SESBRENO VS. CA
G.R. NO. 89252.
MAY 24, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner, Raul Sebreño made a money market placement in the amount or
P300,000 with the Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation, Cebu Branch which
would mature in March 1981. Upon the maturity of the money market placement,
Philfinance issued a Certification of Confirmation of Sale of a Delta Motors Corp
Promissory Note which was in the custody of Pilipinas Bank, Certificate of Securities
Delivery Receipts and 3 Postdated Checks. The petitioner sought to encash the
postdated checks but they were dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds.
Thus, Sesbreño sought to recover the DMC Promissory Note but Pilipinas Bank refused
to assign to him.
ISSUE:
Whether the Pilipinas Bank is Solidarily liable with Philfinance and Delta Motors
crop for the Promissory Note.
RULING:
No. The solidary liability that petitioner seeks to impute to Pilipinasvcannot,
however, be lightly inferred. Under Article 1207 of the Civil Code, "there is a solidary
liability only when the obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature
of the obligation requires solidarity." However, Pilipinas Bank is liable to Sesbreño as
the custodian bank in a contract of deposit.
Sesbreño became entitled to demand the physical delivery of the Promissory
Note held by Pilipinas Bank as soon as his money market placement matured.
PACIFIC BANKING CORP. VS. IAC
G.R. NO. 72275
NOVEMBER 13, 1991;
FACTS:
Cecilia Regala obtained from the plaintiff the issuance and use of Pacificard credit
card. Thereafter, her husband, Robert Regala, executed a Guarantpr’s Undertaking in
favor of PBC that he would be ‘jointly and severally liable’ with his wife. Celia Regala had
a 90,000 debt to which she defaulted. PBC filed suit against the spouses. Robert admitted
executing the Guarantor’s Undertaking but argued that his liability would only be limited
to 2.000 per month.
ISSUE:
Whether Robert is jointly and severally liable to PBC
RULING:
Yes. The undertaking signed by Roberto Regala, Jr. although denominated as
“Guarantor’s Undertalong” was in substance a contrant of surety. As distinguished from a
contract of guaranty where the guarantor binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the
obligation of the principal debtor only in case the latter should fail to do so, in a contract
of suretyship, the surety binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor (Art. 2047, Civil
Code of the Philippines)
QUIOMBING VS. CA
G.R. NO. 93010
AUGUST 30, 1990
FACTS:
Spouses Saligo executed a Construction and Service Agreement with the
Quiombing and Bisocho for the construction of their house for 130,000. Despite repeated
demands, the spouses were unable to pay the contractors for the recovery of sum of
money against the spouses. Spouses argues that Bisocho was an indispensable party
and if not impleaded would merit dismissal of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether Quiombing can recover payment alone as a solidary creditor.
RULING:
Private respondents were liable to either of the two as a solidary creditor for the
full amount of the debt. Full satisfaction of a judgement against them by Quiombing would
discharge their obligation to Biscocho. Hence, it was not necessary for Quiombing and
Biscocho to file the complaint.
If Quiombing eventually collects the amount due from the solidary debtors,
Biscocho may later claim his share thereof, but that decision is for him alone to make. It
will affect only the petitioner as the other solidary creditor and not the private respondents.
PNB vs. CA
G.R. No. 108630
April 2, 1996
FACTS
Private respondent Loreto Tan is the owner of a parcel of land abutting the national
highway in Mandalagan, Bacolod City. Expropriation proceedings were instituted by the
government against private respondent. Tan filed a motion requesting of an order for the
release to him of the expropriation price. Petitioner, through its assistant Branch Manager,
issued a manager’s check for the expropriation price and delivered the same to Sonia
Gonzaga, without Tan’s knowledge, consent and authority through an alleged SPA
executed in her favor by Tan.
Tan executed an affidavit denying execution of SPA in favor of Gonzaga. Tan failed to
recover the amount from PNB; he filed a motion with the court to require PNB to pay the
same to him as PNB contended that they have already paid the price through the
authorized Sonia Gonzaga.
ISSUE
Whether or not there was a complete delivery of payment to Tan that would
extinguish the obligation.
RULING
NO. There is no question that no payment had ever been made to private
respondent as the check was never delivered to him. When the court ordered petitioner
to pay private respondent the amount of P32,480.00, it had the obligation to deliver the
same to him. Under Art. 1233 of the Civil Code, a debt shall not be understood to have
been paid unless the thing or service in which the obligation consists of has been
completely delivered or rendered.
The burden of proof of such payment lies with the debtor. In the instant case,
neither the SPA nor the check issued by petitioner was ever presented in court.
TAYAG VS. CA,
G.R. No. 96053
March 3, 1993;
FACTS:
Juan Galicia Sr executed a deed of conveyance in favor of Leyva with the condition
that the latter will assume the debt of the former with PBV in the amount of 10,000.
Petitioners, the heirs of Galicia Sr. argued that the respondent breached the conditions
agreed upon in the deed of conveyance. While Leyva claims that there was full payment
and compliance with the stipulation.
ISSUE:
Whether Leyva has fully complied with his obligation
RULING:
YES. When respondent allegedly committed a breach of his obligations,
petitioners, instead of immediately filing a case to rescind the instruments, allowed Leyva
to effect numerous payments pursuant to the grace periods provided in the contract. Both
the trial and appellate courts were, therefore, correct in sustaining the claim of private
respondent anchored on estoppel or waiver by acceptance of delayed payments under
Article 1235 of the Civil Code in that: "When the obligee accepts the performance,
knowing its incompleteness or irregularity, and without expressing any protest or
objection, the obligation is deemed fully complied with."
BPI vs. CA
G.R. No. 104612
May 10, 1994
FACTS:
Priv RespondentsEastern Plywood Corporation and Lim as officer of the
corporation, had an “AND/OR” joint account with Commercial Bank and Trust Co (CBTC),
the pred interest of Petitioner BPI. Lim withdraw funds from such account and used it to
open a joint checking account (an “AND” account) with Mariano Velasco. When Velasco
died in 1977, said joint checking account had nearly P 663,000. By virtue of an Indemnity
Undertaking executed by Lim and as President and General Manager of Eastern, he
withdrew half of the amount and deposited it to one of the accounts of Eastern with CBTC.
Eastern obtained a loan of P73,000.00 from CBTC which was not secured. However,
Eastern and CBTC executed a Holdout Agreement providing that the loan was secured
by the joint checking account of Velasco and Lim. Meanwhile, a judicial settlement of the
estate of Velasco ordered the withdrawal of the balance of the account of Velasco and
Lim. Private respondents Eastern and Lim assert that the amount deposited in the joint
account of Velasco and Lim came from Eastern and therefore rightfully belong to Eastern
and/or Lim.
ISSUE:
Whether BPI is still liable to the private respondents on the account subject of the
withdrawal by the heirs of Velasco.
RULING:
YES BPI was the debtor and Eastern was the creditor with respect to the joint
checking account. Therefore, BPI was obliged to return the amount of the said account
only to the creditor. When it allowed the withdrawal of the balance of the account by the
heirs of Velasco, it made the payment to the wrong party. The law provides that payment
made by the debtor to the wrong party does not extinguish its obligation to the creditor
who is without fault or negligence. Therefore, BPI was still liable to the true creditor,
Eastern.
FEBTC VS. DIAZ REALTY INC.
G.R. No. 138588.
August 23, 2001.
FACTS:
Diaz obtained a loan from Pacific Banking Corp in the amount of P720,000 at 12%
interest. The said loan was secured with a real estate mortgage over two parcels of land
owned by Diaz Realty, herein respondent. Subsequently, the loan account was purchased
by FEBTC. 2 years after, the respondent through its President inquired about its obligation
and upon learning of the outstanding obligation, Diaz Realty then tendered payment in
the form of an Interbank check in the amount of P1,450,000 in order to avoid the further
imposition of interests. The payment was with a notation for the full settlement of the
obligation. The petitioner accepted the check, but it alleged in its defense that it was
merely a deposit. When the petitioner refused to release the mortgage, the respondent
filed a suit. Both RTC and CA held that there was a valid tender of payment
ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid tender of payment
RULING:
Although jurisprudence hold that, in general, a check does not constitute legal
tender, and that a creditor may validly refuse it. It must be emphasized, however, that this
dictum does not prevent a creditor from accepting a check as payment. In other words,
the creditor has the option and the discretion of refusing or accepting it. In the present
case, petitioner bank did not refuse respondent's check. On the contrary, it accepted the
check which, it insisted, was a deposit. As earlier stated, the check proved to be fully
funded and was in fact honored by the drawee bank Moreover, petitioner was in
possession of the money for several months.
RAYOS V REYES
G.R. No. 150913
February 20, 2003
FACTS:
Spouses Tazal owned 3 parcels of land and sold to Respondent, Reyes with a right
to repurchase in 2 years. However, they did not repurchase but sold 2 of those parcels to
Petitioner, Rayos. Spouses Tazal asked Reyes to repurchase the property because it was
not a sale with a right to repurchase but an equitable mortgage. Reyes did not accept
their payment and so Spouses Tazal consigned the amount to the court and then sold the
last property to Rayos.
ISSUE:
Whether there was proper consignation
RULING:
NO. First, the consignation was invalid because the offer was conditioned upon
the belief of Spouses Tazal that it was an equitable mortgage and they can pay whatever
time they wanted but that the redemption period has passed. Second, it was noted that
when they consigned there was no notice to Reyes. Third, Reyes did not accept the
consignation in the court and there was no judicial declaration that the consignation was
valid Thus, when they consigned the 7,400 to the Clerk of Court in Cebu City, it was
actually a valid consignation. Further the SC ruled that in this case, there was even no
need for consignation because the tender of payment is valid since this is merely an
exercise of a right. And there’s no debtor-creditor relationship between spouses.
ADELFA PROPERTIES, INC. VS. CA,
G.R. No. 111238
January 25, 1995;
FACTS:
Jose and Domindaro Jimenez owned a parcel of land and sold the eastern portion
of the land to Adelfa properties and later, the latter issued interest with the western portion
of the said land. The parties executed a Deed of Option to Purchase with Adelfa but
thereafter, the Jimenez brothers came and claimed that they were co-owners of the whole
property. Civil action ensued and Adelfa suspended the payment of the remaining balance
saying that they should pay only the remaining balance after the civil case has already
been dismissed or already been decided.
ISSUE:
Whether the Jimenez brothers can still be compelled to sell the said portion of
land.
RULING:
NO. Since Adelfa is already in delay in paying the remaining balance. The court
said that Adelfa should have made payment when the disturbance had already eased, or
when the civil action filed by Jimenez brothers was dismissed by the court. So, the court
held here that proper action Adelfa should have taken was consigning the said payment
to the court and not suspending the payments.
DE MESA VS. CA
G.R. Nos. 106467-68
October 19, 1999.
FACTS:
De Mesa owned a parcel of land which she mortgaged to the bank as security for
her loans. The said property was foreclosed and sold to the bank upon her failure of
paying her mortgage debt. De Mesa was allowed to repurchase the properties and upon
repurchasing the properties, she sold these properties to OSA House Inc. under a Deed
of Sale with assumption of mortgage. OSA continued to pay the bank the quarterly
instalments until the time De Mesa notified OSA that she is rescinding the Deed of Sale.
This led OSA to file to file a complaint for consignation to the court since De Mesa
and his crop he must then be relieved from his obligation to deliver. No sugar was
delivered, so the plaintiff filed a case praying for the judgment of P3,000 plus P1,200.
P3,000 was awarded, thus, both parties appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether the failure of Gonzalez’s crop will relieve him from complying with his
undertaking by loss of the thing due.
RULING:
NO. Gonzales agreed to deliver the sugar, and nothing is said in the contract about
where he was to get it. In designating the article sold, it is clear that Gonzales could only
say that it was “sugar”; the generic name for the thing sold.
There was no “appropriation” of any particular lot of sugar, neither did any party
stipulate this. Determinable subject matter of sale is NOT subject to risk of loss until they
are physically segregated or particularly designated. What they agreed upon was a
generic thing. Genus nunquam perit. Hence, Gonzales cannot blame the failure of his
crop to evade his obligation to deliver.