# 1 Case Title: Manila Prince Hotel FACTS:
vs GSIS
Respondent (GSIS) decided to sell 30% to 51% of the issued and outstan
shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation through public bidding as
GR No. 122156
of the Philippine government's privatization initiative under Proclamation
50.
Date Promulgated: Feb. 3, 1997
According to its terms, the winning bidder is to provide management expe
Topic Discussed: Self-Executory and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial suppo
and Mandatory as a Rule
strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
Student Assigned:
Only two (2) bidders participated:
a. petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, w
offered to buy 51% of the corporation or 15.3M shares at P41.58 per share, a
b. Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, which bid for the same number of sh
at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
In a letter to respondent, petitioner matched Renong Berhad's bid pric
P44.00 per share, pending the designation of Renong Berhad as the win
bidder partner and the execution of the relevant contracts.
In a subsequent letter petitioner sent a manager's check for P33.000.00
as Bid Security to match the bid of Renong Berhad which respondent refuse
accept.
Because of this refusal by the respondent, petitioner came to the Supr
Court on prohibition and mandamus. The SC issued a TRO enjoi
respondents from consummating and perfecting the said sale.
The petitioner hinged his arguments on Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
1987 Constitution. It argued that :
a. Manila Hotel had become part of the national patrimony, having becom
historical monument for the Filipino nation; and
b. Because respondent GSIS, a GOCC, owns 51 percent of the corporat
shares, the hotel business of GSIS, which is part of the tourism industr
unquestionably a part of the national economy. Hence, the petitioner clai
that the corporation is clearly covered by the term national economy unde
contemplation of Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
The respondent, on the other hand, raised the following arguments:
a. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statem
of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requ
implementing legislation
b. While the hotel is indeed historic, Manila Hotel does not fall under the
national patrimony
c. But even if it is, the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplic
since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of
corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building sta
d. the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it
takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the B
of Shares.
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article
Section 10, are self-executing.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative.
KEY POINTS: 1. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for
governance and administration of a nation— it is supreme, imperious, abso
and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. Since
Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme Iaw of the natio
is deemed written in every statute and contract.
2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itsel
that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its te
and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legisla
for action
3. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enfor
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
constitution are self- executing.
4. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the
executing nature of constitutional provisions.
5. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remed
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was
intended to be self-executing—the rule is that a self-executing provision o
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject
any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exe
of constitutional right and make it more available.
6. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and nonexecuting in another.
When the Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges,
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that—qualified Filipinos sha
preferred.
8. When the Constitution declares that a right exists in certain spec
circumstances, an action may be maintained to enforce such r
notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject—such
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance.
9. When the Constitution speaks of “national patrimony,” it refers not on
the natural resources of the Philippines but also to the cultural heritage o
Filipinos. Manila Hotel has become a landmark—a living testimonia
Philippine heritage. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our nati
economy and patrimony.
10. Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the sub
constitutional provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bid
rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for b
violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law tha
laws and contracts must conform with the fundamental law of the land. T
which violate the Constitution lose their reason for being.
# 2 Case Title: Oposa vs Factoran
GR No. : G.R. No. 101083
Date
1993
Promulgated:
Topic Discussed:
Student Assigned:
July
FACTS: A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, e
representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represente
their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They pr
that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representa
30, and other persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the coun
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewin
appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under
premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State i
capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining fo
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resou
property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succee
generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the follow
grounds:
1.
Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2.
The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question w
properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government
ISSUE: Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class su
“prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”
RULING: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generatio
well as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can
themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding genera
file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generatio
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers
“rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation o
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development,
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the fu
generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to pres
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and heal
ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a so
environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obliga
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
KEY POINTS: 1. Minors had the right to sue on behalf of succee
generations because every generation has a responsibility to the nex
preserve nature.
2. Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract vio
any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by
legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by private persons
private purposes is null and void and without any force and effect.
# 3 Case Title: Kilosbayan vs FACTS: In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment L
Morato
Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment
accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket
GR No.: 118910
least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotte
charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel
Date Promulgated: November 16, responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purc
1995
the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to dec
ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petition
Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violativ
Topic Discussed:
PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It vio
Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longe
Student Assigned:
questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply:
is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The po
to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Director
PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their m
crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not pa
to the contract .
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have standing?
RULING:
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the stan
of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real partie
interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF
CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigate
theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in
sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same but the c
are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually
directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be draw
question in any future action between the same parties involving a diffe
cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least w
substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second procee
involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separ
from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the sec
proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at is
Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not prec
determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concep
constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved.
more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIE
INTEREST.
# 4 Case Title: Francisco, et al vs FACTS: Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court C
House Speaker, et al
Justice Hilario G. Davide. The justiciable controversy poised in front of
Court was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second comp
GR No.: 160261
to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law.
Date Promulgated: November 10, ISSUE: Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment comp
2003
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representa
falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution and whether
Topic Discussed:
resolution thereof is a political question – has resulted in a political crisis.
Student Assigned:
RULING: In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constituti
sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that
Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared reso
extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor le
permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest li
adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Cou
ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separatio
powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of governmen
no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of
part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has
carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of eac
these three branches must be given effect without destroying
indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for
contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceed
would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is t
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat anoth
Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond
powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be ab
show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also tha
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a re
of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indef
way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about t
denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is a
to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute o
complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a pu
right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of pers
interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that pu
funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to
improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke
power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he
sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised
taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcem
of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has mere
general interest common to all members of the public.
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpa
suit should be entertained. This Court opts to grant standing to most of
petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Se
of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice
necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any off
action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indee
member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordi
meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote
least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary… to ini
impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on
ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment procee
but rather the filing of a complaint does.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can ini
impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all case
impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to
principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases"
impeachment proceeding."
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and ref
or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committe
Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the Hous
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meanin
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against
same official within a one year period.
The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolve
the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceed
initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imp
one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdic
where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decid
political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to a
judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any
system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to
law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedi
to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch
instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equ
other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning
ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the h
profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above
law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is
Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody
The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in
Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which
approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint aga
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5, section
Article XI of the Constitution.
KEY POINTS: First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words use
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where techn
terms are employed
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its fram
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted
whole.
# 5 Case
Guingona
Title:
GR No.: 34577
Santiago
vs FACTS: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Mar
B. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate. The follow
were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and
Franklin M. Drilon as majority leader.
Date Promulgated:Nov. 18, 1998
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Sen
Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming
Topic
Discussed:
Political position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen
Question vs. Justiciable Controversy Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him
losing nominee, belonged to the "minority."
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority,"
Student Assigned:
Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the Lakas-NU
UMDP Party — numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority — had ch
Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter
arrived at. The following session day, the debate on the question contin
with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the t
session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in rec
of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that
had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof,
Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority le
of the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court
subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guing
had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Se
minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonge
Senator Tatad.
ISSUE:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising
position of Senate minority leader
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recogni
Respondent Guingona as the minority leader?
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE
The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rig
Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclus
within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, howe
the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent ev
which justify its intervention;" and (2) because the resolution of the i
hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence
quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate President (read Avelin
Cuenco about the scope of the Court's power of judicial review).
The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Se
Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a political question. The choic
these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary author
but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court
that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity o
selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine
issue.
SECOND ISSUE
There was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation propose
petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the Rul
the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The Constitu
mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a num
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it however does
provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto const
the "minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no la
regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become
minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electi
Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on
manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All
the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it
deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other office
merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by
aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must
prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
THIRD ISSUE
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exe
of power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law theret
quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the righ
title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoym
The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor or
person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurpe
unlawfully held or exercise by another.
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing m
show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exe
the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by
respondent. In this case, petitioners present not sufficient proof of a clear
indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. Furtherm
no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his spe
acts as minority leader.
FOURTH ISSUE
Grave abuse of discretion - such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgm
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be pa
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refus
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as w
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of pas
and hostility.
By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely a
his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as
minority leader. To recall, the latter belongs to one of the minority partie
the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the mem
of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by
Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came
after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides w
liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Therefore, the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whim
exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reaso
passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or
the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been viola
disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be impute
Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
# 6 Case Title: Javellana vs Exec FACTS:
Secretary
On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided
sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the responden
GR No.: 36142
restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the prop
Date Promulgated: March 31, Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution.
1973
This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and regist
Topic Discussed:Political Question voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and vo
similarly situated.
vs. Justiciable Controversy
Student Assigned:
Balondo
Rony
D.
Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the immed
implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, respond
including.
Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing
said proposed constitution upon ground the that the President as Comman
in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemb
without power to approve proposed constitution; without power to proc
the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and
election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, h
null and void.
Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation
1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import
objective.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102
justiciable or political question, and therefore non-justiciable.
Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constituti
Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the applic
constitutional and statutory provisions.
Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (wit
without valid ratification) by the people.
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constituti
Convention in force.
RULING:
First. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force dep
upon whether or not the said new constitution has been ratified in accord
with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution.
It is well settled that the matter of ratification of an amendment to
constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the constitutio
force at the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution.
The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified
accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitutio
justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned
1935 Constitution) shall show.
Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to ve
those lacking the qualifications and having the disqualifications mentione
the Constitution the right of suffrage.
The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in
Citizen’s assemblies void.
Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregula
that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in Article V Section 1 o
1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since the
no means by which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age ca
separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceeding
the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void.
Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void.
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast" cho
made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking pa
plebiscites.
This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the Amer
regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with its m
characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by
Government and secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping rec
that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the elec
returns.
The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under
supervision of COMELEC is void.
The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place wit
the intervention of the COMELEC and without complying with the provis
of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73.
The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reason
means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the officers
conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X o
1935 Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in
1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and hon
expression of the people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citiz
Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified
revised Constitution.
Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X o
1935 Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive" charge to the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of electio
independently of the Executive. But there is not even a certification by
COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies re
upon in Proclamation No. 1102.
Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federatio
Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of Local Governments
certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all
the Philippines. The citizen’s assemblies did not adopt the prop
constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there
been no such citizen’s assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, n
say, also, in other parts of the Philippines.
Fourth. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers
offices of the Executive Department, in line with Proclamation No. 1
connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.
A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recogn
normally connotes the acknowledgment by a party of the acts of ano
Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not const
congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said act
session duly assembled. This is a well-established principle of Administr
Law and of the Law of Public Officers.
The compliance by the people with the orders of martial law government
not constitute acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither does
Court prepared to declare that the people's inaction as regards Proclama
No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of Presidential orders, dec
and/or instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salu
effects, issued subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoptio
approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation is there, and inac
or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an a
conformity or acquiescence.
As regards the applicability to these cases of the "enrolled bill" rule, it is we
remember that the same refers to a document certified to the President fo
action under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker o
House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Hou
concerning legislative measures approved by said Houses. Whe
Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring the results
plebiscite on the proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the
Constitution denies the executive department of the Government.
In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said c
petitions therein should be given due course, there being more than prima
showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accord
with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or
been acquiesced in by the people or majority thereof; that said prop
Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is stil
Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of
proposed Constitution to the people at a plebiscite for its ratification
rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution
the provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of
plebiscite.
Fifth. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Maka
Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by virtue of the peo
acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makali
Castro, Fernando and Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise state
their votes on the third question that they could not state with judicial certa
whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; an
members of the Court, namely, Justice Zaldivar and myself voted that
Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in fo
with the result, there are not enough votes to declare that the new Constitu
is not in force.
# 7 Case Title: Bondoc vs Pineda
FACTS: In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the
and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position
GR No.: 97710
Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclai
winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Elec
Date Promulgated: 26 September Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justic
1991
the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representative
members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafte
Topic Discussed: The Doctrine of decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congress
Supremacy of the Constitution and Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerill
Expanded Judicial Power
the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
Student Assigned:
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congress
Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from
LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Edu
Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to
said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision,
Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the bas
the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to withdraw
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to the HRE
ISSUE:
Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the domi
political party therein, may change that party’s representation in the HRE
thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in
election contest pending therein.
RULING:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Elec
Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for
determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan considerat
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They m
discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality
independence even independence from the political party to which they bel
Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not v
grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expe
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vot
favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination
appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal
House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an inju
and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion aga
Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the Hous
Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to securi
tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election cont
are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy sec
of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may
be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the mem
congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation f
the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with ano
political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expe
by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he
formally affiliated with another.
# 8 Case Title: Angara vs Electoral FACTS:
Commission
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor
candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for
GR No.: L-45081
1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angar
Date Promulgated: 15 July 1936 member-elect of the Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most number of votes
then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly pa
Topic Discussed:The Doctrine of Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Y
Supremacy of the Constitution and filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the elec
Expanded Judicial Power
of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Elec
Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing o
protests against the election, returns and qualifications of the members o
Student Assigned:
National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec. Commissi
motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out o
prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and pro
the Electoral Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest
contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the
Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the
Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the c
ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and
subject matter of the controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess o
jurisdiction.
RULING:
In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a
constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between
agencies created by the Constitution. The court has jurisdiction over
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy fo
purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constituti
grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relatin
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Nati
Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935 Constitution). It is held, therefore, that
Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of
constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the elec
protest filed by Ynsua.
# 9 Case Title:
Infotech FACTS:
Foundation, et al vs COMELEC
On June 7, 1995, Congress passed R.A. 8046 (An act authorizing the COME
to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system
GR No. 159139
pilot-test it in the March 1996 elections in the Autonomous Region in Mu
Mindanao (ARMM) and for other purposes). On December 22, 1997, Cong
Date Promulgated: 13 January 2004
enacted R.A. 8436 (An act authorizing the COMELEC to use an autom
election system in the May 11, 1998 national or local elections and
Topic Discussed: What constitutes subsequent national and local electoral exercises, providing funds there
grave abuse of discretion
and for other purposes). On October 29, 2002, COMELEC adopted
Resolution 02-0170 a
modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to conduct bidd
Student Assigned:
for the three phases of its Automated Election System: namely, Phase I-V
Registration and Validation
System; Phase II-Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase
Electronic Transmissions. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO
172, which allocated the sum of P 2.5 billion to fund the AES for May 10, 2
elections. She authorized the release of an additional P 500 million, upon
request of COMELEC. The COMELEC issued an “Invitation to Apply
Eligibility and to Bid”. There are 57 bidders who participated therein. The
and Awards Committee (BAC) found MPC and the Total Informa
Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. Both were referred to Techn
Working Group (TWG) and the Department of Science and Techno
(DOST). However, the DOST said in its Report on the Evaluation of Techn
Proposals on Phase II that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a numbe
failed marks in technical evaluation. Notwithstanding these failures,
COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 6074, awarding the project to M
Wherefore, petitioners Information Technology Foundation of the Philipp
wrote a letter to the COMELEC chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. They prote
the award of the contract to respondent MPC. However, in a letter-reply
COMELEC rejected the protest.
ISSUE:
WON the Commission on Elections, the agency vested with the exclu
constitutional mandate to oversee elections, gravely abused its discretion w
in the exercise of its administrative functions, it awarded to MPC the con
for the second phase of the comprehensive Automated Election System.
RULING:
PETITION IS MERITORIOUS. The Court is beguiled by the statement
Commissioner Florentino Tuason Jr., given in open court during the
Argument last October 7, 2003. The good commissioner affirmed that he
aware, of his own personal knowledge, that there had indeed been a wr
agreement among the"consortium" members,34 although it was an inte
matter among them,35 and of the fact that it would be presented by counse
private respondent.36 However, under questioning by Chief Justice Hilari
Davide Jr. and Justice Jose C. Vitug, Commissioner Tuason in effect adm
that, while he was the commissioner-in-charge of Comelec’s Legal Departm
he had never seen, even up to that
late date, the agreement he spoke of. Under further questioning, he
likewise unable to provide any information regarding the amounts inve
into the project by several members of the claimed consortium. A short w
later, he admitted that the Commission had not taken a look at the agreem
Even if the BAC or the Phase II Team had taken charge of evaluating
eligibility, qualifications and credentials of the consortium-bidder, still, i
probability, the former would have referred the task to Commissioner Tua
head of Comelec’s Legal Department. That task was the appreciation
evaluation of the legal effects and
consequences of the terms, conditions, stipulations and covenants containe
any joint venture agreement, consortium agreement or a similar docume
assuming of course that any of these was available at the time. The fact
Commissioner Tuason was barely aware of the situation bespeaks the comp
absence of such document, or the utter failure or neglect of the Comele
examine it -- assuming it was available at all -- at the time the award
was made on April 15, 2003. The problem is that Comelec never bothere
check. It never based its decision on documents or other proof that w
concretely establish the existence
of the claimed consortium or joint venture or agglomeration. It relied me
on the self-serving representation in an uncorroborated letter signed by
one individual, claiming that
his company represented a "consortium" of several different corporation
concluded forthwith that a consortium indeed existed, composed of such
such members, and
thereafter declared that the entity was eligible to bid. True, copies of finan
statements and incorporation papers of the alleged "consortium" mem
were submitted. But these papers
did not establish the existence of a consortium, as they could have b
provided by the companies concerned for purposes other than to prove
they were part of a consortium or
joint venture. For instance, the papers may have been intended to show
those companies were each qualified to be a sub- contractor (and not
more) in a major project. Those
documents did not by themselves support the assumption that a consortiu
joint venture existed among the companies. In brief, despite the absenc
competent proof as to the existence and eligibility of the alleged consor
(MPC), its capacity to deliver on the Contract, and the members’ joint
several liability therefor, Comelec nevertheless assumed that such consor
existed and was eligible. It then went ahead and considered the bid of MP
which the Contract was eventually awarded, in gross violation of the form
own bidding rules and procedures contained in its RFP. Therein lies Come
grave abuse of discretion.
# 10 Case Title: Magallona, et al vs FACTS:
Ermita
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines o
Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codif
GR No.: 187167
the sovereignty of State parties over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it
amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving
Date Promulgated: August 16, drawing of baselines around Sabah.
2011
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNC
III of 1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten one baselin
Topic Discussed:
optimize the location of some basepoints and classify KIG and Scarboro
THE PHILIPPINES:
AS A Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.
STATE
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reason
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
Student Assigned:
2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages h
undermining our sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our c
over those territories.
ISSUE: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
RULING:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is ju
codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522
baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic sta
points to measure. it merely notices the international community of the s
of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legisla
designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and
lanes passages. but in the absence of such, international law norms operate
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both pass
does not place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal st
Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no modern state can in
its sovereignty to forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by
3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover
itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction
KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable ex
from the general configuration of the archipelago’.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll br
the rules: that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.
# 11 Case
COMELEC
Title:Tecson
vs. FACTS:
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (
filed his certificate of candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the positio
GR No. 161434
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming nati
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to
Date Promulgated: Mar. 3, 2004
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.
"Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of b
Topic Discussed: Citizenship
to be Manila.
Modes of Acquisition:
Citizens of the Philippines
Student Assigned:
Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ
cancel his certificate of candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a naturalFilipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the so
Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
RULING: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen o
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years o
on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten y
immediately preceding such election.
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from b
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philip
citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme conside
viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan
who in turn was the father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indic
that he died on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Ca
Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo
was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to
contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the p
of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence be
death. Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not substantiated
proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the “en ma
Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no d
that Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Fili
citizen. And, since the latter was born on August 20, 1939, governed u
1935 Constitution, which constitution considers as citizens of
Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippi
Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philipp
regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.
# 12 Case Title: Mo Ya Lim Yao vs FACTS:
Commission on Immigration
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a
immigrant on 8 February 1961.
GR No. L-21289
In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a tempo
Date Promulgated: October 4 visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese resi
1971
at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to
Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping.
Topic Discussed: Citizenship
Modes of Acquisition: She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a pe
Citizens of the Philippines of one month.
Student Assigned:
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amoun
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung w
actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of
authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representa
might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in
Philippines up to 13 February 1962.
On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen.
Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigratio
confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction.
At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it
admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either Englis
Tagalog, except for a few words.
She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except
Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer
preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon
marriage to a Filipino citizen.
RULING: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien wo
marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Fili
provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Sec
4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently natura
here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he take
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of
disqualifications under said Section 4.
Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceed
Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16.
Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who
during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturaliza
proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it sh
follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that
Legislature intended to treat them differently.
As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, t
is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable
alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizen
settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to pro
everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or busines
exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that
citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquis
of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains
as to native-born Filipinos.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a jud
or administrative case.
Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides the
as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it
to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from an
virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Li
Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
# 13 Case Title:
COMELEC
Valles vs.
GR No. 137000
Date Promulgated: Aug. 9, 2000
FACTS: Rosalinda Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia
Filipino father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of 15, she
Australia and came to settle in Philippines. Then she later married a Filip
Ever since, she participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but
candidate as well. In may 1998 elections, she ran for Governor. Valles
opposing candidate, filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on
ground that she is an australian.
Topic Discussed: Citizenship
Modes of Acquisition: Citizens of the
Philippines
ISSUE: Whether Rosalinda Ybasco is a Filipino citizen?
Student Assigned:
RULING: Yes, The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the princip
jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizens
of the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as oppose
the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the b
of place of birth.
Rosalinda Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took
effect and at that time what served as the Constitution of the Philippines
the principal organic acts by which the US governed the country. These
the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 29, 1
also known as the Jones Law.
Doctrine: The principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by v
of blood relationship. A child follows the nationality or citizenship of
parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrin
jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of plac
birth.
# 14 Case Title: Bengson III vs. FACTS:
HRET
The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of
constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the Hou
GR No.142840
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarla
Date Promulgated: May 7, 2001
1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Ma
Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an
Topic Discussed: Citizenship
of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship
Modes of Acquisition: Citizens of the under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which Philip
Philippines
Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino cit
may lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accep
Student Assigned:
commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.”
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship
erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with
service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation u
RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenshi
Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accep
Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for
was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in the 1
elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelec
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam
respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a memb
the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article
section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filip
upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
RULING: YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the
same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes b
which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means th
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior stat
as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be rest
to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering servi
to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or af
separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United Sta
citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegia
to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil
Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The
said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and havin
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered
original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth
the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allo
him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship
# 15 Case Title: Co vs. HRET
GR No.92191-92
Date
1991
Promulgated:
July
FACTS: On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second distri
Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the positio
representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are
30, petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent,
Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative o
second district of Northern Samar.
Topic Discussed: Citizenship
Modes of Acquisition: Citizens of the The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent alle
Philippines
that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and n
resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
Student Assigned:
The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) declared respon
Ong is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Sa
for voting purposes.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent is a natural born Filipino and a residen
Laoang, Northern Samar.
2. Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of authority in the exe
of its powers.
RULING:
1. The Court affirmed the decision of HRET that respondent is a natural
Filipino and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. The respondent trace
natural born citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship o
father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whethe
not the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that
and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos. Respondent
could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renou
Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other per
faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his fa
which he could possibly have chosen.
2. The Court declared that HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discre
The same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convene
authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full b
brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural born cit
by both bodies.
# 16 Case Title: Balgamelo
Cabiling, et al vs Commissioner FACTS: Petitioners Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr.,
Valeriano Cabiling Ma are children of Felix Yao Kong Ma, a Taiwanese,
GR No. 183133
Dolores Silona Cabiling, a Filipina. They were born during the effectivity o
1935 Constitution, and has been raised in the Philippines. Upon reaching
Date Promulgated:July 26, 2010 age of majority (21), they elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with
1935 Constitution. As such, Balgamelo executed an affidavit of electio
Topic Discussed: Citizenship
Philippine citizenship and took his oath of allegiance to the Philippines. F
Modes of Acquisition: Citizens of the Jr. and Valeriano performed the same acts. Nevertheless, they faile
Philippines
register the documents in the local civil registry in accordance
Commonwealth Act. 625. They were only able to do so thirty years after t
election.
Student Assigned:
In February 2004, the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) received a compl
affidavit from a certain Mat Catral, alleging that Felix Sr. and his children
overstaying aliens. The Ma family considered the complaint as politi
motivated because they were supporting a certain candidate in the
upcoming elections. Notwithstanding, the BOI charged them with violatio
the Philippine Immigration Act (PIA) for failing to present any valid docum
showing their status in the Philippines, and produce documents related to
election of Philippine citizenship. Thereafter, the Board of BOI rendere
decision finding that Felix Sr. and his children violated the PIA, rendering t
undocumented and/or improperly documented aliens.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the Petition of the Petitio
for failing to comply with the requirements of the law for their continued
in the Philippines. It ruled that it is required of the elector to execut
affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship, and thereafter file the same
the nearest civil registry. These procedures concerning citizenship
constitutional mandate which must be adhered upon strictly.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioners are Filipino citizens des
their failure to comply with registration requirement under the l
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The Court held that registra
refers to any entry made int he books of the registry which records solem
and permanently the right of ownership and other real rights. Simply sta
registration is made for the purpose of notification. In contracts of partner
for example, the purpose of registration is to give notice to third per
whereby failure to register said contracts do not affect the liability of
partnership and of the partners to third persons. Neither does such fa
affect the partnership’s juridical personality. Thus, registration is n
requirement for the validity of the contract as between the parties for the e
of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. It is a confirmation fo
existence of fact.
In the present case, registration is the confirmation of the election of
Petitioners on their Philippine citizenship. Having performed the neces
obligations under the Constitution, their failure to register their election in
civil registry should not defeat the election and negate the permanent fact
they have a Filipino mother. Thus, they are Filipino citizens, and
lacking requirements thereof may still be complied subject to administr
penalties, if any.
# 1 Case Title: Aznar vs COMELEC
GR No. 83820
Date Promulgated: May 25, 1990
FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner challenged respondent’s right to
public office on the ground that the latter was an alien. Respondent (L
Osmenia) maintains that he is a son of a Filipino, was a holder of a v
subsisting passport, a continuous resident of the Philippines and a regist
voter since 1965. He was, however, also a holder of an alien registra
certificate.
Topic
Discussed:
Is
mere ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is an alien
possession of alien passport enough
proof of renunciation of Filipino RULING: No, because by virtue of his being a son of a Filipino,
citizenship?
presumed that he was a Filipino and remained Filipino until proof coul
shown that he had renounced or lost his Philippine citizenship. In addi
Student Assigned:
possession of an alien registration certificate unaccompanied by proo
performance of acts whereby Philippine citizenship had been lost is
adequate proof of loss of citizenship.
Petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had los
Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Am
others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by exp
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegianc
support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence,
clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenshi
any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of lo
Philippine citizenship.
# 17 Case Title: Llamansares vs FACTS:
COMELEC
In her COC for Presidency on the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared
she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that her residence up to
GR No. 83820
before May 9, 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May
2005.
Date Promulgated: March 11,
2016
Grace Poe was born in 1968., found as newborn infant in Jaro, Iloilo and
legally adopted by RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (FPJ) and JESUS SON
POE (SUSAN ROCES) in 1974. She immigrated to the US in 1991 after
Topic Discussed:What is the marriage to Theodore Llamanzares who was then based at the US. Grace
citizenship of a foundling?
then became a naturalized American citizen in 2001.
Student Assigned:
On December 2004, he returned to the Philippines due to his fath
deteriorating medical condition, who then eventually demice on Febr
3,2005. She then quitted her job in the US to be with her grieving mother
finally went home for good to the Philippines on MAY 24, 2005.
On JULY 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she
reacquired her Filipino citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a v
and obtained a new Philippine Passport.
In 2010, before assuming her post as appointee Chairperson of the MTR
she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requiremen
to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship. From then on, she stopped using
American passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidac
the ground particularly among others, that she cannot be considered a na
born Filipino citizen since she was a FOUNDLING and that her biolo
parents cannot be proved as Filipinos. The Comelec en banc cancelled
candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and resid
requirements and that she committed misrepresentation in her COC.
On CERTIORARI, the SUPREME COURT, reversed the ruling and held a
of 9-6 that POE is qualified as candidate for Presidency.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Grace Poe- Llamanzares is a natural- b
Filipino citizen
(2) Whether or not Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requireme
RULING:
YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that
satisfied the constitutional requirement that only natural-born Filipinos
run for Presidency.
(1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being show
her physical features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that
was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is
probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing
chance that Poe’s bilogical parents are Filipinos. Said probability
circumstantial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rule
Evidence.
(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural b
citizens as based on the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Conven
wherein though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restri
language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citize
(3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the naturalcitizenship as to the country where they are being found, as covered
supported by the UN Convention Law.
As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because
satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to rem
permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of
returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting
24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelm
evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domici
the US, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizen
under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC
# 18 Case Title: Mo Ya Lim Yao vs FACTS:
Commission on Immigration
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a
immigrant on 8 February 1961.
GR No. L-21289
In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a tempo
Date Promulgated: October 4 visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese resi
1971
at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to
Philippines to visit her great grand uncle, Lau Ching Ping.
Topic Discussed: Naturalization:
Judicial,
Administrative, She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a pe
Congressional
of one month.
Student Assigned:
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amoun
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung w
actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of
authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representa
might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in
Philippines up to 13 February 1962.
On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen.
Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigratio
confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after
expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction.
At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it
admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either Englis
Tagalog, except for a few words.
She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except
Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer
preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citi
upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
RULING: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien wo
marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Fili
provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Sec
4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently natura
here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he take
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of
disqualifications under said Section 4.
Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceed
Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16.
Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who
during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturaliza
proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it sh
follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that
Legislature intended to treat them differently.
As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, t
is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable
alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizen
settled and established so that she may not have to be called upon to pro
everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or busines
exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that
citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquis
of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains
as to native-born Filipinos.
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a jud
or administrative case.
Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides the
as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it
to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.
Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from an
virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Li
Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
# 19 Case Title: Republic vs. Dela FACTS:
Rosa
September 20, 1991 - Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization under
Commonwealth Act No. 63 before the RTC Manila.
GR No.104654
October 7, 1991 - Judge dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on March
Date Promulgated: June 6, 1994 1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Off
Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for 3 consecutive weeks
Topic Discussed: Naturalization: last publication of which should be at least 6 months before the date of the
Judicial,
Administrative, hearing.
Congressional
January 14, 1992 - Frivaldo asked the Judge to cancel the March 16 hearing
move it to January 24, 1992, citing his intention to run for public office in
Student Assigned:
May 1992 elections. Judge granted the motion and the hearing
moved to February 21. No publication or copy was issued about
order.
February 21, 1992 - the hearing proceeded.
February 27, 1992 - Judge rendered the assailed Decision and held
Frivaldo is readmitted as a citizen of the Republic of the Philippine
naturalization.
Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 o
Revised Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of
Interim Rules, to annul the decision made on February 27, 1992 and to nu
the oath of allegiance taken by Frivaldo on same date.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship
Filipino.
RULING:
No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is decla
NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified f
continuing to serve as governor of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordere
vacate his office and to surrender the same to the Vice-Governor of
Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and executory.
proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hea
without a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and
petition itself;
(2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication o
petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality o
judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year wa
period.:
# 20 Case Title: Bengson III vs. FACTS:
HRET
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was
in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents.
GR No. 142840
fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.
Date Promulgated: May 7 2001
Topic
Discussed:
Citizenship
Student Assigned:
Loss
However, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Co
and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took
of oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he los
Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering servic
or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country."
Respondent Cruz then reacquired his Philippine citizenship thro
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630 entitled as “An Act Providing
Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship By Persons Who Lost Such Citizen
by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission in, the Armed Forces o
United States.” He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Sec
District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convin
margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was
running for reelection.
Petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent H
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent
was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives sinc
is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of
Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Cruz can still be considered a natu
born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
RULING: Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationa
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be rest
to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he
be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rend
service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subseque
reacquired Philippine citizenship as provided under Section 1 of R.A. No. 26
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and ha
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasina
accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the a
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status befor
lost his Philippine citizenship.
Therefore, Cruz has all the qualifications to be elected as a member of
House of Representatives. The HRET did not commit any grave abus
discretion, thus the petition was dismissed.
# 21 Case Title: Frivaldo vs. FACT:
COMELEC
Frivaldo, J. was elected as a Governor of the province of Sorsogon on Jan
22, 1988. On October 27, 1988 the League of Cities of Sorsogon Presi
GR No. 87193
Salvador Estuye filed a petition to COMELEC requesting to disqualify Friv
from his office on the grounds that he was a naturalized citizen of the Un
Date Promulgated: 23 June States of America. Frivaldo was naturalized as an American citize
1989
Januray 20, 1983. Frivaldo admitted but said that he was o
forced to do so since the time of Marcos regime he was conside
Topic Discussed: Reacquisition
as an enemy and he went to USA seeking refuge and
naturalization is not impressed with voluntariness as he went b
after the Marcos Regime to the country to help the restoration
Student Assigned:
democracy. He implies that he reacquired his Philippine citizenship
participating in the election. The case was approved by COMELEC and mo
to dismiss filed by Frivaldo was denied to which Frivaldo filed a motion
certiorari and prohibition to the court.
Issue:
Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippine
the time of his election on January 18, 1988?
Ruling:
Petition denied, Juan G. Frivaldo is not a citizen of the Philippines
disqualified from serving as the Governor of the Province of Sorsogon, vac
shall be filled by the elected Vice-Governor.
Local Government Code section 42 indicates that a candidate for
elective office must be a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified v
of the constituency where is running. Omnibus Election Code section
states that a qualified voter, among other qualifications, must be a citizen o
Philippines. The Court rules that Frivaldo was not a citizen of
Philippines at the time of his election as the evidence shown fr
the certification of US District Court of North California stating
he is a citizen of the Philippines. Frivaldo’s argument that he reacquir
Philippine citizenship through the participation in the election which in
view repatriated him to which the Court refutes that there are pro
methods to which one can reacquire citizen ship either thro
Direct Act of Congress, Naturalization or Repatriation to w
Frivaldo did not access to. Only citizens of the Philippines which have
allegiance can run in local elective office.
# 22 Case Title: Tabasa vs Court of FACTS:
Appeals
When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A. Tabasa acquired American citizen
when his father became a naturalized citizen of the US. In 1995, he arrive
GR No. 125 793
the Philippines and was admitted as "balikbayan"; thereafter, he was arre
and detained by the agent of BIR. Th Consul General of the US embass
Date Promulgated: 29 August Manila filed a request with the BID that his passport has been revoked and
2006
Tabasa had a standing warrant for several federal charges against him.
Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriatio
Topic Discussed: Reacquisition; accordance with the RA No. 8171, and that because he is now a Filipino cit
R.A. No. 8171
he cannot be deported or detained by the BID.
Student Assigned:
ISSUE:
Whether or not he has validly reacquired Philippine citizens
under RA 8171 and therefore, is not an undocumented alien sub
to deportation.
RULING:
No. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8
The only person entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 is eith
Filipino woman who lost her Philippine citizenship by marriage to an alie
a natural-born Filipino, including his minor children who lost Philip
citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The
cannot be applied in his case because he is no longer a minor at the time o
repatriation in 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 only belongs to child
who are of minor age at the time of filing of the petition
repatriation.
# 23 Case Title: Mercado vs. FACTS:
Manzano
Petition for disqualification was filed against Edu Manzano to hold ele
office on the ground that he is both an American citizen and a Filipino cit
GR No.135083
having been born in the United States of Filipino parents. COME
granted the petition and disqualified Manzano for being a dual citizen purs
Date Promulgated: 26 May 1999 to the Local Government Code RA 7160, that those with dual citizenship
disqualified from running any public position.
Topic Discussed: Dual Citizenship
and Dual Allegiance
ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to hold or
office in the local position.
Student Assigned:
RULING:
No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is
dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. He
the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood as referrin
“dual allegiance”. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do no
under this disqualification.
Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Fili
parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto
without any voluntary act on his part.
By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, pr
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his Amer
citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce
American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might
as a dual citizen.
# 24 Case Title: Jacot vs Dal and FACTS:
COMELEC
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution dated 28 September 200
the , affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Sec
GR No. 179848
Division, disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayo
Catarman, Camiguin in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on
Date Promulgated: November 27, ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of his US citizenshi
2008
Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who becam
Topic Discussed: Dual Citizenship naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. Petitioner sough
and Dual Allegiance
reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, other
known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act.
Student Assigned:
He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to
Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of
Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Ord
Approval of petitioner’s request, and on the same day, petitioner took his O
of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edwar
Yulo. On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued
Identification Certificate, recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippin
Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificat
Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Catarm
Camiguin.
In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were h
Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Ma
On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolu
11 disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayo
Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of hi
citizenship.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the citizenship requiremen
required by law for persons seeking public office.
HELD:
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to
Republic
of
the
Philippines
made
before
the
Los
Ang
PCG
and
his
Certificate
of
Candidacy
not
substantially
comply
with
the
requirement
a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship, because t
are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens o
Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must
the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacq
or retain their Philippine citizenship.
By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filip
swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing therein
his renunciation of foreign citizenship.
The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who e
retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to ma
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship befo
public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before
filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filip
who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacqu
or retained their Philippine citizenship
(1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, a
(2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines,
to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all for
citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to
filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philip
elections.
# 25 Case Title: AASJS Member FACTS:
Calilang vs Datumanong
Petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent f
implementing RA 9225, or Act Making the Citizenship of the Philip
GR No. 160869
Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for
Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, as Amended, and for Other Purpo
Date Promulgated: November 27, Petitioner avers that said Act is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Ar
2008
IV of the 1987 Constitution: “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to
national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”
Topic Discussed:Dual Citizenship
and Dual Allegiance
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional
2. Whether the court jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance
Student Assigned:
RULING:
No. It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 922
to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes a
Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become natura
citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow
citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philip
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supr
authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his for
citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out o
problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issu
whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. W
happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 92
# 26 Case Title: Lawyer’s League
for Better Phils. vs. Aquino
FACTS:
GR No. 73748, 73972
President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 on February 25, 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power. On M
Date Promulgated: May 22, 1986
25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aq
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government
Topic
Discussed:Kinds
of installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assi
Government: De Facto vs De Jure
by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
Student Assigned:
Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was
established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes.
The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the jud
The Supreme Court further held that:
The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective con
of the entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de
government; and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the
government
#27 Case
Laguardia
Title:
Soriano
vs FACTS:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the prog
Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC.
GR No. 164785
days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affid
complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other pr
Date Promulgated: April 29, 2009 respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitione
connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael M. Sandoval,
Topic
Discussed:Kinds
of felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was then a minister of INC a
Government: De Facto vs De Jure
regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
(Doctrine of Parens Patriae
Student Assigned:
ISSUE:
Are Soriano’s statements during the televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of
religious discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art.III?
RULING:
No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, therefore, and conside
the adverse effect of petitioner’s utterances on the viewers’ fundamental ri
as well as petitioner’s clear violation of his duty as a public trustee
MTRCB properly suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for t
months.
Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that petitioner’s suspension wa
undue curtailment of his right to free speech either as a prior restraint or
subsequent punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re
paramountcy of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character o
broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate broadcast medi
requirement that indecent language be avoided has its primary effect on
form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if
thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language.
The Court ruled that administrative agencies have powers and functions w
may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or qu
judicial, or a mix of the five, as conferred by the Constitution or the law.
authority given should be liberally construed. A perusal of the PD 1986 re
the possession of authority to issue preventive suspension as found in Sec 3
“To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel… exhibition, an
television broadcast… as are determined by the BOARD to
objectionable…” Any other construal would render its power to regu
supervise, or discipline illusory.
Preventive suspension is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary
in an administrative investigation. And the power to discipline and im
penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to investigate administr
complaints and, during such investigation, to preventively suspend the pe
subject of the complaint.
Moreover, the assailed Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) issue
MTRCB in pursuant to PD 1986 merely formalizes the power bestowed by
statute. The IRR provision on preventive suspension is applicable not on
motion pictures and publicity materials but only beyond motion pictures.
MTRCB would regretfully be rendered ineffective should it be subject to
restrictions petitioner envisages.
2.) No. The Court ruled that since MTRCB handed out the assailed orde
response to a written notice after petitioner appeared before that Board f
hearing on private respondents complaint, no violation of the guarantee
made. Under Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986, preven
suspension shall issue any time during the pendency of the case. In
particular case, it was done after MTRCB duly apprised petitioner of his ha
possibly violated PD 1986 and of administrative complaints that had been
against him for such violation. At any event, that preventive suspension
validly be meted out even without a hearing
Neither the guarantee of equal protection was denied. Petitioner argues
he was unable to answer the criticisms coming from the INC ministers.
equal protection clause demands that all persons subject to legislation sh
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the privil
conferred and liabilities imposed. The Court ruled that petitioner can
under the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, w
for one, are not facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB.
another, he offers no proof to such allegations.
3.) No. The Court ruled that there is nothing in petitioner’s statements sub
of the complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthe
his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statem
in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them
character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at ano
person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitio
attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger
the need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction.
4.) No. The Court held that be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g., jud
injunction against publication or threat of cancellation of license/franchis
subsequent liability, whether in libel and damage suits, prosecution
sedition, or contempt proceedings, are anathema to the freedom
expression. Prior restraint means official government restrictions on the p
or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication
dissemination. The freedom of speech may be regulated to serve impor
public interests and it may not be invoked when the expression touches u
matters of essentially private concern. The freedom to express ones sentim
and belief does not grant one the license to vilify in public the honor
integrity of another. Any sentiments must be expressed within the pr
forum and with proper regard for the rights of others. A speech would
under the unprotected type if the utterances involved are no essential pa
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step of truth
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the s
interest in order and morality.
The Petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to
average child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as prote
speech. Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the Court said that
analysis should be context based and found the utterances to be obscene
considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of
show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are all factors that made
utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how
uttered words could be easily understood by a child literally rather than in
context that they were used.
# 28 Case Title: Tañada va Angara
GR No. 118295
FACTS
Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionali
the concurrence by the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification o
international Agreement establishing the World Trade Organiza
(WTO). They argued that the WTO Agreement violates the mandate of
Topic Discussed: Sovereignty; 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent national econ
Theory of Auto- limitation
effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filip
(and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials
locally produced goods.” Further, they contended that the “national treatm
Student Assigned:
and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and produc
member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products
contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of our Constitution, and re
meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”
Date Promulgated: May 2, 1997
ISSUE
Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participatin
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integra
into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrenc
the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the Agreem
establishing the WTO.]
NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our coun
from participating in worldwide trade liberalization and econo
globalization and from integrating into a global economy tha
liberalized, deregulated and privatized.
There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow
Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.
[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Fili
goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the n
for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality
reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against for
competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shu
foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philip
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entr
foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not pro
them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality
reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.
# 29 Case Title: The Province of Facts:
North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel
GR No. 183591
Date Promulgated: Oct. 14, 2008
Topic Discussed:
Sovereignty; Theory
limitation
Student Assigned:
of
Auto-
In pursuit of peace in Mindanao, the Philippine Government and MILF agr
to undergo peace talks. The fruit of the talks is the Memorandum of Agreem
on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The parties were about to sign the
agreement but petitioners filed for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer
the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order. The Court issued the TRO.
The MOA-AD essentially would create a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE)
which would result to an associative relationship (a state within a state). Th
contents of the agreement in question are as follows:
· Inclusion of the ARMM provinces and other areas in Mindanao in the BJ
· The authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral
Lands of the Bangsamoro
· Jurisdiction over all natural resources within its “internal waters”
· Sharing of minerals on the territorial waters between the Central
Government and the BJE, in favor of the latter, through production sharing
economic cooperation agreement.
· The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic
cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall have the
option to establish trade missions in those countries.
· The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of th
Central Government.
· The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total
production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE
· The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses,
contracts or agreements, mining concessions, Mineral Production and Shar
Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA), a
other land tenure instruments granted by the Philippine Government,
including those issued by the present ARMM.
· The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and t
BJE as “associative”, characterized by shared authority and responsibility.
· The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring “amendments to the
existing legal framework” (pertaining to the Constitution and related
substantive laws) shall take effect upon signing of the Comprehensive Comp
and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the nonderogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be
contained in the Comprehensive Compact. |||
ISSUE: Whether or not the MOA-AD is constitutional.
RULING:
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws
Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, nam
the associative relationship (a state within a state) envisioned between the
GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that th
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to
independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof
inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that
framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of
provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between
BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum
Instructions from the President, dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the
government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually
guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws
will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the Preside
herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act woul
amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in
Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through th
process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outc
of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference wi
that process.
At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and
justify the exercise of the people’s right to be consulted on relevant matters
relating to the peace agenda.
·
One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing
consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for
consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information,
comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concern
sectors of society.
·
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991
requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or
program critical to the environment and human ecology including those tha
may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such loca
is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the
diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment.
·
Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1
provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of
ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the
and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the
Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate an
recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abu
of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process,
mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371
The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs
contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical
capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates
gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined.
# 30 Case Title: Republic vs. FACTS:
Villasor
A decision was rendered in a Special Proceeding against the Republic o
Philippines thereby confirming the arbitration award of P1,712,396.40 in f
GR No. L-30671
of respondent corporation. After the decision became final and execu
respondent judge issued an order directing the sheriff to execute the
Date Promulgated: November decision, and the corresponding alias writ of execution was thus issued.
28, 1973
Hence the sheriff served notices of garnishment with several banks espec
the monies due to the AFP in the form of deposits sufficient to cover
Topic
Discussed: Sovereign amount mentioned in the writ. PNB and Philippine Veterans Bank rece
Immunity: Doctrine of Non- such notice. As certified by the AFP Comptroller, these funds of the AFP
Suability of the State
the said banks are public funds for the pensions, pay, and allowances o
military and civilian personnel.
Student Assigned:
The petitioner, in this certiorari and prohibition proceedings, challenges
validity of the Order issued by Judge Villasor declaring the decision final
executory and subsequently issuing an alias writ of execution directed aga
the funds of the AFP in pursuance thereof.
ISSUE:
May the writs of execution and notices of garnishment be sued against pu
funds?
RULING: NO. Although the State may give its consent to be sued by pri
parties, there is corollary that public funds cannot be the object of garnishm
proceedings even if the consent to be sued has been previously granted and
state‘s liability has been adjudged.
Thus in the case of Commission of Public Highways vs. San Diego, such a
settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of Justice Teehankee. The univ
rule that where the state gives its consent to be sued by private parties eithe
general or special law, it may limit claimant‘s action only up to the comple
of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the power of
courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since the government funds
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to sa
such judgment, is based on obvious considerations of public po
Disbursement of public funds must be covered by the correspon
appropriations as required by law. The functions and public services rend
by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by diversio
public funds from their legitimate and specific object is appropriated by law
# 31 Case Title:Tan vs. Director Facts:
of Forestry
On April 15, 1963, Petitioner Wenceslao Tan won the bidding for the licen
logging operations on a public forest land in Olongapo.
On May 30, 1963, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benja
GR No. L-24548
M. Gozon promulgated Order no. 46 which gives the power to the Directo
Forestry to grant (a) new ordinary timber licenses where the area cov
Date Promulgated:
thereby is not more than 3,000 hectares each; and (b) the extension of ordi
timber licenses for areas not exceeding 3,000 hectares.
Topic Discussed: State cannot be On December 19, 1963 General memorandum Order No. 60 was issued by
sued without its consent
acting secretary, revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Fore
which incidentally was the same date the license for petitioner was signed.
Student Assigned:
Acting on claims of irregularity, the license for the petitioner was revoked.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, hence the petitioner raised it directly to
Court.
Issue:
1) Whether or not the license is void ab initio
2) Whether or not the Director of Forestry gravely abused its discretio
revoking the license
Ruling:
Yes.
a. The release of the license on January 6, 1964, gives rise to the impres
that it was ante-dated to December 19, 1963 on which date the authority o
Director of Forestry was revoked.
b. While the timber license might have been signed on December 19, 196
was released only on January 6, 1964. Before its release, no right is acquire
the licensee.
c. As pointed out by the trial court, the Director of Forestry had no lon
any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964. Theref
petitioner-appellant had not acquired any legal right under s
void license.
2. No. A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfa
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the
process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdr
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this ceise.
Petition denied.
# 32 Case Title: Mobile Phil Inc. vs FACTS:
Customs Arrastre Service
Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad consigned to M
Philippines. The Customs Arrastre later delivered to the broker of the consi
GR No. 18 SCRA 1120
three cases only of the shipment. Mobil Philippines Exploration Inc. filed
in the CFI against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Custom
Date Promulgated: December 17, recover the value of the undelivered cases plus other damages.
1966
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground tha
being a person under the law, defendants cannot be sued.
Topic Discussed: If governmental: After the plaintiff opposed the motion, the court dismissed the complain
no suit
the ground that neither the Customs Arrastre Service nor the Burea
Customs is suable.
Student Assigned:
ISSUE: Can the Customs Arrastre Service or the Bureau of Customs be sue
RULING:
NO. The Bureau of Customs, acting as part of the machinery of the nati
government in the operations of arrastre service, pursuant to express legisl
mandate and a necessary incident of its prime governmental function
immune from suit, there being no statute to the contrary.
The Bureau of Customs has no personality of its own apart from that of
government. Its primary function is governmental, that of assessing
collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff
customs duties, fees, charges, fines, and penalties. To this function, arrastre
necessary incident. Although said arrastre function is deemed proprietary,
necessarily an incident of the primary and governmental function of the Bu
of Customs, so that engaging in the same does not necessarily render
Bureau liable to suit. For otherwise, it could not perform its governme
function without necessarily exposing itself to suit. Sovereign immu
granted as to the end should not be denied as to the necessary means to
end.
# 33 Case Title: National Airports Facts:
Corp vs Teodoro
The National Airports Corporation was organized under Republic Act No.
which expressly made the provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to
GR No.L-5122
said corporation. It was abolished by Executive Order No. 365 and to tak
place the Civil Aeronautics Administration was created.
Date Promulgated: April 30, 1952
Before the abolition, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airp
Topic Discussed: If suit against Corporation P65,245 as fees for landing and parking for the period up to
GOCC/Incorporated Agency
including July 31, 1948. These fees are said to have been due and payable to
Capitol Subdivision, Inc., who owned the land used by the National Airp
Student Assigned:
Corporation as airport. The owner commenced an action in the court aga
the Philippine Airlines, Inc.
The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with a third-party complaint agains
National
Airports Corporation, which by that time had been dissolved, and se
summons on the Civil Aeronautics Administration. The third party plai
alleged that it had paid to the National Airports Corporation the fees claime
the Capitol Subdivision, Inc. “on the belief and assumption that the third p
defendant was the lessee of the lands subject of the complaint and that
third party defendant and its predecessors in interest were the operators
maintainers of said airport and, further, that the third party defendant w
pay to the landowners, particularly the Capitol Subdivision, Inc., the reason
rentals for the use of their lands.”
The Solicitor General, after answering the third party complaint, filed a mo
to dismiss on
the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the third- p
complaint, first, because the National Airports Corporation “has los
juridical personality,” and, second, because agency of the Republic of
Philippines, unincorporated and not possessing
juridical personality under the law, is incapable of suing and being sued.
Issue:
1. ) Whether or Not the Civil Aeronautics Administration should
regarded as engaged in private functions and therefore subject to sui
Rulings:
(1) Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Civil Aeronau
Administration comes under the category of a private en
Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National Airp
Corporation, not to maintain a necessary function of government, but to
what is essentially a business, even if revenues be not its prime objective
rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the traveling public.
engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogativ
state,
may, more than the construction of public roads, be undertaken by pri
concerns.
In the light of a well-established precedents, and as a matter of simple justi
the parties who dealt with the National Airports Corporation on the fait
equality in the enforcement of their mutual commitments, the Civil Aerona
Administration may
not, and should not, claim for itself the privileges and immunities of
sovereign state.
# 34 Case Title: China National Facts:
Machinery & Equipment vs Sta. Respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction w
Maria
Urgent Motion for Summary Hearing to Determine the Existence of Facts a
Circumstances Justifying the Issuance of Writs of Preliminary Prohibitory a
GR No.185572
Mandatory Injunction and/or
TRO against CNMEG, the Office of the Executive Secretary, the DOF, the
Department of Budget and Management, the National Economic Developm
Topic Discussed: How about a Authority and Northrail.
State to State commercial contract?
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 06-203 before the Regional Trial
Court,... National Capital Judicial Region, Makati City... respondents allege
that the Contract Agreement and the Loan Agreement were void for being
Student Assigned:
contrary to (a) the Constitution; (b) Republic Act No. 9184 (R.A. No. 9184),
otherwise known as... the Government Procurement Reform Act; (c)
Presidential Decree No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing
Code; and (d) Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administra
Code.[12]
Date Promulgated: April 24, 2012
China will provide for the staffing & building of the railway.... the Contracto
has offered to provide the Project on Turnkey basis, including design,
manufacturing, supply, construction, commissioning, and training of the
Employer's personnel;... however, does not on its own reveal whether the
construction... was meant to be a proprietary endeavor. In order to fully
understand the intention... the Contract
Agreement must not be read in isolation. Instead, it must be construed... wi
three other documents executed in relation to the Northrail Project, namely
(a) the Memorandum of Understanding... between Northrail and CNMEG
(b) the letter of Amb. Wang... to Sec. Camacho;
(c) the Loan Agreement.
The MOU expressly stated CNMEG's jurisdiction over the whole project, &
the Philippine government consents for any undertakings related to the pro
1. Memorandum of Understanding dated 14 September 2002
The Memorandum of Understanding... shows that CNMEG sought the
construction of the Luzon Railways as a proprietary venture.
the NORTHRAIL CORP. also welcomes CNMEG's interest in undertaking t
Project
The parties shall use their best endeavors to formulate and finalize a Contra
with a view to signing the Contract within one... hundred twenty (120) days
from CNMEG's presentation of the Study.
Clearly, it was CNMEG that initiated the undertaking, and not the Chinese
government. The Feasibility Study was conducted not because of any
diplomatic gratuity from or exercise of sovereign functions by the Chinese
government, but was plainly a business strategy employed by
CNMEG with a view to securing this commercial enterprise.
1. Letter dated 1 October 2003
This... would categorize CNMEG as the state corporation within the People'
Republic of China which initiated our Government's involvement in the Pro
The implementation of the Northrail Project was intended to generate profi
CNMEG
The use of the term "state corporation" to refer to CNMEG was only descrip
of its nature as a government-owned and/or -controlled corporation, and it
assignment as the Primary Contractor did not imply that... it was acting on
behalf of China in the performance of the latter's sovereign functions. To im
otherwise would result in an absurd situation, in which all Chinese
corporations owned by the state would be automatically considered as
performing governmental activities, even if... they are clearly engaged in
commercial or proprietary pursuits.
2. The Loan Agreement
Article 11. xxx (j) Commercial Activity... private and commercial acts done
and... performed for commercial purposes under the laws of the Republic o
Philippines and neither the Borrower nor any of its assets is entitled to any
immunity or privilege (sovereign or otherwise) from suit, execution or any
other legal process with respect to its obligations... under this Agreement, a
the case may be, in any jurisdiction.
Thus, despite petitioner's claim that the EXIM Bank extended financial
assistance to Northrail because the bank was mandated by the Chinese
government, and not because of any motivation to do business in the
Philippines,[38] it is clear from the foregoing... provisions that the Northrai
Project was a purely commercial transaction.
the Loan Agreement, which is an inextricable part of the entire undertaking
nonetheless reveal the intention of the parties to the Northrail Project to
classify the whole venture as commercial or proprietary in character.
Thus, piecing together... would reveal the desire of CNMEG to construct the
Luzon Railways in pursuit of a... purely commercial activity performed in th
ordinary course of its business.
B. CNMEG failed to adduce evidence that... it is immune from suit under
Chinese law.
Issues:
Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity, precluding it from being sued bef
a local court.
Whether the Contract Agreement is an executive agreement, such that it can
be questioned by or before a local court.
Ruling:
First issue: Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity
Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascerta
the legal nature of the act involved whether the entity claiming immunity
performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions.
A. CNMEG is engaged in a proprietary activity.
A thorough examination of the basic facts of the case would show that CNM
is engaged in a proprietary activity.
Its designation as the Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it
immunity,... it failed to adduce evidence that it has not consented to be sued
under Chinese law.
Thus,... following this Court's ruling... in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a government-owned and -contro
corporation without an original charter. As a result, it has the capacity to su
and be sued
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. Petitioner China Natio
Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) is not entitled to immunity fro
suit, and the Contract Agreement is not an executive agreement. CNMEG's
prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction is DENIED for being moot and academic. This case
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 145, for further
proceedings as regards the validity of the contracts subject of Civil Case No.
203.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Principles:
In JUSMAG v. National Labor Relations Commission,[25] this Court affirm
the Philippines' adherence to the restrictive theory as follows:
The doctrine of state immunity from suit has undergone further
metamorphosis. The view evolved that the existence of a contract does not,
se, mean that sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in local courts. The
complexity of relationships between sovereign... states, brought about by th
increasing commercial activities, mothered a more restrictive application of
doctrine.
xxx
xxx
xxx
As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has b
restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii). The mantle
state immunity cannot be extended to commercial, private and proprietary
(jure... gestionis).[26] (Emphasis supplied.)
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, i
commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be
said to have descended to the level of... an individual and can thus be deeme
to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions.
Even assuming arguendo that CNMEG performs governmental functions, s
claim does not automatically vest it with immunity.
this Court held that "(i)mmunity from suit is determined by the... character
the objects for which the entity was organized."
State immunity from suit may be waived by general or special law. The spec
law can take the form of the original charter of the incorporated governmen
agency.
this Court reiterated the oft-cited doctrine that the determination by the
Executive that an entity is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a
political question conclusive upon the courts,... In Public International Law
when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomati
immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state wher
is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to... immunity.
Note that the rule in public international law quoted in Holy See referred to
endorsement by the Foreign
Office of the State where the suit is filed, such foreign office in the Philippin
being the Department of Foreign Affairs:
# 35 Case Title: Professional Video, FACTS:
Inc., vs. TESDA
In 1999, TESDA, an instrumentality of the government established under
No. 7796 (the TESDA Act of 1994) and attached to the DOLE to develop
GR No. 155504
establish a national system of skills standardization, testing, and certificatio
the country.
Date Promulgated: June 26, 2009
To fulfill this mandate, it sought to issue security-printed certification an
Topic Discussed: How about a identification polyvinyl (PVC) cards to trainees who have passed
State to State commercial contract?
certification process.
Student Assigned:
Professional Video Inc. (PROVI) signed and executed the “Contract Agreem
Project PVC ID Card issuance” for the provision of goods and services in
printing and encoding of the PVC cards. PROVI was to provide TESDA with
system and equipment compliant with the specifications defined in
proposal. In return, TESDA would pay PROVI a specified sum of money
TESDA’s acceptance of the contracted goods and services. PPOVI alleged
TESDA has still an outstanding balance and still remains unpaid.
TESDA claims that it entered the Contract Agreement and Addendum in
performance of its governmental function to develop and establish a nati
system of skills standardization, testing, and certification; in the perform
of this governmental function, TESDA is immune from suit.
ISSUE:
Can TESDA be sued without its consent?
RULING:
TESDA, as an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its consent.
rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodied in Sectio
Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an established principle
antedates this Constitution. It is as well a universally recognized princip
international law that exempts a state and its organs from the jurisdictio
another state.
The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the prac
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
law on which the right depends. It also rests on reasons of public policy.
public service would be hindered, and the public endangered, if the sover
authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen
consequently, controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means require
the proper administration of the government.
The proscribed suit that the state immunity principle covers takes on var
forms, namely: a suit against the Republic by name; a suit agains
unincorporated government agency; a suit against a government ag
covered by a charter with respect to the agency's performance of governme
functions; and a suit that on its face is against a government officer, but w
the ultimate liability will fall on the government. In the present case, the wr
attachment was issued against a government agency covered by its own cha
As discussed above, TESDA performs governmental functions, and the issu
of certifications is a task within its function of developing and establishi
system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country. F
the perspective of this function, the core reason for the existence of s
immunity applies i.e., the public policy reason that the performanc
governmental function cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can t
suits control the use and disposition of the means for the performanc
governmental functions.
# 36 Case Title: Municipality of San FACTS:
Fernando vs Judge Firme
On December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeep
GR No. L-52179
driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Niever
gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanqu
Date Promulgated: April 8 1991 Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La U
and driven by Alfredo Bislig.
Topic Discussed: Can LGUs be
sued?
Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laur
Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four (4) ot
Student Assigned:
suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
The private respondents instituted a compliant for damages against the E
of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectivel
the passenger jeepney in the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I,
Fernando, La Union.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union can enjoy
immunity from suit.
RULING:
The Court granted the petition and the decision of the respondent cou
hereby modified, absolving the petitioner municipality of any liability in f
of private respondents.
Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution expressly provides that:
the State may not be sued without its consent.
It is a general rule that the State may not be sued except when it gives con
to be sued.
Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law.
A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the government fo
alleged quasi-delict.
While implied consent occurs when the government enters into busi
contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party,
also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.
Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the S
when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should e
the sovereign immunity from suit.
Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such funct
because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.
The municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them
competence to sue and be sued.
The municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its reg
employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental function
Thus, the death of the passenger –– tragic and deplorable though it may b
imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.
# 37 Case Title: USA vs. Guinto
FACTS:
GR No.
USA vs. Guinto. On February 24, 1986, the U.S. Air Force stationed in Clark
Base solicited bids for barbershop concessions. Ramon Dizon won the bidd
Respondents objected, claiming that Dizon had made a bid for four facilitie
which includes an area not included in the bidding. The petitioners explaine
that Dizon was already operating the concession, and informed the respond
that solicitation for the barber service contracts would be available by the en
of June before which the respondents would be notified. On June 30, 1986,
private respondents filed a complaint in court to compel the Philippine Area
Exchange (PHAX) and the petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to cond
a rebidding for the barbershop concessions, and to allow the respondents
through a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operating the concessio
pending litigation. The court issued an ex parte order directing the individu
petitioners to maintain the status quo. Petitioners then filed a motion to
dismiss and opposed the petition for preliminary injunction, stating that th
action was in effect a suit against the United States of America which had no
waived its non-suability. The defendants who are official employees of the U
Air Force were also immune from suit. The trial court denied the applicatio
for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Date Promulgated:
Topic Discussed: Contracts
Student Assigned:
USA v. Rodrigo. Fabian Genove who worked as a cook in the U.S. Air F
Recreation Center at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, filed a comp
for damages against petitioners Anthony Lamachia, Wilfredo Belsa, R
Cartalla and Peter Orascion for his dismissal from work. Belsa, Cartalla,
Orascion had testified during an investigation that Genove had poured u
into the soup stock used in cooking the vegetables served to the club custom
As club manager, Lamachia suspended Genove and referred the case to a b
of arbitrators. The board unanimously found Genove guilty and recommen
his dismissal. Lamachia, et. al., joined by the United States of America m
to dismiss the complaint, alleging that Lamachia was an officer of the U.S
Force and was thus immune from suit. They argued that the suit was in e
against the United States which had not given its consent to be sued. The
court denied the motion, saying that the defendants went beyond
functions that brought them out of the protective mantle of what
immunities they may have initially had such that the plaintiff’s allegation
the acts complained of were illegal, done with extreme bad faith and
preconceived sinister plan to harass and finally dismiss the plaintiff g
significance.
USA v. Ceballos. Luis Bautista, who was employed as a barracks boy in Cam
Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by
petitioners who were special agents of the Air Force Office of Sp
Investigators (AFOSI). A charge was filed against Bautista in violation of
6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act which caused his dismissal f
employment. Bautista thus filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners who filed an answer without the assistance of counsel or auth
from the U.S. Department of Justice. The petitioners alleged that they had
done their duty in enforcing the laws of the Philippines inside the Amer
bases pursuant to the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The law
representing the defendants filed a motion to withdraw the answer and dis
the complaint on the ground that the defendants were just acting in
official capacity and that the complaint against them was in effect a suit aga
the United States which did not give its consent to be sued. The motion
denied by the trial court which stated that the claimed immunity under
Military Bases Agreement covered only criminal and not civil cases and tha
defendants had come under the jurisdiction of the court when they subm
their answer.
USA v. Vergara. Plaintiffs alleged that they were beaten up by the defenda
handcuffed, and allowed to be bitten by dogs which caused extensive injuri
the plaintiffs. The defendants denied the claim and asserted that the plain
were arrested for theft and were bitten by the dogs because they struggled
resisted arrest. The defendants claimed that the dogs were called off and
plaintiffs were immediately taken to the medical center where they were tre
for their wounds. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint,
argued that the suit was in effect a suit against the United States which had
given its consent to be sued. The defendants stated that there were imm
from suit under the RP-US Military Bases Agreement for acts they di
performing their official functions. The motion to dismiss was denied by
trial court.
ISSUE:
Are the defendants right in invoking the State’s immunity from suit for
done by them in the performance of their official duties?
HELD:
USA v. Guinto. The Supreme Court ruled that the barbershop concess
granted by the United States government are commercial enterprises oper
by private persons and are not agencies of the United States Armed Forces
the barbershop concessionaires were under the terms of their contr
and were required to remit fixed commissions to the United St
government. Thus, the petitioners cannot plead any immunity from
complaint filed by the private respondents. The Court though could not dir
resolve the claims against the defendants because the evidence of the all
irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions is lacking. This m
that the Court must receive the evidence first so it can later determine if
plaintiffs are entitled to the relief they seek.
USA v. Rodrigo. The restaurant services offered at the John Hay
Station is of the nature of a business enterprise undertaken by
United States government in its proprietary capacity. Thus, the petition
cannot invoke the doctrine of state immunity to justify the dismi
of the damage suit against them by Genove even if it is established
they were acting as agents of the United States when they investigated and
dismissed Genove. Not even the United States government itself can claim
immunity because by entering into an employment contract with Genov
impliedly divested itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. But still, the C
dismissed the complaint against the petitioners since, while suable,
petitioners were found to be not liable. A thorough investigation establi
beyond doubt that Genove had in fact polluted the soup stock with urine.
USA v. Ceballos. The court found that the petitioners were only exercising
official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operation. The petitio
were connected with the Air Force Office of Special Investigators and
assigned to prevent the distribution, possession and use of prohibited d
and to prosecute those guilty of such acts. As such, the petitioners were
acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they apprehen
and later testified against the complainant. For discharging their d
as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly prosecuted for
imputable to their principal which has not given its consent to be sued.
USA v. Vergara. The Supreme Court found the factual allegations in this
contradictory and recommended a closer study of what actually happene
the plaintiffs. The Court found the record scant of information to indicate i
defendants were really discharging their official duties or had actu
exceeded their authority when the incident in question occurred. The C
then could not directly decide this case and ruled that the required inq
must first be made by the lower court to assess and resolve the conflic
claims of the parties based on the evidence yet to be presented at the
The Court will determine, if it is still necessary, if the doctrine of
immunity is applicable only after the determination of what capacity
petitioners were acting at the time of the incident in question.
# 38 Case Title: Republic of FACTS:
Indonesia vs Vinzon
Petitioner Vinzon entered into a Maintenance Agreement with respondent.
maintenance agreement includes the following specific equipment:
GR No. 54705
conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water heaters and w
motor pumps. The agreement shall be effective for 4 years.
Date Promulgated:
June 26,
2003
The new Minister Counsellor allegedly found respondent's work and serv
unsatisfactory and not in compliance with the standards set in the Agreem
Topic Discussed: Contracts
The respondent terminated the agreement with the respondent. The l
claim that it was unlawful and arbitrary. Respondent filed a Motion to Dis
Student Assigned:
alleging that the Republic of Indonesia, as a foreign state, has sover
immunity from suit and cannot be sued as party-defendant in the Philippin
ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in sustaining the trial court's decision that petitioners
waived their immunity from suit by using as its basis the provision in
Maintenance Agreement.
HELD:
The mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party ca
be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act juri imper
juri gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry. There is no dispute
the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act juri imperii. The state
enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the premises, furnish
and equipment of the embassy. The Republic of Indonesia is actin
pursuit of a sovereign activity when it entered into a contract w
the respondent. The maintenance agreement was entered into by
Republic of Indonesia in the discharge of its governmental functions
cannot be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
#39 Case Title: USA vs Ruiz
GR No. L-35645
Date
1985
Promulgated:
May
Topic Discussed: Contracts
Student Assigned:
FACTS:
United States invited the submission of bids for projects for the repa
wharves and shoreline. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to
invitation and submitted bids. Thereafter, a letter was sent saying that
company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because o
22, previous unsatisfactory performancerating on a repair contract for the sea
at the boat landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The company
the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Co
and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. N
The complaint is to order the plaintiff to allow the company to perform
work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no lo
possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants f
entering into contracts with third parties for work on the projects. The T
court issued the writ.
ISSUE:
Whether the company has the capacity to sue the plaintiff.
RULING:
NO.The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being
in the courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule
necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equalit
States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they
constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states
multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between sovereign
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary
(jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts
imperii.
The restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in the Un
States, the United Kingdom and other states in western Europe. That
correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion
contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in Syquia vs. Lop
Further, the latter case ruled that the United States concluded contracts
private individuals but the contracts notwithstanding the States was
deemed to have given or waived its consent to be sued for the reason tha
contracts were for jure imperii and not for jure gestionis.
# 40 Case Title: Amigable vs
Cuenca
Facts:
GR No. L-26400
Victoria Amigable is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of the Banilad Esta
in Cebu City. She had a transfer certificate title issued by the Register of Dee
Date Promulgated: February 29,
of Cebu on February 1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the government of a
1972
right or interest in the property appears at the back of the certificate. Witho
prior expropriation or negotiated sale, 6,167 square meters of land was used
Topic Discussed: Expropriation
the construction the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
On March 27, 1958, AMigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippin
requesting the payment for her lot. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor
General and was disallowed it in his 9thIndorsement dated December 9, 19
Student Assigned:
Amigable filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nico
Cuenca in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways for the recover
the portion of the lot used. In answer, the defendants interposed the followi
defenses:
1.
The action was premature, the claim not having been filed first with the off
of the Auditor General
2.
The right of action for the recovery of the any amount which might be due
Amigable had already prescribed.
3.
The action being a suit to the government, the claim for moral damages an
other costs have no valid basis since the government did not give its consen
be sued.
4.
Since it was only the province of Cebu who had misappropriated the lot,
Amigable has no cause of action against the defendants.
Issue:
Can Amigable properly sue the government?
Ruling:
Yes. In its decision, the Court cited Ministerio v. Court of First Instance of
Cebu, which also involved a claim for payment of the value of a portion of la
used for the widening of Gorordo Avenue in Cebu City.
Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for
public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against th
government without thereby violating the doctrine of governmental immun
from suit without its consent.
# 41 Case Title:
FACTS:
On April 1, 1989, the Department of Agriculture (DoA) office in Cagayan de
GR No.
and Sultan Security Agency (SSA) entered into a contract where the latter
to provide security services to the former. On September 13, 1990, sev
Date Promulgated: Nov. 11, guards from SSA filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payme
1993
13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday
as well as for damages, against DoA and SSA. Both the DoA and SSA w
Topic Discussed:
Can public subsequently found guilty by the Executive Labor Arbiter, which also held
funds be garnished?
of them liable for the payment of money claims amounting to P266,483.91.
Student Assigned:
On July 18, 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. As a respo
the DoA filed a petition for injunction, prohibition, and mandamus, with pr
for preliminary writ of injunction, before the NLRC. The DoA's petition
dismissed.
Following the dismissal of its petition before the NLRC, DoA filed a pet
before the SC arguing that: (a) it was COA, not NLRC, that was suppose
have jurisdiction over money claims against the Government pursuan
Commonwealth Act No. 327 as amended by PD No. 1445; and (b) that N
had disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not it was COA that has exclusive jurisdiction over money cl
against the Government.
2. Whether or not DoA, as an agency of the State, is covered by the princip
the non-suability of the State.
HELD:
1. Yes, the Court ruled that money claims against the Government shoul
filed before the Commission on Audit pursuant to CA Act No. 327 as amen
by PD No. 1445. In the instant case, underpayment of wages, holiday
overtime pay, and other similar items arising from the Contract for Ser
clearly constitute money claims. As such, the writ of execution issued by
Labor Arbiter and the resolution issued by NLRC were reversed by the Cou
favor of DoA.
2. No, DoA cannot use the principle of non-suability of the State as an ex
not to be sued.
Section 3, Art. XVI of the 1987 Constitution states that "the State may no
sued without its consent." This principle reflects a recognition of the sover
character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten
effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courts. As per Ju
Holmes, a sovereign State is exempt from suits "not because of any fo
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on w
the right depends."
# 42 Case Title: Kuroda vs FACTS:
Jalandoni
Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial
GR No. L-2662
Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The
Philippines during a period covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged
Date Promulgated: March 26, before a military Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed
1949
forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded and failed "to
discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal
Topic Discussed: Adherence to atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisone
International Law (Incorporation of the Imperial Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war
Clause)
comes before this Court seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Orde
No. 68 of the President of the Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit responden
Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from participating in the prosecution of
Student Assigned:
petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to permanently prohib
respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioners.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not E.O. 68 is Constitutional
2) Whether or not the Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try
petitioner for acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the
Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first an
signed the second only in 1947
3) Whether or not Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as
prosecution United State not being a party in interest in the case.
Held:
1) The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President o
his power as Commander in chief of all our armed forces. An importance
incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the military
command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject
disciplinary measure those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or imped
our military effort have violated the law of war. The President as Command
in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this unfinished aspect of war
namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the issuance and
enforcement of Executive Order No. 68
2) It cannot be denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Genev
conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally accepted
principals of international law. Even if the Philippines was not a signatory t
the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately
general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the
recognition of rule and principle of international law as continued
treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory
3) Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special l
and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. The
appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation
sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitt
the vindication of crimes against her government and her people to a tribun
of our nation should be allowed representation in the trial of those very crim
It is of common knowledge that the United State and its people have been
equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes with which petitioner sta
charged before the Military Commission. It can be considered a privilege fo
our Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the hono
its citizens and its government to a military tribunal of our country.
# 43 Case Title: Philip-Morris Facts:
vs. CA
Petitioners are foreign corporations organized under US laws not d
business in the Philippines and registered owners of symbols ‘MARK
GR No. 91332
‘MARK TEN,’ and ‘LARK’ used in their cigarette products. Petitioners move
enjoin respondent Fortune Tobacco from manufacturing and selling cigar
Date Promulgated: July 16, 1993 bearing the symbol ‘MARK’ asserting that it is identical or confusingly sim
with their trademarks. Petitioners relied on Section 21-A of the Trademark
Topic Discussed:Adherence to to bring their suit and the Paris Convention to protect their trademarks.
International Law (Incorporation court denied the prayer for injunction stating that since petitioners are
Clause)
doing business in the Philippines, respondent’s cigarettes would not c
irreparable damage to petitioner. CA granted the injunction but o
Student Assigned:
subsequent motion, dissolved the writ.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner’s mark may be afforded protection under
laws;
(2) Whether or not petitioner may be granted injunctive relief.
Ruling:
(1) NO. Yet, insofar as this discourse is concerned, there is no necessity to
the matter with an extensive response because adherence of the Philippin
the 1965 international covenant due to pact sunt servanda had
acknowledged in La Chemise. Given these confluence of existing laws am
the cases involving trademarks, there can be no disagreement to the gui
principle in commercial law that foreign corporations not engaged in busi
in the Philippines may maintain a cause of action for infringement prim
because of Section 21-A of the Trademark Law when the legal standing to s
alleged, which petitioners have done in the case at hand.
Petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lac
business activity in the Philippines on account of Section 21-A of
Trademark Law but the question whether they have an exclusive right
their symbol as to justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend
actual use of their trademarks in the Philippines in line with Sections 2 and
of the same law. It is thus incongruous for petitioners to claim that wh
foreign corporation not licensed to do business in Philippines files a comp
for infringement, the entity need not be actually using its trademar
commerce in the Philippines. Such a foreign corporation may have
personality to file a suit for infringement but it may not necessarily be ent
to protection due to absence of actual use of the emblem in the local market
(2) NO. More telling are the allegations of petitioners in their complaint as
as in the very petition filed with this Court indicating that they are not d
business in the Philippines, for these frank representations are inconsistent
incongruent with any pretense of a right which can breached. Indeed, t
entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must show that there exists a righ
be protected and that the facts against which injunction is directed are viola
of said right. On the economic repercussion of this case, we are extrem
bothered by the thought of having to participate in throwing into the str
Filipino workers engaged in the manufacture and sale of private respond
“MARK” cigarettes who might be retrenched and forced to join the ranks o
many unemployed and unproductive as a result of the issuance of a simple
of preliminary injunction and this, during the pendency of the case before
trial court, not to mention the diminution of tax revenues represented t
close to a quarter million pesos annually. On the other hand, if the status q
maintained, there will be no damage that would be suffered by petitio
inasmuch as they are not doing business in the Philippines. In view of
explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not eng
in business in the Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable dam
can be suffered by them not to mention the foremost consideration hereto
discussed on the absence of their “right” to be protected.
# 44 Case Title:
Hernandez
Ichong vs Facts:
RA 1180 – An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was enacte
nationalize the retail trade business in the Philippines. The law proh
GR No. L-7995
persons not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnersh
or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of
Date Promulgated: May 31, 1957 Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade and o
prohibitions and regulations.
Topic Discussed: Conflict of
Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending th
Municipal Law vs International Law denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of t
(also covered in International Law liberty and property without due process of law. SolGen content that the
subject)
was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exe
is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic surviv
Student Assigned:
Issue:
Whether or not the Act is unconstitutional because it denies a
residents the equal protection of the laws.
Held:
No.
Ratio:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor
individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppres
of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited eith
the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operat
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires tha
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions bot
to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clau
not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling with
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reason
grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within
class and those who do not.
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one clas
treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is pate
unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legisla
acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the
transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
# 45 Case Title: Gonzales vs FACTS:
Hechanova
Exec. Secretary Hechanova authorised the importation of foreign rice t
purchased from private sources. Gonzales filed a petition opposing the
GR No. L-21897
implementation because RA No. 3542 which allegedly repeals or amends
No. 2207, prohibits the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice and C
Date Promulgated: October 22, Administration or any other government agency."
1963
Respondents alleged that the importation permitted in RA 2207 is to
authorized by the President of the Philippines, and by or on behalf of
Topic Discussed: Conflict of Government of the Philippines. They add that after enjoining the Rice and C
Municipal Law vs International Law administration and any other government agency from importing rice
(also covered In International Law corn, S. 10 of RA 3542 indicates that only private parties may import rice u
subject)
its provisions. They contended that the government has already constitute v
executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma, that in case of conflict betw
Student Assigned:
RA 2207 and 3542, the latter should prevail and the conflict be resolved u
the American jurisprudence.
ISSUE:
W/N the executive agreements may be validated in our courts.
RULING:
No. The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alle
executive agreements has been sufficiently established. Even assuming
said contracts may properly considered as executive agreements, the same
unlawful, as well as null and void, from a constitutional viewpo
said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Acts
2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constituti
system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative autho
he may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction whic
prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto.
# 46 Case Title: Ebralinag vs
Division
Superintendent
of
Schools of Cebu
GR No. 95770 and 95887
Date
1993
Promulgated: March
1,
Topic Discussed: (freedom of
religion and non-establishment of
religion clause
Student Assigned:
Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce
enacted by Congress. He may not interfere in the performance of the legisla
powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may
defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of law
indirectly repealing the same through an executive agreement providing fo
performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.
:
Facts:
The petitioners (Ebralinag, et al.) are elementary and high school students
were expelled from their classes by public school authorities for refusin
salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledg
required by RA 1265 and Department Order No. 8 of the DepEd.
Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag,
the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that t
are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion” which they "cannot conscientio
give . . . to anyone or anything except God". They feel bound by the Bi
command to "guard ourselves from idols — 1 John 5:21". They consider the
as an image or idol representing the State (p. 10, Rollo). They think the ac
of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transc
constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the sphere of
intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control.
Issue:
Whether school children who are members or a religious sect know
Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled from school (both public and private)
refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part in the flag cerem
which includes playing (by a band) or singing the Philippine national anth
saluting the Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.
Ruling:
No, they cannot be expelled for this reason. We hold that a sim
exemption may be accorded to the Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to
observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their religious bel
however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their
not to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to dis
such patriotic exercises. Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in
vs. Dames II, 185 SCRA 523, 535, while the highest regard must be affo
their right to the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be take
mean that school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they sh
commit breaches of the peace by actions that offend the sensibilities,
religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at atten
during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the
sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see
such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and pre
danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or
other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and duty) to pre
(German vs. Barangan, 135 SCRA 514, 517).
# 47 Case
Ochoa
Title:Ymbong
GR No. 294819
Date
2014
Promulgated:
April
vs Facts:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred
status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty
conscience, to allow each man to... believe as his conscience directs, to profe
8, his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the lib
of others and with the common good."[1
Topic Discussed:
(freedom of GROUNDS:
religion and non-establishment of The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the
religion clause
petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the
implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and... injectables which are abortives,
violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees
protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides univer
access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes ca
and other... health problems
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend
that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as
authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. Fo
the petitioners, the use of... public funds for purposes that are believed to be
contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring
religious freedom... they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and
present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the
regulation of the right to free exercise... of religion and the right to free spee
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because
be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to... provid
forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono services for indigent women, under threa
criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed th
the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary ta
of the government program that promotes contraceptive use
The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause o
the Constitution.
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will under
reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue betw
the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters
pertaining to the overall well-being of their... family. In the same breath, it i
also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are
deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.
Issues:
Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
Ruling:
Actual Case or Controversy
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists
and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH
Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetar
measures to carry out the law have... already been passed, it is evident that
subject petitions present a justiciable controversy.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecu
under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from... the service with forfeitur
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter
NOW.
Locus Standi
After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the
right to life and... health, the freedom of religion and expression and other
constitutional rights.
the Court entertains no... doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcende
importance warranting immediate court adjudication.
the Court need not wait for a life to be taken... away before taking action.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea
contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of t
RH Law.[126] Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or
related to it and... the RH Law loses its very foundation
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows tha
both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated a
germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth.
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the righ
life.[137] Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded o
natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon
particular... law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority
the laws of men.
Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without du
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the la
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in
protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legisla
from enacting a measure legalizing abortion.
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and
actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any
determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself
clearly mandates that protection be afforded from... the moment of
fertilization.
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256
the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the
fertilized ovum.
the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients... the Court finds that
RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovu
already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it
2-The Right to Health
Thus, the Court agrees with the... observation of respondent Lagman that th
effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of
contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive
drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician.
With
R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the publi
that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public.
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar a
seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices,
supplies.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escap
the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and
unemployment in the country.
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation
and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive healt
laws, but with coercive measures.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTION
except with respect to the following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
Principles:
a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that i
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected spe
but also all other rights in the First Amendment.
the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and
defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at
fertilization.
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb alrea
has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception, that the
State must protect equally with the life of the mother.
:
# 48 Case Title: Santiago vs. FACTS:
COMELEC
December 6, 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with pu
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Amend
GR No. 127325
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative.
Date Promulgated: March 19, Upon the filing of the Petition, the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issue
1997
Order directing Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with
attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution including the prop
proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form, and the noti
Topic
Discussed:
Reserved hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own exp
lawmaking power (Initiative and and setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
Referendum)
December 12, 1996, Senator Roco, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on
ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by
Student Assigned:
COMELEC.
December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla,
Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising
R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on
Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to pro
any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other mode
initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III.
deliberate omission indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend
Constitution was left to some future law.
December 19, 1996, the Court required the respondents to comment on
petition and issued a temporary restraining order, effective immediately
continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC f
proceeding with the Petition, and private respondents conducting a signa
drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
January 2, 1997, private respondents filed their Comment on the petition. T
argue therein that R.A No. 6735 is the enabling law implementing the pow
people initiative to propose amendments to the constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System
Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intende
include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and i
whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
HELD:
No, Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitutio
concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably failed to satisfy both requirement
subordinate legislation.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section
the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to
Constitution. The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a del
afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, w
exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on national laws and local l
ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on
Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is conf
only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the powe
"directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part,
Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with res
to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
Second. It is true that Section 3 of the Act defines initiative on amendmen
the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative,
that Section 5 restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentag
the registered voters who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the ca
the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the conte
of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragrap
requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought t
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It
not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitut
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referen
(Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no sub
is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This conspicuous sil
as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative
referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 673
fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to
Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering th
the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the rig
the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far m
important than the initiative on national and local laws.
# 49 Case Title: Lambino vs. FACTS:
COMELEC
Lambino Group, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petitio
change the 1987 Constitution. They filed a petition with the COMELEC to
GR No.174153
a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Sec 5(b) and (c)
Sec 7 of RA No. 6735. They alleged that their petition had the suppo
Date Promulgated: October 25, 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least 12% of all registered voters,
2006
each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered vo
COMELEC denied the petition.
Topic
Discussed:
Reserved
lawmaking power (Initiative and
Referendum)
ISSUE:
Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Sectio
Student Assigned:
Article XVII of the Constitution.
RULING:
NO. The framers intended that the “draft of the proposed constituti
amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they
such proposal, before they sign there is already a draft shown to them and
the people should sign on the proposal itself because the propone
must “prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.
essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initia
upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by
people. Two essential elements must be present: the people must aut
and sign the entire proposal and it must be embodied in a petit
These are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is
shown to the people who express their assent by signing such comp
proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is “directly proposed by the pe
through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition
contains the full text of the proposed amendments. The full text of the prop
amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached
If so attached, the petition must state such fact. This is an assurance that e
one of the several millions of signatories had seen the full text of the prop
amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible to prove.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition, a copy of the p
that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino G
submitted a copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments. The signa
sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system
government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft o
proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly
signature sheet is not the “petition” that the framers of the Constitu
envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article X
of the Constitution.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendm
must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative peti
signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Gro
proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to,
signature sheets. The Lambino Group’s citation of Corpus Juris Secun
pulls the rug from under their feet. With only 100,000 printed copies o
petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great majority of the
million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signa
sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to sho
the 6.3 million signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever,
more than one million signatories saw the petition before they signed
signature sheets
#50
Case
Title:
Barangay
Association
for
National
Advancement (BANAT) vs
COMELEC
FACTS:
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BAN
filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proc
the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitu
However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMEL
GR No.179271
national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic
approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution
Date Promulgated: April 21, the winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT
2009
filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC.
Topic Discussed: On party-list
Student Assigned:
ISSUE: (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in
5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? (2)I
2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Sec 11(b) of RA
constitutional.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: 1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandate
filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in
Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left
determination of the number of the members of the House of Representa
to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a cei
party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of
House of Representatives. (2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocatio
additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(
RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent thres
makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum numbe
available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50.
continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20
the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party
representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold onl
relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second cl
of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarra
obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution
prevents the attainment of “the -broadest possible representation of p
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.” (3) No. Ne
the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties f
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in pa
list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the C
decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political pa
from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly
# 51 Case Title: Atong Paglaum, FACTS:
Inc. vs COMELEC
The Comelec disqualified 52 party-list groups and organizations f
GR No. 2003766
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, particularly those tha
not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral group
Date Promulgated: April 2, 2013
organizations must represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sec
AND (2) all nominees must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresen
Topic Discussed: On party-list
sector they represent.
Aggrieved by the disqualification, said part-list groups via Petitions
Student Assigned:
Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition, alleging grave abus
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
Comelec.
ISSUES:
(1)
Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amountin
lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participatin
the 13 May 2013 party-list elections;
(2)
Whether or not the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid d
in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancem
and Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT) should be applie
the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
RULING:
[NOTE: This case abandoned the ruling in BANAT case]
(1)
No. We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following preva
jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. In following preva
jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abus
discretion.
However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now im
and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized u
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. —
NEW RULE (abandoning BANAT doctrine):
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013
subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the follow
parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) nati
parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sec
parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organization
not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent
“marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they reg
under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative dis
elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidate
legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only thro
its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized
underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.”
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized
underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigen
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers.
sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professio
the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that repre
the “marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the mem
of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined poli
constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominee
sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined poli
constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must ha
track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of nati
and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall no
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
at least one nominee who remains qualified.
(2)
No. The experimentations in socio-political engineering have only resulte
confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentation
clear contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now c
to an end. (See above ruling for the new parameters.)
# 52 Case Title: Marcos vs. Facts:
COMELEC
Petitioner Imelda Marcos, whose alleged legal residence is in Tacloban, L
ran for Congress representing the 1st district of Leyte. Her adversary, Mon
GR No.119976
sought to disqualify her candidacy on the ground that, among others, she is
a resident of at least 1 year of Tacloban and therefore she did not satisfy
Date Promulgated: September residency requirement mandated by Art VI, Sec 6 of the Constitution as sh
18, 1995
fact wrote in her Certificate of Candidacy that she resided “in the constitu
where” she sought “to be elected” for only “seven months”. She later claim
Topic
Discussed:
Residence to be an honest mistake brought about by confusion and asserted that it
Requirement (concept of domicile vs fact her domicile “since childhood”. However, COMELEC resolved in favo
residence)
Montejo and contended that Imelda’s domicile ought to be any place where
lived in the last few decades except Tacloban. In its resolution, COMELEC c
Student Assigned:
San Juan, Metro Mla. and San Miguel, Mla. as places where she resided
served certain positions. Mention was even made of her residenc
Malacañang and Honolulu, Hawaii.
Issue:
Is Tacloban, Leyte the legal residence of Imelda thereby satisfying the resid
requirement mandated by Art VI, Sec 6 of the Constitution?
Held:
Yes. The honest mistake in the Certificate of Candidacy regarding the perio
residency does not negate the fact of residence if such fact is establishe
means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper. It is settled
when the Constitution speaks of “residence” in election law
actually means only “domicile.” It was held that Tacloban, Leyte wa
fact the domicile of origin of Imelda by operation of law for a minor follows
domicile of her parents (which was the same). In its Resolution, COMELEC
obviously referring to Imelda’s various places of actual residence, not
domicile (legal residence). An individual does not lose her domicile even if
has lived and maintained residences in different places. Successf
changing
residence
requires
an
actual
and
delibe
abandonment,* and Imelda has clearly always chosen to return to
domicile of origin. Even at the height of the Marcos Regime’s powers, she
her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Taclo
celebrating important personal milestones there, instituting well-public
projects for its benefit and establishing a political power base where
siblings and close relatives held positions of power always with either
influence or consent.
# 53 Case Title: Aquino vs. FACTS:
COMELEC
Petitioner Aquino was a resident of Concepcion, Tarlac for over 50 years. H
GR No. 120265
fact, indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for the 1992 congressi
elections that he was a resident of thereof for 52 years immediately prece
Date Promulgated: Sept. 18, that election. His birth certificate also places Concepcion, Tarlac as
1995
birthplace of both his parents.
Topic Discussed: Residence For the 1995 elections, Aquino ran for the Congress representing the new
Requirement
(concept
of district of Makati City. He stated in his Certificate of Candidacy that he
domicile vs residence)
resided “in the constituency where” he sought “to be elected” for only
months.” He in fact has just transferred to a leased condominium in Ma
from his residence in Tarlac. Private respondents filed a petition to disqu
Student Assigned:
him on the ground that he lacked the residence qualification as a candidat
congressman mandated in Art VI, Sec 6 of the Constitution. The following
Aquino amended his Certificate of Candidacy, indicating he has been a resi
in said place for 1 year and 13 days.
Meanwhile, elections were held and he garnered the highest number of v
However, COMELEC, acting on the private respondents’ petition, suspen
his proclamation permanently. Hence this instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Did Aquino satisfy the constitutional residence requirement in the 2nd dis
of Makati City as mandated by Art VI, Sec 6?
RULING:
No. The essence of representation is to place through the assent of voters t
most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district. Cle
Aquino’s domicile of origin was Concepcion, Tarlac, and the same is not e
lost. That coupled with the fact that Aquino himself claims to have o
residences in Metro Mla. and that he claims to be resident of the condomin
unit in Makati for only a short length of time “indicate that” his “sole pur
in transferring his physical residence” is not to acquire a new residenc
domicile “but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the
district of Makati City.” The absence of clear and positive proof showi
successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the
of identification— sentimental, actual or otherwise—with the area, and
suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement [of
condominium unit in Makati (instead of buying one)] was effected all beli
claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution.
# 54 Case Title: Avelino vs. Facts:
Cuenco
Senators Tañada and Sanidad filed a resolution enumerating charges aga
the petitioner Senate President Avelino and ordering an investigation the
During the session day when Sen. Tañada was supposed to have his priv
GR No. L-2821
speech, all members of the Senate were present except two Senators (so
there were 22 in attendance out of the 24 members of the Senate). When
Date Promulgated: Quorum
session was called to order, Sen. Tañada repeatedly stood up to claim his r
to deliver his one-hour speech but Sen. Pres. Avelino kept on ignoring him,
Topic Discussed: Term vs. Tenure announced that he would order the arrest of anyone who would speak wit
being previously recognized. A commotion broke out. A move for adjournm
Student Assigned:
was opposed. Suddenly, Sen. Pres. Avelino banged his gavel and walked o
the session hall followed by his followers (leaving only 12 senators in the h
Thereafter, senators who remained went on with the session (socalled “r
session”), and voted to declare vacant the position of the Senate President
designated respondent Sen. Cuenco as the Acting Senate President. In
petition, Sen. Avelino prays for the Court to declare him the rightful Se
President and to oust respondent Sen. Cuenco.
Issues:
(1) Is the rump session a continuation of the morning session?
(2) Supposing the rump session was not a continuation of the morning sess
was there a quorum when Sen. Avelino was ousted and Sen. Cuenca was ele
as the Senate President?
Held:
(1) Yes. A minority of 10 senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent
other 12 senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanim
endorsement.
(2) Yes. In view of Sen. Confesor’s absence from the country, for all prac
considerations, he may not participate in the Senate deliberations. There
an absolute majority of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constit
constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum; that i
senators in this case constitute a quorum.¹ Even if the 12 did not constitu
quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the ab
members. If one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt [that there
quorum] then, and Sen. Cuenco would have been elected just the s
inasmuch as, at most, only 11 will side with Sen. Avelino. It would be m
injudicious [then] to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senat
# 55 Case Title: Arroyo vs. de Facts:
Venecia
RA 8240 which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Reve
Code by imposing so-called ”sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale of beer
GR No. 127255
cigarettes were challenged by Representative Joker Arroyo. The bicam
committee after submitting its report to the House, the chairman of
Date Promulgated:Aug. 14, 1997 committee proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech and was interpella
Arroyo also interrupted to move to adjourn for lack of quorum. His motion
Topic Discussed: Rules of defeated and put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor proceeded and
Proceedings
bill was approved on its third reading.
Student Assigned:
Issue:
Whether or not Arroyo should have been heard for his call to adjourn for la
quorum?
Decision:
Petition dismissed. It is unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coe
department of the Court either to set aside a legislative action as void bec
the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure o
allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the jud
forum when the petitioners can find their remedy in their own department.
# 56 Case Title: Osmena vs. Facts:
Pendatun
Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his priv
speech before the House making serious imputations of bribery against
GR No. L-17144
President of the Philippines. Because of this, a Resolution was is
authorizing the creation of special House Committee to investigate the tru
Date Promulgated: October 28, the charges made against the President, to summon petitioner to substan
1960
his charges, and in case petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to s
cause why he should not be punished by the House.
Topic Discussed: Discipline of
Members
Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of
resolution on the ground that it infringes his constitutional abso
Student Assigned:
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House. Meanwhile
Special Committee continued with its proceeding, and after giving petition
chance to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously disord
behavior. A House resolution was issued and petitioner was suspended f
office for 15 months.
Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of
Court to entertain the petition, and defended the power of Congres
discipline its members with suspension.
Issue:
Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally gra
parliamentary immunity for speeches
Ruling: NO.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speec
debate” in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Represent
“shall not be questioned in any other place.” This section was taken or is a
of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In
country, the provision has always been understood to mean that altho
exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered
Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned
Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any other pl
than Congress.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundame
privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. A
as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourag
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness
success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fu
liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of e
one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offen
It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fea
being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or
other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him f
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and con
are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Execu
constitutes disorderly conduct for which Osmeña may be discipline, We bel
however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly beha
not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but
because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which
House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white
presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.
Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed.
#57 Case Title:Santiago
Sandiganbayan
vs. FACTS:
A group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and Deportation
(CID) filed a complaint for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Ac
GR No. 126055
against then CID Commissioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago. It was alleged t
petitioner, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of h
Date Promulgated: April 19, official functions, approved the application for legalization of the stay of sev
2001
disqualified aliens. The Sandiganbayan then issued an order for her suspen
effective for 90 days.
Topic Discussed: Can the
Sandiganbayan
suspend
a ISSUE:
Senator?
o
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decr
90-day preventive suspension against a Senator of the Republi
Student Assigned:
the Philippines
RULING:
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension o
incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of Repu
Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support. xxx
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an o
of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed be
it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance
court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and t
seems to be “no ifs and buts about it.” Explaining the nature of the preven
suspension, the Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan observed:
“x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of jud
proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitle
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive du
suspension.”
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan me
adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as
jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbay
authority to decree the suspension of public officials and employees indi
before it.
Power of Sandiganbayan to Decree Preventive Suspension vis-à-vis Cong
Prerogative to Discipline its Members
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the information filed aga
petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan to discharge its mandated dut
forthwith issue the order of preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct f
the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution w
provides that each“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Member
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Memb
suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shal
exceed sixty days.”
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision
punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or
house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.
xxx
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the member
Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decre
the assailed preventive suspension order.
# 58 Case Title:
Villegas
Astorga vs. FACTS:
House Bill No. 9266 was passed from the House of Representatives to
Senate. Senator Arturo Tolentino made substantial amendments which
GR No. L-23475
approved by the Senate. The House, without notice of
amendments, thereafter signed its approval until all the presid
Date Promulgated: April 30, officers of both houses certified and attested to the bill.
1974
President also signed it and thereupon became RA 4065. Sen
Tolentino made a press statement that the enrolled copy of House Bill No. 9
Topic Discussed: Journal Entry was a wrong version of the bill because it did not embody the amendm
Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory
introduced by him and approved by the Senate. Both the Senate President
the President withdrew their signatures and denounced RA 4065 as inv
Student Assigned:
Petitioner argued that the authentication of the presiding officers of
Congress is conclusive proof of a bill’s due enactment.
ISSUE:
W/N House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and valid.
HELD:
Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive withdrew
signatures therein, the court declared that the bill was not duly enac
and therefore did not become a law.
The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a journal. An import
of having a journal is that in the absence of attestation or evidence of the
due enactment, the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to v
such. “Where the journal discloses that substantial amendment
introduced and approved and were not incorporated in the printed text se
the President for signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been
enacted and did not become a law.
# 59 Case Title:
Subido
Morales vs. FACTS
In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which H
Bill No. 6951 was referred, reported a substitute measure. It is to this subst
GR No. GR No. 1-29658
bill that section 10 of the Act owes its present form and substance.
provision of the substitute bill reads:
Date Promulgated: 27 February “No person may be appointed chief of the city police agency unless he hol
1969
bachelor’s degree and has served either in the Armed Forces of the Philipp
or the National Bureau of Investigation or police department of any city
has held the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three yea
Topic Discussed: Journal Entry any high school graduate who has served the police department of a city fo
Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory
least 8 years with the rank of captain or higher.”
Student Assigned:
The petitioner asserted that there were various changes made in House
6951 and according to the Petitioner the House bill division deleted an en
provision and substituted what is now section 10 of the Police Act of 1
which section reads:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police Agency. – No pe
may be appointed chief of a city police agency unless he holds a bache
degree from a recognized institution of learning and has served as chie
police with exemplary record or has served in the police department of any
with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three years; or
high school graduate who has served as officer in the Armed Forces for at
eight years with the rank of captain and/higher.
Petitioner even submitted documents that would appear that the omissio
the phrase “who served the police department of a city” was made not at
stage of the legislative proceedings but only in the course of engrossment o
bill, more specifically in the proofreading stage and that the change was
made by Congress but only by an employee.
It is for this reason that the Petitioner would have the court look searchi
into the matter.
ISSUE
Whether the Judiciary can assail the validity of an enrolled bill by investiga
the legislative process.
RULING
Negative, the Judiciary cannot be a “sleuth” trying to determine w
actually happen in the process of lawmaking without jeopardi
the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of
cornerstone of our democratic system. The investigation which
Petitioner would like the Court to make can be better done in Congress.
The enrolled bill prevails in any discrepancy.
# 60 Case Title: Trillanes vs. FACTS:
Oscar Pimentel
July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by ju
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into
GR No. 179817
Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded
resignation of the President and key national officials.
Date Promulgated:
June 27,
2008
On the same day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation
427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling ou
Topic Discussed: Privilege of Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
Speech and Debate
Petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades,
Student Assigned:
coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before
RTC of Makati.
4 years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in
political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a 6-year term commencin
noon on June 30, 2007.
Petitioner filed with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Mo
for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Rel
Requests".
The trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes
rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general
HELD:
No, it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and predetainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security; and while predetainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement, the fa
their detention makes their rights more limited than those of the public.
When a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed u
the custody of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so tha
may be bound to answer for the commission of the offense. He mus
detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless h
authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.
Presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil
political rights.
Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and comm
meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man
all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation
only elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also w
be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
# 61 Case Title: League of Cities Fact:
vs COMELEC
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills convertin
municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills convertin
GR No. 176951
other municipalities into cities.
Date Promulgated:
2008
Nov
18, During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9
(RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section
of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirem
Topic
Discussed:
General for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 mil
Plenary Powers (Sec.1can pass, The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Sen
amend, repeal any law
Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities s
subject to limitations
to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact
they are incapable of fiscal independence.
Student Assigned:
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the
Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from
P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities w
cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the
Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted J
Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senat
approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolu
Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities f
through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityh
bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities f
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityh
bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except
of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed
law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without
President’s signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determ
whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conver
of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood L
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament
the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the sha
existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will s
the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 28
the Local Government Code.
Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitu
and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution,
are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to
present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9
took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five y
later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the cri
for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any o
law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitu
because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to
government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government C
as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are c
plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt cer
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was n
written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bil
resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the
Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Sec
450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
# 62 Case Title:
Tang Ho
U.S. vs Ang FACTS:
The Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868 “An Act penalizing
monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn u
GR No. 17122
extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof,
authorizing the Governor-General to issue the necessary rules and regulat
therefor.
Date Promulgated: February 27,
1922
Pursuant thereto, the Governoe-General issued Executive Order No. 53 fi
the price at which rice should be sold. Defendant Ang Tang Ho who sold ri
a price greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 was found guil
Topic Discussed:Doctrine of Non- violation thereof. He contested the validity of said law averring tha
Delegation of Legislative Powers
constituted invalid delegation of legislative power.
Student Assigned:
ISSUE:
Did Act No. 2868 validly delegate legislative power to the Governor-Genera
Held:
No. A law must be complete in all its terms and provision. When it leaves
legislative branch of the government, nothing must be left to the judgmen
the delegate of the legislature. The Legislature does not undertake to speci
define under what conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General
issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued “for any cause,”
leaves the question as to what is “any cause” to the discretion of the Gov-Ge
The Act also says it may be issued “…whenever… conditions arise resultin
an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn.” The Legislature
not specify or define what is “an extraordinary rise.”
The Act also says that the Governor-General, “with the consent of the Cou
of State,” is authorized to issue and promulgate “temporary rules
emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act.” It does
specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or
long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force
effect, or when they shall take effect.
That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or def
any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgment and discretion o
Governor-Gener to say what is or what is not “a cause,” and what is or wh
not “an extraordinary rise in the price, and as to what is a “temporary rule
an “emergency measure” for the carrying out the purposes of the Act.
The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it
make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or stat
things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own ac
to depend. (US v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1)
# 63 Case Title:
Eastern FACTS:
Shipping Lines vs. POEA
A Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. The widow fil
complaint for charges against the Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA, base
GR No. 76633
a Memorandum Circular No. 2, issued by the POEA which stipulated d
benefits and burial for the family of overseas workers. ESL questioned
Date Promulgated: October 18, validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the principle of
1988
delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given
POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization
Topic Discussed: Doctrine of Non- regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion which, under
Delegation of Legislative Powers
principle, is not subject to delegation. Nevertheless, POEA assumed jurisdic
and decided the case.
Student Assigned:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violatio
non-delegation of powers.
HELD:
No. SC held that there was a valid delegation of powers.
The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(
Executive Order No. 797. … “The governing Board of the Administra
(POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules
regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of
Administration (POEA).”
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the
cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion
determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall
The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature.
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to
delegate.
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative power
general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With
proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems
national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrus
administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the gen
provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies
down in a statute by “filling in’ the details which the Congress may not have
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgatio
what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing r
issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulat
have the force and effect of law.
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a v
delegation of legislative power:
1. Completeness test – the law must be complete in all its terms
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the dele
the only thing he will have to do is enforce it.
2. Sufficient standard test – there must be adequate guidelines or stat
in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and preven
delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authori
the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature
exercise a power essentially legislative.
# 64 Case Title:
Auditor-General
Pelaez vs Facts:
The President, purporting to act pursuant to Sec 68 of the Rev
Administrative Code (RAC), issued EOs 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; crea
GR No. L-23825
33 municipalities. Soon after, VP Pelaez, instituted the present special
action challenging the constitutionality of said EOs on the ground, am
Date Promulgated: Dec 24, 1965 others, that Sec 68 of the RAC relied upon constitutes an undue delegatio
legislative power to the President. The challenged Sec 68 provides:
Topic Discussed: Doctrine of President may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of
Non-Delegation of Legislative province, sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district, or o
Powers
political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised the
may divide any province into one or more sub-provinces, separate any poli
Student Assigned:
division x x x into such portions as may be required, merge any of
subdivisions or portions with another.
Issue:
Does Sec 68 of the RAC constitute an undue delegation of legislative power?
Held:
Yes. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislativ
nature. Sec 68 of the RAC, insofar as it grants to the President the powe
create municipalities does not meet the well-settled requireme
for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforceme
a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by
President. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy there would b
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has a
within or beyond the scope of his authority. It is essential, to foresta
violation of the principle of separation of powers, that the law: (a) be comp
in itself and (b) fix a standard to which the delegate must conform.
* The completeness test and sufficient standard test must be app
concurrently, not alternatively. [In delegating legislative power to ano
branch of the govt by law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the prin
of separation of powers, that said law : (a) be complete in itself—it mus
forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
delegate—and (b) fix a standard—the limits of which are sufficie
determinate or determinable—to which the delegate must conform in
performance of his functions. (Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569)
# 65 Case Title: David vs Arroyo
FACTS:
GR No. 171396
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation
1017 (PP 1017) declaring a state of national emergency. On the same day
President issued General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) implementing PP 1017.
proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy am
some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army (NPA),
some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassi
President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the Presi
and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger
programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of E
People Power I are cancelled. Likewise, all permits to hold rallies issued ea
by the local governments are revoked. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales st
that political rallies, which to the President’s mind were organized for purp
of destabilization, are cancelled. Presidential Chief of Staff Michael Defe
announced that “warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, inclu
media, can already be implemented.” During the dispersal of the rallyists a
EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. Davi
professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist.
Date Promulgated: May 31, 2006
Topic Discussed: Delegation of
emergency powers (lawmaking)
Student Assigned:
Exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency
President lifted PP 1017 by issuing Proclamation No. 1021.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot
academic.
HELD:
Moot and academic case - one that ceases to present a justiciable controv
by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be o
practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such cas
dismiss it on ground of mootness.
The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not rende
present petitions moot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP
was operative, the police officers, according to petitioners, committed il
acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutiona
valid? Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues
must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that
unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no dutie
affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative.”
The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide c
otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and
paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue ra
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar,
the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Co
assumption of jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged
the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 violates the Constitution. There i
question that the issues being raised affect the public’s interest, involvin
they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly an
the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guiding
controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the sym
function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions
military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constituti
guarantees. And lastly, respondents’ contested actions are capable
repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review.
#66 Case Title: Divinagracia vs Facts:
Consolidated
Broadcasting Respondents Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) and Peo
System
Broadcasting Service, Inc. (PBS) are radio networks both involved in
operation of radio broadcasting services in the Philippines, they being
GR No. 162272
grantees of legislative franchises. Following the enactment of these franc
laws, NTC issued Provisional Authorities allowing them to install, operate
Date Promulgated:
April 7, maintain various AM and FM broadcast stations in various locat
2009
throughout the nation. Petitioner Santiago C. Divinagracia, alleging that he
a stockholder of respondent companies, filed two complaints with the
Topic Discussed: Delegation of alleging that despite the provisions of the law mandating the public offerin
emergency powers (lawmaking) at least 30% of the common stocks of Respondents, both entities had faile
make such offering. Petitioner prayed for the cancellation of all the Provisi
Student Assigned:
Authorities or CPCs of Respondents. The NTC dismissed both compla
positing that although it had full jurisdiction to revoke or cancel a Provisi
Authority or CPC for violations or infractions of the terms and condition
refrained from exercising the same.
Issue:
Whether or not NTC has the power to cancel Provisional Authorities and C
of entities which Congress has issued franchises to operate
Ruling:
NO.We earlier replicated the various functions of the NTC, as establishe
E.O. No. 546. One can readily notice that even as the NTC is vested w
the power to issue CPCs to broadcast stations, it is not expre
vested with the power to cancel such CPCs, or otherwise empowere
prevent broadcast stations with duly issued franchises and CPCs f
operating radio or television stations.
Petitioner relies on the power granted to the Public Service Commissio
revoke CPCs or CPCNs under Section 16(m) of the Public Service Act.
That argument has been irrefragably refuted by Section 14 of the Public Ser
Act, and by jurisprudence, most especially RCPI v. NTC. As earlier noted, a
time did radio companies fall under the jurisdiction of the Public Ser
Commission as they were expressly excluded from its mandate under Sec
14. In addition, the Court ruled in RCPI that since radio companies, inclu
broadcast stations and telegraphic agencies, were never under the jurisdic
of the Public Service Commission except as to rate-fixing, that Commiss
authority to impose fines did not carry over to the NTC even while the o
regulatory agencies that emanated from the Commission did retain
previous authority their predecessor had exercised. No provision in the Pu
Service Act thus can be relied upon by the petitioner to claim that the NTC
the authority to cancel CPCs or licenses.
# 67 Case Title: ABAKADA Facts:
GURO
PARTY
LIST
vs. On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reform Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a
enjoining government from implementing the law in response to a sle
GR No. 168056
petitions for certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality o
new law.
Date Promulgated: September
1, 2005
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections
and 6: “That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretar
Topic Discussed: Delegation of Finance, shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added ta
power
12%, after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
Student Assigned:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (G
of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);
or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous
exceeds one and one-half percent (1½%)”
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the Presiden
increase the VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to
because such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Co
They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods
services which can’t be included within the purview of tariffs under
exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tri
payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed
imported/exported goods.
Petitioners further alleged that delegating to the President the legislative po
to tax is contrary to republicanism. They insist that accountab
responsibility and transparency should dictate the actions of Congress and
should not pass to the President the decision to impose taxes. They also a
that the law also effectively nullified the President’s power of control, w
includes the authority to set aside and nullify the acts of her subordinates
the Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing of the tax rate by
President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to incr
the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power grante
the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power?
Ruling:
The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which
strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power w
can never be delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete
the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, an
determine the expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power and
the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise which determines
validity of its delegation.
The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies
For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standar
sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its lim
maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegatio
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of
increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made
operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a spec
fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12%
upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No discre
would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretio
the fact that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use o
word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denote
imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the
rate upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This
duty, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to im
the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain
existence of a fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection
percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the nati
government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one
1½%. If either of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Financ
legislative mandate, must submit such information to the President.
In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of eithe
the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego o
President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legisl
department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed
is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by w
legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he posse
all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much bro
perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and co
statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the
conditions laid out by Congress is present.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power whe
describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope o
authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which
legislative process can go forward.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretio
to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did
delegate the power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.
# 68 Case Title: Belgica vs Exec. FACTS:
Secretary,
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whi
GR No. 208566
blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swin
billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dum
Date Promulgated:, Nov. 19, NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of
2013
Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) o
lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft
Topic Discussed: On Pork Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints
Barrel
issue…
Is
PDAF some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and o
constitutional?
officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents o
NGOs set up by Napoles.
Student Assigned:
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in
operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended
agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petit
were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System
declared unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "
Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be is
permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari
Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Tempo
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that
annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the
of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-s
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential S
Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constitu
grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO aga
respondents
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be decl
unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining Presi
Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad f
releasing such funds to Members of Congress
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional
Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they vio
the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b)
delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability
political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to
Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1
relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as
constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
1.Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment meas
which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, he
allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to
sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation
powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that mus
confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of
implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine
separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provision
law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactm
authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelate
congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle
thus unconstitutional.
2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as ma
hereafter directed by the President”‖ constitutes an undue delegatio
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standar
adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the Presi
wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may d
and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond
purview of the law.”
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:
(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was decl
constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS
AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOC
FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FR
CALAMITIES.
(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities du
calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the Presiden
the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional. IT GIVES THE PRESID
CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR
INFRASTRUCTURE
PROJECT
HE
MAY
SO
DETERMINE
A ―PRIORITY‖ . VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINIT
OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ A
HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE
CONSTRUE THE SAME.
# 69 Case Title: Araullo vs Exe.
Secretary
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed
sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy
GR No. 209287
needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then cam
with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
Date Promulgated: July 1, 2014
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government proje
Topic Discussed: On DAP issue
DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to
priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what
Student Assigned:
happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor
be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared a
“savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other
priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was
attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the Gener
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriatio
made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé
claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President
an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the
DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does no
only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executi
projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera
People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberatio
Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators e
P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansan
Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions w
the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their
contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which
provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuan
of an appropriation made by law“.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly th
GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of th
Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Execu
Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to
use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid ou
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29
Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundmen
by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DA
was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an
appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As suc
did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of
Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasur
otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds,
which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realign
via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of fu
refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain
deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually
prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no
impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the
transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is tru
that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their
respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be
allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated b
the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and oth
non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate
realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, eve
though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are nonexistent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriate
them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate, they a
still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the
GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without le
basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared
the Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only oc
among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain
project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The
GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving
project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied wit
under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings sho
only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are
already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and
then being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money sour
for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a
certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue
collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certifica
was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of
act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is
applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has fun
numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under t
DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longe
be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return what the
received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, t
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implement
and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civ
criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
# 70 Case Title: Guingona vs. FACTS:
Carague
For the fiscal year of 1990, Congress passed RA 6831, otherwise known as
GAA Act of 1990. The said budget contained an automatic appropriatio
GR No. 94571
P98.4 billion, of which P86.8 billion was for debt service. This autom
appropriation was made pursuant to three Marcos-era issuances: PDs 81,
Date Promulgated: April 22, and 1967.
1991
The said Act set the appropriation for education at P29.7 billion -- significa
Topic Discussed: (riders and lower than the appropriation for debt service. This was contrary to Sectio
doctrine
of
inappropriate Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "the State shall assign
provisions)
highest budgetary priority to education."
Student Assigned:
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not greater budget allocation for debt servicing as oppose
education violates Section 5, Art. XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not PDs 81, 1177, and 1967 are still operative despite having
issued during the Marcos era.
3. Whether or not automatic appropriation is violative of Section 29(1), Ar
of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD:
1. No, the constitutional provision that the highest appropriation should g
education does not mean that the hands of Congress are so humstrung a
deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest
the attainment of other state policies/objectives. One of these policies
ensure that the President can take advantage of favorable economic condit
such as situations where interest rates are low.
2. Yes, said PDs are still operative. These were not automatically revoked u
the ouster of Marcos. The Court held that these laws remain operative
they are amended, repealed, or revoked, and so long as they are
inconsistent with the Constitution. In addition, the Court dismissed petition
argument that the aforecited PDs fall within the ambit of Section 24, Ar
pertaining to "all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills," mainly because the
in question are considered enacted laws and not bills.
3. No, the Court held there was no undue delegation of legislative po
because the assailed PDs are complete -- they set out a policy and are comp
in their terms, such that the President doesn't have any choice bu
implement them.
# 71 Case
Abalos
Title: Tobias vs. FACTS:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, other
known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Hi
GR No. L-114783
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong” because Article
Section 49 of this act provided that the congressional district of San Ju
Date Promulgated: Dec. 8, 1994
Mandaluyong shall be split into two separate districts.
Topic
Discussed:
limitations
Student Assigned:
Procedural ISSUE:
Whether or not the aforestated subject is germane to the subject matter of
No. 7675.
HELD:
RA 7675 is constitutional.
Contrary to Petitioners’ assertion, the creation of a separate congressi
district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the sub
of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and lo
consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city
Moreover, a liberal construction of the “one title- one subject” rule has
invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactm
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the cont
and the minute details therein.
# 72 Case Title: Tolentino vs FACTS:
Secretary of Finance
PPI contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT w
maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the p
GR No. 115455
CREBA asserts that R.A. No. 7716 impairs the obligations of contracts,
violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Cong
Date Promulgated: October 30, shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation”.
1995
CUP argues that legislature was to adopt a definite policy of granting
exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies provis
Topic
Discussed:
Procedural on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore, b
limitations
infringe a constitutional policy.
Student Assigned:
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7716 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
No. In withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to
same tax burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject.
VAT is not a license tax. It is imposed purely for revenue purposes.
Equality and uniformity of taxation mean that all taxable articles or kind
property of the same class be taxed at the same rate. It is enough that
statute or ordinance applies equally to all persons, firms, and corporat
placed in similar situation.
#73
Case
Title:
BOLINAO
ELECTRONICS vs VALENCIA
FACTS:
GR No. L-20740
Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CB
and Montserrat Broadcasting System, Inc. were radio and television networ
Date Promulgated: June 30, operators which were denied renewal of their respective station licenses by
1964
Department of Public Works and Communications through its secretary
Brigido Valencia. The sole reason for the non-renewal was their late filing o
Topic Discussed: Veto Power
their application for renewal. The three networks then filed a certiorari case
against Valencia. In the certiorari case, the Philippine Broadcasting Service
Student Assigned:
(PBS), a government owned and controlled corporation, intervened as it all
it incurred damages when CBN failed to give up Channel 9 despite its lack o
license and despite a previous agreement that it would give up said channel
PBS averred that its claim for damages arose from the fact that under the 19
63 Budget (Appropriations Act), the PBS was allotted fund to operate and th
such failure of CBN to give up channel 9 caused it damages.
It appears however that the full text of the pertinent provision of the
appropriation act provides:
For contribution to the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting
Service, including promotion, programming, operations and
general administration; Provided, That no portion of this
appropriation shall be used for the operation of television station
in Luzon or any part of the Philippines where there are television
stations.
It also appears that the President vetoed the second sentence (italicized) of
afore-mentioned provision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto is valid.
HELD: No. Hence, the provision that the PBS may not spend for the opera
of a television station where there are already existing TV stations is still in
effect. Thus, PBS cannot validly spend for the operation of a TV station in
places where there are already existing TV stations. In short, the PBS can on
operate TV stations in areas where there are none.
As such, if PBS did spend some public fund in operating a TV station where
there are already existing TV stations, it cannot claim for damages because
should not have made the expenditure in the first place.
The SC ruled that the veto made by the President on the condition is not val
The President has the power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriation bill. However, when a provision of an appropriation bill affec
one or more items of the same, the President cannot veto the provision with
at the same time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates. The
executive’s veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditio
or restrictions.
# 74 Case Title: PHILCONSA vs. FACTS:
Enriquez
Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General Appropriations A
1994.
GR No. 113105
GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of the Congress
REalignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, provided that the tot
Date Promulgated:
Aug. 19, said allocation is not exceeded.
1994
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the Speaker of the H
of Representatives are the ones authorized under the Constitution to rea
Topic Discussed: Veto Power
savings, not the individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the law and imp
Student Assigned:
certain provisional conditions: that the AFP Chief of Staff is authorized to
savings to augment the pension funds under the Retirement and Separa
Benefits of the AFP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of
Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of the House are allowe
approve the realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be realigned
actually savings, and 2) the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the it
of expenditures to which said transfer to be made.
As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is violative
Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution. The list of t
who may be authorized to transfer funds is exclusive. the AFP Chief of
may not be given authority.
# 75 Case Title:
Ermita,
Senate vs. FACTS:
This case is about the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corpora
with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group as well as
Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.
Date Promulgated: Apr. 20, The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Execu
2006
Department and AFP officials for them to appear before Senate on Sept
2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent a letter to Se
Topic Discussed: Legislative President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 2
Inquiry
order to “afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and pre
for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Comm
Student Assigned:
on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.
On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, wh
among others, mandated that “all heads of departments of the Execu
Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prio
appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Execu
Sec. Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP offi
would not be able to attend the meeting since the President has not yet g
her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gud
among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced c
marshal for such attendance.
GR No. 169777
ISSUE:
Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.
RULING:
To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discu
the two different functions of the Legislature: The power to conduct inquiri
aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry during question hour.
Question Hour:
The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Artic
Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
“The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the conse
the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each H
shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any m
pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall no
limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When
security of the State or the public interest so requires and the Presiden
states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.”
The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pu
of Congress’ oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informe
how department heads are implementing the statutes which it had issued
department heads’ appearance is merely requested.
The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to
appearance of department heads during question hour as it explicitly refe
to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
In aid of Legislation:
The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expre
recognized in Article 6, section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respe
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance wit
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in
affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”
The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legisla
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absenc
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to a
or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the requ
information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recogn
exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubr
“executive privilege”. This is the power of the government to with
information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recogn
only to certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Cong
exercise its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exe
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exemp
the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one official may
exempted from this power — the President.
Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerate
Section 2(b) should secure the consent of the President prior to appea
before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. In view the
whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present,
invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the Presid
or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that
requested information is privileged.
The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not expli
invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are b
requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of
privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view o
lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend
hearing. The letter assumes that the invited official possesses information
is covered by the executive privilege. Certainly, Congress has the right to k
why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does
suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office
determined that it is so.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(
thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of provi
precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, cou
with an announcement that the President has not given her consent.
When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his
judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be affo
reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of
possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide
President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whe
the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the laps
that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary inv
the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the offici
appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal m
to compel his appearance.
Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464
declared void. Section 1(a) are however valid.
# 76 Case Title: Bengzon vs. Facts:
Senate Blue Ribbo
1. Petitioner was one of the defendants in a civil case filed by the
government with the Sandiganbayan for the alleged anomalous sale
GR No. L-89914
Kokoy Romoaldez of several government corporations to the group
Lopa, a brother-in-law of Pres. Aquino.
Date Promulgated: November
20, 1991
2.
By virtue of a privilege speech made by Sen. Enrile urging the Sen
to look into the transactions, an investigation was conducted by the
TopicDiscussed:Legislative
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were
Inquiry
subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "wh
they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belon
Student Assigned:
to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
3.
At the hearing, Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his
testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in civil case befor
the Sandiganbayan.
4.
Petitioner filed for a TRO and/or injunctive relief claiming that th
inquiry was beyond the jurisdiction of the Senate. He contended tha
the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction
and legislative purpose. One of the defendants in the case before th
Sandiganbayan, Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for
intervention. The Court granted it and required the respondent Sen
Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in intervention
ISSUE: W/N the Blue Ribbon inquiry was in aid of legislation
NO.
1.
There appears to be no intended legislation involved. The purpos
the inquiry to be conducted is not related to a purpose within the
jurisdiction of Congress, it was conducted to find out whether or n
the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. Lopa had violate
RA 3019 in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lo
Group.
2.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid o
legislation is not absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribe
by the Constitution. As provided therein, the investigation must be
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected
such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of
persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the r
to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against
one's self.
3.
The civil case was already filed in the Sandiganbayan and for the
Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controve
would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial
jurisdiction that had already earlier set in. The issue sought to be
investigated has already been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan. T
allow the inquiry to continue would not only pose the possibility of
conflicting judgments between the legislative committee and a jud
tribunal.
4.
Finally, a congressional committee’s right to inquire is subject to
relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental
action ‘including the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights. One
these rights is the right of an individual to against self-incriminatio
The right to remain silent is extended to respondents in administra
investigations but only if it partakes of the nature of a criminal
proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. Hence, the
petitioners may not be compelled by respondent Committee to app
testify and produce evidence before it only because the inquiry is n
in aid of legislation and if pursued would be violative of the princip
of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government as ordained by the Constitution.
Facts:
# 77 Case Title: Standard Charter
vs Senate
Senator Enrile delivered a privilege speech denouncing SCB-Philippines
selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the Securities Regula
GR No. 167173
Code (RA 8799) and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquir
aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activi
Date Promulgated: Dec 27, the future. Upon motion of Senator Pangilinan, the speech was referre
2007)
respondent, which through its Chairperson Senator Angara, set an in
hearing and invited petitioners herein to attend the hearing. Petitioners
Topic
DiscussedLegislative letter stressed that there were pending cases in court allegedly involving
Inquiry
same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to
jurisdiction of respondent committee to proceed with the inquiry.
Student Assigned:
Legislative investigation commenced but with the invited resource persons
being all present, Senator Enrile moved for the issuance of subpoena an
HDO or to include such absentees to the Bureau of Immigrations’ Watch
During the hearing, it was apparent that petitioners lack proper authorizat
to make disclosures and lack the copies of the accusing documents b
mentioned by Senator Enrile. Thus, when hearing adjourned, petitioners w
later served with subpoenas by respondent.
Petitioner now seeks that respondent committee be enjoined from proceed
citing Bengzon Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, claiming that since
issue is already preempted by the courts, the legisla
investigation is an encroachment upon the judicial powers ves
solely in the courts.
Issue:
Whether the investigation in aid of legislation by respondent comm
encroaches upon the judicial power of the courts.
Ruling: NO.
The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the
resolution, exposes the error in petitioners’ allegation that the inquiry
initiated in a privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simpl
denounce the illegal practice committed by a foreign bank in sel
unregistered foreign securities. This fallacy is made more glaring whe
consider that, at the conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrile ur
the Senate “to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislat
so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in
future.;
Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative compl
before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically
the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extrem
easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient
of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exerci
sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry i
essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or
administrative investigation.
Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the respon
Committee. The Court notes that among those invited as resource persons
officials of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Ban
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). These officials were subjected to the same cri
scrutiny by the respondent relative to their separate findings on the illegal
of unregistered foreign securities by SCB-Philippines. It is obvious that
objective of the investigation was the quest for remedies, in terms of legisla
to prevent the recurrence of the allegedly fraudulent activity.
Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is DENIED for lack of me
# 78 Case Title: Arnault v. FACTS:
Nazareno
In October 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Prog
Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong
GR No. L-3820
P4.5M and P0.5M respectively, or for an aggregate amount of P5M. Of
sum, P1.5M was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, supposed
Date Promulgated: July 18, payment for his interest in the two aforementioned estates. Jean L. Arn
1950
Burt's representative in the Philippines, collected the sum of P1.5M in the f
of checks. From this amount, he encashed P400,000, which he eventually
Topic Discussed: Legislative to an undisclosed person as per Burt's instructions.
Inquiry
Student Assigned:
It turned out, however, that these transactions were dubious
nature. For one, both estates were already owned by the Philipp
Government, so there was no need to repurchase them for P5M. Sec
Burt's interest in both estates amounted to only P20,000, which he wasn't
entitled to because of his failure to pay off his previous loans.
A Senate investigation was thereafter held to determine how the Philip
Government was duped and who ultimately benefited from the assa
transaction. One of the issues pursued was to whom did Arnault give the
amounting to P400,000. Arnault's refusal to provide the name of the per
initially because he couldn't remember it and later for fear of
incrimination, led to his being cited for contempt. He was thereafter hel
prison, and was to be freed only after saying the name of the person he gave
P400,000 to.
Subsequently, Arnault filed this instant petition for habeas corpus in
apparent bid to be freed from imprisonment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt.
2. Whether or not the Senate can impose punishment beyond the legisla
session.
3. Whether or not Arnault can invoke the right against self-incrimination a
excuse in not answering the question he is being asked in the Senate.
HELD:
Before delving into the issues at hand, the Court laid down some gen
principles of law:
The Philippine Constitution is patterned after the US Constitution. But des
similarities in the basic structure of government, one essential difference is
the Philippine legislative department is more powerful than its US counter
in the sense that the latter shares power with the congresses of indivi
states.
The power of inquiry -- with process to enforce it -- is an essential
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function of the Philippine cong
Although there are no express provisions in the constitution that invest ei
the House or the Senate with the power to conduct investigations and e
testimony, such power is implied.
1. Yes, the Court ruled that such power is necessary, especially in the condu
inquiries that fall within the Senate's jurisdiction (see [b] above). With th
mind, it is not a requirement that each and every single question aske
witnesses necessarily be material to the case. This is so because the necessi
lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the ac
itself are determined by the sum total of the information to be gathered
result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elic
from a single question.
2. In the instant case, the resolution holding Arnault for contempt was is
on May 15, 1950. He was subsequently detained for 13 days, or beyond
legislative session of Congress, which session ended on May 18 of the s
year. Arnault claimed that his continued detention had no legal basis, since
body that issued the resolution had already been dissolved by law. But
Court ruled that the Senate is a continuing body and does not cease to
upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress. As such, there is no time l
to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power ma
constitutionally exerted.
3. No, the Court held that Arnault's invocation of the right against
incrimination has no basis. Arnault failed in discharging his duty of provi
frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority
violation of the State's right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation. Wh
specific right and a specific obligation conflict with each other, and on
doubtful or uncertain while the other is clear and imperative, the former m
give way to the latter.
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS DISMISSED.
# 79 Case Title: .Gudani vs. Senga
The ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying be
Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Execut
GR No. 170165
power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of membe
the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are
Date Promulgated:, August 15, hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
2006
FACTS:
TopicDiscussed:
Legislative
Inquiry
On Sept. 22, 2005, Sen. Biazon invited several senior officers of the A
including Gen. Gudani, to appear at a public hearing before the Se
Student Assigned:
Committee on National Defense and Security concerning the conduct of
2004 elections wherein allegations of massive cheating and the “Hello G
tapes emerged. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorand
prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan and company from appearing before
Senate Committee without Presidential approval. Nevertheless, Gen. Gu
and Col. Balutan testified before said Committee, prompting Gen. Seng
order them subjected to General Court Martial proceedings for will
violating an order of a superior officer. In the meantime, President Ar
issued EO 464, which was subsequently declared unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the President can prevent military officers from testifying
legislative inquiry
RULING:
We hold that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtu
her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military of
who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time
also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before
a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate reme
under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Cong
summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. I
President is not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial o
to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have
force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faith
execute.
Ability of President to prevent military officers from testifying before Cong
is based on Commander-in-chief powers
As earlier noted, we ruled in Senate that the President may not issue a bla
requirement of prior consent on executive officials summoned by
legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recogn
the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that
privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ab
of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Cong
does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s powe
commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of
armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are
hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
RATIONALE: Our ruling that the President could, as a general rule, req
military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing before Cong
is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes
prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress h
significant control over the armed forces in matters such as bu
appropriations and the approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on
President that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief an
the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position. Again,
exigencies of military discipline and the chain of command mandate that
President’s ability to control the individual members of the armed force
accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between obe
the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without hesitation af
that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitu
prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the comman
in-chief of the armed forces.
Remedy is judicial relief
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the mil
to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitu
itself recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inqu
in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere
the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental fo
President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legisla
inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitio
testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is a
that with its pronouncement today that the President has the right to req
prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom
actualize.
We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctio
modality by which members of the military may be compelled to at
legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality w
does not offend the Chief Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief.
remedy lies with the courts.
The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch
government to the legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that per
summoned to testify before Congress must do so. There is consider
interplay between the legislative and executive branches, informed by
deference and respect as to their various constitutional functions. Recipr
courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only as a last resort that
branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of behavior.
judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a sim
dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weak
inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies
legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by
Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branche
government.
#80 Case Title: Neri vs. Senate
Committee on Accountability of
Public
Officers
and
Investigation
FACTS:
The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions directing SBRC, among other
conduct an investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the head of NE
was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed tha
COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in exchange for his appr
GR No. 180643
of the NBN Project, that he informed PGMA about the bribery and that
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on w
Date Promulgated:,March 25, they discussed about the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invo
2008
“executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the quest
on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the N
Topic Discussed: Legislative Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) wheth
Inquiry
not she directed him to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for contem
Student Assigned:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the 3 questions covere
executive privilege.
RULING:
The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presiden
communications privilege. It pertains to “communications, documen
other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations
that the President believes should remain confidential.” Preside
communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President.
rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the Presid
unique constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the sub
of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to
President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. The informa
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Elements of presidential communications privilege:
1)The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and
delegable presidential power.” - i.e. the power to enter into an execu
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to e
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a c
advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is tha
advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege
may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the informa
sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - there i
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation o
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
appropriate investigating authority.
#81 Case Title: Balag vs Senate
GR No. 234608
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate has power to impose the indef
detention of a person cited in contempt during its inquiries
FACTS: Balag, leader of Aegis Juris Fraternity filed a petition before th
after senators ordered him detained in Senate premises for b
uncooperative in the probe into the death of the UST Law Student Hor
Topic Discussed: Can one cited "Atio" del Castillo III. During the Senate inquiry, Balag repeatedly invoked
of legislative contempt be right against self-incrimination when asked if he headed the fraternity
detained indefinitely? If not, up
to when?
DECISION: Denied for being moot and academic. However, the perio
imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of the Senate du
Student Assigned:
inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of
legislative inquiry.
Date Promulgated:July 3, 2018
RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court declared the case as moot and academic
the petition presents a critical and decisive issue that must be resolved
capable of repetition. This issue must be threshed out as the Senate's exe
of its power of contempt without a definite period is capable of repetition
said, adding that “the indefinite detention of persons cited in contempt imp
their constitutional right to liberty. The Supreme Court has ruled that
Senate has no power to impose the indefinite detention of a person cite
contempt during its inquiries.
# 82 Case Title: Estrada vs. FACTS:
Desierto
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving br
taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption were made aga
GR No. 146710-15
Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2
Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachm
Date Promulgated: Mar. 2, 2001 proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegation
graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped
Topic
Discussed:
Executive January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President, succeede
Immunity
suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachm
trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out
Student Assigned:
Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada
joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential elec
to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2
He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared
the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resig
his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crow
EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later left Malacañ
Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WP
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any fur
proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends
also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incum
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge
duties of his office.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.
2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.
3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.
4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.
5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejud
publicity.
RULING:
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, a
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive bra
of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom
legality of a particular measure."
Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
EDSA I
EDSA II
exercise
of the
people exercise of people power of
power of revolution which freedom of speech and
overthrew
the
whole freedom of assembly to
government.
petition the government for
redress of grievances which
only affected the office of
the President.
extra constitutional and the
legitimacy of the new
government that resulted
from it cannot be the
subject of judicial review
intra constitutional and the
resignation of the sitting
President that it caused and
the succession of the Vice
President as President are
subject to judicial review.
presented
a political involves legal questions.
question;
The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issue
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the
Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocatio
governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call f
ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve
correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) act
relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.
Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumsta
evidence— bearing material relevant issues—President Estrada is deeme
have resigned— constructive resignation.
SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubte
confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press release containin
final statement:
1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in o
to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any
of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as
disability disappears);
3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve the
President (without doubt referring to the past opportunity);
4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may com
the same service of the country;
5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constru
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—ac
omission before, during and after January 20, 2001.
3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its sup
to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines
subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guing
Jr. As Vice President. Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachm
Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that
houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in
recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is no longer tempo
as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.
The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is politic
nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. In fine, ev
Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim
he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to go
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision
Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of governm
cannot be reviewed by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They inv
plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination
these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covere
the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite
decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who
illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasse
5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press
incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system
judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be e
manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that Estrada did
present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial
influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally
Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing prelimi
investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent e
on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with ju
and less with prosecution.
# 83 Case Title: Almonte et. Al. FACTS:
vs. Vasquez
Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intellig
and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Pers
GR No. 95367
Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1
The subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection with the investigatio
Date Promulgated: May 23, funds representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB which
1995
legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous activities
circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the subpoena d
Topic Discussed:
Executive tecum. They claim privilege of an agency of the Government.
Privilege
ISSUE:
Student Assigned:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtu
subpoena duces tecum to provide documents relating to personal service
salary vouchers of EIIB employers.
RULING:
Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respe
state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This priv
is based upon public interest of such paramount importance as in and of i
transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though,
consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights.
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets wi
disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the E
EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports
information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy,
as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, d
salting." Consequently while in cases which involve state secrets it ma
sufficient to determine the circumstances of the case that there is reason
danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters wit
compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for privilege restin
other considerations.
# 84 Case Title:
Ermita
Senate Vs. FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President
abused power by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principle
GR No. 169777, Apr. 20, 2006
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquirie
Date Promulgated:
Apr. 20, Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitio
2006
pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Topic
Discussed:
Privilege
Student Assigned:
Executive In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, throug
various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in ai
legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employe
the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employe
Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of
Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a pu
hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election frau
the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-c
“Gloriagate Scandal”.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the Presi
as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public offi
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prio
appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerate
Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing be
either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by
executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the
that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidenti
pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemp
from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress,
necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public intere
enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive bra
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withh
such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it
state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branc
evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asser
a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedie
invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in a
legislation is frustrated.
#85 Case Title: Civil Liberties FACTS:
Union vs. Exec. Sec
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of EO 284 which ostensibly restricted
number of positions that Cabinet members, their undersecretaries
GR No. 83896
assistant secretaries and other appointive officials may hold in addition to
primary position but in effect allowed them to hold multiple positions cont
Date Promulgated: Feb 22, 1991 to Art VII, Sec 13 of the Constitution.* In averring that EO 284 create
exception to the rule in Art VII, Sec 13, respondents contend that the ph
Topic Discussed: Prohibitions
“unless otherwise provided in the Constitution” in said section makes refer
to Art IX-B, sec 7(2)** insofar as appointive officials mentioned therein
Student Assigned:
concerned.
ISSUE:
Does the prohibition in Art VII, Sec 13 of the Constitution insofar as Cab
members, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries are concerned a
of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Art I
Sec 7(2) of the same?
RULING:
NO. Art IX-B, sec 7(2) is meant to lay down the general rule applicab
appointive public officials, while Art VII, Sec 13 is meant to be the excep
applicable particularly to the President, Vice-President, Cabinet Members,
deputies and assistants.*** Thus, while all other appointive officials in the
service are allowed to hold other office or employment during their te
when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positi
Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expr
authorized by the Constitution. EO 284 is thus null and void as it is repug
to Art VII, sec 13. It was noted, however, that the prohibition against
holding of any other office or employment by the Pres., VP, Cabinet memb
and their deputies or assistants during their tenure (provided in Sec 13, Art
does not comprehend additional duties and functions required by the prim
functions of the officials concerned who are to perform them in an ex of
capacity**** as provided by law.
* The pertinent provision of the assailed EO read: “Even if allowed by law o
the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecre
or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Departm
may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two position
the government and government corporations”
** [Civil Service Commission] Art IX-B, sec 7(2): Unless otherwise allowe
law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall
any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, ag
or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or contro
corporations or their subsidiaries
*** In the case at bar, there seemed to be a contradiction between Art IX-B
7 and Art VII, sec 13 of the Constitution. One section is not to be allowe
defeat another if by any reasonable construction the two can be made to s
together. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a str
prohibition on the President and his official family insofar as holding o
offices or employment in the govt or elsewhere is concerned. If the conten
of the respondents is adopted, the aforestated intent of the framers woul
rendered nugatory. It must therefore be departed from (Civil Liberties Unio
Exec Sec, 194 SCRA 317)
**** “Ex-officio.” – means “from office; by virtue of office.” It refers t
“authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred u
the individual character, but rather annexed to the official position.”
denotes an “act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office,
without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the off
An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his tit
a certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. To illustrate
express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and Communicat
is the exofficio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority,
the Light Rail Transit Authority. The ex-officio position being actually an
legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the off
concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his service
the said position. The reason is that these services are already paid for
covered by the compensation attached to his principal office. For
attendance, therefore, he is not entitled to collect any extra compensa
whether it be in the form of a per diem or an honorarium or an allowanc
some other such euphemism. By whatever name it is designated,
additional compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
# 86 Case Title: Public Interest Doctrine:
Center vs Elma
The concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC
unconstitutional, for being incompatible offices, does not render
GR No. 138965
appointments void. Following the common-law rule on incompatibilit
offices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his first office as P
Date Promulgated: June 30, Chairman when he accepted the second office as CPLC.
2006
Facts:
Topic
Discussed:
Executive Elma was appointed as Chairman of the PCGG on 30 October 1998. Therea
Privilege
during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief Preside
Legal Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second appointment, but waived
Student Assigned:
renumeration that he may receive as CPLC.
Petitioners cited the case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretar
support their position that respondent Elma’s concurrent appointment
PCGG Chairman and CPLC contravenes Section 13, Article VII and Sectio
par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners also maintained
respondent Elma was holding incompatible offices.
Issue: Whether holding office of Chairman of the PCGG and being appointe
CPLC falls within the prohibition of Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution.
Ruling:
No, the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitu
is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of them
secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former
have the same rank as the latter positions.
Although respondent Elma waived receiving remuneration for the sec
appointment, the primary functions of the PCGG Chairman do not require
appointment as CPLC. Appointment to the position of PCGG Chairman is
required by the primary functions of the CPLC, and vice versa. The prim
functions of the PCGG Chairman involve the recovery of ill-gotten we
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family
associates, the investigation of graft and corruption cases assigned to him
the President, and the adoption of measures to prevent the occurrenc
corruption. On the other hand, the primary functions of the CPLC encompa
different matter, that is, the review and/or drafting of legal orders referre
him by the President. And while respondent Elma did not receive additi
compensation in connection with his position as CPLC, he did not act as ei
CPLC or PGCC Chairman in an ex-officio capacity. The fact that a sepa
appointment had to be made for respondent Elma to qualify as CPLC neg
the premise that he is acting in an ex-officio capacity.
However, In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of
PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include gi
independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of var
executive departments and agencies and to review investigations invol
heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other Preside
appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under the Execu
Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the re
of the CPLC.
#87 Case Title:
Manglapus
vs. FACTS:
On September 15, 1989, the SC voted 8-7 to dismiss the petition of the Ma
family to allow the return of former President Ferdinand Marcos f
Honolulu, Hawaii to the Philippines. The Court held that President Cor
GR No.88211
Aquino did not act arbitrarily with grave abuse of discretion in determi
that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present
Date Promulgated: October 27, and under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welf
1989
Topic
Power
Discussed:
Student Assigned:
Marcos
The decision affirmed the constitutionality of President Corazon Aquino's p
Executive refusal, fearing the instability and security issues that may arise once
remains of former President Marcos were to be brought back to the countr
a statement, she said:
"In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marco
widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the state
order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed t
brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under
administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide."
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not President Aquino has the power to deny the return of Ma
remains.
2. Whether or not President Aquino's refusal to allow the return of Ma
remains is tantamount to dictatorship.
HELD:
1. Yes. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the Presid
upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which
implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for he
comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the Presiden
not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Execu
Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.
This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of
Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President
reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result w
limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to
commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general gran
executive power. Among the duties of the President under the Constitutio
compliance with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote
interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of
Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time
under present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty.
#88 Case Title: Biraogo, et al vs.
Phil Truth Commission
GR No. 192935
2. No, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should
be confused with the power of the President under the 1973 Constitutio
legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6. Whereas the residual powers o
President under the 1987 Constitution are implied, Amendment No. 6 of
1973 Constitution refers to an express grant of power.
:
FACTS:
At the dawn of his administration, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III
July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine T
Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
Date Promulgated: December 7, Petitioner Louis Biraogo, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, assails
2010
No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under Sectio
Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of
Topic
Discussed:
Executive legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.
Power
A special civil action for certiorari and prohibition was likewise filed
Student Assigned:
petitioners Edcel C. Lagman,et al. (petitioners-legislators) as incum
members of the House of Representatives.
As can be gleaned from the provisions of the EO, the Philippine T
Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of
President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corrup
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-princi
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and there
to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and
Ombudsman.
Though it has been described as an “independent collegial body,”
essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to
control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.
Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merel
adjunct body of the Office of the President. Thus, in order that the Presi
may create a public office he must be empowered by the Constitution, a sta
or an authorization vested in him by law.
Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creatio
a public office lies within the province of Congress and not with the execu
branch of government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive possesses the inherent authority to create
finding committees to assist it in the performance of its constitution
mandated functions and in the exercise of its administrative functions.
RULING:
As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the t
principal branches of government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.
The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring
faithful execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws on pu
accountability and transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as
Chief Executive.
That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to cr
bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitutio
in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority.
Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws
faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers of the President are not lim
to those specific powers under the Constitution.
One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees.
flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have b
faithfully executed.
Thus, in Department of Health v. Camposano, the authority of the Preside
issue A.O. No. 298, creating an investigative committee to look into
administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of He
for the anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ru
The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Comm
cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of
Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has
obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully com
with the law.
It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodi
exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to k
so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his du
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
#89 Case Title: Pichay vs Office Facts:
of Deputy Exe. Secretary for President Aquino issued an EO abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft
Legal Affairs
Commission or PAGC transferring its functions to the Investigative
Adjudicatory Division of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
GR No. 196425
affairs and that EO was number 13. That on sometime, the then-fin
secretary Purisima later on and filed a complaint against petitioner
Date Promulgated: July 24, Chairman of the board of trustees of the LWAUA because the purchase o
2012
shares of stocks of
a certain bank. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion for dismissal of
Topic
Discussed:
Executive same complaint on the grounds that the case was pending in the office o
Power
Ombudsman and that it was the only speedy remedy for such. Hence, Puri
appealed for a petition for certiorari and prohibition thus questioning
Student Assigned:
constitutionality of the Executive Order 13.
Issue:
Is EO 13 constitutional?
Ruling:
Yes. Sc held that the constitution and the administrative code of 1987
grants the chief executive the power to reorganize offices at his w
Transfering
of powers and the abolition of the PAGC to Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for legal affairs is th
constitutional and that is justified within the power of the president.
# 90 Case Title: Ocampo, et al vs Facts:
Enriquez
During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candi
GR No. 225973
Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial for
President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani ("LNM
Date Promulgated:Nov. 8, 2016 Duterte won the May 9, 2016 elections.
Topic
Discussed:
MARCOS On August 7, 2016, Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana issue
BURIAL
Memorandum to AFP Chief of Staff General Ricardo R. Visaya regarding
interment of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng
Student Assigned:
Bayani.
On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a directiv
the Philippine Army on the Funeral Honors and Service for President Marc
Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition
Certiorari and Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with
Court.
Issues
1) Whether respondents Defense Secretary and AFP Rear Admiral comm
grave abuse of discretion when they issued the assailed memorandum
directive in compliance with the verbal order of President Dutert
implement his election campaign promise to have the remains of Ma
interred at the LNMB?
2) Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum
directive violated the Constitution, and domestic and international laws?
3) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from
Marcoses and their cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on
Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former Presi
to interment at the LNMB?
4) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of
remains of former President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered int
agreement with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as to
conditions and procedures by which his remains shall be brought back to
interred in the Philippines?
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petitions.
Procedural issues
Political question
The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have
remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question th
not a justiciable controversy. In the excercise of his powers under
Constitution and the Administrative Code of 1987 to allow the intermen
Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain devoted for nati
military cemetery and military shrine purposes, President Duterte decid
question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote national hea
and forgiveness. There being no taint of grave abuse in the exercise of
discretion, as discussed below, President Duterte's decision on that poli
question is outside the ambit of judicial review.
# 91 Case Title:
LacsonMagallanes Co. Inc vs Pano
FACTS:
GR No. L-27811
Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in
Davao. The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an
Date Promulgated: November agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes C
17, 1967
Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner.
Topic Discussed: power of Jose Paño and other farmers filed their application to buy the same parcel o
control vs power of supervision land. At the same time, LMC also applied to buy the same land. The Directo
Lands denied Paño’s application and gave due course to the application of
Student Assigned:
LMC. The Secretary of Agriculture likewise denied Paño’s appeal hence it w
elevated to the Office of the President.
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Paño. Now, LMC averred th
the earlier decision of the Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive hen
beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary
an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not con
any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated t
the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the
President to act personally upon the matter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Execu
Secretary.
HELD: Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his
constitutional powers in person. However, the president may delegate certa
powers to the Executive Secretary at his discretion. The president may deleg
powers which are not required by the Constitution for him to perform
personally. The reason for this allowance is the fact that the president is not
expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administra
functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which
assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that “un
our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf a
by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modi
or even reverse any order” that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.
The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, s
remain valid until reversed, disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In
this case, no reprobation was made hence the decision granting the land
to Paño cannot be reversed.
# 92 Case Title: Buklod ng
Facts: President Estrada issued an order deactivating the EIIB which
Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora
created by President Aquino. He subsequently ordered the employees of
to be separated from the service. Thereafter, he created the Presidential A
GR No. 142801-802
Smuggling Task Force “Aduana”, which EIIB employees claim to be essent
Date Promulgated: July 10, the same as EIIB. The EIIB employees maintained that the president ha
power to abolish a public office, as that is a power solely lodged in
2001
legislature; and that the abolition violates their constitutional right to secu
Topic Discussed: CONTROL OF of tenure.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS
Issue: Is the petitioner correct in contending that only the legislature has
power to abolish an office and that it violated their constitutional righ
Student Assigned:
security of tenure?
Ruling: Yes. The general rule has always been that the power to aboli
public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal pre
that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is e
created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, ex
where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolishe
the same legislature that brought it into existence. The exception, howeve
that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department
concerned, the President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate
functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the b
authority to carry out reorganization measures.
EEIB employees’ right to security of tenure is not violated. Valid abolitio
offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. If the public o
ceases to exist, there is no separation or dismissal to speak of.
# 93 Case Title: Dadole vs. COA
FACTS:
Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Aud
GR No. 125350
issued notices of disallowances to RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of
amount (maximum of P1000 and P700 in provinces and cities
Date Promulgated: December 3, municipalities, respectively) authorized by said circular. The additi
2002
monthly allowances of the judges shall be reduced to P1000 each. They
also asked to reimbursed the amount they received in excess of P1000 from
Topic Discussed: Power of last six months.
General Supervision over LGU’s
ISSUE:
Student Assigned:
Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond
supervisory powers of the President.
RULING:
Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government u
the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of contro
Congress and the power of supervision by the President. Sec 4 Art X of
Constitution: "The President of the Philippines shall exercise gen
supervision over local governments. x x x" The said provision has b
interpreted to exclude the power of control.
The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter
of the President. As such, they are subject to the power of control of
President; he will see to it that the local governments or their officials
performing their duties as provided by the Constitution and by statute
whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions
decisions changed, suspended or reversed. They are subject to the Presid
supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within
sphere of their legitimate powers. The President can only interfere in the af
and activities of a LGU if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrar
law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over LGUs
# 94 Case Title: Gonzales vs Facts:
Office of the President
In August 23, 2010, Former Police Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza hija
a bus packed with tourists and killed most pf its passengers in a 10GR No. 196231
hostage drama. The brother of the hijacker said that his brother was upset
a dismissal from the police force, without due process, no hearing, and
Date Promulgated: January 28, complaint. In the aftemath of the hostage taking, IIRC / Incident Investiga
2014
and Review Committee was created to determine accountability for the inci
through the conduct of public hearing and executive sessions. How
Topic Discussed: Can the petitioner refused to participate inisisting that the Office of the Ombudsm
President remove the Deputy an independent constitutional body. Nevertheless, IIRC found that
Ombudsman?
Petitioner committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violatio
their own rules by allowing Mendoza’s motion for reconsideration to lang
Student Assigned:
for more than 9 months in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed ru
resolve motion for reconsiderations for administrative disciplinary cases w
5 days from submission. Inaction is gross, considering there is no oppos
thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperated resort to host
taking. Petitioner was dismissed from office through Section 8(2) of RA
6770. Petitioner seeks to declare Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 “Ombuds
Act” which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsma
the Office of the Ombudsman unconstitutional.
Issues:
1) whether or not the Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is constitutional
2) whether or not the administrative action of removal taken against Gonz
is valid
Held:
Constitutional. The power of the President to remove a Deputy Ombuds
and a Special Prosecutor is implied from his poeer to appoint. In giving
President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman or Special Prosecu
Congress simply laid down in express terms an authority that is already imp
from the President’s constitutional authority to appoint to the said officia
the Office of the Ombudsman.
Invalid. The motion for reconsideration which remained prolonged for
months cannot be simply taken as evidence of petitioner’s undue interest in
case considering the lack of any evidence of personal grudge, social tie
business affiliation with any parties to the case that could have impelled hi
act as he did. The Office of the President’s pronouncement of administra
accountability against petitioner and imposition upon him of the correspon
penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside as the findings of negle
duty or misconduct in the office do not amount to betrayal of public t
Hence, the President while he may be vested the authority, he cannot orde
removal of the petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intenti
wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting a betrayal of public tru
#95 Case Title:
JBC
De Castro vs Facts:
The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno occurs just
after the coming presidential elections. The JBC, in its en banc mee
GR No. 191002
unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of C
Justice. Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC “automati
Date Promulgated: March 17, considered” for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of
2010
Associate Justices of the Court, namely:
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Cor
Topic Discussed: Limitations to Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbiter
Appointment Power
Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However
last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010
Student Assigned:
January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President has the power appoint
next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII o
Constitution does not apply to appointments in the department of Supr
Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within
days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of
Constitution; that had the framers intended the prohibition to appl
Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in
Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article
(Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Departme
and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restriction
limitations on the President’s power to appoint members of the Supreme C
to ensure its independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation f
political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the positions,
establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President
appoint a Supreme Court Justice.
Issue:
Can the incumbent President appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno u
his retirement.
Ruling:
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments t
a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.
Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict. The first, Section
Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section
15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and u
the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not m
appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions w
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger pu
safety
# 96 Case Title: Matibag vs. FACTS:
Benipayo
The COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as “Acting Director IV” of
EID. Such appointment was renewed in “temporary” capacity twice, firs
GR No. 149036
Chairperson Demetrio and then by Commissioner Javier. Later, PG
appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra
Date Promulgated: April 2, Tuason as COMELEC Commissioners, each for a term of 7 yrs. The three
2002
their oaths of office and assumed their positions. However, since
Commission on Appointments did not act on said appointments, PG
Topic Discussed: Ad Interim or renewed the ad interim appointments.
Recess
Appointments
vs
Regular
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuaso
Student Assigned:
the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the President amounts
temporary appointment prohibited by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-C.
2. Assuming that the first ad interim appointments and the first assumptio
office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are legal, whether or not the renew
their ad interim appointments and subsequent assumption of office to the s
positions violate the prohibition on reappointment under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-
RULING:
Nature of Ad Interim Appointments
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes e
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that is subject to confirmatio
the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in characte
making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointmen
until the next adjournment of Congress. The second parag
of Sec.16, Art.VII of the Constitution provides as follows:
“The President shall have the power to make appointments during the rece
the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments
be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
the next adjournment of the Congress.
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapprov
next adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoke
the President.
…the term “ad interim appointment”… means a permanent appointment m
by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not me
temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked at any time.
term, although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a def
legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence.
Right of an Ad Interim Appointee
An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at
moment a government employee and therefore part of the civil service
enjoys the constitution protection that “[n]o officer or employee in the
service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.” T
an ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once
appointee has qualified into office. The withdrawal or revocation of an
interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appoi
before the moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereaft
tantamount to removal from office. Once an appointee has qualified
acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but
by the Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice
hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process.
How an Ad Interim Appointment is Terminated
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in
Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointm
by the Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the adjournme
Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointm
These two causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by
Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These resolutory condit
constitute, in effect, a Sword of Damocles over the heads of ad int
appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is the Constitution i
that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the ad interim appoint
Ad Interim Appointment vs. Temporary Appointment
While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable excep
provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or ac
capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing po
A temporary or acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure
matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitu
prohibits the President from making to the three independent constituti
commissions, including the COMELEC.
Was the Renewal of Appointment Valid?
There is no dispute that an ad interim appointee disapproved by
Commission on Appointments can no longer be extended a new appointm
The disapproval is a final decision of the Commission on Appointments in
exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President.
disapproval is a decision on the merits, being a refusal by the Commissio
Appointments to give its consent after deliberating on the qualifications o
appointee. Since the Constitution does not provide for any appeal from
decision, the disapproval is final and binding on the appointee as well as on
appointing power. In this instance, the President can no longer renew
appointment not because of the constitutional prohibition on reappointm
but because of a final decision by the Commission on Appointment
withhold its consent to the appointment.
An ad interim appointment that is by-passed because of lack of time or fa
of the Commission on Appointments to organize is another matter. A by-pa
appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits by
Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. The
no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhol
consent to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent
decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a
passed appointee.
The prohibition on reappointment in Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of
Constitution applies neither to disapproved nor by-passed ad int
appointments. A disapproved ad interim appointment cannot be revive
another ad interim appointment because the disapproval is final under Sec
16, Article VII of the Constitution, and not because a reappointmen
prohibited under Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. A by-passe
interim appointment can be revived by a new ad interim appointment bec
there is no final disapproval under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitu
and such new appointment will not result in the appointee serving beyond
fixed term of seven years.
# 97 Case Title: Barroquinto vs. Facts:
Fernandez
Petitioner Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with
crime of murder. Barrioquinto had not yet been arrested. The case proce
GR No. L-1278
against Jimenez and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Date Promulgated: January 21, Before the period of perfecting an appeal had expired, Jimenez availe
1949
Proclamation No. 8. However, the Amnesty Commission had their c
returned to the CFI-Zamboanga, without deciding whether or not they
Topic
Discussed:
Pardon entitled to the benefit s of the said Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground
distinguished from Amnesty
neither Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and k
the victim, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
Student Assigned:
Issue:
WON petitioners are precluded from availing the benefits of Amnesty as
have not admitted to the commission of the crime.
Held:
No. Respondents fail to differentiate between amnesty and pardon.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamatio
1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine
non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which h
charged and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evid
either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense comm
comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation.
# 98 Case Title: Vera vs. People
Facts:
Vera and 96 others were charged with the complex crime of kidnapping
GR No. L-18184
murder before CFI of Quezon. They invoked the benefits
the Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 of the President; thus, the case was referre
Date Promulgated: January 31, the 8th Guerilla Amnesty Commission which tried the case. During the hea
1963
none of the petitioners admitted having committed the crime. Vera was
only one who took the witness stand and denied having killed Lozanes.
Topic
Discussed:
Pardon Commission said it could not take cognizance of the case because the ben
distinguished from Amnesty
of amnesty could only be invoked by defendants in a criminal case
admitting commission of the crime, plead that the said crime was committe
Student Assigned:
pursuance of the resistance movement and perpetrated against persons
aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation. The Commission ord
that the case be remanded to the court of origin for trial.
The CA affirmed the decision of the Commission. Vera appealed to the
contending that to be entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation it is
necessary for them to admit the commission of the crime charged, citing
case of Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, etc.
Issue:
Should persons invoking the benefit of amnesty first admit having comm
the crime of which they were accused?
Held:
Yes. It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgive
for
an
act
which,
according
to
him,
he
has
committed. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when
accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any
for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions,
this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence
such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a ple
confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegat
against
him
but
disclaims
liability
therefor
on
account
intervening facts which, if proved, would being the crime charged within
scope of the amnesty proclamation.
# 99 Case Title: Monsanto vs. Facts:
Factoran
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner and three other accused, of
complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public document. Petiti
GR No. 78239
appealed her conviction to the Supreme Court which subsequently affirmed
same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion
Date Promulgated: Feb. 9, 1989 pending, she was by then President Marcos absolute pardon. By reason of
pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that sh
Topic Discussed: Effect of Pardon restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was
vacant. Petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance
Student Assigned:
resolution in view of the provision of the Local Government Code transfer
the power of appointment of treasurers from the city governments to the
Ministry. The Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to
position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the
she was extended the absolute pardon. Seeking reconsideration of the foreg
ruling, petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowe
her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the governm
has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement sh
correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to
pay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be requ
to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4, 892.50. The Ministr
Finance, however, referred petitioner's letter to the Office of the Presiden
further review and action. Through Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgeni
Factoran, Jr. held that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public of
is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlemen
payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the pe
of his suspension pendente lite and that petitioner is not entitled to
automatic reinstatement on the basis of the absolute pardon granted her
must secure an appointment to her former position and that, notwithstan
said absolute pardon, she is liable for the civil liability concomitant to
previous conviction.
Issue: Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an abso
pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her for
position without need of a new appointment.
Ruling: There is a need to apply and undergo the usual procedure require
a new appointment. The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from pu
office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Cod
estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the author
referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by her par
this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner
apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of
conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the pu
post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated
taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can once again
entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to petiti
has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employm
but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant
treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required f
new appointment.
# 100 Case Title: Torres vs Facts:
Director of Bureau of Prisons
1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was
GR No. 122338
granted conditional pardon by the president on condition that he "would
again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines". He acce
Date Promulgated: Dec. 29, the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinemen
1995
1982, he was charged with 20 counts of estafa (pending trial) while in 1985
was convicted of sedition (pending appeal). In 1986, Justice Secretary Gonz
Topic
Discussed:
Effect
of petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence,
violation of the terms of pardon
president cancelled the
pardon.
Torres
was
accordingly
arre
and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sente
Student Assigned:
Torres thus filed a petition for habeas corpus before the SC questioning
validity of the arrest order. He claimed that he did not vio
his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgmen
20 counts of estafa nor of the crime of sedition.
Issue:
Is conviction by final judgment necessary before a person may be va
rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his condition pardo
Held:
The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon,
the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive
not
subject
to
judicial
scrutiny
under Section 64
(i)
the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of
for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 15
the Revised Penal Code.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i)
the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt
subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgm
of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violatio
his conditional pardon.
Since Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a distinct, substan
felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated the provis
thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final judgment befor
can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed in Article 159.
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been condition
pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon
Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to pro
against him under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code which imposes
penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who "ha
been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate an
the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has chosen to pro
against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative C
That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is
subject to judicial scrutiny
# 1 01 Case Title:
Perez
Lacson vs. Facts:
This case stems from the issuance of former President Gloria Macapa
Arroyo Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there is a state of rebellion in
GR No. 141284
NCR (this was in May 1, 2001). Warrantless arrest of several alleged lea
and promotors of the rebellion were thereafter effected.
Date Promulgated: August 15, Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, et al. filed several petitions against
2000
Proclamation and habeas corpus for the warrantless arrests allegedly effe
by virtue thereof, as it has no basis both in fact and in law. Petitioner fur
Topic
Discussed:
Military contends that said proclamation is being will be used by the authoritie
Powers
justify their alleged impending warrantless arrests.
Respondent, Justice Secretary, denies such allegations. R, on defense, said
Student Assigned:
ordinary procedure applies (that means, obtaining regular warrants of ar
from courts and thereafter preliminary investigation will be conducted) fo
acts committed during the said state of rebellion.
Issue: Whether a petition for habeas corpus may be avail of to preven
impending unlawful warrantless arrest.
Decision: No. Relief is clearly premature considering that as of this date (
10, 2001) no complaints or charges have been filed against any of
petitioners for any crime.
Anent petitioners allegations ex abundante ad cautelam in support of
application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it is manifest tha
writ is not called for since its purpose is to relieve petitioners from unla
restraint (Ngaya-an vs. Balweg, 200 SCRA 149 [1991]), a matter which rem
speculative to this very day.
# 103 Case Title:
Macapagal-Arroyo
David vs. FACTS:
Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call u
AFP and the to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violenc
GR No. No.171396
the country. Permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments w
revoked. Rallyists were dispersed. The police arrested petitioner David
Date Promulgated: May 3, 2006 Llamas without a warrant.
President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of national emerg
Topic
Discussed:
Military has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed petitions with the SC, impleading Arr
Powers
questioning the legality of the proclamation.
Student Assigned:
ISSUE:
Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
RULING:
No. PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the Presiden
the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes neces
as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, th
ruled that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in
absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned pu
utility and private business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP
1017 is only partly unconstitutional.
# 104 Case Title:
GMA
Fortun vs Facts:
On November 23, 2009 heavily armed men, believed led by the ru
Ampatuan family, gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 inno
GR No. GR. No. 190293
civilians on a highway in Maguindanao. In response to this carnage
November 24 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1
Date Promulgated: March 20, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cota
2012
City to prevent and suppress similar lawless violence in Central Mindanao.
Topic
Powers
Discussed:
Student Assigned:
Military Believing that she needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao
secure it from large groups of persons that have taken up arms against
constituted authorities in the province, on December 4, 2009 President Ar
issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring... martial law and suspen
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in that province except for ident
areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front on December 9, 2009 Congres
joint session, convened pursuant to Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution to review the validity of the President's action. But, two days
or on December 12 before Congress could act, the President issued Presiden
Proclamation 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the wr
habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Issues:
constitutionality of a presidential proclamation of martial law and suspen
of the privilege of habeas corpus in 2009 in a province in Mindanao which
withdrawn after just eight days.
Ruling:
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Cong
act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not
sequentially, but in a sense jointly... since, after the President has initiated
proclamation or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the s
based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that
President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court
power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamatio
suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congre
exercise its own review powers, which is... automatic rather
initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend
Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as its
rampart. The constitutional validity of the President's proclamation of ma
law or... suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political questio
the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands o
Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint hous
Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Conseque
the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothin
review. The lifting of martial law and... restoration of the privilege of the
of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated
justiciable controversy.
# 1 05 Case Title: Lagman vs FACTS:
Medialdea
On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declari
state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpu
GR No. 231658
the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding 60 days as required by
constitution. Furthermore, In accordance with Section 18, Article VII,
Date Promulgated: July 4, 2017
President submitted a written report on the factual basis of his proclama
two days later to the congress reasoning that the grounds therefor were the
Topic
Discussed: and hints of rebellion for years already on Marawi City and is going wors
CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF his report, he stated that the a certain terrorist group called Maute have d
MARTIAL LAW IN MINDANAO grave acts of rebellion and waving a foreign flag of Islamic State of Iraq
Syria (ISIS) in Marawi City thereby
Student Assigned:
renunciating the place's allegiance to the country and uphold its constitu
alongside acts endangering public safety and destruction of public propert
taking over a hospital and securing
the place.
Thereafter, the senate declared finding “no compelling reason to re
Proclamation 216". For
this, petitioners questioned the factual basis of President Dute
Proclamation of martial law.
Stating that
1. there is no rebellion or invasion in Marawi City or in any part of Mindana
2. the President's Report contained "false, inaccurate, contrived and hyper
accounts";
3. the President's Report mistakenly included old precedents from 201
additional
factual bases for the proclamation of martial law;
4. considering that the President acted alone and did not consult the mil
any ranking official; and
5. the parameters used in determining the sufficiency of the factual bases.
ISSUE:
1. W/N The the factual bases of Proclamation No. 216 is sufficient.
RULING: The petitioners' motions for reconsideration are denied with fina
HELD: For mootness and lack of merit as there must be a probable c
suggesting that a rebellion was committed or is being committed. S
"martial law is a matter of urgency, the
President, is not expected to completely validate all the information he rece
before declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of ha
corpus."
Morevover, the petitioners are not successful in their refutation as
counter-evidences were
derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet.
# 107 Case Title: Nicolas vs FACTS:
Romulo
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the
Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape committed again
GR No. 175888
Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime on November 1, 2005. Pursuant to
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines
Date Promulgated:
February the US entered into, the US, at its request, was granted custody of Smith.
11, 2009
RTC of Makati rendered a decision finding defendant Smith guilty du
sufficient evidence.
Topic Discussed: Diplomatic Defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philip
Power
law enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders of the DILG
brought to a facility for detention under the control of the US governm
Student Assigned:
under the new agreements between the Philippines and the US, referred t
the Romulo-Kenney Agreement.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of defen
L/CPL Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the VFA is void and unconstitutional.
HELD: NO.
Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 states:
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philipp
and the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign mil
bases, troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except und
treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requ
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referen
held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting St
The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25 of the Constitution, is complied wit
virtue of the fact that the presence of the US Armed Forces through the VFA
presence “allowed under” the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP
Mutual Defense Treaty itself has been ratified and concurred in by both
Philippine Senate and the US Senate, there is no violation of the Constituti
provision resulting from such presence.
The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required
matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions.
Applying, however, the provisions of VFA, the Court finds that there
different treatment when it comes to detention as against custody. “Art. V,
10. The confinement or detention by Philippine authorities of United S
personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philipp
and US authorities.”
Therefore, the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2
which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United S
Embassy, are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is
“by Philippine authorities.” Respondents should therefore comply with the
and negotiate with representatives of the United States towards an agreem
on detention facilities under Philippine authorities as mandated by Art. V,
10 of the VFA.
# 108Case Title: Pimentel, Jr. FACTS:
vs. Executive Secretary
On 28 December 2000, the Philippines signed the Rome Statute thro
Charge d’ Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the Un
GR No. 158088
Nations (PMUN). The Rome Statue establsihed the International Crim
Court which provides “shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction
Date Promulgated: July 6, 2005 persons for the most serious crimes of international concerns…”. However
treaty’s provisions require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance
Topic Discussed:
approval of the signatory states.
Student Assigned:
Petitioner/s filed an instant petitione compelling respondents to transmit
signed text of the treaty to the Senate for ratification. It is on the theory
ratification of a treaty is a function of the Senate. Hence, the duty of
executive it to sign the same and transmit it thereafter to to the Senate
concurrence.
The OSG, representing respondents, contends that the executive departm
has no duty to transmit the said treaty to the Senate for concurrence.
ISSUE: WON Respondents have the ministerial duty to transmit the cop
the subject treaty to the Senate signed by a member of the PMUN even wit
the signature of the President for concurrence?
RULING:
No. The President, being the head of the Sate, is regarded as the sole organ
authority in external relations with foreign nations. In the realm of tre
making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
Although it is correct that the Constitution, in Article VII, Section 21, prov
for the concurrence of 2/3 of all members of the Senate for validating a tr
and is deemed essential to provide check on the executive’s foreign relation
is not absolute. The power to ratify does not belong to the Senate.
The process of treaty making: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exch
of the instruments of ratification. Petitioner’s arguments equate the signin
the treaty by the Phil. representative with ratification. However, it shoul
noted that signature and ratification is two separate steps. Signature is
authentication, on the other hand, ratification is the formal act of accepta
the latter is generally an executive act undertaken by the head of the state.
Moreover, under E.O. 459, issued by Pres. Ramos, provides for guideline
the negotiation of international agreements and its ratification. The said O
provides that a treaty, after it was signed by the representative of the S
shall be subject to ratification by the President. before the Senate can concu
the President must ratify it first.
It should be emphasized that under the Constitution, the power to rati
vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role o
latter is limited only to giving consent to the ratification. Hence, the Presi
has the authority to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate, and/or refus
ratify it.
Share this:
# 109 Case Title: Bayan vs.
Zamora
THE FACTS
The Republic of the Philippines and the United States of Ame
entered into an agreement called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).
agreement was treated as a treaty by the Philippine government and
Date Promulgated: October 10, ratified by then-President Joseph Estrada with the concurrence of 2/3 o
2000
total membership of the Philippine Senate.
GR No. 138570
Topic Discussed: Extent of
The VFA defines the treatment of U.S. troops and personnel visiting
President’s Power in diplomacy Philippines. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits, and fur
defines the rights of the U.S. and the Philippine governments in the matt
Student Assigned:
criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft, importation
exportation of equipment, materials and supplies.
Petitioners argued, inter alia, that the VFA violates §25, Article XVI
the 1987 Constitution, which provides that “foreign military bases, troop
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty
concurred in by the Senate . . . and recognized as a treaty by the o
contracting State.”
II. THE ISSUE
Was the VFA unconstitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DISMISSED the consolidated petitions, held that
petitioners did not commit grave abuse of discretion, and sustained
constitutionality of the VFA.]
NO, the VFA is not unconstitutional.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troop
facilities in the country, unless the following conditions are sufficie
met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the treaty must be duly concur
in by the Senate and, when so required by congress, ratified by a majori
the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c) recognized
treaty by the other contracting state.
There is no dispute as to the presence of the first two requisites in the ca
the VFA. The concurrence handed by the Senate through Resolution No.
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution . . . the provision in
§25, Article XVIII] requiring ratification by a majority of the votes cast
national referendum being unnecessary since Congress has not required it.
This Court is of the firm view that the phrase “recognized a
treaty” means
that
the
other
contracting
party accepts
acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. To require the o
contracting state, the United States of America in this case, to submit the
to the United States Senate for concurrence pursuant to its Constitution,
accord strict meaning to the phrase.
Well-entrenched is the principle that the words used in
Constitution are to be given their ordinary meaning except where techn
terms are employed, in which case the significance thus attached to t
prevails. Its language should be understood in the sense they have in com
use.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats
VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law
executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. To be sure, as long as the
possesses the elements of an agreement under international law, the
agreement is to be taken equally as a treat.
The records reveal that the United States Government, thro
Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard, has stated that the United States governm
has fully committed to living up to the terms of the VFA. For as long as
United States of America accepts or acknowledges the VFA as a treaty,
binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, the
indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
# 110 Case Title: Go Tek vs. Facts:
Deportation Board
Go Tek was to be deported as an undesirable alien for being an alleged se
commander and intelligence and record officer of a guerilla unit in Sta. C
GR No. L-46240
Manila.
Date Promulgated: November 3, Fake dollar checks were found on him in violation of RPC 168 (il
1939
possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instrumen
credit).
Topic Discussed: Deportation of
Undesirable Aliens
Go Tek filed MD, Board has no jdxn in view of the obiter in Qua Chee
(aliens can only be deported on grounds specified by law)
Student Assigned:
Go Tek filed action in CFI and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued
CFI : after hearing, granted writ of prohibition, Board to desist. M
possession of forged dollar checks not ground for deportation under
Immigration Law. Deportation was premature. An alien should be convict
year + of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Issue: WoN the Deportation Board can entertain deportation procee
based on ground not specified in the Immigration Law and although alien
yet convicted.
Held: Yes, the Board has jdxn to investigate Go Tek for illegal possession
alleged guerilla activities. The charge was not premature.
Di applicable ang QCG. Qua Chee Gan: in EO No. 398, of 1951, the Deporta
Board to issue a warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges agains
alien, is "illegal" or unconstitutional because it is contrary to 1935 Constitu
that warrants shall issue only by JUDGE.
2 ways of deporting: (1) by order of the President, after due investiga
pursuant to RAC sec. 69 and (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration u
recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under immigration Law,
37.
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. That power
be exercise by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessar
the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation. When the Chief Execu
finds that there are aliens whose continued in the country is injurious to
public interest he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them.
RAC Sec. 69 and EO 398 do not specify the grounds for deportation. EO
merely provides that "the Deportation Board, motu proprio or upon comp
of any person is authorized to conduct investigations in the manner prescr
in section 69 of the RAC to determine whether a subject of a foreign pow
the Philippines is an undesirable alien or not, and thereafter to recommen
the President of the Philippines the deportation of such alien."
The Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of
which warrant the deportation of aliens as disclosed in an investiga
conducted in accordance with 69. No other tribunal is at liberty to reexamin
to controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.
The fact that an alien has been acquitted in a of the charge does not preven
deportation of such alien based on the same charge. Such acquittal does
constitute res judicata in the deportation proceedings. Conviction of a crim
not n to warrant deportation.
The Deportation Board could take cognizance of the charge of il
importation against an alien as a ground for deportation, even if he of
Deportation Board is merely recommendatory. The Chief Executive ha
approve the board's recommendatory Abuses or rents committed by
prosecutor or by the Board should first be brought to his attention.
Reversed and set aside. WPI dissolved. Remanded to Deportation Board
further proceedings.
# 111 Case Title: GSIS vs Heirs of FACTS:
Caballero
On March 16, 1994, plaintiff (Ceroferr Realty Corporation) filed with
GR No. 158090
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 93, a complaint7 against defen
Ernesto D. Santiago (Santiago). In his answer, defendant Santiago alleged
Date Promulgated: Oct. 4, 2010 the vacant lot referred to in the complaint was within Lot No. 90 of the
Estate Subdivision, covered by his TCT No. RT-78 110 (3538). "In the cour
Topic
Discussed:
.
Fiscal the proceedings, an important issue metamorphosed as a result of
Autonomy
conflicting claims of the parties over the vacant lot actually used as a jee
terminal – the exact identity and location thereof. Because of the compe
Student Assigned:
claims of ownership of the parties over the vacant lot, it became inevitable
the eye of the storm centered on the correctness of property boundaries w
would necessarily result in an inquiry as to the regularity and validity of
respective titles of the parties. It thus became clear, at least from the viewp
of defendant, that the case would no longer merely involve a simple cas
collection of damages and injunction – which was the main objective of
complaint - but a review of the title of defendant vis-à-vis that of plaintiff
May 14, 1996, the trial court issued the order now subject of this appeal wh
as earlier pointed out, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action and lac
jurisdiction. The court held that plaintiff was in effect impugning the tit
defendant which could not be done in the case for damages and injunc
before it. On March 26, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated a deci
dismissing the appeal.
ISSUE: WON the case should be dismissed
HELD: The rules of procedure require that the complaint must state a con
statement of the ultimate facts or the essential facts constituting the plain
cause of action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving
statement of the cause of action inadequate.
A complaint states a cause of action only when it has its three indispens
elements, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means
under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part o
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an ac
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of plainti
constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for w
the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. If these element
not extant, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on
ground of failure to state a cause of action
# 112 Case Title: Garcia vs Board FACTS
of Investments
Congressman Garcia assails the approval by the Board of Investments (B
and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) of the amended applica
GR No. 88637
for registration of the Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), which seek
transfer the site of its petrochemical complex from Bataan, the original sit
choice, to the province of Batangas. The BPC’s original application
Date
Promulgated:
07 registration was published in Philippine Daily Inquirer but the amen
September 1989
application, changing the site from Bataan to Batangas, was not.
Topic Discussed: Judicial Power
Student Assigned:
ISSUE
Is there still a need to publish the amended application in a newspape
general circulation?
HELD
YES. The law requires the “publication of applications for registration,” he
the payment of publication and other necessary fees … prior to the proces
and approval of such applications (Art. 7, subpar. 3, Omnibus Investm
Code).Since the BPC’s amended application (particularly the change of loca
from Bataan to Batangas) was in effect a new application, it should have b
published so that whoever may have any objection to the transfer ma
heard. The BOI’s failure to publish such notice and to hold a hearing on
amended application deprived the oppositors, like the petitioner, of
process and amounted to a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the BOI.
# 113 Case Title: PACU vs. Sec. FACTS:
of Education
Petitioner Philippine Assoc of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assails
GR No. L-5279
constitutionality of Act No. 2706 as amended and RA 139. Act No. 2
provides that before a private school may be opened to the public, it must
obtain a permit from the Sec. of Education, which they aver restrains the r
Date Promulgated: October 31, of a citizen to own and operate a school. Said Act also confers on the Se
1955
Education the duty to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all pr
schools xxx. PACU contends this confers unlimited power constituting unla
delegation of legislative power. On the other hand, RA 139 confers upon
Topic Discussed: How Judicial Board of Textbooks power to review all textbooks to be used in private sch
Review is exercised
and prohibit the use of those deemed, in sum, unsuitable. PACU avers th
censorship in “its baldest form”.
Student Assigned:
ISSUE:
May PACU validly assail the constitutionality of foregoing statutes?
HELD:
No. The action is premature. There is no justiciable controversy as petitio
have suffered no wrong and therefore no actual and positive relief may be
in striking down the assailed statutes.* Petitioner private schools are opera
under the permits issued to them pursuant to the assailed Act, and there i
threat, as they do not assert, that the Sec. of Education will revoke t
permits. Mere apprehension that the Secretary might, under the law, withd
the permit does not constitute a justiciable controversy. Petitioners also do
show how the “general standard of efficiency” set by the Secretary has inj
any of them or interfered with their operation. It has not been shown tha
Board of Textbooks has prohibited certain texts to which petitioners are av
and are thereby in danger of losing substantial privileges or rights.
# 104 Case Title: Dumlao vs. Facts: Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of B
COMELEC
Pambansa Blg 52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and
process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that any retired ele
provincial or municipal official who has received payments of retirem
GR No. L-52245
benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the
of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for
Date Promulgated: January 22, same elective local office from which he has retired. According to Dumlao
1980
provision amounts to class legislation. Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr.
assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52, which states that
Topic Discussed: How Judicial person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including t
Review is exercised
amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes,
not be qualified for any of the offices covered by the act, or to participate in
partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction of t
Student Assigned:
crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charge
the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal
preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the aforementioned statutory provisions vio
the Constitution and thus, should be declared null and void
(2) Whether or not the requisites of judicial review are complied with
Held: No constitutional question will be heard and decided by the Court un
there is compliance with the requisites of a judicial inquiry, which are: 1) T
must be an actual case or controversy; 2) The question of constitutionality m
be raised by the proper party; 3) The constitutional question must be raise
the earliest possible opportunity; and 4) The decision of the constituti
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
As to (1), Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of
provision. His question is posed merely in the abstract, and without the be
of a detailed factual record. As to (2), neither Igot nor Salapantan has b
charged with acts of loyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candid
for local elective positions. They have no personal nor substantial intere
stake. Igot and Salapantan have institute the case as a taxpayer’s suit, bu
institution of a taxpayer’s suit per se is no assurance of judicial review. A
(4), there is no cause of action in this particular case. Therefore, the nece
for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent.
In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Bl
remains constitutional and valid. The constitutional guarantee of e
protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. One class ca
treated differently from another class. In this case, employees 65 years of
are classified differently from younger employees. The purpose of the provi
is to satisfy the “need for new blood” in the workplace. In regards to the sec
paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared null and void for being violative o
constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
# 106 Case Title: KILOSBAYAN FACTS:
VS. ERMITA
Respondent announced an appointment in favor of respondent Ong
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the vacancy created by th
GR No. 177721
Associate Justice R. J. Callejo, Sr. Petitioners claim that respondent Ong
Chinese citizen, that this fact is plain and incontestable, and that his own b
Date Promulgated: July 3, 2007 certificate indicates his Chinese citizenship. Petitioners contend that
appointment extended to respondent Ong through respondent Execu
Topic Discussed: How Judicial Secretary is patently unconstitutional and issued with grave abuse of discre
Review is exercised
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Student Assigned:
ISSUE:
Is Sandiganbayan Justice Ong a natural born Filipino citizen?
RULING:
No. It is clear from the records of the Court that respondent Ong
naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his natu
born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the
decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his mother w
naturalized along with his father. Furthermore, no substantial chang
correction in an entry in a civil register can be made without a judicial or
and, under the law, a change in citizenship status is a substantial change.
The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalitie
respondent Ong’s ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all e
factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial proceeding
as to correct the existing records on his birth and citizenship. The chai
evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok Santos, respondent Ong’s mo
was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears in the records of this Co
Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral tre
well as his citizenship under the time-line of three Constitutions. Until th
done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this Court as
would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be preve
by injunction from doing so.
# 107 Case Title: Kilosbayan vs. FACTS:
Guingona
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), with the approval of
President, entered into a Contract of Lease with Phil. Gaming Managem
GR No. 113375
Corp. (PGMC) which was organized through the initiative of the Berjaya G
Berhad, a foreign company. This was executed despite vigorous oppos
Date Promulgated:May 5, 1994
from petitioner Kilosbayan on account of its alleged immorality and illega
Kilosbayan, an organization of “civic-spirited citizens,” filed the instant pet
Topic
Discussed:
Legal as taxpayers and concerned citizens. Respondents challenge the petition
Standing
legal standing to file this petition.
Student Assigned:
ISSUE:
Must the action fail for the alleged lack of a legal standing?
RULING:
No. We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to
public, and the issues it raised are of paramount public interest.
ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic,
moral wellbeing of the people even in the remotest barangays of the cou
and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on
lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to rais
the exercise of its sound discretion, in keeping with its duty to determ
whether or not the other branches of govt have exercised grave abus
discretion given them, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural ba
which the respondents tried to take advantage of. The Court voted 7-6 on
issue. (The Contract of Lease was eventually declared invalid for being viola
of the charter of PCSO)
# 1 Case Title:
Morato
Kilosbayan vs. FACTS:
As a result of the Court’s ruling in the first Kilosbayan case (Kilosbayan, In
Guingona, Jr., 232 SCRA 110), PCSO forged a new and allegedly
GR No. 118910
agreement with Phil. Gaming Management Corp. (PGMC): the Equipm
Lease Agreement (ELA).
Date Promulgated: November Petitioners file this suit seeking to invalidate the ELA for the reason that
16, 1995
substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in the first c
Respondents again challenge the petitioners’ locus standi. Petitioners con
the previous ruling sustaining their standing is now the “law of the case”
Topic
Discussed:
Legal therefore the question of their standing can no longer be reopened.
Standing
Student Assigned:
ISSUE:
May the petitioners’ locus standi be challenged anew notwithstanding
previous ruling sustaining it?
RULING:
Yes. The Doctrine of “law of the case”¹ is not applicable in this case. While
case is a sequel to the first Kilosbayan case, it is not its continuation.
doctrine applies only when a case is before a court a second time after a ru
by an appellate court, i.e. where both the parties and the case are the sam
the first and in the subsequent. In the case at bar, the parties are the same
the cases are not. The ELA in this present case is essentially different from
1993 Contract of Lease in the first case. Moreover, there is no constituti
question actually involved here and therefore, “standing” is, strictly speak
not the issue since that is a concept in constitutional law.² On the cont
what is raised here actually involves questions of contract law, more specifi
whether petitioners have a legal right which has been violated. The issue, t
is not “standing” but whether the petitioners are the “real parties-ininter
those who have “present substantial interest”. But petitioners do not have
present substantial interest in the ELA as would entitle them to bring this
We deny them of their right to intervene, but they may still raise their issu
an appropriate case before the Commission on Audit or the Ombudsman.
¹ Doctrine of “Law of the Case” — whatever is once established as
controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same
continues to be the law of the case xxx so long as the facts on which the deci
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. It is
practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. (Kilosba
Inc. v. Morato, 246 SCRA 559, 560)
² It was held in constitutional issues, standing restrictions require pa
consideration of the merits as well as broader policy concerns relating to
proper role of the judiciary. The question as to “real party in interes
whether he is “the party who would be benefitted or injured by the judgm
or the “party entitled to the avails of the suit.” In contract law, real parties
those who are parties to the agreement or are prejudiced in their rights
respect to one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment, w
would positively result to them from the contract even though they did
intervene in it, or who can claim a right to take part in a public bidding
have been illegally excluded from it.
# 108: Case Title: Joya vs PCGG
FACTS:
Petitioners are Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists who claim to be de
GR No. 96541
concerned with the preservation and protection of the country’s artistic we
This petition concerns old Masters Paintings and antique silverware allege
Date Promulgated: August 24, be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late Pres. Marcos and his cronies. T
1993
were seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila,
were consigned for sale at public auction by the Govt through respon
Topic
Discussed:
Legal PCGG. Believing the items to be historical relics of cultural significa
Standing
petitioners filed the instant petition for prohibition and mandamus to en
the PCGG to proceed with an auction sale with prayer for prelimi
Student Assigned:
injunction. The application for preliminary injunction was denied and
auction proceeded as scheduled.
ISSUE:
Does the instant petition comply with the legal requisites for this Cou
exercise its power of judicial review over this case?
RULING:
No. The petitioners have no legal standing1 to file this petition.
confiscation of the subject items by the Aquino administration should no
understood to mean that its ownership has automatically passed on to the
without complying with constitutional or statutory requirements.
Any dispute on the statutory defects in the acquisition and their subseq
disposition must be raised only by the proper parties—the true ow
thereof—whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rig
Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or
these have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any legal rig
question their alleged unauthorized disposition.2 Furthermore, for a cou
exercise its power of adjudication there must be an actual case
controversy3 — one which must not be moot or academic or based on ex
legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A
becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as
case at bar since the purpose of the petition is to enjoin respondent pu
officials from holding the auction sale which have long passed.
1 “Legal standing” means a personal and substantial interest… . The t
“interest” is material interest, an interest in the issue and to be affected by
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a m
incidental interest. Moreover, the
interest of the party must be personal and not one based on a desir
vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. (Joy
PCGG, 225 SCRA 568, 576)
2 Certain instances when the Court allowed exceptions to the rule on
standing: (1) when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure
enforcement of a public duty for
the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and (2) wh
taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing
disbursement of public funds.
(ibid.)
3 “Controversy” – involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opp
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution
# 109 Case Title: Umali vs. Facts:
Guingona
Osmundo Umali was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of Inte
Revenue. However, a confidential memorandum against him was sen
GR No. 131124
President Ramos and thus forwarded to Presidential Commission on Anti-G
and Corruption for investigation. Umali complied with the pleadings
Date Promulgated: March 21, hearings set by PCAGC. Umali and his lawyer did not raise clarfica
1999
questions during the hearing. PCAGC foud prima facie evidence to suppor
charges and President Ramos issued AO 152 dismissing Umali.
Topic
Discussed:
The
constitutional question must be He appealed to the Office of the President but was denied. He elevated
raised at the earliest
RTC alleging that he was not accorded due process and deprived of securi
possible opportunity; Exceptions.
tenure. Petition for Certiorari was denied. CA reversed the decision and
elevated to SC. One of Umali raised the issue of the constitutionality of PC
as a government agency.
Student Assigned:
Issue: Whether or not the contention of Umali was raised at the ear
opportunity?
Decision: In lieu of the supervening events AO 152 was lifted. Regarding
constitutionality of PCAGC, it was only posed by petitioner in his motion
reconsideration before the RTC. It was certainly too late to raise the said i
for the first time at such a late stage of the proceedings.
# 110 Case Title: Hacienda Facts:
Luisita vs Presidential Agrarian Before the Court are the Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolutio
Reform Council
November 22, 2011 dated December 16, 2011 filed by petitioner Hacie
Luisita, Inc. (HLI) and the Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification d
GR No. 171101
December 9, 2011 filed by private respondents.
Hacienda Luisita Inc. maintains that the Notice of Coverage issued on Jan
Date Promulgated: 22 November 2, 2006 may, at the very least, be considered as the date of "taking" as this
2011
the only time that the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita were placed u
compulsory acquisition in view of its failure to perform certain obligat
Topic Discussed: The decision on under the SDP. January 2, 2006, was the date when the Notice of Coverage
the constitutional question must be
issued by the DAR pursuant to PARC Resolution No. 2006-3
determinative of the case itself recalling/revoking the approval of the Stock Distribution Plan(DSP).
(constitutional question must be the
very lis mota of the case)
Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid sa Hacienda Luisita (AMBA
contends that if HLI or Tadeco is, at all, entitled to just compensation,
Student Assigned:
"taking" should be reckoned as of November 21, 1989, the date when the
was approved, and the amount of compensation should be PhP 40,000
hectare as this was the same value declared in 1989 by Tadeco to ensure
the FWBs will not control the majority stockholdings in HLI.
Issue:
Whether or not in determining the just compensation, the date of "takin
November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP [stock distribution p
"in view of the fact that this is the time that the FWBS were considered to
and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita"
Held:
We maintain that the date of "taking" is November 21, 1989, the date w
PARC approved HLI’s SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2, in view o
fact that this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and posses
agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands bec
subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution sch
only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, November 21, 1989. Thus,
approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compul
acquisition.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco, the Court held that "the ‘tim
taking’ is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benef
his property, such as when title is transferred to the Republic." It shoul
noted, however, that "taking" does not only take place upon the issuance of
either in the name of the Republic or the beneficiaries of the Comprehen
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). "Taking" also occurs when agricult
lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and approved by PARC for C
coverage through the stock distribution scheme, as in the instant case. T
HLI’s submitting its SDP for approval is an acknowledgment on its part
the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita are covered by CARP. Howeve
was the PARC approval which should be considered as the effective da
"taking" as it was only during this time that the government officially confir
the CARP coverage of these lands.
# 111 Case Title: Salvador
Estipona, Jr. vs Hon. Lobrigo
FACTS:Salvador Estipona, Jr. was indicted for violating Section 11 (illegal
possession of illegal drugs) of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Dangerous Drug
GR No. 226679
Act as he was alleged to have been caught in possession of shabu. Initially,
Estipona pleaded not guilty but later, with the assistance of the Public
Date Promulgated: Aug.15, 2017
Attorney’s Office, he filed a motion to withdraw his initial plea and with a
simultaneous motion to enter into plea bargaining. The prosecution oppose
Topic Discussed: Is the Drugs the motions on the ground that plea bargaining is not allowed under Section
Law
prohibiting
Plea of RA 9165. Judge Frank Lobrigo, although he agreed with the points raised
bargaining a usurpation of the Estipona, denied Estipona’s motion on the ground that what Estipona was
rule-making power of the raising was a question on the constitutionality of Section 23 of RA 9165. Jud
Supreme Court?
Lobrigo opined that although Regional Trial Courts have the power to rule o
the constitutionality of laws, he deemed it best not to rule on the matter as i
Student Assigned:
may have potential ramifications to drugs cases pending before his sala. He
Estipona eventually filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is constitutional.
HELD: No. Pursuant to Section 5 (5) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitutio
the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement o
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts belongs
exclusively to the Supreme Court. Congress has no authority to repeal, alter
supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure. Hence, Sec
23 of RA 9165, an act of Congress, is unconstitutional.
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure. In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining h
been defined as “a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work o
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval.” The
give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the
agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to
avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be
encouraged because the chief virtues of the system – speed, economy, and
finality – can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and t
court.
SIDE ISSUE: The Solicitor-General contended that the action was improp
on the grounds that: (1) the Congress should have been impleaded as an
indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165
cannot be attacked collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse should have bee
petition for declaratory relief before the Supreme Court or a petition for
certiorari before the RTC. Is the Solicitor-General correct?
HELD: Yes. But matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a
backseat when issues of substantial and transcendental importance are pres
(Doctrine of Transcendental Importance). In discharging its solemn duty as
final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Supreme Court shall not shirk from
obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with farreaching implications. hence, it can suspend the rules and decided on cases
such as this.
# 1 12 Case Title: Jardeliza vs FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicia
Sereno
and Bar Council (JBC) announce an opening for application and
recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza),
GR No. 213181
incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of
candidates. Hence, he was interviewed.
Date Promulgated: Aug. 19,
2014
However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself
CJ Sereno, will be invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked becaus
Topic Discussed: Can the Jardeleza’s integrity is in question.
Supreme Court review the
action of the JBC
During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information wh
characterized Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he
Student Assigned:
would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. His
request was denied and he was not included in the shortlist.
Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to
compel the JBC to include him in the list on the grounds that the JBC and C
Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite havin
garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course o
JBC proceedings in cases where an objection or opposition to an application
raised.
RULING: Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it
does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due process.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC
proceedings. Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be hea
and to explain one’s self is availing.
In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the
observance of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s du
to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the
nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process
supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who
vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to prot
the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces,
thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capricious assessm
of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply th
rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Jus
same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates o
fairness because the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount
that of soundness.
Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have bee
included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position
Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose from the violation by the JB
of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process.
True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not presc
from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of d
process.
# 113 Case Title:
Ombudsman
Leyson vs. FACTS: The Coconut Industry Investment Fund ( CIIF) companies faile
comply with its contract agreement with the International Towage
Transport Corporation (ITTC) for the transport of coconut oild in bulk. I
GR No. 134990
Executive Vice President Manual Leysin, Jr. Filed a complaint with the o
of the Ombudsman for breach of contract among others. The complaint
Date Promulgated:
Apr. 27, dismissed.
2000
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdictio
Topic Discussed: Scope of Civil further act on the complaint.
Service;
HELD:
Student Assigned:
NO. All three corporations comprising the CIIF companies were organize
stocks corporations. The UCPB - CIIF owns 44.10% shares of Legazpi O
91.24% of the shares of GrandExport, and 92.85% of the shares of Un
Coconut. Obviously, the below 51 shares of stock in Legaspi Oil removes if f
the definition of government-owned or controlled corporation. There i
showing that GranExport and United Coconut was vested with funct
relation to public needs whether governmental or propriety in nature. T
CIIF companies are private corporations not within the scope of
Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.
# 114 Case Title: Social Security FACTS:
System vs the Court of Appeal
Spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio Cruz applied for and were grant
real estate loan by the SSS with their residential lot located at Lozada St
GR No. 85279
Sto. Rosario, Pateros, Rizal. Claiming that the conditions of mortgage
been broken, SSS filed an application for foreclosure of real estate mortgage
Date Promulgated: July 28, 1989
The Cruz spouses, together with their daughter Lorna C. Cruz, instituted be
the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for damages and attorney’s
Topic Discussed: Right to against the Social Security System (SSS) and the Provincial Sheriff of R
organize
alleging, among other things, that they had fully and religiously paid
Student Assigned:
monthly amortizations and had not defaulted in any payment.
ISSUE: Can the SSS, exercising governmental functions, be held liable
damages?
HELD:
YES.
There should be no question on this score considering that the SSS is a juri
entity with a personality of its own. It has corporate powers separate
distinct from the Government. SSS’ own organic act specifically provides th
can sue and be sued in Court.
These words “sue and be sued” embrace all civil process incident to a
action. So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity f
suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the exp
provision of the aforecited enabling law, the Government must be deeme
have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not the
concede its liability. That statutory law has given to the private-citize
remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights.
The SSS thereby has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the Co
subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. Whether the SSS perfo
governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes unnecessary to bela
For by that waiver, a private citizen may bring a suit against it for va
objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain compensation in damages ar
from contract and even for tort.
# 115 Case Title: Bitonio, Jr. vs FACTS:
COA
Petitioner Bitonio was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relat
GR No. 147392
in the DOLE. DOLE Acting Secretary Brilliantes designated the Bitonio t
Date Promulgated:
2004
March 12,
the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of PEZA. As represent
of the Secretary of Labor to the PEZA, Bitonio was receiving a per diem
every board meeting he attended during the years 1995 to 1997. After a
audit of the PEZA's disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed
Topic Discussed: Ban on double
payment of per diems to the petitioner pursuant to the ruling in
compensation:
Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary where Executive Order No.
Student Assigned:
allowing government officials to hold multiple positions in government
declared unconstitutional. Thus, Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
their Assistant Secretaries, are prohibited to hold other government office
positions in addition to their primary positions and to receive compensa
therefor, except in cases where the Constitution expressly provides. Bit
filed an MR but the COA denied the same. Thus, he appealed to the SC.
The petitioner maintains that he is entitled to the payment of per diems, as
No. 7916 specifically and categorically provides for the payment of a per d
for the attendance of the members of the Board of Directors at b
meetings of PEZA. The petitioner contends that this law is presumed t
valid; unless and until the law is declared unconstitutional, it remains in e
and binding for all intents and purposes. Neither can this law be rend
nugatory on the basis of a mere memorandum circular COA Memorandum
97-038 issued by the COA. The petitioner stresses that R.A. No. 7916
statute more superior than an administrative directive and the former ca
just be repealed or amended by the latter.
He also posits that R.A. No. 7916 was enacted four (4) years after the case
of Civil Liberties Union was promulgated. It is, therefore, assumed that the
legislature, before enacting a law, was aware of the prior holdings of the cou
Since the constitutionality or the validity of R.A. No. 7916 was never
challenged, the provision on the payment of per diems remains in force
notwithstanding the Civil Liberties Union case. Nonetheless, the petitioner'
position as Director IV is not included in the enumeration of officials
prohibited to receive additional compensation as clarified in the Resolution
the Court dated August 1, 1991; thus, he is still entitled to receive the per
diems.
Issue:
Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by
petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meeting
representative of the Secretary of Labor.
Held:
1. Yes. The Secretary of Labor, who sits in an ex officio capacity as memb
the Board of Directors of the Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA
prohibited from receiving any compensation for this additional office, bec
his services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attache
his principal office. It follows that the petitioner, who sits in the PEZA B
merely as representative of the Secretary of Labor, is likewise prohibited f
receiving any compensation therefor. Otherwise, the representative would
a better right than his principal, and the fact that the petitioner’s pos
as Director IV of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) is
covered by the ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment. A
all, the petitioner attended the board meetings by the authority given to him
the Secretary of Labor to sit as his representative. If it were not for
designation, the petitioner would not have been in the Board at all.
There is also no merit in the allegation that the legislature was certainly aw
of the parameters set by the Court when it enacted R.A. No. 7916, four (4) y
after the finality of the Civil Liberties Union case. The payment of per d
was clearly an express grant in favor of the members of the Boar
Directors which the petitioner is entitled to receive.
It is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to
highest law of the land which is the Constitution. No law can render nuga
the Constitution because the Constitution is more superior to a statute. If a
happens to infringe upon or violate the fundamental law, courts of justice
step in to nullify its effectiveness. It is the task of the Court to see to it tha
law must conform to the Constitution.
The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law which is
reason why the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748. Under the amende
law, the members of the Board of Directors was increased from 8 to 13,
specifying therein that it is the undersecretaries of the different Departmen
who should sit as board members of the PEZA. The option of designating hi
representative to the Board by the different Cabinet Secretaries was deleted
Likewise, the last paragraph as to the payment of per diems to the members
the Board of Directors was also deleted, considering that such stipulation w
clearly in conflict with the proscription set by the Constitution.
# 116 Case Title: Phil. Airlines FACTS:
vs. COA
In this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner Philip
GR No. 91890
Airlines. Inc. (PAL) seeks to review, annul end reverse Decision No. 1127 o
Commission on Audit (COA) dated January 5, 1990 and to prohibit, enjoin
prevent COA from enforcing or in any way implementing Department O
Date Promulgated: Jun 09, 1995 No. 19, s. 1974 of the then Department of General Services as implemente
COA Circular No. 78-84, Memorandum No. 498 and Memorandum No.
565. COA Decision No. 1127 required PAL to purchase its fuel requirem
Topic
Discussed:
(scope solely from Petron Corporation (Petron).
includes those NGOs receiving
subsidy or equity, directly or PAL is a domestic corporation organized and existing under the Philip
indirectly from or through the laws, principally engaged in the air transport business, both domestic
Government)
international. At the time of the filing of the petition on February 8, 1
majority of its shares of stock was owned by the Government Service Insur
Student Assigned:
System (GSIS), a government corporation.
To assure itself of continuous, reliable and cost-efficient supply of fuel,
adopted a system of bidding out its fuel requirements under a multiple sup
set-up whereby PAL awarded to the lowest bidder sixty percent (60%) of its
requirements and to the second lowest bidder the remaining
percent(40%), provided it matched the price of the lowest bidder.
On August 17, 1989, COA wrote PAL a letter stating “It has come to
attention that PAL international fuel supply contracts are expiring this Au
31, 1989. In this connection, you are advised to desist from bidding
company's fuel supply contracts, considering that existing regulations req
government-owned or controlled corporations and other agencies
government to procure their petroleum product requirements from PETR
Corporation.”
PAL sought reconsideration of the August 17, 1989 advice, reiterating
reasons contained in an earlier letter, for preferring to bid out and secur
fuel supply from more than one supplier and for its contention
Department Order No. 19, s. 1974, as circularized by COA Office Memoran
No. 490, should not apply to PAL. The final appeal for reconsideration how
it was denied. Hence this assailed decision.
ISSUE:
Whether the Commission on Audit committed grave abuse of discre
amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that Department Order
19, of the defunct department of general services applies to PAL?
HELD:
[the Court is compelled to dismiss the petition pursuant to the governm
privitization program, PAL's shares of stock were bidded out earlier
year, resulting in the acquisition by PR Holdings, a private corporation, of
PAL's outstanding stocks. PAL having ceased to be a government-owne
controlled corporation, is no longer under the audit jurisdiction of the C
Accordingly, the question raised in this petition has clearly become moot
academic.]
Had it not been for this supervening event, PAL would have obtained the r
sought in the instant petition. For although COA was correct in ruling
Department Order No. 19 applied to PAL as a government agency at the tim
nonetheless gravely abused its discretion in not exempting PAL therefrom.
The COA is clothed under Section 2(2), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitu
with the "exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to de
the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and meth
required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules,
regulations including those for the prevention and disallowance of irreg
unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures, or us
government funds and properties." The authority granted under
constitutional provision, being broad and comprehensive enough, enables
to adopt as its own, simply by reiteration or by reference, without the nece
of repromulgation, already existing rules and regulations. It may also exp
the coverage thereof to agencies or instrumentalities under its a
jurisdiction.
The reasons given by PAL for seeking exemption from the operatio
Department Order No. 19 were, to our mind, meritorious. They far outw
the policy enunciated in Department Order No. 19 of giving preferenc
government sources in the filling of the needs of the government for supp
Thus, PAL's bidding requirement conformed to the accepted policy of
government to subject every transaction/contract to public bidding in ord
protect public interest by giving the public the best possible advantages
open competition and to avoid or preclude suspicion of favoritism
anomalies in the execution of public contracts.
Its multiple supplier set-up was designed precisely to meet every conting
that might disrupt its fuel supply. It bespoke of foresight, careful planning
sound business judgment on the part of PAL. As a business operation he
dependent on fuel supply, for PAL to rely solely on a single supplier w
indeed be impracticable. To compel it to do so would amount to a grave a
of discretion on its part as this might well lead to irregular, excessiv
unconscionable expenditures, the very evil sought to be avoided in the crea
of the COA.
# 1 17 Case Title: Luego vs. CSC
GR No. L-69137
Date Promulgated:
1986
August 5,
Topic
Discussed:
(scope
includes those NGOs receiving
subsidy or equity, directly or
indirectly from or through the
Government)
Student Assigned:
FACTS:
Petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer II, Office of the City Ma
Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on 18 February 1983. The appointm
was described as “permanent” but the Civil Service Commission approved
“temporary.” On 22 March 1984, the Civil Service Commission found
private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the conte
position and accordingly directed herein private respondent in plac
petitioner’s position. The private respondent was so appointed on 28 J
1984, by the new mayor; Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner is now invo
his earlier permanent appointment as well as to question the Civil Se
Commission’s order and the private respondent’s title.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disappro
permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qual
than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacemen
the latter?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is
empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extende
the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing
appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When
appointee is qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied,
Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance
the Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service Commission’s resolution i
aside.
# 118 Case Title: Office of the
Ombudsman vs Madriaga
GR No. 164316
Date Promulgated:Sept.
2006,
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman has the authorit
impose administrative sanctions over public officials.
FACTS: The San Juan School Club filed a letter-complaint before the Offi
the Ombudsman charging Gertudes Madriaga with violation of Section
27, Rule IV and Section 1 of Rule VI of the rules implementing R.A. 6713.
DECISION: Yes. The Office of the Ombudsman has the authority to im
Topic Discussed: Composition, administrative sanctions over public officials.
Qualification, and Appointment
# 1 Case Title:
Sandiganbayan
GR No. 91890
Uy
vs
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecutory power of the Ombudsman has no authori
prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of regular courts?
Held:
No. The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to
Date Promulgated: March 20, Ombudsman us plenary and unqualified. It has been held that the clause
2001
illegal act or omission of any public officials” is broad enough to embrac
kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance committed by pu
officers and employees during their tenure of office.
Topic Discussed: Direct other
officials to make appropriate action The court held in the case of Sanchez vs. Demetriou that the power of
against public officials and ensure Ombudsman under Section 15 (1) of RA 6770 is not an exclusive authority
compliance
rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. T
Administrative Order No. 8 issued by the Office of Ombudman provides:
prosecution of case cognizable by the Sandiganbayan shall be under the d
exclusive control and supervision by the Office of the Ombudsman. The
recognizes a concurrence of jurisdiction between the Office of the Ombuds
and other investigate agencies of government in the prosecution of c
cognizable by regular courts.
# 119 Case Title: Cruz vs Sec
DENR
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition
GR No.135385
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of cer
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigen
People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulat
Date Promulgated: Dec. 6, 2000 (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on
ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s owner
Topic Discussed:
Regalian over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resou
Doctrine
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article
of the Constitution.
Student Assigned:
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining
IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership
the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over
natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and
rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of the lan
which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of t
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development
exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the land
the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by na
title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any r
grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by
ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and
not include the right to alienate the same.
# 120 Case Title: CRUZ VS. SEC. Facts:
OF DENR
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition
GR No.135385.
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of cer
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigen
People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulat
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on
Date Promulgated: December ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s owner
06, 2000
over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resou
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article
of the Constitution.
Topic
Discussed:
(scope Issue:
includes those NGOs receiving Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.
subsidy or equity, directly or
indirectly from or through the Held:
Government)
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation
Student Assigned:
voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 o
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.
# 121 Case Title: Chavez vs. PEA
GR No. 133250
Date Promulgated:
2003-
May
FACTS:
President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA, which
tasked with the development, improvement, and acquisition, lease,
sale of all kinds of lands. The then president also transferred to PEA
foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coasta
6, Road and Reclamation Project.
Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land
then, years later, PEA entered into a JVA with AMARI for the developm
Topic
Discussed:
(scope of the Freedom Islands. These two entered into a joint venture in
includes those NGOs receiving absence of any public bidding.
subsidy or equity, directly or
indirectly from or through the Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Ma
Government)
denouncing the JVA as the grandmother of all scams. An investigation
conducted and it was concluded that the lands that PEA was conveyin
AMARI were lands of the public domain; the certificates of title over
Student Assigned:
Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This prom
Ramos to form an investigatory committee on the legality of the JVA.
Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to
billions by the conveyance or sale of the reclaimed areas to AMARI.
also asked for the full disclosure of the renegotiations happening between
parties.
ISSUE:
W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of
lands, reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
HELD:
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged area
rooted in the Regalian doctrine, which holds that the State owns all lands
waters of the public domain.
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It declares tha
natural resources are owned by the State and except for alien
agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources cannot
alienated.
The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 15
hectares of the 750 hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and
rest of the area are still submerged areas forming part of Ma
Bay. Further, it is provided that AMARI will reimburse the actual cos
reclaiming the areas of land and it will shoulder the other reclamation cos
be incurred.
The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the land
the public domain, waters and other natural resources and conseque
owned by the State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas shall no
alienable unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the pu
domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by the PEA doesn’t con
these inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable
disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable
disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-pu
use.
# 122 Case Title: DENR vs. Yap
GR No.167707
Date Promulgated: October 8,
2008
Topic
Discussed:
Citizenship
Requirement for acquisition of
alienable agricultural land of the
public domain
Student Assigned:
FACTS:
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of App
(CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, w
granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants M
Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 decla
Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc.
1801 precluded them from filing an application for a judicial confirmatio
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claim
filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed
petition countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the pu
domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” w
was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or
Revised Forestry Code.
ISSUE:
Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically dee
agricultural land, therefore making these lands alienable.
HELD:
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alien
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the governm
such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administra
action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, an
legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In kee
with the presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and a
emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such a
official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable
for agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to
State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership
presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acqu
from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as
of the inalienable public domain.
# 123 Case Title:
Defensor- FACTS:
Santiago vs. COMELEC
Private respondent filed with public respondent Commission on Elect
(COMELEC) a “Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limit
GR No.127325
Elective Officials, by People’s Initiative” (Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin a
the COMELEC for an order (1) Fixing the time and dates for signa
Date Promulgated: March 19, gathering all over the country; (2) Causing the necessary publications of
1997
Order and the attached “Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution
newspapers of general and local circulation; and (3) Instructing Muni
Topic
Discussed:
People’s Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist Petitioners
Initiative
volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the d
designated for the purpose. Delfin asserted that R.A. No. 6735 governs
Student Assigned:
conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution and COMELEC Resolution
2300 is a valid exercise of delegated powers. Petitioners contend that R.A.
6375 failed to be an enabling law because of its deficiency and inadequacy,
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not (1) the absence of subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, (2)
No. 6735 is adequate to cover the system of initiative on amendment to
Constitution, and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid.
HELD:
NO. Petition (for prohibition) was granted. The conspicuous silenc
subtitles simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative
referendum on national and local laws. R.A. No. 6735 failed to pro
sufficient standard for subordinate legislation. Provisions COME
Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduc
initiative or amendments to the Constitution are declared void.
RATIO:
Subtitles are intrinsic aids for construction and interpretation. R.A. No. 6
failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in
other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II
Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peo
initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only afte
filing. The petition then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filin
cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to presc
the form of the petition; (2) to issue through its Election Records and Stati
Office a certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legisla
district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the establishmen
signature stations; and (4) to verify, through its election registrars,
signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits,
voters’ identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
# 124 Case Title:
COMELEC
Lambino vs. FACTS:
Lambino Group, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petitio
change the 1987 Constitution. They filed a petition with the COMELEC to
GR No.174153
a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Sec 5(b) and (c)
Sec 7 of RA No. 6735. They alleged that their petition had the suppo
Date Promulgated: October 25, 6,327,952 individuals constituting at least 12% of all registered voters,
2006
each legislative district represented by at least 3% of its registered vo
COMELEC denied the petition.
Topic
Discussed:
People’s
Initiativeeople’s
Initiative ISSUE:
(Amendment only)
Whether the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Sectio
Article XVII of the Constitution.
Student Assigned:
RULING:
NO. The framers intended that the “draft of the proposed constituti
amendment” should be “ready and shown” to the people “before” they
such proposal, before they sign there is already a draft shown to them and
the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents m
“prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”The essenc
amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upo
petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people.
essential elements must be present: the people must author and sign the e
proposal andit must be embodied in a petition. These are present only if the
text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express
assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendme
“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only i
people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the prop
amendments. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either wr
on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition m
state such fact. This is an assurance that every one of the several million
signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before sign
Otherwise, it is physically impossible to prove.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition, a copy of the p
that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino G
submitted a copy of a signature sheet after the oral arguments. The signa
sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from
Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system
government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft o
proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly
signature sheet is not the “petition” that the framers of the Constitu
envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article X
of the Constitution.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendm
must be incorporated with, or attached to, the initiative petition signed by
people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group’s proposed changes w
not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lam
Group’s citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physi
impossible for all or a great majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have
the petition before they signed the signature sheets. The inescapable conclu
is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million signatories the
text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories
the petition before they signed the signature sheets.
Subject : Constitutional 1
Date: 26 November 2022