LSAT
*
PrepTest 44
Explained
a guide to the october, 2004 exam
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Section I: Reading Comprehension
SECTION I:
READING COMPREHENSION
Passage 1: Prepaid Legal Plans
Where does the author stand? The first passage in
PrepTest 44 offers a fine tutorial on the importance of
getting that question answered—and a reminder that
the answer doesn’t always arrive as soon as we’d like.
The Topic is prepaid legal plans and not the CAW plan
per se; the CAW plan is just an example of the general
trend, as evidenced by the fact that the author stops
discussing it before the passage is even halfway over.
The Scope is the long-term effects of such plans,
although you may not have figured that out right away
because paragraph 1 is devoted to the CAW plan, first
its details (clients get options, but the plan eases their
financial burden either way), then its popularity
(widespread and growing).
What we need to see is that paragraph 1 is all objective
reportage, as is paragraph 2, which notes that “many
lawyers are concerned” (lines 20–21) about the plan’s
effect (confirming the Scope discussed above). We get
the specifics of those concerns (depressed fees
seems to be the gist of it), and the rebuttal from
proponents of the plan about all of its benefits, but no
authorial comment.
Until paragraph 3, that is, in which the doleful opening
pronouncement (lines 38–40) should instantly have
struck you as the passage’s likely Main Idea. The rest
of the paragraph supports the author’s pessimism that
the plan will attract less experienced, and hence less
skillful, attorneys who, moreover, will be forced to
spend less time on individual cases because of the fee
structure—a recipe for client and attorney
dissatisfaction. Your Roadmap should have reflected
this structural movement from objectivity to argument:
¶ 1—Details & benefits of prepaid legal plans
¶ 2—Criticism and rebuttal
¶ 3—Author’s POV: plans will hurt clients & attys
1. (E)
Global (Main Point)
When the author’s main point is highly subjective,
expect wrong answer choices to be objective or to
take an opposing point of view.
From the moment you read lines 38–40, you should
expect the answer to a question like #1 to feature a
downbeat assessment of prepaid legal plans. Only (E) fits
the bill, acknowledging that these plans are now popular
but taking a doleful view of their long-term effects.
(A) is half right, in its (opening) suggestion that the
plans appear to be beneficial, but goes wrong in the
particular weakness it cites. Lines 38–40, as well as
line 48, confirm that lawyers are not going to benefit,
whether at the expense of clients or otherwise; in fact,
they will work their butts off but deliver inferior results
for less money.
(B) is done in by the overly optimistic phrase “probably
effective,” and by the failure to reflect the author’s
overall downbeat predictions.
(C) goes outside the scope in implying that the author
is endeavoring to suggest an alternative to the CAW’s
plan and others like it; she’s merely countering the
rosy predictions of how these plans will work out.
(D) “Many lawyers are concerned”—not all or the
generality—and “some point out” that fees can drop to
unprofitable levels. The evidence in the passage fails
to justify the claim in (D) that “lawyers generally” are
critical. Indeed, one group of lawyers—the not-yetestablished ones—is probably happy with the plan
(lines 42–44).
2. (D)
Global (Primary Purpose)
By predicting an answer and being sure that you’ve
found the one and only choice that matches, you
won’t fall for the first purpose that looks good.
Again: we need an answer choice that reflects a
negative assessment of the effects of these prepaid
legal plans. (D) is wordy but precisely fits the bill.
(A) not only fails to reflect a negative assessment, but
falls outside the scope. The traditional way of paying
(i.e., out of one’s own pocket) is never mentioned,
much less contrasted with the new plans.
(B) The “growing popularity” of the plans is inferable
(i.e., it reduces the financial burden of legal work and
offers options) but not explicitly “explained.” In any
case, the passage shifts to assessment issues as
early as line 19.
(C) may be tempting, but it merely picks up a detail
from lines 24–27, and ignores the fact that the
passage brings up several other effects of legal plans
beyond the purely financial. The author is most
interested in the plans’ effects on the quality of
services, something that (C) wholly ignores.
(E), like (C) in question 1, wrongly asserts that the
author has an interest in reform. She does not, as the
passage bears witness.
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PrepTest 44 Explained
3. (E)
Detail
To identify a Detail question—and with it an answer
that can be found clearly in the text—look for
categorical stem language.
“Which...will be a [predicted] consequence?” The
categorical nature of the question stem—contrast it with,
say, question 5— this as a Detail question, so we won’t
have to work hard to find the answer. The author’s view
of the plans’ effects comes in paragraph 3, at the very
end of which we find (E): lines 55–56, to be specific.
(A) is a 180. Lawyers critical of the plans would be “at
odds with” any of their potential drawbacks.
(B) Keep your eye on the ball. The “rates” and “fees”
described in the passage are those paid to the lawyers,
not those paid by the plan members. In fact, one could
expect that if all of the dire predictions came to pass,
plans like the CAW’s would probably have to raise their
premiums.
(C) If the CAW plan is any indication, lawyers will be
able to join the staff (lines 5–6) or use another
“cooperating lawyer” and pay the difference
(lines 8–12), but nowhere is it suggested that any
lawyer will be forced to participate.
(D) reflects the optimism of the CAW plan’s directors
(lines 27–37, especially beginning at line 32), not the
pessimism of the author. Call it a 180 or an FUD, it’s
still wrong.
4. (D)
Global (Passage Structure)
When asked for an abstraction of a passage’s
structure, prephrasing is your best defense against
getting bogged down among the choices.
Our Roadmap has pretty much provided what a
question like this one seeks: the passage’s structure
in miniature. If you predict that the answer must
contain (and in this order) the plan; criticism and
rebuttal; and the author’s argument, then the only
correct possible answer can be (D). Once we have a
prediction in hand, notice how blatantly wrong the other
four choices are:
(A) Where’s any reference to criticism? We need
negativity. And what does it mean by “refinements”?
Nothing like that appears.
(B) “Past phenomena”? Like what? And author’s
“approval”? Are they kidding?
(C) A plan in operation since 1985 is hardly a
“proposal,” and, again, the author’s purpose is to
evaluate, not to recommend.
2
(E) “An occurrence” seems an odd way to sum up a
phenomenon that has been evident since at least
1985 and is becoming widespread. The “evaluation” of
the prepaid legal plans comes in paragraph 3 and not,
as (E) would have it, midway. Finally, it is unclear what
they mean by “further data.”
5. (C)
Inference
Use the Hot Words in a question stem to locate the
source of an answer.
The Hot Words here are “proponents,” “benefit,” and
“lower fees,” all of which direct you not just to
lines 27–37, but to the portions therein that speak to
the tradeoff enjoyed by plan lawyers who accept lower
fees. The gist of it is found in lines 29–33: in exchange,
these lawyers get more referrals, based on strong word
of mouth (lines 34–36). This is (C) in a nutshell.
(A) It’s plausible that novice lawyers would become
more skilled once they started working with clients, but
any experience might enhance lawyers’ expertise.
There’s no evidence that accepting lower fees in a legal
services plan would lead to greater skills.
(B) There’s an unwarranted comparison here between
experience and inexperience. Veteran lawyers are not,
we are led to believe, likely to participate in these
plans, let alone enjoy higher profits because of them.
(D) goes beyond the scope. Nowhere do proponents of
the plans suggest that there’s a benefit to participating
lawyers in seducing clients away from other law firms.
(E) picks up on the idea in lines 24–27 that legal fees
in Canadian cities served by the plan have dropped,
but “respond to market forces” is meaningless in this
context. Respond how? And to what benefit to
cooperating attorneys?
6. (A)
Detail
Expect that the answers to Detail questions will, by
and large, be the easiest to locate.
The details of the CAW plan come in paragraph 1, and
a quick scan of lines 1–12 reveals a variety of benefits.
Lines 9–12 make it clear that if a plan member
chooses to use a lawyer outside the plan, the plan will
pay at least a portion of a nonparticipating lawyer’s
fee. That’s the “benefit beyond” to which (A) refers.
(B) is outside the scope. Autoworkers’ enthusiasm for
the plan is evidenced (lines 13–15) by the number of
members enrolled, but there is nothing said about their
views regarding quality or anything else.
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Section I: Reading Comprehension
(C) is also outside the scope. The passage doesn’t
state anything about the nature of the cases handled
by plan attorneys.
(D) distorts lines 11–12. Members pay more to an
outside lawyer if that lawyer’s fees exceed the plan’s
coverage, but that has nothing to do with the cost of
membership, which is the same regardless of which
lawyer a plan member uses.
(E) Lines 1–4 don’t specifically rule out participation in
the CAW plan by those other than autoworkers and
their families, but they don’t mandate it either.
7. (A)
Logic (Purpose of a Detail)
The purpose of a detail is always determined by its
context—what’s around it, and the paragraph in
which it appears.
The phrase in question appears in the context of a
sentence immediately following lines 38–40. As we’ve
said, those lines, and the rest of paragraph 3, are
designed to convey the author’s pessimistic view of
prepaid legal plans’ effects. The author views novice
lawyers as less experienced than veterans, and hence
less likely to perform satisfactorily, so a “marketing
device” for such rookies is not going to meet with the
author’s approval. (A) has it right.
(B) goes wrong in two ways. By line 43, the author is no
longer discussing what plan administrators believe, but
is into her own counterargument. Moreover, as the
author describes them, these “marketing devices” may
serve to get more work for rookie attorneys but are going
to disappoint clients. That tradeoff may or may not
translate into a “material contribution to the profession.”
(C) Classic 180. At best, the benefit of getting novice
lawyers some practical experience is offset by the
compromised service they’ll provide; that hardly counts
as an “unequivocal” benefit.
(D) As with (B), this choice implies that by paragraph
3 the author is still reporting on the views of others,
when we know that her own views have taken center
stage by that point.
(E) implies that novice lawyers are identified in the
passage as supporters of prepaid plans; the passage
says nothing like this. Also, a device for such rookies’
marketing would be a boon to them, not a burden.
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PrepTest 44 Explained
Passage 2: Asian Settlers of the Pacific
Coast
Did you shudder to see—and in the very first line, no
less—the unfamiliar word “historiography”? Never fear
LSAT vocabulary. Either the term won’t be one you
need to understand, or the author will obligingly define
it, as she does here: it’s studying history through
primary sources. Speaking of which, we learn in
paragraph 1 that those studying Pacific Coast
settlement have traditionally leaned on the primary
source material of European explorers’ written records.
In LSAT passages, beware of what’s “traditionally”
been done! For us, the turning point comes in
lines 15–17: “What ‘expanded definition of a source’?”
we should ask. It turns out that historians have ignored
the views of Asian settlers, who didn’t document their
settlement experiences the way Europeans did. But the
actions of Asian settlers, suggest lines 29–32, can be
meaningful, too—their actions are the “expanded
definition” of what a source is.
Ya gotta love “As a case in point”: talk about a blatant
structural signal! Before we even read past line 35, we
already know that the author must believe that the
Chinese farmers’ actions offer useful primary source
material regarding the settlement of the Pacific Coast;
otherwise, why would she follow lines 29–32 with
33–35? The rest of paragraph 3 contrasts European
and Chinese reactions to the land—where the former
saw swamp and nuisance, the latter saw fertility and
opportunity—lending credence to the idea that omitting
the latter reactions, written down or not, would certainly
make for an incomplete portrait. paragraph 4 carries
this idea a step or two further: we really cannot
understand this region’s settlement without factoring in
the Chinese farmers’ special skills (more actions, get
it?) that directly led to the region’s continuing
agricultural success. Left unsaid but understood is the
fact that relying on written sources alone would leave
historians bereft of all of this valuable first-person input.
A possible Roadmap:
¶ 1—Trad: use Eur. views of settlement
¶ 2—Asians didn’t write, but actions are ev.
¶ 3—Chinese saw land as fertile
¶ 4—Chinese farming skills
4
8. (C)
Global
Go for the Global questions early on; your prephrasing
will be freshest right after you’ve digested a passage.
The gist of this passage is that one needs to factor in
more than Europeans’ records to understand the
settlement of the Pacific Coast. That simple statement
has to lead you to (C); “nontraditional...evidence”
refers, of course, to the unwritten but significant views
and actions of the Asians who settled there.
(A) Distortion. It’s not that the Asian settlers’ actions
confirm that which was understood, but that they
complete what otherwise would be a faulty portrait.
(B) Another distor tion: Asians left no record
(lines 21–27) to view as “irrelevant.”
(D) Extreme. Nowhere is it suggested that
historiography’s “methodological foundations” are
being debated. All the author says is that
historiographers are now accepting the value of
unwritten evidence.
(E) Yet another distor tion: the issue is not
“inaccuracy,” but incompleteness. Lines 54–60
confirm that going beyond written records is necessary
if history is to be “fully understood.”
9. (C)
Logic (Purpose of a Detail)
Use the passage’s Keywords diligently.
Your prediction as to why the author devotes paragraph
3 to Chinese settlers need be no more precise than “to
act as a case in point”! That’s enough to make (C)
beckon. The Chinese settlers’ actions are “integral,”
hence “unique”; and paragraph 3 specifically focuses
on their view of the land, as (C) says.
(A) “Settlement patterns” are outside the Scope of the
passage (if not outside the interest of
historiographers). And nothing about the Chinese
settlers’ actions is presented as “typical”; in fact, in
paragraph 3, their views are sharply contrasted with
those of Europeans.
(B) Distortion and FUD combined. Since the Asian
settlers never wrote much at all, there was nothing to
“sur vive.” In any case, their writing habits are
discussed in paragraph 2, not paragraph 3.
(D) The “contention” in paragraph 3 is between the
Chinese and European perspectives on the settlement
land. Nowhere is any kind of historiographers’ debate
going on.
(E) It’s not that the Asian evidence either confirms or
contradicts that which was known from studying
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Section I: Reading Comprehension
European writings; it’s that the record isn’t complete
without it. That Europeans viewed the land as hopeless
while the Chinese farmers saw potential is not an
“inconsistency of history” but a difference of opinion.
10. (E)
Detail
Whenever you can, predict an answer prior to looking
at the choices.
“Primary traditional...sources” (there’s “traditional”
again!) sends us to paragraph 1, specifically
lines 8–14, which allows us to predict as an answer
“the writings of European explorers.” What could be
more straightforward than (E)?
(A) The only reference to time frame is in lines 22–25,
where we hear that the European and Asian settlers
arrived “during this same period,” although the former
wrote things down and the latter didn’t.
(B) Native Americans—whether sources of written
evidence or not—are never mentioned in the passage.
(C) 180. The European settlers saw the land as
“useless, untillable swamp.”
(D) Another 180. The traditional primary sources
considered the Pacific Coast a “generally arid region.”
11. (E)
Inference
Don’t read question stems sloppily! Here, “disagree”
isn’t capitalized, so if you miss that word you can be
in big trouble.
Since the right answer contradicts the text, we can
expect the four wrong choices to complement it, if not
downright reflect it. Let’s look boldly at each choice.
(A) The passage’s exclusive focus on Asian settlers’
evidence doesn’t imply that other groups’ evidence
should be ignored. Quite the contrary. The author’s
demand that all sorts of sources be considered speaks
to greater openness, which is exactly the spirit of (A).
(B) Because “some historiographers” (lines 15–17
and 29–32) see the value in perusing actions and not
just written sources, the door is open for some in the
profession to disagree, so (B) is quite consistent with
the author’s views.
(C) This choice properly recognizes the author’s core
belief: that no one group’s experiences—not the
European settlers, not the Asian settlers—can be seen
as telling the entire story.
(D) This one reflects the passage text more directly
than any of the others; it’s a virtual paraphrase of
lines 27–32.
(E) The last choice standing, (E) must be the loser—
that is to say, the winner—because the other four are
quite consonant with the text. Indeed, the author is
committed to examining a wide variety of sources, and
not just in this one case, so (E)’s proposed exception
in the case of an absence of non-European immigrants
is just silly. The author would never sign on to (E)’s
exclusion of evidence.
12. (D) Detail (All EXCEPT)
For “all EXCEPT” Detail questions, after skimming the
relevant text, toss out the more obvious choices first
and then work your way down to the tougher calls, if any.
A quick skim of paragraphs 2 and 3—the portions of
the passage in which Chinese settlers’ reactions to the
land are described—should knock out (B) and (C) in a
hear tbeat: the Chinese view of the land as
agriculturally promising was certainly “new” compared
with the other settlers’ view (B), and the phrase
“specialized agricultural skills” (C) jumps out at us.
Meanwhile, the Chinese settlers’ interest in using
nuisance weeds in a new and productive way
(lines 43–47) speaks to (A), while lines 51–52 directly
support (E). That leaves (D), and while the Chinese
settlers may well have been smart businesspeople, the
word “agribusiness” is used to describe only the
activities of the modern era (line 54) and thus is not
directly associated with “settlers’ initial interactions.”
13. (B) Inference
The four wrong choices in an Inference question will
either contradict the text or fall outside its scope in
some way.
(A) The reason any settlers—Chinese or otherwise—
came to the Pacific Coast is never mentioned.
(B) Not much of an inference, as lines 50–52
practically state (B) verbatim: if they came to this
continent bringing with them “specialized...swamp
reclamation skills,” the settlers must have learned
them back home. (B) is the winner. For the record:
(C) 180. European settlers saw wild mustard as a
nuisance.
(D) goes too far in the other direction. That one needs
to include the unwritten evidence of Asian settlers
doesn’t mean that any other groups’ unwritten
evidence should be ignored. Indeed, the European
Americans must have done things as well as written
things, and the author’s ecumenical spirit suggests
that their actions should also be considered.
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PrepTest 44 Explained
(E) is contradicted by the text. By and large, the Asian
settlers simply did not write down their reactions; there
was nothing to neglect or lose.
14. (B) Logic (Strengthen the Argument)
To strengthen a claim, be sure to zero in on the
specific terms of that claim.
The claim that we are to strengthen is a lengthy and
dense sentence (lines 54–60) that boils down to: The
input of Chinese settlers is a necessary condition for
understanding today’s irrigation boom and specialty
crops. So we need a choice that speaks to that
necessity in terms of either or both of those agricultural
phenomena, and correct choice (B) addresses the
latter. If evidence from the 1800s suggests that it was
Chinese settlers and their descendants who turned
swampland into specialty-crop land, we’d want to know
how they did it, and not factoring them in would, as
lines 54–60 suggest, paint an incomplete picture.
(A) A fast-growing market today, by itself or in
comparison with other crops, is far removed from the
earliest Chinese settlers.
(C) confirms exactly what the Chinese settlers
suspected when they arrived in the 1800s, but does
not dictate that we need the settlers’ input to
understand the agricultural boom today.
(D) fails to mention Chinese settlers and thus cannot
support the claim in question.
(E) has the same problem as the previous two choices:
it totally sidesteps the role of the Chinese settlers and
thus cannot be what the question is asking for.
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Section I: Reading Comprehension
Passage 3: NGF
A tougher-than-normal Natural Science passage—for
those who are science-phobic, that is; those
comfortable with science probably had little trouble—
this passage reveals itself as almost wholly objective in
nature. The Purpose is to straightfor wardly and
factually describe NGF (the Topic), specifically how Rita
Levi-Montalcini discovered it and what it does (the
twofold Scope). Paragraph 1 defines nerve cells and
their regulators; paragraph 2 describes the process by
which Levi-Montalcini came to find NGF; and paragraph
3 describes its ubiquity in the body (lines 40–50) and
its dual purpose (lines 50–59). And there’s your
Roadmap, perhaps with brackets to break up
paragraph 3:
¶ 1—Definitions
¶ 2—How L-M discovered NGF
¶ 3—Results: presence (lines 40–50); purposes
(lines 50–59)
So we’ve read and understood that much. Is that
enough comprehension to get us into the questions? It
certainly is. After all, this passage is so dense that
we’re going to have to return to it for the trickier,
denser questions anyway. Why not get the gist up front,
pick up a few points, and then go back to read more
deeply as needed? Returning to paragraph 2, we’d
want to highlight its key structural elements, circling
such phrases as “to confirm this theor y”
(lines 14–15), “A fur ther phase” (line 20), “To
investigate this hypothesis” (line 28), and “Further
research” (line 35). Noting these milestones, or
signposts, will make it easier for us to fill in the gaps
between them. In paragraph 3, there are a few key
ideas to take note of: that NSG is all over the place
(lines 40–45); that nerve cells get it from the cells
around them (lines 45–50); and that NSG first ushers
the developing nerves to the right cells (lines 51–54)
and then keeps the nerve cells alive in a way that the
author stops short of describing.
Again, we’ll read more deeply later, but only as the
questions demand.
15. (B) Global
When answer choices are lengthy, remember that
much of what’s there may be correct. But the correct
answer will be right in its entirety. Therefore, be bold
in quickly identifying ways in which four of the
choices go wrong, and remember: if there’s nothing
wrong with a choice, it must be the right answer.
The point is that, in a lengthy wrong choice, some of its
prose will reflect the passage accurately, so you need
to bore through the verbiage to find the categorical
ways in which four of the choices go astray. Otherwise,
you’ll get bogged down in things that sound good even
if you’ve already armed yourself with a prediction.
Take (A), for instance. Levi-Montalcini did make a
discovery, and it was a big deal, and it did involve
research begun in the 1940s. All of that is right. But
the passage doesn’t say that Levi-Montalcini
discovered “neurotrophic factors,” only that she
discovered the first of them, NGF. Moreover, as (A) is
worded, her work is most noteworthy for what it taught
us about chick embryos. Say what? Levi-Montalcini
used chick embryos in her research, but her Nobelwinning findings clearly have impact on many animals
beyond baby chicks—most notably, humans. Get the
idea? By zeroing in on one or more categorical ways in
which a lengthy choice goes wrong, you can quickly
eliminate tricky but ultimately incorrect answers.
(B) The main clause is, “The discovery...was pivotal.”
Quite right; that reflects the one subjective statement
in the entire passage, made in lines 5–10. Does the
rest of (B) accurately reflect the passage? Yes, the
appositive (the modifying phrase between commas)
deftly sums up the “two roles” discussed in
lines 51–59. And is there a sin of omission? No,
everything important is summed up here. But perhaps
you’ll want to confirm that the remaining choices are
bad before making your final selection.
(C) emphasizes NGF’s role in keeping nerve cells alive
(overlooking those cells’ development), makes “tissue
culture” (which was only introduced in line 29) central
to Levi-Montalcini’s work, and ascribes the devising of
tissue culture to her. All of that is bogus.
(D) How NGF is produced is never described in the
passage (it’s all about how Levi-Montalcini found it,
and what it does). Moreover, to say that NGF “is
necessary for the health and proper functioning of
ner vous systems” goes much fur ther than
lines 54–55. And since the star of the passage is LeviMontalcini, it seems odd to diminish her work as only
“partly” responsible.
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PrepTest 44 Explained
(E) gives short shrift to Levi-Montalcini’s discovery
process and its importance and hence to the first twothirds of the passage. Meanwhile, its main clause
focuses only on lines 51–59, and distorts them to boot
(the final “except” clause is tossed in and turns the
choice into gibberish). We’re left with our initial
impression that (B) is the one and only nonflawed
answer.
16. (A) Inference
If an answer depends on more than one part of the
passage, be thorough and check each part.
The noteworthiness of the NGF discovery is mentioned
in paragraph 1, but comes back again in paragraph 3,
and we ought to review both. Neurotrophic factors like
NGF certainly sound important as far as paragraph 1
goes, and their importance is reinforced later by
references to: NGF’s being “the first of many” (line 40);
“subsequent research” (line 42) that has found NGF
throughout the body; and the chemical’s two roles
(lines 51–59). All of that is summed up in (A). As the
first discovered neurotrophic factor, NGF did “pave the
way,” and there’s little doubt as to the “specificity” of
the knowledge sketched out in paragraph 3.
(B) There’s no sense that finding NGF was
“unanticipated.” Indeed, much of Levi-Montalcini’s
work seems to have confirmed hypotheses she already
held.
(C) The normal programming of immature cells to die
should have struck you as a rather marginal affair,
hardly meriting the term “noteworthy,” especially since
the issue never comes up in paragraph 3. (C) just
echoes
Levi-Montalcini’s
initial
hypothesis
(lines 11–14), which was not the endpoint of her
research but the beginning: figuring that the cells were
programmed to die, she asked the question “Why?,” a
quest that led her ultimately to NGF.
(D) This choice does not match up at all with the two
roles played by NGF, at least on the strength of
lines 51–59. This vague statement is unsupported by
the passage.
(E) This choice blows up the importance of mouse
tumors (NGF, remember, is found in many animals),
and “can be used to stimulate” wrongly implies that
NGF is some sort of applied substance, rather than
one occurring naturally in animals’ bodies.
8
17. (C) Logic (Purpose of a Paragraph)
Rely on your Roadmap when asked for a paragraph’s
purpose, or its relationship to something else.
Because paragraph 2, as our Roadmap reminds us,
lays out a step-by-step process the net results of which
are outlined one paragraph later, the right answer
ought to at least reflect the idea of process—which
makes (C) pretty much a certainty. Each of the wrong
choices introduces at least one major distortion:
(A) No sense is given that anything in particular needs
greater “verification.”
(B) Nothing in paragraph 3, or anywhere else,
“undermines” Levi-Montalcini’s work.
(D) At best, “analogous substances” relates to the
brief reference to “other factors” in line 40. At worst,
it’s irrelevant. This passage is all about NGF.
(E) No “supplanting” of previous work is ever alluded to.
18. (E)
Inference
When the question stem offers you no help and the
choices look daunting, consider skipping the question
and moving on.
This one is tough: No assistance is offered in the
stem, and the choices offer a lot of detail that’s going
to require you to work slowly and painfully through
paragraph 2. Most students would do well to write this
one off, especially given how much easier the next
question is.
For those who did try this, there’s no alternative but to
assess each of the choices.
(A) combines lines 15–20 and line 59 into one big fat
distortion. The self-adjustment process mentioned in
the former has no connection to the antibodies
mentioned in the latter.
(B) makes an unwarranted comparison between two
types of nerve cells, and the phrase “qualitatively
identical” offers a level of precision not justified by
anything in the text.
(C) 180: the sense offered in paragraph 3 is that NGF
directs necessary cells to the place where they’re
needed.
(D) hints at a “conversion” or transformation that has
no basis in the text. Besides, (D) implies that NGF and
neurotrophic factor are different things, whereas the
first is actually an example of the second.
(E) The only one left must be inferable, and it is.
According to lines 45–50, nerve cells can receive NGF
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Section I: Reading Comprehension
from “suppor ting cells” to which they are not
“connected.” But that was a lot of work (and time) for
one point, wasn’t it? And take a look at the next
question…
19. (A) Detail
Quite often, a very tough question precedes a much
easier one. Don’t let the former deprive you of the
latter.
A couple of Levi-Montalcini’s hypotheses are
mentioned here and there. But if you circled the phrase
“To investigate that hypothesis” (line 28) and saw that
an experiment is described immediately afterward, you
probably had little difficulty settling on (A), which
describes the hypothesis in lines 26–28 that the
subsequent experiment (lines 29–35) was designed
to test.
(B) mentions a finding of Levi-Montalcini’s
(lines 15–18), not a hypothesis for which an
experiment was designed.
(C) Lines 1–5 and lines 40–41 hint at other
neurotrophic factors, but the passage falls far short of
describing them, let alone presenting an experiment
designed to confirm their existence.
(D) No reference to differing levels of NGF is made
anywhere in the passage.
(E), like (B), offers a research finding (this one, a
discovery not necessarily made by Levi-Montalcini, is
mentioned in lines 45–49), but no experiment backing
it up is described.
(C) There’s no justification for attributing the other
neurotrophic factors’ discovery to Levi-Montalcini. As
far as we know from the passage, Levi-Montalcini
worked on NGF and nothing else.
(D) Here’s the one and only verifiable fact about other
neurotrophic factors. Lines 1–6 confirm that there are
more of them than just NGF, and the first two lines
strongly suggest that they have other “specialized
functions” that the passage never describes. (D) is
correct.
(E) is almost functionally identical to (A), and is every
bit as wrong. As far as we know, Levi-Montalcini’s chick
embryo work involved NGF and nothing else.
20. (D) Inference
Make sure that an inference doesn’t just “sound
right” but is supported by specific passage text.
All five choices allude to the neurotrophic factors other
than NGF—neurotrophic factors that are mentioned
briefly early on, and again later, but that play no
important role in the overall text. Let’s take them in
order:
(A) Neurotrophic factors other than NGF never come up
in the discussion of Levi-Montalcini’s work with chick
embryos.
(B) A statement that’s far from inferable. Yes,
neurotrophic factors other than NGF are known, but
who’s to say that they’re better comprehended?
Besides, if longevity is relevant here, then logic
suggests that NGF—discovered first—would be known
best of all.
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Passage 4: The Modern Movement in
Architecture
In sharp contrast to Passage Three, which took no real
stand on anything, Passage Four has a definite point of
view on the Topic of Modernist architecture, and it is
reiterated in lines 6–9, 10–12, 31–36, and 60–63. Each
of these snippets separately—and certainly all of them
taken together—should hit you between the eyes with
one broad idea, namely, This author has little use for the
Modern Movement. A strong authorial point of view
usually means a manageable passage with a set of
manageable questions. Let’s see whether it did here.
We begin with an irony: the Movement was supposed
to reflect the “functional spirit” and practical building
realities of a new century, but ended up running
counter to those very realities and ultimately, the
Movement fell into decline. (The passage’s Scope—
the movement’s decline—is first mentioned in line 12
and repeatedly thereafter). Your job as a critical reader,
of course, is to keep this irony in mind and look for the
evidence that will support it. The first of two lengthy
paragraphs describes the origins and heyday of
Modernism. The public never cared for it (lines 13–15),
a fact the Modernists seem to have worn as a badge
of honor (lines 15–19). These high-minded aesthetes,
trying to “educate” an unimpressed public, dominated
the mainstream and the critical world in the ‘40s and
‘50s, so much so that architects who were trying other
things (Wagner and Wright, lines 25–30) were
nevertheless pigeonholed as Modernists.
The real evidence for paragraph 1 comes in the lengthy
paragraph 3, where the gist is that the Modernists’ desire
to expose buildings’ structural material flew in the face of
the realities of the building trade: with so many different
contractors involved, it was evidently prohibitively costly to
carry out that exposure concept in reality. We get a strong
sense that these snobby aesthetes were doomed
because they had their heads in the sky (and their noses
in the air). Paragraph 4 is kind of a throwaway.
One possible Roadmap:
¶ 1—Irony: “practical” movement was impractical
¶ 2—Origin & domination
¶ 3—Decline: impractical and too artistic
¶ 4—Final nail in coffin
10
21. (A) Global (Main Idea)
However strong or weak an authorial point of view,
the answer to a Global question must reflect it.
The only choice that reflects the author’s downbeat
view of the Modernists, and that accurately relates the
two reasons for the movement’s decline, is (A).
(B) may or may not be true—the Modernists’ approach
to design sounds more wrongheaded and irrational
than rational—but this choice ignores the author’s POV
and the whole Scope: the decline of Modernism. Its
“development” occupies a brief portion of paragraph 2,
nothing more.
(C) posits a causal connection between Modernism
and building methods, rather than the disjunction
presented in lines 6–9 and explained thereafter.
(D), like (C), is a 180, seeking to find a commonality
where the author takes pains to show disjunction. The
theory behind Modernism was actually out of whack
with how buildings are built.
(E) Specific reasons for Modernists’ rejection of the
past aren’t provided. We sense that they were looking
for a new architecture that would be appropriate for a
new age, but that’s about it.
22. (A) Logic (Parallel Reasoning)
The elements must match up in an Analogy or Parallel
Reasoning question.
The precise comparison we are to mimic is described
in lines 40–44: individual craftspeople in the old days,
a group of separately working craftspeople thereafter.
(A)’s single garment maker vs. assembly line matches
superbly, and its reference to “less precise tailoring”
nicely echoes the reference in lines 46–47 to
“allowable degree of inaccuracy.”
(B) The issue of beauty might be roughly analogous,
and “handwoven vs. machine made” smacks of old
fashioned vs. modern, but (B) would only work if the
author were comparing a building made by one person
with one made wholly by machinery.
(C) involves the same faulty “by hand vs. by machine”
analogy as (B), and brings in the foreign issue of utility.
(D) is one more “hand vs. machine” comparison, and
its focus on the relative effectiveness of the two
methods has no parallel with the building example.
(E) “Fashionableness” has a doubtful connection to
the building example, and since (E) doesn’t explicitly
mention the circumstances of factory craftsmanship,
we can’t match it precisely to lines 40–44. For all we
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Section I: Reading Comprehension
know, (E) is talking about machine craftsmanship like
the other three wrong choices are.
25. (D) Author’s Attitude
Context, context, context.
23. (C) Author’s Attitude
In questions about the author’s attitude, start by
deciding whether the author is broadly positive or
negative, and then go from there.
We already know that the author has little use for
Modernism or its proponents, so (A) and (B) are too
positive, and (E) is too neutral. Meanwhile, (D) goes
too far: this is a movement that crashed and burned
half a century ago; why would the author engage in the
hot emotion of “exasperation”? (C) conveys the
author’s tone best. He has heard the proponents’
arguments but will have none of them.
24. (E)
Inference
Unlike Inference questions in Logical Reasoning,
Reading Comprehension Inference questions often
give you a clue as to the location of the answer and
are thus more amenable to prephrasing.
The author’s chief gripe with the Modernists is that
their ideal of exposing building elements wasn’t in sync
with building methods—lines 6–9 again. A prediction in
that vein is going to lead you to (E): the Modernists’
“concerns were chiefly aesthetic” (lines 35–36); they
sure weren’t practical.
(A) seems to be a veiled reference to those
iconoclastic innovators Wagner and Wright, but they are
never explicitly referred to as “repudiators”; in fact,
they demonstrated enough allegiance to Modernism to
remain linked to the movement.
(B) combines two true facts (the Modernists’ ideal
was rarely achieved and the public disliked it) into a
false statement—a neat trick. The ideal was rarely
achieved because it cost too much, if it could be built
at all (lines 53–55).
(C) You kidding? What builder would balk at taking on
a “prohibitively expensive” job? The problem was
getting someone to pay for it.
(D) Wagner and Wright didn’t repudiate Modernism, but
neither are they identified as its originators. They seem
to be the naughty stepchildren of the movement,
actually: close enough to be family, but wayward
enough to be set apart.
Several of the choices sound as if they might reflect a
certain amount of disdain, but as the question stem
helpfully suggests, we need to look at each in context.
Remember, it’s the author’s attitude we’re seeking here.
(A) The determination that the twentieth century would
have a “functional spirit” was made by the Modernists
and is reported by the author—no slam intended here.
(B) Around line 24, the author is, again, reporting
rather than commenting. He surely doesn’t approve of
critics’ routinely dismissing all non-Modernist
architecture, but critics’ “tending” to do so is not, in
itself, an expression of his viewpoint.
(C) If anything, calling Wagner and Wright “innovators”
is a badge of approval.
(D) There ya go. That Modernists “conveniently
ignored” certain troublesome aspects of Wagner’s and
Wright’s work is a swipe at self-serving aesthetes. (D)
is what we want.
(E) Because so many subcontractors were working
independently, it stands to reason that each one’s
products wouldn’t necessarily fit together seamlessly.
The resulting “degree of inaccuracy” is thus an
expression of common sense and not of author
disdain—for builders, or for anyone else.
26. (B) Logic (Purpose of a Detail)
The purpose of a detail always relates to a larger
purpose—of a paragraph, or an entire passage.
Starting with line 19, paragraph 2 is devoted to
describing the domination of Modernism in the world of
architecture. Part of that domination is the fact that the
movement could claim great and innovative architects
as their own, simply by ignoring idiosyncrasies in the
innovators’ work. This is what (B) is getting at.
(A) No reference to the public is made anywhere near
Wagner and Wright.
(C) “Popularize the Movement”? It was “never very
popular” (line 14).
(D) Wright’s and Wagner’s relationships with their
clients are never mentioned.
(E) The author distinguishes, implicitly, between both
Wagner’s & Wright’s Modernist and non-Modernist
tendencies, but we have no idea whether they fall into
an early-vs.-late contrast as well.
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27. (A) Global (Primary Concern)
Don’t just answer based on a hunch; look for evidence
in the passage.
We’ve been down this road several times already: the
author wants to describe the rise, but mostly the fall,
of an impractical and overly aesthetic school of
architecture. (A) captures that in a nutshell. We
spotted this in lines 6–9, 10–12, 31–36, and 60–63.
(B) Modernism’s future, if any (the passage is based
in the 1940s and 1950s, for Pete’s sake), goes
unmentioned here.
(C) Many
LSAT
passages
tr y
to
correct
misconceptions. This is not one of them.
(D) “Anticipating”? Any future-tense choice is going to
be inappropriate for a past-tense passage.
(E) The only incompatibility described in the passage
is the Modernists’ ideal and the builders’ reality. And
those aren’t “viewpoints about a movement”; they are
differing goals in terms of the construction of actual
buildings.
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Section II: Logical Reasoning
SECTION II:
LOGICAL REASONING
1. (B)
Flaw
A common source of logical error is the author’s
misuse of scope.
Because gravity wholly induces the tides, the author
argues, it must wholly determine the magnitude of the
tides. Those are two different issues, as (B) implies.
Other factors, marginally related or even unrelated to
gravitational force, may very well determine the size of
a tidal range (weather, for instance, or undersea
earthquakes).
(A) It’s true that there’s only one example, but the
author doesn’t need more of them. In fact, he doesn’t
need any. What he does need is a stronger connection
between gravity and tidal magnitude.
(C) Irrespective of how each tide is measured, it’s the
difference between these measurements that
interests us, so methodological differences are beside
the point.
(D) “Activity within the world’s oceans” goes far beyond
the scope. The author’s conclusion is solely concerned
with tidal ranges.
(E) is a classic unwarranted comparison. The gravity of
the sun and of the moon are treated equally here, with
no suggestion that they can, or should, be considered
independently.
2. (E)
Inference
Most Logical Reasonsing Inference questions don’t
lend themselves to prediction. At times, however,
something may come to you.
Upon reading the author’s first two statements—
sometimes bypass surgery is performed, though other,
less risky options are available—you might have
predicted a possible inference as, “Sometimes a risky
bypass procedure could be replaced by a safer one,” or
words to that effect. If so, you would have easily fixed
on (E), which sums that up.
(A) contradicts the second sentence: the “other
therapies pose less risk.”
(B) We cannot make an inference comparing today’s
procedures with yesterday’s, because no evidence
about the latter is provided.
(C) distorts the third sentence. Though a single-artery
bypass is evidently riskiest, multiple-artery disease
may hold almost as much risk, and less risky
alternatives to bypass may still exist in that instance.
(D) The only reference to cost is that alternatives to
bypass are “relatively inexpensive.” Even if that phrase
can be understood to mean “relative to bypass,” it still
doesn’t mean that the expensiveness of bypass is
increased when only one vessel is diseased. No such
connection is made or implied.
3. (C)
Paradox
Mentally reframe the Paradox in your own words, and
then try to predict what will reconcile the facts.
The issue is mixed classrooms, i.e., classrooms with
children of all ages in them. How can it be that the idea
was disastrous in the past, but is enjoying success
now? Prediction: Something different is happening
today; something different is contributing to the success
of these mixed classrooms. (C) offers exactly that. A
new approach to mixed-classroom learning that is likely
to keep all ages of children engaged would explain
today’s success in the face of yesterday’s failure.
(A) offers something different, but how would greater
numbers alone contribute to kids’ success? If anything,
wouldn’t larger classes lead to more inattentive
students?
(B) says that the difference is poorer equipment today
but, if anything, that should make learning harder, not
easier.
(D) The difference here is the sheer range of ages, but
if you pick some possible numbers, you’ll realize that
nothing in the passage suggests that a mix of kids
from, say, 5 to 18 would be more likely to be engaged
than a mix of kids from, say, 9 to 14. In fact, the former
is much more of a “mixed classroom” than the latter,
and probably would exacerbate rather than ease the
problems.
(E) Nothing about the background of the teachers is
ever mentioned in the stimulus; a mixed-classroom
teacher might have more or less success, or the same
amount, regardless of whether she ever sat in such a
class years ago.
4. (C)
Weaken the Argument
To weaken a cause-and-effect, try identifying an
alternative cause for the same effect.
The conclusion, signaled by “Thus,” is that the arrival
of humans was a disaster for Tiliga’s birds. Why?
Because the top layer of soil (coincident with the
humans) shows lots of bird bones, while the bottom
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layers (from the earlier, prehuman time) show evidence
of more bird diversity. We need to shove a wedge
between the arrival of humans and the change in the
birds’ fate, and that’s what (C) does. While (C) doesn’t
preclude the possibility of humans having wrought
havoc on Tiliga’s birds, this airborne microbe in and of
itself might have caused all of the damage that the
author ascribes to human intervention. Positing a
possible, and totally different, cause for the same
effect is the best way to weaken a causation argument.
(A) 180. Since natural predators could be part of an
alternative explanation and (A) rules their influence
out, the net effect is to strengthen, rather than
weaken, the alleged causality.
(B) If those other islands are simliar to Tiliga, then
their bird experience might be relevant. But (B) doesn’t
discuss the effect of human habitation on those
islands’ birds—if indeed humans ever did settle those
islands—and so it can’t shove any kind of wedge
between those islands’ humans and their birds in a
way that will shed any light on Tiliga’s situation.
(D) It wouldn’t be surprising to find, in the lower soil
layers, bones from birds eaten by humans. There were
more species of birds before humans arrived, and the
larger number of species could certainly include [the]
native species later consumed by humans. So the mere
appearance of bones in the lower levels is irrelevant
here. The conclusion is founded on the discrepancy
between the bones on top and the species diversity
below, and (D) doesn’t address that whatsoever.
(E) Flying ability is irrelevant to the effect of humans on
Tiliga’s bird diversity, though it doubtless made the
birds easier to nab.
5. (A)
Assumption
A cause-and-effect argument assumes, almost by
definition, that no other cause is present or relevant.
Why does the author feel that musical training causes
changes in brain anatomy? Because one part of the
brain is bigger in musicians than nonmusicians. Such a
cause-and-effect argument requires that this
difference not be natural or induced in some other way,
so the author is counting on (A) to be true. If (A) were
false, then the corpus callosum is already larger before
musical training even begins. And who knows? Maybe
the larger corpus callosum causes the inclination
toward musicality, rather than vice versa! By ruling out
an alternative cause, (A) is an assumption necessary
to the logic of this argument.
14
(B) Even if true, this raises the question of what effect
early musical training has on brain anatomy, and that is
the scope of this inquiry.
(C) The relevant comparison is between the brains of
musicians and those of nonmusicians. No comparison
between the brains of any two members of either group
affects the author’s reasoning.
(D) The author is speaking in terms of average sizes,
so she isn’t counting on (D) to be true. Thus her logic
is not impaired if (D) is false and the occasional
nonmusician comes along boasting a musician-sized
corpus callosum.
(E) appears to present an alternative explanation for
the discrepancy. But (E) has it exactly wrong: the
assumption here would be that nonmusicians engaged
in no activity that would retard growth, not stimulate it
(since the nonmusician corpus callosum is smaller
rather than larger).
6. (B)
Point at Issue
Follow Kaplan’s Decision Tree to determine the issue
on which the speakers take opposing positions.
(A) Does Chai take a position on whether scientists’
use of ordinary terms is advisable? No. For one thing,
his term (and Dodd’s) is “acceptable,” not “advisable.”
Even more importantly, Chai’s beef is with the use of
what he sees as a potentially misleading common word
like “tree,” and not necessarily with the use of any
common word. Since Chai doesn’t take a solid position
on (A), it can’t be the point at issue.
(B) Does Chai opine on the scientific acceptability of
using one word to describe forms of different lineages?
Sure he does; he says that doing so will not serve
science well. Does Dodd take a position? Yep, and it’s
diametrically opposed to Chai’s—to Dodd, it can be
acceptable to call both forms “tree” because they have
so much else in common. Speaking of trees, our
Decision (not deciduous) Tree has led us to correct
choice (B). For the record:
(C) reflects Chai’s belief (as reported in lines 1–2 of
his speech), but it’s a belief that Dodd implicitly
shares, or at least fails to contest.
(D) “Current scientific theories” is not a term that
either speaker admits to his discussion, so we cannot
be sure how Chai or Dodd would fall out on this.
(E) Chai believes that these two particular forms do
have different lineages, and (as noted regarding (C),
above) Dodd agrees, or at least he doesn’t disagree.
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7. (D)
Strengthen the Argument
Boil down a lengthy argument to simple terms.
In contrast to the familiar and lively context—i.e.,
teenagers listening to music through headphones—the
stimulus is long and dull. It boils down to the author’s
contention that because teens pick their own
headphones, the proposal to sell headphones that turn
off when the volume gets dangerously high won’t reduce
their hearing loss. In her evident belief that teens won’t
be drawn to that particular model, the author must feel
that they will opt for a higher-decibel alternative over
one that moderates volume, and that’s what makes (D)
correct. If (D) is true, then it’s more likely that teens will
eschew the proposed model of headphones in favor of
those that will rock them the loudest.
(A) speaks to an implied comparison between hearing
music through ‘headphones versus some other means,
but that’s irrelevant to whether creating these new
shutoff headphones will protect teens’ hearing.
(B) Another irrelevant comparison. The argument isn’t
about using headphones versus some other means of
listening; it’s about selling a particular model of
headphones that can shut itself off.
(C) Yet another irrelevant comparison. Whether
parents listen to loud music—and, hence, endanger
their own hearing—has nothing to do with teens’
habits.
(E) reports a fact about product lines that has nothing
at all to do with the marketplace. So some auto-shutoff
headphones are already coming to market—big deal.
Whether any teens buy them is the question.
8. (E)
Weaken the Argument (All EXCEPT)
When four of the choices weaken an argument, the
“odd man out” will either strengthen it or have no
effect on it at all.
The author makes a pretty big scope shift here, from
the effect of natural pesticides in the evidence to that
of synthetic ones in the conclusion. Yes, plants have
ways of fighting a parasite, and they contain about 40
natural pesticides, and humans eat them every day.
But the lack of any evidence for the dangers of
synthetic pesticides—the ver y topic of the
conclusion—suggests that this logic is faulty indeed.
The weakeners will all set up some sort of wall
between these two types of pesticides.
(A) explains our ability to safely ingest the natural
pesticides (we’ve adapted to them), leaving wide open
the question of what happens when one ingests the
synthetic ones (to which we haven’t spent millennia
adapting).
(B) shoves an even stronger wedge than (A) does
between the harmless natural pesticides and the
possibly deadly synthetic ones. If true, (B) makes it
much less likely that our ability to eat the natural
pesticides means that we are home free eating the
man-made ones.
(C) not only confirms the relative benignity of the
natural pesticides, but explicitly cites the synthetic
ones as highly toxic. Again, the evidence is shown to be
of a different order of risk than the conclusion.
(D), like (C), speaks to both the relatively neutral
effect of natural pesticides and the potentially awful
effect of the synthetic ones.
(E) is the only answer choice left and actually serves
to strengthen the logic, as any similarity between the
two types of pesticides would tend to do. So (E) is
what we want here.
9. (C)
Assumption
The role of an assumption is to connect a term in the
conclusion with a term in the evidence.
This is a textbook example of how assumptions work.
If you have been struggling with the concept, review
this question carefully.
The author contends that a pricey wine can’t
necessarily be depended upon to be good, on the
grounds that price reflects a vineyard’s reputation.
Well, the term “price” appears in both evidence and
conclusion, but only the former mentions vineyard
reputation and only the latter mentions wine quality. For
the argument to work, these two terms need to be
connected, and that’s the role of correct choice (C).
The author must be taking for granted that reputation
is an unreliable indicator of wine quality; if it weren’t—
if it were quite reliable—then instead of the author’s
proposed disjunction between price and quality those
two things would go hand in hand. Notice that three of
the four wrong choices fail to mention both reputation
and quality, and the one that does mention them both,
(D), distorts matters.
(A) That which should occur is not something the logic
hinges on. (A) expresses the author’s regret as to her
conclusion, but doesn’t cement the connection
between the evidence and that conclusion.
(B) goes further than even the author does. Her
conclusion leaves open the possibility that a pricey
wine could be every bit as great as the price suggests.
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(D) offers an unwarranted comparison between
reputation and quality when what we need is a
connection between them.
(E) “Lesser-known” is meant to evoke the idea of
reputation, but reputation involves many things other
than fame vs. obscurity. In any case, any statement
asserting that a wine’s quality is reflected in its price
will tend to contradict our author’s argument rather
than support it.
10. (B) Paradox
Make mental images as you read the description of a
physical process; doing so will help you to see past
the words into the ideas.
In an ingenious—if slightly sickening—approach to
infant care, the parent beetles feed their hungry larvae
off a vertebrate carcass thoughtfully procured in
advance of the birth. The author is surprised that the
larvae do better with one parent around than two, but
if that carcass is providing sustenance for parents and
offspring alike, as (B) proposes, then it’s small wonder
that the young’uns grow up bigger and heavier with only
one parent around—more food is left for them.
(A) The larvae’s growth, which is at the heart of the
paradox, comes long after the carcass is procured, so
at best (A) is irrelevant to the issue at hand. At worst,
any choice speaking to the benefits of a two-parent
beetle household only deepens the paradox.
(C) implies that one parent is always removed or
absent anyway, sleeping while the other works. Even
so, the paradox is intact; we’re still left to wonder why
there’s a difference between the size of lar vae
depending on whether one or two parents are present.
(D) It’s every parent’s dream to kick the kids out of the
nest (literally in this case), but the fact that the beetle
offspring need no more than a week to hit the road
isn’t relevant to the difference in larvae growth while
they’re still at home.
(E) drags in the issue of predators, which is probably
relevant to the beetles’ everyday existence but not to
the paradox as described here. In any case, as we said
regarding (A), the paradox isn’t resolved with a
statement that lauds the benefits of a two-parent home.
11. (B) Inference
An inference can be no more categorical or absolute
than the statements on which it is based.
We’re told that most scientists nowadays find nonEuclidean geometry to be more useful in a variety of
16
contexts, including (says the third sentence) the
currently accepted cosmological theory. This means
that classical Euclidean geometr y is no longer
considered to be the only useful type, a fairly narrow
statement reflected by (B).
(A) “Progress” is not a term that appears anywhere in
the stimulus, so we certainly cannot ascribe a belief
about progress to Euclidean scientists or anyone else.
(C) goes too far. The author is careful to deem nonEuclidean geometry more useful in “certain areas”;
that’s a far cry from calling it “more complete.”
(D) posits a necessary condition for any “accurate
scientific theory,” but that’s a much grander ambition
than the stimulus ever sets out to wrestle with. All the
author wants to do is report on the current scientific
view of Euclidean vs. non-Euclidean geometry.
(E), like (D), is a grandiose sentence that could only be
the result of a grandiose investigation. But this
author’s scope is very narrow. (E) also goes wrong in
citing “usefulness vs. correctness,” rather than
Euclidean vs. non-Euclidean geometry, as the contrast
that the author explores.
12. (A) Principle
When the principle isn’t stated in either the stimulus
or answer choices, you need to abstract it yourself.
In most Principle questions, the stimulus is a real-life
situation, and the five choices offer abstract principles
or rules, one of which matches up. Occasionally, it’s
reversed: the stimulus is the principle, and you have to
pick which of five real-life situations is governed by it.
This question is a rare variation: the stimulus is a reallife situation, and you have to locate another one that’s
governed in the same way. Your best bet is to frame the
principle first.
There are two ways to approach this idea of the expert
who is to testify, and a preference is shown for a lessexpert witness who is persuasive and confident over a
highly expert witness who can’t persuade. Your abstract
principle should be, The ability to persuade an audience
should trump, or can be more important than, sheer
expertise. You might even refine it to something as
simple as, Style over substance. Any such consideration
of the underlying principle should reveal (A) as correct.
In (A), the “audience” is the electorate and, as in the
stimulus, a preference is asserted for style (the
conducting of a campaign) over substance.
(B) describes a process of learning how to become
more persuasive, but doesn’t describe a conflict
between two approaches to a problem.
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(C) has it exactly backward. Dramatically affecting an
audience would be analogous to “style”; having the
best voice to “substance.” To be correct, (C) would
have to say, “Go with the less skillful singer because
she’ll “persuade the audience” better.
(D) outlines two approaches to a problem and asserts
a preference for one of them, but it lacks the “style vs.
substance” or opposing nature of the options in the
stimulus or in correct choice (A). All (D) is saying is
that there are two ways to train kids, and one is better.
(E) Hiring the applicant who is best qualified is surely
the “substance” choice. Moreover, (E) doesn’t
describe a “style” kind of option, but rather an
inversion (shaping the job to fit the person)—not at all
analogous.
13. (A) Assumption
The appearance of “only” and “unless” is an ironclad
hint that necessity vs. sufficiency is being tested.
Let’s work backward from the conclusion: the author’s
point is that economic enticement is a necessary
condition for solving serious ecological problems
because economic enticement is a necessar y
condition for changing consumers’ habits and, in turn,
changing consumers’ habits is a necessary condition
for solving serious ecological problems. All of them?
No, just those that government mismanagement
doesn’t cause. How many of those are there? There’s
no way to tell, but for the argument to work—for the
solution of “few” big problems to be possible without
economic enticement—very few of those problems can
be attributed to governmental screwups, and that is
why (A) is correct. If (A) were false and a huge
proportion of ecological problems were caused by
governmental ineptitude, then those solutions might
not require economically enticing solutions, contrary to
the author’s position.
(B) “Economically feasible” isn’t a term that appears
anywhere in the argument. Besides, the author’s chain
of logic refers to ecological problems that are not
caused by the government.
(C) That which is necessary is not always feasible. The
author says that economic enticement is a prerequisite
for changing consumers’ habits, but that doesn’t mean
that he believes that such enticement is feasible any
more than saying, “To get to Mars in a day, we’d have
to fly much faster than the speed of light,” implies that
the speaker believes that velocity to be possible.
(D) The scope of this argument is “major ecological
problems,” period. The author is not interested in
whether those happen to be the majority or minority of
ecological problems in general.
(E) On the contrary, it sounds as if the author believes
that solving most serious ecological problems (those
not caused by governmental missteps, that is) requires
changing consumers’ habits.
14. (D) Inference
Even when an Inference question is based on an
argument, the correct answer will come out of the
evidence presented.
Most Inference questions (cf. questions 2, 11, and 17,
for instance) are based on a set of premises. Here the
stimulus is a full-fledged argument, but the right answer
is based on its premises anyway. To the author, if you
have a real estate slump plus low car sales, you’ve
probably got an unhealthy economy. It follows—note the
contrapositive at work—that if the economy is healthy,
then you probably don’t have the combination of a real
estate slump plus low car sales. And that’s (D),
practically word for word. (Notice, incidentally, that the
third sentence doesn’t contribute to the right answer. No
surprise there: Sentence 3 has very little to do with the
logic, because it concerns the probable outcome had
there been no real estate slump or no low car sales. But
we know that both have occurred, so sentence 3 is
beside the point.)
(A) 180. Low car sales alone, the author tells us, “would
be consistent with” (though they wouldn’t necessarily
cause) a healthy economy, contrary to (A).
(B) is a classic case of improperly reversing an “if” and
“then.” If both the real estate and car markets were
booming, it would still be possible to have an economy
in the dumpster. To put it another way, the two slumps
of which the author speaks are, to him, more or less
sufficient for an unhealthy economy, but we cannot infer
that they’re necessary for one.
(C), like (B), misinterprets the author’s logic. A booming
real estate market is just that—one booming
phenomenon. The economy as a whole could be doing
very badly indeed.
(E) has the author’s reasoning backward. He has looked
at the real estate and car markets, assessed them as
terrible, and concluded that the economy is terrible too.
(E) has that reasoning exactly reversed.
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15. (D) Strengthen the Argument
Strengthening an argument doesn’t necessarily prove
it—it simply makes the argument more likely.
One thing that’s needed to prove that the Ice Age
melting contributed to the Swedish earthquakes is a
connection between quakes and cracked crust, the
latter of which was caused by melting ice. Such a
connection is offered by (D). The conclusion can’t be
considered proven—we’d still need to confirm, for
instance, that there was cracking beneath the Swedish
terrain way back when, and that the melting ice caused
that cracking—but (D) brings the conclusion one step
closer to proof.
(A) might serve to weaken the logic in its implication
that the earth’s crust can crack because of pressure
changes in general (i.e., as opposed to the melting of
Ice Age ice specifically). In any event, (A)’s failure to
mention either earthquakes or Sweden brings the
argument no closer to proof.
(B) Indeed? Are any of those areas located beneath
Sweden? Locating cracked crust in Northern Europe
generally gets us no closer to confirming the logic.
(C) Earthquake damage in Canada is even further
removed from the specific situation in Sweden than (B)
is. And what’s more, no information about the cause of
Canadian quakes—information that might be relevant
in making an analogy to Sweden—is forthcoming.
(E) 180. By implying an alternative cause of
earthquakes, (E) is a definite weakener.
16. (E)
Main Point
A conclusion is the point to which all of the evidence
is proceeding.
“Hence” signals conclusion, and (E) simply casts the
stimulus’s “Hence” sentence in a slightly different way.
Both say, in effect, that one can both support
democracy and favor some market regulation—in
contrast to the view of the economists whom the
author opposes (first sentence).
(A) The voting booth detail is part of the evidence, not
part of the conclusion. The rest of the stimulus is not
constructed to bring the reader to realize (A).
(B) goes too far in advocating total regulation in a
democracy. The author isn’t arguing that those who
want democracy cannot support unregulated markets,
just that some regulation is also possible as well.
(C) 180. This is the view to which the author is
opposed. Besides, the author is arguing for something
18
that suppor ters of democracy can suppor t, not
something that they must support.
(D) That the private consumer says to himself, “What
do I want?” does not leave him open to the blanket
charge of being “primarily self-interested.” Remember,
when this same consumer enters the voting booth, he
will likely have a very different, and less self-centered,
question in mind.
17. (C) Inference
Stick strictly to the terms of the statements in
making an inference.
Each adult bird on our list of three is significantly bigger
and heavier than the one before it, yet each bird’s egg
is less and less a percentage of the adult bird’s weight.
This means that we have potent illustration of (C):
when you set up ratios for egg weight vs. adult body
weight, the ratios will be smaller for the heavier birds
than the lighter ones. To think about it arithmetically:
for the larger birds, the numerator (egg weight) will be
quite small, and the denominator (adult weight) quite
large. The opposite is true for the smaller birds.
(A) Species’ eggs are not being compared with each
other, but with the adult body weight within each egg’s
species.
(B), like (A), assumes that a comparison can be made
among eggs of different species. Not so, at least not
from the evidence we’re given. For all we know, all
three species’ eggs could be exactly the same size and
weight even as the adults grow to different sizes.
(D) goes wrong on two counts: we cannot infer variance
in the sizes of eggs [see (B), above], and we also can’t
infer any “effect” that eggs have on adult birds from
the straight-up data comparisons given.
(E) is a totally unwarranted comparison, implying
much more data than we’re given about the relative
sizes of the eggs and the relative sizes of the adult
hummingbird, goose, and ostrich.
18. (D) Assumption
When you’re told what’s false, it’s your job to figure
out what’s true.
The conclusion, “this assumption is false,” has to be
interpreted. It’s referring to the popular misconception
that transforming from vampire to bat is “an essential
part of vampire myths,” so we should state the author’s
view more simply, e.g., Bat transformation isn’t a big
part of the classic vampire myths. Why not? Because
the myths predate Bram Stoker’s book. To use Stoker’s
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later book to draw a conclusion about earlier vampire
myths, the author must believe that the bat myth
originates with Stoker or—as correct choice (D) puts
it—that one or more preexisting myths do not feature
the bat myth. If (D) were false and all of the pre-Stoker
myths featured bat transformation, then that would lend
massive credence to the popular assumption. So the
author is counting on (D) to be true.
(A) is identical to the right answer except for its last
two words, but that’s what kills it. Nocturnality is not
the issue here; what matters is whether a vampire
turns into a bat.
(B) No time frame is mentioned: if these Western
Hemisphere bat myths postdate the Stoker book, then
they are irrelevant to the logic, whereas if they predate
Stoker, they bolster the popular assumption that the
author is challenging. Either way, the author’s not
depending on this.
(C) is, in one sense, irrelevant because the author seems
principally interested in myths within Europe. But
remember, the author is implicitly arguing that bat
transformation is more or less a Stoker invention and not
a long-standing feature of myth; so in a broader sense, any
suggestion [like (C)’s] that vampire myths begin and end
with Stoker tends to weaken the author’s point of view.
(E) Stoker’s familiarity with myths tells us nothing
about whether he adopted bat transformation from
them (as people assume) or came up with it himself
(as the author believes).
19. (B) Role of a Statement
On the most basic level, the conclusion is the
statement that prompts the question, “Why?”; the
evidence is the answer to that question.
Everything after the first sentence is there to explain
why the author is so pessimistic that we will ever be
disease free…which makes that statement the
conclusion. For that reason alone, (C) and (D) must be
promptly rejected. The statement is not evidence at all,
as in (C), and it’s a prediction, not the generalization
that (D) suggests.
As for the other choices, only (B) distills the argument
to its essence: we will probably never be disease free
because the bugs respond to any medicine by
developing immunity to it. The numerousness of
infectious bugs mentioned in (A) blows up the passing
reference to their being “very prolific” into the main
point, whereas (E) distorts the argument by asserting
that the bugs are already immune, rather than
developing their immunity quickly. Their adaptation is
the key to the dilemma, and (E) misses that aspect.
20. (B) Flaw
Keep an eye out for correlation vs. causation,
especially in Flaw questions.
There’s a high correlation between kids’ impulsiveness
and this specific gene variant, so the author posits a
causal relationship between the gene variant and
“adult thrill-seeking,” a phenomenon similar to a
child’s impulsiveness. This is weak enough as a
demonstration of cause and effect, but if (B) is true
and that which we label “impulsiveness” could actually
be many other types of behavior, then the causation is
weaker still. There’s precious little science in saying,
“Well, behavior A is like behavior B,” and even less
when it turns out that “behavior A” is nothing that can
be pinned down.
(A) Adult impulsiveness is not the issue; adult thrillseeking is. And dopamine’s role in the process is
sufficiently fuzzy to render any statement about
dopamine irrelevant to the reasoning.
(C) is the converse of (A). Children’s impulsiveness,
not their thrill-seeking, is what the scientist has
studied.
(D) The argument doesn’t assert that all thrill-seeking
adults, or indeed any of them, show behavior similar to
that of children. The gene variant could cause the
adult’s thrill-seeking without ever being apparent in
that child’s behavior.
(E) Other types of behavior are outside the scope.
21. (E)
Flaw
Watch out for perennial flaws, notably necessity vs.
sufficiency.
According to the author, Claudette shares a trait with
most classical pianists, that of recognizing the works of
Clara Schumann. But a great many nonpianists may be
able to recognize Schumann’s work as well; in fact, as
correct choice (E) points out, pianists could be in the
minority. To put it another way, it’s pretty much safe to
assume that if you’re a classical pianist, you can identify
Schumann’s work, but we can’t simply flip those terms,
and that’s exactly what the stimulus does.
(A) Other composers’ work never enters into the logic.
The issue is, does recognizing Schumann’s work imply
anything? And the answer is no.
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(B) The word “even” in the fourth sentence indicates
an intensifier and, as a rule, intensifiers are not
intrinsic to one’s reasoning. Note that the entire last
sentence of the stimulus could be omitted with
absolutely no damage to the logic. So a choice that
hinges on the inability of nonpianists “even” to know
who Schumann was is irrelevant here.
(C) Other instruments are as irrelevant to the logic as
other composers—choice (A)—are. Piano is the only
relevant term.
(D) There is nothing vague about the term “classical.”
We might not know what it means, but our incomplete
vocabulary shouldn’t be confused with an accusation
of author vagueness. The word appears in the stimulus
four times, and there’s no reason to believe that it isn’t
used consistently and categorically.
22. (E)
Parallel Reasoning
Parallel arguments must feature the same kind of
conclusion. Any choice with a different kind of
conclusion cannot be parallel.
confirmed, the connection between evidence and
conclusion is strengthened.
(A) The author seems to believe that physical labor is
necessary to life, and that if we can’t get technology to
do it, we’ll have to take it on ourselves at the risk of
“drudgery.” But she makes no connection between
physical labor and fulfillment.
(C) brings in the grandiose concept of “freedom,” no
less irrelevant than “fulfillment” in (A). The argument
decries dependence on technology, a narrow issue that
doesn’t require the assumption that one is not free
unless one solely depends on oneself.
(D) The undermining of life’s charm is a side issue that
the author could readily excise with no damage to the
logic. Moreover, (D)’s appeal to the concept of “gain
vs. loss” doesn’t relate at all to the argument.
(E) Much modern technology diminishes selfsufficiency and, hence, well being—not necessarily all.
(E) goes much further than the author’s indictment of
technology.
24. (E)
The stimulus’ “kind of conclusion” is a prediction that,
once a third-party event occurs, exactly one of two
differing opinions will come out on top. This means that
(A), with its assertion that “at least one opinion is
wrong,” (B), asserting that “X and Y must disagree,”
and (C)’s value judgment about “X proving to be
better,” can all be discarded. (Moreover, none of them
offers an intervening and confirming third-party event.)
Meanwhile, (D) doesn’t explicitly confirm that David will
be proved wrong and Jane right, or vice versa, and
(D)’s movement from small-section inspection to fullarea inspection has no parallel in the stimulus.
That leaves (E). Maria’s opinion does parallel the
stimulus’ “experiment”; both (E) and the stimulus do
make a prediction; and both predictions are that, in the
end, one view will prevail over the other.
23. (B) Assumption
When an argument hinges on a scope shift, an
assumption is needed to render the scope shift
logical.
The conclusion is that much modern technology
lessens the well being of its users, because it makes
them less self-sufficient. This clear scope shift renders
the argument unpersuasive unless we can prove that
self-sufficiency has something material to do with well
being…a task that (B) accomplishes. Once (B) is
20
Role of a Statement
Sort out whether a particular statement serves the
author’s purpose, or that of his opponent.
“Mistakenly argue” immediately stamps the author as
an opponent of the anti-Freudians who use the
electrical cause of dreams to prove that dreams are
wholly physiological and, hence, reveal nothing of the
dreamer’s psychology. The clause in question is
preceded by “Since,” which suggests that the clause is
acting as evidence, and so it is. Even if (note the
concession to the anti-Freudians) dreams have an
electrical cause, the fact that “dream content varies
enormously” means that there is something more
going on than mere electrical discharge. That
relationship is summed up by correct choice (E), in
which the “claim” is that dreams have a totally
physiological cause, and the “view of Freud’s” is that
dreams reveal character.
(A) “Mistakenly argue,” in and of itself, proves that the
author is not embracing an anti-Freudian position. All of
the remaining choices suggest that the author is out to
explain dreams:
(B) From what’s provided here, Freud evidently
believed that dreams reveal something about the
dreamer’s character, but we can’t be sure that he felt
it provided “significant information.” Moreover, signing
on to a theory isn’t within the author’s purpose. He is
out to rebut Freudian critics, not to affirm a Freudian
stand. At most, the author is committed to believing
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Section II: Logical Reasoning
(and this is more implicitly than “explicitly stated”) that
there is more to dreams than mere electricity.
(C) Nothing in the stimulus suggests that the author
seeks a third viewpoint, beyond that of Freud and the
cited opponents, in coming up with an explanation for
dreams.
(D) Once again, the author’s purpose is not to promote
a theory or explanation of dreaming but to rebut a
viewpoint; that’s the purpose of the clause in question.
25. (E)
Flaw
Instantly turn “X only if Y” into “If X then Y,” and
watch for arguments that misapply the terms.
The author asserts that, “If technology is accepted,
then it coheres with society’s values.” That’s fine. But
by pointing to the bicycle’s disappearance after an
initial embrace as indicative of a change in values, she
is making the classic error of negating the terms; we
cannot assume that if technology is rejected (as the
bicycle was), then it must not cohere with society’s
values. The author ignores any number of reasons—
other than value-related ones—that the bicycle could
have disappeared for 30–40 years, among them the
unreliable workmanship of the first models, the
prohibitive cost of manufacturing and hence of
purchasing them, laws passed against them, and the
popularity of alternative means of locomotion. (E)
cogently points out this flaw.
(A) Actually, the author presumes that fads are
indicative of acceptance. That’s why she sees a
change in societal values as the explanation for the
bicycle’s reappearance.
(B) The author’s scope is investigating the 30–40 year
invisibility of the bicycle, not the reasons for its
ultimate revival in the 1860s.
(C) That the Draisienne was the “first true bicycle”
(although the author never uses the word “true”) is a
trivial fact irrelevant to the real issue—namely, why the
bicycle disappeared for a for a few decades.
(D) 180. The question posed (i.e., “Why was this?”) is
intensely relevant to the conclusion: it’s the question
that the conclusion answers. That the conclusion
answers this question in a logically faulty way is
another matter altogether.
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SECTION III:
LOGIC GAMES
1. (C)
Game 1: Garibaldi’s Meetings
Perhaps the easiest rule to check is Rule 4, and that
knocks out (E): M cannot occupy the last slot. If we
scan for two F’s in a row, the violation of Rule 2, we can
easily elminiate (B), and a scan for an exception to the
“T S” of Rule 3 gets rid of (D). We have one wrong
answer remaining, with only Rule 1 left, so it stands to
reason that one of the remaining choices fails to give
us the proper number of Fuentes meetings. (A), with
only two F’s, is the culprit, and (C) remains as the
correct answer.
Use the rules to knock out the unacceptable
sequences quickly.
Situation: A bunch of meetings are to be scheduled,
one after another.
Entities: The dignitaries with whom Garibaldi is to
meet.
Action: To sequence the meetings.
Limitations: Seven meetings with five people leaves
some ambiguity as to who is repeated, until we see
Rule 1, that is, which confirms our roster as:
2. (D)
F F F M R S T
Our Master Sketch is simple, and typical of basic
Sequencing games involving numbered slots:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Rule 2 also proves to be significant. If we can never
have two F’s adjacent to each other, then—given that
there are three of them—there are only so many ways
to separate them. Note that there will have to be at
least one F among the first three slots; the latest
possible slots for the F’s would be #3, 5, and 7.
“NEVER FF” is as good a reminder of the rule to jot
down as any.
Rule 3 offers a bloc of entities: “T S” will have to
appear somewhere in the sequence. (We trust you
didn’t get sloppy and read it as “S T.”) Meanwhile, Rule
4 tells us where not to place M—at either end—which
doesn’t tell us much about where M is placed, or who
is first or seventh. Simply jotting down “not M” under
slots 1 and 7 in your Master Sketch should nail this
down.
Beyond those individual rules, there’s little to be
done—no reason to set up Limited Options,no
additional deductions to be made. Sometimes there’s
nothing to be done but to plow through the questions.
22
Acceptability
Could be true
If an early question seems multistepped and complex,
consider skipping it and moving ahead to simpler
questions.
This “if” clause allows us to create a sketch with R in
the seventh, or last, slot, but it’s quickly apparent that
doing so doesn’t tell us a great deal more. In short,
there are a lot of possibilities to work out, many things
that “could be true.” Your options are:
1. Work out various possibilities in a coherent way.
2. Work directly with the choices, trying out each in
search of the one that’s possible
3. Skip the whole thing and move on.
Any of those options is logical and workable. The only
bad choice is to just stare at the question and dither.
Let’s work this out using method 2: try out each
choice. And use your pencil—don’t just work things out
in your head.
(A) If S takes slot #2, that puts T into slot #1 (Rule 3)
and then we’re in a bind: there’s no way to insert the
three F’s according Rule 1. So we can eliminate (A).
(B) If M occupies slot #3, we can properly place the F’s
or insert the “T S” pair, but we can’t do both. Eliminate.
(C) offers the same dilemma. With S fourth and R
seventh (that’s in the question stem, remember), we
will have to violate either Rule 3 or Rule 4. Eliminate.
(D) Now yer talkin’. A little sketch that includes M in
the fifth slot and R in the seventh slot can be
completed properly: “F T S F M F R.” Since it’s
possible, we can choose (D) and need not even go on
to confirm that (E) is impossible. (For the record, S
can’t be sixth, as in (E), for the same reasons that (B)
and (C) are impossible).
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3. (E)
Complete and accurate list
Always work out what must be true before
considering what could be true.
A sketch drawn with F in the second slot might well
make you think about slot #1, which can never be filled
by M (Rule 4), and now can’t be filled by F (Rule 2) or
T or S (Rule 3). Who’s left? Only R, who must occupy
slot #1, making it possible to eliminate (A), (B), and
(D)—R cannot occupy slot #4.
(C) and (E) remain, and each mentions S, so we
needn’t check whether S can occupy slot #4; that must
be possible. In the end, whether you work with (C) and
determine that M can’t occupy slot #4 because it
leaves no room for the F’s and the “TS” pair, or with (E)
and determine that F is eminently possible for slot #4
(e.g., R F M F T S F), you are left with (E) as the correct
answer.
order, are #4 and #6, which means that either of those
slots qualifies as the one in question, the one that
Rhee can occupy. The testmakers chose slot #6 for
correct choice (D).
6. (A)
Must be true
Don’t be afraid to engage in trial and error. If you try,
you’ll rarely err.
Where must G go, given the new “if” clause? That
clause mandates “R M” as an adjacent pair, not unlike
“T S”—so the F’s will be needed to separate and
surround those two pairs. A little trial and error reveals
that one pair will have to take slots 2 and 3, while the
other takes slots 5 and 6; slots 1, 4, and 7 remain for
the F’s, making (A) the right answer here.
4. (E)
Must be true
Create and work with blocs of entities whenever
possible.
If R’s meeting is to come right after S’s, then we have
a bloc of “T S R” to insert somewhere into the
sequence. Start inserting!
If “T S R” begins the sequence...well, that’s a
nonstarter; we wouldn’t be able to insert the three F’s
in line with Rule 3.
“T S R” could move over one slot and fill slots 2–4, in
which case the F’s would go into slots 1, 5, and 7,
leaving M for slot #6. There’s one possibility: “F T S R
F M F.”
If “T S R” slide over to occupy slots 3–5…again, a
nonstarter. Pairs of slots at both ends will not
accommodate three nonadjacent F’s.
The last possibility is to have “T S R” in slots 4–6, for:
“F M F T S R F.”
If you compare the two sequences we’ve assembled,
the only things true in both are that F is always first and
last, the latter of which is reflected in correct choice
(E).
5. (D)
Could be true
Quite often a later question can be much easier than
one or more questions that precede it.
Placing T into slot #1 mandates S in slot #2, of course
(Rule 3), and as we scan the open slots and think of
the F’s we quickly realize that they have to take slots
3, 5, and 7. The remaining slots for M and R, in either
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PrepTest 44 Explained
Game 2: Animal Shelter Placements
Situation: Dogs are to be placed with owners on
separate days.
Entities: The dogs.
Action: To assign them days—a straightfor ward
Grouping game of Distribution, in which Monday,
Tuesday, and Wednesday are the subgroups.
Limitations: We will place one pair per day, so there
are three pairs to assign in total.
Rule 1 clears up a great deal right away: one of the
three pairs—that is, one of the subgroups—will be
“LP.” Make a note of that!
Negative Rule 2—we can never make “GH” a pair—
tells us an awful lot if we turn the negative into a
positive, as we should always do! If G cannot be paired
with H, what can G be paired with? Well, S or K, of
course, as “LP” is a definite pair already. This limited
number of possibilities allows us to set up two options
in terms of the pair-ups:
Op. I: LP ... GK ➔ HS
Op. II: LP ... GS ➔ HK
See how that works? With “LP” a constant, either G will
be paired with K (leaving HS) or with S (leaving HK). Now
all that remains is to figure out the assignment of days.
According to Rule 3, placing K on Monday puts G on
Tuesday. Notice that this would force us to use Option II
(because, in Option I, “GK” are a bonded pair). In the
same way, Rule 4 (“if S is Wednesday, then H is
Tuesday”) would force us to use Option II as well
(because in Option I S and H must be paired). But don’t
misuse these rules: they don’t mean that only Option II
is ever in play! There are many other possibilities. For
now, let’s just jot down the rules and their
contrapositives as we’re used to doing:
K Mon ➔ G Tues
G not Tues ➔ K not Mon
S Wed ➔ H Tues
H not Tues ➔ S not Wed
7. (E)
Acceptability
When tossing out choices, start with the easiest
rules first.
It’s easiest to search for violations of the “LP” rule,
and we get one in (A). A search for “GH” in violation of
Rule 2 reveals (C), another impossible matching. Next,
Rule 3. We need to find a choice that assigns K to
Monday—only (B) does so—and see whether it follows
the rule. Nope; the G is supposed to occupy the
Tuesday slot, and it doesn’t. Eliminate (B). Finally,
expecting to find a violator of Rule 4, we confidently
seek a choice that assigns S to Wednesday but fails to
place the H on Tuesday. (D) gets it wrong but (E) gets
it right.
8. (B)
Must be true (no “if” clause)
Setting up Limited Options can help in many
situations—especially when no additional information
is provided.
The choices all offer possible and impossible pairs; all
we need do is compare each of them to the two
Options we’ve set up. (A), for instance: is it impossible
to have “GK”? Not at all. “GK” is a pair in Option I.
Eliminate (A) because its proposition doesn’t hold
water. G and K can share a day.
As for (B), is it fair to say that we never see “KS”? Yes
indeed; given the permanent “LP” pair, “KS” would leave
“GH” together in violation of Rule 2. So (B) is correct,
and we needn’t bother to go on and learn that (C) is not
impossible (“HS” is found in Option I), while (D) and (E)
are both true in Option II, but not in Option I.
9. (A)
Could be true
Use the contrapositives of your if/then rules.
If we set up a mini-sketch in which P, and hence “LP”
(Rule 1), occupies Tuesday, consulting our rules
instantly reveals that both contrapositives apply;
indeed, neither G nor H can occupy Tuesday (it’s full!),
so let’s proceed systematically.
Rule 3: If G isn’t on Tuesday (which it isn’t), then K
can’t be on Monday, meaning that K must be on
Wednesday. Build that in:
Mon
___
Tue
LP
Wed
K_
Rule 4: If K isn’t on Tuesday (which it isn’t), then S can’t
be on Wednesday, so S must be on Monday, and G and
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Section III: Logic Games
H will occupy the remaining Monday and Wednesday
slots, in either order. If we then proceed to the choices,
what do you know? (A) turns out to be right. It is indeed
possible for G to be placed on Monday.
10. (E)
Must be true
Work out the possibilities carefully, and use your
pencil; don’t try to do it all in your head.
Telling us that “GK” is a pair means that we’re in
Option I, with our pairs comprised of “GK,” “LP,” and
“HS.” Fine. But on which days? Here’s where we have
to work carefully with our if/then rules.
Rule 3 is interesting because it separates the very
entities—K and G—that we’ve just been told to pair up.
Clearly, we cannot place the K on Monday, so the GK
pair will have to occupy either Tuesday or Wednesday,
like so:
Mon
___
___
Tue
GK
or
__
Wed
___
GK_
Now let’s consider Rule 4, which has to work within that
which we’ve just set up. “If the S is placed on Wed,”
begins the rule. Well, that could only occur in the first of
the two possibilities, since Wednesday is filled with
“GK” in the other. The rule continues: “...then H is on
Tues.” Hang on! That won’t work either, because “GK” is
already there. Under these circumstances there is no
way to place S on Wednesday, and that makes (E)
correct. Of the wrong choices, notice that if the
arrangement is HS Mon, GK Tues, and LP Wed, then (B)
and (D) are false, and if the arrangement is LP Mon, HS
Tues, and GK Wed, then (A) and (C) are false.
Rule 2 allows us to fill in all the blanks—turns out
we’re dealing with Option II:
Mon
HK_
LP__
Tue
GS
or
HK
Wed
LP_
GS
But even before we work all that out, (D) is revealed as
the choice that “CANNOT be true,” and thus is correct.
Note that our first instance, above, proves that all four
of the remaining choices are possible!
12. (A) CANNOT be true
Remember that two questions can be set up in similar
ways.
This question is the same as the previous one, except
that the entities are different. Here, the “if” clause
means that we will see either G on Monday and P (with
L) on Tuesday, or G on Tuesday and LP on Wednesday.
Either way, Rule 2 mandates that H occupy the
remaining day. Here’s the very familiar setup:
Mon
G_
H__
Tue
LP_
or
G
Wed
H_
LP _
We’ll be done with this one even more quickly than we
got through the previous question. Note that this
question asks about Tuesday, and look at what we’ve
got: one situation in which LP takes Tuesday and
another in which G is there and thus (as per Rule 2) not
accompanied by H. Either way, H is forbidden to occupy
a Tuesday slot, and so (A) is correct.
11. (D) CANNOT be true
Turn abstract statements into concrete ones.
So the H comes before the S, does it? Don’t just take
that as an abstraction; work out the concrete
possibilities. Either we’ll have H on Monday and S on
Tuesday, or H on Tuesday and S on Wednesday. Either
way, the remaining day will go to our permanent LP pair:
Mon
H__
LP_
Tue
S
or
H
Wed
LP_
S_
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PrepTest 44 Explained
Game 3: Archaeological Sites
This complex and interesting game is a great tool for
understanding a perennial concept that seems simple
on its face but causes many students grief: If it’s not
one, then it’s one of the others. Watch and listen as we
go through these rules.
Situation: Archaeologists discovering and dating
particular sites.
Entities: The archaeologists, and the centuries in
question.
Action: To match up each site with its discoverer (F, G,
or O) and its century (eighth, ninth, or tenth, as we’ll
call them to distinguish them from sites 1–5).
Limitations: Whenever we have more available slots
than we have entities, there’s room for considerable
confusion. Here, the need to duplicate one or more
archaeologists and centuries is complicated by the fact
that we’re never told whether all the archaeologists, or
all the centuries, are used. We’ll just have to stay
flexible.
You can readily represent the five sites with two slots
apiece:
1
2
3
4
F, G, O
8th, 9th, 10th
Notice that we went ahead and built in the substance
of Rule 1: site #2’s century is definitely determined.
We always want to jump on those definite rules! No
clue—yet—as to site 2’s discoverer.
Rule 2 reminds us always to turn negative rules into
positive ones. If O didn’t discover one of the last two
sites, then who did? F or G, of course. If it’s not one,
then it’s one of the others. Build “F/G” into the top row
for site 4 and site 5:
1
2
3
4
F/G
9th
5
F/G
F, G , O
8th, 9th, 10th
Rule 3 tells us that there’s exactly one G in the list—
meaning that all the other discoveries were made by F
26
1
2
3
4
F/G
F/O
5
F/G
9th
F, G , O
8th, 9th, 10th
Rule 4 offers up another useful if/then rule (If a site is
eighth century, then its discoverer was O) and its
contrapositive (if O wasn’t the discoverer, then it’s not
eighth century). Of course, we ought to recognize that
this doesn’t necessarily mean that there is any eighthcentury site! At this point some of you may have
realized, through Rule 1 or through your sketch, that O
didn’t discover our last two sites. As such, those can’t
be eighth century, and therefore:
1
5
9th
or O—and that this G will be inserted with a “10th” for
the century. Did you think through the contrapositive?
If it’s not from the tenth century, then it wasn’t
discovered by G—which allows us to deduce something
about site 2. Remember, if it’s not one, then it’s one
of the others. Since G cannot have discovered ninthcentury site 2, we know that:
2
F/O
9th
3
4
F/G
5
F/G
F, G , O
9th/10th 9th/10th 8 t h , 9 t h , 1 0 t h
We conclude with our most complex and most
influential rule of all, and appropriately, it requires
careful thought. Rule 5 is actually two rules in one,
isn’t it? Site 3’s century is earlier than site 1’s, and it’s
also earlier than site 4’s. Let’s think this through on its
own before going to the sketch. Because site 3
predates those other sites, it cannot date from the
earliest of the three centuries (the eighth), which
means that site 3 must be labeled “9th/10th.”
Meanwhile, sites 1 and 4 cannot date from the tenth
century because that would make them later than site
3’s date. Make sense? Thus sites 1 and 4 are “8th or
9th only.”
But wait a second, look at the Master Sketch: we have
already restricted site 4 to the ninth or tenth centuries!
So now we can reduce it further—site 4 must date
from the ninth century and hence site 3 from the tenth.
There’s no alternative:
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Section III: Logic Games
1
2
3
F/O
9th
10th
4
5
F/G
F/G
9th
14. (C) CANNOT be true
F, G , O
9th/10th 8 t h , 9 t h , 1 0 t h
And we’re not done yet. Remember Rule 3? G’s only
site is a tenth-century site. That means that site 4, now
confirmed as ninth century, is left to F for sure.
What about site 1? We know (thanks to Rule 5) that it’s
earlier than site 3, so site 1 must date from the eighth
or ninth century. As such—Rule 3 again—no matter
what, that’s not a G site, and if it’s not one, then...well,
you know by now. Here’s where we are left:
1
2
F/O
F/O
8th/9th
9th
3
4
F
10th
9th
5
F/G
F, G, O
9th/10th 8th, 9th, 10th
Shall we sum up what else is known or needed? Surely.
We know that any eighth-century sites are O sites, and
only site 1 remains in the running for that honor. So if
that site proves to be from the eighth century, then it’s
definitely O’s. Meanwhile we need exactly one
“G/10th” site (Rule 3), and clearly that has to be either
site 3 or site 5.
That’s a lot of work. But we did it systematically, which
means in the minimum amount of time. And the
question work should be quickly doable.
13. (E) Acceptability
In a highly complex game, you may need your Master
Sketch and its deductions in order to toss out one or
more violators.
Two of the wrong choices can be tossed quickly: (A),
because it assigns O to site 4 (in violation of Rule 2),
and (D), because it assigns two sites to G (contrary to
Rule 3). Further elimination requires consulting our
work on the combined rules, which means consulting
our sketch. We have site 1 labeled “F/O” because, as
an eighth- or ninth-century site, it couldn’t have been
discovered by G, a realization that permits us to
eliminate (B), in which G is assigned site 1.
Meanwhile, the need to assign G to a tenth-century slot
means that (C)—which bestows upon G a site we know
for sure to be ninth centur y (Rule 1)—is also
impossible. (E), as the last man standing, must be
possible.
Let your Master Sketch reveal that which can or
cannot be true.
If there’s exactly one tenth-century site, then it has to
be site 3, which is confirmed as tenth, and it will be a
G site (Rule 3). It follows, therefore, that this site is
forbidden to Ferrara, choice (C). Note that all of the
others can be F’s; as we realized earlier, there doesn’t
have to be a site that was discovered by O!
15. (A) Could be true
Some later questions can be genuine slam dunks if
you’ve done the right work in advance.
Our sketch instantly reveals that the only site eligible
for eighth-century dating is site 1, choice (A). (If you
don’t recall why that’s so, review the step-by-step
deductions we described.)
16. (E) CANNOT be true / Complete and accurate
list
Once again, our sketch rapidly yields a right answer. G
discovered a single tenth-century site, and all of our
deduction demonstrated that sites 1, 2, and 4 are all
definitively from the eighth or ninth century—so (E) is the
complete and accurate list of the sites forbidden to G.
17. (D) Maximum number of possibilities
When asked for a maximum number, it can be useful
to start with the largest answer choice and work your
way backward.
How many F sites can there be? Five, as in choice (E)?
No, Rule 3 mandates that, at minimum, there’s a
single G site. How about four, as in choice (D)? Yes.
It’s quite possible for G to have discovered site 3 only
or 5 only, and for F to have discovered all of the others.
As we noted earlier, there doesn’t have to be any O
site. If you thought there did have to be an O site and
chose (C), you may have misread Rule 4 to mean that
there has to be an eighth-century site discovered by O.
But, again, this is not necessarily the case.
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PrepTest 44 Explained
Game 4: Anastasia’s Parking
Like the previous game, although not quite as much,
this one reminds us of the principle, If it’s not one,
then it’s one of the others.
Situation: Anastasia’s daily parking over the course of
a Monday-through-Friday week.
Entities: The parking lots and their costs.
Action: In this Hybrid game, we have to match lot to
cost, and then sequence them across the days of the
week. (There’s also something of a selection element
too, in that we have to decide which of the lots is used
multiple times.)
Limitations: A five-day week with only three lots available
means, of course, that at least one lot will be repeated.
And we mustn’t ignore the fact that each lot is used at
least once! (Not all rules are indented; some are buried
in the opening paragraph.) Moreover, that very rule
means—think about it—that we have to use each price
at least once. Anyway, three lots, each with a unique daily
cost. We can readily combine Matching and Sequencing
in a sketch, following our principle to use single letters
for one type of entity and spell out everything else:
Mon Tue
Wed
Thu
Fri
X,Y,Z+2
$15
$10, $12, $15
Notice that we went ahead and built concrete Rule 1
right into the sketch. We may not know which lot costs
$15—indeed, that lot’s identity may change from
question to question—but we do know that Anastasia
does use the most expensive lot on Thursday.
It’s easy to give short shrift to Rule 2, but you don’t
want to do that. Rather, you want to delve. Remember
what we taught you: analyze, then draw. If X costs more
than Z, then what are the possibilities? Well, X could be
the $12 lot, in which case Z would be the cheap $10
lot (and by extension, Y would have to cost $15):
If X = $12 ➔ Z = $10 (and ➔ Y = $15)
The only other possibility is that X is the $15 lot, in
which case Z will have to cost either $10 or $12,
leaving Y with whichever price is left over:
If X = $15 ➔ Z = $12 or $10
28
Not bad! We’ve reduced the prices quite a bit, albeit
with more ambiguity than we’d wish for. And we might
observe that no matter what, X is not the $10 lot, nor
is Z the $15 lot:
Mon Tue
Wed
Thu
Fri
X/Y
$15
Next up is Rule 3, the news that Wednesday’s lot costs
more than Friday’s. In other words, Wednesday is
either $12 with Friday being $10, or Wednesday is (like
Thursday) $15, with Friday $10 or $12. You can leave
this alone—or jot it down—or set it up as two Limited
Options. We will elect to simplify matters:
Mon Tue
Wed
Thu
Fri
X/Y
$15/$12
$15
Wed more $
$12/$10
than Fri
Rule 4 may seem to have no immediate applicability,
but we need to understand it and make note of it. We
need more Z’s than X’s; that is, we need at least one
more of the cheaper lot. Well, as we’ve said over and
over again, if you can’t build a rule into the picture,
then note it nearby:
MORE Z’s THAN X’s!!
But think about it: suppose Anastasia used the X lot
twice. Then, to follow Rule 4, she’d need to use Z three
times, and in a five-day week that would leave out
Y...which we’re not allowed to do. So there’s one final
deduction: She will use lot X exactly once.
By building into our diagrams whatever we can build in,
and jotting down prominently that which we cannot
build in, we should be adequately armed for the
questions that follow.
18. (A) Acceptability
No matter what you’ve drawn, 9 times out of 10 the
acceptability question is best attacked via the
individual rules.
Probably the easiest rule to test is the one built into
the paragraph, that each lot be used at least once. (D)
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Section III: Logic Games
violates that condition. Next, we might check against
Rule 4’s mandate that Z’s outnumber X’s, and see that
in (C) there are two of each. Goodbye, (C).
As for Rule 3, it doesn’t speak directly of X, Y, and Z, but
can help us in tandem with another rule—”Wednesday’s
lot is more expensive than Friday’s” (Rule 2).This means
that we can’t have a situation in which Wednesday is Z
and Friday is X—that would reverse Rule 2’s
requirement—so (B) can be eliminated. Finally, we
should look at Thursday, the subject of Rule 1, and
realize that, because Thursday is the most expensive lot,
it can’t be Z (Rule 2)—which knocks out (E). The
arrangement in (A) is left standing, and our sketch
confirms that, in line with (A), the last three days of the
week could be given over to the three individual parking
lots, $12, $15, and $10, respectively.
21. (D) CANNOT be true
A late Logic Games question does not automatically
translate as “agonizingly tough.” Often, it’s quite the
contrary.
If you’ve got the rules under control, that is. Lot Z can’t
be the most expensive lot (Rule 2 told us that) and
Thursday is the most expensive lot, so Thursday is the
one forbidden to Z....choice (D). What a shame it would
be to miss out on this essentially super-low-difficulty
question because you ran out of time or never got to
this game! And yet, in October of 2004, many students
did exactly that.
22. (C) Complete and accurate list
Read question stems very, very carefully.
19. (E)
CANNOT be true
Sometimes “not-if” questions can be answered right
off the Master Sketch.
The question insists that there is a day in which
Anastasia cannot use the $15 lot, and our sketch
reveals it: because Friday’s lot costs less than
Wednesday’s, it’s impossible for Friday to be the most
expensive lot, and (E) is correct.
20. (E)
Must be true
When you’re wondering where to go in a question, be
drawn to that part of the game in which the rules
have the most impact.
If Z is the $12 lot, then X must be the $15 lot (Rule 2)
and Y the $10. At the very least we can stop to toss
out (D): since Thursday is the $15 lot, that ain’t Y, in
this question anyway.
Where to go next? Since none of the rules mention
Monday or Tuesday, you might suspect that those will
remain relatively open ended and direct your attention to
the latter part of the week. Suppose that, as our sketch
acknowledges is possible, Anastasia goes to the $15 lot
on both Wednesday and Thursday. Here, that would
mean two X’s—and hence double trouble, because we
need to have the Z’s outnumber the X’s (Rule 4); we’ve
already deduced that there will be exactly one visit to lot
X. The upshot? Anastasia will use the $12 lot on
Wednesday and the $10 lot on Friday, and in this
question Y is the $10 lot, so (E) is correct.
Those who read this stem too quickly might have been
baffled by the fact that Friday—which we have already
realized can be the $10 lot—isn’t mentioned in any of
the choices. Well, they’re not asking for the complete
and accurate list of all days that Anastasia can park for
$10, but rather a day or pair of days on which she does
park for $10. To put it another way, this is a “Partial
Acceptability” question in which the right answer names
all the $10 days, while the unnamed days go to $12 and
$15 lots. Make sense? Let’s think it through, perhaps
after first putting a line through (D) and (E). Respectively:
Rule 3 tells us that Wednesday costs more than Friday—
which would be impossible if Wednesday cost $10—and
Rule 1 alone tells us that Thursday isn’t a $10 day.
So our answer will be Monday alone; Tuesday alone; or
both Monday and Tuesday. Let’s try that last possibility
first—jot it down: if Monday and Tuesday are the only
$10 lots, where does that leave us? With the $12 and
$15 lots still to be determined. Wednesday has to cost
more than Friday (Rule 3), so that means $15 for
Wednesday and $12 for Friday. Any problem there?
None. The arrangement of lots from Monday through
Friday would be: Z, Z, Y, Y, X. Hurray! We have deduced
that (C) is possible, and thus the correct answer.
For the record, why can’t there be a single $10 lot for
Monday or Tuesday alone? Try it. Whether Z were to be
the $10 lot or the $12 lot, it would be absolutely
impossible to have more Z’s (the cheaper lot) than X’s
(the more expensive lot).
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PrepTest 44 Explained
SECTION IV:
LOGICAL REASONING
1. (C)
Weaken the Argument
To weaken an argument doesn’t mean to disprove it—
simply to make it less likely to be true.
We’re trying to undermine the doctor’s conclusion that
Jones didn’t swallow this chemical, so let’s go back
and seek out the factor she ignored. She knew that
ingesting the chemical would lead to a specific mineral
deficiency that, in turn, would inflame the skin;
therefore, because she saw no inflammation she
assumed no ingestion. This seems to be a proper
employment of the contrapositive (i.e., “No
inflammation à No mineral deficiency à No chemical”)
until you realize the circumstances under which this
diagnosis is being made. Jones was “rushed” to the
ER. What if the chemical hasn’t yet had time to cause
the chain reaction? That’s what (C) is getting at. If (C)
is true, then it’s still possible that Jones didn’t swallow
the chemical, but certainly any conclusion made prior
to the 48-hour period is going to be premature and
hence highly suspect.
(A) The chemical is going to cause its effects whether
or not Jones is aware of its dangers, so his ignorance
is irrelevant to the diagnosis.
(B) Any past skin inflammation is irrelevant to whether
Jones is going to suffer skin inflammation now.
(D) That Jones often worked with the chemical is
irrelevant to whether he swallowed it.
(E) Right now Jones is showing no inflammation, so the
fact that there are many possible causes of
inflammation is irrelevant, and certainly doesn’t affect
the doctor’s diagnosis.
2. (B)
Principle
Watch out for scope shifts.
The pacifist makes a leap from causing harm through
the use of force to threatening to use force. Because
we’re asked to justify his position, we need to paper
over the scope shift, and (B) does the job. If it’s
demonstrated that a threat of immoral behavior is itself
immoral, then the pacifist’s contention that even the
sheer threat of using force is immoral has been
bolstered.
(A) “Even when” indicates that the pacifist is not
impressed by the self-defense issue and would not
concede it as an exception that would excuse immoral
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behavior. In any case, asser ting that there’s
vagueness anywhere in this argument would hardly
serve to bolster an argument that is so categorically
constructed and specifically stated.
(C) The pacifist never brings up the weighing of good
vs. bad, so a principle appealing to such a comparison
cannot be relevant.
(D) is another choice focusing on an issue—selfdefense—that the pacifist explicitly excludes from
consideration.
(E) The pacifist’s scope is the morality of issuing a
threat. That carrying out a threat to use force is
immoral is a given in his argument. In essence, (E) has
matters exactly backward.
3. (D)
Inference
Reframe every paradox in your own words.
Leave it to the LSAT to treat an exciting topic like rock
‘n’ roll in a dry-as-dust manner. Oh, well. Did you see
that there’s a paradox at the heart of this stimulus?
(One wonders whether the testmakers didn’t first
experiment with this as a genuine Paradox question,
and then discover that it worked better this way for
some reason.) The author seems puzzled that, since
pop music became “plugged in,” as it were, there have
been fewer players per band but more players overall.
The solution, of course, is that there are simply more
bands now—more bands employing those additional
musicians—and that’s the assertion of correct choice
(D), eminently inferable from the given facts.
(A) The author is concerned with professional
musicians, not amateurs. In any case, the author sees
electrification as having prodded musicians’ interest,
so any report of a decline in interest would tend to
contradict his viewpoint.
(B) Nonelectric instruments are outside the scope of
the discussion.
(C) Although the average number of musicians per
band has gone down, it’s eminently possible that the
size of some bands has grown—and simply been
offset by the shrinking of others—but not necessarily
true. It’s equally possible that each band has either
stayed the same size or gotten smaller.
(E) Having musicians do double duty by moonlighting in
more than one band would make it even more
mysterious that band size has shrunk while the total
number of musicians has increased.
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4. (A)
Principle
Translate abstract thoughts into simpler language.
Your search through the choices needn’t have lasted
too long. Right off the bat, (A) picks up on the author’s
terms (repeating “radical solutions,” and “better
cognizance” = “heightened awareness”), and affirms
her caution in the face of a report that a problem has
gotten worse. If it’s just that we’re more aware of the
problem, as both the stimulus and (A) point out, then
a “radical solution” may be contraindicated.
(B) seems like a sensible point of view, but goes
outside the Scope. This argument is concerned with
the proper response to findings that a preexisting
problem has suddenly gotten worse.
(C) If anything, the author would be suspicious of
100% reliance on statistical data; that’s what she
implies could move us toward adopting ill-advised,
radical solutions.
(D) Nowhere in the argument does the author accuse
anyone of “manipulating” data. Her beef is with those
who would jump from statistical data to a radical
solution.
(E) is a position to which our author would likely be
sympathetic if she found a particular radical solution to
be unwarranted. But nothing in her argument suggests
her opposition to a radical solution as a response to a
genuinely dangerous increase in a problem.
5. (D)
Weaken the Argument
The more often you try to predict a weakener before
attacking the choices, the better you’ll get at doing so.
Barr challenges the NTA’s claim that tea has become
more popular, citing data from “numerous stores” over
two decades. If you think about it, the NTA’s claim could
still be true if Barr’s data are somehow too limited or
otherwise misleading, and simply thinking to yourself, “I
want a choice that says the data are misleading” should
lead you quickly to (D). Barr’s much-vaunted survey
lacks significance if the surveyed stores are all bunched
in a tiny section of the country that might well be
unrepresentative of the country as a whole.
(A) Feeling pressured to run their own study might
suggest that the NTA is impressed by Barr’s
conclusion. That hardly serves to weaken his logic.
(B) shifts the scope from the popularity of tea in
general to switching types or brands. A statement that
shifts the scope can have no effect on the reasoning.
(C) The identity of the sur veyors’ funders has
absolutely nothing to do with whether their conclusion
is accurate. Don’t fall for such sneaky ad hominem
suggestions of bias.
(E) Another sneaky imputation of possible bias, this
time on the part of the NTA. So they pay for ads. So
what? Besides, if the tea people’s conclusion is phonied
up based on their own self-serving ads, then that ruse
tends to strengthen Barr’s claim, not weaken it.
6. (C)
Role of a Statement
Identifying the role of each statement can help to
clarify the role of any one of them.
“Therefore,” sentence 3, is the conclusion: Dramatic
changes may be needed. Sentence 1 is a factual
report: Doctors say change your diet and lower your
cholesterol. So where does sentence 2, the statement
in question, fit in? It takes the general idea of diet
change and reports that, unfortunately, moderate
change isn’t good enough. That’s why the author
concludes that a radical change may be indicated...and
hence the statement is the conclusion’s main premise,
as (C) asserts.
(A) The author isn’t reporting the failure of moderate
diet change to move cholesterol in order to urge people
to abandon diet as a cholesterol-reducing method.
Quite the contrary.
(B) The author never makes this claim—never
discusses “healthfulness,” never mentions meat—so
how can the statement in question be offered in
support of it?
(D) A vegetarian diet is only cited as an example of a
“dramatic change.” From that single reference, we
can’t infer the inflated claim of success offered by (D).
(E) The Conclusion Keyword “therefore” tells you that
(E) has the evidence/conclusion relationship exactly
backward.
7. (A)
Assumption
Terms in the evidence and conclusion must be
connected.
Note that empathy is common to both evidence and
conclusion, but “following a code of ignoring selfwelfare to help others” is mentioned only in the former,
and “civilized society” only in the latter. To the author,
those two terms are obviously connected (or she
wouldn’t employ them), so she must be assuming that
connection as stated in (A). If as (A) says, civilized
society requires people willing to ignore their own
welfare to help others, and if, as the author says, such
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people require empathy, then civilized society does
indeed, as the author concludes, require empathy.
(B) looks like the contrapositive of the author’s
conclusion, but really isn’t. That contrapositive would
read, “If you have no empathy, then civilized society
cannot exist.” (B)’s reference to “leading to actions
detrimental” appears nowhere in the argument and
thus can’t be part of an assumption within it.
(C) reflects a classic mixup of sufficiency and
necessity. The author says that empathy is necessary
for a civilized society but not, as (C) would have it,
sufficient to bring that about.
(D) reports that moral codes of the type described in
the argument have existed. But the author’s argument
proceeds—as do most arguments—from a
hypothetical base, e.g., “If you want such a moral code,
you must have empathy”; “If you want civilization, you
must have empathy.” Whether such codes have in fact
arisen is irrelevant to the logic.
(E) Sufficiency vs. necessity mixed up again. The
author’s “since” clause asserts that a necessary
condition of following the code of ignoring your own
welfare to help others is empathy. (E) reverses those
terms, asserting that empathy tends to make one
follow such self-sacrificing moral codes.
8. (B)
Main Point
For fill-in-the-blank questions, quickly eliminate
choices that depart from the argument’s scope.
The author reports that an opposition or “insurgent”
party is always divided against itself, with profound
disagreements that the party sets aside when it’s out
of power but that come to the fore when the party
takes over. It follows that ignoring the factions won’t
work when the party is in control, and (B), they had
better be faced if power is to be retained.
(A) Length of time in office is never even hinted at as
a relevant issue, let alone a comparison between the
first party’s tenure and that of the newly installed
insurgents.
(C) Logic suggests that exactly the opposite is true:
that when the insurgents become the dominants, the
likelihood is that they would take on their
disagreements—as (B) asser ts—and develop a
“justificatory ideology” to maintain their “reign.”
(D) seems plausible, but the scope of this paragraph
doesn’t include a prediction of a vicious cycle in which
the “ins” always face a vigorous opposition “out” party.
(E) goes too far. Yes, the long-suppressed factional
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disagreements may emerge upon victory, but there’s
no evidence that the factions will find it “impossible to
compromise.”
9. (D)
Logical Flaw
A question asking for a possibility that the author has
failed to consider is ripe for prephrasing.
When to predict and when not to? Aside from Logical
Reasoning Inference questions, which tend to defy
prediction, nearly all Logical Reasoning types will be
easier—and can be completed faster—if you think
about what the answer ought to look like or contain or
be before you go shopping. When the question asks,
“What has the author failed to consider?” you’re
getting a pretty big hint that may help you predict an
answer even more readily.
The manager wants to defend against the charge of
age discrimination vis-à-vis Sullivan, and he does so by
pointing to the promotion of many staffers older than
Sullivan—implying that it was in fact merit and not age
that made the difference in Sullivan’s case. What he’s
leaving out, of course, is: who else was up for those
jobs? If the only employees eligible for the recent
promotions of which the manager speaks were all older
than Sullivan, then that counterexample would no
longer be relevant to Sullivan’s case. (Remember,
Sullivan definitely lost out to a younger person.) (D)
points to this weakness in the manager’s rebuttal.
(A) Sullivan’s qualifications are not the issue, as the
manager makes a defense against age discrimination.
(B) Actually, the manager does consider that there
were other factors involved in Sullivan’s case, even as
he discounts age as being one of them.
(C) is a bland expression of that which “some people
believe,” utterly irrelevant to what did or did not happen
in the case of the unfortunate Sullivan.
(E), if anything, has even less to do with the issues of
the Sullivan case than the other three wrong answers.
What would the employer’s desire to maintain
confidentiality have to do with the precise reasons for
Sullivan’s being turned down? Nothing.
10. (E)
Point at Issue
Always follow the Kaplan Decision Tree in searching
out the point at issue.
(A) Does P take a position on whether pollution is a
problem? Not explicitly, but by accusing alarmists of
exaggerating pollution’s significance, he cer tainly
seems to concede that pollution is at least a minor
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Section IV: Logical Reasoning
problem. And there’s little doubt that Q agrees
(“serious single instance of pollution”), so this is not
an issue of clear-cut disagreement.
(B) The notion of “path of least resistance” is not
raised by P, but by Q. Because P takes no position on
it, move on.
(C) P refers to “the incident and the behavior that
caused it,” implicitly acknowledging that people
pollute. And Q says that polluting is easier than not
polluting. Here, as with (A), there is more agreement
than disagreement.
(D) P’s sense is that people are disposed not to
pollute anyway, so there’d be no need to change their
behavior. But even if P is saying “Yes, (D) is possible,”
Q doesn’t disagree. To Q, not polluting is harder than
polluting but not impossible. Again, more agreement
than disagreement.
(E), the only choice left, must be correct. As noted with
regard to (D), P flat-out claims that people are not
inclined to pollute, whereas Q argues that polluting is
“the path of least resistance,” and hence the norm
rather than the exception. (E) is a clear-cut point at
issue.
11. (A) Logical Flaw
A common reason for a logical flaw is that the arguer
has ignored or omitted some crucial element of the
situation.
The author wants to toss the entire board. Pretty harsh!
His beef is that board member Wagston has bribers on
her staff. Too harsh! That claim doesn’t even prove that
Wagston is corrupt, let alone the other board
members. (A) points out that the remedy far exceeds
the disease, at least as reported here.
(B) The argument doesn’t need to expand the
indictment of Wagston’s staff; what it needs is some
evidence of corruption on the part of Wagston and all
of her fellow board members.
(C) The relationship between bribery and corruption is
specified enough; what’s unspecified is the
relationship between corruption and all of the board
members that the author wants to fire.
(D) would be right if it said “...presumes without
justification that all of the board has engaged in
corruption.” But then it would be (A), wouldn’t it.
(E) The conclusion does call the board corrupt, but that
cannot be dismissed as a mere character attack
inasmuch as concrete evidence of corruption is
provided; i.e., the argument calls attention to (rather
than “deflecting attention away from”) an issue of
substance. The problem, again, is that this substantial
charge is not laid at the feet of the board members,
which brings us back to (A).
12. (D) Inference
Most Inference stimuli consist of sets of facts, and
you should ponder each fact before you move to the
choices in search of that which must be true.
Sentence 1 outlines how coffee and tea temporarily
spike the vasopressin level. Sentence 2 explains the
negative effect of vasopressin (i.e., blood cell
clumping) and asserts that it’s worse in women than in
men. Sentence 3 posits women’s increased clumping
as the reason their risk of post-angioplasty
complications is 10 times that of men. While you may
not be entirely comfortable with scientific terminology,
these three ideas are fairly straightforward. Now to the
choices.
(A)
Clearly
vasopressin,
the
product
of
methylxanthines, causes blood cell clumping. Why
would anyone, man or woman, want to take a
substance that will clump blood cells prior to an
operation whose very purpose is to unclog arteries?
This makes no sense.
(B) Nothing in the stimulus indicates whether
angioplasty is or is not the only treatment available for
clogged arteries. Other treatments are simply outside
the scope.
(C) We’re told that blood cell clumping is more
pronounced in women than in men, but there’s no
suggestion that this is because more vasopressin is
produced in women’s bodies, let alone that women
ingest more of the substances that indirectly cause the
pituitary gland to produce it.
(D) seems reasonable. If coffee and tea eventually
have a big clogging effect on women’s arteries, then
avoiding those substances before an unclogging
operation makes total sense. (D) has to be what we
want. Let’s make sure (E) is as bad as it needs to be.
(E) That men are at risk after angioplasty, and women
10 times as much at risk, is no argument against
angioplasty—at least on the evidence provided. It is an
argument against drinking coffee or tea beforehand,
however, which is what correct choice (D) advises.
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13. (D) Principle
For Principle questions, insist on a close matchup of
stimulus and answer choice.
Why do engineers stay calm and artists sweat when
their work is being evaluated? The author describes the
ease of assessing a machine’s function vs. the
subtlety of assessing an artwork’s excellence, and
leaves it to us, or to correct choice (D), to explain the
connection. Engineers—the creators of machines,
which have obvious worth—worry less, and artists—
the creators of work with uncertain worth—worry more.
(A) wipes away any difference in anxiety level between
artists and engineers, thus undercutting the author’s
reasoning rather than explaining it.
(B) speaks to the values of the entities created, but
not to the reactions of the creators to evaluation of
those entities, thus leaving out the essential part of
the equation.
(C) The standards that “should be” employed to rate
any kind of work, mechanical or artistic, are totally
irrelevant to the reactions of the engineer or artist to
the rating process.
(E) seems to bolster the idea that an artist—whose
work is indeed harder to evaluate—would be less
confident, hence more nervous. But by comparing the
artist’s confidence to that of the evaluator rather than
to that of the engineer, (E) depar ts from the
reasoning’s scope.
14. (B) Strengthen the Argument
Sometimes, thinking about what’s missing from an
argument, or deciding where it’s shaky, can help you
predict or identify the strengthener.
Two pieces of evidence are provided in support of the
hypothesis that P-fat is needed to build eyesight, but
only one of them actually mentions P-fat: the opening
observation that babies fed milk high in P-fat have
better sight than those who ingest less of the stuff.
The final sentence, the observation that preemies tend
to have worse eyesight than full-term babies, fails to
mention P-fat, though doing so would surely make the
argument stronger. (B) steps in to explain why that
final comparison is relevant: by pointing out that the
preemies are losing out on the best of the P-fat, it
invites us to decide that this is why their sight tends to
be inferior.
(A) The role of P-fat, insofar as this stimulus is
concerned, is restricted to developing eyesight, so no
data on adults’ vision is of interest.
34
(C) The evidence does not hinge on mother’s eyesight
relative to baby’s. Also, mothers are adults and, as we
explained above, adults’ vision is irrelevant here.
(D) Babies’ preferences couldn’t be less relevant. The
effect of P-fat on eyesight hinges not at all on whether
a baby likes or dislikes the liquid it comes in.
(E) Since preemies are still in the womb during the last
trimester, (E) fails to bolster any differentiation
between their eyesight and that of full-term babies. Not
to mention the fact that (E) fails to allude to P-fat
whatsoever.
15. (E) Inference
A “danger zone” Logical Reasoning question can be
relatively easy—the middle ones aren’t all tough.
If a study of contours and hatching—unique to each
artist—can help to separate one artist’s work from
that of another, and fakes from the real thing, and if
that kind of study helped to separate Michelangelo’s
and Clovio’s work, it has to be true that those two
artists had perceptibly different contour and hatching
styles. Choice (E), case closed.
(A) Contours and hatching are one way to differentiate
work, and seem to be a good way, but they may not be
the only or even the main way to do so.
(B) The forgeries issue is just thrown in to distract us.
There’s simply no evidence that Clovio’s work would
qualify as anything other than that done “genuinely” by
a fellow artist, that Clovio was a forger, or that anyone
forged a single Michelangelo work.
(C) Studying contours and hatching can “help to
distinguish...forgeries” but need not be foolproof. For
all we know, contrary to (C), some forgers can
duplicate contours and hatching so well that the
forgery is never discovered.
(D) The only Clovio works described are those once
attributed to Michelangelo. (D) goes too far by
encompassing all of his work, much of which may
demonstrate a somewhat or even strikingly different
contour and hatching style.
16. (D) Assumption
Always be watchful when the conclusion introduces a
term that doesn’t appear in the evidence.
This author concludes that when someone commits an
immoral act, it’s not because his character is defective
but because he’s ignorant of the consequences. And
the evidence describes those consequences: the
immoral act causes harm both to others and to the
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actor himself. What the evidence fails to describe is
this causality’s relationship to the mind and character
of the actor, and so (D) is necessary. If (D) were false,
and the immoral actor knew that the harm to himself
would occur, the moralist wouldn’t be able to let him
off the hook by attributing the act to ignorance of the
consequences.
(A) introduces the term of “moral responsibility.”
Because this term appears nowhere in the argument,
it cannot be part of a necessary assumption within the
logic.
(B) leaves out the key condition of immorality, and also
fails to make sense: if you smash your head into a wall,
it’s hard to argue that you haven’t harmed yourself
despite the fact that you’ve failed to harm others. An
author makes an absurd assumption like (B) only when
her argument is somewhat absurd, and regardless of
whether you agree with her viewpoint, absurd it isn’t.
(C) The moralist is more concerned here with the
immoral act’s backfiring on the actor than with the
harm caused to others. In the context of her argument,
a character defect would be one explanation for why
someone would perform an immoral act that would
hurt himself in the long run. We can’t be sure that the
author sees harming other people as anything other
than human nature.
(E) Simply harming oneself—knowingly or otherwise—
need not be immoral by the moralist’s definition, so
such an act doesn’t necessarily make one guilty of a
character defect. Besides, her aim here is to absolve
the unknowing actor, not to indict the knowing one.
17. (D) Strengthen the Argument (All EXCEPT)
A choice that fails to strengthen an argument either
contradicts it or is irrelevant to it.
Four of the choices support the idea that extremely
dense cosmic dust periodically blocking the sun has
been the cause of each of the ice ages that Earth has
suffered beginning 800,000 years ago. We need to go
into the choices confident that (1) there’s a 4:1
chance—that is, a strong likelihood—that each of
these choices does support the cosmic dust idea, and
(2) one and only one of them either contradicts that
hypothesis or falls outside its scope. Be bold as you
consider each:
(A) Suppose the first cosmic dust clouds appeared
800,000 years ago. That would be a “co-incidence” in
the most formal meaning of the term: two things
happening together. As we know, correlation doesn’t
prove causation, but a strengthener doesn’t have to
prove the point; it just has to bolster it. (A) does so by
connecting the first appearance of a phenomenon to
the hypothesized cause of the phenomenon. Eliminate.
(B) The appearance, 800,000 years ago, of a huge
(and thereafter constant) cosmic dust cloud certainly
supports the hypothesis, as surely as the absence of
any cosmic dust around that time would weaken it.
Eliminate.
(C) draws a palpable connection between cold
temperatures and atmospheric dust. Sure, it’s only a
“slight” temperature drop, but maybe that’s enough to
cause an ice age. Eliminate.
(D) asserts that Earth suffers cosmic dust clouds.
Well, we already knew that; “cosmic dust clouds are
common,” say the climatologists. (D) does nothing to
relate those clouds to any of the factors allegedly
contributing to the periodic ice ages, so (D) is the “odd
man out” we seek.
We can be quite confident that (E) is another
strengthener, and so it is, connecting cosmic debris—the
result of cosmic dust—to the periodic nature of ice ages.
18. (B) Inference (Could be true EXCEPT)
If four choices can be true, it follows that the right
answer must contradict the text, and seeking that
contradiction may be easier than confirming why all
the others are consistent.
The author’s purpose is to compare the rational quest
for happiness with the feral pursuit of our strongest
desires. The former requires us to consider
consequences, while the latter focuses on the shortterm and can turn into compulsions, the attainment of
which causes no happiness at all. One of these
choices contradicts something in there.
(A) It’s certainly possible that most people don’t have
compulsions; the philosopher never suggests how
many of us engage in such self-destructive behavior.
So (A) doesn’t contradict the author. Eliminate it.
(B) Here’s the contradiction we seek: whereas ordinary
desires cause at least some happiness when attained,
says the philosopher, compulsions (according to the
last two lines of the paragraph) do not. Yet (B)
disagrees, asser ting that any goal brings some
happiness. Having found a contradiction, we know
without even looking at the other choices that they are
consistent with the text:
(C), because, in contrast to (A), it’s quite possible that
most of us seek irrational happiness; (D), because the
happiness of others is never mentioned, and so it can
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readily be part of most people’s desires; and (E),
because nothing in the stimulus suggests anything to
the contrary. (It’s true that our strong desires may
make us ignore the long-term consequences of some
actions, but that doesn’t mean that those actions don’t
have consequences.)
19. (B) Parallel Reasoning
A parallel reasoning stimulus written in strictly
formal-logic terms will usually lend itself to algebraic
treatment.
According to the political scientist, all A (governments
worthy of respect) are B (open to dissent). No A,
however, are not C (unprotective of minorities).
Therefore all C (governments that protect minorities)
are B. In (B), jazz musicians = A, capable of
improvisation = B, and capable of reading music = C.
The terms can be plugged in perfectly. There’s no need
to analyze the logic any further; you don’t have to
realize that while the first two statements of the
stimulus convey two elements of worthy governments
(i.e., they all allow dissent and all protect minorities),
those elements need not have any relationship with
each other. As long as you can distill an argument to
stark algebraic terms—and whether you can do so
depends on how the argument’s been written—then
you just have to plug in the terms to find the parallel
choice.
(A) deviates from the algebra pretty quickly. If all A
(admirable politicians) are B (put others’ interests
first), we need the argument to continue, “No
admirable politicians don’t...” And that’s not how (A)
proceeds. Eliminate it.
(C) If A (cool, dry ecosystems) are B (populated by
large mammals), then....well, (B) continues If not B,
then C, which fails to follow the pattern. Eliminate.
(D) “Some intellectuals...”? There’s no “some” term in
the original. Eliminate quickly.
(E) begins If A, then B and C. Forget about it. (Equally
problematic is the fact that (E)’s conclusion is a
recommendation, whereas the conclusion in the
stimulus is a statement of fact.)
20. (D) Logical Flaw
Always try to predict the flaw on your own before
consulting the choices, especially when it’s an
everyday situation to which you can relate.
This commercial is trying to sell us on the Acme
retirement plan on the grounds that 25 years worth of
36
prizewinning economists are covered by it and hence
are testament to its wisdom. “Hey,” you might ask
yourself, “did these economists choose this plan?”
The ad doesn’t say so. And if they are all on the plan
through no choice of their own, then their being
covered by it can hardly be seen as an endorsement.
This line of thinking makes (D) stand out pretty readily:
the ad fails to establish that the economists have
selected Acme. (You might also have read the ad and
said to yourself, “The economists’ being on the plan is
a correlation, not necessarily a causation!” Quite right.
(D) still would stand out as correct.)
(A) The ad’s appeal doesn’t hinge on Acme having
cornered the market on all or even most Economic
Merit Prize winners; it’s simply suggesting that a whole
mob of them are signed up with Acme, so you should
be too. Therefore, (A)’s assertion that Acme has failed
to nab all of them has no impact on the reasoning.
(B) actually describes a possibility that the ad implicitly
hopes we will consider. It wants us to believe that
these prizewinners could have gone with a wide variety
of retirement plans, but they chose Acme instead. Of
course it doesn’t say they chose Acme—which, as (D)
points out, is its Achilles heel—but that’s what the ad
wants us to infer.
(C) If these brilliant financial minds had in fact mulled
over a variety of plans and chosen Acme as the best,
then that would be extremely “direct evidence for that
conclusion.” Contrary to (C), that is the appeal the ad
goes for. And the “exper tise” is real and not
supposed...or would be, at least, if we knew that the
experts had opted for Acme.
(E) The ad carefully and deliberately sidesteps the
error that (E) describes. It does not presume that
Acme will meet the needs of everyone, just “anyone
with retirement needs similar to” the 25 prizewinners.
21. (E)
Parallel Reasoning
Sometimes in Parallel Reasoning questions you can
sum up the entire argument in a sentence rather than
breaking it down into: conclusion, followed by
evidence.
The argument as a whole can be distilled to: “Even
though a small car can be more dangerous in an
accident, it tends to make accidents less likely to
happen in the first place.” Distill it even more
abstractly: While a course of action might intensify
some danger, it actually may make the danger itself
less likely. (E)’s course of action (vigorous exercise)
parallels the small car; the danger it helps avert (a
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Section IV: Logical Reasoning
wasting illness) parallels the accident; and its risk of
intensification (the reduced body fat to draw upon)
parallels the lack of protection.
(A) The stimulus is emphatically a value judgment—
”driving a small car is better”—while (A)’s conclusion
is an assertion of possible cause and effect (“fame
can diminish reputation”). (A) can be discarded on that
score alone.
(B), like the stimulus and correct choice (E), does
offer a value judgment—”reading indoors daily is a
good thing.” But (B) goes on to merely list a pro and
con that are unrelated to each other.
(C) would be closer to the stimulus if it simply began
“such-and-such vehicle is better,” rather than hinging
on a term like “practical” that needs explanation. It
would be closer still if it argued that while such a
vehicle might intensify a problem, its use would make
the problem less likely altogether. But it does not.
(D) offers a laundry list of recommendations for and
against courses of action (e.g., you should limit sugar
and fat; you shouldn’t totally cut out sugar and fat; you
should consume them moderately) that is much more
complicated than the stimulus ever gets.
22. (C) Logical Flaw
If the question stem tells you that the argument is
flawed, it doesn’t matter how logical it might seem at
first; dig deeper and find the misstep—either on your
own, or in one of the choices.
Why should only full-grown dogs be neutered? Because
doing it early on leads to improper leg development,
which, in turn, leads to arthritis problems in old age.
That may sound logical on first reading. But there’s a
considerable time period between early puppyhood and
full growth, and by failing to recognize that fact (and
thus ignoring the possibility of an earlier-than-fullgrowth neutering), the author lays himself wide open to
challenge. Even if you didn’t predict it in those precise
terms, (C) must make sense as the trainer’s logical
error.
(A) The exact percentage is irrelevant. If everything
were as it appears, the knowledge that early neutering
“usually” malforms leg bones would be more than
adequate support for the trainer’s recommendation.
(B) Again, if everything were as it appears, simply
affirming that poor bone development leads to arthritis
would be enough. Dog owners do not have to know all
the ins and outs of veterinary medicine in order to
behave logically and treat their dogs wisely.
(D) “If you want to protect your dog from arthritis,” the
trainer begins. His conclusion does not speak, the way
(D) does, to dog owners who are looking to make a
cost-benefit analysis of neutering puppies.
(E) The issue is early neutering and its effects. (E)
ignores the scope of the argument and focuses on a
totally separate issue, i.e., what can happen in the
event of proper bone development. We can only wish
good bone development on all dogs, but this choice
goes wide of the mark.
23. (B) Main Point
Especially as a section is winding down, a truly dense
and difficult-to-follow argument might be worth
guessing on and skipping. Use a “triage” mindset to
make the most of the section's final minutes
Long and intricate if not especially technical, the
political scientist’s discussion of campaign finance
regulation needs to be understood in full if you are to
find the dilemma’s resolution as “clear” as she herself
does. And coming as it does towards the end of this LR
section, this challenge ought to prompt us at least to
consider whether our limited time is best spent (1) on
this one or (2) on one of the ones coming up, or
perhaps (3) going back to ones we skipped earlier, or
even (4) checking the accuracy of our gridding. Your
work on a section can conclude with finesse, if you
allow it to do so. Make logical choices. Take control of
your exam.
The “interesting dilemma” here is that the broad
principle of a democracy-namely, that people should
spend their money as they see fit-tends to conflict with
three other broad principles of a democracy, i.e.: not
allowing a big spending candidate to have an unfair
advantage; allowing all voices an equal opportunity to
be heard; and not subsidizing anyone’s huge campaign
(as government would have to do if less moneyed
candidates were to keep up with the fat cats). As we
assess the choices, we must avoid those that tilt
toward only one or two of these ideas, in search of the
one that attempts to rationalize them all.
(A) Letting only fat cats run for office would hardly be
in the spirit of letting all voices be heard. Eliminate.
(B)’s categorical nature might have put you off, but it’s
the only logical conclusion here. To the author, the
ability of fat cats to spend outrageously directly
contradicts the “strong obligation” that less moneyed
candidates be heard, and since government can’t
make up the difference between them (sentence 4’s
second clause), the dilemma can only be resolved by
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PrepTest 44 Explained
drawing the line as (B) suggests. “Within broad limits”
doesn’t mean “without any limits at all,” and the
author’s evidence leads to the conclusion that a
campaign spending cap is one particular limit that
needs to be imposed. For the record:
(C) is cer tainly in line with the principle that
government shouldn’t bankroll huge campaigns, but
fails to speak to any spending by wealthy candidates in
amounts over and above the government subsidy.
Hence (C) leaves untouched the dilemma of the
wealthy office seeker's getting an unfair edge as he
exploits his right to spend more or less freely.
(D) is, of course, a blatant infringement on the rights
of those living in a democracy to spend pretty much
however they choose, even if it be on their own
campaigns.
(E) might seem to smooth things out by offering
relatively free spending while imposing a “broad limit,”
but all (E) does is say to the less moneyed candidate,
“You may spend as much as your wealthy opponent
does.” This offers small comfort to the less-wellfunded candidate (who can’t match his opponent
anyway) while giving the fat cat free rein to spend
indiscriminately, a state of affairs that would only
exacerbate the situation as the author sees it.
24. (C) Role of a Statement
The ability of Keywords to convey the essence of
logical structure can help you to bypass much of the
tedious, difficult reading in which you’d otherwise be
forced to engage.
“Some people have maintained that [the statement in
question].…This may be true of X....But Y....” When
figuring out the purpose of the statement in question,
the structural clues around it make your job infinitely
easier. The very structure clearly presages the author’s
view that the statement might be true in some
instances but not in others, and seeing that much—in
other words, simply realizing that the author finds the
statement inapplicable in some situations—ought to
make (C) stand out. As it happens, (C) does reflect
both the terms of the argument (i.e., societies that
need to share resources vs. those that need to develop
new technologies) and the author’s purpose (i.e., to
take exception to an idea of “some people’s” that any
society is doomed by private ownership).
(A) 180. The author suggests, in his second sentence,
that the generalization is much more applicable to
societies less technologically advanced.
38
(B) Far from suppor ting or explaining the
generalization, the author seeks to show that it has
only limited applicability.
(D) is a 180, going in the opposite direction from (A).
The whole point is that private ownership of the means
of production is incompatible with the needs of a less
technologically advanced society, but may be vital to
the more advanced one.
(E) suggests that the author wants to extend the
generalization (to “any society in which...etc.”) when he
actually seeks to limit it. Also, the reference to
“impeding new technology” is never mentioned by the
author.
25. (D) Paradox
Resolving a paradox usually means more than just
removing the apparent contradiction; it usually
amounts to logically connecting the two elements.
How can this cholesterol-lowering medication be called
“effective” if those taking it have a cholesterol level
12–15% higher than the average person? Easily, if in
the absence of the medication their cholesterol levels
would be higher still, and that’s what (D) is getting at.
To someone with a cholesterol level about 30% above
average, lowering it to 15% above average would be
pretty darn good.
(A) News of an even more effective medication would
be relevant only if the conclusion were that this one is
“the best” or “the only.” It isn’t.
(B), like (A), takes us into the irrelevant realm of other
medications. Whether the medication in question is
effective, as the author claims, has nothing to do with
comparisons to other means of treating high
cholesterol, effective or otherwise.
(C) The prescription for this “medication” may or may
not qualify as “drug therapy,” since that’s not a phrase
that the author uses. But more to the point, we cannot
know whether (C)’s special diets are effective in
lowering cholesterol levels; and even if they are, we
cannot know whether they are given to the same
patients that the stimulus talks about; and even if they
are, we cannot know whether that effectiveness
parallels, is connected with, or is independent of the
medication’s effects.
(E)’s broadening of its scope to cover the entire
population goes far afield. The author’s scope is solely
the population of high-cholesterol sufferers who are
prescribed this particular medication. Nothing more.
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Section IV: Logical Reasoning
26. (C) Assumption
When you see an argument that builds in a step-by-step
fashion, skip ahead to the conclusion. Seeing where the
argument’s going may help you follow the steps.
This entire argument is a string of necessar y
conditions, and because it ends with a firm prediction
of what will not occur, the missing assumption will
describe a necessary condition that isn’t going to be
met. Let’s follow the chain: “If all countries in an
alliance are to be strong in foreign policy”—and notice,
the ultimate conclusion is confident that not all EU
members will be!—then what’s required (a necessary
condition, in other words) is an aggressive response to
problems. To have an aggressive response to
problems, what’s required is unanimous agreement
that the problems are grave. In order to get unanimous
agreement on the gravity of the problems, what’s
required is unanimous agreement that the alliance’s
economy is threatened. And there it ends.
Well, the author wants this particular house of cards to
fall—she wants us to demonstrate that the EU won’t all
be strong in foreign policy—and it will fall if the EU is
split as to the economic threat posed by some
problems, which makes (C) the right answer. If, as (C)
contends, not all EU members agree on the economic
threat of some problems, then they won’t all agree on
the gravity of those problems and, in turn, they won’t
respond aggressively to those problems, and (we’re
back where we began) they won’t all be strong in
foreign policy. Whew!
(A) offers an unwarranted comparison between two
types of countries and brings in the totally irrelevant
issue of whether countries join alliances in the first
place, irrelevant because this argument is about an
alliance already in place, the EU.
(B) offers a complex melding and, really, distortion of
various terms from the argument that the author is by
no means relying upon: “becoming less aggressive”
(too vague); “greater wealth” (never mentioned); “more
to lose” (ditto).
(D) “Generally weak”—this is not a term that appears
within the logic whatsoever. The argument is not at all
affected by a statement of generalities, but rather by a
concrete assertion that a condition necessary for a
result has not been met. What we get in (C), in other
words.
(E) Each of the argument’s premises is set up and
works independently, so (E)’s comparison of benefits
has nothing to do with the chain of logic that the author
sets up.
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