An essay reviewing the literature with respect to the impact of the March 2011
Fukushima nuclear disaster on world-wide nuclear power.
31st March 2023
Word count: 4398
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Introduction
The Fukushima nuclear disaster of March 2011 caused a significant disruption to the nuclear
power industry across the globe (World Nuclear Association, 2022). In the wake of the
disaster, numerous governments around the world have re-evaluated the safety of their own
nuclear power plants and have made significant changes to the technology and regulations
(Breidthardt, 2011). Some countries have decided to phase out their nuclear power stations
completely (BBC News, 2011), while others have maintained their commitment to nuclear
energy, albeit with more stringent safety measures and regulations (World Nuclear
Association, 2022).
The public reaction to the Fukushima disaster was significant, both in Japan and globally.
The disaster led to a heightened sense of public concern about the safety of nuclear power
and its potential impacts. In Japan, the disaster led to a significant loss of public trust in the
government and the nuclear industry. Many people became critical of the government's
handling of the crisis and perceived a lack of transparency in the information provided to the
public (Bauer et al., 2018).
Aims:
To critically examine the existing literature on the impact of the March 2011 Fukushima
nuclear disaster on the world-wide nuclear power industry and to identify and analyse the
various theories and perspectives related to the topic into a theoretical framework.
To also propose areas where there are gaps in understanding, that as Ravitch and Riggan
(2017: 4) explain could shape “the design and direction of your study” and guide its
development and provide “justification for why a given study should be conducted” (Varpio et
al., 2020).
Objectives:
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This essay aims to achieve several objectives in order to provide a comprehensive
understanding of the impact of the Fukushima disaster on the nuclear power industry. Firstly,
the essay will evaluate and synthesise the existing literature on the subject, drawing from
both academic and industry publications. This will provide a solid foundation for
understanding the current state of knowledge regarding the disaster's impact on the nuclear
power industry.
Secondly, the essay will identify the various theories and perspectives that have emerged in
relation to the disaster, as well as their implications for the future of nuclear power. This will
help to illuminate the diverse viewpoints taken by researchers and policymakers in response
to the disaster.
Thirdly, the essay will assess the validity and reliability of the evidence presented in the
literature, while also identifying any gaps or limitations in the current understanding of the
effects of the disaster on nuclear power.
Next, the essay will explore recent advances and current trends in understanding the impact
of the disaster on nuclear power, including technological and policy developments.
Finally, the essay will provide recommendations for future research in this area, including
potential avenues for further investigation and areas where more research is needed to
improve our understanding of the effects of the disaster on nuclear power.
Review of the Literature
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There are many theories relevant to the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster, including those
related to the causes of the disaster, the response and management of the disaster, and the
long-term effects on human health and the environment. (Machi and McEvoy, 2011: 92)
explain that a researcher must index the data and “develop a coding scheme to catalogue
your evidence”. Following a review of the literature, the data that appeared most frequently
is outlined in this essay, with patterns and trends examined. The themes identified are
grouped in two main sections, theories relevant to the disaster and recent advances and
current trends.
Theories relevant to the disaster
Natural hazard, systems complexity and systematic failure
The disaster was triggered by a 9.0 magnitude earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan's
northeast coast on March 11, 2011. The earthquake caused significant damage to the
Fukushima nuclear power plant, leading to multiple nuclear meltdowns as “The reactors
proved robust seismically, but vulnerable to the tsunami”. (World Nuclear Association, 2022:
1).
The power plant was located in an area prone to earthquakes and tsunamis (Figure 1), but
the design and infrastructure were not adequately prepared to withstand such events. The
plant's cooling systems were located in low-lying areas that were vulnerable to flooding
(Nuclear Energy Agency, 2013: 15), and the backup generators were not protected from
tsunamis (Acton and Hibbs, 2012).
Figure 1 – INPO (2011: 2)
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This is an example of systems complexity and systematic failure resulting in the ‘Defence in
depth’ (NEA, 2016) systems failing. These are theories that postulate that the disaster at
Fukushima was caused by a series of engineering failures, including faulty designs,
inadequate seismic protection, and inadequate tsunami protection (NEA, 2016: 12) “the
earthquake caused all six off-site power lines to be lost and the associated tsunami took out
all but one on-site emergency alternating current (AC) power supply”. Murato and Karwowski
(2021: 1) explain that “two characteristics proposed in “normal accident” theory—high
complexity and tight coupling—underlay each of the direct causes” witnessed at Fukushima.
This is supported by the journal article published by (Pidgeon, 2012: 19), which explains that
there was “No single contributory cause was sufficient to trigger the Three Mile Island
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meltdown (or indeed the Fukushima disaster), but taken together the events, not fully
anticipated by the plant designers, conspired to defeat multiple safety systems”.
The systematic failure at Fukushima was caused by a combination of malfunctions including
a failure to adequately manage risk (Funabashi and Kitazawa, 2012), failure to adequately
invest in safety measures, and failure to adequately respond to potential natural disasters
(Acton and Hibbs, 2012). This theory is supported by (INPO, 2011: 1) which provides a
“narrative overview and timeline for the earthquake, tsunami, and subsequent nuclear
accident at Tokyo Electric Power Company’s (TEPCO) Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Station on March 11, 2011” and comprehensively outlines the sequence of systematic
failures that occurred.
Human Error
The disaster was exacerbated by human error and inadequate training of the plant's
operators. The workers at the plant were unable to quickly and effectively respond to the
emergency, leading to further damage to the reactors, as Funabashi and Kitazawa (2012: 4)
put it “they were thrown into the middle of a crisis without the benefit of training or
instructions”. Human error theory suggests that the disaster at Fukushima was a product of
a series of human errors, focusing on individual’s mistakes resulting from “aberrant mental
processes such as forgetfulness, inattention, poor motivation, carelessness, negligence, and
recklessness” (Reason, 2000). However, whilst Reason (2000) explains that this is a Person
Approach, he also explains that human errors should be viewed from a Systems Approach
whereby “humans are fallible and errors are to be expected, even in the best organisations”.
(Watson et al., 2006) agree explaining that in high-risk industries “This theory looks at the
process that generates the error rather than the individual who commits the error.” It
classifies errors or “unsafe acts” as slips and lapses, mistakes, and violations”. Funabashi
and Kitazawa (2012) position Human Error theory in the context of the Fukushima accident
by commenting “the role of human error in the Fukushima nuclear accident was not limited
to the misjudgement of any one worker, like the one who misjudged the backup cooling
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situation at Unit 1. The technical chief, the plant director, and the nuclear energy section of
TEPCO’s headquarters all failed to ascertain the true operational situation of the IC system
at Unit 1”. The incident revealed the critical role of human error in the accident “acting as a
common cause failure”. This highlights the importance of human factors research in
preventing similar incidents from occurring (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2016: 23).
Lack of government and regulatory oversight, and communication
An established theory is that the accident was caused by a failure of the Japanese
government and the plant operator, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), to adequately
prepare for and respond to the tsunami that caused the disaster (National Academy of
Sciences, 2014). A study published by Acton and Hibbs, (2012) found that TEPCO and the
Japanese government had been aware of the potential for a large tsunami in the area but
failed to take adequate safety measures.
Next is that the disaster was the result of a failure of the international regulatory framework
for nuclear power. A study by IAEA (2015: 63) found that the accident highlighted the need
for a more robust regulatory framework for nuclear power, identifying that “The regulation of
nuclear safety in Japan at the time of the accident was performed by a number of
organizations with different roles and responsibilities and complex inter-relationships. It was
not fully clear which organizations had the responsibility and authority to issue binding
instructions on how to respond to safety issues without delay”.
In terms of response and management, another theory is that the Japanese government and
TEPCO were slow to respond to the disaster and provided inadequate information to the
public. A study by Funabashi and Kitazawa (2012) found that the response and
management of the disaster were hindered by a lack of communication and coordination
among government agencies and the plant operator.
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The Fukushima incident highlighted the critical importance of robust safety regulations in the
nuclear energy sector; while existing safety regulations were in place at the time of the
incident, the disaster demonstrated the potential weaknesses in those regulations and the
need for continued improvement (Funabashi and Kitazawa 2012). Further investigation into
improved safety regulations is essential to prevent future accidents and mitigate the potential
risks associated with nuclear power. This research could focus on identifying gaps and
weaknesses in existing safety regulations, developing more stringent safety standards, and
implementing effective mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing compliance with those
standards. There may also be a relationship between human factors and lack of regulation in
the Fukushima incident, as both played a role in the disaster. The government and
regulatory bodies failed to enforce adequate safety standards and protocols in the nuclear
energy sector, leading to a “lack of effective and persistent oversight” (Acton and Hibbs,
2012: 15). This lack of regulation and inadequate safety measures at the power plant were
therefore correlated to human factors that contributed to the disaster. The regulatory failures
and complacency among the plant operators and regulators were the result of a complex set
of social, cultural, and organisational factors, including institutional norms and values,
decision-making processes, and power dynamics.
Health and the Environment
The disaster has potentially had a long-term effect on the health of people living in the
affected area. Yamashita et al. (2018: 11) found that the disaster led to an increase in the
incidence of certain diseases, such as thyroid cancer, in people living in the affected area
stating, “The increase in risk for late-onset thyroid cancer due to radiation exposure is a
potential health effect after a nuclear power plant accident mainly due to the release of
radioiodine in fallout”. This is a conclusion that the World Health Organisation (2012) agree
with and draw out in Figure 2 below, however the IAEA (2021) are less sure of the health
effects to the public explaining that “science cannot say if there is or is not a risk, and it
cannot say what level of risk there might be if there is one.”
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It is clear however that the disaster had an impact on the environment and the local fishing
industry. A report by the Bundesamt fur Strahlenschutz (2020) found that the disaster
caused significant damage to the local environment, as they explain “Foodstuffs were
contaminated by radioactive material that was deposited on the leaves or directly on
agricultural produce such as fruit and vegetables, or that was absorbed via the roots of fruit
and vegetable crops.” They go on to describe how radioactive material was released into the
air but also into the local watercourses, shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 - Deposition of caesium-137 in Japan following the Fukushima reactor
accident.
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Aging infrastructure
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The incident revealed the risks associated with aging infrastructure, including the risk of
equipment failure and the potential for safety systems to become less effective over time
(Little, 2012). The seismologist, Ishibashi Katsuhiko had warned in 2007 that “The
government, the power industry and the academic community had seriously underestimated
the potential risks posed by major quakes” (McKie, R, 2011). Katsuhiko argues that “Japan
began building up its atomic energy system 40 years ago, when seismic activity in the
country was comparatively low. This affected the designs of plants which were not built to
robust enough standards”. As many nuclear power plants continue to operate well beyond
their intended lifespan (Gordon, 2022), there is a need to better understand the potential
safety risks associated with aging infrastructure and develop strategies to mitigate those
risks.
Climate Change
Little (2012) explains that an example of proactive risk management for infrastructure has
been carried out in the Netherlands and there, they are dealing with the risks associated with
climate change. Climate change is expected to increase the frequency and severity of
extreme weather events, such as hurricanes and floods, which could impact the safety of
nuclear power plants. Research could focus on assessing the potential risks and
vulnerabilities of nuclear power plants to extreme weather events and developing strategies
to improve the resilience and safety of these facilities, in the face of climate change (Nuclear
Energy Agency, 2016).
Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity is a critical consideration within all businesses, with illegal activities posing a
harmful threat, and this is even more so in high-risk industries such as nuclear power.
Pickering and Davies (2021) state “As global nuclear energy grows, so does the threat of
cyber-attack”. Cybersecurity threats could potentially compromise the safety of nuclear
power plants by disrupting critical systems, generating a radiological discharge or the threat
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of nuclear propagation. In addition to the potential safety risks, a cyber-attack on a nuclear
power plant could also have significant economic and environmental consequences (AXA,
2020). Therefore, studies into cybersecurity could be considered essential by future
researchers, to identify potential vulnerabilities and develop effective strategies to prevent
and mitigate cyber-attacks on nuclear power plants.
Recent Advances and Current Trends
Following the disaster, there have been several advances and trends in nuclear safety to
prevent similar accidents from happening in the future.
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Safety Culture and Risk Management
One trend is the increased focus on risk management and safety culture within the nuclear
industry. Kastenberg (2013) found that the Fukushima disaster highlighted the need for a
strong safety culture within the nuclear industry, and that the organisations responsible for
the nuclear power stations required a “cultural risk assessment be carried out to help
mitigate this situation in the future”.
Safety reviews at nuclear facilities were expanded following the Fukushima disaster because
the event highlighted the need for more comprehensive and thorough assessments of the
safety and reliability of nuclear power plants. The disaster demonstrated that traditional
methods of assessing risk and safety were inadequate, as they did not fully account for the
interplay between technical systems and human behaviour. Nuclear Energy Agency, (2013:
7) confirmed that NEA member countries took early action after the disaster and not only
carried out “preliminary safety reviews” but “all countries with nuclear facilities carried out
comprehensive safety reviews”. This includes the USNRC (2023) Independent Confirmatory
Calculations, which requires power plant owners to submit safety reviews for four technical
disciplines, and the IAEA (2023) service who offered Member States “a wide array of review
services, in which an IAEA-led team of experts compares actual practices with IAEA
standards in, for example, nuclear safety”.
Additionally, public involvement in safety decision-making has been increased, with the NEA
(2016: 29) report advising “Many member countries have further developed their policies on
transparency, openness and involvement of the public in the regulatory process”.
Digital Technology
Another trend is the increased use of digital technologies in nuclear safety. A report from
World Nuclear News, (2021) found that the use of digital technologies, such as advanced
sensors and data analytics, can improve the safety and efficiency of nuclear power plants. In
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this article, William Magwood the DG of the NEA explained that “looking at digital
technologies is the single most important thing that can be done by the technical community
at this point”.
Small Module Reactor and more Resilient Designs
In terms of reactor design, the development of advanced pressurised water reactor systems
has been a key focus since the disaster. This includes the development of pressure
suppression systems such as the containment vessel cooling injection system and the
advanced passive containment cooling system. This is in addition to the development of
advanced active systems such as the advanced core coolant systems and the advanced
turbine-driven auxiliaries (Xing et al., 2016). Nuclear Energy Agency (2013: 46) explain that
the next generation of reactors will contain additional safety measures such as “four
redundant and independent trains of safety systems, including an emergency diesel
generator in each of the trains, and additionally, two diverse station blackout diesel
generators”.
There has also been a trend towards the development of the more advanced and resilient
nuclear reactors designs, such as Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). These reactors are
designed to be safer, more flexible and more cost-effective than traditional large-scale
reactors (Vujic et al., 2012).
A small modular reactor (SMR) is a type of nuclear reactor that is smaller and more flexible
than traditional nuclear reactors. They also have the potential for enhanced safety and
security compared to earlier designs and SMRs offer a number of advantages over
traditional nuclear reactors. For example, they have lower capital costs, (Office of Nuclear
Energy, 2023) as the smaller size of the reactors means that they can be manufactured in a
factory and transported to the site, rather than being built on-site. This also reduces
construction time and reduces the risk of construction errors (IAEA, 2023). SMRs are also
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designed with improved safety features, such as passive cooling systems, which rely on
natural convection to remove heat from the reactor in the event of a power failure, rather
than relying on pumps and other active components. This reduces the risk of a meltdown, as
the passive cooling system can operate even in the event of a power failure (IAEA, 2023).
Overall, SMRs are seen as an important potential source of low-carbon energy, but there are
still challenges to be overcome before they can be widely deployed. Despite the advantages
of SMRs there are concerns about the potential nuclear proliferation risk, as their smaller
size may make them more attractive to countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons. As
Green (2019) explains “Based on historical experience, there's every reason to be
concerned about the weapons proliferation risks associated with a proliferation of SMRs”.
The use of advanced nuclear fuel cycles (ANFC) is a further development in nuclear safety
and environmental management. ANFC refers to alternative methods of managing nuclear
fuel and waste compared to the traditional once-through fuel cycle. The goal of advanced
fuel cycles is to increase the availability of fuel for reactors and reduce the amount of waste
generated (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2006). The Nuclear Energy Agency, (2006) go on to
explain that within the advanced nuclear fuel cycle process, the used fuel is reprocessed to
extract valuable isotopes, such as plutonium, and then re-used as fuel in reactors. Recycling
this waste can increase the availability of fuel and can reduce the amount of radioactive
waste that needs to be stored and disposed of. This can help to minimize the environmental
and health risks associated with nuclear waste, as well as reduce the costs of nuclear waste
management.
IAEA (2023) state that another type of reactor that was incepted in 1960 will be key to the
“long tern development of nuclear power as part of the world’s future energy mix”. Fast
neutron reactors are a type of reactor that uses fast-moving neutrons to split fuel atoms,
which produces more energy than traditional reactors they also have the potential to use all
of the fuel in a reactor which would otherwise need to be stored as waste for long periods of
time (World Nuclear Association, 2021).
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An area identified as failing which could be prime for research would be the development of
new safety technologies that can help prevent and mitigate the effects of nuclear incidents.
New containment technologies that incorporate passive safety features, could help prevent
nuclear incidents from occurring in the first place (IAEA, 2023). Additionally, research into
“decontamination and recovery” technologies could help mitigate the effects of nuclear
incidents, such as those that occurred at Fukushima (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2013: 33). It
may be that this area could be linked together with research into emergency response plans
as it is likely to be triggered, only during or in prevention of an emergency.
Emergency Preparedness
Furthermore, there is an increased focus on emergency preparedness and response in the
event of a nuclear accident. IAEA (2016) found that the Fukushima disaster highlighted the
need for better emergency preparedness and response plans, and the IAEA (2016: 13)
notes that “resulting from reviews and self-assessments, member countries have found that,
in general, nuclear safety, emergency preparedness and response arrangements have
improved”. The Fukushima incident demonstrated the importance of having robust
emergency response plans in place to deal with unexpected events (Nuclear Energy
Agency, 2021). For future studies, there is an opportunity to research and develop new
safety protocols and emergency response plans that consider the lessons already learned
from the Fukushima incident.
Renewables as an alternative to nuclear
The debate between nuclear energy and renewables is complex and there are pros and
cons to each however, there has been an increased focus on renewable energy sources
since the disaster (World Nuclear Association, 2021), with countries such as Japan and
Germany increasingly turning to renewable energy sources to reduce their reliance on
nuclear power (BBC News, 2017). The Union of Concerned Scientists (2017) explain that
renewable energy sources are generally a cleaner source of energy and emit less carbon.
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They continue to have a lower risk to public health, with renewable energy sources being
more scalable, allowing for greater flexibility in meeting energy demand and adapting to
changing energy needs. There are also significant synergies between nuclear and
renewable power which can create a more efficient and sustainable energy system, helping
to achieve decarbonisation targets (IAEA, 2018). They identify additional areas for research
highlighting “Such an integration would also foster cogeneration for seawater desalination,
hydrogen production, district heating, cooling and other industrial applications. Further
research and development, the introduction of appropriate policies and market incentives
are important next steps.”
Overall, the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster has seen several advances and trends in
terms of nuclear safety. This has included strengthening safety culture, utilising digital
technologies, developing advanced reactor designs, improving emergency preparedness
and response, greater public involvement in safety decision making, and increased focus on
renewable energy sources.
When considering the best areas of research for a conceptual framework, it is important to
also consider the costs and time involved in conducting research in these areas (Kumar,
2019). Safety protocols, emergency planning, and new safety technologies may require
significant investments in time and resources but could offer direct and immediate benefits to
the safety of nuclear power plants. Human factors, climate change, aging infrastructure, and
cybersecurity may require longer-term investments in research and development but could
ultimately lead to more comprehensive and sustainable solutions for ensuring nuclear safety.
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Conclusions
The Fukushima nuclear disaster has been the subject of extensive academic research and
literature, with interdisciplinary contributions from fields such as engineering, environmental
science, public health, and social science. In addressing the objectives set forth in this
essay, a comprehensive understanding of the impact of the Fukushima disaster on the
global nuclear power industry has been achieved.
The essay has drawn from a diverse range of sources, including academic research and
industry publications, to provide a comprehensive understanding of the impact of the
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Fukushima disaster on the nuclear power industry. This analysis has highlighted key issues
such as system failures due to complexity, lack of government oversight, and poor
communication.
There has been discussion of several theories and perspectives related to the Fukushima
disaster and its implications for the future of nuclear power. These include the challenges of
risk management, the role of human error, and the potential health and environmental
impacts of nuclear energy.
A critical evaluation has been completed of the reliability of the evidence presented in the
literature and identified gaps or limitations in the current understanding of the disaster's
effects on nuclear power. For example, the long-term health effects of the disaster and the
potential of new nuclear power plant designs to mitigate safety risks warrant further
investigation.
The essay has examined recent advancements in nuclear safety, such as enhanced risk
management strategies that aim to identify potential risks and vulnerabilities and mitigate
them before they can lead to disasters. Digital technology has also advanced, offering new
opportunities for remote monitoring, control, and data analysis in nuclear power plants.
Small modular reactors and resilient designs offer alternative approaches to traditional largescale nuclear power plants, with the potential for increased safety and cost-effectiveness.
Renewable energy sources are being explored as alternatives to nuclear power, with the aim
of reducing the risks of environmental damage.
Several areas have been identified for further research, focusing on improving the safety
and reliability of nuclear power plants. Firstly, aging infrastructure is a critical area of
research, as many nuclear power plants continue to operate beyond their intended lifespan.
Research into cybersecurity at nuclear power plants is critical to ensure the safety and
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security of these facilities and the communities they serve, and to help prevent potential
catastrophic events resulting from cyber-attacks.
The nuclear disaster has had far-reaching implications for the global nuclear power industry.
The disaster has led to a re-evaluation of the safety and reliability of nuclear power plants,
resulting in technological advancements and policy changes aimed at mitigating future risks.
Despite these efforts, the complex nature of nuclear power generation and the potential for
human error continue to pose significant challenges to the industry.
This essay has provided a comprehensive overview of the current state of knowledge
regarding the Fukushima disaster's impact on the nuclear power industry, while also
identifying gaps in understanding and areas for future research. By addressing the essay's
objectives, a foundation has been established for further study and exploration into the
ongoing challenges and potential solutions in the field of nuclear power safety. Ultimately,
the lessons learned from the Fukushima disaster should serve as a catalyst for continued
research and development in nuclear safety, to ensure a more sustainable and secure
energy future.
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