The elimination of global poverty and the
duties bestowed on affluent countries
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Politics, Philosophy and Economics
Word Count: 11,978
Submission date: Friday 2nd May 2014
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Contents
Introduction: Global Poverty in Context
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Chapter 1: Impartiality, Special Relationships and Patriotism
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Chapter 2: Demandingess, Utilitarianism and Capitalism
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Chapter 3: An appeal to human rights: negative and positive duties to alleviate poverty
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Conclusion
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Bibliography
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Introduction: Global Poverty in context
There are over 1.2 billion people in the world today who live in absolute poverty, living on less than
$1.25 a day. This equates to approximately 21 percent of the population in the developing world. (The
World Bank Report 2013 Results, 2013, p.5) On average, life expectancy is 28 years lower in the
poorest countries than it is in the richest ones. (De Vita, 2007, p.103) Seventeen million people in
developing countries die each year from curable infectious diseases, 800 million do not get enough
food and 500 million are chronically malnourished. (Tan, p.20, 2004) Yet despite the extent of global
poverty, the OECD recently published figures suggesting development aid fell by 4% in real terms in
2012, following a 2% fall in 2011. (URL=http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats.htm) The fact remains
however, that the vast majority of citizens in affluent countries still have lifestyles significantly
superior to their third-world counterparts. The Economist Intelligence Unit recently released ‘the
where-to-be-born-index 2013’ and it found that quality of life remained considerably higher in
austerity-hit Greece than in Kenya, with the two countries scoring 6.65 and 4.74 out of ten
respectively. (Kekic, 2013, URL= http://econ.st/1noJK8R)
Chapter 1 therefore examines whether developed countries are justified in prioritising their own
national interests, when citizens in other countries remain in abject poverty. The chapter provides a
critique of varying justifications for the claim that we share ‘special relationships’ to compatriots.
Throughout the chapter, I contrast the patriotist claim; that special relationships with compatriots
entail special responsibilities to compatriots, against the cosmopolitan claim; that all human beings,
regardless of their political affiliation, are (or can and should be) citizens in a single community.
(Kleingeld, 2013, URL=http://stanford.io/1rp2N2v) I challenge the moral significance of national
borders, especially in the context of global poverty, and reinforce Samuel Scheffler’s objection that
‘distributive justice can properly be applied only within reasonably cohesive social groups: groups
that share a common history, culture, language, or ethnicity.’ (Scheffler, 2010, p.112) I examine both
instrumental and intrinsic defences of special relationships, but conclude that neither legitimises
affluent countries’ failure to do more to alleviate global poverty.
Chapter 2 changes tack, focusing more upon the themes of supererogation and demandingness.
Philosophers, like Jan Narveson, have suggested that it is simply charitable to alleviate foreign
suffering, because of the severe demands it imposes upon affluent countries. I reply claiming that too
often, theories that claim a duty to ensure freedom from poverty, are mistakenly assumed to be strictly
utilitarian. Using Thomas Pogge’s and Larry Temkin’s ideas, I argue that the elimination of global
poverty would be relatively painless for affluent countries. The chapter concludes by examining why
there is a systematic failure by affluent countries to eliminate global poverty, when its elimination
could be realised at such small costs. I argue that the capitalist mindset combined with the view that
poverty is as an unfortunate rather than unjust phenomenon, leads to extensive apathy and the
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subsequent persistence of global poverty. It is this that sets the foundation for my final chapter, that
freedom from poverty should be a basic human right. Only in this way I argue, will global poverty
ever be eliminated.
The third and final chapter purports the claim that freedom from poverty should be a human right. The
chapter starts by drawing on the ideas of Thomas Pogge to demonstrate how the global order
systematically reinforces and sustains global poverty. I subsequently diverge from Pogge’s position,
claiming that, in isolation, the negative duty to refrain from harming the global poor is insufficient, on
both moral and empirical grounds, in achieving the elimination of global poverty. I base this on
Simon Caney’s claim that we should recognise the importance of both negative and positive duties to
ensure freedom from poverty as a human right. I conclude that only through the recognition of both
duties will universal freedom from poverty, ever be achieved.
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Chapter 1: Impartiality, Special Relationships and Patriotism
Special relationships, specifically special relationships with compatriots, are commonly used as a
means to justify affluent countries’ failure to do more to alleviate global poverty. It is suggested that
partiality towards compatriots is a corollary of a certain type of special relationship; a specific
relationship that conationals have with one another that they do not share with foreigners. (Dagger,
1985; Hurka, 1997; McIntyre, 1984) Critics of special relationships however, suggest that it is a
concept derived from Western common-sense morality to promote and protect the interests of the
affluent. (Scheffler, 2001; Temkin, 2004) The forthcoming chapter examines both instrumental and
intrinsic justifications of special relationships. I show that neither the instrumental nor the intrinsic
justification provides validation for affluent countries’ failure to do more to alleviate global poverty.
1.1 The instrumental case for special relationships with compatriots
Justifying an argument on an instrumental basis implies that the good being argued for is beneficial,
only in the sense that it helps to attain a further good. In this section, I analyse two instrumental
arguments for special relationships. The first centres on the premise that special relationships help to
overcome the psychological limitations of the moral agent. The second argues that special
relationships are the most efficient way of promoting the good. I challenge whether these arguments
hold in the context of global poverty.
Partiality towards family members or compatriots, some suggest can simply be derived from the
psychological limitations of the moral agent. Indeed critics of strict impartiality suggest that it is
psychologically and conceptually impossible for the moral agent to act completely impartially.
(McMahan, 1997, p.111) William Godwin, the forefather of strict impartialism, contests that given a
choice between saving a family member and an archbishop from a raging fire; the moral agent should
choose to save the archbishop. (Godwin, 1793, p.77) But few philosophers, even committed
utilitarians, advocate such impartiality. Indeed, one of the essential features of any moral theory is that
it must be confined by the parameters of human capabilities. Alasdair MacIntyre has been especially
critical of impartiality in this respect. He says ‘liberal morality requires of me to assume an abstract
and artificial- perhaps an even impossible- stance, that of being as such, responding to the
requirements of morality not qua parent or farmer or quarterback, but qua rational agent who has
abstracted him or herself from all social particularity.’ (MacIntyre, 1984, p.12) And this is one of the
major criticisms of strict impartialists like William Godwin and more recently Peter Singer; it is
simply unattainable for moral agents to operate in such an impartial and agent-neutral manner. Samuel
Gorovitz says that ‘one defence of what might be called our moral parochialism is the claim that it is a
psychological necessity; that the scope and complexity of the world's population of individuals is such
that a person would likely become dysfunctional in attempting to deal with more than a restricted
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subset-indeed, a very carefully restricted subset-of that population.’ (Gorovitz, 1977, p. 140) In short,
this argument holds that compatriots should take priority, for the simple reason that our psychological
limitations will not allow us not to grant priority, or even equal consideration, to compatriots. The
impossibility of strict impartiality therefore necessitates the need for special relationships.
This argument can be taken further by advocates of partiality. It is argued that it is not only impossible
for moral agents to act completely impartially; it is also more efficient and conducive to overall
wellbeing. McMahan says ‘it is of course true that, in general, one is better situated than most others
to promote the well-being of those to whom one is specially related, for typically one has a superior
understanding of the nature of their interests.’ (McMahan, 1997, p.116) Even utilitarian philosophers
like Henry Sidgwick and Richard Brandt, who theoretically should advocate greater impartiality, have
sought to defend the instrumental benefit of special relationships. Sidgwick says ‘as each person is for
the most part, from limitation of either power or knowledge, not in a position to do much good to
more than a very small number of persons; it seems, on this ground alone, desirable that his chief
benevolent impulses should be correspondingly limited.’ (Sidgwick, 1874, p.431)
What replies can be made to the two instrumental claims? What is first important to note is that those
philosophers who challenge the partiality claim, vary in the degree of impartiality they advocate. The
most extreme are the likes of Peter Singer, but the more moderate include Samuel Scheffler and
Thomas Pogge. Singer, in his seminal paper, Famine, Affluence and Morality, calls for a particularly
hard-line impartial approach to global justice. Singer famously says ‘if it is in our power to prevent
something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance,
we ought, morally, to do it.’ (Singer, 1972, p.231) He draws on an analogy of walking past a pond and
seeing a child drowning. Failure to save the child from drowning, he suggests takes no account of the
proximity of the child. Singer says ‘it makes no moral difference whether the person I can help is a
neighbour's child ten yards from me or a Bengali whose name I shall never know, ten thousand miles
away.’ (Singer, 1972, pp.231-232)
Whilst I contest the degree of Singer’s impartiality, he does offer an important reply to the
impartiality objection. He says ‘given a society in which a wealthy man who gives five percent of his
income to famine relief is regarded as most generous, it is not surprising that a proposal that we all
ought to give away half our incomes will be thought to be absurdly unrealistic. In a society which held
that no man should have more than enough while others have less than they need, such a proposal
might seem narrow-minded. What it is possible for a man to do and what he is likely to do are both, I
think, very greatly influenced by what people around him are doing and expecting him to do.’ (Singer,
1972, p.237) Singer makes an important point here. Moral theories are normative in their nature; they
seek to answer what moral agents should do. Whilst we should have concerns about the limitations of
human psychology, we should also be receptive to the fact that human psychology is highly
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dependent upon the societal and cultural norms that moral agents function within. Singer is right to
question whether greater impartiality would seem so alien, given a society where aiding the foreign
needy was more readily endorsed.
It was alternatively suggested that special relationships were the most efficient way of maximising
wellbeing. McMahan says ‘according to this argument, the most efficient way to ensure that people
receive the care they need is to assign each special responsibility for those to whom they are specially
related.’ (McMahan, 1997, p.115) This argument however, does not hold in the context of global
poverty. It shows a lack of moral imagination to suggest that the millions of poverty-stricken human
beings living across the world would be best helped by their fellow poverty-stricken friends, families
or compatriots. McMahan asserts that ‘the affluent are in a better position to care for the needs of
millions of impoverished people in other countries than are those people’s families, friends or
conationals.’ (McMahan, 1997, p.116) To suggest that global poverty would be most effectively
eliminated by assigning special relationships to compatriots, is to show naivety to the far superior
resources and wealth that affluent countries have at their disposal.
1.2 The intrinsic justification of special relationships
Other philosophers have sought to justify special relationships with compatriots on an intrinsic basis.
They suggest that special relationships with compatriots can be justified as ends in themselves, rather
than as a means to provide a further good. The forthcoming analysis focuses specifically on three
main claims.
1.2.1 “Charity begins at home”
Andrew Mason says ‘the idea that we have a special obligation to attend to the welfare of our
compatriots might be regarded as a natural extension of the traditional saying “charity begins at
home”.’ (Mason, 1997, p.428) Paul Nuttall, the deputy leader of the United Kingdom’s Independence
Party, used the saying ‘charity begins at home’ to justify his party’s policy of cutting £12bn from the
UK’s international development budget. But what exactly does it mean when people say ‘charity
begins at home’? It is prudent here to draw on Rawls’ discussion of priority. Rawls distinguishes
between two different forms of priority; priority based according to weightings and priority based on
‘lexical ordering’. (Rawls, 1973, pp.36-37) Priority based on weightings implies that it is possible for
moral agents to simultaneously consider the interests of competing groups of people, through
allocating different weightings to them. Priority based on lexical ordering however, ‘requires us to
satisfy the first principle in the ordering before we can move on to the second.’ (Rawls, 1973, p.38)
The appeal to a lexical-ordering conception of priority therefore maintains that we should attend to
our compatriots before concerning ourselves with the wellbeing of the foreign needy, even if our
compatriots are relatively better off. (Mason, 1997, p.428)
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The appeal to a lexical ordering conception of priority becomes especially prominent in times of
relative economic hardship within affluent countries. Over the past five years in the UK for example,
there has been consistent pressure to prioritise domestic affairs, before diverting time and resources to
international development. In November 2011, George Osborne announced that cuts to the UK’s
international development budget would be used to fund ‘capital projects’ within Britain. (Watt, 2011,
http://bit.ly/1iWymOz) In January 2014, there were calls to reallocate the foreign aid budget when
wide-spread flooding hit South-West Britain. (2014, http://dailym.ai/1iVr0sF) Yet the inherent
problem with the lexical-ordering conception of priority, particularly in the context of global poverty,
is that it is not clear when our attention would ever be given to the foreign needy, since there are
always domestic issues of some description. If the foreign needy should only receive our attention
once every issue within national borders has been rectified, then I ultimately question the likelihood
of them ever receiving our attention.
The saying ‘charity begins at home’, should have the qualifier ‘all things being equal.’ The reason
why the lexical priority conception of priority is so narrow-minded, is because it is barely
comprehensible how much better off 99.9% of the British population are compared with those in
poverty-stricken countries that the £12billion would seek to help. This stems back to the lack of moral
imagination by so many within affluent societies. As a percentage of the UK government’s budget,
foreign aid counts for just 0.7%. (2014, http://bit.ly/1l10Qaz) To give a sense of perspective, the UK
government spent eight times more on defence, and the UK public spent more on fizzy drinks in 2013,
than it did on international development. (Tanner, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-23987237)
And yet so many still hold that it is the international development budget that should be targeted. The
most serious problem, however, with using the saying ‘charity begins at home’ in this context, is
using the same word ‘charity’ to describe two exceptionally different situations (whether ‘charity’ is
the right word at all can be ignored for now). To use the same word to describe a situation where
£12bn is used to try to prevent millions of poverty-related deaths, alleviate starvation and malnutrition
or where £12bn is used to offer tax relief to 100,000 UK citizens to enable them to go on a third
holiday abroad in a year, epitomises the insularity of so many within affluent countries.
1.2.2 Family Members, Compatriots and National Identity
An alternative defence of the ‘priority to compatriots’ claim comes from those who suggest that there
are seeming parallels between relationships between compatriots and relationships between family
members. Many would not question the legitimacy of family members granting priority to one another.
On the topic of the relationship between a mother and son, McMahan says ‘it is the objective nature of
the relation she bears to him that both warrants her special concern and ground the special reasons she
has to favour him.’ (McMahan, 1997, p.111) It is not for instrumental reasons that a mother has a
special relationship to her son; it is just the fact that the person is her son. Whether special
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relationships with compatriots can be derived in such an intrinsic sense, has been the topic of great
controversy. Whilst it is widely accepted that the nature of relationships between family members and
compatriots are different, some philosophers like Thomas Hurka, claim that there is as much character
to relationships between compatriots as there is between family members. (Hurka, 1997, p.149) Hurka
claims that the love of family members derives from both an admiration of distinct character traits but
also loving that person for certain historical qualities. (Hurka, 1997, pp.150) He contends that these
two conditions for love and partiality are essentially parallel in terms of attachment to conationals. He
says ‘nationalists are, first attracted to their culture and the activities that define it, thinking them to a
considerable degree good…what attaches them specially to this culture and its members are historical
facts: that this is the culture they grew up in, that their conationals share with them a history of being
shared in, participating in, and sustaining the culture.’ (Hurka, 1997, pp.150-151) Hurka’s
justification of partiality towards compatriots is therefore derived from shared identity and its cultural
and historical significance. Based on the premise that partiality towards family members is justified
on the grounds of love of particular character traits and shared history, Hurka claims that the grounds
of cultural heritage, shared national identity and history, provides an appropriate comparison to
legitimise special relationships with compatriots.
The credibility of this analogy is contentious. Familial relations are very different in their nature from
the relationships between conationals. Family bonds are far more personal and far more precious than
the bonds between conationals. We know everything about our family members, we have shared
experiences and we have a stronger duty to protect them. Lichtenberg says ‘the emotional and
psychological needs met by intimate familial relationships are among the most important we can
imagine.’ (Lichtenberg, 1997, p.167) This is inherently different to relationships between compatriots;
indeed it is unlikely that an individual will know even one per cent of their compatriots. Even if one
accepts that conationals share a common frame of reference that they do not share with foreigners,
why should this provide a moral justification for a greater obligation to compatriots, particularly when
it comes to access to basic necessities like food, water and shelter? It is a mistake to suggest that there
is a parallel between the special relationships forged between family members and the ‘special
relationships’ formed between compatriots, for the intrinsic essence of the two types of relationship
are so fundamentally different.
This reply can be developed further. Why is it that Hurka makes his identity argument on a national
level? Indeed what is the significance of national borders in terms of shared identity? National identity
is a strange concept in that there are often very few features that all members of a particular country
can claim to share. A banker working in Canary Wharf for example, would appear to have very little
in common with a retired coal-miner in Durham. There is such great variation between communities
within a country, it is often hard to see where the concept of ‘national identity’ fits in. The retired
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coal-miner in Durham may in fact feel a stronger sense of shared identity with a coal-miner in a
foreign country, who shares more of the same values, than he would with the banker in London. This
challenge to national identity can be approached in the opposite way too. Indeed, sometimes shared
identity transcends national borders; it is not a case of national identity, but rather a case of
transnational identity. Scandinavian countries for example are often stereotyped ‘as wealthy,
enlightened, rational Protestants with strong welfare states, lax rules of sexual morality and an
institutionalised yearning for nature and simplicity.’ (Eriksen, 1997, URL= http://bit.ly/1lITviA) And
there is no doubt that as globalisation develops, the presence of transnational identities will continue
to prosper and grow. McMahan concludes saying ‘many sub-national cultures exist within a single
nation, whose unity may be more political or religious than cultural, and there can also be a union of
nations whose historical cultures coexist within and contribute to a larger, encompassing culture based
in part on respect for diversity.’ (McMahan, 1997, p.121) Hurka’s claim that national identity
provides the basis for special relationships with compatriots seems flawed at the outset; it is not even
clear that national shared identity even exists.
1.2.3 Contractualism and Special Responsibilities
An appeal to national identity has proven to be ineffective in justifying special relationships with
compatriots. Some have argued that an alternative justification can be derived from reciprocity and
political obligation. This argument holds that we accept the burdens of special relationships with
compatriots, so we are consequently justified in benefiting from the mutual cooperation. Dagger coins
this the reciprocity argument. (Dagger, 1985, p.436) Whilst special relationships result in a partial and
mutually beneficial relationship between two agents, their existence can be legitimised on the grounds
that they are not arbitrarily beneficial; they impose burdensome and costly responsibilities. Mason
says ‘the idea here is presumably that because each citizen enjoys the benefits of cooperation with
others, fair play requires that she accept the burdens imposed when others are unable to contribute
fully to the cooperative enterprise.’ (Mason, 1997, p.433) Scheffler adds that ‘the benefits that such
responsibilities confer on the participants in interpersonal relationships are always offset by the
burdens they impose. Special responsibilities confer no net advantage on participants and, a fortiori,
no unfair net advantage.’ (Scheffler, 2001, p.87)
The argument from reciprocity is grounded on the ideals of fair play. Citizens of the UK benefit from
services such as the National Health Service, and unemployment and sickness benefit. These benefits,
however, come at a cost; primarily through taxation and national insurance contributions. People are
prepared to accept the burdens of taxation and obeying the laws, in order to benefit from a more
prosperous and safer society. It is this cooperative enterprise that Dagger believes justifies our priority
to compatriots. He says ‘compatriots take priority because we owe it to them as a matter of reciprocity.
Everyone, compatriot or not, has a claim to our respect and concern- a claim founded on the right of
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autonomy- but those who join with us in cooperative enterprises have a claim to special recognition.
Their cooperation enables us to enjoy the benefits of the enterprise, and fairness demands that we
reciprocate.’ (Dagger, 1985, p.446) It follows that while we have a duty to respect the autonomy of
every moral agent irrespective of their nationality, we have a special concern to compatriots, because
of the cooperative nature of our relationship with them.
Those who stress the importance of special relationships, suggest that simply entering into a partial
relationship with someone grants special responsibilities to that person. This is something that
Scheffler and other cosmopolitan philosophers have challenged. It seems questionable that simply
being part of the same group or being part of the same country automatically entails that one has
special responsibilities to other members of the group. In fact, it seems unnecessary to suggest that we
have added responsibility to these people, when we already benefit enough through these relationships.
(Scheffler, 2001, p.85) Redistributing responsibilities in such a way that we have special
responsibilities to those closest to us, ultimately leads to additional advantages to those who have
already benefited from group membership. Scheffler persists saying ‘if Alice and Beth happen to be
wealthier than Carla, then the idea that morality requires them also to receive the advantage of having
increased claims to each other's services may be seen as unjustifiably reinforcing the prior inequality
in resources.’ (Scheffler, 2001, p. 85) Framing this is the context of international justice; people living
in affluent societies already benefit enough from just being part of that society, why is there a need to
confer additional advantages to these people by claiming special responsibilities? This is what
Scheffler terms the distributive objection. (Scheffler, 2001, p.85)
The distributive objection ‘challenges the idea that the members of affluent societies have special
responsibilities to their associates that they do not have to other people.’ (Scheffler, 2001, p.85) The
objection suggests that the entire concept of ‘special responsibilities’ is simply a pseudo-moral term
that promotes partiality and leads to favouritism amongst certain prosperous groups. The corollary of
special responsibilities is that it offers a form of validation by which members of affluent societies can
hoard and maintain wealth. In Scheffler’s terms, it creates the moral equivalent of a ‘tax shelter’.
(Scheffler, 2001, p.85) It provides moral justification for members of affluent societies to channel
resources, time and energy into local affairs, therefore sacrificing efforts towards the needier. Through
entering into these reciprocal relationships, the wealthy can protect their resources from the
potentially burdensome demands of global justice.
In reply to the distributive objection, it is contested that those close to us do not necessarily impinge
upon our general responsibilities. Indeed we should not see the relationship between special and
general responsibilities as a trade-off, rather special responsibilities are simply additional
responsibilities that we have as well as general responsibilities. (Scheffler, 2001, p.85) Having special
responsibilities to family members or fellow compatriots does not mean that we cannot have general
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responsibilities to people living on the other side of the world. Total number of responsibilities should
not be seen as finite, rather total share of responsibility should and can be whatever morality dictates.
Therefore special responsibilities should not serve to weaken our general responsibilities; they should
simply increase our total share of responsibilities. (Scheffler, 2001, p.86)
Scheffler concedes that if the above were true, then the distributive objection would no longer be valid.
(Scheffler, 2001, p.86) If it is possible to have special responsibilities simultaneously with general
responsibilities, then the distributive objection no longer applies, for the distributive objection holds
that special responsibilities impinge upon our general duties. One of the problems however, with
taking this line of defence is that special responsibilities could no longer be utilised as a defence
against the demands of global justice. Scheffler comments that ‘the point of the argument is that the
extent of our responsibilities to non-associates is fixed independently of our special responsibilities to
our associates.’ (Scheffler, 2001, p.86) Whilst this objection does provide a response to the
distributive objection, it would concede that we have general responsibilities to everyone irrespective
of partial ties. Indeed our special responsibilities should have no impact upon general responsibilities.
By trying to overcome the distributive objection, this reply grants the practical conclusion that the
objection seeks to establish. (Scheffler, 2001, p.86) Appeals to reciprocity only serve to exacerbate
the inequality between rich and poor countries. Affluent countries already benefit enough from
cooperative enterprise with fellow compatriots, why is there a need to claim special responsibilities as
well?
1.2.4 Priority to compatriots or foreigners?
Many of the arguments in this chapter so far have rested on the widely held belief that when it comes
to special claims compatriots have against us, we owe more to them, than we do to foreigners. There
are, however, many instances where we actually have greater obligations to those living in foreign
countries. A good way to illustrate this is through the use of some examples:
1. We can dam a river lying wholly within our national territory to the disadvantage of fellow
citizens living downstream. We may not dam rivers flowing across international boundaries to
the disadvantage of foreigners downstream. (Goodin, 1988, p.669)
2. We can tax fellow citizens, even if they are resident abroad. We cannot so tax foreigners
residing abroad on income earned abroad. (Goodin, 1988, p.669)
Goodin says ‘the situation is very much a mixed one. Sometimes we are indeed permitted (sometimes
even required) to treat our fellow citizens better than we treat those who do not share that status with
us. Other times, however, we are required to treat noncitizens better than we need to treat our own
fellow citizens.’ (Goodin, 1988, p.671) In the examples above however, they all tend to be negative
duties. Indeed these are duties not to interfere or harm; not duties to actively aid or assist. This stems
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back to the mutual-benefit society model advocated by Dagger. The widely held consensus is that we
can undermine negative duties to compatriots, if through undermining those negative duties, it
benefits our own society. This does not seem to apply with interaction with foreign societies.
Certainly on a theoretical level, there is instead far greater respect for negative duties; duties not to
interfere, harm or coerce.
There are two corresponding problems that arise from this discussion. Goodin gives examples of
instances where the negative duty to foreigners is stronger than it is to compatriots. I demonstrate in
Chapter 3 that affluent countries have not and are not taking as passive a stance as many would seem
and like to think; the negative duty not to harm the global poor is being systematically violated in the
context of global poverty. The second problem that subsequently arises, is that if we come to
recognise that we are undermining the negative duty not to harm the global poor, then this is not being
contractually legitimised by a corresponding positive duty to actively improve the wellbeing of those
in foreign territories. I hold that affluent countries are failing both their negative and positive duties to
the global poor. This is something that is examined in greater detail in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 2: Demandingness, Utilitarianism and Capitalism
The preceding chapter offered an analysis of patriotist and contractual defences of affluent countries’
failure to do more to alleviate foreign poverty. This chapter starts by examining a different defence:
an appeal to the demands imposed by a duty to ensure universal access to basic necessities. This
defence holds that the alleviation of poverty should be supererogatory, primarily because of the severe
demands that it would impose upon members and governments of affluent countries. Jan Narveson
says, ‘those willing to help at larger or immense cost to themselves qualify for our admiration in so
doing, but go far beyond what duty requires.’ (Narveson, 2003, p.420) The chapter starts by depicting
the demandingness claim, focusing specifically on what exactly it claims is too demanding. I
subsequently turn to the ideas of Temkin and Pogge to explain why Narveson’s and Cullity’s
demandingness objection may offer a compelling criticism of strict utilitarianism, but why this does
not entail a corresponding criticism of a duty to alleviate global poverty. I then seek to examine the
causal influences that lead to affluent countries failing to do more to alleviate global poverty. This
ultimately provides the foundation for my claim that the persistence of absolute poverty should be
regarded as a human rights violation.
2.1 The demandingness claim
The demandingness claim holds that we cannot have a duty to eliminate global poverty for it imposes
too strong a demand on those in affluent countries. Narveson makes this appeal through the concept of
marginal costs. He says ‘we morally ought to render help whenever the marginal benefit as we see it
exceeds the marginal cost on that occasion.’ (Narveson, 2003, p.425) But in Narveson’s theory, he is
sensitive to variations and changes in different people’s ‘psychic budgets’. He says ‘for those whose
psychical and other budgets are small, and whose marginal cost-functions are quite sensitive to the
number of instances in a given amount of time when we can help, we will be able to say that we have
done our duty by performing in a certain smallish number of cases.’ (Narveson, 2003, p.425)
Narveson’s theory, in many respects, reflects the state of affairs in affluent societies today. In the
midst of economic recession, the perceived ability for people in affluent countries to sacrifice
resources falls, which is hence why there are cuts to international development and a reallocation of
resources to domestic issues. This argument appears to have intuitive appeal.
Others have argued that the supererogatory nature of doing more to aid the foreign needy stems from
the unacceptable burden this would impose upon members of affluent countries. Cullity says ‘the
sacrifice involved would amount to more than just forgoing the extra enjoyments one could have in
spending more money on oneself. More seriously and significantly, it would mean compromising
those “life-enhancing” goods that are the most important components of our lives.’ (Cullity, 2003,
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pp.405-406) Cullity raises this objection to what he terms the severe demand. Cullity says the severe
demand entails that:
I should continue to contribute to aid agencies increments of time and money each of which is large
enough to allow those agencies to save a life, until either:
(a) there are no longer any lives to be easily saved by those agencies, or
(b) contributing another increment would itself harm me enough to excuse my failing to save any
single life directly at that cost. (Cullity, 2003, p.405)
Cullity’s objection specifically targets a strongly impartialist, utilitarian theory of justice adopted by
the likes of Singer and Unger. Cullity’s criticism bares resemblance with Bernard William’s critique
of utilitarianism. Williams argues that utilitarianism is flawed because it fails to consider the intrinsic
importance that one’s personal projects has in one’s life. He says ‘utilitarianism would do well to
acknowledge the evident fact that among the things that make people happy is not only making other
people happy, but being taken up or involved in any of a vast range of projects.’ (Williams, 1973,
p.109) The crux of Narveson’s and Cullity’s argument is that the autonomy and personal projects of
those in affluent countries need to be safeguarded against the severe demands that the elimination of
global poverty calls for.
2.2 The reality of global poverty
The demandingess objection raised by the likes of Cullity and Narveson implies that huge sacrifice
would be necessary to alleviate poverty across the world. Pogge however, suggests that shifting
merely 1.2 percent of aggregate global income would eradicate severe poverty worldwide. (Pogge,
2003, p.2) Temkin says the additional cost of achieving and maintaining universal access to basic
education for all, basic health care for all, reproductive health care for all women, adequate food for
all and safe water and sanitation for all is less than 4% of the combined wealth of the 225 richest
people in the world. (Temkin, 2004, p.360) It is vitally important to appreciate just how easy the
elimination of global poverty could be. In Chapter 1, there was a discussion about the confines of
human psychology and the effects this has on a moral agent’s ability to act impartiality. The reality of
the global situation, however, is such that it is not necessary for members of affluent countries to act
completely impartially. Strict impartiality is not a prerequisite for poverty elimination. Few would
argue that a world, in which everyone set aside 1% of their income, would be a world beyond the
realm of human psychological capabilities. Critiques of Singerism and strict utilitarianism question
the rigour of the impartialist claim that ‘everyone ought to give as much as possible at least up to the
point at which by giving more one would begin to cause serious suffering for oneself.’ (Singer, 1972,
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p.234) This is very different from questioning the claim that everyone ought to give the amount
necessary to remove global poverty.
The question that subsequently arises from this discussion is why are affluent countries not doing
more to alleviate global poverty, when it requires such relatively small sacrifice? I examine three
reasons, none of which I argue, legitimises our failure to alleviate foreign poverty.
2.2.1: Apathy
Unfortunately, the reality of the situation is that there are simply not enough people living in affluent
countries who feel compelled and obliged to alleviate foreign poverty. Pogge suggests the reason why
global poverty persists is because we do not find its eradication morally compelling. (Pogge, 2002, p.3)
This in part comes down to the fact that, while we live in an increasingly global society, with
technology and communication improving all the time, it is still so easy for members of affluent
countries to be consumed by their daily lives, without being explicitly reminded of the extent of
poverty overseas. It is only when we are reminded, through programmes like Children in Need, that
there is a greater propensity for more people to feel compelled to give. The problem remains that, as
soon as we revert back to our day-to-day lives, that exposure disappears and as a result, extensive
apathy towards global poverty persists.
2.2.2: Aid fatigue
A major justification people give for failing to give more in the form of foreign aid is that it is simply
ineffective. This claim certainly has elements of truth to it. Pogge admits that the Official
Development Assistance (ODA) has done very little to stimulate development in poverty-stricken
countries. (Pogge, 2002, p.9) I do not challenge those who criticise the effectiveness of aid; rather I
challenge those who suggest that the historical ineffectiveness of aid provides a legitimate
justification for abandoning aid altogether. There are two ways to react to historical aid
ineffectiveness. The first is to retreat to a fatalistic, pessimistic position that accepts that all aid is
ineffective and subsequently abandon it altogether. The second is to work harder to create new and
more efficient initiatives that help create sustainable and long-term development in poorer countries.
Pogge argues that instead of funding direct transfers of wealth to poor households, we need, instead,
to focus on developing social infrastructure through investing in basic schooling, safe water and
transport networks. (Pogge, 2002, p.9)
2.2.3: Capitalism and Consumerism
The fundamental underlying cause of affluent capitalist societies’ failure to eliminate global poverty
stems from capitalism and the impact it has upon human psychology. Capitalism is a self-centred
economic system that is orientated around the individual. In a capitalist system, consumerism and
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materialism are not viewed as vices, but as vehicles to stimulate prosperity and economic growth.
Because capitalism instils such egocentrism and selfishness in moral agents, the prospect of
sacrificing a proportion of one’s wealth to those to whom one does not necessarily feel one has done
any harm, appears to be highly counterintuitive. Even donating just 1% of one’s personal income is
viewed as so praiseworthy and admirable, because it runs so inherently counter to the ideals promoted
in a capitalist system. Consumerism, a natural by-product of capitalism, also presents another massive
stumbling block. Temkin says ‘if you ask which outcome is better, one in which many innocent
people painfully die of easily avoidable causes, or one in which affluent people eat out less, and have
fewer toys, clothes, or appliances, surely on any plausible theory of the goodness of outcomes, the
latter outcome would be better than the former.’ (Temkin, 2004, p.355) And whilst Temkin is
absolutely right to suggest that the latter is more desirable, the reality remains that the former outcome
is so much more likely in a capitalist society, because there is far greater encouragement of excessive
consumption of non-essential goods, than there is on using income to save easily preventable deaths.
This epitomises the problem of viewing poverty simply as a natural social phenomenon in capitalist
societies. The egocentric nature of capitalism coupled with the attitude that poverty is an unfortunate
rather than unjust phenomenon, results in a global situation where 1.2 billion people around the world
live in absolute poverty. The systematic apathy in affluent countries is why an entirely different
approach to poverty is needed.
At present, poverty alleviation is seen simply as a charitable, rather than an obligatory act, and
because capitalism instils such selfishness in people, very few choose to embark on this ‘charitable’
act. In the final chapter, I develop a different theory, a theory based on the premise that absolute
poverty is a violation of human rights. For if poverty is viewed in this way, a very different approach
will have to be taken by affluent countries. Pierre Sane, Assistant Director-General Social and Human
Sciences Sector UNESCO says ‘if…poverty were declared to be abolished, as it should with regard to
its status as a massive systematic and continuous violation of human rights, its persistence would no
longer be a regrettable feature of the nature of things. It would become a denial of justice.’ (Sane,
2003, URL=https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/node/326)
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Chapter 3: An appeal to human rights: negative and positive duties to alleviate poverty
The focus of this final chapter will put forward the claim that the human right to ensure access to
basic necessities (i.e. freedom from poverty) imposes both negative and positive duties on those living
in affluent countries. The chapter starts with a brief discussion of human rights as a theoretical
concept. From there, I focus on the less controversial claim that affluent countries have a negative
duty not to actively harm those living in severe poverty. Contrary to common opinion that we are not
actively harming those living in poverty, I draw on the ideas of Thomas Pogge to demonstrate how
the global order systematically reinforces and sustains poverty. I then diverge from Pogge’s position,
claiming that eliminating institutional and contractual injustices do not suffice alone, in fulfilling our
duty to eliminate global poverty. I subsequently turn to Simon Caney’s more controversial claim that
affluent countries have a positive duty to actively aid and assist those in chronic poverty. For if
poverty persists after we fulfil our negative duty not to deprive people of access to basic necessities,
can we remain blind to their suffering? I argue that this constitutes a denial of justice and undermines
the inviolable nature of human rights.
3.1 Human rights:
Ascribing a specific definition to human rights has been the subject of much moral and political
controversy. A relatively non-controversial definition comes from Ashford; she says ‘human rights
are a set of urgent and rock bottom moral claims against others that every human being has simply in
virtue of their humanity.’ (Ashford, 2007, p.184) Human rights are therefore a foundational concept
that do not rely on further principles for their justification. McKinnell comments:
‘An acknowledgement of a right often seems to be taken to be the acknowledgement that a certain
course of action must be taken, no matter what other moral considerations are at stake. Rights then
seem to have some special force or demandingness which gives them a particular kind of moral
priority over other salient features of a situation.’ (McKinnell, 2010, p.63)
But as McKinnell identifies, most rights are considered claim rights; when X’s right to something
imposes a duty on some other person(s). (McKinnell, 2010, p.68) It is this type of right I am primarily
concerned with, for in the context of this paper, it bears most relevance. Ashford comments that ‘a
right to basic necessities is a claim right, and it therefore entails corresponding duties.’ (Ashford, 2007,
p.183) The corresponding duties associated with establishing a human right to basic necessities
provides a good opportunity to make an important insight into the distinction between positive and
negative duties. This has been touched upon previously, but it is now something that needs further
discussion.
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Ashford says ‘the distinction between positive and negative duties is generally drawn in terms of the
distinction between the duty to actively aid someone and the duty to refrain from interfering in
someone’s life in such a way as to cause them to be significantly worse off than they would have been
without the agent’s intervention.’ (Ashford, 2007, p.187) The right to basic necessities therefore
potentially entails two different kinds of duties; first, we refrain from any action that has the
propensity to restrict another person’s access to basic necessities and secondly, we take certain
positive actions that help to ensure another’s access to basic necessities. This distinction between
positive and negative duties raises some important questions in the context of global poverty. The first
is whether we actually operate within a world where everyone’s right to be free of external
interference in attaining basic necessities actually exists. The second question is if this negative duty
is, or could be implemented, would it suffice in isolation in realising the human right to basic
necessities? The third and final question, is can a compelling case be made to support the claim that
there is a positive duty on the part of those living in affluent countries to actively aid the needy, to
ensure a human right to basic necessities?
3.2 Negative duties
The following discussion of negative duties will be divided into two subsections: the first examines
the moral justification of the negative duty not to deprive anyone of access to basic necessities, whilst
the second examines whether this negative duty is being successfully upheld in contemporary society.
3.2.1 The justification of negative duties
For those living in the West, it is hard to empathise and imagine the suffering of those living in
absolute poverty. The harms inflicted through living in a state where secure access to basic necessities
is not guaranteed, in many ways bears resemblance to living in slavery or facing genocide. (Ashford,
2007, p.190) Just as slavery and genocide entail deprivation of individual autonomy and self-respect,
so too does poverty. Access to basic necessities is a fundamental prerequisite for the virtues of
personal autonomy and individual freedom to have any practical value. Gewirth says ‘there is basic
wellbeing, which consists in having elemental abilities and conditions that are needed for any
purposive action at all; it includes having life, physical integrity, and mental equilibrium.’ (Gewirth,
2007, p.222) No moral theory would hold it permissible to actively impose slavery or conditions of
genocide on a moral agent. And if we recognise the parallels between poverty, slavery and genocide,
in terms of the debilitating impact it has upon the moral agent’s basic wellbeing and personal
autonomy, then it is seemingly uncontroversial to suggest that it is morally unjustifiable to impose
conditions of poverty. There is accordingly a unanimous recognition of a negative duty not to actively
cause and intensify deprivation of access to basic necessities.
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3.2.2 Failing our negative duty?
There is unanimity in the acceptance of a negative duty not to actively deprive of access to basic
necessities. This unanimity, however, is not found in discussions of whether this negative duty is
being satisfactorily upheld in contemporary society. Thomas Pogge for instance says: ‘we have a
negative duty not to harm the very poor through our uncompensated contribution to imposing upon
them a global institutional order which is so designed that it forseeably produces avoidable human
rights deficits on a massive scale.’ (Pogge, 2007, p.6) Jan Narveson however, argues : ‘it was once
popular - and still is in some quarters - to claim that the rich countries are somehow “exploiting” the
poor ones - even, perhaps, stealing from them - and that this is a terrible thing which should weigh
heavily on the consciences of the “rich” nations…the claim is essentially ludicrous.’ (Narveson,
pp.334-335)
The dissimilarity in Pogge’s and Narveson’s statements, epitomise the divergence in philosophical
opinion in the debate surrounding negative duties and global poverty. Those who contest that the
existing global order causes poverty, often accept that rich countries have, and indeed continue, to get
richer. The caveat they make is that this process does not occur at the expense of poor countries;
rather it comes as a benefit to them. (Narveson, 2004, p.334) Narveson appeals to the principle of
Pareto optimality to substantiate this argument. Pareto optimality holds that a distribution of wealth or
resources is optimal such that redistribution to one party is detrimental to one or more others.
(http://bit.ly/QHy4Re) Narveson contends that the global order is not epitomised by richer countries
exploiting poorer ones; rather it works on a more cooperative basis such that the distribution is
optimally conducive to all countries, rich and poor ones alike. This claim however, is both naïve and
empirically inaccurate.
In 1960, the income gap between Europe and Africa was 30:1. In 2005 this ratio had increased to 47:1.
(Pogge, 2007, p.31) This is far from consistent with Pareto optimality. Pogge suggests that this
widening of the income gap stems from the unequal potency rich and poor countries possess when it
comes to negotiating trade deals and the terms of their economic interaction. (Pogge, 2007, p.31)
Pogge argues that international institutions, like the World Trade Organisation (WTO), have only
served to exacerbate the divergence between rich and poor countries. In 2005, for example, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development estimated that poor countries could export $700
billion more a year, if rich countries did more to open their markets. (Pogge, 2007, p.37) Pogge
likewise suggests that the legal framework in place for pharmaceutical research shows yet again how
‘the global rules are designed against the interests of the poor.’ (Pogge, 2007, p.37) The TRIPS
agreement, sanctioned by the WTO, allows inventors a 20-year monopoly over any new
pharmacological product. (Oh, 2007, p.34) These monopolies subsequently lead to significantly
higher prices, meaning that most drugs are often too expensive for the global poor. Pharmaceutical
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companies accordingly concentrate research on drugs designed for the affluent, for this is inevitably
the most profitable strategy. Indeed, of the 1,393 new drugs approved between 1975 and 1999, only
13 were for tropical diseases. (Pogge, 2007, p.37) This no doubt ties back in to the seeming
incompatibility of capitalism and the alleviation of poverty.
It is not simply international organisations who actively fuel and sustain global poverty. Governments
of wealthy countries demand that poor countries prioritise repaying outstanding debts owed to them,
rather than allowing them to invest more resources in basic social infrastructure like education, healthcare and transport. Multi-national corporations exploit the desperation of workers living at or below
the poverty line by paying pitifully low wages, just to ensure excessively high profit margins. In
China for example, it is estimated that employees at clothing, electronic and other export factories
typically work more than 80 hours and make just 42 cents an hour. (Holmes, 2006,
URL=http://buswk.co/Pw11hS) And even on an individual level, we play our part. Small changes in
consumer preferences can instantly trigger the unemployment of 500 factory workers in Bangladesh
plunging them back into poverty. Failure to respect the negative duty not to actively cause poverty is
something that occurs at a micro and macro level; international organisations, rich and poor
governments, multi-national corporations and individual agents all bear some responsibility. Indeed
Pogge says ‘the persistence of severe poverty depends on human decisions at all levels- from large
political decisions about the basic rules of our national or global economy to small personal decisions
about consumption, saving and NGO contributions.’ (Pogge, 2007, p.6)
It is clear that the current global order systematically fuels poverty. It is less clear how this constitutes
a human rights violation. In a typical human rights violation, there is an obvious victim and an
obvious perpetrator. In the example of slavery, it is easy to identify the slave as the victim and the
slave owner as the violator. Slavery offences subsequently allow for easy prosecution, for
identification of the violator is straightforward. The same cannot be said about the infliction of
poverty. Ashford says that ‘direct responsibility is often shared by millions of agents who make a
contribution to these causal chains, generally in the course of their everyday behaviour.’ (Ashford,
2007, p.202) This leads to a dichotomy; either we have to accept that causing poverty cannot be
considered a human rights violation or we need a shift in our conception of human rights to cater for
examples like poverty, where it is not clear that there is an isolated individual or institution is guilty of
violating that right. I hold that the latter of these two options should be embraced; indeed a shift is
needed in how we conceive human rights violations to accommodate for instances where the
perpetrator is not acting independently.
In a world that is becoming increasingly complex, it is becoming more difficult to assign
responsibility for human rights breaches to a particular individual or ruling elite. Ashford argues that
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in modern society, the biggest threat to people’s autonomy derives from social institutions that
predicate and influence the behaviour of millions of individuals, many of whom, unintentionally cause
the resulting harm. (Ashford, 2007, p.203) But if we are to accept that human rights violations can be
caused by complex causal chains, then we have to be wary of the psychological issues this creates for
duty bearers of those human rights. Ashford points out that the impact on our moral conscience is far
smaller when we play a small contributory role in impoverishing the lives of millions of people, than
it is when we take primary or sole responsibility for a far lesser harm. (Ashford, 2007, p.203) The
concept of human rights however, is in some ways already sophisticated enough to pre-empt this issue.
Claim rights are categorised into two sub-categories; claim rights in personam and claim rights in rem.
Claim rights in personam are rights held against a particular individual, whereas claim rights in rem
are those held against everyone. (McKinnell, 2010, p.70) The right not to be deprived of basic
necessities is a claim right in rem for it is a right held against everyone. The reason why poverty
persists is not because people maliciously pursue actions that will harm the global poor, rather it is the
outright failure of people to take personal responsibility for their contribution to such harms. (Ashford,
2007, p.203) Indeed the claim right in rem is not respected, for there is widespread failure to
appreciate how this right comes to be undermined. This poses a serious problem for the global
community, for most of the serious problems the world faces today are not caused by isolated
individuals or groups, but from the aggregate effect of individuals and institutions. Global poverty is
an example, but so too are the likes of overpopulation and environmental issues. It is crucial that we
should revise our conception of human rights as Ashford suggests, or at least reconsider the way we
view claim rights in rem, for it is only then that we will we begin to understand and take responsibility
for the way we systematically reinforce and intensify global poverty.
3.3 Positive Duties:
‘My moral sympathies lie with those who are appalled by how the vast majority of affluent people
ignore the massive underfulfillment of human rights in the present world. Yet, my intellectual
sympathies lie with those who hold that an agent’s failure at low cost to protect and to rescue others
from extreme deprivation, however morally appalling, is not a human rights violation.’ (Pogge, 2007,
p.19) Pogge argues we have a negative duty not to worsen the plight of those in poverty, but we do
not have a positive duty to actively aid and assist those in extreme deprivation. At this point, I seek to
diverge from Pogge’s position by refuting his claim that we have no such positive duty to actively
alleviate the suffering of the global poor.
Let us suppose that we lived in a world in which all negative duties not to deprive anyone of access to
basic necessities were realised; the WTO encouraged greater equality in trading standards,
pharmaceutical research was rewarded by incentive schemes based on the number of people the drug
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helped, and multi-national corporations and members of affluent countries showed greater awareness
of how their actions cumulatively sustained and intensified global poverty. This would undoubtedly
catalyse the elimination of global poverty. But let us now suppose that despite the restructuring of
global institutions, poverty levels fell but some remained. Pogge at this point would have to concede
that the presence of this poverty was justifiable. I propose that this thought experiment emphasises the
necessity for both a negative and positive duty to ensure freedom from poverty as a human right. To
use Simon Caney’s words ‘if we are to eradicate and to assure people of the human right not to suffer
from poverty we must accept a scheme of positive, as well as negative, duties of justice.’ (Caney,
2007, p.294) For if the human right to be free from poverty is conceived this way, then poverty must
be eliminated irrespective of its cause, no matter if it arises from the unjust arrangement of global
institutions (as Pogge suggests) or from local causes or natural calamities. (Caney, 2007, p.294)
The institutional account of justice holds that duties of justice extend to ‘those who are members of
the same scheme of trade, cooperation, and economic interdependence.’ (Caney, 2007, p.281) At the
end of Chapter 1, there was a discussion about the tendency that contractual and institutional
relationships had in strengthening positive duties whilst weakening negative ones. Indeed the
institutional account held that contractualism, reciprocity and economic interdependence legitimise
positive duties. (Caney, 2007, p.281) On the institutional account, it is becoming less clear, especially
as globalisation continues, why we should not have positive duties to those outside national borders.
We live in an increasingly economically-integrated society; international trade has rapidly increased
over the last one hundred years, multinational corporations are becoming more common and countries
are generally more economically interdependent. Tan says ‘that there is a single global economy in
the morally relevant sense, in that we are, more so than ever, vulnerable to each other’s economic
decisions and activities irrespective of borders.’ (Tan, 2004, p.30) She goes on, saying ‘as our
economic practice takes on a global scope, so too should our moral considerations and considerations
of justice. Economic globalisation must be followed by normative globalisation, so to speak. As the
marketplace becomes one without borders, so should justice be without borders.’ (Tan, 2004, p.33)
Yet the institutional account of justice, in isolation, falls short in terms of securing positive duties of
justice to the foreign needy. For if we accept that economic interdependence legitimises positive
duties, then there are obvious examples where people can justifiably become exempt from those
duties. Caney says ‘if someone is born into an impoverished system that has no links with the rest of
the world, a wholly institutional account must maintain the latter have no duties of justice to the
former.’ (Caney, 2007, p.282) And if pockets of people living in affluent countries decided they did
not want to shoulder the burden of the positive duty, then they could equally sever all ties with the
foreign needy and subsequently become exempt from the demands of justice. Caney warns it
‘generates incentives for people to lighten their load by eschewing interaction with the impoverished.’
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(Caney, 2007, p.284) The institutional account, in isolation, is therefore insufficient in securing the
positive duty to ensure freedom from poverty as a human right.
Instead of arguing solely from an institutional approach, I propose an alternative account of justice; an
account that holds that the positive duty to ensure freedom from poverty falls on everyone who can
help. Caney argues that the most important aspect of this account is that the positive duty to ensure
freedom from poverty exists irrespective of economic interdependence. (Caney, 2007, p.287) This
does not entail the elimination of the institutional component, rather it means encompassing it into a
hybrid account that holds:
a) persons have a negative duty of justice not to foist an unjust global order on other persons
(the institutional component); and
b)
persons have a positive duty to eradicate poverty that does not arise from the imposition of
an unjust global order (the interactional component)
(Caney, 2007, p.288)
The main benefit of the hybrid account is that it demands poverty to be eliminated irrespective of its
cause. The institutional account, for example, does not hold that the presence of gruelling poverty on
an isolated island separate from the rest of the world imposes positive duties on affluent countries to
eliminate that poverty. The ‘hybrid account’ on the other hand, is committed to eradicating poverty as
a matter of justice; what causes the poverty is immaterial. This hybrid account also prevents affluent
people from ridding themselves of the positive duty to aid the impoverished simply by removing
themselves from all contact with the foreign needy. In this respect, the hybrid account offers a more
robust theory of our positive duty to eliminate global poverty as a matter of justice.
The hybrid account becomes yet more necessary once a better understanding of the causes of poverty
are appreciated. Earlier in the chapter I highlighted the institutional, Poggean causes of poverty. It is a
mistake however, to assume that all poverty is caused entirely by an oppressive and unjust global
order. Caney suggests that oppressive ruling elites, poor natural resources and physical and mental
infirmities, are more locally specific causes of poverty. (Caney, 2007, p.291) Pogge’s theory can only
tackle poverty that arises from global institutional factors. There is a wealth of empirical evidence to
suggest that some poverty persists simply because of the sheer lack of natural resources available in
the local area. Arid weather conditions in Sub-Saharan countries continually lead to poor crop yields.
(Basu, 2000, http://bit.ly/QZne9l) The 2000 Mozambique floods led to the deaths of 699 people and
the homelessness of hundreds of thousands. (Moore, 2003, p.305) And even in countries with
bountiful natural resources, extensive poverty can still persist. This is known as the ‘resource curse’.
Ross argues that bountiful supplies of natural resources fuel conflict within countries and can cause
the outbreak of civil war. Natural resources can subsequently lead to the intensification of poverty,
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rather than the contrary, as many would think intuitive. (Ross, 1999, p.315) The superiority of the
hybrid account over Pogge’s account is therefore clear. The former account holds that there should be
a human right to be free from all poverty; the latter account holds that there should only be a human
right to be free from poverty imposed by unjust global institutions.
3.3.2 Objections to positive duties:
The existence of poverty stemming from locally specific factors cannot be empirically refuted. The
normative implications that arise from this poverty however, are heavily contested. Narveson says ‘I
have seen no plausible argument that we owe something, as a matter of general duty, to those of
whom we have done nothing wrong.’ (Narveson, 2003, p.419) This objection implies that we are only
under a duty of justice to eliminate poverty that we have caused. But Narveson’s conception of justice
seems too narrow; his conception appears only to be that of reparative justice. Caney rightly questions
Narveson’s conception of justice. He says ‘why should we only ascribe duties of justice to persons
only if and when they have caused some disadvantage?’ (Caney, 2007, p.293) It is now accepted, for
example, that we have a positive duty of justice to ensure freedom from slavery. There would be great
moral condemnation for anyone who failed to alert authorities in the knowledge of slavery. The
positive duty to ensure freedom from slavery however, is not derived from any prior wrongdoing. It is
a mistake to assume that reparation is always a necessary component of justice.
The alternative concern with establishing a positive duty of justice to secure access to basic
necessities is that it does not have the strategic appeal of Pogge’s institutional account. (Caney, 2007,
p.296) The appeal of Pogge’s account over the hybrid account stems from the divergence in common
philosophical opinion, between positive and negative duties. Temkin offers a good summary of the
commonly stated attitude towards positive and negative duties. He says ‘so-called “positive” duties to
aid others are often regarded as weak, broad, imperfect, and meritorious, while “negative” duties are
regarded as strict, narrow, perfect, and unexceptionable.’ (Temkin, p.356) But even if one accepts
this claim, it does not hold that positive duties need to be eliminated altogether; it simply means that
one needs to respect the often greater significance of negative duties. Caney says ‘the hybrid account
is not at loggerheads with common attitudes towards negative duties. It is simply that it also adds
positive duties of justice as well.’ (Caney, 2007, p.297) The second reply to this objection can be born
out of the necessity of positive duties, particularly in the context of global poverty. Just as it is
necessary and indeed a duty of justice to uphold a positive duty to save a drowning child from a pond,
it is equally necessary to uphold a positive duty to aid the impoverished. Refuting positive duties in
both examples lead to disastrous results; either an easily-preventable death of a child is neglected in
the former case or the removal of debilitating, incapacitating poverty is neglected in the latter case.
We are ultimately left with a dichotomy; we either have to accept the persistence of some poverty, for
the concept of positive duties is too philosophically contentious, or we address all poverty and by
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doing so rely on the potentially contentious principle of positive duties. (Caney, 2007, p.298) If we
ultimately accept that freedom from all poverty should be a human right, then I suggest we have to
choose the latter option.
3.3.3: Who bears responsibility to enforce positive duties?
‘However many millions or even billions of lives I, individually, may be unable to affect, it remains
true that at precious little cost to myself, I could easily and significantly improve the lives of some
people who are terribly badly off. Surely, that I cannot help everyone does not absolve me from
helping no one.’ (Temkin, p.361) Temkin’s synopsis epitomises one of the inherent problems with
fulfilling the positive duty to eliminate poverty; the individual moral agent acting independently is so
ineffectual in eliminating such a wide-scale, extensive problem. But as Temkin rightly suggests, this
should not dissuade us from fulfilling this duty, for the very fact that we cannot eliminate global
poverty single-handedly, should not prevent us from playing our role in contributing to its elimination.
Indeed this phenomenon is not something specific to global poverty; few would argue that the
inability of the individual to affect the outcome of an election provides a legitimate reason for them
not to participate in the democratic process at all.
The corollary of the perceived ineffectiveness of the individual in eliminating global poverty, is that
the positive duty to eliminate poverty is best fulfilled by those institutions with greatest wealth and
resources. Indeed a common attitude within affluent countries is that their positive duty to the foreign
needy is fulfilled by their governments, through the designation of a proportion of their GDP to the
international development budget. This attitude, however, only seeks to exacerbate the recurring
problem. Passivity and indifference on the part of the general public reinforces the widely held belief
that members of affluent countries are apathetic towards the issue of global poverty. If more people
regularly made contributions to international charities and NGO’s, this would convey to governments
of affluent countries that the elimination of global poverty is a pressing moral concern. Governments
would subsequently be more willing to allocate more to their international development budgets, for
this would reflect and reinforce the public’s will. Just like the negative duty, the positive duty to
ensure universal access to basic necessities is not the responsibility of just affluent individuals or
governments; it is the responsibility of both.
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Conclusion:
This paper has provided answers to the three following questions:
1) Are affluent countries justified in failing to do more to alleviate global poverty?
2) Why do affluent countries allow global poverty to persist?
3) What is the moral justification for approaching freedom from poverty as a human right?
In answer to the first question, I have argued that neither an appeal to special relationships with
compatriots, nor an appeal to demandingness, legitimises affluent countries failure to eliminate global
poverty. The priority to compatriots argument is flawed on many levels. Priority to compatriots is
completely inappropriate in the context of global poverty for it is affluent countries who have by far
the greatest ability to aid the foreign needy. Priority to compatriots based on an appeal to national
identity suffers immediately from the problem that it is not clear that national identity exists; and even
if it does, then its normative significance, in terms of securing access to basic necessities is again
morally doubtful. And finally, priority to compatriots on the grounds of reciprocity only serves to
reinforce global inequality and arbitrarily sustain and promote the interests of the affluent. I likewise
contest the alternative claim that the elimination of global poverty imposes too strong a demand on
affluent societies. On an empirical level it has been suggested that just a 1.2% reduction in our
incomes could eradicate severe poverty worldwide. (Pogge, 2003, pp.7-8) And on a theoretical level, I
claim that the demands imposed by a duty to ensure universal access to basic necessities, would be
significantly less than the demands imposed by a strictly impartial, utilitarian doctrine.
Yet despite the relative ease at which affluent countries could remove global poverty, its existence
remains ubiquitous. I argue that global poverty persists due to the culmination of numerous factors;
extensive apathy rife in affluent countries; the crippling psychological effects of capitalism; the
perceived historical ineffectiveness of aid; and the view that poverty is an inevitable, yet unfortunate,
fact of life. I conclude that the combination of viewing the elimination of poverty as a supererogatory
act, coupled with the egocentric nature of capitalism, leads to a situation where absolute poverty
continues and will continue to exist. It is this that necessitates the need to change how we approach
the elimination of global poverty; this change can only be achieved through the vehicle of human
rights.
‘Approaching poverty through the prism of human rights is to lift it from the status of a social
problem to that of a moral catastrophe.’ (Campbell, 2007, p.36) To shift our conception of absolute
poverty from that of an unfortunate social phenomenon, to that of a human rights violation, is to make
its elimination no longer optional or charitable, but to make it a duty of justice. Too often in the
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Western world, there is neglect and blindness to the extent of suffering that absolute poverty causes in
foreign territories. The sheer lack of moral imagination in affluent countries is epitomised by the need
for tear-jerking videos on programmes like Children in Need, to help us appreciate the debilitating
impact that global poverty has on over 1 billion people’s lives worldwide. Pogge offers an extensive
analysis of institutional factors that systematically cause and reinforce global poverty. But I do not
solely argue we have a duty not to impose an unjust global order on the world’s poor; I argue for
freedom from poverty as a human right. And if we are to successfully uphold this right, the negative
duty in isolation has shown to be insufficient. Poverty caused from locally specific issues can only be
remedied by ensuring a positive duty to actively aid those whose poverty and dire circumstances do
not arise as a result of our actions. And whilst positive duties are treated with a general scepticism, we
should remind ourselves of the nature of absolute rights: ‘an acknowledgement of a right often seems
to be taken to be the acknowledgement that a certain course of action must be taken, no matter what
other moral considerations are at stake.’ (McKinnell, 2010, p.63) Whilst scepticism of positive duties
is undoubtedly an important ‘moral consideration’, this scepticism has to be overlooked, to respect the
inviolable nature of rights. Caney aptly concludes that ‘even if the introduction of positive duties of
justice is controversial that is insufficient reason to abandon them for relinquishing them comes at a
cost- namely an acquiescence in a state of affairs in which gruelling, debilitating poverty persists and
claims the lives of many.’ (Caney, 2007, p.297)
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