore, appeal — and not a special civil action for certiorari — was the correct remedy to
challenge the dismissal of the second petition on the ground of res judicata. As appeal was available,
PBCOM's Rule 65 petition would not prosper even if the ground therefor was grave abuse of discretion.
Pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a special civil action for certiorari could only be availed of
when a tribunal "acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of [its]
judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction" or when it acted without or in excess of
its x x x jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
if there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
ISSUE #2: Whether RTC-Branch 62’s dismissal of the first petition precluded PBCOM from
filing a second petition to replace its owner's duplicate certificate of title In the interest of
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substantial justice, the Supreme Court relaxed the technical rules of procedure to resolve
the novel issue presented in this case.
HELD#2: No. A registered owner who fails to prove the loss or destruction of his/her owner's duplicate
certificate of title may not be barred from refiling a new petition to replace the same. It is a fundamental
principle in land registration that the certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It is conclusive
evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein.
Ownership of registered land is evidenced by the certificate of title, which is indefeasible and
incontrovertible. Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1529 or the ''Property Registration Decree" mandates
the issuance of this certificate of title in duplicates — the original certificate of title, which is either an
original certificate of title or TCT to be kept by the Register of Deeds and an owner's duplicate certificate
of title to be kept by the registered owner.
The requirement that the owner's duplicate certificate of title be presented for voluntary transactions
is precisely what gives the registered owner "security" and "peace of mind" under the Torrens system.
Without the owner's duplicate certificate of title, transfers and conveyances a] like sales and donations,
mortgages, and leases, and agencies and trusts while valid, will not bind the registered land. As such,
the owner's duplicate certificate of title safeguards ownership. At the same time, the owner's duplicate
certificate of title is also crucial to the full and effective exercise of ownership rights over registered
land. Hence, a registered owner has a substantive right to own and possess the owner's duplicate
certificate of title and to replace the same m case of loss or destruction.
In view of the foregoing, PBCOM, as the undisputed registered owner of the land covered by TCT No.
21320 on file with the Register of Deeds, cannot be barred by res judicata from filing a second petition
to replace its owner's duplicate certificate of title in case of loss or destruction of the original duplicate.
RTC-Branch 62 dismissed the first petition because PBCOM failed to show that it exerted its best efforts
to locate the title. This dismissal is obviously without prejudice to the right of PBCOM, as the undisputed
registered owner, to subsequently and sufficiently prove that the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 21320
has indeed been lost.
REMEDIAL LAW> Appeals in Civil Procedure: Modes of Appeal from Judgments or Final
Orders of Various Courts/Tribunals> Rule 45 – Appeals by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
REMEDIAL LAW> Procedure in the Court of Appeals> Rule 46
WILFREDO CABUGUAS, RENATO CABUGUAS, ALEJANDRO "TABOY" CANETE AND ELEAZAR
MORTOS, • Petitioners, vs. GALLANTS. TAN NERY, REPRESENTED BY KATHERINE TAN
NERY-TOLEDO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 219915, April 03, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: Gallant S. Tan Nery (Nery) filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession of Real Property and
Ejectment before the DARAB, Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator against Wilfredo
Cabuguas et. al involving a parcel of land issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR, in favor
of Nery. Nery claimed that Wilfredo Cabugas was employed to conduct the act of brushing and land
preparation of his landholding for the purpose of planting yellow corn but the latter occupied the land,
built a house and even invited other person to also build a house thereon.
In his answer, Wilfredo claimed that Nery is not an actual occupant or resident where the subject
property is located and the Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued to him will bear this out
while Wilfredo et. al. has been actually possessing, occupying, tilling and cultivating their respective
portions of the subject landholding for a long period of time and have acquired a vested and preferential
right to become farmer-beneficiaries thereof pursuant to Section 22 of RA 665, thus, they cannot be
ejected therefrom as they are more qualified to become beneficiaries than Nery.
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When the case reached the CA, the CA ruled in favor of Nery. Hence, after their Motion for
Reconsideration was denied, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.
However, it appears that petitioners commenced a separate action to assail the CLOA of Nery, and it
also appears that the action was decided in favor of petitioners and that it has become final and
executory. Nonetheless, the Certificate of Finality attached by petitioners is not a certified true copy.
Further, the determination of its validity and its effect on this case is a factual matter that the Supreme
Court cannot determine.
ISSUE: Whether this case should be remanded to the CA.
HELD: Yes. In Manotok IV v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque (Manotok) the Court explained the propriety
and rationale behind remanding a case to the CA for the determination of a factual issue, thus: “Under
Section 6 of Rule 46, which is applicable to original cases for certiorari, the Court may, whenever
necessary to resolve factual issues, delegate the reception of the evidence on such issues to any of its
members or to an appropriate court, agency or office. The delegate need not be the body that rendered
the assailed decision. The CA generally has the authority to review findings of fact. Its conclusions as
to findings of fact are generally accorded great respect by this Court. It is a body that is fully capacitated
and has a surfeit of experience in appreciating factual matters, including documentary evidence. x x x
The provisions of Rule 32 should also be considered as governing the grant of authority to the CA to
receive evidence in the present case. Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu
proprio, direct a reference to a commissioner when a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings,
arises upon motion or otherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect.
The order of reference can be limited exclusively to receive and report evidence only, and the
commissioner may likewise rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The commissioner is likewise
mandated to submit a report in writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him by the order of
reference. In Republic, the commissioner's report formed the basis of the final adjudication by the Court
on the matter. The same result can obtain herein.”
Hence, pursuant to Rules 32 and 46 of the Rules of Court, and consistent with the Court's ruling in
Manotok, this case is remanded to the CA in order to: (i) allow petitioners to present proof of the status
of the CLOA of the subject property; and (ii) allow respondent to present controverting evidence, if
there be any.
REMEDIAL LAW> Appeals in Civil Procedure: Modes of Appeal from Judgments or Final
Orders of Various Courts/Tribunals> Rule 45 – Appeals by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
PAZ MANDIN-TROTIN, Petitioner, v. FRANCISCO A. BONGO, SABINA BONGO-BUNTAG
AND ARTEMIA BONGO-LIQUIT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 212840, August 28, 2019
Second Division
FACTS: The instant controversy involves a parcel of land situated in Danao, Panglao, Bohol, containing
an area of 32,668 square meters, more or less. Lot No. 3982 is covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 64051 registered in the name of Candido Bongo. Candido Bongo is the husband and father
of Heirs of Candido Bongo - Francisco, Sabina and Artemia et al). Candido is also the only brother of
Diosdado Bongo, the father of Heirs of Diosdado Bongo.
The Heirs of Diosdado Bongo's claim over the subject land is founded on the alleged acquisition of the
land by their father Diosdado from its previous owner. They caused the filing of an adverse claim and
an action seeking the annulment of the Heirs of Candido Bongo's title, recovery of ownership and
possession of Lot No. 3982, and. Thereafter, intervenor/cross-claimant Paz Mandin-Trotin (Trotin) filed
an Urgent Motion for Intervention.
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The RTC ruled in favor of the Heirs of Candido Bongo. Aggrieved, the Heirs of Diosdado Bongo appealed
to the CA. The CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the RTC Decision. Without filing a motion for
reconsideration, intervenor Trotin filed the instant Rule 45 Petition against respondents. The
respondents filed their Comments to the Petition for Review seeking the dismissal of the Petition for
lack of merit on the ground, among others, that Intervenor Trotin attempts to introduce new evidence,
which is the Affidavit of Merit, alleging for the first time the existence of the Agreements that were
allegedly executed in 2000 and 2001 (while the trial of the case was on going) by Sabina Bongo-Buntag
and Artemia Bongo-Liquit separately with intervenor Trotin. The respondents contend that Section 15,
Rule 44 of the Rules prohibits the raising of new issues on appeal not raised during the trial.
ISSUE: Whether the Agreements may be considered as newly discovered evidence.
HELD: No. The requisites for the introduction of newly discovered evidence are: (1) the evidence
was discovered after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change
the judgment if admitted. If the alleged evidence could have very well been presented during the
trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same could not be considered newly discovered
evidence.
The said evidence, if indeed the Agreements were executed in 2000 and 2001, as claimed by
intervenor Trotin, were available during the trial and could have been presented during that time.
Therefore, the requisite that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence is wanting. The evidence that intervenor Trotin seeks
to introduce at this late stage of the proceedings is NOT newly discovered evidence.
REMEDIAL LAW> Rule 45 – Appeals by Certiorari to the Supreme Court
CIVIL LAW> Property>Classification of property
PNOC ALTERNATIVE FUELS CORPORATION (PAFC), Petitioner, v. NATIONAL GRID
CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES (NGCP), Respondent
G.R. No. 224936, September 04, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: NGCP is a private corporation which seeks to expropriate, upon payment of just compensation,
a certain area of a parcel of land situated in Bataan that is part of the Petrochemical Industrial Park.
The said land was originally part of a parcel of land of the public domain reserved by the government
for the Lamao Horticultural Experiment Station. Subsequently, 418 out of the 621 hectares of land of
the public domain were declared as an industrial reservation to be administered by the National Power
Corporation (NPC). Later, through a presidential proclamation, the area was enlarged and reserved for
industrial purposes, including the establishment of an industrial estate under the administration of the
National Development Company (NDC) or a subsidiary organized for such purposes. Afterwards, the
administration, management, and ownership of the parcel of land of the public domain was then
transferred to the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC). PNOC’s subsidiary, PNOC Petrochemicals
Development Corporation (PPDC), the primary purpose of which is to administer and operate the
Petrochemical Industrial Zone was changed to PAFC, the respondent in this case. PNOC had organized
PAFC and assigned ownership of the property to PAFC via Deed of Assignment.
In 2011, NGCP filed its Complaint seeking to expropriate the subject property from PAFC. NGCP sought
to exercise its right of eminent domain over the subject property because negotiations conducted with
PAFC on the establishment of transmission lines were unsuccessful. NGCP invoked its general authority
to exercise the right of eminent domain under Section 4 of RA 9511, which allows it to exercise the
right of eminent domain with respect to private property. During the pendency of the expropriation
case, RA 10516 was passed, expanding the use of the Petrochemical Industrial Park to include
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businesses engaged in energy and energy-allied activities or energy-related infrastructure projects, or
of such other business activities that will promote its best economic use.
It is admitted by all parties that the subject property, sitting within the Petrochemical Industrial Park,
is an industrial zone. Further, it is apparent from R.A. No. 10516 and its IRR that the industrial estate
is being owned, managed, and operated by the State, not in its sovereign capacity, but rather in its
private capacity.
RTC issued the Order of Expropriation and ruled that NGCP has a lawful right to expropriate the subject
property upon payment of just compensation. PAFC filed its Motion for Reconsideration but which was
denied hence it directly filed an appeal before the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
ISSUE #1: Whether PAFC was correct in filing its Rule 45 petition directly before the
Supreme Court.
HELD #1: Yes. Section 4, Rule 67 states that: “A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the
property may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.” Therefore, the proper remedy of a
defendant in an expropriation case who wishes to contest an order of expropriation is not to file a
certiorari petition and allege that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of
expropriation. The remedy is to file an appeal of the order of expropriation.
Under Rule 41, in all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be filed
directly before the Supreme Court, not via a notice of appeal or record on appeal, but through a petition
for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45. The instant Petition may be decided by dealing
purely with questions of law. Here, PAFC raises the argument that the expropriation of the subject
property by NGCP is invalid because such exercise of eminent domain was neither done directly by
Congress nor pursuant to a specific grant of authority. It is readily apparent that this primary argument
is legal in nature. PAFC did not commit a procedural error in filing the instant appeal via a Rule 45
petition directly before the Court.
ISSUE #2: Whether the NGCP is empowered to expropriate the subject property despite it
being owned by the State.
HELD #2: Yes. The subject property in this case, though owned by a State instrumentality, is
considered patrimonial property that assumes the nature of private property, and is therefore within
the coverage of Section 4 of RA 9511.
Considering that NGCP is empowered to expropriate private properties exclusively, the concept of
private property and land of the public dominion must be distinguished. Article 419 of the Civil Code
classifies property as either of (1) public dominion or (2) of private ownership. Article 420, in turn,
identifies lands of public dominion as either (1) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character; or (2) those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. Hence, based on Article 420 of
the Civil Code, there are three kinds of property of public dominion: (1) those for public use, which
may be used by anybody, such as roads and canals; (2) those for public service, which may be used
only by certain duly authorized persons, although used for the benefit of the public; and (3) those used
for the development of national wealth, such as our natural resources. Properties owned by the State
which do not have the aforementioned characteristics of a land of public dominion are patrimonial
properties. These properties are owned by the State in its private or proprietary capacity. Even if
patrimonial property refers to land owned by the State or any of its instrumentalities, such is still
deemed private property as it is held by the State in its private and proprietary capacity, and not in its
public capacity. Hence, the mere fact that a parcel of land is owned by the State or any of its
instrumentalities does not necessarily mean that such land is of public dominion and not private
property. If land owned by the State is considered patrimonial property, then such land assumes the
nature of private property. Land of the public dominion expressly deemed by the State to be alienable
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and disposable, susceptible to the commerce of man through sale, lease, or any other mode of
disposition, assumes the nature of patrimonial property. The subject property in this case, though
owned by a State instrumentality, is considered patrimonial property that assumes the nature of private
property.
The management and operation of the industrial estate is proprietary in character, serving the economic
ends of the State. The laws governing the subject property have unequivocally declared that the subject
property is alienable, disposable, appropriable, may be conveyed to private persons or entities, and is
subject to private rights. With the subject property expressly declared by law, i.e., P.D. No. 949, as
amended by RA 10516, to be an industrial and commercial estate that may be transferred or conveyed
to private persons so that business activities may be conducted therein, there is no doubt that the
subject property is patrimonial property. In other words, NGCP has the authority under Section 4 of RA
9511 to expropriate the subject property
REMEDIAL LAW> Appeals in Civil Procedure: Modes of Appeal from Judgments or Final
Orders of Various Courts/Tribunals> Rule 64 – Review of Judgments or Final Orders of the
Commission on Audit
EMERITA A. COLLADO, SUPPLY OFFICER III, PHILIPPINE SCIENCE HIGH SCHOOL
(PSHS), DILLMAN CAMPUS, QUEZON CITY, Petitioner, VS. HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR,
HON. JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR. [COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT] AND THE
DIRECTOR, LEGAL SERVICES SECTOR, ADJUDICATION AND LEGAL SERVICES OFFICE,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondents.
G.R. No. 193143, December 01, 2020
(En Banc)
FACTS: A contract was entered into by and between the PSHS, Diliman Campus and N.C. Roxas, Inc.,
for the construction of the PSHS-Mindanao Campus Building Complex in the amount of P9,064,799.76.
Upon post-audit, the Auditor discovered that the liquidated damages imposed by PSHS Management
on the contractor was only P252,114.79 instead of P2,400,134.65. Consequently, the COA State Auditor
IV (COA Auditor) issued Notices of Disallowance covering the deficiency in the amount of liquidated
damages.
Since it was found that there was an overpayment in the progress billings amounting to
P2,148,019.86.15, the COA Auditor held the following persons solidarily liable: x x x (iii) Rufina E.
Vasquez (Vasquez), Administrative Officer V, for her act of "certifying the expense as necessary, lawful
and incurred under her direct supervision, and (iv) Collado for her act of "computing the erroneous
liquidated damages to be imposed.
The COA National Government Audit Office I (COA-NGAO) sustained the findings of the COA Auditors.
Collado and Vasquez subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 16, 2001. On automatic
review, the COA-CP in the 2002 COA Decision denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
Subsequently, Collado and Vasquez filed a Petition for Review with the COA-CP again. In the 2008
COA Decision received by Collado on May 15, 2008, the COA-CP, treating the Petition for Review
(Petition for Review) as a motion for reconsideration of the 2002 COA Decision, affirmed the 2002
COA Decision with finality.
Unsatisfied, in a Letter dated June 10, 2008, Collado and Vasquez again sought reconsideration of the
2002 COA Decision insofar as it found them liable. The Legal Services Sector-Adjudication and Legal
Services (LSS-ALS) denied due course to the Letter for being a second motion for reconsideration of
the 2002 COA Decision — a prohibited pleading under Section 13, Rule IX of the 1997 COA Rules.
Thereafter, Collado, acting alone, insisted that the Letter dated June 10, 2008 was only the first motion
for reconsideration directed against the 2008 COA Decision and not a second motion for reconsideration
of the 2002 COA Decision. The LSS-ALS denied petitioner Collado's request for reconsideration. Hence,
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Collado filed this instant Petition for Certiorari (Petition) under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court on August 20, 2010.
ISSUE: Whether this instant Petition was correctly filed.
HELD: No. This instant Petition was filed out of time.
By filing the Petition for Review with the COA-CP — the very same body that rendered the 2002 COA
Decision — Collado was seeking a reconsideration of the 2002 COA Decision. In this regard, in the 2008
COA Decision, the COA-CP was correct in treating the Petition for Review as a first motion for
reconsideration. At that point, upon the denial of the first motion for reconsideration, Collado should
have already filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court within the period provided in Rule 64
of the Rules.
Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules, which specifically governs the mode of review from judgments, final
orders, or resolutions issued by the COA, states: “SEC. 3. Time to file petition. - The petition shall be
filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final order or
resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period
herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the
remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned
from notice of denial.”
The 2008 COA Decision — the final dispositive act of the COA-CP on the motion for reconsideration of
the 2002 COA Decision — was received by Collado on May 15, 2008. Following the last sentence of
Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules, Collado had only five days therefrom, or until May 20, 2008, within
which to file the proper petition. Considering therefore that the instant Petition was filed only on August
20, 2010, or more than two years after Collado's receipt of the 2008 COA Decision, the Petition was
perforce filed out of time.
REMEDIAL LAW> Appeals in Criminal Cases: Modes of Appeal from Judgments or Final
Orders of Various Courts/Tribunals>Rule 122
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. WILLIAM CEPEDA y DULTRA * and
LOREN DY y SERO, Accused-Appellant
G.R. No. 229833. July 29, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: Dy and Cepeda were jointly charged with violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 , while Cepeda
alone was charged with violation of Section 11 of the said law before the RTC. The RTC found Dy and
Cepeda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, respectively, Article II, RA
9165. Insisting on their innocence, Dy and Cepeda jointly appealed to the CA. In the CA Decision, the
CA affirmed the RTC Judgment. In a Motion, the counsel of Dy and Cepeda withdrew his representation.
On July 4, 2016, the Public Attorney's Office filed an Entry of Appearance with Notice of Appeal,
informing the CA of Dy's intention to pursue an appeal with the Court. Cepeda, however, no longer
appealed his conviction.
ISSUE: Whether the acquittal of accused-appellant Dy is beneficial to Cepeda.
HELD: Yes. The Court likewise acquits Cepeda, notwithstanding his failure to perfect an appeal herein.
Recently, in Fuentes v. People 43 (Fuentes), the Court, following its acquittal of the accused-appellant
therein from a charge of violation of RA 9165, likewise acquitted the accused-appellant's co-accused
who had failed to appeal from the judgment of conviction rendered by the CA. As a final note, it must
be pointed out that although petitioner's co-accused, Calotes, no longer joined in filing the instant
petition, the Court nevertheless deems it proper to likewise acquit him of the crime charged. This is
79
because the criminal case against Calotes arose from the same set of facts as the case against petitioner
and that such acquittal is definitely favorable and beneficial to him. Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that:
Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. —
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except
insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. (Emphasis
supplied)
Without question, Dy's conviction rests on the same set of facts and circumstances as the conviction of
Cepeda, her co-accused before the CA. Hence, following the instruction of Fuentes and the higher
demand of substantial justice, the supervening acquittal of Dy in the instant appeal must likewise be
extended to Cepeda.
REMEDIAL LAW>Appeals in Criminal Cases: Modes of Appeal from Judgments or Final
Orders of Various Courts/Tribunals> Appeals from the Office of the Ombudsman
SHERWIN T. GATCHALIAN, Petitioner, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and FIELD
INVESTIGATION OFFICE OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 229288, August 1, 2018
(Second Division)
FACTS: The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Gatchalian of the following: (a) one count of
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, (b) one count of malversation of public funds, and (c) one count
of violation of Section X126.2(C) (1) and (2) of MORB in relation to Sections 36 and 37 of R.A. 7653.
The respondents in the Ombudsman cases, including Gatchalian, filed separate motions for
reconsideration of the Joint Resolution. However, on April 4, 2016, the Ombudsman issued a Joint
Order denying the motions for reconsideration.
Aggrieved, Gatchalian filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
and sought to annul the Joint Resolution and the Joint Order of the Ombudsman for having been issued
with grave abuse of discretion.
The CA dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the CA has jurisdiction over Gatchalian’s petition
HELD: No. It is the Supreme Court which has jurisdiction.
The Court - sitting En Banc - decided the case of Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines,
et al. v. Commission on Elections, where it upheld the difference of appellate procedure between orders
or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative and non-administrative cases. Thus:
[The Supreme] Court has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari questioning resolutions or orders of
the Ombudsman in criminal cases. For administrative cases, however, xxx the petition should be
filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. [T]he procedural
rule with respect to administrative cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, [is that], all
remedies involving the orders, directives, or decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases,
whether by an appeal under Rule 43 or a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, must be filed with the
Court of Appeals.
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REMEDIAL LAW>Procedure in Tax Cases>Tax Remedies under The National Internal
Revenue Code>Prescription
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner
vs. SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE, INC., Respondent
G.R. No. 220835, July 26, 2017
(First Division)
FACTS: STI filed its Amended Annual Income Tax Return for fiscal year 2003 on August 15, 2003; its
Quarterly VAT Returns on July 23, 2002, October 25, 2002, January 24, 2003, and May 23, 2003; and
its Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Form 1601E for EWT from May 10, 2002 to April 15, 2003.
On May 30, 2006, STI signed a Waiver of the Defense of Prescription under the Statute of Limitations
of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), with the proviso that the assessment and collection of
taxes of fiscal year 2003 shall come "no later than December 31, 2006." On June 2, 2006, the
waiver was accepted by the Large Taxpayers District Officer of Makati and was notarized on even date.
On December 12, 2006, another waiver was executed extending the period to assess and collect the
assessed taxes to March 31, 2007. A third waiver was executed by the same signatories extending
further the period to June 30, 2007. On June 28, 2007, STI received a Formal Assessment Notice from
the CIR, assessing STI for deficiency income tax, VAT and EWT for fiscal year 2003. STI filed a request
for reconsideration/reinvestigation but was denied.
STI appealed with the CTA which the latter promulgated its Decision denying the assessment on the
ground of prescription. The CTA Division found the waivers executed by STI defective for failing to
strictly comply with the requirements provided by Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 20-90 and
Revenue Delegation Authority Order (RDAO) No. 05-01 which requires that the waiver must be in the
proper form prescribed by RMO 20- 90. The phrase "but not after __________ 19 _", which
indicates the expiry date, and must be signed by the CIR or the revenue official authorized by
him. Consequently, the periods for the CIR to assess or collect internal revenue taxes were never
extended; and the subject assessment for deficiency income tax, VAT and EWT against STI, which the
CIR issued beyond the three-year prescriptive period provided by law, was already barred by
prescription.
ISSUE # 1: Whether the Waiver of Statute of Limitations executed is valid.
HELD # 1: No. The requirements under RMO 20-90 and RDAO 05-01 outlining the procedures for the
proper execution of a valid waiver are mandatory and must strictly be followed. The waivers executed
by STI defective for failing to strictly comply with the requirements provided by Revenue Memorandum
Order (RMO) No. 20-90 issued on April 4, 1990 and Revenue Delegation Authority Order (RDAO) No.
05-01 issued on August 2, 2001. In the case of CIR v. FMF Development Corporation, the waiver was
found defective and thus invalid because it was signed only by a revenue district officer, and not the
CIR as mandated by law.
ISSUE # 2: Whether prescription had set in against the assessments for deficiency income
tax, deficiency VAT and deficiency expanded withholding tax.
HELD # 2: Yes. The Waivers of Statute of Limitations, being defective and invalid, did not extend the
CIR's period to issue the subject assessments. Thus, the right of the government to assess or collect
the alleged deficiency taxes is already barred by prescription.
Section 203 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, limits the CIR's period to assess and collect internal
revenue taxes to three (3) years counted from the last day prescribed by law for the filing of the return
or from the day the return was filed, whichever comes later. Thus, assessments issued after the
expiration of such period are no longer valid and effective.
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CTA Division found that the last day for the CIR to issue an assessment on STI's income tax for fiscal
year ending March 31, 2003 was on August 15, 2006; while the latest date for the CIR to assess STI
of EWT for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2003 was on April 17, 2006; and the latest date for the
CIR to assess STI of deficiency VAT for the four quarters of the same fiscal year was on May 25, 2006.
Clearly, on the basis of these dates, the final assessment notice dated June 16, 2007, assessing STI for
deficiency income tax, VAT and EWT for fiscal year 2003, in the aggregate amount of ₱161,835,737.98,
which STI received on June 28, 2007, was issued beyond the three-year prescriptive period.
REMEDIAL LAW >Procedure In Tax Cases>Tax Remedies under The National Internal
Revenue Code>Refund
PROCTER & GAMBLE ASIA PTE LTD., Petitioner, v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205652, September 06, 2017
(Second Division)
FACTS: On March 22, 2007 and May 2, 2007, P&G filed applications and letters addressed to the BIR
Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 49, requesting the refund or issuance of tax credit certificates (TCCs)
of its input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales covering the taxable periods of January 2005 to
March 2005, and April 2005 to June 2005. On March 28, 2007, P&G filed a petition for review with the
CTA seeking the refund or issuance of TCC in the amount of P23,090,729.17 representing input VAT
paid on goods or services attributable to its zero-rated sales for the first quarter of taxable year 2005.
The case was docketed as CTA Case No. 7581. On July 30, 2007, the two CTA cases were consolidated
since they involved the same parties and common questions of law and/or facts. Meanwhile, on October
6, 2010, while P&G's claim for refund or tax credit was pending before the CTA Division, this Court
promulgated Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. (Aichi). In that
case, the Court held that compliance with the 120-day period granted to the CIR, within which to act
on an administrative claim for refund or credit of unutilized input VAT, as provided under Section 112(C)
of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC), as amended, is mandatory and jurisdictional in
filing an appeal with the CTA. In a Decision dated November 17, 2010, the CTA Division dismissed
P&G's judicial claim, for having been prematurely filed. P&G moved for reconsideration but this was
denied by the CTA Division in its Resolution dated March 9, 2011. Aggrieved, P&G elevated the matter
to the CTA En Banc insisting, among others, that the Court's ruling in Aichi should not be given a
retroactive effect. In the meantime, on February 12, 2013, this Court decided the consolidated cases
of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, Taganito Mining Corporation v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and Philex Mining Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(San Roque), where the Court recognized BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 as an exception to the mandatory
and jurisdictional nature of the 120-day waiting period.
ISSUE: Whether the CTA En Banc erred in dismissing P&G's judicial claims for refund on
the ground of prematurity.
HELD: Yes, the CTA En Banc erred in dismissing P&G's judicial claims for refund on the ground of
prematurity. In the case of Aichi, the Court ruled that compliance with the 120+30-day periods is
mandatory and jurisdictional and is fatal to the filing of a judicial claim with the CTA. Subsequently,
however, in San Roque, while the Court reiterated the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the
120+30-day periods, it recognized as an exception BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, issued prior to the
promulgation of Aichi, where the BIR expressly allowed the filing of judicial claims with the CTA even
before the lapse of the 120-day period. The Court held that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 furnishes a valid
basis to hold the CIR in estoppel because the CIR had misled taxpayers into filing judicial claims with
the CTA even before the lapse of the 120-day period:
In this case, records show that P&G filed its judicial claims for refund on March 28, 2007 and June 8,
2007, respectively, or after the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, but before the date when Aichi
was promulgated. Thus, even though P&G filed its judicial claim without waiting for the expiration of
the 120-day mandatory period, the CTA may still take cognizance of the case because the claim was
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filed within the excepted period stated in San Roque. In other words, P&G's judicial claims were deemed
timely filed and should not have been dismissed by the CTA.
REMEDIAL LAW >Procedure in Tax Cases>Tax Remedies under the National Internal
Revenue Code>Refund>Tax Credit
SITEL PHILIPPINES CORPORATION (FORMERLY CLIENTLOGIC PHILS., INC.), Petitioner
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
G.R. No. 201326, February 8, 2017
(First Division)
FACTS: Sitel is a corporation registered with the BIR as a VAT taxpayer, as well with the Board of
Investments on pioneer status as a new information technology service firm in the field of call center.
On March 28, 2006, Sitel filed separate formal claims for refund or issuance of tax credit with the OneStop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance for its
unutilized input VAT arising from domestic purchases of goods and services attributed to zero-rated
transactions and purchases/importations of capital good. On March 30, 2006, Sitel filed a judicial claim
for refund or tax credit via a petition for review before the CTA, docketed as CTA Case No. 7423
The CTA En Banc ruled that the 120-day period for the CIR to act on the administrative claim for refund
or tax credit, under Section 112(D) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, is mandatory and jurisdictional.
Considering that Sitel filed its judicial claim for VAT refund or credit without waiting for the lapse of the
120-day period for the CIR to act on its administrative claim, the CTA did not acquire jurisdiction as
there was no decision or inaction to speak of.19 Thus, the CTA En Banc denied Sitel's entire refund claim
on the ground of prematurity.
ISSUE: Whether Sitel’s judicial claim for refund was timely filed.
HELD: Yes. Sitel's Judicial Claim/or VAT Refund was deemed timely filed pursuant to the Supreme
Court's pronouncement in San Roque. Based on the plain language of the provision in the Tax Code,
as amended, the CIR is given 120 days within which to grant or deny a claim for refund. Upon receipt
of CIR' s decision or ruling denying the said claim, or upon the expiration of the 120-day period without
action from the CIR, the taxpayer has thirty (30) days within which to file a petition for review with the
CTA.
In Aichi, the Court ruled that the 120-day period granted to the CIR was mandatory and jurisdictional,
the non-observance of which was fatal to the filing of a judicial claim with the CTA. However, in CIR v.
San Roque Power Corporation, the Court clarified that the 120-day period does not apply to claims for
refund that were prematurely filed during the period from the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03,
on December 10, 2003, until October 6, 2010, when Aichi was promulgated. The Court explained that
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, which expressly allowed the filing of judicial claims with the CTA even before
the lapse of the 120-day period, provided for a valid claim of equitable estoppel because the CIR had
misled taxpayers into prematurely filing their judicial claims before the CTA. In this case, records show
that Sitel filed its administrative and judicial claim for refund on March 28, 2006 and March 30, 2006,
respectively, or after the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, but before the date when Aichi was
promulgated. Thus, even though Sitel filed its judicial claim prematurely, i.e., without waiting for the
expiration of the 120-day mandatory period, the CTA may still take cognizance of the case because the
claim was filed within the excepted period stated in San Roque.
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REMEDIAL LAW >Taxation Law> Procedure in Tax Cases> Tax Remedies Under the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, As Amended> Refund
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, vs. LUCIO L. CO, SUSAN P. CO,
FERDINAND VINCENT P. CO, AND PAMELA JUSTINE P. CO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 241424, February 26, 2020
(First Division)
FACTS: Puregold issued to the Cos and Sy a total of 766,406,250 Puregold shares from the unissued
portion of its authorized capital stock in exchange for the 1,703,125 Kareila shares. As a result of the
share swap under the Deed of Exchange: (1) Puregold acquired majority ownership of Kareila; and (2)
Respondents, who, prior to the share swap, already collectively owned 66.5720% of the outstanding
capital stock of Puregold consequently increased their stockholdings to 75.8329% after the swap. On
June 26 and 28, 2012, respondents collectively paid capital gains tax (CGT) including interest and/or
compromise penalty on the said transfer pursuant to Section 24(C) of the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1997 (NIRC), as amended. Respondents, however, contend that their payments of CGT were
erroneous because, under Section 40(C)(2) of the NIRC, their transfer of shares through the Deed of
Exchange was a tax-exempt transaction. Thus, on May 21, 2014, or within the two-year prescriptive
period provided under Section 204(c) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, respondents filed their
administrative claims for refund of the CGT including interest and/or compromise penalty with their
respective Revenue District Offices (RDO).
Due to the CIR's inaction, respondents filed a Petition for Review with the CTA Division. In the Answer,
the CIR alleged that Revenue Regulations No. 18-2001, Revenue Memorandum Order Nos. 32-2001
and 17-2002 provide that there are certain conditions or requirements which should be complied with
in order to avail of the non-recognition of gain under Section 40(C)(2). Specifically, for the share swap
transaction to qualify as a tax-free exchange, a prior application for a BIR certification or ruling must
have been secured. In this case, however, no such prior request from the BIR was made. Accordingly,
the CIR contended that, since refund claims are construed strictly against the taxpayer-claimant, the
refund sought by respondents should be denied.
In the assailed Decision, the CTA EB affirmed respondents' entitlement to refund. The CTA EB also held
that, contrary to the CIR's claim, a prior confirmatory ruling is not a condition sine qua non for the
availment of tax exemption and a claim for refund of erroneously paid tax.
ISSUE: Whether the CTA EB erred in finding that respondents are entitled to the claim for
refund for erroneously paid CGT.
HELD: No. The CTA EB did not err in finding that respondents are entitled to the claim for refund for
erroneously paid CGT. The subject transaction falls under Section 40(C)(2) of the NIRC of 1997, as
amended. In this case, Respondents correctly anchor their claim for refund on the tax-free exchange
provision under Section 40(C)(2) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended. In relation thereto, Section
40(C)(6)(c) of the same Code defines the term "control" as "ownership of stocks in a corporation
possessing at least fifty-one percent (51%) of the total voting power of all classes of stocks entitled to
vote."
According to the CIR, the certification or ruling is important so as to confirm whether the transaction
satisfies the conditions set by law; and the authority to do such is vested upon the BIR. The CIR is
mistaken. BIR rulings are the official position of the Bureau to queries raised by taxpayers and other
stakeholder’s relative to clarification and interpretation of tax laws. In this regard, the primary purpose
of a BIR Ruling is simply to determine whether a certain transaction, under the law, is taxable or not
based on the circumstances provided by the taxpayer. The underlying principle of prior application
with the BIR becomes moot in refund cases, such as the present case, where the very basis of the
claim is erroneous or there is excessive payment arising from non-availment of a tax treaty relief at the
first instance. Corollary thereto, Section 229 of the NIRC provides the taxpayer a remedy for tax
recovery when there has been an erroneous payment of tax. The outright denial of petitioner's claim
for a refund, on the sole ground of failure to apply for a tax treaty relief prior to the payment of the
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BPRT, would defeat the purpose of Section 229. Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the CTA EB,
there is nothing in Section 40(C)(2) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, which requires the taxpayer to
first secure a prior confirmatory ruling before the transaction may be considered as a tax-free exchange.
Indeed, cases filed before the CTA are litigated de novo. As such, party litigants should prove every
minute aspect of their cases. Based on the evidence on record, the CTA found that respondents were
able to establish their entitlement to the claimed refund.
REMEDIAL LAW> Procedure in Tax Cases> Tax Remedies under The National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997, As Amended> Refund> Prescription
MINDANAO I GEOTHERMAL PARTNERSHIP, Petitioner
vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
G.R. No. 197519, November 8, 2017
SECOND DIVISION
FACTS: On August 16, 2005, Mindanao I Geothermal Partnership (Ml) filed a letter-request for the
issuance of Tax Credit Certificate (TCC) with the BIR Large Taxpayers Service (LTS) arising from its
excess and unutilized creditable input taxes in the amount of Php 9,470,500.39, accumulated from the
first to fourth quarters of taxable year 2004. However, said application for issuance of TCC remains
unacted upon by respondent CIR despite the lapse of the one hundred twenty (120)-day period
provided under Section l 12(D) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, as amended.
On July 21, 2006, Ml filed its Petition for Review, praying for the issuance of a TCC in the amount of
Php 6,199,278.90 instead of the amount of [₱]9,470,500.39, which covers merely the second to fourth
quarters of taxable year 2004.
The CTA First Division granted Ml's claim for unutilized input value-added tax (VAT) for the third and
fourth quarters of 2004, but denied Ml's claim corresponding to the second quarter of the same year
for having been filed out of time. Citing CIR v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation, the CTA First Division held
that under Section 112(A) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC), administrative and
judicial claims for issuance of a TCC or refund of unutilized creditable input VAT arising from VAT zerorated sales must be filed within two (2) years from the end of the quarter when the pertinent sales
were made, regardless of when the corresponding input VAT had been paid. Considering that the last
day of the second quarter of 2004 fell on June 30, 2004, the CTA First Division found that Ml only had
until June 30, 2006 within which to file its administrative and judicial claims. Thus, the CTA First Division
found that while Ml's administrative claim (filed on August 16, 2005) was filed within the said period,
its judicial claim (filed on July 21, 2006) was not. Subsequently, both parties filed their respective
motions for partial reconsideration (MPR). The parties' MPRs were resolved by the CTA First Division in
its Amended Decision ordering CIR to issue TCC in favor of Ml, representing its unutilized input VAT for
the second, third, and fourth quarters of taxable year 2004. On Review, CTA En Banc reversed and set
aside CTA First Division Ruling.
ISSUE: Whether the CTA En Banc erred when it dismissed Ml's judicial claim for being filed
out of time – NO, Ml's judicial claim for the second, third and fourth quarters of 2004 were
filed out of time.
HELD: The Petition lacks merit. Section 112 of the NIRC provides the procedure for filing claims for
VAT refunds, and prescribes the corresponding periods therefor.
In Aichi, the Court unequivocally ruled that the two (2)-year period under Section 112(A) should be
reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made consistent with the plain
import of the NIRC. The Court also clarified that the two (2)-year period only applies to administrative
claims, and does not extend to judicial claims. Anent judicial claims, the Court held that the one hundred
twenty (120) and thirty (30)-day periods under Section 112(C) are mandatory and jurisdictional, such
that judicial claims filed before the denial of the taxpayers' administrative claim or the lapse of the one
hundred twenty (120)-day period in case of the CIR's inaction would be deemed premature, while
judicial claims filed beyond the thirty (30)-day period after such denial or lapse would be deemed filed
85
out of time. Subsequently, the Court's ruling in San Roque set out exceptions to the mandatory periods
under Section 112(C).
The principles decreed in Aichi and San Roque were later synthesized in the consolidated cases of
Mindanao II Geothermal Partnership v. CIR and Mindanao I Geothermal Partnership v. CIR (2013
Consolidated Cases) involving Ml's claim for unutilized input VAT for the year 2003 summarized the
relevant periods under Section 112, as follows:
1. An administrative claim must be filed with the CIR within two [2] years after the close of the taxable
quarter when the zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales were made.
2. The CIR has [one hundred twenty (120)] days from the date of submission of complete documents
in support of the administrative claim within which to decide whether to grant a refund or issue a
tax credit certificate. The [one hundred twenty (120)]-day period may extend beyond the two [2]year period from the filing of the administrative claim if the claim is filed in the later part of the two
[2]-year period. If the [one hundred twenty (120)]-day period expires without any decision from
the CIR, then the administrative claim may be considered to be denied by inaction.
3. A judicial claim must be filed with the CTA within [thirty] 30 days from the receipt of the CIR's
decision denying the administrative claim or from the expiration of the [one hundred twenty (120)]day period without any action from the CIR.
4. All taxpayers, however, can rely on BIR Ruling No. DA-489- 03 from the time of its issuance on
[December 10, 2003] up to its reversal by this Court in Aichi on [October 6, 2010], as an exception
to the mandatory and jurisdictional 120+30 day periods. (Emphasis supplied)
Proceeding therefrom, it becomes clear that Ml's judicial claim for the second, third and fourth quarters
of 2004 were filed out of time. The Court notes the following relevant dates:
Quarter
Close of Taxable
Quarter
Second
Third
Fourth
June 30
September 30
December 31
Amended
Administrative
Claim
June 22
June 22
June 22
Expiration of
CIR's period to
Act
October 20
October 20
October 20
Judicial Claim
July 21
July 21
July 21
The thirtieth (30th) day following October 20, 2005 (which is the date when the CIR's period to act
expired) fell on November 19, 2005, a Saturday. Accordingly, Ml had until November 21, 2005, the next
working day, to file its judicial claim before the CTA. As Ml filed its judicial claim over seven (7) months
beyond the expiration of the thirty (30)-day period, the CTA En Banc correctly ordered its dismissal.
REMEDIAL LAW > Procedure In Tax Cases > The Court of Tax Appeals (R.A. 1125, as
amended, and the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals)
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, vs. HEDCOR SIBULAN, INC.,
Respondent
G.R. No. 209306, September 27, 2017
(Second Division)
FACTS: Hedcor Sibulan, Inc. (HSI) filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) its Original Quarterly
VAT Returns for the first quarter of 2008. Thereafter, HSI amended its Quarterly VAT Returns for said
quarter which showed that it incurred unutilized input VAT from its domestic purchases of goods and
services attributable to its zero-rated sales of generated power. HSI allegedly did not have any local
sales subject to VAT at 12%, which means that HSI did not have any output VAT liability against which
its unutilized input VAT could be applied or credited. Consequently, HSI filed its administrative claim
for refund of unutilized input VAT for the first quarter of taxable year 2008. After filing the administrative
claim, HSI filed its judicial claim for refund with the CTA. The CTA Division dismissed its judicial claim
for having been prematurely filed. HSI moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. HSI
elevated the matter to the CTA En Banc which affirmed the Division’s Decision and Resolution. HSI then
86
moved for reconsideration. The CTA En Banc, in view of the Court’s pronouncements in the consolidated
cases of Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. San Roque Power Corporation where it was held that
the BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was recognized as an exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional
nature of the 120-day waiting period under Section 112 (C) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, remanded
the case to the CTA Division for a complete determination of HSI’s full compliance with the other legal
requirements relative to its claim for refund or tax credit of its alleged input VAT for the first quarter of
2008.
ISSUE: Whether HSI is entitled to its claim for refund or tax credit of its alleged unutilized
input VAT.
HELD: NO. Under Section 112(C) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, the CIR is given a period of 120
days within which to grant or deny a claim for refund. Upon receipt of the CIR's decision or ruling
denying the said claim, or upon the expiration of the 120-day period without action from the CIR, the
taxpayer has thirty (30) days within which to file a petition for review with the CTA. The Court in Aichi
clarified that the 120+30-day periods are mandatory and jurisdictional, the non-observance of which is
fatal to the filing of a judicial claim with the CTA. Subsequently, however, the Court, in San Roque,
recognized an exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120+30-day periods. The
Court held that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, issued prior to the promulgation of Aichi, which explicitly
declared that the "taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse of the 120-day period before it could
seek judicial relief with the CTA by way of petition for review," furnishes a valid basis to hold the CIR
in estoppel because the CIR had misled taxpayers into prematurely filing their judicial claims with the
CTA. The second exception is where the Commissioner, through a general interpretative rule issued
under Section 4 of the Tax Code, misleads all taxpayers into filing prematurely judicial claims with the
CTA. In these cases, the Commissioner cannot be allowed to later on question the CTA's assumption
of jurisdiction over such claim since equitable estoppel has set in as expressly authorized under Section
246 of the Tax Code. Clearly, BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule. Thus, all
taxpayers can rely on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 from the time of its issuance on 10 December 2003
up to its reversal by this Court in Aichi on 6 October 2010, where this Court held that the 120+30 day
periods are mandatory and jurisdictional.
Here, records show that HSI filed its judicial claim for refund on March 30, 2010, or after the issuance
of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, but before the date when Aichi was promulgated. Thus, even though
HSI's claim was filed without waiting for the expiration of the 120-day mandatory period, the CTA may
still take cognizance of the case because the claim was filed within the excepted period stated in San
Roque. BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 effectively shielded the filing of HSI's judicial claim from the vice of
prematurity. The CTA En Banc was therefore correct in setting aside its earlier Decision dismissing HSI's
claim on the ground of prematurity; and remanding the case to the CTA Division for a complete
determination of HSI's entitlement to the claimed VAT refund, if any.
REMEDIAL LAW> Procedure in the Court of Appeals> Rule 46 – Original Cases
MICHAEL V. RACION, Petitioner, v. MST MARINE SERVICES PHILIPPINES, INC., ALFONSO
RANJO DEL CASTILLO AND/OR THOME SHIP MANAGEMENT PTE. LTD., Respondents.
G.R. No. 219291, July 04, 2018
(Second Division)
FACTS: Petitioner was hired as a GP1/MTM by respondent MST Marine Services Philippines, Inc. (MST
Marine) on November 22, 2011. During his employment, petitioner suffered an accidental fall and was
found to have suffered from a left knee ligament strain. Petitioner was subsequently repatriated on
medical grounds on July 5, 2012.
Petitioner then filed a claim for disability benefits, refund of medical expenses, sickness allowances,
damages, and attorney's fees on August 17, 2012.The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed petitioner's
complaint for lack of merit. Petitioner then filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), which denied the appeal but modified the LA's decision by directing MST Marine and/or Thome
87
Ship Management PTE. Ltd. to pay petitioner the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
financial assistance.
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before the CA questioning the NLRC's decision. The CA
dismissed the petition outright because it was petitioner's counsel who signed the certificate on nonforum shopping, without authority from petitioner through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), and
without any explanation for petitioner's failure to execute the certificate. The CA also ruled that
petitioner failed to comply with paragraph 1, Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court when he failed to
indicate his own actual address and that of respondent Del Castillo.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari outright.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court had ruled in Vda. De Formoso v. Philippine National Bank that
"[c]ertiorari is an extraordinary, prerogative remedy and is never issued as a matter of right.
Accordingly, the party who seeks to avail of it must strictly observe the rules laid down by law."
Further, "[t]he acceptance of a petition for certiorari as well as the grant of due course thereto is, in
general, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Although the court has absolute discretion to
reject and dismiss a petition for certiorari, it does so only (1) when the petition fails to demonstrate
grave abuse of discretion by any court, agency, or branch of the government; or (2) when there are
procedural errors, like violations of the Rules of Court or Supreme Court Circulars." The CA was correct
in dismissing the petition for certiorari as it was beset with procedural errors arising from violations of
the Rules of Court.
First, petitioner failed to execute a certificate of non-forum shopping. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court directs that a petition should be accompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 46 also of the Rules of Court. The execution of the certificate by
petitioner's counsel is a defective certification, which amounts to non-compliance with the requirement
of a certificate of non-forum shopping. This is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. Second,
petitioner also failed to comply with the requirement in Section 3, Rule 46 as quoted above on alleging
the actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents as he failed to indicate his own actual
address and that of respondent Del Castillo. The requirement that a petition for certiorari must contain
the actual addresses of all the petitioners and the respondents is mandatory. Finally, even if the Court
were to gloss over the technical defects, petitioner has not provided any basis for the Court to review
the findings of the NLRC and LA as he failed to attach the decisions of these tribunals.
LEGAL ETHICS> The Code of Professional Responsibility> To Society
READY FORM INCORPORATED, Complainant, v. ATTY. EGMEDIO J. CASTILLON, JR.,
Respondent
A.C. No. 11774, March 21, 2018
(Second Division)
FACTS: Ready Form, Inc. was one of the companies who participated in a public bidding conducted by
the National Printing Office (NPO). After reviewing these submissions, the NPO imposed a suspension
of one (1) year against Ready Form due to the supposed misrepresentation and misdeclaration it
committed when it submitted alleged false income tax returns (ITR) and financial statements for the
calendar year 2007. Subsequently, Eastland Printink Corporation (Eastland) filed a Petition for
Blacklisting with the NPO against Ready Form wherein Eastland alleged that Ready Form had committed
other violation such as misrepresentation. Atty. Castillon signed the Petition on behalf of his client
Eastland. Ready Form filed a complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines praying that Atty.
Castillon be disbarred due to allegedly violating Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, alleging as a ground therefor Atty. Castillon's supposed unlawful use of
Ready Form's ITRs.
88
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Castillon could be held liable for allegedly violating Rule 1.01, 1.02
and 1.03 of the the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: No. A perusal of the records will reveal that what Atty. Castillon attached in the Petition for
Blacklisting is Ready Form's audited financial statement for the year 2006 and not the latter's income
tax return. Ready Form repeatedly made an issue out of the fact that its ITR was mentioned in the
Petition for Blacklisting, and later on in the Position Paper filed by Eastland, both signed by Atty.
Castillon. They did not, however, offer proof to substantiate its claims that its ITR was attached to the
Petition for Blacklisting despite the clear and express statement therein that only its audited financial
statement, which is available to the public through the SEC, was attached thereto. During the
mandatory conference, it was clear that only an audited financial statement was attached by Atty.
Castillon. Ready Form only wants the IBP, and consequently the Court, to hold that Atty. Castillon used
confidential information by doing such act.
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that audited financial statements submitted by corporations,
as required by Section 141 of the Corporation Code, are made available to the public by the SEC. Hence,
the Court fails to see how Atty. Castillon violated any law when he attached a copy of Ready Form's
audited financial statements in the Petition for Blacklisting, he filed with the NPO.
LEGAL ETHICS > The Code of Professional Responsibility > To Society
CELESTINO MALECDAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. SIMPSON T. BALDO, Respondent.
A.C. No. 12121 (Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4322), June 27, 2018
(Second Division)
FACTS: Malecdan filed a letter of complaint for Estafa, Breach of Contract and Damages against
spouses James and Josephine Baldo, before the Lupon of Barangay Pico in La Trinidad, Benguet. On
August 14, 2014, Atty. Baldo appeared as counsel of spouses Baldo during the hearing on the subject
complaint before the Punong Barangay. Thereafter, Malecdan filed a Complaint-Affidavit (Complaint)
before the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter praying that proper sanctions be imposed on Atty. Baldo for
violating Section 9 of P.D. 1508.
After due proceedings, Investigating Commissioner Robles rendered a Report and Recommendation on
June 2, 2015, recommending that Atty. Baldo be given a warning. Commissioner Robles found that the
language of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is not that definite as to unqualifiedly bar lawyers from
appearing before the Lupon, nor is the language that clear on the sanction imposable for such an
appearance. Commissioner Robles reasoned that the matter of appearance or non-appearance before
the Lupon is clearly addressed to a lawyer's taste of propriety:
On June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution reversing and setting aside the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and instead recommended that Atty.
Baldo be reprimanded.
ISSUE: Whether Atty Baldo is guilty of ethical misconduct for clearly violating the statutory
prohibition of barring lawyers to appeal in any proceeding of the Lupon Barangay.
HELD: Yes. As stated in the case of Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,23 Section 9 of P.D. 1508 mandates
personal confrontation of the parties because: "x x x a personal confrontation between the parties
without the intervention of a counsel or representative would generate spontaneity and a favorable
disposition to amicable settlement on the part of the disputants. In other words, the said procedure is
deemed conducive to the successful resolution of the dispute at the barangay level."
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"To ensure compliance with the requirement of personal confrontation between the
parties, and thereby, the effectiveness of the barangay conciliation proceedings as a mode
of dispute resolution, the above-quoted provision is couched in mandatory
language. Moreover, pursuant to the familiar maxim in statutory construction dictating that ' expressio
unius est exclusio alterius', the express exceptions made regarding minors and incompetents must be
construed as exclusive of all others not mentioned."
Atty. Baldo's violation of P.D. 1508 thus falls squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which provides: CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD
THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. A lawyer, to the
best of his ability, is expected to respect and abide by the law: and thus, avoid any act or omission that
is contrary to the same A lawyer's personal deference to the law not only speaks of his character but it
also inspires the public to likewise respect and obey the law. Rule 1.01, on the other hand, states the
norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers. Any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or
unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is unlawful. Unlawful conduct
does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad enough to include
such element.
Here, Atty. Baldo admitted that he appeared and participated in the proceedings before the Punong
Barangay in violation of Section 9 of P.D. 1508. Atty. Baldo therefore violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR in
connection with Section 9 of P.D. 1508 when he appeared as counsel for spouses James and Josephine
Baldo in a hearing before the Punong Barangay, Barangay Pico, Municipality of La Trinidad in Benguet.
All told, the Court finds that the evidence adduced is sufficient to support the allegations against Atty.
Baldo.
LEGAL ETHICS> The Code of Professional Responsibility> To Society
ROLANDO T. KO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALMA UY-LAMPASA, respondent.
A.C. No. 11584, March 6, 2019 (formerly CBD Case No. 12-3604)
(Second Division)
FACTS: Rolando T. Ko filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Alma Uy-Lampasa who notarized
2 Deeds of Absolute Sale covering the same property and involving substantially the same parties but
containing different dates of notarization. It was also alleged that Atty. Uy-Lampasa filed pleadings in
court without the necessary Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) compliance number
attached to her pleadings. In her defense, she cited that as a former judge, she was exempted from
MCLE compliance for the First, Second and Third Compliance Periods, until she resigned as a judge on
March 2010.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Uy-Lampasa violated the Rules on Notarial Practice.
HELD: Yes. The act of notarization is impressed with public interest. As such, a notary public must
observe the highest degree of care in complying with the basic requirements in the performance of his
or her duties in order to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity of the notarial system. In
this case, Atty. Uy-Lampasa failed to faithfully comply with her duties as a notary public.
Here, respondent clearly violated this provision when she notarized the deeds of absolute sale despite
the incomplete signature and identification details of the vendors. Moreover, when the identification
details were indeed provided in the deeds, the proof of identity indicated for all of them was the CTC
Number. Jurisprudence already holds that a CTC is not considered as competent evidence of identity
90
as it does not bear a photograph and a signature of the individual concerned, as required in Rule II,
Section 12 of the Notarial Rules.
The Notarial Rules clearly mandate that before notarizing a document, the notary public should require
the presence of the very person who executed the same. Thus, he or she certifies that it was the same
person who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what
were stated therein. The presence of the parties to the deed is necessary to enable the notary public
to verify the genuineness of the signature.
When respondent affixed her signature and notarial seal on the deeds of sale, she led the public to
believe that the parties personally appeared before her and attested to the truth and veracity of the
contents thereof when in fact, they deny doing so. Respondent’s conduct is laden with dangerous
possibilities, bearing in mind the conclusiveness accorded to the due execution of a document. Her
conduct did not only jeopardize the rights of the parties to the instrument; it also undermined the
integrity of a notary public and degraded the function of notarization. Thus, respondent should be liable
for such act, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
For having violated the Notarial Rules, respondent also failed to adhere to Canon 1 of the CPR, which
requires every lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for
the law and legal processes. She also violated Rule 1.01 of the CPR which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.
Based on recent jurisprudence, a lawyer commissioned as a notary public who fails to discharge his or
her duties as such is penalized with revocation of his or her notarial commission and disqualification
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of 2 years. In addition, he or she may also be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of 6 months for notarizing a document without the
appearance of the parties.
WHEREFORE, finding Atty. Alma Uy-Lampasa GUILTY of violating the Rules on Notarial Practice and
Rule 1.01 and Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby SUSPENDS her from
the practice of law for 6 months; REVOKES her notarial commission, effective immediately; and
PROHIBITS her from being commissioned as a notary public for 2 years.
LEGAL ETHICS>The Code of Professional Responsibility>To Society
HORTENCIA R. CAYABYAB, Petitioner vs. PRESIDING JUDGE IRINEO P. PANGILINAN, JR.,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 58, Respondent,
AM No. RTJ-20-2584, Jul 28, 2020
First Division
FACTS: Cayabyab was the private complainant in Criminal Case entitled " People of the Philippines v.
Maria Melissa Cayabyab y Robles" for Perjury filed before the court of Judge Pangilinan. Cayabyab avers
that the promulgation of judgment of the Criminal Case was originally set on July 28, 2016. Despite no
request for extension of time from Judge Pangilinan within which to decide the case, the promulgation
was reset thrice. It was only on October 20, 2016 when Judge Pangilinan handed down a decision
acquitting the accused. Judge Pangilinan counters that the complaint merits an outright dismissal for
being malicious, baseless, and unfounded. He labels the complaint as mere harassment after Cayabyab
received an unfavorable decision in Criminal Case.Judge Pangilinan also explains that the parties had
several pending suits in his sala and knowing their familial relationship, he only wanted them to
eventually reconcile. Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found merit in the allegation that Judge
Pangilinan caused undue delay in rendering a decision when Criminal Case was promulgated only on
October 20, 2016, or after four (4) months from the time the case was submitted for decision. The OCA
found his explanation of exerting efforts to have the parties come to an amicable agreement untenable
in light of this glaring proof that there was delay in deciding the case within the period fixed by law.
Noting the penalties prescribed under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, the OCA saw it fit
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to temper the penalty to a reprimand, considering that this is Judge Pangilinan's first offense for undue
delay in rendering a decision.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Pangilinan should be administratively held liable for undue delay
in rendering a decision.
HELD: Yes.The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA, with a modification on the penalty imposed
on Judge Pangilinan. Article VIII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution expressly prescribes that all cases
or matters must be decided or resolved by the lower courts within three (3) months from date of
submission. In parallel, Canon 6, Section 5 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct requires judges to
perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with
reasonable promptness. Hence, in deciding Criminal Case No. 10-5530 four (4) months after it was
submitted for decision, Judge Pangilinan had clearly incurred delay. Judge Pangilinan explains that the
delay was due to his desire to have the parties settle the case amicably. This justification, to the mind
of the Court, is not reasonable under the circumstances, considering that the criminal case of perjury
was a case against public interest which had already reached the conclusion of its trial proper.
Also, in cases where a judge is unable to comply with the reglementary period for deciding cases or
matters, he or she can, for good reasons, ask for an extension from the Court. As a general rule,
requests for extension are granted by the Court in cognizance of the heavy caseload of the trial
courts. Granting that Judge Pangilinan had good reasons for his delay, it remains a given fact that he
failed to ask for an extension of time from the Court within which to resolve Criminal Case No. 10-5530.
Judges, by themselves, cannot extend the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. As
a result of his failure to ask for extension, whether deliberate or not, Judge Pangilinan promulgated his
decision in Criminal Case No. 10-5530 beyond the period allowed by law. Thus, Judge Irineo P.
Pangilinan, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 58 is hereby found guilty of undue
delay in rendering a decision for which he is fined in the amount of P10,000.00. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
LEGAL ETHICS>The Code of Professional Responsibility> To the Legal Profession
MARILYN PABALAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. ELISEO MAGNO C. SALVA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 12098, March 20, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: Pabalan filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) a Complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Salva for unprofessional and immoral conduct.
Pabalan claimed that she and Salva were live-in partners for three years until 2008. She alleged that
1) Salva deceived her into taking him in her condo unit and induced her to advance the funding for his
proposed law office; 2) she and Salva entered into an agreement wherein she would solicit clients for
Salva and they would evenly divide the attorney’s fees paid by the clients, not knowing that a
partnership between a lawyer and nonlawyer was illegal; 3) Salva is a womanizer with children from
different women, and he faked a certificate of non-marriage (CENOMAR) in order to enter into a
marriage for convenience with a U.S. citizen in 2008; 4) Salva was her counsel in a case before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and he failed to represent her with zeal, even withdrawing
as counsel prior to his substitution; and 5) Salva neglected to return more than P1 million she incurred
in putting up his law office, including payment of her shares in the solicitation of clients which she
endorsed to him per their agreement.
Pabalan also stated that she was a witness in another disbarment case filed by a certain Daniel Benito
(Benito) against Salva in CBD Case No. 09-2382.
Salva denied the allegations against him and filed a Motion to Dismiss (MTD) on the grounds of
forum shopping, res judicata, and double jeopardy. He informed the IBP-CBD that it had already
issued a Report and Recommendation in CBD Case No. 09-2382 which was adopted and approved by
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the IBP Board of Governors, wherein he was admonished for entering into an agreement with Pabalan
for the solicitation of clients and division of attorney’s fees.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with modification of the penalty, increasing the admonition to one-year
suspension from the practice of law.
ISSUE: Whether the IBP should dismiss the complaint on the bases of the previous ruling
by the IBP in the case involving the same set of facts.
HELD: Yes. It is, at the very least, unclear if respondent and Pabalan actually divided for themselves
the attorney’s fees paid to respondent. Nevertheless, Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibits not only the actual division of attorney’s fees by a lawyer with a nonlawyer but
also the mere stipulation of such an agreement . The mere execution of the agreement is, thus,
a violation of Rule 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which it is proper to
suspend respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months.
It is noteworthy that among all the allegations of Benito, it is the allegation specific to
Pabalan that became the basis for Salva’s suspension. Still, the IBP Board of Governors denied
Salva’s MR, “there being no new reason and/or new argument adduced to reverse the previous findings
and decision of the Board of Governors.” This is serious error on the part of the IBP. Upon being
informed of the Court’s ruling in A.C. No. 9809, which approved and adopted the IBP’s findings in CBD
Case No. 09-2382 (including Pabalan’s allegations), the IBP should have granted the MR and dismissed
the complaint. Evidently, the allegations raised by Pabalan in this case have been previously ruled upon
by the IBP and the Court in A.C. No. 9809. Having already imposed a punishment on Salva in the said
case involving the same set of facts, the Court is thus constrained to dismiss the instant complaint. On
this note, the Court calls on the IBP to be more circumspect and prudent in handling the cases before
it.
LEGAL ETHICS>The Code of Professional Responsibility>To the Legal Profession
LEGAL ETHICS>The Code of Professional Responsibility>To the Court
CARMELITA CANETE, Complainant vs. ATTY. ARTEMIO PUTI, Respondent
A.C. No. 10949 [Formerly CBD Case No. 13-3915], August 14, 2019
FACTS: This is an administrative complaint filed by Carmelita Canete (Canete) against Atty. Artemio
Puti (Atty. Puti) with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Canete claimed that her husband was a victim in a criminal case for kidnapping for ransom with double
murder filed against Atty. Puti's client. Canete averred that Atty. Puti had, in numerous occasions,
appeared in court while he was intoxicated and made discourteous and inappropriate remarks against
the public and private prosecutors as well as the judge.
Canete claimed that Atty. Puti provoked her private counsel, Atty. Arturo Tan (Atty. Tan), by calling
him "bakla" in open court during the hearing
Canete also alleged that during the May 9, 2013 hearing, Atty. Puti uttered the words "to the handsome
public prosecutor" with seething sarcasm. Canete averred that during the May 22, 2013 hearing, Atty.
Puti repeatedly bullied and threatened the judge in open court. For his part, Atty. Puti prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint against him. He denied ever appearing intoxicated in court. He also claimed
that it was Atty. Tan who provoked him when the latter made threats against him. According to him, it
was his duty to call out the judge for being biased and that he was only discharging his duties to his
client by representing him with zeal.
Investigating Commissioner: The Investigating Commissioner of the CBD issued a Report and
Recommendation finding Atty. Puti liable for misconduct for violating the Lawyer's Oath and the Code
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of Professional Responsibility and recommending his suspension for two (2) years from the practice of
law.
IBP Board of Governors: Adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, with modification.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Puti failed to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor
toward his professional colleagues.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Puti called Atty. Tan "bakla" in a condescending manner. To be sure, the term "bakla"
(gay) itself is not derogatory. It is used to describe a male person who is attracted to the same sex.
Thus, the term in itself is not a source of offense as it is merely descriptive. However, when "bakla" is
used in a pejorative and deprecating manner, then it becomes derogatory. Such offensive language
finds no place in the courtroom or in aother place for that matter. Atty. Puti ought to be aware that
using the term "bakla" in a derogatory way is no longer acceptable - as it should have been in the first
place. Verily, in Sy v. Fineza, the Court ruled that the respondent judge's act of ruling that a witness
should not be given any credence because he is a "bakla" was most unbecoming of a judge.
As against the public prosecutors, Atty. Puti made the following statement: "Bakit 2 kayong prosecutor?
Malaki siguro bayad sa inyo.” Such remark was clearly unprofessional, especially since Atty. Puti used
to be a public prosecutor. By nonchalantly accusing the prosecutors of having been bribed or otherwise
acting for a valuable consideration, Atty. Puti overstepped the bounds of courtesy, fairness, and candor
which he owes to the opposing counsels.
For his statements against the private and public prosecutors, Atty. Puti violated the following provisions
under the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his
professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive, or otherwise improper.
As regards the final ground, the TSN of the May 22, 2013 hearing shows that Atty. Puti made several
remarks against the judge. Specifically, Atty. Puti stated in open court that the judge was abusing his
discretion and implied that the judge was partial and biased. Moreover, Atty. Puti threatened the judge
that he would withdraw from the case and walk out if his request was not granted. Again, such
statements were improper. While a lawyer, as an officer of the court, has the right to criticize the acts
of courts and judges, the same must be made respectfully and through legitimate channels. In this
case, Atty. Puti violated the following provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility:
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Rule 11.03 -A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have
no materiality to the case.
On the penalty to be imposed, the Court disagrees with the IBP's recommendation that Atty. Puti be
suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. While Atty. Puti is found to have violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility, suspension from the practice of law is not a commensurate penalty.
The Court has consistently held that disbarment and suspension of an attorney are the most severe
forms of disciplinary action, which should be imposed with great caution. They should be meted out
only for duly proven serious administrative charges.
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LEGAL ETHICS > The Code of Professional Responsibility > To the Legal Profession
LEGAL ETHICS > The Code of Professional Responsibility > To the Clients
Rommel Reyes vs. Atty. Gerald Gubatan
A.C. No. 12839, November 03, 2020
(First Division)
FACTS: Atty. Gerald Z. Gubatan (Atty. Gubatan) borrowed money from Rommel N. Reyes (Reyes) and
his company multiple times, as evidenced by a promissory note and an Acknowledgement/Agreement.
The former was employed in the company of the latter as Legal Counsel and Special Assistant, handling
corporate and personal matters. However, Atty. Gubatan failed and refused to pay the said obligations
even after receiving a demand letter. Thereafter, Reyes filed complaints against Atty. Gubatan for
collection of sum of money with damages before the MTC. The latter claimed that there was an
agreement that the loans will be set off against his compensation and professional fees for services
rendered to the company and to Reyes personally, and that he was not compensated for much of said
rendered services. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines board reprimanded Atty. Gubatan for violating
the rule which prohibits lawyers from borrowing money from their clients unless the latter's interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice and found that there was no
sufficient evidence of any subsequent agreement to set-off the loans.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Gubatan is justified in not paying his obligations on the ground of
non-payment of professional fees.
HELD: No. Atty. Gubatan is not justified in not paying his obligations on the ground of non-payment
of professional fees.
The relationship between lawyers and their clients is inherently imbued with trust and confidence —
and as true as any natural tendency goes, this trust and confidence is susceptible to abuse. The rule
prohibiting lawyers from borrowing from their clients is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking
advantage of his influence over the client as the rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the
lawyer's ability to use all legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation.
In this case, Atty. Gubatan obtained several loans from Reyes and the Corporation, which are evidenced
by promissory notes and an acknowledgment/agreement. These loans appear to have been contracted
during the existence of a lawyer-client relationship among the parties, when Atty. Gubatan was
employed by the Corporation and retained as legal consultant and special assistant to the president.
Consequently, Atty. Gubatan clearly violated the following provisions of the CPR:
CANON 16 — A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
possession.
xxxx
RULE 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter
he is handling for the client. (Emphasis supplied)
Further, in unduly borrowing money from Reyes and the Corporation and refusing to pay the same,
Atty. Gubatan abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by his clients. In doing so, he failed to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, in contravention of Canon 7 of the CPR, which
provides:
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the integrated bar.
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LEGAL ETHICS > The Code of Professional Responsibility > To the Courts
PRESIDING JUDGE AIDA ESTRELLA MACAPAGAL, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR. 195,
PARAÑAQUE CITY, Complainant, vs. ATTY. WALTER T. YOUNG, Respondent
A.C. No. 9298, July 29, 2019
(Second Division)
FACTS: Presiding Judge Macapagal in a letter-complaint, alleged that she received a letter from
respondent Atty. Walter Young, threatening her that an administrative and a criminal complaint for
„knowingly rendering an unjust judgment‰ would be filed against her if the writ of possession/writ of
demolition would be implemented in connection to an expropriation case filed by the City of Parañaque
against Magdiwang Realty Corporation and Fil-Homes Realty Development Corporation. It appeared
that Judge Macapagal granted the motion for demolition for before the case was unloaded to her, the
writ of possession had already been issued. Judge Macapagal alleged that Atty. Young committed an
act unbecoming of a lawyer in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) in sending the
subject threatening letter. Atty, Young alleged that he was courteous in the subject letter; the subject
letter was worded in such a manner that not a hint of scandalous, offensive or menacing tenor was
made; he was so choosy with his words that almost every paragraph was prefaced with a reverential
phrase or tone; the objective of the subject letter was to serve a cautionary notice unto Judge
Macapagal so that she „could be thwarted and/or rescued from treading on unlawful ground; assuming
without admitting that he threatened Judge Macapagal, the threat must be unlawful in order to be
considered as a ground for an administrative complaint; but the alleged „threat,‰ if it may be called
as such, is more of a cautionary notice; finally, pursuant to Canons 18 and 19, a lawyer is duty-bound
to serve his clients with diligence and zeal.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Young violated the Code of Professional Responsibility on the ground
of committing an act which is unbecoming of a lawyer.
HELD: Yes, Atty. Young violated Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:
“1 CANON 11 -A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.”
There is no question that Atty. Young did threaten to file administrative and criminal complaints against
Judge Macapagal if the writ of demolition was implemented.
While Atty. Young alleged in his Comment that he had no intention to threaten Judge Macapagal in
sending the subject letter, he also stated that she may be “stubbornly pursuing” the demolition
operations “because of her desire to please and gratify” the Mayor of Parañaque City. These statements,
in the mind of the Court, indubitably demonstrate how Atty. Young had failed to observe the respect
due to the Courts and to judicial officers.
LEGAL ETHICS> Code of Professional Responsibility> To the Courts
WILMA L. ZAMORA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. MAKILITO B.
MAHINAY, Respondent.
A.C. No. 12622. February 10, 2020.
CAGUIOA, J.:
FACTS: Complainant Wilma Zamora, representing the PJH Lending Corporation, is the plaintiff in an
action for forcible entry filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City. The MeTC
subsequently rendered a decision in favor of the PJH Lending Corporation. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 212 likewise affirmed the MeTC decision on appeal, and the case
was eventually remanded to the MeTC for proper disposition. PJH Lending Corporation filed a motion
for execution which the MeTC of Mandaluyong City, through Assisting Judge John Benedict Medina,
granted. Respondent Atty. Makilito Mahinay, on behalf of his clients, filed a motion for reconsideration.
where he pertinently alleged in part:
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D.
THE SUBJECT ORDER OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IF NOT
RECONSIDERED WOULD VIOLATE CANON 3 OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT [,] MORE PARTICULARLY RULE 3.01 AND RULE 3.02.
xxx
By provision of law, jurisprudence and specific provision of the Code
of Judicial Conduct, this Honorable Court [cannot] be partial to the party which Atty.
Lim represents.
xxx
Defendants are furnishing a copy of this motion to the Court Administrator, as
they reserve to upgrade their above perceived violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct
to a formal administrative complaint.
Alleging that in the above motion for reconsideration, Atty. Mahinay threatened the judge with an
administrative complaint if he would not grant the motion, Zamora filed a Complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Mahinay before the IBP for violation of Canon 11, Rule 11.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). In his Answer, Atty. Mahinay essentially countered that the complaint of Zamora
has no factual and legal basis. He maintained that there was nothing disrespectful in the motion for
reconsideration he filed before Judge Medina. He stood firm in what he said therein that Judge Medina
was duty bound to consider the facts of the case and that it was his duty as an officer of the court to
be forthright and candid to Judge Medina on what he perceived as deviations from the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
The IBP’s Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and Recommendation to dismiss the complaint
against Atty. Mahinay. He agreed it was well within Atty. Mahinay's duty to be forthright and candid to
Judge Medina. He also held that Zamora did not proffer any proof, such as sworn statements from vital
witnesses or other documentary evidence, which would show that Atty. Mahinay really intended to
threaten Judge Medina. The Board of Governors (Board) of the IBP, in a Resolution dated April 29,
2016, resolved to adopt the findings of fact and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
dismissing the complaint.
Zamora thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration, pointing out that the threat was on the face of
the subject motion for reconsideration itself, which she attached in her complaint. Zamora also
enumerated other cases which purportedly showed an undeniable pattern of Atty. Mahinay's propensity
to attack judges for leverage.
On January 27, 2017, the Board issued its Resolution granting the Motion for Reconsideration of
Zamora. The Board took note of Atty. Mahinay's previous infraction and found Atty. Mahinay to have
committed brazen threats to the courts as leverage. Atty. Mahinay, in turn, filed a Manifestation and
Motion for Reconsideration, asserting that the Board should not have noted his alleged previous
infraction as the same was not covered in the issues stipulated by the parties.
On August 29, 2018, the Board issued a new Resolution granting the Motion for Reconsideration of
Atty. Mahinay and reinstating the earlier Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner to dismiss the Complaint. Aggrieved, Zamora filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari
ISSUE: Whether the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against Atty. Mahinay.
HELD: Yes. It is fundamental that the quantum of proof in administrative cases such as disbarment
proceedings is substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally
reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. While Zamora is correct that the very pleading itself is
the best piece of evidence to prove whether Atty. Mahinay had, indeed, violated Canon 11, Rule 11.03
of the CPR, the Court finds that this proffered evidence failed to reach the threshold of the quantum of
proof required. The Court does not find the language used in the subject motion for reconsideration to
be offensive, abusive, malicious, or intemperate in any way. It did not spill over the walls of decency
or propriety.
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The pertinent portions of the subject motion for reconsideration merely enumerated the facts, which in
the opinion of Atty. Mahinay and his clients, the trial court was duty bound to consider. The last of the
enumeration may have contained the word "partial," to wit: (e) By provision of law, jurisprudence and
specific provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct, this Honorable Court [cannot] be partial to the party
which Atty. Lim represents. A sober reading of the quoted portion, however, does not call to mind that
Judge Medina is being labelled as partial. It neither insinuates so in any way.
Furthermore, the Court finds nothing wrong with the last statement of the subject pleading, to wit:
Defendants are furnishing a copy of this motion to the Court Administrator, as they reserve to upgrade
their above perceived violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct to a formal administrative complaint.
The above statement cannot be construed as either a direct or veiled threat against Judge Medina that
should he fail to rule in favor of Atty. Mahinay's clients, they would file an administrative case against
him.
All told, the Court finds that Atty. Mahinay did not unfairly criticize or disrespect Judge Medina in any
way. On the contrary, Atty. Mahinay had, in fact, been circumspect in choosing the language he used
in crafting his motion for reconsideration. At most, he might have been overzealous in defending his
clients' cause, but this is not necessarily bad. The Court has always been mindful of the lawyer's
bounden duty to defend his client's cause with utmost zeal for as long as he or she stays within the
limits imposed by professional rules. Atty. Mahinay did not overstep these limits.
LEGAL ETHICS> The Code of Professional Responsibility> To the clients
AURORA AGUILAR-DYQUIANGCO, Complainant VS. ATTY. DIANA LYNN M. ARELLANO,
Respondent
A.C. No. 10541 (Formerly CBD Case No. 11-3046), July 12, 2016
(En Banc)
FACTS: Aurora Aguilar-Dyquiangco engaged Atty. Diana Lynn M. Arellano for the purpose of filing a
case for collection of sum of money, advancing ₱l0,000.00 for filing fees and ₱2,000.00 as part of the
attorney's fees out of the agreed amount of ₱20,000.00.
During the existence of a lawyer-client relationship between, Atty Arellano frequently borrowed money
and products from Aurora and her husband. Three years later, Aurora discovered that Atty. Arellano
failed to file her case. Thus, she terminated the counsel’s services and demanded the return of money
and documents she entrusted but this was refused by the lawyer, alleging enforcement of her retainer's
lien. Aurora filed an administrative case for suspension and disbarment with the IBP, which found Atty.
Arellano guilty of violation of Rules 16.04, 16.02, and 18.03 of the CPR.
ISSUE: Whether the lawyer is guilty of violations of the CPR.
HELD: Yes. The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in handling complainant's
case and subsequently failing to render such services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, more specifically, Rule 18.03 states: A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected for or from the client. Acceptance of money
from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the
client's cause. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose, such as for filing fee, but
not used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the client on demand.
In this case, after the Complainant paid the filing fees and also part of the acceptance fees, Atty.
Arellano did not bother to file any complaint before the court. Worse, she knew for a long time that
she required additional documents from Complainant before filing the complaint, yet the lawyer did not
appear to exert any effort to contact Complainant in order to obtain the said documents and finally file
the said case.
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Respondent violated Canon 16 when she obtained loans from a client. The Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and
confidence. The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to
prevent the lawyer from taking advantage of his influence over his client. The rule presumes
that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on
his obligation. Suffice it to say, the borrowing of money or property from a client outside the
limits laid down in the CPR is an unethical act that warrants sanction.
A lawyer, once he takes up the cause of his client, has the duty to serve such client with competence,
and to attend to his client's cause with diligence, care and devotion, whether he accepts the
engagement for free or for a fee. Moreover, lawyers should refrain from obtaining loans from their
clients, in order to avoid the perils of abusing the trust and confidence reposed upon him by such client.
Lawyers must serve their clients with utmost zeal and competence. It is also an equally important
responsibility for them to properly separate and account for any money given to them by their clients,
and to resist the temptation to borrow money from their clients, in order to preserve the trust and
confidence reposed upon lawyers by every person requiring their legal advice and services.
LEGAL ETHICS> The Code of Professional Responsibility> To the clients
PELAGIO VICENCIO SORONGON, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. RAMON Y. GARGANTOS,1
SR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 11326 (Formerly CBD Case No. 14-4305), June 27, 2018
(Second Division)
FACTS: Complainant Pelagio Vicencio Sorongon, Jr. alleged that he gave Atty. Ramon Y. Gargantos,
Sr. (respondent) the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) as full payment of the
latter's legal services, which, s allegedly agreed upon, would cover the acceptance fee, appearance
fees, and other fees until the resolution of the cases.5 The complainant also alleged that respondent
did not give him a receipt nor did they execute a formal memorandum of agreement (MOA). In addition,
complainant narrated that they agreed that if there would be court hearings outside of Quezon City,
then complainant would provide respondent's plane ticket, meals, and hotel accommodation. However,
should the hearing be at the Sandiganbayan, they would just meet in the court.
On June 3, 2014, complainant called the respondent regarding the scheduled hearings at the
Sandiganbayan. The respondent instructed the complainant to pick him up at his residence in Quezon
City, otherwise he would not attend the hearing. The complainant complied and they attended the
hearing. After the hearing, respondent allegedly demanded "pocket money" from the complainant since
he would accompany his wife to the United States, otherwise, he would not appear in the hearing the
following day and he would no longer serve as complainant’s counsel. The next day, the complainant
went again to the respondent's residence to pick him up for the hearing. However, the respondent
allegedly demanded the “pocket money” a harsh voice. After this, the complainant, in his Affidavit
Complaint, prayed for the refund of a portion of the amount paid to respondent in order that he might
be able to hire a new counsel.
On June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XXI-2015-581,40 ordered the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year and to return the entire
amount of P200,000.00 to the complainant.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent violated the the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), particularly Canon 16, Rule 16.01.
HELD. Yes. As found by Commissioner Villamor, the respondent allegedly failed to return, despite
demand, the complainant's documents after he withdrew as his counsel42 in violation of Canon 16,
Rule 16.01 which provides that a lawyer shall account for and hold in trust the money or property from
the client. While the SC adopt the findings of Commissioner Villamor, note that this is respondent's first
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offense, and we shall also take into consideration his advanced age (i.e., he stated that he was already
82 years old in his abovementioned handwritten letter dated November 6, 2014 addressed to Director
Solis). SC noted that, in several cases, the Court, in determining or tempering the penalty to be
imposed, has considered mitigating factors, such as the respondent's advanced age, health,
humanitarian and equitable considerations, as well as whether the act complained of was respondent's
first infraction. In the present case, in view of the respondent's advanced age and the fact that this is
his first offense, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and warned
that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. Respondent should also
return the legal fees paid to him by the complainant in the amount of P200,000.00, and the documents
in respondent's possession which pertain to the case of the complainant.
LEGAL ETHICS> The Code of Professional Responsibility>Lawyer’s Oath
JUDGE GREGORIO D. PANTANOSAS, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. ELLY L.
PAMATONG, Respondent.
A.C. No. 7330, June 14, 2016
(En Banc)
FACTS: Complainant Judge Pantanosas was the presiding judge of the RTC Cagayan De Oro
City. Respondent Atty. Pamatong was the counsel of plaintiffs in a Civil Case for injunction with
damages, which was then pending before the RTC. During the hearing of an application for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order (TRO), respondent Pamatong was allegedly asked by complainant
Pantanosas to remove his copia (a hat worn by Muslims) in open court. Respondent Pamatong
requested to be exempted allegedly due to religious grounds and embarrassment towards his “bald
pate.” Complainant Pantanosas thereafter obliged with a caveat that at the next hearing, he would no
longer tolerate the wearing of the copia inside the courtroom.
Respondent Pamatong filed an Extremely Urgent Motion/Demand for Inhibition or Recusal which
contained the following remarks:
1. Finally, in my thirty (30) years of law practice, I never encountered a Judge who appears to be as
corrupt as you are, thereby giving me the impression that you are a disgrace to the Judicial System
of this land who does not deserve (sic) to be a member of the Philippine Bar at all.
Complainant Pantanosas issued an Order refuting all allegations of abusive language and corruption
and denying the Motion for Inhibition for lack of basis while ordering respondent Pamatong to show
cause why he should not be cited in contempt of court.
Complainant Pantanosas then filed a Complaint for Disbarment dated September 15, 2006 (Disbarment
Complaint) before this Court against respondent Pamatong on the following grounds: (i) violation of
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) for the language employed by respondent
Pamatong in the Motion for Inhibition, and (ii) violation of Canons 1 and 11 of the CPR for engaging in
dishonest and deceitful conduct by supposedly causing the publication of an alleged bribe in a local
newspaper and maliciously imputing motives to complainant Pantanosas, thereby casting dishonor to
and distrust in the judicial system.
ISSUE: Whether Respondent Pamatong violated the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of ethics
of the legal profession.
HELD: Yes. It cannot be overemphasized that it is the sworn duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the
Courts a respectful attitude, “not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for
the maintenance of its supreme importance.” It is precisely for this reason that the Lawyer’s Oath
enjoins all members of the bar to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts in order not
to erode the faith and trust of the public in the judiciary.
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It is not disputed that the Motion for Inhibition filed by respondent Pamatong contained blatant
accusations of corruption against complainant Pantanosas, and then some. As counsel for the plaintiffs
in Civil Case No. 2006-176, it was incumbent upon respondent Pamatong to observe and maintain
respect towards the judicial office then being occupied by complainant Pantanosas. Instead of insisting
on similar conduct from his clients, respondent Pamatong was the first to cast doubt on the impartiality
and independence of the court. Worth repeating below are the invectives directed by respondent
Pamatong against complainant Pantanosas: 6. Finally, in my thirty (30) years of law practice, I never
encountered a Judge who appears to be as corrupt as you are, thereby giving me the impression
that you are a disgrace to the Judicial System of this land who does not deserved (sic) to be a
member of the Philippine Bar at all. (Emphasis supplied) That the slanderous remarks cited above were
inserted in no less than a public record, i.e., Motion for Inhibition, makes matters even worse. Even
granting that the bribery charges were true, such personal attacks against the person of complainant
Pantanosas should have been reserved for a different forum and certainly not included in a motion filed
before a court of law. To be sure, a lawyer is obliged to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language before the courts. As a supposed officer of the court, such behavior exhibited by respondent
Pamatong only serves to betray his utter lack of reverence towards the courts, which promotes nothing
but the degradation of the administration of justice.
We find it befitting to reiterate that lawyers have the right, both as an officer of the court and as a
citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges. However, closely linked to such rule is the cardinal condition that criticisms, no matter how
truthful, shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. To that end, the duty of a lawyer to his
client’s success is wholly subordinate to the administration of justice. True, lawyers must always remain
vigilant against unscrupulous officers of the law. However, the purification of our justice system from
venal elements must not come at the expense of decency, and worse, the discrediting of the very
system that it seeks to protect.
HAIL TO THE CHIEFS!
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