1. If China Targeted Canada’s Elections, America Must Act
Today, Canadian cultural delay remains in full force. Just this year, the American 2016 presidential
election seems to have finally arrived up north. This time, it is foreign interference by the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) at issue. The Chinese have targeted America’s largest trading partner,
our partner in continental air defense, and a founding member of NATO. Americans should take
notice.
As any American who even remotely paid attention to Russia’s efforts to sow chaos in the 2016
election can attest, the fog of foreign interference is disconcerting and frightening. While recent
studies have suggested that these efforts did not sway a critical mass of voters, they did succeed in
causing a significant portion of the American population to doubt the legitimacy of the Trump
administration. Now, it’s Canada’s turn in the barrel.
Since February, Canadians have been treated to a constant stream of damning reports, spurred by
a source in the Canadian intelligence services, suggesting that Canada has been the target of a
widespread effort to affect elections at the federal, provincial, and local levels. Prime Minister
Justin Trudeau has ordered two separate, albeit closed-door, investigations into China’s
chicanery—although both the Tories and Trudeau’s governing coalition partner, the New
Democracy Party, have argued that this is insufficient.
The allegations are as salacious as they are troubling: explicit Chinese involvement in defeating
targeted candidates, including cash donations and Russian-style disinformation campaigns, in both
the 2019 and 2021 federal elections. China’s aims in 2021 were allegedly to secure a chaotic
minority government led by, but not dominated by, the Liberal Party. While a review conducted
by the former chairman of the Pierre Trudeau Foundation—which itself has been embroiled in a
scandal wrought by revelations it received CA$140,000 from a donor backstopped by the PRC—
claimed the results were unaffected by China’s activity, former Conservative leader Erin O’Toole
estimates that the Chinese activity may have scuppered eight or nine Tory victories.
More recent revelations are just as shocking. China’s diplomatic mission in Vancouver conducted
candidate recruitment efforts ahead of the city’s most recent local elections. Worse, it appears that
the Trudeau government knew that a Chinese diplomat operating in Toronto was targeting the
Hong Kong-based family members of Michael Chong, the current shadow foreign affairs minister,
and failed to notify Chong or expel the PRC's man from the country. (After this failure became
public, the Canadian government did expel the diplomat, Zhao Wei, spurring China to expel a
Canadian diplomat in turn.)
One of the alleged targets of China’s efforts, Kenny Chiu, just happened to be the champion of a
foreign agents’ registration bill. (Canada, unlike the United States, does not require political
influencers in the pay of foreign governments to register and report activities on behalf of their
paymasters.) One of the alleged beneficiaries of Beijing’s largesse, Han Dong, purportedly urged
a Chinese diplomat not to release two Canadian citizens being held hostage by the PRC because
doing so would benefit the Conservative Party. (Dong, who has left the Liberal bench to become
an independent, hotly denies these allegations and has filed suit against the Canadian media outlet
that has reported it.)
That these events were set in motion by a source in the Canadian intelligence services is also
disquieting. It could be—as the leaker him/herself suggested in the pages of the Globe and Mail—
that the appropriate political agents have been hesitant to take action against Beijing’s shenanigans,
perhaps unwilling to forgo the possible political rewards. But at this juncture, it could just as easily
be the case that profane, not patriotic motives were at issue. Given that Canada is a crucial
intelligence partner of the United States through the Five Eyes arrangement, neither option is a
good ingredient to toss into the boiling cauldron bubbling on our northern border.
As you might expect, this is just the beginning. Trudeau’s chief of staff has testified in Parliament,
albeit in a more limited capacity than desired by the opposition, about how the government learned
of China’s interference. And at the end of May, a special rapporteur appointed by Trudeau will
make a recommendation on whether the two secret reviews are sufficient—or whether a public
inquiry (think something north of the Mueller investigation and south of the January 6th
Committee in terms of publicity) is necessary.
As a rule, the American public tends not to pay attention to the vagaries of Canadian politics. This
benign neglect may be unsustainable going forward. Americans do not generally recognize how
deeply intertwined we are with Canada’s political and economic system for the same reason that
fish do not think about why the water is wet. But a loss of public faith in Canada’s electoral system
could spark a significant and unsalutary crisis in Ottawa—just as Russian interference did here.
Such instability could echo through the U.S.-Canadian relationship.
Furthermore, we should keep in mind that hostile foreign powers will undoubtedly seek to replicate
whatever elements of China’s Canadian playbook appear promising, including in our own election
next year. This is unlikely to be an isolated incident. While there is still time, the United States
needs to get on the same page with our North American cousins and confront these threats together
going forward.
2. “Blue Dragon” strategy for the Indo-Pacific region
China—which holds a similar worldview regarding multipolarity and the perception of American
decline—has begun to prepare itself for the coming era. To that end, it has devised an incremental
“Blue Dragon” strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. This approach encompasses the country’s
expansion and influences in nearby major bodies of water, supported by economic and military
projects. Starting with the East China Sea, Beijing has already aimed at expanding its reach to the
South China Sea and the Indian Ocean to encircle India.
To this end, China has wasted no time sitting idle over the past few years. Instead, Beijing set its
eyes on the two island nations of Sri Lanka in the heart of the Indian Ocean and Taiwan in the
Western Pacific to advance its’ best “core” national interests and fulfill its longstanding
geopolitical ambitions. For Beijing, Taiwan has been a “breakaway province” of mainland China;
Sri Lanka has maintained religious, diplomatic, and trade links to China for millennia.
Concurrently, these two strategically located island nations have become increasingly vital to
American foreign policy objectives—including the freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific
region, the promotion of democratic governance, and the maintenance of peace and prosperity in
the region. These two island nations have also long been characterized as “unsinkable aircraft
carriers.” The phrase, originally attributed to General Douglas MacArthur, was used to describe
Taiwan and to highlight its historical and strategic importance to China as well as to the United
States.
China’s approach towards these two “unsinkable aircraft carriers” is composed of two different
strategies—a carrot and a stick—aimed at China’s rejuvenation. Guided by the Blue Dragon
strategy, Beijing has basically encircled the expanding vicinity of the East China Sea and Taiwan,
the South China Sea and the artificial islands in the Paracel archipelagos, and the Indian Ocean.
Sri Lanka, located at the southern tip of India and in a perfect strategic position, has historically
been important to Beijing.
. It encompasses Beijing’s Blue Dragon strategy that has already put necessary footprints in the
continental and maritime region of South Asia to encircle India in both security and economic
domains. The subtle encirclement starts with Taiwan in the Western Pacific Ocean and extends to
Sri Lanka in the heart of the Indian Ocean.
All this points to a deterministic grand vision articulated by Beijing that is historically deeper and
more geographically expansive than the United States’ conception of “strategic competition” or
India’s strategic autonomy. Modern China has adhered to the advice of Sun Tzu, who long
ago asserted that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” Following his
counsel, Beijing has succeeded in building militarized artificial islands in the South China Sea
while the United States and its regional allies did not intervene because it would lead to an open
confrontation with China. Likewise, if nothing changes, the Indian Ocean could eventually become
China’s “Western Ocean” as described in ancient Chinese literature.
Lately, the world has witnessed the geopolitical construct of the Asia-Pacific being progressively
replaced by the Indo-Pacific. This has created a diplomatic domino effect with many governments
shifting their focus to Indo-Pacific and articulating their strategic approach towards the region.1 As
a result, major powers like the US, France and the European Union (EU) have come out with their
Indo-Pacific Strategies (IPS), attempting to articulate and accentuate their economic, political and
strategic interests in the region. The latest to join this list are Canada and the Republic of Korea
(ROK), who unveiled their strategies on 27 November 2022 and 28 December 2022, respectively.
Both the documents signal a major transformation in their respective government’s foreign policy
outlook.
3. Canada’s Re-engagement with the Indo-Pacific
Canada identifies itself as a Pacific nation and describes the Indo-Pacific as its neighbouring
region. The strategy implies that the future of the Canadian economy, trade, immigration policies,
environment and security would be extensively shaped through Canada’s engagement with the
Indo-Pacific region.2 But it must be noted that Canada’s attempts to engage with the region are
not new. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the Canadian government, led by then Prime Minister
Brian Mulroney, sought to play a more active role in the emerging security and economic
cooperation architecture of the region. This proactive engagement continued with successive
Canadian governments which even participated in the early multilateral negotiations on the South
China Sea (SCS) disputes.
However, post the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, Canada began to disengage from the region due to
budgetary constraints and diminishing political support.3 Subsequently, Canada’s visibility and
influence in the region receded as a result of which it was excluded from the East Asia Summit
(EAS). Also, despite being a dialogue partner of ASEAN and a member of the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), Canada was not invited to be the part of ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus
(ADMM Plus).4
After a prolonged period of absence, Canada’s need to re-engage with the region was brought forth
by the findings of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
These findings were released in 2015 in a report titled ‘Securing Canada’s Place in Asia-Pacific:
A Focus on Southeast Asia’. This report recommended leading the whole country's effort to
recognise the importance of the Asia-Pacific region for securing Canada’s future prosperity and
seizing regional opportunities. The report underscored the need for developing and implementing
a comprehensive and sustained approach to strengthening Canada’s engagement with the region.5
Accordingly, the Trudeau administration began scaling up Canada’s military, economic and
diplomatic presence in the Indo-Pacific. In 2018, the Canadian Navy launched Operation
Projection, which is an ongoing naval presence mission in the Indo-Pacific.6 On the economic and
diplomatic front, Canada signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement in 2016 and began
seeking membership in forums like the EAS and ADMM-Plus.
In line with these efforts, its IPS has been underpinned by a core assumption that the rising
influence of the Indo-Pacific region is a once-in-a-generation shift that requires a Canadian
response.7 The strategy has pledged to allocate US$ 2.3 billion for investments in five priority
areas over the next five years.8 These relate to security, trade and resilient supply chains, human
resources (HR), sustainable development and strategic engagement with the Indo-Pacific nations.
The strategy describes China as a disruptive global power and unequivocally makes it clear that
Canada will challenge China on issues like coercion and violations of human rights. At the same
time, the strategy also implies that Canada would seek to cooperate with China on issues such as
climate change and nuclear proliferation. The strategy envisages a four-tier diplomatic engagement
with China at domestic, bilateral, regional and multilateral levels.9 In a nutshell, Canada’s IPS
reflects its aspirations to re-engage with the Asia-Pacific region and regain lost ground, post its
disengagement in the late 1990s.
American historian Williamson Murray remarked that only great powers are capable of
making grand strategies and middle or small powers can only respond to those strategies.
This particularly holds true in the context of the IPS .
4. Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: An Overdue Conversation
Canada has recently published its long-awaited Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), which provides a
comprehensive roadmap for managing opportunities and mitigating threats in the region. There are
plenty of each: the opportunities to increase trade, bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI), and
“person-to-person” connectivity (i.e., educational exchanges or cultural programs) are extensive
across the theatre. Similarly, however, the threats to local stability – whether from
China’s increasing disregard for the rules-based international order, or North Korea’s nuclear
provocations, or India’s uncertain border disputes – are numerous and multifaceted. At its heart,
then, the IPS demonstrates that Canada needs to act constructively to maintain an awareness of
these issues, and that any response must necessarily incorporate a variety of perspectives and actors
(military, political, cultural, economic), as there is no universal policy for such a disparate region.
However, while the strategy is welcome in turning Canada’s attention to an area of growing
importance in world affairs, in terms of interests, the IPS remains vague on objective metrics for
success. Increasing Canada’s presence in the region through the use of military, economic, or
cultural ties is a good way to benefit Canada, but what are Canada’s interests in the region? The
IPS offers some useful ideas across the region – increasing engagement in the G7; an increased
presence coordinating with ASEAN; greater cultural ties through increased economic and
education visa programs – but it does not establish a relationship between objective and policy.
Indeed, these are not new objectives: the emphasis on alliances and multilateral solutions to
ongoing challenges has been standard Canadian policy since at least the end of the Second World
War; support for bilateral investment opportunities has also been policy priority for a similarly
long time.
For instance, in promoting “strategic resiliency,” the IPS calls for Canada to “increase…military
engagement and intelligence capacity [and to] deploy additional military assets and increase its
investments in border and cyber security.” These are welcome steps to protect Canadian interests,
but the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) may not have the additional capacity in equipment or
personnel to provide additional support in such a large theatre. Naval and air assets, for instance,
are already generally tasked with specific ongoing missions, and CAF operations in the IndoPacific would rely heavily on the navy.
Militarily, the size of the CAF footprint in the Indo-Pacific is quite small. Naval assets from the
Pacific Fleet (MARPAC) are limited to just thirteen surface ships and two submarines for combat
or force projection, not including auxiliary units such as shore-based aircraft. To assert an
increased security presence in this region, then, would likely require a redeployment of resources
and ships from the Canadian Atlantic Fleet (MARLANT).
This, however, is not without problems. Major MARLANT units, such as the Halifax-class
frigates, are often tasked for participation in NATO’s Standing Maritime Group patrols, which
may last up to a year in duration. Furthermore, Kingston-class ships are perennially visible in the
Caribbean as part of Operation CARIBBE, which interdicts suspected drug smugglers in the Gulf
of Mexico and Caribbean Sea. Re-tasking these units is possible but would negatively impact
Canada’s participation in these operations. It is not enough, therefore, simply to state that more
military assets would be provided, without detailing how and why these would be used.
The use of such assets requires a comprehensive set of objectives as well as a plan to achieve them.
While the IPS lists many useful objectives, from coordinating with allies and partners, to
enhancing trade and economic activity, the step-by-step process for enhancing Canadian interests,
from implementation to successful accomplishment, is often missing altogether. To compare, the
US’ own Indo-Pacific Strategy (USIPS) is much more specific in its tone. In discussing improving
military cooperation within the region, the USIPS notes that “finding new opportunities to link our
defense industrial bases, integrating our defense supply chains, and co-producing key technologies
that will shore up our collective military advantages is a key necessity.” The level of cooperation
and integration here is a means to an end: securing defence-industrial bases will allow the US
to more easily defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion. Indeed, with the US turning its
attention to the region via new security architecture (the “Quad”, AUKUS), and devoting more
military and financial resources into securing its own interests, Canada’s IPS appears small-scale
and rather limited in what it can achieve.
The IPS would be more effective if it provided a niche or specific area of maneuver for Canada.
Canada cannot compete with large powers such as China, Russia, or the US. It should, however,
leverage its soft power in other ways, most usefully by returning to its role as an “honest broker” in
the region through the creation or reinforcement of diplomatic architecture to resolve disputes or
conflicts. As conflict and competition intensify in the region, and with the UN perceived as
being outdated or unrepresentative of the region, new forums for cooperation or resolution will be
required, especially to handle complex problems. Canada should continue its military and financial
contributions to local alliances, but perhaps focus more on leveraging its traditional strengths as
a diplomatic broker – as it did with the creation of the 1997 Ottawa Treaty banning global
landmine use.
Thus, the role of the IPS is perhaps best viewed as the opening of a dialogue on Canada’s future
role in the region. It indicates areas where Canadian participation must be improved – trade,
military alliances, and cultural contacts – but the absence of metrics or criteria for success invites
ideas from government departments, private institutions, NGOs, or other actors to tailor policy
implementation to specific states, conditions, or alliances. The IPS, therefore, is a work in progress,
and will itself likely change as conditions in the Indo-Pacific become clearer and better understood
in the coming years.
5. Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Canada-China Relations
Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), released in November 2022, seeks to re-establish Canada’s
influence and partnerships in the region. It includes many welcome initiatives, particularly in
Southeast Asia, where it commits to renewed investment in scholarly exchanges, disaster relief
and landmine clearance, all of which may boost Canada’s flagging reputation as an inconsistent
partner. While the IPS provides some details on funding for most of its initiatives, the China section
is essentially a long policy statement that presents an apparent shift in Canada’s approach. The
tone is tougher than in the past—for example, calling China a “global disruptor”, and the IPS puts
a stronger emphasis on security issues. Despite the tougher language, this approach is more
pragmatic than hardline. In asserting that Canada will confront China in areas where its actions
conflict with Canada’s interests and values, and cooperate with China on common issues of global
importance, the government has reached a moderate, realistic position in managing what has
become a difficult and troubled relationship. What is needed now is a roadmap to making this
approach a concrete reality.
The Indo-Pacific Strategy’s new language on China is the culmination of the Liberal government’s
shift in its China policy since coming to power in 2015. Initially, the government sought to
“revitalize” the Canada-China relationship, holding back-to-back reciprocal visits between Justin
Trudeau and Premier Li Keqiang in 2016, and seeking to launch a Free Trade Agreement—a
launch that failed when Canadian political leaders misread China’s lack of support for
incorporating “progressive” elements like labour rights in such an agreement. Later, China’s
arbitrary arrest of Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, in retaliation for Canada’s
detention of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou to await extradition to the US, sent ties into a
tailspin. This was followed by new revelations about the Chinese Communist Party’s activities in
Canada, especially attempts to influence and harass Canadians of Chinese origin, along with
China’s oppressive re-education campaigns targeting Uyghurs and their Muslim faith. All of this
led to very negative views of China on the part of the Canadian public.
It is this troublesome relationship that permeates, directly or indirectly, the IPS. Indirectly,
Canada’s commitments to strengthen security ties in the North Pacific, while citing concerns about
North Korea as the driving force, have also been developed in the context of common concern
about a more aggressive China. Support for more commercial engagement in South and Southeast
Asia, and the encouragement of diversification by Canadian business into other parts of the region,
arise from China’s tendency to use market access as a political weapon, and from the increasingly
state-driven, protectionist tendencies of Xi Jinping’s China.
Yet ultimately such diversification is a private sector, not government, choice. While Southeast
Asia is an increasingly attractive region for investment in manufacturing and supply chains, it is
still a long way from matching China’s level of sophistication in infrastructure, technology, and
labour force. While Canada may, as Minister Joly says, warn Canadian businesses about the
potential pitfalls in doing business in China, the Canadian business community is likely to continue
to focus on this important market—a market that is particularly important to Western Canada—
despite current challenges, and make rational economic decisions based on China’s capacities and
economic trajectory.
As with most government strategies, some elements of the China section simply reiterate what the
government is already doing—supporting private sector access to the China market and
diversification of Canadian exports, advocating on human rights concerns (especially with respect
to Uyghurs), and “standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the people of Hong Kong”--which is a nice
sentiment but devoid of concrete action—and working with partners to oppose unilateral action on
the Taiwan Strait, which is more of the status quo at a time when support for Taiwan is both
increasingly crucial and increasingly delicate. The fact that the strategy also frequently refers to
partnering with other, like-minded countries on some key issue is a realistic recognition of the
limits of Canada’s influence.
There are other, important new policy signals, though, which, if implemented, would help
strengthen Canada’s hand in dealing with China. The commitment to protecting Canadians from
interference from agents of the Chinese government, strengthening the security lens on investment,
foreign interference, and on protecting Canadian intellectual property and research responds to
long-standing concerns that have now reached the public eye. How these intentions transform into
new policies and legislation should be watched carefully. Some will level the playing field with
China, which continues to restrict foreign investment in some key sectors. But Canada should be
careful that any changes to its rules on research do not inadvertently stifle academic exchange in
important and benign sectors.
A second welcome element is the commitment to enhancing China competencies in Canada—in
governments “and beyond”, and to putting more China experts into Global Affairs Canada and
into key Canadian embassies outside China. GAC’s China divisions are chronically understaffed,
and so focused on operational issues that long-term policy thinking can get pushed aside. Having
more China experts in the department focusing on these policy issues will strengthen Canada’s
policy capacity, and having diplomats with China expertise in embassies in key capitals will help
strengthen our capacity to form partnerships on key issues and to further deepen our China
knowledge.
Implementing Canada’s approach to China will require a renewed commitment to bilateral
engagement, including at the highest levels. Reviewing existing bilateral mechanisms is a useful
exercise, but it is only a start. Canada has said that it wants to cooperate with China on global
issues of common concern, which is a sound strategic approach. But this will require China’s
agreement as well, and to be effective this is likely to require the support of China’s senior
leadership, especially President Xi Jinping, in order to send signals through the Chinese system
that such cooperation should be considered. Given the testy public interaction between the two
leaders at the last G20 meeting, this will need some work, but having workable—not necessarily
friendly—relations between the two leaders is important for the global cooperation that Canada
considers to be a priority.
Similarly, if Canada is serious about advocating on human rights issues, the most effective
advocacy would take place in frank, closed-door discussions between leaders—discussions that
could lead to concrete, if incremental, action. These issues are too important and complex to leave
to public statements and brief standing encounters on the margins of international meetings.
The success of the IPS—especially its China section-- will depend on how broad statements of
intent are transformed into action, and how much of a sustained financial commitment the
government is willing to make to support its approach. Canadian governments have a recent history
of wide pendulum swings on China policy. Let’s hope this strategy helps chart and maintain a
constructive, middle path—one that can advance Canada’s interests in a way that transcends
changes in government.
6. Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy makes its policy choices clear
Key aspects
The strategy is aligned with the broader outlook of Canada’s allies and partners towards the IndoPacific region, including the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), the European Union
(EU), Australia, Japan and the Republic of Korea. It outlines five strategic objectives: Promote
peace, resilience and security; expand trade, investment, and supply chain resilience; invest in and
connect people; build a sustainable and green future; being an active and engaged partner. The
plan for each objective has been elaborated upon. Canada seeks to be an active player in seizing
the region’s multiple opportunities and making its contribution in addressing the existing and
emerging strategic challenges. It outlines the China challenge, with concerns about China’s
strategic and motivated investments, coercive approaches, arbitrary application of laws, military
capabilities, and attempts to realign the international order to its advantage. Like the strategies of
the EU and the UK, it aims to cooperate and partner with China where needed and stand up and
push back where necessary. Additionally, it plans to review all existing mechanisms and structures
with China and diversify its investments in the region. It identifies India as a critical partner, and
specific areas for enhancing cooperation have been indicated.
The strategy has a special emphasis on northern and western Pacific regions, and on strengthening
cooperation with Japan, the ROK, Australia, and the ASEAN countries. This is particularly evident
in the fields of security and defence. Specific mention of challenges posed by China in the South
China Sea, East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait; strengthening regional defence architectures;
augmenting naval presence and collaborative deployments; ensuring stability in the Korean
peninsula; and enhancing defence and security relationships indicate a clear western Pacific focus.
The strategy positions Canada as a potential partner for new initiatives and frameworks being led
by the US, which in the future could include structures like the AUKUS—as informal security
alliance between Australia, the UK and the US.
Enhancement in trade and investments with efforts to gain increased market access in the region
have been indicated. Canada will seek to progress Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN,
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with Indonesia, and an eventual CEPA
with India after an interim trade agreement. It aims to leverage its strengths to partner in clean
technologies, underwater mapping, remote sensing, fisheries, biodiversity protection, and blue
economy experiences.
Distinctive features
In yet another interpretation of the geographical area, the strategy lists 40 countries that it considers
a part of the Indo-Pacific region, which has been depicted on a map. From Pakistan in the west to
Pacific Island countries (14) in the east, it includes Bhutan, Nepal, and Mongolia. Statistics and
data points are accordingly linked with these 40 countries. It highlights that Canada itself is a
Pacific nation—and not included in the list of Indo-Pacific countries—and that the Indo-Pacific is
in its neighbourhood.
It introduces a new term—people of Indo-Pacific origin, and stresses that the largest diaspora in
Canada is of Indo-Pacific origin. It seeks to accord priority to people-to-people exchanges with the
region, and feminist international assistance. It also introduces the concept of a whole-of-society
approach, wherein businesses, industry, academic institutions, think tanks, media, professionals,
activists, and the broader civil society all play a dominant role. It, therefore, seeks to position itself
as a strategy of the nation, and not just of the government. In doing so, it attempts to align
its domestic agenda of diversity, reconciliation, environmentalism and immigration, with its
foreign policy imperatives. Unlike some other strategies, it does not include separate sections on
connectivity or security, and there is no hint of any strategic autonomy.
Specific areas and steps for engagement with Australia, ASEAN countries, China, India, Japan,
and the ROK have been outlined. However, the engagement plan with China is put forward in a
different way from the others and is described at various levels—domestic, bilateral, regional, and
multilateral. The underlying theme is the apprehension and risks related to deeper engagement
with China, and the desirability of diversifying away from it. The strategy also refers to protecting
Canadian businesses and its economy from investments by China’s state-owned enterprises. While
it highlights the strategic challenge of great-power competition in the region, it positions itself
unambiguously with its allies and partners, stating that commitments have also been tailored to
meet their needs. About Taiwan, it reaffirms its ‘One China’ policy, opposes any unilateral action
that threats the status quo, and stresses its plan to continue to grow its ties. The strategy is a clear
signal to China about the new direction being adopted by Canada. It also plans to invest in
improving Canada’s knowledge and understanding of China, and the region.
Expectedly, the Global Times stated that this strategy is overambitious and full of malice and
prejudice towards the Chinese people. It accused Canada of plagiarism and copying from the US
documents, and highlighted its role as a “cheerleader for Cold War 2.0” while playing a
subordinate position to Washington.
Implementation
The strategy had been under preparation and review for over three years. It has been reported that
several drafts had been vetted. The text of the released version is concise, and the broad approach
is pragmatic, with clarity on goals and objectives. There are adequate descriptions of key steps
planned towards implementation. As per reports, there were multiple iterations for resource and
funding support, which have finally been made more realistic. An allocation of US $ 2.3
billion over five years is planned, of which about US $ 750 million is for FinDev (Canada’s
development finance institution) and US $ 492 million is for expanding naval presence and
participation in regional military exercises. A fresh allocation of US $ 74 million for immigration
support has also been indicated. It is not clear if funding support will be increased for rights-based
organisations in the region, given the record of mixed outcomes in the past.
As done by some other countries, Canada plans to appoint a special envoy for the Indo-Pacific
region, which should facilitate necessary coordination at policy and operational levels. A new
diplomatic position is also planned in Hawaii, which should enable effective liaison with the
headquarters of the US Indo-Pacific Command.
No specific review or monitoring mechanism has been indicated, but it may be announced soon.
The strategy brings with it the potential to add to the ongoing strategic competition and rivalry in
the region. But collaborative and meaningful implementation can also position Canada as a mature
and key player in the Indo-Pacific region. To a large extent, action on the fifth and last objective
of “Canada as an active and engaged partner to the Indo-Pacific” will drive the implementation
plan for all its objectives.
7. Canada’s new Indo-Pacific strategy bids au revoir to middle power ambitions
Ottawa has unveiled its long-awaited Indo-Pacific Strategy. Comprehensive statements on
regional or global foreign policy are a rarity. This whole of government strategy is the most
ambitious effort in a generation to focus attention and resources on the region.
The label of ‘Indo-Pacific’ is more than old wine in a new bottle. The earlier Asia Pacific idea was
born in era of expansiveness, inclusive multilateralism, open regionalism, engagement with China,
cooperative and comprehensive security dreams and the end of a Cold War. The Indo-Pacific era is
the product of great power rivalry, securitisation of technology and trade, fragmenting
globalisation, strengthened alliances, coalitions of the like-minded, a rules-based international
order and an incipient Cold War.
The strategy’s commitment of C$2.3 billion (US$1.7 billion) over five years covers 27 different
projects. The big ticket items are C$750 million (US$549 million) for infrastructure projects
filtered through a new US-led G7 arrangement, C$550 million (US$403 million) for an enhanced
military presence including a third frigate in the Indian ocean and expanded participation in
regional military exercises, and C$225 million (US$165 million) for strengthening public safety
and cyber security at home and in Southeast Asia.
There is also C$100 million (US$73 million) for trade promotion and diversification activities,
C$100 million ($US73 million) for expanded diplomatic capacity and C$350 million (US$256
million) for a range of developmental assistance programs, people-to-people links including
scholarships, network building and a new office in Southeast Asia.
Several items have a distinctive Canadian twist, including a feminist International Assistance
Package, projects related to marine resource management and Team Canada trade missions.
Considering the modest budget commitment, the five-year time frame and the number of activities
to be supported, the impact in the region is likely to be far from transformational. But combined
with diplomatic and defence resources already in play in the region, the strategy does signal the
sincerity of commitment and a long-term investment in knowledge and networks for a sustained
presence.
Too brief and too replete with ambiguities and contradictory inclinations to be the final word, the
strategy indicates that Canada wants to play the new regional game. This time Canada’s approach
is less middle power bridge-building and more about alliances and partners that share its values.
The stark wording on China varies substantially from the engagement vocabulary of the past 50
years. Today’s China is labelled assertive and repressive, an ‘increasingly disruptive global power’
that erodes the existing rules-based international order, threatening Canadian interests and values.
It highlights Beijing’s unilateral actions, foreign interference activities, coercive economic tools,
arbitrary detentions and dangerous state-owned enterprises.
The strategy calls for domestic measures to strengthen cybersecurity and protect against the theft
of intellectual property, and, internationally, to work more closely with the Five Eyes, NATO and
international institutions to monitor and push back against Chinese assertiveness. Departing from
the earlier 4C’s approach — coexistence, cooperation, competition and challenge — the new
strategy claims that Ottawa will ‘compete with China when we ought and cooperate when we
must’.
It builds on specific actions already taken including the Huawei 5G ban, rejection of Chinese
investments in strategic minerals, the Uyghur genocide resolution in the House of Commons,
public criticism of the National Security Law in Hong Kong and the recent announcement of
consultations about a possible Foreign Agent Registry.
Beneath the strategy is a domestic tide of public negativity about China, unrelenting media
criticism and the hardened policies of the US and other like-minded countries that have produced a
new consensus in Ottawa, largely unopposed.
The strategy has elements of nuance both in what it does and does not say. It does not use the
words friendshoring, decoupling or ‘genocide’. It is mute on techno-nationalism and the need for
an industrial policy to counter China’s rise. There is no commitment to pursuing membership in
the Quad or AUKUS.
It lauds trade diversification both ‘beyond’ and ‘within’ China even as it underlines new risks in
doing business in China. It makes the case for cooperation and dialogue on existential problems
like climate change, biodiversity loss, global health and nuclear proliferation. And, suggesting the
cake is not entirely baked, the Foreign Minister continues to emphasise the virtues of working with
China, establishing channels of dialogue and making sure existing institutions include China.
Familiar rhetoric about the growing importance of India is focused on economic and immigration
issues but neither strategic nor human rights matters
Reactions so far include mainstream media support, China-hawk claims that the strategy isn’t
tough enough, applause from Japan, proposals for a Canada–US Strategic Dialogue on the IndoPacific and Chinese taunts about a loss of Canadian independence.
Southeast Asian reactions will be especially important. The strategy emphasizes ASEAN centrality
and almost half of the 27 specific projects have a Southeast Asian element. In a region whose own
ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific continues to promote an Asia Pacific agenda, including
various forms of non-alignment, neutrality in great power conflict and opposition to the bifurcation
of the global economy, Ottawa is now at odds. Whispered criticisms that Canada may not be
America’s deputy sheriff in the region but is now a prominent part of the posse may become louder.
Questions abound. What will be the balance between support for ASEAN-centred inclusive
institutions and coalitions among the like-minded including AUKUS, the Quad, APEC and the
new US Indo-Pacific Economic Forum? What will be the balance between open trading and
technology systems compared to friend shoring and supply chain resilience? Will the region take
any notice?
But there is no question that amid those shifting tectonic plates — Canada is leaning closer to its
American allies and away from a regional middle power role.
8. Strong and free: Canada’s Indo-Pacific awakening and what comes next – Kei Hakata for
Inside Policy
This is a bold step by a gentle country. Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), launched in
November 2022, pointed to China as “an increasingly disruptive global power” and maintained
that “Canada will, at all times, unapologetically defend [its] national interest, be it about the global
rules that govern global trade, international human rights or navigation and overflight rights.”
As Canada infuses geostrategy into its foreign policy, the Liberal government under Prime
Minister Justin Trudeau clarified Ottawa’s stance, which some have already dubbed “historic.”
Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly rightly said, “Canada is a Pacific country […] the Indo-Pacific
region is part of Canada’s DNA.” By confronting China’s revisionism, Canada has demonstrated
its determination to remain present and relevant in an increasingly critical region.
As a much-awaited document, Canada’s IPS is the culmination of its trusted engagement with Asia
and desperate struggle with the People’s Republic of China. Accompanied by a fiveyear program of $2.3 billion covering a wide range of activities, the IPS is a departure from
Ottawa’s past China policy and represents an effort to counterbalance China’s weight. The IPS
was introduced after the COVID-19 crisis and the war in Ukraine brought a clear strategic
perspective. Indeed, as Canadian analysts pointed out, the IPS is a work in progress, and how
Canada’s long-term commitment will materialize remains to be seen.
Absent in the conversation for many years and coming after Quebec’s foray, Canada is a latecomer
to the Indo-Pacific formulation compared to other lynchpin states, such as Australia, India, Japan,
and the United States. This lag is understandable given Canada’s distance from the geopolitical
epicentre of the Indo-Pacific. Except for cases of Chinese influence operations inside Canada or
those involving Canadian citizens (notably the “two Michaels”) detained in China, Canada does
not typically face Beijing’s provocations around its borders. The inertia of the Pearsonian tradition
may also have hindered a tough posture in terms of its foreign policy.
In many regards, Canada’s trajectory resembles those of Australia and Japan. For decades, Canada
has enjoyed peace and prosperity in the US-led international order. However, China’s growing
bellicosity has challenged Canada’s peaceful existence. As was true for Canberra and Tokyo,
Ottawa’s Indo-Pacific embrace was bound to occur sooner or later.
Like Australia and Japan, Canada has aimed to present itself as a “good citizen” of what many
used to call the international community. There is little doubt that the dividends of a stable
international order allowed this diplomatic posture. Therefore, Ottawa could efficiently use the
United Nations and other multilateral forums as its preferred venues, and it worked. Canada has
been an influential soft power in the international arena since World War II.
UN peacekeeping operations, initiated by Lester B. Pearson, responded to the needs of the era. The
Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines, led by Lloyd Axworthy, illustrated Canada’s skillful
diplomacy, although it was a product of a time when policy-makers worldwide, including those in
threat-ridden Japan, were still naïve. The “protection of civilians in armed conflict,” an
initiative introduced at the UN Security Council in 1999, is Canada’s valuable contribution to
human security. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which few now discuss, exemplifies
Ottawa’s diplomatic activism.
In the “good old days,” Canada could comfortably exploit its pacifist niche. Now, the country must
grapple with the harsh reality of a multipolar world in which its cherished agendas are not
necessarily relevant or easily accepted. In this strategic dilemma, the premise of Canadian
diplomacy is falling apart. How will the IPS, with its “Canadianess,” unfold? Can Canada maintain
its activist position by pursuing a rule-based Indo-Pacific order? Should Canada change its
diplomatic identity?
Obviously, because the IPS offers possibilities for different postures, political input, including
further budget allocations, will determine its outcome. Thus, the direction to which its core China
policy (and its engagement with Taiwan) will go depends on its actual implementation, as well as
its defence policy. Despite these uncertainties, we can cautiously predict the eventual challenges.
The IPS wisely articulates economic elements, such as the expansion of Canada’s trade network
and further engagement with the member states of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement
for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Such policies will not be controversial because Canada
will gain much from trade if it is conducted carefully. Canada’s raw materials and agricultural
products are important assets, as its trade ties with Japan prove. People-to-people relations with
the Indo-Pacific region, from which many migrants to Canada come, is also a smart way to promote
Canada’s public diplomacy. It is likely that many Canadian citizens will concur with and
participate in these diplomatic efforts.
By contrast, Canada’s military expenditures and defence cooperation with like-minded states,
either bilateral or minilateral, may require a boost. An allocation of $492.9 million pledged under
the IPS for the “Enhanced Defence Presence and Contribution” does not seem to match the real
needs. Even with the war in Ukraine, Canada’s military spending remains one of the lowest as a
percentage of GDP among NATO members. Further, Zeitenwende will be required by the
Canadian polity and society to reverse what has been accepted as a norm for many decades.
Undoubtedly, there are advantages to partnering with other Indo-Pacific states, such as Australia
and Japan. Concerted efforts will safeguard Canada’s peacebuilder identity, highlight its
international standing, and increase its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the US. For example, Canada
and Japan concluded an “Action Plan for contributing to a free and open Indo-Pacific region” in
October 2022. Such partnerships can foster Ottawa’s international commitment — albeit
differently from its past — and promote the role of “good cop.”
To secure a rules-based maritime order, the Royal Canadian Navy actively participated in various
military exercises and operations with US forces, which became more effective peacekeeping
tools than UN-led ones. Canada should perhaps moderate its affection for the UN and judiciously
explore minilateralism, which has been underutilized thus far. Ottawa’s reported proposal for a
“North Pacific Quad” of Canada, Japan, South Korea, and the US reflects this direction, though
South Korea, which had grabbed the Japanese island of Takeshima, may hardly identify as an
espouser of international law.
As Canada increases its Indo-Pacific presence, the question of prioritizing various military
engagements necessarily arises. The Indo-Pacific geopolitical centre areas, such as the South and
East China Seas and Taiwan Strait, are far from Canada’s shores. However, this region holds
special meaning for Canada’s attachment to the rule of law, begging the question of resource
allocation, as the Arctic region is equally crucial for Canada’s defence and presence. These
conundrums can only be resolved by increasing the defence budget.
It also remains questionable whether Ottawa’s emphasis on the values of human rights and
democracy, including its feminist agenda, is realizable in a more complicated international
environment. This question applies particularly to the current Liberal government. Many
governments in developing and emerging states now feel empowered against the background of
the collective “Global South.” If Global Affairs Canada, under pressure from domestic
constituencies, wants to advocate Canadian values, it must embrace pragmatism. Nonetheless,
Canada must not compromise its core values vis-à-vis China, as Joly declared.
The “internalization” of the Indo-Pacific or China strategy will face practical challenges. For
Beijing, Canada has operated as “a friend in America’s backyard” and, as such, it consciously
attempted to dominate Canada in various aspects. To counter PRC interference, the Canadian
government must take tough measures to ban foreign political financing and unregistered lobbying
on Canadian soil. Disruptive activities by China’s United Front on Canada’s Chinese diaspora
must be annihilated.
The whole task is daunting for Canada, which must grasp the speed of strategic developments.
Despite its tough rhetoric in the IPS, Canada’s “good cop” disposition may also induce it to deal
with leaders in Beijing in an appeasing way. Policy-makers in Canberra, Tokyo, and Washington
must carefully examine how Ottawa’s China policy evolves.
At the very least, Canada is stepping up its foreign policy readjustment with a foray into the IndoPacific. True to its national character, Canada has proved its strength by exhibiting resolve. The
country has also vindicated freedom by defending its sovereignty and democracy. Canada’s IndoPacific awakening may only be a prelude to a demonstration of its resilience.
9. China’s infiltration and cooptation of Canadian research
The infiltration and cooptation of Canadian research by Chinese defence, intelligence,
national security and dual-use technology entities is deep and vast.
As early as 2018, in an OpEd in the Toronto Star entitled “China’s Silent Invasion of Western
Universities,” I had flagged research on concerns about research collaboration on cooperation of
Canadian universities and researchers by the PRC, CCP, Chinese companies and entities related
to China’s defence, intelligence and national security apparatus and related research
institutions. As I wrote at the time, between 2007 and 2017, China’s National University of
Defence and Technology (NUDT) and similar institutions sponsored over 2,500 military scientists
and engineers to infiltrate universities abroad, leverage overseas expertise, research and training
and strategically develop relationships with researchers and institutions in technologically
advanced countries to improve military technology”. At the time, the Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, in a report entitled “Picking flowers, making honey”, identified 300 of those 2,500
military scientists – that is, over 11% — to have developed collaborations with Canadian
institutions and researchers. Among universities outside of China with collaborations with the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) – the armed wing of the Communist Party of China – three
Canadian universities ranked in the top 10: the University of Waterloo, the University of Toronto,
and McGill University. Waterloo and McGill’s problematic relationships show up again in a very
detailed January 2023 report by the Centre for Research Security and Integrity, as do other
Canadian universities.
Many of the PLA researchers simply use an affiliation with an existing non-PLA institution in the
Canadian visa application. That makes their fraud hard for Canada to detect. Operatives disguise
their military affiliations, such as claiming to be from non-existent academic institutions and
inviting themselves on the pretense of supposedly fully funded scholarships and fellowships, to
target areas such as hypersonic missiles, navigation technology, quantum physics, signal
processing, cryptography, and autonomous vehicles. To be clear: research data obtained in Canada
have direct application to weapons development and other strategic military purposes. No need to
belabour here China’s ostensible attempt to capture the Trudeau Foundation and the way China
has previously leveraged Confucius Institutes as an instrument of soft power on Canadian
university campuses.
As reported by the Wall Street Journal on 20 January 2023, China also leverages academic
institutions to circumvent bans, on importing certain microchips, for example. In a case for which
the government continues to obstruct the release of documents to parliamentary
committee, Chinese operatives appear to have infiltrated Canada’s National Microbiology Lab in
Winnipeg, one of the few Level 4 labs in the world, to exfiltrate research, research practices, IP,
and virus samples.
Meanwhile, Le Journal de Montréal recently flagged a sizeable gift by Huawei to Corcordia
University, and opaque research relationships between Huawei and McGill University, l’Ecole
Polytechnique and l’Institut national de la recherche scientifique. Huawei money is found in many
other Canadian universities, including Western, Calgary, Waterloo and Toronto, although the
universities of Waterloo, Toronto, McGill and l’Université de Montréal have since publicly
disavowed future research engagements with Huawei. Federal signalling on Huawei thus appears
to be working. Some institutions appear to be getting the message. Still, there is need for federal
rigour and greater institutional responsibility, complemented by federal assistance and education.
Huawei, of course, is the world’s largest digital enabler of authoritarianism and human rights
abuses on a vast scale. Although the current federal government finally banned Huawei equipment
from Canadian telecommunications networks seven years into its mandate, it has been perfectly
content to let Huawei continue its collaborations with Canadian public universities, using public
research funding.
Testimony
Not to put too fine a point on it: the infiltration and cooptation of Canadian research by Chinese
defence, intelligence, national security and dual-use technology entities is deep and vast. In some
cases, Canadian institutions and researchers know full well that their Chinese interlocutors are
highly problematic; in others they are unwitting participants.
Canadian tax dollars, public research funding, and public universities have for years been
leveraged systematically to support and enable research and dual-use technology that benefits
hostile authoritarian states, which in turn use it for grey-zone activities that aim to undermine
Canada’s and allied democratic institutions, electoral processes, economic prosperity, national
security, fundamental values, international and multilateral institutions, and so forth. The federal
government purports to have a values-based foreign policy, yet for over 17 years its own research
dollars and institutions have been used by hostile states to advance nefarious purposes that run
counter to those very values!
This is not a random distribution problem. For China, for example, the problematic research
partners and methods of infiltration and cooptation have been a matter of public record for at least
five years, as have key areas of sensitive research.
At the same time, dithering by the federal government on a coherent and systematic approach and
framework to contain this problem is anecdotally causing some scholars from being excluded from
opportunities merely by virtue of a Chinese surname! So, contrary to the Prime Minister’s claims
that government action might have racist consequences or overtones, it is precisely the
government’s inaction that is having racist consequences by creating widespread uncertainty.
Conversely, any scholar who has family in China, who works with former colleagues in the PRC
or who visits China would be vulnerable, as is naturally the case for most scholars with relations
in China.
Although the focus of the committee is on the federal government’s role, this domain requires
close and extensive collaboration among the federal government, provinces and research
institutions, with robust and resolute federal leadership to ensure certainty and national
coherence. To this end, the federal government must not succumb to the temptation to take the
easy way out by taking a narrow approach. This would be a serious mistake. Only a
comprehensive approach to research security will be effective and meaningful.
Although universities are open entities by their very nature and academic freedom is the sine qua
non of university research, it is perfectly legitimate for the federal government to leverage TriCouncil funding and the relationship this funding affords with post-secondary institutions to steer
universities away from an agnostic approach to an approach that is informed by research security,
to ensure that Canadian research funding and institutions are not used in ways that could undermine
Canada’s and allied national security, prosperity, and fundamental democratic values. The
problem is that post-secondary institutions have little insights into national security; as such, it is
incumbent on the federal government, as the entity that is best positioned to balance security
intelligence with national interest, to provide proportionate, necessary, efficient and effective
guidance on research security.
10. Countering China’s Economic Coercion
China recently moved to ban Canadian canola, soybeans, and other agriproducts. These efforts at
economic coercion are closely tied to the ongoing tensions between the two countries, which began
when Canadian authorities arrested Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou in December 2018, following a
US extradition request. Simply put, China is attempting to pressure Canada economically into
releasing Meng Wanzhou.
The disparity in power between Canada and China has led some observers to comment that “we
need China – and China doesn’t need us” or that we were only “a flea sitting on China’s shoulder.”
The suggestion is that there’s little the Canadian government can or should do in response to
Chinese economic coercion.
Yet, as a new MLI report by Munk Senior Fellow Duanjie Chen makes clear, Canadians must
reject the view that China has all the economic power and Canada has none. Titled Countering
China’s Economic Coercion: No fear but resolve, no illusion but diversification, this paper
demonstrates that Canada has some significant advantages and China is taking some serious risks.
“The majority of our exports to China are commodities for which the supply is constrained by
natural resources that are either scarce or rapidly depleting in China,” writes Chen.
“Meanwhile, all our imports from China are manufactured goods that are easily replaceable from
suppliers in other markets, despite possibly higher prices. Indeed, cultivating more reliable
suppliers for such goods will benefit Canada economically in the long run.”
In its dealings with China, the Canadian government has much to learn from other governments.
The paper explores the experiences of the Philippines, Mongolia, France, Norway, South Korea,
Japan and Taiwan, which have all suffered from Chinese economic coercion.
The Philippines and Mongolia have capitulated while France and Norway have modified their
behaviour to appease China. South Korea largely refused to appease China, and at least one of its
large investors is seeking to leave China entirely. Japan also took the important step of diversifying
its rare earth supplies following a Chinese ban in 2010. Taiwan has shown remarkable resilience
and made conscious efforts to boost trade and investment with other countries to reduce its
economic dependence on the mainland.
Chen also points out that the long-term prospects for our farmers facing China’s ban on our
agriproducts do not seem as dire. For example, even with the ban on canola, Canadian canola by
total planted area is expected to climb, total canola seed exports will be still higher than in the past,
and canola oil production will increase over the longer term. Still, as detailed in the report’s
conclusion, they deserve support from the government in the near term due to political disruptions
beyond their control.
“The canola story reflects general global trends for other commodities dependent upon natural
resources, particularly edible ones – specifically, that global markets for our agriproducts and other
natural resources have been generally stable,” notes Chen. “China’s disruptive play will only cause
growing distrust among its trading partners, which in turn will adversely affect China’s long-term
security in food supply.”
According to the report, a Chinese ban on all our agriproducts would total about $10 billion for
the coming year – and that potential loss would increase to $16.4 billion if China ever decides to
bar its tourists from Canada and recall its students studying in Canada. That is not a likely outcome,
but it does show the limits of China’s ability to apply economic coercion against Canada.
Finally, China’s economy is also showing signs of wear; it is suffering from severe shortages of
arable land, persistent income disparity, an aging population and a growing popular desire for the
benefits of foreign competition. Importantly for Canada, China’s need for agriproducts imports
will only continue to grow.
Canada is not in such a weak position as we had believed. We have immediate options in
countering China’s economic coercion. For instance, Canada can:

Ban Huawei from any involvement in Canada’s 5G wireless network, given that it poses a
direct threat to our national security.

Expand existing insurance programs to help Canadian farmers cope with China’s economic
coercion, with some of the funds potentially coming from the diversion of our capital share
in the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).

Register and scrutinize all the R&D funding sources from China and sever the ones that
aim to steal our intellectual property.

Withdraw Canada’s membership from the AIIB, which serves as an important institutional
representation of China’s global power.
In the long-term, Canada should be taking every measure available to diversify our trade beyond
China. Taiwan has been vigilantly doing so for years, and Canadians should take note of its efforts
to achieve greater resilience against China’s economic coercion. Such trade diversification should
be part of Canada’s long-term strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
With its growing economic size, China believes it can act at will against any country. Yielding to
China’s coercion, economic or otherwise, will only embolden it. Chen’s paper argues that it is
therefore time for Canada to learn from the like-minded jurisdictions that have been standing up
to China’s economic coercion.
“This is not to suggest that Canada take a blindly confrontational approach towards China, but
rather, to act upon our conviction that we do not want any country to behave the way China
currently does towards Canada. What we want from China is for it to behave like an equal member
of the international community,” concludes Chen.
11. Canada’s New Indo-Pacific Strategy and China
In November of 2022, the Government of Canada finally unveiled its long-anticipated Indo-Pacific
Strategy (IPS), what is described as a new, whole-of-government Canadian approach to what, until
recently, was termed the “Asia Pacific” region. The new strategy has been developed against the
backdrop of the significant downturn in U.S.-China relations, a reality that has clearly influenced
its direction. The IPS posits that “The rising influence of the Indo-Pacific region is a once-in-ageneration global shift that requires a generational Canadian response.”
It starts out by highlighting the economic realities of the region, well known to anyone even
remotely familiar with the rise of Asia. It notes that “By 2040—less than two decades from now—
the region will account for more than half of the global economy, or more than twice the share of
the United States.” In terms of international trade, the region is identified as Canada’s second
largest export market, including six of the country’s top 13 trading partners. (Why 13 and not the
top 10? Because the authors of the strategy wanted to squeeze in India, Taiwan and Vietnam.) But
the strategy is based on much more than just trade and economic opportunity. It has five
components: trade and investment, peace and security, people-to-people relations, sustainable
development and climate change and finally, Canada’s presence in the region. They are
interlinked.
With respect to trade and investment, an “inconvenient truth” for the strategy is that Canada’s
largest export market in the region is and will continue to be China. In fact, Canadian exports to
China in 2021 exceeded exports to Japan, South Korea, India and Taiwan—combined! In terms of
supply chains, imports from China equalled imports from the entire EU and easily overshadowed
imports from all other countries in the Indo-Pacific region. If one goal of the strategy is to diversity
Canadian trade and investment away from the U.S. toward the Indo-Pacific (the U.S. remains
hugely dominant in Canadian trade, taking 75% of Canadian exports and providing 62% of
imports), then China must be part of this strategy. This is where the Indo-Pacific Strategy is
somewhat contradictory.
The main focus of the strategy is to de-emphasize and move away from China by diversifying to
other parts of the region and putting the emphasis on alternative partners, ranging from Japan and
South Korea in the North Pacific to India and ASEAN in South and Southeast Asia. At the same
time, the realities of the potential of the China market cannot be ignored, and the strategy
references this: “Canada will continue to protect Canadian market access in China while working
with clients to diversify within, and beyond, that market.”
But, of course, China is much more than a market. It is a significant global power, one that is
increasingly challenging the norms of the established “rules-based order”, but also one whose
participation is essential for global governance and tackling global issues, like climate change,
energy transition, poverty, migration, pandemics and so on. Further complicating the equation is
the way China governs domestically, particularly when it comes to minorities such as its Uyghur
or Tibetan populations, as well as its actions towards entities such as Hong Kong and Taiwan, and
in the South China Sea. Here the IPS stakes out new ground in terms of Canada-China relations
which, until the arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou in Vancouver on a U.S. Department
of Justice warrant, and the subsequent retaliatory arrest in China on national security grounds of
Canadians Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, were relatively warm despite periodic Canadian
criticism of China’s human rights record.
In the IPS, China is called out as “an increasingly disruptive global power.” Canada’s approach
going forward is apparently going to be “clear-eyed”. The strategy states that Canada’s approach
is “aligned with those of our partners in the region and around the world.” That is a doubtful
assertion since many in the region, like the ASEAN countries, have tried to keep a balance in their
relations with China, not wanting to have to choose between the PRC and the United States. In
dealing with China in the future, the mantra espoused by Foreign Affairs Minister Melanie Joly is
that Canada will compete with and challenge China when it should, but will cooperate with China
when it must. This last “concession” is a reference to, among others, climate change and global
health.
While the focus of the IPS is on diversification of efforts away from China—in everything from
trade and investment promotion to academic and student exchanges, development assistance
activities and enhanced Canadian presence—China still occupies a central place. There is a call
for reassessment of relations, but no call for decoupling or reshoring. At the same time, the tradeoff for continued engagement with China seems to have been a shift in rhetoric to more hardline
positions on military security and vocal advocacy on human rights.
Regarding the objective of promoting “peace, resilience and security,” Canada will deploy more
of its modest military assets to the region but will also work on cyber-security, bolster capacity to
collect and assess intelligence and tighten oversight over foreign activities within Canada.
Unstated but obvious is the target of such activities. However, there is no mention of AUKUS, or
seeking to join the “Quad” (comprised of the U.S., Japan, India, Australia) defence arrangement,
structures that are seen as largely aimed at containing China from a military perspective.
At the end of the day, the IPS is a compromise. It shifts attention and resources away from China
to other parts of the region, areas where Canadian engagement has been seen as sporadic or lacking,
but at the same time it recognizes the reality of China as a global player and important economic
market, both for exports and essential supply chain inputs. The balance struck is somewhat
uncomfortable, with the wheels of continued Canada-China cooperation being greased with the oil
of harsher criticism of China’s international and domestic behaviour. This may have been
necessary for domestic Canadian (and U.S.) consumption, but a key question remains; how will
China react to the IPS?
12. Canada’s new Indo-Pacific strategy is clear-eyed on China
The Canadian government released its highly anticipated Indo-Pacific strategy last weekend. It
commits the government to spending C$2.3 billion over five years to expand Canada’s military,
security, trade and diplomatic ties with Indo-Pacific countries and views the region as globally
important.
The strategy examines economic opportunities and strategic challenges and outlines five strategic
objectives centring on peace and security, trade, investment, sustainability (including a green
future) and Canadian engagement as an active partner to the Indo-Pacific.
A relatively long section is devoted to the threats (and opportunities) coming from China. There’s
also a section on India, which is portrayed primarily as a democratic friend that offers significant
trade diversification and investment opportunities.
Significantly, the document identifies China as an ‘increasingly disruptive global power’, but also
carefully differentiates between ‘the actions of the current Chinese government, with whom we
have differences, and the Chinese people’. It directly addresses Beijing’s unpredictability and
aggression with explicit descriptions of the geopolitical risks many Indo-Pacific nations now face
from China. At the same time, Ottawa proposes to cooperate with Beijing to help address climate
change, biodiversity loss, global health and nuclear proliferation.
The document is also explicit in its support of Taiwan and the rights of Uyghurs, Tibetans and
other ethnic and religious minorities. It demonstrates that Canada is committed to being a reliable
partner to the countries in the region and, notably, states: ‘In areas of profound disagreement, we
will challenge China, including when it engages in coercive behaviour—economic or otherwise—
ignores human rights obligations or undermines our own national security interests and those of
partners in the region.’
The strategy was three years in development, and strongly reflects the changes that Ottawa has
experienced and witnessed in Beijing’s behaviour. During that time, Canada went from being
friendly with China to recognising that the China of today is not the China of 2015—when Justin
Trudeau came to power hoping for a free trade agreement and closer relations. President Xi
Jinping’s use of ‘wolf warrior’ tactics against Canada and other nations, along with China’s
unpredictable business practices towards foreign companies, have made Beijing increasingly
difficult to engage with.
Canada’s relationship with China has been tested in various ways as Beijing has increasingly
asserted itself at the global, multilateral and bilateral levels. Canada’s primary values and
allegiances, especially with the US and other Five Eyes partners, have been constantly challenged.
At last month’s G20 summit in Bali, Xi was filmed chiding Trudeau for allegedly releasing
information to the media about a ‘private’ discussion they’d had. While it was hardly a wolfwarrior exchange, the incident illustrates the soured relations between the two countries,
particularly since Canada’s arrest in 2018 of Meng Wanzhou, then chief financial officer of
Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei. China reciprocated by spuriously arresting the ‘two
Michaels’ (Spavor and Kovrig) and giving a sentence of execution to Robert Schellenberg, now
being appealed. During this period, Canada has unsuccessfully sought rapprochement with China.
By its own admission, the new strategy reflects a more ‘clear-eyed’ view of dealing with China.
Canada conducted extensive consultations with Indo-Pacific nations about the strategy’s
composition, and Canada’s domestic constituents have expressed a variety of views on the subject.
Getting all the stars aligned was undoubtedly challenging.
Overall, the strategy offers a comprehensive, coherent plan for Canada’s Indo-Pacific engagement,
with funding attached to core objectives. The previous ‘strategy’ relied on a combination of
ministerial press releases and tag lines from prime ministerial or ministerial statements made in
parliament. It had no coordinated framework or associated funding, thus lacking substance.
The new strategy articulates Canada’s primary values and interests with clarity, encompassing a
‘whole-of-society approach’ requiring involvement of Canadians from every sector. This is no
small ambition, with objectives set to match the region’s future opportunities and challenges. The
strategy describes it as a ‘once-in-a-generation global shift that requires a generational Canadian
response’.
Importantly, the strategy commits resources—including C$492.9 million in increased defence
commitments such as the deployment of an additional frigate to the region. Ottawa will also
provide nearly C$227 million to expand the capacity of Canadian intelligence and cybersecurity
agencies to work closely with partners in the Indo-Pacific and protect Canadians from attempts by
foreign states to influence them covertly or coercively. Other initiatives include a fund to support
ocean management and investments to support disaster risk and resilience, for science and
technology collaborations and to enhance partnerships with ASEAN.
The strategy states that Canada will work with its allies ‘to push back against any unilateral actions
that threaten the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, as well as the East and South China Seas’. Canada
has recently joined the Blue Pacific initiative in support of the Pacific islands, and has applied to
join the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity. Canada has also offered to contribute
to AUKUS through the partnership’s technology working group, as many of its targeted
technologies are significant strengths of Canada.
This is no superficial strategy. Beijing’s bullying and well-documented coercive actions towards
its neighbours and towards Canada have caused Indo-Pacific nations to band together to find ways
to deal with this more aggressive, authoritarian power. The strategy signals the emergence of a
new narrative on Ottawa’s engagement in the region. Canada now has a coherent approach
reflecting its sovereign interests and liberal democratic values and aligning with its allies and
partners. This new strategy can serve as a model for other countries, including Australia, that don’t
yet have a comprehensive Indo-Pacific strategy.
13. Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy: Wary eye on China, bid to reset India ties
Ahead of her scheduled participation in the G20 Foreign Ministers’ meeting in March in New
Delhi, Canada’s Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly made a quiet bilateral visit to the capital this
week. Both sides appear keen to draw a line under the bitterness that has dogged their relationship
over the last few years — and Canada’s freshly minted Indo-Pacific strategy, which has attracted
notice for its unusually blunt language against China, seems to have provided an appropriate
opening.
Joly’s February 6-7 visit, during which she met External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar for the
India-Canada Strategic Dialogue, did not see any joint announcements or address to the media.
Each side put out its own statement on the visit.
The Ministry of External Affairs said the two Ministers “expressed interest in deepening
collaboration across domains and look forward to the Early Progress Trade Agreement (EPTA)”.
It welcomed Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy, given “the shared vision of a free, open and inclusive
Indo-Pacific”.
The Canadian side said they “discussed strengthening the economic partnership…, advancing
security cooperation, facilitating migration and mobility…, and growing our strong people-topeople ties. [The Ministers] also discussed furthering Canada-India cooperation in the IndoPacific, following the announcement of Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy in November”.
After an interaction with Canada watchers in India at the New Delhi-based think tank Ananta
Aspen, Joly tweeted: “India’s growing strategic, economic, and demographic importance makes it
a critical partner for Canada in the Indo-Pacific. In return, Canada can be a reliable supplier of
critical minerals, a strong partner in the green transition and a major investor.”
None of the issues that have strained ties, such as Khalistani activities in Canada, found mention
in the official statements
Embrace of Indo-Pacific
Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy was released last November, amid domestic and international calls
for Ottawa to join the US-led alliance against China and stand for the “shared interests and values”
of Western democracies. Canada, 20 per cent of whose population originates in the Indo-Pacific
region, is the last G7 nation to embrace the concept of the Indo-Pacific — it has been more
comfortable earlier with “Asia Pacific”.
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who has been in office since 2015, found Canada’s historically soft
policy on China upended in December 2018, when Canadian authorities arrested Meng Wanzhou,
a top executive of the Chinese telecom giant Huawei, for extradition to the United States. Days
later, China detained two Canadians in apparent retaliation. Three years later, after a three way
deal between China, Canada and the US, both countries returned each other’s nationals.
With a lot of economic interests at stake, Ottawa continued to make efforts to repair ties with
Beijing. But the ruling Liberal Party found itself increasingly out of step on this with the antiChina mood at home as well as with its allies, especially the US. Critics said Canada, which carved
out a post-War role as a “middle power”, was living in “strategic la-la land”. One Canadian analyst
told the Voice of America that the country’s leadership lacked the skills to navigate the new
geopolitics: “It’s like entering the ring with Muhammad Ali. [The Chinese] are playing chess,
we’re playing checkers.”
From last year, a series of steps signalled a change in Canada’s China policy, including a sudden
tightening of investment rules to prevent Chinese state companies from taking control of its critical
minerals and mines industry. The Trudeau government suggested the basis for this decision was
an assessment of threats to national security. It also banned Huawei 5G. Canada’s Parliament
passed a resolution to declare China’s treatment of its Uighur minority as “genocide”.
Against this fast evolving background, Canada announced its Indo-Pacific strategy — reportedly
three years in the making — in end 2022. Joly described it as a response to a “generational
geopolitical shift”; China’s state run Global Times said Canada’s “hostility” was “absurd and
dangerous”.
Features of the strategy
“China is an increasingly disruptive global power. Key regional actors have complex and deeply
intertwined relationships with China. Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is informed by its clear-eyed
understanding of this global China, and Canada’s approach is aligned with those of our partners in
the region and around the world,” the document says.
Beijing “increasingly disregards” the same international rules and norms that have helped China’s
rise, it says.
The document is also “clear-eyed” — a term that appears several times — about its dependence
on China: Canada cannot ignore China’s “sheer size” — China remains Canada’s main export
destination. So cooperation is necessary to address issues such as climate change and health. Plus,
the Chinese economy “offers significant opportunities for Canadian exporters”.
In short Canada is saying it will both “unapologetically” defend its national interest and cooperate
with China when required.
The strategy contains a funding commitment of US $1.7 billion over five years, spread over
infrastructure projects through the US-led G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and
Investment, US $403 million for an enhanced military presence including a third frigate in the
Indian Ocean, and expanded participation in regional military exercises.
Five objectives are outlined: promote peace, resilience and security; expand trade, investment and
supply chain resilience; invest in and connect people; build a sustainable and green future; be an
active and engaged partner to the Indo-Pacific. Engagement with India is seen as critical to the
strategy.
Canada-India relations
Despite a bilateral relationship “underpinned”, according to an MEA brief, “by shared values of
democracy, pluralism, expanding economic engagement, regular high level interactions and longstanding people-to-people ties”, ties have been in the sick bay for several years.
The big issue for India is the safe haven that Canada has been for separatist Khalistani groups, and
what New Delhi sees as the Liberal Party’s pandering to these groups for votes.
Diaspora Sikhs are well represented in the Trudeau government. Some of them are politically
supported by pro-Khalistan groups. Jagmeet ‘Jimmy’ Dhaliwal, whose New Democratic Party
supports Trudeau’s minority government in Parliament, is viewed with suspicion by the Indian
establishment.
Trudeau’s visit to India in 2017 was a diplomatic disaster over the Khalistan issue. Last year, New
Delhi objected to Canada permitting a Khalistani secessionist “referendum” in the Sikh diaspora,
and hit back with an advisory against travel in Canada that warned against hate crimes. Last month,
a Hindu temple near Toronto was vandalised and defaced with anti-India graffiti. Concerns that
Canada is slow to act against anti-India elements on its soil have been a constant irritant in the
relationship.
Still, both countries seem to realise that any attempt to reset bilateral ties will need to surmount
Canada’s vote-bank restraints and India’s security concerns. Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy, which
says India’s strategic importance can only increase as its economy grows and it becomes the
world’s most populous country, offers a wider staging ground for the two to come together, based
on a shared suspicion of China, and seeking to expand trade ties, invest in supply chain resilience,
and greater people-to-people exchanges.
Though not spelled out, there could also be a defence and security component with Canada’s
resolve to participate more in maritime security and exercises in the Indo-Pacific, and deeper
counter-terrorism cooperation than exists now.
The under-negotiation EPTA is seen as a stepping stone to a comprehensive economic partnership
agreement, and may pave the way for a wider reset of ties. Whether this will help to “decouple”
from China is another question.
14. Here’s a thought for Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy: some LNG diplomacy
In late November, Canada unveiled its Indo-Pacific Strategy, aiming to reposition Canada in the
region in the face of an increasingly hostile China. The five-year, $2.3-billion strategy was released
amid high inflation, crushing energy prices and a slowing global economy that threatened net-zero
emission plans.
Despite this, the strategy made no mention of liquefied natural gas, something which Canada could
potentially export in abundance and which many Asian economies already import in great
quantities.
LNG could do many things that the strategy attempts to achieve. It could deepen trade by supplying
allies with reliable and affordable energy for long periods of time, generate revenue from a key
export as Canada decarbonizes its own energy sources and reduce Canada’s dependence on China
and the United States. Canada has a rich history of using its natural resources to build relationships
with other countries and LNG diplomacy can be the latest chapter of that story.
It’s been a long and bumpy road for Canada’s LNG projects to come to fruition. Despite being the
world’s fifth largest producer of natural gas, the country does not – and physically cannot – export
liquefied natural gas, lacking the sophisticated infrastructure to get gas piped to the coast and
chilled for shipment overseas.
That will change when the LNG Canada project in Kitimat, B.C., now nearly complete and with
an eventual export capacity of up to 28 million tonnes per year, starts exporting. These physical
constraints became painfully evident after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sent gas prices
skyrocketing for our European and Asian allies, and led both German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to ask Prime Minister Justin Trudeau for LNG, to no avail.
Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy puts a heavy emphasis on lessening this country’s reliance on
China – for good reason. China has been increasingly disruptive: federal election interference,
espionage charges, human-rights violations, supplies of critical minerals, and so on.
This does raise an issue when we consider LNG exports. After all, China is the world’s second
largest economy and became the world’s largest LNG importer in 2021, with plans to build 34
coastal terminals by 2035. But China isn’t the only big market for LNG. Canada has other – less
complicated, more friendly – options.
In total, Asia buys about three-fourths of global LNG cargoes. Chief among these buyers are some
of Canada’s most important allies. Japan, South Korea, India, and Taiwan collectively purchase
about 45 per cent of all LNG cargoes. That doesn’t include another half-dozen Asian buyers who
buy in smaller quantities – all with whom Canada is attempting to deepen ties.
LNG shipments from Canada’s West Coast to allies and like-minded countries in Asia could do a
lot of good for each side.
First, it could ensure reliable and affordable supplies to friendly countries. Second, natural gas
could help these countries shift to lower-carbon sources of energy.
Third, the use of long-term contracts (how most Asian importers prefer to buy LNG) could shield
both exporter and importer from whiplashing natural gas prices, while ensuring a market for
capital-intensive LNG projects that take many years to turn a profit. Fourth, turning natural gas
into a major export makes use of a resource Canada possesses in abundance, while generating
revenue and allowing Canada to more actively pursue its own decarbonization.
For Canada, LNG cargoes could help extend influence in Asia, while giving Canada some
breathing space from the U.S. and side-stepping landmines with China.
Exporting LNG here serves three of the five strategic objectives of Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy:
trade and investment; a sustainable and green future; and partnerships.
It also holds promise for Canada’s own decarbonization efforts, while generating revenue, earning
friends and breaking political deadlock around the future of our resource endowment. This is a
chance for Canada to do more – for its friends and for itself.
15. North Pacific Potential: Japan and Canada Seek Expanded Security and Economic Alliance
On January 12, Canada will welcome Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida for its first visit by
a sitting Japanese head of government in almost four years. The world has changed significantly
since the late Shinzo Abe visited Ottawa in April 2019: China’s power in the Indo-Pacific has
increased under an emboldened Xi Jinping; the United States ousted former president Donald
Trump and elected Joe Biden to the White House; and Russia launched an illegal, ongoing invasion
of Ukraine. Looming over these developments is a global pandemic that revealed widespread
vulnerability to biological threats and forced countries to reevaluate both public health policy and
supply chains for critical goods.
In that time, Canada has sought to reassert its status as an Indo-Pacific state. Its exclusion from
two major Indo-Pacific institutions – the AUKUS Security Pact and the Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework (IPEF) – were indications that the United States and other allies did not consider
Canada to be a major player in the region. Ottawa pushed back against that perception, first by
highlighting its role in existing institutions such as the Comprehensive and Progressive TransPacific Partnership (CPTPP), then by gaining U.S. support for admission to the IPEF, and finally
by launching a comprehensive, funded Indo-Pacific Strategy in November 2022.
Prime Minister Kishida’s visit to Canada, the first by an Asian head of government since the launch
of the Indo-Pacific Strategy, is an early test of whether Ottawa can translate its ambitious Strategy
into action.
Canada and Japan have ample reason to increase bilateral cooperation and an existing framework
to build upon. The Canada-Japan Joint Action Plan, launched by foreign ministers Melanie Joly
and Hayashi Yoshimasa during a bilateral visit to Tokyo in October 2022, outlines six shared
priorities with corresponding action items. These include commitments to maintaining the rule of
law, working towards energy security, and promoting free trade, all of which are likely to be raised
when the two prime ministers meet.
While Canada and Japan may seem to be unlikely partners in a landscape of international trade
that is increasingly inclined towards nearshoring, Japan is Canada’s fourth largest partner in
two-way merchandise trade. In 2021, Canadian exports of minerals, oil, pork, and softwood
lumber to Japan totalled $14.5 billion, in exchange for the import of $15.5 billion of Japanese
auto parts and machinery. Canada and Japan are also two of the largest economies in the
CPTPP, which comprises 11 countries with a combined GDP over $10 trillion.
Strong Canadian-Japanese economic cooperation extends beyond research and innovation.
The Canada-Japan Joint Committee on Science and Technology (CJJC), created in 1986,
meets biennially to discuss advancements in emerging technologies of interest such as
nanotechnology, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence. In 2019, Canada’s National
Research Council (NRC) signed a memorandum of understanding with Japan’s Advanced
Telecommunications Research Institute (ATR) that invited Canadian companies to join ATR’s
business and startup support program, Keihanna Global Acceleration Program Plus; further, NRC
opened an office in Tokyo to help facilitate collaboration between Canadian and Japanese
research entities.
Another crucial topic of discussion this week between PM Kishida and PM Trudeau will be
whether Canada can help Japan meet its demand for natural gas. After overtaking China in 2022,
Japan became the world’s largest importer of LNG, the majority of which comes from Russia.
In order to meet demand from Japan and other countries looking to divest from Russian supplies,
Canada would have to significantly bolster export capabilities. Increasing this capacity is
dependent on the completion of the massive LNG facility under construction in Kitimat, British
Columbia, however, there are competing proposals for the construction of export facilities on the
east coast of Canada. While Japan would benefit from the continued expansion of Canadian LNG
exports, Canada may not have as much to gain from doing so in the short-term.
On the topic of defense, Japan continues to find itself in a crucial moment to strengthen its
positionality in security partnerships. In addition to the looming threat of China’s power and in the
shadow of Russia’s war on Ukraine, Japan has faced more direct challenges posed by North
Korea’s firing of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) into Japanese and South Korean
airspace. The threat of these destabilizing acts has increased pressure on Japan’s security strategy
and emphasized the importance of allied defense partnerships in the current geopolitical climate.
In response, Canada and Japan have opened negotiations on a bilateral General Security of
Information Agreement (GSOIA) that would serve as a legal framework for intelligence sharing
between the two states. Both countries have expressed interest in regularizing the joint naval
exercise KAEDEX (a play on the Japanese word for maple, kaede), which involves warships from
the Royal Canadian Navy and Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force. The exercise, most recently
conducted in 2019, aims to improve and maintain interoperability between Canadian and Japanese
warfighting forces in the Indo-Pacific environment. Canada has also resolved to seek membership
in the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus and promised that its Defense Policy Update will
reflect the regional priorities outlined in its Indo-Pacific Strategy.
In December 2022, Japan published a redefined National Security Strategy, in which PM
Kishida’s government asserted its commitment to increase defense spending which is now set to
reach 2% of GDP by 2027. If Canada wants to be considered as a serious partner for Japan, as well
as other Indo-Pacific nations, in the realm of defense, the visit of PM Kishida may also probe the
ongoing Canadian domestic debate as to whether Canada itself should increase its defense
spending to the 2% threshold. Japan’s National Security Strategy hints that it will look to allies
and partners to coordinate this increase and strengthen its defense capabilities; if Canada remains
unwilling to commit to 2%, can (and will) it be considered as a reliable defense partner for Japan?
Following his visit to Ottawa on Thursday, Prime Minister Kishida will travel to Washington to
meet with U.S. President Joe Biden. Japan’s recently published National Security Strategy hails
the Japan-U.S. alliance as “the cornerstone of Japan’s national security policy.” While Canada
may not aspire, nor be able, to be deemed such a cornerstone as the United States is by its allies,
there is an opportunity in the current geopolitical moment for it to solidify itself as a contributing
ally in defense, trade and economic partnership with Japan.
Given the sequence of the meetings, PM Kishida may look to Prime Minister Trudeau for an
indication of where the priorities of the Biden administration stand, following the recent bilateral
meetings between Canada and the United States in the wings of the North American Leaders’
Summit.
With opportunities to expand collaboration in trade, energy, and security, Canada should be
prepared to use Prime Minister Kishida’s visit to showcase its willingness to invest in bilateral
initiatives with Indo-Pacific allies. Japan, in turn, should encourage Canada to follow through on
its commitments in the Indo-Pacific Strategy and Canada-Japan Joint Action Plan such as
continued progress towards the signing of a GSOIA and tangible efforts to make Canada a reliable
and secure energy partner for North Pacific states. Both countries stand to gain from establishing
closer ties in the face of geopolitical instability that threatens shared national interests; their
success, or failure, in doing so will have implications for the outcome of Canada’s Indo-Pacific
ambitions.
16. The Emperor Has No Clothes: Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy
This past week has seen Canada’s Conference of Defence Associations Institute publish a letter signed by
more than 60 former top security officials, including the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, two
Deputy Prime Ministers, five former Liberal and five former Conservative Defence Ministers, and nine
former Chiefs of Defence Staff, calling on the Trudeau government to take national security and defense
more seriously and make it a government priority. Within days, a leaked document from the series of
leaked Pentagon papers revealed that Prime Minister “Justin Trudeau (despite a unanimous motion in the
House of Commons a year earlier in April 2022) has told NATO officials privately that Canada will never
meet the alliance’s defense spending target (of 2 percent of gross domestic product) and that Canada’s
‘widespread’ military deficiencies are harming ties with security partners and allies.” In short, the
‘Emperor has no clothes’ and nowhere is this more apparent than in Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy
released last year.
The Strategy
In late November 2022, the government released its much-heralded and long-awaited Indo-Pacific
Strategy to great interest among Canadians. The strategy framework, set out Canada as a Pacific
nation with broad interests throughout the increasingly important region. Those broad interests
included national security, economic prosperity, respect for international law and human rights,
democratic values, public health, protecting the environment, and promoting enhanced Canadian
engagement in the region with partners to shape those interests. It is important to note that, much
like Ukraine but on a bigger scale, one in five Canadians have family ties in Asia. A document,
one of many by G-7 states noted that the dynamics of the region would shape the lives of Canadians
for generations to come.
The strategy was based on realism concentrating on protecting Canadian interests and values as
the starting point and noted that Canadian investment would reach almost $2.3 billion in the IndoPacific region over the next five years. The document outlined Canada’s Indo-Pacific national
interest in one clean line: “Encompassing 40 economies, over four billion people, and $47.19
trillion in economic activity, it is the world’s fastest growing region and home to six of Canada’s
top 13 trading partners.” Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy included five whole-of-government
interconnected strategic objectives, including promoting peace and security, expanding trade and
investment, connecting people, a sustainable green future, and Canada as a reliable engaged
partner.
Devil in the Details
To advance Canada’s security interests, the government planned to spend $720.6 million,
including $492.9 million to reinforce military and naval presence and participation in regional
military exercises and $47.4 million to develop cyber security capacity in select regional allies. In
support of expanding trade and investment, the Canadian government would invest $244.6 million,
including $24.1 million to establish the Canadian Trade Gateway in Southeast Asia, $31.8 million
to establish Canada’s first agriculture office in the region, and $13.5 million to expand natural
resource ties, technology, and innovation. Canada’s strategy to invest in people included
contributing $261.7 million, with $100 million in Feminist International Assistance Policy
development and $74.6 million to enhance Canada’s visa processing capacity in New Delhi,
Chandigarh, Islamabad, and Manila. In building a sustainable green future, Canada committed a
total of $913.3 million in spending including $750 million for FinDev Canada to expand its
operations into the Indo-Pacific, $84.3 million to help reinforce a healthy marine environment, and
measures against illegal and unregulated fishing. As a reliable Pacific partner and to enhance its
presence and influence in the region, Canada will invest $147 million including $100 million to
expand capacity at Canada’s Indo-Pacific missions abroad and $24.5 million for a new office of
the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada in the region.
The document was uncharacteristically blunt regarding the rise of an increasingly aggressive
China. In the Indo-Pacific Strategy, China was described as “an increasingly disruptive global
power” but too great to ignore because of its social and economic power. The document warned
that the Canadian government needs to be “clear-eyed” about China’s objectives in the IndoPacific and the world at large. The Canadian framework further cautioned: “China’s rise, enabled
by the same international rules and norms that it now increasingly disregards, has had an enormous
impact on the Indo-Pacific, and it has ambitions to become the leading power in the region.” The
strategy document also makes it clear that not only can we not ignore an aggressive China, but
because of its economic clout, we must find ways to engage with Beijing and cooperate when it is
in our interest. The strategy document went on underline the importance of maintaining pressure
on the Kim Jong-un regime of North Korea by enforcement of the sanction regime. On the security
front, this is where the strategy comes up short.
State of the Canadian Armed Forces
The past year has seen significant defense and security challenges for Canada and, by extension,
the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). From the Indo-Pacific Strategy to the upcoming Defence
Policy Update, as well as announcements on NORAD modernization and the acquisition of a new
generation of fighter jets in F-35 and tanker aircraft, Canada is posturing or positioning itself to be
at the decision-making table. But these first good steps are years away from being turned into real
capabilities and the world can shift fast. Readiness is extremely difficult, especially in times of
inflation, for effective military procurement, and for recruiting and retaining members of the CAF
against the backdrop of full employment and internal cultural issues. Here is where the rubber
meets the road.
Sadly, the Canadian Army is short 10,000 troops and the Royal Canadian Air Force and Royal
Canadian Navy are also both critically short of personnel. The troop shortage is so critical,
especially given current major deployments in Eastern Europe, that Chief of Defence Staff
General Wayne Eyre recently ordered all non-essential activities to end, in order to concentrate
on reconstituting the Canadian Forces and on bringing it to a higher state of readiness. The CAF
is struggling with culture change and a recruiting and retention crisis, to meet the federal
government’s commitment to NATO and Latvia for a brigade-sized formation by later this year.
Lieutenant-General Joe Paul has said that the Army shrank by 1,200 soldiers last year and possibly
another 800 this year, in a force already 8,000-10,000 soldiers short of manning levels. Moreover,
plans to reconstitute the Canadian Army following Afghanistan were not followed through and the
land force lacks basic military capabilities, such as a counter-drone capability, modern anti-tank
weapons, and anti-aircraft defenses.
From a security point of view, the call for an increased Canadian presence in the Indo-Pacific faces
similar challenges to Canada’s commitment to NATO Operation Forward Presence in Latvia in
terms of lack of personnel and equipment. As 2023 unfolds, we have already begun to see the
strain on CAF’s resource allocation. The strategy called for a forward presence of three Canadian
frigates at a time when the Royal Canadian Navy is short 1,300 sailors and its ships are getting
older, particularly with some frigates over 30 years of age and four Victoria-class some 40 years
old, meaning more time is required for training stressed crews and for repairs and maintenance.
The navy possesses 12 frigates and with normal training and maintenance can only sustain three
abroad at best. It is hard pressed to maintain one forward deployed Victoria class submarine at one
time. This past June, the HMCS Vancouver and HMCS Winnipeg were both deployed to the IndoPacific. Canada has a commitment of sustaining one frigate as part of the NATO Standing Naval
Force Atlantic. The deployment of two frigates to the Pacific meant that Canada had to pull one
ship from European waters for the first time since the Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014.
We just witnessed this predicament when the United States shot down all four flying objects in
North American airspace because Canada’s CF-18s did not have the capability or availability to
do so. The 40-year-old CF-18’s first introduced in 1982 have been upgraded repeatedly but their
electronic warfare suite has long been obsolete rendering them vulnerable in a modern combat
environment. Military equipment can be second best on land and still win, in the air or at sea
second best gets you dead. The CAF is a hollowed-out shell of its former self, and the Trudeau
government has shown limited interest as did his predecessors in rebuilding a once proud military
other than the steps outlined above. This lack of interest comes at the time of a shooting war on
NATO’s doorstep in Ukraine and with a war pending in terms of Taiwan in the Western Pacific.
In conclusion, it is easy as part of a strategy to flow money to enhance trade and development and
attempt to use it to enhance your diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific region, but when push comes to
shove, Canada has very little to preserve its national interest or that investment in treasure through
peace and security in the Indo-Pacific. Soft power and hard power go hand in hand, sadly, Canada’s
strategy to promote peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific has little to offer in terms of real military
power. Canada through successive governments has rendered itself largely strategically irrelevant
to its allies on a military basis in the region and perhaps this is why Canada has not been
approached or offered to join the ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting Plus, the Quad of India,
Australia, Japan, and the United States and was ignored by Australia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States in AUKUS. In the end analysis, Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy is a
communications strategy to hide weakness at home and abroad and the lack of a national
commitment to international security in a region of vital economic interest.
17. Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy: Analysis

Do you feel the IPS better positions Canada to work more effectively in Asia in the
near- to medium-term?

What aspects of the IPS do you find the most compelling?

What aspects of the IPS concern you?
the Strategy's real strengths are in its initiatives. If the Trudeau administration is serious about
advancing Canadian interests in Asia—which it clearly is—it needs to focus more on programming
that results in greater Canadian enmeshment throughout the region. Any activity, project, or
engagement that leads to a new relationship, whether at the regional, state, or substate level, has
the strategical effect of strengthening Canada’s status within Asia. The more Canada focuses on
actionable outcomes over strategic ideologies, the more it can develop partnerships that advance
its national interests and benefit Asian states. The list of initiatives the Strategy identifies will go
a long way towards building this basis for Canadian engagement in the region.
I am particularly impressed with the initiatives related to sustainable development, people-topeople ties, and academic exchange, as they are entirely in line with the priorities of those in the
region.
On sustainable development, the Shared Ocean Fund and FinDev Canada will help provide much
needed funding to address illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and for sustainable
infrastructure in Asia, respectively. Canadian prioritization of the Indo-Pacific in the Powering
Past Coal Alliance will also position Canada to provide guidance on transitioning from coal power
to clean energy. Support for Canadian micro, small, and medium enterprises through the
Advancing International Clean Technology Demonstration in the Indo-Pacific initiative is another
thoughtful means to promote Canadian national interests and to address regional demand.
On people-to-people ties, initiatives to speed up visa processing and to facilitate travel will also
pay dividends for Canada’s engagement in the region. Expanded SEED scholarship programs and
studentship opportunities that lead to permanent residency will increase Canada's visibility and
desirability in Asia as a destination for potential study and/or immigration. For those of us who
spend time in Asia, these initiatives answer the clear desire one repeatedly hears for increased
opportunity to travel to, study in, or immigrate to Canada.
On academic exchange, the Strategy’s Indo-Pacific Regional Engagement initiative, once fully
realized, will help deepen Canada's ties with Asian institutions, universities, think-tanks, and
research centres. These ties, in turn, will provide Canadian academics and scholars greater
opportunity to engage in Asia and for Asian scholars to spend time in Canada, thereby creating a
Canada-Asia knowledge network.
Where this Strategy’s strengths are in its initiatives, its weaknesses are in its strategic framing,
particularly with respect to regional security and China. Canada stands to gain very little by
securitizing aspects of its approach to Asia, particularly when it does so in co-ordination with the
United States, not in line with demand coming from within the region. Canada’s decision to expand
its naval footprint in Asia and its plan to establish a diplomatic position in Hawaii, in this respect,
are less about supporting Asian states’ security than they are about Western state alignment. One
finds no demand in the region for a more robust Canadian security role in Asia. Rather, one finds
repeated concern over American provocation on matters ranging from North Korea and Taiwan to
the South China Sea. Canada would do better to focus its Strategy entirely on non-security
engagement.
Neither is it in Canada’s national interests to identify its Indo-Pacific Strategy as ‘inseparable’
from its approach to China, which, according to the Strategy, is primarily adversarial. While
Canada-China relations are indeed problematic, choosing this Strategy as the time and place to
declare a more assertive Canadian position toward Beijing undermines its other more positive
aspects as it relegates all other Asian states to secondary status—clearly not the Strategy’s aim.
That Canadian and international media coverage of the Strategy has to date focused exclusively
on its China component is evidence this approach was counterproductive.
Overall, there are many good things in this Strategy. From my perspective, it is at its best when it
focuses on what Canada can do in the region to strengthen state capacity and to raise living
standards. It is at its worst when it attempts to recreate other Indo-Pacific strategies, particularly
the U.S.’s, which are predicated on great power politics and the need to challenge China in Asia.
The Indo-Pacific Strategy marks a milestone in Canadian foreign policy by ratcheting up the
priority of Asia and the Pacific. A key strength is its comprehensive approach, weaving together
Canadian interests across several critical domains. The Strategy strongly endorses the rules-based
international order and highlights the importance of partnerships, such as continuing co-operation
with Japan on development through the Asian Development Bank. This makes sense, but Canada
should also work more closely with other bank shareholders to harness the institution’s great
capacity to mobilize substantial funding for infrastructure.
The Strategy states that Canada will give particular attention to building capacity to engage with
several countries, including in Southeast Asia. This is a sensible approach, given that ASEAN will
soon become the world’s fourth largest economy and boasts great geopolitical importance.
Through the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP),
and an anticipated Canada-ASEAN free trade agreement, Canadian businesses can increasingly
use ASEAN as a platform to enter the enormous Chinese market.
Debate will rage about whether the right notes have been struck vis-à-vis China, which the Strategy
describes as a “disruptive power” that disregards international rules. Yet the Strategy also
recognizes that involvement of the Asian giant is indispensable to solving critical global
challenges. Hawkish elements of the Strategy are being welcomed in Washington, but could
further complicate Ottawa’s sour relations with China.
The real measure of the Strategy’s success will be effective implementation and co-ordination with
other federal initiatives and policies (like the Feminist International Assistance Policy). Canada’s
public and private sectors have increasingly targeted Asia for bilateral trade and direct investment,
but with only modest gains to date. Thus, plans to open an office to increase Canadian agriculture
and agri-food exports to Asia is a wise investment.
The Strategy is grossly underfunded given its ambitions and regional focus. For example, the
C$750 million allotted to FinDev Canada to expand its lending capacity in Asia is laudable, but
too modest considering Canada’s role in the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and
Investment, and the massive capital boost provided by the U.S. to its own version of FinDev.
In sum, the Indo-Pacific Strategy represents an appropriate repositioning of Canada’s foreign
policy priorities. The country’s future will increasingly be tied to international engagement
outward from its Pacific Coast. Ottawa now must follow through on specific plans set forth in the
Strategy, rally domestic support, and prove to skeptical Asian and Pacific audiences that Canada
is serious about realizing its Pacific vision.
The most important thing about the Indo-Pacific Strategy is that it provides a foreign and trade
policy direction. The Canadian public, the private sector, the public service, and other countries
know that the government is prioritizing a list of specific activities to promote deeper engagement
with the countries of the region. The fact that the Strategy provides guidance and funding across
so many areas, including climate, trade and investment, and security, is also good news.
As a democracy with a small, open economy, Canada is dependent on global markets to grow its
citizens’ living standards and also has a strong stake in a stable, rules-based international order.
Deeper engagement with the faster-growth economies of the Indo-Pacific makes sense. So does
the suite of actions in the document aimed at defending and advancing the rules-based international
order.
The real challenge will be to advance these long-standing imperatives in the face of geopolitical
and geographic realities. China is a global power that does not play by the rules in which Canada
has a profound stake. While the early years of Prime Minister Trudeau’s mandate focused on
pursuing a Canada-China free trade deal, the imprisonment of the “Two Michaels” has made it
clear that this country needs a more nuanced approach. The Strategy plans investments in
deepening diplomats’ understanding of how China operates, in growing Canada’s presence in other
parts of the region, and in advancing global and regional agreements. It is not clear if this will be
enough to advance Canadian interests, but these actions move Canada in the right direction.
The other reality — unmentioned in the document — is that Canada shares a border with the
world’s largest economy. While the Strategy talks about diversifying beyond China, the reality is
that Canadian companies do most of their business with the U.S. Generations of policymakers
have tried and failed to meaningfully broaden Canada’s trade beyond the U.S. market. An
orientation towards the Indo-Pacific will therefore not be easy.
One thing the Strategy should go farther on is the global digital and services economy. There are
many references to growing agricultural and resource trade, but only brief mention of the
opportunity to trade services — including digitally — in the region. Significant value comes from
things that are more difficult to see and measure: ideas, data, research, and expertise. Canada has
a major advantage here: personal connections. One in five Canadians have roots in the region.
While the Strategy outlines many activities to strengthen and expand these connections, these
could be more explicitly connected to leveraging these possibilities. Related to this, the Strategy
should do more to place Canada at the forefront of advancing rules for the digital economy,
including, for example, ensuring that data for commercial flows can move freely while respecting
security and privacy.
In short, while the path ahead will not be easy, Canada now has a plan aimed at protecting and
advancing Canadian interests.
The IPS is an impressive, comprehensive document that tackles a broad spectrum of issue-areas,
outlines a much clearer direction to our engagement of various sub-regions and partners, with
resources to match. It includes several promising, creative initiatives that will bolster Canada’s
visibility in the region. Still, some components of the Strategy will likely lead to some setbacks,
which may not have been fully anticipated. This has less to do with the nature of the initiatives
announced than the general framing of the Strategy, and the balance it intends to strike between
confrontational and co-operative aspects, especially with regards to China.
The Strategy does best when it outlines specific, targeted, and creative co-operative initiatives that
speak back to its key objectives and the broader principles underpinning Canada’s foreign policy,
while also catering to regional demand. These include, among others, the establishment of a
regional office for the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, support for Canadian expert
participation in policy dialogues (although the nature of this support needs to be clarified), the
development of collaborations between Canadian and regional civil society organizations, oceans
management initiatives focused on IUU fishing and plastic pollution, and the expansion of the
scholarships program. The focus on the promotion of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS)
agenda in the region, with Southeast Asian partners in mind, is also promising, although I expected
more substance on this front. ASEAN just released a Regional Action Plan on WPS, so Ottawa’s
timing is quite good, so long as it is mindful of regional sensitivities that inevitably arise when
Western states promote liberal “human security” initiatives.
Canada seems to have effectively shut the door, in the near to medium term, on the possibility that
China can act as a constructive player on the global stage, while at the same time stating that cooperation with Beijing on key issue-areas, like climate change, is not only possible but a necessity.
A shift to a more confrontational tone on China, while rooted in legitimate concerns about
Beijing’s behaviour, also provides a convenient justification for allocating all these resources to a
region that appears so far away for many Canadians. But it also creates significant tension with
the co-operative aspects of the Strategy. Branding China as a “security threat” certainly aligns with
Washington’s view, but it is not as clear as Ottawa suggests that all of our closest partners share
this assessment, at least to this extent. This stance is going to complicate Canada’s attempts to
overturn a perception in the region’s policy circles that it is nothing more than a “mini U.S.,” and
to convince ASEAN, in particular, that “more Canada” is actually needed in key fora, given
ASEAN's penchant for a non-confrontational, inclusive approach to regional affairs. I’m not sure
how Ottawa is going to be able to walk that tightrope.
The Strategy is the first multi-year, costed, and funded overall plan for a whole-of-country
engagement with the expanded region that I am aware of, and it is welcome. It is comprehensive
and addresses all the key sectoral areas of engagement from security to economic to people-topeople to climate change and institutional presence, as well as redirecting geographic focus to
Southeast and South Asia, while maintaining strong linkages with key North Pacific economies,
such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.
It reassesses Canada’s ongoing important relationship with China, setting parameters for
engagement while recognizing the key role that China will continue to play in the region. To me,
what is important is that while the Strategy will provide significant additional resources for
activities and exchanges in the region, including an enhanced physical presence, it also recognizes
the need for additional funding for domestic-based activities that are related to issues connected to
Canada’s engagement with the region. These include defensive measures such cybersecurity,
combating foreign interference and hostile activities on Canadian soil, increased vigilance against
terrorism, and closer review of foreign investment, but also proactive measures such as
encouraging engagement by Canadians with the region through Track 2 activities, sharing of
expertise, and educational exchanges. The Strategy will raise expectations in the region; the key
will be delivery. We have proclaimed a role in the region before — although not to this extent and
with this degree of financial and apparent policy commitment — and we cannot allow this to
become yet one more episodic exercise where we don’t deliver.
The most compelling elements of the Strategy are its recognition of the necessity for an integrated
approach by Canada to the region, and the significant commitment of multi-year funding allocated
to it. In the past we have had trade promotion, or traditional security, or development assistance
initiatives, but there has never been a “whole-of-government,” indeed a “whole-of-country” (for
many of the activities lie outside the direct purview of government departments) approach. What
is also significant is a recognition of the peace and security dimensions which must underpin any
economic, development assistance, or people-to-people approach. I also appreciate the recognition
of the role that individual Canadians, experts, and institutions can play in establishing bridgeheads
and building bridges. I look forward to learning more about the Regional Engagement Initiative.
Finally, recognition of the need for “boots on the ground” is important, through the establishment
of a new APF Canada office in the region (with Singapore understood to be the currently-planned
location), the Regional Trade Gateway, and additional diplomatic resources in the region.
While the Strategy lays out a wide range of commitments and activities, key will be execution and
accountability. At the moment, many details of the Strategy are lacking. It will inevitably take time
for the Strategy to gain momentum, and it is essential that delivery mechanisms be put in place as
quickly as possible. There should be aspirations for an “early harvest” in some areas. For example,
while the Regional Engagement initiative, through which “a broad range of Canadian sector
leaders, subject-matter experts, academics and civil society groups will be able to build new
networks in the Indo-Pacific, strengthen the Canadian voice on priority issues and create
partnerships on behalf of Canada” is very welcome, there is no information as to allocation of
funding, means of delivery, priority sectors, or any other concrete information that would allow
the named groups to start preparing to access the program.
Given the wide scope of the Strategy, it is also imperative that results be identified, tracked, and
reported on in an integrated and comprehensive manner. Goals should be identified, and results
measured against them annually and across the duration of the Strategy. Perhaps this could be one
of the areas of responsibility for the new special envoy for the Indo-Pacific Strategy, who is to be
named. It is surprising that that position was not filled and the envoy ready to begin implementation
on the day the Strategy was released.
For a country where trade accounts for 60.9 per cent of its GDP, the commitment to increase
presence, investment, and understanding in the world’s fastest-growing economic region is a good
and necessary start for Canada’s long-awaited Indo-Pacific Strategy. While it is important to wait
and see how the implementation will roll out, the strategy contains some compelling and promising
aspects. These include:
1. Increasing presence and understanding in the region through new gateways and offices
such as new Team Canada Missions and the Canadian Trade Gateway in Southeast Asia.
2. Clearly identifying and strengthening economic ties with existing allies in the region.
3. Recognizing the need to develop better trade infrastructure in Canada with some
commitments, such as the National Trade Corridors Fund.
4. Remaining in dialogue with China and engaging economically with eyes wide open; more
importantly, there is no explicit language of decoupling from China.
Remaining in dialogue versus active engagement is very different. Remaining in dialogue with
China is barely enough to manage relations with our second-largest trading partner. The
commitment to increase Canadian competencies and understanding of China at every level
(government, industry, academia) is of the utmost importance for Canada to survive in a world
where China is the largest trading partner and economy in the world. While the strategy identified
this clearly, it allocates no investments or resources toward China. There is no explicit mention of
China under the new Team Canada trade missions like there is for India, ASEAN, Japan, and South
Korea. Neither is there an increase in visa-processing capacity for student permits or renewing
student permits for China, as there is for India, Pakistan, and the Philippines. This signals that
despite the lack of decoupling language, Canada is not looking to expand its relations with China,
nor is the government pushing to increase trade within the Chinese market. Instead, the emphasis
is to work with businesses to diversify within and beyond China.
As a trade-reliant small country with limited resources, the “not having all your eggs in one basket”
diversification mentality makes sense. Yet despite efforts to diversify away from the U.S., the
country remains our largest trading partner accounting for 62 per cent of Canada’s total two-way
trade. A growing global hegemon that is the largest trader and investor in South, East, and Pacific
Asia – as well as North America, the Middle East and Africa – China is here to stay. Without
explicit and real investment in time and resources at every level on China, we will fall behind our
allies, who are also our competitors in China and in the region.
Further, what applies to China in the Indo-Pacific Strategy should apply to other Southeast Asia
nations. Issues of human rights, forced labour, SOEs, and unfair trade practices exist in these Asian
countries that the IPS has identified as key partners. Yet, there were no discussions of these issues
nor how to manage them with India, the Philippines, or Myanmar, just to name a few. India’s
Canadian peas ban in 2017 had a similar, if not worse, impact as China’s canola ban, and these
issues persist today. The FTA negotiation stalls with Indonesia on addressing labour standards also
demonstrates the difficulty and the reality of engaging in these issues in the region. Canada needs
to approach Southeast Asia nations in an equally realistic and clear-eyed assessment as it has
indicated for China.
Finally, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)
was not cited in the Indo-Pacific Strategy as a key tool to encourage new regional economies to
participate. The CPTPP is the “gold standard,” the most comprehensive agreement in the IndoPacific region, and one of which Canada is a part. The CPTPP gives Canadian businesses
everything American businesses want – but will not have. These are real, ratified, and implemented
tariff and non-tariff measures. These are high labour and environmental standards with key
economies in the region. The strategy should prioritize the CPTPP as a proactive tool to encourage
non-members in the region to join.
18. CANADA’S NEW INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
ABSTRACT Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), built around five program objectives and
funded at C$2.3 billion over the initial five-year period, has been finally unveiled, although details
of its implementation are generally lacking as of date of publication. The strategy lays out an
ambitious plan for Canada’s re-engagement with parts of the Indo-Pacific region it has neglected,
in relative terms, for a number of years while simultaneously trying to address the challenge of
China. The strategy is a welcome blueprint for diversification of Canadian engagement across
various sectors, with ASEAN centrality a key component and closer engagement with north Pacific
partners such as Japan and Korea, and with South Asia, in particular India, constituting core
elements. Yet the IPS does not close the door on relations with China or propose a decoupling
strategy. China is both at the heart of the IPS, and yet not a focus of most of the initiatives. The
trade-off for including China in the strategy seems to have been to vocally demonstrate Canada’s
anti-China credentials (to the U.S. and the Canadian public) by talking tough in order to set the
stage for more limited forms of ongoing co-operation. This includes calling out Beijing’s activities
in several areas, including domestic interference in Canadian affairs. There is also a strong infusion
of Canadian values throughout the document. A risk for Canada is that many of the countries in
the Indo-Pacific region that are the targets of the strategy do not share a Manichean view of China.
Canada must be careful to ensure that strengthening relations with these other countries will be
based on its own merits and regional priorities, rather than being portrayed simply as an antidote
to expansion of Chinese influence. Furthermore, given Canada’s past sporadic engagement with
the region, it is important that a detailed action plan be put in place quickly. The Trudeau
government should be aiming for an early harvest for some of the initiatives to avoid the
impression of a quick announcement followed by a distinct lag in implementation.
Canada’s long-awaited and anticipated Indo-Pacific Strategy (Global Affairs Canada 2022a) has
finally been unveiled, although details of its implementation are largely lacking. The strategy lays
out an ambitious plan for Canada’s re-engagement with parts of the Indo-Pacific region that it has
neglected, in relative terms, for a number of years while simultaneously trying to address the
challenge of China. In a way, it is almost as if there are two Indo-Pacific strategies encapsulated
in one — a strategy for diversification of Canadian efforts and activities through a multi-faceted
framework (and it is a framework rather than a set of objectives) as well as confirmation of a
change of course toward China, without shutting the door on relations with the Middle Kingdom.
In putting the two together in one overarching strategy, the diversification initiatives risk being
interpreted by some in the region as part of an effort to contain China. Canada’s newly embraced
partners in the region do not see themselves as pawns on a giant chessboard whose goal is to checkmate China, and Canada needs to handle this aspect of the strategy with care. The IPS is built
around five objectives: • Promoting peace, resilience and security; • Expanding trade, investment
and supply chain resilience; • Investing in and connecting people; • Building a sustainable and
green future; and • Canada as an active and engaged partner in the Indo-Pacific. Each of these
elements comes with a price tag and allocated funding over five years (Global Affairs Canada
2022b), the majority of it being new money. An update in 2026-27 will outline resources for the
subsequent five-year period. Total funding for the initial period is $2.3 billion (Global Affairs
Canada 2022b). Roughly a third of this ($720.7 million) will be spent on peace and security
initiatives, including: • Repositioning a frigate from the East Coast to the West Coast; • Increased
participation in regional military exercises; • Increased capacity for national security agencies to
support Canadian interests in the region; • Strengthening regional responses to crime, terrorism
and threats from weapons proliferation; and • Developing cyber-security capacity in select partner
countries. While broad levels of funding are indicated for each of these sub-activities, there is
a paucity of detail and timing. Similarly, with respect to expanding trade and investment, a series
of general actions is laid out ranging from re-establishing Team Canada trade missions to the
region (but not China), to establishing a “Canadian Trade Gateway in Southeast Asia” (which is
presumably some sort of trade promotion presence). More grants and contributions will be
provided to promote exports and Canada will open an agriculture and agri-food promotion office
somewhere in the region.
Also outlined under this objective are: • More technical assistance for trade and labour compliance;
• Expanding natural resource ties with the region (by assigning new expert personnel in the field
and enhancing capacities in Canada); • Strengthening Canada’s ability to engage in and benefit
from international S&T and innovation partnerships by funding more co-innovation and businessoriented R&D partnerships between Canadian SMEs and Indo-Pacific partners; • Enhancing
standardization by establishing new formalized relationships with individual standards and
accreditation bodies; and • Negotiating trade and investment agreements with India, ASEAN and
Indonesia as well as expanding the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for TransPacific Partnership). Total price tag over five years: $244.4 million. The remaining three strategic
objectives come in at $261.7 million, $902.7 million and $137.6 million respectively, calculated
over five years. There are a lot of numbers and a lot of objectives which include: • Investing and
connecting people (bolstering visa processing, student recruitment, expanding scholarships,
funding a “Regional Engagement Initiative” for civil society groups, think-tanks, academics, etc.
and supporting feminist international assistance programming); • Building a sustainable and green
future (infrastructure support for private sector projects through FinDev Canada, oceans
management measures, disaster response and clean tech demonstration projects); and • Enhancing
Canadian presence in the region (new positions in Canada’s diplomatic missions in the region,
funding for co-operation with ASEAN, establishing a physical presence in the region by the Asia
Pacific Foundation of Canada (APFC)). The strategy is premised on the fact that “The rising
influence of the Indo-Pacific region is a once-in-a-generation global shift that requires a
generational Canadian response.” Indeed, this region’s influence has been rising for several
decades and Canada’s response is arguably a bit tardy. That is a quibble, but this is not the first
time that Canada has discovered that it is a Pacific nation. Back in the early 1980s, there was a
burst of enthusiasm for greater engagement with the region. The APFC was established in 1984
by an Act of Parliament and although headquartered in Vancouver, later opened an office in
Singapore. Canada, which had become a dialogue partner of ASEAN in the late 1970s, established
development assistance programs with ASEAN through CIDA and had a Canada-ASEAN Centre
in Singapore to manage bilateral programs, including Track II Dialogue forums. These initiatives
subsequently sputtered and died. The Foundation closed its office, the Canada-ASEAN Centre was
wound up, and apart from China, there was a relative decline in interest in the region as other
issues took priority (NAFTA, relations with the EU, etc.). Now, we have a new strategy that among
other things proclaims “ASEAN Centrality” as one of its key tenets. Parties in the region can be
forgiven a degree of skepticism given past pronouncements. This is why, this time, Canada needs
to follow through and become a permanent rather than sometime partner. The strategy lays the
foundation for this commitment, but it needs to be actualized. For this to happen, a detailed action
plan must be put in place quickly. While it is expected that some details will be lacking when a
new comprehensive strategy is unveiled, the lack of specificity and details on the paths to
implementation of many of the IPS’s elements is concerning. The funding has been placed in five
large buckets, although no details have been given regarding disbursement schedules. One
presumes it will take some time to begin to allocate funds, suggesting that greater funding will be
made available in the out-years. Details of major announced program initiatives, such as
strengthened public safety and security, security partnerships and capacity building, cyber-security
and digital technology diplomacy, or even relatively discrete and specific announcements such as
the “Canadian Trade Gateway” or “CanExport program enhancements” have not been made
available. Some specificity is provided about deployment of additional resources for visa
processing, with New Delhi, Chandigarh, Islamabad and Manila being identified, as well as the
opening of new posts in Hawaii and Fiji. Otherwise, the “Indo-Pacific Regional Capacity Uplift”
of $100 million over five years remains unspecified. One suspects details have not yet
been worked out. As for welcome programs like the Regional Engagement Initiative, the sending
of experts to the region and the granting of scholarships, the potential users and beneficiaries of
these programs wait expectantly for news. It is important that executing agencies be identified and
information made available soon as it takes time for programs like these to get up and running.
The government should be aiming for an early harvest for some of the initiatives to avoid the
impression of a quick announcement followed by a distinct lag in implementation. The clock is
ticking. What about China? China is both at the heart of the IPS, and yet not a focus of most of
the initiatives. Initially, there were reports that China would not be included at all in the strategy,
which seems counter-intuitive if one looks at the Indo-Pacific as an integrated region. China is the
largest regional economy, the largest trading partner of most if not all of the Indo-Pacific countries,
the largest potential strategic threat and one of the largest sources of both students and immigrants
for Canada. It is also the world’s largest current polluter, a huge consumer of energy and natural
resources and a significant challenger in terms of technology. Canada has had an on-again/offagain relationship with China over the years, a relationship that ironically turned sour during the
year marking a half century of diplomatic relations. 5 The immediate cause is well known: the
arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou on a U.S. Department of Justice warrant at the
Vancouver airport in December 2018, followed almost immediately by China’s retaliatory arrests
of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor (the two Michaels) on national security grounds. The
merits of the U.S. case, the wisdom of Canada’s action or the appropriateness of China’s response
can all be debated but the result was the most serious crisis in Canada-China relations since the
establishment of relations in 1970. It spilled over into trade actions on China’s part and diplomatic
initiatives to combat hostage-taking on the part of Canada. Compounding the bilateral crisis was a
series of other events that put extreme stress on the relationship. These included: • China’s
imposition of a national security law on Hong Kong; • Increased surveillance and detention of
China’s Uyghur minority; • Continued development of Chinese military bases in disputed waters
in the South China Sea; • Chinese sabre-rattling with regard to Taiwan; • China’s role in the
COVID-19 pandemic; and • Unofficial Chinese police “convenience stations” in Canada. These
situations demonstrated well the West’s schizophrenic relationship with China: blame for footdragging on dealing with the outbreak of the pandemic, dependence on China for supplies to fight
COVID and negative economic impact from disrupted supply chains as Chinese ports and
production facilities shut down. As a backdrop to the Canada-China bilateral crisis, U.S.-China
trade and technology relations worsened and anti-China regional security arrangements were
developed. These included the Quad, a loose alliance of the U.S., Japan, Australia and India, and
AUKUS, a security relationship centred on the building of nuclear submarines between the U.S.,
U.K. and Australia. These were all designed to buttress a U.S. policy concept released under the
Trump administration: the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP). In the face of these
developments, if Canada needed a reset in its relationship with China, what better way to do it than
to shift emphasis away from China toward other parts of the region? Thus, the IPS was born or
more accurately, reborn, since the idea has been around for a while. If the strategy marks a pivot
away from China, Beijing still cannot be written out of the script. China is simply too large, too
important and too central across all of the five identified objectives to ignore (Global Affairs
Canada 2022c). The trade-off for including China in the strategy seems to be to demonstrate
Canada’s anti-China credentials (to the U.S. and the Canadian public) by talking tough in order to
set the stage for more limited forms of ongoing co-operation. Thus, China is described as an
“increasingly disruptive global power” that ignores international rules and norms. It is accused of
seeking to shape the international order into a more permissive environment for its interests and
values. Canada’s approach to China is now going to be “clear-eyed” (suggesting that the scales
have now fallen from Canada’s eyes) and one in which we will “unapologetically defend our
national interest.” One would take that as a given no matter what the bilateral relationship. Any
thought of an improved framework for bilateral economic relations, such as a trade agreement, has
long ago been relegated to the dustbin of reality arising from the Meng/ Michaels affair. The
strategy does not suggest, however, that Canada should decouple from China or jump holus-bolus
into friend-shoring arrangements, although there is lots of general language about supply chain
resilience. Significantly, the strategy states that “China’s sheer size and influence makes
cooperation necessary to address some of the world’s existential pressures, such as climate change
and biodiversity loss, global health and nuclear proliferation. And China’s economy offers
significant opportunities for Canadian exporters.” Thus, Canada will “continue to protect Canadian
market access in China while working with clients to diversify within, and beyond, that market.”
And why not? That is what all our other trading partners are doing, including the United States. It
is worth noting that some nine per cent of U.S. exports go to China. For Canada, the corresponding
number is roughly half that percentage, and much less in absolute terms (only 13 per cent of the
total of U.S. exports to China by dollar value). The continued need to work with China on a range
of urgent global issues is a welcome dose of reality. The mantra around the strategy’s public release
was: “We will compete with China when we ought to and we will cooperate with China when we
must,” frequently enunciated by Foreign Affairs Minister Mélanie Joly. In other words, let’s hold
our noses and co-operate with China when we have no other choice. This is not exactly the best
way to win co-operation from an interlocutor with whom you need to work to achieve
your own national objectives, although in the current domestic political climate it is hardly
unexpected. In its approach to China, the strategy asserts that “Canada’s approach is aligned with
those of our partners in the region and around the world.” That is a bit of a stretch. There is no
question that China is an increasingly assertive regional and global power in every sense:
politically, militarily, economically and technologically. However, many of those in the region
with whom Canada seeks to partner as part of the IPS do not necessarily view China in quite the
same black-and-white Manichean terms laid out in the strategy. They live in the neighbourhood
and experience a different dynamic in their relationship with China, based on geographic reality.
In many cases, such as the members of ASEAN, countries in the region do not see themselves as
part of a global chessboard where they can be enlisted to curb China’s influence. In seeking to
diversify and emphasize relations with other parts of the Indo-Pacific, Canada will need to keep
this in mind and be careful to ensure that strengthening relations with other countries in the north
Pacific, South and Southeast Asia and the south Pacific is based on its own merits and regional
priorities and not seen simply as an antidote to expanding Chinese influence.
One other aspect of the China relationship dealt with in the strategy is the domestic political
context. In the face of increasing evidence that China has been actively meddling in Canada’s
internal political processes, the IPS will increase resources to protect Canadians from “attempts by
foreign states to influence them covertly or coercively” and develop “early warning against threats,
such as foreign interference, (and) hostile activities by state actors.” What actions will be taken is
unclear, but there will be “stronger enforcement” and “more precautions” to protect intellectual
property and Canadian research (the impact this might have on Canadian universities could be
significant). The Investment Canada Act will be tightened when it comes to investments by stateowned enterprises and in sectors such as critical minerals. Lest all this anti-China vigilance bleed
into reactions against Canadians of Chinese ethnicity, we are reminded that “the bedrock of our
relations remains the people of Canada and China,” noting the extraordinary contribution
Canadians of Chinese heritage have brought to Canadian life. This is a worthwhile reminder. With
China dealt with early on, the strategy then highlights the potential for improved relations with
India, the north Pacific (only Japan and South Korea are highlighted, although there are various
references to improving economic and people-to-people ties with Taiwan elsewhere in the
strategy) and ASEAN. Specific initiatives flow from these priority areas of concentration. It will
be a big lift to grow markets in these areas that could match the potential of China (Canada’s
exports to India are currently about one-tenth of the value of exports to China) but a start needs to
be made. India, or even ASEAN, will likely never replace China but any increase in trade
diversification is welcome. Also clear in the strategy is the strong infusion of Canadian values
throughout with an emphasis on human rights, gender equality and women’s rights, a feminist
development assistance policy and reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples. A specific commitment
deals with supporting the economic empowerment of Indigenous Peoples through implementing
the Indigenous Peoples Economic and Trade Cooperation Arrangement. The strategy
also discusses anti-racism and continuing work to counter forms of arbitrary detention,
an initiative Canada launched during the detention of the two Michaels. This list is not exclusive.
Matching these Canadian aspirations with the capacity and value systems in the region will be
challenging at times, but the values dimension rounds out the IPS’s strategic, economic,
technological and people-to-people elements. The big task now is implementation. Prime Minister
Justin Trudeau left a trail of one-by-one funding announcements during his visit to Asia in midNovember, followed by release of the full strategy on November 27. Various government
departments need to start transparently putting in place the mechanisms to effect the strategy. Of
course, not all is new. Some of the activities, such as the Five Eyes and participating in
enforcement of UN sanctions against North Korea are ongoing. Canadian missions in the region
will continue to deliver their programs, from political assessment to trade promotion to visa
processing and delivery of development assistance. But, at the moment, many of the new initiatives
are unclothed skeletons. The new Indo-Pacific trade representative and the special envoy for the
Indo-Pacific region “to coordinate a whole-of-government approach and manage strategic
implementation of the strategy” need to be named and to begin work. The region is watching and
waiting. And so are Canadians.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
• Appoint the special envoy for the Indo-Pacific region as soon as possible and
empower that office to co-ordinate IPS activities across government;
• Appoint the new Indo-Pacific trade representative as soon as possible and
specify the functions and responsibilities of that office;
• Make public as soon as practical details of the Regional Engagement
Initiative, placement of experts and scholarship programs to allow civil society
and academia to develop proposals to access these programs;
• Specify measurable objectives for various program components outlined in
the strategy, translating vague aspirational language into concrete outcomes;
and • Provide a co-ordinated cross-departmental annual report of progress
toward achievement of IPS objectives, in terms of activities, outcomes and
funding
19. Original Document
Quick facts about the Indo-Pacific region

50% of world GDP by 2040

50% of global greenhouse gas emissions

65% of world’s population

67% of world’s Indigenous peoples

37% of the world’s poor

1 in 5 Canadians have family ties to the region

PRC, Japan, India, ROK, Australia: 5 of the region's largest economies

US$29.3T combined GDP of top 5 compared to US$17.2T for whole EU-27
20. Strategic objectives and initiatives
1. Promoting peace, resilience and security
Stability in the Indo-Pacific is essential to global stability. The region is home to numerous security
hotspots with potential global repercussions, and Canada must engage as a regional security
partner to protect our national interests and security. Canada’s actions are guided by an unwavering
commitment to the safety and security of Canadians.
At present, Canadian Armed Forces members contribute to regional stability through stand-alone
and multinational operations, such as supporting the implementation of UN sanctions imposed
against North Korea through Operation NEON. Canada also contributes to upholding the
international law of the sea including the UN convention through forward naval presence
operations in the waters of the Indo-Pacific.
China’s rapid and dramatic modernization of the People’s Liberation Army, including its offensive
technological capabilities and geographic reach, has caught the region’s attention. As China
becomes more assertive and grows in influence, Canada is stepping up as a reliable partner in the
region to promote security and stability across the region and at home.
Canada will increase our military engagement and intelligence capacity as a means of mitigating
coercive behaviour and threats to regional security.
Working with partners in the region, Canada will increase its security-based engagement in the
Indo-Pacific. Canada will deploy additional military assets and increase its investments in border
and cyber security, as well as in intelligence. Canada will continue to build cooperative
relationships with customs and law enforcement agencies across the region. Working with regional
partners, Canada will help strengthen regional defence architectures and deepen our long-standing
commitments to women, peace, and security. And Canada will work with our partners in the IndoPacific to make our societies more resilient and less vulnerable to the disruptions and shocks that
can damage the fabric of our societies. Canada’s Defence Policy Update will support Canada’s
Indo-Pacific Strategy and its implementation.
Like countries around the world, Canada is concerned by the rise of coercive and irresponsible use
of technology. The spread of disinformation, ransomware and other cyber security threats directly
affect Canadians, working to destabilize our democracy and our economy. Canada will take a
leadership role in combatting these threats, investing in expertise and technology to better protect
all Canadians.
Canada will work hand-in-hand with ASEAN and its member states to ensure full respect for
international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in the South
China Sea. Canada will work with allies to boost awareness of the region and enhance resilience
and preparedness, as well as to protect against coercive tactics and the theft of sensitive data,
technology and intellectual property from our companies and research organizations. The impact
of climate change on security amplifies the need to work with regional partners to improve
resilience to climate-related disasters. Canada’s military will work with its counterparts and share
best practices to improve climate-related disaster resilience.
As an Arctic nation, Canada is conscious that powers in the Indo-Pacific region are looking to the
Arctic as a region of opportunity. Canada is committed to maintaining the peace and stability of
the region and the safety, health and resilience of Canadian Northern populations and Indigenous
Peoples. At a time of accelerating impact of climate change and rising geopolitical competition,
Canada will advance its standing as an Arctic power and uphold our Arctic sovereignty and the
rules-based international order in our bilateral and multilateral engagement with Indo-Pacific
countries on Arctic and polar affairs. We will do so responsibly and sustainably, together with
partners.
Canada’s initiatives aimed at promoting peace, resilience and security in the Indo-Pacific
will:

make meaningful contributions to the region’s security and defence and enhance our
defence and security relationships with regional partners and allies

bolster Canada’s long-standing collaboration with, and contribution to, the Five Eyes

enhance defence cooperation with ASEAN and North Pacific partners

continue our long-standing contributions to defence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,
including by supporting the implementation of UN Security Council sanctions against
North Korea through participation in current operations, such as Operation NEON, and
working side-by-side with our partners to uphold regional security and advocate for North
Korea’s denuclearization
Through investment in military operations, training and capacity building, Canada will:

enhance our security and defence contribution by committing additional resources to
the region and increase engagement in international exercises and operations

augment its naval presence, including by increasing the number of frigates deployed on
to the region where it will conduct forward naval presence operations, uphold international
law of the sea including the UN convention, and conduct collaborative deployments with
its allies and partners

expand existing military capacity building initiatives and launch new training programs
that advance joint priorities and interoperability with regional partners, such as Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam, including in the area of Women, Peace
and Security
Through investment in intelligence and cyber security, Canada will:

ensure Canada’s national security and law enforcement agencies, including the
Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Communications Security Establishment, the
Canada Border Services Agency and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, are
appropriately tasked and resourced to support the objectives outlined in the strategy and
work in a coordinated fashion to enhance Canada’s public safety and the security of
Canadians

increase resources devoted to protecting Canadians from attempts by foreign states to
influence them covertly or coercively

bolster Canada’s capacity to collect, develop and provide timely intelligence, analysis and
assessment to meet national security needs and provide foresight analysis and early
warning against threats, such as foreign interference, hostile activities by state
actors and economic-based national security threats emanating from the region

build capacity in the region by dedicating new funding for cooperation, including on
borders and law enforcement, cyber-crime, anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism
financing

detect and respond to increasing cyber security threats originating in the region, including
malicious activity targeting businesses, industry and infrastructure, and threats to
democracy posed by online disinformation campaigns and surveillance technology,
including online attacks targeting civil society and human rights defenders
Through investment in science and research, Canada will:

continue to detect and mitigate risks to protect Canadian post secondary
institutions from malign actors who seek to exploit our open society

increase investment to protect Canada’s innovation and knowledge economy from
intellectual property theft
2. Expanding trade, investment and supply chain resilience
Canada is a trading nation. To grow the economy, create good jobs, and keep our competitive
advantage, Canada must continue to expand into new export markets and create partnerships
abroad. Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy will position Canada for long-term growth and prosperity
that benefit all Canadians by enhancing and diversifying our economic relationships with key IndoPacific economies.
The Indo-Pacific is the world’s fastest-growing economic region, and its importance will only
continue to expand over time. In a world increasingly shaped by tensions, trade is not only an
economic but, also, a geopolitical priority. It is also uniquely vulnerable to supply chain disruptions
emerging from the region, as demonstrated during the pandemic. In this context, Canada’s
economic network needs to be resilient. Canada’s business sector needs to be able to mitigate risk.
To do so, diversification is a priority.
We are also witnessing competition to define the rules for trade and technology in the region and
for the world. In this context, Canada will work hard to promote rules-based trade in the region,
expand trade and digital partnerships and enhance innovation and research. Canada will also
increase funding to support inclusive economic growth and start new partnerships to promote trade
and develop technologies.
This will support good jobs in Canada and ensure we are meeting the needs of countries in the
Indo-Pacific. It is in our national interest to expand trade and investments and to reinforce supply
chain resilience.
Emerging patterns of protectionism and economic coercion are of significant concern to Canada.
Canada is committed to a trade system that is stable and inclusive, and which creates economic
prosperity for everyone. To better position Canada to respond to new geopolitical shocks and
bilateral trade barriers, Canada will strengthen our supply chains through new and existing trade
and investment agreements; investments in domestic infrastructure that increase trade flows and
facilitate stronger business-to-business relationships. Canada will increase its engagement in
regard to the shaping of international standards and norms, particularly in the technology sector.
This, in turn, will create new opportunities for Canadian businesses and ensure a strong economy
for years and decades to come.
To expand Canada’s trade network at home and abroad, Canada will:

launch a Canadian Trade Gateway in Southeast Asia to expand Canada’s business and
investment engagement, and networks in the region; the gateway will focus on sectors and
solutions where Canadian innovation responds to regional demand and will enhance
Canada’s profile as a commercial and investment partner, creating opportunities for
Canadian exporters and attracting foreign investment to Canada

appoint a new Canadian Indo-Pacific Trade Representative to advance Canada’s
regional trade policy, promotion, and economic cooperation objectives in the region

launch a new series of large-scale Team Canada trade missions that involve Canadian
businesses, provinces and territories and other relevant partners and organizations; Canada
will showcase the capabilities and competitiveness of its exporters and innovators to ensure
their success in the region and facilitate long-term trade and investment opportunities

provide greater support for Canadian small and medium-sized enterprises, innovators and
national industry associations pursuing new trade and investment opportunities in the IndoPacific through an enhanced and tailored CanExport program

support the economic empowerment of Indigenous Peoples through the implementation of
the Indigenous Peoples Economic and Trade Cooperation Arrangement (IPETCA) in
cooperation with existing partners—Australia, New Zealand and Taiwan—and Indigenous
Peoples from those participating economies

provide enhanced support to women entrepreneurs to maximize opportunities in the
Indo-Pacific region by expanding international partnerships through the Women
Entrepreneurship Strategy

open our first Agriculture and Agri-Food Office in the region to help Canadian farmers
and producers to diversify their exports and position Canada as a preferred supplier in key
emerging markets

expand the regional mandate of Canada’s development finance institution, FinDev
Canada, to the Indo-Pacific. Canada’s commitment to the G7 Partnership for Global
Infrastructure and Investment will be done in an approach that looks to amplify,
leverage and collaborate with Canadian private sector and institutions, like pension funds
should they choose to, on needed small to medium infrastructure projects across the
region. This will support high-quality, sustainable infrastructure, and also provides
alternative options to developing economies exploring infrastructure development
To enhance rules-based trade that provides predictability for economies and exporters,
Canada will:

ensure the Trade Commissioner Service provides expert advice on China’s market while
promoting export diversification across the region

strengthen Canadian economic security in reinforcing the Investment Canada Act to
defend our national interests, oversee stronger enforcement and add more precautions
to protect intellectual property and Canadian research

continue to work with like-minded partners in the region to counter economic
coercion and non-market practices

work with partners to develop digital infrastructure, promote interoperability and
promote coherent regulations affecting the Internet, the digital economy and trust and
security in the use of information and communications technology; this will enhance
cooperation on standards, norms and regulations that will benefit Canada, the Indo-Pacific
region and rules-based trade

provide greater technical assistance to Indo-Pacific trading partners to improve
the enforcement of labour provisions, including on forced labour, in current and future
free trade agreements with Canada; this will help protect workers’ rights, ensure companies
are respecting human rights in their supply chains and contribute to levelling the playing
field for Canadian workers and employers
To ensure the resilience of supply chains, Canada will:

continue to make significant investments in domestic transportation infrastructure projects
through the National Trade Corridors Fund, such as investments in the ports of
Vancouver and Prince Rupert, for major upgrades to Canada’s marine, port, airport, road
and rail infrastructure, increasing national trading capacity, fluidity and efficiency

advance shared interests in supply chain resilience with partners, including through
greater Canadian involvement and alignment with regional initiatives, such as the
Australia-Japan-India Supply Chain Resilience Initiative

contribute to global supply chain resilience and sustainability by engaging in technical,
policy and high-level cooperation through APEC on standards, conformity assessment
procedure and best practices to enhance trade

position Canada to be a reliable supplier of clean energy in the region—and in a net-zeroemissions economy—including critical minerals and hydrogen, to fight climate change, be
an energy security partner and support global climate goals

expand natural resource ties—related to trade, investment and science, technology and
innovation—with priority Indo-Pacific partners

strengthen Canada’s Science, Technology and Innovation partnerships with key
economies, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, India, Singapore and Taiwan, to
support international co-innovation projects and commercialization-oriented research and
development partnerships for Canadian small and medium-sized businesses with IndoPacific partners
To increase export diversification and free trade access, Canada will:

work with partners to strengthen and expand the CPTPP and ensure that any form of
expansion will be based on high standards and track records

seek to join and meaningfully contribute to the newly established Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework for Prosperity

improve market access through new comprehensive free trade agreements, such as those
currently being negotiated with ASEAN, India and Indonesia, and on new or
modernized Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements

join the Digital Economic Partnership Agreement with Singapore, New Zealand and
Chile while securing a cultural-industries exception for the Canadian cultural sector
3. Investing in and connecting people
Canada is deeply connected to the Indo-Pacific region through people. Almost 20% of new
Canadians come from the region, close to 18% of Canadians have family ties to the region and
60% of the international students coming to Canada hail from the Indo-Pacific. Students come to
study in Canada and often stay to work, to contribute and to join Canadian society. Those who
return home forever carry with them the knowledge and experiences gained in Canada.
Indigenous Peoples from across Canada have established ties with Indigenous communities and
organizations across the Indo-Pacific on issues as diverse as trade, oceans protections and
Indigenous rights. Canada will support Indigenous leaders as they grow and deepen networks in
the region across many areas of collaboration.
Investing in ties between Canadians and people from the region lies at the heart of Canada’s IndoPacific Strategy. For example, Canada will improve its visa-processing capacity to make it easier
for families and students to visit. Canada will also continue its investment in cultural diplomacy
so that people in the region and Canadians have more opportunities to experience the rich art forms
and traditions that inform each country.
Canada is a steadfast partner and is well positioned to provide assistance that is transparent and
responds to partner needs through the Feminist International Assistance Policy. Our approach leads
to strong partnerships with Indo-Pacific countries and also builds our understanding and expertise.
Canada is expanding our feminist international assistance and will continue to defend human rights
through partnerships with Canadian civil society and partners in the region.
To strengthen people-to-people exchanges, Canada will:

bolster visa-processing capacities in key locations in the region to ease access for students
and family members; this initiative will enhance visa-processing capacity within Canada’s
centralized network, as well as abroad in New Delhi and Chandigarh, India; Islamabad,
Pakistan; and Manila, Philippines; these new resources will support ongoing efforts to
accommodate the high volume of temporary resident visa applications (including visas,
study permits and work permits) from the region

facilitate travel to and from the region to strengthen people-to-people ties and bolster
tourism by using different tools, such as the new and modernized Air Transport
Agreements, and explore options to further facilitate travel, making travel to Canada easier,
faster and safer for everyone

leverage its reputation as a top education destination by launching over 1,000
scholarship and fellowship opportunities for Canadian students and for students from
ASEAN countries

strengthen Canada’s international student program with permanent residence and job
opportunities for students from the Indo-Pacific that could lead to staying in Canada to
contribute to Canada’s future; these investments will attract highly skilled workers to
Canada to meet the needs of our economy today and into the future

ensure that under the Indo-Pacific Regional Engagement Initiative, a broad range of
Canadian sector leaders, subject-matter experts, academics and civil society groups will be
able to build new networks in the Indo-Pacific, strengthen the Canadian voice on priority
issues and create partnerships on behalf of Canada

invite over 200 Canadian experts to go to the region to support countries that seek to
partner with Canada in tackling challenges where Canada has expertise, such as in
governance, energy transition and oceans management

foster greater inclusion of Canadian diaspora communities of Indo-Pacific heritage
through expanded cultural initiatives

fight against anti-Asian racism in Canada, in all its forms, through the full implementation
of the federal Anti-Racism Strategy

pursue the path of reconciliation with First Nations, Inuit and Métis Peoples through
enhanced Indigenous exchanges with regional partners, such as Australia, New Zealand
and Taiwan; support education and skills development for Indigenous youth; continue the
implementation of the IPETCA; and support the implementation of the UN Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples

support francophone immigration objectives by expanding our diversification efforts in
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam—home to 1.3 million French speakers
To strengthen our international assistance, Canada will:

deepen partnerships in the region by increasing feminist international assistance
programming based on partner needs; Canada will help to protect the most vulnerable
populations and support work to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals

support efforts toward democracy, inclusivity, accountable governance and sustained
economic growth, helping key countries in the region

work with development partners in the region to reduce inequality and contribute to their
economic prosperity

continue to provide critical humanitarian assistance, especially in times of crisis, such as
the recent floods in Pakistan

establish our first international assistance program for the Pacific Islands region,
supported by our membership in, and support for, the Partners in the Blue Pacific

support Canadian civil society organizations through targeted initiatives that will enable
them to pursue human-rights and gender-equality projects in the Indo-Pacific and bolster
partnerships with their regional counterparts

help build demining capacity by establishing standards for landmine clearance and
accelerate mine-clearing by sharing expertise to support personnel, especially women,
engaged in demining activities in Laos and Cambodia
To defend and enforce human rights, Canada will:

strengthen dedicated Canadian funding and advocacy to support human rights across
the Indo-Pacific, including for women and girls, religious minorities, 2SLGBTQI+ persons
and persons with disabilities

leverage Canada’s leadership in multilateral institutions to support regional action on
human rights

work to counter forms of arbitrary detention by hosting a summit on arbitrary
detention in 2023

fully implement the next phase of Canada’s Rohingya Strategy

support peacebuilding in Sri Lanka and Myanmar and encourage truth seeking and
accountability for alleged violations of human rights and humanitarian law during the civil
conflict in Sri Lanka
4. Building a sustainable and green future
Climate change is a global challenge that requires global solutions. As Canada takes historic
climate action at home, it is clear that progress in tackling emissions also requires the full
engagement of our Indo-Pacific partners. The Indo-Pacific produces more than half of global
emissions and includes many rapidly industrializing economies that will have a significant impact
on our shared environment. We need everyone to be part of the solution, and we need to make sure
that the move toward a net-zero-emissions economy creates shared economic prosperity.
The same is true in the interconnected work of halting and reversing biodiversity loss, growing
sustainable economies and building communities that are resilient in the face of climate change.
The Indo-Pacific is made up of coastal countries. Canada, with shoreline spanning three oceans, is
committed to a “blue economy” and has much to share with partners in the region. Canada has
significant expertise in underwater mapping and in monitoring oceans through advanced sensing
and through real-time satellite images from space—knowledge that is valuable for preserving the
health and security of our oceans and valuable for partners in the Indo-Pacific region.
Canada will work with its partners on fisheries, funding sustainable infrastructure, biodiversity
protection and conservation, food security and agricultural technology, energy transitions and
climate finance. Canada will also share our expertise on natural disaster resilience and recovery
and promote clean technology to prevent and mitigate the impacts of climate change. Canada and
the Indo-Pacific will face this challenge together.
To support the region in building a sustainable and green future, Canada will:

expand the capacity for FinDev Canada to support high-quality, sustainable infrastructure
in the Indo-Pacific and also provide alternative options to developing economies exploring
infrastructure development

support oceans management initiatives and expand measures against illegal, unreported
and unregulated fishing in the Indo-Pacific, including through our Dark Vessel
Detection Program, which uses Canadian technology to find illegal fishing vessels and
protect fish stocks

establish a signature initiative in the region on disaster risk and resilience that enables
Canada to share expertise and to help countries adapt to, and be ready for, the impacts of
climate-induced disasters before, during and after disasters strike

boost commercial demonstration of Canadian clean technology in priority Indo-Pacific
markets and help Canada’s clean technology small and medium-sized enterprises with
financial support to break into markets in the region

build on the already allocated $1.26 billion out of the Canada Climate Finance
Commitment toward the Indo-Pacific region to assist partner countries with economic
recovery and infrastructure needs and catalyze inclusive and sustainable development
through Canadian capital, technology and policy expertise

prioritize the Indo-Pacific region as part of the Powering Past Coal Alliance, which is
working to help partners advance their transition from unabated coal power generation to
clean energy; Canada will collaborate with partners in the region to support a transition to
cleaner energy

ensure Canada’s international assistance program will target climate and environment
action, with the greatest impact based on needs defined locally and related to climate
change, energy transition, biodiversity and oceans management

work with Indo-Pacific countries to prevent plastic pollution from entering the oceans and
the environment, reduce plastic waste and better manage existing plastic resources,
including by supporting an ambitious, legally binding global agreement to end plastic
pollution that addresses the full lifecycle of plastics

advance Canada’s Global Carbon Pricing Challenge to share expertise on carbon
pollution pricing as an important tool to fight climate change and drive investment in clean
technologies
5. Canada as an active and engaged partner to the Indo-Pacific
Canada’s overarching priority is to be an active, engaged and reliable partner in the Indo-Pacific.
Canada will build influence among our partners and allies in the region by increasing our
diplomatic engagement, forging connections between like-minded countries and collaborating in
common causes. Through sustained investment and engagement at the highest levels, Canada is
increasing and deepening its political, economic and security partnerships, as well as its sustainable
development assistance and cultural footprint throughout the Indo-Pacific.
Defending the rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific requires a dynamic approach to
Canadian diplomacy and engagement. Canada will pursue its cooperation as it always has: as a
friend and partner committed to mutual respect; as a proudly diverse country; and as a champion
of multilateralism motivated by the idea that our future security and prosperity are best served
when all countries—large and small—abide by global and regional rules. Canada’s Indo-Pacific
Strategy continues our long tradition of global and regional commitments tailored to meet the
needs of our allies and partners in the region.
To become a more active and engaged partner in the Indo-Pacific, Canada will:

appoint a special envoy for the Indo-Pacific region to coordinate a whole-of-government
approach and manage strategic implementation of the strategy

recognizing ASEAN centrality in the region, confirm and advance our relationship
with ASEAN to the level of Strategic Partner

seek membership in the ADMM+ and in the East Asia Summit

increase Canada’s diplomatic presence and engagement in the region through more
frequent high-level travel, through more diplomatic representation and by deepening
engagement in regional groupings

strengthen engagement with the Pacific Island Countries by opening Canada’s first
mission to Fiji, committing to increased ministerial-level representation at the meetings of
the Pacific Islands Forum and contributing concretely as a member of the Partners in the
Blue Pacific initiative

continue to grow its economic and people-to-people ties with Taiwan while supporting its
resilience

deploy Canada’s first diplomatic position in Hawaii to lead engagement with local U.S.
and international partners

bolster the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada’s engagement in the region by opening an
office in the region and through a new range of activities, including seminars, events and
research programming related to the Indo-Pacific

hold the inaugural Canada–United States Strategic Dialogue on the Indo-Pacific in 2023

increase Canada’s presence—supporting analysis, consultation and diplomacy related to
China—at Canada’s multilateral missions to the United Nations, the European Union in
Brussels and NATO, to anticipate and respond to political, economic and security trends
Conclusion: Canada’s Indo-Pacific future
Canada is a Pacific nation. The Indo-Pacific is our neighbourhood. Canadians from all
backgrounds, all regions and all parts of the economy stand to gain from our deepening
relationships with partners around the Indo-Pacific.
The Indo-Pacific will shape the future of our economy, trading relationships, immigration policies,
environment and security.
Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy will ensure that Canada plays an active role in shaping this future.
It will position us to take advantage of the growing opportunities the Indo-Pacific presents.
Canada is looking out at the horizon of the Indo-Pacific future with a clear view of the shared
prosperity that lies ahead for Canadians and for people throughout the Indo-Pacific region. By
engaging and investing in partnership, we will secure a better future for all.
We cannot do this without the involvement of Canadians from every sector. This is at the core of
Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. Together, we can raise our sights, commit to building a better
future and make Canada a reliable and engaged partner in the Indo-Pacific.