PB 7-22-1
BG LARRY BURRIS
Commandant,
U.S. Army Infantry School
SPRING 2022
RUSSELL A. ENO
Editor
MICHELLE J. ROWAN
Deputy Editor
FRONT COVER:
The commander of 1st Battalion,
503rd Infantry Regiment
(Airborne), 173rd Airborne
Brigade, gives instructions to his
Soldiers during live-fire training
as part of exercise Eagle
Storm in Slunj, Croatia, on 21
September 2021. (Photo by
Elena Baladelli)
BACK COVER:
Soldiers assigned to 3rd
Battalion, 509th Parachute
Infantry Regiment, 4th
Infantry Brigade Combat
Team (Airborne), 25th Infantry
Division, fire an M3 Multi-role
Anti-armor Anti-personnel
Weapon System (MAAWS)
during live-fire training at Joint
Base Elmendorf-Richardson,
AK, on 15 September
2021. (Photo by SrA Emily
Farnsworth, USAF)
This medium is approved for official
dissemination of material designed to keep
individuals within the Army knowledgeable of
current and emerging developments within
their areas of expertise for the purpose of
enhancing their professional development.
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
MARK F. AVERILL
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
2207700
Distribution: Approved for public release; distribution
is unlimited.
Volume 111, Number 1
DEPARTMENTS
1
2
COMMANDANT’S NOTE
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
2 TRAINING TODAY’S SOLDIERS FOR TOMORROW’S WAR: IMPLEMENTING LSCO INTO OSUT
LTC Alphonse J. LeMaire, MAJ Ross C. Pixler, CPT James E. Bryson,
CPT Avery W. Littlejohn, CPT Andrew E. Carter, CPT Matthew T. Lunger,
CPT Joshua K. O’Neill, and CPT Rory M. Fellows
8 HIGH-ANGLE FIRES AND MANEUVER: RUSSIAN UPGRADED MORTARS MAINTAIN VITAL ROLE ON THE FUTURE BATTLEFIELD
Dr. Lester W. Grau and Dr. Charles K. Bartles
16 THE SNIPER’S ROLE IN LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS
CPT David M. Wright, SSG Andrew A. Dominguez, and
SSG John A. Sisk II
19 INCREASING INDIRECT FIRE CAPABILITY IN THE LIGHT INFANTRY
BATTALION
CPT Sam P. Wiggins and LTC Alexi D. Franklin
24 SENIOR NCOS AT POINTS OF FRICTION
CSM Nema Mobarakzadeh
31 THE INFORMATION DOMAIN AND SOCIAL MEDIA
SGM Alexander E. Aguilastratt and SGM Matthew S. Updike
37 ARMY AVIATION — ABOVE THE BEST! NOW LET’S TRAIN TOGETHER
CPT Daniel Vorsky
39 USING GOALS TO DEVELOP OUR SUBORDINATES
CPT Jacob Mooty
41 THE SFAB: A LIEUTENANT’S EXPERIENCE
1LT Christopher Wilson
44 YOU WILL ACCOMPLISH NOTHING: THE FUNDAMENTAL
CHALLENGE FOR SOLDIERS SERVING AS ADVISORS IN SFABS
IS UNDERSTANDING SUCCESS
MAJ Eric Shockley
47 LESSONS FROM THE PAST
47 DEATH ON THE ROAD TO OSAN: TASK FORCE SMITH
CPT Connor McLeod
52 BOOK REVIEWS
Infantry (ISSN: 0019-9532) is an Army professional bulletin prepared for quarterly publication by the U.S.
Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, GA. Although it contains professional information for the Infantryman,
the content does not necessarily reflect the official Army position and does not supersede any information
presented in other official Army publications. Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the
authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element of it.
Contact Information
Mailing Address: 1 Karker St., McGinnis-Wickam Hall, Suite W-141A, Fort Benning, GA 31905
Telephones: (706) 545-6951 or 545-3643, DSN 835-6951 or 835-3643
Email: usarmy.benning.tradoc.mbx.infantry-magazine@army.mil
Commandant’s Note
BG LARRY BURRIS
Modernizing for Large-Scale
Combat Operations
O
ver the past two decades, the United States
has enjoyed technological superiority against
adversaries while focusing on counterinsurgency
(COIN) warfare in the Middle East. However, during this
time, potential threats sought to advance their technological
and tactical capabilities to challenge us in the future. The
theme of this issue, Modernizing for Large-Scale Combat
Operations (LSCO), is relevant and based on world events —
very timely. As this edition of Infantry goes to print, Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine has entered its fifth week. Sadly, we
have seen through ample media coverage the incredible
devastation Russia’s military operations have wreaked on
Ukraine’s infrastructure and civilian population. This tragedy
enables us to study, in real-time, using a likely peer threat,
what LSCO may look like in the future. Modernizing for
LSCO has several implications for organizing, training, and
thinking about future operations.
It is impossible to predict with precision what the next fight
looks like; however, some factors will likely lead to failure
if neglected. The first is that the U.S. Army must always
look to improve its ability to conduct operations through a
combined arms approach. Applying combined arms begins
with the Infantry understanding how other branches operate.
In this edition, CPT Daniel Vorsky provides a great article
to enhance the Infantry Soldier’s knowledge of working with
aviation units.
We must also remind ourselves that the high-intensity
nature of LSCO requires the effective employment of both
direct and indirect fires, kinetic and non-kinetic, to support
dismounted Infantry Soldiers. Early observations of the situation in Ukraine show that Russian forces may lack the ability to synchronize fires and maneuver. The U.S. Army must
continue advancing our systems, organization, and doctrine
to ensure that we do not face similar setbacks in future
operations. We must think about the best ways to organize
and distribute these critical capabilities within our formations. In this issue, CPT Sam Wiggins and LTC Alexi Franklin
provide an excellent starting point for this discussion with
their article “Increasing Indirect
Fire Capability in the Light
Infantry Battalion.” Additionally, we must understand how
potential enemies will employ their fires. Readers should
pay special attention to the article by Dr. Lester W. Grau and
Dr. Charles K. Bartles. They provide a well-timed analysis of
how the Russians use their upgraded mortar systems on the
battlefield.
A third guidepost we can apply is that LSCO will require
Soldiers to have a different mindset than COIN. The
COIN fight that our Army grew accustomed to over the
past two decades prioritized population-based objectives.
Engagements with the enemy occurred sporadically and
mostly at the platoon level. We must adapt our training so
that our Soldiers become familiarized with the environment
they will face in high-intensity LSCO. One principle is that
LSCO means we will be fighting intense wars of maneuver
focused on terrain and threat-based objectives. Such fights
will occur at all echelons from the team to division levels
while fighting as a joint force. This mindset starts with the
“soldierization process” during initial military training. In this
edition, officers from 2-58 Infantry Battalion of the 198th
Brigade at Fort Benning provide an article discussing how
Infantry One Station Unit Training (OSUT) is modernizing
for LSCO.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine teaches us that LSCO in
the future will be intense, brutal, and demanding. Former
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates famously said, “When
it comes to predicting the nature and location of our next
military engagements, since Vietnam, our record has been
perfect. We have never once gotten it right.” Of course,
Secretary Gates is right — we cannot predict with certainty
against who, where, or when the next fight will occur.
However, failing to train and employ combined arms, losing
our proficiency regarding fire and maneuver, and evading
the mindset needed for LSCO will undoubtedly lead to future
failures. Ultimately, the Infantry Soldier, whose mission is to
close with and destroy the enemy, will pay that price.
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 1
Training Today’s Soldiers for Tomorrow’s War:
Implementing LSCO into OSUT
LTC ALPHONSE J. LEMAIRE, MAJ ROSS C. PIXLER, CPT JAMES E. BRYSON,
CPT AVERY W. LITTLEJOHN, CPT ANDREW E. CARTER, CPT MATTHEW T. LUNGER,
CPT JOSHUA K. O’NEILL, AND CPT RORY M. FELLOWS
“Wars are won by the courage of soldiers, the quality of leaders, and the
excellence of training… training that is realistic, meaningful, and thorough…
training that convinces our soldiers and our leaders that they can and must
win the battle of the next war.”
— GEN Donn Starry
“The Soldier and Training,” 9 January 19811
T
he U.S. Army Infantry School’s (USAIS)
One Station Unit Training (OSUT) is
designed to transform civilian volunteers
into lethal Infantry Soldiers ready to deploy, fight,
and win our nation’s wars against any adversary,
anytime, and anywhere. This year’s National
Security Strategic Guidance highlighted “that the
distribution of power across the world is changing,
creating new threats,” most notably near-peer adversaries China and Russia.2 To build Infantry Soldiers ready to
combat these near-peer threats, the USAIS must implement
large-scale combat operations (LSCO)-focused training into
its Infantry OSUT program of instruction (POI).
The Maneuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) Commanding
General MG Patrick Donahoe directed that “our most immediate priority is completing the cognitive disconnect with
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, and ensuring our
training focuses on preparing for LSCO.”3 As the lead for
the 198th Infantry Brigade, the 2nd Battalion, 58th Infantry
Regiment (2-58IN) began optimizing live-fire exercises
(LFXs) and situational training exercises (STXs) to install a
realistic and challenging experience that certifies trainees
on individual Soldier skills through collective infantry tasks
while operating in a LSCO environment. This optimization
includes educating Infantry trainees on near-peer adversary weapons, equipment, uniforms, and battlefield tactics.
Implementing LSCO into Infantry OSUT also capitalizes
on the leader development initiative of training leaders at
echelon to ensure they are prepared to lead Soldiers to
defeat our nation’s enemies in tomorrow’s fight.
2 INFANTRY Spring 2022
Reminiscent of the post-Vietnam Army of 1970s,
today’s Army is transitioning from an emphasis on
small-scale, COIN-centric conflicts back to LSCO.
Over the past two decades, Infantry OSUT focused
on small-scale asymmetric threats in a partially
contested environment that involved fire team to
squad-level dismounted patrols or route clearance missions operating out of forward operating
bases or combat outposts. Enemy activity was depicted as
capable but technologically and logistically inferior, resulting in Infantry Soldiers developing an overdependence on
friendly enablers while maintaining consistent air superiority.
This approach produced competent Infantry Soldiers for
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, but did so at the expense
of preparing to face near-peer competitors. Efforts to transition from COIN to LSCO in Infantry OSUT are well under
way in both the LFX and STX training progressions that
place a primary focus on performing individual Soldier skills
through collective infantry tasks. This article will outline how
the application of LSCO-focused training into portions of the
22-week Infantry OSUT cycle will better prepare Infantry
Soldiers and leaders to fight our nation’s wars.
LSCO in Live-Fire Exercises (LFXs)
Infantry OSUT LFX progression consists of Buddy Team
LFX (BTT), Fire Team LFX (FTT), and culminates with
Enhanced Fire Team LFX (EFLX). It is intended to ground
trainees on the individual Soldier skills required to produce
lethal Infantry Soldiers ready to combat a near-peer enemy.
This progression uses the crawl-walk-run methodology that
affords multiple repetitions on the following tasks:
- Move as a member of a team;
- Engage targets with an M4 Carbine;
- Use verbal and non-verbal communication;
- Maintain adequate suppressive fire;
- Employ hand grenades;
- Perform individual movement techniques; and
- Select proper cover and concealment to close with and
engage an enemy.
BTT and FTT are the “crawl” and “walk” that train the
fundamentals of operating as a member of a team and reinforce Soldier self-confidence on effectively engaging enemy
targets, performing individual movement techniques, and
selecting adequate cover and concealment.
Building on the foundation established with BTT and FTT,
EFLX is the “run” that certifies Soldiers on fundamentals
while operating in a more dynamic and challenging environment defined by complex natural terrain without preestablished fighting positions. This challenges Soldiers to
accurately select fighting positions while conducting fire and
maneuver through natural terrain and is the first LFX where
enemy activity influences a fire team’s actions on the objective. While the standards for BTT, FTT, and EFLX remain
consistent with doctrine, additions made to implement nearpeer engagements include increasing targets to each lane
(simulating engaging a larger force); developing targets
that require multiple hits to go down (simulating an enemy
with personal protective equipment); and replacing faceless
target silhouettes with images of armed foreign soldiers.
These refinements remove COIN-centric approaches and
instill the challenges of LSCO.
Creating Near-Peer Opposition Forces (OPFOR)
“The United States Army faces an inflection point... Our
Nation’s adversaries have gained on [U.S. Army] qualitative
and quantitative advantages. If the Army does not change, it
risks losing deterrence and preservation of the Nation’s most
sacred interests.”
— GEN James C. McConville, Army Chief of Staff4
To optimize the LSCO training environment, Infantry OSUT
needed to change the way it portrays a known OPFOR.
Infantry Soldiers must become familiar with and train against
an OPFOR that accurately represents a near-peer adversary
who can engage forces across a range of military operations
like Russia, China, Iran, or North Korea. Over the past two
decades, Infantry OSUT OPFOR typically consisted of trainees operating in small, three-to-four-person teams armed
with M4s, wearing Army Combat Uniforms, and executing
tactics to match the incompetence of a small insurgent
force. While that provided an easily controlled method for
drill sergeants to prepare Soldiers for the Global War on
Terrorism fight, it willfully missed on a variety of opportunities to enhance the fundamentals of fire and maneuver that
produce versatile Infantry Soldiers.
The 2-58IN is validating a method towards improving
OPFOR for a LSCO environment by incorporating foreign
uniforms, weapons, tactics, and
an organizational structure that
replicates a near-peer enemy.
Coordination with the Training
Aid Service Center helped
establish an “OPFOR Package”
consisting of foreign military
uniforms, flags, insignia, and
weapons such as AK-47s, rocketpropelled grenades (RPGs),
PKMs (Pulemyot Kalashnikovas),
AK-74s,
RPKs
(Ruchnoy
Pulemyot Kalashnikovas), and
SVDs (sniper rifles). This package
includes modification equipment
from the Army National Guard
Exportable Combat Training
Center that enables U.S. Army
high
mobility
multipurpose
wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs)
to resemble Russian BRDMs.
These OPFOR adjustments
improve
collective
training
lanes by exposing actual enemy
uniforms, weapons, and equipment. Units can resource this
Photos courtesy of 2nd Battalion, 58th Infantry Regiment
package to augment and provide
A Soldier in training with 2-58IN engages enemy targets from a selected fighting position in natural
terrain during the Enhanced Fire Team Live-Fire Exercise.
realism to any situational trainSpring 2022 INFANTRY 3
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
At left, an OPFOR soldier engages Bravo Company, 2-58IN during a squad
attack collective training lane. Above, OPFOR soldiers prepare for a near
ambush against a friendly infantry squad during a field training exercise.
ing exercise. Additionally, 2-58IN resourced visual threat noise-light-litter discipline, and Soldier field craft;
posters that display weapons and equipment capabilities
- Shifting from a non-contiguous/non-linear battlefield
of Russian, Chinese, Iranian, and North Korean militaries. setting to a contiguous linear battlefield setting with particuBoards for each country are hung in platoon bays through- lar respect to conducting defensive operations; and
out company training areas that enable Soldiers to regularly
- Introducing a disciplined OPFOR that wears enemy
identify, study, and understand the capabilities and tactics uniforms, uses enemy weapon systems, and fights with
of potential enemies. These applications provide a LSCO enemy tactics to accurately reflect combating our anticipated
focus that improves the development of Infantry Soldiers near-peer adversaries.
and their understanding of our
The Forge is the first STX where
Foreign Military Threat Boards
potential adversaries.
trainees conduct individual Soldier
LSCO in Situational
Training Exercises (STX)
The Infantry OSUT STX
progression begins with the
Forge exercise that certifies
trainees to become Soldiers
and is followed by squad tactical training (STT) and the field
training exercise (FTX)/Bayonet
that certifies Soldiers to become
Infantry Soldiers. After a thorough review of the STX progression, it became apparent that
adjustments were necessary to
instill a focus on LSCO. These
adjustments include:
- Increasing physical rigor
and mental hardship on Soldiers
while operating as a member of
a team;
- Enforcing strict standards
towards individual camouflage,
4 INFANTRY Spring 2022
skills through collective Infantry
tasks. The key LSCO-focused training events are:
- Formations and Order of March
(FOOM),
- Night Infiltration Course (NIC),
- Battle March and Shoot, and
- Patrol Base Operations.
FOOM is the introduction to
squad and platoon-level movement and maneuver that includes
advancing
through
restrictive
terrain under both day and night
conditions; this is the event where
trainees increase familiarization on
operating with night vision devices.
The NIC simulates maneuvering while under direct enemy fire
during hours of limited visibility, like
what is anticipated in LSCO. Battle
March and Shoot incorporates
strenuous physical and mental
challenges before transitioning into a “stress shoot.” The
purpose is to put trainees under duress before performing a
live-fire engagement wearing a full combat load. Additionally,
this event also presents a chemical, biological, radiological,
and nuclear (CBRN) live-fire engagement that simulates
engaging enemy targets in a contaminated environment.
Throughout the Forge, trainees conduct patrol base operations that include how to occupy, establish security, construct
fighting positions, and perform priorities of work consisting
of weapons maintenance and field hygiene while enforcing noise-light-litter discipline. These events inculcate the
necessary individual Soldier skills for LSCO as well as build
the foundation to progress into STT and the FTX/Bayonet
where Soldiers will be contested by an OPFOR.
STT builds upon the foundations established during
Forge through an emphasis on squad collective training.
STT mirrors the FTX/Bayonet and is where Soldiers gain
an understanding of squad battle drills, establish squad and
platoon fighting positions, and execute collective training
lanes against a designated OPFOR. STT institutes a LSCO
focus with companies occupying an assigned training area
in a defensive posture oriented against a near-peer enemy
threat. This company defensive posture reinforces individual
and introduces squad and platoon-level fighting positions
that serve as a launch point for squad collective training
against an OPFOR. During this four-day STX, Soldiers get
multiple repetitions performing the collective tasks required
to advance into the FTX/Bayonet.
The Infantry OSUT FTX/Bayonet are the culminating
events that certify and produce Infantry Soldiers. During
these two events, Soldiers execute squad and platoon collective training against an internally resourced OPFOR operating with a specific mission and intent that mimic a near-peer
enemy. The FTX begins with the company establishing an
area defense with mutually supporting platoon fighting positions. This generates a linear area of operations against an
enemy force that is likely in a LSCO fight. Companies then
transition into shaping operations consisting of the following
platoon and squad collective training lanes: squad attack;
movement to contact; near and far ambush; anti-armor
ambush; react to contact/ambush; knock out a bunker;
enter/clear a trench; and platoon attack. These collective
training lanes reinforce the individual and collective tasks
taught during Forge and STT with an additional emphasis on
Soldier leadership. Collective training lanes during shaping
operations are led by platoon leaders and platoon sergeants,
with Soldiers rotating as squad leaders and fire team leaders
while drill sergeants serve as observer-coach-trainers.
A typical FTX collective training lane consists of a squad
receiving a mission while in its assigned defensive position. The squad then executes a series of assigned tasks
Soldiers in 2-58IN defend against an OPFOR attack during the FTX.
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 5
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
on this opportunity, 2-58IN instituted a tactical
orders process into the FTX/Bayonet event.
The orders process trains a fundamental skill
required of leaders at multiple echelons and
is essential for preparing junior officers and
NCOs to lead Soldiers in future LSCO.
The 2-58IN Battalion Staff presents a large-scale combat operations
Company cadre prior to their cycle’s FTX/Bayonet event.
against a designated OPFOR that simulates a near-peer
enemy. At the completion of each training iteration, the
squad returns to its established defensive position while
remaining under constant enemy surveillance. This serves
as the mechanism for achieving a continuously contested
environment that includes periodic enemy probes into
defensive positions, reaction to indirect fires and air attacks,
and the occasional CBRN attack to simulate a contaminated
battlefield. The FTX shaping operations phase consists of
five days of continuous activity before transitioning into the
Bayonet. The Bayonet is the final 48 hours of the FTX that
consists of a 12-mile tactical foot movement followed by
a platoon raid on a designated enemy objective occupied
by OPFOR. Once Soldiers successfully complete the FTX/
Bayonet, they are ready to advance to become “Infantry
Soldiers.” Incorporating LSCO into STX progression better
prepares Infantry Soldiers to integrate into any operational unit across the Army ready to quickly develop into
a fire team leader.
The use of a LSCO tactical operation
order (OPORD) in a company’s FTX/Bayonet
enables battalion commanders to develop
leaders at echelon beginning with the battalion staff and continuing through company
command teams, platoon leaders/platoon
sergeants, and drill sergeant cadre. For each
company’s FTX/Bayonet, this process begins
with the battalion issuing a tactical OPORD
that provides the overall “road to war” (from
division to company) and delivers the company’s mission and intent for its assigned training
area of operations. After receiving the battalorder to Charlie
ion OPORD, company commanders produce
a company OPORD issuing specified tasks
for the shaping operations phase of the FTX. The shaping
operations phase is the period where company command
teams rotate platoons and squads through collective training
lanes against an OPFOR in a continually contested environment. Throughout this phase company command teams
assess platoon leaders and platoon sergeants on their
ability to create and brief fragmentary orders (FRAGOs), as
well as how drill sergeants evaluate assigned Soldiers on
the individual Soldier skills required for graduation. Shaping
operations occur over a five-day period before transitioning
into the FTX’s final 48 hours, or Bayonet event.
Roughly 48 hours prior to transitioning into the Bayonet,
companies receive a FRAGO from battalion directing a
platoon raid on a designated enemy objective. This FRAGO
provides an additional repetition of the orders process
for battalion, company, and platoon-level leadership and
Leader Development
“Leader development is our top priority. It is through
the touchpoints we have with junior maneuver officers
and NCOs that we are capable of changing the trajectory
of the Army... we must capitalize on every opportunity to
make leaders who are more prepared to lead Soldiers
in today’s Army, and in future large-scale combat operations.”
— MG Patrick Donahoe5
The effort to implement LSCO into Infantry OSUT
reveals additional ways to accomplish one of the MCOE
commander’s top priorities of leader development.
Leader development is defined as “the deliberate,
continuous, sequential, and progressive process… that
grows leaders capable of decisive action.”6 To capitalize
6 INFANTRY Spring 2022
A platoon leader briefs the Bayonet mission fragmentary order to his platoon.
presents an updated enemy situation and
mission for the final 12-mile foot movement and
platoon collective training lane. The battalion
commander, command sergeant major,
executive officer, operations officer, and
operations sergeant major observe, coach,
and mentor cadre on their performance of each
company and platoon OPORD brief as well as
the execution of the Bayonet event. Feedback
is given to junior officers and NCOs following
each iteration to facilitate leader development.
Implementing the orders process into the FTX/
Bayonet undoubtedly strengthens junior officers
and NCOs to integrate into any operational unit
prepared to fight and win in future LSCO.
Summary
This article outlines enhancements to Infantry OSUT that
are improving the development of Infantry Soldiers through
applications that simulate LSCO. The 2-58IN made deliberate adjustments to install a LSCO focus with no changes to
the current POI by critically analyzing LFX and STX training,
OPFOR creation and utilization, and leader development
opportunities. This includes increasing the number of targets
for lane iterations, developing targets that require multiple
hits to go down, and replacing faceless target silhouettes with
images of armed foreign soldiers into the LFX progression.
With STX progression, 2-58IN improved educating cadre
and Soldiers on potential adversaries’ military weaponry
and its capabilities, and implemented a realistic OPFOR that
looks, acts, and fights like a near-peer enemy operating in
a continually contested environment on a linear battlefield.
Finally, 2-58IN incorporated the orders process for the FTX/
Bayonet that places a deliberate focus on the training and
development of junior officers and NCOs towards LSCO.
The cost associated to resource these applications and
training adjustments are nearly negligible both in time and
money. However, the payoff is real, tangible, and directly
impacts the readiness of training today’s Infantry Soldiers
for tomorrow’s war.
Notes
1
Lewis Sorley, Press On! (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat
Studies Institute, 2009), 717.
2
The White House, “Interim National Security Strategic
Guidance,” Whitehouse.gov, last modified 3 March 2021,
accessed from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/
2021/03/03/interim-national-security-strategicguidance/.
3
MG Patrick Donahoe, “Fiscal Year 2022 Annual Mission
Guidance,” Fort Benning, GA: Maneuver Center of Excellence,
2021, 3.
4
GEN James C. McConville, “Army Multi-Domain
Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict,”
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 16 March 2021, i.
5
Ibid, 2.
6
Army Regulation 600-100, Army Profession and Leadership
Policy, 2017, 32.
LTC Alphonse J. LeMaire currently commands 2-58IN,
198th Infantry Brigade, Fort Benning, GA. He earned a
bachelor’s degree from the University of North Carolina
at Charlotte and master’s degrees from Kansas State
University, Air University, and the School of Advanced
Military Studies. He is also a graduate of the Air
Command and Staff College. LTC LeMaire has served
in various command and staff positions that include
the Army Talent Management Task Force, 25th Infantry
Division, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and the 4th
Infantry Division. He has completed multiple tours in both
Iraq and Afghanistan.
MAJ Ross C. Pixler currently serves as the executive
officer (XO) of 2-58IN. He earned a bachelor’s degree from
the U.S. Military Academy (USMA) at West Point, NY; a master
of art degree from Colombia University; and a master of art and
science degree from the Command and General Staff College at
Fort Leavenworth, KS. He has served in various command and staff
positions that include the 3rd Infantry Division, 10th Mountain Division,
101st Airborne Division (AASLT), and West Point instructor and tactical
officer. He has served multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan.
CPT James E. Bryson currently serves as the operations officer for
2-58IN. His previous assignments include serving as a Stryker platoon
leader in A Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Battalion; weapons platoon
senior observer-coach-trainer (OCT) with Task Force 2; division battle
captain in Headquarters and Headquarters Battalion; and commander
of Charlie Company, 2-54IN. CPT Bryson earned a bachelor’s degree in
political science from Arizona State University and a master’s degree in
business administration from Grand Canyon University.
CPT Avery W. Littlejohn commanded Alpha Company, 2-58IN.
His previous assignments include serving as a platoon leader with 3rd
Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, and with 4th Battalion, 9th
Infantry Regiment, Fort Carson, CO. CPT Littlejohn earned a bachelor’s
degree in systems engineering from USMA.
CPT Andrew E. Carter currently commands Bravo Company, 2-58IN.
He previously served as a platoon leader in the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in
Vilseck, Germany. CPT Carter earned a bachelor’s degree in technical
management from Northern Arizona University.
CPT Matthew T. Lunger currently commands Charlie Company,
2-58IN. He is a former enlisted Infantry Soldier who spent three years
in 1st Battalion, 501st Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team,
25th Infantry Division, Fort Richardson, AK, which included a 12-month
deployment to Afghanistan in 2009-2010. He then served five years as
a team member through section leader in a dismounted reconnaissance
company in 3rd Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat
Team, 4th Infantry Division, and included additional Afghanistan deployments in 2012 and 2014. After commissioning, CPT Lunger served as
an assistant S3 and rifle platoon leader in 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry
Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade, in Vicenza, Italy; and as company XO
in Delta Company, 2-58IN. He earned a bachelor’s degree in criminal
justice and public policy from the University of Colorado in Colorado
Springs.
CPT Joshua K. O’Neill currently commands Delta Company, 2-58IN.
His previous assignments include serving as a rifle platoon leader and
mortar platoon leader in 4th Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, 1st Stryker
Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, TX. He earned a
bachelor’s degree in defense and strategic studies from USMA.
CPT Rory M. Fellows currently serves with the 1st Brigade Combat
Team, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX. He previously commanded
Echo Company, 2-58IN. His other assignments include serving as a
platoon leader in Bandit Troop, 1st Squadron, 3rd Cavalry Regiment,
which deployed to Afghanistan from April 2016 to February 2017. He
earned a bachelor’s degree in military history from Norwich University in
Northfield, VT.
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 7
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
High-Angle Fires and Maneuver:
Russian Upgraded Mortars Maintain
Vital Role on Future Battlefield
DR. LESTER W. GRAU
DR. CHARLES K. BARTLES
A
rtillery has been integrated into Russian Army
infantry regiment tables of organization and
equipment (TO&Es) since at least Peter the Great
(1682-1725). His 1707 field regulations specified that two
three-pounder cannon or two mortars be standard in every
infantry regiment. Guard’s regiments would have more.1
Cannon artillery and/or mortars have been organic to
Russian maneuver units for centuries. These were separate
from the standard artillery battalions assigned to the infantry
regiments or operational reserves. The cannon crews and
mortar crews organic to infantry battalions have always
been manned by artillerymen. During World War II, Soviet
infantry battalions had two Model 1937 45mm semiautomatic
wheeled anti-tank guns and six 82mm mortars.
Since World War II, the composition and size of the
organic artillery in infantry battalions have varied. The 1949
Soviet rifle battalion had an artillery battery of two wheeled
Model 1948 57mm anti-tank guns, four 12.7mm heavy
machine guns, and four PTRD-41 anti-tank rifles as well as
a mortar battery of nine 82mm mortars.2 Concepts began
to change in the Soviet Army with the death of Stalin in
1951. Future war was expected to be fought exclusively with
atomic weapons, and maneuver units were reduced in size
to become less attractive targets. The Soviet motorized rifle
battalion experienced at least seven more significant TO&E
changes before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Cannon
artillery and recoilless rifles disappeared while anti-tank
guided missiles entered the force. For a brief period, when
the Soviets determined that future war would only be atomic,
mortars disappeared. But with the realization that future
war could be nuclear or conventional maneuver war under
nuclear-threatened conditions, mortars came back and have
remained. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian
armed forces underwent a sweeping reform with the ground
forces built primarily around brigades and combined arms
armies rather than regiments, divisions, and armies. They
retained BMP-equipped and BTR-equipped motorized rifle
battalions. Each of these battalions includes an eight-mortar
battery of either 120mm 2S12 “Sani,” 82mm 2B14 “Podnos,”
or 82mm 2B9 Vasilek mortars.3
Except for the brief period during preparations solely for
an atomic battlefield, Soviet and Russian ground forces
have always wanted organic battalion-level “hip-pocket”
8 INFANTRY Spring 2022
artillery available to decimate the enemy before, during,
and after contact. The mortar is that weapon of choice for
enemy equipment and personnel. The anti-tank guided
missile and anti-tank grenade launcher are the weapons of
choice for enemy tanks. The locale of war is changing from
set-piece contests in open-maneuver spaces to mountains,
deserts, thick forests, marshland, and urban areas — areas
that negate many of the advantages of newer technology.
Mortars and light anti-tank weapons are ideal for these
locales as they are transportable, effective, and relatively
easy to emplace. Western forces and Russian forces view
tactical war differently. The West thinks that artillery supports
maneuver and that the best way to kill a tank is with another
tank. Russian forces think that artillery enables maneuver
and the best way to kill a tank is with an anti-tank weapon.
The true value of Russian tanks is proven when they are
committed deep inside the enemy rear area seizing or
destroying key infrastructure and support facilities. Despite
these conflicting views, neither side would disagree that
the correlation between the range of fire systems and the
reach of maneuver elements is now changing because the
range of artillery is increasing while the speed of advance of
maneuver formations is not.4
The Not-So-Humble Mortar
The 120mm 2B11 Sani [Сани-sled] has been in the inventory since 1981. It won a state design prize in 1984. This
4.7-inch mortar remains in Russian motorized rifle battalion
batteries but is being replaced by the upgraded 2S12A Sanicomplex.5 The emplaced weapon weighs 230 kilograms
(507 pounds) and it is moved on a 2x1 wheeled chassis
(designated 2L81). The mortar construction is rigid and does
not have a recoil-absorption system. The new baseplate
has an internal rotating firing plate which allows 360-degree
engagement without time-consuming repositioning of the
base plate or removal of the smooth-bore barrel. It includes
a device to prevent double loading and provides a rate of fire
of up to 15 rounds per minute. Night-firing holds no special
challenges, and the improved gunsight can be rapidly
adjusted.6
The “Sani’s” main function remains motorized rifle direct
support. Afghanistan combat proved that mortars are irreplaceable in mountainous and rugged terrain and in wooded
areas where artillery fire is ineffective.7 In the city fighting
Maximum firing range – 7,100 meters (up to 9,000 meters using
the “Gran” precision fire system)
Minimum firing range – 480 meters
Maximum rate of fire – up to 15 rounds a minute
(damage) on it in which it completely loses its combat capability. The probability of hitting individual targets is 0.7-0.9 or
the mathematical expectation that 50-60 percent of targets
within a group will be hit.
Annihilation of a target renders it unusable.
Maximum initial speed of mortar round – 325 meters a second
Portable munitions load – 56 rounds
Mortar weight in combat configuration – 230 kilograms
Mortar weight with 2L81 wheeled carriage – 357 kilograms
Crew – 5 men
Table 1 — 2S12 Sani Specifications
8
in Grozny, Chechnya, mortar fire caused the bulk of the
casualties.9 In addition to the normal high-explosive (HE)
fragmentation, smoke, illumination, incendiary, and leaflet
rounds, 2S12A mortars also use the KM-8 “Gran” guidedprojectile system, an HE fragmentation round with the
9E430 laser-guided self-homing seeker and the “Malakhit”
automated fire control system (or the laser range finder
beam). The “Gran” enables first-round hits without firing for
adjustment against mobile and fixed targets at day or night.
If multiple targets are located within 300 meters of each
other, a single firing angle is sufficient and the gunsight
does not need to be adjusted. Tests of the “Gran” system
demonstrate its accuracy where six of every eight rounds
will hit right on target.10
Mobility and rapid displacement are important to mortar
survivability. The 2S12A “Sani” mortar is transported on a
Ural-43206-0651 all-wheel drive truck or towed behind it.
The 2F32 special equipment package (electric winch, loading planks, and bracing material) is carried in the truck bed.
This equipment enables the crew to move the mortar from
the traveling position into a firing position (and back) in under
three minutes. The old 2B11 mortar required 20 minutes. A
MT-LB lightly armored tractor can also be used as the prime
mover.11
Suppression of the target inflicts such losses on it that it
temporarily loses its combat capability, restricts its maneuver, or disrupts control. The number of targets hit is about
30 percent.
Harassment is the moral and psychological impact on
the enemy from firing a limited number of mortar and artillery
rounds for a specified time.13
Types of fire planning for a mortar battery: When
engaging an enemy with fire, artillery subunits use the
following fire planning: fire against an individual target, fire
concentration, standing barrage fire, deep standing barrage,
moving barrage, successive fire concentrations, offensive
rolling barrage, and massed fire.14
Fire against an individual target is battery, platoon,
or individual mortar fire conducted independently from a
covered firing position.
Figure 1 — Fire Against an Individual Target, in this case, an
Enemy Anti-tank Guided Missile
Fire concentration is fire conducted simultaneously by
several batteries on one target. The mortar battery fires a
concentration area as part of a higher-level artillery plan. The
maximum area for the mortar battery within a fire concentration is eight hectares.
The ability to shoot and quickly vacate the firing position is
essential to crew survival. Russia has fielded turreted mobile
82mm and 120mm gun-mortars which include breechloading, rifled tubes that can fire HE, white phosphorus,
and smoke. These are mounted on tracked and wheeled
chassis. Some motorized rifle battalion mortar batteries use
these hybrid gun-mortars instead of the Sani. They are more
mobile but have a lower rate of fire.12
Mortar Fire Planning
When a target is designated (depending on its nature,
importance, and the combat situation), the firing missions of
artillery subunits can be: destruction, annihilation, suppression, or harassment.
Destruction of the target consists of inflicting such losses
Figure 2 — Fire Concentration
Standing barrage fire is a continuous curtain of fire
created in front of an attacking (or a counterattacking) enemy.
It is used to repel attacks (counterattacks) of enemy infantry.
The width of the fixed barrage fire sectors are assigned at
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 9
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
vehicles. The distance between the lines of the mobile
barrage fire, depending on enemy speed, can be 400-600
meters. The width of the mobile barrage fire battery sector is
assigned at the rate of no more than 25 meters per mortar.
Barrage fires are assigned the names of predatory animals,
such as “Lion,” “Tiger,” etc., and each line, starting from the
most distant one, has its own designated number. A moving
barrage is often planned in conjunction with a howitzer
battalion. Sometimes the first two lines are fired simultaneously as in a deep standing barrage.
Figure 3 — Standing Barrage Fire
the rate of no more than 50 meters per mortar. The boundaries of fixed barrage fire sectors are assigned tree names
such as “Beech,” “Birch,” etc. The mission is fired with HE
fragmentation mortars. When conducting a single fixed
barrage fire, firing begins at the moment the infantry and
tanks approach the fixed barrage fire line of fire and continues until the infantry is cut off from the tanks and the attack
(counterattack) is stopped. If the enemy’s infantry takes
cover, the firing transitions to a fire concentration mission.
A deep standing barrage is a continuous curtain of fire
on the axis of enemy tank and infantry fighting vehicles
which are fired simultaneously on several lines of fire. The
lines may be 400-600 meters apart, and the width of the
lines are not more than 25 meters per mortar.
Successive fire concentrations are used for fire
support of an attack. Successive fire concentration lines
are assigned after determining the formation of the enemy’s
defense at 300-1,000 meters from one another. The borders
of the successive concentrations of fire are assigned names
of predatory animals, such as “Lion,” “Tiger,” etc., which are
numbered in the order of priority of their firing at them, starting from the closest line. The mortar battery will normally
participate with an individual concentration as part of a larger
battalion or brigade artillery group successive fire concentrations plan. When planning the lines of the successive fire
concentrations, the mortar battery target concentration
is assigned on the first line, the area of which should not
exceed two hectares.
Figure 4 — Deep Standing Barrage
A moving barrage is a continuous curtain of fire created
at one line on the axis of enemy tanks, infantry fighting
vehicles, and armored personnel carriers and sequentially
transferred to other designated lines as the main mass of the
enemy leaves the zone of fire. A moving barrage is prepared
at several lines located on the path of movement of enemy
Figure 5 — Moving Barrage
10 INFANTRY Spring 2022
Figure 6 — Successive Fire Concentrations
An offensive rolling barrage is used for fire support of
an attack. It is conducted along the main and intermediate
lines. The main lines of the offensive rolling barrage fire are
assigned every 300-1,000 meters from one another, and the
intermediate ones are assigned 100-300 meters between the
main lines. The main lines of the barrage fire are assigned
names of predatory animals, such as “Fox,” “Tiger,” etc.,
while the lines are numbered in the order of priority of firing
them, starting from the closest line. Intermediate lines are
numbered separately from the main ones and are named 1st
intermediate, 2nd intermediate, etc. The mortar battery will
normally participate with an individual concentration as part
of a larger battalion or brigade artillery group successive fire
trated or within an area, as well as some dug-in unarmored
vehicles positions, as a rule, are destroyed.
The targets of artillery (mortar) fire are usually enemy
platoon strongpoints, mortar platoons, command and observation posts, radar stations, and companies in assembly
areas and on the march. The firing capabilities of artillery to
engage enemy targets with fire from covered firing positions
are determined by the nature of the targets and engagement, number of available mortars, quantity and quality of
available ammunition, and required time to complete tasks.15
Depending on the number of mortars at the disposal of
the battalion (company), the duration of fire, and the mode
of fire, the number of required mortars can be determined.
Divide this number by the average ammunition consumption
rate to obtain the number of objects that can be suppressed
(destroyed) during the artillery preparation of the attack.
Mortar Battery on the Offensive
Figure 7 — Offensive Rolling Barrage
concentrations plan. The size of the mortar battery concentration is determined at the rate of 15 meters per mortar.
Massed fire is conducted simultaneously by all or most
of the artillery against an
enemy grouping with the goal
of decisively hitting one or
several important targets in a
short time. The mortar battery
may have a fire concentration
within the massed fire or be
part of a howitzer battalion
concentration.
As a rule, fixed targets
that are unobservable from
the mortars but seen from
Figure 8 — Massed Fire
forward observers — such
as unprotected unarmored targets — are destroyed, and
covered and armored targets are suppressed or destroyed.
The entire battery, and often higher artillery, is used against
such targets.
Enemy
artillery,
mortar
batteries and platoons, as well
as individual guns, are struck in
their firing positions. Batteries
(platoons) of self-propelled
guns are rapidly fired upon, as
a rule, immediately upon their
detection. Uncovered deployed
personnel and weapons are
usually suppressed. Enemy
anti-tank weapons (anti-tank
missiles and anti-tank guns),
depending on the situation,
are destroyed or suppressed.
Groups of unarmored and lightly
armored vehicles in concen-
In the offense, the mortar battery destroys or suppresses
the enemy’s means of nuclear and chemical attacks, artillery
and mortar batteries, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, antitank and other direct fire weapons, personnel, command
posts, communications, and fortifications. In order to carry
out these fire missions, the mortar battery is deployed into
its combat formation. The combat formation consists of
the mortar platoons deployed into their firing positions, a
command and observation post, and, if necessary, an observation post (forward and lateral).
The mortars are located in covered firing positions with
intervals of 20-40 meters between them. The mortar transport vehicles are placed behind the mortars, to the right or
left of them in a covered position at a distance of 300-500
meters.16
The command post is intended for the observation of the
enemy and terrain, controlling fire and maneuvering units,
observing the actions of the troops, and maintaining interaction with them. The command post of the battery is collocated with the command post of the motorized rifle battalion
or designated motorized rifle company. In order to deploy the
Table 2 — Mortar Battery Maximum Fire Coverage by Area and Line17
Artillery
Assigned
Quantity
120mm
Mortar
8
Artillery Support of the Attack
Concentrated
Successive
Fire
Concentration
of Fire
8 hectares
2 hectares
20 acres
5 acres
Barrage Fire
Barrage
Fire
Fixed
Barrage
Fire
Moving
Barrage
Fire
120 meters 400 meters 200 meters
131 yards
437 yards
219 yards
Table 3 — Mortar Battery Assets18
System
Quantity of
Mortars
Rounds
per Mortar
Total
Rounds
Platoons
Command
Posts
Radar
120mm
Mortar
8
54
432
2
1
1
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 11
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
mortar battery in combat formation, the firing positions and
the command post site are designated. The firing positions
of the mortar battery are 1-1.5 kilometers from the front-line
positions of friendly troops. When attacking a defending
enemy from the march, the battery, if it is involved in the
preparation of the attack, must take up its firing position no
later than 1.5-2 hours before the start of the artillery preparation of the attack. Deployment in combat formation is carried
out, as a rule, at night, hidden from enemy ground and air
observation. This time is needed to prepare the mortars for
firing, lay out the ammunition (which will be used during the
artillery preparation of the attack) on the ground, ensure
spacing between mortars, and aim the mortars at the targets
on which fire will first be laid.19
Artillery fire engagement in an offensive is carried out by
phases: artillery support for the advance of troops, artillery
preparation for the attack, artillery support of the attack, and
artillery support for troops advancing in depth. Success in
this phase of fire support, distinctly designed for this attack,
determines the achievement of the artillery in the subsequent phases.20
Artillery preparation for the attack begins at a set time and,
as a rule, with the approach of a motorized rifle company to
the line of deployment in battalion columns. At this time, the
mortar battery, at the signal of the senior commander, begins
its missions.
Artillery preparation for the attack begins with sudden
heavy fire strike by all artillery on planned targets, and above
all on personnel and means of fire on the front line, artillery
batteries, and other important targets. Artillery preparation
ends at the appointed time with a fire strike on the strong
points of the first echelon companies and anti-tank weapons.
Covering fire is carried out against artillery and mortar batteries. It usually begins before the end of the artillery preparation and ends with the arrival of motorized rifle subunits on
the front edge of the enemy’s defense, coinciding with the
attack time on the front line.21
Artillery support for the attack begins when the motorized rifle companies reach the line of transition to the attack
and continues until the motorized rifle subunits capture the
first echelon areas of a brigade (regiment). The transition
to artillery support is carried out without any interruption in
firing. Artillery support can be carried out by various methods — single or double successive fire concentrations, fire
barrages, concentrated fire, fire against a single target, and
combinations thereof. There may be other methods as well.
An expedient method of fire support is one that provides
a greater degree of simultaneous destruction of direct fire
weapons, especially anti-tank guided missiles, at the greatest distance possible. Calls for fire and shift fire, in addition
to the command to start fire support for the attack, may be
given by the battalion commander.22
Fire accompaniment of troops in the depth is carried out
as the offensive develops throughout the depth of the enemy
defense. It begins after the end of artillery support for the attack
12 INFANTRY Spring 2022
and continues until the motorized rifle subunits complete
their combat missions. During artillery accompaniment, the
mortar battery can perform the following tasks: ensure the
entry into battle of the second echelons, repulse counterattacks by the enemy reserve, support subunits when crossing
water obstacles, and pursue retreating enemies. During this
period, the mortars, as a rule, perform on-call fire missions.
The battery can conduct fire against an individual target, fire
concentration, standing barrage fire, and massed fire.23
The preparation of a mortar battery for an offensive begins
with receiving a mission from the battalion commander.
After receiving the mission from the battalion commander
at the set time, the battery commander is obliged to support
the company commander, for whose support the battery is
assigned or supporting, and report the composition, position,
condition, and security of the battery; the missions received
and the established ammunition consumption; the battery’s
fire capabilities; the assigned areas for firing positions and
location of the command post; the time and order of their
occupation; the order of movement during the battle; and
the required time needed to open fire. He must be ready to
answer the company commander’s questions regarding the
use of the battery in battle.24
In order to support the motorized rifle battalion (company)
commander, the battery commander arrives at the indicated
place to conduct reconnaissance and receive the mission
and coordinating instructions. When providing the combat
missions for the mortar battery, the battalion commander
indicates the following in the combat order: the targets for
destruction and/or suppression during the period of fire
preparation of the attack, with the time of the start of the
attack and whom to support, the tasks of ensuring the entry
into battle of the second echelon and repelling enemy counterattacks, firing positions, route and order of advance, time
of readiness to open fire, and order of movement during the
battle.25
At the set time and at the signal (command) of the
senior commander, the battery opens fire and performs
tasks according to the artillery support plan. The battery
commander controls the execution of his subordinate
platoons’ fire missions and monitors the results of the
fires, correcting them if necessary. At the beginning of the
attack, the battery suppresses and/or destroys the planned
and newly identified enemy targets. As tank and motorized
rifle subunits approach the line of fire, the mortar battery
commander, at the direction of the motorized rifle battalion
(company) commander, transfers fires to the next line in
the sequence to ensure a safe distance from the exploding
mortars for friendly troops. When new targets are discovered, the battalion commander sets tasks for their suppression and/or destruction.26
The movement of the mortar battery is carried out by order
of the battalion commander. It begins after the companies of
the first echelon have taken possession of enemy platoon
strongpoints on the front line of the enemy’s defenses.
Depending on the nature of the actions of the enemy and
friendly subunits, the battery can move as a whole battery
or by individual platoons. The battery commander is obliged
to move the command post in a timely manner and maintain contact with the battalion (company) commander. The
second echelon of the battalion is brought into action under
artillery cover. The battery suppresses the enemy’s firepower,
as a rule, with a heavy fire lasting 8-10 minutes. During this
time, enemy direct and indirect firepower should diminish
as the second echelon moves to the line of engagement.
During the offense, subunits must be constantly prepared to
repel enemy counterattacks. Upon detection of advancing
enemy reserves, the battery commander adjusts the firing
line, taking into account the change in the direction of the
enemy’s counterattacks. Artillery repels a counterattack
by enemy tanks and infantry with moving barrage fire and
standing barrage fire. When the enemy retreats, the mortar
battery often moves and deploys in combat formation. Firing
positions are usually located near roads.27
Mortar Battery in the Defense
In the defense, mortar batteries usually occupy positions away from tank avenues of approach, prominent local
features, and on low ground.28 The mortar firing position can
be dug by hand, but the major excavation is usually done by
the brigade’s engineer battalion equipment.
The battery in the defense carries out fire engagement of
the enemy in cooperation with other means of destruction
and the following tasks:
- Using artillery for interdicting and attacking the deployment areas of enemy troops;
- Using artillery to repulse an enemy attack;
- Conducting artillery support of troops defending in depth;
and
- Using artillery to defeat the enemy during friendly counterattacks.29
In order to perform firing missions in the defense, the
battery selects at least two firing positions so it can maneuver during the battle. The nearest avenues of approach to
the firing positions are mined. The main firing positions of
a mortar battery are usually assigned within the battalion
defensive area, behind the companies of the first echelon.
Figure 9 — Fighting Position for the 2S12 Sani Mortar30
Reserve firing positions are selected on the flanks of the
main area and in the depths of the defense. Command
observation and observation posts of artillery (mortar)
subunits are usually deployed within the battalion defensive
area in order to create a system of continuous observation of
the enemy in front of the forward edge of the line of defense,
and to ensure survivability, they are scattered along the
front and in depth. In order to defeat the enemy effectively
in the defense, an artillery fire system will be created,
which consists of the advance preparation of concentrated
and defensive fires to defeat the enemy on the avenues of
approach to the defense, in front of the forward edge of the
front line and in depth, as well as the concentration of fire on
any threatened axis.31
A battery’s fire capabilities will determine its ability to
perform tasks in defense. The preparation of a battery
for combat in defense depends on the conditions for the
transition to defense, the mission received, the nature of
the enemy, and available time. During the transition to the
defense in conditions of direct contact with the enemy, the
battery commander, in accordance with the decision of the
battalion commander, sets the task of preparing the fire for
capturing and securing the specified line, providing flanks
and gaps, and repelling possible attacks by the enemy.
Subsequently, all the necessary measures are taken to
prepare for the defense. When organizing the defense
when not in contact with the enemy, the battery commander
receives missions, as a rule, from the battalion commander
during reconnaissance.
Regardless of the conditions for the transition to defense,
the battery commander participates in the reconnaissance and coordination activities, contacts the company
commander to whom he is assigned and reports the following: the composition, position, condition, and security of
the battery; tasks received from the battalion commander;
the locations of the firing positions; ammunition status; fire
capabilities; and location of the command post. The battalion commander coordinates the actions of the companies
and batteries to defeat the enemy in the course of refining
the plan of battle and also clarifies the methods of target
designation, warning signals, control, and coordination. After
the reconnaissance, the battalion commander will issue a
combat order, including assigning artillery tasks.32
During the advance and deployment of the enemy, the
battery lays fire concentrations and fire against individual
targets, attempting to inflict defeat on the advancing enemy.
When the enemy transitions to the attack, the battery
conducts standing barrage fire or moving barrage fire on the
combat formations of the advancing enemy subunits. During
this time, the artillery fires with the greatest intensity. The
battery uses barrage fire to defeat tanks and other armored
vehicles, to disrupt the combat formations of enemy units,
and to cut off the infantry from the tanks. Calls for fire are
directed by the commanders of the company and battalion.
In the event of a penetration of the enemy into the defensive area of the battery, the battery lays fire concentrations,
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 13
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
Mission
Ammunition Expended
Basic Load/Rounds
Potential Enemy
Suppression
Artillery denies
0.3
enemy advance and 26x8=208
deployment
Fire concentration on
mechanized infantry platoon in
two columns – 120 rounds;1-2
separate targets – 90 rounds
Artillery defeats
enemy attacks
0.5
40x8=320
Moving barrage fire – 2-3 lines –
160 rounds:
2nd Moving Barrage Fire – 110
rounds; 1 target – 50 rounds
Artillery supports
defending units in
depth
0.5
40x8=320
Fire concentrations – 2 mech
infantry platoons in combat
formation – 110 rounds;
Standing Barrage Fire – 3 sites –
160 rounds; 1 target – 50 rounds
Fire destruction
of enemy
counterattack
0.4
32x8=256
Fire concentrations – 2 mech
infantry platoons in combat
formation – 110 rounds; 1 mortar
platoon – 110 rounds; 1 target –
40 rounds
Figure 10 — Conceptual drawing of Russian
82mm automatic robot-mortar35
maneuver for the Russian ground combat
units.
Notes
1
O. Leonov and I. Yl’yanov, Регулярная
Пехота: Боевая Летопись, Организация,
Table 4 — Mortar Rounds Expended for Defense Fire Missions33
Обмундирования, вооружение, Снаружение
1698-1801 [Regular Infantry: Military Annals,
standing barrage fire, or moving barrage fire in an attempt Organization, Uniforms, Armaments, Supply 1698-1801], Moscow:
to prevent the spread of the enemy into the depth of the TLO “ACT”, 1995, 24-25.
2
Lester W. Grau, “The Soviet Combined Arms Battalion —
defense and towards the flanks.
Reorganization for Tactical Flexibility,” Soviet Army Studies Office,
When the friendly second echelon conducts a coun- 1989, 3, accessed from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA216368.
terattack, the battery can be assigned to support it. pdf. There are also brigades mounted on tracked MTLB armored
When the command post moves to a new location, the carriers operating in boggy, marshy or Arctic areas that are orgabattery commander establishes contact with the battalion nized like BTR-equipped brigades.
3
Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles, The Russian Way of War:
commander. The battery supports the battalion by laying fire
Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground
concentrations and fire against individual targets. Priority
Forces, Foreign Military Studies Office, 2016, 211, accessed from
firing targets are enemy artillery and mortar batteries, anti- https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/p/fmso-bookshelf.
tank weapons, tanks, personnel, and direct-fire weapons
4
Jack Watling, “The Future of Fires: Maximising the UK’s
that must be suppressed in the direction of the friendly Tactical and Operational Firepower,” RUSI Occasional Paper, Royal
counterattack.
United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies, London,
November 2019, 18. Other consequences of the increase in range
Conclusion
are the ability of a smaller number of guns to bring a higher proportion
Mortars or gun-mortars will remain a vital part of the of the groups fire to bear in support of a specific maneuver brigade
Russian motorized rifle battalion. They provide responsive, and the extent of the “last-mile resupply” of ammunition, food, and
increasingly accurate fire support and masking particulate- fuel5 is extended over 50 kilometers behind the FLOT, 19.
Petyr Nikolaev, “You Don’t Joke with the Sanis. The Reliable
smoke cover to the maneuver force. However, as unmanned
Mortar Acquires a ‘Second Breath’ and Remains a Serious Threat to
aerial vehicles and high-precision fires become common on
the Enemy,” Armeyskiy Standart [Army Standard], https://armystanthe battlefield, mortar crew mortality should rise. Further, dard.ru/, 26 April 2021.
6
combat in the Arctic and Far North is difficult for mortar crews
Ibid.
7
in the open for extended periods of time. The Russians are
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
field testing the 82mm automatic mortar mounted on a small
9
N. N. Novichkov, V. Ya. Snegovskiy, A. G. Sokolov and V. Yu.
Kamaz truck chassis (the Drok) [Gorse] and the 120mm
gun howitzer mounted on a large truck chassis (the 2S40 Shvarev, Rossiyskie vooruzhennye sily b chechenskoim konflikte:
Floks [Phlox]) or the Magnolia articulated tracked Arctic analiz, itogi, vyvody [Russian armed forces in the Chechen conflict:
analysis, results and outcomes], Moscow: Holweg-Infoglobe-Trivola,
vehicle. Russians engineers are investigating the develop1995, 131.
ment of 82mm robot-mortars which will operate separately
10
Nikolaev.
11
from the firing crew.34 These efforts — combined with the
Ibid.
12
improvements in the mobility, accuracy, and rate of fire of
Murat Rafikhovich Toekin, Минометная Батарея в Основных
artillery battalions and brigades — should continue to enable Видах Боя [The Mortar Battery in the Basic Types of Combat],
14 INFANTRY Spring 2022
Almaty: Kazakhstan University, 2002, 6.
13
Ibid.
14
Fire planning section derived from Toekin, 6-9, and Grau and
Bartles, 243-250.
15
Toekin.
16
Ibid, 12.
17
Ibid, 10.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid, 12-13.
21
Ibid, 13.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid, 13-14.
24
Ibid, 14.
25
Ibid, 15.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid, 16.
28
With the introduction of the “Gran” precision firing system, high
elevation positioning of part of the battery may be ideal when using
laser-beam target identification.
29
Toekin, 17.
30
Ground Forces Combat Regulations: Part 2 Battalion and
Company [Боевой устав сухопутных войск: часть 2 батальон
рота], Moscow: Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, 2014.
31
Toekin, 17.
32
Ibid, 17-18.
33
Ibid, 18.
34
D. Pervykhin, G. Mitrofanov, V. Del’ros and I. Kruglov,
Совершенстование
Артиллерии:
Внедрение
научнотехнических решений--залог успешного выполнения огневных
задач артеллерии [Perfecting artillery: Inculcating scientific-technical decisions — securing the successful accomplishment of artillery
fire missions], Армеиский Сборник [Army Digest], February 2021,
63-71.
35
Ibid, 71.
Dr. Les W. Grau, a retired Infantry lieutenant colonel, is research director
for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, KS. His
previous positions include serving as senior analyst and research coordinator,
FMSO; deputy director, Center for Army Tactics, U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth; political and economic adviser,
Allied Forces Central Europe, Brunssum, the Netherlands; U.S. Embassy,
Moscow, Soviet Union; battalion executive officer, 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry
Regiment, Republic of Korea and Fort Riley, KS; commander, Headquarters
and Headquarters Company, 1st Support Brigade, Mannheim, Germany;
and district senior adviser, Advisory Team 80, Republic of Vietnam. His
military schooling includes U.S. Air Force War College, U.S. Army Russian
Institute, Defense Language Institute (Russian), U.S. Army Command and
General Staff College, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, and Infantry Officer
Basic Course. He has a bachelor’s degree in political science from the
University of Texas-El Paso, a master’s degree in international relations from
Kent State University, and a doctorate in Russian and Central Asian military
history from the University of Kansas. His awards and honors include U.S.
Central Command Visiting Fellow; professor, Academy for the Problems
of Security, Defense and Law Enforcement, Moscow; academician,
International Informatization Academy, Moscow; Legion of Merit; Bronze
Star; Purple Heart; and Combat Infantryman Badge. He is the author of 13
books on Afghanistan and the Soviet Union and more than 250 articles for
professional journals. Dr. Grau’s best-known books are The Bear Went Over
the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan and The Other Side of
the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War.
Dr. Chuck Bartles is an analyst and Russian linguist with FMSO at
Fort Leavenworth. His specific research areas include Russian and Central
Asian military force structure, modernization, tactics, officer and enlisted
professional development, and security-assistance programs. Dr. Bartles
is also a space operations officer and lieutenant colonel in the Army
Reserve who has deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq and has also served as
a security assistance officer at embassies in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and
Kazakhstan. He has a bachelor’s degree in Russian from the University
of Nebraska-Lincoln, a master’s degree in Russian and Eastern European
Studies from the University of Kansas, and a PhD from the University of
Missouri-Kansas City.
From the Foreign Military Studies Office Bookshelf
Russian Military Art and Advanced Weaponry by Timothy Thomas
Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gerasimov has continually requested that the Academy of Military
Science provide him with ideas about new forms and methods of warfare. One source defined “methods”
as the use of weaponry and military art. Weaponry is now advanced and is characterized by new speeds,
ranges, and agilities, which introduce new ways for Russian commanders to apply force. Military art takes
into consideration advanced weaponry’s contributions to conflict along with a combination of both old and
new combat experiences, the creativity and innovative capabilities of commanders, and new ways for
considering or adding to the principles of military art (mass, surprise, etc.).
https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-books/352075/download
The Russian Way of War: Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization
of the Russian Ground Forces by Dr. Lester W. Grau and Charles K. Bartles
Russia’s 2014 annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, activity in Eastern Ukraine, saber rattling
regarding the Baltics, deployment to Syria, and more assertive behavior along its borders have piqued
interest in the Russian armed forces. This increased interest has caused much speculation about
their structure, capabilities, and future development. Interestingly, this speculation has created many
different, and often contradictory, narratives about these issues. At any given time, assessments
of the Russian armed forces vary between the idea of an incompetent and corrupt conscript army
manning decrepit Soviet equipment and relying solely on brute force, to the idea of an elite military
filled with special operations forces who were the “polite people” or “little green men” seen on the
streets in Crimea. This book will attempt to split the difference between these radically different ideas
by shedding some light on what exactly the Russian ground forces consist of, how they are structured,
how they fight, and how they are modernizing.
https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/m/fmso-books/199251/download
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 15
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
The Sniper’s Role in LargeScale Combat Operations
CPT DAVID M. WRIGHT
SSG ANDREW A. DOMINGUEZ
SSG JOHN A. SISK II
T
raditionally, the sniper in U.S. Army doctrine and
training has been an underutilized and misunderstood asset available to the tactical level
commander. Snipers are specially trained in long-range
marksmanship and infiltration. Their use and effectiveness
by special operations forces during the Global War on
Terrorism have brought a heightened level of awareness and
attention to the sniper in American culture. Simultaneously
to this increase in notoriety, the U.S. Army has moved in the
opposite direction by focusing on high-end fires and maneuver capabilities. These changes are necessary to ensure the
Army is ready for a fight against a near-peer or peer adversary in the multi-domain environment. When commanders
employ snipers effectively, they create an advantage during
large-scale combat operations. Over the last 15 years, our
adversaries have observed our success in ground combat
at the tactical level. They have focused on developing capabilities that limit the Army’s ability to maneuver and make
decisions. America’s military is viewed as over-reliant on
technology, joint fires capabilities, and unmanned systems
that provide information for kinetic effects. Our opponents
aim to deny information through anti-access and area denial
(A2/AD) and target fixed American formations with fires
delivered from outside our effective range.1 This approach
leaves a gap for commanders to empower aggressive
and intelligent subordinates to operate without leveraging
American technological capabilities. When the Army is not
massed and needs to establish a foothold, the sniper can
expose vulnerabilities and give context to unmanned aircraft
system footage and collected imagery.
“As the Army and the joint force focused on counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism at the expense of other
capabilities, our adversaries watched, learned, adapted,
modernized and devised strategies that put us at a position of relative disadvantage in places where we may be
required to fight.”
— LTG Michael D. Lundy
Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations
Soldiers assigned to the 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 7th
Infantry Division conduct sniper training alongside members of the
Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force as part of exercise Rising
Thunder at Yakima Training Center, WA, on 10 December 2021.
Photo by Sgt. Ayato Takei, Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force
16 INFANTRY Spring 2022
We expect our adversaries to employ
a mixture of conventional tactics, terror,
criminal activity, and information warfare to
complicate the battlefield and limit options.
This environment will require commanders to become more comfortable assuming
risk to develop a situation. It also requires
a commander to exploit all assets available
to provide a clear picture of the battlefield.
Commanders require information to generate
options and make decisions. The Department
of Defense has invested billions into giving
that information. There is a perception that
the sniper has no place in this environment.
The sniper section augments the overwatch
and reconnaissance capabilities of the scout
platoon at the battalion level. Gaining and
maintaining contact without the enemy being
aware retains freedom of maneuver for the
commander. In armored and Stryker brigade
Photo by SSG Cody Forster
combat teams, snipers should move with the
mounted scout sections to maintain pace and Snipers from 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry Regiment, 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th
Infantry Division, conduct training in Alaska.
infiltrate their assigned positions. Leaving the
sniper team as an overwatch asset also allows the scout that can disrupt the enemy’s defensive planning and engageplatoon to continue answering battalion priority intelligence ment area development. Snipers provide a unique capability
requirements for terrain or defining the enemy disposition to disrupt, fix, and isolate small formations through precision
and composition in greater detail. A commander can effec- or indirect assets. Precision fires create casualties, lower
tively decide the place and time to converge maneuver morale, and affect the enemy’s decision-making process.3
assets against the enemy’s most vulnerable point with a Employing snipers in the offense requires commanders to
clearer picture of the battlefield.2
accept risk. Detailed and coordinated planning between
the battalion staff and the sniper section helps mitigate and
Enabling Tasks
reduce risk.
During large-scale combat operations, brigade combat
In the Defense
teams seize ground and hold it. Utilizing snipers during these
phases generates options for a commander. The sniper
The U.S. Army conducts the defense to shape favorable
team leader is trained and experienced in processing infor- conditions for returning to offensive operations. Snipers
mation according to the commander’s guidance and helps continue to offer options for the commander to disrupt,
develop those options. Institutionally trained snipers learn delay, and fix formations in the defense. Snipers are experts
to infiltrate and remain undetected, making them the best at infiltration, making them very useful in identifying enemy
option to observe an enemy operating in its defensive plan. avenues of approach not easily seen from defensive posiThe sniper can identify breach points in buildings and routes tions. Using snipers as forward observers allows commandto and from support-by-fire positions in any terrain. They ers to disrupt the enemy’s plan and force an early deployment
confirm information with high-powered optics or unmanned into their offensive plan. Snipers are experts at target detecaircraft systems. If needed, the sniper team provides a preci- tion and vehicle identification. They provide the commander
sion fire capability that a commander can employ against the means to orient on the enemy without betraying friendly
identified weapon emplacements as well as high-payoff and defensive positions. Snipers can provide the location and
high-value targets. In addition, a sniper team can neutral- disposition of the enemy’s breaching equipment, fire support
ize vehicles, equipment, and enemy leadership. It can also platforms, and assault force from a concealed position.
provide additional isolation to prevent enemy maneuver. Snipers can delay and fix formations using direct fires from
These capabilities augment the commander’s plan with a long range when unobserved. Fixing an element at the edge
low cost to combat power and precision capabilities, maxi- of the engagement area allows commanders to leverage
their most casualty-producing weapons against the enemy
mizing the economy of force for a given task.
for a more extended period.
On the Offense
A sniper can force the enemy to orient combat power
away from the friendly main effort focusing on an objectively
small shaping effort. Snipers give the commander an asset
The Sniper’s Future
Commanders may hesitate to employ snipers due to a
lack of experience operating with them in a decisive action
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 17
training environment for various reasons. Commanders
need to invest in their snipers and train sniper employment
to combat this. The Soldiers’ time is misused when they
practice prone shooting on a static range. Sniper teams and
sections should train on infiltration against skilled observers,
mounted and dismounted land navigation, battle handover
rehearsals, and pattern of life recognition. These skills are
critical to meeting the commander’s intent in the field.
With force modernization on the horizon, the U.S. Army
Sniper Course cadre and supporting communities have
gone to great lengths to prepare for tomorrow’s conflicts.
The sniper will engage multiple types of threats with a single
weapon platform. The MK22 Precision Sniper Rifle will allow
snipers to choose the proper system and type of munition
to engage soft or hard targets. The sniper can effectively
engage targets up to 2,000 meters reliably when used
with the Improved Night/Day Observation Device (INOD).
These additions to the inventory allow the U.S. Army sniper
to continue owning the night while increasing distances to
ensure overmatch and lethal effects.
The art of tactics is having a creative and flexible array
of means to accomplish the mission against an adaptive
enemy. Snipers have proven themselves a reliable asset
throughout America’s campaigns and should be considered
so for future conflicts. Leaders with questions on sniper
employment capabilities should start with their sniper section
leader and sniper team leaders on capabilities and limitations.
18 INFANTRY Spring 2022
A student attending the U.S. Army Sniper Course trains on
infiltration techniques in June 2020.
Photo by Patrick A. Albright
Training Circular (TC) 3-20.40, Training and Qualification –
Individual Weapons, provides the current ammunition and
qualification strategy for snipers. Commanders should also
include sniper teams and sections in company certification
live fires and situational training to develop trust between
commanders and the sniper teams that support them. TC
3-22.10, Sniper, provides the doctrine for sniper training and
employment considerations. The cadre at the United States
Sniper Course continues to update doctrine and develop
new strategies to increase proficiency for sniper teams at
home stations. For information regarding the United States
Army Sniper Course, head to https://www.benning.army.mil/
Armor/316thCav/Sniper/.
Notes
Field Manual 3-0, Operations.
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Handbook 10-01,
Commander’s Guide to Snipers, October 2009.
3
Army Techniques Publication 3-21.20, Infantry Battalion.
1
2
CPT David M. Wright currently serves as commander of C Company,
1st Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment, at Fort Benning, GA.
SSG Andrew A. Dominguez currently serves as an instructor with C
Company, 1-29 IN.
SSG John A. Sisk II currently serves as an instructor with C Company,
1-29 IN.
Increasing Indirect Fire Capability
in the Light Infantry Battalion
CPT SAM P. WIGGINS
LTC ALEXI D. FRANKLIN
“[…] you’re going to have to rapidly aggregate
to achieve mass and combat power to achieve
an effect on a battlefield. So it’s going to have to
be a force that’s essentially in a stage of constant
motion.”
D
— GEN Mark A. Milley1
uring the Cold War, the division was the Army’s
unit of action, with division field artillery (DIVARTY)
formations organizationally centralized and oriented
against a peer or near-peer threat in large-scale combat operations (LSCO). During the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT),
field artillery assets were assigned directly to the brigade
combat team (BCT), and division-level fires synchronization
withered. Post GWOT, the Army is reorganizing in order to
deter or defeat our enemies during LSCO, and the division
is returning as the Army’s unit of action. However, while divisional synchronization may be the U.S. Army’s goal for the
way it wants to fight in the future, the most likely and most
dangerous course of action is that the enemy will attempt
to deny the U.S. Army that ability to conduct a division-level
combined arms fight. While the U.S. Army may want to fight
LSCO with divisions as the primary unit of action, the enemy
gets a vote.
While the U.S. Army is correct to prepare to synchronize
at the division level, we must also be prepared to fight at the
lowest possible level when the command
and control (C2) systems we rely on to
achieve synchronization are inevitably
attacked. However, the Field Artillery
Branch cannot simply swing the pendulum
back to a pre-GWOT operational construct.
If the division is the unit of action, the
natural response of our enemies will be
to target our ability to effectively exercise
divisional mission command. During
the pre-GWOT era, our opponents had
limited means to disrupt our communications either through the limitations of the
electromagnetic spectrum or a robust U.S.
overmatch. That reality no longer exists.
The U.S. is vastly more reliant on digital
C2 systems, and our competitors possess robust C2 denial
systems — anti-satellite weapons and advanced cyber and
electronic warfare tools — that they have already employed
(or have given to their proxies to employ) in battle. As a
result, while the Army prepares to synchronize fires at above
the brigade level, it must also prepare to devolve its fires
assets below the brigade level.
In the future, the operational environment in which light
infantry formations might find themselves — megacities,
triple canopy jungles — will likely be combined with the ability of peer and near-peer competitors to severely degrade
the U.S. Army’s capability to centrally control indirect fires
in support of dispersed elements. Desynchronization is one
cyberattack or severe weather incident away. The Army
needs to pre-position fires in space, doctrine, and task organization to be prepared to fight decentralized at a moment’s
notice while those assets remain prepared to support
centralized objectives. Habitually organized and trained
decentralized fires can enable desynchronized maneuver
elements to still accomplish their tactical objectives nearly
uninterrupted following a desynchronizing event.
The current operational approach is a one-size-fits-all
approach where the infantry brigade combat team (IBCT),
armored brigade combat team (ABCT), and Stryker brigade
combat team (SBCT) deconflict air and ground assets
to focus indirect fire efforts on the deep fight. The current
Soldiers in the 2nd Cavalry Regiment fire a
M777A2 howitzer during a live-fire exercise in
Germany on 19 October 2021.
Photo by Markus Rauchenberger
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 19
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
approach centralizes the preponderance of our tactical indirect fire assets into a few C2 nodes, with primary communication occurring through only a few, relatively severable
communications pathways. While fast-moving ABCTs and
SBCTs will be both targeting and the target of high-value
enemy targets residing in the enemy’s support zone, the
light infantry brigade and battalion will move at a significantly
slower pace, leveraging their skills to clear and hold severely
restricted terrain. Mounted maneuver formations have inherent levels of mobility, survivability, and firepower to mitigate
intermittent C2 disruption, but the light infantry does not.
While devolving assets to all types of BCTs is advisable, at
a minimum, the light infantry needs closer control of field
artillery assets in order to be able to effectively fight in a
degraded C2 environment. If also provided sufficient small
unmanned aerial system (SUAS) assets, the light infantry
battalion can revolutionize the way it fights and more effectively closes with and destroys the enemy.
As currently written, field artillery doctrine discusses the
current near-peer threat in general terms but lacks the conceptual follow-through to mitigate that clearly articulated threat.
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-19, Fires, acknowledges
that “[p]eer threats will attempt to isolate friendly forces in all
domains and the information environment to force friendly
forces to culminate prior to accomplishing their mission,” but
the tone and tenor of Field Manual (FM) 3-09, Fire Support
and Field Artillery Operations, does not seem to operationalize this concept. Per FM 3-09, one of the characteristics
of fire support is “to always operate as a single entity,” a
mandate at odds with the conclusion that opponents will
seek friendly isolation. The manual further describes field
artillery support as a “top-down process with bottom-up
refinement,” a principle again at odds with the potential for
isolation. The majority of the explicit considerations in Annex
C, Denied, Degraded, and Disrupted Operations, of FM
3-09 are focused on solving highly technical, cannon-centric
solutions — how observers should be prepared to locate
targets with a map and compass or how to survey a firing
location with limited technical aids. In Annex C’s short “threat
to network connectivity” section, the manual suggests that
“[i]f digital communication are denied or degraded [...] data
can be transmitted by voice. If voice communications are not
possible, courier or liaison personnel can be utilized.” This
is an impractical solution not reasonably executed by a light
infantry battalion that is both geographically and organizationally remote from artillery support.
In lieu of field artillery support operating as a single
entity managed from the top down, the paradigm needs
to be reversed: light infantry field artillery support needs to
be designed on the premise that fighting isolated is not a
possibility but an inevitability. Field artillery assets can and
should be leveraged for centrally managed operations at
higher levels but must be devolved to the lowest possible
levels to enable physically and electromagnetically isolated
battalions to maintain the initiative in a denied, degraded,
and disrupted environment. Simply put, a habitually attached
20 INFANTRY Spring 2022
fires capability could not as easily be cut off from its parent
infantry battalion headquarters in a desynchronizing event.
The direct procedural relationship and physical proximity
between a field artillery unit and maneuver forces at the
lowest possible level would allow for near-uninterrupted
operations even in a degraded communications environment. Provided greater indirect fire synchronization and
execution capability, the isolated maneuver formation can
retain the initiative in the offense or maintain or transition to a
strong defensive posture by developing engagement areas
with field artillery coverage.
With our near-peers’ numerically superior long-range
cannons and rockets, their doctrine for their employment,
and their willingness to use them with fewer concerns for
collateral damage, centralized friendly C2 structures are
at an increased risk for destruction. Currently, calls for fire
are ideally sent digitally from an observer to the battalionlevel fire support element and relayed again to the brigade
(or higher) for deconfliction; then they are sent to the firing
battalion for execution. This cumbersome process slows
the tempo of units and serves as a single communications
thread for the enemy to attack. Friendly centralized indirect
fire command and control nodes represent no-fail, singularly
critical channels through which fire support must travel.
In the last 20 years of combat, light infantry forces were
commonly the main effort and became accustomed to
general access to close air support on a nearly on-call basis.
In LSCO against peer competitors, the United States will not
enjoy air supremacy and will more likely than not operate
under a condition of air parity or denial. Our peer competitors
have advanced integrated anti-aircraft systems and robust,
modern air forces. In the air, air assets will be dedicated
to achieving air superiority and conducting attacks against
high-value and payoff targets in the enemy’s support zone.
On the ground, armored and Stryker forces will serve as
friendly main effort forces while light infantry is relegated to
a secondary role, to follow-on to clear secured or bypassed
urban or austere terrain. Within the IBCT itself, an increased
indirect fire capability at the battalion level would free up
IBCT-level fires to shape the brigade commander’s deep
fight where large, massed fires are needed.
Providing additional organic artillery to the IBCT’s four
maneuver battalions (three infantry battalions and one
cavalry squadron) complicates the enemy’s targeting by
quadrupling the number of nodes the enemy must sever in
order to deny the ability of U.S. forces to conduct combined
arms warfare. This is not to imply that devolved field artillery
formations would only or even mostly operate in a disaggregated fashion; a functioning higher-echelon headquarters
could still direct disaggregated batteries to prioritize fires
and synchronize effects elsewhere — the reverse is not true.
It is a significantly more complex — if not impossible — challenge for a field artillery battalion to, in the heat of battle,
unexpectedly and immediately transition, disaggregate, and
fight in an ad hoc way should its higher headquarters be
unable to direct its efforts.
A light infantry battalion should have a semi-organic,
habitually affiliated fires battery, similar to a forward support
company’s (FSC) command and support relationship
between a maneuver and support battalion. Adding a field
artillery battery directly subordinate to the infantry battalion
will increase the maneuver commander’s ability to rapidly
employ indirect fires to effectively shape engagements in
the near-peer or peer fight. Closer control over indirect fire
assets would allow a battalion-level commander to increase
the tempo of combat operations with a rapidity of violence,
disrupting the enemy’s decision-making cycle.
A hypothetical light infantry fires battery could consist of
the battalion’s organic mortar platoon, currently associated
fire support section, and a third field artillery platoon with a
key capability — three high mobility multipurpose wheeled
vehicle (HMMWV)-mounted 105mm tube artillery “Hawkeye”
platforms, a weapons system currently undergoing Army
evaluation and testing. When compared to a towed M119,
the superior maneuverability of the Hawkeye and its smaller
gun crew allows the system to penetrate severely restricted
terrain with a reduced footprint. As HMMWVs are already
organic to an infantry battalion, the increased sustainment
requirements for the light infantry battalion’s FSC will be
modest in both parts and manpower.
Currently, the light infantry battalion’s mortar platoon
operates both 81mm and 120mm systems in an “arms room”
concept, where the platoon is not allocated the manpower
to operate both systems simultaneously. For mission planning, battalion commanders are forced to either choose one
system — thus negating the advantage of having two systems
with significantly different advantages and disadvantages
— or bring both systems and the appropriate ammunition.
In garrison, the battalion’s mortar platoon is forced to crew,
train, and maintain proficiency on two systems, an additional training burden that can result in expertise on neither
system. Replacing the trailer-mounted 120mm mortar with
a battalion-level fielding of the Hawkeye system can solve
all these problems. The Hawkeye system can ably fill the
role that the light infantry battalion’s 120mm systems fill but
with its own dedicated manning, longer range, additional
ammunition types, a smaller crew, and a reduction in towed
rolling stock. The Hawkeye’s mobility and ability to emplace
and displace rapidly make it much better suited for evading counterbattery fire. Given the near-peer capability and
capacity for effective counterbattery fire, speed will serve to
increase the survivability of the Hawkeye platforms which,
in turn, helps keep the light infantry formations combat
effective. The Hawkeye can fire almost twice as far as the
120mm mortar system and can also be effectively employed
in a direct-fire role.
Ideally, the battery would be commanded by a major, providing the battalion commander with a seasoned field artillery
officer to coordinate execution and delivery of effects. While
in a garrison or conducting training, the battery commander
would function as a traditional battery commander with regard
to training and administrative oversight. In tactical and operational environments, the battery commander would transition
to his secondary role to become the battalion’s fire support
coordinator (FSCORD). The battalion fires support officer
would retain primary focus on the planning and implementation
of fire support, with the battery commander/FSCORD focusing on mortar and howitzer displacement and emplacement,
engagement criteria, sustainment, and communications. The
establishment of the battalion’s FSCORD to a position equal
to the battalion’s S3 and executive officer would provide the
expertise and staffing to help synchronize the paramount
importance that fires planning has on the survival of a light
infantry battalion in LSCO.
A Soldier with Test Platoon, 2nd Battalion, 122nd Field
Artillery, Illinois Army National Guard, sights in the Hawkeye
105mm Mobile Weapon System during a simulated drill on
Camp Grayling, MI, on 23 July 2019.
Photo by MAJ W. Chris Clyne
Spring
Spring 2022
2022 INFANTRY
INFANTRY 21
21
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
major war that then followed was heavily influenced
by the capability of the belligerents to integrate and
implement the lessons learned from the previous,
smaller conflict. The employment of SUAS to great
effect in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war should serve
as a cautionary tale to the paucity of employment and
integration of SUAS in the U.S. Army today. One of
the mission-essential tasks of a light infantry battalion
is to conduct a “movement to contact,” defined in
Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-21.20, Infantry
Battalion, as “when the enemy situation is vague or
not specific enough to conduct an attack.” To be glib,
hyperbolic, and reductive, the operational construct
here can be simplified as “walk around until you
bump into something.” With the absence of dedicated
battalion-level intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), light infantry battalions have little
choice but to do exactly that.
The combat platforms in armor and Stryker formations have the long-range sensors necessary to find,
fix, and destroy enemy formations from kilometers
Photo courtesy of authors
Soldiers in Mortar Platoon, Headquarter and Headquarters Company, 1st away, a capability severely lacking across the light
Battalion, 175th Infantry Regiment, fire 120mm mortar training rounds for effect infantry battalion. However, light infantry battalions
during the unit’s 2018 annual training at Camp Guernsey, WY.
fighting in severely restricted terrain do not require
The battalion fires cell and mortar platoon would remain bulky, power-intensive, line-of-sight optics. Light infantry
largely unchanged, save for the aforementioned removal battalions require their own solutions, solutions optimized
of the 120mm mortar mission and equipment. Placing all for close-range combat in severely restricted terrain. Much
of the battalion-level indirect fires professionals under one like the Hawkeye, SUAS represent a novel capability that the
formation allows for a greater level of synchronization than Cold War-era U.S. Army lacked and provide another way in
currently exists. The Hawkeye platoon would consist of three which ground combat can be reimagined in the current great
Hawkeyes, a HMMWV-mounted Fire Direction Center, an power competition (GPC) era.
additional ammunition-hauling HMMWV, and other nominal
SUAS are particularly well suited for light infantry combat.
equipment such as additional Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Instead of relying on scarce forward observer teams to
Data Systems (AFATDS) and high frequency (HF) radios. stealthily insert and observe key terrain or named areas of
The proposed Hawkeye platoon and battery command interest, the light infantry battalion can and should litter the
structure would only add an additional 23 personnel to each battle zone with low-cost, easily employed SUAS to find,
battalion (12x 13B, 4x 13J, 3x 13A, 1x 13Z and an additional fix, and destroy the enemy. SUAS enable close-in, beyond
3x 91F Soldiers in the FSC), representing a force-wide line-of-sight observation to allow light infantry to identify and
growth of just over 3,100 personnel. Currently existing field engage targets that would nominally threaten a mounted platartillery force structure should not serve as the bill payer for form but would significantly challenge a dismounted element.
this growth. However, given the zero-sum nature of Army The SUAS capability is specifically unique in its ability to revoforce structure, eliminating one of the M119 batteries from lutionize the light infantry. While the flying speed of the Raven
the IBCT’s field artillery battery could potentially serve as one barely exceeds that of a mounted platform, it far exceeds
bill payer. Alternatively, acknowledging the increased lethality that of dismounted light infantry. Furthermore, dismounted
this capability would represent for light infantry battalions and light infantry can carry the 4.2-pound Raven on missions to
brigades, this growth could be offset by a reduction in light dynamically employ the SUAS as mission conditions dictate.
infantry forces themselves.
The modified tables of organization and equipment
Field artillery assets combined with the unique technical (MTOEs) for U.S. Army maneuver battalions of all types list
capability that SUAS provide have the potential to funda- the RQ-11 “Raven” SUAS as required equipment. However,
mentally change ground combat much like machine guns, those MTOEs fail to code any Soldier by duty position or
armored vehicles, or airplanes have in the past. Many major additional skill identifier (ASI) as a battalion master SUAS
conflicts are presaged by a smaller, regional conflict — the trainer or company-designated unit SUAS operator. While
Mexican-American War before the Civil War, the Boer War this provides flexibility for small unit commanders, it also
prior to World War 1, or the Spanish Civil War before World represents a vacuum of guidance in how to satisfy an underWar 2. In each “pre-conflict,” technological innovations drove resourced requirement. Commanders must independently
significant changes in tactics and techniques. Success in the determine how many personnel to dedicate to this essential
22 INFANTRY Spring 2022
skill and have no authoritative document with which to justify
the allocation of scarce training dollars. To solve this problem, commanders have two possible solutions: permanently
remove a Soldier from a subordinate squad (thus reducing
its combat power) or engage in a perpetual game of tug-ofwar within their own formations, forcing a Soldier to attempt
to simultaneously master two skills at once.
Armored cavalry squadrons and combined arms battalions have a sergeant in the battalion S2 section with the
“Q7” additional skill identifier, denoting the completion of the
Information Collection Planner Course (presumably denoting a capacity for SUAS integration). However, the light
infantry battalion lacks any doctrinal or MTOE-designated
battalion-level staff member as the battalion-level SUAS
integrator. As a result, light infantry battalions are particularly disadvantaged and must develop grassroots, ad hoc
solutions to integrating company-level SUAS collection into
the larger battalion intelligence picture with varying levels of
efficacy. The Army should immediately add the “Q7” capability to all light infantry battalion S2 shops that have or may
have subordinate units enabled with SUAS to enable better
SUAS integration into battalion tactical plans.
In another battalion-level inconsistency, the scout
platoons of combined arms battalions are authorized Raven
SUAS, but light infantry battalions are not. As a result, light
infantry formations face the decision to either reduce the
potential reconnaissance reach of their scout elements or
reduce the capability from a line company. Simple parity
would demand that the Army should add at least one
additional SUAS to these formations. However, parity is
insufficient; light infantry battalions should be furnished with
multiple SUAS platforms per company. The goal of a light
infantry battalion should be to find, fix, finish, and destroy
the enemy to the greatest extent prior to securing the objective. Greater SUAS density and integration at the battalion
level — combined with robust, battalion-led fires — provide
the light infantry battalion the ability to shape the battlefield
to a heretofore unimagined extent. The goal of an infantry
battalion should not be to fight and die every inch of its way
onto a contested objective; it should be to rapidly occupy a
devastated enemy battle position, destroy minimal residual
resistance, and seize terrain for transition to stability or
defensive operations. The potent combination of multiple
SUAS platforms combined with on-call fires would enable
the light infantry battalion to do so.
In a future near-peer fight, the U.S. Army can expect to
fight in a markedly different environment than existed during
the Cold War or GWOT. Instead of reverting to the construct
from the last era of GPC, a third approach to fire support
must be implemented, an approach better suited to the
acknowledged challenges the Army may face. Degraded
communications and isolation in an air denial environment
would pose a challenge for maneuver forces writ large, but
pose an especially acute danger for light infantry forces
when arrayed against our imagined foes. SUAS platforms
provide a capability for light infantry formations to identify
enemy positions well before a movement to contact would
accidentally uncover them. Light infantry formations are
inherently vulnerable and can rapidly become a liability on
the future battlefield if not furnished with the appropriate
resources. Devolving greater indirect fire capability directly
down to the light infantry battalion, combined with the
SUAS platforms and integration necessary to maximize the
utility of that firepower, will allow these formations to gain
and maintain the initiative on the battlefield — even when
geographically or electromagnetically isolated — in order to
help higher echelon commanders to press the advantage
and defeat our opponents.
Notes
Michelle Tan, “Army Chief: Soldiers Must Be Ready to Fight in
‘Megacities,’” Defense News, 5 October 2016, accessed from https://
www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/ausa/2016/10/05/
army-chief-soldiers-must-be-ready-to-fight-in-megacities/.
1
CPT Samuel P. Wiggins is a 2012 graduate of the Salisbury University
Army ROTC program who currently commands Company B, 1st Battalion,
175th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), 28th
Infantry Division. His previous assignments include serving as battalion
fire support officer (FSO), Detachment 1, Headquarters and Headquarters
Battery, 1st Battalion, 107th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd IBCT, 28th ID;
and executive officer (XO), mortar platoon leader, and company FSO for
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1-175th Infantry.
LTC Alexi D. Franklin currently serves as the National Guard Liaison
Officer to Joint Task Force - National Capital Region. LTC Franklin’s previous Infantry assignments include serving as the XO of 1-175 Infantry, 2nd
IBCT, 28th ID; commander of C Company (Long Range Surveillance), 158th
Cavalry Squadron, 58th Battlefield Surveillance Brigade; and a variety of
company-grade leadership and staff assignments with the 173rd Airborne
Brigade. Commissioned through ROTC in 2005 from Johns Hopkins
University (JHU), he holds a bachelor’s degree in political science and
master’s degree in government from JHU, a master’s in business administration from Mount St. Mary’s University, and a master’s degree in defense
and strategic studies as a National Defense University Countering Weapons
of Mass Destruction graduate fellow.
Photo courtesy of authors
A Soldier with 1st Battalion, 175th Infantry Regiment launches a Raven
small unmanned aerial vehicle during a training event.
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 23
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
Senior NCOs at Points of Friction
CSM NEMA MOBARAKZADEH
I
n 1815, the British Army, led by Lieutenant General
Pakenham, suffered a decisive defeat at the Battle
of New Orleans. In preparation for the battle, the
American forces created a large trench and a seven-foottall rampart that ran from the bank of the Mississippi River
to a swampy area to the northeast.1 On the west bank of
the Mississippi, a battery of American artillery oversaw the
battlefield. The British Army planned to send a formation to
seize the American battery and then attack the trench using
two columns of Soldiers. The first column’s attack failed
when the commander died, leading to a disorderly retreat.
The unit responsible for emplacing ladders and fascines
was late, delaying the second column. Pakenham chose to
personally retrieve the unit, leaving the rest of the formation
without a commander. In Pakenham’s absence, a subordinate commander decided to reinforce the position, resulting
in half of the formation dying and later Pakenham himself. It
is easy to imagine how the battle may have gone differently
if the British had placed senior NCOs at crucial locations. A
senior NCO could have acted on Pakenham’s behalf, leaving him to command the second column or to reorganize the
panicked first column. The Battle of New Orleans’s outcome
may have been a British victory if Pakenham had better
employed his NCOs.
Friction Points,” Douglas R. Satterfield paraphrased Carl von
Clausewitz: “The good general must know friction in order to
overcome it whenever possible, and in order not to expect
a standard of achievement in his operations which this very
friction makes impossible.”2 While quoting Clausewitz may
elicit eye rolls from some readers, the quote highlights an
important question: How can a commander mitigate operational friction?
Senior NCOs are adept at reducing friction. As respected
members of an organization, senior NCOs can influence
Soldiers and leaders through presence. To maximize their
impact, senior NCOs must make deliberate decisions
about where they position themselves on the battlefield,
rather than relying on doctrinally suggested positions.
Some senior NCOs struggle to identify points of friction or
ways they can influence their formation. By understanding
the operational plan, communicating with the commander,
and applying a friction rubric, senior NCOs better posture
themselves to make informed decisions. Additionally,
understanding historic points of friction for common tactical
operations will aid a senior NCO in identifying risk. Senior
NCOs can maximize their operational effectiveness by
carefully considering their optimal placement rather than
arbitrarily going to where they are comfortable or have
always gone.
Senior NCOs play a critical role during combat operations.
They benefit organizations in
numerous ways, but identifying and lubricating friction
points is one of their most critical functions. Like a Pro Bowl
free safety, senior NCOs roam
the field cleaning up mistakes.
While officers and junior leaders position themselves to best
control their element, senior
NCOs should be at the point
of maximum friction. Senior
NCOs at points of friction free
commanders to command
the overall operation. Every
mission has friction: operational risk due to adjacent
unit convergence, complexity,
enemy actions, poor planning,
inadequate intelligence, or a
lack of experience. Friction is
often self-inflicted, desynchronizing an operation before the
Photo by SGT Sarah D. Sangster
enemy has voted. In his 2015 Soldiers in 2nd Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, prepare for a daytime air assault
article “Identifying Strategic mission at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, LA, on 14 October 2020.
24 INFANTRY Spring 2022
Senior NCOs are Optimal for Lubricating Points
of Friction
Senior NCOs are generally among the most experienced
Soldiers in a formation. The platoon sergeant (PSG), first
sergeant (1SG), or command sergeant major (CSM) have
years of experience and military education. Commanders
expect senior NCOs to identify and solve problems during all
phases of an operation. As seasoned Soldiers, they are calm
in the face of adversity, thinking through problems as chaos
ensues on the battlefield. Placing senior NCOs in the correct
location on the battlefield can significantly reduce risk and
optimize productivity. Leaders solving issues before they
become an impediment to success can be the difference
between success and failure. Placement of senior NCOs on
the battlefield should be rooted in doctrine.
The Army’s doctrine both directs and frees senior NCOs to
find the best location for them to leverage their talents. Army
Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, Army Leadership and the
Profession, establishes the leadership requirements model
and identifies that leaders should possess the attributes
of “character, presence, and intellect.”3 Simply put, senior
NCOs cannot solve problems if they are not present. Senior
NCOs build credibility when they demonstrate competence
during routine functions and lower echelon training. Leaders
are more apt to listen to a credible senior NCO. Doctrine
suggests some locations where senior NCOs can position
themselves. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-21.8,
Infantry Platoon and Squad, proposes that a PSG be at the
support-by-fire (SBF) position or with the assault element.
ATP 3-21.10, Infantry Rifle Company, recommends that the
1SG be heavily involved in medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)
and sustainment operations. As NCOs move up the NCO
support channel, their roles become more opaque. This
ambiguity is liberating for senior NCOs, allowing the freedom to position themselves at the most critical locations.
This freedom enables senior NCOs to have an enormous
impact on mission success.
A senior NCO from a higher headquarters (HQs) provides
several advantages to the formation. A CSM can provide
companies a fresh perspective and detect problems others
do not see. Additionally, a CSM has access to more information, understands the larger operation, and has the means
to affect other elements. The CSM is not directly responsible for controlling a specific element during an operation,
which frees him or her to observe enemy actions, friendly
elements, and battlefield effects. This freedom allows the
CSM to keep formations on task and avert issues before they
arise. The CSM will understand subordinate units’ strengths,
weaknesses, and task proficiency. Senior NCOs’ positional
power, and personal power built through previous engagements, allows them to provide instructions that Soldiers will
follow without hesitation. While a 1SG from one company
may hesitate to reposition his or her element at the request
of another company, that same 1SG will move without question when ordered by the CSM. Senior NCOs are adept at
risk management and intuitively understand how conditions
As NCOs move up the NCO support
channel, their roles become more
opaque. This ambiguity is liberating for
senior NCOs, allowing the freedom to
position themselves at the most critical
locations. This freedom enables senior
NCOs to have an enormous impact on
mission success.
such as fatigue, darkness, terrain, and poor weather affect
operations.
The summation of a senior NCO’s intuition is a concept
known as thin-slicing. Thin-slicing is a psychological methodology that allows people to dissect situations quickly
and accurately. According to Jeff Thompson, PhD, thinslicing is when a person is “observing a small selection of
an interaction, usually less than five minutes, and being
able to accurately draw conclusions in the emotions and
attitudes of the people interacting.”4 Senior NCOs regularly
thin-slice situations by applying their breadth and depth of
knowledge and experience. Some leaders mention a gut
feeling or their “spidey sense,” but they are unknowingly
referencing the thin-slice concept. Presence is necessary
for thin-slicing to work. For example, a CSM walking through
a vehicle marshalling area may identify a Soldier without a
night vision goggle (NVG) mount on his or her helmet. The
CSM can quickly surmise that the unit did not complete precombat checks (PCCs) and pre-combat inspections (PCIs)
to standard. Understanding the risk of a driver or leader
operating a vehicle in black-out conditions without NVGs will
lead the CSM to investigate further. A small investment of
time to scrutinize the depth of the problem, along with other
potential safety shortcomings, could save Soldiers’ lives and
prevent an accident that could derail the operational timeline
and reduce combat power. Thin-slicing helps senior NCOs
identify common points of friction.
Methods of Identifying and Overcoming Friction
Every operation has numerous points of potential friction,
and they vary by phase. Senior NCOs can use differing
tools and methods to identify and subsequently lubricate
friction. Senior NCOs have to assess each potential point
of friction to position themselves at the most critical location. Furthermore, CSMs must help coordinate subordinate
senior NCO placement, ensuring adequate coverage of
anticipated operational friction. In order to identify points of
friction, senior NCOs must assess the overall operation.
Senior NCOs should consider several criteria before
deciding the maximum point of friction. Before they can
decide where they should be, they must understand the plan
and the commander’s intent. A senior NCO’s participation
during the planning process can prevent problems later.
Additionally, understanding the plan will allow the senior
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 25
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
Criteria
Type of
Operation
Unit
Proficiency
SBF
1
1
3
1
Assault
3
2
1
2
Breach
4
4
2
4
MEDEVAC
2
3
4
3
Location
Leader
Risk
Proficiency Mitigation
Location 5
Location 6
Friction Rubric
NCO to examine and weigh critical factors systematically.
Much like a writing a college essay, a rubric or matrix can aid
in determining points of friction (see table above).
The friction rubric is a tool that helps leaders determine
operational friction and, subsequently, senior NCO placement. An adapted decision matrix, the rubric weighs criteria
across each considered location.5 The unit can score the
rubric in either descending or ascending order. Identical to
weighing courses of action during war-gaming, leaders can
assign a multiplier as appropriate. The current conditions
of the unit and environment may have negligible impacts
on the considered locations. For example, if the unit is at
full strength and rested, and the weather is favorable, then
the concern is low. Conversely, a unit attrited to 75-percent
combat power that has 50 percent of its combat load — in
addition to the fact that it has moved a great distance over
several days and it has now started to rain — will increase
risk and need accounting for in the rubric. The rubric lists
each criterion across the top of the rubric. The left column
contains the tentative locations. This example scores friction
in descending order, meaning the highest number contains
the most friction. Since leaders are considering four locations, they assign each criterion a score between one and
four. The highest score is the tentative location for a senior
NCO. If the unit prefers, leaders can use probability and
severity rather than a numbered score.
Senior NCOs should determine evaluation criteria that will
comprise their friction rubric. Much like the war-gaming phase
of the military decision-making process, the commander’s
planning guidance will help determine the weight of each
criterion. It is best to start with the risk assessment. Senior
NCOs should identify the most dangerous hazards and
determine if the risk mitigation measures are adequate.
Furthermore, senior NCOs should focus on who is supervising the mitigation measure. A clear sign of friction is where
the risk assessment identifies the supervising individuals
as all leaders, leading to an economic theory known as the
tragedy of the commons.6 This theory asserts that a lack of
ownership encourages others to neglect resources or tasks.7
If someone is directly responsible, the probability of comple26 INFANTRY Spring 2022
Conditions
* if applicable
Score
1
7
tion to standard increases.
After assessing risk, senior
NCOs should look where units
converge.
When units are in close
proximity
or share the same
1
9
terrain, there is sure to be friction. Whenever units rub, they
1
15
will create friction regardless of
1
13
the type of operation. Imagine
two companies opening a
breach in a wired obstacle so
they can attack an objective.
The S3 or commander will likely
command and control (C2)
the fight, but friction typically
arises as the units converge. While a company understands
the details of its portion of the fight and the concept of the
adjacent unit, a CSM with an understanding of the whole
operation can synchronize efforts directly at the point of friction. Delays in reporting and the chaos of battle can make it
difficult for commanders positioned behind the fight to make
effective decisions. A CSM at the breach site understands
the current fight better and can direct spacing, force flow,
and security; improve reporting; ensure all conditions are
set; and immediately address issues as they arise. Senior
NCOs must understand the capabilities of their units and
leaders as well as the effects of the current fight.
A unit and its leaders’ capabilities and limitations, the
current environmental conditions, and the organization’s
readiness can create or reduce friction. Continuing down
the friction rubric, the senior NCO must understand the
capability of the formation. The unit’s frequency and proficiency at completing the assigned mission will influence risk.
Furthermore, the senior NCO should consider the competence
and tendencies of the formation’s leaders. Additionally, the
senior NCO must evaluate the unit’s current level of fatigue,
assigned strength, maintenance, and weather conditions.
Within the friction rubric, leaders summarize these factors
under the conditions column. Finally, the type of mission
is an important consideration. Each mission comes with a
varying degree of difficulty and risk. The more demanding the
mission, the more these factors will matter. After considering
each criterion in the friction rubric, senior NCOs will have
tentative locations that need leader supervision. The next
step of determining senior NCO placement is a conversation
with the commander.
The commander understands the overall mission and has
concerns about specific aspects of the operation. Senior
NCOs, armed with an understanding of the mission and
an assessment of potential friction, can have an informed
conversation with their officer counterpart. Many command
teams forgo this step. Officers often trust that their senior
NCOs will select the correct location. While senior NCOs
are experienced, they often lack repetitions at their current
echelon. Imagine a newly assigned battalion CSM. He or
she may be the most experienced 1SG in the battalion but
does not have practice serving as the battalion CSM. Many
senior NCOs revert to where they are most comfortable, or
where tradition places them, rather than at the point of maximum friction. Understanding these factors, coupled with the
commander’s concerns about crucial aspects of the mission,
can lead the command team to a better decision.
Another method is for commanders to ask themselves
two questions: “Where do I have to be?” and “Where do I
wish I could be?” They might have to be in the C2 aircraft
during an air assault because it provides the most advantageous location to synchronize the fight; however, they may
desire to be at the landing zone (LZ) because they know
there will be two separate companies landing together with
junior command teams. This is a potential location for the
CSM. Ultimately, the command team should vet the CSM’s
tentative location during the rehearsal.
Rehearsals are a critical component of mission success.
While the command team may have a specific location in
mind for the senior NCO, the rehearsal may reveal a better
location. Following the rehearsal, the most senior NCO
should speak with subordinate NCOs about their placement.
This conversation allows for proper dispersion of the most
senior leaders across the battlefield. This is also an opportunity for the more senior NCOs to coach subordinates on
discerning the maximum point of friction for their portion of
the mission.
After the mission, units should conduct an after action
review (AAR). The AAR will reveal positive and negative
aspects of the mission. The leaders should invest time in
determining if senior NCOs were in the correct locations.
During training, senior NCOs should experiment with their
placement. Training at different locations will build experience and confidence, which allows leaders to make better
decisions about where they should place themselves during
future missions. The unit can use this information to inform
future missions or drive preparation for collective training.
CSMs must educate their subordinate NCOs before unit
training. Leader professional development (LPD) sessions
are a crucial component of NCO development. While LPD
sessions often coach tactics, some sessions fail to discuss
points of friction or NCO placement. Furthermore, NCOs
should engage trusted mentors about NCO placement and
methods of identifying friction. Finally, leaders should amend
professional military education to coach officers and senior
NCOs on methods of identifying and reducing operational
friction. It is important for these NCOs to understand common
points of friction during combat operations.
Common Points of Friction
There are many points of friction during combat operations. Newly promoted senior NCOs are often unsure of their
place on the battlefield. Instead of thinking critically about
the friction in the operation, they default to conventional
wisdom such as the PSG is always at the SBF position or
the 1SG should always remain at the casualty collection
point (CCP). It is important to understand the positive and
negative effects of positioning a senior NCO at a specific
location. Additionally, senior NCOs must identify transition
points where they can move from a lubricated friction point
to the next area of risk. Considering these factors will allow
them to maximize their impact on the operation.
While a unit may conduct countless types of missions,
this section will only discuss the friction found in some of
the most common operations, starting with uncoiling from
the tactical assembly area (TAA). Uncoiling from the TAA is
time consuming, complicated, and dangerous. Uncoiling is
rife with friction. A large collection of units, equipment, and
vehicles, regularly operated by novice crews, converging in
tight spaces lends itself to accidents. Movement plans are
often inaccurate and lack detail, further complicating operations. Simply lining up a chalk or serial of vehicles can be
difficult. Weather conditions, maintenance, radio communications, PCCs/PCIs, and information dissemination further
complicate matters. Senior NCOs can solve problems
by placing themselves at the points of friction. Placing an
operations sergeant major in a staging area will significantly
buy down risk. 1SGs and CSMs spot-checking vehicles,
weapons, equipment, and observing ramp briefs can lead to
positive outcomes. Similarly, many of these same concerns
carry over to air assault operations. There are many factors
to consider, but senior NCOs play a crucial role in keeping
the operation safe and on time. Uncoiling is not complete
until all units have unloaded in their area of operation.
De-trucking, or unloading helicopters, is dangerous and
can desynchronize an operation if executed poorly. Troop
movement operations usually involve a strict timeline, allowing convoys or helicopters to deliver subsequent chalks or
move to their next mission. Riding in a helicopter or in the
back of a truck is disorienting, especially for sleep-deprived
Soldiers. While unloading, Soldiers often become intermingled with other elements, move slowly to establish security,
leave equipment behind, or move in the wrong direction.
Taking too long to dismount causes supporting vehicles or
aircraft to deliver other units late. There is risk of injury as
Soldiers linger in the road and convoys attempt to maneuver. During combat training center rotations, it is common
for brigades to take 24 hours longer than they planned to
deploy their units into the area of operations. Senior NCOs
at critical locations can greatly reduce friction in the operation. Senior NCO placement within an airlift or convoy, on an
LZ or de-trucking point, and at link-up locations is essential.
During field planning, senior NCOs are often unsure
where they should be located. While a unit is planning,
numerous operations or tasks occur simultaneously.
Brigades and battalions are always in a state of planning
while also conducting operations. Companies and platoons
are normally either executing a mission or planning/preparing for an operation. Deciding where senior NCOs place their
attention is challenging. Imagine a company in a patrol base
conducting troop leading procedures while the company
commander plans. The 1SG must supervise rehearsals,
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 27
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
solve problems and share
information. CSMs have a
positive impact on an organization when they visit units
during combat operations.
Through the churn of reporting, planning, and combat
operations, information gets
lost in the shuffle. This is
also an opportunity for the
CSM to serve as the “camp
counselor” by smoothing
over personality conflicts,
allowing subordinates to
vent, or vetting plans. A
CSM’s presence can uncover
problems the HQs personnel
are unaware of, allow him
or her to disseminate critical
information, or return information to the commander.
These engagements often
U.S. Army photo
uncover systemic problems.
A command sergeant major assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division and Regional Command (South)
For example, a company may
speaks with an NCO during a battlefield circulation in Zabul Province, Afghanistan, on 8 April 2012.
report it has not received any
casualty
replacements.
The
CSM
may thin-slice the situaconduct resupply, spot check Soldiers and equipment, aid
tion
and
determine
the
brigade
replacement
cell (BRC) is
in planning, and enforce security, just to name a few responthe
likely
point
of
friction.
While
1SGs
must
stay
with their
sibilities. How 1SGs split their time amongst their responsibilities is paramount. It is imperative the senior NCOs and company, the CSM can drive to the brigade support area and
officers of the company discuss priorities and leader cover- investigate. Conversations at the mortuary affairs collection
age for supervising tasks. A published timeline aids the 1SG point and the BRC may uncover transportation issues. CSMs
can use their positional power to cobble together and lead
in keeping track of inspection priorities.
a convoy to deliver the replacement Soldiers. Additionally,
Helping the staff plan is a complicated endeavor for
CSMs can rectify shortfalls in the casualty replacement
CSMs. Finding the right touchpoints during planning with
process. Finally, savvy CSMs keep additional supplies in
the commander and staff is difficult for CSMs as they often
their vehicle to address emergent materiel concerns.
have to spend time circulating the battlefield or reducing
Senior NCOs often place themselves at doctrinally
friction. CSMs must regularly speak with the commander,
S3, and executive officer (XO) to understand priorities and suggested positions, such as the SBF position, rather than
concerns. CSMs should be involved in the course of action the maximum point of friction during tactical operations.
development and the war game, helping to vet feasibility and Many senior NCOs gravitate to the SBF position. This may
offering practical solutions. The operation order brief is too be the best location for a senior NCO, but the decision
late for a CSM to shoot holes in the plan. Additionally, CSMs should be deliberate. Leaders must consider the composican serve as a bridge between current operations and future tion, experience of the crews, complexity of the plan, and
operations. Many plans fail because planners are unaware leader proficiency. A competent weapons squad leader
of a unit’s current location, personnel status, and equip- can easily handle two machine guns but may struggle to
ment readiness. Likewise, battle captains may direct units manage four machine guns, a sniper, and handheld mortars.
or enablers to objectives that take them too far from future This complexity may require a senior NCO to synchronize
mission locations, rendering the plan unfeasible. CSMs can the various elements. If not a senior NCO, the commander
share information between the two teams, reducing friction. may have the best vantage point to see the entire fight, best
Subsequent touchpoints with each warfighting function can control all of the elements, and employ enablers. Even a
produce opportunities to share information, lubricate fric- company XO at the SBF can free the senior NCO to move to
tion, or identify issues the CSM can rectify. The information other points of friction.
garnered during planning and these staff engagements will
Another common senior NCO location is at the CCP
aid shared understanding as the CSM conducts battlefield or controlling the MEDEVAC process. MEDEVAC operacirculation.
tions are complex and, if done poorly, can distract from the
Battlefield circulation is a senior NCO’s opportunity to
28 INFANTRY Spring 2022
objective. Clearly, senior NCOs can aid MEDEVAC. While
overseeing these operations is a common function of senior
NCOs, this is not always the best place for them to be. For
example, if the headquarters and headquarters company
1SG is very reliable, the battalion CSM may better serve the
formation elsewhere. Many factors determine how complex
MEDEVAC operations will be. The number of projected
casualties, the distance of MEDEVAC, enemy array, number
of competent medical providers, and unit leader proficiency
are just a few considerations. 1SGs often place themselves
at the CCP even though there are only a few casualties.
They may better benefit their units by placing themselves at
a greater point of friction. The 1SG can always move to the
CCP if that becomes the greatest point of friction. Instead
of focusing on MEDEVAC operations, 1SGs may help flow
their company into an urban area and de-conflict units within
the objective. After the objective is secure or the tactical situation permits, they can move to the CCP to take over the
MEDEVAC process.
Senior NCOs can greatly benefit the unit’s consolidation
and reorganization. After heavy fighting, consolidating and
reorganizing can become challenging. Finding defendable
terrain, tying in adjacent units, distributing ammo, placing
key weapons in advantageous positions, and all of the
necessary tasks can become chaotic without supervision.
CSMs can help units through this process with their experience and understanding of the larger mission. MEDEVAC
operations may consume a 1SG’s attention. The CSM is
free to help the company defend the seized objective and
ready the formation for the next mission. Likewise, a PSG
relieving the 1SG of MEDEVAC duties allows the 1SG to
tend to the entire company. Consolidation and reorganization often includes planned resupply missions. Distributing
supplies after establishing a hasty defense is complex and
something a 1SG may need to oversee, rather than a supply
sergeant.
There are also numerous locations for a senior NCO
during movement-to-contact missions. Controlling formations during a movement to contact can be difficult. Platoons
or companies often cannot see each other because of the
terrain, which presents further challenges when there are
casualties. The company trains must stay far enough from
the company to prevent enemy compromise, but this separation causes friction to C2 and security. The company trains
frequently have the best communications, which requires
a key leader to monitor and report from that platform.
Movement through challenging terrain strains communication across the unit and with the higher HQs. Once a unit has
reached its limit of advance, formations normally move into
a hasty or deliberate defense. Finally, the unit will likely need
a resupply, a common senior NCO task. There are many
acceptable locations for a senior NCO, which vary by phase,
during a movement-to-contact mission. The 1SG and CSM
must decide where they can best help their unit by applying
the friction rubric.
Senior NCOs play an important role in a deliberate
defense, but they often struggle to define their role.
Senior NCOs can maximize their
operational effectiveness by carefully
considering their optimal placement
rather than arbitrarily going to where
they are comfortable or have always
gone.
While preparing a defense, several tasks are happening simultaneously: offensive operations in the disruption zone, engagement area development, planning,
and refit. Enemy incursions often interrupt progress as
the unit repels attacks and deals with casualties. Senior
NCOs must help plan casualty evacuation (CASEVAC),
MEDEVAC, and sustainment operations all while ensuring
Soldiers complete maintenance. The organization must
unload important equipment from the company trains (for
example, Javelin missile launchers and chemical protective equipment). Senior NCOs link up with and guide
delivery crews to unload class IV materials at planned
obstacle sites rather than having the team carry the items
a great distance. Before dig assets waste time on unsuitable positions, senior NCOs can help the commander vet
and mark fighting positions. Subsequently, senior NCOs
must inspect fighting positions and the distribution of key
weapons systems. Finally, overseeing rehearsals and
receiving back briefs from Soldiers on alert plans, engagement/disengagement criteria, CASEVAC procedures, and
the process for passing friendly units through obstacles are
paramount. Frequent communication between key leaders,
applying the friction rubric, a detailed timeline, and thinslicing during inspections will inform senior NCOs where to
place their attention.
After the defense is established, senior NCOs must
determine their role in fighting the defense. There are
numerous points of friction in a defense. The natural position for a CSM during the defense is overseeing MEDEVAC
operations. While MEDEVAC operations are worthy of a
senior NCO’s attention, other facets of the mission may
contain more friction. Elements in the disruption zone
often return to supplement primary battle positions, causing a risk of fratricide. Senior NCOs can play an important
role in de-conflicting these two converging units. Anti-tank
engagements are critical in the defense and may need a
senior NCO’s oversight. Soldiers must engage vehicles with
the correct munition so the element has the appropriate
munitions remaining to kill more significant threats. While
subordinate leaders focus on their portion of the fight, they
often lose sight of disengagement criteria. Disengaging from
a primary position to an alternate fighting position can be
disorganized and lead to additional casualties. Senior NCOs
can help maintain security and direct fire and maneuver so
the formation can occupy alternate fighting positions in an
organized manner. Additionally, senior NCOs can help calm
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 29
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
and direct a formation in the event of a chemical attack.
Finally, they can also play an important role in organizing
elements to counterattack at the appropriate time. Using the
friction rubric, conversing with the commander, attending
rehearsals, and conducting battlefield circulation will inform
senior NCOs of their optimal position.
Task-organization changes often produce friction.
Senior NCOs should be interested any time there is a taskorganization change. These changes are easy for a planner
to write into an order, but they do not always account for
the logistics of moving a formation. For example, a Sapper
squad installing obstacles for a battalion will conduct strenuous manual labor for most of the day. Shortly after the squad
finishes its work, the engineer battalion will move the squad
to support another unit. When the Sappers arrive at the next
unit, the leaders will expect them to start working immediately on their obstacles. No one considered that the squad
is out of food, has not slept in 36 hours, is out of fuel, and
low on ammunition. Task-organization changes add additional friction when they direct an element to traverse the
battlefield across numerous unit boundaries. Whether it is a
CSM at a tactical operations center or a 1SG on the ground,
senior NCOs should involve themselves in task organization changes. Senior NCOs are responsible for inspecting
and reporting the status of attachments when they arrive
and depart. With countless points of friction during combat
operations, senior NCOs must deliberately assess their
location on the battlefield.
Conclusion
Senior
NCOs
influence
operations in many ways. To
maximize a unit’s effectiveness, commanders and senior
NCOs must carefully consider
where the formation’s most
experienced leaders should
serve during combat operations.
While doctrine informs leader
placement, commanders and
senior NCOs apply the friction
rubric, risk assessments, and
understanding of operational
risk derived from rehearsals to
determine maximum points of
friction. Senior NCOs improve
their ability to assess friction by
experimenting during training,
participating in AARs, developing subordinates through LPD
sessions, and coaching from
mentors. Senior NCOs positively affect outcomes through
presence
and
thin-slicing.
Understanding historical friction points commonly found in
routine combat missions will help
30 INFANTRY Spring 2022
senior NCOs determine where they can best ensure mission
success. Senior NCOs can maximize their operational effectiveness by carefully considering their optimal placement
rather than arbitrarily going to where they are comfortable or
have always gone.
Notes
1
History.com, “Battle of New Orleans,” 2019, accessed from
https:// www.history.com/topics/war-of-1812/battle-of-new-orleans.
2
Douglas R. Satterfield, “Identifying Strategic Friction Points,”
The Leader Maker: A Blog About Senior Executive Leadership,
accessed from https://www.theleadermaker.com/identifying-strategic-friction-points/.
3
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, Army Leadership and
the Profession, July 2019, 1-15.
4
Jeff Thompson, PhD, “Thin Slices & First Impressions,”
Psychology Today (24 March 2012), retrieved from https://www.
psychologytoday.com/us/blog/beyond-words/201203/thin-slicesfirst-impressions.
5
Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Commander and Staff Organization
and Operations, May 2014.
6
Alexandra Spiliakos, “Tragedy of the Commons: What it is
and 5 Examples,” Harvard Business School, 6 February 2019,
accessed from https://online.hbs.edu/blog/post/tragedy-of-thecommons-impact-on-sustainability-issues.
7
Ibid.
CSM Nema Mobarakzadeh currently serves as command sergeant
major of the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division at Fort Polk,
LA. He is a graduate of Ranger, Sapper, Jungle, Airborne, Jumpmaster,
Pathfinder, Reconnaissance Surveillance Leaders, and Military Free-Fall
courses among others.
Photo courtesy of the Joint Readiness Training Center Operations Group
CSM Jeffrey Loehr from 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain
Division, participates in live-fire training at the Joint Readiness Training Center on 28 March 2017.
The Information Domain and
Social Media
SGM ALEXANDER E. AGUILASTRATT
SGM MATTHEW S. UPDIKE
A
form of asymmetric warfare
is waged against the United
States and its citizens daily
across multiple venues and platforms
without reaching the threshold or definition of open conflict.1 That form of
asymmetric warfare is disinformation.
Disinformation erodes trust and
the ability to establish a society with
effective institutions to serve and
protect. As a result, it is conceivable
to assume that disinformation and its
social-media venues are corrosives
affecting the information domain.
Much like the early stages of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), disinformation presents the United States
with a cost-effective, low-effort tactical
problem with a strategic consequence
Graphic by Patrick Buffett
manifested in national trust erosion.
Social media is the preferred venue for foreign, domestic, and proxy enemies to engage the
The U.S. Army faces the renewal of Army remotely with minor risk.
great power competition with adversaries engaging in multiple domains, thus challenging the media as a tactical system in the new information domain.
traditional definitions of war and peace and operating under
Active measures in the realm of social media include
the threshold that would warrant military action.2
influencing others in a coercive way; disinformation; politicalA few years ago, Frank Hoffman identified the “weaponization” of social media as playing perfectly into the concept
of hybrid warfare: “[Hybrid warfare] incorporates a range of
different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including
indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.”3
Importance
The information domain offers adversaries the ability
to engage the U.S. Army with digital IEDs and erode trust
between our military and the American people. Social media
is the preferred venue for foreign, domestic, and proxy
enemies to engage the Army remotely with minor risk.
The information domain starts at the tactical level, and it
is also a tactical commander’s responsibility to occupy it or
otherwise relinquish key terrain to nefarious actors. However,
there is a lack of concise guidance about information and the
aspects of cross-domain warfare. The result is the effect of
“paralysis by analysis” and the consequent disregard of social
influence operations in what could be considered the tactical
setting for the asymmetric gray zone; hybrid; or next-generation information warfare against the U.S. Army.
Operational Environment
Social media, as part of the information domain, fits
perfectly as a tool to shape the information operational environment, coordinate efforts, and erode trust by antagonizing
below the threshold of conflict.4
In the past, basic communication models included sender,
receiver, transmission, medium, and message as separate
components; however, due to advances in technology, the
information domain now adds the Internet, radio waves,
satellite communications, wireless networks, and social
media to the previous media.5
As a result, the information domain will become the
preferred operational environment by near-peer, extremist
organizations, and domestic threats that cannot match the
U.S. Army’s kinetic capabilities.
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 31
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
Example: ISIS in Mosul
When the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) invaded
Northern Iraq in 2014, it only had about 15,000 militants who
picked up weapons and vehicles from the previous extremist groups. However, after introducing its hashtag campaign
#ALLEyesOnISIS, it gained an extensive network of passionate supporters and Twitter bots to lock down other trending
hashtags for Arabic-speaking users.6 ISIS’ on-line tactics and
mastery of the information domain recruited from more than
100 countries and spread fear globally.
The information domain as an operational environment is
now a contested battlespace where various actors with realworld goals such as ISIS could use the same tactics with
relative simplicity. For example, ISIS’s top recruiter, Junaid
Hussein, used the same tactics that Taylor Swift used to sell
her records.7
The acknowledgment of the changes in the character
of warfare related to the information domain is evident not
only to the military but also to corporations. Facebook, for
example, is planning the creation of a “war room” to counter
disinformation operations.8
Commanders at all levels deal with the challenges of
the information domain, social media, and their formations.
Social media is the ideal platform for information/disinformation, on-line communities, nefarious actors, inundation and
targeting, and less-than-honest techniques. For example,
during the last Mexican elections, one-third of the on-line
conversations were generated by bots.9
Social-media platforms are addictive by design.
Notifications, for example, do not tell the user what the
subject is about, thus creating a certain level of anxiety and
the need for closure, appealing to emotions. Unfortunately,
our young generation of Soldiers is affected by this type of
emotional targeting. For example, in Chicago, 80 percent of
school fights originate from on-line comments. Gangs and
extremist-organization recruiters stir negative emotions such
as anger to disenfranchise and absorb young recruits.
If units do not occupy and employ the information-domain
operational environment, they risk enabling nefarious actors
to target Soldiers, spread disinformation, and operate with
impunity.
Speed and Level of Response
The need for a social-media presence as part of information-domain occupation is paramount for U.S. society and its
symbiotic relationship of trust with its Army. One of the most
efficient ways for commanders to occupy the information
domain and counter disinformation is to practice consistent
messaging, whether doctrine or science/fact-based.
As social media continues to evolve with visual venues,
including China’s TikTok, it is essential to point out that the
enemy uses artificial intelligence and algorithms to flood
the virtual battlefield. As a result, reliable information must
be treated as a defensive/offensive weapon system and an
area-denial tool against threat actors.
32 INFANTRY Spring 2022
The U.S. Army must recognize at
echelon that social media can be used as
a weapon of adverse effects; therefore, it
must invest in social-media literacy and
instill awareness of methods and goals
of targeted campaigns by nefarious
actors.
The most effective tool against nefarious actors is an
educated and empowered population of Soldiers and leaders capable of identifying and discrediting disinformation
attempts. The U.S. Army must recognize at echelon that
social media can be used as a weapon of adverse effects;
therefore, it must invest in social-media literacy and instill
awareness of methods and goals of targeted campaigns by
nefarious actors.
For example, Russia believes that the United States’
weakness is its diversity, so to counter this, the U.S. Army
must show strength in its pluralism and pave the way to heal
the divisions in our country by shielding our own culture.
When the Army acknowledges social media as part of the
information domain and develops an effective strategy, it
will deny nefarious actors crucial terrain in the information
environment.
Changes in Technology
The U.S. Army’s adversaries see information as a domain
and all forms across platforms as potential venues of power
ready to be weaponized. Near-peer threats also view all U.S.
information-technology systems as vulnerabilities.10
As information technology evolves, so do its platforms
(using TikTok as an example). Technological advances
enable nefarious actors to manipulate media with artificial
intelligence-enabled “deep fakes.”11 Tech companies are
developing methods to reveal such deep fakes and image
alterations that create anger and negative public opinion.
Also, developers are working on their algorithms to counter
those used by nefarious actors to discourage the practice of
sharing misleading information based on the title alone. The
algorithms will aid in creating a healthy level of skepticism,
improving social-media literacy.12
Despite all advances in technology, the most important
advance must occur within the human domain. The most
effective tool to counter disinformation and divisionism is the
educated and empowered U.S. Army, capable of discrediting disinformation and targeting efforts. In addition, the Army
must inoculate its Soldiers against those who seek malign
control of the information domain.
Command teams must invest in social-media literacy and
instill awareness, methods, and goals of targeted disinformation campaigns while measuring fissures in their information
campaigns.
Strategic Communications and Information
Advantage
The spread of misinformation and division is actually a
“biohazard” that can spread throughout any formation if
command teams do not effectively occupy the information
domain. Command teams at echelon must define purpose
with clarity and convey clear and concise messaging while
considering the target audience and desired effects to counter or deny the enemy of crucial terrain to infect the information domain.
Social media is an effective platform to inform Soldiers
and families while combating disinformation. Also, young
Soldiers, officers, and NCOs live in an era in which social
media is essential in their lives.
Humanizing the narrative to create positive effects within
formations is critical for countering the infection created by
the weaponization of social media. Units that humanize their
narrative can use the information domain as a means for
Soldiers to:
• Know the unit’s purpose;
• Communicate that purpose often and in different ways;
• Make it personal by creating informal feedback loops;
• Reinforce narrative with actions;
• Give purposed-based feedback; and
• Align behaviors with purpose.
Pre, During, and After Action Plans
Effective social-media communication provides command
teams a venue to exercise information-domain advantage
and deny nefarious actors key terrain and avenues to infect
formations. Also, command teams and staff must have the
capability to engage in contingency operations to inform or
respond to emergencies before, during, and after crises.
Time is of the essence, especially if that time is during a
crisis. You will likely use social media and on-line platforms
as the first resource to react and to put out information.
Because social media provides speed, reach, and direct
contact with audiences, it is a crucial tool to disseminate
command information and provide a place to receive timely
updates.
Develop the social-media strategy as part of your crisiscommunication plan. Having a set strategy the team is
comfortable with will help your unit better prepare and
manage responses during a crisis.
Command Presence and Talent Management
Command teams must manage the information domain
like any operational environment. Staff and senior enlisted
advisers can help the commander navigate the complex
environment using experienced members within their formation (Soldiers and civilians) who are talented and adept to
the social-media environment. A candid, genuine command
presence can help leaders define their expectations, style,
and expectations to Soldiers and geographically displaced
family members.
Also, subordinate commanders can emulate a solid and
genuine social-media command presence. Defining leader
expectations for the information domain is as important and
comparable to the four rules of a gun range:
• Watch the muzzle and keep it pointed in a safe direction
at all times;
• Treat every weapon system as if loaded at all times;
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 33
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
Vignette: Social-Media Reputation
Management and Response
(10th Mountain Division Shoothouse
Incident, 21 February 2021)
A bodycam video of Soldiers conducting live-fire
close-quarters battle training displaying many safety
violations began circulating on the Internet. It claimed
that the Soldiers belonged to 10th Mountain Division.
Staff from the 10th Mountain determined the Soldiers
were from the division but not the unit they belonged to
or how long ago the training occurred.
Measured response: Within 24 hours, the video had
gone viral. Through contact with the meme pages from
the energy-drink rumor, CSM Mario O. Terenas, 10th
Mountain’s top enlisted Soldier, eventually determined
the exact unit in the shoothouse and the training time.
Rather than send out an old-fashioned press release,
he addressed the allegations in a one-minute response
video on all his social-media accounts.
He admitted that the Soldiers belonged to 10th
Mountain Division and was saddened by what he saw.
However, he assured the audience that was not the
unit’s standard and he would fix the problem.
Results: CSM Terenas’ video received an overwhelming amount of audience engagement. Users
commended Terenas for owning up to the allegations
instead of trying to hide from them. His video went
viral almost immediately after being released (152,000
views on Twitter, 86,000 Instagram views, and 1,000
on Facebook).
• Positively identify the target and the backdrop; and
• Keep your finger off the trigger until ready to engage.
Social media is an excellent medium for sharing information and reaching out to otherwise geographically displaced
personnel; however, it is also a target-rich environment for
nefarious actors. As a result, a strong command presence,
coupled with action plans and expectations, is required to
protect command integrity and safeguard Soldiers and
families from the effects of disinformation and deliberate
targeting.
Threats
Foreign. Open-source intelligence indicates that foreign
actors are engaging in covert information operations against
the United States. Disinformation is not a new concept.
Russia has a long history of seeking to project power and
influence while playing to our potential technological and
geopolitical handicaps.13
Without the equivalent conventional might of the United
States, Russia, China and other nations recognize our appetite for information. They use social media as a platform to
exercise tactics of influence, coercion, and the capability to
34 INFANTRY Spring 2022
control the narrative, thus manipulating a specific population’s hearts and minds.14
The diverse, pluralistic, and democratic nature of the
United States makes it a target-rich environment of socialmedia-empowered Russian disinformation. As a result, the
all-volunteer force composed of free citizens of a diverse
nation offers the same opportunities for a country that has
long fought to rebalance power.15
At the macro level, Russia has realized U.S. conventional
superiority, with General Valery Gerasimov’s doctrine revolving around information control as the key to victory. The
Gerasimov Doctrine — or Russian new-generation warfare
— advocates simultaneous operation and control of the military, political, cyber, and information domains, which can be
accessed employing social media.16
Gerasimov also made the following statement about
information technology: “Information technology is one of
the most promising types of weapons to be used covertly not
only against critically important informational infrastructures
but also against the population of a country, directly influencing the condition of a state’s national security.”17
Russia operates under the concept that the distinction
between war and peace no longer exists and uses misinformation to protect itself from a military response. In essence,
once it has started, Russia must maintain momentum since
it acknowledges that the United States’ advantages in information technology will undermine Russian social, cultural,
and political institutions if pushed beyond the threshold of
conflict.18
China also seeks to influence the American public,
although its approach differs widely from Russia’s tactics. A
Recorded Future article stated: “We believe that the Chinese
state has employed a plethora of state-run media to exploit
the openness of American democratic society in an effort to
insert an intentionally distorted and biased narrative portraying a utopian view of the Chinese government and party.
...what distinguishes Russian and Chinese approaches are
their tactics, strategic goals, and efficacy.”19
A paper published by the Hoover Institution in November
2018 included findings from more than 30 of the West’s
preeminent China scholars, collaborating in a working
group on China’s influence operations abroad. The scholars
concluded: “[T]his report details a range of more assertive
and opaque ‘sharp power’ activities that China has stepped
up within the United States in an increasingly active manner.
These exploit the openness of our democratic society to
challenge, and sometimes even undermine, core American
freedoms, norms, and laws.”20
“The Russian state has used a broadly negative,
combative, destabilizing, and discordant influence operation because that type of campaign supports Russia’s strategic goals to undermine faith in democratic processes,
support pro-Russian policies or preferred outcomes, and
sow division within Western societies. Russia’s strategic
goals require covert actions and
are inherently disruptive, therefore, the social-media influence
techniques employed are secretive and disruptive as well.
The Chinese state has a
starkly different set of strategic
goals, and as a result, Chinese
state-run social-media influence
operations use different techniques. [Chinese President] Xi
Jinping has chosen to support
China’s goal to exert greater influence on the current international
system by portraying the government in a positive light, arguing
that China’s rise will be beneficial,
cooperative, and constructive for
the global community. This goal
Graphic by Regina Ali
requires a coordinated global Military experts are constantly warning service members about social media scams.
message and technique, which
Russia employs tactics such as those used against Africanpresents a strong, confident, and optimistic China.”21
The relentless need to maintain the social media and Americans in advance of the 2016 election and the exploitaflooding Twitter
disinformation continuum of operations under the destabiliz- tion of the Black Lives Matter movement by
24
hashtags
and
diluting
legitimate
concerns.
ing Gerasimov Doctrine enables Russian tactical commanders to conduct offensive cyber and information operations. In
contrast, U.S. tactical commanders lack clear social-media
guidance at the tactical level. It is fair to conclude that a
Russian tactical commander is more empowered to conduct
offensive information operations than a U.S. tactical-level
commander due to the protection of several disinformation
layers. As a result, Russian tactical-information units and
their proxies occupy the proverbial “high ground” of the
information domain.
Modus operandi. Western newspapers once described
Russian President Vladimir Putin as “the cold-eyed ruler of
Russia,” “a cold, calculating … spy who sought to undermine
freedom in the West.” With “his dark past, his sinister look,”
he was “straight out of KGB central casting.”22 Thus one
could say that Putin is the spy who would be king. As such,
he understood that once he embarked on the Gerasimov
Doctrine, his methods for occupying the information domain
would become predictable.
As a result, the need for relentless action at the tactical
level would become the Russian apparatus’ cornerstone.
Therefore Russia’s social-media exploitation method is
predictable. They identify a contentious issue, employ bots
and trolls on various social-media platforms to spread divisive messages, and amplify discord.23
In addition, a diverse U.S. Army, recruiting from a pluralistic society dealing with societal fissures and racial tension,
creates opportunities for Russian disinformation attacks
against the foundations of trust between the U.S. Army and
the American people.
In the case of creating friction against the U.S. Army,
The need for a response and occupation of the information
domain becomes prevalent when the Russian threat recognizes the need to identify, exploit, and amplify U.S. political
tensions, racial wounds, and the promotion of health scams
(anti-vaxxer movement) in a divisive and emotional manner.
Domestic. On-line social-media platforms are playing an
increasingly important role in the radicalization processes of
U.S. extremists. While U.S. extremists were slow to embrace
social media, in recent years the number of individuals relying on these user-to-user platforms to disseminate extremist
content and the facilitation of extremist relationships has
grown exponentially.
In fact, in 2016 alone, social media played a role in the
radicalization processes of nearly 90 percent of the extremists in Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States
data.
Social media exists for the extremist the same way it exists
for the everyday user, neither evil nor benevolent. Socialmedia sites are simply a method extremists use to conduct a
myriad of organizational functions.
Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube are the most popular
social-media sites today, but that does not mean they will
stay on top. Tumblr, LinkedIn, Google+, and Instagram are
all social-media sites growing in popularity.
Command teams and staff must acknowledge and keep
abreast of new advances in social media.25 However, it must
not consume their time, nor should they neglect professional
distance, but rather consider social media as part of the information domain.
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 35
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
Notes
Recorded Future, “Beyond Hybrid War.”
Greg McLaughlin, Russia and the Media: The Makings of a
New Cold War (London: Pluto Press, 2020); retrieved from http://
www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvzsmdt1.
23
Gamberini, “Social Media Weaponization.”
24
Ibid.
25
U.S. Air Force MAJ Joshua Close, “#Terror: Social Media and
Extremism,” paper for graduate requirements, Air Command and
Staff College, May 2014.
21
Sarah Jacobs Gamberini, “Social Media Weaponization: The
Biohazard of Russian Disinformation Campaigns,” Joint Force
Quarterly, 4th Quarter 2020.
2
Ibid.
3
Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid
Warfare (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007),
cited in Dr. Ofer Fridman, “The Danger of ‘Russian Hybrid Warfare,’”
Cicero Foundation Great Debate Paper, July 2017.
4
Gamberini, “Social Media Weaponization.”
5
Robert Kozloski, “The Information Domain as an Element of
National Power,” Center for Contemporary Conflict, 2020.
6
The University of Pennsylvania, “Why Social Media is the New
Weapon in Modern Warfare,” Knowledge@Wharton interview with
P.W. Singer and Emerson T. Brooking, 2019.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Gamberini, “Social Media Weaponization.”
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Dr. Harold Orenstein and LTC (Retired) Timothy Thomas, “The
Development of Military Strategy Under Contemporary Conditions:
Tasks for Military Science,” Military Review, November 2019.
18
Gamberini, “Social Media Weaponization.”
19
Recorded Future, “Beyond Hybrid War: How China Exploits
Social Media to Sway American Opinion,” 6 March 2019, accessed
from
https://www.recordedfuture.com/china-social-media-operations.
20
Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, eds., “China’s Influence &
American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance,” The Hoover
Institution, 29 November 2018, accessed from https://www.hoover.
org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-promotingconstructive-vigilance.
1
22
Editor’s Note: This article first appeared in the Winter
2022 issue of Armor.
SGM Alexander Aguilastratt is an Infantry Soldier assigned as
the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) projectinclusion sergeant major at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. His previous
assignments include serving as command sergeant major, U.S. Southern
Command, Soto Cano Air Force Base, Honduras; command sergeant
major, Charlie Squadron, Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG), Fort Meade,
MD; and sergeant major, Baker Squadron, AWG, Fort Meade. His military
schooling includes the U.S. Army Sergeant Major Academy, Vulnerability
Assessment Methodology Course, AWG Operational Adviser Training
Course, Master Resiliency Course, Joint Readiness Training Center
Observer-Controller Course, Reserve Officer Training Command Course,
Air Assault School, Airborne School, and Jumpmaster Course. SGM
Aguilastratt earned a master’s degree in international relations and affairs
from Liberty University and a bachelor’s degree in business administration
in liberal arts (graduated summa cum laude) from Excelsior College.
SGM Matthew Updike has a scout background. At the time this article
was written, he was assigned to G-3/5/7, TRADOC, Fort Eustis, VA. His
previous assignments include serving as command sergeant major for
deputy director, Noncommissioned Officer’s Professional Development
Directorate, NCO Center of Excellence, Fort Bliss, TX; brigade command
sergeant major, Task Force Sinai, Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt; and command
sergeant major, 3rd Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade
Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, NY. His military
schooling includes the Scout Leader Course, security force assistance
advisor training, Sergeants Major Course, and Maneuver Battalion and
Brigade Pre-Command Course. SGM Updike earned an associate’s
degree in business and administration and a bachelor’s degree in
business and management from Excelsior College.
New from the Center For Army Lessons Learned
Handbook 22-663: Call to Action: Suicide Prevention — Reducing Suicide in Army Formations, Brigade and
Battalion Commander’s Handbook
The purpose of this handbook is to thoroughly examine, from a leadership perspective, the
fundamental concepts and engagement necessary to develop and execute an effective
suicide prevention program. The suicide prevention framework utilizes visibility tools, which
assess risk and protective factors. The suicide prevention framework also establishes a unit
forum to operationalize the suicide prevention program through the operations process.
There is no single action that can prevent suicide. However, leaders who apply consistent
and systematic whole-of-person approaches can positively impact individual and unit
readiness. This handbook presents a vision of an Army built on a culture of trust. Soldiers
can build strength and confidence in each another through the application of these principles,
practices, and qualities.
Suicide results from complex, interrelated factors, and therefore prevention must be
comprehensive. This handbook describes the strengthening influence of recognized
protective factors in many facets of Soldiers’ and Army families’ lives.
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited
No. 22-663
NOV 2021
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited
Find this publication online at https://usacac.army.mil/organizations/mccoe/call/publication/21-14.
36 INFANTRY Spring 2022
Army Aviation — Above the Best!
Now Let’s Train Together
CPT DANIEL VORSKY
W
e live in trying times, and technology has facilitated the dissemination of doctrinal, tactical, and
intellectual enhancements to the profession of
arms. Not all changes are to our advantage, however, but as
we adapt our tactics, techniques, and procedures to meeting
the challenges posed by former near-peer adversaries we
learn more about them as well. Army Aviation is a valuable
adjunct to the combined arms team, and we need to learn
how we can combine our capabilities to overcome the challenges posed by the enemy.
The overall purpose of this article is to assist Infantry
leaders with tools and tips to accomplish training objectives
and build a better rapport with aviation assets, and most
importantly, remove misconceptions surrounding the Army
Aviation Branch. In my short decade in the Army, I’ve been
blessed to do and experience quite a bit. I’ve learned how to
fly helicopters and planes and train with the finest Soldiers
the world has ever seen. With that being said, Army Aviation’s
sole purpose is to support the ground force commander
and support ground forces as a whole. Consequently, I am
left to wonder why the majority of aviation training missions
are flown without the ground force on board and why most
of the submitted mission requests from ground forces aren’t
supported. The following are some tips, tricks, and a general
and informal guide to working with Army Aviation. Hopefully,
this article will give ground forces a better understanding of
how aviation units operate and the best ways of getting your
training requirements and mission requests accomplished.
Understanding
No, we cannot take an aircraft out whenever we want to.
Yes, we do have other requirements outside the cockpit. Yes,
we wear different uniforms. Yes, crew rest is a REAL thing.
Now that I have addressed some common stereotypes
about aviators, let’s get down to discussing how you can
maximize your opportunities to get a ride from us. After
spending almost 10 years in the branch, I’d like to stress
that Army Aviation and aviators are NOT better; we’re different — the same way the Infantry is different from Armor and
every other branch. Please understand that we WANT to help
you, we WANT to fly, and we ARE going to do pretty much
everything within our power to accomplish the task and get
the blades spinning to get off the ground. Aviators have flight
requirements and regulations that have to be followed. If we
don’t have crew rest, good weather, realistic expectations,
and shared understanding, the mission is simply not going
to happen. Like with any other branch, aviators have training
outside of the cockpit that must be accomplished, and unfortunately, this removes us from the cockpit, which reduces the
number of people we have able to achieve the mission. With
other tasks comes the start of the duty day. Please understand that crew rest is for everyone’s safety, as I’ve lost more
friends than I’d like to admit due to pilot error tracing back to
pilot fatigue or pushing the envelope too far to complete the
mission for the client.
Weather
No, we cannot just take off if there’s terrible weather. No,
we cannot just hover at 6,000 feet and lower ourselves vertically to the ground. No, the weather has not changed in the
five minutes since you called last. No, we cannot easily or
quickly shift the mission 10 hours to the right because the
weather might be better, requiring another crew.
While this might seem simple, there is a lack of understanding of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations and
Army Regulation 95-1, Flight Regulations. To put things simply
in regards to weather, if we have to take off under Instrument
Flight Rules (IFR), we are more than likely taking off and
flying point to point. In other words, we’ll be flying airport to
airport, and we won’t be able to land at a random field in the
middle of a training area. To put it in perspective, IFR flying is
like driving a car, only looking at your dashboard and never
looking outside. Aviators operating under IFR conditions are
essentially flying blind, relying on their airframe’s instruments
to provide the necessary information to fly. IFR flying makes
special requests and many training requirements impossible
to accomplish. After all this is said, follow the go/no-go times.
I can honestly say there is nothing worse than having a client
set a go/no-go time and not follow it. When the timeline
gets pushed to the right, the arrival time most likely doesn’t
change, so all it means is all things have to move quicker and
faster, which generally creates a hazardous situation and will
most likely not get approved by the pilot’s briefer. The last
major factor with weather is we are NOT allowed to shop for
the weather. Shopping for weather is when pilots call different
weather briefers to get more favorable conditions for the exact
same weather outside; again, it ends with an aircraft crashing.
Realistic Requests
No, we cannot do auto-rotations with an entire cabin of
passengers. No, we cannot land wherever we want. We most
likely cannot land in that tiny area that would barely fit our
aircraft but would be more convenient.
Just like anything else, be reasonable with your requests
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 37
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
for aviation support. We cannot drop everything to make a
mission happen just because the “good idea fairy” struck at the
last minute. Aviation operations require pilots, crews, ground
crews, flight operations, and permission, often necessary
from outside our battalions and brigades. Come with several
courses of action on where you’d like us to land or options on
how to accomplish your requirements. To the extent possible,
know the aircraft limits of what you’re requesting: A UH-60
Black Hawk cannot lift the same as a CH-47 Chinook helicopter, and a CH-47 cannot land in the same area as a UH-60.
Each airframe is different and brings something different to
the table, and to that end, if you are given less aircraft than
you wanted, please don’t scrap the mission because things
aren’t exactly what you wanted. Ask to see the unit’s risk
common operational picture (R-COP) and the Department of
the Army (DA) Form 5484-R, as these documents are what all
aviators use to get their missions not only approved but see
the risk level of what is being requested. If the request comes
in as high risk, drop it — no training mission is worth the loss
of life. Chances are high that if you tell us what you need to be
accomplished, we can suggest modifications to your plan to
lower the risk and still achieve your training objectives.
Forge a Bond
Yes, most of us have great hair (not including myself). Yes,
we say clear right and clear left when driving cars. No, the
flight vest isn’t going anywhere and not all of us wear aviator
sunglasses.
We are all Soldiers in the Army and want to help. Come
visit the airfield. The best way for your missions and requests
to be accomplished is to know your aviation unit. I’ve never
met an aviation unit that didn’t want to show off their aircraft,
talk capabilities, and have a reason to spin blades. I honestly
cannot stress this enough: We WANT to fly your mission,
make the client happy, and WANT your mission/training to
succeed. All of these driving factors start with the communication between the client and the aviation unit. Let us know what
38 INFANTRY Spring 2022
you’d like and what you’d settle for, so we can come up with a
plan to accomplish the task at hand. Most importantly, be the
unit that aviators want to work with. In other words, don’t insult
or belittle the pilots when weather or operational constraints
don’t work in your favor; nothing kills the bond between aviators and ground forces faster than that.
Conclusion
“Above the Best” is the Aviation Corps’ motto as we know
the clients we serve are the best in the world. We want a
reason to fly and want YOU to give us a reason to get the
birds off the ground. Everything stated in this article is from
events I have personally encountered and/or seen in my 10
years in Army Aviation. Hopefully, this article provides some
insights that can aid ground forces as they seek to work
with aviation more frequently. As the adage goes: the more
we sweat together in peace, the less we bleed in war. When
the military is focusing on preparing for large-scale combat
operations, ensuring that a smooth working relationship exists
between aviation and ground forces could not be more critical, and training is where this all begins.
CPT Dan Vorsky currently attends the Military Intelligence Captains
Career Course at Fort Huachuca, AZ. He has served as a pilot in command
and air mission commander (UH-60A/L). His assignments include serving as commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 12th
Aviation Battalion, The Army Aviation Brigade (TAAB), Fort Belvoir, VA;
executive officer (XO) for Bravo Company, 12th Aviation Battalion, TAAB;
XO for Foxtrot Company, 3-2 General Support Aviation Battalion, Camp
Humphrey, South Korea; and platoon leader in A Company, 1-150 Assault
Helicopter Battalion, Joint Base McGuire-Dix, Lakehurst, NJ. He earned a
bachelor’s degree in maritime studies and a master’s degree in international
transportation management from SUNY Maritime College, and is pursuing a
doctoral degree in strategic leadership with Liberty University.
Soldiers in the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division
(Air Assault) supported by rotary wing assets from 3rd Combat
Aviation Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division conduct air assault operations
during a field training exercise at Fort Knox, KY, on 2 December 2018.
Photo by CPT Justin Wright
Using Goals to Develop Subordinates
CPT JACOB MOOTY
“What are you doing after you get out?”
“Going back home.”
“Do you have a job lined up?”
“I’m going to college.”
“That’s great, which one?”
“Probably the community college.”
“So you haven’t applied anywhere yet… do you know
what do you want to study?”
“I’m thinking I’ll just knock out general classes first.”
“What degree do you want?”
“Um... business?”
“What do you want to do with that?”
(Conversation devolves into awkward eye contact.)
I
f I had a nickel for every time I’ve had the above conversation with an ETSing Soldier, I’d probably be pushing
a dollar. Small change, but it breaks our hearts as
leaders and mentors when service members leave the Army
without a plan. We shouldn’t be surprised though. Many of
our Soldiers seem to listlessly drift from job to job without
thinking about what they want out of a career or even just a
single enlistment. A lot of potential goes completely unrecognized because individuals simply don’t have anything they
are working towards beyond the next paycheck. As leaders, I
believe some of our duties are to gauge that untapped potential and ensure that our Soldiers are serving in a capacity
that allows them to get the most out of their service. We’ve
all heard of the SMART goals acronym (specific, measurable, action-oriented, realistic, and timely) and know how to
make our own goals using it, but do you know what your
subordinates’ goals are? Have you ensured that those goals
are SMART? And most importantly, are you developing your
subordinates towards achieving those goals?
When I first commissioned, I had a vague sense of what I
wanted to do with my career but no clear definition of success
or idea of how to get there. Fortunately for one 2LT Mooty,
my battalion commander didn’t just ask his lieutenants for a
single SMART goal, he asked for 12 of them: personal goals,
professional goals, physical fitness goals, and financial
goals. Each category required a near-, short-, and long-term
goal. Your near-term goals are within a year, your short-term
goals are within five years, and your long-term goals are
beyond five years. After completing my platoon leader and
executive officer (XO) time, I was the “new-lieutenant sponsor” (now a nickel for every made-up additional duty…). Part
of my duties was helping new LTs develop their goals prior
to initial counseling with the battalion commander. Almost
every one of them had a goal along the lines of “I want to
max the ACFT (Army Combat Fitness Test).” I sincerely
hope you all recognize this as a bad goal — not a bad desire
but a bad goal. Let’s make it into a good goal using the
SMART acronym.
First, this is not a specific goal. The ACFT has six sub
components, and they intentionally have little overlap when
it comes to muscle groups and how we use those muscle
groups. To better specify this goal, we’ll say that the subject
is unable to achieve the Army leg tuck standard. To better
specify their goal, we’ll switch it from a broad scope to a
narrow, specific one: I want to max the ACFT leg tucks.
Next, we need to describe how we will define success.
Yes, maxing the leg tucks can be measured by, well, maxing.
But by not refining this measure, we have a narrow but scary
goal. We can’t measure our progress. To make this goal
measurable, we amend it to say: I want to max the ACFT
leg tucks by improving my rep count to 20 reps.
Now we’re getting somewhere. However, this goal still
has a way to go. What are we going to do to get to 20 reps?
I don’t think I’m being too controversial saying Army physical training (PT) is not going to get the results the subject
wants. Additionally, is this a good goal if it would be achieved
by just doing what we already do day-to-day? NO! A good
goal is action oriented. To truly be a goal and not a conclusion, we need to have to fight for it. In this example, we can
improve our goal as such: I WILL max the ACFT leg tuck
by improving my rep count to 20 reps. I will do this by
completing 20 extra pull-ups and 40 extra sit-ups every
day after PT. I would also like to draw attention to the change
in wording — from I want to I will. It’s a small change, but it
adds ownership and purpose to goal.
Realistic goals require self-reflection. This is not so much
a written part of our goals, but an honest assessment to
ensure that we are not setting ourselves up for failure. I
figure most of you scoffed when we kept “maxing something”
as part for the goal of someone who cannot yet achieve the
standard. While leaders should not discourage development
on the parts of our subordinates, we should make sure they
are able to develop at a reasonable rate. We should not tell
the subject that maxing the ACFT is impossible, but we may
need to encourage them to make that a short or even longterm goal. Let’s revise our subject’s goal to: I will increase
my ACFT leg-tuck score from 0 (0 reps) to 70 (5 reps) by
completing 20 extra pull-ups and 40 extra crunches at
the end of PT every day.
I also would like to mention that as a leader, you will have
very large say in what is realistic for your subordinates.
Whether you mean to or not, you serve as a gate to many
goals such as schools or special programs for your Soldiers.
A funny story I bring up is that when I took my platoon and
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 39
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
Near
Short
Personal
Professional
Physical
Financial
Example Goal Sheet
asked how many of my Soldiers wanted to go to Ranger
School, over half raised their hands. After I sent the first
one, the number of volunteers dropped to two. I asked my
NCOs what happened and discovered that it had been over
a year since anyone from the platoon had gone because of
the paperwork nightmare associated with brigade schools.
None of the Soldiers thought it was realistic for them to go,
so they had no problem advertising Ranger School as goal.
As a leader, find out what your subordinates believe to be
realistic and use that to help them. Develop goals that will
further their interests, not just sound good on paper. We
need to make sure that we are not holding our Soldiers back,
but we also need to make sure that their goals are driving
them to achieve something.
Lastly, we need to give our subject’s goal an expiration
date. The number one reason I see Soldiers failing to achieve
their goals is that they are waiting until they are “ready.”
There will always be something we can do to be more ready
to achieve something, so this is a terrible way to determine
when we will achieve our goals. I always make my Soldiers
choose a specific date they intend to accomplish their goals
by. In the case of our subject, the last piece of their goal
Long
will be added as such: I will increase my ACFT
leg-tuck score from 0 (0 reps) to 70 (5 reps)
no later than 31 May 2022 by completing 20
extra pull ups and 40 extra crunches at the
end of PT every day.
Now that’s a goal! The final piece I give to my
Soldiers is two-fold. Place a copy of their goals
in a place where they will see them daily and
have them share their goals with someone. This
helps to prevent us from cheating ourselves
and abandoning our goals when they get tough.
For every Soldier I rate, I keep a copy of their
goals sheet for us to talk about and update at
each counseling. For every leader that I rate, it
is my expectation that they are doing the same
for their Soldiers. By identifying what our Soldiers want out
of their time in the Army, we are better able to utilize their
drive and motivation. By identifying their goals and helping
them to improve themselves, we improve morale. No longer
are Soldiers coming to work to further the goals of a leader
many echelons above them that they may have never met;
we are empowering them to come to work to meet their own
goals.
Ultimately, no one is responsible for achieving our goals
besides ourselves. However, as leaders development is
100-percent our responsibility. It is a responsibility that we
easily push to the back burner because it is ill defined, and I
encourage you to keep a goals sheet for each of your junior
leaders and include it as a part of your quarterly counseling.
At the time this article was written, CPT Jacob Mooty was attending the
Military Intelligence Captains Career Course (MICCC). He completed his
branch detail as an Infantry officer in May 2021. His previous assignments
include serving as a rifle platoon leader, headquarters and headquarters
company executive officer, and assistant S3 with the 1st Battalion, 32nd
Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, Fort
Drum, NY.
Infantry Needs Your Articles
INFANTRY is always in need of articles for publication. Topics for articles can include information
on organization, weapons, equipment, training tips, and experiences while deployed. We can
also use relevant historical articles with an emphasis on the lessons we can learn from the past.
Our fully developed feature articles are usually between 2,000 and 3,500 words, but these are
not rigid guidelines. We prefer clear, correct, concise, and consistent wording expressed in the
active voice.
When you submit your article, please include the original electronic files of all graphics. Please
also include the origin of all artwork and, if necessary, written permission for any copyrighted
items to be reprinted. Authors are responsible for ensuring their articles receive a proper security
review through their respective organizations before being submitted. We have a form we can
provide that can aid in the process.
Find our Writer’s Guide at https://www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/about.html. For
more information or to submit an article, call (706) 545-6951 or email us at usarmy.benning.
tradoc.mbx.infantry-magazine@army.mil.
40 INFANTRY Spring 2022
The SFAB: A Lieutenant’s
Experience
1LT CHRISTOPHER WILSON
A
s I inprocessed into the 2nd Security Force
Assistance Brigade (SFAB) at Fort Bragg, NC,
last summer, I anticipated running into at least
a few peer-lieutenants. It did not take many double-takes
and greetings of “So, you’re the LT,” before I realized that I
was the singular variable in the 2nd SFAB’s lieutenant trial
experiment. I immediately assumed that my relative inexperience would be a great weakness here, but I was wrong.
SFAB is structured so that everyone adds a niche capability
to the team, one’s unconventional experiences become his
or her value-added. I was not even in the organization for
two weeks when I walked in on a battalion meeting at the
tactical operations center (TOC) during a live-fire exercise
(LFX). CSM Jacob D. Provence immediately turned to me
and said, “Sir, I’m so glad you’re here. You know why?
Because you’ve got fresh eyes. Tell us what you think about
this [situation].” Now a whole room of senior
or at least disparately experienced Soldiers
stare at you expecting you to provide them
with something worthwhile. That’s what it is
to be an advisor.
the scope of responsibility of a headquarters and headquarters company executive officer (XO)? I experienced the
breadth and depth of leadership styles, a Joint Readiness
Training Center Rotation (JRTC) rotation, and even some
training with the 5th Special Forces Group and 75th Ranger
Regiment. But completing a training cycle just to start a new
training cycle is not exactly motivating. So, when I received
an offer to broaden with the 2nd SFAB as it geared up to
deploy across Africa, I seized it.
My former brigade in the 101st did not deploy while I
was with them. That is a great thing for our country, but I
nonetheless felt like I had missed out, both in how I had
anticipated serving and on the tactically and logistically
formative experiences of a deployment. Readiness can be
a dreaded buzzword. It is the strategic competition mission
of the brigade combat team (BCT) and that will not change
Fast forward to present-day North Africa
where I am partnered with the commander
of a foreign special forces battalion against
al Qaeda and ISIS-affiliate terrorist cells.
More than broadening, the SFAB experience is the definition of mutual force multiplication. Our allies receive our assistance,
and advisors gain invaluable experience
at echelons of responsibility implausible in
any other conventional assignment. Then
we bring that experience with us back into
the regular force.
After growing up with the backdrop
of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)
for 20 years, today’s combat arms junior
officers did not commission in the hope
of deploying to Fort Irwin, CA; Fort Polk,
LA; or Hohenfels, Germany. Many even
based post preferences off of who was on
the patch chart. Make no mistake, I loved
my time in the 101st Airborne Division.
What Infantry LT could ask for more than
15 months as a platoon leader, a few free
reps as an assistant operations officer, and
Photos courtesy of author
A Security Force Assistance Brigade advisor assesses partner forces at the range.
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 41
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
until the next conflict which could be tomorrow or
long after we retire. SFABs are the only conventional
units designed to deploy in war, peace, and everything in between. As the GWOT era ends, SFABs will
do exactly what they are designed to do and keep
moving the strategic ball down the field, while BCTs
will do exactly what they are designed to do by maintaining readiness. Both are necessary and both build
upon each other.
In the last year alone, the Security Force Assistance
Command (SFAC) deployed advisor teams to 41
countries and is only in its initial phases of “building” its reach as our allies’ preferred partners.1 My
experiences here in North Africa and the logistical
lessons learned in moving advisors, weapons, and
equipment — as well as building up a footprint off
of an economy — have been an amazing learning
opportunity. Not only is it personally fulfilling, but the
lessons learned will help me better lead and serve
down the line. That is how SFAB is designed, not as
a branch transfer like special operations but as a branchcomplementary broadening opportunity. SFABs enable top
performers to broaden outside of the BCT training cycle
for a stint before returning them with the most up-to-date
schooling, deployment experience, and exposure to joint,
multinational, and multi-domain processes.
All things in perspective, my experience is admittedly
abnormal. For combat arms officers, an SFAB assignment
is designed to be a broadening opportunity post Maneuver
Captains Career Course (MCCC) as either a battalion advisor team (BAT) assistant S3 or a company advisor team
(CAT) senior operations advisor (basically an XO). It has
a utilization tour of 18-24 months, though they employ the
advisor attribute of flexibility in that as well with no additional service obligation (ADSO). Post command, SFAB
mimics the 75th Ranger Regiment insofar as the broadening opportunity is for command positions at echelon from
team leaders (post-command captains or majors) to brigade
commanders. However, one of the greatest benefits of such
a new, diverse, and relatively small organization is its openmindedness. The only thing that makes my path here unique
is my rank, not that they worked individually to bring me onto
the team.
In a May 2019 U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
article about the 1st SFAB’s first deployment to Afghanistan,
its commander, BG Scott A. Jackson (who is now the SFAC
CG, MG Jackson), said that “the key to our success is
the talented, adaptable, and experienced volunteers who
serve in this brigade.”2 I could not agree more. One of the
best broadening aspects of the SFAB option to a combat
arms junior officer is exposure to soft elements of the Army
outside of the usual BCT structure. The majority of them
are more than a cut above. Learning their backgrounds and
capabilities will undoubtably enhance our ability to integrate
them both on staff and in command.
As an example of the caliber of advisor I have the privilege
42 INFANTRY Spring 2022
Locations of Security Force Assistance Brigades
of working with, allow me to introduce the only advisor on the
team younger than me: our Intelligence NCO, SSG Janay
D. Walker. Not only did she graduate high school before
most kids are even eligible for a driving permit, but she
also had already deployed with the U.S. Special Operations
Command (SOCOM) and turned down the Civil Affairs pipeline to be an advisor in the 2nd SFAB. It is not just the soft
skills; my team is also composed of five Ranger-qualified
Infantry Soldiers. My company commander, MAJ Jacob
M. Phillips, brings SOCOM experience to the table from
his time with Ranger Regiment; my battalion commander,
COL Christopher J. Ricci, brings U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) experience; and my brigade
commander, COL Michael P. Sullivan, is a Green Beret. Such
diversity not only makes this experience truly broadening, it
directly enables our mission.3 Name another conventional
organization in which a battalion deploys 12 teams across
an area of responsibility that spans a Combatant Command
with missions so diverse as to require a battalion team to
advise and assist at the joint and diplomatic level, a maneuver team to do the same with an airborne commando unit,
and a company team to integrate completely with a foreign
special operations command. Yet here we are.
Candor as the eighth Army Value, not all advisors are
created equal. With regard to the few subpar advisors, I
believe it is just a matter of refining the systems we already
have in place: from making advisor selection universal for
all advisors, to emphasizing interpersonal tact and personal
initiative as essential selection criteria, to utilizing the relief
for standards (RFS) protocol for underperformers. Like all
selective organizations, the quality of advisor we retain today
will impact the quality of advisor we recruit tomorrow. SFABs
can be the most elite organizations in U.S. Army Forces
Command (FORSCOM) and are in the most unique position
of then returning Soldiers with force-multiplying schools and
skills throughout it.
One of the downsides of SFAB’s novelty is the lack of or
even misinformation on it. We are neither a BCT nor Special
Forces (SF). That said, we are similar to SF insofar as we
operate in small, specialized, senior, and regionally aligned
teams. However, where SF trains and assists nonconventional forces on nonconventional tactics, SFAB partners,
advises, and assists on the conventional side (even sometimes with nonconventional partner forces). Our mission
here with a North African special forces group demonstrates
the synergy between our organizations.4 For example, an SF
Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) team recently
rotated through to train them in close-quarters combat
(CQB). It was advisors’ persistent partnership, however,
which institutionalized that knowledge and resourcing
through sustainable training programs before, during, and
after the JCET rotation.
Unlike a BCT, SFAB is a decentralized organization. It
holistically employs mission command. Our mission sets
are often ambiguous and usually follow the “one captain,
one country, one team” structure. My experience through
our pre-deployment train-up was one of an organization that
actually trains to standard and not to time, and the small
size and seniority of advisor teams tends to filter out many
(but not all) of the time-consuming Soldier problems. There
are no redundancies on the team. If an advisor does not
perform, it weighs the whole team down, which is why the
quality of advisor is so crucial. In MG Jackson’s words,
“every advisor is a great Soldier, but not every Soldier is a
great advisor.”5
What is the most underrated contribution to success as
an advisor? Communication. The greatest obstacle to our
mission so far has been the language barrier. It is no issue
with our senior leader and officer counterparts who speak
English, but that funnels our attention toward the picture
painters and away from the raw reality. If my rudimentary
French capacity can bridge a bit of that gap with our current
partner force’s second language, imagine what a
team of fluent Arabic speakers could do with regard
to rapport, trust, accurate assessments, and advising. The SFAB’s regionally-aligned and persistent
partnerships literally lend themselves to language
schooling, but we handicap ourselves until it is
prioritized (if not mandated) across the organization. Another option that would serve this need,
incubate continuity of unit culture, and enhance
persistent partner relationships is to task organize
a linguist advisor per team.
While the American advisory mission has a
surprisingly long legacy, the SFAB as an institution
is very young. It is gratifying to be in an organization that is authentically trying to optimize its structures and systems. If you want to have an impact
from the individual to the organizational level, this
is the place. I hope the SFAB retains its flexibility
and openness to growth; it is a stark contrast to the
all-too-common rigidity and risk aversion across
the force. My very existence here serves as evidence of its
open-mindedness.
Words matter. The most unconventional aspect of this
article is the unqualified source writing it. Am I the unicorn for
being the lieutenant advisor, or is SFAB the unicorn for inviting the perspective of its most junior officer? Either way, I am
profoundly grateful for both. From deployment experience
to scope of responsibility to soft skill and mission command
exposure, the SFAB experience has not only given me the
tools to better serve in the future, it has invigorated my desire
to do so. It was an option I had not considered before, but
one I am damn glad to have seized.
Notes
1
Todd South, “SFAB Soldiers Are Heading out in Smaller Teams to
More Places,” Army Times, 13 October 2021, accessed from https://
www.armytimes.com/news/2021/10/13/sfab-soldiers-are-heading-outin-smaller-teams-to-more-places/.
2
C. Todd Lopez, “Success of First SFAB in Afghanistan Proves
‘Army Got It Right,’ Commander Says,” Army News Service, 9 May
2019, accessed from https://www.centcom.mil/media/news-articles/
News-Article-View/Article/1842769/success-of-first-sfab-in-afghanistanproves-army-got-it-right-commander-says/.
3
The SFAB Mission Statement: To conduct training, advising, assisting, enabling, and accompanying operations with allied and partner
nations.
4
More on the symbiosis of SFAB and SF on The Indigenous
Approach podcast between Security Force Assistance Command
Commanding General MG Scott Jackson and 1st Special Forces
Command Commanding General MG John Brennan hosted by 2nd
SFAB Commander COL Michael Sullivan, 11 February 2021.
5
Ibid.
1LT Christopher L. Wilson currently serves as a maneuver advisor
team leader in 1st Battalion, 2nd Security Force Assistance Brigade. He
previously served as a light infantry platoon leader, assistant operations
officer, and headquarters and headquarters company executive officer in
1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st
Airborne Division. He commissioned into the Infantry out of the U.S. Military
Academy at West Point, NY, in 2018 with a bachelor’s degree in international relations.
The author advises partner forces during a training event.
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 43
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
You Will Accomplish Nothing:
The Fundamental Challenge for Soldiers Serving as
Advisors in SFABs Is Understanding Success
MAJ ERIC SHOCKLEY
“A
leader is best when people barely know he exists;
when his work is done, his aim fulfilled, they will say:
we did it ourselves.” In this quote by the philosopher Lao Tzu, we can find the guidance that will most likely
bring success for advisors in security force assistance
brigades (SFABs). Applying this quote to the role of SFAB
advisors brings to light the fundamental problem of advising
success. SFAB leaders and individual advisors can set the
conditions for true success by recognizing that success in
advising is both unseen and unrealized. This creates a situation where the more an advisor pursues success the more
elusive that success becomes. This problem can create
intolerable levels of ambiguity, but in reality advisors can
use doctrine as a foundation to make sense of the many
“unknowns” in advising missions. For Soldiers and leaders
who are serving or want to serve in an SFAB, the intent of
this article is to showcase this problem and offer some techniques on how to address it.
Success is unseen. As the previous quote from Lao Tzu
showcased, it is often best to conduct operations in ways
that allow others to believe that they accomplished the task.
While some people may view this cynically and assert that
this is simply one person or group taking credit for someone
else’s work, my assertion is that such is a limited viewpoint.
The group that says “we did it ourselves” does indeed do
work. An example that illustrates this is from the 1958 book
The Ugly American, which was written by Eugene Burdick
and William Lederer. A situation in the book details how an
American spouse living in a rural area of a foreign country
noticed that the locals spent a significant amount of time on
sweeping the outside areas around their homes. Because the
local handmade tools they used were short handled, many
of them, especially the elderly, walked about in a stooped
manner. To address this issue, the spouse could have
ordered long-handled brooms from the United States and
given them to the locals for use. However, she recognized
that this solution was an unsustainable one. Instead, she
found that there was a better plant several miles away from
her village that was better suited for making brooms with
long handles. Again, instead of presenting this as a solution
to the locals, she simply made her own long-handled broom
and started using it. The locals noticed, asked about it, and
then went and gathered enough
of the plants to make their own
brooms. They also planted some
of the plants in the village so that
they could make new brooms
whenever they needed to. So
while the spouse did work at the
outset, she did it in a way that
allowed the locals to work also —
in a self-determined way so they
could say they did it themselves.
According to Army Techniques
Publication
(ATP)
3-07.10,
Advising Multi-Service Tactics,
Techniques, and Procedures
for Advising Foreign Security
Forces, “…advisors likely never
please their own Service with
A Soldier with the 54th Security Force
Assistance Brigade advises a Guyana
Defence Force (GDF) soldier during
a multinational training exercise on
15 June 2021 at Camp Stephenson,
Guyana.
Photo by SPC N.W. Huertas
44 INFANTRY Spring 2022
regard to the forces they are advising, and they
never fully satisfy the demands of the FSF [foreign
security forces] unit. Advisors are figuratively, and
literally, caught in the middle.” It can be easier to
create and present an immediate solution rather
than do the protracted mental work and “soft sell” to
implement a long-term solution. Doctrine highlights
this challenge for advisors, as advisors are always
trying to satisfy requirements from many sources.
Therefore, advisors must maintain the discipline of
focusing on the long-term goal. They can partially
address this by using the doctrinal techniques
associated with identifying objectives along with
measures of performance, measures of effectiveness, and indicators to determine when they have
obtained the objective. This allows leaders in
SFABs to highlight progress towards success in the
inevitable situation reports (SITREPs) and update
briefs that units require, despite those highlights not
Photo by PFC Zoe Garbarino
being the usual public affairs officer (PAO)-friendly
photo opportunity of a U.S. Soldier “training” a Role-players talk to an advisor team leader from the 1st Security Force
Brigade during a training event at the Joint Readiness Training
counterpart. Leaders and individual advisors can Assistance
Center at Fort Polk, LA, on 13 January 2018.
also maintain a list of “quick win” items to satisfy
information requirements. For example, a team may submit issue. As stated previously, leaders start by identifying the
a storyboard of an event with a photo of an NCO teaching overall objective. Field Manual (FM) 6-0, Commander and
a class on machine-gun emplacement. The higher head- Staff Organization and Operations, along with other publicaquarters could see this as a task completed, even without tions, describes ways to identify problems, conduct assessknowing the background work that went into the event, such ments, and develop the desired end state. Leaders can set
as several members of the team coaxing the counterpart interim objectives that nest with the long-term objective.
battalion staff members over several months to get them to Setting these interim objectives allows the individual advisynchronize time, resources, and the commander’s train- sors to create a list of tangible tasks that they can plan to
ing guidance, all of which will allow the counterpart unit to complete. Having this refined list provides the opportunity to
plan out how best to satisfy the previously mentioned inforperpetuate these types of training events on their own.
Success is unrealized. Part of the reason for creating mation requirements while maintaining a long-term focus.
SFABs was to establish long-term relationships with allies
and partners. These relationships will arguably allow the
U.S. Army to better operate with counterparts during any
future operations. Therefore, advisors must operate with the
understanding that it’s unlikely they will see the counterpart’s
eventual success. Advisors can do tactical small unit planning and combined operations. Their primary focus is on
systems and processes of the counterpart unit as they apply
to working together in future conflict scenarios. Advisors
spend a significant amount of time and energy in identifying the problem, developing solutions that the counterpart
can realistically implement in a sustained manner, and then
assessing the results of that implementation. One example
is when a counterpart unit wants to change its NCO corps
to make it more like ours. To truly make this happen takes
years. Issues like pay, development of a professional military
education system, and change in officer culture all must be
dealt with in order to achieve success. Advisors working on
these kinds of problems must accept that they may only
solve a very small portion of the overall problem, and they
may never know if the overall plan was successful or not.
Again, doctrine provides a foundation for addressing this
A second aspect of how success is unrealized is in how
plans change to become the counterpart’s plan. An individual
advisor may develop a tentative plan, and it must then be
wargamed by the team to improve it. Advisors must display
the attribute of humility, one of many applicable competencies
and attributes from the Army’s Leader Requirements Model
(Army Doctrine Publication 6-22, Army Leadership and the
Profession), as their plan changes over time. That plan then
must change and become the counterpart’s plan. When
finally implemented, it may look very little like the original
idea. Advisors must accept this and remain focused on the
counterpart’s long-term success, not their own individual role
in that success. Again, this is not a new idea for Soldiers. After
action reviews often start with the reminder of “no thin skins.”
The intent of that statement is to tactfully remind participants
of the usefulness of constructive criticism. Soldiers who want
to serve as advisors must be able to embrace this idea in
order to achieve both personal and mission success.
Success is elusive. I have described ways where
success looks different as an SFAB advisor. Now I want to
describe some ways that Soldiers can operate that are more
likely to bring about true success when compared with more
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 45
PROFESSIONAL FORUM
typical methods. First, advisors must reframe their understanding of the mission. Arguably, examples from Vietnam to
Afghanistan showcase the pitfalls of mainly focusing on tactical tasks and small unit operations without a complementary
effort to build long-term viability. Advisors should reframe
their mindset from “What can I teach my counterpart?” to
“What does my counterpart need to be successful when I’m
no longer here?” For example, instead of identifying that a
counterpart’s unit marksmanship program is not up to U.S.
Army standards and therefore running a U.S. Army-style
range, the advisor should try a different way. This may be
an iterative process with the counterpart that identifies the
value (or lack thereof) of marksmanship excellence in the
unit or the reason behind current marksmanship qualifications (e.g., a lack of weapons or ammunition or no system to
reserve training resources). This work is often done one on
one, behind closed doors. It is therefore not as easy to highlight but is arguably more valuable for long-term success.
Second, leaders in SFABs must recognize the work that
advisors are doing and have a plan to report it to a higher
headquarters. SITREPs and storyboards are the usual
medium, so don’t fight the format — work with it. Using the
previous marksmanship example, instead of a photo showing an advisor teaching preliminary marksmanship instruction to a counterpart as part of machine-gun training, leaders
could instead show a picture of an advisor and counterpart
discussing range fans on a map. This second option could
have a caption that highlights that they are working together,
not one teaching the other. This is especially important for
publicly released photos, as the messaging to the public is
a factor for the counterpart. Keeping with this example, the
Part of the reason for creating SFABs
was to establish long-term relationships
with allies and partners. These relationships will arguably allow the U.S. Army
to better operate with counterparts
during any future operations. Therefore,
advisors must operate with the understanding that it’s unlikely they will see
the counterpart’s eventual success.
accompanying SITREP could highlight the multiple internal
planning sessions that shaped the overt interactions with the
counterpart and ultimately ensured that the marksmanship
training happened.
In summary, success for SFAB advisors represents a
unique challenge in comparison to other conventional forces
assignments in that true success must appear to be the
work of the counterpart. This means that advisor successes
are typically unseen, and at the individual and team level
success is often unrealized. SFAB leaders and individual
advisors can combat this ambiguity by reframing how they
approach the mission and how they highlight progress.
Serving in an SFAB can be a unique and rewarding
assignment, both in spite of and because of the challenges
that I’ve mentioned. To achieve success during this assignment, I recommend SFAB Soldiers start with the following
fundamental, though counterintuitive, principle: the more
actively you pursue success, the
more elusive that success becomes.
Critics may argue that advisors
are still pursuing success, just in
a different form. I don’t disagree.
Instead, I am attempting to make
the point that how we pursue that
success is critical. True success is
most likely when it appears that the
counterpart achieved it. While it will
likely feel uncomfortable, I suggest
a return to the title of this article —
you will accomplish nothing. And as
odd as it may seem, your goal is to
accomplish nothing because that
maximizes what your counterparts
are able to accomplish.
U.S. Army photo
A 2nd Security Force Assistance Brigade advisor and Ghana Armed Forces members discuss a
practical exercise at Kamina Barracks, Ghana, in November 2021.
46 INFANTRY Spring 2022
MAJ Eric Shockley is a career Army
logistics officer with combat deployments to
Iraq, an operational deployment to Romania
as a security force assistance brigade
(SFAB) advisor, and an assignment as an
observer-coach-trainer at Fort Polk, LA. He is
currently serving as the executive officer for
6th Battalion, 4th SFAB at Fort Carson, CO.
Death on the Road to Osan:
Task Force Smith
CPT CONNOR MCLEOD
T
he first ground battle between American and North
Korean forces during the Korean War ended in a
North Korean victory, a distinct difference from
the performance of the U.S. military that fought on multiple
fronts in World War II and contributed to the defeat of the
Axis powers.1 Task Force (TF) Smith lost at the Battle of
Osan on 5 July 1950 because it did not appropriately use
the characteristics of the defense (specifically disruption,
flexibility, and operations in depth) and one of the five
military aspects of terrain (key terrain) against the Korean
People’s Army (KPA).
The strategic scene in which TF Smith fought at Osan was
set in the aftermath of World War II. President Harry Truman
and his Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, drastically cut
military spending in the interest of transitioning to postwar life.
American occupation forces in Asia were among the hardest
hit as “U.S. infantry divisions in the Far East were shorn of 62
percent of their firepower... with barely a forty-five day supply
of ammunition.”2 The insufficient funding meant maneuver
units did not conduct large-scale field exercises, essentially
reducing them to constabulary units in the local area rather
than America’s first line of defense against communist aggression in Asia.3 The Korean War began on 25 June 1950 when
North Korea invaded South Korea with seven KPA divisions
and more than 150 T-34 tanks and 200 aircraft against eight
Republic of Korea (ROK) Army divisions.4 North Korean forces
quickly routed the ROK divisions defending the capital city of
Seoul and entered the city’s suburbs by the morning of 27
June (see Map 1).5 General of the Army Douglas MacArthur
recommended President Truman order air, ground, and naval
forces to South Korea as soon as possible to assist the ROK
Army.6
President Truman saw Korea as an opportunity to prevent
unopposed communist expansion and set an example for
nations bullied by “stronger communist neighbors” to stand
and fight.7 Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote that
America’s “internationally accepted
Map 1 — The North Korean Invasion, 25-28 June 1950
position as the protector of South
Korea” was at stake.8 President
Truman deliberated over information as it came in and decided in
favor of military action under a
United Nations (UN) resolution. The
vote passed, aided by the fact that
the Soviet Union, one of the five
veto powers on the UN Security
Council, was absent from the vote
because “it was treating the crisis
as a Korean internal affair.”9 Air and
naval forces of the United States
and Great Britain launched strikes
against North Korean forces attacking south, particularly around Seoul,
starting on 27 June.10 MG William F.
Dean’s 24th Infantry Division (ID), on
occupation duty in Japan, received
orders from Eighth Army on 30 June
to prepare for deployment to South
Korea.11 MG Dean selected the 21st
Graphics from South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950) by Roy E. Appleman
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 47
LESSONS FROM THE PAST
driving past South Korean refugees fleeing south.18 The first
thing LTC Smith conducted at Osan was a reconnaissance
with key leaders from 1-21 IN on 4 July and identified where
to establish his defense, “an irregular line of hills stretched
across the main road [to Osan] and the railway to the east”
(see photo below).19
At the time of its airlift from Japan, TF Smith consisted of
B and C Companies and assorted Headquarters Company
elements: 406 men with small arms, “two 75mm recoilless
guns, two 4.2-inch mortars, and some 2.36-inch bazookas.”20-21 There were experienced men throughout TF Smith
to provide a steady core. Including LTC Smith, “about onethird of the officers…[and] one-half of the non-commissioned
officers were World War II veterans, but not all had been in
combat. Throughout the force, perhaps one man in six had
combat experience.”22 Battery A, 52nd Field Artillery (FA)
Regiment, consisting of six 105mm howitzers with six armordefeating high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds under the
command of LTC Miller Perry, joined 1-21 IN on 4 July.23 TF
Smith established positions on a ridge overlooking the road
from Suwon to Osan. One platoon from B/1-21 IN was to
the west of the road with the rest of B and C/1-21 IN to the
east of the road. A/52 FA was located approximately 1 kilometer south of the infantry positions, except for one howitzer
emplaced forward with the six HEAT rounds (see Map 3 for
reference).24-25 LTC Smith and his men faced KPA forces
consisting of 33 Soviet-built T-34 tanks and 4,000 seasoned
infantry from the KPA 4th Division, with supporting artillery.26
Map 2 — 28 June - 4 July 1950
Infantry Regiment (the “Gimlets”) because it was the closest
24th ID element to Korea. The Gimlets also had the strongest
esprit de corps among the regiments and performed the best
in exercises with the division’s limited training resources in
Japan.12 Concurrently, the KPA 4th Division attacked south
along the rail-highway axis from Yongdungp’o toward Suwon.
It defeated the 5th ROK Regiment fighting a delaying action
on 4 July and rapidly advanced toward Osan (see Map 2).13
At approximately 0730 on 5 July, TF Smith spotted the first
North Korean tanks coming from Suwon unaccompanied by
infantry. Battery A fired a high-explosive (HE) barrage at a
range of approximately 1,800 meters with no effects.27 The
recoilless rifles opened fire at approximately 650 meters and
received fire from KPA T-34 cannons and machine guns in
return. American bazooka teams waited until the KPA tanks
were at point-blank range and then knocked out two T-34s.28
Unfortunately, most of the rockets, as well as the 75mm
recoilless rifles, were ineffective. 2LT Ollie Conner, awarded
the Silver Star after the battle for his actions, “fired 22
rockets, from about fifteen feet... and cursed as his shots...
COL Richard Stephens, commander of the 21st Infantry
Regiment, alerted LTC Charles Smith, commander of the 1st
Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment (1-21 IN), for
deployment at 2245 on 30 June.14 LTC Smith,
a veteran of the Guadalcanal campaign in
World War II, assembled his troops on 1 July.15
Smith had six U.S. Air Force (USAF) C-54s
available for air movement, meaning he could
move only two of his three rifle companies and
half of his 75mm recoilless rifles and 4.2-inch
mortars from the Headquarters Company.16 MG
Dean met LTC Smith on the tarmac at Itazuke
Airfield before the battalion flew to Pusan and
simply said, “Head for Osan. We’ve got to
block the main Seoul-Pusan road as far north
as possible.”17 TF Smith made a rail movement
from Pusan to Taejon on 2 July and a vehicle
movement from Taejon north toward Osan, Task Force Smith's position straddled the Osan-Suwon Road.
48 INFANTRY Spring 2022
failed to cripple the tankers.”29 The remaining
T-34s passed through the infantry’s positions
and moved toward the artillery battery. Battery
A’s lone forward howitzer destroyed two tanks
with HEAT rounds before T-34 fire destroyed
it.30 The remainder of A/52 FA “traded howitzer
for tank, destroying five enemy tanks [including
those destroyed by the HEAT howitzer], and
losing five howitzers.”31 LTC Perry gathered
artillerymen into bazooka teams as a last-ditch
effort to stop the enemy armor. These bazooka
teams destroyed two T-34s, and LTC Perry
was wounded in the leg by North Korean fire
in the process. The KPA T-34s did not stop to
engage A/52 FA and sped toward Osan.32 At this
point, TF Smith suffered around 20 killed and
wounded from enemy fire.33
LTC Smith used the lull in the battle to improve
his companies’ positions and communications as
well as conduct hasty weapons maintenance.34
A column of KPA trucks and dismounted infantry
appeared from Suwon about an hour later. At
900 meters, “Task Force Smith ‘threw the book
at them.’”35 The KPA infantry suffered heavy
casualties as artillery and mortars “landed
smack among the trucks… while 50-caliber
machine guns swept the column.”36 Three T-34s
came forward from the column and fired on
the Americans. North Korean infantry began
to flank TF Smith, establishing support-by-fire
positions on hills to the east and west.37 Fire
from Hill 1230 in the west forced LTC Smith to
move the B Company platoon on the west side
of the road to the main company position (see
Map 3).38 Smith’s executive officer, MAJ Floyd
Martin, moved all extra ammunition and the 4.2-inch mortars
forward from their previous positions closer to the “battalion
command post…[in] a tighter defense perimeter on the highest ground east of the road.”39
LTC Smith lost radio communications with his artillery
at around 1100 because his radios and communications
wire were damaged or destroyed by the previous night’s
rain and enemy fire.40 He could not effectively call for fire
on the KPA machine guns firing from the high ground or
the infantry maneuvering on his position. Nevertheless, TF
Smith kept KPA infantry at bay with small arms and mortar
fire until 1430 when LTC Smith realized the task force’s
situation was untenable.41 In LTC Smith’s own words, “In
an obviously hopeless situation… I was faced with the decision: what the hell to do? To stand and die[?]… I chose to
get out, in hopes that we would live to fight another day.”42
Faced with no other choice, LTC Smith gave the order to
withdraw.43 B Company covered CPT Richard Dashmer’s
C Company, battalion headquarters, and the medical
section’s withdrawal off the ridge toward Osan.44 Once C
Company established a support-by-fire position near the
Map 3 — Task Force Smith at Osan-Ni, 5 July 1950
railroad tracks running to the south, it covered B Company’s
movement with small arms fire.45 At this point, KPA forces
nearly enveloped the battalion, “but the first units… cleared
a pathway… to withdraw southward in small groups.”46 The
withdrawing companies left behind some of their heavy
weapons, and regretfully among the TF’s veterans, their
dead and around 30 non-ambulatory wounded. Despite
leaders’ attempts to keep the movement as orderly as
possible, some men took matters into their own hands and
escaped any way they could, running across rice paddies or
seeking cover from KPA patrols until darkness.47 By nightfall
of 5 July, around 250 personnel from TF Smith, including
LTC Smith, regrouped at Ansong and moved to Taejon the
next morning.48 Smaller groups evaded KPA patrols and
reunited with their units over the following days.49
After the battle, LTCs Perry and Smith said reflectively in
interviews that “a few well-placed antitank mines would have
stopped the entire armored column in the road.”50 There were
no antitank mines in TF Smith or all of Korea.51 TF Smith
suffered approximately 150 casualties killed, wounded, or
missing during the Battle of Osan.52 North Korean casualSpring 2022 INFANTRY 49
LESSONS FROM THE PAST
ties number around 40 killed and 90 wounded and between
four and seven T-34s.53-54 TF Smith’s stand at Osan gave the
24th ID’s 34th Infantry Regiment enough time to deploy to
Korea and establish defenses south of Osan, but actions of
the 34th Infantry Regiment and other 24th ID elements were
all too similar in the first weeks of the Korean War due to
piecemeal employment and KPA momentum.55
They create conditions by disrupting enemy long-range
fires, sustainment, and command and control. These disruptions weaken enemy forces and prevent any early enemy
successes. Operations in depth prevent enemy forces from
maintaining their tempo. In the defense, commanders establish a security area and the main battle area (MBA) with its
associated forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).”63
TF Smith’s defeat at Osan stems from its inappropriate
use of the characteristics of the defense, specifically disruption, flexibility, and operations in depth, and the military
aspect of terrain of key terrain. Disruption, as defined in Army
Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-90, Offense and Defense, is
when “defending forces seek to disrupt attacks by employing
actions that desynchronize an enemy force’s preparations.”56
Disruption means taking action to prevent the enemy’s
plan or operation from working smoothly. TF Smith failed
to practice disruption because it did not effectively employ
anti-armor weapons to destroy significant amounts of KPA
armor.57 This shortcoming led to defeat because TF Smith
did not force an early deployment of forces or stop the North
Korean movement and massing of combat power. The task
force also displayed a lack of disruption because it did not
desynchronize the enemy’s operation. Besides the forces
manning battle positions along the Suwon-Pusan Road,
there were no other effects to block or disrupt the North
Korean advance.58 This deficiency was critical because
North Korean tanks easily punctured TF Smith’s positions
due to ineffective direct and indirect fires targeting the tanks’
movement. Also, North Korean infantry moved unimpeded
near TF Smith’s positions once the North Korean supportby-fire positions achieved suppression.59
Operations in depth means there are multiple parts of the
battlefield to fight the enemy and prevent them from gaining
an advantage. TF Smith did not implement operations in
depth because it employed no security or reconnaissance
elements forward of its position to provide early warning or
disrupt enemy forces and their warfighting functions.64 The
inability to achieve this characteristic was pivotal because
TF Smith had no information about the enemy situation and
did not observe the enemy force until it was a few kilometers
away. LTC Smith arrayed his two companies on line with
each other along a ridge.65 He violated operations in depth
because he did not organize a reserve force or have subsequent battle positions between the infantry and Battery A.
LTC Smith had insufficient forces available to constitute a
reserve or depth, so he had to place his companies on line
to establish the defense. This decision allowed the North
Koreans to penetrate and bypass TF Smith’s battle positions,
leaving no American forces between the North Koreans and
the unprotected artillery battery and Taejon.66
As for flexibility, ADP 3-90 states that “defensive operations require flexible plans that anticipate enemy actions and
allocates resources accordingly. Commanders shift the main
effort as required. They plan battle positions in depth and
the use of reserves in spoiling attacks and counterattacks.”60
Flexibility is having multiple options available to adapt to the
enemy’s actions. TF Smith’s plan to make a stand against
a mobile, armored threat and lack of subsequent battle
positions broke the characteristic of flexibility. The inflexible
nature of TF Smith’s defense was a factor in the loss at Osan
because it confined TF Smith to battle positions on the ridge
and limited the ability to mount a counterattack or retrograde
if necessary. There was also no contingency or anticipation
if North Korean tanks penetrated TF Smith’s positions, which
contradicted the characteristic of flexibility.61 The absence
of flexibility in the defense influenced the outcome of the
battle because once the infantry lost radio communications
with the artillery, A/52 FA knew North Korean tanks were
approaching only when they came into view. The belief that
the enemy tanks would turn around after being engaged by
the infantry meant the artillerymen had to quickly create ad
hoc bazooka teams that had little effect.62
Operations in depth, as defined in ADP 3-90, “is the simultaneous application of combat power throughout an area of
operations. Commanders plan their operations in depth.
50 INFANTRY Spring 2022
ADP 3-90 defines key terrain as “an identifiable characteristic whose seizure or retention affords a marked advantage to either combatant.”67 In layman’s terms, key terrain
is a place or point that gives one side the advantage over
the other if it is controlled or acted upon. TF Smith incorrectly utilized and recognized key terrain because it did not
occupy, or at least deny enemy access to, the high ground
around its battle positions. The North Koreans established
support-by-fire positions on hills to the east and west of the
task force’s positions.68 This event was influential because
the enfilade fire that came from those hills allowed the North
Korean infantry to maneuver on the flanks and into dead
space to envelop TF Smith in its battle positions.69
North Korean forces defeated LTC Smith and his troops
at Osan on 5 July 1950 in the first ground battle between
American and North Korean forces. TF Smith managed to
stop the North Korean advance for several hours, but it was
not enough to slow the momentum as the North Koreans
continued through Osan to P’yongt’aek.70 TF Smith failed
at the Battle of Osan on 5 July 1950 due to the poor use
of the characteristics of the defense, specifically disruption,
flexibility, and operations in depth, and the military aspect of
terrain key terrain, against the Korean People’s Army.
Notes
1
Bill Sloan, The Darkest Summer, Pusan and Inchon 1950: The Battles
that Saved South Korea – and the Marines – From Extinction (NY: Simon &
Schuster, 2009), 22-23.
2
Ibid, 22.
3
Roy K. Flint, “Task Force Smith and the 24th Division: Delay and
Withdrawal, 5-19 July 1950,” in America’s First Battles: 1776-1965, ed.
Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft (Lawrence, KS: University Press of
Kansas, 1986), 270-274.
4
Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1950-51: They Came from the
North (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2010), 85-89.
5
Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (JuneNovember 1950) (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1961),
29-31.
6
Sloan, The Darkest Summer, 19.
7
Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (NY: Hippocrene
Books, 1998), 33.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid, 42-43.
10
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 50-52.
11
Ibid, 59.
12
Flint, “Task Force Smith and the 24th Division,” 271- 276.
13
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 54-58.
14
Richard W. Stephens, “21st Infantry Regiment War Diary for the
Period 29 June to 22 July 1950, from 292400 June 1950 to 302400 June
1950,” in United States Army 24th Infantry Division Unit War Diaries from
June to November 1950 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1950).
15
T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness (NY:
Macmillan, 1963), 65.
16
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 60-61.
17
George B. Busch, Duty: The Story of the 21st Infantry Regiment
(Sendai, Japan: Hyappan Printing Company, 1953), 20.
18
Korea – 1950 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History,
1952), 14.
19
J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of
Korea (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1969), 47.
20
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 60-61.
21
John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 (NY: William
Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991), 77.
22
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 61.
23
Collins, War in Peacetime, 47-50.
24
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 66-67.
25
Collins, War in Peacetime, 49-50.
26
Shelby P. Warren, A Brief History of the 24th Infantry Division in Korea
(Tokyo: Japan News, 1956), 4.
27
Toland, In Mortal Combat, 80.
28
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 69.
29
Busch, Duty, 21.
30
Collins, War in Peacetime, 50-51.
31
Busch, Duty, 20.
32
Collins, War in Peacetime, 51.
33
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 70.
34
Collins, War in Peacetime, 51.
35
Busch, Duty, 21.
36
Collins, War in Peacetime, 52.
37
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 73.
Collins, War in Peacetime, 52.
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 73.
40
Ibid, 70.
41
Alexander, Korea, 60-61.
42
Busch, Duty, 22.
43
Stephens, “21st Infantry Regiment War Diary for the Period 29 June
to 22 July 1950,” 2.
44
Busch, Duty, 21.
45
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 74-75.
46
Stephens, “21st Infantry Regiment War Diary for the Period 29 June
1950 to 22 July 1950.”
47
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 74-75.
48
Busch, Duty, 22.
49
Alexander, Korea, 62.
50
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 72.
51
Ibid, 72.
52
Collins, War in Peacetime, 54.
53
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 76.
54
Alexander, Korea, 58-60; Appleman, South to the Naktong, 69-76;
Collins, War in Peacetime, 50-52; and Millett, The War for Korea, 137-138.
There are conflicting numbers of T-34s destroyed. Most cited sources report
four T-34s destroyed, including Appleman, Collins, and Millett. According to
Alexander, TF Smith destroyed four T-34s and damaged three more to the
point of being combat ineffective.
55
Collins, War in Peacetime, 55.
56
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-90, Offense and Defense, July
2019, 4-1.
57
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 72.
58
Ibid, 65-68.
59
Ibid, 73.
60
ADP 3-90, 4-2.
61
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 70.
62
Ibid, 70-71.
63
ADP 3-90, 4-2.
64
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 66-67.
65
Ibid.
66
Busch, Duty, 21.
67
ADP 3-90, 3-10.
68
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 73.
69
Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost, 60-61.
70
Appleman, South to the Naktong, 79.
38
39
At the time this article was written, CPT Connor McLeod was attending
the Maneuver Captains Career Course at Fort Benning, GA. His previous assignments include serving as a rifle platoon leader, mortar platoon
leader, and assistant S3 with 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment, Joint
Base Lewis-McChord, WA. He earned a bachelor’s degree in history from
Michigan State University.
New from the U.S. Army Center of Military History
The Conflict with ISIS: Operation Inherent Resolve, June 2014 - January 2020
This publication, written by Mason W. Watson, chronicles how a U.S.-led coalition fought against the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) — a terrorist organization that, at its height, controlled a span
of territory in Iraq and Syria the size of Kentucky. Beginning in August 2014, a campaign of targeted
airstrikes slowed ISIS’s offensive momentum and gave U.S. military advisers a chance to help
rebuild the shattered Iraqi Security Forces. With coalition assistance, the Iraqis then liberated their
country in a series of major operations that culminated in the battle for Mosul (2016-2017), one of the
largest urban battles in recent history. The narrative further describes how U.S. Army conventional
and special operations forces enabled local partners, including the Syrian Democratic Forces, to
retake ISIS-held areas of eastern Syria. By January 2020, Iraqi and Syrian forces — supported by
U.S. airpower, armed with U.S. equipment, and trained and assisted by U.S. military advisers — had
defeated ISIS on the battlefield and ended its pretentions to statehood.
Find this publication online at https://history.army.mil/catalog/pubs/78/78-2.html.
1
Spring 2022 INFANTRY 51
Guidelines for the Leader and
the Commander
By GEN Bruce C. Clarke
Guilford, CT: Stackpole Books,
2021 (reprint), 117 pages
Reviewed by LTC (Retired)
Rick Baillergeon
I
f you are looking for a book on
leadership, you know there are
an incredible amount of options out
there. How do you select the “right one” with the seemingly
endless possibilities? The savvy reader knows you must do
your homework and conduct the requisite research. One of
the key aspects of this is to establish the credentials of the
author. Do they have the necessary background, experience,
and expertise to craft a beneficial volume on a difficult subject — leadership? An author who unquestionably possesses
these characteristics is the late GEN Bruce C. Clarke who
addresses leadership (and much more) in his superb volume,
Guidelines for the Leader and the Commander.
Let me highlight those exceptional credentials below. GEN
Clarke served in the U.S. Army from 1917 to 1962 and held
the ranks of private to four-star general. During his long career,
he commanded a long list of formations in war and peacetime.
These include commands at the division and corps level, U.S.
Army Pacific, Seventh U.S. Army, U.S. Army Europe, and
U.S. Continental Army Command. With all his accomplishments, he is perhaps best known for his leadership during
the Battle of the Bulge where his actions and decisions were
critical in halting the German advance. In total, this is clearly
someone who walked the walk and can justifiably talk the talk
on a myriad of topics including leadership.
Before delving into the many virtues of the book, let me
address the history of the volume. Guidelines for the Leader
and the Commander was first published in 1963. The volume
was revised in 1964 and 1968 before its final edition was
published in 1973. For well over 40 years, the book remained
under the radar for new readership. Then in the fall of 2020,
the book was featured on a highly popular podcast, and interest in GEN Clarke’s thoughts rose dramatically. The original
publisher (Stackpole Books) saw this renewed interest and
reprinted the 1973 edition in the spring of 2021, thus providing
the volume for a new generation of readers.
Within this book, GEN Clarke captures these 45 years
of experience. He does this by combining transcripts of his
speeches and lectures, excerpts of his previous works, and
his thoughts on various subjects into a cohesive volume. GEN
Clarke divides these into four distinct sections: Leadership
52 INFANTRY Spring 2022
and Command, Training, Operations and Administration, and
A Final Word (capturing miscellaneous topics). Within each
section, readers will find an incredible amount of nuggets to
reflect upon. Some of these will be things that simply reinforce
your own thoughts or support actions you already perform.
Others may spark fresh views or generate new techniques or
behavior. Not only will this text benefit a military audience, but
those in the civilian world will also find numerous takeaways
from the volume.
There are two factors which greatly assist the reader in
gleaning these nuggets from the volume. First, is the writing
style. This a book where you feel you are in an office with him
and he is having a conversation with you. He also promotes
a dialogue with the reader by having the ability to encourage
them to reflect on points he makes. This reflection time is
invaluable. The other factor is the book’s organization. GEN
Clarke has organized his volume into bite-size chunks for the
reader. Inside the aforementioned four major sections, GEN
Clarke then divides his discussion into more specific chapters. Finally, he provides further specificity by dividing each
chapter into numerous smaller discussion areas. These small
sub-chapters truly promote reflection and comprehension.
There are two additional subjects I would like to address
pertaining to the volume. The first is the dedication GEN Clarke
places at the beginning of his book. Even nearly 60 years ago
(when the volume was written), he sensed the way people
were becoming enamored by technology. Consequently, he
dedicates his book to the “Ground Combat Soldier.” Within
this dedication, he states, “It will be a sorry day for all mankind
in this supersonic nuclear age of ours should the ground combat soldier ever be deprived of his rightful place in the hearts
and minds and military forces of his people.” Obviously, these
words still ring true today.
The second point I would like to address is an added bonus
of the volume. I believe this book affords readers an opportunity to learn about the post-World War II and Korean War
Armies. There is much you can ascertain from GEN Clarke’s
words regarding the state of the force during that period. His
thoughts and opinions on certain areas give a great perspective on the mindset and capabilities of that force.
Some would say that a book on leadership written so long
ago is no longer relevant today. They could not be further from
the truth. Certainly, some of the things GEN Clarke writes on
have changed over the years. However, the basic concepts
and advice he provides are just as powerful today as ever. So
if you are looking for that right book on leadership, I have done
the research for you. This a book crafted by a Soldier and
leader who is truly qualified to speak and write on the subject,
and his advice should be heeded.
The Infantry Creed
I am the Infantry.
I am my country’s strength in war, her deterrent in peace.
I am the heart of the fight… wherever, whenever.
I carry America’s faith and honor against her enemies.
I am the Queen of Battle.
I am what my country expects me to be, the best trained Soldier in the world.
In the race for victory, I am swift, determined, and courageous, armed with a fierce will
to win.
Never will I fail my country’s trust.
Always I fight on... through the foe, to the objective, to triumph overall.
If necessary, I will fight to my death.
By my steadfast courage, I have won more than 200 years of freedom.
I yield not to weakness, to hunger, to cowardice, to fatigue, to superior odds,
For I am mentally tough, physically strong, and morally straight.
I forsake not my country, my mission, my comrades, my sacred duty.
I am relentless.
I am always there, now and forever.
I AM THE INFANTRY!
FOLLOW ME!