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SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY et al.
Vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., Mayor of the City of Manila
G.R. No. 156052
March 7, 2007
FACTS
The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila passed Ordinance No. 8027, which reclassified the area
from industrial to commercial and ordered owners and operators of enterprises forbidden from
functioning within six months of the ordinance's effective date. The so-called "Pandacan
Terminals" of the oil corporations Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation, and Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation are among the businesses located in the area.
But the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) agreed in a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the oil companies that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals
was the most viable and practicable option." In the MOU, the oil companies were required to
remove 28 tanks, starting with the LPG spheres, and to start work on the creation of safety buffer
and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. The City Mayor and DOE will allow the oil
corporations to continue operating inside the constrained region created by joint operations and
the scale-down program in return. In Resolution No. 97, the Sangguniang Panlungosod approved
the MOU.
In order to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and require the immediate removal of the oil company
terminals, petitioners ask that a mandamus be issued against Mayor Atienza.
Issue
Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals.
Ruling
Yes. The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the obligation, as city mayor, to
"enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city," one of which is Ordinance
No. 8027, and establishes upon respondent the duty to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to
the governance of the city." As the city's chief executive, he is obligated to uphold Ordinance No.
8027 as long as the Sanggunian has not repealed it or the courts have not declared it invalid. He is
without other options. His ministerial duty requires him to comply.
DIOCESE OF BACOLOD
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015
FACTS
On February 21, 2013, petitioners put up two (2) tarpaulins inside the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod's private compound. The size of each tarpaulin was roughly six feet by ten feet. They
were displayed in plain sight on the cathedral's entrance walls. The phrase "IBASURA RH Law"
on the first tarpaulin refers to Republic Act No. 10354, often known as the Reproductive Health
Law of 2012. The second tarpaulin is what the current lawsuit is about. This tarpaulin has the
headline "Conscience Vote" and names the candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a
checkmark or "(Pro-RH) Team Patay" with a "X". The electoral candidates were divided into
groups based on how they voted in favor of Republic Act No. 10354, also known as the "the RH
Law." According to petitioners, those who voted in favor of the law's passage make up "Team
Patay," while those who voted against it make up "Team Buhay."
Respondents acknowledged that no candidate sponsored or paid for the tarpaulin. Additionally,
the petitioners acknowledged that only candidates for the 2013 elections are listed on the tarpaulin,
not those lawmakers who contributed to the development of the RH Law but did not run for office
in that year.
Issues
1) Whether or not the Diocese's fundamental right to freedom of expression was violated by
COMELEC's contested notice and letter requesting the removal of the tarpaulin.
2) Whether or not the tarpaulin removal order is a regulation that is either content-based or contentneutral.
3) Whether or not the petitioners' property rights were violated.
4) Whether or not the message on the tarpaulin qualifies as religious expression
Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the
removal of the Pandacan Terminals.
Ruling
1) YES. The petitioners' right to freedom of speech is violated by these COMELEC orders.
COMELEC lacks the jurisdiction to control how a non-candidate may exercise their preferred right
to freedom of expression. Every citizen has high levels of protection for their political expression.
The Court ruled that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The
COMELEC's argument that the tarpaulin is election propaganda, being the Diocese's way of
endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it, holds
no water. No political candidate or group paid for or placed the tarpaulin "in exchange for
consideration."
2) The COMELEC's prohibition is a rule that is based on content. Contrary to content-neutral
regulation, which focuses only on the circumstances around the communication, such as its time,
place, or manner, content-based restraint or censorship refers to limitations "based on the subject
matter of the utterance or speech." There is a strong presumption against content-based regulation,
hence the clear and present danger test must be used. In this instance, COMELEC was unable to
defend the rule. There is no compelling and significant governmental interest threatened by the
tarpaulin posting that would allow for the restriction of the freedom of expression. The state has
no justification for undermining the non-candidate petitioners' right to erect the tarpaulin on their
private land. No one else's constitutional rights are affected by the size of the tarpaulin.
3) YES. The court decided that even though the tarpaulin is clearly visible to the public, the diocese
nonetheless owns it privately. The Constitution also protects their right to use their property.
Therefore, any legislation that effectively confiscates private property or infringes on property
rights in an arbitrary or irrational manner is invalid because it violates the constitutional guarantees
of due process and equal treatment under the law.
4) NO. The viewpoint of the Catholic Church in the Philippines with regard to the RH Law is
insufficient to classify the posting of a tarpaulin by one of its members as religious expression on
that grounds alone. There can be no question that the list of candidates on the tarpaulin's face
indicates that it is political speech and not religious discourse.
PBM Employees Asso. v PBM 51 SCRA 189 (1973)
FACTS
Petitioners gave notice to the employers of the respondents of their plans to hold a large protest
against the allegedly abusive actions of the Pasig police. The petitioners argue that the
demonstration is not a strike against their employer but rather an exercise of their right to peaceful
assembly to voice their complaints against the oppressive Pasig police. The respondent claims that
the demonstration violates their CBA agreement. The petitioners were dismissed by the
respondent, and the court upheld their claim that they engaged in ill faith bargaining.
Issue
Whether the petitioners' ability to assemble peacefully was interfered with in any way.
Ruling
According to the court, it has been upheld that human rights including the freedom of expression,
of peaceful assembly, and of petitioning for the redress of grievances take precedence over
property rights. The obvious goal of the mass protest organized by the respondent company's
employees was for their mutual defense and protection against alleged police abuses; to deny this
would have interfered with or limited the employees' right to take such collective action to better
protect themselves against such alleged police indignities. The firing of the 8 labor leaders for
leading the demonstration in addition to flouting constitutional protections for free speech and
assembly as well as the right of workers to petition for the resolution of their complaints.
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
vs.
DANTE O. GARIN
G.R. No. 130230
April 15, 2005
FACTS
Due to his improper parking, respondent Garin received a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and had
his driver's license taken away. Garin requested the reinstatement of his license in a letter to the
former MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta, stating that he preferred to have his case brought before
a judge. Without receiving a prompt response from the chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary
injunction, claiming, among other things, that Section 5 of RA 7924 violates the constitution's ban
on the improper delegation of legislative authority by allowing MMDA to set and impose
unlimited and arbitrary fines and penalties. RTC ruled in his favor, ordering MMDA to return his
license and for the authority to stop taking drivers' licenses without first allowing the owner a
chance to be heard in a suitable hearing.
ISSUE
Whether or whether Section 5 of RA 7924, which allows the MMDA to seize, suspend, or revoke
a driver's license in order to enforce traffic laws and regulations, is constitutional.
Ruling
Police authority does not belong to the MMDA. It was determined that MMDA does not possess
the authority to adopt ordinances for the community's welfare as a local government unit of a
public company or as a public corporation endowed with legislative authority.
The legislature has the authority to create any wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances with or without penalties that are not in violation of the constitution and that they deem
to be in the commonwealth's and its subjects' best interests. This authority is known as police
power.
There is no clause in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA or its council the authority to "enact
ordinance, approve resolutions, and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of
Metro Manila." The MMDA was established to set policies and work with other national
government agencies, People's Organizations, NGOs, and the private sector to deliver services
effectively and quickly. Its activities are all administrative in nature.
CARLOS BALACUIT, LAMBERTO TAN and SERGIO YU CARCEL,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE AND
BUTUAN CITY, Branch 11, and the CITY OF BUTUAN,
G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988
FACTS
The City of Butuan's Municipal Board approved Ordinance No. 640 on April 21, 1969, which
imposes fines on individuals and organizations who sell entry tickets for movies or other public
events and demand that children between the ages of 7 and 12 pay the full fee. The petitioners are
theatrical directors in the aforementioned city. They argued that the ordinance should not be
applied because it is unlawful.
The Municipal Board, on the other side, argued that it was a legitimate use of police force since,
as stated in RA 523, the City of Butuan Charter, the Board has the authority to control and
determine the amount of license fees for theaters, cinematographs, etc.
Issue
Is the Municipal Board's action a legal exercise of police authority?
Ruling
No. In order to wield police power, it must not only appear that the public interest usually justifies
interfering with individual rights, but also that the methods used to achieve the goal are reasonable
necessary and do not unfairly oppress people. The regulation was developed to assist parents who
lament that it is too expensive to purchase their children at full price. There is no public need for
this. A police authority law must be firmly based on the welfare and interest of the general public.
The requirement that children and adults pay the same fee is not evil. Under the pretense of
regulation, a valid business or calling may not be unduly interfered with, not even by the use of
police authority.
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO
vs.
THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ
G.R. No. L-63419 December 18, 1986
FACTS
The Bouncing Checks Law, BP 22, was adopted to halt or to curtail the practice of issuing checks
that are worthless, according to a report that estimated the daily value of bouncing checks to be
close to Php200 million. By making the act of writing a worthless check illegal, it immediately
addresses the issue.
The petitioners in this case contest the constitutionality of the aforementioned law on the following
grounds First, it violates the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt, Second. it
restricts the freedom of contract, Third, it violates the equal protection clause, Fourth, it improperly
delegated legislative and executive power, and Fifth , its enactment was flawed because the Interim
Batasan broke the law against amending bills of legislation during its passage.
Issue
Is BP 22 constitutional?
Ruling
Yes. Although it is true that the Constitution protects against imprisonment due to failure to pay a
debt or poll tax, the debt intended to be covered by the constitutional guarantee pertains to those
deriving from contracts rather than those ex delicto. BP 22 is a legitimate use of police authority
because the act was punished under the law as an infraction against public order rather than
property.
By passing BP 22, the legislature declared that the writing and issuing of worthless checks
constituted a public nuisance that needed to be stopped by the enforcement of criminal penalties.
In this aspect, the Court cannot contest the legality of the law.
Carlos Superdrug Corp. et al. petitioners,
Vs.
DSWD, et al., respondents
G.R. No. 166494, June 29,2007
Facts
This is an application for prohibition with a prayer for preliminary injunction challenging the
legality of Section 4 of Republic Act R.A. No. 9257, also referred to as the Expanded Senior
Citizens Act of 2003.
The petitioners are local businesses and owners who run pharmacies in the Philippines. The
Department of Social Welfare and Development , the Department of Health , the Department of
Finance , the Department of Justice , and the Department of Interior and Local Government , on
the other hand, are public respondents with the specific mandate to monitor the drugstores'
compliance with the law , Establish implementing laws and regulations, pursue legal action against
violating drugstore businesses, and have their licenses revoked.
Issue
whether Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257 is constitutional.
Ruling
YES. The statute is an acceptable use of police power that, like the power of eminent domain, has
the public good as its goal. In order to emphasize how extensive police power is to fulfill all needs
and leave opportunity for an effective and flexible reaction to conditions and circumstances, it has
been purposefully cloaked in generic words. This ensures the best benefits.
As a result of its broad application to all significant public requirements, it has been called the
most crucial, demanding, and least limitable of all powers. The legislature has the authority to
create any wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances—with or without penalties—
that they deem necessary for the commonwealth's and its subjects' well-being. This authority is
granted to the legislature by the constitution.
For this reason, even while property rights are protected by due process, they must give way to the
interests of the general welfare when the circumstances so require as established by the legislature.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS
ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO CHIU,
petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA
G.R. No. L-24693
July 31, 1967
Facts
On June 14, 1963, the Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association and one of its
members, Hotel del Mar Inc., filed a petition to have Manila's prohibition of Ordinance 4670
enforced.
They argued that because hotels were not covered by the Manila City Board's regulatory authority,
the ordinance was outside of its purview. They further argued that Section 1 of the contested
ordinance was unconstitutional and void because it imposed license fees of P6,000.00 for firstclass motels and P4,500.00 for second-class motels annually and required visitors to fill out a form
with their personal information. These provisions were deemed unreasonable and in violation of
due process.
The structures and amenities of such hotels, motels, and lodging establishments were also subject
to inspection by local authorities. They asserted that the vagueness of this was a violation of due
process.
The law also divided hotels into two categories and stipulated that first-class hotels must maintain
a minimum set of amenities, including a restaurant, a dining room, and a laundry. Additionally,
the petitioners claimed that this was arbitrary because there was no due process.
The owner was also forbidden from renting out any room or section of a room more than twice
every 24 hours. Persons under the age of 18 were also not allowed at the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also resulted in the licenses of the hotels that disregarded the law being
automatically revoked. The ordinance was deemed illegal by the lower court.
Hence, the city of Manila is making this appeal.
Issue
Whether City of Manila Ordinance No. 4760 violates the due process provision.
Ruling
Yes. The ordinance was passed in order to curtail certain actions that were detrimental to public
morals. The decision was made in light of the alarming rise in prostitution, adultery, and
fornication rates in Manila, which can be largely attributed to the presence of motels. These
establishments offer the necessary conditions for covert entry, presence, and exit, making them the
perfect haven for prostitutes and thrill seekers.
The ordinance aims to prevent transients and guests of these establishments from being harbored
secretly by requiring them to fill out a registration form prepared for the purpose in a lobby that is
always open to the public and by introducing several other amendatory provisions designed to
destroy the confidentiality surrounding the registration of transients and guests. The increase in
license fees was implemented to both boost revenue for the municipal government and deter
businesses of this type from operating for unlawful purposes.
Additionally, the limitation on the right to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance prohibits
the owner, manager, keeper, or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house,
tavern, common inn, or the like from leasing or renting any room or portion thereof more than
twice every 24 hours, with the caveat that full payment shall always be charged, cannot be viewed
as a violation of the law's requirement of due process. It is neither irrational nor arbitrarily chosen.
The freedom of the citizen may be restricted for reasons such as the public health, public order,
and safety, or for other reasons that fall within the proper purview of the police power. Personal
freedom, property, and businesses and occupations may all be interfered with by the state in the
name of promoting the general welfare.
Social Justice Society, et.al.
Vs.
Hon. Jose Atienza
G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008
Facts
The Manila City Council passed Ordinance No. 8027, which reclassified the Pandacan Area from
industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses prohibited by the
reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months of the
ordinance's effective date. The oil corporations Shell, Chevron (Caltex), and Petron, which have
oil storage in the area, are the most affected.
Despite the ordinance, the Sanggunian passed Resolution No. 13, which extended the agreement
to close the Pandacan depots until April 2003 and permitted the mayor of Manila to issue special
business permits to the oil firms. Nonetheless, the petitioners filed a mandamus petition, seeking
to compel the Mayor to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. The oil firms challenged the ordinance's
constitutionality.
Issue
Whether or whether Ordinance No. 8027 is legal and enforceable.
Ruling
The Court decided in favor of the petitioners. Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted in the present
instance to promote sound urban planning, public safety, and the general welfare of Manila people.
The Sanggunian was compelled to take precautions to protect its citizens from catastrophic
devastation in the event of a terrorist assault on the Pandacan stockpiles.
Furthermore, the zoning rule that reclassified the region is a reasonable and not arbitrary enactment
to the oil corporations because they were not restricted or prohibited from conducting business in
the city except in the now reclassified location of the depot, where such operations are no longer
permitted. The authority to create zones for industrial, commercial, and residential purposes stems
from the police power itself and is used to protect and benefit inhabitants.
The Court decided that property condemned as a result of the use of police power is not subject to
compensation despite claims that they should not be reimbursed. It is not a taking when a
restriction is put in place to safeguard people's lives, public health, and safety.
Velasco vs. Villegas
G.R. No. 24153
Feb. 14, 1983
Facts
The petitioners question the constitutionality based on Manila City Ordinance No. 4964, which
forbade the practice of massaging clients of a barber shop. They are speaking on their own behalf
as well as behalf of the other proprietors of barbershops in Manila. They claim that it amounted to
the taking of their livelihood without following the required legal procedures.
Issue
Whether the ordinance in question was illegal and thus an improper use of police authority
Ruling
No. The attack on the validity cannot prevail. It is a police power measure, as stated in the brief of
respondents-appellees. The goals of its passage are as follows: First, to be able to impose payment
of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as
amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the
business of barbershops; and, Second, to prevent possible immorality which might grow out of
the construction of separate rooms for massage of customers.
The Court has been extremely lenient when upholding laws based on the general welfare clause.
The relevance and reach of such a phrase, which "delegates in statutory form the police power to
a municipality.The courts have liberally interpreted this provision in respect to the unique facts of
the case, as previously mentioned, and municipal authorities have applied this clause widely.
Therefore, it is good that the Philippine legal system be seen in a progressive manner.
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC.
G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
Facts
When PAGCOR announced that a casino will be opening in Cagayan de Oro City, there was
immediate opposition. The issue emerged when PAGCOR decided to expand its activities to
Cagayan de Oro City in 1992, flush with its remarkable success in numerous places. The
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City's response was immediate and harsh. Ordinance
No. 3353 was passed on December 7, 1992.
Additionally, this wasn't everything. On January 4, 1993, it passed a stricter Ordinance
No. 3375-93. Pryce challenged the ordinances in court, and PAGCOR joined in as an
intervenor and supplemental petitioner. They won the contest. The Court of Appeals
invalidated the ordinances and issued the order that was requested to prevent their
enforcement on March 31, 1993.
Issue
Whether Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 are enforceable.
Ruling
No, Local government units are authorized by the Local Government
Code to prevent or suppress, among other things, "gambling and
other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision
excludes games of chance that are not prohibited but are in fact
permitted by law. The rationale for the requirement that the
ordinances not contravene a statute is obvious. 1869.