US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL)
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
Contents
C101: The Army Profession
Advance Sheet ............................................................................................................................ 17
C101RA: Will Army 2025 be a Military Profession? .............................................................................. 21
Don M. Snider
C101RB: Mastering the Profession of Arms, Part I: The Enduring Nature ............................................. 35
Mick Ryan
C121: Critical Thinking
Advance Sheet ............................................................................................................................. 43
C121RB: Thinking Critically about Critical Thinking............................................................................. 46
Jennifer Mulnix
C121RC: The Applied Critical Thinking Handbook, Version 8.1 ........................................................... 63
Product of the TRADOC G2, Operational Environment Enterprise
C121RD: Good Decisions: Tips and Strategies for Avoiding Psychological Traps ................................ 314
Brian Fitch
C121RE: Critical thinking: Intellectual Standards Essential to Reasoning Well within Every
Domain of Thought .................................................................................................................. 324
Linda Elder and Paul Richard
C122: Creative Thinking
Advance Sheet ............................................................................................................................ 328
C122RA: The Hungry Beast and the Ugly Baby .....................................................................................330
Ed Catmul and Amy Wallace
C122RB: The Adjacent Possible .............................................................................................................. 339
Steven Johnson
C122ORD: Creative Thinking ................................................................................................................. 344
Jack D. Kem
C122ORE: On Military Creativity ........................................................................................................... 346
Milan Vego
C131: Leader Development
Advance Sheet ............................................................................................................................. 356
C132: Self-Awareness
Advance Sheet .............................................................................................................................360
C132RA: Understanding the JOHARI Window ...................................................................................... 362
Steve Boylan
C133: Developing Leaders
Advance Sheet ............................................................................................................................. 368
C133RC: 2018 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership: Military and
Civilian Leader Findings Technical Report 2019-01 ................................................................... 371
US Center for the Army Profession and Leadership
C133RD: Leader Development Improvement Guide (LDIG) February 2018 ......................................... 386
US Center for the Army Profession and Leadership
C171: Effective Writing
Advance Sheet ............................................................................................................................. 594
C171ORA: Read, Think, Write, and Publish ........................................................................................... 597
Admiral Jim Stavridis
C172: Writing Workshops
Advance Sheet ............................................................................................................................. 603
C173: Effective Speaking, Listening, and Briefing
Advance Sheet ............................................................................................................................. 607
C173Ref: Military Briefings Student Quick Reference........................................................................... 615
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL)
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
Block Advance Sheet for C100
Foundations of the Army Profession
1. SCOPE
C100 Foundations of the Army Profession improves the fundamental skills and knowledge you need to
succeed during CGSOC and as leaders in the operational force. We organized C100 into three modules to
address the following domains: critical and creative thinking; leader assessment and development, and
effective communication. These domains underpin all learning in CGSOC and directly support the
Army’s priority to develop leaders for a complex world. As a result of C100 you will:
•
•
•
•
•
Incorporate critical and creative thinking to effectively solve problems
Incorporate critical and creative thinking, coupled with communication skills, to speak, brief,
listen, and write effectively
Understand leader development with an emphasis on self-awareness and developing subordinate
leaders
Understand how to produce an individual development plan (IDP)
Understand how to produce a leader development plan (LDP)
To prepare for each lesson, refer to the lesson advance sheet. Although most are only a few pages in
length, each advance sheet contains important insights and requirements for you to achieve the expected
learning objectives. Advance sheets describe the purpose and scope of the lesson, lists the learning
objectives, lists the required readings, and provides focus questions that facilitate learning. Lesson reading
assignments are an important part of each lesson. The computer-based instruction (CBI) likewise is an
important part of each lesson.
C100 is a 30-hour course consisting of three modules: C120: Critical and Creative Thinking; C130:
Leader Assessment and Development; and C170: Effective Communication. Each module consists of
several lessons and exercises.
C120: Critical and Creative Thinking. This eight-hour module introduces the fundamentals of critical
and creative thinking. The module introduces different ways to view and understand these concepts, as
well as techniques for spotting flaws in your thinking and the consequences of those flaws. The intent of
C120 is to help you become a more critical and creative thinker, which has multiple implications to you
as a leader and decision maker.
C130: Leader Assessment and Development. This eight-hour module prepares the foundation for your
continued education and development as an organizational leader. C130 focuses on your individual
development and improvement during your time in CGSOC, as well as your role in developing junior
leaders in organizations. We begin the C100 block with a two-hour lesson on the Army profession. You
discuss the role of trust in the profession, the importance of ethical behavior in developing organizations,
and the responsibilities of organizational leaders to steward the profession. In subsequent lessons you
discuss the leader development process and your role in that process. Using ADP 6-22 Army Leadership
and the Profession, students study the leader development process, their role in it, and how to produce
C100 Block Advance Sheet
May 2021 (AY 21-22)
their own individual development plan (IDP) for themselves and leader development plan (LDP) for their
organizations.
C170: Effective Communication. This 14-hour module helps you become a more effective
communicator. You review the fundamentals of speaking, writing, and listening. You will watch videos
of writing workshops and briefing techniques to help improve their communication skills.
2. LEARNING OBJECTIVES
TLO-CC-1
Action: Analyze organizational level leadership concepts used to lead in developing organizations.
Condition: Acting as an organizational-level leader, using principles and standards of critical thinking,
references, case studies, practical exercises, and computer-based instruction (CBIs).
Standard: Analyses includes ₋
1. The role of field grade officers as organizational-level leaders
2. Ethical reasoning considerations in decision making as an organizational leader
3. The integration of power and influence in organizational development
4. The role of leaders in effective organizational cultures and climates
5. Effective change management in organizations
6. The development of learning organizations
7. The development of organizational teams
8. The development of resilient organizations
9. The leader’s role in a culture of ethical behavior
10. The processes for organizational envisioning
11. Extending influence through negotiations
12. Army leader development doctrine
13. The leader self-development process
14. Self-awareness
15. How your ethical reasoning influences the conduct of joint operations
16. The organizational leader’s role in the Army profession
17. The role of emotional intelligence in organizational development
ELO-CC-1.1
Action: Analyze the role of field grade officers as organizational-level leaders.
Condition: Acting as an organizational-level leader, using principles and standards of critical thinking,
references, case studies, practical exercises, and computer-based instruction (CBIs) .
Standard: Analysis includes 1. Leadership at the organizational level
2. Critical thinking in problem framing
3. Organizational vision
4. Field grade officer’s role in developing organizations
5. Field grade officer’s role in developing leaders
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Analysis
CGSOC PLO 1 Attributes:
a. Independently research and critically evaluate information.
b. Comprehend context of the situation.
c. Create meaning from information and data.
d. Creatively design or revise concepts and ideas.
e. Communicate concepts with clarity and precision in written, graphical, and oral forms.
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f. Compose complete and well-supported arguments.
g. Apply critical and creative thinking
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 1 (Strategic Thinking and Communication): Graduates who
are able to incorporate thinking that is broader than the issue at hand and effectively communicate that
thinking.
CGSOC graduates independently research and critically evaluate information to inform their understanding of the context, create meaning, and creatively design or revise concepts and ideas. Graduates
expertly use written communication to deliver rational, complete and well-supported arguments,
explanations, options, and/or solutions in a form that is specifically tailored to the most relevant audience.
CGSOC PLO 2 Attributes:
a. Apply ethics, norms, and laws of the profession.
b. Apply knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting.
c. Apply interpersonal skills, leadership, and followership.
d. Meet organizational-level challenges.
e. Demonstrate commitment to develop further expertise in the art and science of war as life-long
learners.
f. Demonstrate commitment to study beyond their own service’s competencies.
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 2 (The Profession of Arms): Graduates who are able to comport
themselves as professionals, responsive to the country and the public as servant-leaders.
CGSOC graduates model and enforce the ethics, norms, and laws of the profession of arms, applying
their knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting and related capabilities that advance US
security aims. They apply effective interpersonal skills, leadership and followership in the joint
environment. They demonstrate a high degree of commitment to further development of their own
expertise in the art and science of war, going beyond the study of their own Service’s competencies.
ELO-CC-1.12
Action: Analyze (Army) leader development doctrine.
Condition: As a student in the Command and General Staff Officer Course, using class lecture,
computer-based instruction (CBIs), reflective thinking, and references.
Standard: Analysis includes–
1. The Army framework for leader development
2. The Army Leadership Requirements Model (ALRM)
3. The role of mentoring in leader development
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Analysis
CGSOC PLO 2 Attributes:
a. Apply ethics, norms, and laws of the profession.
b. Apply knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting.
c. Apply interpersonal skills, leadership, and followership.
d. Meet organizational-level challenges.
e. Demonstrate commitment to develop further expertise in the art and science of war as life-long
learners.
f. Demonstrate commitment to study beyond their own service’s competencies.
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CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 2 (The Profession of Arms): Graduates who are able to comport
themselves as professionals, responsive to the country and the public as servant-leaders.
CGSOC graduates model and enforce the ethics, norms, and laws of the profession of arms, applying
their knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting and related capabilities that advance US
security aims. They apply effective interpersonal skills, leadership and followership in the joint
environment. They demonstrate a high degree of commitment to further development of their own
expertise in the art and science of war, going beyond the study of their own Service’s competencies.
ELO-CC-1.13
Action: Describe the leader self-development process.
Condition: As a student in the Command and General Staff Officer Course, using class lecture,
computer-based instruction (CBIs), reflective thinking, and references.
Standard: Description includes–
1. The self-development process and opportunities
2. Leader development challenges
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Comprehension
CGSOC PLO 2 Attributes:
a. Apply ethics, norms, and laws of the profession.
b. Apply knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting.
c. Apply interpersonal skills, leadership, and followership.
d. Meet organizational-level challenges.
e. Demonstrate commitment to develop further expertise in the art and science of war as life-long
learners.
f. Demonstrate commitment to study beyond their own service’s competencies.
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 2 (The Profession of Arms): Graduates who are able to comport
themselves as professionals, responsive to the country and the public as servant-leaders.
CGSOC graduates model and enforce the ethics, norms, and laws of the profession of arms, applying
their knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting and related capabilities that advance US
security aims. They apply effective interpersonal skills, leadership and followership in the joint
environment. They demonstrate a high degree of commitment to further development of their own
expertise in the art and science of war, going beyond the study of their own Service’s competencies.
ELO-CC-1.14
Action: Develop self-awareness.
Condition: As a student in the Command and General Staff Officer Course, computer-based instruction
(CBIs), assessment instruments, reflective thinking, practical exercises, and references.
Standard: Development includes–
1. Individual assessment results
2. Personal strengths and weaknesses
3. Prioritizing developmental needs
4. Individual Development Plan (IDP)
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Analysis
CGSOC PLO 2 Attributes:
a. Apply ethics, norms, and laws of the profession.
b. Apply knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting.
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c. Apply interpersonal skills, leadership, and followership.
d. Meet organizational-level challenges.
e. Demonstrate commitment to develop further expertise in the art and science of war as life-long
learners.
f. Demonstrate commitment to study beyond their own service’s competencies.
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 2 (The Profession of Arms): Graduates who are able to comport
themselves as professionals, responsive to the country and the public as servant-leaders.
CGSOC graduates model and enforce the ethics, norms, and laws of the profession of arms, applying
their knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting and related capabilities that advance US
security aims. They apply effective interpersonal skills, leadership and followership in the joint
environment. They demonstrate a high degree of commitment to further development of their own
expertise in the art and science of war, going beyond the study of their own Service’s competencies.
ELO-CC-1.16
Action: Examine the organizational leader’s role in the Army profession
Condition: Acting as an organizational-level leader, using principles and standards of critical thinking,
references, and computer-based instruction (CBIs).
Standard: Analysis includes –
1. The traditional underpinnings of the Army profession
2. The five characteristics of the Army profession
3. The relationship between treating people with dignity and respect and mission readiness
4. The role of the field grade officer in stewarding the Army profession
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Analysis
CGSOC PLO 2 Attributes:
a. Apply ethics, norms, and laws of the profession.
b. Apply knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting.
c. Apply interpersonal skills, leadership, and followership.
d. Meet organizational-level challenges.
e. Demonstrate commitment to develop further expertise in the art and science of war as life-long
learners.
f. Demonstrate commitment to study beyond their own service’s competencies.
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 2 (The Profession of Arms): Graduates who are able to comport
themselves as professionals, responsive to the country and the public as servant-leaders.
CGSOC graduates model and enforce the ethics, norms, and laws of the profession of arms, applying
their knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting and related capabilities that advance US
security aims. They apply effective interpersonal skills, leadership and followership in the joint
environment. They demonstrate a high degree of commitment to further development of their own
expertise in the art and science of war, going beyond the study of their own Service’s competencies.
TLO-CC-2
Action: Incorporate thinking skills.
Condition: Given individual reading and writing assignments and computer-based instruction (CBIs)
while faced with problems characteristic of the operational environment.
Standard: Incorporation includes–
1. Critical thinking skills
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2. Creative thinking skills
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Synthesis
CGSOC PLO 1 Attributes:
a. Independently research and critically evaluate information.
b. Comprehend context of the situation.
c. Create meaning from information and data.
d. Creatively design or revise concepts and ideas.
e. Communicate concepts with clarity and precision in written, graphical, and oral forms.
f. Compose complete and well-supported arguments.
g. Apply critical and creative thinking
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 1 (Strategic Thinking and Communication): Graduates who
are able to incorporate thinking that is broader than the issue at hand and effectively communicate that
thinking.
CGSOC graduates independently research and critically evaluate information to inform their understanding of the context, create meaning, and creatively design or revise concepts and ideas. Graduates
expertly use written communication to deliver rational, complete and well-supported arguments,
explanations, options, and/or solutions in a form that is specifically tailored to the most relevant audience.
ELO-CC-2.1
Action: Incorporate critical thinking skills.
Condition: Given individual reading and writing assignments and computer-based instruction (CBIs) .
Standard: Incorporation includes–
1. A definition of critical thinking
2. An explanation of the core critical thinking skills
3. An analysis of mental models
4. An analysis of impediments to critical thinking
5. An understanding of Meta-cognition
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Synthesis
CGSOC PLO 1 Attributes:
a. Independently research and critically evaluate information.
b. Comprehend context of the situation.
c. Create meaning from information and data.
d. Creatively design or revise concepts and ideas.
e. Communicate concepts with clarity and precision in written, graphical, and oral forms.
f. Compose complete and well-supported arguments.
g. Apply critical and creative thinking
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 1 (Strategic Thinking and Communication): Graduates who
are able to incorporate thinking that is broader than the issue at hand and effectively communicate that
thinking.
CGSOC graduates independently research and critically evaluate information to inform their understanding of the context, create meaning, and creatively design or revise concepts and ideas. Graduates
expertly use written communication to deliver rational, complete and well-supported arguments,
explanations, options, and/or solutions in a form that is specifically tailored to the most relevant audience.
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ELO-CC-2.2
Action: Incorporate creative thinking skills.
Condition: Given individual reading and writing assignments and computer-based instruction (CBIs).
Standard: Incorporation includes–
1. Creative thinking enhancers
2. An identification of creative thinking barriers
Learning Domain: Cognitive, Level of Learning: Synthesis
CGSOC PLO 1 Attributes:
a. Independently research and critically evaluate information.
b. Comprehend context of the situation.
c. Create meaning from information and data.
d. Creatively design or revise concepts and ideas.
e. Communicate concepts with clarity and precision in written, graphical, and oral forms.
f. Compose complete and well-supported arguments.
g. Apply critical and creative thinking
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 1 (Strategic Thinking and Communication): Graduates who
are able to incorporate thinking that is broader than the issue at hand and effectively communicate that
thinking.
CGSOC graduates independently research and critically evaluate information to inform their understanding of the context, create meaning, and creatively design or revise concepts and ideas. Graduates
expertly use written communication to deliver rational, complete and well-supported arguments,
explanations, options, and/or solutions in a form that is specifically tailored to the most relevant audience.
TLO-CC-10
Action: Incorporate effective communication skills.
Condition: Given adequate time in an academic course, a requirement to communicate using the
Universal Intellectual Standards, and access to graduate level resources.
Standard: Communication includes–
1. Writing effectively
2. Speaking effectively
3. Listening effectively
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Synthesis
CGSOC PLO 1 Attributes:
a. Independently research and critically evaluate information.
b. Comprehend context of the situation.
c. Create meaning from information and data.
d. Creatively design or revise concepts and ideas.
e. Communicate concepts with clarity and precision in written, graphical, and oral forms.
f. Compose complete and well-supported arguments.
g. Apply critical and creative thinking
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 1 (Strategic Thinking and Communication): Graduates who
are able to incorporate thinking that is broader than the issue at hand and effectively communicate that
thinking.
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CGSOC graduates independently research and critically evaluate information to inform their understanding of the context, create meaning, and creatively design or revise concepts and ideas. Graduates
expertly use written communication to deliver rational, complete and well-supported arguments,
explanations, options, and/or solutions in a form that is specifically tailored to the most relevant audience.
ELO-CC-10.1
Action: Write effectively.
Condition: As a field grade leader on a problem-solving team or individually, and using critical writing
skills; drawing on references, computer-based instruction (CBIs), personal experience, and individual
learning while faced with complex, ill-structured problems characteristic of the operational environment.
Standard: Writing includes–
1. Substance
2. Organization
3. Style
4. Correctness
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Synthesis
CGSOC PLO 1 Attributes:
h. Independently research and critically evaluate information.
i. Comprehend context of the situation.
j. Create meaning from information and data.
k. Creatively design or revise concepts and ideas.
l. Communicate concepts with clarity and precision in written, graphical, and oral forms.
m. Compose complete and well-supported arguments.
n. Apply critical and creative thinking
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 1 (Strategic Thinking and Communication): Graduates who
are able to incorporate thinking that is broader than the issue at hand and effectively communicate that
thinking.
CGSOC graduates independently research and critically evaluate information to inform their understanding of the context, create meaning, and creatively design or revise concepts and ideas. Graduates
expertly use written communication to deliver rational, complete and well-supported arguments,
explanations, options, and/or solutions in a form that is specifically tailored to the most relevant audience.
CGSOC PLO 2 Attributes:
a. Apply ethics, norms, and laws of the profession.
b. Apply knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting.
c. Apply interpersonal skills, leadership, and followership.
d. Meet organizational-level challenges.
e. Demonstrate commitment to develop further expertise in the art and science of war as life-long
learners.
f. Demonstrate commitment to study beyond their own service’s competencies.
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 2 (The Profession of Arms): Graduates who are able to comport
themselves as professionals, responsive to the country and the public as servant-leaders.
CGSOC graduates model and enforce the ethics, norms, and laws of the profession of arms, applying
their knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting and related capabilities that advance US
security aims. They apply effective interpersonal skills, leadership and followership in the joint
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environment. They demonstrate a high degree of commitment to further development of their own
expertise in the art and science of war, going beyond the study of their own Service’s competencies.
ELO-CC-10.2
Action: Speak effectively.
Condition: Acting individually and using provided formats, out-of-class research, class references,
computer-based instruction (CBIs), and personal experiences.
Standard: Speaking includes–
1. Substance
2. Organization
3. Style
4. Correctness
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Synthesis
CGSOC PLO 1 Attributes:
a. Independently research and critically evaluate information.
b. Comprehend context of the situation.
c. Create meaning from information and data.
d. Creatively design or revise concepts and ideas.
e. Communicate concepts with clarity and precision in written, graphical, and oral forms.
f. Compose complete and well-supported arguments.
g. Apply critical and creative thinking
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 1 (Strategic Thinking and Communication): Graduates who
are able to incorporate thinking that is broader than the issue at hand and effectively communicate that
thinking.
CGSOC graduates independently research and critically evaluate information to inform their understanding of the context, create meaning, and creatively design or revise concepts and ideas. Graduates
expertly use written communication to deliver rational, complete and well-supported arguments,
explanations, options, and/or solutions in a form that is specifically tailored to the most relevant audience.
CGSOC PLO 2 Attributes:
a. Apply ethics, norms, and laws of the profession.
b. Apply knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting.
c. Apply interpersonal skills, leadership, and followership.
d. Meet organizational-level challenges.
e. Demonstrate commitment to develop further expertise in the art and science of war as life-long
learners.
f. Demonstrate commitment to study beyond their own service’s competencies.
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 2 (The Profession of Arms): Graduates who are able to comport
themselves as professionals, responsive to the country and the public as servant-leaders.
CGSOC graduates model and enforce the ethics, norms, and laws of the profession of arms, applying
their knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting and related capabilities that advance US
security aims. They apply effective interpersonal skills, leadership and followership in the joint
environment. They demonstrate a high degree of commitment to further development of their own
expertise in the art and science of war, going beyond the study of their own Service’s competencies.
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ELO-CC-10.3
Action: Listen effectively.
Condition: As an individual drawing on critical thinking skills, references, computer-based instruction
(CBIs), and personal experience.
Standard: Listening includes–
1. Listens and watches intently
2. Tunes in to content, emotion, and urgency
3. Uses verbal and nonverbal means to reinforce with the speaker that you are paying attention
4. Reflects on new information before expressing views
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Synthesis
CGSOC PLO 1 Attributes:
a. Independently research and critically evaluate information.
b. Comprehend context of the situation.
c. Create meaning from information and data.
d. Creatively design or revise concepts and ideas.
e. Communicate concepts with clarity and precision in written, graphical, and oral forms.
f. Compose complete and well-supported arguments.
g. Apply critical and creative thinking
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 1 (Strategic Thinking and Communication): Graduates who
are able to incorporate thinking that is broader than the issue at hand and effectively communicate that
thinking.
CGSOC graduates independently research and critically evaluate information to inform their understanding of the context, create meaning, and creatively design or revise concepts and ideas. Graduates
expertly use written communication to deliver rational, complete and well-supported arguments,
explanations, options, and/or solutions in a form that is specifically tailored to the most relevant audience.
CGSOC PLO 2 Attributes:
a. Apply ethics, norms, and laws of the profession.
b. Apply knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting.
c. Apply interpersonal skills, leadership, and followership.
d. Meet organizational-level challenges.
e. Demonstrate commitment to develop further expertise in the art and science of war as life-long
learners.
f. Demonstrate commitment to study beyond their own service’s competencies.
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 2 (The Profession of Arms): Graduates who are able to comport
themselves as professionals, responsive to the country and the public as servant-leaders.
CGSOC graduates model and enforce the ethics, norms, and laws of the profession of arms, applying
their knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting and related capabilities that advance US
security aims. They apply effective interpersonal skills, leadership and followership in the joint
environment. They demonstrate a high degree of commitment to further development of their own
expertise in the art and science of war, going beyond the study of their own Service’s competencies.
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3. BLOCK ASSESSMENT PLAN
Grading is in accordance with CGSC Bulletin 903 (February 2021), Academic Performance, Graduation,
and Awards Policies and Procedures and CGSC Bulletin 920 Academic Ethics Policy (January 2021).
These CGSC Bulletins and other administrative policies are on the course information page on
Blackboard.
Department of Distance Education (DDE) instructors will assess student understanding of the course
material, use of critical thinking skills, and ability to analyze the themes and topics presented during the
C100 block. Each student must demonstrate the knowledge, skills, and ability to think critically and
creatively. They are responsible for reading all assigned readings, completing all of the online lessons,
and having a thorough understanding of the material. DDE will assess academic performance in C100
based upon the following academic requirements; see the table below.
C100 Assessment Matrix
Assessment Instrument
Length / Duration
Instrument
Weight
Due
Six online quizzes taken via
Blackboard. Lessons C101
Up to three attempts,
(10%), C121 (10%), C122 (10%), retaining only highest
C131 (10%), C133 (10%), &
score
C173 (10%)
60%
After completing the
associated online lesson
and required readings
C170 – Argumentative Essay
(imbedded at the end of the C172
lesson)
40%
Upon completion of the
previous C100 lessons
750 – 1,250 words (3
– 5 pages)
C100 online Blackboard Quizzes (60%): Find the online quizzes on Blackboard, which appear only
after completing the computer-based instruction (CBI) for the lesson; click on the Quiz link inside the
lesson to access the online quizzes. Complete a total of six online quizzes via Blackboard. The six
online quizzes are for lessons C101 (10%), C121 (10%), C122 (10%), C131 (10%), C133 (10%), and
C173 (10%). Performance on the online quizzes demonstrates understanding of the lesson materials.
Completion of the required readings and the online lessons enables taking the tests with little difficulty.
NOTE: Complete the online tests after reading the required readings and viewing the computer-based
instruction (CBI). You have up to three chances to take each online quiz; Blackboard retains only the
highest of the three scores. The online tests are untimed; however, Blackboard will time out after 15
minutes of inactivity. Make sure to click “Save answer” for each question. After completing the test,
make sure to click “Submit.” For technical or internet connection problems, contact the Blackboard
Helpdesk (913-684-5693).
C170 Argumentative Essay (40%): Write a three- to five-page argumentative essay (approximately 750
– 1,250 words). The essay takes a position on a topic of current interest as a vehicle to demonstrate the
key concepts of written communication from the C100 block. The C170 Essay Instructions and the C170
Argumentative Essay Development Student Guide are located in the C172 lesson area in Blackboard and
are available after completing the C172 lesson CBI.
4.
LESSON DESCRIPTIONS
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C101 Profession of Arms: This lesson uses ADP 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession, C1, 25
November 2019, and video instruction from Dr. Don M. Snider. The lesson addresses the civil-military
relationship in distinguishing between a bureaucracy and a profession, the importance of trust, how the
US Army has changed in its history, and the role of leaders as stewards of the profession.
C121 Critical Thinking: This lesson covers concepts of critical thinking, the elements of thought, and
universal intellectual standards developed by Drs. Richard Paul and Linda Elder. It also reviews models,
mental models, and paradigms. The lesson also discusses the concept of metacognition and how
individuals can use metacognition to overcome impediments such as fallacies and biases. The lesson
includes a short historical example based upon the film, Thirteen Days, about the Cuban Missile Crisis.
C122 Creative Thinking: This lesson introduces creative thinking and addresses two specific
components–enhancers to creative thinking and barriers to creative thinking. The lesson draws upon the
concepts discussed in critical thinking and continues to expand on how to become a better thinker and
problem solver. The lesson enhances awareness of how organizations may encourage or discourage
creative thinking. Finally, the lesson expounds upon the relationship creative thinking has with
imagination, innovation, agility, and adaptability.
C131 Leader Development: This lesson covers the Army’s Leadership Requirements Model (LRM),
including the Army’s framework for leader development, the role of mentoring, and the role that
attributes and competencies play in the doctrinal foundation for continued education and development of
organizational leaders. The result is an organizational leader who masters and exemplifies the attributes
and core leader competencies from a lifelong learning process.
C132 Self-Awareness: This lesson includes the HEXACO Personality Inventory, as presented by Mr.
Bruce Roeder. The HEXACO Personality Inventory is a measure of six major dimensions of personality:
honesty-humility, emotionality, extraversion, agreeableness (versus anger), conscientiousness, and
openness to experience. The lesson presents an opportunity to take the free online assessment for selfawareness and leader development.
C133 Developing Leaders: This lesson is to understand the requirements for assessing your
subordinates, the elements of developing leaders, the attributes and competencies involved and required
to further the development of subordinates from a specific and holistic point of view that supports the
individual and the Army. You will study and understand the requirements and elements of the
development of leaders as presented in FM 6-22 and review the LRM as presented in ADP 6-22. By the
conclusion of this lesson, you will understand the Army’s framework for developing leaders with a
specific focus on each field grade officer crafting a plan to support the development of the subordinate
leaders in their organization, the Leader Development Plan (LDP). This lesson builds upon the lesson and
framework from C131
C171 Effective Writing: This lesson addresses effective written communication, following the
guidelines of the writing process as outlined in Student Text (ST) 22-2, Leader Communication. The
writing process consists of pre-writing, drafting, revising, editing, and publishing. Each step examines
writing using the specific criteria of substance, style, organization, and correctness. This lesson will focus
primarily on substance and organization skills, as the C172 Writing Workshops will focus heavily, but not
solely, on the areas of style and correctness.
*** DDE encourages students to purchase their own copy of Kate Turabian’s A Manual for Writers of
Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations (ninth edition). Students will use this writing guide for the
remainder of CGSOC and future academic research.
C100 Block Advance Sheet
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June 2021 (AY 21-22)
C172 Writing Workshops: This lesson includes computer-based instruction and video recordings of a
resident CGSC class conducting the workshops focused on improving knowledge of the rules that support
good writing. The workshops cover the elements of communication: substance, style, organization, and
correctness as well as how the CGSC Form 1009W is used to assess student writing. Applying these four
elements is essential for success during CGSOC. Strive to master these elements to become an effective
writer able to develop strong written arguments. NOTE: The C170A Argumentative Essay assignment
instructions are enabled upon completion of the C172 lesson.
C173 Effective Speaking, Briefing, and Listening: This lesson provides the techniques and formats for
military briefings and oral presentations found on CGSC Form 1009S. Leaders must possess and master
effective communication skills. C173 provides instruction on verbal communication skills, a review of the
doctrinal steps to develop different types of briefings, the standard Army formats, and tips for briefing
success. The lesson also introduces the behaviors, skills and standards for listening effectively.
5. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION--ACCESSING ELECTRONIC RESOURCES
In ILE, you will be required to access electronic resources from CARL (Combined Army Research
Library). Because you do not have a CARL library card and do not have a 14-digit pin, you are provided
with a database pin number. The database pin number is located in Blackboard: Master Library and
CGSC Resources link (top right menu)>CARL (right side of page)>Database Access (scroll down to
bottom of the page). Please note that CARL periodically changes the database pin numbers, so a database
pin number you use in Phase 1 may not be valid in Phase 3.
The CARL section of the Master Library and CGSC Resources also provides you information on how to
access other resources, so highly recommend you review this information.
RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
C100 Block Advance Sheet
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June 2021 (AY 21-22)
C101
The Army Profession
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL)
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
Advance Sheet for C101
The Army Profession
1.
SCOPE
Army officers are first and foremost members of the Army profession, sworn to support and defend
the Constitution, and ethically employ their specialized knowledge in the art and science of warfare. They
demonstrate this professionalism through the exercise of moral judgment and stand as the embodiment of
professional ethics and American values. Yet professionalism is not a given. A professional organization
requires stewards to maintain the professionalism of its members. A professional organization is founded
on ideals to which its members must adhere. This lesson examines the foundations of the Army
profession, the five characteristics of the Army profession, the importance of ethical behavior in
developing organizations, and responsibilities of organizational leaders to steward the profession.
Organizational-level leaders steward the two complementary communities of practice in the Army
profession, the profession of arms and the Army civilian corps. Those leaders steward by creating and
fostering an organizational climate predicated on mutual respect and trust, wherein ethical behavior is the
norm and unethical behavior is not tolerated. Trust grows when professionals treat people with dignity
and respect. Army initiatives and programs related to diversity and inclusion, equal opportunity, and
preventing sexual harassment and assault, all define the minimum levels of dignity and respect required of
professionals. Yet the Nation expects much more than just the minimum from members of the Army
profession. Dedication to the profession and allegiance to the Constitution provide the shared common
denominators that unify professionals and provide fundamental shared values for organizational leaders to
leverage in addressing the many challenges confronting our Army today. These shared values of the
profession provide a guiding azimuth as the Nation navigates times of social and political unrest. Among
these complex issues are the challenges society and the Army face in changing behaviors and mental
models about diversity and inclusion. This lesson is an opportunity to begin the dialogue about what the
nation expects of its professionals in these important and often emotional areas. Leaders who build and
sustain internal and external trust prepare their organizations to successfully operate in the chaos and
uncertainty of the operational environment, exercise mission command, and ultimately accomplish the
mission.
The senior leadership of the Army charged leaders at all levels to examine, understand, and abide by
the ideals of the Army profession and the historic values of our Nation. Specifically, senior leaders expect
leaders to model and enforce the ethics, norms, and laws of the profession of arms, applying their
knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting and related capabilities that advance US security
aims. These same leaders expect organizational-level leaders to apply effective interpersonal leadership
and followership skills to accomplish the mission effectively. With this comes the responsibility to
educate about the profession so professional behavior becomes habitual-ingrained into the subconsciousness of the force.
This lesson is part of the process to integrate the Army profession and the associated expected ethical
behavior into the CGSOC experience. The goal is to examine the direct association between treating
people with dignity and respect and mission accomplishment. C101 sets the stage for discussions
throughout the year about professional conduct. The aim of this lesson is for you to consider (and
C101 Advance Sheet
May 2021 (AY 21-22)
reconsider) the foundations of your service and to reflect on responsibilities as professionals in stewarding
their profession.
The readings for this lesson include Army doctrine as espoused in ADP 6-22, cultural foundations in
the Declaration of Independence and US Constitution, and two opinion readings, one by Don Snider and
the other by Mick Ryan. These readings provide content to achieve the learning objectives. The doctrine
and the Constitution provide the explicit knowledge to understand the Army profession and reflect on the
subjects. Snider’s article complements the doctrinal reading and provides some contentious assertions that
elicit a reaction in support of achieving the learning objectives. Snider warns that the Army must take
explicit action to maintain the profession by maintaining a culture of trust, understanding and improving
the application of transformational leadership, and improving character development. Ryan’s article
supplements Snider’s views and the ADP by providing a broader view and examining the military as a
profession, not just the specifics of the US Army. Ryan provides a synopsis of the development of the
western military as a profession and his view on what constitutes a profession.
2. LEARNING OBJECTIVES
This lesson supports CGSOC TLO-CC-1, “Analyze organizational level leadership concepts used to
lead in developing organizations”; TLO-CC-2, “Incorporate thinking skills”; and TLO—C-10,
“Incorporate effective communication skills,” as listed on the block advance sheet. All applicable TLO
numbers and action statements are referenced in this paragraph.
ELO-CC-1.16
Action: Examine the organizational leader’s role in the Army profession
Condition: Acting as an organizational-level leader, using principles and standards of critical thinking,
references, and computer-based instruction (CBIs).
Standard: Examination includes−
1. The traditional underpinnings of the Army profession
2. The five characteristics of the Army profession
3. The relationship between treating people with dignity and respect and mission readiness
4. The role of the field grade officer in stewarding the Army profession
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Analysis
PLO Standards Supported: CGSOC PLO 1 and CGSOC PLO 2
CGSOC PLO 1 Attributes:
a. Independently research and critically evaluate information.
b. Comprehend context of the situation.
c. Create meaning from information and data.
d. Creatively design or revise concepts and ideas.
e. Communicate concepts with clarity and precision in written, graphical, and oral forms.
f. Compose complete and well-supported arguments.
g. Apply critical and creative thinking
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 1 (Strategic Thinking and Communication): Graduates who
are able to incorporate thinking that is broader than the issue at hand and effectively communicate that
thinking.
CGSOC graduates independently research and critically evaluate information to inform their understanding of the context, create meaning, and creatively design or revise concepts and ideas. Graduates
expertly use written communication to deliver rational, complete and well-supported arguments,
explanations, options, and/or solutions in a form that is specifically tailored to the most relevant audience.
C101 Advance Sheet
2
May 2021 (AY 21-22)
CGSOC PLO 2 Attributes:
a. Apply ethics, norms, and laws of the profession.
b. Apply knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting.
c. Apply interpersonal skills, leadership, and followership.
d. Meet organizational-level challenges.
e. Demonstrate commitment to develop further expertise in the art and science of war as life-long
learners.
f. Demonstrate commitment to study beyond their own service’s competencies.
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 2 (The Profession of Arms): Graduates who are able to comport
themselves as professionals, responsive to the country and the public as servant-leaders.
CGSOC graduates model and enforce the ethics, norms, and laws of the profession of arms, applying
their knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting and related capabilities that advance US
security aims. They apply effective interpersonal skills, leadership and followership in the joint
environment. They demonstrate a high degree of commitment to further development of their own
expertise in the art and science of war, going beyond the study of their own Service’s competencies.
This lesson supports development of the following SHARP intermediate level leader competencies as
described in U.S. Army Combined Arms Center SHARP Learning Strategy, wC1, dated 24 April 2019,
Appendix B.
Integrates SHARP into unit climate reflective of trust, cohesion, dignity, and respect.
Integrates organizational programs, policies, and procedures to align with and support SHARP program.
3. HOMEWORK ASSIGNMENT
a. First requirement: Read and view the following before viewing the computer-based instruction
(CBI):
Read:
C101RA: Snider, Don M. "Will Army 2025 be a Military Profession." Parameters 45, no. 4
(2015): 39, (12 pages)
C101RB: Ryan, Mick “Mastering the Profession of Arms, Part I: The Enduring Nature” February
8, 2017, War on the Rocks Website (6 pages). Also available:
https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/mastering-the-profession-of-arms-part-i-the-enduring-nature/
(accessed 26 October 2021)
C101RC: ADP 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession, US Department of the Army.
Washington DC: Government Printing Office, July 2019, Change 1, 25 November 2019. Chapter
one. “The Army Profession, Ethic, and Leadership,” (23 pages)
C101RD: The Declaration of Independence and The US Constitution, available at numerous online locations.
C101RE: Watch the video “The Army Framework for Character Development” (18:35 minutes).
Available: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2ZESeFn6MtY (accessed 17 August 2021). This
whiteboard video is a learning product along the lines of an RSA video. It provides an
explanation of the Army's framework for character development, why character matters in the
Army, and why the Army must intentionally develop character in its Soldiers and Army Civilians
through the alignment of identity, climate, and culture with the Army Ethic. It also does a
commendable job of distinguishing character development responsibilities at the direct,
organizational, and strategic level. The video also provides a clear linkage to the importance of
character in developing trust and executing operations employing mission command as a
philosophy.
C101 Advance Sheet
3
May 2021 (AY 21-22)
For additional readings on this lesson topic, consider:
Pfaff, C. Anthony. "Five myths about military ethics." Parameters 46, no. 3 (2016): 59-69.
Snider, Don M. "Five myths about our future." Parameters 46, no. 3 (2016): p 51-58.
Ryan, Mick “Mastering the Profession of Arms, Part II: Keeping Pace with Changes” February
16, 2017, War on the Rocks Website, (6 pages). Available at the following URL:
https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/mastering-the-profession-of-arms-part-ii-keeping-pace-withchanges/ (accessed 17 August 2021).
Ryan, Mick “Mastering the Profession of Arms, Part III: Competencies Today and into the
Future” March 23, 2017, War on the Rocks Website, (6 pages). Available at the following URL:
https://warontherocks.com/2017/03/mastering-the-profession-of-arms-part-iii-competenciestoday-and-into-the-future/ (accessed 17 August 2021).
America’s Army Our Profession. Army Profession Pamphlet, Center for the Army Leadership
Profession and Leadership October 2018. Available: army-profession-pamphlet.pdf (accessed 17
August 2021).
b. Second requirement: View the computer-based instruction (CBI) and consider the following
questions:
What differentiates a profession from a bureaucracy?
What is the significance of the Army as a profession?
What is my role as a steward of the profession?
What role does ethics serve in the function and preservation of a profession?
How do I develop junior leaders to be stewards of the profession?
How do the foundations of the U.S. Military influence the perception of the services as a
profession?
How does the treatment of people influence mission accomplishment?
c.
Third Requirement: Take the C101 Blackboard quiz located in the C101 lesson area.
4. ASSESSMENT PLAN
In this lesson, you will be assessed on your comprehension of the lesson material by completing the C101
Blackboard quiz, which accounts for 10% of your C100 grade. You may take the quiz up to three times;
only the highest score will be recorded in the gradebook.
RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
C101 Advance Sheet
4
May 2021 (AY 21-22)
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
C101: The Army Profession
Reading: C101RA
Will Army 2025 be a Military Profession?
Author: Don M. Snider
Professionalism and the
Volunteer Military
Will Army 2025 be a Military Profession?
Don M. Snider
Abstract: Army 2025 is now being built and it needs to have all the
right expert knowledge developed into its practitioners and units
for immediate use when called upon. That is an immense task given
the crunching defense reductions now ongoing. Analyzing the current state of the Profession using Army data on the bureaucratizing influences of the drawdown, on leadership and trust within the
ranks, and on the development of moral character of future Army
professionals, the author arrives at a less than sanguine conclusion.
While the Army will find the necessary efficiencies during reductions, military effectiveness is the true hallmark of the success of our stewardship.
ADP1 - The Army (2012)1
I
n this article I will argue there are no guarantees that Army 2025, now
being developed by its current Stewards, will be an effective participant in the military profession. In fact, there is a very good possibility
it will not be, to the extreme detriment of the Republic’s security. The
provenance of this challenge resides within the Army’s history and its
unique institutional characters. And, as we shall see, the potential solution
lies with the quality of the Stewards the Army develops, the leadership
they provide through this decade of defense reductions, and the results
they do, or do not, obtain.
The Department of the Army is, in fact, an institution of dual character. It is at the same time both a governmental bureaucracy and a
military profession. Thus there is a powerful, internal tension raging
between the competing cultures of bureaucracy and profession. Only
one can dominate institution-wide and at the levels of subordinate organizations and units.2 Presently, and after fifteen years of war, there are
indicators the culture of profession dominates that of bureaucracy, but
only weakly so.3
Stated another way, like all organizations the Army has a set of
default behaviors that accurately reflect a core functional makeup. Since
its establishment in 1775, that default behavior has been, and remains,
1 US Department of the Army, The Army, Army Doctrinal Publication 1 (Washington, DC: US
Department of the Army, September 2012), paragraph 4-19.
2 This dual-character framework and the conduct of its inherent, internal struggle is one of
the main findings of the two research/book projects that renewed the study of the US Army as a
military profession. See, Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, eds., The Future of the Army Profession,
2d Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2005).
3 This is a judgment call on my part based on the data reported in the 2015 Annual Survey of
the Army Profession (CASAP FY15) and the 2013 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army
Leadership (CASAL – Main Findings, April 2014). In particular, I focused on data in both reports that
supported the existence of a professional vs. bureaucratic culture within Army AC units. Subsequent
documentation in this article will draw specifics more from the CASAL given the longitudinal nature
of its data.
Dr. Snider currently
serves as Professor of
Army Profession and
Ethic in the Strategic
Studies Institute, US
Army War College and
as Senior Fellow for the
Center for the Army
Profession and Ethic at
West Point. He is also
Professor Emeritus
of Political Science at
West Point and in a
previous military career
served three combat
tours in Vietnam as an
infantryman. In 2015 the
Inter-University Seminar
on Armed Forces
and Society awarded
Dr. Snider the Morris
Janowitz Award for
lifetime achievement in
that discipline.
40
Parameters 45(4) Winter 2015-16
one of a hierarchical government bureaucracy. Only by the immense
efforts of post-Civil War leadership, both uniformed (Major General
William T. Sherman) and civilian (Elihu Root), was the behavior of the
Army first conformed from bureaucracy to that of a military profession,
and then only within the officer corps. The remainder of the Army was
professionalized later, though that status was lost in Vietnam only to be
renewed in the re-professionalization that occurred in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. To this day the challenge remains—every morning by presence and policy, Army leaders at every level, and particularly the senior
Stewards, must shift the Army’s behavior away from its bureaucratic
tendencies and to the behavior of a military profession. It simply does
not occur naturally; it is a function almost solely of leadership. To be
more specific, read carefully the contrasts laid out in the table below:
Profession Versus Bureaucracy Comparison4
Comparison
Profession
Knowledge
Expert, requires lifelong learning, education,
and practice to develop
expertise
Application Knowledge applied as
expert practice through
discretion and judgment
of individual professional; commitment based
Measure of
Mission effectiveness
Success
Culture
Values and ethic based;
granted autonomy with
high degree of authority, responsibility and
accountability founded
on trust; a self-policing
meritocracy
Investments Priority investment in
leader development;
human capital/talent
management; investment
strategy
Growth
Develop critical thinking
skills to spur innovation,
flexibility, adaptability;
broadened perspectives
Motivation
Intrinsic - Sacrificial service, sense of honor and
duty, work is a calling
Bureaucracy
Non-expert skills based,
learned on the job and/
or through short duration
training
Work accomplished by
following SOPs, administrative rules and procedures; compliance based
Efficiency of resource
expenditure
Procedural compliance
based; closely supervised
with limited discretionary authority, highly
structured, task-driven
environment founded on
low-trust
Priority investment in
hardware, routines; driven
by cost
Develop tactical and
technical competence to
perform tasks
Extrinsic - Ambition to
get ahead, competition;
work is a job
4 This table was first published in a chapter by T.O. Jacobs and Michael G. Sanders in The
Future of the Army Profession (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2005). I have subsequently adapted and updated
it several times, most recently with insights from Professor John Meyer of the Navy War College.
Professionalism and the Volunteer Military
Snider
41
It should be clear from these comparisons of the Army’s dual
character that a real tension exists within the Army and its subordinate
commands and agencies. Thus leadership, both civilian and uniformed,
through presence and policy is what ultimately determines the cultural
and behavioral outcome of Army commands and agencies.
This is not a trivial issue, as too many today believe, because if the
Army morphs into its default behavior of an obedient military bureaucracy it will be unable to do what professions alone can do.5 As shown
in the table, professions only exist because of two unique behaviors their
clients need to exist: they create expert knowledge and develop individuals to apply it effectively and ethically under the control of a self-policed
Ethic.
As new Army doctrine states, that sought after behavior is only
manifested when Army stewards create and maintain within Army
culture and its professionals the five essential characteristics of the
Army profession (versus Enterprise bureaucracy): Military Expertise;
Honorable Service; Esprit de Corps; and Stewardship which together
produce the internal and external Trust needed for the Army to be, and
to remain, a military profession.6
Restated in military parlance, unless the Army behaves as a military
profession it will be unable to produce: (1) the evolving expertise of
land combat to Win in a Complex World; and, (2) an Ethic to motivate the
development, honorable service, and sacrifice of individual professionals and to control ethically the immense lethality of their expert work.7
Either outcome, I believe, is a disaster for the security of our Republic.
I will make three inter-related arguments in support of the thesis
that there is no guaranteed outcome for Army 2025. But first let me
state very briefly two facts needed for context by those who may not be
acquainted with the sociology of professions.8 First, the Army is not a
profession just because it states somewhere it is one; calling yourself a
professional does not make you one! In fact the Army does not even get
to determine if it is a profession. As with all professions, their clients
determine when they are behaving as effective and ethical professions
and their approval is seen in an established trust relationship and in the
resulting autonomy of practice granted to the profession and its individual members.
Second, modern professions compete within their jurisdictions of
work with many other organizations and in that competition some of
them do not succeed; they die as professions. They either cease to exist
because their work is no longer needed or expert (railroad porters and
schedulers), or they morph into a different organizational behavior for
5 This point is best understood by comparing, over the past decade or so, the battlefield performance of the professional US Army to that of the bureaucratic European land armies serving in
the same coalitions in the Middle East.
6 US Department of the Army, The Army Profession, Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 1
(Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, June 2015), 1-3 - 1-5.
7 US Department of the Army, The US Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World: 20202040, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Washington, DC: US Army Training and Doctrine Command,
October 2014); and Don M. Snider, “Renewing the Motivational Power of the Army’s Professional
Ethic,” Parameters 44, no. 3 (Autumn 2014): 7-11.
8 The foundational text is, Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of
Expert Labor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
42
Parameters 45(4) Winter 2015-16
a period until they can try to re-earn the trust of their clients (accountancy, after the Enron scandals). Thus, contrary to what Huntington
implied in his classic, The Soldier and the State, it is simply not the case,
“once a profession, always a profession.” I will return to this point in
the conclusion.
With those facts stated, on to the first argument.
An Institutional Culture of Trust
While it is well established in research and in Army Doctrine that
trust, both internal and external, is the “currency” of professions, it
is not clear the Army’s Stewards will be able to maintain the current
institutional culture of trust so essential to the Army functioning as a
military profession. There are at least two reasons for this:
The first and main reason is found external to the Army. It is the
intense bureaucratization being abetted within all military departments
by the ongoing defense reductions.9 While only slightly winning the
constant battle over institutional culture, the Army is now enduring extensive and de-motivational reductions in personnel and other
resources (e.g., involuntary terminations of service for both officers
and senior enlisted soldiers, lowered readiness in many units which
demotivates leader initiative, a sustained high op-tempo which means
at all levels “doing more with less,” etc.). For the Army leadership, as
they execute such necessary—but clearly bureaucratic—responses, the
culture of trust so tenuously held together is pressured to fray even
further. This is but a recurring example of the well-accepted fact from
decades past that defense reductions tend strongly to bureaucratize the
military departments.10
A second reason the battle over a professional institutional culture
may well be lost in the near future is the fact that the operational Army
has now moved back to garrison in CONUS from its wartime deployments in the Middle East. And, it is fair to say, it is having some major
problems fitting in. Particularly in the junior ranks, both officer and
enlisted, there is a huge learning curve to be surmounted as individuals
and units learn anew, to cite just two critical items, how to do training
management/execution in garrison; and, how to develop Army leaders
under stateside priorities, policies, and procedures. This transition is
turning out to be a very significant leadership challenge at all levels, one
that will exist for several more years with the outcome likely remaining
in question.
Fortunately, the Army regularly surveys at all levels throughout
the institution both the state of the Army as a profession, and Army
leaders’ perceptions of leadership and leader development effectiveness.
The former is found in the CASAP Report, the most current being
9 The post-Cold War reductions within the Department of Defense provided an “extreme”
case of organizational downsizing, and scholars documented then across all types of organizations such bureaucratizing effects as “increasing formalization, rules, standardization, and rigidity;…
loss of common organizational culture; loss of innovativeness; increased resistance to change; risk
aversion and conservatism in decision-making…” See, Kim S. Cameron, “Strategic Organizational
Downsizing: An Extreme Case,” Research in Organizational Behavior Vol. 20 (JAI Press, 1998):185-229.
10 Periods of Defense reductions also offer opportunities for the Stewards of the profession
to renegotiate jurisdictions of practice to ease an excessive optempo created by the smaller force. It
remains to be seen whether that will eventuate for Army 2025.
Professionalism and the Volunteer Military
Snider
43
September 1015; and, the latter in the CASAL Report, the latest being
April 2014.11 Of interest to this discussion are findings that cast light on
the state of the Army’s institutional and unit climates amid the defense
reductions in which Army leaders now lead. One finding from the
CASAL is particularly relevant to our discussion:
Mixed climate indicators – Commitment high (Captain intent to stay highest
percent since tracked in 2000), confident in mission ability, but decrease in
career satisfaction, upturn in unit discipline problems, increase in workload
stress.”12
For the last item, the report notes, “Stress from high workload is a
serious problem for nearly one-fifth of Army leaders.” This is a significant increase from 2009 when twice as many active component Army
leaders rated it “not a problem.”13
To understand better this challenge of the bureaucratizing, indeed
de-professionalizing, influence of the defense reductions coinciding with
the post-war “return to garrison,” consider the case of the implementation to date of the Army’s new doctrine of mission command. Within
internal audiences senior Army leaders repeatedly state, “We can’t do
mission command unless the Army is a profession.”14 They say this, correctly, because of the critical role trust plays in the execution of mission
command and the fact that, uniquely, professions create and maintain
high levels of trust both internally and externally—it is, as noted earlier,
the “currency” of all professions. But is that requisite level of trust being
generated now among those implementing mission command?
To remind, mission command is “…the exercise of authority and
direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined
initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.” Several doctrinal
principles are embedded in this definition, three of which are germane
here: “Build cohesive teams through mutual trust,” “Exercise disciplined
initiative,” and “Accept prudent risk.”
The current challenge, which is now described internally within the
Army as the “hypocrisy” of mission command, rests on the different
perspectives held by the Army’s younger generations of leaders about
the current implementation of the concept. Junior leaders, both commissioned and non-commissioned, most of whom enjoyed great freedom of
action while deployed and have seldom before served in garrison, focus
on the principles of exercising initiative and accepting prudent risk.
They want to operate in garrison as they did while deployed—mission
orders, freedom to exercise initiative, and with minimum oversight by
seniors who underwrite the risks inherent in their initiatives.
11 Center for the Army Profession and Ethic (CAPE), Annual Survey of the Army Profession
(CASAP FY15), Technical Report 2015-01 (West Point, NY: Center for the Army Profession
and Ethic (CAPE), September 2015), http://cape.army.mil/repository/reports/Technical%20
Report%20CASAP%20FY15.pdf; and Center for Army Leadership, Annual Survey of Army Leadership
(CASAL), Main Findings, Technical Report 2014-01, April 2014, http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cal/2013CASALMainFindingsTechnicalReport2014-01.pdf.
12 Ibid., 28-29.
13 Ibid., 35-36.
14 For example, General David Perkins, CG TRADOC, speaking at the Army’s Senior Leader
Seminar (SLS-15-02) in August 2015, author in attendance.
44
Parameters 45(4) Winter 2015-16
But, currently, their perception is it is not the case. In the CASAL
report company grade officers and especially junior NCOs rate satisfaction with “amount of freedom/latitude in the conduct of duties” as
even below the CASAL’s acceptable (but inexplicably low!) favorability
threshold of 67 percent. Similarly unsatisfactory rating were received for
empowerment to make decisions, and learning from honest mistakes.15
Their battalion and brigade commanders, on the other hand, see in
garrison situations significant personal and professional downsides in
underwriting initiatives by junior leaders. Simply stated, executing live
fire exercise in CONUS is a far more restricted and controlled activity
than it was when conducted while deployed. To paraphrase one recent,
and successful, battalion commander, “If you think I am going to risk
a ‘top block’ OER on the initiatives of one of my platoon leaders who
doesn’t know what the hell he’s doing in garrison, you are crazy.” While
regrettably careerist as expressed, the CASAL data indicates this position may well be too common among the 20-30 percent of Army leaders
not rated effective in demonstrating the principles of mission command.
That data concludes:
Between 70-78% of leaders are rated effective in demonstrating the principles of the mission command philosophy (lowest rating of six tasks was
“building effective teams” at 70%).16
In earlier defense reductions such a climate was known as “micromanagement,” a recognized obstacle to leader development and the
creation of positive unit climates.17 The result is not only the erosion of
critical leader-led trust relationships within operational units, but also
the erosion more broadly of the institutional culture necessary for the
Army to remain a military profession.
So, aside from the specific issue of mission command, how is the
Army doing at building and maintaining a culture of trust amid this
bureaucratizing environment? Let us turn again to specific CASAL
data, two of which are directly focused on this question:
Seventy-three percent of leaders rate their immediate superior effective or
very effective at building trust while 14% rate them ineffective. A majority
of leaders (72-83% [by component]) are also viewed favorably in demonstrating trust-related behaviors including looking out for others’ welfare,
following through on commitments, showing trust in other’s abilities and
correcting conditions in units that hinder trust.
Two thirds of leaders report having high or very high trust in their immediate superior, peers, and subordinates (overall no more than 12% of leaders
reporting having low or very low trust in those cohorts). Just over half of
leaders (55%) report having high trust in their superiors two level ups (14%
report low or very low trust).18
I read these data as, roughly one-quarter of all the followers surveyed
indicate that their leaders are less than “effective or very effective” at
building trust and 14 percent of those are, in perception, fully ineffective.
15 Center for Army Leadership, Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL), Main Findings, 38.
16 Ibid., 39-40.
17 See, for example, George Reed, Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the US Military (Lincoln,
Nebraska: Potomac Books, 2015).
18 Center for Army Leadership, Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL), Main Findings, 46.
Professionalism and the Volunteer Military
Snider
45
Further, one third of Army leaders do not have “high or very high” trust
in their immediate leaders, and considerably less in those two levels up.
When these portions of Army leaders (1/4 -1/3) are deficient at the critical tasks of “building trust” and “being trusted,” it is difficult for me to
be sanguine about the future state in internal trust within the Army.19
Army Leaders are Not Sufficiently Practicing Transformational
Leadership
The second element of my thesis is that current leadership practices
within the Army are unlikely to provide the inspiration and motivation,
and thus the trust and commitment, needed for both the institutional
Army (at the policy level) and its professionals (at the level of individual
practice) to prevail against the bureaucratizing pressures outlined in the
first argument.
While there are currently dozens of leadership theories extant in the
relevant literatures, for our purposes here they can be discussed best in
the context of how they are practiced by Army leaders. Broadly speaking
there are two related practices, both of which are implicitly endorsed
by the Army in its leadership doctrines. Current doctrines emphasize
“situational leadership,” that is, Army leaders are to be able to adjust
their actions to influence and otherwise lead based on the specifics of
the situation.20 This is commonsense—in the chaotic work that is the
Army’s, situations confronted by leaders are seldom if ever replicated.
The first broad practice is “transactional” leadership. Known for
its use of contingent reinforcement, or the “if-then, carrot and stick”
approach, it emphasizes the use of the formal authority of the leader to
influence, indeed if required to compel, subordinates to obedience, to
correct actions and behaviors.21 Rewards and punishments, threats and
sanctions are prominent in such interactions. The motivation and commitment produced by such a compliance-oriented relationship, then, is
what we know as the obligation of the duty concept, “I must do my
duty.” Thus commanders offer rewards for high performance and within
UCMJ there are articles which prescribe punishments for “dereliction”
of one’s duty. Understandably, such a leadership practice, if relied on too
heavily, will create a top-down, legalistic, compliance-oriented climate,
one more akin to a bureaucratic organization than a professional one.
Going well beyond such compliance oriented interactions is the
practice of “transformational” leadership. This approach looks deeper
into the human dimension of the leader-follower interaction to address
“the follower’s sense of self-worth in order to engage the follower in
true commitment and involvement in the effort at hand. This is what
transformational leadership adds to the transactional exchange.”22
More specifically, such leadership practices focus on the underlying
commitment of the leader and follower to shared goals and ideals as
19 This data on trust is only very slightly improved from the 2013 CASAL, which rated as
“moderately favorable” the perceived level of trust within Army organizations and units.
20 US Department of the Army, Army Leadership, Doctrine Publication 6-22 (Washington, DC:
US Department of the Army, August 2012), 4.
21 Bernard M. Bass, Transformational Leadership: Industrial, Military, and Educational Impacts
(Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum Associates, 1998), 6-7.
22 Ibid., 4.
46
Parameters 45(4) Winter 2015-16
the basis for influencing behavior. Generally such leadership has four
components: (1) Leader as role model, someone whose attributes and
competencies are so compelling as to be aspired to and emulated; (2)
Inspirational motivation by the leader’s demonstrated commitment to
shared goals, well communicated expectations, and creation of a team
spirit; (3) Intellectual stimulation by the leader’s encouragement of innovation and creativity by the team; and, (4) Individualized consideration
of subordinates by the leader’s special attention as mentor or coach to
each one’s needs for achievement and growth.23
The relevant questions, then, are: (1) which, or what mix, of these
approaches is most likely to produce climates of trust and honorable
service needed for the Army to maintain its effectiveness and status as a
military profession; and, (2) which is the Army now using most?
When the first question is addressed in the context of the role of a
military Ethic in regulating the performance and behavior of individual
professionals, the answer is comparatively clear. Research on the Israeli
military has shown the three facets of a soldier’s commitment—to
organizational goals, to career expectations, and to internalized ethical
principles—are aligned better, and maintained that way, under the
transformational techniques.24
Research on the development and capabilities of “authentic”
leaders also sheds light on which practice is more effective. There, the
leader’s development of a cooperative interdependent relationship with
subordinates based initially on his/her competence, character, and demonstrated dependableness are the sources of trust. In turn, this trust
opens subordinates to further influence by their leaders, creating highimpact leadership seen both in unit effectiveness in combat and in the
moral development of subordinates. “Transformational leaders induce
their followers to internalize their values, belief and visions.”25
Further, studies of transactional versus transformational leadership component effectiveness in both stable and unstable environments
show both practices to be effective in stable environments. But in an
uncertain and unstable environment, such as deployments or combat
where “complexity, volatility and ambiguity are increased, transformational practices rated approximately 85 percent more effective than
transactional.”26 This is not a marginal difference!
Thus, what is most needed for Army 2025 is authentic leaders using
more frequently the practices of transformational leadership. So how is
the Army doing?
Returning once again to the 2014 CASAL report, the findings
of relevance here are those that give insights into the leadership techniques now being used by Army leaders. The CASAL assesses leader
23 Ibid., 5-6.
24 Reuben Gal, “Commitment and Obedience in the Military: And Israeli Case Study,” Armed
Forces and Society 11 (1985): 553-564.
25 Patrick J. Sweeney and Sean T. Hannah, “High Impact Military Leadership: the Positive
Effects of Authentic Moral Leadership on Followers,” in Forging the Warrior’s Character, Don M.
Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, eds. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 91-116; quotation, 95.
26 Bernard M Bass and Ronald E. Riggio, Transformational Leadership, 2d Edition (New Jersey:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2006), 53; see also Peggy C. Combs, US Army Cultural Obstacles to
Transformational Leadership, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, March
2007).
Professionalism and the Volunteer Military
Snider
47
effectiveness in each of the nine methods of influence described in Army
doctrine, methods ranging from inspirational appeals and getting buy-in
at the transformational end of the influence continuum, to pressure and
legitimating actions by authority at the transactional end. As one would
expect, Army leaders are perceived as exercising different degrees of
effectiveness with these techniques. Overall the report notes:
Larger percentages of leaders use the preferred methods of influence to gain
commitment from others as opposed to compliance-gaining methods, which
is a positive finding…Two thirds of AC leaders (69%) rate their immediate
superior effective in inspirational appeals as a method of influence, while
15% rate them ineffective. While these results meet the two-thirds threshold
of favorability, improvement of leader effectiveness in this skill [would be]
beneficial as it is positively associated with other favorable outcomes.27
Specifically, the five lowest rated techniques were participation,
pressure, personal appeals, inspirational appeals, and exchange.28 It is
good that three of these are transactional techniques and that, in particular, exchange rated the lowest. But I find it problematic that inspiration
appeals and getting buy-in (participation) are even in this group and that
inspirational appeals are next to the lowest.
So, what we currently have is 15 percent of all AC Army leaders perceived as ineffective in a vital tenet of transformational leadership and
roughly a third are rated less than “effective or very effective” with the
same technique. Further, in another critical tenet of transformational
leadership, getting buy-in, Army leaders are only rated as 77 percent
effective. How can an Army with that portion of its leaders (roughly
one-fourth) perceived as less than effective in critical transformational
leadership techniques expect to create a culture of trust essential to
professional behavior?
These data reinforce my contention Army leaders are leading too
much with transactional modes and too little with transformational
ones.29 Transformational leadership can still be practiced during a drawdown and in a constrained environment. But, as presented in the earlier
discussion on trust, some leaders will succumb to bureaucratic tendencies and gravitate towards transactional leadership in order to “survive”
and “climb” the careerist ladder. But the best organizations will be those
that have transformational leaders. Both will look good on paper in the
short term, but units and organizations with inspiring, developmental
leaders will continue to be successful beyond that leader’s tenure, i.e,
will provide a far greater contribution to the professional state of Army
2025.30
Unfortunately, unless the use of transformational leadership
increases markedly in the future one cannot be sanguine about Army
2025 being a military profession.
27 Center for Army Leadership, Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL), Main Findings, 20.
28 Ibid., 19.
29 Obviously leaders at all levels and at most all times use a blend of techniques; my conclusion
is qualitative rather than quantitative.
30 The concluding comments here benefit from discussions with Colonel Thomas Clady, USA.
48
Parameters 45(4) Winter 2015-16
An Ineffective Approach to Character Development
The third element of my argument is the Army does not have
an effective approach to the development of the moral character of
its professionals. Yet, such character is essential to the Army’s daily
effectiveness as a profession, and in particular as just discussed, to the
authenticity requisite to transformational leaders.
Professions are not only expected to be functionally effective, but
they are also expected to do their work rightly, according to their own
Ethic which their client has approved. This is their basis of trust with
their client, their life-blood as a profession. Not unexpectedly this is
particularly true of a profession such as the military because its lethality
places it in the “killing and dying” business.31
Couple this with the fact that the “practice” of the Army professional, regardless of age, rank, or location, is the “repetitive exercise
of discretionary judgments.”32 These decisions and resulting actions,
done many times a day by each Army professional, are highly moral in
character in that they directly influence the well-being of other persons.
Given this situation, the imperative for high personal character in each
Army professional is clearly established.
However, recent research describes the Army’s approach to character development as “laissez faire.”33 This is attributed to a number of
reasons not the least of which is an institutional culture too infused with
social trends that contradict the principles of the Army Ethic, imperatives such as the moral principle that each Soldier, to be trustworthy,
must be capable and reliable in executing all requirements of their occupational specialty.
But the main point of the critiques is that Army doctrine essentially
absolves the institution of responsibility and places almost complete
responsibility on the individual professionals to development themselves
morally. The key excerpt from current doctrine is:
Soldiers and Army Civilians are shaped by their backgrounds, beliefs, education, and experience. An Army leader’s job would be simpler if merely
checking the team member’s personal values against the Army Values and
developing a simple plan to align them sufficed. Reality is much different.
Becoming a person or leader of character is a process involving day-today experiences, education, self-development, developmental counselling,
coaching, and mentoring. While individuals are responsible for their own
character development, leaders are responsible for encouraging, supporting
and assessing the efforts of their people.34
The last sentence is key. Such a “hands off” approach is further
exemplified by the fact that no extant doctrine contains a robust model
explaining human or character development and how such a thing
comes about and is reinforced by the fulfilling of the mutual responsibilities of the Army, its leaders, and the individual. So, without such
31 James Toner, True Faith and Allegiance: The Burden of Military Ethics (Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky, 1995), 25.
32 US Department of the Army, The Army Profession, Ibid., para 1-8 on page 1-2.
33 Brian M. Mickelson, “Character Development of U.S. Army Leaders: The Laissez-Faire
Approach,” Military Review 93, no. 5 (September-October, 2013): 30-39.
34 US Department of the Army, Army Leadership, Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 6-22
(Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, August 2012): paragraph 3-26, page 3-6.
Professionalism and the Volunteer Military
Snider
49
common understanding and language of character development, how
can the Army hope to effectively develop the strength of character of its
professionals? According to one Army study, this recognized void now:
…permits leader and professional development of Soldiers and Army
Civilians to proceed without explicit, coordinated focus on character in
concert with competence and commitment; accepts unsynchronized, arbitrary descriptors for desired qualities of character in Soldiers and Army
Civilians; continues undisciplined ways and means of assessing the success
of Army efforts to develop character within education, training, and experience; and defers to legalistic, rules-based, and consequentialist reasoning in
adjudging the propriety of leaders’ decisions and actions.35
To further document this argument we need not rely on the all too
often cited media reports of egregious cases of moral failure by individual Army leaders. Instead, the results of such a weak approach to
character development and reinforcement are more reliably seen in a
recent study completed by two Army War College professors aptly titled,
Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession.36 In it they sought to
determine, as the Army is downsizing and returning to garrison, what
the impact of increasing requirements for evaluative reporting up the
chain of command is on the ability of Army leaders, and particularly
officers, to refrain from moral compromise, or “ethical fading” as it is
known in the literature:
While it has been fairly well established that the Army is quick to pass
down requirements to individuals and units regardless of their ability to
actually comply with the totality of the requirements, there has been very
little discussion about how the Army culture has accommodated the deluge
of demands on the force. This study found that many Army officers, after
repeated exposure to the overwhelming demands and the associated need
to put their honor on the line to verify compliance, have become ethically
numb. As a result, an officer’s signature and word have become tools to
maneuver through the Army bureaucracy rather than being symbols of
integrity and honesty. Sadly, much of the deception that occurs in the profession of arms is encouraged and sanctioned by the military institution as
subordinates are forced to prioritize which requirements will actually be
done to standard and which will only be reported as done to standard. As
a result, untruthfulness is surprisingly common in the U.S. military even
though members of the profession are loath to admit it.37
Thus, the authors document clearly that the Army, as an institution, is actually abetting the very behavior it finds unacceptable as the
antithesis of the behavior of a military profession. Operationally, the
strength of character of Army leaders, in this case primarily officers, has
been and continues to be too easily overmatched by the demands of the
Army’s bureaucratic behavior.
Yes, the current bureaucratizing behavior of the Army, unchecked
by its Stewards, is allowing the culture of bureaucracy to dominate that
of profession, a dire situation for the future of Army 2025. And, for
yet another data point we can look at the long, and as yet unsuccessful,
campaign the Army has waged against sexual assault and harassment
35 Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, The Army Concept for Character Development of
Army Professionals, Draft (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Mission Command Center of Excellence, US Army
Combined Arms Center, December 23, 2015), 5, copy in possession of author.
36 Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession
(Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, February 2015).
37 Ibid., ii.
50
Parameters 45(4) Winter 2015-16
within its own ranks. What better case is there that the Army’s client,
the American people have lost trust in its effectiveness as a military
profession? Trusted professions are granted autonomy by their client;
the people’s Congress is doing exactly the opposite as it repeatedly seeks
to pull away from Army commanders authorities to deal with this issue.
Leaders of character are not bystanders, especially when a buddyprofessional is threatened! Yet by observation it is clear that the Army is
not yet winning its battle against the moral disengagement, indeed moral
cowardice, of the too-many bystanders among its ranks, both uniformed
and civilian.
Demonstrably, then, how can the Army’s current process for character development of leaders be seen as other than inefficacious? The
observable behaviors are not moving in the right direction and, in my
judgment, the Army’s laissez faire approach to character development
simply is too weak to reverse them.38
Conclusion
We started with the question of whether Army 2025 will be a military profession. And I have offered three reasons why I believe a positive
answer is not at all assured.
Some will argue my assessment is too negative: there are very
positive things going on I did not consider. I am aware of many positive
things going on, even in the midst of the very trying defense reductions.
One is the development of new fields of Army expert knowledge, such
as cyber, and the development of soldiers and civilians to use that new,
and urgently needed, knowledge. Such behaviors are exactly what one
would expect from a military profession rather than from a military
bureaucracy.
There is a second positive trend centered on the Army’s recent
intellectual efforts to rethink its own future, culminating in the new
operation concept, Win in a Complex World.39 A part of that effort is the
Army’s new focus on the “human dimension” of warfare which very
favorably corresponds to the focus of this paper, the quintessentially
human nature of modern competitive professions.40 This initiative does
have potential to address directly and powerfully the professional character of Army 2025. But, given the facts that it has just been initiated and
the Army’s poor historical record of actually implementing any strategy
for, or actual reforms to, policies for human capital development, it is far
too early yet for anything but sincere hope.
Thus, on balance, I believe it a fair assessment to be less than sanguine
about the professional future of Army 2025. To me, the three arguments
offered here simply out-weigh such positive scenarios. The fact that the
Stewards’ ability to prevail against the bureaucratizing tendencies of the
38 To be fair, the Army is aware of this failing and has initiated an internal effort to rethink its
approach to character development. But the results are not due until late 2016 and implementation
will take additional years after that. Whether this effort will be implemented to show results within
Army 2025 remains to be seen.
39 US Department of the Army, The US Army Operating Concept, Ibid.
40 US Department of the Army, The Army Human Dimension Strategy 2015 (Washington,
DC: US Department of the Army, 2015), http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/20150524_Human_Dimension_Strategy_vr_Signature_WM_1.pdf.
Professionalism and the Volunteer Military
Snider
51
defense reductions remains problematic, the fact that Army leaders do
not sufficiently use practices of transformational leadership to generate
needed climates of trust; and, the fact that the Army lacks an effective
approach to strengthen and reinforce the moral character of its professionals, altogether indicate to me a very problematic future for the US
Army as a military profession.
All of this brings us back to the title of this article and to the moral
agency that the Army’s Stewards play in such a time as this. They alone
have the moral responsibility and accountability to keep the Army a
military profession, and thus an effective national instrument of landpower. And they will only do so by urgently and forthrightly addressing,
among many others, the issues outlined in this essay.
As General Odierno noted when he commenced his tenure as CSA
at the beginning of these crunching force reductions (epigram to this
essay), “the necessary reductions will be found.” But, as he also noted,
they will not define success for the Army’s Stewards. Rather, it will be
the residual effectiveness of Army 2025 that defines their success in
executing their moral agency. And that effectiveness will be assessed, as
we have done in this analysis, by whether Army 2025 is then a military
profession “ready for the first battle of the next war,” or just another
obedient military bureaucracy.41
RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
41 This phrase is adopted from, Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, America’s First Battles,
1776-1965 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986).
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL)
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
C101: The Army Profession
Reading: C101RB
Mastering the Profession of Arms, Part I: The Enduring Nature
Author: Mick Ryan
C101RB
May 2021 (AY 21-22)
Mastering the Profession of Arms, Part I: The Enduring Nature by Mick Ryan February 8,
2017 from : https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/mastering-the-profession-of-arms-part-i-theenduring-nature/
Two centuries ago, Carl von Clausewitz described the need for able intellects to lead armies in
his work, On War. He noted that any complex activity, virtuously executed, requires the gifts of
intellect and temperament, as well as two other indispensable qualities. First, “an intellect that
even in the darkest hour retains some glitterings of the inner light which leads to truth.” And,
second, the courage “to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.”
More recently, Williamson Murray wrote in Strategy and Military Effectiveness:
[W]ar is an incredibly complex endeavour. It is…the most demanding intellectually and morally.
The cost of slovenly thinking at every level of war can translate into the deaths of innumerable
men and women, most of whom deserve better from their leaders.
What Murray describes here is the need for military leaders to seek mastery of the most complex
and intellectually challenging of professions — the profession of arms. And it is a profession that
is becoming more challenging to master. Technology continues to advance, our societies change,
and great power competition once again defines the strategic environment. It is therefore
imperative that we evolve our understanding of the profession, how its key competencies are
evolving, and how our institutions can remain at the forefront of “professional practice.”
Professionalism is when a person is engaged in creative and intellectually challenging work. A
profession requires skills and knowledge, often based on first principles — propositional
knowledge. Professions are subject to strict codes of conduct, which in some cases are based on
rigorous ethical and moral obligations — such as doctors and the Hippocratic Oath.
C101RB
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May 2021 (AY 21-22)
Clausewitz describes war as having an enduring nature but constantly changing character. I
propose that, like war, the profession of arms reflects this duality. It is a profession that is
constantly evolving as society and technology changes, while also being underpinned by
enduring features.
Understanding these features provides insights into the culture of military organizations. More
importantly, understanding changes in society, geopolitics, and technology can assist in ensuring
the contemporary and future relevance of military education and training continuums. Based on
the U.S. and Australian experiences, I offer three propositions in three articles. In this first
installment, I propose that there exists an enduring nature of the profession of arms. In the next
installment, I propose that there are seven key drivers for contemporary changes in the
competencies required in the profession of arms. Finally, in the third installment, I propose that
there are seven essential and evolving competencies of the military professional in digital-age
warfare.
The Birth and Life of the Profession
One of the best examinations of the birth of the military profession was conducted by a
renowned soldier-historian from the British Army, Sir John Hackett. In 1962, Hackett presented
a series of lectures at Trinity College in Cambridge that charted the profession’s development.
As Hackett argues, the emergence of a modern profession of arms — one built upon notions of
the nation-state and the regularization of armed service in Western Europe — can be traced to
the early 1800s. The profession was also brought forth by the Prussian disasters at Jena and
Auestadt.
Prussia was the first state to institute a complete and well-rounded approach to the profession
over the period between 1806 and 1812. As White has described in The Enlightened Soldier,
Scharnhorst was particularly influential in the early definition of the profession of arms. He was
heavily influenced by the ideas of Immanuel Kant and the German enlightenment idea of
bildung, which described the perfection of one’s character and intellect through education.
Applying his deep experience as an instructor and his operational experience with the EnglishHanoverian Army in the 1790s, Scharnhorst sought to define the profession through the lens of a
disciplined intellect and the modernization (or transformation) of warfare. Only through the
nurturing the intellect of military officers could a military force sustain a progressive approach to
the changing character of warfare.
In his influential examination of the military profession, The Soldier and the State, Samuel
Huntington recognized Scharnhorst’s approach as the start of military professionalism in the
West. Describing the founding of the Kriegsakademie in Berlin in 1810, Huntington examined
how this underpinned reforms to the Prussian military and how it comprised one of the key
drivers of military professionalism in Prussia. Scharnhorst also instituted requirements for
general and special entry, promotion exams, advancement on merit, an effective staff system,
and a sense of collective unity and responsibility. Together, these defined the profession of arms
for the Prussian Army, and this approach to developing its commanders and staff underpinned its
success on the battlefield in the 1800s.
C101RB
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May 2021 (AY 21-22)
Clausewitz also offered a definition for the profession. Although he examined it through the lens
of military genius, his conception shared much with Scharnhorst’s. He described the two
indispensable qualities as an intellect that retains some glitterings of the inner light which leads
to truth even in the darkest hour and the courage to follow this faint light. He examined these
qualities through the constructs of coup d’ oeil (the inner eye) and determination. These qualities
had to be honed. Determination, however, was beyond those of low intelligence, requiring a
special type of mind. Ultimately, the bildung-like blending of these two qualities ensured the
military professional could develop an increased capacity to deal with the unexpected.
In The Soldier and the State, Huntington identified what he believed were the central elements of
the profession. This provides a foundational definition of the contemporary profession of arms
that is tweaked and adapted by different nations accordingly to their distinct national, strategic,
and military culture. Huntington identified three core aspects of a profession in general and of
the profession of arms specifically: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.
A well-defined sphere of expertise was identified by Huntington and he noted that it was
common to all, or almost all, officers. This was what differentiated them from civilian
professionals. Appropriating Lasswell’s term, “the management of violence,” Huntington
described the core function of a military force as successful armed combat. The special skill of
the military leader — particularly officers — was the direction, operation, and control of
organizations with a primary purpose of applying violence.
The second element that Huntington believed defined the military profession was responsibility.
The expertise developed by the military professional imposes a special responsibility to society.
Society insists that the management of violence be only used for socially approved purposes —
this is a manifestation of Clausewitz’s famous dictum of war being a part of politics and
subordinate to it. As Huntington noted, while all professions are to some extent regulated by the
state, the military profession is monopolized by the state.
The final element that defined the military professional, in Huntington’s view, was that of
corporateness. He wrote that the corporate structure of the profession included the official
bureaucracy as well as societies, associations, schools, journals, customs, and traditions. This he
defined as the professional world of the military officer. The line between a military officer and a
civilian is also publicly symbolized by uniforms and insignia of rank.
Morris Janowitz was another crucial contributor to defining the profession of arms. He
established the study of the profession of arms and society as a subfield within sociology, and
was the author of numerous studies and articles on the military professional and society. But his
classic study of The Professional Soldier, published in 1960, remains a landmark in defining the
profession as well as an important study in civil-military relations. He also studied military
professionalism through the lens of various models of political-military elites.
Writing in Conflict Resolution in 1957, Janowitz described how military operations, given their
growing technical complexity, had passed from the domain of drafted citizens to be the preserve
of highly trained professionals. He was of the view that war-making would in the future rely on a
highly professionalised and specialised occupation, the professional soldier. Due to technological
C101RB
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May 2021 (AY 21-22)
change, professional soldiers would require longer formal training to acquire mastery, with
temporary citizen armies becoming less important and relevant. Further, the needs of the state
now dictated that the old periodic model (rapid expansion followed by similarly rapid
dismemberment) must give way to more permanent military establishments. This demanded
military professionals who were the masters of military operations and who possessed
sufficiently intellectual skills to provide advice to government leaders.
In the 1970s, both the U.S. and Australian armies reviewed their professions. In 1970, the U.S.
Army Study on Military Professionalism sought to deal with the heart and soul of the Army’s
leaders — its ethics, morality and professional competence. It found a strong correlation in the
relationship between professional ethics and professional competency. Further, it provided a
range of recommendations on the explicit description of the elements of the military professional
and the institutional education, training, and cultural requirements to achieve an optimal blend of
ethical behavior and excellence in executing the breadth of military duties.
The 1978 Regular Officer Development Study was a detailed study commissioned by the
Australian Army to review the profession of arms in the Australian context. A key finding of the
committee was that, in comparison to qualifications held by middle managers in the civilian
community, mid-ranking army leaders were under qualified and most did not hold an
undergraduate tertiary qualification let alone any post-graduate work. The study recommended
that an Officer Development Program be established and that this should include a sponsored
self-development program of tertiary correspondence studies to complement military training.
Two more recent reviews of the profession round out this examination of the development of the
profession of arms. First, an important contribution to understanding the contemporary
profession of arms was the work of Maj. Gen. Craig Orme in 2011. His report, Beyond
Compliance, proposed an Australian profession of arms concept. In noting that professionalism
was a foundational value, it proposed four characteristics of the profession: being an expert,
stewardship, being a representative, and service to the state. Finally, and most recently, was the
review of the profession of arms conducted by the U.S. Army over the period 2010 to 2013. The
result was the 2015 publication, The United States Army Profession. It listed five essential
characteristics that defined the Army profession: trust, military expertise, honourable service,
espirit de corps, and stewardship of the profession.
The Enduring Nature of the Profession
After reviewing this history, it is clear that the profession of arms could broadly be described as
having an enduring nature (what is the profession) and changing competencies (what should the
profession and its members be able to do). Contemporary and future military forces need to
appreciate both of these aspects of the profession of arms to ensure their education and training
activities remain relevant.
The best guide to identifying the enduring nature of the profession remains the work of
Huntington. As noted earlier, he proposed three key characteristics of the profession: expertise,
responsibility, and corporateness. The U.S. Army 2013 approach with five elements and Orme’s
four characteristics provides a guide to what the characteristics of the military profession might
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be in a contemporary sense. Using this as foundational material, I propose that there are four
elements that comprise the enduring nature of the military profession. These are: expertise,
stewardship, corporateness, and service to the state.
Expertise. Huntington wrote that the skill of the officer is neither a craft nor an art. It is instead
an extraordinarily complex intellectual skill requiring comprehensive study and training. And as
Orme notes, being an expert demands a commitment to constantly excel in individual and
collective achievements by mastering the skills and the theoretical knowledge relevant to their
role. It requires them to have a working understanding of the context and complimentary
activities associated with that role, including to potentially undertake the roles of those
immediately above them in the chain of command, for short durations.
Stewardship. Military professionals are stewards of their profession. While it might be simply
described as leaving things better than one found them, it is the professional obligation to
constantly seek improvement in individuals and teams. It speaks of a professional responsibility
to foster and nurture the profession writ large for the future — professional military schools and
colleges are an element of this. Stewardship is driven by an imperative to remain at the leading
edge of the profession and not “drift away” from best practice due to issues peripheral to the
profession. Stewardship also implies the obligation to care for and enhance the assets placed at
the disposal of leaders.
Corporateness. The profession of arms retains a corporate character. It possesses its own formal
military bureaucracy and organizations as well as associations, schools and training centers,
journals, customs, and traditions. This corporate approach includes possessing a strong idea of
the mission of the profession and the cultures, policies, and supporting structures that underpin
it. Finally, a critical element of this corporateness is the importance of professional self-identity.
This aligns with Huntington’s view of the corporateness of a profession. In particular,
Huntington noted, “The functional imperatives of security gives rise to complex vocational
institutions which mold members into an autonomous social unit.”
Service to the State. In his classic book on management, Concept of the Corporation, Peter
Drucker also wrote that corporate institutions should be instruments for “the organization of
human efforts to a common end.” As a member of the profession of arms, personal loyalty must
be to the state, the military institution, and the government. Military activities — at least in
democracies — are conducted for the advancement of national interests rather than individual or
corporate interests. The expertise developed by the military professional imposes a special
responsibility. As Huntington notes, the state insists that the management of violence be only
used for socially approved purposes. This was also a key theme in Clausewitz’s classic On War,
where he wrote that the political object will determine both the military objective to be reached
and the amount of effort it requires. At heart, being a servant of the state requires members, as
individuals, to be prepared to risk injury or death on lawful, state-directed missions.
Conclusion
Like war, the profession of arms reflects a duality. It is a profession that is constantly evolving as
society and technology changes, but it is also a profession that has enduring features. This article,
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in reviewing the modern development of the profession, has proposed four enduring features of
the profession of arms. But, understanding these only provides us with a partial understanding of
how we might prepare our people for contemporary and future conflicts. We must also
appreciate how the profession changes over time, what that means for military education and
training. Importantly, we must understand what is driving changes in the profession of arms.
Mick Ryan is an Australian Army officer. A graduate of Johns Hopkins University and the U.S.
Marine Corps Staff College and School of Advanced Warfare, he is a passionate advocate of
professional education and lifelong learning.
Image: U.S. Army Medical Dept.
RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
C101RB
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May 2021 (AY 21-22)
C121
Critical Thinking
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL)
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
Advance Sheet for C121
Critical Thinking
1. SCOPE
The purpose of the C120 module of C100 is to improve your ability to think critically and creatively
and apply these skills throughout your career. C120 closely links to C170, where we expect you to
demonstrate critical and creative thinking in writing. You have likely often heard “think critically” about
problems. You may already do this well, or might have not given thinking much thought. C120 provides
you the opportunity to improve your critical and creative thinking skills. The focus of this lesson is not
what to think or even how to think, but how to become a better thinker and problem-solver.
Everyone does some critical and creative thinking, but we tend to be comfortable in our patterns of
thinking, less likely to look at problems from new perspectives or question the underlying beliefs and
assumptions that lead us to certain outcomes. We believe a person cannot improve either critical or
creative thinking simply by applying a checklist or mental model. Improving critical thinking and creative
thinking requires practice.
C121, a four-hour lesson, introduces concepts that improves your ability to think critically and solve
problems by examining critical thinking, the impediments to critical thinking, and allowing you to
practice the skill. The concepts we examine in C121 helps you begin thinking about how you think (a
concept called meta-cognition) and cause you to question where and how you get information for
decision-making. We do not expect you to master critical thinking in a four-hour class, or even during the
foundations theme of instruction. Rather, C120 introduces you to some of the current theories on the
subject and offers some tools to use. However, much like beginning a new exercise regimen, critical
thinking takes practice and dedication. This class only provides the foundation. The payoff comes from
the critical and creative thought you apply during CGSOC and the rest of your career.
As a result of this lesson, you will understand how organizational leaders must think critically to
solve problems effectively. You will also understand the eight elements of thinking and the nine universal
intellectual standards of Paul and Elder’s Critical Thinking Theory and the importance of practicing
critical thinking to improve the skill.
Critical thinking skills should be evident in classroom discussions as you and your peers explain,
defend, and critically examine points of view and perspectives. Papers throughout CGSOC require logical
thought and critical analysis in the arguments. An improved or higher level of critical thinking skill may
not manifest itself in the first C120 lesson, but the first lesson lays the groundwork for further
development of those skills later in the academic year.
2. LEARNING OBJECTIVES
This lesson supports CGSOC TLO-CC-2, “Incorporate thinking skills,” as listed on the module
advance sheet. All applicable TLO numbers and action statements are referenced in this paragraph.
C121 Advance Sheet
May 2021 (AY 21-22)
ELO-CC-2.1
Action: Incorporate critical thinking skills.
Condition: Given individual reading and writing assignments, small group discussions, and practical
exercises.
Standard: Incorporation includes 1. A definition of critical thinking
2. An explanation of the core critical thinking skills
3. An analysis of mental models
4. An analysis of impediments to critical thinking
5. An understanding of Meta-cognition
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Synthesis
PLO Standards Supported: CGSOC PLO 1
CGSOC PLO 1 Attributes:
a. Independently research and critically evaluate information.
b. Comprehend context of the situation.
c. Create meaning from information and data.
d. Creatively design or revise concepts and ideas.
e. Communicate concepts with clarity and precision in written, graphical, and oral forms.
f. Compose complete and well-supported arguments.
g. Apply critical and creative thinking
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 1 (Strategic Thinking and Communication): Graduates who
are able to incorporate thinking that is broader than the issue at hand and effectively communicate that
thinking.
CGSOC graduates independently research and critically evaluate information to inform their understanding of the context, create meaning, and creatively design or revise concepts and ideas. Graduates
expertly use written communication to deliver rational, complete and well-supported arguments,
explanations, options, and/or solutions in a form that is specifically tailored to the most relevant audience.
3. HOMEWORK ASSIGNMENT
a. First requirement: Read the following before viewing the computer-based instruction (CBI):
C121RA: Explore the critical thinking website. Available:
https://louisville.edu/ideastoaction/about/criticalthinking (accessed 17 August 2021).
Understand what critical thinking entails, the intellectual standards, the elements of thought and
the intellectual traits from the Paul and Elder theory of critical thinking.
C121RB: “Thinking Critically about Critical Thinking” Mulnix, Jennifer W. Educational
Philosophy and Theory, 2010. (16 pages).
C121RC: The Applied Critical Thinking Handbook, Version 8.1. Chapter four: Critical Thinking,
page 40 to 51 (11 pages). Review the critical thinking traits on pages 106 to 108. (2 pages)
C121RD: “Good Decisions: Tips and Strategies for Avoiding Psychological Traps” Fitch, Brian.
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, (June 2010): 1-9 (9 pages). Reading is on Blackboard.
C121RE: “Critical thinking: Intellectual Standards Essential to Reasoning Well within Every
Domain of Thought,” Linda Elder and Richard, Paul Journal of Developmental Education, 2013.
(2 pages)
b. Second Requirement. View the computer-based instruction (CBI) and consider the following
questions:
How is critical thinking different from thinking?
C121 Advance Sheet
2
May 2021 (AY 21-22)
How can I improve my critical thinking skills?
How can I encourage critical thinking in an organization?
Are the theories examined persuasive? Do they reinforce or contradict each other?
How can I apply these theories to become a better critical thinker?
What are the impediments to critical thinking and how can I recognize my impediments and
overcome them?
c. Third Requirement: Take the C121 Blackboard quiz located in the C121 lesson area at the bottom
of the page.
4. ASSESSMENT PLAN
You will be assessed on your comprehension of the lesson material by completing the C121
Blackboard quiz, which accounts for 10% of the C100 grade. You may take the quiz up to three
times; only the highest score will be recorded in the gradebook.
RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
C121 Advance Sheet
3
May 2021 (AY 21-22)
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
C121: Critical Thinking
Reading: C121RB
Thinking Critically about Critical Thinking
Author: Jennifer Mulnix
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 2010
doi: 10.1111/j.1469-5812.2010.00673.x
Thinking Critically about Critical Thinking
Jennifer Wilson Mulnix
Department of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth
Abstract
As a philosophy professor, one of my central goals is to teach students to think critically. However,
one difficulty with determining whether critical thinking can be taught, or even measured, is that
there is widespread disagreement over what critical thinking actually is. Here, I reflect on several
conceptions of critical thinking, subjecting them to critical scrutiny. I also distinguish critical
thinking from other forms of mental processes with which it is often conflated. Next, I present my
own conception of critical thinking, wherein it fundamentally consists in acquiring, developing,
and exercising the ability to grasp inferential connections holding between statements. Finally,
given this account of critical thinking, and given recent studies in cognitive science, I suggest the
most effective means for teaching students to think critically.
Keywords: critical thinking, critical reasoning, scholarship of teaching, teaching critical thinking, philosophy of education
Introduction
As a philosophy professor, one of my central goals, especially in lower-level courses, is to
teach students to think critically.To this end, I undertook a research project to figure out
whether a student’s ability to think critically improves after taking philosophy courses,
and further, whether the specific implementation of a writing portfolio project showed an
increase in critical thinking skills (see Mulnix & Mulnix, 2010). Immediately, I found
myself faced with certain challenges. One obvious difficulty with determining whether
critical thinking can be taught, or even measured, is that there is widespread disagreement as to what critical thinking actually is or amounts to. To be sure, ‘critical thinking’
seems to be all the rage in current academic pedagogy. As such, in a climate where
colleges and universities are increasingly demanding that their faculties instill critical
thinking skills in undergraduate students, it is imperative that we begin to think critically
about this concept.Yet, my survey of the literature immediately revealed that what counts
as ‘critical thinking’ seems to vary widely. So, if we are charged with teaching students to
think critically, then we need to clarify the concept; otherwise we will be shooting arrows
at a target that we cannot see.
In this paper, I will first reflect on several different conceptions of critical thinking,
subjecting them to critical scrutiny. In the process of surveying and discussing these
accounts, I will also distinguish critical thinking from other forms of mental processes
with which it is often conflated. Next, I will present my own conception of critical
thinking, wherein critical thinking fundamentally consists in acquiring, developing, and
© 2010 The Author
Educational Philosophy and Theory © 2010 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
Published by Blackwell Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
2
Jennifer Wilson Mulnix
exercising the skill of being able to grasp inferential connections holding between
statements. Finally, given this account of critical thinking, and given recent studies in
cognitive science, I will suggest the most effective means for teaching students to develop
a more critical habit of mind.
1. Competing Definitions of Critical Thinking
What is it to think critically? Michael Scriven and Richard Paul state:
Critical thinking is the intellectually disciplined process of actively and
skillfully conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating
information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief and action. In its
exemplary form, it is based on universal intellectual values that transcend
subject matter divisions: clarity, accuracy, precision, consistency, relevance,
sound evidence, good reasons, depth, breadth, and fairness.
Critical thinking can be seen as having two components: 1) a set of information and belief generating and processing skills, and 2) the habit, based on
intellectual commitment, of using those skills to guide behavior. It is thus to be
contrasted with: 1) the mere acquisition and retention of information alone,
because it involves a particular way in which information is sought and treated;
2) the mere possession of skills, because it involves the continual use of them;
and 3) the mere use of those skills (‘as an exercise’) without acceptance of their
results. (Scriven and Paul, 2008a)
This is a rather thorough and informative definition of critical thinking. Notice that,
according to Scriven and Paul, critical thinking is an ‘intellectually disciplined process’.
We can draw out two important consequences from this claim. First, critical thinking
must be a learned skill. Second, critical thinking is a habit of mind—an intellectual
virtue—of being disposed to using and accepting the results of these reasoning skills.
That is, critical thinking is a set of intellectual virtues possessed by good thinkers. Hence,
it does not consist in the mindless application of a set of logical principles ‘as an exercise’.
This implies that there must be some sort of metacognitive awareness on the part of the
thinker of her own thought process. Critical thinking involves, as do all virtues, a set of
habituated skills possessed by the agent and applied to her thinking.
This highlights the contrast between merely constructing a logical argument, which
can be done in a mechanical way, and thinking critically, which requires careful application of the skills of sound reasoning to patterns of belief and a commitment to accept
the results of that reasoning. Harold Brown expresses the distinction between reasoning
versus merely thinking in a way that conforms to the rules of logic:
The feature of cognitive agents that they exhibit when they adopt beliefs on the
basis of appropriate reasons ... Following rules is not always required [for
reasoned thinking], since one task of rational assessment is to determine which
rules should be followed in a particular situation ... Mindlessly applying rules
just because they are logically correct is foolish. (Brown, 1995)
© 2010 The Author
Educational Philosophy and Theory © 2010 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
Thinking Critically about Critical Thinking
3
Throughout their work on the theory of critical thinking, Richard Paul and Linda
Elder also maintain that critical thinking encompasses elements of thought, universal
intellectual standards and intellectual virtues. Elaborating, they claim that the relevant
elements of thought are: Point of View, Purpose, Question at Issue, Information, Interpretation and Inference, Concepts, Assumptions, and Implications and Consequences,
while the intellectual standards associated with critical thinking are: Clarity, Accuracy,
Precision, Relevance, Depth, Breadth, Logic and Fairness. Finally, the intellectual
virtues central to critical thinking are: Intellectual Humility, Intellectual Courage, Intellectual Empathy, Intellectual Autonomy, Intellectual Integrity, Intellectual Perseverance,
Confidence in Reason, and Fairmindedness (Paul & Elder, 2008):
Critical Thinking is that mode of thinking—about any subject, content, or
problem—in which the thinker improves the quality of his or her thinking by
skillfully analyzing, assessing, and reconstructing it. Critical thinking is selfdirected, self-disciplined, self-monitored, and self-corrective thinking. It presupposes assent to rigorous standards of excellence and mindful command of
their use. It entails effective communication and problem-solving abilities, as
well as a commitment to overcome our native egocentricism and sociocentrism. (Scriven & Paul, 2008b)
... Critical thinking is self-guided, self-disciplined thinking which attempts to
reason at the highest level of quality in a fair-minded way. People who think
critically consistently attempt to live rationally, reasonably, empathetically.
They are keenly aware of the inherently flawed nature of human thinking when
left unchecked ... They use the intellectual tools that critical thinking offers—
concepts and principles that enable them to analyze, assess, and improve
thinking. They work diligently to develop the intellectual virtues of intellectual
integrity, intellectual humility, intellectual civility, intellectual empathy, intellectual sense of justice and confidence in reason. (Elder, 2007)
Nevertheless, there is a danger in construing critical thinking as a set of virtues if that
is understood as moral virtues. One worry with the above characterization centers on the
explicit reliance on moral terms like ‘being fair-minded’ or ‘being empathetic’ or ‘being
committed to a sense of justice’, as this seems to mix up moral virtues with intellectual
virtues. Critical thinking, as an intellectual virtue, is not directed at any specific moral
ends.That is, it does not intrinsically contain a set of beliefs that are the natural outcomes
of applying its method. For instance, two critical thinkers can come to hold contrary
beliefs despite each applying the skills associated with critical thinking well and honestly.
As such, critical thinking has little to do with what we think, but everything to do with
how we think. Accordingly, any model of critical thinking that asserts that there are
definite ends at which critical thinking aims—in terms of what we should or should not
believe, or how we should or should not behave—is deeply suspicious.
Insofar as the critical thinker is made more autonomous by learning to utilize the skills
of critical thinking, it is an insult to suggest that she cannot determine for herself what
the morally good life consists in. This is to beg the question against differing ethics and
outlooks. The skills associated with quality critical thinking will never prescribe any sort
of attitude or ethical stance concerning egocentrism or sociocentrism. After all, some
© 2010 The Author
Educational Philosophy and Theory © 2010 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
4
Jennifer Wilson Mulnix
rather influential and respectable moral philosophies center on the idea that morality is
founded in individual self-interest and others focus on the interests of one’s society. In
fact, even versions of moral nihilism are argued in ways perfectly consistent with the
precepts of solid critical thinking. To state that critical thinking precludes these positions
is to make it a moral theory, which it clearly is not. It is a theory about how to think, not
about how to live.
Scriven, Paul and Elder suggest that critical thinking consists in the myriad of skills
they list. However, it seems clear that in order to develop these skills, the thinker must
be in possession of at least one very important antecedent foundational skill: that of
recognizing the inferential connections that hold between statements. If a thinker is to
live up to the standards of clarity, accuracy, precision, consistency, relevance, and so on,
then she must first be highly capable of grasping evidential relationships that hold
between statements. In other words, these other important aspects of critical thinking
depend upon a prior ability to recognize inferential connections. Thus, the other skills
suggested by Scriven, Paul and Elder are in fact derived from this more basic foundational ability.This is where I diverge with Scriven, Paul and Elder’s conception of critical
thinking.While I agree that critical thinking amounts to an intellectual virtue, I think that
the above accounts of critical thinking fail to include this vital foundational skill, which
is necessary for the acquisition and development of the other skills contained in the
intellectual virtue of critical thinking.
Of course, not all proposed definitions of critical thinking analyze the concept as an
intellectual virtue. For example, Lewis Vaughn claims that critical thinking consists in
following a set of procedures:
Critical Thinking [is] the systematic evaluation or formulation of beliefs, or
statements, by rational standards. Critical thinking is systematic because it
involves distinct procedures and methods ... And it operates according to
rational standards in that beliefs are judged by how well they are supported by
reasons. (Vaughn, 2005, p. 4)
Ken Petress (2004) also seems to identify critical thinking quite directly as a set of rational
criteria that such thinking satisfies, rather than a set of intellectual skills possessed by a
thinker. Insofar as a thinker meets these criteria, he has reasoned well.Yet, Petress does not
claim that the thinker must be habitually disposed to think in these ways in order to think
critically. It is enough that he does so on this occasion to claim that he has successfully
employed the criteria of critical thinking. We see, then, that both Petress and Vaughn,
among others, think of critical thinking as specific act of reasoning that conforms to a set
of rules of rationality. Most likely, these principles are the sort of axioms one would learn
in an Introduction to Logic class. Hence, they do not claim that there need be any
metacognitive awareness on the part of the thinker himself concerning the thinking
process in which he is engaged, in order for him have reasoned well. Furthermore, there is
no need on the part of the reasoner to be committed to accepting the results.
Instead, to think critically, according to Petress and Vaughn, is to mechanically follow
a set of guidelines in the formulation of an argument. In defining critical thinking this
way, there is no mention of intellectual skills. Instead of trying to develop critical habits
of mind, one need only consult a set of procedural rules and apply them in a rather
© 2010 The Author
Educational Philosophy and Theory © 2010 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
Thinking Critically about Critical Thinking
5
mechanical way. But, if critical thinking is a possession of certain skills, then, as with
other skills, it cannot be learned through the formulaic following of procedural rules. For
instance, in learning how to ride a bike—in acquiring that skill—the learner will not get
very far if she tries to concentrate on applying a set of physical laws that govern motion,
balance, torque and the like. Instead, she must practice. For, in developing the ability to
control the movements of the body requisite for riding a bike, there is no surrogate for
repetitive practice. In this sense, the bike-rider is gaining what is sometimes called a
‘knowing-how’. This is contrasted with content knowledge, or a ‘knowing-that’.1 Petress
and Vaughn imply that critical reasoning amounts to a form of knowing-that—of memorizing the appropriate intellectual moves. However, I think it is better to conceive of
critical reasoning as a form of knowing-how—of gaining an ability to control the ‘movements’ of our mental processes in certain ways.
Others, such as Barbara Thayer-Bacon, claim that the current concept of critical
thinking is too limiting:
It is limited in that vital tools that help us to be critical thinkers are ignored or
diminished, such as our tools of imagination, intuition, and emotional feelings,
while our reasoning tool is highlighted and underscored.2
This thought is also echoed by Anne Phelan when she states that, ‘the reliance on reason
(that characterizes critical thinking) ... is limiting’ (Phelan, 2001). Both argue for a more
inclusive concept of critical thinking, one that seeks to foster intellectual virtues other
than mere reasoning skills. Such an account of critical thinking attempts to broaden its
scope to encompass all thought processes.
This type of charge against critical thinking—that its emphasis on reason to the
exclusion of other types of mental cognition is a problem with the concept itself—is
fundamentally misguided. It runs the concept together with other different forms of
mental processes: imagination, intuition and emotional responses.Yet, critical thinking is
an inherently reason-based process, and as such, it cannot escape the central focus it
places on reason. That this is the case is undeniable. Hence, if we were to include in our
concept of critical thinking all mental processes, then the term would cease to have any
meaning, in that it would be unable to disambiguate critical thinking from other mental
processes. Accordingly, it is important to keep in mind that critical thinking is a type of
thinking; it is not the same as thinking in general. We must not confuse critical thinking
with other forms of thought:
Although thinking critically utilizes higher order thinking, critical thinking and
higher order thinking are not equivalent. Critical thinking is not a ‘catch-all’
category for higher order thinking. It is one of a family of closely related forms
of higher order thinking. Others include problem solving, creative thinking and
decision making. (Rudd, 2007, p. 48)
The attempt to subsume other thought processes within the category of critical thinking
would make it an amorphous catch-all for mental life in general. Having said this, there
is still a need for robust debate concerning whether critical thinking and reasoning holds
a privileged position with respect to attaining knowledge over these other thought
processes.3 I think it does; however, I do not have the space here to argue that point.
© 2010 The Author
Educational Philosophy and Theory © 2010 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
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Jennifer Wilson Mulnix
There are still others who argue that critical thinking is not a skill of any sort. Daniel
T. Willingham, professor of cognitive psychology at the University of Virginia, describes
what he believes is the common conception of critical thinking in the following way:
In layperson’s terms, critical thinking consists of seeing both sides of an issue,
being open to new evidence that disconfirms your ideas, reasoning dispassionately, demanding that claims be backed by evidence, deducing and inferring
conclusions from available facts, solving problems, and so forth. (Willingham,
2007, p. 8)
However, according to Willingham, this basic understanding of the concept of critical
thinking has led educators down a dangerous path of trying to improve students’ abilities
in the arena of critical thinking in much the same way as we would try to improve any other
skill. And, according to Willingham, this sort of attempt to improve students’ reasoning
abilities is doomed to failure.Willingham’s reasoning is that while many consider critical
thinking to be a skill (such as riding a bicycle) that can be employed in all situations, critical
thinking is not actually this kind of skill. In fact, it is not a skill at all:
The common conception of critical thinking ... as a set of skills is not accurate.
Critical thinking does not have certain characteristics normally associated with
skills—in particular, being able to use that skill at any time. If I told you that
I learned to read music, for example, you would expect, correctly, that I could
use my new skill whenever I wanted. But critical thinking is very different.
(Willingham, 2007, p. 15)
The difference, argues Willingham, is that critical thinking is fundamentally intertwined with domain knowledge, and as such, appears to be highly discipline-specific and
non-transferable across disciplines. That is, students who are competent to think critically in one discipline have difficulty transferring it to another:
The processes of thinking are intertwined with the content of thought (that is,
domain knowledge). Thus, if you remind a student to ‘look at an issue from
multiple perspectives’ often enough, he will learn that he ought to do so, but
if he doesn’t know much about an issue, he can’t think about it from multiple
perspectives. You can teach students maxims about how they ought to think,
but without background knowledge and practice, they probably will not be
able to implement the advice they memorize. (Willingham, 2007, pp. 8–10)
For example, in an experiment conducted on high-school students solving mathproblems, students were able to answer some problems and not others, despite the fact
that the problems all shared the same deep structure (that is, the solutions were capable
of being determined according to the same set of mathematical moves). The students
were more likely to focus on the surface structure and treat each problem as unique. To
illustrate, one problem focuses on planting rows of vegetables, while another concerns
columns of band marchers. Despite the fact that the two problems shared similar deep
structures, ‘few subjects—just 19 percent—saw that the band problem was similar and
that they could use the garden problem solution’ (Willingham, 2007, p. 11).
© 2010 The Author
Educational Philosophy and Theory © 2010 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
Thinking Critically about Critical Thinking
7
Willingham claims that, because thought processes are mixed in with what is being
thought about, coupled with the claim that students rarely recognize the ‘deep structure’
of a problem and focus only on its ‘surface structure’, critical thinking is irreconcilable
across disciplines. And, since critical thinking is domain-specific, it is not essentially a
skill set that can be transferred easily across domains. If this is an accurate understanding
of critical thinking, then it would appear that there are no identifiable universal principles
and methods that apply across all domains of knowledge. Instead, each set of legitimating
moves are local and relative to a particular domain. Thus, to approach critical thinking
as if it were capable of being applied in a way detached from particular domain content
is to misunderstand the process of human thinking.
However,Willingham’s conclusions seem a bit hasty, for two obvious reasons. First, his
understanding of critical thinking flies in the face of a great deal of the received wisdom
on critical thinking, especially in his claim that it is domain-specific. Second, his claim
that critical thinking is not a skill (or set of skills) is unconvincing and misleading.
Regarding the first criticism, recall what Scriven and Paul claimed about critical thinking: ‘In its exemplary form, it is based on universal intellectual values that transcend subject
matter divisions’ (Scriven & Paul, 2008a, my emphasis). Indeed, I think the ability to grasp
evidential relations is exactly that sort of skill that is transferrable across domains.
Moreover, according to Lewis Vaughn:
Critical thinking has extremely broad application. Principles and procedures
used to evaluate beliefs in one discipline or issue can be used to assess beliefs
in many other arenas. Good critical thinking is the same everywhere. (Vaughn,
2005, p. 8)
I agree that a student cannot implement the skills of critical thinking without having at
least some working knowledge of the topic about which they are being asked to think.
After all, we need some set of data on which to exercise our skills as thinkers. Nevertheless, this does not entail, as Willingham suggests, that critical thinking skills themselves are domain-specific. Dependent on domain knowledge in order to be exercised?—
Yes. Different skill sets for different domains?—No.
Moreover, if a student is a proficient critical thinker, then even if she lacks the relevant
domain knowledge to formulate informed opinions on the matter, at the very least, she
ought to be able to identify and formulate questions relevant to obtaining the necessary
information to engage in reasoned thinking about the matter. There is a difference
between having information at our disposal on the one hand, and knowing what to do
with that information in order to reach reasonable and justified conclusions on the
other. The former is domain knowledge, the latter is critical thinking. Willingham’s
criticism seems to rest on the fact that he takes critical thinking to depend on the
memorization and application of intellectual ‘maxims’. But this requires no more than
a mechanical application of procedures without any need to understand the ‘deep
structure’. In fact, to grasp the deep structure of a problem—to move beyond mere
surface grammar—requires an ability to grasp the evidential relations holding between
types of statements. Hence, what is required to facilitate understanding of deep structure is the ability to reason critically, and not, as Willingham suggests, domain-specific
content knowledge.
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Jennifer Wilson Mulnix
Turning to the second criticism, Willingham states that the reason we should not
consider it a skill is because we can fail to think critically even after we have supposedly
achieved the skill. However, just because a person possesses a skill, this does not mean
she can always apply it to her fullest potential. Take Willingham’s example: once he has
learned to read music (acquired that skill), does that mean he will always be able to use
that skill whenever he wants? No. He, too, can make mistakes, or the environmental
conditions may hinder his ability to make use of the skill (perhaps there is no light to read
by). Further still, he may not be able to read sheet music as quickly and fluently as a
concert pianist. But this does not imply that he has not acquired a skill. Possessing a skill
is always a matter of degree. The key is to recognize that possession of a learned skill is
not the same as mastery of it, or possession of it to an excellent degree. Three-year-olds,
as Willingham points out, can calculate conditional probabilities,4 but they can also
throw balls. Of course, they cannot throw balls as hard as Nolan Ryan or with the
accuracy of Greg Maddux anymore than they can calculate conditional probabilities as
well as the scientist or mathematician. Skills take continuous practice to be improved, but
also to be maintained. Critical thinking is no different:
Critical thinking of any kind is never universal in any individual; everyone is
subject to episodes of undisciplined or irrational thought. Its quality is therefore typically a matter of degree and dependent on, among other things, the
quality and depth of experience in a given domain of thinking or with respect
to a particular class of questions. No one is a critical thinker through-andthrough, but only to such-and-such a degree, with such-and-such insights and
blind spots, subject to such-and-such tendencies towards self-delusion. For
this reason, the development of critical thinking skills and dispositions is a
life-long endeavor. (Scriven & Paul, 2008a)
In summary, critical thinking is a process, a skilled activity of thought. It includes a
commitment to using reason in the formulation of our beliefs. It is not the same as
creative, imaginative or emotion-based thinking. And, as with any skill, it can be possessed to a greater or lesser degree. Nevertheless, these virtues will be intellectual, and
never moral. Being fair, being just, and being socially tolerant are ethical stances that will
or will not be justified by the method of critical thinking—they are not part of that
method itself. Perhaps, being rational and being moral are equivalent terms, but for this
claim, we would need a solid argument that is developed through the methods of critical
thinking. We cannot accept claims that morality and reason reduce to the same thing
without evidence—to do so would be to fail at the method of critical thinking! Admittedly, the discussion so far is not overly informative, since it does not reveal which specific
skills are constitutive of critical thinking. Defining how one should think if one is to think
critically will consist in describing a set of thinking skills to be acquired. So, which
particular set of skills must we master in order to become good critical thinkers?
2. Critical Thinking as the Ability to Grasp Inferential Connections
Critical thinking is an attempt to understand what it is for a belief to be rationally justified.
As such, critical thinking techniques evaluate some beliefs in light of others. Moreover,
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according to Jerry Cederblom and David W. Paulsen, critical reasoning ‘is both active and
open to alternative points of view’ (Cederblom & Paulsen, 2006, p. 2). By ‘active’, they
signify the ability to recognize the structure of reasoning, taking some statements as
justifications for others, and then evaluating or assessing the reasoning. By ‘open’, they
denote the disposition of being open to changing one’s beliefs if a better alternative is
presented.This will involve a certain detachment from our own beliefs with a willingness
to consider alternative viewpoints. When two individuals disagree over which of two
incompatible beliefs is true, critical thinking is a tool that allows for meaningful discussion
between them. As Cederblom and Paulsen write: ‘Critical reasoning is a process that
emphasizes a rational basis for belief and provides a procedure for resolving disagreements by means of further inquiry’ (Cederblom & Paulsen, 2006, p. 8).
Critical thinking just is that mode of thinking that seeks to justify beliefs on the
evidential relations that hold between statements. Admittedly, such an understanding is
not novel—it has a history as old as philosophy itself. For example, Plato argued that
thinking according to reason is the mark of a well-ordered soul, while Aristotle developed
a systematic approach—through the tools of syllogistic logic—to outline the principles of
good reason-based thinking. Indeed, the concept of thinking clearly and in accordance
with evidential relations holding between statements is the very practice of philosophy.
This might explain why critical thinking classes are most often housed within the
philosophy departments in university and college settings (and why they should be).
According to Christopher Kirwan, ‘reasoning’ actually describes two different, but
closely related processes: the process of searching for reasons and the process of giving
reasons (Kirwan, 1995). Searching for reasons, according to Kirwan, involves research,
but is not reasoning itself. The search for reasons is often messy, since when a thinker
begins her search, she often has little domain knowledge concerning the subject of her
query. On the other hand:
Giving reasons is setting them out, to oneself or someone else. This too is a
process, though quite a different one from searching for reasons. Since it can
be rehearsed and repeated, it is likely to be more orderly than the search was.
(Kirwan, 1995, p. 748)
The giving of reasons is more orderly since it relies on systematic procedures and
methods that determine when one statement counts as evidence for the truth of another.
That is, there are principles of inferential support that can be studied and applied to our
thinking. Given this, we can say that you reason well, or engage in critical thinking, when:
[T]he reasons that you find, or give, favour (and not just seem to favour) the
belief or action or response they are presented as reasons for; that is, they make
it more likely that the belief is true or the action is right or the response is
appropriate. (Kirwan, 1995, p. 749)
Moreover, because it is a matter of objective fact whether one statement evidentially
supports another, we can develop a science of sound reasoning, wherein there are various
argument patterns in accordance with good reasoning, and others—fallacies—which are
not. Still, in order to give reasons that actually favor one’s beliefs, a thinker must have
acquired the ability to recognize inferential connections holding between statements. In
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Jennifer Wilson Mulnix
other words, reasoning well, or thinking critically, consists first in the ability to grasp
inferential connections holding between statements in order to see a progression of
evidence in the form of an argument to a specified conclusion. To be a proficient critical
thinker, then, is to see clearly the relationship between evidence and conclusion, and to
be proficient at providing reasons in support of one’s beliefs. This must also include the
ability to recognize what would count as evidence against one’s beliefs.
In fact, according to studies conducted by Deanna Kuhn, the willingness and ability
to see that what we believe may be false, and in such cases, to see what would count as
evidence against our belief, is the core component of thinking critically:
[T]hese two abilities—the ability to recognize the possible falsehood of a
theory and the identification of evidence capable of disconfirming it—are the
foundational abilities that lie at the heart of both informal and scientific
reasoning. These abilities lie at the heart of critical thinking, which similarly
can be regarded, at the most global level, as the ability to justify what one
claims to be true. (Kuhn, 1993)
This suggests that the fundamental skill to be acquired by a critical thinker is the ability
to recognize inferential connections holding between statements, where this would
include the ability to understand the possibility that what we believe might be false and
the ability to identify the sorts of evidence that would undermine our beliefs.
3. How to Teach Critical Thinking
Why should we want students to learn and practice critical thinking? As Cederblom
and Paulsen highlight, critical thinking encourages important dialogues with oneself,
allowing one to reason well and to adopt reasonable rather than simply comfortable
positions—it compels us to seek a rational basis for our beliefs. Moreover, developing
these skills to evaluate our own beliefs as well as the claims of others in light of evidential
connections, makes for rational individuals—persons who are not easily misled into
believing that for which there is no solid evidence. In this sense, critical thinking protects
us from sloppy and conformist thinking and insulates us against empty dogmatism and
rhetoric. Critical thinking is, then, closely tied to the development of autonomy, or the
ability to decide for ourselves what we believe according to our own deliberations and not
on the basis of what others claim.
However, as a teacher of critical thinking, I am in a tough spot. In order to think
critically, a student must be able to grasp why certain forms of inference are acceptable
and others are not. I can give students guidance by laying out for them both sound
argument forms and fallacies, but this alone will not produce fully developed critical
thinkers. Merely showing them examples of solid and weak inferences is not teaching
them the underlying inferential links inherent in sound thought; instead, it is only
modeling it for them. For example, one cannot define the word ‘game’ by building a list
a games. These are examples of games, and as examples, they do not directly reveal what
it is that makes them such. Even if we were given a list of every game there ever was or
will be, the concept ‘game’ still will not have been defined. Likewise for critical thinking:
even if it were possible to provide my students with an utterly complete set of successful
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and unsuccessful patterns of inference,5 I still might not succeed in getting the student
to grasp or understand why these patterns work and others do not. In fact, grasping why
a particular statement can be validly inferred from another is really a form of ‘knowinghow’ and not a form of ‘knowing-that’—it is a skill, and as with all skills, no amount of
instruction can substitute for active and deliberate practice, particularly when it comes to
achieving proficiency.
Skills are taught (or, maybe more accurately, coached) in a rather straightforward way.
It involves modeling the skill, having the student practice the skill, providing feedback
on his performance, and some amount of natural talent. Though I can model the skill
through a list of inferential patterns and fallacies, and I can model it through being a
strong exemplar of the skill, nothing can replace repetitive practice. If you want to be able
to hit a Nolan Ryan fastball, it will not serve you well to read books on the art of hitting
a baseball. Instead, you need to get to the batting cage. And, if you want to reason well,
you need to practice.
I have synthesized research from varied sources in order to help teachers design the
most effective and efficient curriculum for instilling critical thinking. When examining
the literature on teaching critical thinking skills, I found several consistent themes. First,
we need to embed in the student a metacognitive awareness of the processes of thought
itself. What can help students achieve this metacognitive awareness of the processes
of thinking? The only apparently effective means to achieve this awareness is through
substantial repetition of thinking exercises (Dawson, 2000). Studies about metacognitive
change conducted by Deanna Kuhn indicate that ‘exercise can be a sufficient mechanism
to induce change, but the fact that many adults reason at a sixth grade level indicates that
sufficient exercise is probably not available’ (Dawson, 2000, p. 80).
Yet, far too many college undergraduates have yet to achieve proficiency in thinking
critically, and the research seems to support this. In fact, many students are unable to
recognize even the simplest of evidential relationships between statements. This is supported through a set of studies conducted by Kuhn, in which participants were asked to
first give an opinion concerning some topic, and then second, to justify this opinion;
unfortunately, the majority of participants were unable to provide any justification.
Responding to these studies, Tim van Gelder writes, ‘Such people are not incapable of
reason ... The problem is that they do not have a general grasp of the notion of evidence
and what would properly count as providing evidence in support of their view on a
nontrivial issue’ (Van Gelder, 2005). This appears to suggest that the fundamental
concern of any critical thinking course ought to be teaching students to ‘grasp’ inferential
or evidential connections.
However, the ability to recognize evidential relationships is dependent upon being able
to pick out premises and conclusions from extended passages. Hence, in order to develop
their skills, students need a strong foundation in recognizing the difference between
evidence and the conclusions they support. Dawson states that Kuhn’s experiments
reflect this need:
The developmental process [Kuhn] describes requires thinking about theories,
rather than merely with them, and thinking about evidence, rather than merely
being influenced by it ... In addition, coordination of theory and evidence
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Jennifer Wilson Mulnix
by children and lay-adults is not the same as that employed by science and
scientists. Children (and many lay-adults) were, by far, less able to make the
distinction between the theories they use to understand the world and the
evidence that could support or refute those theories than scientists ...
[However] formalizing the process may provide a metacognitive awareness of
the difference between theories and evidence. (Dawson, 2000, pp. 80–81)
One way that we can help students in this regard is to employ extensive use of argument
maps in the classroom. Chains of reasoning and evidence are structured hierarchically,
with some premises supporting others and lending support to the conclusion either
indirectly, conjointly or independently, and we can diagram these structures.6 Moreover,
studies from cognitive science support the crucial importance of argument mapping
when it comes to improving students’ critical thinking skills:
The crucial result from cognitive science is that students’ critical-thinking
skills improve faster when instruction is based on argument mapping. The
main evidence for this comes from studies in which students are tested before
and after a one-semester undergraduate critical-thinking course. Students in
classes based heavily on argument mapping consistently improve their skills
much faster than students in conventional classes. Indeed, one semester of
instruction based on argument mapping can yield reasoning skill gains of the
same magnitude as would normally be expected to occur over an entire
undergraduate education. (Van Gelder, 2005, p. 45)
It should not be surprising that this technique helps foster critical reasoning skills, since
it focuses student attention on the inferential connections between statements and how
some statements can work together in a variety of ways to lend evidential support to
other statements. Not only does requiring students to map arguments strengthen their
ability to see evidential relationships between statements, it also greatly improves the
overall structure and flow of their own writing. By mapping an argument one is advancing in a persuasive paper, a student can naturally see a structured format, which then
suggests a rather straightforward outline of the paper.
Of course, mapping arguments is not the only important element of a comprehensive
plan of instruction for teaching critical thinking skills. There is also evidence to suggest
that true improvement in skill requires students to learn the ‘theory’ of critical thinking:
Beyond a certain point, improvement demands acquiring some theory. The
serious critical thinker understands the theory of critical thinking.This means,
in part, acquiring the specialist vocabulary. Instead of saying, ‘That argument
sucks’, the critical thinker can say that she does not accept the conclusion, even
though she grants the premises, because the inference is an example of the
fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc. (Van Gelder, 2005, p. 44)
Students need to learn names for argument patterns and fallacies if they are to be more
successful critical thinkers. And, this seems to follow from thinking of critical thinking as
achieving a set of intellectual virtues. At some point in the development of a virtue, a
person can proceed no further by mere habituation; she must come to understand the
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Thinking Critically about Critical Thinking
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underlying theory—she must come to understand why this behavior is a virtue in the first
place. Hence, just teaching the theory of critical thinking alone will not improve a
student’s ability to think critically. Skill acquisition does not merely follow from knowledge of a theory; it arises independently. As an example, a beginning golfer can read an
article in Golf Digest about how to hit the perfect draw shot, and yet, he will not have
suddenly acquired the ability to do so. However, after having become a relatively
proficient golfer, reading the magazine may actually help to develop the skill further.
Unfortunately, we do not live in a Matrix world where information and skills can just
be effortlessly uploaded into our brains. In order to become proficient in any skilled
domain, we need to practice that skill. And the more we practice, the better we become.
Such practice will take extensive effort on the part of the student. This is why, as Van
Gelder writes:
For students to improve, they must engage in critical thinking itself. It is not
enough to learn about critical thinking. These strategies are about as effective
as working on your tennis game by watching Wimbledon. Unless the students
are actively doing the thinking themselves, they will never improve. (Van
Gelder, 2005, p. 43)
To this end, I have found that having students continuously edit their own papers (from
any class they are taking) and the papers of others—with an eye to weeding out fallacies
and also towards improving their argument patterns—greatly helps improve overall
reasoning ability (see Mulnix & Mulnix, 2010). This type of application of theory to the
student’s own work is a crucial component for long-term skill retention.
Karl Anders Ericsson conducted further research in the arena of skill acquisition. He
studied the habits of persons who achieved excellence in many different fields. Though
Ericsson did not study critical thinking skills directly, Van Gelder asserts that it is not
unreasonable to extend Ericsson’s findings to the skills of critical thinking, since his
studies seem to indicate a very high level of parity across different skilled activities.
According to Ericsson, the sort of practice that is most helpful in developing proficiency
of any skill type is ‘deliberative practice’. Deliberative practice is summarized as follows:
1. It is done with full concentration and is aimed at generating improvement.
2. It is not only engaging in the skill itself but also doing special exercises designed to
improve performance in the skill.
3. It is graduated, in the sense that practice activities gradually become harder, and
easier activities are mastered through repetition before harder ones are practiced.
4. There is close guidance and timely, accurate feedback on performance. (Van Gelder,
2005, p. 43)
Ericsson’s studies indicate that there is a direct relationship between the amount of
deliberate practice one engages in, and one’s level of proficiency:
This means that our students will improve their critical-thinking skills most
effectively just to the extent that they engage in lots of deliberate practice in
critical thinking. Crucially, this is not just thinking critically about some topic.
It also involves doing special exercises whose main point is to improve criticalthinking skills themselves. (Van Gelder, 2005, p. 43)
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Jennifer Wilson Mulnix
Accordingly, these findings should influence the sorts of assessments that we assign
our students in the classroom. If we want them to develop the skills of critical thinking,
we need to realize that repetition is important—students are not going to succeed in
achieving proficiency in this mode of thought accidentally.What is more, students are not
going to suddenly have an ‘ah-ha’ moment simply after reading those who are excellent
critical thinkers. Van Gelder explains that this latter approach is a rather common
mistake among faculty teaching critical thinking:
For students to improve, they must engage in critical thinking itself. It is not
enough to learn about critical thinking. Many college professors seem unaware
of this point; they teach a course on the theory of critical thinking and assume
that their students will end up better critical thinkers. Other teachers make a
similar mistake: They expose their students to examples of good critical thinking (for example, having them read articles by professional philosophers),
hoping that students will learn by imitation. (Van Gelder, 2005, p. 44)
This type of strategy is not effective and will do nothing to actually improve students’
ability to think critically. As stated earlier, cognitive science studies reveal that we must
engage our students in the process itself if we desire actual results. This claim reflects the
most strongly supported conclusion coming out of cognitive science research concerning
teaching critical thinking: students need a great deal more repetitive practice than they
are receiving. Dawson writes:
The concept of repetition is probably not politically correct in education today,
especially if it is conceived of as a drill. Yet all the evidence from [Kuhn’s]
studies would indicate that becoming aware of the thinking processes, generating the ability to coordinate theory and evidence, and developing the capacity to recognize false theories is dependent on sufficient repetition of thinking
tasks. (Dawson, 2000, p. 82)
That repetition is central should be no surprise given that critical thinking is a skill. All
skills need extensive amounts of deliberate and varied practice to be developed, honed
and maintained. We cannot hope to teach our students to be proficient critical thinkers
if we do not offer them the opportunity to practice their newly learned skills frequently.
Thus, any course in which critical thinking is a core curricular objective must carefully
design its assessments in such a way as to reinforce, reintroduce and repeat the skills of
reasoning throughout.7
4. Conclusion
Critical thinking is the same as thinking rationally or reasoning well. In order to reason
well, a thinker must be able to give reasons for what she believes, and these reasons must
actually support the truth of the statement or belief they are claimed to support. As a
matter of objective fact, some statements count as evidence for others by standing in
inferential or evidential relations, wherein one statement will give one a reason to believe
that another statement is true. In order to give reasons that actually do support (and do
not just seem to support) a given claim, a critical thinker must have learned the skill of
grasping inferential or evidential links between separate statements. To be a proficient
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Thinking Critically about Critical Thinking
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critical thinker, then, is to understand what counts as a good inference between statements, and what does not.
Moreover, we should be careful not to confuse critical thinking with other thought
processes. For example, critical thinking is not equivalent to creative thinking, nor is it
equivalent to intuition or emotive response. To be sure, these other mental processes are
certainly important to the psychological life of an individual and may even tap into
knowledge that critical thinking—because of its method based in reason—does not. For
these reasons, we may encourage individuals to develop all of their mental skills, rather
than just focusing on critical thinking. Nonetheless, to say this is not to say that these
other thought processes are part of the very conception of critical thinking itself.
What is more, we need certain pedagogical tools in order to teach critical thinking.
Studies from cognitive science seem to quite conclusively suggest that the most efficient
and effective way to increase a student’s ability in the arena of critical thinking is through
extensive deliberate practice, and in particular, through extensive use of argument
mapping. Indeed, it is no wonder that mapping arguments increases students’ abilities to
think critically, since to think critically just is to be able to accurately grasp the inferential
connections between statements.
If, as educators, we want to encourage our students to be more autonomous thinkers,
and if we desire to help our students develop their critical reasoning skills, then it is
imperative that we think carefully about what those skills consist in. Moreover, we should
rely on empirical studies to develop pedagogical strategies that encourage improvement
in this area, and we should, accordingly, design curricula and assessments carefully to
target those skills. To do any less is not only to let our students down, but it is to fail at
that very skill we are trying to teach.
Notes
1. For a fuller explanation of the difference between ‘knowing-how’ and ‘knowing-that’, see ‘Part
1—General Introduction: The Theory of Knowledge’ in Pojman, 2003.
2. Thayer-Bacon, 1998.Thayer-Bacon thinks that prioritizing reason over other cognitive processes
is not just a bias in favor of one sort of mental process, but also a mark of gender bias. I agree that
thinking according to the mandates of reason has been conventionally considered to be a male
trait. This seems quite undeniable. Still, we cannot infer from this fact alone that reason itself is
male-centered.That is, it may well be the case that women and men are equally rationally capable
and the sexism present in history and even in contemporary society with respect to women’s
abilities to think in such ways is due to the hubris of a male-centered society in thinking that
women were incapable of being rational. Perhaps the problem is not that we are being too rational,
but that we are not being rational enough! For persuasive arguments to this end see, Martha
Nussbaum’s 1997 Lindley Lecture at The University of Kansas titled, ‘The Feminist Critique of
Liberalism’ (Nussbaum, 1997) and J. S. Mill’s The Subjection ofWomen (Mill, 1963–1991).
3. For one argument to the effect that rational thinking does hold a privileged position over these
other processes, see Plato’s The Republic (2003) or Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of
Morals (1996).
4. As suggested by a study conducted by A. Gopnik, D. M. Sobel, L. E. Schulz, and C. Glymour.
For a description of the study and its results see Willingham, 2007, pp. 14–15.
5. Which we obviously cannot. After all, part of the reason that teaching critical thinking is so
difficult is that we are capable of producing and encountering an infinite number of novel
inferential patterns.
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Jennifer Wilson Mulnix
6. For a helpful model of argument mapping see Hurley, 2006, especially Chapter 1.6.
7. For a discussion of one type of assessment tool aimed at the objective of improving students’
critical thinking abilities, see Mulnix & Mulnix, 2010.
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Thayer-Bacon, B. (1998) Transforming and Redescribing Critical Thinking: Constructive
thinking, Studies in Philosophy and Education 17, pp. 123–148.
Van Gelder, T. (2005) Teaching Critical Thinking: Some lessons from cognitive science, College
Teaching, 53, pp. 41–46.
Vaughn, L. (2005) The Power of Critical Thinking: Effective reasoning about ordinary and extraordinary
claims (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
Willingham, D. T. (2007) Can Critical Thinking Be Taught?, American Educator, Summer,
pp. 8–19.
© 2010 The Author
Educational Philosophy and Theory © 2010 Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia
RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
C121: Critical Thinking
Reading: C121RC
The Applied Critical Thinking Handbook
Product of the TRADOC G2, Operational Environment Enterprise
Summary of Changes
(Version 8.0)
x Added:
o a Glossary,
o the RT TTP Table,
o Appreciative Interview,
o Assumption Sensitivity Analysis,
o Critical Thinking Traits,
o Gallery Walk, Ideal Group Process,
o Logic of Failure,
o a new Problem Restatement,
o RT Assumption Questions,
o Think-Write-Share, and
o Yes…And.
Note: All edited items were highlighted in the
Table of Contents.
(Version 8.1)
x Deleted page numbers within the body of text
x Added to the Red Teaming TTP table: Appreciative
Interviews (GTM), Think-Write-Share (GTM), and TROIKA
consulting (GTM).
x Deleted the older TTP of Critical Thinking Habits and kept
the newer TTP of Critical Thinking Traits.
x Updated to the newest version of Logic Fallacies.
x Revised Problem Restatement one more time.
Applied Critical Thinking Handbook v8
Points of Contact
Red Teaming Central
MilSuite requires a common access card (CAC). Go to
suite.mi
https://www.milsuite.mil/book/community/spaces/redteaming
central, click the
e JOIN button in the lower left corner of the
webpage, and then complete your milSuite profile.
UFMCS http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/ufmcs-red-teaming
University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies
TRISA (TRADOC G2 Intelligence Support Activity)
803 Harrison Drive, Building 467, Room 315
Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027-2308
FAX 913-684-3887
DSN 552
Director 913-684-3860
Operations 913-684-3857
Security 913-684-4336
Technology 913-684-4339
Curriculum 913-684-4321
Instructors 913-684-3892/3959
SMEs 913-684-4323/4338
Librarians 913-785-3001/3081
ATRRS Enrollment
1. Go to https://www.atrrs.army.mil/atrrscc/search.aspx
2. Select a Fiscal Year, i.e., 2015.
3. Select the School Code: 159 (UFMCS).
4. Click Search the ATRRS course catalog button
(near the bottom).
5. Select a UFMCS course from the table.
Page i
Table of Contents
Summary of Changes ..........................................................i
CHAPTER I: Introduction....................................................1
Why Red Teaming?...........................................................1
What is Red Teaming? ......................................................1
How is Red Teaming Conducted? .....................................3
How is a UFMCS Education Unique?................................4
Why this Red Teaming Handbook? ...................................7
Summary ...........................................................................8
CHAPTER II: Self-Awareness .............................................9
What is Self-Awareness? ..................................................9
Why is Self-Awareness Important? ...................................9
Who Am I? ......................................................................10
Outcomes of Introspection ..............................................13
Journaling Daily ...............................................................14
Interpersonal Communication..........................................15
Personality Temperament ...............................................17
Summary .........................................................................20
CHAPTER III: Fostering Cultural Empathy......................21
Cultural Awareness .........................................................22
Ethnocentrism .................................................................23
Some Cultural Frameworks .............................................26
Functional Systems Approach .........................................30
Cultural Relevance ..........................................................34
Summary .........................................................................35
CHAPTER IV: Critical Thinking ........................................40
Introduction .....................................................................40
What Do Critical Thinkers Do? ........................................40
Why is Critical Thinking Necessary? ...............................44
Summary .........................................................................50
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Applied Critical Thinking Handbook v8
CHAPTER V: Groupthink Mitigation & Decision Support
........................................................................................53
Groupthink .......................................................................53
Groupthink Mitigation ......................................................55
Military Decision Making Process ....................................57
Mitigating Groupthink during the MDMP..........................58
Red Teaming During Planning ........................................59
Red Teaming During Problem Framing ...........................60
Red Teaming During Operational Design........................64
The Red Team’s Role .....................................................65
Summary .........................................................................66
CHAPTER VI: Red Teaming TTP ......................................67
Red Teaming TTP Table .................................................67
1-2-4-Whole Group .........................................................68
1 on 1, 2 on 2, Exchange Emissaries..............................70
4 Ways of Seeing ............................................................71
5 Whys ............................................................................71
5 Will Get You 25 ............................................................73
6 Empathetic Questions ..................................................74
6 Words ..........................................................................74
Alternative Futures Analysis............................................75
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) .....................78
Appreciative Interview .....................................................81
Argument Deconstruction ...............................................82
Assumption Sensitivity Analysis (ASA) ...........................84
BATNA ............................................................................85
Brainstorming ..................................................................86
Challenges to Effective Planning ....................................89
Circle of Voices ...............................................................99
Circular Response ........................................................100
Cognitive Biases ...........................................................101
Critical MDMP Questions ..............................................103
Page iii
Critical Review Steps ....................................................105
Critical Thinking Traits ..................................................106
Critical Variables (CVs) .................................................109
Cultural Perception Framework.....................................115
Deception Detection......................................................132
Determining the Suitability of an Analogy .....................134
Devil’s Advocacy ...........................................................136
Divergence - Convergence ...........................................138
Dot Voting .....................................................................139
Fishbowl ........................................................................140
Frame Audit ..................................................................141
Gallery Walk..................................................................143
High-Impact/ Low-Probability Analysis ..........................148
Ideal Group Process .....................................................150
Indicators or Signposts of Change ................................151
Key Assumption Check .................................................153
Liberating Structures .....................................................155
Logic of Failure .............................................................156
Logic Fallacies ..............................................................157
Mitigating Groupthink ....................................................159
My 15% .........................................................................160
Onion Model..................................................................161
Outside-In Thinking .......................................................163
Premortem Analysis ......................................................165
Problem Restatement (Revised) ...................................168
Quality of Information Check .........................................169
Red Team Analysis .......................................................171
Red Teaming – Assessment Questions ........................174
Red Teaming – Assumption Questions.........................175
Red Teaming – Key Questions .....................................177
Red Teaming – MDMP Actions .....................................178
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Applied Critical Thinking Handbook v8
Shifting the Burden .......................................................183
Stakeholder Mapping ....................................................185
Strategies for Structured Analysis .................................190
String of Pearls .............................................................192
S-W-O-T Analysis .........................................................203
Team A / Team B Analysis ...........................................204
Telling Stories ...............................................................206
Think - Write - Share .....................................................207
TRIZ ..............................................................................208
Troika Consulting (Ad Agency) .....................................209
Validating Assumptions .................................................210
What if? Analysis ..........................................................220
Who Am I? ....................................................................222
Why Assess? ................................................................225
Yes … and ....................................................................228
Endnotes .......................................................................229
Abbreviations ..................................................................233
Glossary...........................................................................235
Index ................................................................................236
Bibliography
g p ....................................................................237
My Notes ..........................................................................242
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ACTHB v8 Chapter I
CHAPTER I: Introduction
“We need to help our commanders and staffs escape the gravitational
pull of Western military thought.”
-- CSA Peter Schoomaker 1
Why Red Teaming?
The premise of the program at the University of Foreign Military
and Cultural Studies (UFMCS) is that people and organizations
court failure in predictable ways, that they do so by degrees,
almost imperceptibly, and that they do so according to their
mindsets, biases, and experience, which are formed in large part
by their own culture and context. The sources of these failures are
simple, observable, and lamentably, often repeated. They are also
preventable, and that is the point of ‘red teaming’.
Our methods and education involve more than Socratic discussion
and brainstorming. We believe that good decision processes are
essential to good outcomes. To that end, our curriculum is rich in
divergent processes, red teaming tools, and liberating structures,
all aimed at decision support.
We educate people to develop a disposition of curiosity, and help
them become aware of biases and behavior that prevent them
from real positive change in the ways they seek solutions and
engage others.
We borrow techniques, methods, frameworks, concepts, and best
practices from several sources and disciplines to create an
education, and practical applications, that we find to be the best
safeguard against individual and organizational tendencies toward
biases, errors in cognition, and groupthink.
Red teaming is diagnostic, preventative, and corrective; yet it is
neither predictive or a solution. Our goal is to be better prepared
and less surprised in dealing with complexity.
What is Red Teaming?
Red teaming is a function that provides commanders an
independent capability to fully explore alternatives in plans,
operations, concepts, organizations and capabilities in the context
of the operational environment (OE) and from the perspectives of
partners, adversaries and others.
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ACTHB v8 Chapter I
A Red Team performs three general types of tasks:
-
Support to operations, planning, and decision support
-
Critical review and analysis of already-existing plans
-
Intelligence support (Threat Emulation)
(UFMCS provides education for the first two tasks; TRADOC’s
Intelligence School and Center provides education on the third.)
In order for a Red Team to effectively contribute to decision
making all of the following elements are required:
x
The ability to think critically about the problem. While this
may seem obvious, the reality is that critical thinking is a skill
set that requires training, education and tools. The Army
assimilates people from different backgrounds across the
nation. One of the drawbacks of that assimilation is our
military tendency to reflect the same biases and
perspectives. We pride ourselves in common values—which
while ingrained in the Army culture are not universal outside
of that culture.
x
Thinking critically and challenging the group is an unnatural
act for military staffs. Doing so effectively requires tools and
methods that enable leaders to see different perspectives.
x
Red Teams require top cover to be allowed to challenge the
conventional wisdom and the organization’s leaders. No
matter the quality of the Red Team or the methods they
employ, dictatorial or toxic leaders are incompatible with
successful red teaming.
x
Red teaming is not easy, and not everyone can do it. Red
Teamers must be effective written and oral communicators.
They must have credibility in the area in which they are
providing red teaming insights. They must be able to
constructively challenge the plan. This means focusing on
what is truly important, able to explain why it is being
challenged and offering some alternative ways to think about
the problem. Constituting a Red Team with those the
organization ‘can afford to give up’ is a sure recipe for
failure.
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ACTHB v8 Chapter I
x
There is no given template for a red teaming approach to a
problem, no “one size fits all.” Red teaming activity must be
tailored to specific requirements. Time available is a critical
factor, as is expertise with the issue at hand, the makeup of
the team, engaged leaders and their predisposition to provide
too much input, etc.
A Red Team works best behind the scenes, assisting the
commander and staff in a non-critical, helpful manner, without
taking credit. (It is hard enough to accept someone criticizing your
thinking—it is much tougher if they are obnoxious and loud about
it.)
While there is no formula for red teaming, there are some
common activities that most Red Teams do most of the time.
These include challenging facts and explicit assumptions, looking
for implicit (unstated) assumptions, identifying cultural
assumptions and developing targeted cultural questions for
subject matter experts (SMEs), challenging the problem frame
(and proposing alternative frames), identifying cognitive biases
and symptoms of underlying groupthink, etc. All of these activities
lead to the development of alternative perspectives.
How is Red Teaming Conducted?
Not everyone should practice medicine. Scalpels, drugs, and the
procedures in which they are used are not to be trusted to those
with a passing familiarity of their application. Everyone should have
a basic knowledge of how to maintain their health and wellness
(basic elements of diet, exercise, sleep). Red teaming is like
medicine. Medicine is diagnostic, preventative, and corrective. It
works best when applied in small applications over time. And so it is
with red teaming. Everyone needs medicine at one time or another.
Not everyone needs the same dose. You want a well-trained Red
Team for the same reasons you want a well-trained physician. As
with your relation with your physician, monitoring and periodic
checkups are preferable to intervention. What does your unit need…
intervention, prevention, triage, a second opinion, or a dose of
common sense? The applications for red teaming are dependent on
the needs of the unit.
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ACTHB v8 Chapter I
The following are some important questions to consider when
practicing red teaming. Some have definite answers; some answers
are dependent on context and the needs of the unit:
x What does a Red Team look like? (Ad hoc, standing team, an
individual, or an on-call team)?
x What does it do? (Challenges assumptions, tests hypotheses,
explores alternatives, and heightens awareness).
x Who are the best people to do it? (Rank and education are not
exclusive discriminators. You want reflective, critical thinking
persons with a curious disposition.)
x When is it done? (Continuous, on call, in planning, or when
things are going poorly)?
x To whom does the Red Team belong? (Optimally, to the
commander, though they may work directly for the Chief of
Staff.)
x Where in planning does red teaming belong? (Everywhere.)
How is a UFMCS Education Unique?
Our approach has proven effective in units and organizations from
brigades to the Joint Staff. UFMCS’ curriculum is designed to
improve critical thinking, and proceeds from a premise that before
you point out to someone the errors of their thinking, you had
better understand your own.
Most of us are disinclined to naturally challenge prevailing
thoughts. We challenge students to examine things they hold
sacrosanct. We expose them to the ethnocentrism of their own
thinking, their overreliance on method, their tendency to default to
Western/Aristotelian logic, their lack of appreciation for the frames
that subconsciously capture their thinking, their failure to avoid
common cognitive biases, and their predisposition to seek
consensus while exhibiting classic symptoms of groupthink.
UFMCS’ curriculum revolves around some fundamental questions:
x
What does it mean to be “self-aware?”
x
When I perceive and interpret information, what are those
interpretations based upon?
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ACTHB v8 Chapter I
x
What do I value and believe? Why? How do these values
and beliefs motivate my behavior? How do others’ values
and beliefs motivate their behaviors differently?
x
How can cultural anthropology help me think about another
culture without resorting to mirror imaging?
x
How do I improve my ability to think critically?
UFMCS’ curriculum is organized around the following major areas,
designed to improve a soldier’s ability to think and understand in
new and continually evolving environments:
Self-Awareness: Understanding how our values and beliefs affect
how we think and decide … and how that differs for others. Major
sub-elements:
x
Personal reflection, Jungian typology, Personality
Dimensions, Thomas-Kilmann conflict mode instruments,
etc.
x
Watershed event story telling
x
Daily Journaling
Groupthink Mitigation & Decision Support: The challenges
inherent in hierarchical environments and elite teams—groups
which might value maintaining social relationships more than
making a tough decision.
x
Use of fungible, small group techniques to mitigate
groupthink: use of anonymous feedback, liberating
structures, etc.
x
How to connect critical thinking to operational design,
problem framing, assumption validation, assessment tools,
and MDMP.
Critical Thinking: Support for planning and decision making deconstructing arguments, examining analogies, challenging
assumptions, and exploring alternatives.
x
The role of intuition—System 1 versus System 2 thinking.
x
Numerous tools to examine a plan through different lenses—
Premortem Analysis, Stakeholder Mapping.
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ACTHB v8 Chapter I
x
Thinking meta-cognitively, and enabling graduates to
understand how humans think, and how culture shapes
thoughts.
Fostering Cultural Empathy: Developing better questions about
culture, in order to facilitate strategic and operational decision
making which is informed by cultural empathy.
x
Culture examined from the perspective of a cultural
anthropologist, versus “dos and don’ts.”
x
Conscious examination of the roles of ethnocentrism, versus
cultural relativism.
x
Culturally-centric case studies.
x
Tools to help understand foreign cultural contexts, and to
foster empathy.
Our intent is to inculcate behaviors designed to make critical
thinking a discipline. The outcome of this process is a student with
a bundle of cognitive capabilities—at the heart of which is a better
ability to apply one’s normal thought processes and their common
sense, to the circumstances of a given situation.
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ACTHB v8 Chapter I
Why this Red Teaming Handbook?
The purpose of this Red Teaming Handbook is to provide an aide
memoir for UFMCS graduates, and an introduction to the
concepts for those unfamiliar with red teaming. This handbook is
not a checklist of actions or tasks, but rather serves as a
compendium of key ideas and information taught in the UFMCS
curriculum to help facilitate practical red teaming. The contents of
this handbook are neither doctrine nor the “school solution.”
This handbook represents the essence of what students study at
UFMCS. It provides an overview in the four major educational
areas of the red teaming program as described earlier in this
introduction. Each chapter points the user to tools and methods in
Chapter VI for use when confronting challenges associated with:
Self-Awareness and Reflection, Groupthink Mitigation and
Decision Making, Critical Thinking, or Fostering Cultural Empathy.
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ACTHB v8 Chapter I
This handbook is a living, UNCLASSIFIED document. We
welcome your comments, suggestions, and input. Time and
personal preference of different facilitators may result in some of
these ideas or tools being new to you despite having attended the
program. As you go through this handbook, if you see things you
were not exposed to in class, please engage our faculty.
Summary
People and organizations court failure in predictable ways, by
degrees, almost imperceptibly, and according to their own culture
and context. As a countermeasure, we can fully explore
alternatives in that context and from differing perspectives. We call
this function red teaming.
Red teaming requires challenging the facts, problem frame, and
assumptions. This function also seeks to qualify the assumptions,
develop targeted cultural questions, and propose alternative
perspectives, as well as identify any cognitive biases, groupthink
mitigations, etc.
To that end, organizations can utilize individuals taught to execute
red teaming, or charter an empowered Red Team (standing, ad
hoc, or on-call). Either way, red teaming has worked best behind
the scene.
UFMCS offers a unique red teaming education. The curricula is
designed to challenge one’s view of the surrounding world and
self. The school creates an experience built upon: self-awareness,
cultural awareness, critical thinking, groupthink mitigation,
decision support, and practical experiences with red teaming
tools.
Endnotes
1
Conversation CSA Schoomaker, Greg Fontenot and Steve Rotkoff, Spring
2006.
Page 8
ACTHB v8 Chapter II
CHAPTER II: Self-Awareness
Everything that irritates us about others can lead us to an
understanding of ourselves. -- Carl Jung 1
Most of the shadows of life are caused by standing in our own
sunshine. -- Ralph Waldo Emerson 2
The unexamined life isn’t worth living. -- Socrates 3
What is Self-Awareness?
Everyday life is a flurry of activity that demands our attention.
From training and deployment schedules, to children and home
life responsibilities, we are always on the go. As a result, we have
little time for self-awareness and personal development. The
process of improving self-awareness via introspection happens
when we take a dedicated look inward and examine our own
thoughts, feelings, and motives. But, who has the time to do that?
Self-awareness is the capacity for introspection and the ability to
recognize oneself as an individual separate from the environment
and other individuals.
Why is Self-Awareness Important?
The self-aware person is more enabled as a critical thinker, more
aware of personal biases and recognizes his or her own cultural
framework. It is with this understanding of self that an expanded
world view opens—one that is more empathetic to the differences
of other cultures and ways of thinking and thus primed to engage
as a Red Teamer.
UFMCS focuses on four areas to develop Self-awareness:
1. Study of Temperament, Personality Dimensions®
Instrument and Model, Introversion and Extraversion
2. Study of Interpersonal Communications
3. Introspection Exercise—Who Am I?
4. Daily Journaling Exercise
People are complex and diverse. A self-aware person has
dedicated introspective time to acknowledge personality traits,
personal values, habits, psychological needs and emotions that
drive behaviors.
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ACTHB v8 Chapter II
Personality - An understanding of your personality can help create
awareness of strengths and weaknesses, talents, motives,
stressors and motivators for decision making and interpersonal
communications.
Values - It's important that we each know and focus on our
personal values. In doing so, we are more likely to accomplish
what we consider most important.
Habits - Our habits are the behaviors that we repeat routinely and
often automatically.
Needs - Our needs cause motivation; and when needs aren't
satisfied, they can cause frustration, conflict and stress.
Emotions - recognizing your own feelings, what causes them, and
how they impact your thoughts and actions is emotional selfawareness.
Who Am I?
The Who Am I exercise requires reflection and introspection of
your personal family narratives and dynamics, regional culture,
religion, educational experiences, and critical watershed moments
that shape your worldviews and values—that all put together
construct an idea of who you are as an individual. In its whole, the
exercise enhances the individual’s self-awareness while at the
same time creates cohesion and relationship bonding within the
participating group.
There are two critical elements to the exercise: private preparation
through solo reflection and introspection, and group sharing and
storytelling.
1. Individuals first must do the hard work of reflection, of recalling
the seminal life events that were critical in shaping their
personalities and deeper values. One might think of these
events as crucibles, both difficult and triumphant, that forged
the individual’s character. In essence, this private preparation
is intended to encourage introspection. Such deep reflection
takes time, and must be built into the structure of the entire
exercise.
What exactly participants choose to share with their
classmates in the verbal portion is a different question. It is
important during preparation that participants be completely
Page 10
ACTHB v8 Chapter II
honest with themselves as to how they developed into the
person they are today. This preparation can take an hour or
longer, and is ideally conducted at least one day prior to the
group sharing.
2. In the second step, the group sits together in a private setting,
and one by one the individuals hold the floor, sharing aloud
their story. Participants should take as long as they want,
uninterrupted while providing their story. This enables a
degree of rambling which intentionally creates an environment
where many people end up sharing more than they originally
planned. This open time frame can be very liberating, as for
many this is the first opportunity they have ever had to share
aloud with others why they are who they are.
3. As such, any interruptions in the form of questions or time
limits tend to kill the magic of the moment. To mitigate the
abuse of this open ended opportunity to talk, facilitators are
encouraged to get their story down under 15 minutes, as this
then sets an example that most others will naturally follow. The
story should be conducted entirely as narrative—no power
point slides or film clips etc.—nothing to distract from the story
each person is telling the group, and nothing to hide behind.
This activity should be like telling stories around the
campfire—but the story we tell is about ourselves.
4. There is no question and answer period following the story so
as to avoid any semblance of an ‘interrogation‘, and also to
keep the playing field even, (i.e., if the facilitator were to ask
one participant three questions and another only one, it might
leave the impression that the first participant‘s story was more
interesting, etc.)
5. Every member of the group who is not sharing is asked to
practice ‘full-body’ listening by giving their complete and
unfettered attention to the person speaking. Receiving this
attention while sharing is extremely powerful and the facilitator
can both model this and suggest that participants give the kind
of attention you yourself would want to receive.
6. Every participant must provide a narrative, but the order of
presentation is purely voluntary, an important factor in creating
safety. While every participant must share something,
precisely how much to reveal about themselves is an
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ACTHB v8 Chapter II
individual decision. In this way, the exercise entails individually
manageable personal risk.
7. No more than three personal narratives are conducted in a
row. If someone goes exceedingly long this may be shortened
to two or even simply one. In order for the group to exercise
‘full-body’ listening and remain engaged, the entire group ‘who
am I’ must be spaced out over time. Done right, the story is
often draining both for the listeners and the presenters. Each
hour of stories should be broken up with an hour or more of
some other less emotionally investing activity.
8. It is highly recommended that the facilitator models their own
story before the participants commence their solo reflection.
What the facilitator shares will set the tone for what the
participants share. Facilitators are urged to go out on a limb
and reveal meaningful events in their life that genuinely
shaped them as people. By taking action and modeling this
openness first, the facilitator encourages participants to risk
being personally vulnerable themselves.
9. From past experience, several participants have initially told
the group that they had felt they did not know everyone well
enough to completely share who they are and everything they
had learned about themselves in preparing for the exercise. In
most cases, they came forward later and decided to redo their
story on their own initiative—sharing things they had learned
through introspection but needed time to process. This
methodology allows people to operate within their comfort
zone while simultaneously establishing a group norm that
encourages them to both reflect and share.
10. By now, it should be clear that this exercise is definitely NOT a
normal biographical recitation. Positions held, size and
composition of family, etc. are not important unless they are
linked to some watershed event. In an Army context, when
someone commanded a company or held some other position
of importance is not relevant UNLESS some critical event
happened while in that position that has stayed with, and
continues to shape their daily outlook. Similarly, while the birth
of a child is without question a significant event in anyone’s
life, it may or may not necessarily change your worldview
about things like the nature of personal responsibility, values,
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ACTHB v8 Chapter II
etc. Hence participants are ideally sharing events that were
personally transformational on a fundamental level.
11. Finally, and most importantly, this all requires a degree of
confidentiality among the group. While not confession or
protected speech, it is critical that if someone chooses to
share personal vulnerabilities (e.g., current struggles at home
or difficult events from the past) that this content does not
become fodder for gossip. To gain buy-in on this, the facilitator
should openly propose confidentiality as a group norm, and
foster a brief discussion about what this means. A good rule of
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Outcomes of Introspection
‘Who Am I’ is a deceptively simple exercise that works on many
personal and emotional levels simultaneously. Several outcomes
are enumerated below:
1. Using introspection to better understand how one engages the
world, allows participants to view themselves in profound ways
at depths rarely encouraged in the Army. Results may be scary
for those unlocking doors in their head that may have long been
closed, but it universally produces a better self-understanding.
2. When participants share their story, and listen as others share
their own, it invariably dawns on them that they are not alone
in coping with problems in life such as grief, prejudice,
disappointment, relationship issues, etc. This leaves
participants feeling significantly more connected with the group
and less alone in the world.
3. Practicing active listening is not something we routinely do or
reward in leader development. In fact, in some cases people
are penalized for not contributing in volume to class
discussions. This creates an environment where we reward
the loudest who frequently crowd out and undermine efforts at
collaboration. This exercise reinforces active listening and
more importantly it reinforces listening for a deeper
understanding of what they mean. This understanding
promotes a connection on an emotional level. This is an
exceedingly important skill for leaders to develop.
Organizations where leaders and those led are emotionally
connected have higher morale, are more committed to the
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ACTHB v8 Chapter II
mission, can better discern intent in the absence of explicit
orders, and are more adaptable in extreme circumstances.
4. This exercise creates an environment where alternative
perspectives can be valued. When a participant hears another
tell a personal story about encountering direct prejudice and
how that shaped them, they are less likely to think of that
participant as simply ‘hypersensitive.’ They understand where
that person is coming from and why they see the world as they
do—elements foundational to actual communication and
education.
5. Finally, this is a tremendous team building vehicle. Upon
completion, each member of the group knows all other
members in a deeper way, faster than such knowledge
normally develops. Often group members express that they
now know other participants better than long time neighbors or
even some members of their own family.
Journaling Daily
UFMCS requires students to journal daily, reflect on events and
information. This layer of personal consciousness is seldom
explored in the normal course of a day; paramount to critical
thinking habits. Through introspective time with personal thoughts
and feelings, this writing process induces the reflection on, and
synthesis of, concepts as well as the subsequent application to
one’s own life experiences.
Journals are not intended to be simple regurgitations of the day’s
events. Entries should reflect a deeper and more considered
review of the day’s topics as well as down other paths those
considerations lead. The act of journaling often leads the person
writing the journal to examine their beliefs, attitudes, and values
beyond what was discussed in class.
While students are required to turn in their journals, it is important
to remember that the act of keeping a journal is designed to
provide a vehicle for reflection for the individual writing them.
Entries are not be looked on as graded writing. Bottom-line, they
are designed for the writer not the reader.
Prompting questions:
x
x
What have I learned about myself?
What have I learned about my emotional responses?
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ACTHB v8 Chapter II
x
x
What learning topics or tasks did I respond to most easily/
with most difficulty?
What do I feel proudest about/ most dissatisfied about
regarding my personal growth?
Interpersonal Communication
Interpersonal communication is the face to face exchange
between two or more persons that conveys ideas, emotions, and
information; what is said and what is received verbally and
nonverbally via body language and facial expressions. Personal
objectives are one of the many driving forces underlying
interpersonal communication.
x
x
x
x
x
x
Interpersonal communication involves the use of semiotics
which includes verbal and non-verbal representations of
ideas, emotions, or events.
Interpersonal communication occurs between people who
are themselves developing and changing.
Ethics, the use of moral principles to guide action, are part
of interpersonal communication.
Interpersonal communication can be strategic.
Consider how one’s communication affects others.
To achieve their goals, communicators must be competent,
meaning both appropriate and effective.
The many benefits of effective interpersonal communication
include personal and professional success, more satisfying
relationships, and goal achievement.
Strategic Questioning: seeking information to facilitate choices
or open a space for new ways of thinking about a problem. It is
open and closed questions, not a statement in the form of a
question.
When to do it:
x Your professional role demands it
x As part of Critical Thinking
x You are confused about the purpose of the interaction
x You are problem-solving
How to do it:
x Use active listening
x Weigh they are saying against your goals
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ACTHB v8 Chapter II
x
x
Ask clarifying questions and offer paraphrases
Stay open to new discoveries
Strategic Listening": listening to shape the outcome and help
you accomplish your ends; measured later, by whether you gain
information or improve the relationship. It considers when to use
open and closed questioning, not stating the form of a question.
When to do it:
x Your professional role demands it
x As part of Critical Thinking
x You are confused about the purpose of the interaction
x You are problem-solving
How to do it:
x Use active listening
x Weigh they are saying against your goals
x Ask clarifying questions and offer paraphrases
x Stay open to new discoveries
Active Listening": listening to foster social relationships. This is
measured at the time by how well you show your interest. It shows
respect and involvement. Its absence can show lack of interest
and dismissal.
When to do it:
x When the relationship matters
x As part of strategic listening
How to do it:
x Keep your eyes on the other’s face
x Show emotional reaction but don’t interrupt
x Echo parts of what they are saying
Empathic Listening": listening in support of emotions,
demonstrating care and involvement. In the moment it helps the
person feel understood and supported. Its absence can show
impatience, disinterest, or dismissal.
When to do it:
x When you can be sincere
x When you truly understand or want to understand how
your counterpart feels
x When you want to defuse strong emotions
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ACTHB v8 Chapter II
How to do it:
x Show emotional reaction but don’t interrupt; murmur
x Use indirect questions to echo parts of what they say
x Keep your eyes on the other’s face
x Comment on their emotions
Interpersonal Conflict
An awareness of others’ temperaments can be quite helpful when
conflict arises. Acknowledging the similarities and differences
between the four temperaments allows for bridging strategies to
be developed. In other words, courses of action that take into
account each temperament’s needs, motivators, and skills to form
a more mutually beneficial outcome to manage the conflict.
Learning the four temperaments and examining your own
personal patterns (dominant to least used) helps to frame your
own personal needs, values, inter-personal stressors, and biases.
An understanding your own and observing the patterns of others
you work and live with allows you to:
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Influence and persuade others in a positive manner.
Acknowledge your talents and those of others.
Improve interpersonal communication.
Identify potential problems early.
Support and encourage others.
Narrow gaps and differences.
Improve team performance.
Negotiate more effectively.
Organize efficient teams.
Increase productivity.
Elevate morale.
Personality Temperament
Temperament is defined as a pattern of observable personality
traits, such as habits of communication, patterns of action, and
sets of characteristic attitudes, values, and talents. It also
encompasses personal needs, the kinds of contributions that
individuals make in the workplace, and the roles they play in
society. In essence, the study of temperament describes the ‘why’
of our behaviors, motivators and sources of stress.
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ACTHB v8 Chapter II
Historically, theorists have identified four unique patterns of
individual tendencies, values, and needs. These patterns were not
arbitrary collections of characteristics, but sprang from an
interaction between basic dimensions of human behavior: our
communication and our action, our words and our deeds, or,
simply, what we say and what we do.
Personality Dimensions® is a human relations and
communications model rooted in Jungian typology and
temperament theory that creates a common language for
understanding self and others. The model examines four
temperaments with innate psychological needs, values, talents,
and behaviors.
Personality
Dimensions®
Core Needs
Values
Inquiring
Green
knowledge, competence,
mastery, & self-control
scientific inquiry, concepts,
theories, & logical
consistency
Authentic
Blue
finding significance,
meaning, & unique
identity
harmony, cooperation,
ethics, & authentic
relationships
Organized
Gold
membership, belonging,
responsibility and duty
stability, security,
procedures, and group
preservation
Resourceful
Orange
freedom to act in the
moment; make an
impact, & expediency
variety, adventure,
excitement, and
performance with skill
Introversion and extraversion were first popularized by Carl Jung.
This concept frames a continuum of traits with discernible
GLIIHUHQFHVRULGHQWLILHUVIRUSUHIHUHQFHVRQWKHH[WUDYHUVLRQļ
introversion continuum. Regardless of where one may naturally
fall on the continuum, most will develop skills to effectively
augment behaviors along the entire continuum to fulfill core needs
and motivations.
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ACTHB v8 Chapter II
Those who prefer introversion will often:
x
x
x
Do their best thinking, learning, and decision making
through quiet reflection and individual contemplation.
Seek stimulation from within and direct their energies
inward in reflection.
Prefer to inwardly think things through before sharing any
of their thoughts.
Those who prefer extraversion will often:
x
x
x
Discuss thoughts out loud as a method to process
information and make decisions.
Seek stimulation from external sources and direct their
energies outward.
Prefer brainstorming out loud to get their creative juices
flowing.
Linda Berens, Understanding Yourself and Others, also addresses
the core self, the predisposition with which we are born. The
developed self; the skills and behaviors we learn as we grow and
mature; and the contextual self, how we prefer to react to a given
situation. Berens claims that, given our "core self" and our
"developed self", we are able to behave and react in a variety of
ways in different situations or contexts. She states that we have
the choice of: giving in to our core self, or following our developed
self, or selecting an appropriate contextual response.
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ACTHB v8 Chapter II
Summary
Self-Awareness and time introspecting is a fundamental element
of the red teaming education. Self-awareness includes
acknowledging that each of us come with differing values,
behaviors, beliefs, personal stories, motivations and goals. Selfawareness enables the Red Teamer to improve their own:
interpersonal communication, critical thinking, empathy for others,
and cohesion within the group.
An understanding of individual
temperament patterns and
LQWURYHUVLRQļH[WUDYHUVLRQ
confirms how we see ourselves
(what we say and what we do) may
be quite different from how others
perceive what we say and what we
do, and vice versa.
Endnotes
1
C.G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections, (New York: Pantheon Books,
1963), 247.
2
"Wisdom Quotes." Ralph Waldo Emerson Quote: "Most of the Shadows Of..."
January 1, 2014. Accessed November 24, 2014.
http://www.wisdomquotes.com/quote/ralph-waldo-emerson-162.html.
3 While this saying is attributed to Socrates, it was captured in Plato’s Apology.
Benjamin Jowett, Six Great Dialogues, (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 2007),
18.
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RTHB v8 Chapter III
CHAPTER III: Fostering Cultural Empathy
“I don’t think we should study things in isolation. I don’t think a
geographer is going to master anything, or an anthropologist is going
to master anything, or a historian is going to master anything. I think
it’s a broad-based knowledge in all these areas, the ability to dissect a
culture or an environment very carefully and know what questions to
ask, although you might not be an expert in that culture, and to be
able to pull it all together. Again, an intelligence analysis that isn’t an
order-of-battle, militarily oriented one, but one that pulls these factors
together that you need to understand…“I mean, as simple as flora and
fauna all the way up to basic geographic differences, environmental
differences – cultural, religious and everything else. That becomes your
life as a planner, or as the director of operations, and as the key
decision maker.”
-- General Anthony Zinni, 1998 1
This chapter is about developing better questions concerning
culture, in order to facilitate planning, policy making, and strategic
and operational decision making which is informed by cultural
empathy and enhanced by red teaming tools and a functional
systems approach. Red teaming methods and tools prevent us
from accepting easy answers to hard questions about culture and
its complexity. The functional systems approach enhances our
ability to translate the abstractions and nuances of culture into
doctrinal, operational terms. To that end, we emphasize the
following in our approach to the red teaming method of cultural
examination:
-
Conscious examination of the roles of ethnocentrism vice
cultural relativism
-
Culturally centric case studies
-
Tools to foster empathy
“Cultural analysis is intrinsically incomplete. And, worse than that, the
more deeply it goes the less complete it is. It is a strange science whose
most telling assertions are its most tremulously based, in which to get
somewhere with the matter at hand is to intensify the suspicion, both
your own and that of others, that you are not quite getting it right. But
that, along with plaguing subtle people with obtuse questions, is what
being an ethnographer is like.”
-- Anthropologist Clifford Geertz, 1973 2
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RTHB v8 Chapter III
Cultural Awareness
In the above passage from The Interpretation of Cultures, Clifford
Geertz was describing what it is like to be an ethnographer, but he
may just as well have been describing a Red Team tasked with
cultural analysis. A curious, skeptical disposition, rather than one
of certainty befits the Red Teamer. For the Red Teamer,
awareness means the discovery that there is no “normal” position
in cultural matters. 3
For the Red Teamer, culture may be best approached with
techniques borrowed from the perspective of a cultural
anthropologist instead of a prescriptive framework or list of ‘dos
and don’ts’; in other words, there is value in passively regarding
what is. However, “Anthropology, or at least interpretive
anthropology, is a science whose progress is marked less by a
perfection of consensus than by a refinement of debate. What
gets better is the precision with which we vex each other.” 4 This
will not do. What is needed is a systemic approach to culture the
outcome of which is designed to enhance military planning.
To observe dispassionately is the role of the ethnographer, but not
necessarily the role of the military commander or Red Teamer.
Their role is to decide what to “do,” based on their observation and
analysis.
Cultural awareness is not the same thing as cultural sensitivity.
The idea is not to escape or discard our own deeply held values,
beliefs, and ideals, or to practice cultural relativism, but to better
understand the distinctions and similarities between our own and
those held by others (both adversaries and allies) for the purpose
of avoiding missteps in planning and policy formulation. Our
methods and outcomes as military planners differ from those of
the ethnographer or anthropologist in that our task is not only to
observe, but also to plan and act upon our analysis.
With that in mind, keep this caution in mind as you read this
chapter and as you begin on any cultural examination: when we
analyze another culture we must do so with full consciousness
that our vantage point lies outside of it. Moreover, the things we
see are the things we most often attempt to manipulate. These
things are the superficial edifices of culture. Real wisdom here is
to allow for the deep, unalterable foundations of culture, not to
reconstruct it in the manner we desire. 5
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Ethnocentrism
One aim of the red teaming cultural methodology is the reduction
of blind ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism, the belief that one’s own
culture is inherently superior to other cultures is a natural
tendency of most individuals 6 (Haight, 1990). This is a problem in
planning when the planner is so bound by their own culture as to
be “blind to the ability to see the world through the eyes of another
national or ethnic group.” 7 Negative or distorted stereotypes too,
are a challenge to complete cultural understanding as well.
Stereotypes by themselves are not negative. At issue here is
whether they are accurate or distorted. Distorted stereotypes are
polarized, simplistic, and self-serving. Race and ethnicity are
common characteristics that are historically susceptible to
distorted stereotypes.
“Stereotyping is a process by which individuals are viewed as members
of groups and the information that we have stored in our minds about
the group is ascribed to the individual”
-- Behavioral Scientist Taylor H. Cox, 1994 8
Often we tend toward oversimplification of cultural complexity in
matters of planning. Our natural inclination is to construct
simplified models of a complex reality in order to explain things.
We develop simplified explanations based upon selected cultural
aspects of the OE that facilitate our planning and desired end
states. The tendency is to regard culture as a block, a category
with geographic or ethnic boundaries, and not as the people, the
individuals that make up what is the human domain. For example,
a simple answer to the question “Where is Mexico?” might be one
that explains geographical boundaries, as on a political map. A
more insightful answer is “It’s where Mexicans are,” or where
Mexican food is, where “Mexican” Spanish language is spoken, or
wherever Cinco de Mayo is celebrated, by whomever and for
whatever reason. Cultures have social and psychological as well
as geographical contexts. Culture’s complexity is illustrated by the
hundreds or perhaps even thousands of culturally learned
identities, affiliations, and roles we each assume at one time or
another. “Complexity involves the identification of multiple
perspectives within and between individuals.” 9 Multiple and
alternative perspectives, better questions, and thinking more
“complexly” is the aim of the red teaming approach to culture.
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RTHB v8 Chapter III
To that end, we adopt the position that the study of culture is “not
an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in
search of meaning.” 10 There are several challenges to forming an
interpretive approach to culture, but that is our aim. We seek an
explanation that accounts for the occurrence of certain phenomena
in culture, in a place, at a certain time, for a certain group, for the
purpose of planning, policy formulation, and decision support.
Challenges to interpreting culture
‡
To choose apperceptive (conscious perception with full
awareness) frameworks that are sufficiently rigorous without
being reductive.
‡
What cultural skills should a Red Teamer have?
‡
How are these skills best introduced in our practice?
‡
The most important aspects of multicultural awareness may
be learned but cannot be taught. 11
‡
Good training can create favorable conditions for
multicultural awareness to occur and provide the necessary
knowledge and skills
‡
What is “good” training for Red Teams?
“It is difficult to know the cultures of others until and unless you have
an awareness of your own culturally learned assumptions as they
control your life”
-- Psychologists Mary Connerley and Paul Pedersen, 2005 12
When seeking to interpret, understand, or analyze a culture,
nothing is more essential than to realize the extent to which the
interpretation is uniquely our own, with all the inherent and
inescapable biases and ethnocentricity that comes with it. While
we cannot completely escape our culturally learned
ethnocentricity, there are tools, methods, and frameworks we
employ to give us greater awareness of it and how it shapes our
thinking and decision making.
There are hundreds of definitions of culture. Some are broad,
general, and inclusive, while others are specific to the interest of
the practitioner (ethnographer, social scientist, psychologist,
warfighter, etc.).
Some definitions:
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RTHB v8 Chapter III
–
“Whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to
operate in a manner acceptable to its members.” 13
–
“The webs of significance designed by men for
themselves.” 14
–
“The collective programming of the mind that distinguishes
the members of one group or category of people from
another.” 15
–
Operational Culture: Those aspects of culture that influence
the outcome of a military operation; conversely, the military
actions that influence the culture of an area of operations
(AO).” 16
–
“A theory on the way in which a group of people in fact
behave.” 17
The key point to remember is it is all theory until you get there.
Culture…
‡
Is learned.
‡
Is shared.
‡
Changes over time.
‡
Is not always rational to outsiders.
There are several frameworks that attempt to capture aspects of
culture for the purpose of studying them. These are broad
frameworks that lay out major categories of cultural differences.
Differences of the various approaches relate directly to the
purpose of the research. Cultural frameworks do not explain
everything, but they still explain something, and our attention
should be focused on isolating what that something is with regard
to military planning.
There is no ideal framework or best way to classify a culture.
Moreover, frameworks should not supplant a straightforward
explanation. The Red Teamer should understand that
classifications and categories often only serve to provide a
simplified basis for analysis. Opting for one categorization or
framework over another not only determines the kind of questions
we may ask, but may obscure other important questions that
should be asked. For this reason, the Red Teamer should employ
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RTHB v8 Chapter III
several frameworks or cultural “lenses” (like 4-Ways of Seeing)
when conducting cultural analysis.
The Red Teamer views frameworks (including PMESII-PT as diagnostic tools, not
by themselves explanations for the way things are.
Some Cultural Frameworks
While PMESII (Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information,
Infrastructure) is the most frequently used method of organizing
militarily-relevant knowledge about a place it is not the only valid
framework nor is it complete in and of itself. Graduates are
encouraged to ask themselves the question ‘What is missing in an
exclusively PMESII analysis…does it cover the WILL of the people
in question, does it address how they view TIME either historically
or day to day etc. Frameworks of all kinds are diagnostic tools not
explanations for the way things really are in the society.
Kluckholn’s Six Age-Old Dimensions of Culture:
x The nature of people, good or bad?
x The relationship between people and nature, Harmony or subjugation?
x The relationship of people, individualism or Group?
x The primary mode of activity, Being or Acting?
x Conception of space, private or public?
x Time orientation, past, present or future?
Nesbitt on Cognitive Differences:
x Patterns of attention and perception
x Assumptions about the composition of the world
x Beliefs on controllability of the environment
x Assumptions about stability and change
x Preferred patterns of explanation of events
x Habits of organizing the world
x Use of formal logic rules
x Application of dialectical approaches
Hall on Communication Patterns:
x Context, what must be explicitly stated?
x Space, how much personal space is necessary?
x Time, monochromic (events occur one at a time) or polychromic (simultaneity)
Five Operational Cultural Dimensions:
Ofstede’s Country Profiles:
1. The Physical Environment
x Power distance
2. The Economy
x Uncertainty avoidance
3. The Social Structure
x Individualism
4. The Political Structure
x Masculinity/femininity
5. Beliefs & Systems
x Time Horizon
From Operational Culture for the Warfighter
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RTHB v8 Chapter III
In the end, the framework(s) we choose is/are based on what we
want to know and what we plan to do. We want to gather not only
analysis and facts but explanations that lead to empathy /
understanding that contribute to a methodological approach to
operational Design, joint and service military decision making
processes.
Every Red Teamer should possess a general OE knowledge of:
– Dimensions of Culture
– Aspects of National Culture
– Distinct motivational values born of cultural upbringing and
context
Red-teaming instruction at UFMCS focuses on culture at the
general level of knowledge. Emphasis is placed on culture
because culture was identified as a gap in the understanding of
the OE during OIF and OEF, and because culture is historically
difficult to understand as its substance and significance is often
abstract and not immediately observable.
The UFMCS Culture curriculum includes lessons focused
principally on four subjects that are uniformly acknowledged in
anthropological studies as foundational to any cultural study:
social structure, politics (power and authority), economics, and
religion (belief systems). The assumption is that to understand any
one part of a culture or society we must look at all the rest of the
socio-cultural context. The purpose of separating a society or
culture into elemental parts or basic principles is not to isolate
these elements, but to determine the nature of the whole.
General knowledge focuses learning about a complex OE on what
is important for military planning and decision making. General
knowledge is not concrete but an abstraction from experience;
generalizations abstracted from multiple specific cases.
Generalization simplifies a complex reality; complexity that
otherwise overwhelms our ability to understand. An example of a
model or framework that serves to simplify and illustrate an
otherwise complex cultural reality is Hofstede’s “Onion” model of
Cultural Manifestations.
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RTHB v8 Chapter III
This simple, general model, when populated, presents the Red
Teamer with a cultural “… set of patterns, of and for behavior,
prevalent among a group of human beings at a specified time
period and which … presents … observable and sharp
discontinuities.” 18 Models like this one allow the Red Teamer to
analyze what is the same, and what is different, the “sharp
discontinuities” of the cultural context. It provides general
categories and asset of patterns with which to begin a cultural
examination of the OE that may be useful in the development of
the Environmental frame of the Design process.
Without general categories we easily get lost in the complexity of
specific details. At the population level, the human domain is
extremely complex and is continuously changing which makes
analysis to identify what can be influenced to achieve the desired
outcome intractable. There are too many interconnected
variables—at some level most all variables are connected—and
causal relationships are constantly changing. This fact alone is
enough to make planners take an essentialist view of culture, “It’s
always been that way with these people.”
“To explain different patterns of culture we have to begin by assuming
that human life is not merely random or capricious. Without this
assumption, the temptation to give up when confronted with a
stubbornly inscrutable custom or institution becomes irresistible” -Anthropologist Marvin Harris, 1989 19
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RTHB v8 Chapter III
Organization of cultural information is more than simple
aggregation or populating a rigid systems model with general
information. Important nuances of culture may be missed in a
simple aggregation and cannot be examined by looking only at
institutional design. This is where red teaming tools may be useful
in determining which information, general and specific, is
contextually important in the design or planning process, and help
us to avoid the temptation to “give up,” or generalize in a
stereotypical fashion.
The complexity of the human domain may be simplified by
organizing specific information into general categories important
for military operations. These general categories are based on
what is important to know. At the highest level of organization for
military operations, these general categories are the military
operational variables, PMESII-PT. These categories simplify
reality and provide a framework to focus collection of Regional
Expertise and Culture (REC) -specific information relevant for
military analysis.
Systems Thinking: According to CJCSI 3126.01A, Language,
Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC) Capability Identification,
Planning, and Sourcing, systems thinking is: “Understanding how
...variables in the regional system interact with one another and
change over time.” 20 At the population level, it is an understanding
of the interaction of variables across a population. Given
complexity, as mentioned above, “systems thinking” is enabled by
the simplification of reality into relevant general categories of
variables. The task for the Red Teamer is to render reality as
simple as possible, but no simpler, for the purpose of military
planning. For this reason, a functional approach to cultural
analysis of the OE is suggested as one approach the Red Team
may take for the purpose of connecting cultural analysis to
planning and operations. The following Functional Systems
Approach to cultural analysis for planning is adapted from the
USAFAS Regional Expertise and Culture Instructor Course (Pilot)
developed by Dr. Daryl Liskey.
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RTHB v8 Chapter III
Functional Systems Approach
A System is an analytical approach to understand regular
interacting relationships (links) and the associated entities (nodes)
in an OE (see JP 2 01.3). 21 It is an analytic device for separating
from its context a set of phenomenon we want to study.
Anthropologist Ronald Cohen describes it this way:
The system as a whole does something. It can be
characterized as having an activity or activities, and its
various parts contribute to the fulfillment of these ends.
Indeed systems designers are quite clear on this point
when they design systems, since they start with functions
(emphasis added) and then work back to create a set of
interrelationships that will, in fact, describe the carrying
out of these ends. 22
How variables are related to produce a specific outcome is the
definition of a function. The functional system consists of the
regular patterns of interacting variables that cause the output. A
functional systems approach is useful because it provides a
systemic approach to analyzing interactions on what is important
to know.
Keep in mind that the functional systems approach is not theory,
nor is it doctrine. It is a method that links all aspects of cultural
research together (Red Teaming, Design, LREC, PMESII, etc.). It
is but one of many methods that may be used to enhance
apperception (conscious perception with full awareness). Its
intended use is as a bridging device between red teaming analysis
and doctrine. The goal of this approach is an accurate description
of a culture, leading to an explanation, and ultimately better
informed planning and decision making.
The PMESII systems (which the Army identifies as the
Operational Variables) purport to identify the most important
outputs or effects relevant for military operations in a typical
country at the campaign level of planning.
In functional terms, the Operational Variables are:
Political – power: how binding decisions are made
Military – physical force: how physical force is exercised
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RTHB v8 Chapter III
Economic – resources: how goods and services are produced,
distributed, and consumed
Social – solidarity: how people interact in their everyday lives
Infrastructure – physical macro systems: how critical resources
and activities move across man-made physical systems
Information – communications: how information is produced,
distributed, and consumed
A functional understanding differs from but is consistent with the
description of the operational variables in ADRP 5 and other Army
and Joint Publications like JP 2-01.3.
At UFMCS, we include Religion, or belief systems, as a function.
In general, the PMES variables are important functions of any
population, which is well established in the academic literature. A
PMESII systems approach can be useful across the levels of war:
a village, for example, may be usefully analyzed in terms of a
PMESII framework for missions that cross the full range of military
operations.
Caveats: In general, a PMESII Operational Variables approach is
consistent with a functional systems approach given two caveats:
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RTHB v8 Chapter III
¾ PMESII are not meant to be stand-alone descriptive bins
for categorizing entities (e.g., persons or institutions).
In other words, it is unnecessary to think of any element of
the system as a compartmentalized function which must be
sharply separated from its context. A single entity or
institution may be important across the PMESII operational
variables. For example, a sheik may be an important
variable in an analysis of power, force, resources, and
solidarity of a tribe. If the sheik is categorized as a social
variable but not a political variable, then the analysis of
power misses an important variable. In more complex
societies, institutions may be structured to perform a single
specialized function; for example, a business enterprise is
organized to perform an economic function or a government
to perform a political function. However, a political analysis
of American politics can include military, economic, and
social institutions as important variables. If economic
institutions are walled off from Political, then the analysis will
be partial or biased and unlikely to accurately estimate the
effect.
¾ Mission Dependent: What functions are important in a
particular military mission may differ depending on the
mission. As noted in JP 2 01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation
of the OE, for more-focused military operations, a full
analysis of the PMESII variables is not needed. As, in
governance operations, analysis of the political system can
be the most useful (keeping in mind that PMESII are not
descriptive categories) while for military force-on-force
operations the analysis of the Military system is likely the
most useful.
By now we have established that there are several frameworks,
procedures, and models by which to examine culture. Whatever
design we decide upon is dependent on the answer to four critical
questions (adapted from Keesing, 1970):
1. What will be the shape and design of the cultural
description?
2. What is the relation of such a cultural description to the
overall goals of the military plan or decision?
3. How is the adequacy of the description to be evaluated?
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4. What evidence is there that the descriptions we have
sketched will be productive?
The purpose of these questions is to explain culture to what end?
What is the connection? And the answers to these questions are
critically important in determining the validity of whatever cultural
framework, process or model we choose. The answer must be
better understanding to inform the planning process.
The human domain is infinitely complex. It pushes back, evolves,
and changes rapidly and unpredictably. We currently lack
sufficient analytical power to reliably understand functions in the
human domain in the same way we can in the biological or
engineering domains. Institutions can be engineered to perform a
function, but the OE outside institutions, is more complex. Rather,
red teaming tools and a functional approach to the human domain
generate research questions that focus the purpose for an
analysis and what casual relationships are important. Given a
certain question, we structure research areas by identifying what
is necessary to answer the question based on our general
knowledge. To the extent that general knowledge is true, the
categories and relationships will be true. It provides our “best
initial guess” which is preferable to the alternatives. The Critical
Variables, Cultural Perceptions Framework, and “Onion” model
are useful red teaming tools in generating questions and
categories that support the functional systems approach and in
generating broader understanding (empathy) and alternative
perspectives for cultural analysis.
Advantages of a Functional Approach: There are three important
advantages of a functional approach.
x
Focuses Analysis on Outcomes and Effects: Observing
entities alone can tell us little about what is important for
outcomes like power (control). A local government official or
sheik may not be an important variable. In a village, the
priest or large land owner may exercise more power. Or,
power, more likely, is distributed throughout a functional
political system. By understanding the functional system,
entities or relationships can be identified that are important
for causing an outcome. Systemic functional analysis
increases the likelihood of developing course of action
(COA) that will achieve a desired effect.
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x
Identifies what is important across specific areas: A
functional approach also enables a REC-general
understanding applicable across any area. Understanding
key specific functional relationships like decision making,
execution, and enforcement enables identification of the
specific institutions across specific regions or systems. The
specific institutional form can vary greatly: the ultimate
decision-making function can be exercised by Congress in
the United States, the Central Committee in the People’s
Republic of China, or the religious leader in Iran. It may also
be shared among different institutions to varying degrees.
Understanding of functions provides general knowledge of
what is important across specific areas where institutional
form can vary widely.
x
Synchronizes knowledge and analysis across echelons:
Specific forms of institutions also vary across echelons
within an AO. For example, political parties may have a
national level organization, linked to regional political groups,
which in turn are linked to local informal power holders in a
village. A functional analysis enables an understanding of
vertical as well as horizontal system relationships related to
outcomes despite specific differences in form. This enables
an analysis of how one level affects the other as well as
enabling the aggregation of information and analysis across
echelons.
Cultural Relevance
A few rules of thumb apply to recognize when culture may be
more important:
Greater Cultural Differences: Culture is more important when
cultures differ from our own. In countries like Afghanistan, these
differences can be marked and more important than institutional
considerations. In more Westernized cultures, culture differences
may be few and institutional differences will matter more.
Unstable Countries: Where institutions are weak or are
collapsing, cultural ties are relatively more important and can
become a critical source of conflict as well as resilience.
Marked Differences within a Country: The cultures within a
country can vary markedly. The culture in rural areas is less
Westernized compared to major urban areas and the culture can
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vary from area to area within a country. Differences in culture can
produce strong cultural dynamics within a country even in highly
institutionalized Western countries and these dynamics can be
critical for Western countries.
Additionally, culture can be a more critical consideration in
population Inform and Influence operations and, at the individual
and organizational levels, operating with JIIM partners.
Summary
Anthropology is about observation, collection, and cross-cultural
comparisons. Military planning is oriented toward action, and
exhibits a bias toward a particular type of action (security, stability,
decisive action, etc.) The processes of military planning can have
a dramatic effect on the goals of those actions. Red teaming is
about apperception, theory construction and testing. These fields
frequently overlap, but tend to use different methodologies and
techniques. Red teaming methods and tools aim at improving
cultural understanding with the goal of enhancing the chances of
successful outcomes in military planning. In the case of cultural
empathy it is about explanations of the relationships of cultural
functions. Red teaming represents a methodology, and the
approach affects the method. The order of application reflects a
strategy. The aim of the strategy is the support of operational
planning in the form of Design and MDMP. The following are
some thoughts for the Red Team to keep in mind when
conducting cultural analysis:
x
The study of culture is not performed in isolation. It is only
meaningful when regarded as part of a larger body of
thought (e.g., strategy, design, campaign planning).
x
Cultural analysis is part of the larger intellectual process of
war fighting and peace keeping.
x
The tendency to depend on one authority, one theory, or one
approach to cultural apperception is extremely dangerous in
military planning.
x
Red teaming cultural methodology is not a new way of
knowing—it is a systematized approach—a synthesis of
several works.
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x
A functional systems approach is useful because it provides
a systemic way of analyzing what is important to know about
the OE.
x
Red teaming methodology does not produce solutions, but
insights that inform planning—a logic of inquiry.
x
The aim is to avoid spurious correlations and conclusions.
x
The goal is to make sense of—or meaning of—what goes on
in a particular cultural milieu; for that time, and in that
context, for the purpose of planning and policy making.
x
The red teaming cultural methodology aims to inventory and
understand a people and their motivations at a level of
general knowledge for the purpose of resolving or avoiding
violence and conflict.
x
The goal of general knowledge is not prediction per se, but
understanding in order to control and influence the outcomes
we desire in military operations.
And finally, some observations on “why we study culture” 23 from
Dr. Geoff Demarest:
1. To find people and things. Cultural knowledge helps locate
individuals, their wealth and their supporters. ‘Locate’ means
establish their precise whereabouts -- where they will sleep
tonight, where their mother is buried, the number of their bank
account and the bank routing number, where their motorcycle
is sitting, their email address, where and when they play
golf…and where they feel safe. For the competitor in a violent
struggle this is the first and most compelling reason for cultural
knowledge. It is what Sam Spade, the private investigator,
knows. The rest is useful, too, but if he knows where you are
while you don’t know where he is, you are the prey. To control
anonymity, you must know the culture.
2. To communicate good. Cultural knowledge can improve
communications with others so as to endear and not offend, to
facilitate collaboration and compromise, and to settle disputes
peacefully when preferable. This involves language beyond
the verbal, and into customs, prejudices, habits, mores,
expectations, fears, historical grievances, community pride
and the like. All knowledge is grist to the mill. It will be
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especially productive to identify aspects of the culture related
to honor and dishonor.
3. To identify objects of desire, sources and holders of power,
grievances, agents (especially ‘exclusive’ agents), resolution
mechanisms, debts, tax relationships, jurisdictions and
expectations. In short, to comprehend the territorial geography
of conflict and conflict resolution.
4. To set reasonable objectives. Knowing how or if to change the
social compact, how long it might reasonably take you to
implement such a change, and how long the changes might
last. This may include determining the interrelationship
between peoples’ behaviors and their surrounding
environment in order to derive durable improvements in
human flourishing and harmony. When good intentions are not
built on sufficient knowledge, the reward may be a set of nasty
unintended consequences. In a domestic legal setting we
demand due diligence of doctors and lawyers -- that they avoid
negligent practice. Strategic due diligence presupposes the
programmed and resourced study of foreign cultures in order
to avoid strategic negligence.
5. To put things in the right places. Whether you want to
optimally place a fish pond, police station, camera, or a
shooter, it is local cultural knowledge (and usually the kind that
cannot be gained via remote sensing) that will guide best.
6. To correctly time actions and activities. Knowing when to act
and not act is a much easier standard if we are steeped in
local cultural knowledge.
7. To get the joke or make the joke. Jokes work the same mental
pathways as military deceptions. For practical purposes,
military deceptions are jokes. Irregular armed conflicts are
generally clothed in law, economics, propaganda and other
aspects of quotidian, civilian life. Not being able to get civilian
jokes means being vulnerable to the dangerous military or
criminal ones. Just as the insurgent can move from military
uniform to civilian attire, so can military thought hide in civilian
guise.
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Endnotes
1
Anthony Zinni, "Non-Traditional Military Missions: Their Nature, and the Need
for Cultural Awareness & Flexible Thinking" in Capital "W" War: A Case for
Strategic Principles of War: (because Wars Are Conflicts of Societies, Not
Tactical Exercises Writ Large), by Joe Strange (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps
University, 1998), 282.
2
Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York:
Basic Books, 1973), 29.
3
Geert Hofstede, Forward to Leadership in a Diverse and Multicultural
Environment: Developing Awareness, Knowledge, and Skills by Mary Connerley
and Paul Pederson, (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2005), ix-x.
4
Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 29.
5
Ibid, page #?.
6
Haight, G. "Managing Diversity." Across the Board 27, no. 3 (1990): 22.
7
Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979),
15.
8
Taylor Cox, Cultural Diversity in Organizations: Theory, Research, and Practice,
(San Francisco, Calif.: Berrett-Koehler, 1993), 88.
9
Mary L. Connerley and Paul Pedersen, Leadership in a Diverse and
Multicultural Environment: Developing Awareness, Knowledge, and Skills,
(Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2005), 29.
10
Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 5.
11
Connerley and Pedersen, Leadership in a Diverse and Multicultural
Environment, xii.
12
Ibid, xi.
13
Ward Hunt Goodenough, Culture, Language, and Society, 2d ed., (Menlo Park,
Calif.: Benjamin/Cummings Pub., 1981), 109.
14
Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, 5.
15
Geert H. Hofstede and Gert Jan Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations:
Software of the Mind: Intercultural Cooperation and Its Importance for Survival,
Rev. and Expanded 3rd ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010), 6.
16
Barak A. Salmoni and Paula Eber, Operational Culture for the Warfighter:
Principles and Applications, (Quantico, Va.: Marine Corps University;
Washington, DC: 2011) 15.
17
Florence Rockwood Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck, Variations in Value
Orientations, (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1961) 7.
18
Claude Levi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship. (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1967), 10.
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RTHB v8 Chapter III
19
Marvin Harris, Cows, Pigs, Wars & Witches: The Riddles of Culture, (New
York: Random House, 1989), 4.
20
CJCSI 3126.01A. Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture (LREC)
Capability Identification, Planning and Sourcing, H-1.
21
JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, (21
May 2014).
22
Ronald Cohen, "The Political System," in A Handbook of Method in Cultural
Anthropology, eds. Raoul Naroll and Ronald Cohen, pp. 484-499. New York &
London: Columbia Press, 1970.
23
Demarest, Geoffrey. Winning Irregular War. Leavenworth, Kansas: Foreign
Military Studies Office, 2014, pp. 153-154.
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CHAPTER IV: Critical Thinking
In all affairs it’s a healthy thing now and then to hang a question mark
on the things you have long taken for granted.
Many people would sooner die than think. In fact, they do.
-- Bertrand Russell 1
Introduction
Critical thinking is a term that many institutions hold in high regard,
that most people have heard about, and that almost nobody
practices on a thorough and systematic basis. This section of the
Red Team Handbook is designed to acquaint you with many of
the fine points associated with critical thinking by doing two things:
exploring what critical thinking is, and addressing why critical
thinking is necessary.
Critical thinking is hard, deliberative work and it takes an open,
inquisitive mind. It is not easy, but it doesn’t take a genius either.
You can choose to believe whatever you hear and see. But to be
a critical thinker, you must learn to ask yourself whether you must
believe what you hear and see. Ultimately, critical thinking is
about what to believe.
What Do Critical Thinkers Do?
What exactly is critical thinking? A common approach to answer
that question is to consider how the term is defined. Let’s look at
a few definitions of critical thinking. Drs. Richard Paul and Linda
Elder, authors of many critical thinking books and documents,
define critical thinking as
“A process by which the thinker improves the quality of his or
her thinking by skillfully taking charge of the structures inherent
in thinking and imposing intellectual standards upon them… [It
requires] a commitment to overcome our native egocentrism
and sociocentrism.” 2
Robert Ennis, also recognized as an expert in critical thinking,
defines it differently: “Critical thinking is a process, the goal of
which is to make reasonable decisions about what to believe and
what to do.” 3
Are either of those definitions sufficient to explain what critical
thinking is in full, or what critical thinkers do? Certainly not.
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Neither enumerate what critical thinking is, nor point us in the right
direction in terms of how to think critically. The challenge of
defining critical thinking is that it seems to defy definition—at least
a definition that stands alone, fully explaining what it is and how to
do it. In fact, several authors who have written about critical
thinking do so without attempting to define the term. Among them
are Stephen Gerras (“Thinking Critical About Critical Thinking”),
Stephen Brookfield (Developing Critical Thinkers), Tim Hurson
(Think Better), and Peter Facione (Critical Thinking: What It Is
and Why It Counts).
Although the definitions leave us with questions concerning what
critical thinking is and how to do it, they do provide insight. By
closely reviewing several definitions, we can ferret out ideas that
help us better understand the nature of the critical thinking.
Look at the definition by Drs. Paul and Elder above. Several
tangible ideas emerge: critical thinking is a process, and it deals
with the quality of thinking by imposing intellectual standards. In
fact, in other writing these two authors assert that critical thinking
considers points of view, the quality of information, interpretation
and inference, assumptions, and implications and consequences,
and that critical thinkers think open-mindedly, and gather, assess
and interpret relevant information. 4
Additional verbiage from other critical thinking experts, with their
key ideas italicized, are as follows:
x
Stephen Brookfield (Developing Critical Thinkers): Critical
thinking consists of challenging assumptions and exploring
alternatives. 5
x
M. Neil Browne and Stuart M. Keeley (Asking The Right
Questions): “Critical thinking consists of an awareness of a
set of interrelated critical questions, plus the ability and
willingness to ask and answer them at appropriate times”
(Italics added.) 6
x
Gary Jason (Critical Thinking): “Broadly defined, critical
thinking means developing an ever better worldview and
using it well in all aspects of your life… the essence of
critical thinking is questioning and arguing logically. … the
heart of critical thinking is the ability to … infer or reason
well… questioning and arguing logically” (Italics added). 7
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x
Sylvan Barnet and Hugo Bedau (Critical Thinking, Reading,
and Writing): “[Critical thinking includes] searching for hidden
assumptions, noticing various facets, unraveling different
strands, and evaluating what is most significant … [critical
thinking] implies conscious, deliberate inquiry, and especially
it implies adopting a skeptical state of mind.” “Critical
thinkers are…sufficiently open-minded… [and] adopt a
skeptical attitude.” “Critical thinking means questioning not
only the assumptions of others, but also questioning your
own assumptions” (Italics added.) 8
Make a short list of all of the italicized words in the definitions
shown thus far. Collectively, these words help illuminate what
critical thinking is, and what critical thinkers do. Here is an initial
list of the ideas expressed in italics:
x
x
Critical thinking is:
o
awareness.
o
a process
o
quality of thinking
o
imposing intellectual standards
o
challenging assumptions and exploring alternatives
o
searching for hidden assumptions
o
questioning and arguing logically
o
developing an ever better worldview
Critical thinkers:
o
are open-minded
o
adopt a skeptical state of mind
o
gather, assess, and interpret relevant information
o
question [their] own assumptions
o
consider points of view, the quality of information,
interpretation and inference, assumptions, and
implications and consequences
Let’s elaborate on a few of the ideas expressed above. First,
critical thinking is awareness: critical thinkers are aware of their
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surroundings, what they do know and (more importantly) what
they do not know, and how their thinking can often fool them.
Because of this, critical thinkers are self-reflective and defer
judgment: they do not jump to conclusions, but rather take time to
ask questions, ensure they’ve considered various perspectives,
ask themselves what’s missing that needs to be considered, and
reflect upon how their values and beliefs may be conspiring to fool
them.
Critical thinking is also a process. Good critical thinkers consider
various frameworks when thinking about problems, because
frameworks force us to consider alternative perspectives that we
wouldn’t naturally consider. The latter portion of the Red Team
Handbook is filled with frameworks with which we can think
critically about various challenges.
Critical thinking includes knowing that for many issues,
assumptions prevail. Often these assumptions are hidden, or
implicit: we make them without realizing that we are doing so. All
assumptions need to be challenged. When the assumptions are
challenged and found to be faulty, we may have better insight into
the nature of the problem.
Exploring alternatives is equally important. Otherwise, we take for
granted that the first thing that comes to our mind is the way it
really is—we fall prey to default-mode thinking, allowing ourselves
to be comfortable with the first conclusion we settle upon.
Considering the collective list of extracted ideas from critical
thinking experts is a first step toward more fully appreciating what
critical thinking is, and how to do it. To add to the list above, think
of someone you admire as a critical thinker. What is it that s/he
does that you admire? How is it that this person “thinks critically?”
What habits of thought does this person exhibit? There is no
perfect, all-inclusive list of critical thinking traits. But by
constructing such a list, we can better understand the aspects of
critical thinking that definitions alone won’t provide.
In summary, critical thinking definitions—however eloquently
stated—often do not provide complete, self-contained
understanding because there is much more to critical thinking than
any one definition can provide. Rather than focus on definitions of
critical thinking, we invite you to review the list of Critical Thinking
Traits. Review each item on this list. If you aren’t doing all of the
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things noted on the list, perhaps your critical thinking has room for
improvement. Make sure to explore those ideas that you don’t
understand.
This completes the discussion of what critical thinking is, and what
critical thinkers do. But is critical thinking a necessity?
Why is Critical Thinking Necessary?
We maintain that critical thinking is indeed vitally necessary.
Why? For a number of reasons—among them the fact that we
spend most of our waking day on “cognitive autopilot,” not
consciously thinking about the choices that we make; that each of
us perceives and interprets the same information in several
different ways; and that there are ingenious attempts on the part
of the few to fool the many. This section will briefly examine these
reasons.
Most human beings are on “cognitive autopilot” most of the time.
Think about it: since you woke up this morning, how much of your
daily routine has been just that—a routine? Unless you’re a child,
and haven’t yet learned all of the things necessary to survive and
thrive in the modern world, we don’t usually give a second thought
to many of the things we do during the day. This includes
dangerous activities—driving a car on a busy highway; playing ice
hockey; working in a noisy, dangerous automotive plant; or
crossing a busy street while listening to music on an iPod.
According to Daniel Kahneman, most impressions and thoughts
arise in your conscious experience without your knowing how they
got there. The mental work that produces impressions, intuitions,
and many decisions goes on in silence in our mind. As we
navigate our lives, we normally allow ourselves to be guided by
impressions and feelings, and the confidence we have in our
intuitive beliefs and preferences is usually justified.
But not always. 9
According to Richards Heuer (The Psychology of Intelligence
Analysis) and Morgan D. Jones (The Thinker’s Toolkit), we do not
approach analysis with empty minds. Our minds are full of biases
and assumptions. Unless we are forced to stop and think through
a particular challenge, we are able to blot out much of the
complexity surrounding us and rely on routines of habit. Usually,
this works fine until we treat a truly unique situation as yet another
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routine situation, at which point we are taken by complete
surprise. Hopefully we survive and learn. Sometimes we’re
profoundly embarrassed.
Critical thinking helps us break the bond of unreflective
dependence upon our intuition. It is a counter-weight to “cognitive
autopilot.” Why? For several reasons, among them our reliance
upon mental models, patterns and intuition; the effects of “frames”;
and our values, beliefs and worldviews.
When we perceive and interpret information, we usually use
mental models, patterns, and anomalies: our intuition. Mental
models—also referred to as “mindsets”—are tools that we
unknowingly create to replicate how we believe the world actually
works. They act as implicit assumptions—unstated, hidden
assumptions we don’t consciously make, but which nonetheless
exist. We use these mental models to simplify our daily lives.
Mental models allow us to cope with reality by providing a readymade default mechanism: “when I see the following, here’s how I
interpret it and here’s how I act.” Most of these mental models, like
our values and beliefs, reside in our subconscious, which means
that we are not normally cognizant when we are using them.
Mental models do make our lives easier; they simplify the
environment by bringing to each new experience a preestablished frame of reference. The absence of mental models
would require us to figure out every situation as it presents itself,
and we would soon be overwhelmed.
When our mental models of the world do not match the reality that
we face, we often ignore that reality. Unfortunately, we often try to
project our own mental models onto situations, whether or not
they actually fit. We tend to perceive what we expect to perceive
in the world around us, valuing information that is consistent with
our views, and rejecting or overlooking information that is
inconsistent with our views. And we perceive in a way that is least
likely to disturb what we expect to see—least likely to disturb the
mindsets buried in our subconscious. 10
Related to mental models are sets of patterns that we establish
throughout our experiences in life. The longer we live, the more
experiences we gather and the more we are able to operate
autonomously through the use of these patterns. Sometimes when
a particular pattern that we expect doesn’t present itself—when
we spot an anomaly—we are able to act upon that information too.
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Many times, however, spotting anomalies is difficult, especially if
we are not looking for them in advance.
When we view the world around us in terms of patterns, however,
we get into trouble when those patterns don’t actually exist. This is
a description of a “cognitive bias” called the Narrative Fallacy.
We can also fall into a trap of allowing our minds to jump to
conclusions—having been deceived by the faulty use of mental
models or patterns—and form a conclusion to a particular problem
without first considering alternatives, simply because that’s what
our mental models or overreliance on patterns tells us is the truth.
This is an example of what we call Confirmation Bias, which is
another of the Cognitive Biases. In order to preclude Confirmation
Bias, we should not seek to confirm anything. Rather, we should
seek to disconfirm, or disprove an idea, especially if that idea
comes in the form of an assumption. An ideal tool that uses the
principle of disconfirming evidence is the Analysis of Competing
Hypotheses.
A concept closely related to mental models is frames, which
according to Edward Russo and Paul Schoemaker are “mental
structures that simplify and guide our understanding of a complex
reality.” 11 Frames are hard to recognize, and distort what we see.
Most of us don’t realize that we have various frames and mental
models. We often use frames to consider problems or situations,
but fail to realize that we should use several frames instead of just
one. Rather, we normally use the first frame that occurs to us.
Challenging our frames is a necessity, but we can’t challenge our
frames if we don’t realize that they exist. A useful tool in working
with frames is the Frame Audit.
Our values, beliefs and worldview act as filters to skew our
perception and interpretation of information, and they motivate our
subsequent behavior. Most of our values and beliefs reside in our
subconscious; we know we have them, and when forced to think
about them we can generally describe what they are. Values and
beliefs are both forms of assumptions about how the world works,
and our worldview could be considered as a compilation of these
beliefs and values.
Since each of us (even within the same culture) are apt to have
subtle differences in our values, beliefs and worldview, it should
be easy to understand that each of us is apt to perceive and
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interpret information differently from each another. Of course,
when we work with people from other cultures, the differences are
apt to be much more significant. Critical thinking helps us to think
about each other’s’ perspectives.
One way to think critically about issues in which our values, beliefs
and worldview may have affected us is to adopt the role of a Devil’s
Advocate. Devil’s Advocacy is a process which forces us to think
through an issue from a completely different perspective, one
which we wouldn’t normally consider. Each of us perceive and
interpret information differently—for several reasons. Among these
reasons are the physical limitations of our perceptive processes;
our inability to reason properly; our inability to differentiate between
causation and correlation; and our difficulty in “thinking complexly”
about complex problems.
We are limited in terms of what we can physically perceive.
Hence, each of us is apt to see different elements of the same
information. When we observe something, we often miss many
things. According to Dr. Marcus Raichle, a neurologist at
Washington University, each of us has ten billion bits of
information hitting the backs of our retinas every second—of this,
only six million bits make it to our optic nerve, and 100,000 bits
make it to our visual cortex. Yet only 100 bits of information make
it to our conscious brain each second. That is a significant
physical filtering of information—from 1010 power to 102 power.
Even if Dr. Raichle’s numbers are a bit off, the effect should be
readily apparent. We simply do not have the capability to register
and think about everything we can perceive. When several of us
look at the same thing, we often notice different aspects of it.
Why? Our mental models, the patterns we’ve experienced, our
frames, our values and beliefs, and our worldview. This is why
diversity among groups is important: each of us is apt to be able to
think about key aspects and perspectives that others in our group
are not, and vice versa.
Our vision is a construction. The process of observing includes
recreating in our minds—constructing—what we believe we are
observing. When we observe, our brains take in information, and
relate that information to the surrounding context. Given all of the
information that is physically filtered out, we are inclined to fill in
the gaps by making assumptions in a way that makes sense to us:
we assign meaning to what we perceive, because we are
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generally uncomfortable with a completely abstract picture devoid
of meaning. The more abstract a perception, the more our brains
will add meaning to it. (If you don’t believe that, assemble a group
of people and view the most abstract art you can find. Many will
perceive and interpret the art piece in demonstrably different
ways, in part because of the physical limitations described above,
and in part due to the mental models, patterns, frames, and beliefs
and worldview described above.) The completed “picture” that we
see is not necessarily the reality in front of us; rather, it is the
constructed version of that reality that reflects assumption-based
conclusions to which our brains have already jumped. Again—this
is why diversity of experience is crucial to groups conducting
critical thinking.
Often our reasoning is faulty. We reason in one of a couple of
ways—deductively or inductively. Deductive reasoning relies upon
drawing a conclusion from two or more premises. So long as the
premises are facts—the truth—then our conclusion is certain to be
true. Deductive reasoning tends to be faulty, however, when one
or more of our premises are not in fact true, but rather are
unrealized assumptions that we have overlooked. In order to
ensure that we deduce properly, it pays to think critically and ask
whether each and every premise upon which we base our
conclusion is factual information, and not a presumed fact—an
assumption.
Inductive reasoning is different. When using inductive reasoning,
we infer a conclusion that, at best, is probable (vice certain). The
probability of the conclusion’s truth varies directly with the degree
of likelihood that its premises are true. Inductive reasoning occurs
in a number of different ways: reasoning from a sample to a larger
population; reasoning from a population to a sample; accepting a
conclusion based on what people report observing; inferring “why”
something happened; and reasoning from one sample to another,
or analogizing (Determining the Suitability of an Analogy). In all
cases, the first requirement of a critical thinker is to realize that he
is resorting to inductive reasoning, and as such acknowledge that
his inferences and conclusions are at best probabilities. Following
that, a critical thinker must ascertain the degree of probability to
his conclusion in order to avoid surprise.
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In thinking critically about either deductive or inductive reasoning,
a valuable tool to consider using is the 5 Why’s, which helps us by
revealing unsound logic in our thinking.
We fail to differentiate between causation and correlation.
Distinguishing between cause and correlation is an important
function of critical thinking. Most of us are unaware that the two
concepts exist, and tend to fall into a trap of connecting two
events in a linear cause-and-effect relationship. We often fail to
understand that linear chains of cause-and-effect are rarely the
reality. Instead, what we perceive as a cause-and-effect
relationship is in fact a correlative one. For example, during an
insurgency we might infer that heaps of trash in the city are
causing increased levels of violence among the insurgents. Based
upon that linear cause-and-effect analysis, removing the trash
should eliminate the insurgent violence. Closer examination,
however, might dispel that hypothesis. Although both appear to
happen with some relatively predictable levels, there is most likely
a correlation between the two—that removal of the trash might
help reduce the level of insurgent activity, but not completely
eliminate it.
A critical thinker asks himself, therefore, the following question: is
there a cause-and-effect relationship at work here, or are the two
actions I observe in some correlative relationship? If so, what is
the nature of that correlative relationship? Once a critical thinker
develops that hypothesis, s/he should test and amend it as
necessary, based upon feedback. (Note: an even more troubling
question a critical thinker should ask is whether s/he is inferring
(or imagining) a relationship that doesn’t exist at all. This question
is related to the Narrative Fallacy, one of the Cognitive Biases, as
well as to a famous Logical Fallacies and Biases entitled The
False Cause.
We fail to appreciate the complexity in systems, and instead resort
to “linear” cause-and-effect thinking. Life around us is incredibly
complex, yet we tend to think in linear cause-and-effect
relationships, according to Dietrich Doerner (The Logic of Failure)
and Peter Senge (The Fifth Discipline). Most of us attempt to act
upon a simple, single variable which creates unintended, cascading
effects. Instead, we should consciously account for the interrelated
variables in a particular scenario by creating and testing a
hypothesis of what we believe the complex system consists of. We
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then should assess the feedback of our actions, amending our
initial hypothesis until we have confidently figured out the system
with which we’re working. Several tools help when working with
complexity: Premortem Analysis, Shifting the Burden), and S-W-OT Analysis.
Finally, we need to think critically because a lot of people are
constantly trying to trick us. Beyond all of the reasons cited above
for why critical thinking is necessary, there is also the fact that
many people are simply trying to fool us. Unfortunately, for the
most part they succeed—because most of us don’t think critically
enough, or recognize many of the tricks that these folks use.
Examples of these rhetorical tricks such as Appeal to the Masses,
Appeal to Fear, Ad Hominum, False Dichotomy, and the Slippery
Slope, are all Logical Fallacies and Biases. Critical thinkers are
knowledgeable of these common logic fallacies and use logic to
deconstruct arguments based upon them.
For all of the reasons cited above, critical thinking is a necessity.
One of the most robust tools for thinking critically about written
and oral argumentation is the Argument Deconstruction.
Summary
That is critical thinking. As you can see, it is pretty involved—
deliberative, hard work. To do it properly, you have to know a
great deal—about how we perceive and interpret information
differently from others, how our thinking can be affected by a
number of things like mental models and values and beliefs, and
how others are constantly trying to fool us. But with some
diligence and hard work, critical thinking can become a valuable
habit. We need to practice it thoroughly and systematically at all
times.
Remember: critical thinking is about what to believe. We can
believe most anything.
But must we?
The ideal critical thinker is habitually inquisitive, well-informed,
trustful of reason, open-minded, flexible, fair-minded in evaluation,
honest in facing personal biases, prudent in making judgments,
willing to reconsider, clear about issues, orderly in complex
matters, diligent in seeking relevant information, reasonable in the
selection of criteria, focused in inquiry, and persistent in seeking
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results which are as precise as the subject and circumstances of
inquiry permit. 12
Endnotes
1
"Quotations by Author." Bertrand Russell Quotes. January 1, 2013. Accessed
November 24, 2014. http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Bertrand_Russell/.
2
Richard Paul and Linda Elder, The Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking:
Concepts and Tools, 6th ed., (Dillon Beach, Calif.: Foundation for Critical
Thinking, 2009), 1.
3
Robert Hugh Ennis, Critical Thinking, (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1996), xvii.
4
Paul and Elder, The Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking, 5.
5
Brookfield, Stephen. Developing Critical Thinkers: Challenging Adults to
Explore Alternative Ways of Thinking and Acting. San Francisco, Calif.: JosseyBass, 1987.
6
M. Neil Browne, M. Neil and Stuart M. Keeley, Asking the Right Questions: A
Guide to Critical Thinking, 8th ed., (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice
Hall, 2007), 3.
7
Gary James Jason, Critical Thinking: Developing an Effective Worldview,
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Thomson Learning, 2001), 2.
8
Sylvan Barnet and Hugo Bedau, Critical Thinking, Reading, and Writing: A Brief
Guide to Argument, 7th ed., (Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martins, 2011), 3-5.
9
Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2011), 4.
10
The section above refers to ideas found in Richards Heuer’s book, The
Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, and Morgan D. Jones’ book, The Thinker’s
Toolkit.
11 J. Edward Russo and Paul J. H. Schoemaker, Winning Decisions: Getting It
Right the First Time, (New York: Currency, 2002), 21.
12 Peter A. Facione, Critical Thinking: What It Is and Why It Counts: A Resource
paper (Millbrae, CA: California Academic Press, 1998), 3.
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CHAPTER V: Groupthink Mitigation &
Decision Support
The penultimate purpose of red teaming and applying critical
thinking techniques is to support the organization in reaching good
decisions while avoiding the lure of groupthink. This sounds very
simple but as Clausewitz reminded us, “Everything in war is very
simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” 1 This section covers
identifying groupthink and recommendations for groupthink
mitigation, how red teaming fits into the Army Design
Methodology, and the Red Team’s role in the MDMP process.
Groupthink
Groupthink is one of a number of terms that we use without truly
realizing what it is, why it occurs, and how we can mitigate it.
Group norms—and the social pressures to conform to them—are
in tension with the need for a staff to consider alternatives during
decision-making. 2
Irving Janis has defined groupthink as: “a mode of thinking that
people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive ingroup, when the members’ strivings for unanimity override their
motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action.”
And, “Groupthink refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency,
reality testing, and moral judgment that results from in-group
pressures.”
Janis outlined seven defects in decision-making attributed to
groupthink. We list them below for reference. During the conduct
of the military decision making process watch for the indicators of
these defects and apply red teaming methods and techniques to
overcome them.
x Discussion limited to merely two or a few alternative courses
of action (often only two)
x No survey of objectives to be fulfilled and the values implicated
by the choice
x Failure to reexamine the selected COA from the standpoint of
non-obvious risk and drawbacks not considered during the
original evaluation
x Neglect COAs initially evaluated as unsatisfactory
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x Little or no attempt to gain information from experts on other
COAs
x Interest only in information that supports the group decision
x Failure to work out contingency plans to cope with foreseeable
setbacks
The Army stresses teamwork, shared understanding and esprit de
corps. These are admirable traits in the profession of arms. Janis
points out however, “The more amiability and esprit de corps
among the members of a policy making in-group, the greater is
the danger that independent critical thinking will be replaced by
groupthink, which is likely to result in irrational and dehumanizing
actions directed against out-groups.” Officers educated in red
teaming, whether or not they are acting as a Red Team or simply
a member of a plans team, must ensure groupthink does not take
hold.
Symptoms of groupthink are:
x Overestimations of the groups power/invulnerability, and
morality
x Closed mindedness and the tendency to rationalize away
contrary information
x Pressures toward uniformity of thought within the group
x Self-censorship by individuals in the group, inclination to keep
quiet
x The emergence of self-appointed mind-guards to protect group
from adverse information
x Stereotyped views of enemy leadership and culture
The consequences of groupthink as stated by Janis are;
“whenever a policy making group displays most of the symptoms
of groupthink, we can expect to find that the group also displays
symptoms of defective decision-making.” How can a team avoid
the consequences of groupthink?
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Groupthink Mitigation
To mitigate groupthink in an organization certain techniques have
been developed to try to overcome the symptoms identified by
Janis. These techniques are targeted at the organizations as a
whole, and situations where groups within that organization are in
the decision making process. Janis discusses a number of
themes at the organizational level that help mitigate groupthink:
x Senior leaders set the tone for the organization by
encouraging decision making groups to air objections and
doubts during the decision making process, and discourage
members from soft-pedaling disagreements.
x Leaders in the organization should not prejudice the decisionmaking group with his/her favored course of action. The leader
should allow the group to explore impartially a wide range of
courses of action without the group feeling the pressure to
conform to the leader’s views.
x The senior leaders should setup multiple groups to examine
the same problem. This allows for differing views and
solutions for the leader to consider
(see Team A / Team B)
x Senior leaders should bring in outside expertise to challenge
the views being developed by the decision-making group.
x The leaders should assign individuals (if not individuals from
the Red Team) to act as “devil’s advocate” for solutions and
COAs the group is developing.
During the actual decision-making process the following actions
can be initiated to mitigate groupthink tendencies in a decisionmaking group:
x One of the keys to mitigating groupthink is to have all
members of the group express their opinion absent pressure
from the leader or group to conform. Weighted anonymous
feedback techniques give the individual the ability to express
his or her opinion in an anonymous fashion without being
crushed by group pressure. The leader of the group can have
the individuals in the group pre-commit their ideas by writing
down their initial answers to the problem being discussed
before the meeting occurs. This helps establish the individuals’
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ideas prior to the group’s deliberation, and mitigate the pull
towards conformity. Another technique, 5 Will Get You 25, will
give each individual a voice in the finding the best COA
without the group being dominated by the senior leader or one
individual.
x To better facilitate discussion within a group there are a
number of techniques which help all members of a group
communicate better without being dominated by the senior
leader or one dominating individual. Techniques like 1-2-4Whole Group, 5 Whys, Circle of Voices, and Troika Consulting
provide forums for everyone in the group to participate in the
discussion concerning the problem.
x To better understand a problem the group faces, the group
can use a number of techniques. Techniques like Shifting the
Burden, Stakeholder Mapping, and TRIZ help the group
elucidate the problem in a more coherent fashion and provide
each individual an opportunity to participate in the discussion
and become more aware of the nuances of the problem.
x To help generate a wider range of options/COAs for a problem,
the group needs to go through a divergence-convergence
thought process. Divergence thinking allows the group to
explore multiple solutions to problems without constraints. A
divergence technique like Brainstorming allows each group
member to offer ideas for a solution to a problem without the
idea being judged or “shot down” by the senior or dominating
individual in the group. Once the group has identified a number
of solutions/COAs, they can begin the convergence process of
whittling down and refining viable options by using techniques
like 6 Words, Dot Voting, My 15%, Troika Consulting (Ad
Agency). All of these techniques help the group collectively
come up with the best COA without being dominated by one
individual.
The Operational Environment Laboratory (OEL) at Fort Leavenworth invited a
Red Team in for a three-day leader program. The OE lab was being
restructured and wanted to use red teaming techniques as a means of
identifying and addressing organizational priorities. Much as described above,
the Red Team facilitators used weighted anonymous feedback and other tools
to identify the single most critical problem the leadership had to address in
the near term. The OEL leaders then broke into small groups to work through
some solutions. Towards the end of the second day the group appeared to
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have developed a plan to address its single biggest problem. The OEL Director
and all of his lieutenants seemed in agreement.
The Red Team facilitator asked everyone to take out a piece of paper and
anonymously provide feedback on the action plan to address the problem.
Feedback was a simple: Yes, I think we are on the right track; No, this will not
work and the reason why is as follows; or this issue does not affect my section
I choose to abstain on judging the merits of the solution.
The facilitator asked the director of the lab to predict, based on the discussion,
how many would vote in which manner. The director predicted three of his
subordinates would choose to abstain and the remaining six would all vote
that the plan was a good one. What actually happened is three did in fact
abstain; the remaining six, when allowed anonymity, all said the plan was not
executable. In one form or another their major objection to the plan was it
lacked any forcing function which would require them to participate in
providing the data required to implement the plan. They knew how busy they
were and they knew without some hammer they would simply not comply
with the very solution they designed. The remaining day of the engagement
was spent designing the forcing function that would enable the policy.
Military Decision Making Process
“The military decision making process (MDMP) is an iterative
planning methodology to understand the situation and mission,
develop a course of action, and produce an operation plan or
order. The MDMP combines the conceptual and detailed aspects
of planning and integrates the activities of the commander, staff,
subordinate headquarters, and other partners throughout the
planning process. The MDMP helps leaders apply thoroughness,
clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to
understand situations, develop options to solve problems, and
reach decisions. The MDMP results in an improved understanding
of the situation and a plan or order that guides the force through
preparation and execution.” 3
Army Doctrine Publication [ADP] 5-0, The Operations Process, and
Army Doctrine Reference Publication [ADRP] 5-0, The Operations
Process, 26 September 2011, serve as the primary references for
the Army’s planning and operations system. Red Team members
must understand this planning process in order to know how and
when to influence the planning process. Red Teams supports the
wide range of operations across the spectrum of conflict and
during all phases of an operation – from shaping to post- conflict
stability and support operations.
Chapter VI provides Critical MDMP Questions.
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Mitigating Groupthink during the MDMP
There is a tendency for organizations, during the Design and the
MDMP, to follow formalized procedures which can limit individual
participation and lead to groupthink. With the groupthink mitigation
recommendations, a Red Team can help the organization
integrate the full potential of the staff and assist the organization in
avoiding groupthink. The following are areas where integration of
the mitigating techniques can be integrated in the Design and
MDMP processes.
x The Design process, in itself, was developed as a collaborative
activity; however personalities can force it down the groupthink
path. Within an Operational Planning Team (OPT) the Red
Team member can help the team leader overcome groupthink
by using groupthink mitigating techniques such as Team A /
Team B Analysis, to help the group look at the problem from
multiple perspectives. This will help the OPT Leader maximize
all individuals in the group and allow more divergent viewpoints
to emerge. Techniques such as 4 Ways of Seeing, Alternative
Future Analysis, Shifting the Burden, Stakeholder Mapping, and
TRIZ can help the group elucidate the problem within steps 1-5
of the Design process, and bring greater participation by all
members of the planning team. In smaller organizations, where
there are no formalized/separate planning teams (Brigade
Combat Teams, Battalions), the XO or Deputy Commander can
use the techniques outlined above to avoid the closedmindedness, self-censorship, and pressure to conform within
normally extremely cohesive groups during the design process.
Further, individuals in smaller organizations could have a
tendency to view problems in a more limited fashion, given the
possible commonality of the staff’s background. The groupthink
mitigating techniques will help the XO/Deputy Commander
facilitate the staff in looking at the problem in a broader
framework during the design process.
x The MDMP process is one of the most formalized and
systematic processes that the U.S. Military uses on a habitual
basis. Units have a tendency to conduct the MDMP in a
systematic, and in some cases, a lock step approach to produce
a decision or an order for execution. This formalized approach to
decision-making lends itself to many aspects of groupthink, to
include limited COAs, using information that only supports the
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group’s COAs and decisions, lack of outside input from SMEs,
self-censorship, mind guards, and ethnocentrism towards the
enemy. The groupthink mitigating techniques helps
organizations make the MDMP more dynamic by using the full
potential of the personnel in the OPT or staff. During steps 1
and 2 of the MDMP the leader of the OPT or staff can use
similar mitigating techniques (4 Ways of Seeing, Shifting the
Burden, Stakeholder Mapping) as in the design process to frame
and explore all aspects of the problem more fully. During the
COA development the OPT/staff can use the divergenceconvergence thought process to develop a broader range of
COAs. Brainstorming is particularly helpful for expanding the
group capability to develop multiple COAs. During the COA wargaming and COA decision mitigating techniques such as 5 Will
Get You 25 and Dot Voting, can help the OPT/staff narrow and
refine the COA options. Once the COA is decided upon by the
commander, the OPT/staff can continue to improve and refine
the selected COA by using Troika Consulting (Ad Agency),
again giving the group a collective stake in developing the best
possible COA for the organization. All the groupthink mitigating
techniques outlined above will help organization execute more
comprehensive decision-making, while providing for the fuller
use of the greater potential of the OPT/staff as a whole.
Red Teaming During Planning
The commander/chief of staff’s guidance, available time, and size
of the team will influence the tasks to be completed.
x Red Teams should participate at each phase in the planning
process—often without overt intervention and largely
remaining in the background.
x Red Teams should avoid briefing in staffing meeting or open
forums.
x The Red Team’s communication skill and finesse will determine
their effectiveness in the planning process.
x Identify unseen opportunities, alternatives, gaps and
vulnerabilities, and threats to the friendly courses of actions
that may generate development of additional branches and
sequels not previously considered—determines the Red
Team’s “value added.”
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x Timely and tailored Red Team input to the staff and the
commander avoids having them move backward in the
planning sequence. Early engagement is paramount.
x The echelon, size and expertise of the team, time, and the
information available influences the scope of the effort and
ability of the Red Team to support the planning process.
x Discuss and consider Red Team inputs at the lowest
appropriate level in order to resolve, discount, or incorporate
them into the plan.
x Items discounted by the staff but determined as critical to the
success of the mission by the Red Team Leader should be
elevated–first with the individual staff member, followed by the
primary staff member, the Chief of Staff, and ultimately to the
Commander (if required).
Red Teaming During Problem Framing
This section contains key ideas and questions to assist Red
Teams during problem framing, as in concepts and several key
questions for the Red Team in the design process. 4 Problem
framing establishes an initial hypothesis about the character of the
friendly, adversarial, and wider environmental factors which define
the situation. Problem framing also explores cultural narratives,
institutional histories, propensities, and strategic trends in order to
postulate a general structure of the factors and their relationships.
This hypothesis will be incomplete at first, but will provide a basis
from which the commander can visualize the design of his
campaign and begin operations to uncover the true nature of the
problems. The hypothesis thus defines the art of the possible,
warns what may be unachievable, and anticipates how the
situation might evolve.
The art of framing the problem is the art of seeing the essential
and relevant among the trivial and irrelevant; penetrating the logic
of the broad received mission and its messy contextual situation;
and reshaping it into a well-enough structured working
hypotheses. It requires commanders to inquire into the nature or
character of the factors—friendly, opposing, and the larger
environmental—which define the situation into which his command
will operate. The figure below refers to the strategic level but the
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steps are equally applicable to the operational and tactical levels of
war.
1. Establish the strategic context. Context establishes the reasons
why the problem came to exist, its history, and how it may
develop. Consider and define both the domestic and
international context:
x political and/or diplomatic long- and short-term causes of
conflict
x domestic influences, including public will, competing
demands for resources, and political, economic, legal, and
moral constraints
x international interests (reinforcing or conflicting with U.S.
interests, including positions of parties neutral to the
conflict), international law, positions of inter-governmental
organizations, and other competing or distracting
international aspects of the situation.
When considering the strategic context, the commander
should consider the following questions:
(a) What is the history of the problem?
What is its genesis?
(b) Who are the parties interested in the problem
(c) What are the implications of likely outcomes?
(d) What caused the problem to come to the fore?
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(e) Why is this emerging problem important to the nation’s
strategic leaders? Determine how they “see” the
problem. For example:
ƒ Are national interests and ideals at stake?
ƒ What are the economic considerations of action?
ƒ Are there treaty obligations that require or block the
ability to act?
2. Synthesize strategic guidance: must identify logical boundaries
for the problem by establishing its essential relationship to the
nation’s strategic aims.
x Do the currently tasked strategic aims/objectives vary with
previously established policy and objectives? If so, why?
x What policy objectives or statements serve as potential
limitations to meeting current strategic guidance?
x Determining the desired strategic ends. What strategic aims
define the strategic conditions that constitute success?
x Determining the expected outcomes in terms of time and
resources.
3. Describe the systemic nature of the problem. Key components
include:
x Defining the factors, constituents, and relationships, bearing
on the problem.
x Consider the relationships from the points of view of the
constituents:
x Friendly forces, organizations, and entities.
x Adversaries and those opposed.
x Neutrals: both with and without interests relative to the
problem at hand.
x Unknowns: those with clear interests and influence but
whose intentions are unknown. Consider using 4 Ways of
Seeing and the Cultural Perception Framework.
x Defining the interests and strategies of each constituent, as
they understand them, and how they relate—positively
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and/or negatively—to one another, as well as to those of the
U.S. Government.
x Defining/synthesizing the problem in terms of its constituents’
systemic components:
ƒ How are the constituent parts of the problem related and
influenced in terms of capabilities, interests, and intent,
from the perspective of culture, politics, social
infrastructure, economy, military power, and information?
ƒ What are the power groups and functional components of
these systems?
ƒ How do these systems relate to one another? Are there
relationships to the constituent’s strategic outlook?
ƒ How do these systems sustain themselves?
ƒ Describing the tensions in these relationships and
identify opportunities for exploitation, positively or
negatively, during the conduct of the campaign.
4. Determine strategic trending. This activity involves describing
how the strategic situation might evolve over time. What are
the possible “futures” that could unfold based on current
understanding? Consider using Alternative Future Analysis.
5. Identify gaps in knowledge.
6. Establish assumptions about the problem.
7. Identify the operational problem. Based on the tasks above,
the commander must identify the critical factors of the problem
in order to satisfy strategic aims or objectives. Binding the
problem this way requires the commander to distill the
essential components from the broad set of factors bearing on
the problem to focus the command’s efforts to achieve the best
effect.
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8. Determine initial mission statement.
x Express the mission in terms of who, what, when, where,
and why (purpose).
x Frame the mission with a clear, concise statement of the
essential task(s) and the purpose(s).
9. Obtain approval of the problem and mission statements. The
final task in framing the problem requires the commander to
obtain approval of the problem statement, the rationale for the
development of the problem statement, and the initial mission
statement from his superior.
Conduct mission analysis after you frame the problem and the
commander obtained approval of the mission statement.
Unlike the traditional mission analysis described in the military
decision making process—this mission analysis is just that—
an analysis of the mission. This process does not result in a
restated mission as the mission has been approved as a result
of framing the problem.
Red Teaming During Operational Design
Design is embedded in Joint and Army doctrine. Army Doctrine
Reference Publication, ADRP, 5-0, The Army in Unified land
Operations, states:
“The Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and
creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe problems and
approaches to solving them. The Army design methodology is particularly
useful as an aid to conceptual thinking about unfamiliar problems.” 5
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When contemplating unfamiliar problems, design aids the
commander’s visualization of the problem, the initial
understanding of the OE, and provides the foundation for the
commander’s initial intent statement or planning directive.
A key element of design is the collaboration among commanders
and their design teams to determine and frame the problem and
visualize potential solutions (as illustrated below). A Red Team or
the use of red teaming techniques reinforces the effort to frame the
correct problem.
The Red Team’s Role
x The Red Team should be represented in the execution of
Army Design Methodology (ADM), either as a core member or
by providing critical reviews of the final product of the design.
x Red Teams are an integral part of a critical and creative
thinking process about unique situations.
x Red Teams assist the commander and staff to visualize the
problem and describe an approach to solve it.
x Red Teams help the design team to capture all perspectives
and provide alternative perspectives about the problem.
x Red Teams propose solutions from various perspectives, to
include the adversary, partner, and others in the OE.
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x Take a breath, step back and to the side, and see what your
frame prevents you from seeing. Use the divergenceconvergence model.
Summary
In the process of decision-making, the group’s need to rigorously
consider alternatives is at tension with the social pressures to
conform to group’s norms. Hence, avoiding the lure any
‘groupthink’ is a penultimate chore in the quest for good decisions.
The symptoms of groupthink are observable and groupthink can
be mitigated.
To mitigate groupthink, apply the techniques referenced in
Chapters V and VI of this handbook, like Brainstorming, Dot
Voting, My 15%, and Troika Consulting (Ad Agency). These
techniques: eliminate attribution, allow every participants to
contribute without the fear of being judged by others, and
intercede dynamics [tangential to the process] that might detour
the group from its best productivity.
A Red Team or the use of red teaming techniques reinforces the
effort to reaching a good decision. The Red Team can have a role
in: problem framing, operational design methodology, the MDMP,
etc. Moreover, there are rules of thumb for planning sessions.
Endnotes
1
Carl Von Clausewitz and Michael Howard, On War, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1984), 119.
2
All quotations in these paragraphs are drawn from Irving, Janis, Groupthink,
(Boston, MA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1982), 9-10, 13, 174, 262-265 respectively.
3
Army Doctrine Publication 5-0, The Operations Process, 9.
4
This is an extract of TRADOC Pam 525-5-500, Commander’s Appreciation and
Campaign Design, Version 1.0, 28 Jan 08. We deleted certain passages and
questions. We retained the most essential ones.
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/p525-5-500.pdf.
5
Army Doctrine Publication 5-0, The Operations Process, (26 September 2011),
9.
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CHAPTER VI: Red Teaming TTP
(Tactics, Techniques and Procedures)
Red Teaming TTP Table
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1-2-4-Whole Group
This process is a good way to get a rich conversation and
more ideas by using small groups. It involves the principle
of pre-commitment, critical thinking, and the clear
expression of thought.
Method
One: Individual reflection and pre-commitment. Give participants
a short amount of time to reflect on a question or issue. You
may use a common issue or have each person choose their
own issue. Have them write down their thought or position on
the issue. To write is to think again. By writing the participants
are pre-committing to their ideas without external influence.
Encourage the participants to use the framework of State,
Elaborate, Exemplify, and if possible, Illustrate (SEEI). For
example, “Here’s what I think, here is what I mean by that, let
me give an example, and here is a graphic illustration (or
analogy).” If you can complete all these steps, you have
thought through a problem completely.
Twos: Have the participants find another person and share their
ideas. Record any new thoughts or insights.
Small Groups: Invite each of the pairs to join up with another pair
to briefly share their issues and any insights gained. Then
share observations of the quality of each pair’s examination of
their issues. How were the issues framed? What was missing
from the explanation? Were there biases detected?
Whole Group: Invite everyone back into the whole group. Ask an
open question like “What insights emerged from your
conversations? What did you learn? How has your
understanding/view of the issue changed?” Lastly, ask “What’s
your 15% of the problem?”
Example
“Most people have about 15-percent control over their work
situations. The other 85 percent rests in the broader context,
shaped by the general structures, systems, events and culture in
which they operate. The challenge rests in finding ways of
creating transformational change incrementally: By encouraging
people to mobilize small but significant "15-percent initiatives" that
can snowball in their effects. When guided by a sense of shared
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vision, the process can tap into the self-organizing capacities of
everyone involved.”
- Gareth Morgan, The Globe and Mail 1
It doesn’t matter if you’re a General or an enlisted soldier, a senior
executive or a member of the team. You still have only your 15
percent. Where do you have freedom to act? What’s in your 15%?
This conversation works very well using the Troika process. Grow
from small groups (1 on 1) into larger groups and exchange group
representatives. This is a great way to get into a rich conversation
with small groups. The steps are:
1. Prepare: Position an issue or problem into one
straightforward question.
2. Reflect individually: Give participants two minutes of silence
to reflect on the question. They may close their eyes, jot a
few notes, etc.
3. Share in pairs: Ask participants to stand, find a partner, and
share both ideas in 10 minutes. They may pick the nearest
person or move around to mix.
4. Gab in groups: Ask each pair to partner with other pairs in
groups of 4-6 for 10 minutes. Suggest that they begin with
each sharing items of interest from the previous round and
then move to converse as a group.
5.
Harvest in whole: Ask everyone back to a ‘whole group’ for
10 minutes. Open with, “What insights emerged from your
conversation?” or “How has your understanding/ view of the
issue changed?”
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1 on 1, 2 on 2, Exchange Emissaries
In this method members of the team are asked to think about
ways to address the problem before the group.
1. They first spend time thinking and writing down their ideas.
2. Next, the members form into pairs and exchange ideas.
Two groups of two each form a group of four and
exchange the ideas each group developed both
individually and as a group of two.
3. Each group of four selects a spokesperson for the group.
After each group has had sufficient time to explore their
options to address the problem, they send their
spokesperson to another group of four that addressed the
same problem and in turn welcome the spokesperson from
the other group to their group.
4. Each spokesperson (emissary) provides the group they
have joined a description of the ideas developed by the
group they are representing. After they are finished, the
group they have joined tries to add to or improve the ideas
brought to them by the emissary. After this exchange, the
emissary returns to his/her group.
5. Upon return, the emissary shares the feedback from the
group visited. In turn, the emissary’s group informs him/her
of their exchange with the other group’s emissary.
6. This concludes with a group out brief of the issue.
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4 Ways of Seeing
Examining the situation using the Four Ways of Seeing may show
the challenges you face:
1. How you view yourself, your unit, the mission, etc.
2. How the adversary (or indigenous people) views himself; his
cause, unit mission, etc.
3. How you view the adversary (or indigenous people)
4. How the adversary (or people) views you
5. Identify disconnects between steps 1 & 4, 2 & 3. These are
critical points that analysis and planning must address
Thorough research should be conducted to complete the analysis
of these perceptions. It is more complex than the simple model
implies, for several reasons:
x
Seldom, if ever, will there be only two actors in the system
under study.
x
All the actors’ perceptions
and inter-relationships within
the system must be
considered in order to
provide context for the
analysis.
x
How each actor perceives
and defines the OE,
legitimate targets and
acceptable weapons must
also be considered.
How X
Sees Itself
How X
Sees Y
How Y
Sees Itself
How Y
Sees X
x
It must be realized that all
actors hold values, beliefs, and perceptions that they view as
right and rational.
x
Perceptions of the external audience(s) to whom we and our
adversaries are playing cannot be discounted.
5 Whys
The 5 Whys is a question-asking technique used to explore the
cause-and-effect relationships underlying a particular problem.
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The technique is used to determine the root cause of a defect or
problem symptom. However, the process can be used to go
deeper to explore questions related to purpose rather than
problems.
Method: Pick an issue or pose a question and ask participants to
think about it for at least a minute. Pair up or form a small group
and choose one person to state their thoughts on the issue. Each
participant gets a turn in this role of explaining their thoughts and
position on an issue of their choice.
The role of the others in the group is at first to be active listeners.
Let the speaker complete their thoughts; do not interrupt for
clarification or any other purpose. Once the speaker is done, ask
“why?” at least five times, e.g., “Why is that important? Why
should my staff section care about that? Why should resources
be applied against that effort now?”
You don’t need to stop at 5 whys, several “what” and “who”
questions should arise as a result, like “what should do we do
now? What are the implications of what is suggested? Who else
needs to know?”
It is important to begin with “why” questions. The answers to
“why” questions get at causal links behind events and problem
symptoms. “What” questions tend toward simple data collection,
and are subject to confirmation biases.
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5 Will Get You 25
This is a method to tap into the wisdom of the crowd. This is not
recommended to make a decision. It is a way to get feedback you
might not otherwise get from your staff. 5 Will Get You 25 and Dot
Voting are two methods of weighted anonymous feedback.
Method
Distribute file cards to everyone. Pose a question:
(i.e., What is the single greatest obstacle to implementation of
plan/concept/policy X?)
Ask the participants to think about it and write their best idea as
clearly and in as few words as possible on the card –- a bullet, not
an explanation.
When everyone has completed their card, invite the participants to
stand up, mill around, and pass the card to someone new. Repeat
the process until told to stop, and then each participant reads the
card they hold. On the back, rate the idea from 1 to 5; 5 is
brilliant, 1, not so much.
Once you grade the card, repeat the process. No one should
grade their own card. Emphasize the participants must read the
reply without turning the card over and viewing previous scores so
they are not influenced.
Repeat the process five times, in five rounds. By round five, each
card should have five ratings on the back of the card. Add them
up.
Ask “Does anyone have a card with a score of 25…24…23…until
you get a “yes.” Ask that person to read the card aloud and record
the reply on a piece of butcher paper. Continue with the
countdown until you get at least the top five replies.
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6 Empathetic Questions
Questions [and difficulty] when looking empathetically from
another’s perspective:
1. It is difficult to appreciate another’s problems.
What are the “other’s” problems?
2. It is difficult to feel another’s pain.
What is the nature of the “other’s” pain?
3. It is difficult to understand another’s ambitions.
What are the “other’s” ambitions?
4. It is difficult to internalize another’s experience.
What is the “other’s” experience?
5. It is difficult to understand how our own actions appear to
others.
How do our own actions appear to “others?”
6. It is difficult to feel how threatened another may feel.
Why does the other feel threatened? 2
6 Words
Help people get to the core of an idea by writing a short phrase
summarizing their thinking into a set number of words.
This idea is based on a complete short story written by
Hemingway “For sale, baby shoes – never worn.”
These 6 words communicate a huge degree of information and
emotional content. This is an exercise in creating pithy bumper
stickers that communicate in a visceral way and are memorable.
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Alternative Futures Analysis
Systematically explores multiple ways a situation can develop
when there is high complexity and uncertainty.
When to Use
This approach is most useful when a situation is viewed as too
complex or the outcomes as too uncertain to trust a single
outcome assessment. First, the Red Team must recognize that
there is high uncertainty surrounding the topic in question.
Second, they, and often their customers, recognize that they need
to consider a wide range of factors that might bear on the
question. And third, they are prepared to explore a range of
outcomes and are not wedded to any preconceived result.
Depending on how elaborate the futures project, the effort can
amount to considerable investment in time, analytic resources,
and money.
A team can spend several hours or days organizing,
brainstorming, and developing multiple futures; alternatively, a
larger-scale effort can require preparing a multi-day workshop that
brings together participants (including outside experts). Such an
undertaking often demands the special skills of trained scenariodevelopment facilitators and conferencing facilities.
This technique is a sharp contrast to contrarian techniques, which
try to challenge the high confidence and relative certitude about
an event or trend. Instead, multiple futures development is a
divergent thinking technique that tries to use the complexity and
uncertainty of a situation to describe multiple outcomes or futures
that should be considered, rather than to predict one outcome.
Value Added
This approach is useful in highly ambiguous situations, when
analysts confront not only a lot of “known unknowns” but also
“unknown unknowns.” What this means is that the Red Team
recognizes that there are factors, forces, and dynamics among
key actors that are difficult to identify without the use of some
structured technique that can model how they would interact or
behave. Given the time and resources involved, scenario analysis
is best reserved for situations that could potentially pose grave
threats or otherwise have significant consequences.
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Past experience has shown that involving policymakers in the
alternative futures exercise is the most effective way to
communicate the results of this exploration of alternative
outcomes and sensitize them to key uncertainties. Most
participants find the process of developing such scenarios as
useful as any finished product that attempts to capture the results
of the exercise. Policymakers and Red Teams can benefit from
this technique in several ways:
x
It provides an effective means of weighing multiple
unknown or unknowable factors and presenting a set of
plausible outcomes.
x
It can help to bind a problem by identifying plausible
combinations of uncertain factors.
x
It provides a broader analytic framework for calculating the
costs, risks, and opportunities presented to policymakers
by different outcomes.
x
It helps anticipate otherwise surprising developments by
challenging assumptions and considering possible wild
cards or discontinuous events.
x
It generates indicators to monitor for signs that a particular
future is becoming more or less likely, so that policies can
be reassessed.
The Method
The most common method used in both the public and private
sectors involves the following steps:
x
Develop the “focal issue” by systematically interviewing
experts and officials who are examining the general topic.
x
Convene a group of experts (both internal and external) to
brainstorm about the forces and factors that could affect
the focal issue.
x
Select by consensus the two most critical and uncertain
forces and convert these into axes or continua with the
most relevant endpoints assigned.
x
Establish the most relevant endpoints for each factor; (e.g.,
if economic growth were the most critical, uncertain force,
the endpoints could be “fast” and “slow” or “transformative”
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and “stabilizing” depending on the type of issue
addressed.)
x
Form a futures matrix by crossing the two chosen axes.
The four resulting quadrants provide the basis for
characterizing alternative future worlds.
x
Generate colorful stories that describe these futures and
how they could plausibly come about. Signposts or
indicators can then be developed.
Participants can then consider how current decisions or strategies
would fare in each of the four worlds and identify alternative
policies that might work better either across all the futures or in
specific ones. By anticipating alternative outcomes, policymakers
have a better chance of either devising strategies flexible enough
to accommodate multiple outcomes or of being prepared and agile
in the face of change.
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Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH)
Identification of alternative explanations (hypotheses) and
evaluation of all evidence that will disconfirm rather than confirm
hypotheses.
When to Use
This is an effective technique when there is a large amount of data
to absorb and evaluate. While a single analyst can use ACH, it is
most effective with a small team that can challenge each other’s
evaluation of the evidence. Developing a matrix of hypotheses
and loading already collected information into the matrix can be
accomplished in a day or less. If the data must be reassembled,
the initial phases of the ACH process may require additional time.
ACH is particularly appropriate for controversial issues when
analysts want to develop a clear record that shows what theories
they have considered and how they arrived at their judgments.
Developing the ACH matrix allows other analysts (or even
policymakers) to review their analysis and identify areas of
agreement and disagreement. Evidence can also be examined
more systematically, and analysts have found that this makes the
technique ideal for considering the possibility of deception and
denial.
Value Added
ACH helps analysts overcome three common mistakes that can
lead to inaccurate forecasts:
x
Red Teams can be susceptible to being unduly influenced
by a first impression, based on incomplete data, an
existing analytic line, or a single explanation that seems to
fit well enough.
x
Groups seldom generate a full set of explanations or
hypotheses at the outset of a project.
x
Groups often rely on evidence to support their preferred
hypothesis, but which also is consistent with other
explanations.
In essence, ACH helps Red Teams to avoid picking the first
solution that seems satisfactory instead of going through all the
possibilities to arrive at the very best solution.
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The Method
Explicitly identify all the reasonable alternative hypotheses, then
array the evidence against each hypothesis—rather than
evaluating the plausibility of each hypothesis one at a time. To
create a level playing field, the process must:
x
Ensure that all the information and argumentation is
evaluated and given equal treatment or weight when
considering each hypothesis.
x
Prevent individuals from premature closure on a particular
explanation or hypothesis.
x
Protect the individual against innate tendencies to ignore
or discount
x
Protect information that does not fit comfortably with the
preferred explanation at the time.
To accomplish this, the process should follow these steps:
x
Brainstorm among analysts with different perspectives to
identify all possible hypotheses.
x
List all significant evidence and arguments relevant to all
the hypotheses.
x
Prepare a matrix with hypotheses across the top and each
piece of evidence on the side. Determine whether each
piece of evidence is consistent, inconsistent, or not
applicable to each hypothesis.
x
Refine the matrix and reconsider the hypotheses—in some
cases, individuals will need to add new hypotheses and reexamine the information available.
x
Focus on disproving hypotheses rather than proving one.
Tally the pieces of evidence that are inconsistent and
consistent with each hypothesis to see which explanations
are the weakest and strongest.
x
Analyze how sensitive the ACH results are to a few critical
items of evidence; should those pieces prove to be wrong,
misleading, or subject to deception, how would it impact an
explanation’s validity?
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x
Ask what evidence is not being seen but would be
expected for a given hypothesis to be true. Is denial and
deception a possibility?
x
Report all the conclusions, including the weaker
hypotheses that should still be monitored as new
information becomes available.
x
Establish the relative likelihood for the hypotheses and
report all the conclusions, including the weaker hypotheses
that should still be monitored as new information becomes
available.
x
Identify and monitor indicators that would be both
consistent and inconsistent with the full set of hypotheses.
In the latter case, explore what could account for
inconsistent data.
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Appreciative Interview
Value added
x
Good icebreaker for introductions.
x
Bring clarity to the story, get to the core.
x
Passing ideas in a non-hostile/informal environment
x
Build up energy in the room
The Method
‡
Identify a priming question such as “Think of a time when you
were able to suggest an out-of-of-the-box idea and you got a
positive response.”
‡
Allow the group to take about five minutes to jot down some
notes on their story
‡
Tell the group members to find a partner and share their stories
‡
5 minutes for each person’s story
‡
Enforce active listening: Only one person tells their story without
interruption, then the other person can ask questions
‡
After 10 minutes, tell the group members to find another partner
to tell their story to
‡
Conduct three rounds
Reference: Liberating Structures
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Argument Deconstruction
When to use
Use the argument deconstruction framework when posed with an
oral or written argument that requires critical thinking.
Value added
Deconstructing arguments without a framework can lead to
insufficient challenging of opinions, value conflicts, statistics,
alternative causes and conclusions, and the implications of
accepting the argument posed. Critical thinking emphasizes the
need to be thorough and systematic, which the argument
deconstruction framework facilitates.
The Method
x
What is the argument?
o Argument =
Issue (or premise, or thesis) + Reasons + Conclusion
o Premise: a proposition supporting or helping to support a
conclusion; a proposition antecedently supposed or
proved; something previously stated or assumed as the
basis of further argument; a condition; a supposition.
o Thesis: a proposition stated or put forward for
consideration, esp. one to be discussed and proved or to
be maintained against objections; an affirmation, or
distinction from a supposition or hypothesis
9 Is the right problem defined?
9 Is there any use of vague or ambiguous words?
9 What is the author’s point of view?
x
Are there any value conflicts?
x
Are there any prescriptive assumptions? (Statement by
author of the way things should be, is it a good assumption?)
x
Are there any descriptive assumptions? (Statement by
author of the way things are—is it a good assumption?)
x
Are there any fallacies in reasoning?
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x
Does the author use any heuristics (a simplifying strategy, or
“rule of thumb”) to lay out his information/make his case? (The
devil is in the details…)
x
How good is the evidence? Does the author use or rely on
9 Intuition?
9 Personal experience?
9 Testimonials?
9 Appeal to authorities?
9 Personal observation?
9 Research studies?
9 Analogies? (Is the analogy apt?)
x
Is there a rival cause? Are there other plausible hypotheses
(than the author suggested) which might explain what
happened? What are they? Some other way to explain the
evidence (reasons) and conclusion?
x
Are statistics used?
o
Are they deceptive?
o
Use numbers without percentages?
o
Use percentages without numbers?
x
Is there any significant information which is omitted? (Where
is the dog that isn’t barking?)
x
Is there any other reasonable conclusion you can draw from
the evidence?
x
What are the implications of accepting the argument?
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Assumption Sensitivity Analysis (ASA)
This tool uses anonymous weighted feedback to uncover the
group’s confidence level with each assumption in order to narrow
and focus their efforts.
1. To ensure anonymity, give everyone a 5x8 card.
2. Tell everyone to estimate their confidence that assumption
“X” will be valid in execution, “My personal belief is that
assumption “X” has what% chance of coming to fruition.”
3. Aggregate the cards. In this case [8 respondents]: 80%,
80%, 85%, 90%, 90%, 90%, 95%, & 95%.
4. Average the estimates. In this case: 705% / 8 = 88%.
5. Realize that “We are 88% confident that assumption “X”
will become come to fruition as stated.”
6. Calculate the aggregate probability that at least one
Assumption does not hold;
a. For a specific plan assume there are 6 assumptions.
b. The average (see 4 above) for each assumption in turn
is
i. 1- 75%, 2- 80%, 3- 82%, 4- 88%, 5- 90%, 6- 93%
c. The likelihood that at least one of the assumptions will
not hold is the sum of the likelihood of each
assumption multiplied by all of the others.
i. .75 x .80 x .82 x .88 x .90 x .93 = 36.24%
7. This result should stimulate a Pre-mortem analysis as
while the lowest likelihood of any one assumption remains
75% the likelihood that at least one of the 6 will fail to hold
is now 63.76%
8. In addition to pre-mortem of the entire plan, a sensitivity
analysis of given assumptions may also be a consequence
of this approach. If a given assumption does poorly when
assessed by the group anonymously (the average
estimates below 75%) than the assumption itself may be
individually challenged or recrafted.
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BATNA
“What is your BATNA – your Best Alternative To a Negotiated
Agreement? That is the standard by which any proposed
agreement should be measured. That is the only standard that
can protect you both from accepting terms that are too
unfavorable and from rejecting terms it would be in your best
interest to accept.
Your BATNA not only is a better measure but also has the
advantage of being flexible enough to permit the explorations of
imaginative solutions. Instead of ruling out any solution that does
not meet your bottom line, you can compare a proposal with your
BATNA to see whether it satisfies your interests. 3
Develop your BATNA. Vigorous exploration of what you will do if
you do not reach agreement can greatly strengthen your hand.
Attractive alternatives are not just sitting there waiting for you; you
usually have to develop them. Generating possible BATNAs
requires three distinct operations: (1) inventing a list of actions you
might conceivably take if no agreement is reached; (2) improving
some of the more promising ideas and converting them into
practical alternatives; and (3) selecting, tentatively, the one
alternative that seems best. 4
Consider the other side’s BATNA. You should also think about the
alternatives to a negotiated agreement available to the other side.
The more you can learn of their alternatives, the better prepared
you are for the negotiation. Knowing their alternatives, you can
realistically estimate what you can expect from the negotiation.
Having a good BATNA can help you negotiate on the merits. You
can convert such resources as you have into effective negotiating
power by developing and improving your BATNA. Apply
knowledge, time, money, people, connections, and wits into
devising the best solution for you independent of the other side’s
assent. The more easily and happily you can walk away from a
negotiation, the greater your capacity to affect its outcome. 5
Developing your BATNA thus not only enables you to determine
what is a minimally acceptable agreement, it will probably raise
that minimum. Developing your BATNA is perhaps the most
effective course of action you can take in dealing with a seemingly
more powerful negotiator.” 6
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Brainstorming
Brainstorming is an unconstrained group process designed to
generate new ideas and concepts.
When to Use
A technique for stimulating new thinking and it can be applied to
virtually all of the other structured analytic techniques as an aid to
thinking. Typically, Red Teams will brainstorm when they begin a
project to help generate a range of hypotheses about their issue.
Brainstorming, almost by definition, involves a group meeting to
discuss a common challenge; a modest investment of time at the
beginning or critical points of a project can take advantage of their
different perspectives to help structure a problem. This group
process allows others to build on an initial idea suggested by a
member of the brainstorming session.
Value Added
This technique can maximize creativity in the thinking process,
force Red teams to step outside their normal mind-sets, and
suspend their typical “good judgment” about the practicality of
ideas or approaches. More generally, brainstorming allows
organizations to see a wider range of factors that might bear on
the topic than they would otherwise consider. Brainstorming gives
permission to think more radically or “outside the box.”
In particular, it can spark new ideas, ensure a comprehensive look
at a problem or issues, raise unknowns, and prevent premature
consensus around a single hypothesis.
The Method
Paradoxically, brainstorming should be a very structured process
to be most productive. An unconstrained, informal discussion
might produce some interesting ideas, but usually a more
systematic process is the most effective way to break down mindsets and produce new insights. In particular, the process involves
a divergent thinking phase to generate and collect new ideas and
insights, followed by a convergent phase in which ideas are
grouped and organized around key concepts. Some of the simple
rules to be followed include:
x
Never censor an idea no matter how unconventional they
might sound.
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x
Rather find out what prompted the thought, as it might
contain the seeds of an important connection between the
topic and an unstated assumption.
x
Give yourself enough time to do brainstorming correctly. It
usually takes one hour to set the “rules” of the game, get the
group comfortable, and exhaust the conventional wisdom on
the topic. Only then will the truly creative ideas begin to
emerge.
x
Involve at least one “outsider” in the process—that is,
someone who does not share the same educational
background, culture, technical knowledge or mindset as the
core group but has some familiarity with the topic.
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A two-phase, twelve-step, structured process is often used to get
the most out of the brainstorming sessions
Divergent Thinking Phase:
x
Typically, 10-12 people work best.
x
Pose the problem in terms of a “focal question.” Display it
in one sentence on a large easel or whiteboard.
x
Ask the group to write down responses (as many as they
can think of) to the question.
x
Go sequentially around the room, with each individual
giving one idea at a time. Write down the ideas up on the
whiteboard. No judgments concerning the ideas are voiced
at this time. Continue going around the room until each
individual’s ideas are exhausted.
x
The individuals conducting the brainstorming exercise
then will group similar ideas together, forming similar ideas
into categories.
Convergent Thinking Phase:
x
The individuals conducting the brainstorming exercise
then will group similar ideas together, forming similar ideas
into categories
x
The group can then check/discuss each idea for feasibility
as a solution to the problem.
x
Assess what the group has accomplished in terms of new
ideas or concepts identified or new areas that need more
work or further brainstorming.
x
The brainstorming group can then use other techniques,
such as Dot-voting, to further narrow the field of ideas.
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Challenges to Effective Planning
1. Background: Working in groups, especially in the planning
process, is fraught with challenges. From an individual
perspective, intuitive reasoning often fails under conditions of
uncertainty, time pressures and cognitive bias. From an
organizational perspective, group structure and conformity can
also lead to suboptimal judgments and decision making. This
section describes some of the variables and common
challenges found in the planning process and what can be
done to prevent, mitigate them and improve planning
performance.
a. In addition to exploring alternatives in plans, operations and
concepts, Red Teams help commanders and staffs identify
and understand flawed organizational processes that
contribute to potential errors in planning and decision
making.
b. From an organizational perspective, Red Teams not only
provide mitigation and prevention tools but also contribute
to improved performance through the use of liberating
structures and structured analytical tools. These tools and
methods are group combat multipliers that should augment
conventional methods such as staff planning meetings and
presentations.
2. Factors affecting the planning process: A number of factors
can contribute to planning errors, poor decisions and
outcomes to include:
a. Group cohesion and the pull toward conformity: A cohesive
staff is a force multiplier but cohesion can exert pressure for
group conformity which can lead to the phenomena of
groupthink (see Introduction). Excessive conformity stifles
professional dissent because hierarchy and relationships
are more valued than critical analysis and decision
outcomes. If group activity is structured to mitigate
hierarchy and conformity, then members are likely to
provide feedback and insights that expose invalid
assumptions, ill-conceived plans or flawed courses of
action. Red Teamers are trained to interact with the staff to
enable structured discussion that balances cohesion with
groupthink mitigation. Simultaneously, Red Teams must
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support the dynamics of staff interaction and avoid
‘paralysis by analysis.’
b. Strong directive leadership: Strong leaders under time
pressure may direct a course of action thereby limiting
options for staff consideration. Doctrine cautions leaders to
avoid directing a course of action early in planning process
that prevents the staff in identifying other appropriate
alternative courses of action.
c. Cognitive biases and heuristics: Research conducted over the
past three decades indicate that people are prone to systemic
errors in judgment and decision making in predictable ways. 7
These errors are associated with heuristics and biases of our
cognitive processes in the context of judgment and decision
making. Cognitive biases result in suboptimal actions and
beliefs and are generally related with intuitive thinking. 8
Manifestations of these biases in intuitive thinking, are found
in heuristics formally defined as, “…a simple procedure that
helps find adequate, though often imperfect answers to
difficult questions.” 9 In high risk, uncertain and complex
environments, these imperfections are costly and warrant
prevention and mitigation.
d. Relationship and task conflict: Conflict between group
members is bound to occur due to difference in leadership
styles, personalities, interests and personal agendas.
However, not all conflict is bad. Research indicates that
“moderate amounts of task conflict (i.e. differences of
opinion about the task and how it should be completed) are
necessary and valuable for group decision making
processes in preventing groupthink. However, relationship
conflict in which personal differences are attacked can
distract the group from its purpose and objectives. 10 (see
Chapter II)
e. Time constraints and lack of preparation: No matter how
cohesive the group, inadequate planning time, inexperience
in the operational environment, lead to poor situational
understanding and development of flawed plans. Poor
preparation and organization for planning further encumber
the commander and staff in producing useful and timely
plans and orders.
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f. Organization for planning: Factors such as a poorly
designed physical space and a lack (or excess) of planning
standing operating procedures can stifle productive
discussion, increase staff friction and hamper effective staff
coordination. Poor Information management (e.g.,
inaccurate or incomplete displays of visualization and
dissemination of information) can contribute to a lack of
shared situational understanding and degrade staff
interactivity.
3. Planning challenges: Many of the variables above manifest
themselves in dysfunctional group behaviors that lead to poor
planning and decision making outcomes. Red Teams assist
the commander and staff in identifying and mitigating these
challenges. If left undetected dysfunctional group behaviors
may result in bad decisions, lost opportunities, and increased
vulnerabilities for the unit. These challenges include:
a. Complacency: In planning, this often takes the disguise of
“we’ve always done it this way” mentality. In a complex
environment, the dilemma is to adapt based on prior
experience of what works in one situation to another
situation. The challenge is understand when continuity and
change are decisive and when to discard principles, tactics
and strategies that governed past success. As Major Tim
Karcher notes in Understanding the Victory Disease, the
attitude among some staffs could be:
(1) “Why change what has worked in the past?” The
greatest danger when using established patterns lies in
the enemy’s reaction. Setting a pattern is fine as long as
the enemy follows with his own patterns and reacts in a
predictable fashion. A considerable danger occurs,
though, when the enemy deviates from his normal
reaction, placing the friendly force at a significant
disadvantage and causing the supposed recipe for
success to turn into a recipe for failure.” 11
(2) Situations in the OE often change after completion of
deliberate planning (e.g., MDMP) but the unit
continues executing its’ original plan. This behavior is
often characterized as “fighting the plan and not the
enemy.” The staff may adhere to inadequate plans
and orders due to the investment in time, pride in
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ownership, and time. New evidence disconfirming
assumptions and tactics may emerge in the interim
where new strategies and tactics provide more
appropriate solutions to the mission. Red Teams
should assist commanders, staff and planning teams
in questioning strategies, tactics and plans that claim
to be the only solution to a problem when the situation
indicates otherwise.
(3) The Red Team’s challenge is to help the staff think
about “what’s next” or “what could potentially occur” –
balancing realism with imagination. Red Team tools
designed to mitigate complacency are Alternative
Futures Analysis, Analysis of Competing Hypotheses,
and Shifting the Burden.
b. Mirror Imaging: Richards J. Heuer, who spent 45 years in
the CIA working in collection operations,
counterintelligence, intelligence analysis, and personnel
security, views mirror imaging as “…filling gaps in the
analyst’s own knowledge by assuming that the other side is
likely to act in a certain way because that is how [your
country or organization] would act under similar
circumstances.” 12 Mirror imaging occurs when you apply
your attitudes about trends, capabilities, beliefs, culture onto
another. Many American policy makers and analysts fell
into this trap during the planning for Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). As noted in the report on the
miscalculation of Iraqi WMD capabilities, it noted:
(1) “Analysis of Iraq’s weapons programs took little
account of Iraq’s political and social context. While
such a consideration would probably not have
changed the Community’s judgments about Iraq’s
WMD, the failure even to consider whether Saddam
Hussein had elected to abandon his banned weapons
programs precluded that possibility.
(2) It seems unlikely to us that weapons experts used to
combing reports for tidbits on technical programs
would ever have asked: “Is Saddam bluffing?” or
“Could he have decided to suspend his weapons
programs until sanctions are lifted?” But an analyst
steeped in Iraq’s politics and culture at least might
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have asked those questions, and, of course, those
turn out to be the questions that could have led the
Intelligence Community closer to the truth.”
(3) The culture and objectives of others nations and other
transnational groups differ from ours. Our
assumptions, assessments, and estimates of
adversary courses of action need to account for these
differences.
(4) While working to avoid mirror imaging American
intentions, motivations, thought processes, and
capabilities to the enemy. It is just as important not to
apply mirror imaging to partners and others within the
operational environment.
(5) Using 4 Ways of Seeing and Stakeholder Mapping are
ways to mitigate and prevent mirror imaging.
c. Ethnocentrism: Unlike mirror imaging, this error recognizes
the existence of adversary and partner cultural differences
but perceives these differences with contempt, disdain and
in many cases out of context. Ethnocentrism is “…using the
practices of your own ‘people’ as a yardstick to measure
how well the customs of other, different peoples measure
up.” 13 A common tendency of most individuals is to view
one’s culture and customs as inherently superior to others.
This can lead to a condescending attitude toward other
cultures that breeds arrogance. Contempt and arrogance
contribute to overconfidence by underestimating the
capabilities and motivations of others. One historical
example:
(1) “At the tactical level, the 7th Cavalry displayed
remarkable overconfidence, clearly demonstrated by
how Custer viewed his Indian adversary. During the
1868 Battle of the Washita, when a subordinate
speculated they might find more Indians than they
could handle, Custer reportedly said, “There are not
enough Indians in the country to whip the Seventh
Cavalry.” 14 Custer’s conceit seems to have trickled
down to his subordinates, causing them to also
believe in their indestructibility.” 15
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(2) The challenge for the commander and staff is to
understand the culture of the adversary, as well as our
partners and others. Then staffs must apply this
understanding to the assumptions made and the
assessments created.
(3) See Chapter III for a discussion of interpreting,
understanding and analyzing cultures and mitigating
the effects of ethnocentrism.
d. Mindsets / Patterns of Expectation: Perception is not a
passive process that allows us to objectively view the world
‘as it is’. Richards J. Heuer notes that, “…experiments have
been conducted to show the extraordinary extent to which
the information obtained by an observer depends upon the
observer’s own assumptions and preconceptions.” The
human brain is designed to ‘fill in the blanks’ based upon
our individual, cultural and social experience. Heuer states,
“We tend to perceive what we expect to perceive.” In other
words, our mission; organizational climate; culture; selfinterest; assumptions; prejudices; doctrine; and attitudes
influence our thinking. A mindset is a “summation or
consolidation of all of our biases about a particular
subject.” 16
(1) As individuals receive new information and data, they
perceive them in existing images governed by these
factors. Continually asking, “What does this mean?”
and, “How else can I perceive it?” can offer critical
insights.
(2) The challenge is to understand when changes in the
operational environment negate the usefulness of past
patterns and trends for projecting future
developments. Military history contains numerous
examples of countries refuting past trends to field new
dominating technology or concepts (e.g., development
of carrier aviation and the concept of Blitzkrieg to
defeat French stationary defenses).
(3) David C. Gompert and Richard L. Kugler note a classic
case study of this failure to perceive change. They
analyzed Lee’s decision to order (on July 3, 1863, the
3rd day of the Battle of Gettysburg), a frontal assault
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across a mile of open field against the strong center of
the defending Union forces. The authors argue that Lee
depended too much on his experience from previous
battles such as at Chancellorsville. That when pressed,
Union forces would collapse. Lee ignored the fact that
the Union forces learned lessons from these battles.
Lee underestimated their training and commanders. He
ignored the latest information that a significant Union
force was entrenched with significant reserves
available.
(4) Another challenge of ‘patterns of expectation’ is when
planners believe that “the future will be a linear
continuation of the present.” 17 This ‘planning pitfall’ is
likely when planners believe their plan can dictate the
future. A method for combating this tendency is to use
the Premortem Analysis technique.
e. Oversimplifying or Failure to Think and Decide ‘Complexly’:
In problem solving simulations, cognitive researcher and
author, Dietrich Doerner observed that “People court failure
in predictable ways” based upon habits of thought that “set
failure in motion from the beginning” 18 and an inability to
think and decide more ‘complexly.’ Doerner contends that
x Failure develops gradually according to its own logic.
x When we fail to solve a problem, it is often due to several
small mistakes. Small mistakes add up.
x Complicated situations elicit habits of thought that may
not measure up to the demands of the system that is
generating the problem.
x Apprehensions of failure encourage methods of decision
making that may exacerbate the problem
(1) Doerner observed that ‘bad’ participants:
(a) Acted without prior analysis of the situation.
(b) Failed to anticipate side effects and long term
repercussions.
(c) Assumed that the absence of immediately
obvious negative effects meant that correct
measures had been taken.
(d) Let over involvement in projects blind them to
emerging needs and changes in the situation.
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(e) Were prone to cynical reactions
(2) Good participants:
(a) Made more decisions per task and goal.
(b) Considered of not just the primary goal of any
given measure but also its potential effects on
other sectors of the system.
(c) Acted more 'complexly' – their decisions took
different aspects of the entire system into
account, not just one aspect.
(d) Recognized early where [the situation’s] real
problems lay and attacked them first.
(e) Tested their hypotheses - asked more 'why' than
'what' questions.
(f) Dug deeper in their analysis.
(g) Were interested in causal links behind events and
the causal network.
(h) Did not lapse into ‘ad hoc-ism.’
(i) Focused on right fields of endeavor and
continued to focus on those fields over time.
(j) Were self-critical/ reflective and structured in
thinking.
(3) The challenge for any staff is accounting for the myriad
variables in a complex problem without oversimplifying
the situation. This is even more difficult when planning
under time constraints and when a staff lacks
organization and integration, (e.g., staff elements and
planning teams that “working in their own functional
perspective and lanes”).
(4) Red Teams can help staffs think more ‘complexly’ by
employing Red teaming tools such as 1-2-4-Whole
Group, Shifting the Burden, and Troika Consulting.
Specifically, Shifting the Burden fosters close
examination of underlying problem(s) and
perspective(s) rather than dealing with symptoms
manifesting themselves throughout a system.
f.
Flawed (historical) or False Analogies: Webster defines
analogy as “a form of logical inference, or an instance of it,
based on the assumption that if two things are known to be
alike in some respects, then they must be alike in other
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respects.” As one author noted, “When confronted with a
novel challenge, the human mind reasons by analogy. We
then become prone to reading the world in ways that
reaffirm the choice we have made.” 19
(1) When used successfully, analogies help make sense
of a new situation, reduce complexity, and aid in the
dialogue with others. However, analogies should be
used with caution. Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates, quoted American historian Gordon Wood that,
“History does not teach lots of little lessons. Insofar as
it teaches any lessons, it teaches one big one: that
nothing ever works out quite the way its managers
intended or expected.” 20
(2) Decision makers often use history and historical
analogies. In Richard Neustadt and Ernest R. May‘s,
Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision
Maker, the authors highlight the challenge and
potential errors of using history and historical analogy
in decision making without understanding the details
and context of events and the differences between the
current and past situations (Determining the suitability
of an Analogy).
g. Hubris and Overconfidence. Flawed planning takes place
when staffs are overconfident in their ability to predict the
future, anticipating the actions of adversaries or the
consequence of the effects of operations and tactical
actions. Some scholars such as Nicholas Taleb contend
that it is impractical to predict the future or understand the
complexity of the situation. Taleb argues that the only real
solution is to have planning systems in place that can react
quickly to changes and events. 21
(1) Overconfidence also stems from faulty reasoning in
terms of “attaching high probabilities to low-frequency
events” or base rate neglect. 22 Political scientist Philip
Tetlock notes that political analysts often base
probabilities on “…case-specific hunches about causality
that make some scenarios more “imaginable” than
others.” 23 Tetlock follows that “A plausible story of how
a government might suddenly collapse counts for far
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more than how often similar outcomes have occurred in
the past.” 24
(2) The connection between faulty intuition and confidence
in improbable but plausible arguments is emphasized in
Taleb’s notion of the “narrative fallacy.” Taleb believes
that people are “[vulnerable] to over interpretation and
predilection for compact stories over raw truths. It
severely distorts our mental representation of the world;
it is particularly acute when it comes to the rare event.” 25
Summary: Effective planning in unique, novel, and uncertain
situations is difficult. Red Teams help the commander, staff, and
planning teams when their reasoning is flawed or when
organizational processes impede sound planning. This chapter
offers ways to prevent and mitigate challenges in planning and
decision making processes. Red Teams must balance intellectual
distance to observe and highlight potential errors in reasoning
against being embedded in the organization as a contributor to the
planning process.
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Circle of Voices
Circle of Voices is a simple facilitation practice designed to
equalize participation and teach students that listening,
appreciating, and synthesizing are just as crucial to good
discussion as is making brilliant original contributions.
Participants form small groups of five to six seated in a circle.
They are given a minute or so in silence to think about what they
have to say about an assigned topic. The discussion opens with
one person having a period of uninterrupted “airtime” of no more
than one minute. During this time the speaker may say whatever
they wish about the topic at hand. While the person is speaking no
interruptions are allowed. People take their turn to speak by going
around the circle in order. This eliminates the stress of other
participants having to decide when or whether to jump in, or for
the speaker to worry about interruption before they can finish their
thoughts.
After the initial circle of voices is complete, discussion opens for
anyone to speak. The only restriction on this period of discussion
is that participants are only allowed to discuss other person’s
ideas that have already been expressed. Participants may not
expand on their own ideas, only about their reaction to something
already said. This prevents a tendency toward grandstanding.
Facilitation principles:
x
Pre-commitment
x
Everyone speaks once before anyone speaks twice.
x
Active listening.
x
Respectful engagement.
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Circular Response
This is a great way to facilitate discussion participation, promote
continuity of conversation, and to give people some experience in
the effort required for respectful listening.
Participants form groups of six to eight, seated in a circle. They are
given a minute or so in silence to think about their response to a
discussion topic or question. The conversation begins with one
person having a period of uninterrupted “airtime” of no more than
one minute. During this time the speaker may say whatever they
wish about the topic at hand. While the person is speaking no
interruptions are allowed.
After the minute is up, first speaker yields the floor to the person
on their left, and that person speaks for a minute. The second
speaker is not free, however, to say anything they want. They
must incorporate into their remarks some reference to the
preceding speaker’s message, and then use this as a springboard
for their own comments. This does not have to be an agreement; it
may be an expression of dissent from the previous opinion.
After a minute, the second speaker stops talking, and the person on
their left becomes the third discussant, following the same ground
rules. Following this pattern the discussion moves around the circle.
Once everyone has had the opportunity to speak, the floor is opened
for unconstrained conversation.
The interesting thing about this facilitation technique is that the
last person has no advantage over the second speaker. This is
due to the last speaker not having the luxury of mentally
rehearsing the perfect contribution because they have no idea
what the person immediately before them is going to say until they
speak.
Facilitation principles:
x Pre-commitment
x Everyone speaks once before anyone speaks twice.
x Active listening.
x Respectful engagement
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Cognitive Biases
Cognitive biases are unconscious beliefs that condition, govern
and compel our behavior. Examples include the following:
x
Anchoring: Oftentimes, humans are unable to compute an
item’s true value. Instead, they resort to an overreliance
upon an initial “anchor” value provided by someone else,
and thereafter bias all subsequent value decisions relative to
that initial “anchor.”
x
Status Quo Bias: Many humans find the status quo
comfortable, and avoid changing it.
x
Confirmation Bias: A trap that humans often fall into —we
tend to look for evidence that supports the conclusion we’ve
made prematurely, not realizing that evidence can often
support several hypotheses. “No matter what we humans
think about, we tend to pay more attention to stuff that fits in
with our beliefs than stuff that might challenge them…” 26 In
the process, inclined to “see what we expect to see,” we
actively dismiss evidence that contradicts our conclusion. It
is this phenomenon that lends importance to the active
search for disconfirming evidence: evidence that would
disprove the conclusion we’ve formed.
x
Sunk-Cost Bias (aka “Loss Aversion”): A bias in which
humans increasingly persist in deciding and acting illogically,
based upon decisions they made previously. This occurs
despite the fact that the present context dictates deciding
otherwise. Sunk-cost bias occurs because it relieves one of
the necessity to admit that preceding decisions might have
been made in error. It also may avoid incurring a permanent
loss, at least in the short term. It is a failure to cut bait, to use
a fishing metaphor.
x
Framing Trap: The way we frame an issue affects the way
we perceive it, and hence, affects a solution’s potential
options.
x
Halo Effect: We tend to select that which we see as more
attractive, regardless of actual capabilities or qualities. The
opposite of the halo effect is the Pitchfork Effect: we tend to
disregard (or put at the bottom of a list) that which we find
unappealing.
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x
Narrative Fallacy: The human compulsion to turn a series of
connected or disconnected facts into story or pattern;
inventing reality. This is a human tendency to construe
meaning in a completely random situation, where no
meaning actually exists. 27
x
Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Bias: A term coined by Robert
Merton in 1948. “The self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the
beginning, a false definition of the situation evoking a new
behavior which makes the originally false conception come
true… the prophet will cite the actual course of events as
proof that he was right from the beginning…” 28
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Critical MDMP Questions
We discussed the MDMP and Mitigating Groupthink During the
MDMP in Chapter V, p62. This is a consolidated list of
considerations from those discussions. Upon receipt of a mission,
a planning directive, or commander’s guidance, the Red Team
Leader must determine the following, often in collaboration with
the Commander/Chief of Staff:
x When should the Red Team engage in the planning process?
(Most Red Teams will primarily work with Plans.)
x How should the Red Team engage? What are the expected
deliverables or outcomes? Are their reporting requirements to
the Commander or Chief of Staff?
x What linkage should the Red Team have within the staff? For
example, does the chief of staff expect the Red Team to
observe or participate in the war gaming process? Does he
expect the Red Team to develop alternatives on their own for
presentation to the Commander?
x What information does the Red Team need and is it available
inside or external to the unit? Are their restrictions on the
dissemination of information? What reach-back capability does
the team require?
x What is the relationship between other specialized groups on
the staff (e.g., Commander’s Initiative Group)?
Red Teams face a number of challenges to “provide commanders
an independent capability to fully explore alternatives to plans,
operations, concepts, organizations, and capabilities in the context
of the OE and from the perspectives of our partners, adversaries,
and others.”
Challenge 1: Remaining independent but accountable. While
independent of the staff as a special staff element, Red
Teams rely on the primary and other coordinating staffs to
provide them information and must work with staff
members to resolve issues, insights, and observations.
Challenge 2: Inherent tension with the staff. There are inherent
tensions with the staff who may view the Red Team’s
efforts with suspicion. The Commander must endorse the
Red Team’s effort. Conversely, the Red Team must
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carefully weigh which items require elevation to the
Commander. The Red Team is not a “shadow staff” nor
does it replace any of the inherent functions performed by
the staff. Success can be judged by quality of the Red
Team inputs which provides insights, perspectives,
identification of vulnerabilities and unseen opportunities, as
well as the team’s effort to foster dialogue and
communication among staffs.
Challenge 3: “Groupthink versus Pros from Dover.” While the Red
Team is an independent staff entity, it lives and works
within the unit. The team must balance its abilities to be
part of the team—cooperatively working to accomplish the
mission, while remaining immune to “groupthink.”
Conversely, the team cannot be aloof or viewed as the
“Pros from Dover.”
Challenge 4: Cookie-cutter TTP approach. While the deliberate
planning system describes a linear thinking process (e.g.,
Mission Analysis consists of 17 steps), no single red
teaming TTP can fit all problems. For example, a red
teaming approach to planning consideration for a
humanitarian operation will differ from that of planning an
offensive operation against a conventional force.
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Critical Review Steps
A critical review is an intellectual exercise using various
investigative and analytical techniques. The process described
here is only a start point for Red Team leaders to formulate their
own plan and serves only as baseline to spur thought on how the
Red Team will approach a specific critical review.
While the process described here appears as a linear process, in
reality many of the steps may overlap. Except for the first and last
step, the other steps should be conducted simultaneously or
amended based on time, resources, and the initiating authority’s
guidance.
By definition, a critical review assumes the existence of a concept
plan or other document in need of review. If the initiating authority
is dissatisfied with the existing courses and desires the Red Team
to examine a problem to determine alternative solutions, the Red
Team should use the Problem Solving Method rather than the
Critical Review.
1. Identification of the Requirement – Receipt of Mission
2. Critical Review Mission Analysis
3. Restatement of the Requirement or Red Team Task to the
Initiating Authority
4. Key Issue/Problem Identification and Assessment
5. Initial Research – Formulate Data Collection Plan
6. Conduct Research
7. Determine Critical Review Criteria
8. Contrast and Comparison - Key Questions + Alternative
Perspectives
9. Finalize the preliminary assessment and initial report
10. Crosswalk the initial report with requirement
11. Complete report and briefings
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Critical Thinking Traits
This entry addresses the skills and attitudes we must learn
to become self-aware, critical thinkers. Red teamers must be
able to discern the challenges associated with oral and
written arguments, in order to assist the command in
realizing valid and invalid argumentation surrounding the
decision-making process. Central to Red Teaming is learning
to ask the right questions and knowing what those questions
(argument deconstruction) are. A self-reflective, critical
thinker must decide what to believe and what to question.
[Note—this is by no means an “all-inclusive list!”]
Critical thinking is:
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
awareness
a process
quality of thinking
imposing intellectual standards
challenging assumptions and exploring alternatives
searching for hidden assumptions
questioning and arguing logically
developing an ever better worldview
meta-cognition—thinking about the process of thinking
Critical thinkers…
x are active listeners
x adopt a skeptical state of mind
x are open-minded–they never shout down an idea, and they
reconsider and revise views where honest reflection suggests
that change is warranted
x abhor absolutes–they realize there is often more than one way
x think contextually–they gather, assess and interpret relevant
information, and disregard irrelevant information
x are dialectical thinkers–they can handle contradictions and
opposing ideas
x identify and question their own assumptions
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x consider points of view, the quality of information,
interpretation and inference, assumptions, and implications
and consequences
x are “reflectively skeptical”
x regard problems as exciting, not a hassle
x understand the constraining role of personal world views
x demonstrate the intellectual courage required to challenge
conventional wisdom
x search for what s/he doesn’t know, rather than being
complacent with what s/he does know
x ask “Why?” “How Do?” “So What,” and
“What should we be doing?”
x are exceedingly curious and inquisitive; driven to determine a
more refined version of a given perception
x are detached emotionally—“reason prevails”
x are disinclined to board the Bus to Abilene—“intellectually
independent”
x seek to understand the opinions of others
x detect attempts to turn concepts into actual entities
x frame a problem in several ways to consider alternative
perspectives
x evaluate the consequences of various alternatives
x understand how framing can be used by others to mislead, in
order to bias the reader/listener
x attempt to identify the interconnected variables of a complex
situation, and the variables’ interrelationships/relative strength
of those interrelationships
x generate hypotheses for given situations, and then test those
hypotheses
x seek disconfirming evidence
x discern inferences drawn, and looks for faulty inferences
x distinguish between causation and correlation
x recognize the bias in hindsight analysis
x understand the effects of memory on decision making
x know of/recognize cognitive biases present in decision making
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x know of/recognize the effects of social conformity/social
psychology (including groupthink) present in group decision
making
x discriminate between inductive and deductive reasoning
x use metaphors and analogies appropriately
x produce and uses graphics to enhance comprehension
x judge the credibility of an information source
x identify premises and conclusions
x challenge explicit assumptions
x actively look for implicit assumptions, and challenge them
x challenge “facts”: not all facts are created equal
x recognize and defend against inappropriate use of
emotional/loaded language
x identify/recognize underlying theories and/or philosophies
inherent in an argument
x detect misuse/abuse of word definitions
x understand, recognize and avoid common logic fallacies
x remember to ask “What’s missing from the argument?”
x check for adequate sampling size and possible bias in
sampling when a generalization is made
x review statistics used in arguments, and challenge them
x ask “Are there rival causes that we have overlooked?”
x ask “What are the implications of accepting this argument asis?”
Finally:
x are systematic and thorough in applying precepts of critical
thinking to various situations
x defer judgment to avoid jumping to conclusions or believing
false claims
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Critical Variables (CVs)
1. The Physical Environment defines the physical circumstances
and conditions that surround and influence air, land, sea, and
space operations. The defining factors are terrain, weather,
topography, hydrology, and environmental conditions. The
physical environment has always been a key factor in military
operations. History demonstrated that forces able to take
advantage of the physical environment have a much higher
probability of success. Our opponents understand that less
complex and open environments favor the U.S. This is due to
our standoff technology, precision guided munitions (PGM),
and sophisticated surveillance and reconnaissance
capabilities. For this reason, adversaries will seek to use
complex terrain, unfavorable weather, and less trafficked sea
lanes when confronting U.S. forces.
2. Nature and Stability of Critical Actors refers to the internal
cohesiveness of actors. It evaluates the population, economic
infrastructures, political processes and authority, military
forces, goals, and agendas. It also refers to an actor’s strength
or weakness. It is important to determine where the real
strength of the organization lies. It may be in the political
leadership, the military, the police, or some other element of
the population. Understanding this variable allows US forces to
better visualize the nature of the military campaign and the
true aims of a threat’s campaign. An entity that must commit
significant resources to maintain internal control may represent
less of a conventional threat and more of a stability and
support threat.
3. Sociological Demographics concern the characteristics of a
human population or part of it. Demographics measure the
size, growth, density, and distribution of populations.
Demographics also measure statistics regarding birth,
marriage, disease, and death. Demographics are a significant
factor contributing to likelihood of conflict. Perceived inequities
among sectors of a population can breed envy and
resentment. This often results in conflict. Overpopulation and
an uneducated, unemployed “youth bulge” can aggravate
economic, ethnic, religious, and other rivalries.
4. Culture is a system of shared beliefs, values, customs,
behaviors, and artifacts that the members of society use to
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cope with their world and with one another. Understanding a
culture requires examining multiple elements, including its core
values, history, myths, traditions, and other factors. A culture
can change over time. Cultures transmit their shared values
and beliefs from generation to generation through learning and
social interaction. Finally, a culture in and of itself does not
cause a conflict. The friction that comes from the interaction
between two different cultures creates the potential for conflict.
5. Nation-states or non-state actors often enter into Regional and
Global Relationships that can be local, regional, or global.
These relationships include political, economic, military, or
cultural mergers and partnerships. Membership or allegiance
to such a relationship can determine an actor’s actions. This
can be in terms of support, motivation, and alliance construct.
When actors create alliances, they can add to their collective
capability and broaden the scale of operations and actions.
Regional and global relationships of opponents or allies shape
the scale, intensity, and perseverance of antagonists in military
operations. In the age of globalization, regional activities will
undoubtedly draw global interest and potential involvement.
Effects created in one part of the world at the operational or
tactical level could have global, cascading outcomes at the
strategic level.
6. Existing Military Capabilities are the most critical variable for
military operations, political aspirations, resolve, and will. It
was once easy to define military capabilities. However, this
variable is rapidly becoming one of the most complex. A
commander must be able to visualize all military capabilities of
the threat. Red Teams must emphasize that our enemies can
be flexible and adaptive. They could have the knowledge and
ability to use a combination of conventional and
unconventional capabilities. The commander must have
information on conventional and unconventional capabilities,
his ability to use modern technology, and his economic and
political ability to affect the mission. Capabilities include
equipment, manpower, training levels, resource constraints,
and leadership issues. Niche technologies will be increasingly
the norm for the near-term. Hybridization, rapid technological
advancement, and asymmetric concepts generate constantly
changing requirements and needs. In addition, paramilitary
organizations, Special Forces, or enhanced police
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organizations take on greater significance as their capabilities
and roles expand.
7. Information involves civil and military access, use,
manipulation, distribution, and reliance on information
technology systems by an entity. Information technology is the
systems or mechanisms for preserving or transmitting
information. Various actors seek to use perception
management to control how the public sees things. The threat
will exploit U.S. mistakes. They will also use propaganda to
sway the local population to support their cause. Media and
other information means can make combat operations visible
to the world. The media can influence U.S. political decision
making, internal opinion, or the sensitivities of coalition
members. The expansion of information technology will greatly
assist commanders. Complicated networks provide a vast web
of communications capabilities. Redundant communications
systems allow for the constant flow of information. Developing
countries may have little in the way of communications
infrastructure. Information may flow by less sophisticated
means––couriers, graffiti, rumors, gossiping, and local print
media. Understanding existing communication infrastructure is
important because it ultimately controls the flow of information
to the population and the threat.
8. Technology reflects the equipment and technological
sophistication that an entity could bring to the OE. Technology
includes what nations or actors can develop, produce, or
import. Global access to technological advances is slowly
eroding the U.S.’s advantage. Understanding this variable can
determine whether the threat has the technological ability to
achieve equality or overmatch in selected areas. The presence
of sophisticated technology can indicate where opponents
expect to achieve the greatest advantage or perceive the
greatest threat.
9. The U.S. military could find a variety of External Organizations
in a conflict or failed state. These include non-government
organizations (NGOs), international humanitarian
organizations, multinational corporations, transnational
organizations, and other civilian organizations. The
organizations can have stated and hidden interests that assist
or hinder U.S. mission accomplishment. Each organizational
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or individual participant pursues its interests in concert or
competition with other entities. These actors may have
economic, political, religious, cultural, or private motivations
that differ from their public organizational mission statements.
Defining these variables should inform the commander of the
impact external organizations have on mission
accomplishment.
10. National Will and Will of Critical Actor encompasses a
unification of values, morals, and effort between the
population, the leadership or government, and the military.
Through this unity, all parties are willing to sacrifice individually
for the achievement of the unified goal. The interaction of
military actions and political judgments, conditioned by
national will, further defines and limits the achievable
objectives of a conflict. This determines the duration and
conditions of termination of a conflict. The willingness of the
people to support threat military, paramilitary, terrorists, or
insurgencies can be a significant characteristic of the
battlefield. It will influence the type and intensity of resistance
the people will pose to U.S. military operations. Most countries
view the U.S. national will as a U.S. strategic center of
gravity. 29 The degree to which one group can attack its
opponent’s will and still preserve its own represents its ability
to set the conditions for achieving favorable conflict resolution.
In a world of transparent military operations, attack on (and
defense of) national will has tactical, operational, and strategic
implications. A perceived attack on a group’s cultural identity
will usually serve to bolster its will to fight. This potentially
increases both the intensity and duration of a conflict.
11. Time is a critical factor and a tool to manipulate tactical,
operational, and strategic advantages. It drives the conduct of
operations and campaigns. Time is one of the most significant
planning factors driving decision-making. How much time is
available and how long events might take will affect every
aspect of military planning. This includes force package
development, force flow rate, quality of intelligence preparation
of the AO, need for forward-deployed forces and logistics, etc.
Planners need to consider time in the context of the culture
that the force is operating. Every culture views time differently.
An opponent’s view of time might be radically different from
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ours. This different view of time causes disjointedness in
operational tempo.
12. The Economic variable establishes the boundaries between
the “haves” and the “have-nots.” This gap of economic
differences among nation-states and other actors can cause
conflict. Differences may be significant among nation-states,
organizations, or groups regarding how they produce,
distribute, and consume goods and services. Control and
access to natural or strategic resources can cause conflict.
The ability to affect another actor through economic, vice
military means, may become the key to regional hegemonic
status or dominance. Economic deprivation is also a major
cause of conflict. One actor may have economic superiority
over another for many reasons, including access to natural
resources or power.
Economic power and the ability to mobilize it represent a
nation or actor’s ability to rapidly procure, mobilize, and
conduct sustained operations. It also reveals external
relationships that could result in political or military assistance.
For example, potential adversaries understand that the U.S.
economy is a center of gravity that is very sensitive to
perturbation. American economics and the power that flows
from it will be inviting targets. Any disruption of the flow of oil
products would have a significant negative impact on our
economy. Many of our economic institutions may appear
vulnerable to cyber-attack. Economic superiority rather than
military superiority may be the key to power or dominance
within a region. Analysis identifies those elements of economic
power that may be a significant characteristic of the battlefield.
In a globalized economy, the threat may leverage its economic
power in a manner that affects friendly operations.
13. Religion is a variable that affects each of the preceding
variables. Religion in itself “is a world view in which people
personify cosmic forces and devise ways to deal with them
that resemble the ways they deal with powerful human beings
in their society. Religion provides man with a way to deal with
uncertainty that they otherwise cannot control. 30 Religion is
interwoven with a nation’s culture. It can be a cornerstone that
affects every aspect of culture. It also provides the individual a
more worldly connection to other co-religionist outside the
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boundaries of a particular state. Our understanding of the
religion practiced in a state that U.S. forces operate is crucial
to our success. This understanding will shape the way the
Army should conduct operations (i.e., belief system of our
opponent, key sites, organization of society, interpersonal
relationships between our forces and the population).
Critical Variables are relevant to PMESII+PT and METT-TC.
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Cultural Perception Framework
When to use
The Cultural Perception Framework is used to assist Red Team
members in apperceiving another culture. In order to avoid mirrorimaging, its steps lead red teamers through a process of
discovering another culture based on its underlying tendencies,
habits, values and beliefs. It provides red teams an ability to
consider the kinds of questions that must be asked of Subject
Matter Experts, in order to provide alternative perspectives about
that culture.
Value added
Thorough use of the Cultural Perception Framework will ensure an
enhanced understanding of a particular culture, by forcing the Red
Team members to consider aspects of that culture they might not
otherwise have discerned.
The Method
Step 1 – Establish a baseline of understanding by using the 4Ways of Seeing
x
How X views itself
x
How Y views itself
x
How X views Y
x
How Y views X
Step 2 – What does the physical environment offer to the culture?
(Water, Land, Food, Climate, Fuel/Power, Natural
Resources)
Water
x
What is the symbolic significance of water?
x
Are there cultural rules about water’s use?
x
What is the relationship between water use and ritual?
x
Who customarily exercises specific functions with respect to
water? What are these functions?
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x
Who, in the culture, has customarily controlled access to
water, and how have they used that for power, influence,
etc.?
x
What roles are expected of U.S. military personnel with
respect to water use and provision?
Land
x
Has the geography facilitated security, or invite invasion by
another culture? How has the security outlook of the people
evolved with respect to its geography?
x
Who owns the land? Is access open to everyone, or
restricted? What are the local conventions of private,
communal, and state ownership/use of land? How is the
ownership of land related to the power structure of the
region?
x
Is there sufficient land for agricultural use? Does this land
allow for completely feeding the population? Does it provide
for agricultural export?
x
What land in the area is/is not appropriate for certain groups
of people to use? Why?
x
Who, locally, has legitimate ability to determine outsiders’
access to land?
x
Are there symbolic meanings for certain sub-districts in the
region, and do groups within the area view this symbolism
similarly, or differently? Why?
x
What is the relationship between the political
national/regional boundaries, and how people living in the
nation/region view those boundaries, in terms of politics,
economics, genealogy, and security?
x
What are the geographic area’s principles of division, and is
there a relationship between these dividing lines and access
to both tangible and symbolic resources?
x
Are there particular land formations that are visually striking,
with local significance?
Food
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x
What are the local staples, and what is the required labor to
grow, prepare, and serve them?
x
What foods are served by whom, to indicate the status of
server or guest?
x
How do U.S. Military operations or logistics impact the ability
of local people to obtain essential foodstuffs?
x
What foods have which kinds of ritual significance?
x
What are the time- or calendar-related roles of various
foods?
x
Which foods are strategic commodities, inasmuch as
controlling access to them influences one’s coercive or
political power?
x
What, in local terms, is considered food sufficiency, food
scarcity, and the proper role of external forces in providing
food?
x
What kinds of locally-accepted foods are considered
strange, dangerous, or not even food (by the U.S. Military)?
What foods raise concerns about health or sanitation?
Climate and Seasons
x
How does the climate influence local attitudes to—and
capabilities for—work, business, and combat?
x
What, in local terms, passes for good weather, bad weather,
etc.?
Fuel and Power
x
What are the locally-found, or locally-produced sources of
power and fuel?
x
What is the relationship between local elites and access
to/provision of fuel and power?
x
How does the larger government authority provide, or
control, access to power?
x
What do local people expect of outside forces in terms of
power/fuel provision and protection?
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x
How does the population deal with shortages of power and
fuel, and how do U.S. Military operations impact them?
Natural Resources
x
What natural resources can be found inside the recognized
borders of the nation/region?
x
Are these natural resources accessible? Are they nearing
depletion? Who controls access to these natural resources?
x
Which natural resources are required by the culture, but not
available internal to their borders? Where are these locally
unavailable resources procured? Who is in the controlling
seat for procuring them, and who provides them? What
sources of power emanate from this relationship?
Step 3 – How is the economy structured? How do the people
make use of what the physical environment offers?
(Formal, Informal, As a Means of Exchange, Effect on
Social Structure)
The Formal Economy
x
What comprises the formal economy?
x
On what commodities/services does the formal economy
focus?
x
What categories of people work in the formal economy?
x
How will U.S. Military operations impact the formal economy,
and people in it?
The Informal Economy
x
How big is the informal economy, as compared to the formal
economy? If it is large—why?
x
What categories of people work in the informal economy?
x
On what commodities/services does the informal economy
focus?
x
What is the relationship between the informal economy, on
the one hand, and unregulated movement of people, crime,
and violence, on the other?
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x
How does the formal economy rely upon the informal
economy? Does this cause abuse to the area’s population?
x
What economic opportunities exist for the population?
x
What are formal/informal economic actors’ expectations of
the state or over-arching political-military authority, with
respect to involvement in or disregard for economic activity?
x
What is considered an “illegal” good or service in the area,
and on what basis? Is what would be termed in the West as
“bribery” and “corruption” endemic? If so, what do locals
consider corrupt?
x
What goods/services are legal, but culturally frowned upon?
Who deals in these goods/services?
x
What percent of the formal and informal economy is under
“foreign” control?
x
How will U.S. Military expenditure in the local informal
economy, or employment of local informal economic actors,
influence the socio-economic balance of power in the area?
Economy as a Network of Exchange
x
How are important physical resources (food, clothing,
shelter, cars etc.) obtained by local peoples?
x
How do people gain access to critical services such as
medical care, transportation, or education?
x
Would a specific operational plan improve or block access to
critical goods and services?
x
What is the degree of (in) equity in the distribution of goods
and services among the population?
x
Who seems to control the distribution of goods and services,
and how? Would a planned operation change this
distribution pattern?
x
Along with or instead of money, what do local peoples rely
on to obtain and exchange goods in the region?
x
If money is not the primary economic system, can the U.S.
Military effectively use the local method of economic
exchange?
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Economy as a Way of Structuring Social Relationships
x
What are the main economic systems in place in the region
(pastoralism, agriculture, industrial production—all three may
be present simultaneously)?
x
What are the economic rhythms of the community (migration
seasons, planting and harvesting, market day, work hours)?
x
What are the important features of the environment that
determine the economy of the area?
x
Who has/controls most of the wealth? What percent of the
population lives in poverty, as locally defined?
x
How is wealth distributed? Does wealth seem to be
concentrated in the hands of certain individuals or groups?
On what basis? What power is conferred from such a
concentration?
x
Does the economy rely on general, balanced, or negative
reciprocity?
x
Do the elites own wealth, or do they possess power that
generates wealth?
x
How do local economic structures reflect the relationship of
the group to the larger political and state system?
Step 4 – How is the social organization structured? How do the
people organize, given the gifts of their physical
environment, and their economic choices? (Age,
Gender, Kinship, Class, Ethnicity)
Age
x
What are the population’s demographics? What do they
suggest?
x
At what age is someone considered a child or adult?
x
What specific ceremonies mark the transition to adulthood?
Which new social privileges are granted to men and women
when they pass these manhood or womanhood rituals?
x
What are locally accepted or expected economic roles for
what U.S. society considers children?
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x
How should the U.S. Military prepare to respond to children
that act as soldiers in militaries or insurgencies, or
participate in violent activities against U.S. forces?
x
What special status or roles are accorded to the elderly?
x
Is there an age grading system that stratifies people
according to their age and stage in the life cycle? And if so,
what rights, roles, and duties do people have at each stage?
Gender
x
What are the common child rearing practices, and how do
they differ by gender and class?
x
What are the roles assigned to men? What are the roles
assigned to women?
x
What work, activities, and spaces are assigned
predominantly to men and women?
x
Who undertakes which tasks and where?
x
How must operational plans change to account for different
work, roles, and spaces assigned to men and women?
x
What roles do women play in local militaries and
insurgencies? Do they engage in armed combat?
x
If women are not visibly observable, what roles and tasks do
they undertake “behind the scenes?”
x
How can operational plans and assignment of manpower
include gender to maximize effectiveness of the unit?
Kinship and Tribal Membership
x
Does some form of “tribe”- or “clan”-related social structure
exist, and play a role in society? To what degree?
x
From which side of the family does descent originate? Is the
society a matriarchal or patriarchal one? Do members of a
family identify with the father’s side/relatives, the mother’s
side/relatives, or both?
x
What is the nature of marriage in society: who decides, what
are the power relationships internal to, and external to the
married couple? Does the society practice monogamy or
polygamy?
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x
To what degree does the society believe in collective unity,
vice individualism? What degree of egalitarianism is
prevalent in society?
x
What are the reasons underlying social unity? What is it that
holds the society together? What provides “meaning” to this
society?
x
Does the society rely upon “fictive” kinship? What is the
essence of this fiction—which segments of society does it
uphold, and which segments does it suppress?
x
Does the society rely upon extended family units, or nuclear
families? Why?
x
How are land, water, or access to certain goods and
resources concentrated in the hands of specific kin groups or
tribes?
x
How will our operations in the region support certain kin
groups and enhance their power; or conversely undermine
these groups?
x
What are the possible outcomes of an operation that will
challenge the power or control of resources by certain kin
groups in the region (war, insurgency, increased stability,
greater/lesser access to important goods and services)?
x
How does a U.S. Military’s choice of local points of contact
interact with or disturb local kin relationships, thus
influencing the degree of success of U.S. Military initiatives?
Class
x
Does class play a role in society? To what degree?
x
How is class defined in the area: on the basis of wealth,
education, region of origin, inheritance, or other factors?
x
Is status acquired through birth, or achieved through action?
x
What are the privileges (economic, political, social, and
religious) of members of the upper class?
x
What are the key institutions in the social structure, and how
did the leaders of those institutions acquire their roles?
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x
How is access to essential resources for survival (food,
shelter, clothing, water) determined by class?
x
How does the concentration of wealth (through corruption,
graft, or legitimate means) in the hands of an elite upper
class relate to resource or power access?
x
If creating a plan to support lower class groups, will funds
and resources have to pass through the hands of the upper
class first (and consequently disappear)?
x
What is the reality of upward mobility in the area’s class
system, and what do local people consider to be their
potential for in-system upward mobility?
x
How will U.S. Military measures that influence different
groups’ social mobility be viewed by those groups, or by
other, competing groups?
Ethnicity
x
Does ethnicity play a role in society? To what degree?
x
What is the relationship between particular ethnic groups
and control of professions or positions of power?
x
How do groups that are barred from these positions of power
challenge the system (breeding grounds for insurgents, theft
and bribery, civil war)?
x
What are local assumptions about U.S. and western biases
and partisanship with respect to ethnic group struggles?
x
How will a US Military alliance or dealings with a particular
ethnic group affect those in power? What are possible
reactions of those groups that are ignored?
x
In this area, what kinds of processes have historically
activated which ethnic identities and feelings of group
membership?
Step 5 – What defines the political structure? Who makes the
decisions concerning power distribution and resource
usage? (leadership conflicts over power)
Leadership
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x
What types of leaders does the society support?
Charismatic? Violent? Legally elected?
x
Who are the central players in the leadership? What are their
histories, and what are their ideologies and beliefs? What
networks do they belong to?
x
Do the members of the leadership “live for politics,” or make
a living “off of politics?” What are their motives in doing so?
x
How is decision-making organized, and who makes
decisions?
x
What particular social and political ideologies are prevalent?
What narratives is the leadership using?
x
What are the principles and processes governing policy
deliberations and decision-making?
x
Whom do leaders have to consult; to whom must they
answer?
x
How is leadership obtained and passed on (by election,
inheritance, demonstration of skill, and membership in a
certain age or social group, by force)?
x
Who are the official formal leaders and what symbols
indicate their status?
x
To whom do people turn to actually get something done?
x
What is the relationship between the formal and informal
leader?
x
Which institutions wield power? Particular social structures
(tribes, clans, etc.)? Religious entities? Labor unions?
Political parties? Courts? Criminal organizations?
Conflicts over Power
x
What motivates the society? This may be political in nature,
as well as economic, or even based on desires for social
change. What tensions are inherent in the society?
x
How does the society handle the inequity of power? Do
members of society revile others who exert power upon
them? Or are members of society inclined to accept this
inequitable power structure submissively? Are members
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who accept inequitable power relationships submissively
inclined to “wait until told what to do?” In other words, are
they overly dependent on what the boss says—as opposed
to a society in which the people feel inclined toward a high
degree of interdependence, and use initiative?
x
To what degree are the members of society comfortable with
uncertainty (exhibited in low stress and low anxiety—what is
different is curious)? To what degree do they attempt to
avoid uncertainty (exhibited in high stress and high anxiety—
what is different is dangerous)?
x
Is this a society that relies on harsh power, or rule of law?
x
What are the most important cultural characteristics that
determine one’s position and power in the community (age,
class, gender, tribal identity, ethnicity, religion)?
x
What is the degree of polarization in the region with respect
to religious/ethnic/tribal identities?
x
What is the amount of flexibility and interaction between
religious/ethnic/tribal groups?
x
Which groups hold power, and to what degree of
concentration?
x
Which groups are excluded, and along which axes?
x
What is their degree of consciousness of exclusion?
x
What is the nature of the bureaucracy? Is it efficient, and
easy for the society to navigate? Or do the members of the
bureaucracy exact tribute from society as a way of
conducting business, or exercising power? To what degree
is it necessary to find someone who can deal with this
inefficient bureaucracy (someone who has “wasta”) quickly?
x
What is the role of patronage, and what characterizes a
“patron?”
x
Are politics used for religious purposes, or is religion used
for political purposes?
x
How do state bureaucracies relate to other elements of the
social structure?
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x
Do these groups’ leaders think it is possible to challenge the
system?
x
How do marginalized and losing groups gain access to
valued goods, resources, and opportunities (black market,
theft, raids, and insurgency)?
x
How will allying with one group affect U.S. Military
relationships with the other groups?
Step 6 – What are the belief systems? (History, Folklore, Rituals,
Norms, Imagined Memory, Icons, Symbols and
Communication, Taboos, and Religion)
History, Imagined Memory, Folklore
x
What are the critical narratives of the cultural history? What
are the pivotal historical stories that all people in the
community share?
x
What do people believe about themselves, and where they
came from? What are the stories taught in school?
x
How do the people learn in school? Via rote memory?
Socratic dialogue? Other? Are they taught to challenge
authority and conventional wisdom, or follow the party line?
x
What are the daily sayings and folktales that everyone refers
to in common conversation?
x
How are these (remembered histories, folktales, and
sayings) used to emphasize or teach important values and
ideals?
x
How do different groups in the area give different
significance to the same historical stories?
x
How does the society perceive current and past events?
x
What are the key myths associated with social control?
x
Does this society defer to ethnocentric beliefs, or does it
display cultural relativity in its views of outsiders?
x
Are there any myths explaining the essence of the “nation?”
To what degree do the people identify with a “national”
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myth? How does this national myth conflict with other social
structure bases—ethnicity conflicts, tribal conflicts, etc.?
x
Are there any significant emotional events in the life of the
people? How recent/how far back in time are these events?
To what degree has myth embraced these events, and what
are the myths? Which leadership groups within the area
support these myths to their own ends?
x
Has the area been historically invaded or isolated? What is
the significance of this?
x
How are these histories, folktales, and sayings used to
support propaganda for or against U.S. Military and U.S.
activities in the region?
x
How has the society accommodated cultural change in the
past? Is it a society that relies upon pluralism? Syncretism?
Or Assimilation?
Icons
x
Who are the local heroes? What important qualities do these
heroes embody?
x
Who are the local villains? Why are they villainous (what
makes them evil)?
x
Are the heroes or villains compared to the U.S. Military or
Americans?
x
What do the comparisons illustrate about local attitudes
towards the U.S. and the military?
Symbols and Communication
x
What physical symbols (clothing, headdress, insignia, and
scarification) indicate membership or status in the ethnic,
religious, and social groups of the region?
x
What physical and written symbols (graffiti, fences, signs,
and spiritual markers) are important to be able to recognize
in order to navigate and understand what is happening in the
region?
x
What is the nature of routine greetings and farewells? What
do they mean?
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x
What are the hand signals and predominant body language
actions that members of the population use? What do they
mean?
x
How do the people communicate? Word of mouth? Gossip
and rumor? In written form? Via television? Via texting and
cell phone? Via Internet?
x
What are the society’s proverbs? For those which translate
only with difficulty—what do they mean?
x
What words or phrases are essential for basic
communication with local people?
x
What non-verbal behaviors may be misinterpreted by local
people? Which non-verbal behaviors are important to
understand in meetings and negotiations?
Rituals
x
What are the rites of passage? Rites of enhancement?
x
What behaviors and actions are important in the ritual or
ceremony, and what does this reveal about cultural ideals
and values?
x
Who participates in the ritual, and what roles do the
participants play?
x
What does presence of participants, or the nature of their
participation, say about their membership and status in the
group?
x
What does the public performance of the ritual communicate
to outsiders?
x
How is this performance potentially a politically charged
statement about the group’s status and rights within the
larger society?
x
What activities, not related to the ritual or ceremony itself,
occur at ceremonial gatherings, due to the social status of
the participants?
Norms, Mores, and Taboos
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x
What does the society value? Are its values predicated on
dualism (e.g., absolutes, “evil versus good”), or on relativism
(right versus wrong depends upon context)?
x
How does society sanction its members? Does it allow for
criticism and alienation?
x
What is the role of emotional outburst—is it restrained?
Accepted? Gender specific?
x
To what degree do the members of society value human
life? For what reasons would people in the society kill
someone else? Why—as a measure on behalf of the state?
To restore personal or family honor? To appropriate
vengeance?
x
What underlying allegiances or codes of honor could
influence the success of an operation?
x
What activities in the area are considered serious violations
of social mores and could carry serious punishments,
including death?
x
What food and behavioral taboos exist in the region?
x
What norms should the U.S. Military observe, even if they
are foreign to the area?
x
What beliefs or assumptions exist locally about American
practices as regards local norms, mores, and taboos?
x
What might the local people think (or have been
propagandized to think) that the U.S. Military is likely to
disregard in terms of local norms, mores, and taboos?
Religious Beliefs
x
What are the predominant religions in the area?
x
What are the key religious narratives? What do they signify,
and whom do they support?
x
Are the practiced religions focused on the social welfare of
the people, in the hereafter, or both?
x
What are the actual (versus theoretical/textual) religious
practices in the specific area where the U.S. Military
operates? Are these religions affected by local culture?
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x
How do local practices of a religion the U.S. Military has
encountered elsewhere differ from what the U.S. Military
thinks the religion is “supposed” to look like?
x
Who is the actual leader of the local religious community?
x
How do religious leaders relate to the educated elite vs.
popular groups, etic?
x
What is the basis of authority for a “religious” leader in the
area: book learning, lineage, charisma, etc.?
x
What power and role, if any, does the formal religious
system play in local peoples’ daily lives?
x
What conflicts or disagreements exist between the formal
religious system and the local religious practices of the
area?
x
How prominent is “religion” as an explanatory factor for
people in current events, and in reference to history, or
historical trajectories?
x
What is “the way the world is supposed to be” according to
locally-held religious beliefs, and how does the U.S. Military
presence impact that?
Religious Membership
x
How do people define and express their religious
membership in the region?
x
What roles and status do the various religious groups or
sects hold in the larger society?
x
What is the meaning of geography for religious groups in the
area?
x
What effects would a planned U.S. Military operation in the
region have upon the power, status, and access to critical
resources of the various religious groups or sects?
x
How will the U.S. Military operations influence indigenous
peoples’ views of U.S. Military or U.S. biases towards
different religious groups of the social structure?
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Step 7 –
A. Conduct an analysis, based on the results of all information
acquired. What particular deductions can you come to,
based on the aggregate of the collected information?
B. Synthesize the results. Given the particular reason/motive
for conducting the analysis, what is the “so what?” How
does the information provide insight as to how another
culture might react to U.S. Military presence? In what
ways does the information illuminate “how they might think”
about various issues?
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Deception Detection
Systematic use of checklists to determine when deception actually
may be present and how to avoid being deceived.
When to Use
In reality, analysts too seldom check for the possibility of
deception, even when there is a well-known history of its use. The
search for clues that deception is being conducted is often time
consuming and requires extensive fact checking and hypothesis
testing. Nonetheless, it can be critical in cases where the stakes
are high. Analysts should be concerned about the use of
deception when the deceiver would have a lot to gain through his
efforts and has strong capabilities to deny or manipulate U.S.
intelligence collection assets.
Value Added
Deception Detection can add rigor to analysis and reinforce the
effectiveness of other analytic techniques covered in this primer.
There may be times when analysts will place too much confidence
in the effectiveness of other techniques covered in this primer, if
they have not considered the possibility that deception may be
present as well. For example, a well-developed set of indicators
might actively mislead analysts, if they were partly developed from
information purposely designed or fabricated by an adversary to
mislead its opponents. While most analysts know they cannot
assume every piece of collected intelligence is valid, few know
how to adapt their daily work habits to adjust for the possibility of
deception. Posing the hypothesis of deception places a
considerable cognitive burden on analysts. Once accepting this
possibility, it places in question all the evidence and makes it
difficult to draw any inferences from the evidence with high
confidence. A checklist of questions to detect possible deception
can prevent the analyst from becoming paralyzed.
The Method
Analysts should routinely consider that their information base is
susceptible to deception. If there is any possibility that deception
could be present, a small group of analysts should assess key
reporting based on four sets of criteria:
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x
Does a foreign actor have the motive, opportunity, and
means (MOM) to deceive?
x
Would this potential deception be consistent with past
opposition practices (POP)?
x
Do we have cause for concern regarding the manipulability
of sources (MOSES)
x
What can be learned from the evaluation of evidence (EVE)?
In addition to using this deception detection technique, analysts
can also employ the technique of analysis of competing
hypotheses (ACH). In this case, analysts would explicitly pose
deception as one of the multiple explanations for the presence or
absence of information. In the counterintelligence field, the use of
ACH as well as Deception Detection techniques has proven very
useful.
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Determining the Suitability of an Analogy
An analogy is a comparison, used to improve our ability to
comprehend one situation by comparing it to a previous situation
about which we know something. It is a form of inductive
reasoning, in which we proceed from one general premise to
another. Like all inductive thinking, however, there is no certainty
whether the analogical conclusion is warranted—at best the
conclusion could be probable.
The manner to determine an analogy’s suitability is to compare
the ways in which both situations are similar to each other, and
the ways in which both situations are dissimilar. For example,
given the analogy “Going into Iraq will be our next Vietnam,” the
person making the statement presumes that one will be like the
other. In some ways, perhaps it might. In others, however, there
may be significant differences.
As such—given the analogy stated above, first determine the
criteria around which you make the “similar/dissimilar”
assessment. List the broadest and most expansive set of criteria
you can possibly think of; the assessment of an analogy’s
suitability rests in large measure on the number of different criteria
you can possibly site. Just a few of the criteria for our scenario
could be as follows:
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Nature of the enemy
Nature of the environment in which we will operate
Nature of the regional allies or antagonists which may
help/hinder either side
Size and composition of enemy forces we will fight against
Size and composition of our own enemy forces
Whether or not the population will tend to rally around one
side or the other
Duration of the conflict
Professional state of the enemy forces
Professional state of the U.S. forces
Next, carefully consider our situation in Vietnam for each criterion.
Make a list.
Thereafter, carefully consider our situation in Iraq for each
criterion. Make a list.
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Now compare the two lists, criteria-by-criteria. Are those two lists
more similar or dissimilar? If they are mostly similar, perhaps you
have a strong analogy/inductive argument. However, if they are
mostly dissimilar, you have a weak analogy/inductive argument,
and whomever uttered the statement most likely didn’t think
through the ramifications of his/her remarks. Instead, they were
likely focused on a narrow subset of the criteria you have
considered, in a way that frames their conclusion.
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Devil’s Advocacy
Challenging a single, strongly held view or consensus by building
the best possible case for an alternative explanation.
When to Use
Devil’s Advocacy is used to consider whether stated beliefs or
assertions have been formed prematurely, without first
considering alternative perspectives. It is a technique designed to
help expose implicit assumptions and faulty reasoning.
The logic behind Devil’s Advocacy stems from the cognitive
challenges of decision making discussed by Richards Heuer (The
Psychology of Intelligence Analysis) and Morgan D. Jones (The
Thinkers Toolkit):
x
We commonly solve problems by first forming a conclusion,
and then using available evidence to support it. “[We tend to]
favor a particular outcome or solution early on in the analytic
process...long before we can objectively analyze the
evidence and reach a conclusion.” (This is the cognitive bias
known as confirmation bias.)
x
We tend to perceive what we expect to perceive
x
We tend to value information that is consistent with our
views, and reject or overlook information that is not
x
We can easily become wedded to a pre-existing plan,
person’s reputation, etc., which precludes us from continuing
to think critically about that plan, person, etc.
Value Added
Devil’s Advocacy helps red teamers expose faulty reasoning,
especially when the beliefs or assertions in question are the result
of “conclusions jumped to.” The tool will help establish additional
evidence which should have originally been considered; it helps
illuminate evidence which was either intentionally or
unintentionally disregarded or ignored.
The Method
Conducting Devil’s Advocacy is fairly straightforward: for a stated
belief or assertion, prove its opposite. Do this by 1) considering
the same evidence, some of which may have been disregarded or
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ignored, and by 2) finding new and disconfirming evidence
originally unavailable.
Example. Given a stated position: “The U.S. Federal
Government should not directly fund private schools”
x
x
State and prove the position in its opposite form: “The
U.S. Government should directly fund private schools,
because…”
ƒ
Enumerate reasons why this should be so.
Consider all evidence originally available,
especially that which was disregarded or ignored.
Oftentimes, evidence can support several
hypotheses, based upon its interpretation.
ƒ
Actively search for new evidence which proves this
opposite assertion.
Disprove the original belief or assertion:
ƒ
Reasons in the “stated position” which are faulty
ƒ
Reasons in the “stated position” which were
ignored/overlooked
ƒ
Reasons which are missing from the “stated
position”
ƒ
Consider any implicit assumptions upon which the
“stated position” rests
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Divergence - Convergence
This is one of the most important Liberating structures. It is
essentially structured brainstorming. It is based on the idea
that before tackling an issue, we must think first, write down
our thoughts, and then share them in a disciplined fashion.
Most frequently this is done by going around the room and
taking one idea from each member of the group. You cannot
share more than one as to give others a chance to contribute.
If someone else offers something on your list, then scratch it
out and offer something not yet raised. This goes on until all
lists are exhausted.
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Dot Voting
Frequently, planning teams must prioritize their efforts as there is
simply not enough time to address all legitimate issues. Dot voting
is a method designed to anonymously collect the groups’
perspective about the most urgent issues needing to be
addressed. Dot Voting and 5 Will Get You 25 are two methods of
weighted anonymous feedback.
x
Identify the largest possible universe of issues using
divergent thinking and collect them in a macro list
x
Group the input in the broadest possible way so that no two
topics remaining on the list overlap with each other (i.e.,
each topic is distinguishable from each other)
x
Number the remaining distinguishable issues (for the sake of
this illustration let's assume there are 12 different and
legitimate issues worthy of the groups energy and attention)
x
Each member writes a list of the numbers 1-12 in a column
on a 3x5 card
x
Each member then 'dot votes' 7 times (place a dot next to
the number of the topic that s/he wants to vote for. All 7
votes can be given to a single topic, 7 topics one vote each,
or divided 3 and 4, 1 and 6, 2 and 5, etc.
x
Collect the 5x8 cards and total the number of votes for each
idea or issue
The value of this approach is as follows:
x
forces each person to prioritize by having a little more than
50% votes of the total number of issues (7 of 12) but also
gives them the opportunity to vote for more than one
compelling issue
x
gives some indication of the weight of each idea with respect
to each other (a group score of 40 is significantly higher than
a group score of 20 even though 20 may be the second
highest score). This can be used to develop what the
weighted/ priority factors for a COA should be
Note - for this to work properly it is absolutely critical that ideas
don't compete against each other during dot voting so creating
distinguishable issues is a key part of the process.
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Fishbowl
“Fishbowl” is a liberating structure aimed at developing active
reflection, listening, and fresh perspectives.
Create a circle of chairs in the center of a larger circle. Five-six is
a good number. If you have a very large group, there may be
multiple outer circles.
Invite a small group of people that have direct experience with the
challenge into the small circle of chairs at the center. Ask this
group to talk about the challenge together, sharing stories of their
direct experience and insights as they might do if they were sitting
in a coffee shop or at dinner together. They talk to each other,
NOT the audience.
Invite the audience to ask questions and share their insights about
the conversation while those in the center circle just listen. Gather
all the questions. You might want to use file cards or have
someone capture all the questions on chart paper.
Then invite the group to dialogue with each other between the two
circles.
Some good questions for the debrief:
x
What did you hear that surprised you?
x
How has your perspective on the issue changed?
x
What questions are still open for you?
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Frame Audit
Use the Frame Audit to help uncover less than successful frames
and faulty logic, as well as potentially reframe an issue in more
helpful ways. Given a situation and frame, do the following:
x
Ask yourself: what matters most to whomever uses this
frame? What do they tend to talk about the most? Why?
x
Also ask: given the frame we are using, how do others tend
to see/frame the same issue? What is it they consider that
we don’t consider?
x
For the frame you are using, consider further:
x
o
What issue(s) does the frame address most? Why?
o
What boundaries do we put on the question?
(Boundaries are what we include within the frame,
versus what we leave out.)
o
What yardsticks (how we measure the question) and
reference points (key measurement benchmarks) do
we use to measure success?
o
What metaphors do we use in thinking about this
issue? Why?
o
Why do we think about this question this way? What
training or experience frames the way we view the
world?
o
What does the frame emphasize? Minimize? Why?
o
Do other people in our profession think about this
question differently? How? Why? Are their frames
successful?
Finally, ask whether your frame is effective:
o
Does the frame prompt you to ask the right questions
most of the time?
o
Have you tested or challenged the frame, or have
others tried to do so?
o
Is your frame decisive in the sense of helping you
resolve tough issues?
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o
Is your frame easily communicated to and understood
by others?
o
Do key stakeholders accept your frame as a guide to
joint action?
o
Does your frame achieve sufficient simplicity without
being too simple?
o
Is your frame adaptive and up-to-date with respect to
changing times?
o
Does your frame generate solutions that achieve
desired results?
o
What are some notable failures of the frame? Where
has it led you astray?
o
What are some of the deeper assumptions which
underlie your frame?
o
What are some of the origins of the assumptions in
your past experience?31
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Gallery Walk
Gallery Walk is an exercise
where teams circulate among
and discuss a ‘gallery’. Each
team has role players:
leader, reporter, monitor, and
recorder. The gallery has
multiple stations staged with
items [artifacts, charts,
points, etc.]. Teams are
directed to begin at different ‘stations’, and rotate clockwise to the
next station every five minutes. The Gallery Run is a variant with a
faster pace and lesser scope. As teams visit each station, they
complete prescribed questions or tasks. Also, the instructor
circulates to nurture discussion and involve disengaged members.
After all teams have viewed all stations, everyone meet for a
‘Report Out’, or a prescribed discussion. During this final meeting,
the instructor alleviates misconceptions and solicits feedback on
the process. See also
http://serc.carleton.edu/introgeo/gallerywalk/how.html .
To inject even more structural organization, add a ‘public journal’
to each station where the recorder posts pithy bullets from each
team’s review; force members to reach a concise consensus. To
inject even more interaction, add an ‘emissary’ function to each
team; force members to channel questions/issues for the
instructor through one member of the team. To inject even more
cooperative learning, switch roles at each station; force members
to experience and respect the challenges of each role.
is a ‘walk’ sped up to a ‘run of rounds’. The questions at each
station are lower order and don't need as much discussion or time.
Thus, students don't need as much time discussing the question
at each station, they complete a round much quicker, and can do
more rounds. If using posters, the answers evolve with each round
as groups contribute new ideas. The Report Out will still engage
higher order thinking.
Computer Tour is carried out the same way as a "Gallery Walk"
except the question or image to be discussed at each station is
pictured on a computer rather than a sheet of paper posted on the
wall. The advantage of this approach is that images for discussion
can quickly be posted, or changed for rounds.
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Process
x
Students post their products on the wall of the classroom.
x
Once all student products are posted, the students take a
Gallery Walk to visually examine each of the products.
During the Gallery Walk, each student may develop up to 3
questions on particular products, including their own (if
they want the entire group to hear a particular facet of their
product). Each question will be written legibly on a
separate 3x5 index card, together with the name of the
particular product.
x
At the end of the Gallery Walk, students will turn in their
questions to the Facilitators.
x
Facilitators then choose cards randomly and ask the
question of the owner of that particular product.
Gauge What Is Learned
The exercise is most successful when instructors manage
challenges and expectations. Gallery Walk can be assessed
informally [doesn’t counts for a grade] or formally [does]. Some
learning may be stifled by the pressure of formal evaluation. Still,
formal evaluation does emphasize and improve the learning. It is
just as much a learning activity as is a discussion, exercise, or
reading. Nonetheless, either type can be as simple as: a brief
quiz, rotating between groups and making sure each group is on
task, checking against learning objectives during the report out
phase, or the response to explain this issue to someone who has
little or no background with this material. Atypically a students can
self-assess some aspect of the instruction, i.e., a class debate run
by the students or instructor. Rubrics range from measuring the
quality of an individual’s participation to measuring the criteria of a
product.
See Also:
1. Instructor/Student Evaluation Form for Group Discussion
2. Instructor Evaluation Form for Oral Reports:
3. Instructor Evaluation for Written ReportsRubric for
Research Paper: (more info)
5. Student Rubric for Evaluating Group Work:
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6. Student Evaluation for Gallery Walk
Challenges Implementing Gallery Walk
x
The activity requires time that matches the scope, and
space, for class size.
x
Some students:
o may not take part in the discussion
o prefer memorization and regurgitation to discussion
o frown if content from the syllabus is not being
coveredare more introverted and don't like
interacting with othersare concerns about being
graded, fairly, and in a group no less
Tactics for Managing Challenges
x
Award credit for countering social ‘exclusion’; inclusion
brings serendipity.
x
Emphasize that industries seek: active listening, critical
thinking, teamwork, etc.
x
Emphasize that omitting material does not equate to
obstructing a key concept.
x
Reduce the time spent at each station and share an
equitable rubric beforehand.
x
Keep teams on task through conversation:
o Your group seems to think ... about this issue.
o How would you rephrase or summarize what has
been discussed so far?
o What similarities and differences do you see
between the responses you are giving at this
station and what was summarized at the last
station?
Student Directions
1. This activity is great practice for teamwork, a key facet to
success in any industry, business, or academia. Individuals
must be capable of working effectively in groups. So suspend
any judgments and just jump in fully receptive and engaged.
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2. Divide everyone into groups of five [or less], assign roles, and
clarify responsibilities.
o Leader - keep your group on task and prompt participation.
o Monitor – keeps track of time and the preceding/following
groups.
o Reporter - presents the group's thoughts on a question to
the class.
o Recorder – scribe a concise consensus on posters and for
the report out.
o Fifth Wheel (in groups of five) – assist others in need.
3. Review the process, tasks, expectations, and/or evaluation
criteria, when applicable, how we will be assessed or what we
will expected to present/produce.
Step by Step Instructions
1. Prepare Concepts – Establish the central concept or your
message for the exercise. Prepare four to five questions that
steer the dialog toward that central concept. Also see Higher
Order Thinking and Bloom's Taxonomy and Examples of
Gallery Walk.
2. Visualize Process - Rehearse the event in your head and/or
onsite. Move through the process as a student, visualize
materials they’ll use [what/where/when]. Decide whether to
use large sheets of paper, whiteboards, notepads, index
cards, etc.
3. Prepare Stations - Position artifacts, questions, and space for
each group’s answer. Instead, questions can be placed on
cards and each scribe can keep answers.
4. Prepare Students – Give students directions, clarifying mixups. Discuss process, evaluation, tasks, etc. See also
Preparing Students & Assessing Gallery Walk.
5. Prepare Groups – Arrange students into teams. Assign roles
and responsibilities: leader, monitor, reporter, and recorder.
Distribute group materials: pens, pads, etc.
6. Launch Gallery Walk - Direct each group to a different stations
and start the clock.
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7. Monitor Groups - Nurture student discussions and involve
each group member. Rephrase questions or to provide hints;
be ready to redirect the participants.
8. Rotate Groups - After 5 minutes, have groups "rotate”
clockwise to the next station. Continue rotations until every
group has visited every station.
9. Report Out - Allow ten minutes for the groups to synthesize
the recorders notes or each poster. Then have each reporter
present a 5-minute summary of the synthesis.
10. Reinforce Learning– After the Report Out, discuss the process
and recap key points to the central concept. Correct
misconceptions and errors.
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High-Impact/ Low-Probability Analysis
Highlights a seemingly unlikely event that would have major policy
consequences if it happened.
When to Use
A contrarian technique that sensitizes analysts to the potential
impact of seemingly low probability events that would have major
repercussions on U.S. interests. Using this technique is advisable
when policymakers are convinced that an event is unlikely but
have not given much thought to the consequences of its
occurrence. In essence, this can be a warning that the intelligence
and policy communities must be alert to an unexpected but not
impossible event.
Value Added
Mapping out the course of an unlikely, yet plausible, event can
uncover hidden relationships between key factors and
assumptions; it also can alert analysts to oversights in the
mainstream analytic line. In addition, an examination of the
“unthinkable” allows analysts to develop signposts that may
provide early warning of a shift in the situation. By periodically
reviewing these indicators a Red Team is more likely to counter
any prevailing mind-set that such a development is highly unlikely.
The Method
If there is a strongly held view that an event is unlikely, then
postulating precisely the opposite should not be difficult.
x
Define the high-impact outcome clearly. This process is
what will justify examining what most analysts believe to be
a very unlikely development.
x
Devise one or more plausible explanations for or
“pathways” to the low probability outcome. This should be
as precise as possible, as it can help identify possible
indicators for later monitoring.
x
Insert possible triggers or changes in momentum if
appropriate. These can be natural disasters, sudden health
problems of key leaders, or new economic or political
shocks that might have occurred historically or in other
parts of the world.
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x
Brainstorm with individuals having a broad set of
experiences to aid the development of plausible but
unpredictable triggers of sudden change.
x
Identify for each pathway a set of indicators or
“observables” that would help you anticipate that events
were beginning to play out this way.
x
Identify factors that would deflect a bad outcome or
encourage a positive outcome.
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Ideal Group Process
Red Teaming tools and Liberating Structures are designed to
enhance our thinking and staff processes.
x How do we employ them?
x Where do they fit in the planning process?
x In what order should they be applied?
We could offer simple answers to those questions, but that may
be too prescriptive.
Critical thinking and Red Teaming in general do not always lend
themselves well to a checklist approach. Perhaps Dietrich Dorner
put it best when he wrote: “How can we teach people to deal
effectively with uncertainty and complexity? There is probably no
cut-and-dried method for teaching people how to manage
complex, uncertain, and dynamic realities, because such realities,
by their nature, do not present themselves in cut-and-dried form.
(Dorner, 193).”
There are however methods to deal with a problem in the most
appropriate way. The context of the situation will dictate those
methods. “Ideal Group Process” from Russo and Schoemaker’ s
Winning Decisions provides a good, broad template for critical
thinking and the application of Red Teaming tools. Probably the
most powerful tool is one of the simplest: Think, Write, and Share
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Indicators or Signposts of Change
Periodically review a list of observable events or trends to track
events, monitor targets, spot emerging trends, and warn of
unanticipated change.
When to Use
An analyst or team can create an indicators or signposts list of
observable events that one would expect to see if a postulated
situation is developing; (e.g., economic reform, military
modernization, political instability, or democratization).
Constructing the list might require only a few hours or as much as
several days to identify the critical variables associated with the
targeted issue. The technique can be used whenever a Red Team
needs to track an event over time to monitor and evaluate
changes. In those instances, a Red Team would be watching for
mounting evidence to support a particular hypothesis, low
probability event, or scenario.
When there are sharply divided views on an issue, an indicators or
signposts list can also “depersonalize” the argument by shifting
analytic attention to a more objective set of criteria. Using an
indicators list can clarify substantive disagreements, once all sides
agree on the set of objective criteria used to measure the topic
under study.
Value Added
By providing an objective baseline for tracking events or targets,
indicators instill rigor into the analytic process and enhance the
credibility of analytic judgments. An indicators list included in a
finished product also allows the policymaker to track
developments and builds a more concrete case for the analytic
judgments. By laying out a list of critical variables, analysts also
will be generating hypotheses regarding why they expect to see
the presence of such factors. In so doing, the Red Team can
make the analytic line much more transparent and available for
scrutiny by others.
The Method
Whether used alone, or in combination with other structured
analysis, the process is the same:
x
Identify a set of competing hypotheses or scenarios
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x
Create separate lists of potential activities, statements, or
events expected for each hypothesis or scenario
x
Regularly review and update the indicators lists to see
which are changing
x
Identify the most likely or most correct hypotheses or
scenarios, based on the number of changed indicators that
are observed
Developing two lists of indicators for each hypothesis or scenario
may prove useful to distinguish between indicators that a
development is or is not emerging. This is particularly useful in a
“What If?” Analysis, when it is important to make a case that a
certain event is unlikely to happen. Checklist of questions to
detect possible deception can prevent the analyst from becoming
paralyzed.
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Key Assumption Check
List and review the key working assumptions on which
fundamental judgments rest.
When to Use
Most useful at the beginning of an analytic project. An individual
analyst or a team can spend an hour or two articulating and
reviewing the key assumptions. Rechecking assumptions also can
be valuable at any time prior to finalizing judgments, to ensure that
the assessment does not rest on flawed premises. Identifying
hidden assumptions can be one of the most difficult challenges an
analyst faces, as they are ideas held—often unconsciously—to be
true and, therefore, are seldom examined and almost never
challenged.
Value Added
Explicitly identifying working assumptions during an analytic
project helps:
x
Explain the logic of the analytic argument and expose
faulty logic.
x
Understand the key factors that shape an issue.
x
Stimulate thinking about an issue.
x
Uncover hidden relationships and links between key
factors.
x
Identify developments that would cause you to abandon an
assumption.
x
Prepare analysts for changed circumstances that could
surprise them.
The Method
Consider how their analysis depends on the validity of certain
premises, which they do not routinely question or believe to be in
doubt. A four step process will help analysts:
1. Review what the current analytic line on this issue appears
to be; write it down for all to see.
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2. Articulate all the premises, both stated and unstated in
finished intelligence, which are accepted as true for this
analytic line to be valid.
3. Challenge each assumption, asking why it “must” be true
and whether it remains valid under all conditions.
4. Refine the list of key assumptions to contain only those
that “must be true” to sustain your analytic line; consider
under what conditions or in the face of what information
these assumptions might not hold.
Questions to Ask During this Process Include:
x
How much confidence exists that this assumption is
correct?
x
What explains the degree of confidence in the
assumption?
x
What circumstances or information might undermine this
assumption?
x
Is a key assumption more likely a key uncertainty or key
factor?
x
Could the assumption have been true in the past but less
so now?
x
If the assumption proves to be wrong, would it significantly
alter the analytic line? How?
x
Has this process identified new factors that need further
analysis?
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Liberating Structures
A liberating structure (LS) is any approach/technique/effort that
liberates good ideas from group constraints. Liberating structures
intercede factors [tangential to the process, i.e., group dynamics]
that otherwise detour the group from their best productivity.
Liberating structures release a group in deliberation [i.e. problemsolving or decision-making] from constraints unrelated to the
problem itself.
Useful techniques are detailed throughout this chapter and at
http://www.liberatingstructures.com.
Liberating structures can:
x
Buy time.
x
Suspend rank.
x
Afford anonymous input.
x
Vocalize opportunity costs.
x
Enjoy life, suspend stressors.
x
Lead a person out of logical habits.
x
Take people out of their comfort-zone.
x
Test prevalent wisdom as though it were wrong.
x
Summons diversity; contributions with differing expertise,
backgrounds, perspectives, etc.
x
Invites dichotomy; from those closest to the problem to
farthest from the bias or a view on the other side.
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Logic of Failure
The Logic of Failure: How human planning and decision making
processes can go awry if we do not pay enough attention to
possible side-effects and long-term repercussions.
The “Logic:”
x
Failure develops gradually according to its own logic.
x
When we fail to solve a problem, it is often due to several
small mistakes. Small mistakes add up.
x
Complicated situations elicit habits of thought that may not
measure up to the demands of the system that is
generating the problem.
x
Apprehensions of failure encourage methods of decision
making that may exacerbate the problem
The Logic of Failure occurs:
o
When we generate truths instead of hypotheses
o
When we assign blame
o
When we forget to ask, “Why?”
o
When our goals are too general or specific, or never
change
o
When we plan too elaborately, or too sketchily
o
When corrective measures are too timid or too aggressive
o
When we ignore premises that should have been
considered
o
When we miss interrelations
o
When our habits of thought don’t measure up to the
demands of the system.
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Logic Fallacies
1. Ad Hominem Occurs when someone tries to attack a person,
and not a position.
2. Appeal to Fear or Emotions Occurs when language is
emotionally charged to distract the audience from relevant
reasons and evidence.
3. Appeal to the Masses or Popularity Occurs when an assertion
is made that if something is good for everyone else, it must be
good for you too. Marketing and advertisements usually make
this claim.
4. Appeal to Questionable Authority Occurs when the authority
we use to support the premises is actually the wrong authority for
the issue at hand. It’s akin to “hiding behind”
someone/something famous, in the hopes that that alone will sell
the argument.
5. Begging the Question An argument in which the conclusion is
assumed in the reasoning (vice explicitly stated). A fallacy of
deductive reasoning. “Accept this as true: the premise from
which it comes is true!
6. Causal Oversimplification Explaining an event by relying on
causal factors that are insufficient to account for the event, or by
overemphasizing the role of one or more of these factors.
7. Confusion of Cause and Effect Confusing the cause with the
effect of an event or failing to recognize that the two events may be
influencing each other.
8. Equivocation A key word is used with two or more meanings in
an argument such that the argument fails to make sense once
the shifts in meaning are recognized.
9. Explaining by Naming Falsely assuming that because you have
provided a name for some event or behavior, that you have also
adequately explained the event.
10. False Cause The presumption that a real or perceived
relationship between things means that one is the cause of the
other.
11. False dichotomy Occurs when someone presents a complex
situation in black and white terms—i.e., they only present two
alternatives where many exist. The logic fault here is that there is
much more to the argument than the watered-down version
presented. Rather than allow watered-down arguments, critical
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12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
thinkers actually need to widen the aperture to determine the best
possible set of options.
Faulty or Weak Analogy Occurs when an author uses an
analogy to communicate a concept, but the analogy used is not
strong enough to support the conclusion being drawn.
Glittering Generality The use of vague emotionally appealing
virtue words that dispose us to approve something without
closely examining the reasons.
Hasty Generalization Fallacy Related to anchor adjustment
fallacy. A fallacy of inductive reasoning. A person drawing a
conclusion about a large group based on experiences with only a
few members of the group.
Neglect of a Common Cause Failure to recognize that two
events may be related because of the effects of a common third
factor.
Post Hoc Fallacy Related to False Cause. Occurs when
someone argues that because two events occurred together and
one followed the other closely in time, then the first event caused
the second. It’s an appeal to believe a cause-and-effect
relationship that does not actually occur.
Red Herring Occurs when the author diverts the reader’s
attention with distracting information that is flashy, eye-catching,
and generally not relevant to the topic at hand.
Searching for the Perfect Solution Falsely assuming that
because part of a problem would remain after a solution is tried,
the solution should therefore not be adopted.
Slippery Slope Occurs when the conclusion of an argument
rests upon an alleged chain reaction and there isn’t sufficient
reason to conclude that the chain reaction will actually take
place. Unfortunately, hypothesizing often requires us to
speculate in this arena.
Straw Person Distorting an opponent’s point of view so that it is easy
to attack; thus attacking a point of view that does not truly exist.
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Mitigating Groupthink
x The leader should refrain from stating up front any preferences
or expectations.
x Establish an expectation of conflict in deliberation—but focused
on the issues, not between personalities. Conflict can foster
creativity and learning.
x Prior to beginning, have all individual “pre-commit” by writing
down their initial answers to the issue being discussed—this
helps establish ideas prior to deliberation and mitigate a pull
toward conformity. Demand several options from each member.
x Each member of a decision-making group should have the
responsibility to air objections and doubts, and be reinforced by
the leader’s acceptance of criticism from the group at large.
x Leverage anonymity of ideas and responses where possible.
x The group should consciously construct alternative perspectives
of the situation. Alternative perspectives force the group to form
options in the case they occur.
x The group should set up several independent sub-groups to
work on the same issues. Seek diversity in assembling these
groups.
x The group should assign individuals to act as a devil’s advocate
vis-à-vis options, policies, etc., that the group is assembling.
x The group’s individuals should seek outside expertise and input
on the question(s) at hand.
x The group should bring in expertise to challenge the views being
developed by the group itself.
x Once the group has reached a conclusion on the best option, a
“second chance” meeting should be held at which every
member restates any and all reservations he/she may have
concerning the chosen option.
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My 15%
Most people have about 15 percent control over their work
situations. The other 85 percent rests in the broader context,
shaped by the general structures, systems, events and culture in
which they operate. The challenge rests in finding ways of
creating transformational change incrementally: By encouraging
people to mobilize small but significant "15 percent initiatives" that
can snowball in their effects. When guided by a sense of shared
vision, the process can tap into the self-organizing capacities of
everyone involved.
It doesn’t matter if you’re a General Officer or an enlisted soldier,
a Senior Executive or a member of the team. You still have only
your 15 percent.
Where do you have freedom to act? What’s in your 15%?
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Onion Model
Hofstede’s “Onion” Model: Manifestations of Culture at Different
Levels of Depth. In Hofstede’s model we find Values at the core,
wrapped by Rituals, Heroes, and Symbols. Each layer is
influenced by the core and subsumed under the term Practices.
As with most red teaming tools, the “onion model “should be used
to prompt better questions, create a more comprehensive
perspective, and expose ignorance. Notionally, it is possible to
learn about, train on, or emulate each layer through concentrated
practice; but not the core. Core values are learned culture, and
deeply contextual. This is what Connerley and Pederson meant
when they said “Culture may be learned, but it cannot be
taught.” 32
When to Use
Like 4-Ways of Seeing, use this tool early in any cultural review.
Many people belong to several different groups at the same time,
unavoidably carrying within them layers of mental programming
that corresponds to different levels of culture. Refer to Chapter III
for additional insight.
Value Added
This model helps to surface manifestations, similarities, and
differences among or within the culture of a country, region, or
group.
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The Method
Interview and observe subjects. Postulate values and layers within
the group(s). Populate the layers. Compare and contrast against
the other selected groups, as needed.
For example:
x
a National level according to one's country (or countries for
those who migrated during their lifetime)
x
a Regional and/or Ethnic and/or Religious and/or Linguistic
Affiliation level; most nations are composed of culturally
differing groups: regions, ethnicities, religions, and language
x
a Gender level, according to whether a person was born as
a girl or as a boy
x
a Generation level, according to whether a person is a
grandparent, parent, or child
x
a Social Class level, according to opportunities linked with
educational, occupational, or social standings
x
an Organizational or Corporate level, according to how
employees are/were socialized in their workplace
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Outside-In Thinking
Used to identify the full range of basic forces, factors, and trends
that would indirectly shape an issue.
When to Use
At the conceptualization of an analytic project, when the goal is to
identify all the critical, external factors that could influence how a
particular situation will develop. It would work well for a group of
analysts responsible for a range of functional and/or regional
issues. When assembling a large database that must identify a
number of information categories or database fields, this
technique can aid in visualizing the entire set of categories that
might be needed in a research effort. Often analysts realize only
too late that some additional information categories will be needed
and then must go back and review all previous files and recode
the data. With a modest amount of effort, “Outside-in Thinking”
can reduce the risk of missing important variables early in the
analytic process.
Value Added
Most analysts spend their time concentrating on familiar factors
within their field or analytic issue. That is, they think from the
“inside”—namely, what they control—out to the broader world.
Conversely, “thinking from the outside-in” begins by considering
the external changes that might, over time, profoundly affect the
analysts’ own field or issue. This technique encourages analysts
to get away from their immediate analytic tasks (the so-called
“inbox”) and think about their issues in a wider conceptual and
contextual framework. By recasting the problem in much broader
and fundamental terms, analysts are more likely to uncover
additional factors, an important dynamic, or a relevant alternative
hypothesis.
The Method
Develop a generic description of the problem or the phenomenon
under study. Then:
x
List all the key forces (social, technological, economic,
environmental, and political) that could have an impact on
the topic, but over which one can exert little influence (e.g.,
globalization, social stress, the Internet, or the global
economy).
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x
Focus next on key factors over which an actor or
policymaker can exert some influence. In the business
world this might be the market size, customers, the
competition, suppliers or partners; in the government
domain it might include the policy actions or the behavior
of allies or adversaries.
x
Assess how each of these forces could affect the analytic
problem.
x
Determine whether these forces actually do have an
impact on the particular issue based on the available
evidence.
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Premortem Analysis
This is a method for helping decision makers anticipate problems.
The purpose of a Premortem is to find key vulnerabilities in a plan.
In contrast to risk analysis, the Premortem begins with the
assumption that the plan has failed. The pull of groupthink,
consensus, and a false sense of security is punctured, and is
replaced by an active search aimed at preventing trouble later on.
The premise for the Premortem exercise is that people may feel
too confident once they have arrived at a plan. Premortem
analysis empowers the participants to question the premise of a
proposed course of action, its assumptions, and tasks. It breaks
ownership of a course of action through a divergent process that
encourages objectivity and skepticism.
Dr. Gary Klein developed the concept of the Premortem
analysis. 33 This is a powerful red teaming tool as it is 1] simple to
use, 2] simple to understand, 3] and when used during the
decision-making process will empower the red team and members
of the larger plans team to question the premise of a proposed
course of action, assumptions, or specified tasks.
When to Use
The ideal time to use a Premortem Analysis is just before the war
gaming step in the decision making process, either the war game
that analyzes proposed COAs or the war game that refines the
selected COA into the concept of the operation.
Value Added
The use of a Premortem analysis will break the ownership of a
particular course of action by a thorough, if rapid, session of
answering the question, what would cause this course of action to
fail if it is the basis for the operations plan?
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The Method
Premortem analysis is an application of mental simulation. The
premise for Premortem analysis is that people may feel too
confident once they have arrived at a plan, especially if they are
not highly experienced. The Premortem analysis requires one
person to act as the scribe and must be limited in duration to no
more than 30 minutes, ideally 20.
Step 1 Preparation. All members should be familiar with the
base plan, at a minimum.
Step 2 Imagine a fiasco. Imagine that the plan failed. Ask, why
did this happen? What could have caused this?
Specifically, what are the reasons?
Step 3 Generate the reasons for failure. Participants individually
spend several minutes writing down all the possible
reasons for failure. It is important to do this individually
first, so that the insights and experience of each
participant are brought to bear.
Step 4 Consolidate the lists. Go around the room in round-robin
fashion and solicit input from the participants, one at a
time. Record the ideas on a whiteboard or poster paper.
Continue until all ideas are exhausted. This is a
divergent process in which four rules must be followed:
Rule 1: The more ideas, the better
Rule 2: Build one idea upon another. In other words, if
someone else’s idea prompts a new one from
you, write it down.
Rule 3: Wacky ideas are okay. This rule bothers most
people. Conventional wisdom dictates that
“new” ideas must be sensible, reasonable,
constructive, and practical. Wacky, silly, and
foolish are subjective modifiers that people
tend to apply to any idea that does not conform
narrowly to a risk-free standard of sensible,
reasonable, constructive, or practical. Although
wacky ideas may seem foolish, they can
generate serious thought.
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Rule 4: Don’t evaluate ideas, neither yours nor
someone else’s. This includes body language,
eye rolls, nods or groans. This rule liberates
people from their self-imposed restraints in
generating ideas, and eliminates fear of
criticism and ridicule.
Step 5 Revisit the plan. Based on the list of concerns, revisit the plan
and determine what to mitigate. Determine “ownership” and
develop concepts for modifications to the plan.
Step 6 Keep and periodically review the list. This helps keep the
possibility of different types of failure fresh in everyone’s
mind as the plan develops or is implemented. 34
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Problem Restatement (Revised)
Problem Restatement is a powerful process in which new
perspectives and informative insights may be gained from using
techniques that may expose the “real” issue at hand. Sometimes
restating a problem points to a solution, though usually it shows
there is more than one problem and helps identify them. Problem
restatement is particularly powerful when combined with a
divergent process, restating the problem in as many ways as you
can think of. The goal of problem restatement is to expand our
thinking of the problem, not to solve it.
Common Pitfalls in Problem Definition
No focus - definition is too vague or broad.
Example: What should we do about readiness?
This statement doesn’t really identify the problem.
Focus is misdirected – definition is too narrow.
Example: Unit readiness rates are slipping. How can
we get unit commanders to focus on training?
Lack of focus on the part of unit commanders may not
be the problem, and if it isn’t, pressuring them may
aggravate the problem.
Statement is assumption-driven.
Example: Examine the issue you identified for implicit
assumptions. The assumptions may define the problem
too narrowly. If the assumptions are invalid, the
problem statement misdirects the focus of the analysis.
Statement is solution-driven.
Example: How can we persuade Division HQ to
provide more equipment/billets to increase our
capability for X?
This narrow-focus statement assumes a solution. If the
assumed solution is inappropriate, the problem
statement misdirects the analytic focus.
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Quality of Information Check
Evaluate completeness and soundness of available information
sources.
When to Use
Weighing the validity of sources is a key feature of any critical
thinking. Moreover, establishing how much confidence one puts in
analytic judgments should ultimately rest on how accurate and
reliable the information base is. Hence, checking the quality of
information used in intelligence analysis is an ongoing, continuous
process. Having multiple sources on an issue is not a substitute
for having good information that has been thoroughly examined.
Analysts should perform periodic checks of the information base
for their analytic judgments. Otherwise, important analytic
judgments can become anchored to weak information, and any
“caveats” attached to those judgments in the past can be forgotten
or ignored over time.
Value Added
A thorough review of information sources provides analysts with
an accurate assessment of “what we know” and “what we do not
know.” It is also an opportunity to confirm that sources have been
cited accurately. In the case of HUMINT, this will require extensive
review of the sources’ background information and access as well
as his or her motivation for providing the information. Similarly,
reviewing technical sourcing can sometimes reveal inadvertent
errors in processing, translation, or interpretation that otherwise
might have gone unnoticed. In addition, a quality of information
check can be valuable to both collectors and policymakers:
x It can help to detect possible deception and denial strategies
by an adversary.
x It can identify key intelligence gaps and new requirements for
collectors.
x It can assist policymakers in understanding how much
confidence analysts are placing on analytic judgments.
The Method
An analyst or a team might begin a quality of information check by
developing a database in which information is stored according to
source type and date, with additional notations indicating
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strengths or weaknesses in those sources. Ideally, analysts would
have retrieval and search capability on the database, so that
periodic reviews are less labor intensive and result in a more
complete review of all sources used in past analysis. For the
information review to be fully effective, analysts will need as much
background information on sources as is feasible. Knowing the
circumstances in which reporting was obtained is often critical to
understanding its validity. With the data in hand, analysts can
then:
x
Review systematically all sources for accuracy.
x
Identify information sources that appear most critical or
compelling.
x
Check for sufficient and strong corroboration of critical
reporting.
x
Reexamine previously dismissed information in light of new
facts or circumstances that cast it in a different light.
x
Ensure that any recalled reporting is identified and properly
flagged for other analysts; analysis based on recalled
reporting should also be reviewed to determine if the
reporting was essential to the judgments made.
x
Consider whether ambiguous information has been
interpreted and caveated properly.
x
Indicate a level of confidence that analysts can place in
sources, which are likely to figure in future analytic
assessments.
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Red Team Analysis
Models the behavior of an individual or group by trying to replicate
how an adversary would think about an issue; UFMCS also refers
to this method as the Initiatives Group.
When to Use
Frequently, analysts face the challenge of forecasting how a
foreign leader or decision-making group may behave when it is
clear that there is a risk of falling into a “mirror-image” problem.
That is, analysts can sometimes impute to a foreign actor the
same motives, values, or understanding of an issue that they hold.
Traditional analysis sometimes assumes that foreign leaders or
groups will behave “rationally” and act as the analysts would if
faced with the same threats or opportunities. History has shown
that foreign leaders often respond differently to events because of
different cultural, organizational, or personal experiences. Red
teaming analysis tries to consciously place analysts in the same
cultural, organizational, and personal setting (“putting them in their
shoes”) in which the target individual or group operates. Whereas
analysts normally work from the position of the “blue” (friendly
forces), a “red” team of analysts attempts to work in the
environment of the hostile forces.
Value Added
Like Devil’s Advocacy and Team A/Team B techniques, red
teaming analysis is aimed at freeing the analyst from the prison of
a well-developed mind-set; in this case, the analyst’s own sense
of rationality, cultural norms, and personal values. Whereas
analysts usually operate as “observers” of a foreign adversary, the
red teaming technique transforms the analyst into an “actor”
operating within the adversary’s culture and political milieu. This
form of “role playing” is useful when trying to replicate the mindset of authoritarian leaders, terrorist cells, or other non-Western
groups that operate under very different codes of behavior or
motivations. Often this technique can introduce new or different
stimuli that might not have been factored into traditional analysis—
such as the target’s familial ties or the international political,
economic, and military pressures felt by the individual. For
example, Red Team participants might ask themselves: “What
would my peers, family, or tribe expect me to do? Alternatively, a
Red Team analyst might pose the question to his colleagues:
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“How do we perceive the external threats and opportunities?”
Finally, the red teaming technique can factor into its analysis the
way in which personal power and status might influence a target’s
behavior.
The Method
Build a team of experts with in-depth knowledge of the operating
environment, the target’s personality, and the style of thinking
used. The team should be populated not just with those who
understand the language, but also with people, who might have
experienced the culture, share the ethnic background, or have
worked in a similar operational environment. Once established
and separated from traditional analysis, the team members
should:
x Put themselves in the adversary’s circumstances and react to
foreign stimuli as the target would.
x Develop a set of “first-person” questions that the adversary
would ask, such as: “How would I perceive incoming
information; what would be my personal concerns; or to whom
would I look for an opinion?”
x Draft a set of policy papers in which the leader or group makes
specific decisions, proposes recommendations, or lays out
courses of actions. The more these papers reflect the cultural
and personal norms of the target, the more they can offer a
different perspective on the analytic problem.
Red teaming analysis is not easy to conduct. It requires significant
time to develop a team of qualified experts who can think like the
adversary. The team has to distance itself from the normal
analysis and work as though living in the target’s world. Without a
sophisticated understanding of the culture, operational
environment, and personal histories of the foreign group, analysts
will not be able to behave or think like the enemy. Analysts can
never truly escape their own experiences and mindsets, but this
technique can at least prevent them from falling into “mirrorimaging” unconsciously.
The most novel feature of red teaming analysis is its presentation.
x
The analysis is often in a “first person” format—that is,
drafted as memos to or from a leader or group.
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x
Red teaming analysis avoids the use of caveats or
qualifications and assumes that the recipient understands
that the paper is aimed more at provoking thought or
challenging the conventional understanding of how an
adversary thinks.
x
Such papers are rarely coordinated among other experts
and do not purport to represent the consensus view on an
issue.
Red teaming papers do not plot out all possible courses of action
but seek to give a prediction based on the target’s special
personal, organizational, or cultural experiences.
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Red Teaming – Assessment Questions
x
Are the proposed measurements of effectiveness clearly
linked to the strategy, mission, or end state?
x
Does the measurement have a clear start point (baseline)
in which to measure progress?
x
Does the measurement system incorporate higher
headquarters metrics? Are the unit’s tasks developed to
local conditions?
x
What is the level of coalition or interagency agreement to
the assessment measures? If no agreement, what are the
implications?
x
Who has primary responsibility for assessment? Has the
task (who, what, when, where) been established?
x
Has key assessment measures been included in the unit’s
CCIR?
x
Do the metrics reflect a cultural sensitivity, whereby
important things are measured? From the civilian
population perspective, does the U.S. MOE matter (e.g.,
Maslow Theory - electricity vice elections)? What are the
expectations of the people in terms of patience for
process?
x
From the enemy’s perspective, what are their measures of
effectiveness? Does our MOE’s measure what is important
to him?
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Red Teaming – Assumption Questions
When to Use
An individual analyst or a team can spend an hour or two
articulating and reviewing the key assumptions. Rechecking
assumptions also can be valuable at any time prior to finalizing
judgments, to ensure that the assessment does not rest on flawed
premises. Identifying hidden assumptions can be one of the most
difficult challenges an analyst faces, as they are ideas held—often
unconsciously—to be true and, therefore, are seldom examined
and almost never challenged.
Value Added
Explicitly identifying working assumptions during an analytic
project helps:
x
Explain the logic of the analytic argument and expose
faulty logic
x
Understand the key factors that shape an issue.
x
Stimulate thinking about an issue
x
Uncover hidden relationships and links between key
factors
x
Identify developments that would cause you to abandon an
assumption
x
Prepare analysts for changed circumstances that could
surprise them
The Method
Consider how their analysis depends on the validity of certain
premises, which they do not routinely question or believe to be in
doubt. A four step process will help analysts:
x
Review what the current analytic line on this issue appears
to be; write it down for all to see.
x
Articulate all the premises, both stated and unstated in
finished intelligence, which are accepted as true for this
analytic line to be valid.
x
Challenge each assumption, asking why it “must” be true
and whether it remains valid under all conditions.
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x
Refine the list of key assumptions to contain only those
that “must be true” to sustain your analytic line; consider
under what conditions or in the face of what information
these assumptions might not hold.
The List
x
Does the assumption meet the standards for an
assumption; fact or opinion?
x
Is the assumption based on preconception, bias, or
historical analogy; are they relevant and/or accurate?
x
Is the assumption logical, given what is known about the
enemy (equipment, doctrine, and TTP), weather, and
terrain; does the assumption reflect reality found in the
OE?
x
Does the staff use a defined procedure throughout the
planning and preparation (and potentially portions of the
execution phase) that continually examines whether
assumptions are valid?
x
Is the assumption appropriate to the level of planning?
x
Are there assumptions made implicitly during planning but
not stated or assumptions made by the staff but not
included in the plan?
x
How is the staff addressing assumptions included in higher
headquarters plans?
x
How many assumptions are acceptable?
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Red Teaming – Key Questions
Red Teams continually and constructively challenge the staff’s
thinking processes during planning and operations:
Question
Result in
x What if….?
x Alternative analysis
x What are the
objectives of….?
x Consideration of enemy, partner,
and others on the battlefield
x What about….?
x Identification of gaps, seams,
vulnerabilities
x What are we
missing?
x Identification of gaps, seams,
vulnerabilities
x What happens
next?
x Identification of branches and
sequels
x What should
we assess?
x Identification of measures of
effectiveness
x How can we
assess…?
x Description of the assessment
x How do we
know success?
x Description of a desired end-state
x What worked
and why?
x Enables a learning organization
x What didn’t work
and why?
x Avoid patterns of operation
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Red Teaming – MDMP Actions
The military decision making process (MDMP) combines the
conceptual and detailed aspects of planning and integrates the
activities of the players throughout the planning process. The
MDMP begins with Receipt of the Mission and ends with Execution.
Staff actions are outlined in doctrine and the following are
recommendations for the Red Team.
Receipt of the Mission
1. Based on the mission brief, construct a simple matrix
using the S-W-O-T Analysis formula identified in the
briefing which are found in the operational environment
from the US, adversary, and other perspectives. From
this matrix, what are glaring omissions/gaps in the
briefings/products provided?
2. What are the timelines associated with the plan?
3. Did the mission brief provide sufficient details to support
the planning for all phases of the operation?
4. Were higher headquarters assumptions identified?
Mission Analysis
5. Assist the staff in the identification of specified, implied,
and essential tasks.
6. Identify higher headquarters assumptions and challenge
assumptions used by the staff.
7. Attend mission analysis brief.
8. Identify the enemy and US/coalition centers of g ravity from
their perspectives.
9. Identify potential end state definitions for adversaries,
coalition, and other major stakeholders.
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10. Continue OE/cultural analysis for use in COA
Development.
11. Red Teaming Tools/Questions include:
‡ Was the U.S./coalition end states clearly stated? Are
there differences between the partners? Did we
identify the enemy end state?
‡ Does the information about the OE provide sufficient
detail and linkages among the variables?
‡ Has the higher headquarters provided any
“assessment” measures that would affect formulation of
the unit’s assessment system
COA Development
x
Is there sufficient focus and identification of requirement for
all phases of the operations (e.g., stability and support)
x
Does the COA account for all variables found in the OE
(e.g., PMESII-PT)?
x
Are the assessment tasks sufficiently identified?
x
Continually examine assumptions for validity. Is there a
plan to confirm/deny them? What consequences or
branches are required? Did we consider key assumptions
as potential CCIR? ISR Implications?
x
Conduct a Premortem Analysis of the COAs.
COA Analysis
x
Assist staff by serving as the unbiased “umpire” for the war
game to arbitrate disputes.
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x
Help staff determine if adequate measures are in place to
measure success and how/who will provide input to the
measurement.
x
Monitor the war game to help insure accuracy, for:
‡ Realistic friendly and enemy capabilities.
‡ Appropriate actions and results.
x
Review the war game procedures and questions.
x
Does the war game account for the involvement, reaction, or
counteraction by significant stakeholders? (4 Ways of Seeing
and Stakeholder Mapping)
(DOD) Wargaming is a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of an
operation, given own strengths and weaknesses and dispositions,
enemy assets and possible COAs. It attempts to foresee the action,
reaction, and counteraction dynamics of an operation. This process
highlights tasks that appear to be particularly important to the
operation and provides a degree of familiarity with operational-level
possibilities that might otherwise be difficult to achieve. (JP 5-00.2)
War games succeed or fail due for a variety of reasons. Red
Teams can help the staff review the following with them:
12. What are the standing operating procedures for the war
game?
13. Who’s in charge? XO or Chief of Staff according to
doctrine – Is this reality?
14. What is the role of the G5/G3 Planner – who has
ownership of the plan?
15. Who’s the umpire? Who decides and arbitrates disputes?
16. Is there sufficient time available for war gaming?
Does the war game account for the most difficult phase or aspect
of the planned operation? (e.g., for a conventional fight – river
crossing/passage of lines are considered among the most
difficult).
Who fights the enemy? G2? Is there significant
seniority/expertise of the enemy team?
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x
Is the enemy’s “aim and concept” placed within a larger
context to see the “big picture”?
x
Is the range of alternatives available broad enough for
consideration (e.g., prevent deployment of US forces)?
x
Are enemy capabilities wished away through the
application of joint capabilities (e.g., airpower)
x
Does the enemy fight realistically? What doctrine/TTP?
x
What is the cultural mindset and how does it influence the
ECOA?
x
Based on lessons from the war games, which intelligence
estimates require changes?
x
What assumptions are used? What unstated assumptions
are used?
x
What procedures or “plays” are used based on SOP? TTP
from experience? How is the OE for the current operation
different from previous experience?
x
Who role plays the others on the battlefield? Civilian
factions, militias, NGOs, corporations?
x
Who role plays the coalition or interagency partners?
COA Comparison
x
Monitor development of COA comparison and subsequent
briefings to ensure the COA accounts for critical items to
include:
‡ the OE variables
‡ assumptions
‡ perspectives of coalition partners and others
OPLAN/OPORD Production & Briefing
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17. If directed, conduct order’s crosswalk to identify gaps,
disconnects, or vulnerabilities to the plan based on critical
review of the prepared order and staff annexes and
appendices.
18. Review the assessment plan to insure adequacy and it
reflects the cultural implications associated with assessing
progress.
19. Review timelines for release of the order/plan for a review
whether sufficient planning time is available for subordinate
units.
Key Points
x Red Teams do not normally produce a separate staff product
for inclusion in the order or plan.
x The best measure of Red Teams value is the staff producing a
better staff product and identification of alternatives to the
Commander.
x Red Teams depend on the Commander’s or Chief of Staff’s
guidance, the negotiations/communication skills of the Red
Team, and the culture of the unit.
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Shifting the Burden
The “Shifting the Burden” model structure as Peter Senge calls it is
composed of two balancing (stabilizing) processes. Both balancing
loops try to correct the same problem symptom, but one addresses
symptoms while the other addresses the underlying problem(s).
Efforts directed only at symptomatic solutions which appear
beneficial at first only serve to exacerbate the problem over time,
often with debilitating side effects.
While Senge addresses the underlying problem indirectly in
“Understanding and Using the Model” on page 105 of The Fifth
Discipline, (revised 2006 edition), the problem is not part of the
model, only the problem symptom. He talks about a problem again
in “How to Create Your Own Shifting the Burden Model” on page
111, but does not address how to determine what the problem is
or how it is perceived.
Senge’s approach is symptom/solution centric. The addition of
problem and perspective elements to the structure along with Red
Team tools and Liberating Structures to diagnose them, make
Senge’s structure a richer framework for Red Teamers to develop
alternative perspectives and options. To start with identifying the
problem symptom as Senge suggests is a good place to begin,
but rather than proceeding from there to identifying the
fundamental solution (convergent thought process), this model
recommends a close examination of the underlying problem(s)
and perspective(s) before moving on to the solution(s).
Sometimes restating a problem shows there is more than one
problem. Several tool recommendations are included in the
illustration on the next page.
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Operating Assumption is an alternate term for Perspective. JJ
O'Boyle explains operating assumptions and cultural logic in
The Culture of Decision Making;
http://www.winstonbrill.com/bril001/html/article_index/articles/2
51-300/article251_body.html.
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Stakeholder Mapping
When to Use
Stakeholder Mapping is a diagnostic tool for use in analysis,
influence, negotiation, and decision support. It should be used
when the Red Team needs to demonstrate the breadth of effects
a planned operation can have within an operating area. Using
intelligence and information available, the Red Team can develop
a perspective on operations that will enhance the appreciation of
the staff on potential unintended consequences of operations. The
Red Team can also suggest methods of improving the impact of
an operation on groups that are “on the fence” regarding their
support for US/coalition/host nation operations.
Value Added
Stakeholder Mapping’s greatest value is in the campaign design
phase of decision making, specifically in framing the problem. In
developing the commander’s appreciation for the mission and
operating area that precedes mission analysis Stakeholder
Mapping provides understanding and viewing the operational
environment from a systemic perspective. The analysis that
occurs in the Stakeholder Mapping provides commander and
planners insights into how the stakeholders view operations in the
battle space.
The Method
Step 1: Identify Stakeholders. They can be:
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‡ Internal or external
‡ Individual, organization, or entity
‡ Strategic, Operational, or Tactical
‡ Senior or subordinate, or horizontal levels
Step 2: Identify Stakeholder Black/White/Grey Affiliation
Step 3: Analyze Grey Stakeholder 4-Ways of Seeing
Conduct thorough research to complete the analysis of
these perceptions as it is more complex than the simple
model implies, for several reasons:
‡ Seldom, if ever, will there be only two actors in the
system under study.
‡ All the actors’ perceptions and inter-relationships within
the system must be considered in order to provide
context for the analysis.
‡ How each actor perceives and defines the
organizational or Operational Environment, strategic
goals, and plans must be considered.
‡ It must be realized that actors and organizations may
hold perceptions, both accurate and inaccurate.
‡ Perceptions of the external audience(s) to whom we
and our allies are playing cannot be discounted.
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Step 4: Analyze Stakeholders Lines of Effort (LOE) Interests.
‡
After a thorough assessment of the Stakeholder,
the Red Team defines the Stakeholder’s LOEs.
Begin with the “fence sitters.”
‡
Determine what the Stakeholder’s Desired effect is
within each LOE.
‡
Next, the Stakeholder’s desired effect in the Lines
of Effort (LOE) is assessed within the
Commander’s LOOs.
Step 5: Red Team Analysis: Organizational Mind Mapping. There
is no one way to conduct Red Team analysis. Mind
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Mapping may be useful in organizational analysis: after
identification of stakeholders, categorization is required.
This is done by using a whiteboard or flip chart.
The arrows are representative of potential links between
stakeholders, e.g., command relationships, habitual
collaboration, common interests, etc.
Step 6: Another method for Analysis
‡ Once stakeholder interests have been mapped, they
must be prioritized. A common approach is to map the
interest and influence of each stakeholder group based
on a chart like this one:
‡ Once the stakeholders have been mapped, focus of
effort can be placed on the highest priority groups while
providing sufficient information to keep the less
influential groups happy.
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Strategies for Structured Analysis
These structured analytic techniques can be used in a variety of
ways when analysts begin a new assessment. Some can be used
equally effectively at multiple points in the process and can
promote an analyst’s ability to keep an open mind, to consider
multiple—including highly unlikely—hypotheses, to challenge
conventional wisdom, and to assess the impact of important
information gaps or deception on analytic judgments and
confidence levels. The Timeline for Using Analytic Techniques
provides some thoughts on when to use one or more of them
during the course of an analyst’s research and writing.
Starting Out
At the beginning of an analytic project, analysts are always wise to
consider brainstorming and assumptions checks to ensure that
important factors are not being missed or taken for granted.
Similarly, outside-in-thinking can sometimes put an analytic
project into a broader international context, in which factors
outside the lead analyst’s area of responsibility might impact on
his or her analytic judgments. For instance, economic
assumptions about the price of oil might be key to a regional
political analyst’s understanding the prospects for political stability
in an oil-exporting country or an underdeveloped country entirely
dependent on expensive energy imports. A High Impact/Low
Probability assessment can also sensitize analysts early on to the
significance of dramatic events that might affect their analytic
lines.
Some techniques like Indicators and Signposts or Analysis of
Competing Hypotheses (ACH) can be useful throughout a project
and revisited periodically as new information is absorbed and
analyzed. ACH, in particular, is a good tool to use throughout a
project to prevent premature closure and to highlight evidence that
is most “discriminating” in making an analytic argument.
Alternative Futures analysis is similarly useful at the beginning of
a project, but can amount to the structure for the entire project.
Hypothesis Testing
As an analytic project takes shape, and hypotheses are being
formed about the key intelligence question, it can be appropriate
to use one or another contrarian technique to challenge the
conventional analytic line that is being developed. If the
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assessment contains strong judgments about an adversary’s
behavior, then challenging this view with a “Red Team” effort
might be a good corrective to too much of a rational actor
approach. In addition, a review of intelligence gaps at this
juncture can also help give the analysts a better degree of
confidence in the information base and judgments reached in the
assessment.
A Final Check
As the assessment is being finalized, it can still be useful to review
key assumptions as a sanity check on the underlying logic of the
analysis. A brainstorming session also may be helpful to ensure
that no plausible hypothesis has been dismissed or left
unaddressed. If a firm consensus has formed around an analytic
line and has not been seriously questioned in some time, then a
Devil’s Advocacy exercise could be useful. Analysts might also
use a final review to decide if they have identified a list of key
indicators for future developments. This can be an important
guide to include in the assessment as a way to track future
developments and monitor whether the analytic judgments
reached are being realized or in need of revision.
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String of Pearls
The Army Directed Studies Office developed the Task Concept
Analysis technique, often called the “string of pearls” as a
technique to link a rigorous analysis of assumptions with
consideration of unintended consequences. This is a time
consuming analysis best suited to a structured planning process.
Use of the tool provides a way to visualize the cumulative effects
that result from “wishful thinking” and failure to consider the many
possible outcomes in a friendly plan or order. This analysis will
show if the plan is vulnerable to faulty assumptions; dependencies
that may not remain in place when the plan is executed; or the
effects of unmitigated, unintended consequences (cascade or 2nd
& 3rd order effects).
Identifying critical vulnerabilities in the plan allows planners to
reinforce or mitigate these critical vulnerabilities. At a minimum, it
informs the commander that there is a risk associated with a
particular area in the plan. There are an infinite number of
unintended consequences for any action. This technique will help
identify those that are most likely to occur and most likely to
generate results which may need to be mitigated by branch and
sequel planning.
This analysis of the plan can stand alone or be used in a
comparison with an emulative analysis of an enemy plan in order
to see where differing strategies match up. The staff may identify
an enemy strategy that is “unanswered” by a friendly course of
action.
When to Use
String of Pearls is a time consuming process. It is best used when
the Red team is asked to do an independent assessment of an
existing plan. Red Teams can also use the method in a focused
manner for analyzing and challenging assumptions associated
with a plan, as well as showing the cumulative effect of failed
assumptions on the entire plan.
Value Added
The methodology is a rigorous process of analyzing the plan:
x
help prevent “assuming away the problem”
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x
x
x
identify weaknesses in a plan
force consideration of unintended consequences
highlight the need for focused branch &/or sequel plans
The Method
There are four basic steps to conducting a concept analysis.
Step one is to identify all the major tasks.
Step two is to identify three elements of each major task:
x
x
x
Identify challengeable stated and implied assumptions
Identify key dependencies in each task
Identify the potential unintended consequences
(cascade and 2nd & 3rd order effects) for each task
Step three is to depict how the combined assumptions, key
dependencies, and possible unintended consequences for each
task accumulate across the entire plan.
Step four is to analyze how the cumulative effect [depicted above]
might indicate any gaps or weaknesses in the plan.
The key to this concept analysis is the graphics rendered in
PowerPoint, e.g., the source of the phrase String of Pearls. It is
this representation which allows the decision maker to “see” and
understand the cumulative effects which are often hidden when
considered separately.
Assumptions & Dependencies
Appropriate assumptions have two characteristics:
x
They are valid, that is, they are likely to be true, and
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x
They are necessary, that is, they are essential to
continuing the problem solving process.
The staff is most concerned about the validity of each assumption.
If planners are considering assumptions that are valid but not
necessary, they are creating extra work for themselves. If they are
creating a roadblock in the planning process for themselves by
identifying an assumption that is not necessary but can’t be shown
to be valid, that is a concern and should be pointed out. It is
important to distinguish between assumptions and dependencies.
ƒ
ƒ
ƒ
ƒ
Assumptions replace unknown facts in order to enable
continued planning.
If an assumption is invalid, the task associated with it may
fail or may be at risk of failure.
A dependency is a critical condition or precursor action
necessary for successful execution of the task.
Another task can be a dependency.
Let’s talk about the difference between an assumption and a
dependency. By re-wording a dependency, you can turn it into an
assumption but that defeats the purpose of this analysis. For
example, you could say either that execution of a task is
dependent on fuel being available or that a planning assumption is
that fuel will be available.
The difference is temporal, (i.e. whether or not you actually know
the answer “at the time” of the analysis). An assumption is a fact
that you don’t know, but must “assume” in order to continue
planning a specific course of action. If the staff assumes fuel will
be available, then the staff can plan a road movement or
helicopter assault.
A dependency is necessary to execute the task successfully and
is a fact at the time of planning. For example the staff may know
that fuel is available for a planned helicopter assault and plans
accordingly, but if the fuel is destroyed or diverted to other uses,
then the task cannot be executed.
Remember, a task can also be a dependency. Relationships
between tasks can create dependency; the start or end date of the
2nd task (successor) is constrained by the start or end date of the
1st (predecessor). Differentiate the assumption from the
dependency by asking, “Where is it listed during mission analysis,
under ‘facts’ or ‘assumptions’?”
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Unintended Consequences
An understanding of unintended consequences must begin with a
discussion of an adaptation of Bloom’s Taxonomy. 35 Bloom
postulated that learning occurs in three Domains and for our
purposes, so do effects. So, what are domains?
Domains are a particular sphere of influence, concern, or
activity. 36 Bloom offers three domains. The cognitive domain
reflects knowledge. In this domain, the mind completes levels of
understanding a concept; building to next higher level of
understanding. The affective domain reflects emotion: attitude,
awareness, and integration; one feels levels of feeling about
recognizing and synthesizing the information. The psychomotor
[physical] domain reflects the body; one connects mind to body
events in a way that generates particular muscle memory for an
action.
Events or actions are sometimes called 1st order effects as they
actually occur in the physical domain. 2nd order effects represent
how individuals feel about the event; emotions in the affective
domain. 3rd order effects represent thoughts about the event;
thinking in the cognitive domain.
On the other hand, cascading effects follow a chain of actual
causality (If-then or Cause-in-fact) as they occur exclusively in the
physical domain. Cascade effects are mechanical, as one event
precipitates the next.
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Consider the unintended disaster in southern Africa which resulted
from a project to combat hunger in the Okavango delta. 37 A simple
plan to repress the Tsetse Fly and increase cattle production
resulted in over-grazing which after several years turned originally
habitable land into barren desert, ultimately resulting in more
starvation than in the beginning.
Theoretically, in this scenario, one could call starvation a “6th
Order Effect”, however such an analysis renders the terms
meaningless since an infinite number of events could result.
Contrast this against the causality associated with 2nd & 3rd order
effects and its concept of “free will” (remember the distinction
between complicated and complex). 2nd & 3rd order effects result
in what is commonly called but for causation. For example, in the
scenario, individual “A” decides not to invite individual “B” to a
party. B decides A dislike him and gets angry, slashing the tires
on A’s car.
We could say that but for A’s decision, his tires would not have
been damaged, but one should not accuse A of causing the
damage to his own tires.
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Events subsequent to 2nd & 3rd order effects which precede them
are often “unintended” consequences of the first event or decision,
but they are not caused by the original event. 3rd order effects do
NOT produce 4th order effects, they merely introduce the element
of choice into the equation. They become the catalyst for the new
event.
2nd & 3rd Order Effects are a “term of art”, used to focus the
planner’s attention on the OE (especially Culture) and the way in
which it affects how people (friendly, enemy, or others) may “feel”
and “think” about the results of the plan.
Considering unintended consequences, both cascade and 2nd &
3rd order effects, will minimize the likelihood that one or the other
will be overlooked in the analysis. For example:
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In image, a smaller Blue Force, observes a larger Red Force
massing at Point “A”. The movement occurs in the physical
domain, but Blue’s thoughts (i.e. is attack imminent, is this a feint
or ruse?) influence Blue’s action. For example, if Blue decides an
attack is imminent and decides to destroy the Bridge/Dam in order
to prevent Red from crossing, the unintended consequences
might be illustrated like this:
To identify cascade effects requires a knowledge of physics, a
hard science question. To identify 2nd & 3rd order effects and
predict their consequences requires an understanding of culture,
history, and sociology among other social, or “soft” sciences. The
Red Teamer must be adept at both of these skills or enlist the aid
of “ad hoc” members to do so. Ask:
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x
Will the plan you are contemplating produce a cascade of
other events and if so, what could they be?
What message or “information” is being conveyed by the
plan and to whom is it being conveyed?
(Research Stakeholder Analysis for more information).
How will it be “interpreted” by your adversary, friends,
partners or others?
x
x
Build the “String of Pearls”
This image is key to understanding (or demonstrating) the final
analysis. Group the tasks by objective, phases, layers, or any
other way the planners related them. At the end, the grouping will
surface tasks that need a closer look and show the cumulative
effect on each objective, phase, or layer. To build the graphic,
take the following steps:
Examine the assumptions (specified & implied) in the plan.
x
x
x
x
x
x
Determine whether they are valid.
Associate each assumption that you do not consider valid
with a specific task or tasks that you have previously
identified.
For each task, determine whether a dependency should
be implied as necessary in order for that task to be
executed.
Decide whether these are “risky” dependencies.
List these assumptions & dependencies for inclusion in
the spider chart you will build for each task.
Characterize each based upon whether it places the plan
at “risk” or if invalid will cause the plan to “fail”.
Consider the potential for unintended consequences associated
with each task.
x
x
x
x
Determine if there are likely to be cascading effects.
Consider what message is being sent to each of the major
stakeholders and how they may feel about it.
Determine the spectrum of beliefs that may be engendered
by the message (i.e. their perceptions).
Consider what actions they may take as a result.
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Next, build a spread sheet to help determine how frequently each
assumption, dependency, or unintended consequence appears,
i.e. how many other tasks may not be completed as a result of a
particular assumption or action. The more tasks that may not get
completed, the greater risk of failure.
From the spreadsheet or a manual count:
x
x
x
Count how many times each assumption occurs throughout
the entire plan or order.
Count how many times each dependency occurs throughout
the entire plan or order.
Count how many times each unintended consequence
occurs throughout the entire plan or order.
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A thorough analysis of the data will reveal that some events occur
repeatedly across multiple tasks—this should be of concern to the
commander.
For Example:
If the same dependency is necessary for 15 of 20 tasks, it is
significant for this analysis. If the same unintended consequence
might occur as a result of only 7 of 20 tasks, it may not be
significant for this analysis.
Now Build The PowerPoint Images.
The aggregate effect of the identification of possibly invalid
assumptions, dependencies, and unintended consequences for
each task can be viewed in a graphic representation. This
representation indicates which tasks are most sensitive to other
events and helps planners determine and prioritize which tasks
should be revisited or what branch plans should be written to
mitigate unintended consequences.
x
x
x
x
x
Step 1: Draw “failure” and “risk” assumptions over the tasks
on the “string of pearls”
Step 2: Draw dependencies over the tasks on the “string of
pearls”
Step 3: Draw 2nd & 3rd order effects under the tasks on the
“string of pearls”
Step 4: Draw cascade effects under the tasks on the “string
of pearls”.
Step 5: Combine all elements in one slide, except for “at risk”
assumptions
Analysis/Key Findings
x
Note which tasks are most sensitive to the aggregate effect
of the different elements you have identified
x
Recommend that planners revisit these tasks or write branch
plans to mitigate the consequences of the attempted or
successful execution of the tasks
x
In the chart below tasks 5 and 9-12 were identified as
especially sensitive tasks given the number of dependencies
and unintended consequences. Each staff group should then
provide its analysis and guidance back to the plans staff
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section (G5/S5) for its final efforts in writing the operations
plan. The steps of this process, much like the steps of the
decision making process, can be adapted to the time
available.
LIMITATIONS
Remember, the different elements that are identified are not
weighted. For example:
x An unintended consequence might be igniting a civil war. This
is more important than another identified unintended
consequence like running out of fuel.
x However, both effects would get one arrow in this analysis;
identify in both the analysis and the brief.
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S-W-O-T Analysis
When to use
SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) is a red
teaming framework designed to view a situation from four different
perspectives. While SWOT can be used at any time, it is
especially beneficial when used early in the red team’s analysis of
a problem, in conjunction with the 4 Ways of Seeing. Doing so
helps the red team step away from its personal and cultural biases
early-on, in order to attain alternative perspective. Combining SW-O-T Analysis with 4-Ways of Seeing can become a powerful
process to help stimulate the red team’s effort.
Value added
SWOT is a framework that adds
value by essentially forcing the red
team to think through the various
perspectives of a given situation.
The Method
Red teams using SWOT should
establish a four-quadrant diagram,
and label each quadrant as “Strengths,” “Weaknesses,”
“Opportunities,” and “Threats.”
Thereafter, the team brainstorms to identify entries for each of the
four quadrants, based upon the situation being red teamed. For
example a red team could conduct a SWOT analysis on the
potential implications of actively affecting the economic situation in a
given region. When using SWOT in a situation of various actors
(e.g., Division red team recognizing and dealing with various
political leaders within its area, or a theater-strategic red team
considering the interaction between the various entitles within the
theater), conducting multiple SWOT analyses (one for each actor
that views the other actors) would help the red team “see” the
situation in a more holistic light. Finally, when SWOT used in
conjunction with the 4 Ways of Seeing, some consideration should
be given to which of the two tools is used first, and which follows.
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Team A / Team B Analysis
Use of separate analytic teams that contrast two (or more)
strongly held views or competing hypotheses.
When to Use
If there are at least two competing views within a Red Team or
perhaps competing opinions within the policymaking community
on a key issue, then Team A/Team B analysis can be the
appropriate technique to use. Developing a full-blown Team
A/Team B exercise requires a significant commitment of time and
resources, so it is worthwhile considering if the issue merits this
kind of attention. A longstanding policy issue, a critical decision
that has far-reaching implications or a dispute within a community
that has obstructed effective cross-agency cooperation would be
grounds for using Team A/Team B. If those circumstances exist,
then the Red team will need to review all of the data to develop
alternative papers/briefing that can capture the essential
differences between the two viewpoints.
Value Added
For the policymaker, this technique helps to surface and explain
important analytic differences within the expert community. Often
senior officials can learn more by weighing well-argued conflicting
views than from reading an assessment that masks substantive
differences or drives analysis to the lowest common denominator.
By making the key assumptions and information used for each
argument more transparent, a policymaker can judge the merits of
each case, pose questions, and reach an independent judgment
on which argument is the strongest. Moreover, highlighting
alternative views puts individuals on notice that they need to be
searching for new information that can confirm or disconfirm a
range of hypotheses.
If opposing positions are well established, it can be useful to place
individuals on teams that will advocate positions they normally do
not support; forcing Red Teamers to argue “the other side” can
surface an awareness to their own mind-set.
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The Method
Analysis Phase: A Team A/Team B exercise can be conducted on
an important issue to:
x
Identify the two (or more) competing hypotheses or points
of view.
x
Form teams or designate individuals to develop the best
case that can be made for each hypothesis.
x
Review all pertinent information that supports their
respective positions.
x
Identify missing information that would buttress their
hypotheses.
x
Structure each argument with an explicit presentation of
key assumptions, key pieces of evidence, and careful
articulation of the logic behind the argument.
Debate Phase: An oral presentation of the alternative arguments
and rebuttals in parallel fashion can then be organized for the
benefit of other analysts:
x
Set aside time for an oral presentation of the alternative
team findings; this can be an informal brainstorming
session or a more formal “debate.”
x
Have an independent “jury of peers” listen to the oral
presentation and be prepared to question the teams
regarding their assumptions, evidence, or logic.
x
Allow each team to present their case, challenge the other
team’s arguments, and rebut the opponent’s critique of its
case.
x
Let the jury consider the strength of each presentation and
recommend possible next steps for further research and
collection efforts.
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Telling Stories
The most conservative estimates of linguists and anthropologists
put the evolution of oral language a minimum of 175,000 years
prior to the development of written languages. As a consequence
humans are wired to learn things through the use of storytelling.
When remembering or telling a personal story humans are more
connected to the information being described. There is a
difference in the quality of discussions and learning when stories
are personal. An illustration follows:
Recently the author was asked to facilitate a discussion of
desirable leadership qualities with a group of Majors at CGSC.
Rather than ask them to regurgitate a list of established desirable
qualities of leaders they were asked to remember the best leaders
they had ever worked for and write down the qualities that made
them such good leaders. The group then collected a
comprehensive list, the number of qualities collected was
staggering (group of 11 in 5 minutes of this exercise named 80
independent leadership qualities) and very personal. While well
accepted qualities such as ‘setting the example’, treating others
with respect, etc., were on the list so were much less noted
qualities such as ‘being respectful of their subordinates time’, ‘a
sense of humor’, ‘empathy,’ etc.
Telling stories is a powerful way to generate conversation and
have people learn and remember.
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Think - Write - Share
Think - Write - Share - This is the single most important idea to
enable critical thinking. Before tackling any issue, we should think
independently and reflectively first, then write down our thought–
which helps us to shape and refine them, and finally share them in
a disciplined fashion. Divergence-convergence is a form of ‘thinkwrite-share’ – method:
x
Everyone writes down as many ideas as they can about
the problem or issue – they do not self-censor.
o
Facilitator goes around the room taking only one
idea from each member of the group. Everyone
speaks once before anyone speaks twice. Ideas
are collected without commentary or criticism. If
someone else offers something on your list, then
scratch it out and offer something not yet raised.
x
This goes on until all lists are exhausted.
x
Once everyone’s list is exhausted and captured on the
board, the group, aided by the facilitator, bins the ideas
into a set of unique and distinguishable approaches so
ideas bleed over on each other to the minimum extent
possible. This sets the table for ‘dot voting’.
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TRIZ
TRIZ is "a problem-solving, analysis and forecasting tool derived
from the study of patterns of invention. It was developed by the
Soviet inventor and science fiction author Genrich Altshuller and
his colleagues in the 1940s. In English it is typically translated as
“the Theory of Inventive Problem Solving.” It is sometimes used in
Six Sigma processes, in project management and risk
management systems, and in organizational innovation initiatives.
The full TRIZ process includes many problem-solving strategies.
For our purposes we’re only going to use one piece of the TRIZ
approach.
Ponder a difficult and complex problem you need to solve by
walking through.
Describe the key elements of the desired result, and be specific.
Design a complete system that makes it impossible to achieve
that result.
Then ask:
x
What policies, practices, and ways of operating could
eliminate any possibility of any requisite events occurring?
x
What does this system have in common with the current
state of affairs?
What will eliminate similarities between the current system and the
new design?
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Troika Consulting (Ad Agency)
This is a great process to help participants get started thinking
about applications and action planning.
Invite participants to find two partners and sit down in a group of
three (or four, but no more than four). Suggest that one member of
the group be a time keeper to keep the group on track and to
ensure everyone gets equal time. Give everyone time to reflect
individually on a gnarly question. It may be very useful for them to
take some notes.
Think about a challenge you are facing in your staff section.
x
What’s the question you most need to answer in order to
move forward?
How can you get that question answered?
x
What’s the biggest obstacle to making the changes you
want to make?
What must be done to move beyond that obstacle?
In each round of 10 minutes, one participant will share their
challenge and ideas for next steps.
The role of the partners is first to ask questions to help them hone
and improve their ideas.
Next, the partners engage with each other and, finally, with the
participant about how they might handle the challenge and what
possibilities might contribute to moving forward.
Switch roles so that each member of the Troika has a turn. After
each member of the Troika has had their turn, the group can
spend some time in conversation about insights and patterns they
noticed across the three rounds.
This is a method to tap into the wisdom of the crowd. This is not
recommended to make a decision. It is a way to get feedback you
might not otherwise get from your staff.
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Validating Assumptions
How many times have we encountered situations in which completely
plausible premises, based on solid expertise, have been used to
construct a logically valid forecast—with virtually unanimous
agreement—that turned out to be dead wrong? In how many of these
instances have we determined, with hindsight, that the problem was
not in the logic but in the fact that one of the premises—however
plausible it seemed at the time—was incorrect?
In how many of these instances have we been forced to admit that the
erroneous premise was not empirically based but rather a conclusion
developed from its own model (sometimes called an assumption)?
And in how many cases was it determined after the fact that
information had been available which should have provided a basis for
questioning one or more premises, and that a change of the relevant
premise(s) would have changed the analytic model and pointed to a
different outcome? 38
-- Douglas MacEachin
Former CIA Deputy Director of Intelligence
No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first
encounter with the enemy’s main strength. 39
-- Helmuth von Moltke
Chief of the Prussian General Staff, 1857-1887
1. What is an assumption? An assumption is an implicit or
explicit belief about a past, current or future situation, issue or
state of affairs. Planning and problem solving rely on
assumptions because commanders, staffs and planning teams
often lack relevant information about a situation and habitually
rely on their beliefs to interpret a situation. Assumptions also
help simplify and interpret factors related to ‘what ought to be
done’ or ‘how the world works’. From a cognitive perspective,
humans are persistently on “cognitive autopilot” enabling us to
accomplish routine tasks efficiently but unreflectively (without
costly mental effort) (See Chapter III). Hence, it is often the
case that assumptions are overlooked or accepted uncritically,
even when matters are complex and entail high risk under
conditions of uncertainty.
a. Assumptions are often hidden from view. In solving or
managing problems we often act based upon intuition and
if questioned, rationalize our actions after the fact. If there
is a degree of risk associated with taking action it is
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prudent to understand the assumptions underlying that
decision. In matters involving high risk, it is essential to
understand assumptions behind that decision. The latter is
important in anticipating the consequences of those
actions.
b. Assumptions can also constrain us as we attempt to deal
with an issue. If we critically assess assumptions we might
be able to gain additional insight and generate options that
would not otherwise be apparent. Identifying and
assessing assumptions, when working in groups, is also
useful in preventing misunderstanding, aligning interests
and reducing conflict within the group. 40
2. Assumptions and Red Teaming: Red teaming tools and
techniques provide a critical capability for checking,
challenging and validating assumptions in planning, problems
solving and decision making. Specifically, Red Teams assist
Commanders, staffs and planning teams in checking,
challenging and validating assumptions by:
a. Helping the staff identify invalid and unneeded
assumptions.
b. Identifying needed assumptions to further the planning
process.
c. Identifying when the staff has defaulted to an unstated
assumption – during design, mission analysis and course
of action development and analysis.
d. Offering alternatives and insights to assumptions about the
operational environment, adversaries and other actors in
the operational environment.
e. Identifying when the staff needs to develop a branch plan
in case a key assumption proves invalid.
3. Assumptions in military planning: Joint Publication (JP) 5-0,
Joint Operation Planning defines an assumption as “…a
supposition about the current situation or future course of
events, assumed to be true in the absence of facts…[or] a
presupposition on the future course of events, either or both
assumed to be true in the absence of positive proof, necessary
to enable the commander in the process of planning to
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complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on
the course of action.” 41, 42
a. Commanders, staffs and planning teams employ
assumptions to “…address gaps in knowledge critical for
the planning process to continue.” 43
b. Commanders and staffs and planning teams “…must either
validate the assumptions (turn them into facts) or invalidate
the assumptions (alter the plan accordingly) as quickly as
possible.” Rules of thumb are “…never assume away
adversary capabilities or assume that unrealistic friendly
capabilities would be available.” 44
4. Assumptions in the context of oral and written statements and
arguments: Authors M. Neil Browne and Stuart M. Keeley
define an assumption as “…an unstated belief that
supports…explicit reasoning.” 45 The authors emphasize the
importance of identifying implicit assumptions because,
“hidden or unstated beliefs may be at least as significant in
understanding [an] argument.” 46 (See assumptions in
arguments)
a. Browne and Keeley further define assumptions into two
categories: value and descriptive assumptions.
(1) A value assumption “is an implicit preference for one
value over another in a particular context.” 47 These
are prescriptive in nature and imply how the world
‘ought to be.’
(2) A descriptive assumption “is an unstated belief about
how the world was, is, or will become.” 48
b. Browne and Keeley believe that questioning assumptions
not only benefits individual reasoning but contributes to the
quality of group reasoning and decision outcomes.
Underlying this is their observation that assumptions are
often, “hidden or unstated; taken for granted; influential in
determining the conclusion; and potentially deceptive.” 49
5. Sources of Assumptions:
a. Mental models, mindsets, values, beliefs and world views:
These are ideas that help us frame and interpret how the
world works. These are similar to heuristics which help us
navigate and engage our environment. As guiding
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patterns, these are valuable from an efficiency perspective
but often hinder us when the environment changes or
when the world does not conform to our expected pattern
(See Chapter III).
b. For military operations, assumptions often relate to:
(1) Policy and strategic aims that direct the use of military
action.
(2) Narratives describing the nature of the operation.
(3) Characteristics of the OE — the composite of the
conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect
the employment of capabilities and bear on the
decisions of the commander.
(4) Descriptions of adversary capabilities and will, critical
links, key nodes, high value targets (HVTs) and
centers of gravity (COG).
(5) Adversary probable intentions and likely courses of
action (COA). 50
(6) Weather.
(7) Specific terrain considerations that significantly affect
the feasibility of the course of action.
(8) Deployment time, assets, availability, and access to
airfields and ports.
(9) Risk.
(10) Date and level of mobilization for reserve and National
Guard forces.
(11) Cultural implications (e.g., how the population views
US/coalition involvement).
(12) Post conflict conditions.
c. For problem solving, assumptions often deal with
resources, support, and relationships.
d. In concept development, specifically in the force
development arena, assumptions often address conditions
anticipated to be prevalent in the future, 5 to 15 years. 51
6. Checking, Challenging and Validating Assumptions:
Commanders, staffs and planning teams should question
whether their assumptions are valid throughout planning and
the operations process. Assumptions must be continually
reviewed to ensure validity. 52
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a.
Challenging assumptions helps identify stakeholder
perspectives and their implications to the planning process.
b. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence states, “Red teams assist joint
operation planning by validating assumptions about the
adversary, participating in the war-gaming of friendly and
adversary COAs, and providing a check on the natural
tendency of friendly forces to “mirror image” the adversary
(i.e., to ascribe to an adversary the same motives, intent,
and procedures that guide friendly forces).” 53
c. In conceptual planning or Army Design Methodology
(ADM), planning teams develop assumptions in the lack of
factual evidence as they frame an OE and problems.
Planning teams record their assumption and challenge
them while planning.
d. A structured analytical technique for identifying
assumptions is listing and reviewing key working
assumptions on which fundamental judgments rest, Red
Teaming – Assumption Questions.
(1) Broad assumptions without an understanding of their
sub-level components may lead to faulty assumptions.
(2) For example, given sufficient preparation, load, and
travel time, a staff can only assume a Brigade Combat
Team (BCT) will be available to a theater commander
in 30 days. Airfields and ports must have favorable
weather unfettered by the enemy. The staff should
continually question whether their assumptions are
valid using the variables found in the OE or a similar
construct.
(3) Past operations illustrate the challenges inherent to
any operation when planning assumptions prove false.
It appears that most senior civilian and military leaders
failed to review the historical records of military
occupations and of Middle Eastern or Iraqi history,
and also failed to listen and evaluate outside views
about potential weaknesses with their planning
assumptions. Even the most senior staffs can fall into
this trap, noted in ON POINT II:
“In the case of OIF, the postwar situation in Iraq was severely out of
line with the suppositions made at nearly every level before the war.
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The V Corps commander, Lieutenant General Wallace, asserted that
the assumptions made by planners about the Iraqi infrastructure and
society after the conflict were particularly damaging to the PH IV plan:
I believe the things that we assumed would be in place on the ground
that make Phase IV operations extraordinarily easy if they are there or
extraordinarily hard if they are not had most to do with Iraqi
institutions and infrastructure. We made the assumption that some of
those institutions and some of that infrastructure would be in place
upon our arrival, regardless of the presence of the regime or not. The
criticality of those assumptions was such that when the regime ceased
to exist or ceased to dominate the areas in which we were operating,
then all of those institutions and all of that infrastructure ceased to
operate at the same time.
Wallace succinctly concluded, “We had the wrong assumptions and
therefore we had the wrong plan to put into play.”
-- ON POINT II 54
Another example, assumed access by a friendly nation to ports and
airfield to support closure into a region – requires continual checks to
insure the assumption isn’t wishful thinking but is grounded in reality.
Throughout the lengthy planning effort for Operation Allied Force in
1998-99, allied leaders and planners widely adhered to a significant
assumption. When the order arrived to execute the operation – on the
very eve of hostilities – that assumption continued to prevail. But as
the days of the aerospace campaign stretched into weeks and then
months, the allies recognized their assumption for the fallacy it was –
namely, that President Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia would
capitulate after a “modest set of punitive air strikes…”
-- COL Malone, USAF
OPERATION ALLIED FORCE 55
(4) Are the assumptions logical, realistic, and considered
likely to be true?
(5) Are there too many assumptions? How many
assumptions are acceptable? There is no rule that
defines the correct number of assumptions but an
excessive amount of assumptions may correlate with
higher risk and an increased probability of a faulty
plan. General (ret) Anthony Zinni USMC offers, “I
would always challenge assumptions very vigorously
as the commander in chief (CINC). We have too
many (assumptions). Many are pointless and some
assume away problems.” 56
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(6) Are there branches and sequels to execute if one or
more key assumptions prove false?
(7) Why must this assumption “be true”?
(8) How much confidence exist that this assumption is
true?
(9) What is the explanation for the degree of confidence
for this assumption to be true?
(10) Could the assumption have been true in the past but
less so now?
(11) If the assumption proves to be wrong, would it alter
the line of thinking?
(12) Has checking assumptions identified new factors that
need future analysis?
(13) What circumstance or information might underline this
assumption?
e. Planning team and planning process considerations in
challenging assumptions: A system must be in place that
enables continual examination of the accuracy of the
assumptions. Planners must also establish branch plans in
case key assumptions prove invalid. The planning team
works on these questions as a group, assigns a sub-team
to work on these questions, or solicits support from the
unit’s red team to help with challenging assumptions.
(1) Is there a procedure that is used throughout the
planning and preparation (and potentially portions of
the execution phase) that continually examines
whether assumptions are valid? A technique is to
establish validation points throughout the planning
process to insure:
(a) Assumptions remain valid
(b) Assumptions proven as facts are deleted
(c) Assumptions proven invalid are discarded - requiring
re-examination of the feasibility of the plan or
development of branches.
(2) Is the assumption appropriate to the level of planning?
(3) Are there assumptions made implicitly during planning
but not stated or assumptions made by the staff but
not included in the plan? Unstated assumptions
(explicit or implicit) can fault a plan from the beginning
and do a disservice to the commander and the
planning process.
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(4) How are assumptions in higher headquarters plans
addressed? Joint planning doctrine states, “For
planning purposes, subordinate commanders can
treat assumptions made by higher headquarters as
true in the absence of proof to the contrary. However,
they should challenge those assumptions if they
appear unrealistic.” 57
(5) In deliberate planning there likely assumptions that
cannot be verified until a crisis develops. In Crisis
Action Planning (CAP), “…assumptions should be
replaced with facts as soon as possible.” 58
(a) The staff accomplishes this by identifying the
information needed to convert assumptions to facts
and submitting an information request to an
appropriate agency as an information requirement.
(b) If the commander needs the information to make a
key decision, the information requirement can be
designated a commander’s critical information
requirement (CCIR). Although there may be
exceptions, the staff should strive to resolve all
assumptions before issuing the Operations Order
(OPORD).
f.
Argument Deconstruction: For evaluating assumptions in
statements and oral arguments, we can employ critical
questioning to expose hidden assumptions. For example
questions see Challenging Assumptions below. Authors M.
Neil Browne and Stuart M. Keeley refer to critical thinking
as:
(1) Awareness of a set of interrelated critical questions;
(2) Ability to ask and answer critical questions at
appropriate times; and the
(3) Desire to actively use the critical questions. 59
g. 5 Whys is important to begin with “why” questions. The
answers to “why” questions get at causal links behind
events and problem symptoms. “What” questions tend
toward simple data collection, and are subject to
confirmation biases. The 5 Whys is a question-asking
technique used to explore the cause-and-effect
relationships underlying a particular problem. The
technique is used to determine the root cause of a defect
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or problem symptom. However, the process can be used to
go deeper to explore questions related to purpose rather
than problems.
h. Four Ways of Seeing is a flexible tool; a technique
available to planning teams to develop and compare how
other actors within an OE view a situation or problem. The
planning team can compare the friendly force with an
enemy force or other actors or compare multiple actors
with each other.
(1) To develop a richer understanding of an OE and
problems, it is helpful for the planning team to
examine the situation from the perspectives of other
actors within the OE in order to appreciate their
respective assumptions. For example:
(2) How does an enemy view the causes of conflict?
(3) What are the goals of the enemy force within an area?
(4) How does the enemy force perceive the goals of
coalition forces in the area?
i.
Premortem is another means of identifying and challenging
assumptions is to apply the Premortem Analysis to a plan
or COA. Premortem Analysis is a form of mental simulation
in which you imagine an outcome that results in failure.
The premise for the Premortem exercise is that people
may feel too confident once they have arrived at a plan.
Premortem analysis empowers the participants to question
the premises of a plan or proposed course of action, its
assumptions, and tasks. The pull of groupthink,
consensus, and a false sense of security is punctured, and
is replaced by an active search aimed at preventing trouble
later on. It breaks ownership of a plan or COA through a
divergent process that encourages objectivity and
skepticism.
j.
Frame Analysis Audit: The frame audit is useful for
uncovering built in biases and blind spots in mental
models, beliefs or worldviews. 60
7. Intelligence and Assumptions: Intelligence analysts often have
to fill in gaps in knowledge with assumptions about adversary
will, capabilities, probable intentions and visualization of the
OE (e.g., PMESII-PT). The intelligence estimate supporting
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the operation should clearly identify these assumptions. The
intelligence staff should identify and tap into any ongoing or
existing information collection activities or joint intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) collection that may
offer relevant information to fill gaps. 61 The challenges for the
intelligence professional are threefold:
a. Avoid confusing assumptions as facts.
b. Keep assumptions to a minimum, challenge them
continually, and assumptions must reflect the culture,
doctrine, TTP, and realistic adversary capabilities.
c. The Information Collection or intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (ISR) plan must reflect the requirements to
confirm or deny these assumptions using available ISR
assets. 62
8. Key Points:
a. An assumption is an implicit or explicit belief about a past,
current or future situation, issue or state of affairs.
Assumptions help simplify and interpret factors related to
‘what ought to be done’ or ‘how the world works’
b. It is often the case that assumptions are overlooked or
accepted uncritically, even when matters are complex and
high risk under conditions of uncertainty.
c. Assumptions are often hidden or unstated; taken for
granted; influential in determining the conclusion; and
potentially deceptive.
d. Assumptions must be continually reviewed to ensure
validity. Commanders, staffs and planning teams should
question whether their assumptions are valid throughout
planning and the operations process.
e. In joint planning, a valid assumption has three
characteristics: logical, realistic, and essential for the
planning to continue.
f. An excessive amount of assumptions may correlate with
higher risk and an increased probability of a faulty plan.
g. The use of assumptions requires the staff and planning
teams to develop branches and sequels if the assumptions
prove invalid.
h. Often an unstated assumption may be more dangerous
than stated assumptions proven wrong.
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What if? Analysis
Assumes that an event has occurred with potential (negative or
positive) impact and explains how it might come about.
When to Use
A technique for challenging a strong mindset that an event will not
happen or that a confidently made forecast may not be entirely
justified. It is similar to a High- Impact/Low-Probability analysis,
but it does not dwell on the consequences of the event as much
as it accepts the significance and moves directly to explaining how
it might come about.
Value Added
By shifting the focus from whether an event could occur to how it
may happen, analysts allow themselves to suspend judgment
about the likelihood of the event and focus more on what
developments—even unlikely ones—might enable such an
outcome. An individual or team might employ this technique and
repeat the exercise whenever a critical analytic judgment is made.
Using this technique is particularly important when a judgment
rests on limited information or unproven assumptions. Moreover,
it can free analysts from arguing about the probability of an event
to considering its consequences and developing some indicators
or signposts for its possible emergence. It will help analysts
address the impact of an event, the factors that could cause—or
alter—it, and likely signposts that an event is imminent.
A What If? Analysis can complement a difficult judgment reached
and provide the policymaker a thoughtful caution to accepting the
conventional wisdom without considering the costs and risks of
being wrong. This can help decision makers consider ways to
hedge their bets, even if they accept the analytic judgment that an
event remains unlikely.
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The Method
What If? Analysis must begin by stating clearly the conventional
analytic line and then stepping back to consider what alternative
outcomes are too important to dismiss, even if unlikely.
Brainstorming over a few days or weeks can develop one or more
plausible scenarios by which the unlikely event occurs:
x
Assume the event has happened.
x
Select some triggering events that permitted the scenario
to unfold to help make the “what if” more plausible; for
example, analysts might postulate the death of a leader, a
natural disaster, or some economic event that would start a
chain of other events.
x
Develop a chain of argumentation based as much on logic
as evidence to explain how this outcome could have come
about.
x
“Think backwards” from the event in concrete ways–that is,
specifying what must actually occur at each stage of the
scenario is often very useful.
x
Identify one or more plausible pathways or scenarios to the
unlikely event; very often more than one will appear
possible.
x
Generate a list of indicators or “observables” for each
scenario that would help to detect the beginnings of the
event.
x
Consider the scope of the positive and negative
consequences of each scenario and their relative impacts.
x
Monitor the indicators developed on a periodic basis.
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Who Am I?
The Who Am I exercise requires reflection and introspection of
your personal family narratives and dynamics, regional culture,
religion, educational experiences, and critical watershed moments
that shape your worldviews and values that all put together
construct an idea of who you are as an individual. In its whole, the
exercise enhances the individual’s self-awareness while at the
same time creates cohesion and relationship bonding within the
participating group.
There are two critical elements to the exercise: private preparation
through solo reflection and introspection, and group sharing and
storytelling.
12. Individuals first must do the hard work of reflection, of recalling
the seminal life events that were critical in shaping their
personalities and deeper values. One might think of these
events as crucibles, both difficult and triumphant, that forged
the individual‘s character. In essence, this private preparation
is intended to encourage introspection. Such deep reflection
takes time, and must be built into the structure of the entire
exercise.
What exactly participants choose to share with their
classmates in the verbal portion is a different question. It is
important during preparation that participants be completely
honest with themselves as to how they developed into the
person they are today. This preparation can take an hour or
longer, and is ideally conducted at least one day prior to the
group sharing.
13. In the second step, the group sits together in a private setting,
and one by one the individuals hold the floor, sharing aloud
their story. Participants should take as long as they want,
uninterrupted while providing their story. This enables a
degree of rambling which intentionally creates an environment
where many people end up sharing more than they originally
planned to. This open time frame can be very liberating, as for
many this is the first opportunity they have ever had to share
aloud with others why they are who they are.
14. As such, any interruptions in the form of questions or time
limits tend to kill the magic of the moment. To mitigate the
abuse of this open ended opportunity to talk, facilitators are
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ACTHB v8 Chapter VIV
encouraged to get their story down under 15 minutes, as this
then sets an example that most others will naturally follow. The
story should be conducted entirely as narrative – no power
point slides or film clips etc. – nothing to distract from the story
each person is telling the group, and nothing to hide behind.
This activity should be like telling stories around the campfire –
but the story we tell is about ourselves.
15. There is no question and answer period following the story so
as to avoid any semblance of an ‘interrogation‘, and also to
keep the playing field even, i.e., if the facilitator were to ask
one participant three questions and another only one if might
leave the impression that the first participant‘s story was more
interesting, etc.
16. Every member of the group who is not sharing is asked to
practice ‘full-body’ listening by giving their complete and
unfettered attention to the person speaking. Receiving this
attention while sharing is extremely powerful and the facilitator
can both model this and suggest that participants give the kind
of attention you yourself would want to receive.
17. Every participant must provide a narrative, but the order of
presentation is purely voluntary, an important factor in creating
safety. While every participant must share something,
precisely how much the reveal about themselves is an
individual decision. In this way the exercise entails individually
manageable personal risk.
18. No more than three personal narratives are conducted in a
row. If someone goes exceedingly long this may be shortened
to two or even simply one. In order for the group to exercise
‘full-body’ listening and remain engaged, the entire group ‘who
am I’ must be spaced out over time. Done right, the story is
often draining both for the listeners and the presenters. Each
hour of stories should be broken up with an hour or more of
some other less emotionally investing activity.
19. It is highly recommended that the facilitator models their own
story before the participants commence their solo reflection.
What the facilitator shares will set the tone for what the
participants share. Facilitators are urged to go out on a limb
and reveal meaningful events in their life that genuinely
shaped them as people. By taking action and modeling this
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ACTHB v8 Chapter VI
openness first, the facilitator encourages participants to risk
being personally vulnerable themselves.
20. During my experience, several participants have initially told
the group that they had felt they did not know everyone well
enough to completely share who they are and everything they
had learned about themselves in preparing for the exercise. In
most cases they came forward later and decided to redo their
story on their own initiative—sharing things they had learned
through introspection but needed time to process. This
methodology allows people to operate within their comfort
zone while simultaneously establishing a group norm that
encourages them to both reflect and share.
21. It should be clear by now that this exercise is most definitely
NOT a normal biographical recitation. Positions held, size and
composition of family, etc. are not important unless they are
linked to some watershed event. In an Army context, when
someone commanded a company or held some other position
of importance is not relevant UNLESS some critical event
happened while in that position that has stayed with and
continues to shape their daily outlook. Similarly, while the birth
of a child is without question a significant event in anyone‘s life
it may or may not necessarily change your worldview about
things like the nature of personal responsibility, what your
values are, etc. Hence participants are ideally sharing events
that were personally transformational on a fundamental level.
22. Finally, and most importantly, this all requires a degree of
confidentiality among the group. While not confession or
protected speech, it is critical that if someone chooses to
share personal vulnerabilities—e.g. current struggles at home
or difficult events from the past—that this content does not
become fodder for gossip. To gain buy-in on this, the facilitator
should openly propose confidentiality as a group norm, and
foster a brief discussion about what this means. A good rule of
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ACTHB v8 Chapter VIV
Why Assess?
“Nothing is more wasteful than doing with great efficiency, that
which is totally unnecessary!” 63
Assessment is a process that measures progress toward
accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective.
Assessment Considerations:
‡ Effective assessment systems focus on the end state and
objectives.
‡ Measures of effectiveness are usually more important than
measures of performance.
‡ Assessment’s applicability transcends the spectrum of
conflict and all phases of an operation.
‡ Effective assessment planning is not an afterthought, but
built up front in planning.
‡ Assessment processes and metrics should be nested with
the higher headquarters but designed and tailored to assess
the specific objective of the unit.
‡ A good assessment system enables commanders to make
timely shifts in resources to reinforce efforts.
‡ Assessment measures can be either quantitative or
qualitative.
‡ Objectives, effects, and measures of effectiveness are
interrelated.
‡ Assign responsibility for assessment.
‡ Understand other stakeholder’s interests in an assessment
system (coalition, interagency, enemy).
Assessment measures must be:
‡ Relevant: Assessment measures should directly relate to the
envisioned operational end-state, objective, or mission. The
less precise an end state the more difficult it is to define
assessment measures.
‡ Appropriate: Should reflect the OE; be realistic and
appropriate for the echelon.
‡ Measurable: Assessment measures can be qualitative or
quantitative. To be measurable, a baseline must be
established which accurately states the current situation in
order to determine progress. Objective, quantitative criteria
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ACTHB v8 Chapter VI
(metrics) are less subjective to error than qualitative or
subjective criteria (metrics).
‡ Timely: Good assessment systems provide commanders
timely feedback. Timeliness not only determines success or
failure of efforts, but it also helps to reprioritize and
reallocate resources as needed. Good assessment systems
should be reasonable in the time required to input and use
the system.
‡ Numerically Reasonable: Keep measures to a minimum to
maintain focus on the most important and to enable
recognition of success or failure to reallocate resources.
‡ Resourced: For any effective assessment system, planners
must establish:
¾ Who will observe?
¾ When will we observe
¾ How often will we observe?
‡ Nested (when appropriate) with Higher Headquarters
Assessment Measures.
‡ Systemically (and graphically when appropriate) Displayed
and Reviewed.
‡ Account for the “culture and expectations” found in the OE.
It should be emphasized that both MOE and MOP must be
“measurable.” If you can’t Measure it, it can’t be an MOE or an
MOP. This means it must be stated in terms of “numbers.” It
should also be emphasized that while MOE are usually more
important, if we don’t look at MOP and we are not achieving the
desired effect, we won’t know if it’s because we aren’t doing the
right thing or if it’s because we’re not doing things right. MOP
must be looked at to rule out execution if the tasks aren’t
achieving the desired effect.
Measures of Performance (MOP)
‡ Criteria used to evaluate accomplishment of our actions.
‡ Should answer “Are we doing things right?”
‡ The criterion to assess friendly actions that is tied to
measuring task accomplishment?
‡ Sometimes called a Measure of “EFFORT”
Example
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ACTHB v8 Chapter VIV
Desired Effect: Reduction in popular support to criminal
elements
Task: Influence populace to report crime &criminals
MOP: Number of face-to-face engagements with local
leaders
Number of advertisements for tip-line numbers
Common Measures of Performance (MOP)
x Quantity
x Cost
x Schedule
x Productivity
Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)
‡ The criteria used to evaluate how actions have affected
(changed) system behavior or capabilities.
‡ Should answer “Are we doing the right thing?”
Example
Desired Effect: Reduction in popular support to criminal
elements
Task: Influence populace to report crime &criminals
MOE: Number of valid citizen reports of criminal elements
Number of valid citizen reports of criminal activities
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ACTHB v8 Chapter VI
Yes … and
This technique is designed to get people to listen to one enough
more fully. Conduct this in groups of no larger than 6, but 3 or 4 is
better. Like all of the tools, have people start by individually
thinking about the problem or question at hand and then writing
down their thoughts.
Have the small group sit in a circle or sit knee to knee (in a
square).
Once everyone in the group has written their ideas, one person
starts by stating their idea.
After they have finished, the person next to them (can go
clockwise or counter) must start their sentence with “Yes…and…”
- they must agree with the idea suggested by the first person and
then build on that idea in some positive way that strengthens the
idea.
The next person builds on the first two by again starting with “Yes
…and…”
This continues until the small group have all commented upon and
improved person 1’s idea.
Person 2 goes next with the same rules, each improving each
other’s idea until everyone has shared and idea and had the group
build upon it.
Each originator of the idea is responsible for submitting the final
version of that idea to the collective knowledge at the end of the
exercise.
See also
x
http://99u.com/articles/7183/the-yes-and-approach-lessego-more-openness-more-possibility
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ACTHB v8 Chapter VIV
Endnotes
1
Gareth Morgan, “The 15-% solution,” The Change Page of the Globe and Mail
(Toronto, ON: Philip Crawley, 1994).
2
From Ken Booth’s book, Strategy and Ethnocentrism.
3
Fisher, R., Ury, W. and Patton, B. (1991). Getting to Yes: Negotiating
Agreement Without Giving In. Second Edition. New York: Penguin Books.102.
4
Fisher, R., Ury, W. and Patton, B. (1991). Getting to Yes: Negotiating
Agreement Without Giving In. Second Edition. New York: Penguin Books. 105.
5
Fisher, R., Ury, W. and Patton, B. (1991). Getting to Yes: Negotiating
Agreement Without Giving In. Second Edition. New York: Penguin Books. 107.
6
Fisher, R., Ury, W. and Patton, B. (1991). Getting to Yes: Negotiating
Agreement Without Giving In. Second Edition. New York: Penguin Books. 108.
7
Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (New York: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux, 2011), 4.
8
Thinking, Fast and Slow, 8.
9
Ibid. 98.
10
J. Edward Russo and Paul J. H. Schoemaker, Winning Decisions: Getting It
Right the First Time (New York: Currency, 2002), 165.
11 Timothy Karcher, Understanding the "victory Disease" from the Little Bighorn
to Mogadishu and beyond (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute
Press, 2004), 2.
12
Richards J. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. 2nd ed. (Washington,
D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), 70.
13 Robert H. Lavenda and Emily A. Schultz, Core Concepts in Cultural
Anthropology. 3rd ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2007), 21.
14
Robert M. Utley, Cavalier in Buckskin: George Armstrong Custer and the
Western Military Frontier (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988), 65 cited
in Karcher, Understanding the “Victory Disease,” From the Little Bighorn to
Mogadishu and Beyond, 40.
15
Walter, Mason Camp and Kenneth M. Hammer, Custer in '76: Walter Camp's
Notes on the Custer Fight (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1976),
107 cited in Understanding the “Victory Disease,” From the Little Bighorn to
Mogadishu and Beyond, 40.
16
Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 7-8.
17
Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 5-0, The Operations Process,
(17 May 2012), 2-24.
18
Dietrich Doerner, The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error in
Complex Situations (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 10.
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ACTHB v8 Chapter VI
19
Evan Thomas in his book, Sea of Thunder, describes the naval actions in the
Pacific during World War II between US commanders and their Japanese
counterparts culminating in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. In particular the narrative
describes how an experienced American commander was wedded to a
preconception shaped by U.S. military culture, past experience fighting the
Japanese, and a failure to consider other possibilities. Evan Thomas, Sea of
Thunder: Four Commanders and the Last Great Naval Campaign 1941-1945
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006).
20
Jim Garamone, “Gates Urges Restraint, Resolve for NATO,” American Forces
Press Service, 19 September 2008. Available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=51250 (Accessed 29 August
2014). In his speech to the Oxford Analytica in Blenheim Place, England,
Secretary of Defense Gates juxtaposed lessons of miscalculations, nationalism
and hubris which led to WW I and the Munich ‘appeasement.’ He concluded “For
much of the past century, Western psychology, rhetoric and policy-making on
matters of war and peace has been framed by, and often lurched between, these
two poles – between excessive pressures to take military action and excessive
restraint, between a too eager embrace of the use of military force and an
extreme aversion to it.” Thus he concludes that the “lessons of history” may be
over learned.
21
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable
(New York: Random House, 2007).
22
J. Koehler, “The Base-Rate Neglect Fallacy Reconsidered: Descriptive,
Normative, and Methodological Challenges,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19
(1996): 1-53 cited in Philip E. Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good is It?
How Can We Know? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 40.
23 Philip E. Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment How Good Is It? How Can We
Know? (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005), 40.
24
Ibid.
25
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable,
2d Ed. (New York: Random House, 2010), Kindle Edition location 1653.
26
Gary F. Marcus, Kluge: The Haphazard Construction of the Human Mind
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008), 53.
27
Taleb, The Black Swan, Chapter 6.
28
Scott Plous, The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1993), 234-235.
29
Wayne Michael Hall, Stray Voltage: War in the Information Age. (Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003). Mr. Hall defines will as “the resolution,
sacrifice, and perseverance of individuals and groups of people to win in a
competitive struggle.”
30
Drawn from Robert H. Lavenda and Emily A. Schultz, Core Concepts in
Cultural Anthropology (Boston, Mass: McGraw Hill, 2007).
31
The information from the Framing Audit Tool is derived from pages 30-31 and
45 of Winning Decisions, by J. Edward Russo and Paul J.H. Schoemaker.
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ACTHB v8 Chapter VIV
32
Mary L. Connerley and Paul Pedersen, Leadership in a Diverse and
Multicultural Environment: Developing Awareness, Knowledge, and Skills
(Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2005), xii.
33 Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge,
Mass.: The MIT Press, 1998), 71.
34
Ibid.
35
Benjamin S. Bloom, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives; the Classification of
Educational Goals (New York: Longmans, Green, 1956).
36
Bloom.
37
Doerner, Logic of Failure.
38
Douglas MacEachin, Forward to Psychology of Intelligence Analysis
(Washington, DC: CSI Publications, 1999). Available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csipublications/books-and-monographs/psychology-of-intelligenceanalysis/index.html
39
Helmuth von Moltke, Militarische Werke, vol. 2, part 2, pp. 33-40, translated
and cited in Daniel J. Hughes (ed.), Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings
(New York: Presidio Press, 1993), 45. Compare to the often quoted paraphrase,
“No plan survives first contact with the enemy.”
40
Adapted from Lieutenant Colonel Richard King, Thinking Skills Resources.
Unpublished draft, 2009, 69.
41
Ibid. GL-5.
42
Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 11 August 2011, IV-7.
See also the JP 5-0, GL-5. Available online from the Joint Electronic Library at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp5_0.pdf
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid. IV-8.
45
M. Neil Browne and Stuart M. Keeley, Asking the Right Questions: A Guide to
Critical Thinking (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007), 55.
46
Ibid. 53.
47
Ibid. 59.
48
Ibid. 73.
49
Ibid. 54-55.
50
JP 2-0, I-26.
51
A good example of how an analyst critically questioned a concept based upon
its assumptions is found in, Antulio J. Echevarria II, Rapid Decisive Operations –
An Assumptions-Based Critique (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001).
Available at
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=218,
accessed 8 August 2014.
52
JP 5-0, IV-8.
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ACTHB v8 Chapter VI
53
JP 2-0, I-26.
54
Donald P. Wright, Timothy R. Reese with the Contemporary Operations Study
Team, ON POINT II: Transition to the New Campaign: The United States Army in
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM May 2003–January 2005, Fort Leavenworth, KS:
Combat Studies Institute, 2008, pages 79 – 80.
55
Timothy G. Malone, “The Red Team” Forging a Well-Conceived Contingency
Plan, Aerospace Power Journal, Summer 2002, page 22.
56
Peter D. Woodmansee, Timothy L. Faulkner and Wayne C. Blanchette, “The
Need to Validate Planning Assumptions,” Military Review. January – February
2005, pgs. 58 - 62.
57
JP 5-0, pgs. IV-7 to IV-8.
58
Ibid. pg. IV-8.
59
Asking the Right Questions, pg. 2.
60
J. Edward Russo and Paul J.H. Schoemaker, Winning Decisions: Getting it
Right the First Time (New York: Doubleday, 2002), 21-33.
61
Field Manual (FM) 3-55, Information Collection, 23 April 2012, pg. 3-2.
62
Information collection is… the Army’s replacement [term] for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). ISR is a joint term, for which the Army
revised to meet Army needs. FM 3-55, iii.
63
Will Kaydos, Measuring, Managing, and Maximizing Performance (Cambridge,
Mass.: Productivity Press, 1991), 17.
Page 232
RTHB v8 Glossary V
Abbreviations
Abbreviations
ACH
ADM
ADP
ADRP
AO
BCT
CAP
CCIR
CGSC
CINC
CJCSI
COA
COG
CVs
DOD
ECOA
ESP
EVE
HUMINT
HVT
ISR
JIIM
JP
LOE
LOO
LREC
MDMP
MOE
MOM
MOP
MOSES
MRX
OE
OEF
OEL
Analysis of Competing Hypothesis
Army Design Methodology
Army Doctrine Publication
Army Doctrine Reference Publication
Area of Operations
Brigade Combat Team
Crisis Action Planning
Commander’s Critical Information Requirement
Command & General Staff College
Commander In Chief
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
Course of Action
Centers of Gravity
Critical Variables
Department of Defense
Enemy Course of Action
Extrasensory Perception
Evaluation of Evidence
Human Intelligence
High Value Targets
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
Joint Interagency, Intergovernmental, and
Multinational
Joint Publication
Lines of Effort
Lines of Operation
Language Regional Expertise and Culture
Military Decision Making Process
Measures of Effectiveness
Motive, Opportunity and Means
Measures of Performance
Manipulability of Sources
Mission Rehearsal Exercise
Operational Environment
Operation Enduring Freedom
Operational Environment Laboratory
Page 233
RTHB v8 Glossary
OIF
OPLAN
OPORD
OPT
PGM
PMESII
PT
POP
REC
RT
RTHB
SEEI
SME
SOP
SWOT
TRADOC
TTP
UFMCS
USAFAS
WMD
XO
Operation Iraqi Freedom
Operations/Operational Plan
Operations Order
Operational Planning Team
Precision guided munitions
Political, Military, Economic Social, Infrastructure,
Information
Physical Environment and Time (US Army)
Past Opposition Practices
Regional Expertise and Culture
Red Team or Red Teaming
Red Team Handbook
State, Elaborate, Exemplify, Illustrate
Subject Matter Expert
Standard Operating Procedure
Strengthens, Weakness, Opportunities & Threats
United States Army Training and Doctrine
Command
Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
University of Foreign Military and Cultural
Studies
United States Army Field Artillery School
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Executive Officer
Page 234
RTHB v8 Index V
Glossary
Applied Critical
thinking, (ACT)
The deliberate process of applying tools and methodologies to
critically review problems by "asking better questions," such as
deconstructing arguments, examining analogies, challenging
assumptions, and exploring alternatives. Effective
employment of ACT tools and methodologies cannot occur
without self-awareness of one's own cognition, and how one
"thinks about thinking:" understanding biases,
perception/interpretation, mental models, framing, and
worldviews.
Groupthink
mitigation (GTM)
The application of tools designed to foster divergent thinking
during problem solving by including the perspectives of every
member of the group before converging on a course of action.
Inherent in GTM techniques are the requirements of
individuals to consider and record their thoughts before group
engagement, and the use of anonymity to encourage candid
feedback.
Page 235
Index
2nd & 3rd order ..... 192, 196
alternative futures ......... 75
analysis ....................... 107
apperception ........... 30, 35
assessment ................. 134
assumption.. 106, 108, 142
assumptions check ..... 153
Bloom .......... 195, 231, 237
Booth ............ 38, 229, 237
brainstorming ................ 86
Browne ... 41, 51, 212, 217,
231, 237
center of gravity .. 112, 185
Clausewitz............. 53, 237
critical actors ............... 109
culture ......................... 109
deductive. 48, 49, 108, 157
demographics ............. 109
devil’s advocacy .......... 136
Doerner ... 49, 95, 229, 238
Douglas ............... 210, 231
economics ................... 113
empathy .......... 27, 33, 206
external organizations . 111
Hall .............................. 230
Hofstede.. 27, 38, 161, 239
hypotheses, competing . 78
hypothesis testing ....... 190
indicators or signposts 151
inductive 48, 108, 134, 158
information .................. 111
initiatives group ........... 171
Janis ... 53, 54, 55, 66, 239
Jung .... 9, 18, 20, 237, 239
Klein ............................165
Lavenda.......................230
listening .........................16
Malone.........................232
mental simulation ........166
military capabilities ......110
national will ..................112
personality ...... 5, 9, 10, 17,
172
physical environment ...109
PMESII .... 26, 31, 179, 218
receipt of mission ........105
Reese ..........................232
relationships ................110
religion .........................113
Russo ..... 46, 51, 229, 230,
232, 241
Schoomaker ................1, 8
Schultz.........................230
self, core ........................19
Senge ............ 49, 183, 241
stakeholder mapping ...185
strategic questioning .....15
system 30, 49, 71, 96, 208,
225
System ............................5
team A/team B.............204
technology ...................111
Thomas ........... 5, 230, 241
time .............................112
what if? analysis .. 220, 221
Zinni ............... 21, 215, 241
Page 236
ACTHB v7 Bibliography
Bibliography
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D.C.: Department of the Army, May 2012.
Barnet, Sylvan. Critical Thinking, Reading, and Writing: A Brief Guide to
Argument. 7th ed. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martins, 2011.
Berens, Linda. Understanding Yourself and Others: An Introduction to
the 4 Temperaments, 4.0. Los Angeles: Radiance House, 2010.
Bloom, Benjamin S. Taxonomy of Educational Objectives. New York:
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Booth, Ken. Strategy and Ethnocentrism. New York: Holmes & Meier,
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Brookfield, Stephen. Developing Critical Thinkers: Challenging Adults to
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Brookfield, Stephen. The Skillful Teacher: On Technique, Trust, and
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Browne, M. Neil. Asking the Right Questions: A Guide to Critical
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Burnet, John. Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and Crito. Oxford:
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"Carl Jung: Books." Carl Jung: Books. Accessed November 20, 2014.
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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION
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Claude Levi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of Kinship. (Boston:
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Clausewitz, Carl Von, and Michael Howard. On War. Princeton, N.J.:
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Ronald Cohen, "The Political System," in A Handbook of Method in
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ACTHB v8 Bibliography
York & London: Columbia Press, 1970.
Connerley and Pedersen. Leadership in a Diverse and Multicultural
Environment: Developing Awareness, Knowledge, and Skills. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2005.
Cox, Taylor. Cultural Diversity in Organizations: Theory, Research, and
Practice. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler, 1993.
Demarest, Geoff. Winning Irregular War. Leavenworth, Kansas: Foreign
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Dept of the Army of the US of America, ADP 5-0, The Operations
Process. Washington, DC: GPO, 2012.
Dept of the Army of the US of America, Field Manual (FM) 3-55,
Information Collection. Washington, DC: GPO, 2013
Dept of the Army of the US of America, The United States Army
Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design,
1st Ed, Ft Monroe VA, Washington, DC: GPO, 2008
Doerner, Dietrich. The Logic of Failure: Why Things Go Wrong and What
We Can Do to Make Them Right. New York: Metropolitan Books, 1996.
Echevarria, Antulio Joseph. Rapid Decisive Operations: An
Assumptions-based Critique. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001.
Elder, Linda, and Richard Paul. The Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking:
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RTHB v8 My Notes
My
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Page 242
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
C121: Critical Thinking
Reading: C121RD
Good Decisions: Tips and Strategies for Avoiding Psychological Traps
Author: Brian Fitch
Good Decisions: Tips and Strategies for Avoiding Psychological Traps
Fitch, Brian
FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin; Jun 2010; 79, 6; ProQuest
pg. 1
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US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
C121: Critical Thinking
Reading C121RE:
Critical Thinking: Intellectual Standards Essential to Reasoning Well
Within Every Domain of Thought
Authors: Linda Elder and Richard Paul
Critical Thinking: Intellectual Standards
Essential to Reasoning Well Within Every
Domain of Thought
By Linda Elder and Richard Paul
Students live in a world of thoughts. They accept some thoughts as true. They
reject others as false. But the thoughts they perceive as true are sometimes
false, unsound, or misleading. And the thoughts they perceive as false and
trivial are sometimes true and significant.
The mind doesn’t naturally grasp the truth or naturally see things
as they are. People don’t automatically sense what is reasonable and what
unreasonable. Thought is often biased by personal agendas, interests, and
values. People typically see things as they want to and twist reality to fit
preconceived ideas. Distorting reality is common in human life. Everyone
falls prey to this phenomenon.
Each person views the world through multiple lenses, often shifting them
to fit changing feelings. In addition, perspective is largely unconscious and
uncritical and has been influenced by many forces including social, political,
economic, biological, psychological, and religious influences. Social rules
and taboos, religious and political ideologies, biological and psychological
impulses, all play a role, often unconscious, in human thinking. Selfishness,
vested interest, and parochialism are deeply influential in the intellectual
and emotional lives of most people.
A system for intellectual intervention—a method for pre-empting bad
thinking—is necessary: one that allows us to take rational command of our
cognitive processes so we may rationally determine what to accept and what
to reject. In short, we need standards for thought; standards that guide us
to consistently excellent thinking; and standards we can count on to keep
our thinking on track, to help us mirror in our minds what is happening in
reality, to reveal the truth in situations, and to enable us to determine how
best to live our lives.
In this and the next few columns we introduce an explicit foundation for
thinking about intellectual standards and the words that name them. When
taken seriously, such explicitness will lead to a higher level of consciousness
of these standards and their importance in human life. It will enable students
(and instructors) to think more effectively in every domain and subject in
which, or about which, they think. Of course, in these brief columns we can
merely begin to analyze the standards for thought.
In conceptualizing intellectual standards, we hypothesize the following:
1. Intellectual standard terms are rooted in everyday language and are
presupposed in every subject, discipline, and domain of human thought.
2. There is a rich variety of intellectual standard terms extant in natural
languages from which one can draw in order to discipline one’s thinking.
3. Intellectual standards form constellations of interrelated meanings that
can be placed into categories under headings such as clarity, accuracy,
precision, relevance, importance, and fairness.
4. There are numerous concepts (e.g., integrity, empathy, fairmindedness) in
natural languages which, though not themselves intellectual standards,
presuppose intellectual standards.
34
JDE_36-3_final130724.pdf 34
5. Systematic cultivation is required for humans to use intellectual standard
words at a high level of skill.
6. In reasoning through subjects and disciplines, intellectual standards to
which one is expected to adhere should be made explicit (to be properly
monitored).
7. The consistent and explicit satisfaction of intellectual standards is
important to commanding the quality of one’s life and, more generally,
to creating societies that genuinely value critical thinking.
Intellectual Standard Words
All modern natural languages provide their users with a wide range of
intellectual standard words. Natural languages are languages used in the
conduct of daily life (such as English, German, French, Arabic, Japanese).
These languages emerge from repositories of terms and phrases that have
developed over thousands of years by people who share a region and hence
communicate with one another within that region. Natural languages contrast
with artificial languages, which are created by specialties to facilitate a domain
of study or interest (e.g., science, psychology, mathematics, baseball, etc.).
Natural language terms, when appropriately used, serve as plausible guides
for assessing reasoning. For example, the following words name intellectual
standards in the English language: clarity, accuracy, precision, relevance,
depth, breadth, logicalness, significance, and fairness (see Figure 1). There are
synonyms for these essential intellectual standards in every natural language
(German, French, Spanish, Korean, Chinese, Turkish, and so on). The same
words in French, for instance, are clarté, exactitude, précision, pertinence,
profondeur, ampleur, logique, signification, and impartialité.
Understanding how to apply intellectual standard words appropriately to
cases is essential to thinking well in every language and to reasoning through
all content. To live “reasonably,” humans need to construct their thinking so
as to be clear, accurate, relevant, significant, logical, and so forth. They also
need to clarify the thinking of others, to check for accuracy, logic, significance
and so on. Routine use of these nine intellectual standards—reflected in
the intellectual standard words—is essential to thinking well within every
domain of human life. And these standards are part of a much broader set of
intellectual standards humans need to draw upon regularly as part of their
everyday life.
In speaking of “intellectual standards,” it may be more accurate to
say “intellectual standards words.” For purposes of simplicity and ease of
reading, we often use the shorter term “intellectual standards.” The relationship between concepts and word use is complicated. It would be difficult
to understand or explain intellectual standards without using and talking
about intellectual standard words. The critical analytic vocabulary of the
English language, rightly used, fosters command of intellectual standards for
English speakers. These standards may go beyond present usage in that they
may encompass underlying implications. But without cultivated command
of intellectual standards, the foundations cannot be laid. In short, when
Journal of Developmental Education
7/25/13 3:12 PM
we use the term “intellectual standards,” we generally mean “intellectual
standard words established by educated use.” Intellectual standards, as we
understand them, are conceptualizations in disciplined human minds of
possible strengths and weaknesses in thinking. They are embodied in the
proper use of intellectual standard words in context.
Conclusion
Our fundamental purpose in this series is to illuminate (a) the essential
role intellectual standards play in the life and mind of the scholar, (b) the
importance of intellectual standards in understanding and reasoning through
content of any kind, and (c) the importance of explicitly mastering intellectual
standards. In doing so, we offer a brief analysis of some of the most important
intellectual standards in the English language. We look at their opposites.
We argue for their explicit contextualization within subjects and disciplines
(see Figure 2). And we call attention to the forces that undermine their use
in everyday human life and human reasoning.
Reference
Elder, L., & Paul, R. (2012). The thinker’s guide to intellectual standards: The words
that name them and the criteria that define them. Tomales, CA: Foundation for
Critical Thinking Press.
Linda Elder is an Educational Psychologist and President of the Foundation for
Critical Thinking. Richard Paul is Director of the Center for Critical Thinking
and Director of Research of the Foundation for Critical Thinking, Tomales,
CA: www.criticalthinking.org
Figure 1. Essential intellectual standard words, and brief
definitions, applicable to skilled reasoning in all domains of
human thought and action.
Figure 2. Questions implied by understanding and use of
intellectual standards. Each question represents an intellectual
move students can make as they reason through content and
as they develop ideas.
Note: Reprinted with permission from Elder, L., & Paul, R. (2012). The
Thinker’s guide to analytic thinking (p. 8). Tomales, CA: Foundation for
Critical Thinking.
Note: Reprinted with permission from Elder, L., & Paul, R. (2012). The
Thinker’s guide to analytic thinking (p. 9). Tomales, CA: Foundation for
Critical Thinking.
Volume 36, Issue 3 • Spring 2013
JDE_36-3_final130724.pdf 35
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35
7/25/13 3:12 PM
C122
Creative Thinking
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL)
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
Advance Sheet for Lesson C122
Creative Thinking
1. SCOPE
In C121 we introduced the concepts of critical and creative thinking. This two-hour class introduces
creative thinking and addresses two specific components–enhancers and barriers to creative thinking. This
lesson draws upon the concepts discussed in critical thinking and continues to expand on how to become
better thinkers and problem solvers.
This lesson enhances awareness in how creative thinking is encouraged–and enhances awareness in
how creative thinking is discouraged. The lesson provides the definition for creative thinking and the
relationship creative thinking has with imagination, innovation, agility, and adaptability. This lesson is
highly interactive and energetic.
This lesson focuses on how to foster a climate of creativity in the classroom throughout Common
Core. The ultimate focus is to foster a climate of creativity beyond the walls of CGSOC–in line with ADP
1, The Army, which states, “Soldiers with physical and moral courage, the ability to think critically and
creatively, and the resilience to endure hardship provide the Army its collective strength.”
Creative thinking–developing new ideas and approaches of value–using adaptive and innovative
approaches developed from imagination, insight, and novel ideas–is a critical component to affect change
that is needed not only for the classroom, but also for the Army today and in the future. This lesson helps
start this journey.
2. LEARNING OUTCOMES/OBJECTIVES
This lesson supports CGSOC TLO-CC-2, “Incorporate thinking skills,” as listed on the module
advance sheet. All applicable TLO numbers and action statements are referenced in this paragraph.
ELO-CC-2.2
Action: Incorporate creative thinking skills.
Condition: Given individual reading and writing assignments, and computer-based instruction (CBIs).
Standard: Incorporation includes1. Creative thinking enhancers
2. Identification of creative thinking barriers
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Synthesis
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 1 (Strategic Thinking and Communication): Graduates who
are able to incorporate thinking that is broader than the issue at hand and effectively communicate that
thinking.
CGSOC graduates independently research and critically evaluate information to inform their understanding of the context, create meaning, and creatively design or revise concepts and ideas. Graduates
expertly use written communication to deliver rational, complete and well-supported arguments,
explanations, options, and/or solutions in a form that is specifically tailored to the most relevant audience.
C122 Advance Sheet
April 2021 (AY 21-22)
PLO Standards Supported: CGSOC PLO 1
CGSOC PLO 1 Attributes:
a. Independently research and critically evaluate information.
b. Comprehend context of the situation.
c. Create meaning from those ideas.
d. Creatively design or revise concepts and ideas.
e. Communicate concepts with clarity and precision in written, graphical, and oral forms.
f. Compose complete and well-supported arguments.
g. Apply critical and creative thinking.
3. HOMEWORK ASSIGNMENT
a. First Requirement: Read the following before viewing the computer-based instruction (CBI):
Read:
C122RA: “The Hungry Beast and the Ugly Baby” excerpt from Ed Catmul and Amy Wallace,
Chapter 7, Creativity, Inc. pages 129-144 (15 pages).
C122RB: “The Adjacent Possible” Chapter 1, excerpt from Steven Johnson, Where Good Ideas
Come From, pages 25-35 (5 pages).
C122RC: ADP 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession, 31 July 2019, paras 4-1 through 4-10,
6-25, 9-31, and 9-40 (1 page). Located in the Blackboard Master Library.
Optional Readings:
C122ORD: “Creative Thinking,” excerpt from Dr. Jack D. Kem, Planning for Action: Campaign
Concepts and Tools, pages 15-17 (1 page).
C122ORE: “On Military Creativity,” Milan Vego, Joint Force Quarterly (70), 3d quarter 2013,
pages 83-90 (7 pages). Also available: https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq70/JFQ-70_83-90_Vego.pdf (accessed 26 October 2021).
b. Second Requirement: View the CBI and consider the following questions:
•
How do we think creatively?
•
What are the benefits of creative thinking?
•
How does diversity, equity, and inclusion support creative thinking?
•
What enhances creative thinking?
•
What are some barriers to creative thinking?
•
Do we really value creative thinking or just say we do?
•
How do we set a climate that encourages creativity in the classroom? In our future units?
b. Third Requirement: Take the C122 Blackboard quiz located in the C122 lesson area on
Blackboard.
5. ASSESSMENT PLAN
You will be assessed on your comprehension of the lesson material by completing the C122 Blackboard
quiz, which accounts for 10% of your C100 grade. You may take the quiz up to three times; the highest
score will be recorded in the gradebook.
RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
C122 Advance Sheet
2
April 2021 (AY 21-22)
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL)
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
C122: Creative Thinking
Reading: C122RA
The Hungry Beast and the Ugly Baby
Authors: Ed Catmul and Amy Wallace
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, as an ascendant Disney Animation was enjoying a remarkable
string of hit films- The Little Mermaid, Beauty and the Beast, Aladdin, The Lion King- I began to hear a
phrase being used again and again in the executive suites of its Burbank Headquarters: “You’ve got to
feed the Beast.”
As you may recall, Pixar into a contract to write a graphics system for Disney- the Computer
Animation Production System, or CAPS- that would paint and manage animation cels. We began working
on CAPS while Disney was producing The Little Mermaid, so I had a front-row seat from which to view
the way that film’s success led to the studio’s expansion and to its need for more film projects to justify
(and occupy) the growing staff. In other words, I was there to witness the creation of Disney’s Beast- and
by “Beast” I mean any large group that needs to be fed an uninterrupted diet of new material and
resources in order to function.
I should say that none of this was happening by accident or for the wrong reasons. The Walt Disney
Company’s CEO, Michael Eisner, and the studio’s chairman, Jeffrey Katzenberg, had committed to
reviving animation after the long fallow period that followed Walt’s death. To their credit, the result was
an artistic flourishing that drew on the talents of legendary artists who’d been at the studio for decades as
well as the fresh thinking of more recent hires. The films they produced not only were huge economic
drivers for the company, but they immediately became iconic in the popular culture and, in turn,
prompted the animation explosion that would ultimately enable Pixar to make Toy Story.
But the success of each new Disney film also did something else: It created a hunger for more. As the
infrastructure of the studio grew to service, market, and promote each successful film, the need for more
product in the pipeline only expanded. The stakes were simply too high to let all those employees at all
those desks in all those buildings sit idle. If you’d asked around Disney at the time, you would have had
trouble finding someone who believed that animated storytelling was a product that could or should be
made on an assembly line, even though the term “Feed the Beast” has that very idea embedded in it. In
fact, the intentions and values of the high-caliber people working in production were surely admirable.
But the Beast is powerful and can overwhelm even the most dedicated individuals. As Disney expanded
its release schedule, its need for output increased to the point that it opened animation studios in Burbank,
Florida, France, and Australia just to keep up with its appetites. The pressure to create- and quickly!became the order of the day. To be clear, this happens at many companies, not just in Hollywood, and its
unintended effect is always the same: It lessens quality across the board.
After The Lion King was released in 1994, eventually grossing $952 million worldwide, the studio
began its slow decline. It was hard, at first, to deduce why- there had been some leadership changes, yet
the bulk of the people were still there, and they still had the talent and desire to do great work.
C122RA
June 2021 (AY 21-22)
Nevertheless, the drought that was beginning then would last for the next sixteen years: From 1994 to
2010, not a single Disney animated film would open at number one at the box office. I believe this was
the direct result of its employees thinking that their job was to feed the Beast.
Seeing even the earliest manifestation of this trend at Disney, I felt an urgency to understand the
hidden factors that were behind it. Why? Because I sensed that if we continued to be successful, whatever
was happening at Disney Animation would almost certainly happen to us, too.
Originality is fragile. And, in its first moments, it’s often far from pretty. This is why I call early
mock-ups of our films “ugly babies.” They are not beautiful, miniature versions of the adults they will
grow up to be. They are truly ugly: awkward and unformed, vulnerable and incomplete. They need
nurturing- in the form of time and patience- in order to grow. What this means is that they have a hard
time coexisting with the Beast.
The Ugly Baby idea is not easy to accept. Having seen and enjoyed Pixar movies, many people
assume that they popped into the world already striking, resonant, and meaningful- fully grown, if you
will. In fact, getting them to that point involved months, if not years, of work. If you sat down and
watched the early reels of any of our films, the ugliness would be painfully clear. But the natural impulse
is to compare early reels of our films to finished films- by which I mean to hold the new to standards only
the mature can meet. Our job is to protect our babies from being judged too quickly. Our job is to protect
the new.
Before I go on, I want to say something about the protection. I worry that because it has such a
positive connotation, by implication anything being protected seems, ipso facto, worth protecting. But
that’s not always the case. Sometimes within Pixar, for example, production tries to protect processes that
are comfortable and familiar but that don’t make sense; legal departments are famous for being overly
cautious in the name of protecting their companies from possible external threats; people in bureaucracies
often seek to protect the status quo. Protection is used, in these contexts, to further a (small-c)
conservative agenda: Don’t disrupt what already is. As a business becomes successful, meanwhile that
conservatism gains strength, and inordinate energy is directed toward protecting what has worked so far.
When I advocate for protecting the new, then, I am using the word somewhat differently. I am saying
that when someone hatches an original idea, it may be ungainly and poorly defined, but it is also the
opposite of established and entrenched- that is precisely what is most exciting about it. If, while in this
vulnerable state, it is exposed to naysayers who fail to see its potential or lack the patience to let it evolve,
it could be destroyed. Part of our job is to protect the new from people who don’t understand that in order
for greatness to emerge, there must be phases of not-so-greatness. Think of a caterpillar morphing into a
butterfly- it only survives because it is encased in a cocoon. It survives, in other words, because it is
protected from that which would damage it. It is protected from the Beast.
Pixar’s first battle with the Beast came in 1999, after we’d released two successful films and were
putting what we hoped would be our fifth movie, Finding Nemo, into production. I remember Andrew
Stanton’s initial pitch for Nemo, his abducted son. It was a brisk day in October, and we had gathered in a
crowded conference room to hear Andrew talk through his story beats. His presentation was nothing short
of magnificent. The narrative, as he described it, would be intercut with a series of flashbacks that
explained what had happened to make Nemo’s father such an overprotective worrywart when it came to
his son (Nemo’s mother and siblings, Andrew said, had been slain by a barracuda). Standing there in the
C122RA
2
June 2021 (AY 21-22)
front of the room, Andrew seamlessly wove together two stories: what was happening in Marlin’s world,
during the epic search he undertakes after Nemo is scooped up by a scuba diver, and what was happening
in the aquarium in Sydney, where Nemo had ended up with a group of tropical fish called “the Tank
Gang.” The tale Andrew wanted to tell got to the heart of the struggle for independence that often shapes
the father-son relationship. And what’s more, it was funny.
When Andrew finished his pitch, those of us in attendance were silent for a moment. Then, John
Lasseter spoke for all of us when he said, “You had me at the word fish.” At this point, the specter of Toy
Story 2, which had taken such a devastating toll on our employees, still loomed large in our memories.
Stretched to the breaking point, we’d emerged from that film with a clear understanding that what we had
gone through was not healthy for our employees or our business. We had vowed not to repeat those
mistakes on Monsters, Inc., and for the most part, we hadn’t. But our determination on that front also
meant that Monsters, Inc. ended up taking nearly five years to make. In the wake of that, we were actively
looking for ways to improve and speed up our process. In this, we were driven by a particular
observation: It was obvious to us that a large portion of our costs stemmed from the fact that we never
seemed to stop tinkering with the scripts of our movies, even long after we started making them. It didn’t
take a genius to see that if we could only settle on the story early on, our movies would be much easierand thus cheaper- to make. This then became our goal- finalize the script before we start making the film.
After Andrew’s tour de force pitch, Finding Nemo seemed like the perfect project with which to test our
new theory. As we gave Andrew the go ahead, we were confident that locking in the story early would
yield not just a phenomenal movie but a cost efficient production.
Looking back, I realize we weren’t just trying to be more efficient. We were hoping to avoid the
messy (and at times uncomfortable) part of the creative process. We were trying to eliminate errors (and,
in so doing, to efficiently feed our beast). Of course, it was not to be. All those flashbacks that we’d loved
in Andrew’s pitch? They proved confusing when we saw them on early reels- in a Braintrust meeting,
Lee Unkrich was the first to call them cryptic and impressionistic, and he lobbied for a more linear story
telling structure. When Andrew tried it, an unexpected benefit emerged. Before, Marlin had come off as
unsympathetic and unlikable because it took too long to find out the reason he was being such a
smothering father. Now, with a more chronological approach, Marlin was more appealing and
sympathetic. Moreover, Andrew found that his intention to weave together two concurrent storylines- the
action in the ocean vs. the action in the aquarium- was far more complicated than he had imagined. The
tale of the Tank Gang, originally intended as a major throughline, became a subplot. And those were just
two of many difficult changes that were made during the production as unforeseen problems presented
themselves- and our goal of a predetermined story and a streamlined production fell apart.
Despite our hopes that Finding Nemo would be the film that changed the way we did business, we
ended up making as many adjustments during the production as we had on any other film we had made.
The result, of course, was a movie we’re incredibly proud of, one that went on to become the secondhighest grossing film of 2003 and the highest-grossing animated film ever. The only thing it didn’t do was
transform our production process.
My conclusion at the time was that finalizing the story before production began was still a worthy
goal- we just hadn’t achieved it yet. As we continued to make films, however, I came to believe that my
goal was not just impractical but naïve. By insisting on the importance of getting our ducks in a row early,
we had come perilously close to embracing a fallacy. Making the process better, easier, and cheaper is an
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important aspiration, something we continually work on- but it is not the goal. Making something great is
the goal.
I see this over and over again in other companies. A subversion takes place in which streamlining the
process or increasing production supplants the ultimate goal, with each person or group thinking they’re
doing the right thing- when in fact, they have strayed off course. When efficiency or consistency of
workflow are not balanced by other equally strong countervailing forces, the result is that the new ideasour ugly babies0 aren’t afforded the attention and protection they need to shine and mature. They are
abandoned or never conceived in the first place. Emphasis is placed on doing safer projects that mimic
proven money-makers just to keep something- anything!- moving through the pipeline (see The Lion King
1 ½ , a direct to video effort that came out in 2004, six years after The Lion King 2: Simba’s Pride). This
kind of thinking yields predictable, unoriginal fare because it prevents the kind of organic ferment that
fuels true inspiration. But it does feed the Beast.
When I talk about the Beast and the Baby, it can seem very black and white- that the Beast is all bad
and the Baby is all good. The truth is, reality lies somewhere in between. The Beast is a glutton but also a
valuable motivator. The Baby is so pure and unsullied, so full of potential, but it’s also needy and
unpredictable and can keep you up at night. The key is for your Beast and your Babies to coexist
peacefully, and that requires that you keep various forces in balance.
How do we balance these forces that seem so at odds, especially when it always appears to be such an
unfair fight? The needs of the Beast seem to trump the needs of the Baby every time, given that the
Baby’s true worth is often unknown or in doubt and can remain so for months on end. How do we hold
off the Beast, curbing its appetites, without putting our companies in jeopardy? Because every company
needs its Beast. The Beast’s hunger translates into deadlines and urgency. That’s a good thing, as long as
the Beast is kept in its place. And that’s the tough part.
Many talk of the Beast as if it is a greedy, unthinking creature, insistent and beyond our control. But
in fact, any group that produces a product or drives revenue could be considered to be part of the Beast,
including marketing and distribution. Each group operates according to its own logic, and many have
neither the responsibility for the quality of what is produced nor a good understanding of their own
impact on that quality. It simply isn’t their problem; keeping process going and the money flowing is.
Each group has its own goals and expectations and acts according to its own appetites.
In many businesses, the Beast requires so much attention that it acquires inordinate power. The
reason: It is expensive, accounting for the vast majority of most companies’ costs. Any company’s profit
margin depends in large part on how effectively it uses its people: The auto workers on the assembly line
who are being paid whether the line is in motion or not; the stock boys in Amazon’s warehouses who
come to work regardless of how many shoppers are online that day; the lighting and shading experts (to
pick one of dozens of examples in the world of animation) who must wait for many others to complete
their duties on a particular shot before they can begin to do their work. If inefficiencies result in anyone
waiting for too long, if the majority of your people aren’t engaged in the work that drives your revenue
most of the time, you risk being devoured from the inside out.
The solution, of course, is to feed the Beast, to occupy its time and attention, putting its talents to use.
Even when you do that, though, the Beast cannot be sated. It is one of life’s cruel ironies that when it
comes to feeding the Beast, success only creates more pressure to hurry up and succeed again. Which is
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why at too many companies, the schedule (that is, the need for product) drives the output, not the strength
of ideas at the front end. I want to be careful not to imply that it is the individual people who comprise the
Beast who are the problem- they are doing the best they can to accomplish what they’ve been charged
with doing. Despite good intentions, the result is troubling: Feeding the Beast becomes the central focus.
The Beast thrives not only within animation or movie companies, of course. No creative business is
immune, from technology to publishing to manufacturing. But all Beasts have one thing in common.
Frequently, the people in charge of the Beast are the most organized people in the company- people wired
to make things happen on track and on budget, as their bosses expect them to do. When those people and
their interests become too powerful- when there is not sufficient push-back to protect new ideas- things go
wrong. The Beast takes over.
The key to preventing this is balance. I see the give and take between different constituencies in a
business as central to its success. So, when I talk about taming the Beast, what I really mean is that
keeping its needs balanced with the needs of other, more creative facets of your company will make you
stronger.
Let me give you an example of what I mean, drawn from the business I know best. In animation, we
have many constituencies: story, art, budget, technology, finance, production, marketing, and consumer
products. The people within each constituency have priorities that are important - and often opposing. The
writer and director want to tell the most affecting story possible; the production designer wants the film to
look beautiful; the technical directors want flawless effects; finance wants to keep the budgets within
limits; marketing wants a hook that is easily sold to potential viewers; the consumer products people want
appealing characters to turn into plush toys and to plaster on lunchboxes and T-shirts; the production
managers try to keep everyone happy - and to keep the whole enterprise from spiraling out of control.
And so on. Each group is focused on its own needs, which means that no one has a clear view of how
their decisions impact other groups; each group is under pressure to perform well, which means achieving
stated goals.
Particularly in the early months of a project, these goals - which are subgoals, really, in the making of
the film - are often easier to articulate and explain than the film itself. But if the director is able to get
everything he or she wants, we will likely end up with a film that’s too long. If the marketing people get
their way, we will only make a film that mimics those that have already “proven” to succeed- in other
words, familiar to viewers but in all likelihood a creative failure. Each group, then, is trying to do the
right thing, but they’re pulling in different directions. If anyone of those groups “wins,” we lose.
In an unhealthy culture, each group believes that if their objectives trump the goals of the other
groups, the company will be better off. In a healthy culture, all constituencies recognize the importance of
balancing competing desires- they want to be heard, but they don’t have to win. Their interaction with one
another - the push and pull that occurs naturally when talented people are given clear goals - yields the
balance we seek. But that only happens if they understand that achieving balance is a central goal of the
company.
While the idea of balance always sounds good, it doesn’t capture the dynamic nature of what it means
to actually achieve balance. Our mental image of balance is somewhat distorted because we tend to
equate it with stillness - the calm repose of a yogi balancing on one leg, a state without apparent motion.
To my mind, the more accurate examples of balance come from sports, such as when a basketball player
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spins around a defender, a running back bursts through the line of scrimmage, or a surfer catches a wave.
All of these are extremely dynamic responses to rapidly changing environments. In the context of
animation, directors have told me that they see their engagement when making a film as extremely active.
“It seems like it’s good psychologically to expect these movies to be troublesome,” Byron Howard, one of
our directors at Disney, told me. “It’s like someone saying, ‘Here, take care of this tiger, but watch your
butt, they’re tricky.’ I feel like my butt is safer when I expect the tiger to be tricky.”
As director Brad Bird sees it, every creative organization - be it an animation studio or a record label is an ecosystem. “You need all the seasons,” he says. “You need storms. It’s like an ecology. To view
lack of conflict as optimum is like saying a sunny day is optimum. A sunny day is when the sun wins over
the rain. There’s no conflict. You have a clear winner. But if every day is sunny and it doesn’t rain, things
don’t grow. And if it’s sunny all the time- if in fact, we don’t ever even have night - all kinds of things
don’t happen and the planet dries up. The key is to view conflict as essential, because that’s how we know
the best ideas will be tested and survive. You know, it can’t only be sunlight.”
It is management’s job to figure out how to help others see conflict as healthy - as a route to balance,
which benefits us all in the long run. I’m here to say that it can be done - but it is an unending job. A good
manager must always be on the lookout for areas in which balance has been lost. For example, as we
expand our animation staff at Pixar, which has the positive impact that we must deal with: Meetings have
become larger and less intimate, with each participant have a proportionally smaller ownership in the final
film (which can mean feeling less valued). In response, we created smaller subgroups in which
departments and individuals are encouraged to feel they have a voice. In order to make corrections like
this- to reestablish balance - managers must be diligent about paying attention.
In chapter 4, I talked about a key moment in Pixar’s development, as we embarked on making Toy
Story 2, when we realized that we never wanted to foster a culture in which some workers were viewed
as first-class, and others as second-class, where some employees were held to a higher standard and others
were effectively relegated to the B-Team. This may have sounded vaguely idealistic to some, but it was
just another way of saying that we believe in preserving balance in our culture. If some employees or
constituencies or goals are perceived to matter more, or to “win,” there can be no balance.
Imagine a balance board - one of those planks of wood that rests, at its midsection, on a cylinder. The
trick is to place one foot on each end of the board, then shift your weight in order to achieve equilibrium
as the cylinder rolls beneath you. If there’s a better example of balance - and of the ability to manage two
competing forces (the left and the right) - I can’t think of one. But while I can try to explain to you how to
do it, show you videos, and suggest different methods for getting started, I could never fully explain how
to achieve balance. That you learn only by doing - by allowing your conscious and subconscious mind to
figure it out while in motion. With certain jobs, there isn’t any other way to learn than by doing - by
putting yourself in the unstable place and then feeling your way.
I often say to managers of creative enterprises must hold lightly to goals and firmly to intentions.
What does that mean? It means that we must be open to having our goals change as we learn new
information or are surprised by things we thought we knew but didn’t. As long as our intentions- our
values- remain constant, our goals can shift as needed. At Pixar, we try to never waver in our ethics, our
values, and our intention to create original, quality products. We are willing to adjust our goals as we
learn, striving to get it right- not necessarily to get it right the first time. Because that, to my mind, is the
only way to establish something else that is essential to creativity: a culture that protects the new.
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For many years, I was on a committee that read and selected papers to be published at SIGGRAPH,
the annual computer graphics conference I mentioned in Chapter 2. These papers were supposed to
present ideas that advanced the field. The committee was composed of many of the field’s most
prominent players, all of whom I knew; it was a group that took the task of selecting papers very
seriously. At each of the meetings, I was struck that there seemed to be two kinds of reviewers: some who
would look for flaws in the papers, and then pounce to kill them; and others who started from a place of
seeking and promoting good ideas. When the “idea protectors” saw flaws, they pointed them out gently,
in the spirit of improving the paper- not eviscerating it. Interestingly, the “paper killers” were not aware
that they were serving some other agenda (which was often, in my estimation, to show their colleagues
how high their standards were). Both groups thought they were protecting the proceedings, but only one
group understood that by looking for something new and surprising, they were offering the most valuable
kind of protection. Negative feedback may be fun, but it is far less brave than endorsing something
unproven and providing room for it to grow.
You’ll notice, I hope, that I’m in no way asserting that protecting the new should mean isolating the
new. As much as I admire the efficiency of the caterpillar in the cocoon, I do not believe that creative
products should be developed in a vacuum (arguably, that was one of the mistakes we made on film about
blue footed newts). I know some people who like to keep their gem completely to themselves while they
polish it. But allowing this kind of behavior isn’t protection. In fact, it can be the opposite: a failure to
protect your employee from themselves. Because if history is any guide, some are diligently trying to
polish a brick.
At Pixar, protection means populating story meetings with idea protectors, people who understand the
difficult, ephemeral process of developing the new. It means supporting our people, because we know that
the best ideas emerge when we’ve made it safe to work through problems. (Remember: People are more
important than ideas.) Finally, it does not mean protecting the new forever. At some point, the new has to
engage with the needs of the company - with its many constituencies and, yes, with the Beast. As long as
the Beast is not allowed to run roughshod over everyone else, as long as we don’t let it invert our values,
its presence can be an impetus for progress.
At some point, the new idea has to move from the cocoon of protection into the hands of other people.
This engagement process is typically very messy and can be painful. Once, after one of our special effects
software guys resigned, he wrote me an email containing two complaints. First, he said, he didn’t like that
his job involved cleaning up so many little problems caused by the new software. Second, he wrote, he
was disappointed that we weren’t taking more technical risks in our movies. The irony was that his job
was to help solve problems that arose precisely because we were taking a major technical risk by
implementing new software systems. The mess that he encountered - the reason he quit - was, in fact,
caused by the complexity of trying to do something new. I was struck by how he didn’t understand that
taking a risk necessitated a willingness to deal with the mess created by the risk.
So: When is that magic moment when we shift from protection to engagement? This is sort of like
asking the mama bird how she knows it’s time to nudge her baby out of the nest. Will the baby have the
strength to fly on its own? Will it figure out how to use its wings on the way down, or will it crash to the
earth?
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The fact is, we struggle with this question on every film. Hollywood famously uses the term green
light to reference the moment in a project’s development when a studio officially decides it is viable (and
many, many projects remain stuck in “development hell,” never to emerge to face the world). In Pixar’s
history, though, we have only developed one feature film that didn’t make it through to completion.
One of my favorite examples of how protection can give way to engagement comes not from a Pixar
film but from our intern program. In 1998, I decided that the company would benefit from a summer
program - like those at many creative companies - that would bring bright young people into Pixar for a
couple of months to learn from working with experienced production people. But when I ran the idea past
our production managers, they said no thanks: They had no interest in taking interns on. At first, I thought
this was because they were too busy to spend time attending to inexperienced college kids and teaching
them the ropes. But when I probed more deeply, it became clear that the resistance wasn’t a question of
time but of money. They didn’t want the added expense of paying the interns. They only had so much
cash in their budget and would rather spend it on experienced people. They had only had so much time
and resources, and the Beast was bearing down upon them. Their reaction was a form of protection, I
suppose, motivated by a desire to protect the film and to aim every dollar at making it a success. But this
stance didn’t benefit the company as a whole. Internship programs are mechanisms for spotting talent and
seeing if outsiders fit in. Moreover, new people bring an infusion of energy. To me, it seemed like a winwin.
I suppose I could simply have mandated that our production managers add the cost of adding the
interns to their budgets. But that would have made this new idea the enemy - something to resent. Instead,
I decided to make the interns a corporate expense - they would essentially be available, at no extra cost, to
any department who wanted to take them on. The first year, Pixar hired eight interns who were placed in
the animation and technical departments. They were so eager and hard-working and they learned so fast
that every one of them, by the end, was doing real production work. Seven of them ultimately returned,
after graduation, to work for us in a full-time capacity. Every year since then, the program has grown a
little more, and every year more managers have found themselves won over by their young charges. It
wasn’t just that the interns lightened the workload by taking on projects. Teaching them Pixar’s ways
made our people examine how they did things, which led to improvements for all. A few years in, it
became clear that we didn’t need to fund interns out of the corporate coffers anymore; as the program
proved its worth, people became willing to absorb costs into their budgets. In other words, the intern
program needed protection to establish itself at first, but then grew out of that need. Last year, we had ten
thousand applications for a hundred spots.
Whether it’s the kernel of a movie idea or a fledgling internship program, the new needs protection.
Business-as-usual does not. Managers do not need to work hard to protect established ideas or ways of
doing business. The system is tilted to favor the incumbent. The challenger needs support to find its
footing. And protection of the new - of the future, not the past - must be a conscious effort.
I can’t help but think of one of my favorite moments in any Pixar movie, when Anton Ego, the jaded
and much feared food critic in Ratatouille, delivers his review of Gusteau’s, the restaurant run by our hero
Remy, a rat. Voiced by the great Peter O’Toole, Ego says that Remy’s talents have “challenged my
preconceptions about fine cooking….[and] have rocked me to my core.” His speech, written by Brad
Bird, similarly rocked me - and, to this day, sticks with me as I think about my work.
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“In many ways, the work of a critic is easy,” Ego says. “We risk very little yet enjoy a position over
those who offer up their work and their selves to our judgment. We thrive on negative criticism, which is
fun to write and to read. But the bitter truth we critics must face is that in the grand scheme of things, the
average piece of junk is probably more meaningful than our criticism designating it so. But there are
times when a critic truly risks something, and that is in the discovery and defense of the new. The world is
often unkind to new talent, new creations. The new needs friends.”
RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
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US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL)
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
C122: Creative Thinking
Reading: C122RB
The Adjacent Possible
Author: Steven Johnson
C122 RB: “The Adjacent Possible” Chapter 1, excerpt from Steven Johnson, Where Good Ideas Come
From, pages 25-35.
Sometime in the late 1870s, a Parisian obstetrician named Stephane Tarnier took a day off from
his work at Maternite’ de Paris, the lying-in hospital for the city’s poor women, and paid a visit to the
nearby Paris Zoo. Wandering past the elephants and reptiles and classical gardens of the zoo’s home
inside the Jardin des Plantes, Tarnier stumbled across an exhibit of chicken incubators. Seeing the
hatchlings totter about in the incubator’s warm enclosure triggered an association in his head, and before
long he had hired Odile Martin, the zoo’s poultry raiser, to construct a device that would perform a
similar function for human newborns. By modern standards, infant mortality was staggeringly high in the
late nineteenth century, even in a city as sophisticated as Paris. One in five babies died before learning to
crawl, and the odds were far worse for premature babies born with low birth weights. Tarnier knew that
temperature regulation was critical for keeping these infants alive, and he knew that the French medical
establishment had a deep-seated obsession with statistics. And so as soon as his newborn incubator had
been installed at Maternite’, the fragile infants warmed by hot water bottles below the wooden boxes,
Tarnier embarked on a quick study of five hundred babies. The results shocked the Parisian medical
establishment: while 66 percent of low weight babies died within weeks of birth, only 38 percent died if
they were housed in Tarnier’s incubating box. You could effectively halve the mortality rate for
premature babies simply by treating them like hatchlings at the zoo.
Tarnier’s incubator was not the first device employed for warming newborns, and the contraption
he built with Martin would be improved upon significantly in the subsequent decades. But Tarnier’s
statistical analysis gave newborn incubation the push that it needed: within a few years, the Paris
municipal board required that incubators be installed in all the city’s maternity hospitals. In 1896, an
enterprising physician named Alexandre Lion set up a display of incubators- with live newborns- at the
Berlin Exposition. Dubbed the Kinderbrutenstalt, or “child hatchery,” Lion’s exhibit turned out to be the
sleeper hit of the exposition, and launched a bizarre tradition of incubator sideshows that persisted well
into the twentieth century. (Coney Island had a permanent baby incubator show until the early 1940s.)
Modern incubators, supplemented with high oxygen therapy and other advances, became standard
equipment in all American hospitals after the end of World War II, triggering a spectacular 75 percent
decline in infant mortality rates between 1950 and 1998. Because incubators focus exclusively on the
beginning of life, their benefit to public health- measured by the sheer number of extra years they
provide- rivals any medical advance of the twentieth century. Radiation therapy or a double bypass might
give you another decade or two, but an incubator gives you an entire lifetime.
In the developing world, however, the infant mortality story remains bleak. Whereas infant
deaths are below ten per thousand births throughout Europe and the United States, over a hundred infants
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die per thousand in countries like Liberia and Ethiopia, many of them premature babies that would have
survived with access to incubators. But modern incubators are complex, expensive things. A standard
incubator in an American hospital might cost more than $40,000. But the expense is arguably the smaller
hurdle to overcome. Complex equipment breaks, and when it breaks you need the technical expertise to
fix it, and you need replacement parts. In the year that followed the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the
Indonesian city of Meulaboh received eight incubators from a range of international relief organizations.
By late 2008, when an MIT professor named Timothy Prestero visited the hospital, all eight were out of
order, the victims of power surges and tropical humidity, along with the hospital staff’s inability to read
the English repair manual. The Meulaboh incubators were a representative sample: some studies suggest
that as much as 95 percent of medical technology donated to developing countries breaks within the first
five years of use.
Prestero had a vested interest in those broken incubators, because the organization he founded,
Design that Matters, had been working for several years on a new scheme for a more reliable, and less
expensive, incubator, one that recognized complex medical technology was likely to have a very different
tenure in a developing world context than it would in an American or European hospital. Designing an
incubator for a developing country wasn’t just a matter of creating something that worked; it was also a
matter of designing something that would break in a non-catastrophic way. You couldn’t guarantee a
steady supply of spare parts, or trained repair technicians. So instead, Prestero and his team decided to
build an incubator out of parts that were already abundant in the developing world. The idea had
originated with a Boston doctor named Jonathan Rosen, who had observed that even the smaller towns of
the developing world seemed to be able to keep automobiles in working order. The towns might have
lacked air conditioning and laptops and cable television, but they managed to keep their Toyota 4Runners
on the road. So Rosen approached Prestero with an idea: What if you made an incubator out of
automobile parts?
Three years after Rosen suggested the idea, the Design that Matters team introduced a prototype
device called the NeoNurture. From the outside, it looked like a streamlined modern incubator, but its
guts were automotive. Sealed-beam headlights supplied the crucial warmth; dashboard fans provided
filtered air circulation; door chimes sounded alarms. You could power the device via an adapted cigarette
lighter, or a standard-issue motorcycle battery. Building the NeoNurture out of car parts was doubly
efficient, because it tapped both the local supply of parts themselves and the local knowledge of
automobile repair. These were both abundant resources in the developing world context, as Rosen liked
to say. You didn’t have to be a trained medical technician to fix the NeoNurture; you didn’t even have to
read the manual. You just needed to know how to replace a broken headlight.
Good ideas are like the NeoNurture device. They are, inevitably, constrained by the parts and
skills that surround them. We have a natural tendency to romanticize breakthrough innovations,
imagining momentous ideas transcending their surroundings, a gifted mind somehow seeing over the
detritus of old ideas and ossified tradition. But ideas are works of bricolage; they’re built out of that
detritus. We take the idea’s we’ve inherited or that we’ve stumbled across, and we jigger them together
into some new shape. We like to think of our ideas as $40,000 incubators, shipped direct from the
factory, but in reality they’ve been cobbled together with spare parts that happened to be sitting in the
garage.
Before his untimely death in 2002, the evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould maintained an
odd collection of footware that he had purchased during his travels through the developing world, in open
air markets in Quito, Nairobi, and Delhi. They were sandals made from recycled automobile tires. As a
fashion statement, they may not have amounted to much, but Gould treasured his tire sandals as a
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testimony to “human ingenuity.” But he also saw them as a metaphor for the patterns of innovation in the
biological world. Nature’s innovations, too, rely on spare parts. Evolution advances by taking available
resources and cobbling them together to create new uses. The evolutionary theorist Francois Jacob
captured this in his concept of evolution as a “tinkerer,” not an engineer; our bodies are also works of
bricolage, old parts strung together to form something radically new. “The tires-to-sandals principle
works at all scales and times,” Gould wrote, “permitting odd and unpredictable initiatives at any momentto make nature as inventive as the cleverest person who ever pondered the potential of a junkyard in
Nairobi.”
You can see this process at work in the primordial innovation of life itself. We do not yet have
scientific consensus on the specifics of life’s origins. Some believe life originated in the boiling, metallic
vents of undersea volcanoes; others suspect the open oceans; others point to the tidal ponds where Darwin
believed life first took hold. Many respected scientists think that life may have arrived from outer space,
embedded in a meteor. But we have a much clearer picture of the composition of the earth’s atmosphere
before life emerged, thanks to a field know as prebiotic chemistry. The lifeless earth was dominated by a
handful of basic molecules; ammonia, methane, water, carbon dioxide, a smattering of amino acids, and
other simple organic compounds. Each of these molecules was capable of a finite series of
transformations and exchanges with other molecules in the primordial soup: methane and oxygen
recombining to form formaldehyde and water for instance.
Think of all those initial molecules, and then imagine all the new potential new combinations that
they could form spontaneously, simply by colliding with each other (or perhaps prodded along by the
extra energy of a propitious lightning strike). If you could play God and trigger all those combinations,
you would end up with most of the building blocks of life: the proteins that form the boundaries of cells;
sugar molecules crucial to the nucleic acids of our DNA. But you would not be able to trigger chemical
reactions that would build a mosquito, or a sunflower, or a human brain. Formaldehyde is a first-order
combination: you can create it directly from the molecules in the primordial soup. The atomic elements
that make up a sunflower are the very same ones available on earth before the emergence of life, but you
can’t spontaneously create a sunflower in that environment, because it relies on a whole series of
subsequent innovations that wouldn’t evolve on earth for billions of years: chloroplasts to capture the
sun’s energy, vascular tissues to circulate resources through the plant, DNA molecules to pass on
sunflower-building instructions to the next generation.
The scientist Stuart Kauffmann has a suggestive name for the set of all those first-order
combinations: “the adjacent possible.” The phrase captures both the limits and the creative potential of
change and innovation. In the case of prebiotic chemistry, the adjacent possible defines all those
molecular reactions that were directly achievable in the primordial soup. Sunflowers and mosquitoes and
brains exist outside that circle of possibility. The adjacent possible is a kind of shadow future, hovering
on the edges of the present state of things, a map of all the ways in which the present can reinvent itself.
Yet is it not an infinite space, or a totally open playing field. The number of potential first-order reactions
is vast, but it is a finite number, and it excludes most of the forms that now populate the biosphere. What
the adjacent possible tells us is that at any moment the world is capable of extraordinary change, but only
certain changes can happen.
The strange and beautiful truth about the adjacent possible is that its boundaries grow as you
explore those boundaries. Each new combination ushers new combinations into the adjacent possible.
Think of it as a house that magically expands with each door you open. You begin in a room with four
doors, each leading to a new room that you haven’t visited yet. Those four rooms are the adjacent
possible. But once you open one of those doors and stroll into that room, three new doors appear, each
C122RB
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leading to a brand new room that you couldn’t have reached from your original starting point. Keep
opening new doors and eventually you’ll have built a palace.
Basic fatty acids will naturally self-organize into spheres lined with a dual layer of molecules,
very similar to the membranes that define the boundaries of modern cells. Once the fatty acids combine
to form those bounded spheres, a new wing of the adjacent possible opens up, because those molecules
implicitly create a fundamental division between the inside and outside of the sphere. This division is the
very essence of a cell. Once you have an “inside,” you can put things there: food, organelles, genetic
code. Small molecules can pass through the membrane and then combine with other molecules to form
larger entities too big to escape back through the boundaries of the proto-cell. When the first fatty acids
spontaneously formed those dual-layered membranes, they opened a door into the adjacent possible that
would ultimately lead to a nucleotide-based genetic code, and the power plants of the chloroplasts and
mitochondria- the primary “inhabitants” of all modern cells.
The same pattern appears again and again throughout the evolution of life. Indeed, one way to
think about the path of evolution is as a continual exploration of the adjacent possible. When dinosaurs
such as the velociraptor evolved a new bone called the semi-lunate carpal (the name comes from its halfmoon shape), it enabled them to swivel their wrists with far more flexibility. In the short term, this gave
them more dexterity as predators, but it also opened a door in the adjacent possible that would eventually
lead, many millions of years later, to the evolution of wings and flight. When our ancestors evolved
opposable thumbs, they opened up a whole new cultural branch of the adjacent possible: the creation and
use of finely crafted tools and weapons.
One of the things I find so inspiring in Kauffmann’s notion of the adjacent possible is the
continuum it suggests between natural and man-made systems. He introduced the concept in part to
illustrate a fascinating secular trend shared by both natural and human history: this relentless pushing
back against the barricades of the adjacent possible. “Something has obviously happened in the past 4.8
billion years,” he writes. “The biosphere has expanded, indeed, more or less persistently exploded, into
the ever-expanding adjacent possible….It is more than slightly interesting that this fact is clearly true, that
it is rarely remarked upon, and that we have no particular theory for this expansion.” Four billion years
ago, if you were a carbon atom, there were a few hundred molecular configurations you could stumble
into. Today that same carbon atom, whose atomic properties haven’t changed one single nanogram, can
help build sperm whale or a giant redwood or an H1N1 virus, along with a near-infinite list of other
carbon-based life forms that were not part of the adjacent possible of prebiotic earth. Add to that an
equally formidable list of human concoctions that rely on carbon- every single object on the planet made
of plastic, for instance- and you can see how far the kingdom of the adjacent possible has expanded since
those fatty acids self-assembled into the first membrane.
The history of life and human culture, then, can be told as the story of a gradual but relentless
probing of the adjacent possible, each new innovation opening up new paths to explore. But some
systems are more adept than others at exploring those possibility spaces. The mystery of Darwin’s
paradox that we began with ultimately revolves around the question of why a coral reef ecosystem should
be so adventurous in its exploration of the adjacent possible- so many different life forms sharing such a
small space- while the surrounding waters of the ocean lack that same marvelous diversity. Similarly, the
environments of big cities allow far more commercial exploration of the adjacent possible than towns or
villages, allowing tradesmen and entrepreneurs to specialize in fields that would be unsustainable in
smaller population centers.
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The Web has explored the adjacent possible of its medium far faster than any other
communications technology in history. In early 1994, the Web was a text-only medium, pages of words
connected by hyperlinks. But within a few years, the possibility space began to expand. It became a
medium that let you do financial transactions, which turned it into a shopping mall and an auction house
and a casino. Shortly afterward, it became a true two-way medium where it was as easy to publish your
own writing as it was to read other people’s, which engendered forms that the world had never seen
before: user-authored encyclopedias, the blogosphere, social network sites. YouTube made the Web one
of the most influential video delivery mechanisms on the planet. And now digital maps are unleashing
their own cartographic revolutions.
You can see the fingerprints of the adjacent possible in one of the most remarkable patterns in all
of intellectual history, what scholars now call “the multiple”: A brilliant idea occurs to a scientist or
inventor somewhere in the world, and he goes public with his remarkable finding, only to discover that
three other minds had independently come up with the same idea in the past year. Sun spots were
simultaneously discovered in 1611 by four scientists living in four different countries. The first electrical
battery was invented separately by Dean Von Kleist and Cuneus of Leyden in 1745 and 1746. Joseph
Priestly and Carl Wilhelm Scheele independently isolated oxygen between 1772 and 1774. The law of
conservation of energy was formulated separately four times in the late 1840s. The evolutionary
importance of genetic mutation was proposed by S. Korschinsky in 1899 and then by Hugo de Vries in
1901, while the impact of X-rays on mutation rates was independently uncovered by two scholars in
1927. The telephone, telegraph, steam engine, photograph vacuum tube, radio-just about every essential
technological advance of modern life has a multiple lurking somewhere in its origin story.
In the early 1920s, two Columbia University scholars named William Ogburn and Dorothy
Thomas decided to track down as many multiples as they could find, eventually publishing their survey in
an influential essay with the delightful title “Are Inventions Inevitable?” Ogburn and Thomas found 148
instances of independent innovation, most them occurring within the same decade. Reading the list now,
one is struck no just by the sheer number of cases, but how indistinguishable the list is from an unfiltered
history of big ideas. Multiples have been invoked to support hazy theories about the “zeitgeist,” but they
have a much more grounded explanation. Good ideas are not conjured out of thin air; they are built out of
a collection of existing parts, the composition of which expands (and, occasionally, contracts) over time.
Some of those parts are conceptual: ways of solving problems, or new definitions of what constitutes a
problem in the first place. Some of them are, literally, mechanical parts. To go looking for oxygen,
Priestly and Scheele needed the conceptual framework that the air was itself something worth studying
and that it was made up of distinct gases; neither of these ideas became widely accepted until the second
half of the eighteenth century. But they also needed the advanced scales that enabled them to measure the
miniscule changes in weight triggered by oxidation, technology that was itself only a few decades old in
1774. When those parts became available, the discovery of oxygen entered the realm of the adjacent
possible. Isolating oxygen was, as the saying goes, “in the air,” but only because a specific set of prior
discoveries and inventions had made that experiment thinkable.
RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
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AY 21-22
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
C122: Creative Thinking
Reading: C122ORA
Critical Thinking
Author: Dr. Jack Kem
Creative Thinking
Innovation describes the ability to introduce something new when needed or as opportunities exist.
Innovative leaders tend to be inquisitive and good problem solvers. Being innovative includes
creativity in producing original and worthwhile ideas. Leaders should seize such opportunities to
think creatively and to innovate. A key concept for creative thinking is developing new ideas and
approaches to accomplish missions. Creative thinking uses adaptive approaches (drawing from
previous circumstances) or innovative approaches (developing completely new ideas).1
The hardest skill is to be creative while still coming up with solutions that are feasible. This takes
practice and an environment where unique and innovative responses are encouraged. Everyone on
the staff can think creatively. In fact, creative thinking is more likely to be found in those staff
officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) who are new and not hindered by “the way it has
always been done.”
When I was a planner on a division staff – many years ago – we always developed three different
courses of actions (COAs) to present at the COA development briefings. The first COA that was
presented always represented exactly what we thought the commanding general (CG) had in mind
and was looking for as the solution. COA #1 was an attempt to provide a back-brief of exactly what
the commander had envisioned during the mission analysis briefing. COA #2 was always what the
staff thought was the way it should have been done; we would adjust the guidance to what we
thought was the best approach or what we thought the CG’s guidance “should have been.” COA #3
was intended to be a creative solution or something “out of the box.” Like the other two courses of
action, COA #3 had to meet the screening criteria of being feasible, acceptable, suitable,
distinguishable, and complete. It could not be a “throwaway COA” but had to have something
outlandish and totally different. It also had to meet the objectives of the mission and be realistic –
but a different way of looking at the problem and the solution.
Briefing the three different COAs was rather interesting. The CG always wanted to see the COAs in
order. He would look at the first COA to see if we actually understood what he wanted and was
thinking, and, as we briefed it, he would make minor corrections on what was “his” COA. He would
then review our second one—the “iron major” COA—to see if we were solid in our understanding of
tactics and the use of combat power. He would look at it and see a few things that were perhaps
good thoughts; then it would be time for the mystery COA—COA #3. Nothing was out of bounds as
long as it met the standards (the screening criteria) and was not a “throwaway.” This was our
chance to show how creative we could be.
Most of the time the COA the CG ultimately approved used components from all three COAs.3 Our
process for developing these courses of action included giving a back-brief, being adaptive, and
being creative. The climate in the division encouraged all three actions.
Notes
1
ADRP 6-22 (2012), para 5-9
COA development briefing presented the COAs before war gaming and COA selection. In a timeconstrained environment, the CG could select portions of all three developed COAs to determine a single
directed COA for war gaming. Another variant included a hasty war game of all three COAs, followed by a
determination of a single directed COA for detailed war gaming.
2 The
Excerpted from Planning for Action: Campaign Concepts and Tools, Dr. Jack Kem, pp. 15-17
RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
C122: Creative Thinking
Reading: C122ORB
On Military Creativity
Author: Milan Vego
On Military
Creativity
DOD (Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo)
By M i la n V e g o
Admiral
Admiral Nimitz,
Nimitz, commander
commander of
of
Eastern
Eastern Pacific,
Pacific, briefs
briefs President
President
Roosevelt,
Roosevelt, Admiral
Admiral Leahy,
Leahy, and
and
General
General MacArthur,
MacArthur, commander
commander of
of
the
the Western
Western Pacific,
Pacific, on
on operations
operations
advancing
advancing toward
toward Japan
Japan
DOD
I
n the public mind, creativity is usually
associated with the works of the
famous painters, sculptors, musicians,
philosophers, and scientists, but not of
those in the military. Yet the success in a military domain in both peacetime and in war is
hardly possible without considerable creativity on the part of the military institutions as
whole and the commanders and their staffs at
all levels. War is largely an art, not a science.
Hence, it is inherent that military commanders and their staffs must be highly creative
in planning, preparing, and employing
their forces for combat. While technological
innovations should never be neglected, focus
should be clearly on those aspects of creativity most directly related to leadership. That is
where the outcomes of military actions were
determined in the past and it is where they
will be determined in the future.
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
What Is Creativity?
Creativity is perhaps one of the most
significant but least understood areas of
human endeavor.1 A great deal has been
written about what constitutes creativity, but
no theory is completely accepted. One reason
is that different fields of knowledge require
different factors in combination.2 Creativity
can be defined as one’s ability to bring something new into existence—to generate novel
ideas that are valued by others.3 It involves
one’s ability to properly evaluate and present
already existing ideas or processes in a different way.
In general, to be creative and novel, a
product or the idea behind it must transcend
previous concepts or views. A creative product
should have a high intrinsic value due to its
essential originality and uniqueness.4 Originality is generally defined as any response or
behavior on the part of the individual that
is atypical or unusual.5 A creative idea must
be useful and satisfy some need.6 Uniqueness means that a certain idea or a product
contains characteristics having nothing alike
or equal in existence.7 A person could have an
idea that is unique for him but in fact might
be very common. The final result must be
something new and uncommon in relation to
a particular problem being studied.8
Military Environment
The military is a unique profession.
It is characterized by the commitment of
its members to unlimited service, extending to the risk of life itself. As in no other
Dr. Milan Vego is Professor of Operations in the
Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval
War College.
issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 83
FEATURES | On Military Creativity
ence and execution of orders. Leaders are
usually selected without consultation with
subordinates. The peacetime environment
encourages breeding of officers who rigidly
follow rules. Such officers conform to the
wishes of superiors and sacrifice their own
independence of action by first ascertaining
the preferences of their leaders and basing
their own conduct on those.12 This problem is
compounded in a military where the officer
corps is highly politicized—where ambitious
officers try to cultivate personal connections
with politicians, which often leads to political
interference in military promotions, especially at the highest levels.
The highly centralized and hierarchical command organization reinforces the
authoritarian tendencies on the part of the
higher commanders. Authoritarianism is
a major obstacle to the creativity of both
individuals and the military institution as
a whole. Often, higher commanders are
reluctant or unwilling to acknowledge their
own failings openly or tacitly. They try to
keep the image of infallibility. They also often
refuse to learn from their errors.13 Finding
someone to blame for errors and accidents is
a common occurrence in a military organization. Authoritarian structures allow pressure
only to be applied top-down, not bottom-up.
Yet in practice, it is from the bottom that creative ideas are usually generated. B.H. Liddell
Hart wrote in his Memoirs that “if a soldier
advocates any new idea of real importance,
he builds up such a wall of obstruction—
compounded of resentment, suspicion and
inertia—that the idea only succeeds at the
sacrifice of himself. As the wall finally yields
to the pressure of the new idea, it falls and
crushes him.”14
Like any other large organizations,
military institutions are often heavily
bureaucratized. They force their members
to apply numerous fixed techniques and
procedures in the erroneous belief that this
would enhance effectiveness. Yet it has just
the opposite effect because the rank-and-file
relies on a fixed routine instead of using
judgment and experience. The mission of
the institution is increasingly forgotten or
ignored. The chiefs of various departments
or sections create veritable fiefdoms of
power and influence and try to devise ways
to protect and expand their authority and
power. They are also often resistant to any
change because change is considered a threat
rather than an opportunity. Hence, any novel
idea is usually dismissed as impractical, irresponsible, or absurd. The existing rules and
regulations became the ends in themselves.
Another problem associated with
bureaucratized thinking is reliance on
various checklists and matrices for planning
instead of relying on the intelligent judgment
U.S. Army
organization, the military trains its members
to perform tasks they hope will never need to
be performed.9 It has a strong sense of group
identity, and its highly specialized missions
and functions have led to a culture that is
vastly distinct from society as a whole. A
military culture is defined as the sum of intellectual, professional, and traditional values
possessed by an officer corps.10
In contrast to their civilian counterparts, military artists must work within a
rather narrow framework and are subject to
numerous rules and regulations that must be
factored in. All organizations, and the military in particular, tend to be wasteful. They
are also subjected to various pressures, both
external and internal. These pressures tend
to reduce potential leaders to mediocrity.11
Military culture is generally not conducive
to finding a drastic solution to some new
challenge. It tends rather either to resist any
changes or, in the best case, slightly modify
the existing situation.
The main obstacles to military creativity are posed by the military’s inherent hierarchical command structure—an authoritarian, bureaucratized system—and its thinking,
which is exemplified by conformity, groupthink, parochialism, dogmatism, intolerance,
and anti-intellectualism. The military is a
highly stratified organization, and its leaders
require prompt and unquestioning obedi-
American troops in tanks
advance in World War I
84 JFQ
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ndupres s . ndu. edu
VEGO
and experience of the commanders and their
staffs. For example, the U.S. military widely
uses the so-called universal joint task force
list, universal naval task list, naval tactical
task list, and Marine Corps task list. These
lengthy documents aim to replace thinking
with ready-made tasks that simply have to
be listed. They are the antitheses of creative
thinking. For example, the U.S. military has
lost its way in writing concisely, clearly, and
using plain language by its overuse and abuse
of various buzzwords.15 The use of buzzwords
can be intended to impress the audience or
readers, win arguments, or grossly inflate
the importance of unimportant ideas. By
using vague or opaque words, one can give a
positive connotation to questionable propositions. Bureaucratized thinking is directly
responsible for this sad state of affairs.
Conformism is a major obstacle to creativity in a military organization, especially
during peacetime. A given military force
has the need for stability, which is ensured
by conformity. Within a group, conformity
pertains to members changing their personal
attitudes and beliefs to align with the beliefs
of a group as whole. It is most often the
result of a peer pressure. The most extreme
manifestation of conformity is so-called
groupthink, which exists in small or large
organizations when members mimic the
thinking of their superiors. Groupthink is the
antithesis of creativity.16
The very structure of the military is
aimed to ensure the maximum conformity of
its members. This tendency is further aggravated by the conditions of peacetime service
and of human weaknesses.17 The military
organization uses myriad standard operating procedures and regulations to ensure
this high degree of conformity. The selection and promotion process is often biased
against officers who think and act outside
the box.18 Moreover, many military theorists
and practitioners are uncomfortable with the
notion that warfare is largely an art and not a
science. They consider warfare as destructive
and grim while art is beautiful and creative.
To allow too much creativity would invariably lead to anarchy.19
The military needs the stability of
conformity so it can successfully function in
peacetime and in war. Yet at the same time
it also has a paramount need for creativity;
otherwise, it is doomed to failure when a
supreme test of war comes. One of the most
demanding tests for any military leader is to
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
appropriately reconcile these contradictory
requirements. Experience shows that military
organizations that succumb to conformity
eventually decline. The enemy essentially
only delivers the final blow, as the case of the
French army in 1940 illustrates.20 Around
World War I, the Japanese naval academy
increasingly emphasized rigorous regimentation and memory work at the expense of
originality, individuality, and creativity; the
unimaginative emphasis on cramming and
rote memory ended any original thinking.21
Parochialism within the Services can
sometimes be a serious obstacle to creativity.
Each Service has a distinctive organization,
culture, tradition, and way of warfare. The
individual beliefs of Servicemembers are
institutionalized through education, training,
and socialization.22 Service parochialism is
reflected in the resistance to close cooperation
War (1861–1865), Russo-Turkish War of
1877–1878, Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902),
and Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 was
simply ignored. These wars showed enormously increased capabilities for defense.24
In Germany, the cult of the offensive
was glorified. Field Marshal Alfred von
Schlieffen wrote that “attack is the best
defense.”25 Similarly, the French army was so
obsessed with the offensive that it spread to
civilians. Marshal Joseph Joffre (1852–1931),
chief of the General Staff, wrote that the
French army “no longer knows any other law
than the offensive . . . . Any other concept
ought to be rejected as contrary to the very
nature of war.”26 The British military and
some other European militaries also believed
in the superiority of offense over defense.
Many officers in France and Britain also
believed that superior morale would overcome
experience shows that military organizations that succumb to
conformity are eventually doomed
with other Services during planning, preparation, and execution of military action. One of
the most pernicious effects of strong parochial
views is that the Services often do not fully
agree on a certain organizational options.
This, in turn, has highly adverse effects on the
performance of a joint force in combat.
Many militaries are characterized by
rigid if not outright dogmatic views on many
aspects of their activities in peacetime and in
combat. This is often the case with military
doctrine. Optimally, doctrine should be
descriptive, not prescriptive. It should be
highly flexible, allowing its application to fit
in different physical environments and different fundamental warfare areas. Despite great
potential value, doctrine can easily slide into
dogma. It can become a substitute for creative
thinking about warfare. That is especially
the case in an era of rapid technological
change. A military doctrine can narrow one’s
vision by dictating the questions and thereby
imposing certain answers.23
Prior to World War I, the cult of the
offense was dominant in Germany, France,
and Great Britain. The prevalent view, based
on the experiences of the wars for German
Unification (1864, 1866, 1870–1871), was
that new weapons gave a decisive advantage
to the attacker. Consequently, a future war
would be short and decisive. The contrary
evidence as provided by the American Civil
superior enemy firepower.27 Yet after the
battle on the Marne in August 1914 and on
until the final Allied offensive in the fall of
1918, the clash on the Western Front degenerated into a war of attrition. The high commanders on both sides tried over and over to
achieve limited tactical successes and in the
process suffered huge casualties.
In the 1920s, there was considerable
debate and flexibility about the French army’s
doctrine. However, that essentially disappeared in the 1930s in part because regression
was seen by the French high command as an
attack from the left—an infiltration of the
army ranks by communist agitators. The
French army became more rigid by applying
the rules of its doctrine almost without exception, regardless of circumstances.28 In 1935,
General Maurice Gamelin (1872–1958), commander in chief of the French army, tightened
the control of military writings and required
that all publications receive prior approval;
only official views could be presented. In 1934,
Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Charles de
Gaulle (1890–1970) was refused permission
to publish an article in the Revue militaire
française, and after his pubic campaign for
armored offensive tactics, he was taken off the
promotion list. Those who challenged official
doctrinal views were silenced. Endorsement of
official views was the rule. There was no lively
debate. Consider, for instance, the Spanish
issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 85
FEATURES | On Military Creativity
Civil War. Both German and Soviet military
journals devoted enormous attention to the
study of that conflict. The Revue militaire
française rarely covered it, and when it did, it
provided little analysis.29
French army doctrine was based on a
carefully orchestrated attack, rigidly controlled divisional boundaries, and a slow,
phased advance in which air, armor, and
artillery functioned in tightly controlled
harmony. That was exactly the opposite of
the German concept of air-land battle
those of superiors. Higher military officers
and commanders should avoid setting the
tone of professional debate, as it was during
the heyday of U.S. military transformation in
the early 2000s, and thereby stifling contrarian views. Higher authorities should create
an environment that encourages and furthers
reasoned debate. Critical thinking should be
the norm and not the exception. No military
organization can be successful or even survive
without a free and open debate on important
professional matters.
higher commanders should avoid setting the tone of
professional debate and thereby stifling contrarian views
(Blitzkrieg), which stressed individual initiative, opportunistic exploitations of unexpected openings, and local vulnerabilities
in the French lines.30 Prior to the German
invasion in May 1940, the French believed the
Germans could not and would not ultimately
perform radically differently than their own
forces. They refused to see that the enemy
had other options. The sense of infallibility was aggravated by an institutional bias
against feedback that contradicted existing
doctrine or preparations. There was little
learning because the high command had all
the answers.31
In the 1930s and until the raid on
Schweinfurt in August 1943, the U.S. Air
Corps embraced the theory of strategic
bombing as dogma despite growing empirical
evidence that this theory was based on false
premises. In 1937, the U.S. military attaché in
Spain suggested that high-altitude bombing
was ineffective and that small tactical
bombers and fighters offered the best combat
capability. The Air Corps, then in the midst of
a funding debate concerning the B-17 bomber,
brushed aside the report, arguing that such
views contradicted the existing doctrine and
hence could not be accepted.32
Often, military organizations lack
tolerance of views that diverge from the socalled mainstream. Yet without tolerance no
creativity is possible.33 Intolerance usually
stifles the discussion of professional topics
in peacetime, as was the case in the British
and French militaries in the interwar years.
Ideally, officers and the rank-and-file should
be free to express their opinions on professional matters. They should not be ostracized
or punished for having views that differ from
86 JFQ
/ issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013
Another serious factor detrimental to
creativity in the military is the anti-intellectualism often generated by an overly authoritarian command structure. An officer with
an impressive academic pedigree and/or
a scholarly approach to a given problem is
often considered a threat because he or she
makes the aura of infallibility upon which
the prestige of authoritarianism is built
dubious. Yet the necessity for intelligent,
independent, and creative thinking in war
is obvious. At the same time, the cultural
obstacles to dislodging the all-pervasive
assumption of the infallibility of higher
commanders are often very high. Lip service
is paid to the need for independent and creative thinking, while it is given short shrift
in practice.34 For example, British Prime
Minister David Lloyd George (1916–1922)
observed, the “military mind . . . regards
thinking as a form of mutiny.” Bernard
Brodie wrote that soldiers have always
cherished the image of themselves as men of
action rather than as intellectuals.35
In most militaries, there is considerable prejudice against those who seem
excessively intellectual. There is the widely
held belief that fighting depends more upon
muscle than brain and that any display of
education is not only bad form but also incapacitating.36 Yet the most successful military
leaders such as Napoleon I, Helmuth von
Moltke, Sr., Erich von Manstein, George
Patton, Douglas MacArthur, Ernest King,
Chester Nimitz, and Raymond Spruance
were excellent thinkers and practitioners.
The lack of solid professional education and
self-education has been one of the underlying reasons for military incompetence.
Experience shows many examples in
which independently thinking and creative
officers were forced to change or even
abandon views because of open or hidden
opposition from their superiors. For example,
Patton and Eisenhower began to seriously
think about armored warfare in 1919–1920.
Patton wrote articles for Cavalry Journal and
Eisenhower for Infantry Journal. Eisenhower
was summoned by Major General Charles
Farnsworth, chief of infantry, and told that
his ideas were not only wrong but dangerous.
Eisenhower was warned that in the future,
his writing should be in conformity with
doctrine.37
In Britain, the prevailing attitude in the
19th century and interwar years of the 20th
century was a deliberate spirit of amateurism
that valued honor, physical courage, skill in
field sports, and, above all, one’s regiment
while deprecating professionalism, schooling, and intelligence. The British military
was traditionally against book studies. The
preference was character over intellect. This
preference has always taken the form of
denigration of the staff college graduate38
and apotheosis of that splendid chap, the
regimental officer.39 For example, General
J.F.C. Fuller, while chief instructor at the
British Staff College at Camberley in late
1923, requested permission to publish his
book on the foundations of the science of
war. His request was refused on the ground
that the chief of the Imperial General Staff,
Lord Cavan, objected to staff officers writing
books. Lord Cavan told Fuller that authorship is contrary to discipline for serving
officers because it might call the validity of
field manuals into question. He also told
Fuller not to publish books while he was an
instructor. Hence, Fuller asked to reduce his
time on the staff from 4 to 3 years in order to
publish his work.40
Organizational Creativity
In generic terms, organizational creativity is best defined as the “creation of a
valuable, useful new product, service, idea,
procedure or process by individuals working
together in a complex social system.”41 In a
military context, organizational creativity
pertains to significantly enhancing combat
effectiveness of one’s forces through inventing
a novel and unique way of arranging levels of
command and their constituent elements and
thereby opening the way for a nontraditional
employment of one’s forces in combat.
ndupres s . ndu. edu
VEGO
ing tactical actions and major operations/
campaigns regardless of the enemy and the
place where these actions would occur.
The Soviet Red Army was the leader in
the development of theory of operational art in
the interwar years. The Soviets developed the
so-called deep battle (dubokoy boy) concept
in 1935, which envisaged forces no larger
than corps attacking the enemy simultaneously over the entire depth of fielded forces.43
A year later, the Soviets developed and put
into their doctrine an even bolder concept
of deep operations (glubokaya operatsiya) to
be applied at the operational level of war.44
This concept was at the heart of planning and
execution of (major) operations conducted
by the armies and fronts (army groups) and
supported by air and airborne forces to launch
simultaneous blows throughout the enemy’s
entire operational depth.45 Deep operation was
successfully applied in the Soviet offensives on
the Eastern Front in 1944–1945.
The U.S. Marine Corps developed
an innovative and ultimately highly successful operational concept for conducting
major amphibious landings. The document,
Tentative Manual for Landing Operations,
was issued in January 1934. After a series of
fleet landing force exercises, it was officially
adopted by the U.S. Navy as Fleet Training
Publication 167, Landing Operations. All U.S.
amphibious landing operations in World
War II were based on that manual.
The highly successful and novel
German air-land battle concept of the late
1930s was relatively simple and highly
flexible. The key was using air and ground
reconnaissance to locate gaps in the enemy’s
defenses. Then the weight of main effort
(Schwerpunkt) would be in that area. The
second key element was concentration at the
weight of main effort (Schwerpunktbildung).
Speed, mobility, surprise, and utilization
of windows of opportunity were central
U.S. Army
Perhaps the most novel and effective
way of organizing naval forces for combat
is the U.S. Navy’s task force concept, used
extensively from 1941 to 1945 and still in
use today. A task force (TF) was a provisional organization composed of ships and/
or submarines and aircraft from different
administrative units (squadrons, divisions).
It was usually dissolved shortly after the
mission was accomplished. The main aim of
the TF concept was to enhance operational
flexibility. A TF was in turn broken down
into several task groups (TGs), and each of
these was divided into task units (TUs) with
the latter composed of several task elements
(TEs). Each TF was assigned a two-digit
number (for example, TF 38). TGs, TUs, and
TEs were identified by decimal numbers (TG
58.1, TU 58.1.1, TE 58.1.1.2).
Fast carrier groups created in both
the Japanese and U.S. navies in the interwar
years are another example of how integration
of high-strategic mobility and firepower can
lead to qualitatively new capabilities through
innovative command organization. Carrier
groups were capable of theater-wide or
operational employment. Another example
of successful organizational creativity was
the establishment of the first Panzer divisions
in the German Wehrmacht in 1935. These
divisions included not only tanks but also
motorized infantry, artillery, engineers, and
signal troops.42 This concept was not emulated by the French. The Germans continued
their innovative approach in the late 1930s by
using Panzer units in close cooperation with
the Luftwaffe. In March 1940, the Germans
also created the first army-size Panzer formation, Panzer Group Kleist, composed of one
Panzer corps and two motorized infantry
corps and capable of conducting independent
major operations in cooperation with the
Luftwaffe. Panzer Group Kleist was part of
Army Group A and spearheaded the thrust
through the Ardennes in May 1940.
Combat Concepts
In time of peace, various tactical/operational concepts are created for the employment of combat forces in case of hostilities.
A tactical concept is aimed to employ combat
forces to accomplish tactical objectives, while
an operational concept aims to accomplish
operational or, in some cases, partial strategic
objectives. These concepts form the heart of
the respective tactical and Service/joint doctrine. They are used in planning and executn d u p res s .ndu.edu
General Eisenhower,
Supreme Allied Commander
in Europe during World War II
issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 87
FEATURES | On Military Creativity
elements in the concept. The Panzer forces
would penetrate deeply into the enemy rear.
They would have little regard for open flanks.
The initial aim was to destroy not enemy
troops but command posts and supply lines
and to threaten lines of retreat. The key to
success was the psychological effect of the
fast-moving Panzer forces. Often, entire
sectors of a front would collapse even though
the Panzers penetrated the front at just a
single point.46
The Air-Land Battle concept of 1981
was an example of an innovative way to
employ the U.S. Army’s combat arms and
notions. 52 The best test of creativity is to
achieve surprise. One of the main methods
is a highly innovative deception plan and its
skillful execution. Commanders should put
themselves in the enemy’s shoes and think
what course is the least likely the enemy will
foresee or forestall.53 The art of warfare rests
on the freest application of its fundamentals
under constantly changing conditions.54
Making a decision and executing it
presumes the need for some degree of creativity on the part of military commanders.
A military decision is the result of creative
thinking. A military decision is often unique
a creative intellect allows commanders to surprise enemy
counterparts and thus render them impotent
air force in a major offensive. It envisaged
offensive initial blows carried out from multiple and unexpected directions by both land
and air forces against forces deployed in the
operational depth of the enemy’s defenses.
It would be followed by actions aimed at
preventing the enemy from recovering. The
main idea was to shatter the coherence of
enemy forces.47 Air-Land Battle remained the
mainstay of the U.S. Army’s doctrine until
the late 1990s.
Creativity in Combat
Creativity of commanders refers to their
ability to find workable, novel solutions to
problems—to be innovative and adaptable in
fast moving, potentially confusing situations.
All exceptional military leaders have had a
large measure of creative skills.48 A creative
intellect allows commanders to surprise
enemy counterparts and thus render them
impotent.49 Moltke, Sr., believed that in war,
as in art, there are no generally valid norms.
In both war and art, rules cannot replace
talent.50 Success in combat at all levels requires
imagination on the part of commanders, who
should possess a high degree of creativity in
thinking and a readiness to take risks.51
Creative thinking and mental agility
refer to commanders’ ability to see the whole
picture from its individual parts. Leaders
should be bold and innovative; they should
not use forces in a traditional manner. This
means not being fixated on the mechanical
or schematic employment of combat forces.
To preserve versatility and variability of decisions, commanders should not act according
to conventional views and preconceived
88 JFQ
/ issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013
and is based on a specific situation that is
rarely repeated. Successful commanders
should possess a great deal of good common
sense, logical thinking, and rational decisionmaking skills. No plan, no matter how sound,
could survive the first contact with the enemy
without creativity. Hence, commanders and
subordinates must have the mental agility to
react quickly when facing unforeseen situations or to take advantage of fleeting opportunities in order to make new decisions based
on running estimates of the situation.
The most successful commanders were
well known for their unique and creative style
in planning and the employment of forces
in combat. Moltke, Sr., was renowned for
thinking broadly in planning and executing
his campaigns in three victorious wars (1864,
1866, and 1870–1871). The key elements in
his operational thinking were focusing on
meticulous deployment planning, seeking
the destruction of the enemy army, giving
maximum freedom of action to subordinates,
and concentrating forces at the weight of the
main effort to effect large envelopments and
encirclements.55 Like Napoleon I, Moltke, Sr.,
insisted on quick deployment and achieved
the greatest victories by concentrating his
armies on the battlefield.56 Moltke, Sr., also
had a surprising ability to foresee how a situation would develop and to take the right
measures, as he demonstrated in his brilliant
victories at Koeniggraetz on July 3, 1866, and
Sedan on September 1–2, 1870.57
General MacArthur was one of the
most successful Allied commanders in World
War II. He was known for his thorough
planning, boldness of vision, and energetic
execution.58 MacArthur had the rare gift of
recognizing the importance of geography
and planning his campaigns accordingly. He
was well known for his ability to integrate
both military and nonmilitary aspects of the
situation into his campaign plans. He had the
demonstrated ability to think broadly and
far ahead. In the initial phase of the Korean
War, for instance, his actions were instrumental in saving South Korea from falling
under communist rule. After initial setbacks,
MacArthur proposed to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff a bold and innovative idea to land
United Nations forces deep in the rear of the
North Korean army at Inchon. The plan was
strongly opposed by many officials in Washington because of its high risks. In arguing
for his plan to the Joint Chiefs, he stated
that he was firmly convinced an early and
strong effort behind the enemy’s front would
sever his main lines of communications and
enable U.S. forces to deliver a decisive blow.
The alternative was a frontal attack from
the Naktong line that could only result in a
protracted and expensive campaign to slowly
drive the enemy north of the 38th Parallel.59
In the end, MacArthur’s views prevailed; the
amphibious landing at Inchon (Operation
Chromite), some 150 miles behind the North
Korean forces then besieging the Pusan
perimeter, was carried out on September 15,
1950. The landing was brilliantly executed,
and it quickly led to the collapse of the North
Korean forces at the Pusan Perimeter.
Any plan or order should revolve
around an overarching idea, known generically as the concept of operations (CONOPS),
suggesting how to employ combat forces most
decisively to accomplish a given military
objective. In operational warfare theory, the
term operational idea (scheme) pertains to the
concept for a major operation or campaign.
CONOPS is the heart of any sound plan for
the employment of forces. It is developed from
the most optimal friendly course of action
and is included as an integral part of the commander’s decision. A sound CONOPS idea
requires ingenuity and creativity on the part
of the commander and staff.
A sound CONOPS should describe
in broad terms, concisely and clearly, what
each force element will do to accomplish
the ultimate objective. Among other things,
CONOPS should avoid traditional patterns.
It should be bold and novel and be speedily
executed. It should pose multidimensional
threats the enemy has little or no chance of
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countering successfully. It should surprise
and deceive the enemy, further complicating
his response. Most importantly, it should be
directed at the destruction or neutralization
of the enemy’s center of gravity.60
An example of a creative operational
idea was the German campaign in Denmark
and Norway in April 1940 (Unternehmen
Weseruebung—Weser Enterprise) and
preceding the first phase of the German
campaign in the West from May to June 1940
(Plan Gelb-Yellow). For example, the German
operational idea for the invasion of Denmark
and Norway in April 1940 was innovative.
Never before had anyone attempted to
seize positions separated by a wide sea area
without obtaining command of the sea first.
The Germans envisaged simultaneous and
multiple thrusts by ground, sea, and air elements to quickly seize southern Norway and
then move north under the protective shield
of the Luftwaffe. The operational idea was
also bold, and the Germans took rather high
risks to mount such a large-scale effort in the
face of British superiority at sea and its ability
to react quickly to any German landing in
Norway. At the same time, the Germans
maintained a high degree of operational
security, using deception and concealment.61
In the first phase of their campaign in
the West in May 1940, the Germans used
combined penetration and single-sided envelopment maneuvers to cut off and destroy the
major part of the Allied forces deployed in
northern France and Belgium. It was General
Erich von Manstein’s idea to combine singlesided envelopment with penetration. He
selected the Sedan-Dinant sector as the point
for a tactical penetration maneuver. This
would be followed by an operational singlesided envelopment maneuver extending all
the way to the French Channel coast. The
aim was to avoid making a frontal attack on
the Allied forces as they moved into Belgium,
and rather to cut them off in the rear of the
Somme River.62
The Allied campaigns in the Pacific
during World War II were successful because
they included, among other things, some
highly creative ideas. In the so-called islandhopping approach, as exemplified by the
New Guinea, Solomons, and Central Pacific
campaigns, the Allies attacked enemy weaknesses and avoided enemy strengths. That, in
turn, greatly enhanced the Allied operational
tempo and thereby never allowed the Japanese to recover from their losses.
n d u p res s .ndu.edu
Not all Allied concepts of operations
were creative. In fact, many were quite
ordinary. For example, in both the Pacific
and European theaters in World War II, the
Allies used similar and highly predictable
operational ideas for their amphibious landings. That made it considerably easier for
the enemy to deduce Allied intentions. It did
not lead to defeats largely because the Allies
had enormous superiority on the ground,
at sea, and in the air in most of the landings conducted. For example, the Japanese,
by closely observing and analyzing U.S.
amphibious landings, changed their method
of conducting antiamphibious defense from
defending the beaches to digging in and
establishing several defensive lines farther
from the beaches. In that way, they countered superior U.S. firepower and maximized their own advantages. For example,
after U.S. troops landed on Okinawa in
April 1945 (Operation Iceberg), the Japanese
offered stubborn resistance in the interior
of the island. By the time the last resistance
Godfroy, director of naval intelligence, later
became known for his James Bond novels.64
In addition to Fleming, Godfroy’s naval
intelligence department employed a schoolmaster, journalist, collector of books on
original thought, Oxford classical don, barrister clerk, and insurance agent along with
two regular naval officers, two stockbrokers,
and several women acting as assistants and
typists. 65
Conclusion
Creativity is the key element in the successful planning, preparation, and execution
of a combat action and ultimately in winning
a war. It is directly linked to the art side of
warfare, so it requires thorough knowledge
and understanding of the true nature of
war. Creativity in peacetime is essential to
developing sound military organizations,
operating concepts, and doctrine, and to
educating and training future commanders
and their staffs. The need for technological
creativity should not be confused with the
CONOPS should pose multidimensional threats the enemy has
little or no chance of countering successfully
ended in late June 1945, the Japanese had
lost 110,000 men in combat, but they also
inflicted heavy losses on the attacker: U.S.
battle casualties were 49,000 including
12,500 killed or missing.63
Deception is one of the most important
supporting plans. Successful deception is the
product of an imaginative story: a series of
actions and measures aimed to manipulate
enemy intelligence channels so the deception
target—the enemy commander—believes
what one desires him to believe. Building
a story is one of the most complicated yet
critical parts of deception planning. The
most effective deception story reinforces the
enemy’s belief in what he already expects,
underscoring the critical role of detailed
and accurate knowledge of the enemy’s
perceptions and beliefs that is obtained by
intelligence. Experience has shown the great
value of using the work of artists such as
playwrights or novelists in providing ideas
for a deception story. Artists often have more
fertile and imaginative ideas than professional officers. For example, many members
of the British wartime intelligence apparatus
were unorthodox personalities. Ian Fleming,
personal assistant to admiral Sir John H.
cognitive aspects of creativity. Experience
shows repeatedly that novel technologies by
themselves are insufficient to win victories
and ultimately wars. New technologies
must be followed by creative, corresponding
changes in force organization.
The single most important factor is
sound integration of new technologies and
creative operating concepts and doctrine;
otherwise, ultimate success will be wanting.
In contrast to the environment for artists and
scientists, the military environment poses
formidable obstacles to creativity at all levels.
Thus, it is incumbent at the highest levels of
military and political leadership to create a
climate and provide adequate resources for
creativity and experimentation. Only through
the open and vigorous struggle of competing
ideas is it possible to develop and apply sound
operating concepts and doctrine. A military
organization that restricts or, worse, does not
allow free professional discussion is doomed
to stagnate in peacetime and to eventually fail
in combat. Finally, the German-style mission
command should be adopted and applied
in both letter and spirit so as to educate and
train commanders and staffs to think and act
creatively. JFQ
issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 89
FEATURES | On Military Creativity
Notes
1
Jeffrey Maitland, “Creativity,” The Journal
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 34, no. 4 (Summer
1976), 397.
2
Marshall Dimock, “Creativity,” Public Administration Review 46, no. 1 (January–February 1986), 4.
3
Cited in Ronald D. Daniel, Creativity and Strategic Vision: The Key to the Army’s Future (Carlisle
Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1993), 4–5.
4
Harold H. Anderson, “The Nature of Creativity,” Studies in Art Education 1, no. 2 (Spring
1960), 10.
5
Norman E. Wallen, “Creativity—Fantasy and
Fact,” The Elementary School Journal 64, no. 8 (May
1964), 439.
6
Irvin Summers and David E. White, “Creativity Techniques: Toward Improvement of the
Decision Process,” The Academy of Management
Review 1, no. 2 (April 1976), 100.
7
Dimock, 3.
8
J. Nazareth, Creative Thinking in Warfare
(New Delhi: Lancer, 1987), 3.
9
Cited in Amos A. Jordan and William J.
Taylor, Jr., “The Military Man in Academia,”
Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Sciences 406 (March 1973), 130.
10
Williamson Murray, “Innovation: Past and
Future,” Joint Force Quarterly 12 (Summer 1996), 54.
11
Nazareth, 39.
12
Ibid., 41.
13
Ibid., 43.
14
Cited in ibid., 45.
15
Kate Bateman, “War on (Buzz)Words,” Proceedings 134, no. 8 (August 2008), 22.
16
Charles D. Allen and Stephen J. Gerras,
“Developing Creative and Critical Thinkers,” Military Review, November–December 2009, 80.
17
Nazareth, 41–42.
18
Charles D. Allen, Creative Thinking for
Individuals and Teams (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S.
Army War College, 2009), 3.
19
James Mrazek, The Art of Winning Wars
(New York: Walker and Company, 1968), 33.
20
Nazareth, 41.
21
Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor:
The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 163.
22
Brooks L. Bash, “Leadership and Parochialism: An Enduring Reality, Joint Force Quarterly 22
(Summer 1999), 64.
23
Jay Luvaas, “Some Vagrant Thoughts on
Doctrine,” Military Review, March 1986, 60.
24
Stephen van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International Security 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984), 58–59.
25
Ibid., 59.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid., 61.
28
Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and
British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 83.
90 JFQ
/ issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013
Cited in ibid., 86.
Irving B. Holley, Technology and Military
Doctrine: Essays on a Challenging Relationship
(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 25.
31
Murray, 57.
32
Robert F. Gass, Theory, Doctrine, and Ball
Bearings: Adapting Future Technology to Warfare
(Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, January 1996), 31, 33.
33
Edwin R. Micewski, “Creativity and Military
Leadership in Postmodern Times,” paper presented
at the International Conference for Interdisciplinary Creativity in Science and Technology, Bucharest, February 25–26, 2005, 5.
34
Nazareth, 44.
35
Lloyd J. Matthews, “The Uniformed Intellectual and His Place in American Arms, Part I:
Anti-Intellectualism in the Army, Yesterday and
Today,” Army, July 2002, 18–19.
36
Gabriel Serbu, “The Dangers of AntiIntellectualism in Contemporary Western Armies,”
Infantry, November/December 2010, 44.
37
Nazareth, 45.
38
Matthews, 18.
39
Correlli Barnett, “The Education of Military
Elites,” Journal of Contemporary History 2, no. 3
(July 1967), 18.
40
Nazareth, 45.
41
Richard W. Woodman, John E. Sawyer, and
Ricky W. Griffin, “Toward a Theory of Organizational Creativity,” Academy of Managerial Review
18, no. 2 (April 1993), 293.
42
Cited in Williamson Murray, “Armored
Warfare: The British, French, and German Experiences,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar
Period, ed. Williamson Murray and Alan R. Millett,
42 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
43
Richard W. Harrison, The Russian Way of
War: Operational Art, 1904–1940 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 188–194.
44
Wayne A. Parks, Operational-Level Deep
Operations: A Key Component of Operational Art
and Future Warfare (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School
of Advanced Military Studies, 1998), 24–25.
45
Harrison, 194–195.
46
Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende: Der
Westfeldzug 1940 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag,
1995), 419–420.
47
Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations
(Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the
Army, August 1982), 2-1.
48
FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at
Senior Levels (Washington, DC: Headquarters
Department of the Army, July 31, 1990), 30.
49
Mitchell M. Zais, Generalship and the Art of
Senior Command: Historical and Scientific Perspectives (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced
Military Studies, 1985), 49.
50
Hans Speth, Auswahl, Erziehung und Ausbildung der Generalsbsoffiziere im Frieden und im
Kriege 19, MS # P-031b, Part 19, ZA/1 1867, Studien
der Historical Division Headquarters, United States
29
30
Army Europe, Foreign Military Branch, Bundesarchiv/Militaerarchiv (BA-MA), Freiburg, i.Br., 10.
51
Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr,
Arbeitspapier (working paper), Operative Fuehrung
(Hamburg, 1992), 18.
52
Ibid.
53
B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: F.A.
Praeger, 1954), 348.
54
Friedrich von Bernhardi, On War of To-Day,
vol. 2, Combat and Conduct of War, trans. Karl von
Donat (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1914), 413.
55
John English, “The Operational Art: Development in the Theories of War,” in The Operational
Art: Developments in the Theories of War, ed. B.J.C.
McKercher and Michael A. Hennessy, 9 (Westport,
CT: Praeger, 1996).
56
Charles A. Willoughby, Maneuver in War
(Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing, 1939;
reprint Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1986), 118.
57
Roland G. Foerster, “Die operative Denken
Moltkes des Aelteren und die Folgen,” in Ausgewaehlte Operationen und ihre militaerhistorischen
Grundlagen, ed. Hans-Martin Ottmer and Heiger
Ostertag (Bonn/Herford: Verlag E.S. Mittler &
Sohn, 1993), 263.
58
D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells,
Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in
Korea 1950–1953 (New York: Free Press, 1993), 30.
59
Ibid., 162.
60
Walter A. Vanderbeek, The Decisive Point:
The Key to Victory (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School
of Advanced Military Studies, 1988), 39.
61
Olivier Desarzens, Nachrichtendienstliche
Aspekte der “Weseruebung” 1940 (Osnabrueck:
Biblio Verlag, 1988), 173; T.K. Derry, The Campaign
in Norway (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery
Office, 1952), 232.
62
Guenter Roth, “Operatives Denken bei
Schlieffen und Manstein,” in Operationen und ihre
militaerhistorischen Grundlagen, 292–293.
63
Roy Appleman et al., The War in the Pacific:
Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington, DC: Center
for Military History, 1948, reprint 1991), 473.
64
Ben Macintyre, Operation Mincemeat: How
a Dead Man and a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis
and Assured an Allied Victory (New York: Harmony
Books, 2010), 11.
65
Ibid., 30.
RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
ndup res s . ndu. edu
C131
Leader Development
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL)
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
Advance Sheet for Lesson C131
Leader Development
1. SCOPE
Training and developing leaders require a long-term outlook while balancing the short-term mission
requirements of the unit. The long-term development of leaders is the focus of this lesson. As a result of
this two-hour lesson, you gain an understanding of the attributes and competencies of leader development
from a life-long learning perspective of an organizational leader. You discuss the leadership requirements
model as presented in ADP 6-22. By the conclusion of this lesson, you have an overall understanding of
the Army’s framework for leader development with particular emphasis on the self-development domain,
to include the role mentoring plays in leader development.
You analyze and describe leader development and gain a deeper understanding of the role of selfdevelopment in developing the professional leader. You also gain insight about the value of mentorship
and mentoring in leader development. For the remainder of your career, you are involved in developing
leaders, while you are developing yourselves. The intent of this lesson is twofold. The first is to explore
the overall framework of leader development and how organizations and individuals develop their
leadership capacity. The second is to examine the factors promoting effective self-development.
Understanding how people learn and develop is essential to not only personal development as a leader,
but also in how to approach developing others.
In this lesson, you discuss the potential barriers to effective self-development and insights into how
you contribute as a leader and learner to building and maintaining a learning environment. Understanding
how people learn and develop is essential to not only your personal development as a leader, but also in
how you approach developing others. The skills associated with promoting effective learning are broadly
applicable to all that follows during CGSOC. You gain a deeper understanding of the role of selfdevelopment for the professional leader. You also gain insight about the value of mentorship and
mentoring in leader development. For the remainder of your career, you are involved in developing
leaders, while you are developing yourself. You also explore how people develop their leadership
competencies and you examine the factors promoting effective self-development.
2. LEARNING OBJECTIVES
This lesson supports CGSOC Common Core Course TLO-CC-1, “Analyze organizational level
leadership concepts used to lead in developing organizations” as listed on the theme advance sheet.
ELO-CC-1.12
Action: Analyze (Army) leader development doctrine.
Condition: As a student in the Command and General Staff Officer’s Course, using class lecture, class
discussions, reflective thinking, practical exercises, and references.
Standard: Analysis includes 1. The Army framework for leader development
2. The Army Leadership Requirements Model (ALRM)
3. The role of mentoring in leader development
C131 Advance Sheet
May 2021 (AY 21-22)
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Analysis
PLO Supported: N/A
ELO-CC-1.13
Action: Describe the leader self-development process.
Condition: As a student in the Command and General Staff Officer Course, using class lecture, class
discussions, reflective thinking, practical exercises, and references.
Standard: Description includes 1. The self-development process and opportunities
2. Leader development challenges
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Comprehension
PLO Standards Supported: CGSOC PLO 1
CGSOC PLO 1 Attributes:
a. Independently research and critically evaluate information.
b. Comprehend context of the situation.
c. Create meaning from information and data.
d. Creatively design or revise concepts and ideas.
e. Communicate concepts with clarity and precision in written, graphical, and oral forms.
f. Compose complete and well-supported arguments.
g. Apply critical and creative thinking
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 1 (Strategic Thinking and Communication): Graduates who
are able to incorporate thinking that is broader than the issue at hand and effectively communicate that
thinking.
CGSOC graduates independently research and critically evaluate information to inform their understanding of the context, create meaning, and creatively design or revise concepts and ideas. Graduates
expertly use written communication to deliver rational, complete and well-supported arguments,
explanations, options, and/or solutions in a form that is specifically tailored to the most relevant audience.
3. HOMEWORK ASSIGNMENT
a. First requirement: Read the following before viewing the computer-based instruction (CBI):
Read:
C131RA: ADP 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession, Change 1, 25 November 2019, para.
1-23 to 1-29 (1 page).
C131RB: ADP 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession, Change 1, 25 November 2019, para.
6-1 to 6-19 and para. 6-43 to 6-62 (5 pages).
C131RC: FM 6-22, Leader Development, 30 June 2015, Chapter 4 (17 pages).
Review: C101RC: ADP 6-22, Army Leadership and the Profession, US Department of the Army.
Washington DC: Government Printing Office, July 2019, Change 1, 25 November 2019. Chapter
one. “The Army Profession, Ethic, and Leadership,” (23 pages)
Key points:
Leaders have the responsibility to create a climate that fosters self-development and leader
development of subordinates. Leaders help set this climate by serving as role models and
mentors. The key to self-development is self-awareness. Developing self and others requires a
well-crafted plan based on a solid needs assessment.
C131 Advance Sheet
2
May 2021(AY 21-22)
Effective self-development is grounded in the principles of adult learning and starts with an
accurate self-awareness and needs appraisal. Successful self-development involves identifying
strengths and weaknesses, identifying the gaps (which leads to goal setting), developing a plan to
achieve the goals, developing criteria to evaluate progress, and making adjustments as one
progresses towards the goals. Immediate, mid-term, and long-range goals can better develop
leadership improvements.
Mentorship and mentoring can play a key role in the development of self and others. A trusted
mentor can identify leader development gaps in others.
Major challenges to effective self-development include lack of self-awareness, problems with
self-regulation, inaccurate self-appraisal, bias, dispositions, attitudes, experience, knowledge
frameworks, cognitive ability, weak critical thinking, and lack of adaptive problem solving.
Leader development is achieved through the synthesis of knowledge, skills, and experiences
gained through institutional training and education, operational training, operational experience,
and self-development.
b. Second Requirement: View the computer-based instruction (CBI).
c. Third Requirement: Take the C131 Blackboard quiz.
4. ASSESSMENT PLAN
In this lesson, you will be assessed on your comprehension of the lesson material by completing the C131
Blackboard quiz, which accounts for 10% of your C100 grade. You may take the quiz up to three times;
only the highest score will be recorded in the gradebook.
RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
C131 Advance Sheet
3
May 2021(AY 21-22)
C132
Self-Awareness
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL)
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
Advance Sheet for C132
Self-Awareness
1. SCOPE
This lesson focuses on leader self-awareness and uses the HEXACO personality test. These selfassessment instruments help identify and understand one’s preferences, style, strengths, and
developmental needs. The idea is to make you aware of your personality and preferences and to
understand and appreciate ways in which people not only differ, but also are similar. Once one knows
their personality style or preferences, they can also apply this information into their individual
improvement, help in developing subordinates, and with understanding others. A key factor in learning
about and understanding personality preference is that not everyone may think and act the same way in
group, team, and organizational settings.
Using the HEXACO personality test in your organizations provides enhanced clarity and comfort with
one’s own personality and learning styles, while constructively identifying possible blind spots and areas
of vulnerability. Learning more about oneself provides a logical, coherent structure for understanding
normal differences between people in a host of work-related areas such as communication styles, working
on teams, project management, time management, preferred supervision style and work environment,
responses and needs during organizational change, preferred learning styles, and many more. This
instrument assists in presenting a dynamic picture of individual functioning, including recognition of
potential dominant function as the basis of motivation and identification of customary responses to stress.
2. LEARNING OBJECTIVES
This lesson supports CGSOC Common Core Course TLO-CC-1, “Synthesize organizational level
leadership concepts used to lead in developing organizations,” and TLO-CC-10, “Incorporate
effective communication skills,” as listed on the theme advance sheet.
ELO-CC-1.14
Action: Develop self-awareness.
Condition: As a student in the Command and General Staff Officer Course, integrating class lecture,
class discussions, assessment instruments, reflective thinking, practical exercises, and references.
Standard: Development includes−
1. Individual assessment results
2. Personal strengths and weaknesses
3. Prioritizing developmental needs
4. Individual Development Plan (IDP)
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Analysis
JPME I Learning Areas Supported: N/A
ELO-CC-10.2
Action: Speak effectively.
Condition: Acting individually on a problem-solving team or individually and using provided formats,
out of class research, class references, class discussions, and personal experiences.
C132 Advance Sheet
May 2021 (AY 21-22)
Standard: Speaking includes—
1. Substance
2. Organization
3. Style
4. Correctness
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Synthesis
JPME I Learning Areas Supported: 6e. Communicate with clarity and precision.
PLO Standards Supported: CGSOC PLO 2
CGSOC PLO 2 Attributes:
a. Apply ethics, norms, and laws of the profession.
b. Apply knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting.
c. Apply interpersonal skills, leadership, and followership.
d. Meet organizational-level challenges.
e. Demonstrate commitment to develop further expertise in the art and science of war as life-long
learners.
f. Demonstrate commitment to study beyond their own service’s competencies.
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 2 (The Profession of Arms): Graduates who are able to comport
themselves as professionals, responsive to the country and the public as servant-leaders.
CGSOC graduates model and enforce the ethics, norms, and laws of the profession of arms, applying
their knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting and related capabilities that advance US
security aims. They apply effective interpersonal skills, leadership and followership in the joint
environment. They demonstrate a high degree of commitment to further development of their own
expertise in the art and science of war, going beyond the study of their own Service’s competencies.
This lesson focuses on leader self-awareness and uses the HEXACO personality test. These selfassessment instruments help identify and understand one’s preferences, style, strengths, and
developmental needs. The idea is to make you aware of your personality and preferences and to
understand and appreciate ways in which people not only differ, but also are similar. Once one knows
their personality style or preferences, they can also apply this information into their individual
improvement, help in developing subordinates, and with understanding others. A key factor in learning
about and understanding personality preference is that not everyone may think and act the same way in
group, team, and organizational settings.
3. HOMEWORK ASSIGNMENT
a. First Requirement:
Read:
C132RA: “Understanding the JOHARI Window” (4 pages). Located in the C132 lesson area
in Blackboard.
b. Second Requirement:
Watch: HEXACO video on Blackboard (13 minutes). Video is located in the C132 lesson
area on Blackboard.
Complete: HEXACO personality inventory. Available: http://hexaco.org/hexaco-online
(accessed 18 August 2021)
5. ASSESSMENT PLAN
The self-awareness assessment is for personal use and is not formally assessed in C100.
C132 Advance Sheet
2
RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
May 2021 (AY 21-22)
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL)
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
C132: Self-Awareness
Reading C132A1
Understanding the JOHARI Window 2
Author: Mr. Steve Boylan
The JOHARI window is a technique created by UCLA graduate students Joe Luft and Harry Ingham in
1955 (Joe and Harry = JOHARI). It is a simple and useful tool for understanding and improving:
• self-awareness
• personal development
• communications
• interpersonal relationships
• group dynamics
• team development
• intergroup relationships
The JOHARI window emphasizes the soft skills of behavior, empathy, cooperation, interpersonal
development and intergroup development. The Johari Window works for an individual and within group
situations. It is a helpful model because it is simple and its application to a variety of potential situations.
There are four panels.
Johari Window
Self (Known)
Others
Others do
not Know
Arena
Facade
Self (Unknown)
Blind
Spot
Know
Information
Unknown
Information
See footnote below 3
1
Adapted from DDE C132 Reading A. David B. Roeder, CGSC 2020.
Lee, Kibeom, and Michael C. Aston. “A Measure of the Six Major Dimensions of Personality.“ The Hexaco Personality Inventory—Revised, 2009,
http://hexaco.org/scaledescriptions.
3 Adapted from Luft, J.; Ingham, H. (1955). "The Johari window, a graphic model of interpersonal awareness". Proceedings of the
Western Training Laboratory in Group Development. Los Angeles: University of California, Los Angeles.
2
C132 Reading A
May 2021 (AY 21-22)
Two factors contribute to the JOHARI window. The first factor: what do you know about yourself? The
second factor: what other people know about you. The model works using four quadrants:
Arena (or “Open”) – Anything you know about yourself and known by others constitutes your “arena”
area.
Blind Spot – Any aspect you do not know about yourself, but others are aware of constitutes your “blind”
area.
Façade (or “Hidden”) – Aspects about yourself that you are aware of while keeping hidden, not letting
others know.
Unknown – This area is unknown to you or anyone else – the true “unknown” area.
Just as in most areas of self-awareness and self-development, aspects of the individual can and do change.
The same holds true with the use of the Johari Window. Within the Johari Window, by improving selfawareness, the individual increases the “arena” area.
Johari Window
Self (Known)
Others do
not Know
Feedback Desired
Open
(information is
known by you
and others)
Self-Identify/ Make
others Aware
Combined
Discovery
Self-Awareness
Others
Self (Unknown)
Hidden
Know
Information
Blind
Spot
Feedback
from others
Unknown
Information
See footnote below 4
By building trust between themselves and others, often by providing information about themselves, they
in turn gain new information about others and potentially learn more about themselves because of the
4
Adapted from Luft, J.; Ingham, H. (1955). "The Johari window, a graphic model of interpersonal awareness". Proceedings of the
Western Training Laboratory in Group Development. Los Angeles: University of California, Los Angeles.
C132 Reading A
2
May 2021 (AY 21-22)
interaction. When you provide someone information about yourself not previously known, you increase
the open or arena. For example, maybe you are not comfortable contributing ideas when in large groups.
This self-disclosure would increase your “arena” area and decrease your “façade” area.
Asking for feedback potentially increases your “arena” or “open” area. Using feedback from others, you
become aware of your traits, both positive and negative, as perceived by others. The important aspect of
this is that you may not necessarily have awareness of and not attempting to overcome some of the
personal issues inhibiting your personal or group dynamics within a team. For example, you interrupt
people before they have finished making their point, which can cause frustration. On a more positive note,
perhaps people often want to talk to you because you are a good listener. Sometimes you do not realize
these aspects of your own character until pointed out. When provided feedback honestly, it can reduce the
size of your “blind” area.
By working with others – both telling and asking – it is possible for you and others to discover aspects
about yourself that neither of you ever have appreciated before.
Examples of “unknown” factors:
• an acquired ability that is underestimated or untried through a lack of opportunity, encouragement, or
training
• a natural ability or aptitude that a person does not realize they possess
• a fear or aversion that a person does not know they have
• an unknown illness
• repressed or subconscious feeling
• conditioned behaviors, attitudes, or biases from culture or childhood
A practical method for implementing the Johari window has two steps. The original model used a list of
56 adjectives listed below in this reading. In use, step one, the individual selects the adjectives they
believe describe themselves best. Then in step two another person selects adjectives from the same list
that they believe describe the individual best. The words common to both go into the “Arena”, the words
unique to the individual are in the ”Façade” and the words unique to the other person’s list go in the
“Blind spot.”
An alternative method to start in the “arena or open” area is by jotting down some notes about yourself,
review the Proust Questionnaire from C131 or can be found online at:
https://www.writingclasses.com/files/documents/resources/ProustCharacterQuestions.docx (accessed 18
August 2021) along with your HEXACO results and/or your MBTI preferences if you know and have
taken it previously. By using these other tools, determine what are your strengths and your weaknesses?
What are you comfortable with and willing to share with others? In order for this to be effectives, you
must be open, honest, and clear about what you know about yourself already. Should you wargame your
responses to what you believe others see, or how you desire others to perceive you, the results will be
skewed as with any self-assessment.
When you involve other people and ask for feedback about yourself try if needed, suggest some
descriptors from the below list, HEXACO, or the Proust Questionnaire. Again, for this to be effectives,
you must take their feedback seriously by considering the responses you receive. You do not have to
agree with everything suggested, but you should listen and reflect about the feedback received. Give the
person who provided the feedback acknowledgement for making the effort to assist you in self-awareness.
Depending on how confident you are, you might do this as a group exercise or on a one-on-one basis.
Remember that giving effective feedback is a skill and some are better at it than others. Try not to make it
emotional or offensive. When giving feedback, be honest, but not hurtful. When receiving feedback, be
C132 Reading A
3
May 2021 (AY 21-22)
respectful, listen and reflect on what is said. It may be that upon receiving feedback you can explore an
aspect of your perceived self a bit further, which can lead to discovery about yourself. Keep in mind the
objective is to expand your “Arena” area and reduce the “Unknown” area.
Drawbacks with the JOHARI window:
• Not always better to communicate some things with others.
• You lose control of the information once given resulting in passing along the information they receive
further than desired or use it in a negative way.
• When dealing with various people and cultures, not all consider being open and accepting to
feedback. Inadvertently, you may offend others as they may consider the feedback as a personal
attack. Use caution and start slowly ensuring they understand your intent. In the same way, other may
not feel comfortable provide you feedback you may desire.
Used correctly, just like any other self-awareness tool, The JOHARI window is a useful model, providing
alternative ways to assist individuals to understand themselves while assisting them to grow. Once
internalized, the model can empower them to use the thinking in their own way, and to incorporate the
underlying principles into their future thinking and behavior.
C132 Reading A
4
May 2021 (AY 21-22)
JOHARI Window Adjectives
The following 56 adjectives are possible descriptions of the individual but are not all inclusive:
-
able
accepting
adaptable
bold
brave
calm
caring
cheerful
clever
complex
confident
dependable
dignified
empathetic
energetic
extroverted
friendly
giving
happy
helpful
idealistic
independent
ingenious
intelligent
introverted
kind
knowledgeable
logical
loving
mature
modest
nervous
observant
organized
patient
powerful
- proud
- quiet
- reflexive
- relaxed
RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
C132 Reading A
5
May 2021 (AY 21-22)
C133
Developing Leaders
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL)
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
Advance Sheet for Lesson C133
Developing Leaders
1. SCOPE
Developing leaders requires a comprehensive combination of assessment, planning, training, and
developing subordinate leaders. The development of leaders from the field grade perspective to the
subordinate requires understanding of the needs of the individual, the unit/organization, and the Army.
The building block approach and development of leaders is the focus of this lesson.
The result of this two-hour lesson is that you understand the requirements for assessing your subordinates,
the elements of developing leaders, the attributes and competencies involved and required to further the
development of subordinates from a holistic and specific point of view that supports the individual and
the Army. You will learn the requirements of developing leaders, understand the elements of development
of leaders as presented in FM 6-22, and review the leadership requirements model as presented in ADP 622. By the conclusion of this lesson, you understand the Army’s overall framework for developing
leaders, with a specific focus on development of a plan by the field grade officer to support the
development of the subordinate leader. This lesson builds upon the lesson and framework from C131.
You will gain a better understanding of the role of the field grade officer in the development of
subordinate leaders. Stemming from C131, the roles of and importance of assessing, coaching,
counseling, and mentoring within the scope of developing leaders, thereby fostering the professional
development of both the field grade officer and subordinates is further developed. The intent of this
lesson is threefold. First is to define the role of developing leaders and the role of the field grade officer.
The second reinforces the skills/attributes/competencies students desire and need in their subordinates by
examining how FM 6-22 treats the topics specifically in appropriate highlights from chapters 1-3. Lastly,
the lesson focuses on chapters six and seven of FM 6-22 as they relate to developing a plan to further
develop subordinate leaders upon returning to the operating force.
The combination of C131 and C133 provide the basis for you to write a plan for developing leaders at the
battalion level and higher. This plan should utilize your experiences to date, external and internal
indicators, and curriculum-based lesson material to culminate in an individually produced product for
students to use in future assignments as field grade leaders in Army organizations
2. LEARNING OBJECTIVES
This lesson supports CGSOC Common Core Course TLO-CC-1, “Analyze organizational level
leadership concepts used to lead in developing organizations,” and TLO-CC-10, “Incorporate
effective communication skills,” as listed on the theme advance sheet.
ELO-CC-1.1
Action: Analyze the role of field grade officers as organizational-level leaders.
Condition: Acting as an organizational-level leader, using principles and standards of critical thinking,
references, case studies, and computer-based instruction (CBIs).
Standard: Analysis includes C133 Advance Sheet
April 2021 (AY 21-22)
1. Leadership at the organizational level
2. Critical thinking in problem framing
3. Organizational vision
4. Field grade officer’s role in developing organizations
5. Field grade officer’s role in developing leaders
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Analysis
ELO-CC-1.12
Action: Analyze (Army) leader development doctrine.
Condition: As a student in the Command and General Staff Officer Course, using computer-based
instruction (CBIs), reflective thinking, and references.
Standard: Analysis includes 1. The Army framework for leader development
2. The Army Leadership Requirements Model (ALRM)
3. The role of mentoring in leader development
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Analysis
ELO-CC-10.1
Action: Write effectively.
Condition: As a field grade leader using critical writing skills; drawing on references, computer-based
instruction (CBIs), personal experience and individual learning while faced with complex, ill-structured
problems characteristic of the operational environment.
Standard: Writing includes1. Substance
2. Organization
3. Style
4. Correctness
Learning Domain: Cognitive Level of Learning: Synthesis
JPME I Learning Areas Supported: 6e. Communicate with clarity and precision.
CGSOC PLO 2 Attributes:
a. Apply ethics, norms, and laws of the profession.
b. Apply knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting.
c. Apply interpersonal skills, leadership, and followership.
d. Meet organizational-level challenges.
e. Demonstrate commitment to develop further expertise in the art and science of war as life-long
learners.
CGSOC Program Learning Outcome 2 (The Profession of Arms): Graduates who are able to comport
themselves as professionals, responsive to the country and the public as servant-leaders.
CGSOC graduates model and enforce the ethics, norms, and laws of the profession of arms, applying
their knowledge and commitment to strengthen warfighting and related capabilities that advance US
security aims. They apply effective interpersonal skills, leadership and followership in the joint
environment. They demonstrate a high degree of commitment to further development of their own
expertise in the art and science of war, going beyond the study of their own Service’s competencies.
C133 Advance Sheet
2
April 2021 (AY 21-22)
3. HOMEWORK ASSIGNMENT
a. First requirement
Scan:
C133RA: FM 6-22, Leader Development, June 2015, Chapters 1-3 (55 pages). Located in the
Blackboard Master Library.
Read:
C133RB: FM 6-22, June 2015, Leader Development Supplement, Chapters 6-7. Available:
https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/FM6-22Supplement/index.html (accessed 18 August
2021).
C133RC: 2018 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership: Military and
Civilian Leader Findings Technical Report 2019-01 (May 2019) Center for Army Leadership,
Executive Summary, pages iv-xiv (11 pages). Located in the C133 lesson area in Blackboard.
Additional Reference Material:
C133RD: Leader Development Improvement Guide (LDIG) February 2018. US Army Center for
Army Leadership. Located in the C133 lesson area in Blackboard.
Note: There is no computer-based instruction (CBI) for this lesson.
b. Second requirement Consider the following statements as you complete the readings from the
first requirement. :
-Leaders have the responsibility to create a climate that fosters the development of subordinates.
-Leaders are responsible for implementing programs that support the leader development based
on unit/organization and individual needs based on continuous assessment.
-Developing self and others requires a well-crafted plan based on a solid needs assessment.
-Leader development is achieved through the synthesis of knowledge, skills, and experiences
gained through institutional training and education, operational training, operational experience,
and self-development.
c. Third Requirement: Take the C133 Blackboard quiz located in the C133 lesson area at the bottom
of the page.
5. ASSESSMENT PLAN
Comprehension of the lesson material is assessed by completing the C133 Blackboard quiz, which
accounts for 10% of the C100 grade. You may take the quiz up to three times; only the highest score will
be recorded in the gradebook.
In future assignments as a field grade officer in a battalion-level organization or higher, you will develop
a leader development plan (LDP) for your unit. Use your past assignments and operational experiences to
date, the unit mission set, the required and desired knowledge/skills/abilities, external and internal
indicators of both strengths and needs, and other curriculum-based C133 lesson materials to culminate in
an individually produced LDP product to use in future assignments as field grade leaders in Army
organizations.
C133 Advance Sheet
3
RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
April 2021 (AY 21-22)
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
C133: Developing Leaders
Reading: C133RC
Annual Survey on Army Leadership
From the Center for Army Leadership
2018
CENTER
FOR ARMY
LEADERSHIP
Annual Survey of Army Leadership
Military and Civilian Leader Findings
TECHNICAL REPORT 2019-01
MAY 2019
The Center for the Army Profession and Leadership
Mission Command Center of Excellence,
U.S. Army Combined Arms Center
D. L. Hilton
COL, MP
Director
Concepts, Doctrine and Requirements Division
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-2348
Jon J. Fallesen, Chief
Distribution: Release only authorized by CG CAC
Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the
data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing
this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 222024302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently
valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)
2. REPORT TYPE
3. DATES COVERED (From - To)
30-05-2019
Technical Report
August 2018 – May 2019
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
2018 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL)
W91QF4-18-F-0106
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)
Ryan P. Riley, M.A., ICF
Kaitlyn Mihalco, M.S., ICF
Jennifer Harvey, Ph.D., ICF
Jon J. Fallesen, Ph.D., CAPL
Kate Lambourne, Ph.D., ICF
Matt McDonough, M.A., ICF
5d. PROJECT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT
NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
ICF
9300 Lee Highway
AND ADDRESS(ES)
Fairfax, VA
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
Center for the Army Profession and Leadership
804 Harrison Drive (Bldg. 472)
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2308
CAPL
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT
NUMBER(S) 2019-01
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Pre-decisional. Limited Distribution. Release only authorized by CG CAC.
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
This report provides findings from the CASAL survey for both Army military and civilian leaders.
14. ABSTRACT CASAL is the Army’s annual survey to assess the quality of leadership and leader development. 2018 findings are
based on responses from 9,514 Army leaders, consisting of 6,169 sergeants through colonels in the Regular Army, US Army
Reserve, and Army National Guard, and 3,345 Army Civilians. This 14th year of the survey has additional coverage on outcomes of
effective leadership, hindrances to unit readiness, unit discipline issues, leader preparedness for warfighting tasks, leadership skill
improvement at CTC, and individuals’ priorities for leader development. Results indicate many positives to sustain and areas for
improvement. Develops Others and the Leads category of the leadership competencies warrant the most improvement based on
assessments of uniformed and civilian leaders. Most leaders display positive leadership and only between 6% and 8% of uniformed
and civilian leaders demonstrate more counterproductive than productive leadership behaviors. Leaders assess their superiors as
well prepared to conduct warfighting tasks, though favorable ratings for the challenge and effectiveness of unit-based training are
moderate and have declined. Operational experience and self-development have the largest percentage of leaders rating it as an
effective domain of leader development while fewer rate institutional education as effective. While the quality of PME is rated
favorably by 74% of recent graduates, smaller percentages perceive their course challenged them to perform at a higher level (59%)
or improved their leadership (58%). Leader attitudes toward command climates are at moderate levels. Two-thirds of uniformed
leaders and three-fourths of Army Civilians perceive their unit is well or very well prepared to perform its primary mission. High
workloads are reported across the Army, and there are persistent challenges with stress from high workload in organizations. Unit
discipline is reported as a serious or significant problem by 12% of AC leaders, reflected by a lack of positive work ethic, not meeting
standards for professionalism, and leaders not holding others accountable. Levels of morale and career satisfaction are relatively
unchanged and moderate. The intentions of AC captains to remain in the Army maintained a 14-year high. Recommended steps are
offered to address the results.
15. SUBJECT TERMS Leadership; Leader Development; Engagement; Education; Experience; Mentoring; Performance Assessment; Mission
Command; Counterproductive Leadership; Combat Training Centers
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
a. REPORT
Unclassified
b. ABSTRACT
Unclassified
17. LIMITATION
OF ABSTRACT
c. THIS PAGE
Unclassified
18. NUMBER
OF PAGES
19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
Jon J. Fallesen
220
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area
code)
913-758-3160
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18
Executive Summary
Purpose
The Center for Army Leadership’s (CAL) Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) is a
recurring, longitudinal study to capture assessments from the field about leadership and leader
development. CASAL has been used to inform senior leaders about leadership quality and
associated upward or downward trends since 2005, which enables decision makers and
stakeholders to make better informed decisions, course adjustments, or leverage prevailing
strengths. CAL accepts data queries submitted by agencies and individuals for further analysis
of CASAL results. CASAL findings inform groups such as the Army Profession and Leader
Development Forum, Civilian Workforce Transformation, Army Learning Coordination Council,
Army Talent Management Task Force, as well as special studies and initiatives conducted by
various other organizations.
Readiness remains a top priority for Army senior leaders. The total force must be ready to fight
to win, which requires each element to be prepared to perform at its best. Unit readiness is
contingent on a number of factors, the most apparent being manpower, resources, and
training. Other factors internal and external to the unit also impact readiness, and one of those
factors is leadership. Leaders make decisions about resources, personnel, and training in units
and organizations, but they also influence the climate within their unit, and the attitudes and
behaviors of their unit’s members, which can impact readiness. Leaders energize their followers
to accomplish directed and implied tasks and invest in improving their organizations. Given the
positive relationships between leadership and many aspects of unit readiness, it is important to
assess the effectiveness of Army leaders and leader development. The results of such an
assessment can enable decision makers and stakeholders to make better informed decisions,
course adjustments, adopt new or revised developmental practices, and leverage prevailing
strengths, and thus further advance efforts toward total force readiness.
Method
CAL applies scientifically strong methods to survey development, sampling, data collection,
analysis, interpretation, and reporting to obtain accurate and reliable information. CASAL
addresses genuine Army leadership and leader development requirements as established by
Army regulations and doctrine. Survey items are chosen based on historical tracking of issues,
new input from stakeholders in the Army leader development community, and emerging issues
identified by CAL. CASAL data were collected from 23 October through 3 December 2018.
Survey respondents consisted of 9,514 globally dispersed, active component (AC) and reserve
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component (RC) Soldiers in the ranks of sergeant through colonel and Army Civilians. Sampling
practices generally produced results with a margin of error of ± 4.0% or less for the nearly
600,000 Army leaders represented.1 Data analysis includes assessment of percentages by
cohort and ranks, analysis of trends, comparisons across experiences and demographics, coding
of short-answer responses, correlations, and regressions. Findings from other surveys and data
sources are consulted to check the reliability of CASAL responses.
For most items, percentages are used to convey the relative frequency of respondents who
assess leaders or leader development positively and to show trends across time. As an aid in
interpretation, favorability levels have been set based on past CASAL and other surveys. Studies
to determine the levels of risk to mission success found that a threshold of 75% applied to the
percentage of unit leaders required to be effective in leadership competencies and attributes to
avoid medium or significant chance of mission failure. CASAL’s assessment of leadership
behaviors whereby item results receive three-fourths or more favorable responses (i.e., 75%
effective plus very effective) are considered positive. Items where favorable responses fall
below this threshold and/or receive 20% or more unfavorable responses are considered areas
for improvement. Across 13 previous years of CASAL results, several consistent patterns
emerged that provide a backdrop to aid understanding of specific findings:
Group percentages indicating favorability of leadership and leader development
increase with the rank and length of service of the respondent. For example, lowerranking NCOs tend to provide less favorable ratings than do NCOs in higher ranks.
Ratings on items that have greater personal impact (e.g., agreement that your
immediate superior is an effective leader) tend to be more favorable than ratings for
items that are less specific (e.g., rating the effectiveness of your superiors as leaders).
Results from AC and RC leaders tend to be similar, within 1% to 3% favorable response
on many items. Meaningful differences are noted where applicable.
Army Civilian leaders on average fall below military leaders in terms of favorable
leadership ratings. However, on average, Civilian leaders feel more empowered than
military leaders.
Operational experience and self-development are rated as having greater value and
impact than formal institutional education (e.g., resident and nonresident courses and
schools) for leader development.
The Army Values and professional beliefs tend to be rated more favorably than other
leader attributes and competencies.
1
The sampling errors for AC and RC warrant officers, AC junior NCOs, and RC field grade officers slightly exceeded
the desired level (i.e., responses obtained resulted in a sampling error of ± 4.1% to ± 4.4%).
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Summary of Findings
Army Working Environment
Organizational Climate
Organizational climate encompasses many aspects, including perceptions of unit preparedness,
command climate, trust, workload stress, and standards and discipline. Perceptions of unit
preparedness are moderately favorable. About two-thirds of Army leaders and three-fourths of
Army civilians perceive their unit or organization is well or very well prepared to perform its
primary mission, which is consistent with findings from 2017 when this was first assessed by
CASAL. Thus, one in four respondents perceive their unit is not well prepared to perform its
primary mission. For an Army that is focused on readiness, this finding indicates room for
improvement. Of the respondents who indicate their unit is poorly or very poorly prepared for
its mission (10-17%), the most commonly cited factors are unit leadership issues to include lack
of guidance, poor decision making, not holding Soldiers accountable, and showing favoritism;
personnel or manning shortages; deficiencies in unit training or proficiency; lack of equipment,
facilities, and/or resources; taskings and other disruptions to the unit’s mission; and the
working dynamics within the organization.
Command climate is a factor that affects perceptions of unit preparedness. CASAL results
indicate that only two-thirds of uniformed leaders and 57% of civilian respondents assess the
command climate in their unit or organization as positive or very positive. Trust is an important
contributor to a positive command climate, in addition to the quality and effectiveness of
leaders and the upholding of standards. Trust is also critical for mission command. The
percentages of respondents with favorable perceptions of trust among unit members, trust in
their superiors, and trust shown by superiors are only moderate and remain unchanged from
previous years. Given the importance of trust, any lack of it has broad negative impacts on
leadership, unit climate, and unit readiness. Similar to trust, about two-thirds of respondents
agree that standards are upheld, that unit leaders allow or encourage members to learn from
honest mistakes, and that unit members are empowered to make decisions pertaining to the
performance of their duties.
Related to issues with personnel or manning shortages for unit preparedness, CASAL results
indicate high workloads continue to be an issue for a majority of uniformed leaders and Army
civilians. Over half of AC and RC leaders (61% and 55%, respectively), and 76% of Army civilians
characterize their current workload as high or very high. In addition, one-third of AC leaders
(34%) and Army Civilians (32%) report stress from a high workload as a serious or significant
problem. Stress from a high workload is one of the significant unit characteristics that
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contribute to whether a unit is prepared to perform its primary mission. To address these
findings, additional resources and support should be provided to leaders on how to prioritize
and manage workloads. Leaders should serve as a buffer to subordinates, provide clear and
consistent guidance on priorities, as well as delegating and developing subordinates to prepare
them to handle increased responsibilities. However, it should be noted that leadership
behaviors only explain a small portion of the variance in respondents’ perceived stress from a
high workload. Other factors, such as insufficient personnel, time constraints, and lack of
resources, have been noted by respondents to contribute to their perceptions of workload
stress.
Attitudes Toward Assigned Duties and Engagement
Despite the modest views on command climate and trust, higher percentages of Army leaders
hold favorable attitudes toward the performance of their assigned duties. Strong commitment
remains among the most favorable findings in CASAL, with over 90% of Army leaders agreeing
they are committed to their team or immediate work group. Over four-fifths of leaders believe
their assigned duties are important to the unit or organization (84%) and know what is
expected of them in their positions (82%). Engagement represents the level of commitment
leaders have for their organization and the level of initiative they apply to their duties. Levels of
engagement remain high and unchanged. If directed appropriately, senior leaders can leverage
high levels of commitment and engagement in their subordinate leaders and others to enhance
areas that need to be strengthened.
Morale, Career Satisfaction, and Intentions to Remain in the Army
Morale is a measure of how people feel about themselves, their team, and their leaders. The
percentages of respondents reporting high or very high morale are moderate and stable.
Consistent with the trend of moderately favorable perceptions for morale, two-thirds of AC and
RC leaders are satisfied with their Army career up to this point. One in five respondents are
dissatisfied, which is also consistent with past years. Intentions to remain in the Army until
retirement eligibility or beyond remain strong (70% AC and 77% RC plan to stay) for uniformed
leaders. About one-third of Army Civilians expect to ascend to a higher level of leadership
within the next five years. More than one-fourth of managers (31%) and first-line supervise
(27%) expect to retire within the next five years, creating potential concerns for knowledge
retention, while also creating opportunity for lower-level civilian leaders to assume new levels
of leadership and responsibility.
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Together, these findings indicate the working environment within Army units is moderately
positive, and should be maintained and addressed to better support unit readiness. As many of
the aspects within the working environment are strongly related to the quality and
effectiveness of leadership, it is important to examine Army leader strengths and weaknesses.
Quality of Army Leadership
Leadership Quality in Army Units and Organizations
Unit leadership issues was one area cited most frequently by respondents who indicated that
their unit was poorly or very poorly prepared to perform its mission. Attitudes toward the
quality of leadership in the Army remain relatively positive, with a majority of respondents
viewing their superior, peers, and subordinates as effective leaders. However, more than 25%
of respondents view their superiors, peers and subordinates as not effective. Levels of
satisfaction with the quality of military and civilian leadership remain fairly stable. Larger
percentages of Army civilians (67% and 62%, respectively) report satisfaction with the quality of
military and civilian leadership in their unit than do uniformed leaders.
Army Military Leadership
The U.S. Army has long defined leadership as actions to influence people to accomplish
missions and to improve their organizations (ADRP 6-22, 2012e) The Army’s leadership
requirements model (LRM) establishes what is expected of Army leaders. The LRM outlines the
competencies and attributes that are required by leaders, and CASAL results consistently
demonstrate that those leadership requirements significantly predict leader, unit, and
subordinate outcomes. Of the 10 core leader competencies and 13 attributes in the LRM, the
competencies of Leading Others, Building Trust, and Developing Others, and the attribute of
Sound Judgment are the strongest predictors of the extent to which immediate superiors meet
subordinate expectations. With the exception of Innovation, 75% or more of respondents
indicate their immediate superior is effective or very effective in the attributes; however, less
than 75% of respondents indicate their immediate superior is effective or very effective in all
but two of the LRM competencies, Gets Results and Prepares Self. The trends in leadership
competencies show a leveling off and in some cases a decline in the percentage of leaders who
are judged to be effective. In operational terms, the percentage of effective leaders is at a level
where there is risk to mission accomplishment as judged by the leaders themselves.
Similar to the findings for the LRM requirements, within the area of mission command, less
than 75% of immediate AC superiors are rated favorably on the six mission command principles,
with building effective teams (67%) being the lowest rated. Larger percentages of AC and RC
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CAL TECHNICAL REPORT 201 9-01
leaders tend to be assessed as being well or very well prepared to perform or conduct
warfighting tasks associated with unit mission success in comparison to the percentage of
leaders who are assessed as effective in the mission command behaviors.
CASAL results consistently demonstrate that leader effectiveness in the core leader
competencies and leader attributes is significantly related to organizational outcomes, such as
cohesion, capabilities, and discipline of teams, as well as subordinate attitudes that affect
mission accomplishment. Prior CASAL findings have indicated that less than three-fourths
favorable responses on leadership behaviors (i.e., 75% agreement or effectiveness) could mean
elevated risk of unit mission failure. Thus, the consistent finding across a decade of assessment
that one in three to one in four Army leaders are not rated effective in most of the
competencies, especially those within the Leads category, as well as all six mission command
principles, signals potential risks to unit readiness.
Army Civilian Leadership
Findings for CASAL indicators regarding the quality of civilian leadership largely mimic the
findings for the quality of uniformed leadership. Less than 75% of civilian respondents assess
their civilian immediate superior as effective or very effective in all but two of the LRM
competencies, Gets Results and Prepares Self. Larger percentages of civilian leaders are
assessed favorably on the attributes in comparison to the competencies; however, civilian
leaders fall short of the three-fourths favorability threshold on four of the 13 attributes. Civilian
leaders are also rated below the three-fourths favorability threshold (66%-74%) on mission
command behaviors. Given the findings for the quality of both uniformed and civilian leaders
and the relationship that effectiveness in the LRM components have on organizational
outcomes and subordinate attitudes, there are ample opportunities for leader development to
make an impact.
Counterproductive Leadership
Counterproductive leadership is defined in Army regulation and doctrine with the intent of
describing leadership behaviors and impacts that are not desired and not to be tolerated.
Counterproductive leadership involves conduct that decreases followers’ well-being and
undermines unit functioning. This is reflected in any leadership activity or attitude that goes
against the desired outcomes of positive leadership actions (AR 600-100, 2017c). The presence
of counterproductive leadership behaviors in the Army remains low. Since first assessed in
2012, between 5% and 9% of Army leaders (uniformed and civilian) have been assessed as
exhibiting a combination of counterproductive leadership behaviors. Findings continue to
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affirm that leaders who engage in multiple and recurring counterproductive behaviors are
perceived as having adverse effects on command climate; the cohesion, discipline, and
capability of the teams and work groups they lead; and the work quality, engagement, and
morale of their subordinates. Leaders who effectively Build Trust, demonstrate Sound
Judgment, Military and Professional Bearing, and Create a Positive Environment are least often
perceived to demonstrate counterproductive leadership behaviors.
Quality of Army Leader Development
Military Leader Development
The self-development and the operational domains are viewed by uniformed leaders to be
effective in preparing them to assume new levels of leadership or responsibility, while
institutional education lags behind in the percentage of uniformed leaders perceiving it as
effective. The favorable perceptions of self-development, and operational and job experiences
differ by rank and leadership level, with more senior-level leaders perceiving these leader
development domains to be effective than junior-level leaders. Time may play a key role in the
perceived effectiveness and impact of self-development. While self-development is an
expectation and a requirement, less than half of uniformed leaders believe they have sufficient
time for self-development in their current assignments.
Leader development practices that are associated with the operational domain have the largest
impact on development. These practices include mentoring, on-the-job training, opportunities
to lead, learning from peers, deployments. The practices rated as having the lowest impact
include developmental counseling from superior, formal leader development in units, 360
degree assessment/feedback, and distributed learning. However, practices, such as 360 degree
assessment, that take a modest investment of time and other resources can have a beneficial
and worthwhile impact on development.
Leaders’ interests in different types of developmental opportunities and their goals for those
opportunities likely depends on where they are in their careers (i.e., their rank group). An
understanding of AC and RC leaders’ levels of interest in different leader development
outcomes (e.g., attaining degrees and certifications, enhancing leadership skills, completing
Army education (PME) requirements) can help inform which outcomes should be made
available across a leader’s career, and which outcomes may be more important at certain
phases of a career. Those outcomes in which leaders are very or extremely interested include
preparing for their next likely assignment (82%); improving their ability to perform the duties in
their current position (80%), and enhancing their leadership skills through opportunities for
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CAL TECHNICAL REPORT 201 9-01
increased responsibility (80%). These could be considered universal, as leaders in all rank
groups express interest in continued development in these ways. Other outcomes vary by rank
and level of responsibility; for example, larger percentages of junior NCOs express interest in all
leader development outcomes, including attaining degrees or certifications, and completing
PME requirements, compared to other ranks.
Civilian Leader Development
As with uniformed leaders, a larger percentage of civilian leaders view self-development and
their job experiences to be effective in preparing them to assume new levels of leadership or
responsibility in comparison to institutional education. Time for self-development appears to be
a greater concern for civilian leaders, as only 38% perceive they have sufficient time for selfdevelopment in their current role. The perceived amount of time needed for self-development
is influenced by leaders’ interpretation of what comprises self-development, and civilian
leaders often consider mandatory training as part of their self-development.
As only one-third of managers and first line supervisors expect to be serving in a higher level of
leadership (in the Army) five years from now, this may limit civilian leaders’ perceived need or
interest in leader development. For those civilian leaders who do expect to advance to a higher
level of leadership, they may approach leader development with greater motivation and a
growth mindset. CASAL findings support this premise. Civilian leaders who anticipate being at a
higher level of leadership five years from now are significantly more likely to have favorable
perceptions of self-development, institutional education (including distributed learning), multisource 360 degree assessment feedback, and mentoring.
Leader’s Role in Development
Leaders’ effectiveness in the Develops Others competency encompasses behaviors such as
providing performance counseling and informal feedback to help subordinates improve their
current skills and prepare for future assignments. Based on CASAL results, performance
counseling is inconsistently applied by Army leaders and tends to be perceived as having small
to no impact on leaders’ development. Informal feedback, on the other hand, is provided at
least occasionally by most superiors. This type of feedback tends to focus more on performance
of duties and less on how to improve or prepare for future responsibilities. In a survey of over
25,000 global leaders, Sinar and colleagues (2018) found that when 75% of performance
management discussions were focused on development planning, leader engagement and
retention increased. It is recommended that Army senior leaders seek to foster a feedback
culture where leaders provide feedback that is more focused on development, but also
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encourages leaders to solicit feedback from others rather than expecting or waiting for
superiors to provide feedback.
While mentoring is the leader development practice that is consistently rated by the most
respondents as having a large or great impact on their development, just over half of AC and RC
leaders (54-59%) and 28% of Army Civilians report they currently receive mentoring. Mentoring
can be especially beneficial for junior leaders, but less than half of junior-level uniformed
leaders report having a mentor (42% of AC company grade officers and 46% of junior NCOs).
This finding is especially concerning when it is considered alongside the finding that only 58% of
leaders are rated effective or very effective in developing subordinates. If leaders are not being
effectively developed by their immediate superiors, one way to fill the gap would be for these
leaders to seek development from someone else such as a mentor. However, CASAL results
show that those junior leaders who rate their superior ineffective on the competency Develops
Others are also less likely to have a mentor. Continuing to foster and promote informal
mentoring relationships by removing actual and perceived impediments (e.g., access to senior
leaders) and misconceptions (e.g., a mentor must have experience in the same career path that
a mentee desires) about mentoring can help address this.
Army Education
Courses and schools continue to be viewed as providing a good quality of education with
effective instructors. However, there are mixed results regarding the degree of rigor and
challenge that courses pose to leaders. Fifty-eight percent of recent graduates rate their most
recent course effective or very effective at improving their leadership capabilities. While all
courses are viewed effective in preparing leaders for teamwork, most junior- to mid-level
courses show some room for improvement in preparing leaders for various other
characteristics of effective leadership (e.g., developing subordinates, influencing others, taking
action in the absence of orders, being technically and tactically proficient). Findings suggest
leaders’ operational assignments are perceived by their subordinates to be well prepared to
perform a range of warfighting tasks in support of large scale combat operations. Yet, smaller
percentages of leaders in these same ranks attribute their proficiency in these warfighting skills
to the learning that occurred at their most recent course/school.
Institutional education tends to be an undervalued and underutilized domain for Army Civilians,
with slightly more than half of civilian leaders having completed a CES course. Recent graduates
of CES courses hold moderate to positive perceptions of their course experience, the quality of
the education, and the value to their development. Courses with a resident component
(Intermediate Course and Advanced Course) are more often perceived to provide quality
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education, pose challenge to learners, provide useful and relevant content, improve leadership
capabilities, and prepare Army Civilians for leadership. In contrast, courses conducted entirely
via DL (Foundation Course, Manager Development Course) are assessed favorably on these
indicators by smaller percentages of recent graduates.
Unit Training and Leader Development
The priority that units place on leader development remains, in practice, at a moderate level.
Yet, relatively few leaders (about 1 in 3) indicate they are aware of a formal plan or published
guidance for leader development held by their unit or higher headquarters. Army units and
organizations tend to rely on self-development, authorizations for resident school/course
attendance, and leader development programs such as OPD/NCOPD to develop leaders.
Methods that capitalize on the learning that occurs in the operational domain are the ones with
greatest potential positively impact developing leaders. Greater focus could be paid on
engaging leaders in team-building activities or events, emphasizing leader development in
collective training, and providing stretch or developmental assignments. These developmental
methods, which tend to occur rarely or occasionally in units, integrate leader development into
already occurring activities in units.
Unit-based training is a means to prepare units for operations and to practice and improve
individual skills of leading and developing others. The percentage of AC leaders rating their
unit’s training conducted in the past quarter as effective or very effective for preparing for
future mission success has decreased by 3% for each of the past two years, and is currently at
50%. Similarly, the percentage of AC leaders who indicate agreement that unit training is
sufficiently challenging to prepare their unit for future mission success has decreased from 52%
to 42% between 2016 and 2018. Perceptions of unit training effectiveness differ by rank group,
with relatively smaller percentages of junior NCOs and warrant officers responding favorably.
Army results for the Status of Forces Survey (SOFS; Office of People Analytics, 2018) provide
supporting evidence for the gradual decrease in the level of favorable attitudes toward unit
training in recent years. Within CASAL results, poor unit training, and less than optimal levels of
technical/tactical proficiency of unit members were reasons cited by respondents for their unit
being poorly or very poorly prepared to perform its mission. In conflict with these moderate
ratings for unit-based training effectiveness is the positive finding that 72% of respondents rate
their immediate superior as well/very well prepared to plan and conduct training for tactical
operations. A more in-depth assessment of current unit training practices, specifically to
explore junior leaders’ expectations for unit training and where those expectations are or are
not being met is recommended.
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The combat training center (CTC) program is the cornerstone of an integrated strategy that
builds trained and proficient combat-ready units and leaders prepared to win in a complex
world (AR 350-50, 2018). Fifty-seven percent of AC leaders and more than one-third in the RC
(35%) have participated as part of the training audience at a CTC at least once in their career.
Respondents who trained at a CTC within the past 12 months rate the experience effective for
improving their leadership skills (71%); for improving their ability to lead the preparation,
execution, and assessment of tactical operations (79%); and for improving their unit’s mission
readiness (81%). A majority of AC respondents indicate they received effective feedback about
their leadership at the CTC (62%), and 73% noted improvement to their subordinates’
leadership skills as a result of the experience. More than half of AC respondents indicate
leadership skill improvement was addressed in their rotation’s after action review (AAR; 55%),
while smaller percentages of respondents report leadership skill improvement was addressed
between OC/Ts and unit leaders in one-on-ones (47%), was part of the leader training program
prior to conducting operations in the maneuver training area (40%), or was a training objective
for the rotation experience (39%).
Conclusions
The Army can stand proud that its leaders are committed to their teams and immediate work
groups. Uniformed and civilian members continue to report positive levels of engagement, and
intentions to remain in service to the Army are high. The Army should capitalize on this strong
commitment and seek to enhance leader development, particularly in the areas of institutional
education, leader skills in developing others, mentoring, a culture of informal feedback, and
unit training, to increase its levels of unit preparedness, command climate, trust, and leadership
effectiveness. If left unaddressed, the reported moderate levels in these areas are positioned to
impact unit readiness and hinder the Army from achieving its goal of total force readiness.
RETURN TO TABLE OF CONTENTS
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CAL TECHNICAL REPORT 201 9-01
US ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
US Army Command and General Staff School
Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) Common Core
C100: Foundations of the Army Profession
C133: Developing Leaders
Reading: C133RD
Leadership Development Improvement Guide (LDIG)
From the Center for Army Leadership
Leader Development Improvement
Guide (LDIG)
February 2018
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Leader 360 / MSAF program is operated by the Center for Army Leadership, Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas. Log onto MSAF at https://msaf.army.mil . For further information contact 913.758.3216 or 913.758.3160.
Table of Contents
(Hold Ctrl and click on a heading to jump to a section)
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 5
Background ......................................................................................................................................... 5
Army Leadership Requirements ......................................................................................................... 6
Using the Leader Development Improvement (LDI) Guide ......................................................... 7
LDI Guide Purpose .............................................................................................................................. 7
How the LDI Guide is organized ......................................................................................................... 9
Individual Leadership Development Plan.......................................................................................... 18
Section One: Leader Competencies ......................................................................................... 24
Competency: Leads Others ..................................................................................................... 25
Uses appropriate methods of influence to energize others ............................................................ 26
Provides purpose, motivation, and inspiration ................................................................................ 28
Enforces standards ............................................................................................................................ 30
Balances mission and welfare of followers ....................................................................................... 32
Additional Information ..................................................................................................................... 34
Competency: Builds Trust ....................................................................................................... 35
Sets personal example for trust ........................................................................................................ 36
Takes direct action to build trust ...................................................................................................... 38
Sustains a climate of trust ................................................................................................................. 40
Additional Information ..................................................................................................................... 42
Competency: Extends Influence Beyond the Chain of Command ............................................. 43
Understands sphere, means and limits of influence ........................................................................ 44
Negotiates, builds consensus, and resolves conflict ......................................................................... 45
Additional Information ..................................................................................................................... 48
Competency: Leads by Example .............................................................................................. 49
Displays character ............................................................................................................................ 50
Exemplifies the Warrior Ethos........................................................................................................... 52
Leads with confidence in adverse situations .................................................................................... 54
Demonstrates technical and tactical competence ........................................................................... 56
Understands the importance of conceptual skills and models them to others ................................ 58
Seeks diverse ideas and points of view ............................................................................................. 60
Additional Information ...................................................................................................................... 62
Competency: Communicates .................................................................................................. 63
Listens actively .................................................................................................................................. 64
Creates shared understanding ......................................................................................................... 66
Employs engaging communication techniques ................................................................................. 68
Is sensitive to cultural factors in communication ............................................................................. 70
Additional information ...................................................................................................................... 72
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Competency: Creates a Positive Environment/Fosters esprit de corps ..................................... 73
Fosters teamwork, cohesion, cooperation, and loyalty (esprit de corps)......................................... 74
Encourages fairness and inclusiveness.............................................................................................. 76
Encourages open and candid communications................................................................................. 78
Creates a learning environment ........................................................................................................ 80
Encourages subordinates to exercise initiative, accept responsibility, and take ownership ............ 82
Demonstrates care for follower well-being ...................................................................................... 84
Anticipates people’s on-the-job needs ............................................................................................. 86
Sets and maintains high expectations for individuals and teams ..................................................... 88
Additional Information ...................................................................................................................... 90
Competency: Prepares Self ..................................................................................................... 91
Maintains mental and physical health and well-being ..................................................................... 92
Expands knowledge of technical, technological, and tactical areas ................................................. 94
Expands conceptual and interpersonal capabilities .......................................................................... 96
Analyzes and organizes information to create knowledge ............................................................... 98
Maintains relevant cultural awareness ........................................................................................... 100
Maintains relevant geopolitical awareness..................................................................................... 102
Maintains self-awareness: Employs self-understanding and recognizes impact on others ........... 104
Additional Information .................................................................................................................... 106
Competency: Develops Others.............................................................................................. 107
Assesses developmental needs of others ....................................................................................... 108
Counsels, coaches, and mentors ..................................................................................................... 110
Facilitates ongoing development .................................................................................................... 112
Builds team or group skills and processes ...................................................................................... 114
Additional Information .................................................................................................................... 116
Competency: Stewards the Profession ................................................................................. 117
Supports professional and personal growth ................................................................................... 118
Improves the organization .............................................................................................................. 120
Additional Information .................................................................................................................... 122
Competency: Gets Results .................................................................................................... 123
Prioritizes, organizes, and coordinates taskings for teams or other organizational
structures/groups ............................................................................................................................ 124
Identifies and accounts for capabilities and commitment to task .................................................. 126
Designates, clarifies, and deconflicts roles ..................................................................................... 128
Identifies, contends for, allocates, and manages resources ........................................................... 130
Removes work barriers ................................................................................................................... 132
Recognizes and rewards good performance ................................................................................... 134
Seeks, recognizes, and takes advantage of opportunities to improve performance...................... 136
Makes feedback part of work processes ......................................................................................... 138
Executes plans to accomplish the mission ...................................................................................... 140
Identifies and adjusts to external influences on the mission and organization .............................. 142
Additional Information .................................................................................................................... 144
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Section Two: Leader Attributes………………………………………………………………………………………………..145
Attribute: Army Values…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..146
Values are principles, standards, or qualities considered essential for successful leaders …………...147
Values are fundamental to help people discern right from wrong in any situation ……………………...148
The Army has seven values to develop in all Army individuals: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service,
honor, integrity, and personal courage…………………………………………………………………………………………149
Attribute: Empathy ............................................................................................................... 150
The propensity to experience something from another person’s point of view ............................ 151
The ability to identify with and enter into another person’s feelings and emotions ..................... 152
The desire to care for and take care of Soldiers and others ........................................................... 153
Attribute: Warrior Ethos/Service Ethos ................................................................................. 154
The internal shared attitudes and beliefs that embody the spirit of the Army profession for
Soldiers and Army Civilians alike ..................................................................................................... 155
Attribute: Discipline ............................................................................................................. 156
Controls one’s own behavior according to Army Values ................................................................ 157
Mindset to obey and enforce good orderly practices in administrative,
organizational, training, and operational duties ............................................................................. 158
Attributes: Military and Professional Bearing ........................................................................ 159
Possessing a commanding presence ............................................................................................... 160
Projecting a professional image of authority .................................................................................. 161
Attributes: Fitness ................................................................................................................ 162
Having sound health, strength and endurance that support one’s emotional health and
conceptual ability under prolonged stress ...................................................................................... 163
Attribute: Confidence ........................................................................................................... 164
Projecting self-confidence and certainty in the unit’s ability to succeed in its missions ................ 165
Demonstrating composure and outward calm through control over one’s emotions ................... 166
Attribute: Resilience ............................................................................................................. 167
Showing a tendency to recover quickly from setbacks, shocks, injuries, adversity and stress while
maintaining a mission and organizational focus ............................................................................. 168
Attribute: Mental Agility....................................................................................................... 169
Flexibility of mind; the ability to break habitual thought patterns ................................................. 170
Anticipating or adapting to uncertain or changing situations; to think through outcomes when
current decisions or actions are not producing desired effects...................................................... 171
The ability to apply multiple perspectives and approaches ............................................................ 172
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Table of Contents
Attribute: Sound Judgment ................................................................................................... 173
The capacity to assess situations shrewdly and draw sound conclusions ...................................... 174
The tendency to form sound opinions, make sensible decisions and reliable guesses .................. 175
The ability to assess strengths and weaknesses of subordinates, peers, and enemies to
create appropriate solutions and actions ....................................................................................... 176
Attribute: Innovation ............................................................................................................ 177
The ability to introduce new ideas based on opportunity or challenging circumstances .............. 178
Creativity in producing ideas and objects that are both novel and appropriate ............................ 179
Attribute: Interpersonal Tact ................................................................................................ 180
The capacity to understands interactions with others ................................................................... 181
Being aware of how others see them and senses how to interact with them effectively .............. 182
Conscious of character, reactions and motives of self and others and how they affect
interactions ..................................................................................................................................... 183
Recognizing diversity and displays self-control, balance, and stability .......................................... 184
Attribute: Expertise .............................................................................................................. 185
Possessing facts, beliefs, logical assumptions and understanding in relevant areas...................... 186
Glossary ............................................................................................................................... 187
Index of Key Terms ............................................................................................................... 189
Component Relationships ..................................................................................................... 190
Leads Others.................................................................................................................................... 190
Builds Trust ...................................................................................................................................... 191
Extends Influence Beyond the Chain of Command ......................................................................... 192
Leads by Example ............................................................................................................................ 193
Communicates................................................................................................................................. 194
Creates a Positive Environment ...................................................................................................... 195
Prepares Self.................................................................................................................................... 196
Develops Others .............................................................................................................................. 197
Stewards the Profession.................................................................................................................. 198
Gets Results ..................................................................................................................................... 199
Virtual Improvement Center Interactive Multimedia Instruction Lessons .............................. 200
Developmental Activity Form ............................................................................................... 201
Individual Leadership Development Plan Form ..................................................................... 202
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Introduction
This Leader Development Improvement Guide (LDI Guide) provides Army leaders at all levels with ideas and
activities for professional growth, development, and continuous learning that can be incorporated into an
Individual Leadership Development Plan (ILDP) or used informally when a leader wants to improve in a
particular area. Leaders at all levels can use this guide to jump start their ideas for self development.
The LDI Guide is especially useful following participation in one of the Multi-Source Assessment and
Feedback (MSAF) programs. The MSAF programs enhance individual development by providing leaders with
personalized and confidential feedback from traditional and nontraditional sources - superiors, peers and
subordinates. The feedback increases self-awareness by identifying gaps in perception and by providing
specific information regarding a leader's strengths and developmental needs. The MSAF program consists
of three sub-programs. The Leader 360 (LDR360), a self-initiated Leader event (formerly MSAF360), Unit
360, a commander directed organizational event and Commander 360 (CDR360), a rater initiated event for
CSL commanders. The feedback from all three programs address leader core competencies from ADP/ADRP
6–22, Army Leadership. The MSAF program is under the organization and direction of the Center for Army
Leadership (CAL), U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, KS. CAL is the action agent
for leader development, leadership research, leadership doctrine, and leadership common core
development for professional military education (PME) systems to sustain excellence in the Army’s core
competency of growing leaders.
Background
The LDI Guide helps you design customized developmental activities tailored to your particular needs as a
leader. You may also choose developmental activities from other sources. The developmental activities you
select from the LDI Guide (or create on your own) should be linked to your strengths and developmental
needs identified through an MSAF assessment. Also consider other sources of insight including formal
evaluations, direct feedback from individuals at work, and self-reflection.
The LDI Guide can be used as a resource to improve your proficiency in certain leadership component
areas. While you may have participated in the MSAF program and received a Leader Feedback Report (LFR),
these steps are not a prerequisite. The LDI Guide is organized around the leader competencies and
attributes from the Army Leader Requirements Model found in ADRP 6-22. We will discuss Army leader
attributes and competencies and their corresponding components in more detail in the sections that follow.
As you use the LDI Guide, remember it is designed as a resource to initiate ideas for how you can develop
your strengths and improve in your areas of developmental need. For example, while completing the
Developmental Activities section of your ILDP, the LDI Guide is a helpful resource to get you thinking
about the types of developmental activities you can use to ensure improvement. The developmental
activities you select from the LDI Guide should be transcribed directly to your ILDP.
TIP
When considering learning and developmental activities, you may automatically think to take a formal training course
or read a book. While these may be helpful, you are encouraged to select developmental activities that fit with your
learning-style preferences and your situation. It is also important to think through your personal and career goals 5
when deciding on a developmental activity.
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Introduction
Army Leadership Requirements
The Army defines leadership as influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to
accomplish the mission and improve the organization (ADP 6-22). Effective leadership blends core leader
competencies (groups of related leader behaviors that lead to successful performance and are common
throughout the organization and consistent with the organization’s mission and values) with leadership
attributes (characteristics inherent to the leader that moderate how well learning and performance
occur). The attributes and the competencies are listed below. The LDI Guide focuses on these
competencies and attributes as well as their key components.
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Using the LDI Guide
LDI Guide Purpose
The LDI Guide fosters your development following insights you received from an MSAF assessment or other
sources that help you take action on your strengths as well as your developmental needs. When using the
LDI Guide, keep the following factors in mind:

Opportunities for development are endless; the LDI Guide represents a small sample of possible
activities. Think about what opportunities you have in your current role when considering
potential developmental activities.

The design of this guide is intended to help you begin your development quickly.

Developmental activities for each of the leader components can be modified to fit your needs,
or used to jump start your own thinking regarding the areas you wish to improve.

Don’t constrain yourself to activities inside your comfort zone. Taking prudent risk can result in
additional growth.
It is valuable for you to be aware of your preferred approaches to learning before selecting developmental
activities. Approaches may include learning through self-study, hands-on application, visual models, verbal
explanation, feedback, self assessment, and/or observation. When you select development activities,
consider your past learning experiences, those that were successful as well as those that were less
successful. Successful learning experiences provide evidence of your preferred learning approach.
Remember that some learning approaches are better suited for acquiring information. Some learning
approaches are better suited for gaining skills. For example, if you want to improve your skills in Active
Listening, an effective approach is to practice Active Listening skills and gain feedback on your performance.
Reading a book on Active Listening may be informative, but you will need to practice these skills to develop
them.
Additional Resources
FM 6-22 Leader Development
FM 6-22 Leader Development provides a doctrinal framework covering methods for leaders to develop
other leaders, improve their organizations, build teams, and develop themselves. The principal audience for
FM 6-22 is all leaders, military and civilian, with an application focus at the operational and tactical levels.
Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this manual. FM 6-22 applies to the Active Army,
Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and United States Army Reserve. To access
FM 6-22 go to http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm6_22.pd.
FM 6-22 Leader Development E2 Publication
The E2 publication is an interactive digital publication (IDP) that contains figures, tables, and digital content
such as videos, pictures and interactive diagrams not included in the printed edition of FM 6-22. To access
the FM 6-22 digital supplement go to https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/FM6-22Supplement. 7
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Using the LDI Guide
Additional Resources (Cont.)
LeaderMap
LeaderMap is a mobile application that provides flexible leader development support to Army
professionals. LeaderMap contains resources to help guide your self-development efforts and your
implementation of leader development programs. This tool brings to life key concepts from FM 6-22 and
other Army leadership doctrine. It offers many resources including videos, interactions, selfassessments, and job aids to pique the interest of Army leaders and to engage them in simple practices
to make developing others and themselves more of a habit. For more information on LeaderMap go to
https://go.usa.gov/xcyeF or https://www.army.mil/article/153025.
Leadership Coaching
To further support your leadership development the Army provides you access to a personal leadership
coach to help you make the most out of your MSAF participation and refine your development strategy
using your Leader Feedback Report (LFR) and the LDI Guide. This cadre of experienced coaches works
directly with you to interpret your 360 feedback and to integrate strengths and developmental needs
with goals to improve your leadership skills. To schedule a session with an MSAF Coach, visit the website
https://msaf.army.mil/_layouts/MSAF/coachingrequest.aspx.
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Using the LDI Guide
How the LDI Guide is Organized
The LDI Guide, as well as the Leader 360 / MSAF instrument, is organized around the 10 core leader competencies,
13 leader attributes, and their respective components. There are two primary sections that address competencies
and attributes. The first section addresses the 10 competencies Army leaders must obtain and apply to be
successful. Although attributes are addressed before competencies in ADRP 6-22, the competencies are listed first
in the LDI Guide because they are the primary focus of the feedback leaders receive from the Leader 360 / MSAF.
While attributes are character traits, competencies are generally behaviors that are easily identified and measured
using the Leader Behavior Scale, which is based primarily on Army leader competencies. Competencies are readily
improved through study, practice and feedback.
The second section focuses on the 13 attributes of an effective Army leader. This section was added to the LDI Guide
in recognition of the critical influence of attributes on the ability of Army leaders to reach their full professional
potential. Attributes are aspects of character, but are not ingrained and can be learned and modified over time
through study, practice and feedback as well. Army leaders refine values and attributes and acquire professional
knowledge as part of becoming a competent leader. They develop desired attributes and competencies through the
self-awareness and learning opportunities available in the Leader / MSAF 360 experience, as well as through other
leader development opportunities throughout the Army.
LDI Guide Icons
To help you to quickly reference a particular leader competency or attribute, the LDI Guide is organized using 23
icons on the right-hand side of the page. The icon that is not faded indicates which competency or attribute material
you are viewing.
Leader Competencies
Leads Others
Creates a Positive Environment/
Fosters esprit de corps
Builds Trust
Prepares Self
Extends Influences Beyond the
Chain of Command
Develops Others
Leads by Example
Stewards the Profession
Communicates
Gets Results
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Using the LDI Guide
Leader Attributes
Army Values
Resilience
Empathy
Mental Agility
Warrior Ethos/Service Ethos
Sound Judgment
Discipline
Innovation
Military and Professional Bearing
Interpersonal Tact
Fitness
Expertise
Confidence
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Using the LDI Guide
Section Design
Each leader leader component and leader attribute section is further divided by their respective components. Each
component subsection includes two parts designed to first evaluate and then expand your capabilities both on and
off duty.
Evaluate Capabilities – This part involves identifying personal practices that support or hinder successful
performance and why you may or may not be excelling at a particular leader component.
Expand Capabilities – This part involves reviewing suggested developmental activities and personalizing them to
reflect your circumstances.
Each of the ten competency subsections has an “Additional Information” page that provides a list of books and other
materials you can use to gain fundamental knowledge about a particular competency. Additional information is
organized at the competency level and includes resources relating to components of the competency.
Additional resources on each component can be found on the MSAF website (see https://msaf.army.mil/) and the
Virtual Improvement Center (VIC) (see https://msaf.army.mil/My360/VIC/Default.aspx). The VIC includes self-study
and self-development materials to read, reflect on, and practice, which should improve one’s leadership skills.
Pages 12-14 describe the design of the leader competency and leader attribute component pages in further detail.
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Using the LDI Guide
Section One: Leader Competencies
Component pages of section one consist of two
parts.
Self-evaluate Capabilities
Part one of each component is diagnostic in nature
and provides a means of evaluating how well you
are performing on each of the components. While
reviewing this information, you should ask yourself
how well these strengths and needs indicators describe your behavior. Keep in mind that you may
want to consider other sources of information as
well when determining your capabilities (e.g., formal
MSAF feedback, insight from others, own experiences). Part one of each component page includes:

Strength Indicators. Behaviors and actions that
contribute to or support successful performance of the leader component.

Need indicators. Behaviors and actions that
reduce or hinder successful performance of the
leader component.

Underlying Causes. A list of reasons why you
may not be excelling at a particular leader component.
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Using the LDI Guide
Section One: Leader Competencies (Cont.)
Expand Capabilities
Part two of each component provides activities for
self-development that can be used to address the
needs identified in part one. Three types of developmental activities are displayed for each component. These include:

Feedback. Sources and methods for obtaining
feedback on your capabilities that may help
guide your self-development efforts.

Study. Topics and activities you can use to
learn more about a component. You may be
directed to interactive multimedia instruction
(IMI) lessons on the MSAF Virtual Improvement
Center (VIC) website. These lessons are hyperlinked to the VIC. The IMI lesson links can also
be pasted directly into your internet browser.
The IMI lesson links are listed on page 200.

Practice. Actions you can take to improve your
skills and comfort in performing a leader component.
Additional Developmental Activities. At the conclusion of each component page there is a list of related leader components you can reference in the LDI
Guide that may provide additional developmental
activities to consider.
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Using the LDI Guide
Section Two: Leader Attributes
Component pages of section two consist of two
parts.
Self-evaluate Capabilities
Just as in section one, the first part is diagnostic in
nature and provides a means of evaluating how well
you are performing on each of the components.
While reviewing this information, you should ask
yourself how well these strengths and needs indicators describe your own behavior. Keep in mind that
you may want to consider other sources of information as well when determining your capabilities
(e.g., formal MSAF feedback, insight from others,
own experiences). Part one of each component includes:

Strength Indicators. Behaviors and actions that
contribute to or support successful performance of the leader component.

Need indicators. Behaviors and actions that
reduce or hinder successful performance of the
leader component.

Underlying Causes. A list of reasons why you
may not be excelling at a particular leader component.
Expand Capabilities
The second part of this section provides example
Feedback and Development Activities for each component. They are designed to help you improve on
those components where enhancement may be
needed. These activities may include self-reflection
exercises, relevant articles or books, or observation
activities. Where feasible, practical exercises may
be included as well.
This part also includes information (as applicable) on
other related leader components you can reference
in the LDI Guide that may provide additional developmental activities to consider.
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Using the LDI Guide
Personalizing Developmental Activities
To assess how to personalize a suggested developmental activity, first consider what leader behaviors
you should ask for support and feedback on. Next, identify what you want to learn, and determine how to
practice. Evaluate your thinking through the use of the “If-Then” model discussed on page 16.
Feedback
Study
Practice
Ask for concrete
feedback...
From others about how you are doing with specific issues and areas of
performance.
Gain support...
From peers, colleagues, friends, or other people who can partner with you
by giving you encouragement or recognizing your success.
Consult...
With friends, bosses, peers, subordinates, coaches, mentors, or other
professionals who can give advice on your strengths or areas of concern.
Observe...
Other leaders, professionals, and similar organizations and note leadership
behaviors, traits, attributes, and attitudes that are most/least effective.
Make time to
reflect on...
Personal or situational characteristics that relate to the strength or need.
Consider alternative perspectives offered by others on an issue of interest.
Read...
Books, articles, manuals, and professional publications.
Investigate...
A topic through internet or library searches, inquiry, gathering or asking
questions, and soliciting information and materials from others.
Practice...
A skill or behavior that needs improvement in a work situation or away
from the unit.
Participate in
training...
Including Army schools, unit training programs, outside seminars, degree
programs, and professional certifications.
Teach...
A skill you are learning to someone else.
Accept an
on-the-job
opportunity...
That stretches your abilities, such as giving presentations, teaching classes,
volunteering for special duty assignments, assuming “acting” positions, job
cross-training, and representing the boss at meetings.
Explore
off-duty
applications...
Such as joining or leading community groups, trying a new skill in a
volunteer organization, or giving presentations to schools and civic
organizations.
TIP
Remember that your first priority should be to address those leadership behaviors that are barriers to
your successful/effective performance.
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Using the LDI Guide
“If-Then” Model
If….
Then…
I should seek Feedback.
I need more insight into how well I
Feedback is an opportunity to gain information from others
am demonstrating a component of an
about how well you are doing. Feedback can include direct
attribute or competency and what I
feedback from others, your own observations, analysis of
can do to improve...
response patterns, and acknowledgement of outcomes.
I need to gain or expand my
understanding of theory, principles
or knowledge of a leader
competency, attribute or
component...
I should Study.
Study facilitates an intellectual understanding of what you are
learning. Study can include attending training courses, reading
books or articles, watching movies, observing others on-the-job,
and analyzing various sources of information.
I need more experience or I need to
enhance/build a current capability
through increased opportunities to
exhibit a leader attribute or perform a
leader competency...
I should Practice.
Practice provides activities to convert your learning into action.
Practice includes engaging in physical exercises, methods of
team activities, “walk throughs”, and drills.
Because the LDI Guide offers many types of general developmental activities, view all suggestions
through your own lens. The questions below are a sample of questions you might ask yourself when
refining a development activity to fit your needs and situation. However, other considerations that you
come up with may be important too, depending on the activity you choose to tailor to your needs. Be
willing to take risks and choose activities that will take you outside of your comfort zone.






Developmental Activity: What do I want to do?
Desired Outcome: What do I hope to achieve?
Method: What resources (people or other) do I need? How am I going to do this?
Time available: When will I do this? How will I monitor my progress (e.g., identifying and
monitoring milestones, rewarding success, accountability partners)?
Limits: What factors will affect or hinder me from successfully implementating of this
activity?
Controls: What can I do to minimize or control the factors that would hinder my
implementation of this activity?
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Using the LDI Guide
Below is an example of how to refine a development activity provided in the LDI Guide into a “development
activity” that is customized for you. This example is from the competency “Develops Others” and the leader
component “Facilitates ongoing development.” A blank Developmental Activity Form can be found on page
201 of this document. (link)
Competency and Component: Develops Others— Facilitates ongoing development
Suggested Development Activity: Hold frequent development discussions with key subordinates
Questions I Could Consider...
My Answer...
Developmental Activity: What
do I want to do?

Hold frequent development discussions with key subordinates
Desired Outcome: What do I
hope to achieve? How is this
specific development activity tied
to my broader goals?

To better understand my subordinates’ developmental goals

To ensure my subordinates know that I am interested in their
development (and to demonstrate this to my superiors)

To improve my own skills in developing my subordinate
leaders by taking a more active approach to their development
Method: What resources
(people or other) do I need? How
am I going to do this?

I will meet informally with each of my five subordinates to
discuss their development

I will provide brief feedback on each subordinate’s recent
accomplishments and ask them about their professional goals

I will ask peers what works best for them for developing others
Time Available: When will I do
this?

Meet with each subordinate separately for 20-30 minutes
once every other week

Key opportunities for these sessions include before or after PT
and over the lunch hour
Limits: What factors will affect
or hinder successful
implementation of this activity?

Subordinates not being available

An increase or fluctuation in the section’s workload or other
demands
Controls: What can be done to
minimize or control the factors
that would hinder
implementation of this activity?

Schedule/plan these sessions with subordinates well-enough
in advance (the week prior)

Remain flexible as to when these sessions occur
Refined Developmental Activity:
Hold bi-weekly 1-on-1 development discussions with each subordinate (20-30 minutes) at
opportune times such as over lunch or around PT; discuss subordinate short- and long-term
goals and the types of roles and experiences that interest them.
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Using the LDI Guide
Individual Leadership Development Plan (ILDP)
Individual Development
Successful development starts with the end in mind. You should focus on writing development objectives
that are in alignment with your personal values and professional goals. These objectives will receive the
greatest support and elicit the most energy for change. Be sure your objectives are written from a
positive point of view (describe what you will do, not what you won’t do) and take into account both
your strengths and your developmental needs.
It is also important that you focus on taking actionable steps toward your goal that are tailored to your
learning style and include a variety of activities to sustain your interest. Be opportunistic and link your
action steps to things you are already doing. Try a new way of doing or approaching something on the
job and reflect on what went well and what you would do differently next time (e.g. individuals you
frequently interact with, reports you’re already responsible for, regular briefings). And finally, it is
imperative that you build in time to reflect on each experience and find ways to continuously apply
your insights and what you’ve learned. Successful individuals typically take more opportunities to
reflect on what they can learn from an experience and apply lessons learned to new situations. They also
actively seek and use feedback, are open to criticism, and treat mistakes as learning opportunities.
What is an ILDP?
Your Individual Leadership Development Plan (ILDP) is a document created by you, for you, to guide your
growth as a professional. You can create an ILDP on your own or collaboratively with your supervisor, a
trusted colleague, mentor, or coach. Your ILDP is not a part of your performance evaluation. It is a tool
for creating clear objectives for your professional development, stating concrete ways to achieve those
results, and mapping part of your journey as a lifelong learner.
Why do an ILDP?
If you have ever tried to master something such as acing an exam, completing a construction project, or
mastering a new sport, you most likely discovered you needed three things to be successful:
 A desire or need to accomplish it
 A clear and specific target or result that signaled success
 A plan that laid out the steps and activities to get you there
Your ILDP maps this path, in your words, and with clearly defined actions to enable continuous
improvement and learning. The more you put into the ILDP process, the more you will get out of it.
This section of the LDI Guide will take you through a step‐by‐step process that will help you understand:
• What you should work on
• What you can do to work on it
• How you can benefit
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Individual Leadership Development Plan (Cont’d)
Many leaders start an ILDP because they are told they need to do it. The good news is that leaders who
take the process seriously, clearly targeting their development efforts, defining outcomes, and choosing
the activities that will enable their success, find they greatly benefit from the process. The key is to
“own” the process for yourself: make it something that is directly relevant to your experience and
ambitions, and decide that you are doing this for yourself, not just because you were told to do it.
Where are you now?
The first step in targeting your development efforts is to get clear about what you are good at already
and what needs improvement.
Use the boxes below to help you identify your strengths and weaknesses. You can fill in strengths and
weaknesses identified through a review of your Leader Feedback Report (LFR) from the MSAF, if you
completed the assessment, and/or feedback and observations from your personal experience.
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Using the LDI Guide
Individual Leadership Development Plan (Cont’d)
Where do you want to be?
Now that you have some idea of your strengths and developmental areas, you might want to consider
how you will decide to focus your developmental efforts.
In Box 2 of the ILDP form below, fill in (in your words) what you want to develop. A blank ILDP form can
be found on page 202 (Link).
INDIVIDUAL LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT PLAN
(ILDP)
(1) Leader's Name: Susan Daniels
(2) Areas to Develop:
- Improve my ability and willingness to really
listen to and understand others’ ideas.
- Become more skilled in giving performance
counseling to my subordinates.
(3) Supported Leader Competencies:
- Communicates
- Develops Others
(4) Desired Outcomes:
(5) Developmental Activities:
(6) Progress Indicators:
- At the end of a conversation,
I am able to accurately summarize the other person’s
points.
- Read about active listening methods.
-Use active listening in conversations I
have at work and home.
- During conversations others
indicate that I understand their
points.
- I am able to get through all
the steps of counseling
without becoming sidetracked.
- Analyze past counseling sessions to
identify how they got sidetracked.
- Use a written counseling plan to keep
counseling sessions on track.
- During performance counseling
I am able to re-focus the conversation when the counselee becomes
defensive or argumentative.
(7) Resources and Logistics Needed:
-Library of 13 counseling/coaching videos from the Virtual Improvement Center on the MSAF website.
- Interactive Multimedia Instruction lesson on Navigating Contentious Conversations on the MSAF website.
Ref: LFR, ADRP 6-22, Leader Development Improvement Guide, Virtual Improvement Center; h t t ps://msaf.army.mil
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Individual Leadership Development Plan (Cont’d)
For Areas to Develop that come from your MSAF Leader Feedback Report, identify the competencies that
correspond to the specific reported behaviors you want to develop. If you wrote areas to develop in your
own words, review ADRP 6‐22, Army Leadership, and find competencies that relate to your areas to
develop. For example, the area “Become more skilled in giving performance counseling to my
subordinates” relates to the Develops Others competency.
In Box 3 of the ILDP form, write the competencies you identify. ADRP 6‐22 is a guide that clearly lays out
the specific attributes and skills required for Army leaders. This LDI Guide is a good resource that
provides recommendations, organized by the ADRP 6‐22 competencies, which you can use for your
personal development.
A Desired Outcome (Box 4) is an accomplishment that signals attainment of some developmental gain—a
step toward satisfaction of one of your areas to develop. The outcome should be appropriate for your
situation and written in your own words. An outcome is a tangible result of improving the areas to
develop you identified in Box 2. The desired outcome answers the question: How will you know you have
improved in this area?
Box 5 asks for specific Developmental Activities that will lead to the outcomes you developed
in Box 4. Developmental activities answer the question: How are you going to achieve the outcome?
There are three types of developmental activities:
• Feedback is an opportunity to gain information from others about how well you are doing.
Feedback can include direct feedback from others, your own observations, analysis of response
patterns, and acknowledgement of outcomes.
• Study provides a foundation of knowledge, principles, and concepts. Study can include
attending training courses, reading books or articles, watching movies, observing others on the
job, and analyzing various sources of information.
• Practice provides activities to convert your learning into action. Practice includes engaging in
physical exercises, “walk throughs,” drills, and teamwork.
There is no perfect science to picking the right developmental activities. Some developmental activities
might address more than one outcome and some outcomes might require more than one developmental
activity. Consider what it will take to achieve the desired outcomes, whether it is one developmental
activity or a few.
You may not identify the right activity at first. The important thing is to stick to it, noticing what works
and what else you need to do to move your development towards your identified outcomes. Remain
flexible and adjust to alternatives that might work better.
Now that you have decided what you want to develop and how you are going to work on it, it can be
helpful to find a way to monitor progress. Box 6 asks you to consider indicators that suggest what is
working and what might need to change as you work on your development activities.
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21
Using the LDI Guide
Individual Leadership Development Plan (Cont’d)
You might consider the following to help you identify Progress Indicators (Box 6):
 What would improvement look like, and how might I measure it?
 Who can I ask for feedback?
 What is a realistic time table or deadline for this activity?
One thing that can inhibit a well thought out development plan is not having the resources in place to
make it all happen. Box 7 asks you to fill in specific Resources and Logistics that will allow you to do the
activities you named so that you know exactly what you need to do to follow through.
 What are the materials, such as books, articles, and videos that I will need to start this activity?
 How can I get those materials?
 Do I need facilities or equipment?
 How can I locate and get use of them?
 Who do I need to connect with to carry out the activity?
 What is my schedule for carrying out the activity?
 Do I need feedback from others, how should I request that, of whom, and when?
This section links the resources of the LDI Guide with the Individual Leadership Development Plan. For
more detailed information about planning your development refer to the Individual Development
Planning Guide located on the Virtual Improvement Center at https://msaf.army.mil/
ReferenceDocuments/IDP%20Guide.Final.pdf.
Army Career Tracker Individual Development Plan vice MSAF ILDP
Army Career Tracker
Army Career Tracker (ACT) is a leadership development tool that integrates training and education into
one personalized website for all members of the Army. While E-9s, W-5s, SESs, and General Officers do
not have a career "progression" path, they still have a role in ACT as leaders, supervisors, and mentors.
General Officers may opt out of being searched for and requested as mentors.
Users can search multiple education and training resources to monitor their career development and
receive personalized advice from their supervisor and Army leadership by sharing an Individual
Development Plan (IDP). The IDP allows users to establish personal and professional goals based on a
Professional Development Model (PDM) and Career Map. The PDM serves as the professional reference
for a successful military and civilian career while providing information and guidance on assignments,
education, and training. There are PDMs, and associated competencies, for each career path that are
created by the respective proponent. Competencies vary based on Rank/Level, MOS, Career Field, or
Career Program.
The PDM provides a standardized framework and all-inclusive career enhancing information for
professional development, which includes goals. Users select goals for their IDPs from their respective 22
PDMs and, essentially, use the IDP as a roadmap to accomplish those goals. Because the goals are
established on the Career Map, which is created by proponents for each career field or program,
22
22
Using the LDI Guide
Army Career Tracker Individual Development Plan vice MSAF ILDP (Cont’d)
everything on an IDP supports the users’ goals. The mentor tool in ACT supplements the Army's mentor
program, and allows mentors to see the user's PDM and IDP. ACT does not incorporate the results of
formal evaluations. Furthermore, ACT does not provide a feedback mechanism to inform users on how
well they are meeting the competency standards in the PDM. For more information on ACT log into the
ACT website at https://actnow.army.mil.
MSAF ILDP
The MSAF ILDP offers leaders unique options with the potential to support and enhance the ACT IDP.
Leaders at all levels in the Army can use the MSAF IDP to address specific developmental needs based on
their own observations, or 360 feedback, that reflect how well they are meeting leadership requirements
described in ADRP 6-22. Army doctrine provides specific guidance on what behaviors constitute an
effective Army leader, regardless of rank, branch, or career field. Leaders use ILDPs to record
personalized developmental activities and particular needs that can be addressed as leaders progress
through the ACT PDMs, not as a replacement for the ACT IDP, but as a supplement that incorporates a
greater level of detail than the broader focused ACT Career Maps. The MSAF ILDP allows leaders to
clarify which behaviors to work on, designate outcomes for development efforts, pinpoint specific
activities that will achieve outcomes, identify necessary resources, and refer to a structure to follow
growth and progress.
The MSAF ILDP also features a degree of flexibility that allows leaders to apply their preferred approach
to learning as they select study, practice, and feedback activities to meet their changing leadership roles
and assignments during ACT progression. This aspect of the MSAF ILDP is particularly important as
leaders continuously reassess their own blend of doctrinal competencies and attributes to reflect
changes in their rank; duty position; organizational mission; and their superiors, peers, and subordinates.
This adaptability also allows leaders to concentrate on those leadership behaviors that best meet the
goals identified in the ACT IDP and, ultimately, to successfully navigate through their prescribed Career
Maps.
23
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23
Section One:
Leader Competencies
Leader
Competencies
24
24
24
Leads Others (LO)
Competency Overview
As a leader, you motivate, inspire, and influence others to take initiative, work toward a common
purpose, accomplish critical tasks, achieve organizational objectives, and improve the organization.
Influence is focused on compelling others to go beyond their individual interests and to work for the
common good.
The competency Leads Others is composed of four components:
Component
Page #
Uses appropriate methods of influence to energize others
26
Provides purpose, motivation, and inspiration
28
Enforces standards
30
Balances mission and welfare of followers
32
(Hold Ctrl and click on heading to jump to section)
25
Uses appropriate methods of
influence to energize others
“Leadership is the knack of getting somebody to do something you want done because he wants to do it.”
-General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Component Overview
You, as an Army leader, can draw on a variety of techniques to influence others ranging from obtaining
compliance to building commitment to a cause or organization. Specific techniques for influence fall
along a continuum and include: pressure, legitimate requests, exchange, personal appeals, collaboration,
rational persuasion, apprising, inspiration, participation, and relationship building. To succeed in creating
true commitment, you need to determine the proper influence technique based on the situation and
individuals you are attempting to influence. However, keep in mind influence is not often instantaneous.
It may take some time before you start to see the effects of your persuasion. For more information on
this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 6-1 to 6-21 and Table 6-1.
Strength Indicators

Assesses the situation and determines the
best influence technique to use to foster
unit and subordinate commitment.
 Takes the mission into account when
exerting influence on team members and
subordinates.
 Uses positive influence to do what is right
for the Army, the mission, the team, and
each individual.
 Uses pressure only when the stakes are
high, time is short, and attempts at
achieving commitment are not successful.
Need Indicators

Uses a single or limited number of
influence techniques for all influence
without consideration of the
circumstances or individual being
influenced.
 Coerces or manipulates the situation to
achieve personal gain.
 Subordinates come back several times to
clarify what needs to be done.
Underlying Causes







Lacks understanding of the individuals to be influenced (values, needs, opinions).
Lacks awareness of the likely effects (advantages and disadvantages) of influence techniques
on others.
Does not match the appropriate influence technique to the individual and does not factor in
contextual causes (such as high OPTEMPO, significant stress, speed of situational changes).
Focuses on personal gain and accomplishment rather than doing what is right for the Army
and the unit.
Is too forceful or not forceful enough when applying influence techniques.
Believes that personal authority is weakened by collaborative or rational approaches to
gaining desired behavior.
Relies too much on positional power to influence.
26
Uses appropriate methods of
influence to energize others
Feedback





Study





Practice







Conduct after-action reviews (AARs) with team members and subordinates and listen for
clues on the style and method of influence that works best for the team.
Periodically touch base with subordinate leaders to make sure your influence is creating a
positive environment and is in line with Army expectations.
Complete a self-assessment tool to better understand the way you operate and how that
might affect your approach and style of influence.
Talk to subordinates about what kind of influence they find most effective when being
assigned a certain task.
Review influence techniques outlined in ADRP 6-22, Sections 6-5 to 6-17. Identify methods
of influence where you are strong and those where you struggle. Create an action plan to
develop the full continuum of influence techniques.
Identify when you should use compliance-focused influence, which is based primarily on
your authority, and when you should use commitment-focused influence which seeks to
change attitudes and beliefs.
Contact former superiors about ways they handled conflict and influence. Ask what worked
best and common mistakes that can be made in a high stress situation.
Research available methods of group collaboration. Teams can have very different dynamics
so a better understanding of different methods will help you adapt.
Explore your beliefs and assumptions about being a leader, authority, and seniorsubordinate relationships. Consider how these beliefs affect the methods of influence you
use and be open to challenging your beliefs and assumptions.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Making Influence Count; Motivating Through Rewards; Enabling
Subordinates Using Mission-Focused Delegation; Beyond People Skills: Leveraging Your
Understanding of Others.
Proactively seek information to understand what is important to those you’re trying to
influence. Craft your message so that it addresses your stakeholder’s key needs and
concerns.
Identify the appropriate influence technique by analyzing the criticality and time available
for obtaining the desired behavior and the disposition of those you seek to influence.
Observe and analyze different ways you influence others noting what seems to be most
effective for different tasks, situations, and individual dispositions.
Consider the everyday stresses, obligations, interests, values, and dispositions of those you
are trying to influence. Purposefully choose influence techniques to produce the best results
under these circumstances.
Ensure your chosen influence technique aligns with the Army Values, ethical principles, and
the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
When leading your team towards mission accomplishment, use the least coercive and most
cooperative influence techniques that the circumstances permit to help build and sustain a
sense of task ownership and enhanced motivation.
Stay persistent, influence is not instantaneous and may require repeated action.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):

Leads by Example: Displays character; Leads with confidence in adverse situations
27
Provides purpose, motivation,
and inspiration
“Success demands singleness of purpose.”
-Vince Lombardi
Component Overview
Establishing and imparting a clear sense of intent and purpose acts as a jump start or catalyst to getting
work done by providing you and others with a distinct path forward. Oftentimes, when you have a firm
sense of purpose, the end result is easier to reach. Defining a clear sense of purpose can be difficult as it
requires you to think about the objective or task at hand from a macro-level before getting involved in
implementing the details. However, developing clear intent and purpose can provide substantial benefits
by clarifying required actions and resources as well as aligning the efforts of the team. For more
information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 6-22 to 6-34 and Table 6-1.
Strength Indicators






Determines goals or objectives.
Translates task goals and objectives into a
sequenced action plan.
Restates the mission so that it resonates
with the unit and is easily understood.
Communicates clear instructions to
subordinates that detail each step of the
process through task completion and
provides guidance to subordinates as
needed throughout the process.
Focuses on the most important aspects of
a mission or situation to emphasize
priorities and align efforts.
Empowers authority to the lowest level of
the unit possible.
Need Indicators






Restates the assigned mission in a manner
that does not translate into a unit mission
that subordinates understand.
Fails to provide strong, clear direction to
team members and subordinates.
Keeps all or most authority and decision
making centralized.
Keeps subordinates in the dark and fails to
recognize subordinates’ need to
understand the unit or task goal.
Does not set a standard for expected
contributions to the team.
Subordinates often must come back to
you several times to clarify task goals.
Underlying Causes







Does not form a clear purpose and intent in own mind before communicating to others.
Does not fully understand the objectives of a given mission or task.
Does ask for clarification when superiors fail to clearly articulate the mission.
Has difficulty in expressing intent and purpose in terms that others can easily understand and
visualize.
Is uncomfortable with relinquishing personal control and authority over the task or unit.
Lacks confidence in subordinates’ abilities to make decisions and achieve the purpose and
intent.
Fails to adapt to complexity, ambiguity or stress of a situation.
28
Provides purpose, motivation,
and inspiration
Feedback



Study





Practice




Ask your subordinates if the purpose and intent of the mission or task is clear to
them. Have them back-brief the purpose and intent to you. Ask what you could do
to facilitate their understanding of what you are trying to convey.
Talk to your team members about the clarity of their task assignments. Do they
understand how the work they complete contributes to organizational goals?
Listen to feedback from your unit (superiors, peers, and subordinates) about
communication techniques that you use. Determine those that are effective and
those that are ineffective in imparting the purpose and intent of the mission.
Study the reactions of your subordinates when you first establish the goals and
purpose of the mission. Do their facial expressions and body language convey
understanding or confusion?
Identify someone in your unit who is a strong planner and mission briefer. Watch
his or her actions. How do his or her actions compare to what you typically do?
Study how other leaders impart clear purpose and intent to their subordinates.
Discuss the thought process the leader uses when identifying, planning, and
communicating the purpose and intent of missions.
Examine organizational or commanders’ vision statements or past operations
orders. Note how intent and purpose are expressed, the clarity of the
communicated vision, and how the intent and purpose might have been expressed
more effectively.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Clarifying Roles; Creating and Supporting Challenging Job
Assignments; Motivating Through Rewards; Creating and Promulgating a Vision of
the Future; Rapid Team Stand-up: How to Build Your Team ASAP; Enabling
Subordinates Using Mission-Focused Delegation.
When receiving a mission, back-brief the mission and higher commander’s intent in
your own words to ensure you understand what you must accomplish.
When planning a task or mission, begin by visualizing and drafting a written
description of the end-state you want to achieve.
When giving a mission or task to your team or unit, create a detailed plan of
execution for the mission outlining each team member or sub-unit’s responsibilities.
Show how individual or sub-unit responsibilities relate to the purpose and desired
outcomes of the overall task or mission.
Create an open environment in which your subordinates feel comfortable
approaching you to discuss and brainstorm how to complete tasks and missions.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):



Leads by Example: Leads with confidence in adverse situations
Gets Results: Executes plans to accomplish the mission; Identifies and adjusts to external influences
on the mission and organization
Communicates: Creates shared understanding
29
Enforces standards
“You owe it to your men to require standards which are for their benefit even though they may not be
popular at the time.”
-General Bruce C. Clarke
Component Overview
To lead others and gauge if a job has been performed correctly, the Army has established standards for
military activities. Standards are formal, detailed instructions that can be described, measured, and
achieved. To use standards effectively, you should explain the standards that apply to your organization
and give your subordinates the authority to enforce them. For more information on this component see
ADRP 6-22 Sections 6-37 to 6-41 and Table 6-1.
Strength Indicators






Reinforces the importance and role of
standards.
Explains the standards that apply to a
particular unit and their significance.
Prioritizes unit activities to make sure that
everything is not a number one priority.
Ensures tasks do not fall below established
standards.
Recognizes and takes responsibility for
poor performance and addresses it
properly.
Sets attainable milestones to ensure tasks
ultimately meet the standard.
Need Indicators

Focuses on too many priorities at one
time.
 Ignores established individual and
organizational standards.
 Overlooks critical errors instead of dealing
with them.
 Blames sub-standard outcomes on others.
Underlying Causes





Does not know or accept established standards.
Does not want to be viewed by subordinates as too demanding.
Exercises poor self-discipline in meeting standards and setting a personal example.
Is unable to handle the complexity of tracking and enforcing standards for multiple tasks or
individuals.
Does not follow-up on task delegations to ensure standards are met.
30
Enforces standards
Feedback


Obtain objective and subjective assessments of individual and collective
performance in your unit. Compare these assessments to established standards to
identify performance strengths and weaknesses.
Engage organizational leaders in discussion and examination of performance
standards in the organization, including how well standards are communicated,
known, enforced, and achieved.
Study



Learn established Army standards for performance of the individual and collective
tasks expected of your unit.
Research how successful leaders have established, communicated, monitored, and
enforced individual and collective standards.
Consult with superiors about the organizational standards most critical to
attainment of the higher commander’s vision and intent. Consider how these
standards pertain to your unit.
Practice






When assigning tasks or missions, explicitly state the standard of performance you
expect to be achieved.
When assigning performance standards, explain why the standard set is essential
for organizational success.
Set the tone when involved with any individual or group task. Make sure you are
always giving your best effort and providing an example for the team to follow.
Recognize team members who exemplify the standards you are trying to employ
across your group.
Identify individuals who repeatedly fail to achieve performance standards and deal
with them appropriately.
When receiving a mission or tasking, verify the standard expected and examine if
the standard is appropriate or necessary.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):


Gets Results: Identifies, contends for, allocates, and manages resources; Prioritizes, organizes, and
coordinates taskings for teams or other organizations structures/groups; Executes plans to
accomplish the mission
Communicates: Creates shared understanding
31
Balances mission and
welfare of followers
“The people you’re responsible for have got to know you care about their well-being. This has more to
do with the success of an organization than anything else.”
-Lieutenant General James H. Merryman
Component Overview
The welfare of your team is vital to completing a mission while maintaining morale. Taking care of your
followers will allow you to create a closer working relationship as they know you are on their side. As a
leader, you should be able to keep your eye on the mission while being cognizant of and caring for the
people working for you. For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 6-42 to 6-47
and Table 6-1.
Strength Indicators





Regularly assesses the impact of mission
fulfillment on the mental, physical, and
emotional well-being of subordinates.
Checks-in with team members and
subordinates to monitor morale and
safety.
Provides appropriate relief when difficult
conditions risk jeopardizing team member
and subordinate success.
Builds a cohesive team moving in one
direction to achieve common goals.
Offers support and resources when a team
member seems unnecessarily burdened or
overloaded.
Need Indicators

Ignores the risks of overexerting
subordinates.
 Visibly shows discouragement or disgust
when team member morale struggles due
to the workload.
 Is insensitive to signs of high stress or
diminishing morale.
 Does not weigh the importance of the task
or mission against its adverse effects on
stress, morale, and welfare.
Underlying Causes





Has “tunnel vision” regarding completion of the mission; believes in mission accomplishment
at almost any cost or does not consider the cost.
Is overtaxed or fatigued and becomes too focused on own needs rather than those of the
organization.
Refuses to delegate tasks for fear of failure; does not see the developmental opportunities.
Is excessively concerned with personal accomplishment and achievement and avoids
negative performance feedback.
Is generally unsympathetic towards the needs of subordinates.
32
Balances mission and
welfare of followers
Feedback





Study






Practice



Gather feedback on mission demands and member welfare from your unit using
face-to-face interaction. This will give you a complete reflection of their status.
Seek counsel from a mentor or trusted advisor when dealing with a difficult
situation. Have him or her guide you and provide insight into possible next steps.
Discuss proposed missions with other unit leaders to assess the adverse effects of
mission execution on the welfare of unit members.
Have mental health professionals survey the organization for evidence of excessive
stress. Ensure they provide you with summary information and recommendations
for reducing the stress level.
Investigate activities and methods of relief used to counter stress. See what has
worked well for other leaders and what could be done better.
Regularly assess and document both team and individual morale. Identify activities
that constitute the greatest sources of stress for members of your organization.
Look for methods of reducing the stress produced by these sources.
Research signs of stress so that you can recognize a problem before it becomes an
issue.
Learn the symptoms and effects of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) so you can
obtain appropriate help for unit member(s) displaying symptoms.
Observe or consider a leader who succeeded in balancing severe demands or
stresses faced by his or her unit in relation to member welfare. How did that leader
do it? What types of behaviors and methods can you model to ensure your success?
Consider what messages your own behavior sends about balancing personal welfare
and mission requirements.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete the developmental
material: Out of Time: Managing Competing Demands; Seeking and Delivering Faceto-Face Feedback; Navigating Contentious Conversations.
Take note of day-to-day subordinate morale. Are they struggling with the workload?
Is it affecting group morale? Hold a meeting with other unit leaders to brainstorm
possible solutions for your team members’ workloads.
Take advantage of opportunities to give your subordinates time off when the
mission permits.
Weigh proposed missions to compare the importance of the intended outcomes
against the costs they are likely to impose on the members who will perform them.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):



Prepares Self: Maintains mental and physical health and well-being; Maintains self-awareness:
employs self-understanding and recognizes impact on others
Creates a Positive Environment/Fosters esprit de corps: Demonstrates care for follower wellbeing; Anticipates people’s on-the-job needs; Encourages open and candid communications
Gets Results: Prioritizes, organizes, and coordinates taskings for teams or other organizations
structures/groups; Makes feedback part of work processes
33
Leads Others
Additional information
Budd, M. (2001). You are what you say: The proven program that uses the power of language to
combat stress, anger, and depression. New York, NY: Three Rivers Press.
Collins, J. (2001). Good to great: Why some companies make the leap and others don’t. New
York, NY: HarperBusiness.
Covey, S. (2005). The eighth habit: From effectiveness to greatness. New York: Free Press.
Deci, E. & Flaste, R. (1996). Why we do what we do: Understanding self-motivation. London, UK:
Penguin Books.
Duhigg, C. (2014). The power of habit: Why we do what we do in life and business. New York, NY:
Random House.
Frederick, J. (2010). Black Hearts: One platoon’s descent into madness in Iraq’s triangle of death.
New York, NY: Broadway Books.
Goldsmith, M. (2007). What got you here won’t get you there: How successful people become
even more successful. New York, NY: Hyperion.
Goleman, D., Boyatzis, R., & McKee, A. (2004). Primal leadership: Learning to lead with emotional
intelligence. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press.
Heider, J. (2005). The Tao of leadership: Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Ching adapted for a new age. Atlanta,
GA: Humanics Publishing Group.
Hickman, G.R. (2010). Leading organizations: Perspectives for a new era (2nd ed.). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Medina, J. (2014). Brain rules: 12 principles for surviving and thriving at work, home, and school.
Seattle, WA: Pear Press.
Nye, R.H. (2001). The challenge of command: Reading for military excellence. New York, NY:
Penguin Publishing Group.
Patterson, K., Grenny, J., McMillan, R., & Switzer, A. (2002). Crucial conversations: Tools for
talking when stakes are high. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Professional.
Scharlatt, H., & Smith, R. (2011). Influence: Gaining commitment, getting results (2nd ed.).
Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership
Sinek, S. (2009). Start with why: How great leaders inspire everyone to take action. New York,
NY: Penguin Group.
U.S., Department of the Army. (2012). ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership. Washington, DC:
34
Builds Trust (BT)
Competency Overview
Trust is a key ingredient to all effective alliances, particularly within the Profession of Arms. Trust
facilitates a bond between Soldiers, leaders, the Army, and the Nation that enables mission success.
Building trust is formed on the bedrock of mutual respect, shared understanding, and common
experiences. In order for teams and organizations to function at the highest level, a climate of trust
needs to exist. Leaders create a climate of trust by displaying consistency in their actions, and
through relationship-building behaviors such as coaching, counseling, and mentoring.
The competency Builds Trust is composed of three components:
Component
Page #
Sets personal example for trust
36
Takes direct actions to build trust
38
Sustains a climate of trust
40
(Hold Ctrl and click on heading to jump to section)
35
Sets personal example for trust
“Trust men and they will be true to you; treat them greatly, and they will show themselves great.”
-Ralph Waldo Emerson
Component Overview
As leaders engage in behaviors to direct their units, they epitomize their beliefs about trust in their
actions. Setting a personal example inspires those around them to act in the same manner. The actions a
leader models to subordinates communicates the values of the leader and the unit. Setting a personal
example for trust should be consistent, and is the most powerful tool a leader has to shape the climate of
his or her organization. For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 6-48 to 6-52
and Table 6-2.
Strength Indicators







Keeps confidences.
Follows through on commitments and
promises.
Keeps people informed of progress,
actions, and results.
Presents the truth, even if the message is
unpopular or difficult.
Protects and safeguards confidential
information.
Admits mistakes.
Demonstrates respect for others while
remaining firm and fair.
Need Indicators







Engages in actions that are inconsistent
with words.
Blames others for own mistakes.
Makes promises that are not kept or that
are unrealistic.
Treats others differently at different
times.
Focuses on self-promotion; takes credit
for the work and contributions of others.
Violates confidences made with others.
Gossips or “bad mouths“ others behind
their back.
Underlying Causes of Ineffective Behavioral Modeling






Is too anxious or timid to deliver unfavorable news.
Is unable to say “no” at the appropriate time.
Is unable to maintain a position and follow through.
Focuses on own welfare and personal ambition inappropriately.
Avoids conflict.
Is uncomfortable with how others will respond to the truth.
36
Sets personal example for trust
Feedback





Study






Practice





Get feedback from others on the types of behaviors in your organization or unit that
demonstrate a high degree of trust. Factors might include open communication,
collaboration, strong innovation, and clear work expectations.
Observe your own behavior. Be as objective as you can. Assess if you treat others
equitably and fairly. Determine whether you tend to have “favorites.” Get feedback
from others to support your assessment.
Contact others outside your unit and find out how you can build greater trust,
openness, and mutual understanding to achieve common goals.
Find out how well others understand your expectations and standards.
Complete a trust self-assessment tool. Some informal tools are available though a
search on the web. Other formal assessments are available through references and
resources listed.
Observe the behaviors of other leaders who you think are trustworthy. What
behaviors do they exhibit that build trust? Make a list of the behaviors they
demonstrate that you want to model.
Investigate the essential factors that build and maintain trust. If trust has been
violated, ask for ways to rebuild it.
Study your own behaviors. Analyze if you are more consistent following up on some
promises/commitments than others. If so, ask or explore why.
Analyze the trust level in your organization or unit. Consider factors that indicate a
breach of trust, such as back stabbing, gossiping, common self-serving behavior,
verbal abuse, discriminatory behavior, and excessive time spent covering mistakes.
Learn from mistakes by writing out alternative actions you might have taken.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Building Working Relationships Across Boundaries; Building
Trust.
Let others know what the course of action is and follow through on it.
Evaluate your available time for follow through before making a commitment.
Clarify the expectations of a job or task you assign. Be clear as to how and when you
want to see progress on the responsibility you communicate to subordinates.
Speak precisely. Be clear, use simple language, and let others know exactly what
you want and where you stand.
Hold a discussion with another person with whom you want to build greater trust
and openness.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):




Leads by Example: Displays character; Seeks diverse ideas and points of view
Creates a Positive Work Environment: Encourages open and candid communications; Encourages
fairness and inclusiveness; Demonstrates care for follower well-being.
Communicates: Creates shared understanding
Prepares Self: Maintains self-awareness: employs self-understanding and recognizes impact on
others
37
Takes direct actions to build trust
“Generals delegate not just as a way to get more done but, more importantly, as a way to build trust
among subordinates and within whatever organization they lead.”
-LTG James M. Dubik (U.S. Army, Ret.)
Component Overview
Fostering trust is not a passive exercise. Leaders build trust in their organizations by taking actions that
promote trust. Developing others through mentoring, coaching, and counseling are actions that build
trust. When a leader mentors effectively, that leader sends a clear message: I trust you to continue the
Profession of Arms and build a stronger, more adaptable Army. Leaders also foster trust by making efforts
to develop positive, informal relationships with peers, superiors, and subordinates. These leaders
however do not tolerate unfair treatment, and they take immediate action to correct dysfunction in the
unit. For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 6-48 to 6-52 and Table 6-2.
Strength Indicators







Mentors, coaches, and counsels leaders.
Demonstrates care for others.
Identifies areas of commonality and builds
upon shared experiences.
Empowers others in activities and
objectives.
Demonstrates an unwillingness to tolerate
discrimination and corrects the actions or
attitudes of those who undermine trust.
Communicates honestly and openly with
others.
Acts with great integrity and character.
Need Indicators






Makes little effort to build developmental
leader relationships.
Remains isolated and aloof from others.
Appears awkward or uncomfortable
communicating; does not engage others in
informal discussion.
Is unwilling to share authority or power in
achieving tasks or objectives.
Is apathetic towards discrimination, allows
distrustful behaviors to persist in unit or
team.
Is ambiguous, inconsistent or unclear in
communication with others.
Underlying Causes







Does not understand the importance of leader development.
Is socially anxious and fears failing or appearing weak in front of others.
Is focused on own ambitions at the expense of other’s.
Communicates poorly.
Lacks self-confidence and faith in own leadership abilities to shape an organization or team.
Does not value diversity and displays this attitude by showing a lack of respect, or by
treating others unfairly or inequitably.
Accepts discrimination as a “reality” and feels “powerless” to stop it.
38
Takes direct actions to build trust
Feedback





Study




Practice



Get feedback from trusted colleagues and mentors on actions they take to build trust
within their unit. Describe the actions you take to build trust within the unit and ask
for feedback.
Observe the actions you take to build trust within the unit. Consider how they
contribute to building trust. Ask trusted colleagues if your actions had the desired
impact.
Regularly seek information from those at different levels in your unit. Find out how
clearly your orders are being communicated.
Seek regular input on your leader development efforts. Assess the extent to which
subordinate development occurs in your unit. Adjust efforts accordingly.
Assess unit morale with Command Climate surveys or other assessments of unit
morale. Allow for feedback to be anonymous. Determine whether additional actions
need to be taken to build trust.
Observe leaders you think are trustworthy. Consider the actions they take to build
trust within the unit. Effective actions may include exhibiting clear communication,
demonstrating care for Soldiers, creating transparency, and extending trust to others.
Read books and articles on concepts supporting doctrine on the art of building trust
(see Burke et al., 2007; Gillespie & Mann, 2004; Williams, 2012). Find resources on
the web, but examine them critically. Question whether the actions could be applied
to your unit. Get feedback from others, and apply the best lessons to your
leadership.
Study your unit. Get to know as many people on an individual-basis as possible.
Understand their strengths, weaknesses, expectations, and motivations. Use this
knowledge to establish greater rapport.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Making Influence Count; Rapid Team Stand-up: How to Build
Your Team ASAP; Building Working Relationships Across Boundaries; Building Trust.
When developing others through actions such as mentoring, coaching, or counseling
create mutual agreement on performance change, goals, and specific follow-up or
corrective actions.
Help subordinates recover from failure by demonstrating understanding and
empathy. Counsel subordinates by providing feedback on the course of action and
the results, as well as alternatives.
If dysfunction or distrustful behaviors occur within the unit, take immediate action to
correct the behavior. Provide clear feedback about why the actions or attitudes were
contributing to a climate of distrust, and describe expectations for the future.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):




Builds Trust:: Sets personal example for trust; Sustains a climate of trust
Creates a Positive Work Environment: Encourages open and candid communications; Encourages
fairness and inclusiveness; Demonstrates care for follower well-being
Communicates: Creates shared understanding
Develops others: Counsels, coaches, and mentors
39
Sustains a climate of trust
“The people when rightly and fully trusted will return the trust.”
-Abraham Lincoln
Component Overview
A climate of trust is when the norms and values of the unit create a positive, mutually beneficial
environment characterized by openness and risk-tolerance. Leaders sustain this environment by
consistently demonstrating these values through behavior, and communicating to others that distrustful
attitudes and behaviors will not be tolerated. It is important for leaders to note that setting an example
and directing action to build trust are important tools which help to sustain a climate of trust. For more
information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 6-48 to 6-52 and Table 6-2.
Strength Indicators





Assesses factors or conditions that
promote or hinder trust.
Keeps people informed of goals, actions,
and results.
Follows through on actions related to
expectations of others.
Under-promises but over-delivers.
Maintains high unit morale.
Need Indicators





Appears insensitive to the factors that
promote or hinder trust.
Demonstrates poor communication of
goals, actions, and results to others.
Shows inconsistency in attitudes or
behaviors, does not follow through on
actions.
Over-promises and under-delivers.
Enables poor unit morale.
Underlying Causes







Lacks overall leadership experience.
Is insensitivity to the conditions which help create trust or hinder it.
Exhibits a general lack of transparency in decision making.
Has poor communication skills.
Is anxious about perceptions of others and wants to please.
Is unable to commit to a particular course of action.
Is overly ambitious and does not focus on the team or causes larger than self.
40
Sustains a climate of trust
Feedback




Study





Practice




Hold meetings regularly with key staff and gather feedback on both unit and
individual morale, the level of openness within the unit, and factors (both positive
and negative) which may be influencing trust.
Use instruments such as Command Climate Surveys and other assessments to
regularly assess the morale of the unit. Low morale is a good indicator of a lack of
trust.
Encourage frequent informal feedback on climate of the unit. Note: the values and
tone you set as a leader will be modeled by others. Reward candid, informal
feedback.
Foster trust by acting on the feedback you receive. If the feedback you receive on
climate reveals a weakness in the unit, take action to rebuild trust.
Regularly observe individuals and teams performing their duties during normal
operations and trainings in an attempt to gauge the level of trust existing between
them.
Study the actions leaders take to rebuild trust in the unit if trust has been lost.
Notice when a climate is distrustful. Study the factors that contributed to the loss of
trust.
Study the cases of particularly inspiring leaders in both civilian and military culture
who created climates of trust in their units, teams, or organizations. Write down the
actions they took, and the effect they had on the climate of the organization.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Making Influence Count; Rapid Team Stand-up: How to
Build Your Team ASAP; Building Working Relationships Across Boundaries; Building
Trust; Managing Difficult Behavior; Managing Conflict; Seeking and Delivering Faceto-Face Feedback; Navigating Contentious Conversations.
Describe unit values surrounding trust frequently. In your message, be clear about
how you and all members of the unit will create a climate of trust. Make building
trust an explicit goal.
Be clear about your expectations when assigning tasks. When giving developmental
assignments, give leaders a clear picture of what success and failure look like.
Cultivate risk-tolerance within the unit by communicating and demonstrating
through actions that taking carefully calculated risks can be appropriate.
Create transparency by opening multiple communication channels, including
newsletters, reports, and staffing meetings to talk openly about performance,
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):





Builds Trust: Sets personal example for trust; Takes direct actions to build trust
Creates a Positive Work Environment: Encourages open and candid communications; Encourages
fairness and inclusiveness; Demonstrates care for follower well-being
Communicates: Creates shared understanding
Prepares Self: Maintains self-awareness: employs self-understanding and recognizes impact on
others
Gets results: Makes feedback part of work processes
41
Builds Trust
Additional information
MSAF Virtual Improvement Center (VIC). https://msaf.army.mil/My360/VIC/Default.aspx
Burke, C.S., Sims, D.E., Lazzara, E.H., & Salas, E. (2007). Trust in leadership: A multi-level review
and integration. The Leadership Quarterly, 18(6), 606-632.
Carmeli, A. & Gittell, J. H. (2009). High-quality relationships, psychological safety, and learning
from failures in work organizations. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 30, 709-729.
Covey, S. (2012). How the best leaders build trust. Retrieved from http://
www.leadershipnow.com/pvcovey.html.
Gillespie, N.A., & Mann, L. (2004). Transformational leadership and shared values: The building
blocks of trust. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 19(6), 588-607.
Johnson, W.B., & Ridley, C.R. (2004). The elements of mentoring. New York, NY: Palgrave
MacMillan.
Lombardo, M.M., & Eichinger, R.W. (2006). FYI: For your improvement: A guide for development
and coaching (4th ed.). Minneapolis, MN: Lominger Limited, Inc.
McCall, M. (2010). Recasting leadership development. Industrial and Organizational Psychology,
3, 3-19.
Odierno, R. T. (2011, September). The Profession of Arms. Military Review, 2-4.
Schneider, R.J., & Johnson, J. (2005). Direct and indirect predictors of social competence in
United States Army junior commissioned officers. Arlington, VA: United States Army Research
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
Sweeney, P., Thompson, V., & Blanton, H. (2009). Trust and influence in combat: an
interdependence model, Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 39, 1, 235–264.
U.S., Department of the Army. (2012). ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership. Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office.
Williams, M. (2012). Building and rebuilding trust: Why perspective taking matters. In R.M.
Kramer & T.L. Pittinsky (Eds.). Restoring trust in organizations and leaders: Enduring challenges
and emerging answers (pp. 171-184). New York, NY: Oxford University Press
Yip, J., & Wilson, M.S. (2010). Learning from experience. In E. Van Velsor, C.D. McCauley, & M.N.
Ruderman (Eds.). The Center for Creative Leadership handbook of leadership development. San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass and The Center for Creative Leadership.
Yukl, G. (2013). Leadership in organizations (8th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
42
Extends Influence Beyond
the Chain of Command (EI)
Competency Overview
As a leader, you can influence beyond your direct line of authority and chain of command. Your influence can
extend across units, to unified action partners (formerly known as JIIM—joint, interagency, intergovernmental,
multinational), and to other groups.
In these situations, leaders use:
 Indirect means of influence
 Diplomacy
 Negotiation
 Mediation
 Arbitration
 Partnering
 Conflict resolution
 Consensus building
 Coordination
A key to extending influence beyond the chain of command is creating and communicating a common vision and
building agreement.
The competency Extends Influence Beyond the Chain of Command is composed of two components:
Component
Page #
Understands sphere, means and limits of influence
44
Negotiates, builds consensus and resolves conflict
46
(Hold Ctrl and click on heading to jump to section)
43
Understands sphere, means,
and limits of influence
“You cannot antagonize and influence at the same time.”
-J. S. Knox
Component Overview
Leading and influencing others outside your established organizational structure requires specific skills
and abilities. Assessing roles of others outside your chain of command, knowing over whom they have
authority and influence, and understanding how they are likely to exert that influence is important. By
learning about people outside of your chain of command, understanding their interests and viewpoints,
and being familiar with internal relationships within the organization, you can identify influence
techniques that are likely to work beyond your own command chain. In addition, you can adjust
influence techniques to the situation and parties involved. For more information on this component see
ADRP 6-22 Sections 6-61 to 6-63 and Table 6-3.
Strength Indicators
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


Assesses situations, missions, and
assignments to determine the parties
involved in decision making and decision
support.
Evaluates possible areas of interference or
resistance.
Reviews organizational structures to
understand who reports to whom and
informal relationships that illustrate who
influences whom.
Has a good sense of when and when not to
influence beyond the chain of command.
Gets input from members of own chain of
command before influencing others.
Need Indicators
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


Uses the same technique in every
situation to influence others.
Operates in isolation from others outside
the chain of command when not
appropriate.
Begins negotiating with others without
recognizing their priorities or interests.
Relies solely on informal organizational
relationships such as colleagues and peers
outside of the chain of command; does
not take into account and work through
the formal command chain.
Makes assumptions about others too
quickly without getting the facts.
Underlying Causes
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
Does not appreciate the potential benefits of understanding spheres of influence.
Is impatient; wants to take action before understanding relationships.
Is risk averse and shields self from criticism or failure.
Lacks organizational knowledge outside of own chain of command.
Is politically insensitive to factors impacting broader Army interests.
Lacks tact.
44
Understands sphere, means,
and limits of influence
Feedback

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
Study

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


Practice







Get feedback on your ability to actively listen, present information so others
understand advantages, and be sensitive to the cultural factors in communications.
Find out the degree to which you gain cooperation with peers or others outside of
your chain of command.
Self-assess your level of knowledge of an organization other than your own.
Request feedback from others on your effectiveness in working with others. For
example, ask others to describe a time when you effectively demonstrated
resilience, patience, confidence, or mental agility.
Learn as much as possible about how your unit or organization works and the key
players.
Gain information about shared common goals between your organization and
organizations outside your chain of command and evaluate the similarities and
differences.
Understand the organization’s climate and the origin and reasoning behind key
policies, practices, and procedures.
Gain insight into the culture, work priorities, and leadership interests of
organizations outside your chain of command by working on a project or team
assignment with another organization.
Ask others outside your unit or organization how to gain insight into their
organizational priorities.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Making Influence Count; Building Working Relationships
Across Boundaries; The Leader as Follower.
Practice getting things done using both formal channels and informal networks.
Determine who to tell, when to tell, and how to communicate a situation to
superiors and team members.
Practice explaining the rationale of a tough decision to those who are affected.
Practice focused listening and asking questions to identify points of agreement and
contention.
Consider alternatives from the viewpoint of others who are affected.
Ensure team members and subordinates understand the reporting structure in your
unit and know who to ask when they have a question.
When communicating decisions or proposing new ideas, clearly articulate the
broader strategic benefits to your unit or the Army.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):



Extends Influence Beyond the Chain of Command: Negotiates, builds consensus, and resolves
conflict
Leads by Example: Seeks diverse ideas ands points of view
Communicates: Creates shared understanding
45
Negotiates, builds consensus,
and resolves conflict
“Start out with an ideal and end up with a deal.”
-Karl Albrecht
Component Overview
The art of persuasion is an important method of extending influence. Proactively involving partners
opens the lines of communication and helps to work through controversy in a positive and productive
way. Building consensus though sharing ideas and seeking common ground helps overcome resistance to
an idea or plan. For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 6-64 to 6-65 and Table
6-3.
Strength Indicators





Identifies individual and group positions
and needs.
Sees conflict as an opportunity for shared
understanding.
Facilitates understanding of conflicting
positions and possible solutions.
Works to collaborate on solving complex
problems in ways that are acceptable to all
parties.
Builds consensus by ensuring that all team
members are heard and listened to.
Need Indicators

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



Uses the same technique in every
situation to influence others.
Negotiates with others without
recognizing their priorities or interests.
Uses extreme techniques such as being
too hard or too soft when resolving
conflicts.
Isolates team members and pressures
them to align with personal goals and
priorities.
Does not seek to reconcile conflicting
positions; only seeks to win.
Prefers to point out negative aspects of
possible goals and priorities.
Underlying Causes

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




Does not seek the middle ground on issues, but demands that identified personal needs are
met.
Is conflict avoidant; uncomfortable in situations that demand identifying the conflict and
solving the problem.
Is unable or unwilling to look for a common causes or mutual goals.
Is uncomfortable or does not like to work with teams towards common goals and priorities.
Takes things personally.
Does not maintain a solutions-based focus.
Is not open to errors in one’s thinking or assumptions.
46
Negotiates, builds consensus,
and resolves conflict
Feedback





Study




Practice







Get input from peers about your understanding of negotiation techniques. Ask
questions such as “Can you describe a situation in which I negotiated effectively?”
“What could I do to negotiate more effectively?”
After presenting a concept or idea to your peers, ask for their feedback to get their
thoughts and perspectives.
Record yourself in a practice session in which you negotiate a dispute. As you view the
recording, self-assess your actions and note effective and ineffective actions.
Before negotiations begin, select several negotiating techniques and practice with a
peer to gain insight on how they might work and the potential drawbacks of each.
Request feedback from your peer on your skills.
Get feedback on your ability to listen actively, to present information so others
understand advantages, and your sensitivity to the cultural factors in communication.
Study the behaviors of leaders that are strong negotiators or behaviors of successful
arbitrators. List specific behaviors they demonstrate and what you admire about them.
List all of the roles and resources that figure in to a goal or priority of your
organization. Identify people with whom you may have a common cause or mutual
goals.
Carefully outline your principles and values so that you are aware when negotiation
crosses your boundaries.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following developmental lessons: Extending Influence During Negotiation; Managing Conflict; Building
Working Relationships Across Boundaries; Building Trust; Navigating Contentious Conversations; Managing Difficult Behavior.
Find an opportunity to exercise diplomacy and tact to achieve a favorable decision or
outcome.
When in a discussion with individuals of differing opinions, practice asking questions
that are likely to result in compromise, such as “What points can we agree upon?” or
“What is most important to you and what can you concede?
Work to be a team player that can represent your own interests.
Anticipate problem areas in complex situations and vary your approach accordingly.
Call a team meeting at the first sign that there is tension among group members.
When disputes occur, evaluate areas of common ground between different parties and
document findings.
Research the viewpoints of other individuals involved in the negotiation or consensus
building. Leverage those viewpoints accordingly in your argument.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):





Extends Influence Beyond the Chain of Command: Understands sphere, means, and limits of
influence
Communicates: Creates shared understanding; Employs engaging communication techniques
Builds Trust: Takes direct actions to build trust; Sustains a climate of trust
Prepares Self: Maintains self-awareness: employs self-understanding and recognizes impact on
others
Leads others: Uses appropriate methods of influence to energize others
47
Extends Influence Beyond the
Chain of Command
Additional Information
MSAF Virtual Improvement Center (VIC). https://msaf.army.mil/My360/VIC/Default.aspx
Abrashoff, M. (2002). It’s your ship: Lessons learned from the best damn ship in the Navy. New
York, NY: Warner Books.
Brower, C. F. (2011). George C. Marshall: Servant of the American nation. New York, NY: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Covey, S. (2006). Speed of trust: The one thing that changes everything. New York, NY: Free Press.
Cuddy, A. (2015). Presence: Bringing your boldest self to your biggest challenges. New York,
NY: Little, Brown and Company.
Deems, R.S., & Deems, T.A. (2003). Leading in tough times: A manager’s guide to responsibility,
trust and motivation. Amherst,, MA: HRD Press.
Ehin, C. (2005). Hidden assets: Harnessing the power of informal networks. New York, NY:
Springer Science-Business Media, Inc.
Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (2011). Getting to yes (Rev. ed.). New York, NY: Penguin
Publishing Group.
Foster, D.G., & Marshall, M. (2007). How can I get through to you: Breakthrough communication
beyond gender, beyond therapy, beyond deception. New York, NY: Hatchette Books Group.
Hudson, W. M. (2015). Army diplomacy: American Military Occupation and Foreign Policy after
World War II. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky.
Johnson, L., & Phillips, B. (2003). Absolute honesty: Building a corporate culture that values
straight talk and rewards integrity. New York, NY: AMACOM.
Kilner, P. (2017). Divergent ethics: Facing a foreign partner who has a difference moral code.
https://www.ausa.org/articles/divergent-ethics-facing-foreign-partner-who-has-different-moralcode.
Leavitt, M., & McKeown, R. (2013). Finding allies, building alliances: 8 elements that bring—and
keep—people together. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Solomon, R.C., & Flores, F. (2001). Building trust: In business, politics, relationships, and life.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Ury, W. (2007). Getting past no. New York, NY: Bantam Dell.
Useem, M. (2001). Leading up: How to lead your boss so you both win (1st ed.). New York, NY:
Crown Business
Wheeler, M. (2003). Negotiation. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
48
Leads by Example (LE)
Competency Overview
As a leader, you can influence others by acting in a manner that provides others with an example by which to
measure and model their own behavior. Leading by example is a form of influence in which leaders provide
models rather than explicit direction.
The competency Leads by Example is composed of six components:
Component
Page #
Displays character
50
Exemplifies the Warrior Ethos
52
Leads with confidence in adverse situations
54
Demonstrates tactical and technical competence
56
Understands the importance of conceptual skills and models them to others
58
Seeks diverse ideas and points of view
60
(Hold Ctrl and click on heading to jump to section)
49
Displays character
“War must be carried on systematically, and to do it you must have men of character activated by
principles of honor.”
-George Washington
Component Overview
Upon entering the Army, Soldiers take an oath to uphold a new set of values: the Army Values. The Army
Values are a set of principles, standards, and qualities that are essential for Army leaders. The Army
recognizes seven values that must be upheld: loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and
personal courage. It is every Army leader’s obligation to demonstrate these values to the highest extent
possible, and in doing so, set an example for others to follow. Demonstrating these values establishes
one as a person of character who is accountable. For more information on this component see ADRP 622 Sections 6-66 to 6-72 and Table 6-4.
Strength Indicators





Displays high standards of duty
performance, personal appearance,
military and professional bearing, and
physical fitness and health.
Takes an ethical stance and fosters an
ethical climate.
Demonstrates good moral judgment and
behavior.
Completes both individual and unit tasks to
standard, on time, and within the
commander’s intent.
Demonstrates determination and
persistence when facing adverse situations.
Need Indicators

Solves problems using the “easy path”
without regard for what is “the right thing
to do.”
 Puts personal benefit or comfort ahead of
the mission.
 Hides unpleasant facts that may arouse
anger.
 Is publicly critical of the unit or its
leadership, yet does nothing to help.
Underlying Causes






Has not accepted one or more of the Army Values.
Is overly committed to self-interests, career goals, and personal achievement.
Is not able to translate Army Values to personal behaviors.
Is afraid of facing demands or hardships that following Army Values might bring.
Is not aware of personal behaviors and how they are perceived by others.
Distinguishes between on-duty and off-duty behaviors.
50
Displays character
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Reflect on your personal values and the Army Values. Do any conflict with one
another? If you perceive a conflict, consult a mentor with respected values and
judgment for discussion and guidance.
Ask others you work with on how well they understand the expectations and the
standards you set.
Ask peers and subordinates how well they think you uphold the Army Values. How
do your behaviors signal your values?
Consider your personal behaviors and how you complete tasks to standard, on time,
and within the commander’s intent. How do you ensure success and timeliness of
completion? How do you gauge your adherence to standards? How do you ensure
success and timeliness of completion?
Observe other leaders within your unit or organization who effectively demonstrate
and uphold the Army Values. Consider how these leaders attained their rank and
current position. Tailor the approach to your situation.
Analyze the influence of the Army Values on your unit by observing instances and
examples of integrity, honor, courage, loyalty, duty, respect, and selfless service.
What are the consequences when adherence to these values falls short?
Study historical military figures who demonstrated determination, persistence and
patience in achieving an objective. What factors led to their success? In times of
intense hardship, what actions did they use to overcome adversity?
Consider what each Army Value means and its implications for your behavior and
development.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: The Value of Self-Awareness; Seeking and Delivering Faceto-Face Feedback.
Exercise initiative by anticipating task requirements before being told what to do.
Take responsibility for both yourself and your subordinates when an issue arises.
Make decisions based on what you know is right. Do not be swayed by
circumstances or internal or external factors that may affect your decision. Act
according to clear principles rather than the “easy path.”
Foster and encourage an “open-door” policy with your subordinates where they
feel comfortable coming to talk to you about ethical and moral challenges they are
facing and how to implement the correct action.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Leads by Example: Exemplifies the Warrior Ethos
Leads Others: Enforces standards
Creates a Positive Environment/Fosters esprit de corps: Encourages fairness and inclusiveness
Prepares Self: Maintains self-awareness: employs self-understanding and recognizes impact on
others
51
Exemplifies the
Warrior Ethos
“Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who follow and
of the man who leads that gains the victory.”
-General George S. Patton
Component Overview
The Warrior Ethos refers to the professional attitudes and beliefs that characterize the American Soldier.
The Warrior Ethos shapes and guides a leader’s actions both on and off the battlefield. Leaders
demonstrate the Warrior Ethos anytime they experience prolonged and demanding conditions that
require an unrelenting and consistent determination to do what is right. For example, tirelessly
advocating for a more comprehensive training program on leader development demonstrates the
Warrior Ethos, just as does leading others in a combat zone. For more information on this component
see ADRP 6-22 Sections 3-21 to 3-23 and Table 6-4.
Strength Indicators
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Removes or fights through obstacles,
difficulties, and hardships to accomplish
the mission.
Demonstrates the will to succeed and
perseveres through difficult and
complicated situations.
Demonstrates physical and emotional
courage.
Upholds and communicates the Warrior
Ethos to others.
Pursues mission-focused victories over
extended periods, regardless of the
conditions.
Need Indicators
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Gives up when facing difficult challenge or
hardship.
Is pessimistic or negative about personal
ability to achieve results within the
constraints of the organization.
Lets fear of risk stop action despite
importance of action.
Hesitates or avoids stepping up when the
need arises.
Demonstrates timidity and hesitation to
act.
Underlying Causes
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Lacks a holistic understanding of the Warrior Ethos and its implications for personal
behavior.
Becomes frustrated or fatigued from excessively demanding conditions over an extended
period of time.
Allows laziness or complacency to compromise the task at hand.
Allows current situation to inspire a feeling of hopelessness and a sense that there is no
prospect of improvement.
Lacks resilience.
52
Exemplifies the
Warrior Ethos
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Ensure that you clarify and understand the scope of newly assigned tasks and how they
relate to mission accomplishment. Perseverance is valuable as long as it is aligned with the
organizational goals.
Request feedback from peers and subordinates on how well you demonstrate
determination, persistence and patience. Determine if there are patterns in the way you
handle different types of situations.
Ask for feedback from a superior on how well you demonstrate the Warrior Ethos. Identify
points where you could have persevered more and points where you should not have been
as tenacious to ensure a balance between achieving effective results and wasting time.
Request advice from a mentor or trusted advisor before undertaking a difficult task. Have
them guide you and provide insight into the appropriate steps. Provide the individual with
as much context as possible and then talk through the situation and how you can deal with
anticipated difficulties.
Reflect on your experiences in upholding the Warrior Ethos. In a difficult or prolonged task,
what factors most made you want to give up, and what factors most helped you keep
going?
If you’re having trouble getting something done, reflect on why it is not working and what
alternative approaches might succeed.
Research historical military figures who demonstrated physical and emotional courage and
the will to succeed. What actions and attitudes led them to success? In times of intense
hardship, what was their approach to leadership?
Identify ways to relieve stress to manage your emotional reactions while at work (e.g., take
several deep breaths, count to ten, think before you act).
Study historical military figures who demonstrated determination, persistence and patience
in achieving an objective. What factors led to their success? In times of intense hardship,
what actions did they use to overcome adversity?
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: The Value of Self-Awareness; Seeking and Delivering Face-toFace Feedback.
Consider what each Army Value means and its implications for your behavior and
development.
Volunteer to take the lead on a difficult or prolonged issue. As you work through the issue,
take time to note where your work started and the progress you have made toward
resolution of the issue.
When leading, accept responsibility for your errors and move on. Don’t allow criticism of an
outcome or setbacks prevent you from taking the lead or persisting in your efforts.
When interacting with team members and subordinates, realize that resistance and inertia
are natural. When this occurs, remember to stick to the point and don’t take criticism
personally.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Leads by Example: Leads with confidence in adverse situations; Displays character
Leads Others: Uses appropriate methods of influence to energize others
Prepares Self: Maintains mental and physical health and well-being; Maintains self-awareness: employs self-understanding and recognizes impact on others
53
Leads with confidence in
adverse situations
“Just as fire tempers iron into fine steel so does adversity temper one’s character into firmness,
tolerance, and determination.”
-Margaret Chase Smith
Component Overview
The opportunity to lead with confidence in adverse situations happens frequently, but it is the big
decisions and difficult times that can define an Army leader’s career. Mistakenly, individuals often believe
that leading with confidence in adverse situations is a responsibility for senior leaders, and do not
recognize the need for confident leadership at all levels. How Army leaders approach and persevere
through difficult times sets a leadership example for others while demonstrating commitment to the
organization. For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 6-68 to 6-72 and Table 64.
Strength Indicators
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Provides leadership presence at the right
time and place.
Displays self-control and composure,
especially under adverse conditions;
remains calm under pressure.
Remains decisive, even after discovering a
mistake.
Makes a decision and acts in the absence
of guidance.
Remains positive, even when the situation
changes or becomes confusing.
Encourages subordinates when they show
signs of weakness.
Need Indicators
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Loses hope or inertia when adversity is
high.
Shows discouragement when faced with a
setback.
Allows anger or emotion to compromise a
situation.
Hesitates in taking decisive action and
defaults to following a superior’s lead in
times when it is not appropriate.
Avoids situations where it is necessary to
take an authoritative stand on an issue or
problem.
Underlying Causes
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Is slow to adapt to changing situations.
Is not comfortable with personal capabilities and skills as a leader; unwilling to step up and
take control of the situation.
Is indecisive; has trouble making final decisions.
Fears that the consequences of making a bad decision will reflect poorly on himself or
herself.
Avoids risks to ensure no negative performance feedback.
Does not meet problems head-on; avoids conflict.
Lacks emotional intelligence: self-awareness and self-management.
54
Leads with confidence in
adverse situations
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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After leading a difficult task or mission, conduct an after action review (AAR). Ask for
feedback from others to identify effective and ineffective actions and opportunities
for improvement. Have team members provide feedback on how you personally
handled the situation.
Request feedback from peers about how well you respond to set-backs, and how
effectively you demonstrate perseverance to achieve goals.
Meet with your team to brainstorm creative solutions to a challenge that your unit
or organization currently faces. Try to approach the problem from a new and
different direction.
Request advice from a mentor or trusted advisor on how to deal with a difficult
situation. Have him or her guide you and provide insight into your possible next
steps.
Complete a mission or problem analysis when faced with a tough decision. Consider
multiple possible courses of action, select one, and develop a plan of action to enact
it.
Develop the realization that failure and criticism happen. As a leader, take the risk,
realizing that you are not always going to be right.
Learn about planning and problem solving methods and tools that you can use to
help ensure the success of your efforts.
Observe a leader in your unit who has consistently achieved under seemingly
unfavorable circumstances. How did he or she do it? What types of behaviors can
you model to ensure similar success for yourself?
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Leadership Decision Making; Being an Adaptable Leader in
Times of Change; Managing Difficult Behavior.
When resistance occurs, remember to stick to your argument and the facts and
details that support it, while remaining open to feedback and opinions. Remember
to not take criticism personally.
Take on a series of increasingly demanding tasks or challenges to build a record of
success and bolster your confidence in difficult situations.
Be very well prepared! Anticipate potential resistance/pushback from your
audience and spend time gathering data and rationale to support your position.
Persevere. Don’t easily give up on opinions or judgments for which you have a
strong argument. Clearly articulate why you feel the way you do using detailed
explanations and examples; remain respectful of the opinions of others.
Use clear, assertive language to state your position. Be aware of non-verbals that
may communicate lack of confidence and avoid using tentative language.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Leads Others: Provides purpose, motivation, and inspiration
Leads by Example: Exemplifies the Warrior Ethos; Displays character
Creates a Positive Environment/Fosters esprit de corps: Encourages subordinates to exercise initiative,
accept responsibility, and take ownership
Gets results: Executes plans to accomplish the mission; Identifies and adjusts to external influences on the
mission and organization
55
Demonstrates tactical and
technical competence
“Techniques which must be mastered to become an expert vary mightily, depending on the field of your
expertise, the level of command and the personalities involved. But the basic requirement is simple:
study and train and practice until you have more knowledge and know-how than others with whom you
work.”
-Aubrey “Red” Newman
Component Overview
Striving for tactical and technical competence and expertise is important for Army leaders. Army leaders
must implement the most up-to-date, cutting-edge technologies and methods to solve problems and
ensure mission accomplishment. Demonstrating technical and tactical knowledge and skills includes
seeking out and implementing best practices as well as exploring and encouraging a culture of sharing
among team members to develop and refine their technical proficiency. For more information on this
component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 6-73 to 6-75 and Table 6-4.
Strength Indicators
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Uses technical and tactical skills and
expertise to accomplish the mission to
standard and protect resources.
 Displays the appropriate level of
knowledge of equipment, procedures, and
methods for the position.
 Embraces and employs new technology to
accomplish the mission.
Need Indicators
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Leverages assets, equipment, procedures
and methods ineffectively.
 Consumes excessive resources due to
ineffective use of technology.
 Uses outdated or ineffective approaches
to problems.
 Uninterested in learning new knowledge
and skills.
Underlying Causes
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Does not have a full awareness of jobs and operations within the unit or organization.
Does not understand the optimal employment of assets, equipment, procedures, and
methods.
Does not seek opportunities to be introduced to new solutions for technical and tactical
problems.
Is not comfortable with new technology and is unaware of its capabilities.
Is unaware of how to locate and learn new technical and tactical knowledge and skills.
56
Demonstrates tactical and
technical competence
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Learn from those around you by asking which skills and what knowledge is missioncritical. Ask others how they learned it, and follow a similar path.
Talk with others inside and outside your chain of command to stay current on
external influences (e.g., emerging technology, the latest tactics, techniques and
procedures). Key opportunities to network and share information include
attendance at conferences, meetings, training courses, and TDY travel, as well as
through online resources.
Look for opportunities to be tested on your technical and tactical proficiency.
Self-monitor your ability to be a technical and tactical leader by reading the latest
journal articles, professional journals, and professional association releases and
comparing your knowledge and skills to emerging information from these sources
(see Hannah et al., 2010; Wolfe & Arrow, 2013).
Build your expertise by reviewing doctrine, technical manuals, and non-military
references in an area that interests you.
Subscribe to or research professional journals and resources dealing with a new
technical skill or capability. Keep up-to-date on emerging technical information by
reviewing blogs and other Web-based resources.
Volunteer to prepare and deliver training on a specific technical or tactical subject.
Write and submit a journal or magazine article on your technical area of expertise.
Look for opportunities to take a continuing studies course to build your knowledge
in a technical area. Consider resident, distance or distributed learning, and
correspondence offerings.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Seeking and Incorporating Diverse Ideas; The Art of Asking
Questions; The Value of Self-Awareness; Seeking and Delivering Face-to-Face
Feedback.
Find and pursue opportunities for advanced training in a technical subject that
pertains to your responsibilities.
Identify and volunteer for opportunities that will provide technical or tactical
experience in new areas.
Develop one or more specialty areas where you will be considered the expert within
your unit. Communicate your knowledge to other team members and ensure they
come to you when they need guidance or support.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Prepares Self: Expands knowledge of technical, technological, and tactical areas
Gets Results: Identifies, contends for, allocates, and manages resources; Seeks, recognizes, and
takes advantage of opportunities to improve performance
57
Understands the importance of
conceptual skills and models
them to others
“It is not enough to have a good mind. The main thing is to use it well.”
-René Descartes
Component Overview
Army leaders must not only understand the importance of conceptual skills, they must possess,
continually develop, and model them as well. Conceptual skills are the basis for making sense of complex
situations, understanding cause and effect, critical thinking, solving problems, developing plans, and
leading others. In short, they are essential to accomplishing the critical functions of the Army. For more
information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 5-1 to 5-29 and Table 6-4.
Strength Indicators
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Identifies the critical issues that are
present in a situation or issue and uses this
knowledge to make decisions and take
advantage of opportunities.
Recognizes and generates innovative
solutions.
Relates and compares information from
different sources to identify possible cause
-and-effect relationships.
Uses sound judgment, logical reasoning,
and critical thinking.
Makes logical assumptions in the absence
of facts.
Need Indicators
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Gets lost in the details of a situation
without perceiving how they fit together
and interact.
Comfortably maintains the status quo;
does not explore new thought processes
to solve a problem.
Overly relies on one source of information
or one approach to problem solving.
Employs stereotyped, rigid, or biased
thinking when making sense of a situation.
Uses a scattered approach to thinking
through problems and developing
solutions.
Does not articulate the evidence and
thought processes leading to decisions.
Underlying Causes
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Is impatient with the time or effort required for rigorous conceptualization.
Uses gut instinct or past approaches to make decisions.
Fears the risk of failure that may come from new conceptualizations or approaches.
Is unsure of the thought process and evidence used to reach decisions and therefore unable
to articulate them to others.
Does not take time for personal reflection and thought.
Is not open to considering errors in one’s thinking or assumptions.
58
Understands the importance of
conceptual skills and models
them to others
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Ask yourself how an issue you face and your related decisions or actions will fit into
the bigger picture of events. What larger operations and units are affected? What
groups or other decisions will be affected?
Ask others if they have observed personal biases or conceptual shortcomings you
have demonstrated when analyzing or problem solving. Ask for clear and honest
feedback regarding perceived biases and conceptual difficulties. Compare this
feedback to your own self assessment.
Consider the long-term consequences of a decision or action you are contemplating.
What are the second or third order effects? Identify the consequences and then
reevaluate the potential decision. Present the idea to others and request their
input.
Read about methods of conceptualizing ambiguous and complex situations. Topics
may include systems thinking and mind mapping.
Train yourself to visualize how plans or operations will unfold by thinking in terms of
branches, phases, sequences, and time schedules.
Study the topics of critical and creative thinking, and apply the methods you learn to
issues you face.
Observe a leader who is adept at conceptual skills and developing conceptual
models. Discuss the leader’s thought process with the leader.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Leadership Decision Making; Being an Adaptable Leader in
Times of Change; The Leader's Role in Providing On-the-Job Learning and Support;
Every Leader as a Coach.
When faced with a problem, apply a systematic approach to define the problem,
gather relevant information, make essential assumptions, and develop potential
courses of action.
Work to synthesize facts, data, experiences, and principles to make sense of
situations. Look for patterns, themes, connections, and interactions.
When faced with a problem, take time to develop multiple plausible solutions to the
problem. Then apply pre-selected criteria to help you evaluate the solutions and
select the best.
Use a mind mapping technique or tool to make sense of the elements of a complex
or ambiguous situation and their relationships.
Create and communicate your vision for the outcome of an important effort and the
process by which the outcome will be achieved.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Creates a Positive Environment/Fosters esprit de corps: Creates a learning environment;
Encourages subordinates to exercise initiative, accept responsibility, and take ownership
Prepares Self: Expands conceptual and interpersonal capabilities
Stewards the Profession: Supports professional and personal growth; Improves the organization
59
Seeks diverse ideas
and points of view
“I’ve always felt that a person’s intelligence is directly reflected by the number of conflicting points of
view he can entertain simultaneously on the same topic.”
-Abigail Adams
Component Overview
By seeking and being open to diverse ideas and points of view, Army leaders become exposed to new
ideas, perspectives, explanations, and approaches that can help achieve tasks and projects more
efficiently and effectively. Consideration of diverse ideas and points of view helps ensure the adequate
conceptualization of issues as well as the development and selection of viable courses of action. Being
open to diverse ideas and points of view also aids in the perception of change, identification of new
requirements, and adaptability to dynamic operational environments. For more information on this
component see ADRP 6-22, Table 6-4.
Strength Indicators
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Encourages respectful, honest
communication among staff and decision
makers.
Explores alternative explanations and
approaches for accomplishing tasks.
Reinforces new ideas and demonstrates
willingness to consider alternative
perspectives to resolve difficult problems.
Uses knowledgeable sources and subject
matter experts.
Encourages team members to express their
ideas and points of view even if they
question the consensus.
Need Indicators
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Settles for the first solution that comes to
mind.
Does not view subordinates’ opinions and
ideas as relevant.
Does not express opposing views in order
to gain favor or avoid argument.
Operates in isolation from others.
Maintains the status quo and hesitates to
alter current “tried and true” approaches.
Belittles, bullies, and berates rather than
offering constructive and specific
feedback.
Underlying Causes
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Views subordinates’ ideas as threats to personal expertise or authority.
Is impatient with talk and discussion; wants to quickly reach a decision.
Has difficulty perceiving or understanding shades of meaning/nuances or differences in
opinion.
Relies excessively on certain individuals’ perspectives; does not offer everyone a chance for
input.
Does not take time for personal reflection and thought.
Does not understand, appreciate, or value the strength of diversity of thought.
60
Seeks diverse ideas
and points of view
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Encourage your team members to express their ideas and opinions about the
team’s functioning. Use active listening methods to ensure that you accurately
understand their perspectives.
Get someone skilled in team processes and communications to observe one of your
team collaboration or work meetings and later give you feedback on how open to
diverse ideas and opinions you appeared to be and how you encouraged or
discouraged ideas and opinions.
Communicate the desired outcome of a project or task, and ask team members for
their feedback and opinions. Leverage that opinion to devise new and more
effective strategies.
Learn how to conduct research in subject areas that are important to your job.
Get involved in your professional community by participating in associations and
groups that promote learning and creative solutions.
Interview a leader who has a reputation as a strong innovator and leader of teams
that solve complex and unique challenges. Learn about the thought process and
methods used to get the best out of team members and reach a creative solution.
Read about the approaches and methods that people in other fields or from other
backgrounds used to solve problems similar to those you face.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Seeking and Incorporating Diverse Ideas; Achieving Shared
Understanding; The Art of Asking Questions; Seeking and Delivering Face-to-Face
Feedback; Beyond People Skills: Leveraging Your Understanding of Others.
Keep an open mind even when ideas do not fit conventional thinking or seem to be
tangential to the mission.
Ensure that when team member ideas are ‘off target’ that you do not belittle or
berate them. Look for the merit in every argument rather than the fatal flaw.
Purposefully assemble diverse teams for your projects or tasks. Solicit input and
opinion from all team members when trying to find a solution to the problem.
Do not dismiss others’ opinions because of their rank, age, or gender. Actively listen
to their opinion or approach and determine how the approach could be applied or
included in a particular solution.
Meet with your team to brainstorm creative solutions to a challenge that your
organization or unit currently faces. Try to approach the problem from a new and
different direction.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):


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Communicates: Listens actively
Creates a Positive Environment/Fosters esprit de corps: Creates a learning environment;
Encourages open and candid communications
Gets results: Makes feedback part of work processes
61
Leads by Example
Additional Information
MSAF Virtual Improvement Center (VIC). https://msaf.army.mil/My360/VIC/Default.aspx
Ariely, D. (2012). The honest truth about dishonesty: How we lie to everyone—especially
ourselves. New York, NY: HarperCollins.
Baldoni, J. (2008). Lead by example: 50 ways great leaders inspire results. New York, NY:
AMACOM.
Chopra, S., & Fisher, D. (2012). Leadership by example: Ten key principles of all great leaders.
New York, NY: Thomas Dunne Books.
Collins, J.C., & Porras, J.I. (1994). Built to last. (Rev. ed.) . New York, NY: Harper Business.
Ericsson, A. & Pool, R. (2016). Peak: Secrets from the New Science of Expertise. New York, NY:
Haughton, Mifflin, Harcourt.
Fazio, R. (2016). Simple is the new smart: 26 success strategies to build confidence, inspire
yourself, and reach your ultimate potential.
Hannah, S.T., Jennings, P.L., & Nobel, O.B. (2010). Tactical military leader requisite complexity:
Toward a referent structure. Military Psychology, 22, 412-449.
Harvard Business Review (2007). Lessons learned: Straight talk from the world’s top business
leaders: Leading by example. Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press.
Hayes, M. & Comer, M. (2010). Start with humility: Lessons from America’s quiet CEOs on how to
build trust and inspire followers. Westfield, IN: Greenleaf Center for Servant Leadership.
Lee, G. (2006). Courage: The backbone of leadership. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Oettingen, G. (2015 .) Rethinking positive thinking: Inside the new science of motivation. New
York, NY: Penguin Group.
Paul, R. W., & Elder, L. (2002). Critical thinking: Tools for taking charge of your professional and
personal life. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Financial Times Prentice Hall.
Phillips, S. (2006). Rescue on Roberts Ridge. Dateline NBC. Retrieved from: http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13233811/
Pressfield, S. (2011). The Warrior Ethos. Black Irish .
Twenge, J. M., & Campbell, W. K. (2010). The narcissism epidemic: Living in the age of
entitlement. New York, NY: Atria Books.
U.S., Department of the Army. (2012). ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership. Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office.
U.S., Department of the Army. (2016). ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations. Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office.
Wolfe, A.L., & Arrow, H. (2013). Military influence tactics: Lessons learned in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Military Psychology, 25(5), 438-451.
62
Communicates (C)
Competency Overview
Leaders communicate by clearly expressing ideas and actively listening to others. By understanding the nature and
importance of communication and practicing effective communication techniques, leaders will relate better to
others and be able to translate goals into actions.
Communication is essential to all other leadership competencies.
The competency Communicates is composed of four components:
Component
Page #
Listens actively
64
Creates shared understanding
66
Employs engaging communication techniques
68
Is sensitive to cultural factors in communication
70
(Hold Ctrl and click on heading to jump to section)
63
Listens actively
“To listen well is as powerful a means of communication and influence as to talk well.”
-John Marshall
Component Overview
The most important purpose of listening is to comprehend the speaker’s thoughts and internalize them.
Throughout a conversation you have with someone else, you should pay attention to what the other is
trying to communicate. Active listeners have a lot to focus on: a variety of verbal and non-verbal cues,
the content of the message the speaker is trying to deliver, and the urgency and emotion of the speaker.
Remember to stay alert for common themes that recur with the speaker as well as inconsistencies or
topics they completely avoid. For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 6-77 to 678 and Table 6-5.
Strength Indicators
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Pays attention to non-verbal cues.
Asks questions to clarify the meaning when
the speaker’s point is not understood.
Summarizes and paraphrases the speaker’s
main points before crafting an answer.
Maintains eye contact.
Takes brief mental or written notes on
important points or items for clarification.
Stays alert for common themes in the
speaker’s discussion.
Reflects on new information before
expressing views.
Need Indicators
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Interrupts to provide own opinions and
decisions.
Gets distracted by anger or disagreement
with the speaker.
Uses the first response that comes to
mind.
Focuses attention on taking copious notes.
Confuses the overall point of the message
with the details provided.
Tells people what they should say or think.
Underlying Causes
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Focuses on what to say next rather than to accurately understand the other person.
Does not accurately perceive feelings or read body language.
Feels uncomfortable with the topic, information, or emotions the speaker is sharing.
Believes that own way is the only way; does not listen to others’ opinions.
Is distracted by time pressure, other concerns, or environmental factors.
Lacks emotional intelligence: self-awareness and self-management.
64
Listens actively
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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If you do not understand what the speaker is trying to communicate, ask him or her to
restate what he or she said in another way.
Paraphrase what the speaker said after he or she has expressed him or herself, but
before you respond. Use wording such as, “So what you’re saying is…”
Ask others you work with or in your network how you can improve active listening skills.
At the close of a conversation, recap or summarize the main points and the motivations
that might be behind them. Note trends and themes from the discussion.
During your daily activities, try to observe someone who you feel is a strong listener
interacting with someone else. What makes that person a good listener? What types of
verbal and non-verbal cues do they use?
Learn what behaviors limit active listening. Consider how often you make statements
such as, “Yes, but…” or “Let’s get to the point.” Do you check your blackberry or
continue to type on your computer during conversations? These types of behaviors
tend to communicate an unwillingness to listen and limit conversation.
Find out if you are a selective listener by observing what topics, what people, and in
what settings you are an active listener and which you are not.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Achieving Shared Understanding; The Art of Asking Questions;
Building Working Relationships Across Boundaries; Seeking and Delivering Face-to-Face
Feedback; Navigating Contentious Conversations; Beyond People Skills: Leveraging Your
Understanding of Others; Managing Difficult Behavior.
During conversations, offer very brief summary statements of the person’s statements
and associated feelings. Look for confirmation of your understanding from the other
person. Paraphrase in your own words to avoid parroting the words of the other person,
which may be perceived as mocking.
Employ verbal prompts, such as “Yes…”, “Go on…”, and “Tell me more…” and nonverbal
prompts, such as nodding your head, leaning toward the other person, and making good
eye contact to encourage the other person to talk.
During everyday conversations, try to focus solely on what the speaker is saying rather
than forming your argument.
Minimize external distractions by turning off your cell phone or blackberry and closing
the door or going to a place where you can be with the speaker one-on-one. If this is not
convenient, ask the speaker if you can schedule an appointment at a later date so you
can focus on what he or she has to say.
Try not to argue mentally with the person. It sets up a barrier and distracts you from
listening to what he or she is trying to convey.
Take notes that identify important points or items for clarification during meetings.
Review your notes and follow-up with an email or conversation if it remains unclear.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Communicates: Creates shared understanding
Creates a Positive Environment/Fosters esprit de corps: Fosters teamwork, cohesion, cooperation, and
loyalty (esprit de corps); Encourages open and candid communication
Prepares Self: Maintains self-awareness: employs self-understanding and recognizes impact on others
Extends influence beyond the chain of command: Negotiates, builds consensus, and resolves conflict
65
Creates shared understanding
“No one would talk much in society if they knew how often they misunderstood others.”
-Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe
Component Overview
As a leader, you understand your unit’s mission and develop plans to meet your mission goals. You owe it
to both your organization and subordinates to share information that directly applies to their duties and
provides the necessary context for what needs to be done. Keeping team members and subordinates in
the communication loop ensures that your organization is all on the same page, relieves stress, and
shows your team members that they are appreciated. For more information on this component see
ADRP 6-22 Sections 6-79 to 6-86 and Table 6-5.
Strength Indicators
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Expresses thoughts and ideas clearly to
individuals and groups.
Double checks that subordinates
understand the communicated message.
Reinforces the importance of current unit
objectives and priorities for subordinates.
Recognizes and addresses the potential for
miscommunication.
Uses a communication method aligned
with the information that will be
expressed.
Communicates to subordinates as well as
superiors to ensure everyone is in the loop.
Need Indicators
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Creates inconsistent and confusing
messages, arguments, and stories.
Communicates highly technical subject
matter without converting it into
“laymen’s terms.”
Places an emphasis on the wrong subject
matter for an audience (too simplistic for
management and too detail-heavy and
strategically-focused for subordinates).
Shares information and understanding
with only select favorites.
Limits communication to subordinates and
superiors within own chain of command.
Underlying Causes
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Has limited preparation time before speaking to individuals or a group on a topic.
Does not prepare adequately even when time is available before speaking to individuals
or a group on a topic.
Does not have accurate knowledge of the gaps in the audience’s understanding of the
subject.
Is not skilled in crafting messages or explanations suited to the audience’s background,
comprehension level, language, culture, or other factors.
Possesses partial or incomplete understanding of the subject matter.
66
Creates shared understanding
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Encourage open feedback and dialogue among and with subordinates, particularly when
they are asking questions about a project or process.
Discuss your intent, priorities, and thought processes with your subordinates to ensure
“they get it.” Offer subordinates the opportunity to follow-up with you on any points
they may not have understood.
After delivering information, ask others to summarize the information you just
delivered. Communicate this in a way that is not threatening or condescending but that
shows you are interested in making sure that everyone is on the same page.
Periodically check-in with team members and subordinates to ensure they know what is
going on in the organization. Fill them in on any missing details.
Assess the best way to communicate with different individuals or groups both inside and
outside your organization. Learn how to match the message and method to the
audience.
Study individuals (public figures, historical, or local) who are considered to be skilled
communicators and who were able to provide messages that translated into action.
Take a course on effective communications techniques or join a public speaking group to
build your knowledge and skill in crafting and delivering compelling messages to others.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Making Influence Count; Achieving Shared Understanding; The
Art of Asking Questions; Rapid Team Stand-up: How to Build Your Team ASAP; Building
Working Relationships Across Boundaries; Navigating Contentious Conversations;
Beyond People Skills: Leveraging Your Understanding of Others; The Leader as Follower.
Relate your unit’s current objectives and priorities to the larger organizational goals.
As you plan the words and delivery of your message, imagine how your message will be
received by the intended audience.
Consider the nature of the information you are trying to explain and build your
explanation in a logical progression that fits the topic (e.g., chronological, sequential,
top down, bottom up).
Don’t put your team into information overload. Offer information in segments that can
be comprehended without causing confusion and that together will convey the
complete story.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Builds Trust: Takes direct actions to build trust; Sustains a climate of trust
Communicates: Employs engaging communication techniques
Creates a Positive Environment/Fosters esprit de corps: Encourages open and candid
communications
Prepares Self: Expands conceptual and interpersonal capabilities
67
Employs engaging
communication techniques
“Be sincere; be brief; be seated.”
-Franklin D. Roosevelt
Component Overview
As a leader, you must clearly and succinctly deliver a message to your unit or subordinates to ensure
shared understanding. To ensure that your message stands out from the crowd, you will need to employ
engaging communication techniques to make sure your message is attended to, understood, and
remembered. For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 6-81 to 6-84 and Table 6-5.
Strength Indicators
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States goals to energize others to adopt
and act on them.
Creates a “buzz” around a new idea or
thought by radiating enthusiasm and
excitement.
Makes eye contact when speaking.
Speaks enthusiastically and maintains
listeners’ interest and involvement.
Uses gestures that are appropriate but not
distracting.
Selects the appropriate communication
medium to deliver the message.
Recognizes and addresses places where
misunderstandings may arise.
Seeks feedback on communications that
did work and communications that did not
work and why.
Acts to determine, recognize, and resolve
misunderstandings.
Need Indicators
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Delivers an unclear goal or key message.
Provides information using a monotone
voice and few aids or devices to support
understanding.
 Uses a tone of voice that is
condescending.
 Mismatches the message to be delivered
and the communication medium.
 Takes a long time to express central ideas.
Underlying Causes
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Does not consider the audience well enough to choose words and delivery approach that will
connect with them.
Is not able to communicate the main message succinctly and clearly.
Is uncomfortable presenting information to others.
Matches a communication message with an inappropriate communication medium (e.g.,
delivering constructive criticism via email rather than face-to-face).
Does not have ample time to prepare the information that needs to be delivered.
Lacks social awareness.
68
Employs engaging
communication techniques
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Assess the individual or group to see if they are engaged in the information you are
conveying. Shift the angle of the conversation or the method of delivery based on verbal
and non-verbal cues.
Ask team members or subordinates to give you specific feedback on your ability to
deliver information in a way that is engaging and easily comprehensible. Ask how you
can improve.
During a presentation or meeting, ask your subordinates or team members direct and
specific questions about the information you are communicating.
Talk to your team members or subordinates about misunderstandings when they arise.
Analyze the reasons why a misunderstanding may have occurred.
Assess the best way to communicate with various individuals in your organization
including superiors, peers, and subordinates. Match your method with the individual.
Measure whether your subordinates and team members are absorbing the thoughts
and ideas you provide to them. Indicators may include: more eye contact, following
directions accurately, asking fewer questions for clarification, appearing more relaxed.
Observe an individual in your unit or a leader who always seems to “connect” when
communicating with others. Investigate how this person gains and retains the attention
of others and generates so much interest. What types of communication techniques
does he or she use?
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Seeking and Delivering Face-to-Face Feedback; Navigating
Contentious Conversations; Achieving Shared Understanding.
Communicate thoughts and ideas in a simple way that all staff understands using a
logical and sequential progression. Provide supporting details to prove your central idea.
Create “buzz” around new and exciting tasks that your unit is undertaking. Send emails
and have informal conversations with subordinates about the benefits of the new task.
Make sure that you convey enthusiasm for the new task both verbally (choosing active
versus passive words) and non-verbally (e.g., posture, tone, gestures).
Match your tone of voice with the information you have to deliver. For example, if your
unit will undergo a major change, use a tone that is direct, clear, and reassuring to your
team members and subordinates. If your unit is embarking on a new and innovative
task, use a tone that builds excitement and enthusiasm.
Employ a variety of techniques to ensure that your audience is engaged in the
information you are presenting, such as stories, anecdotes, and examples.
Use visual aids, when appropriate, to support your message. Make sure that visual aids
have a clear and direct relationship to the information being presented.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Communicates: Creates shared understanding
Prepares Self: Maintains self-awareness: employs self-understanding and recognizes impact on
others
69
Is sensitive to cultural factors
in communication
“Examine what is said not who speaks.”
-Arabian proverb
Component Overview
Cross-cultural awareness and understanding of how cultural factors can influence the success of
communications has long been an important competency for military leaders leading ethnically and
culturally diverse organizations. In recent years, the necessities of counterinsurgency, stability, and
unified action (formerly known as JIIM) operations have placed cross-cultural communications skills at
the center of operational success. Understanding cross-cultural factors and the ability to adjust
communication attempts to accommodate and capitalize on them are crucial in today’s operating
environment. That being said, it is important to note that Soldiers do not have to necessarily agree with
all of the cultural norms or practices, however, they MUST understand how those cultural values impact
interactions with individuals from that culture. For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22
Sections 5-12 to 5-13 and Table 6-5.
Strength Indicators
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Is sensitive to cultural variations in
communication and is willing and able to
accommodate or adapt to these variations.
 Maintains a wide-ranging awareness of
communication customs, expressions,
actions, and behaviors.
 Demonstrates respect for others regardless
of their culture, race, or ethnicity.
 Looks beyond surface features of the
individual or manner of communication to
discern the message and its meaning.
Need Indicators
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Stereotypes and makes generalizations
about individuals based on their culture,
race, or ethnicity.
 Avoids situations in which interacting with
other cultures is required.
 Assumes that individuals from other
cultures have the same values, priorities,
and worldview as Americans.
 Pushes personal beliefs, norms, and more
onto an individual from a different culture,
race, or ethnicity.
Underlying Causes
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Assumes that American views and understanding is correct and that other perspectives are
less developed or faulty.
Fears how individuals from different cultures will react to American cultural norms and
mores (moral attitudes).
Fears embarrassment or self-consciousness over not understanding or violating another
culture’s norms or mores.
Believes cultural differences are too great to permit creation of an advantageous alliance.
Does not have the time or inclination to focus on learning about a new culture.
Lacks exposure to other cultures.
Dwells on previous negative experience with individuals from another culture.
Does not understand, appreciate, or value the strength of diversity of thought.
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Is sensitive to cultural factors
in communication
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Connect with an individual, from a different culture, with whom you are comfortable, and
discuss the social norms, mores, and expectations. Have the individual provide you with
feedback on how effective and appropriate your interpersonal communications habits are
likely to be with other members of the individual’s culture.
Seek help from external resources (e.g., chaplains and counselors) for overcoming any deepseated biases you may have due to traumatic or negative experiences with individuals from
other cultures.
Take advantage of counterinsurgency field exercises to practice culturally appropriate
communications skills and receive feedback on their effectiveness.
Share what you have learned about other cultures with your peers and subordinates. Discuss
effective and ineffective approaches to cross-cultural communications.
Become a part of a club or professional association that fosters and encourages crosscultural understanding. Research opportunities by contacting cultural organizations and
asking about cross-cultural meet-ups.
Take a foreign language and culture course at a community college. Pay particular attention
to specific cultural norms and practices. Even highlight areas of cultural difference that are
common across all cultures [i.e., religion, sport, economic structure, gender difference,
power distance between superiors and subordinates (Hofstede’s Power Distance Index)].
Use resources and reference books to examine a culture’s history, society, religion,
governance, lifestyle, sports, business practices, current events, and other important aspects.
Observe and assess how others with extensive cross-cultural communication experience
conduct themselves when communicating across cultures. Look for attitudes, behaviors, and
methods that you can adopt.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Making Influence Count; Seeking and Incorporating Diverse Ideas;
Building Working Relationships Across Boundaries.
Make a genuine effort to communicate with an individual from a different culture by learning
and using culturally correct communication greetings, behaviors, forms, and patterns. Solicit
feedback to understand their interpretation of U.S. culture and your behavior.
Make a personal inventory of your own biases. Create and implement actionable steps to
reduce these issues.
Focus your awareness on how you evaluate others and what role their cultural differences
play in your evaluation. Attempt to evaluate people on an individual basis rather than based
on stereotypes of their culture.
Leverage active listening techniques, such as summarizing the main points of an individual’s
discussion after he or she has communicated them, to ensure mutual understanding.
Be on the lookout for possible misunderstanding or misinterpretation. Proactively consider
issues from other cultures’ perspective.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Prepares Self: Maintains relevant cultural awareness; Maintains relevant geopolitical awareness
Communicates: Listens actively
71
Communicates
Additional information
Cragan, J. F., Kasch, C. R., & Wright, D. W. (2009). Communication in small groups: Theory, process, and
skills (7th ed.). Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
Department of Defense (DoD). (2007, May 4). Department of Defense information sharing strategy.
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). (2008, April 18). Department of Homeland Security information
sharing strategy. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
Donoghue, P., & Siegel, M. (2005). Are you really listening? Keys to successful communication. Notre
Dame, IN: Sorin Books.
Doty, J. & Knotts, L. (2017, February). It’s time to encourage diversity of thought. Army Magazine, 11-13.
Gole, H.G. (2005). Soldiering: Observations from Korea, Vietnam, and safe places. Dulles, VA: Potomac
Books.
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations
across nations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Hofstede, G.J., Pederson, P., & Hofstede, G. (2002). Exploring culture: Exercises, stories, and synthetic
cultures. Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press.
Hoppe, M. (2006). Active listening: Improve your ability to listen and lead. Greensboro, NC: Center for
Creative Leadership.
Ibrahimov, M. (April/June 2011). Cross- Cultural Negotiations/Skill Building in an Operational
Environment. Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin. http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/
documents/cace/LREC/2011_CrossCulturalNegotiations.pdf
Lewis, R.D. (2006). When cultures collide: Leading across cultures. Boston, MA: Nicholas Brealey
International.
Perry, W.L & Moffat, J. (2004). Information sharing among Military headquarters: The effects on decision
making. Washington, DC: Rand Corporation.
Prince, D. W., & Hoppe, M. H. (2000). Communicating across cultures . Greensboro, NC: Center for
Creative Leadership.
Safko, L., & Brake, D. (2009). The social media bible: Tactics, tools, and strategies for business success.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Trompenaars, F., & Hampden-Turner, C. (2012). Riding the waves of culture: Understanding diversity in
global business (3rd. Revised ed.). Boston, MA: Nicholas Brealey Publishing.
US Army Culture, Regional Expertise and Language Management Office (CRELMO) website: http://
usacac.army.mil/organizations/cace/lrec.
72
Creates a Positive Environment/
Fosters esprit de corps (CPE)
Competency Overview
Leaders have the responsibility to establish and maintain positive expectations and attitudes that produce the
setting for healthy relationships and effective work behaviors. Leaders are charged with improving the
organization while accomplishing missions. They should leave the organization better than it was when they
arrived.
The competency Creates a Positive Environment/Fosters esprit de corps is composed of eight components:
Component
Page #
Fosters teamwork, cohesion, cooperation, and loyalty (esprit de
corps)
74
Encourages fairness and inclusiveness
76
Encourages open and candid communications
78
Creates a learning environment
80
Encourages subordinates to exercise initiative, accept
responsibility, and take ownership
82
Demonstrates care for follower well–being
84
Anticipates people’s on-the-job needs
86
Sets and maintains high expectations for individuals and teams
88
(Hold Ctrl and click on heading to jump to section)
73
Fosters teamwork, cohesion,
cooperation, and loyalty
(esprit de corps)
“The teams and staffs through which the modern commander absorbs information and exercises his
authority must be a beautifully interlocked, smooth-working mechanism. Ideally, the whole should be
practically a single mind.”
-General Dwight D. Eisenhower
Component Overview
A team is a group of individuals with complementary skills who are committed to a common purpose, set
of performance goals, and approach for which they hold themselves mutually accountable. Commitment
may not always be present from the start, but it is critical for team sustainability. The team also needs to
have a common purpose that is detailed enough so that all members can understand the what, how, and
who. For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 7-5 to 7-9 and Table 7-1.
Strength Indicators
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Encourages people to work together
effectively.
Promotes teamwork and team
achievement to build trust.
Draws attention to the consequences of
poor coordination.
Attributes mission success or failure to the
performance of the team.
Rapidly and effectively integrates new
members into the team.
Uses unit activities to build cohesion and
trust.
Encourages team members to take on
extra responsibilities for the betterment of
the unit.
Maximizes talents of all members of the
team.
Need Indicators
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Attributes mission success or failure to the
performance of individuals.
 Regularly provides the meaningful tasks
and assignments to high-performing or
experienced team members over new or
less experienced team members.
 Maximizes the skills and talents of only a
few team members.
 Permits team members to take
independent approaches to accomplishing
unit tasks.
Underlying Causes
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Places greater importance on individual contribution than team-based contribution.
Manages a unit or group that prefers to work individually rather than as a team.
Feels less comfortable guiding a team than guiding individuals.
Lacks a clear process for integrating new members into the unit and making them feel like
they are part of a team.
Lacks awareness of the talents and capabilities of team members.
Lacks trust in capabilities and dependability of team members.
Is overly narcissistic.
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Fosters teamwork, cohesion,
cooperation, and loyalty
(esprit de corps)
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Use in-process reviews (IPRs) and after-action reviews (AARs) to share feedback and
promote unit and team self-improvement. Share ways that the team could improve as a
whole rather than singling out individuals.
Articulate the strengths, limitations, preferences, and beliefs of your team members to
superiors. Act as an advocate to promote the interests and needs of your unit.
Seek feedback on how you work with your team members and subordinates in a way
that promotes accomplishment of your unit or organization’s mission, and how you
provide purpose, direction, and motivation to team members.
Self-assess your ability to manage your team. How do you facilitate teamwork and
cohesion? Do you support and guide team members through difficult situations?
Set aside time to become familiar with subordinates’ career goals. Ask your team
members and subordinates questions that treat them as individuals who you want to
see succeed.
Identify and utilize both informal and formal leaders within your unit. For example, your
unit may have an individual who team members respect and look up to. Examine why
this individual is viewed as a role model and seek ways to leverage this understanding to
build cohesion and teamwork within the unit.
Solicit recommended reading or documents on team building from trusted mentors and
from content experts within the Army
Identify and develop clear linkages between team training and higher unit missions and
success.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Rapid Team Stand-up: How to Build Your Team ASAP; Building
Trust; Fostering Team Unity.
Define and gain agreement on team missions, standards, and expectations. Have all
team members participate in this process so they buy into what is developed.
Identify and address negative intra-team conflict to minimize its effect on team
productivity and morale.
Identify and determine opportunities to highlight the task/role interdependencies of
your team and unit. Illustrate how a Soldier’s ability to successfully perform his or her
job depends on the performance of other Soldiers.
Acknowledge and celebrate team accomplishments and mission success to build
cohesion. Define success in terms of team accomplishment rather than individual
achievement.
Make a point of welcoming and transitioning new team members into the unit by
ensuring that their first few weeks go smoothly. Assign them a mentor or buddy and
touch base with them periodically.
Promote teamwork across units and discourages “Us-versus-Them” thinking and
behaviors. Reinforce and promote a sense of identity and pride among team members.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Creates a Positive Environment/Fosters esprit de corps: Encourages fairness and inclusiveness
Leads by Example: Seeks diverse ideas and points of view
Develops Others: Builds team or group skills and processes
75
Encourages fairness and
inclusiveness
“These men ask for just the same thing, fairness, and fairness only. This, so far as in my power, they, and
all others, shall have.”
-Abraham Lincoln
Component Overview
To build a positive climate, you should use consistent but flexible policies and viewpoints in your
treatment of others. While you should treat all team members and subordinates fairly and consistently,
not everyone will be treated exactly alike. Fairness means that no one gets preferential treatment, but
leaves leeway for team member and subordinate capabilities and needs. Inclusiveness means that all of
your team members and subordinates are absorbed into the organization, regardless of their differences.
For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Section 7-15 and Table 7-1.
Strength Indicators
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Applies the same guidance, requirements,
and policies to all team members and
subordinates in the organization.
Leverages skills and capabilities of team
members and subordinates without
providing preferential treatment.
Adheres to equal opportunity policies and
prevents harassment.
Encourages and supports diversity and
inclusiveness.
Actively seeks to integrate all team
members and subordinates into the unit.
Encourages learning about and leveraging
diversity.
Need Indicators
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Exempts a select few team members or
subordinates from duties.
Selects the same high-performing
members of the unit for almost all
developmental opportunities.
Prevents high-performers from attending
developmental opportunities (i.e.,
resident training or education) because
they are too valuable to the unit mission.
Grants permission for training and
professional development only to unit
members who need improvement.
Allows groups or teams to isolate
individuals they do not like or who have
difficulty fitting in.
Saddles burden on high performers.
Underlying Causes
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Gravitates to certain team members and subordinates and wants to provide them with
opportunities for development.
Does not successfully balance the need to develop subordinates with the need to accomplish
the mission.
Uses favoritism as a tool to retain team members and subordinates.
Does not realize that team members or subordinates are isolating select members of the
team.
Conducts an incomplete assessment of the capabilities of some groups or individuals.
76
Encourages fairness and
inclusiveness
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Dedicate time during the normal duty day to hold one-on-one meetings with your
subordinates and ask about their feelings regarding fairness in your unit. Do they believe
only a select few get opportunities? Are some assigned tasks that lead to more
development than others?
If a team member or subordinate mentions that you are unfair, ask about his or her
feelings. Let him or her speak their mind. Reflect upon what they said to you and ask
yourself if their views have merit. Seek out a trusted subordinate (e.g., NCO or junior
officer) to solicit their input regarding your potential lack of fairness.
Consult with a trusted subordinate to discover biases that members of the unit may
hold towards individuals in the unit (e.g., based on their character, personality, religion,
race, ethnicity, or culture). Discuss the biases and devise strategies to overcome them.
Create an action plan with specific tactics detailing how you can make your unit more
fair and inclusive. Document your progress towards your goals on a monthly basis.
Set aside time to familiarize yourself with policies related to equal opportunity and
harassment that outline your team members and subordinates’ responsibilities.
Apply guidance, requirements, and policies to the roles and responsibilities of each team
member. Document how you applied the policy or guidance on a piece of paper in case
you need to reference or communicate it later to someone else.
Participate in a training course or read reference material on how to create an inclusive
environment. Document how specific information pertains to your organization.
Reflect upon your record of selecting subordinates for developmental assignments and
opportunities (including approving and sending subordinates to resident training and
education). Was your approach fair?
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Seeking and Incorporating Diverse Ideas; Building Trust.
Lead by example by treating others the way you want to be treated. Favoritism makes
team members and subordinates feel that they are not important contributors to the
unit. Invest your time and effort in all of your team members and subordinates to
develop them.
Create a succession plan for key positions in your organization. Develop a pool of
individuals who could fill the positions in case some do not work as you hoped.
Inclusiveness starts with the team members who are already in the environment.
Directly challenge the barriers to inclusiveness in your unit. Does your unit have certain
individuals who do not mesh well with the group? What are the barriers preventing
them from successfully “fitting-in” with the group?
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Gets Results: Recognizes and rewards good performance; Makes feedback part of work processes;
Identifies and accounts for capabilities and commitment to task
Creates a Positive Environment/Fosters esprit de corps: Encourages open and candid
communications
Builds trust: Takes direct actions to build trust; Sustains a climate of trust
77
Encourages open and candid
communications
“Seek first to understand, then to be understood.”
-Stephen Covey
Component Overview
As a good leader, you should encourage collaboration through open and candid communications to
create an environment where others feel free to contribute and know that their ideas and input are
valued. Creating an open environment is a key to developing a unit that is capable of reacting to change.
As a leader that values and reinforces open and candid communications in your unit, you should show
respect for team member and subordinate opinions, recognize others’ viewpoints, and encourage input
and feedback. For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Section 7-16 and Table 7-1.
Strength Indicators
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Reinforces the importance of expressing
contrary and minority viewpoints as a way
to guard against groupthink.
Remains calm, objective, and facts-focused
when receiving potentially bad news.
Encourages input and feedback especially
during times of change.
Shows respect for team member and
subordinate opinions even if you do not
agree with them.
Communicates positive attitude to
encourage others and improve morale.
Displays appropriate reactions to new or
conflicting information or opinions.
Guards against groupthink.
Need Indicators
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Demeans team member and subordinate
opinions either consciously or
subconsciously.
 Halts conversation when it appears to be
moving towards a change in the unit’s
processes or practices.
 Reacts viscerally or angrily when receiving
bad news or conflicting information.
 Shares information and understanding
with only select favorites who disseminate
information to the rest of the unit.
Underlying Causes
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Has a concern that too much open communication can lead to “too much talking and not
enough doing.”
Wants to stay true to the current direction of the unit that has been provided by superiors.
Has too many simultaneous tasks moving forward to take time to hear others’ ideas.
Does not fully understand the relationship between an open environment and the ability to
adapt to change.
Has difficulty adapting (emotionally and cognitively) to unforeseen problems, bad news, or
conflicting information.
Feels the need to control information.
Is overly narcissistic.
78
Encourages open and candid
communications
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Hold monthly meetings where your unit shares information and provides the status on
their tasks.
Hold a brainstorming session or forum with team members and subordinates to discuss
possible solutions to barriers currently impeding the progress of the task. Ask team
members and subordinates for their opinion on how to remove the barriers.
Hold regular unit meetings to discuss internal operations and ongoing issues. Stress
taking initiative, underwriting honest mistakes, and continuous improvement.
Make sure that team members and subordinates feel comfortable presenting their
thoughts and ideas. If team members or subordinates are uncomfortable
communicating their ideas, hold one-on-one conversations to seek their feedback and
input into the process.
Lead by example. Ask for feedback from your team members and subordinates on your
ideas. If they come up with a good idea or insight, incorporate it into your new initiative.
Observe a leader whose unit has an open communications environment. Watch what
the leader does, and incorporate ideas into your practices.
Take a course on soliciting input and open communications. Make sure the course has
hands-on examples and scenarios so you can practice improving your skills.
Reflect upon your communication style with others in your organization (including
superiors, team members, and subordinates) and whether it was conducive to the open
and candid flow of information and ideas. Note things that you can improve and work to
incorporate these changes into future communications.
Read a reference book or other resource to learn how to effectively foster an open
communications environment (see Fritz, 2012).
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Seeking and Incorporating Diverse Ideas; Seeking and Delivering
Face-to-Face Feedback; Navigating Contentious Conversations; The Leader as Follower.
Make an effort to know your superiors, peers, and subordinates. Showing interest lets
them know they are valued as members of the unit beyond the work they produce.
Demonstrate to team members and subordinates that their ideas are valued and an
important component to unit success.
Demonstrate results by empowering team members and subordinates when they come
up with a good idea. Ensure that you communicate that your unit will be implementing
their idea.
Recognize team members and subordinates for a job well-done at meetings or events.
Conduct regular informal discussions with subordinates to solicit their ideas for how to
address problems and improve processes. Reinforce and cultivate opinions or views that
may be outside of the mainstream or typical responses.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Communicates: Listens actively; Creates shared understanding
Creates a Positive Environment/Fosters esprit de corps: Fosters teamwork, cohesion, cooperation, and
loyalty (esprit de corps); Encourages subordinates to exercise initiative, accept responsibility, and take
ownership
Builds trust: Takes direct actions to build trust; Sustains a climate of trust
79
Creates a learning environment
“To raise new questions, new problems, to regard old problems from a new angle requires creative
imagination and makes real advances.”
-Albert Einstein
Component Overview
The Army seeks to constantly reinvent, reinvigorate, and renew its processes in order to more efficiently
and effectively accomplish its strategic mission. In order to do so, it depends on the experiences of its
people and organizations to contribute to a climate that values and supports learning. By both
acknowledging and embracing the importance of learning, you, as a leader, ensure that the Army actively
fosters both a culture dedicated to lifelong learning and a cadre of leaders within it who possess a thirst
for knowledge and innovation. For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 7-17 to
7-19 and Table 7-1.
Strength Indicators
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Uses effective assessment and training
methods.
Challenges how organization operates,
especially those processes that are only
done in a certain manner “because they’ve
always been done that way.”
Discards techniques or procedures that
have outlived their purpose.
Regularly expresses the value of seeking
counsel and expert advice.
Encourages leaders and their subordinates
to reach their full potential.
Motivates and stimulates innovative and
critical thinking in others.
Seeks new approaches to problems.
Need Indicators
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Puts the onus on other leaders to take full
responsibility for the development of their
subordinates.
Adopts a “go at it alone” mentality, and
fosters an individualistic unit climate.
Allows no room for deviation or
innovation.
Holds on to techniques or procedures,
regardless of their utility, efficiency, or
effectiveness.
Accepts outcomes as they are and moves
on to the next task.
Fails to seek advice or counsel from others
when facing a new or complex task.
Underlying Causes
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Is unaware of or unwilling to improve the effectiveness of assessment and training methods.
Believes that no matter what example he/she sets, subordinates will not seek selfdevelopment opportunities.
Fears change and the possible difficulties and turmoil that come with putting new techniques
or procedures in place.
Feels that effective leaders are “take charge” and are “decision makers.”
Believes that seeking advice or counsel is a sign of weakness and lack of expertise.
80
Creates a learning environment
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Informally ask members of your unit why processes are done certain ways. Identify
processes that appear to be performed a certain way for no apparent reason.
Brainstorm ways to improve these processes.
Ask members of your unit about processes or techniques that frustrate them. Encourage
them to think of a more effective way of getting the job done. Demonstrate that you
value their feedback by incorporating their suggestions, as appropriate.
Have a conversation with your superior about your unit environment. Ask if he/she feels
that it currently supports learning, or if there are ways that it could be more supportive.
Gather “lessons learned” from recent tasks to improve their execution in the future.
Make a habit of asking yourself why you perform processes or activities a certain way. If
the best answer that you can come up with is “because I’ve always done it that way,” it
may be time to reconsider your approach.
Ask other unit leaders what assessment and training techniques they are using.
Document these techniques, and evaluate which ones would work best in your unit.
Think about great Army leaders who inspire you. Highlight any of their actions that
helped to advance the Army as a “learning organization.” Use these actions to spur
insights that may be able to relate or incorporate with your unit.
Choose one process in your unit to study. Document exactly how it is done, from start to
finish. Then identify areas where the process may hit “roadblocks.” Brainstorm possible
solutions to either get over the roadblocks or circumvent them.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: The Leader's Role in Providing On-the-Job Learning and Support;
Supporting the Developing Leader; Library of 13 Counseling/Coaching Videos.
Conduct periodic brainstorming sessions with groups of subordinates to think through
likely problems the unit may face and guide the discussion as an opportunity to
reinforce the idea of creative sharing and the importance of others’ advice and counsel.
While performing normal duties, identify processes or procedures within your unit that
seem slow or inefficient. Identify and incorporate new methods to increase efficiency.
Set a self-development example by communicating opportunities related to
developmental activities or training. Share your experience from a developmental
activity or training with your team members and subordinates.
During your next unit briefing, consciously make an effort to include information about
the importance of interacting with others and seeking counsel. Couch it in the context of
the Army’s organization-wide commitment to lifelong learning.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Communicates: Creates shared understanding
Prepares Self: Analyzes and organizes information to create knowledge; Expands conceptual and
interpersonal capabilities
Develops Others: Facilitates ongoing development
Gets results: Makes feedback part of work processes; Seeks, recognizes, and takes advantage of
opportunities to improve performance
Stewards the profession: Supports professional and personal growth; Improves the organization
81
Encourages subordinates to
exercise initiative, accept
responsibility, and take ownership
“Do you want to know who you are? Don’t ask. Act! Action will delineate and define you.”
-Thomas Jefferson
Component Overview
As a leader, one of the greatest challenges is to encourage subordinates to exercise initiative, accept
responsibility, and take ownership. Subordinates may hesitate to step forward and express their
technical knowledge or provide factual information because they fear being told they are wrong or do
not want to take on an additional task. It is your responsibility to build confidence in a subordinate’s
ability to solve problems, set the conditions that foster taking initiative, and encourage input from
anyone with an understanding of the applicable subject matter. For more information on this component
see ADRP 6-22 Sections 7-29 to 7-30 and Table 7-1.
Strength Indicators
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Encourages subordinates to explore new
approaches to a problem.
Pushes decision making to the lowest
appropriate level to encourage
subordinate responsibility and
empowerment.
Involves others in decisions and keeps
them informed of consequences that affect
them.
Provides subordinates with their “own
piece of the task” to ensure ownership and
accountability.
Guides team members and subordinates in
thinking through problems for themselves.
Reinforces and rewards initiative in
individuals and teams.
Need Indicators
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Hesitates to consider or incorporate
subordinates’ suggestions into the unit
tasks.
Defines the course for most tasks without
consulting team members or experienced
subordinates.
Uses only “tried and true” approaches to
solving problems or completing tasks.
Uses only the same small cadre of team
members to support decision making.
Takes time to inform a team member or
subordinate on how to perform all aspects
of a specific task.
Treats Soldiers’ honest mistakes as things
that must be avoided/prevented—not as
opportunities to learn.
Underlying Causes
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Is satisfied with the status quo; does not seek to improve the unit.
Feels a lack of control when decision making authority is delegated to subordinates.
Has insufficient time to help subordinates think through problems.
Has trouble trusting the judgment abilities of others.
Feels that subordinates are not stepping up to take on new opportunities and challenges.
Feels that mission or task success is compromised when decision making is delegated to
lower levels.
Is overly controlling.
Does not understand the value of Mission Command.
82
Encourages subordinates to
exercise initiative, accept
responsibility, and take ownership
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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When a new task is presented, interview a handful of team members or subordinates
who are interested in the role. Select the best subordinate .
At the beginning of a new task, hold a brainstorming session with team members and
subordinates to discuss possible solutions to barriers currently impeding task progress.
Ask team members and subordinates for their opinion on how to remove the barrier.
Hold regular unit meetings to discuss internal operations and ongoing issues. Stress
taking initiative, underwriting honest mistakes, and continuous improvement.
Periodically check-in with team members and subordinates to ensure they are
comfortable with their current task responsibilities. Make sure they do not feel
overwhelmed making critical decisions.
Take a course or training on delegation and implement learned techniques on-the-job.
Consult a coach or mentor to discuss your delegating skills. Create a list of tangible
practices that you can incorporate on-the-job.
Observe a peer or superior who is adept at delegating responsibility to subordinates.
Examine the process they use for selecting subordinates to complete tasks and how they
communicate the responsibility and expectations.
Allocate time to create a “wish list” of initiatives that you as a leader would like to take
on. Share the list with your team members and subordinates and discuss how to make
some of those “wish list” items a reality.
Read a reference book or article to learn about effectively encouraging subordinates to
exercise initiative, accept responsibility, and take ownership (see Bass, 1996).
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Supporting the Developing Leader; Creating and Supporting
Challenging Job Assignments; Enabling Subordinates Using Mission-Focused Delegation.
Leverage teams with diverse backgrounds and experience to attack new and complex
problems and operations. Encourage trial and error for solutions that are not obvious.
Delegate stretch assignments to subordinates. Match the size and complexity of the task
to the skill-level and potential of each person.
Monitor delegated tasks, but do not micromanage. Use progress-related milestones or
in-process reviews (IPRs) and touch base to ensure that progress is successful. This
encourages subordinates to ask questions and discuss challenges.
Have subordinates define what taking initiative and ownership mean to them. Discuss
their responses one-on-one and create or provide opportunities to help them develop.
Conduct periodic brainstorming sessions with groups of subordinates to think through
likely problems the unit may face; guide the discussion as Soldiers think through
problems and probe to identify potential barriers that individuals or teams may have in
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Creates a Positive Environment/Fosters esprit de corps: Encourages open and candid communications; Sets
and maintains high expectations for individuals and teams; Creates a learning environment
Builds Trust: Sustains a climate of trust
Gets results: Prioritizes, organizes, and coordinates taskings for teams or other organizational structures/
groups; Identifies and accounts for capabilities and commitment to task; Designates, clarifies, and deconflicts
roles
Develops others: Builds team or group skills and processes
83
Demonstrates care for
follower well-being
“Remember that leaders aren’t made leaders because they are college graduates Leaders are invariably
made leaders because they are caring and concerned about people.”
––SP4 Mickey Howen
Component Overview
As an Army leader, you should cultivate both physical and mental health by being both logical and clearheaded when making decisions. As a leader who emphasizes mental and physical health and well-being,
you inspire confidence in your direct reports, who see you as an example of how to balance the inherent
stresses of both personal and professional life. Reducing stress and improving physical fitness are
excellent tactics for avoiding sickness, promoting mental clarity, and encouraging similar behavior in
direct reports. For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 7-31 and Table 7-1.
Strength Indicators
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Ensures subordinates’ and their families’
health, welfare, and development are
provided for.
Routinely monitors morale and encourages
honest feedback.
Sets a personal example for colleagues.
Nurtures long-term well-being through
rigorous training and preparation.
Understands and nurtures individual
subordinates’ intrinsic motivators.
Tells a subordinate to go home when they
have been working long hours.
Gives subordinate time off during the work
day to take care of family matters.
Need Indicators
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Unwilling to negotiate with or tell
superiors “no” when the unit is
overburdened or at the breaking point.
Fails to provide for family and individual
support needs.
Takes credit for unit success and/or allows
unfair blame to fall on subordinates when
failures are experienced.
Ignores morale indicators and promotes
overly optimistic feedback.
Does not endure/share in the hardships
experienced by Soldiers.
Coddles subordinates with easy or
comfortable training.
Underlying Causes
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Wishes to avoid controversial or critical decision-making.
Wants to please, impress, and create a positive impression to superiors (i.e., does not want
to decline taskings).
Focuses on accomplishing the short-term mission without sufficient concern for the longterm needs and well-being of Soldiers and their families.
Expects more of subordinates than of oneself.
Values personal relationships over the health, welfare, and safety of the unit or team.
Expects that subordinates will be self-sufficient or capable of addressing issues
independently.
Lacks empathy - Is overly narcissistic.
84
Demonstrates care for
follower well-being
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Encourage peers and subordinates to share their candid opinions, reiterating that you
welcome different perspectives.
Speak with your team and their families to determine how you can better serve them.
Solicit feedback on specific issues that may be affecting morale. Communicate to your
subordinates that you are seeking their assistance in developing a full understanding of
the issues.
Ask subordinates to explain the range of perspectives on an issue rather than only
providing their opinions.
Discuss with your team how training exercises can be improved to better meet specific
objectives.
Seek feedback from trusted senior subordinates regarding their perceptions of the
welfare and morale of the unit—including families. Identify potential stressors or
factors negatively affecting the unit and work with the trusted subordinates to identify
ways to address these stressors.
Observe the behaviors of other leaders who you admire. Note how these leaders make
difficult decisions that balance the welfare of Soldiers with mission accomplishment?
In addition to maintaining your knowledge and awareness of Army programs, identify
and investigate programs offered by local communities and social service organizations
that may be of help to your Soldiers and their families.
Regularly reflect upon your actions in terms of balancing the welfare of Soldiers and
their families with accomplishing the mission. When your actions fail to maintain this
balance, reflect upon what motivated you to act as you did?
Question the value of your training exercises. Are they rigorous for rigor’s sake, or do
they serve a specific objective, such as safer or more efficient operations?
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete the following developmental
material: Seeking and Delivering Face-to-Face Feedback.
Set aside social time with subordinates, peers, and their families. These activities can
help you develop compassion and provide insight for ways to help meet their needs.
Draft a statement of how you want your unit to be treated. When your unit’s treatment
doesn’t live up to your standards, list objectives for improvement you can work to
implement.
Create a record of each time you are about to rebuke a peer or subordinate for failing to
live up to set standards. In the record, include a memory of the last time you failed to
live up to the same standard.
Ask subordinates and peers to speak to their understanding of the reasons for specific
training exercises. If your staff understands the links among training, safety, and
effectiveness, they will likely respect the rigor of their training.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Leads Others: Balances mission and welfare of followers
Creates a Positive Environment/Fosters esprit de corps: Anticipates people’s on-the-job needs; Encourages
open and candid communications
Develops Others: Counsels, coaches, and mentors
Gets results: Identifies and accounts for capabilities and commitment to task; Makes feedback part of work
processes; Identifies and adjusts to external influences on the mission and organization
85
Anticipates people’s
on-the-job needs
“It is better to have it and not need it than to need it and not have it.”
-Gerard Patrick Roeling
Component Overview
To anticipate your team member and subordinates’ on-the-job needs, you should be aware of each
individual’s responsibilities, duties, strengths, current workload, as well as their professional interests
and goals. In addition, you should become aware of their strengths and developmental needs to provide
you with a holistic understanding of both where the individual currently is and where he or she wants to
be. Attempt to match subordinates with tasks and opportunities that not only foster career and
professional development, but that also align with their interests and motivations. For more information
on this component see ADRP 6-22 Table 7-1.
Strength Indicators
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Recognizes and monitors subordinates’
current jobs, duties, strengths, and
developmental needs to obtain a baseline
of performance.
 As part of formal counseling sessions or via
informal conversations with subordinates,
discusses and verifies professional
interests and goals.
 Interacts and collaborates with
subordinates frequently to ensure their
roles and responsibilities are clear and that
their job satisfaction and morale are high.
 Assigns roles based on unit members’
interests, motivation, strengths, and
developmental needs against mission
tasks.
Need Indicators
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Does not attempt to account for team
member and subordinate developmental
needs, professional interests, job
satisfaction, or morale in assigning jobs or
tasks.
 Resources projects without a clear
commitment that the expectations can be
met within the timetable required.
 Interacts with and observes staff
infrequently.
 Just does it and does not analyze the
mission and risk.
Underlying Causes
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Assumes individuals are “cut from the same mold” in terms of having the same interests and
motivators.
Allocates insufficient time to become aware of subordinates’ professional interests,
motivation, strengths, and developmental needs.
Believes the role of a leader is to tell people what to do without telling them why.
Places the mission first at the expense of other considerations.
Does not consider individual and unit morale when assigning individual and unit tasks.
86
Anticipates people’s
on-the-job needs
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Set aside time to ask subordinates to discuss their job responsibilities. Make sure their
understanding of their job responsibilities is the same as yours. Reconcile any differences
through conversations with the subordinate.
Conduct periodic meetings with trusted staff to discuss and gather feedback regarding
the morale of the unit (including the morale of individuals within the unit), ways that job
requirements and job structure may be influencing morale, and ways to better anticipate
the on-the-job needs of unit staff.
Conduct debriefs after the task/mission is complete to compare the performance with
the indicators of success and failure, discuss learning opportunities, and focus on problem
-solving regarding any mistakes made.
Have periodic discussions with subordinates to discuss their current jobs, duties, and
professional interests and goals, and how well their current job duties are aligned with
their professional goals.
Assess current jobs against the mission to identify tasks required, knowledge, skills, and
abilities (KSAs) that the mission and task require, and KSAs that the mission or tasks are
likely to develop.
Determine whether any additional support will be needed, such as resources, a mentor,
or extra time to complete the task.
Identify and provide resources to team members and subordinates, such as job aids and
other decision support tools, to help make task achievement easier and more stress-free.
During normal operations, make a point of observing team members and subordinates
performing their job duties in attempting to gauge motivation and morale levels as they
performing their job duties.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: The Leader's Role in Providing On-the-Job Learning and Support;
Out of Time: Managing Competing Demands; Supporting the Developing Leader;
Every Leader as a Coach.
Assign roles to team members and subordinates only after considering the unit member’s
strengths, developmental needs, and professional interests against mission tasks. Assign
team members to roles that give them a challenge that will help with growth,
development, and gaining confidence in their skills.
Communicate your expectations to unit members about assigned tasks. Be upfront about
your intentions of why this is a learning opportunity.
Create opportunities for on-the-job learning by pairing team experts with novices.
Weigh the criticality and time available to accomplish a task. If time permits, adjust the
pace and personnel involved to balance individual development with meeting the
objective.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Leads Others: Balances mission with welfare of followers
Gets Results: Identifies and accounts for capabilities and commitment to task; Identifies, contends
for, allocates, and manages resources
Develops Others: Assesses developmental needs of others; Facilitates ongoing development
Stewards the Profession: Supports professional and personal growth
87
Sets and maintains high
expectations for individuals
and teams
“High achievement always takes place in the framework of high expectations.”
-Charles F. Kettering
Component Overview
Leaders sometimes focus considerable energy on annual performance reviews and do not give sufficient
attention to providing guidance and establishing expectations during the course of a rating period.
Providing direction and setting expectations are crucial to getting the best results and promoting
professional and career development. When setting expectations with your team members and
subordinates, make sure that your stated expectations are connected to the objectives of the unit and
mission, clearly expressed, and mutually agreed upon. For more information on this component see
ADRP 6-22 Sections 7-5 to 7-7 and Table 7-1.
Strength Indicators
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Clearly articulates expectations for
subordinates and teams.
Expects good performance and does not
accept poor performance.
Provides recognition of superior
performance.
Identifies poor performance and attempts
to understand and address its cause.
Touches base frequently with the
individual or unit regarding their ability to
meet the standard.
Ensures that expectations are clearly tied
to the goals and objectives of the unit and
mission.
Need Indicators
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Only sets expectations once per year
during the team member or subordinate’s
performance review.
Touches base infrequently with team
members regarding how they are meeting
the expectations and standard.
Determines expectations for the team
member or subordinates without
discussion or consultation.
Does not communicate individual and
team expectations.
Provides expectations to subordinates or
teams half-way through the task rather
than at the beginning.
Underlying Causes
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Feels uncomfortable discussing areas for improvement and delivering feedback.
Is unclear what expectations for team members and subordinates at different levels should
look like.
Has not allocated an appropriate amount of time to touching base with individuals or teams
regarding expectations.
Believes the unit leader should articulate his or her expectations to unit members rather
than obtaining acceptance and buy-in from unit members regarding the expectations.
Does not clearly understand how expectations of subordinates and teams are tied to the
organization and unit’s mission.
88
Sets and maintains high
expectations for individuals
and teams
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Have a peer review the performance expectations you developed for subordinates or
team leaders. Tell them to review the document with a critical eye to ensure that it is
reasonable given the current environment of the Army.
Discuss the expectations your unit set and assign “stretch tasks” to willing individuals or
teams. When you assign the tasks, make sure that the individuals can visualize how to
achieve the goals. If they cannot visualize how to achieve the goals, then they will not be
able to define a path forward.
Periodically assess how the measurement of performance expectations is going. Ensure
that the data and measures are accurately assessing performance against the
expectations.
Study other organizations’ performance expectations in the military, public, and private
sectors and develop a list of best practices based on what you learned.
Ensure that you have a firm understanding of the organization’s mission and goals. Also,
ensure that you understand and can discuss your unit’s mission and goals. This should
function as a refresher for you to make sure you are on the right page.
Examine if your unit has a process for goal setting, evaluation, feedback and
accountability that lets team members and subordinates know how they are doing.
Read a reference book or resource on how to develop—in collaboration with unit
members—clear, highly challenging, yet achievable goals (see Dobson & Wilson, 2008).
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Creating and Supporting Challenging Job Assignments; Creating
and Promulgating a Vision of the Future.
Develop expectations for your subordinates or teams together. This should not be a
“management only” task.
Develop useful measures for performance expectations that are agreed upon by the
entire team. Measures should be consistent for all subordinates and teams and should
assess their capabilities related to the task at hand.
Encourage your team members and subordinates to stretch themselves to reach for
new goals during their performance reviews. Ask yourself how you know it is a stretch?
Make sure that definitions of the performance expectations are clear and not open to
interpretation. Remember to make them specific and write them down.
Develop a clear rewards and recognition system. The recognition should communicate
the behaviors and actions that you expected from your team members and
subordinates.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Leads Others: Enforces standards
Gets Results: Identifies and accounts for capabilities and commitment to task; Recognizes and
rewards good performance; Seeks, recognizes, and takes advantage of opportunities to improve
performance
Communicates: Creates shared understanding
89
Creates a Positive
Environment
Additional Information
MSAF Virtual Improvement Center (VIC). https://msaf.army.mil/My360/VIC/Default.aspx
Blanchard, K.H., Edington, D.W., & Blanchard, M. (2004). The one-minute manager balances work and
life. London, UK: HarperCollins.
Bolton, R., & Bolton, D. (2009) People styles at work (2nd ed.). New York, NY: AMACOM.
Burchell, M., & Robin, J. (2010). The great workplace: How to build it, how to keep it, and why it matters.
New York, NY: Wiley.
Connor, M., & Clawson, J. (2004). Creating a learning culture: Strategy, technology, and practice.
Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
Dobson, M.S., & Wilson, S.B. (2008). Goal setting: How to create an action plan and achieve your goals
(2nd ed.). New York, NY: American Management Association.
Fritz, J.M.H. (2012). Professional civility: Communicative virtue at work. New York, NY: Peter Lang
Publishing, Inc.
Heath, R. (2009). Celebrating failure: The power of making mistakes, taking risks, and thinking big.
Franklin Lakes, NJ: Career Press.
Lawler, E. E., Mohrman, S. A., & Benson, G. (2001). Organizing for high performance. San Francisco, CA:
Jossey-Bass.
Lencioni, P. (2002). The five dysfunctions of a team. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons.
Manz, C. (2002). The power of failure: 27 ways to turn life’s setbacks into success. San Francisco, CA:
Berrett-Koehler Publishers.
Peyton, P. R. (2003). Dignity at work: Eliminating bullying and create a positive working environment.
New York, NY: Brunner-Routledge.
Pink, D. (2011). Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us. New York, NY: Riverhead Books.
Schein, E.H. (2004). Organizational culture and leadership (3rd ed.). New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons.
Selladurai, R., & Carraher, S. (Ed.) (2014). Servant leadership: Research and practice. Hershey, PA:
Business Science Reference.
U.S., Department of the Army. (2003, October). FM 7-21.13, The soldier’s guide. Washington, DC,
Government Printing Office.
U.S., Department of the Army. (2006, October). Soldier Training Publication No. 21-1-SMCT; Task 805CPAD-1245, Support Unit and Family Readiness Through the Army Family Team Building (AFTB) Program,
Washington, DC, Government Printing Office. p. 3-43.
90
Prepares Self (PS)
Competency Overview
Leaders ensure they are prepared to execute their leadership responsibilities fully. They are aware of their
limitations and strengths and seek to develop themselves. Leaders maintain physical fitness and mental wellbeing. They continue to improve the domain knowledge required of their leadership roles and their profession.
Only through continuous preparation for missions and other challenges, being aware of self and situations and
practicing lifelong learning and development can an individual fulfill the responsibilities of leadership.
The competency Prepares Self is composed of seven components:
Component
Page #
Maintains mental and physical health and well-being
92
Expands knowledge of technical, technological, and tactical areas
94
Expands conceptual and interpersonal capabilities
96
Analyzes and organizes information to create knowledge
98
Maintains relevant cultural awareness
100
Maintains relevant geopolitical awareness
102
Maintains self-awareness: employs self understanding and recognizes
impact on others
104
(Hold Ctrl and click on heading to jump to section)
91
Maintains mental and physical
health and well-being
“I am obliged to sweat them tonight, sir, so that I can save their blood tomorrow.”
-General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson
Component Overview
Army leaders cultivate comprehensive fitness through both physical and mental health and make logical
and clear-headed decisions. They inspire confidence in their followers and set the example of how to
balance the inherent stresses of both personal and professional life. Reducing stress and improving
physical fitness are tactics for avoiding sickness, promoting mental clarity, and encouraging similar
outcomes in others. For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 4-8 to 4-9 and
Table 7-2.
Strength Indicators
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Recognizes imbalance or inappropriateness
of one’s own actions.
Removes emotions from decision making.
Seeks work/life balance.
Applies logic and reason to make decisions
when interacting with emotionally charged
individuals.
Recognizes the sources of stress and
maintains appropriate levels of challenge
to motivate self.
Takes part in regular exercise, leisure
activities, and time away from routine
work.
Stays focused on life priorities and values.
Exhibits resiliency characteristics.
Need Indicators
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Avoids physical activity.
Frequently abandons sleep for other
activities.
Perpetuates a deadline-based
environment that leaves no time for
relaxation.
Engages in unhealthy eating or drinking
habits.
Uses tobacco products or misuses legal or
illegal drugs or other substances.
Allows personal emotions to drive
decisions or guide responses to
emotionally charged situations.
Tries to deny, ignore, or push through
stress.
Underlying Causes
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Is overwhelmed by workload or responsibility.
Practices poor time management.
Keeps emotions contained and does not find opportunities to release them.
Lacks experience in new job tasks.
Believes that being a Soldier or leader means that he or she should be able to endure or be
immune to high levels of stress.
Lacks emotional intelligence.
92
Maintains mental and physical
health and well-being
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Get periodic health examinations to assess indicators of physical health and stress, as
well as lifestyle factors that may affect physical and mental health. Obtain guidance on
corrective actions from healthcare and diet professionals.
Ask a trusted leader in your organization to give you feedback on your performance in
handling emotionally-charged issues or decisions. Are you able to remain logical and
objective, or do your emotions drive your decisions? How might you handle these
situations better?
Use a trusted family member or friend as a sounding board to give you feedback on your
perception and interpretation of events as well as your plans and intended actions.
Observe the behaviors of other leaders who you admire. How do these leaders handle
their stress? Make a list of the methods they use that you would like to try.
Reflect on an incident in which stress disrupted your performance. How could you have
dealt with the stress better? Consider a high-pressure incident that you handled well.
What allowed you to deal effectively with the stress?
Analyze your diet by keeping a list of the foods you consume over a one-week period.
Identify unhealthy foods (e.g., high fat, salt, or calories) in your diet and healthier
alternatives that you can adopt.
Reflect on your values and priorities to build a clear sense of direction and perspective.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete the following developmental
material: The Value of Self-Awareness; Seeking and Delivering Face-to-Face Feedback.
Exercise for 30 minutes or more several times per week. Make aerobic exercise or sport
a main component of your exercise to maintain cardiovascular health and reduce stress.
To help you maintain interest , be sure to include a variety of activities (e.g., favorite
sports, exercise with friends).
Make time every day to organize your activities. Use lists to prioritize what needs to be
done, track progress, identify accomplishments, and practice time management.
Socialize with others, and maintain friendships.
Find a trusted family member or friend to serve as a sounding board, someone with
whom you can discuss concerns and issues.
Reduce or eliminate alcohol and tobacco consumption.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Leads by Example: Seeks diverse ideas and points of view; Displays character; Exemplifies the
warrior ethos; Leads with confidence in adverse situations
Communicates: Creates shared understanding
Creates a Positive Environment/Fosters esprit de corps: Encourages fairness and inclusiveness;
Encourages open and candid communications; Demonstrates care for follower well-being
Leads others: Enforces standards
Prepares Self: Maintains self-awareness: employs self-understanding and recognizes impact on
others
93
Expands knowledge of technical,
technological, and tactical areas
“Concern for man and his fate must always form the chief interest of all technical endeavors.
Never forget this In the midst of your diagrams and equations.”
-Albert Einstein
Component Overview
Technical knowledge consists of specialized understanding of a particular function or system. Army
leaders are responsible for leveraging both individual and collective specialized knowledge to complete
the mission. They must expand their skills in technical, technological, and tactical areas. This requires an
understanding of how functional components are related as well as the requirements for training and
logistical planning to support technical operations. Army leaders capitalize on opportunities to share
knowledge across an organization, especially to leverage their subordinate’s knowledge to educate
others on technical and tactical details. Army leaders also must maintain awareness of new trends and
emerging technologies that are available and how they can best be applied. For more information on this
component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 7-39 to 7-41 and Table 7-2.
Strength Indicators
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Seeks knowledge of systems, equipment,
capabilities, and situations, particularly
information technology systems.
Encourages understanding of systems.
Considers how systems affect doctrine,
tactics, organizational design, training,
related material, personnel, and facilities.
Embraces efforts that share knowledge
across and between organizations.
Encourages subordinates to share their
specialized skills and knowledge.
Adapts to new technologies, learning the
special capabilities and shortcomings
technical systems offer.
Need Indicators
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Does not locate and attend to information
on new trends, developments, ideas, and
technologies that are relevant to or
provide context for organizational
requirements.
Views equipment and technologies in
isolation without understanding how they
integrate or combine to operate as a
system.
Sees no personal need to understand
technology and technological
developments.
Hinders the exchange of knowledge
between personnel in the organization.
Overemphasizes or relies on a single tactic
or technical approach that has worked in
the past.
Underlying Causes
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Views technologies only in terms of their individual components; not practiced in systems
thinking.
Tries to avoid time and expense required to share or grow technical or tactical knowledge.
Is not comfortable with team changes brought on by knowledge sharing and innovation.
Is dubious about piloting new technologies or standards.
Prefers the status quo; hesitant to change a process or system that is already proven.
Is not open to new learning.
94
Expands knowledge of technical,
technological, and tactical areas
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Seek testing and certification in the use of relevant technologies and application of
technological competencies.
Practice the employment of tactics and technologies to address the requirements or
mission of your organization. Conduct AARs after each significant attempt to capture
the lessons of the experience and guide future attempts.
Request that technical staff provide their suggestions on operational and planning
details that should be addressed.
Request that other technical teams provide updates on their progress and challenges in
order to identify areas that might be able to build collaboration.
Read or engage in technical discussions to better understand how components and
processes combine to create systems and how these systems may be optimally designed
and employed.
Attend briefings, meetings, or courses that address pertinent technologies including the
effective uses and limitations of those technologies.
Capitalize on opportunities to share technical or tactical information with your
immediate work group or team. Run a professional development interest group or
forum that focuses on exchanging information and keeping up to date on technical and
tactical developments.
Engage in a professional reading program that includes books and journals that report
on tactical and technological developments and their employment to better address
operational requirements.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete the following developmental
material: The Value of Self-Awareness; Seeking and Incorporating Diverse Ideas;
Seeking and Delivering Face-to-Face Feedback.
Employ technologies, organization, people, and processes as an integrated system to
produce desired outcomes.
Draft a list of technological knowledge and skills that are key to your individual
performance and the functioning of your organization. Implement a method for
acquiring and disseminating information pertaining to developments in these areas.
Organize a session among technical staff from within your organization or across similar
organizations to share ideas and knowledge.
List pros and cons of new technologies or tactics in an effort to reason out the effects of
a new system.
Look for ways to test new ideas and technologies in the operations of your organization
so that effective innovations can be incorporated into the organization’s way of doing its
business. This approach supports the goal of continuous organizational improvement.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Leads by Example: Demonstrates tactical and technical competence
Gets Results: Identifies, contends for, allocates, and manages resources; Makes feedback part of
work processes; Seeks, recognizes, and takes advantage of opportunities to improve performance
Creates a positive environment: Creates a learning environment
Develops others: Facilitates ongoing development; Builds team or group skills or processes
Stewards the profession: Improves the organization
95
Expands conceptual and
interpersonal capabilities
“An amazing thing, the human brain. Capable of understanding incredibly complex and intricate
concepts. Yet at times unable to recognize the obvious and simple.”
-Jay Abraham
Component Overview
Conceptual abilities enable sound judgment; help Army leaders think creatively; and permit leaders to
reason analytically, critically, ethically, and with cultural sensitivity. Army leaders consider both intended
and unintended consequences, and anticipate the results and consequences of important decisions on
people and mission. To expand conceptual and interpersonal capabilities, Army leaders seek and
leverage opportunities to improve reasoning and problem-solving skills and to implement the best
solution for the unit. For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 7-39 to 7-41 and
Table 7-2.
Strength Indicators
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Applies lessons learned to avoid repeating
mistakes and guide future actions.
Filters unnecessary information efficiently.
Sets aside time for self development,
reflection, and personal growth.
Understands and appropriately employs
critical thinking, imagination, and problem
solving under different task conditions.
Learns new approaches to problem solving.
Need Indicators
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Attempts to solve problems using a limited
number of approaches despite the
characteristics of the problem.
Accepts problem situations at face value;
does not examine them critically or fully;
does not look for system influences and
interactions.
Goes with the first solution that seems like
it might work even if time permits more
thorough solution development.
Becomes overwhelmed and frustrated by
the number of details of a situation.
Uses a scattered approach to thinking
through problems and developing
solutions.
Underlying Causes
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Lacks interest, or perceives a lack of time, to learn or engage in critical and creative thinking
and problem solving.
Fears the risk of failure when opportunities to be innovative present themselves.
Does not see the benefit of personal reflection and thought.
Perceives a lack of time for self development, reflection, and personal growth.
Is dubious about piloting new ideas or approaches to solving problems.
Is not to open to errors in one’s thinking or assumptions.
Is not open-minded.
96
Expands conceptual and
interpersonal capabilities
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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As you lead your team in solving a complex problem, use a skilled problem solver to
observe and provide feedback on the team’s methods, processes, communications, and
dynamics.
Seek multiple perspectives and ideas from superiors, peers, subordinates, or others
outside your organization to get a holistic view of a problem.
Hold a meeting with your team members and subordinates to discuss alternate
approaches to solving a problem or issue. Actively brainstorm ideas with your team
members and subordinates and encourage divergent thinking to develop creative
solutions.
Ask for feedback on your performance as a member of a planning or problem solving
team.
Observe a leader who is strong at implementing conceptual skills and models. Ask him
or her key questions about how he or she became skilled at conceptualizing problems
and applying critical and creative thinking to their solution.
Volunteer to be part of a project team addressing a complex issue requiring a creative
solution. As you work on the issue, observe the methods and processes used by the
team and reflect on their effectiveness and how they might be improved.
Read a book or other reference material on how to expand your conceptual and
analytical skills, such as through the use of concept mapping, divergent thinking,
systems thinking, the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), (see Kallet, 2014).
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Leadership Decision Making; The Value of Self-Awareness;
Beyond People Skills: Leveraging Your Understanding of Others.
Use reflective journaling as an aid for developing critical and creative thinking.
Purposefully test new approaches and ideas for problem solving as the mission allows.
Note which methods work best for different types of problems and circumstances.
Incorporate lessons learned into the work processes of your section or unit. When
providing guidance to others, identify known areas in need of improvement and have
others determine how the same mistakes can be avoided. Identify comprehensive and
detailed solutions that account for multiple variables.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Leads by Example: Understands the importance of conceptual skills and models them to others
Stewards the Profession: Supports professional and personal growth
Creates a positive environment: Encourages open and candid communications; Creates a learning
environment
Gets results: Makes feedback part of work processes; Seeks, recognizes, and takes advantage of
opportunities to improve performance
97
Analyzes and organizes
information to create knowledge
“Information is a source of learning. But unless it is organized, processed, and available to the right
people in a format for decision making, it is a burden, not a benefit.”
-William Pollard
Component Overview
Army leaders prepare themselves for leadership positions through lifelong learning, which involves study
and reflection in how to best acquire new knowledge. Becoming a better learner involves several steps
including planning a learning approach, focusing on specific and achievable learning goals, setting aside
time to study, organizing new information as it is encountered, and tracking progress. For more
information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 7-39 to 7-41 and Table 7-2.
Strength Indicators
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Analyzes and synthesizes information from
relevant sources, sees the implications,
and draws conclusions.
Reflects on what has been learned and
organizes these insights for future
application.
Identifies reliable sources of data and
other resources to acquire knowledge.
Sets up systems, procedures, and
standards to store and share knowledge.
Implements strategies for how to learn
new information faster and more
thoroughly.
Considers source, quality or relevance, and
criticality of information to improve
understanding.
Need Indicators
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Draws conclusions based on limited facts
or an incomplete understanding of an
issue.
Organizes data for personal use rather
than sharing resources with team
members and subordinates.
Does not document the source of
information.
Does not look for the connections
between pieces of information.
Accepts information and assertions
without critical review or thought to see if
it makes sense.
Underlying Causes
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Lacks a mental structure or frame of reference for organizing, connecting, and making sense
of information.
Assumes that sources are reliable without cross-referencing or checking them.
Does not have the time to review information that has been learned and organize it for
future application.
Applies past approaches and knowledge already at hand rather than building new knowledge
and expanding perspectives.
Does not understand how to implement nor understand the need for a plan or strategy for
knowledge acquisition and sharing.
Is not to open to errors in one’s thinking or assumptions.
Is not open-minded.
98
Analyzes and organizes
information to create knowledge
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Describe your understanding (facts, relationships, mental models) of an important topic
with an expert on the topic. Seek feedback on the completeness and accuracy of your
understanding and advice on how to further improve it.
Apply your understanding of a topic to predict the outcomes of an emerging or
anticipated event related to the topic. Later compare your predictions to actual
outcomes and reflect on incorrect predictions: what information did you misinterpret or
misapply, what information did you lack, how can you become better informed, how
should you modify your mental models?
Talk with experts in your area of interest who can provide you with recommendations
on new resources or sources of knowledge that are relevant to your topic or issue at
hand. Have them also discuss how they leveraged that information and translated it into
practice.
Read about methods of studying and reading to build understanding and insight.
Investigate methods of categorizing and relating information to build mental models
and systems understanding.
Get instruction on how to conduct library and internet research to find information
relevant to your needs.
Discuss, with an expert in your area of interest, methods and criteria for evaluating the
validity and usefulness of information.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Leadership Decision Making; The Value of Self-Awareness; The
Art of Asking Questions.
Develop a personal action plan that identifies your information needs, how you will
obtain the information, and how you will study and synthesize it to produce the
knowledge and insights you need.
Organize information and data as you obtain it. Do this by consciously looking for
themes, principles, and connections. Make a concept map showing these elements and
connections, then use this map as a way of organizing and making sense of new
information you acquire.
Develop a system for organizing, categorizing, integrating, and retrieving information
that you need and use. This may involve filing, note-taking, and/or database
components. To organize and share information with others, consider an online
collaboration tool, Army Knowledge Online interest group, or creation of a wiki.
Use AARs to gather and make sense of important information from organizational
events.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):

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Communicates: Creates shared understanding
Creates a positive environment: Encourages open and candid communications; Creates a learning
environment
Gets results: Makes feedback part of work processes
Stewards the profession: Improves the organization
Leads by example: Understands the importance of conceptual skills and models them to others; Seeks
diverse ideas and points of view
99
Maintains relevant
cultural awareness
“Men build too many walls and not enough bridges.”
-Sir Isaac Newton
Component Overview
In today’s contemporary operational environment, it is critical for Army leaders to understand the
culture in which they operate - including awareness of partners, neutral parties, and adversaries. Army
leaders must be mindful of cultural factors that may influence members of their unit, multinational
partners, host nations and the local populace. Culturally astute leaders are able to more effectively
utilize resources and complete the mission. For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22
Sections 5-26 to 5-29 and Table 7-2.
Strength Indicators

Studies issues such as language, values,
customs, ideas, beliefs, and patterns of
thinking that influence self and others.
 Takes advantage of all opportunities to
expand knowledge of different cultures
and languages, to include immersion,
training, and self-study.
 Stays up-to-date on cultural issues that
have contributed to past successes or
shortcomings in working with multinational
partners and host nation citizens.
 Stays aware of current events, particularly
those of international interest.
Need Indicators

Fails to maintain an awareness of the
impact culture factors can have on
outcomes.
 Relies on tactical solutions without
consideration of cultural influences.
 Views other cultures as inferior to own
culture.
 Makes little or no attempt to learn about
the cultures of adversaries and allies.
Underlying Causes
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Underestimates, or fails to recognize, the influence that culture can play in shaping a
person’s values, behavior, ideas, beliefs, and patterns of thinking.
Fails to learn from previous encounters in which cultural issues helped shape events.
Does not align personal way of thinking about culture and its influence on mission success
with current Army doctrine.
Believes that forces from partner nations will think and act like U.S. forces.
Does not understand, appreciate, or value the strength of diversity of thought and culture.
100
Maintains relevant
cultural awareness
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Connect with an individual with whom you are comfortable from a different culture and
discuss the social norms, mores, and expectations of their culture. Have the individual
provide you with feedback on the degree of your cultural knowledge and sensitivity.
Share what you have learned about other cultures with your peers and subordinates.
Encourage them to ask questions and provide insights related to your experiences.
Take knowledge and skill tests as part of a formal language or culture-related course.
Read books and articles on cultural awareness and the role that cross-cultural
proficiency plays in influence and work across cultures, especially as it pertains to
military operations (see Livermore, 2010; Wunderle, 2006).
Read novels or short stories placed in and written by authors from cultures in which you
are interested.
Join a club or professional association that fosters and encourages cross-cultural contact
and understanding.
Study a foreign language at a college, through a professional association, or through online or other computer-based learning opportunities. Seek out information on the
accompanying cultural norms and expectations.
Take courses or engage in independent study of cultural anthropology, comparative
religion, and other similar culture-spanning topics.
Set aside a few hours each week dedicated to reading the news, paying particular
attention to areas where America has national interests.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete the following developmental
material: Seeking and Incorporating Diverse Ideas; The Art of Asking Questions;
The Value of Self-Awareness.
Consider the cultural backgrounds of your subordinates. Think about how a
subordinate’s particular background or past experiences could be leveraged to increase
the understanding and awareness of others and to accomplish the mission..
Take advantage of the Basic Language Survival Kit and other learning opportunities on
the VIC.
Discuss current cultural issues with your subordinates and with other unit leaders. What
impact do current issues have on the effectiveness of your section or unit? What impact
could they have in the future?
Consider the historical evolution of other cultures and the functions that different
elements of the culture serve in preserving the society.
Make a personal inventory of your own opinions and create actionable steps to
eliminate any barriers you face that impede your greater understanding of people who
are different from you.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Prepares Self: Maintains relevant geopolitical awareness; Maintains self-awareness: employs selfunderstanding and recognizes impact on others
Communicates: Is sensitive to cultural factors in communication
Extends influence beyond the chain of command: Negotiates, builds consensus, and resolves
conflict; Understands sphere, means and limits of influence
101
Maintains relevant
geopolitical awareness
“No country can act wisely simultaneously in every part of the globe at every moment of time.”
-Henry Kissinger
Component Overview
Today’s military leaders are expected to operate worldwide, in a variety of physical and cultural
environments. To be prepared for worldwide deployment, military leaders must stay up to date on
events and national policies around the world that may affect U.S. national interests and potentially lead
to military intervention. This requires an understanding of U.S. interests, an appreciation of international
political and military processes, and the active pursuit and study of relevant news and information from
around the world. For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 5-26 to 5-29 and
Table 7-2.
Strength Indicators
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Learns about societies, news, and events
outside the U.S. through reading and selfstudy.
Is able to describe the impact that the U.S.
has on other countries.
Applies understanding of Army influences
on other countries, multinational partners,
and opposing forces in support of the
mission.
Understands factors that influence conflict
and peacekeeping, peace enforcing, and
peacemaking missions.
Communicates geopolitical awareness and
insights to team members and
subordinates.
Explains the implications and possible
outcomes of geopolitical events.
Need Indicators

Demonstrates lack of awareness or
concern for geopolitical issues and their
relevance to military operations.
 Views military solutions as involving only
the application of military power.
 Views countries as disconnected rather
than mutually influencing components of
a global system.
Underlying Causes
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Is unwilling to use influence and negotiation to achieve mission objectives.
Is unskilled in the use of influence and negotiation to achieve mission objectives.
Embraces a limited and simplistic view of the scope of military objectives and methods.
Is unaware of the influence and intricacies of the global political network.
Has trouble relating to other cultures or believes that his or her own culture is superior.
Views political issues, considerations, and behaviors as unsavory.
Is not interested in learning and acquiring new knowledge.
102
Maintains relevant
geopolitical awareness
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Discuss geopolitical events with knowledgeable individuals to test your perceptions and
understanding of related facts and implications.
When employing AARs to examine the effectiveness of mission performance or training
events related to peacekeeping, peace enforcing, and peacemaking, examine the actual
or likely political outcomes of decisions and unit’s actions.
Meet with your team to brainstorm creative solutions to any challenges your unit is
facing or likely to face because of geopolitical events.
Get in the habit of reading newspapers, news magazines, or online news sources. Make
a point to seek out news on societal and political issues around the world.
Research the cultures, physical resources, geography, histories, aspirations, policies, and
geopolitical climates of the countries that are likely to affect U.S. national interests.
Consider how other nations and cultures are reacting to current geopolitical events.
How are other militaries acting or reacting?
Read Ibrahimov Mahir, Otto Gustav, Gentile Lee "Cultural Perspectives, Geopolitics and
Energy Security of Eurasia: Is the Next Global Conflict Imminent?" http://
www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/culturalperspectives.pdf.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete the following developmental
material: Seeking and Incorporating Diverse Ideas; The Art of Asking Questions.
Lead others in group discussions on current geopolitical events. Consider questions
such as: What driving factors are causing international conflicts? What cultures are
involved? What role might the Army play in mitigating or resolving these conflicts?
When making military decisions or planning military operations, consider how the
methods and outcomes may affect U.S. interests and international perceptions.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Prepares Self: Maintains relevant cultural awareness; Maintains self-awareness: employs selfunderstanding and recognizes impact on others
Communicates: Is sensitive to cultural factors in communication
Extends influence beyond the chain of command: Negotiates, builds consensus, and resolves
conflict; Understands sphere, means and limits of influence
Gets results: Makes feedback part of work processes
103
Maintains self awareness:
employs self understanding and
recognizes impact on others
“Each of us is led, some of us are leaders. The competence we demand in our leaders must be our model
when we lead. Where are you?”
-General Glen K. Otis
Component Overview
Self-aware leaders know themselves, including their traits, feelings and behaviors. Self-aware leaders
recognize their strengths and weaknesses across a range of environments and progressively leverage this
knowledge to develop a clear, honest picture of capabilities and limitations. In addition, leaders must be
flexible and adaptable by constantly assessing abilities and limitations in the context of mission
requirements or tasks. For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 7-42 to 7-48 and
Table 7-2.
Strength Indicators
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Actively evaluates one’s strengths and
weaknesses.
Learns from mistakes and makes
corrections; learns form experience.
Considers feedback on performance,
outcomes associated with actions, and
actions taken by others to achieve similar
goals.
Determines personal goals and creates a
path to achieve those goals.
Develops capabilities and seeks
opportunities to improve in areas in need
of development.
Understands self motivation under various
task conditions.
Need Indicators
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Unclear on personal and professional
values, priorities, and objectives.
Is comfortable with the status quo; no
developmental direction or goals.
Not attentive to the reaction of others.
Completes tasks and moves on without
reflecting on what went well and what
could go better next time.
Not interested in or rejects feedback from
others or from just some others (e.g.,
subordinates or peers).
Underlying Causes
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Is fearful of identifying personal weaknesses and unwilling to make the effort required to
resolve them.
Does not think personal improvement is necessary.
Is disconnected or aloof from team members and subordinates.
Does not practice self observation, analysis, and reflection.
Has personal blind spots or biases that block or distort self-observation, analysis, and
reflection.
Lacks emotional intelligence.
104
Maintains self awareness:
employs self understanding and
recognizes impact on others
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Seek feedback openly and actively by sitting down and informally talking with your team
members and subordinates.
Conduct an MSAF assessment.
Discuss one of your recent accomplishments or set-backs with a coach, friend, or other
trusted individual who can provide you with honest feedback and encouragement.
Analyze your behaviors, performance, and interests to identify your strengths and
developmental needs. Share them with a trusted family member or associate and ask
for their feedback.
Keep a journal of your experiences. Reflect on situations where you are both successful
and unsuccessful. Write about events in your daily routine and describe what happened,
how you reacted, how others reacted, and why. What can you learn about yourself
based on what you did and how you felt?
Self-analyze the gaps between your actual self and your desired self. Investigate ways
that you can close those gaps using training, coaching, mentoring, books, and other
learning materials.
Analyze the actions of others in a variety of events. Think about the events and
situations leading to the events, behaviors and their apparent motives during the
events, and consequences or outcomes.
Take time for personal reflection during your daily routine. Consider your recent
thoughts and behaviors and how they relate to your values, priorities, and goals.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Seeking and Incorporating Diverse Ideas; Achieving Shared
Understanding; The Art of Asking Questions; Building Working Relationships Across
Boundaries; The Value of Self-Awareness; Seeking and Delivering Face-to-Face
Feedback; Building Trust; Navigating Contentious Conversations; Beyond People Skills:
Leveraging Your Understanding of Others.
Conduct an MSAF assessment. Multi-source assessments collect data from peers,
subordinates, superiors, and you to provide information on your strengths and
developmental needs.
Create an individual leader development plan (ILDP) that identifies your strengths and
developmental needs and the activities that you will practice to achieve your objectives.
Use the Army’s Individual Development Planning (IDP) Guide to think about how you will
identify and build on your strengths and developmental needs.
After important meetings or encounters, reflect on your statements and behaviors and
their apparent effect on others. Reflect on your reactions to statements and behaviors.
Find a coach to guide you through self-improvement. Good coaches know how to
effectively collect and digest feedback and make it relevant and specific to you.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):

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Prepares Self: Analyzes and organizes information to create knowledge; Maintains mental and physical
health and well-being
Creates a Positive Environment/Fosters esprit de corps: Demonstrates care for follower well-being;
Encourages open and candid communications; Creates a learning environment
Develops Others: Facilitates ongoing development
Stewards the Profession: Supports professional and personal growth
105
Prepares Self
Additional Information
Ahlstrom, D., Lamond, D., & Ding, Z. (2009). Reexamining some management lessons from military history."
Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 26, 617-642.
Barton, F., & Karin, H. (2007). Mixed blessings: U.S. Government with religion in conflict-prone settings.
Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Bellamy, A.J., Williams, P., & Griffin, S. (2004). Understanding peacekeeping. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
Benson, H. & Klipper, M. (2011). The Relaxation Response. New York, NY: HarperCollins.
Blascovich, J., & Hartel, C. (2008). Human behavior in Military contexts. Washington, DC: National Academies.
Bradberry, T., and Greaves, J. (2010). Emotional Intelligence 2.0. Grand Haven, MI: Brilliance Corporation.
Britt, T.W., Adler, A.B., & Castro, C.A. (2006). Military life: The psychology of serving in peace and combat.
Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
Day, D.V., Harrison, M.M., & Halpin, S.M. (2009). An integrative approach to leader development: Connecting
adult development, identity, and expertise. New York, NY: Taylor & Frances Group.
Dweck, C. (2007). Mindset: The New Psychology of Success. New York, NY: Random House Publishing Group.
Goleman, D. (1995). Emotional Intelligence. New York, NY: Random House.
Kallet, M. (2014). Think smarter: Critical thinking to improve problem-solving and decision-making skills.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Langer, E. (2014). Mindfulness. Boston, MA: Da Capo Press.
Leonard, H.A. (2006). Something old, something new: Army leader development in a dynamic environment.
Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
Livermore, D. (2010), Leading with cultural intelligence: The new secret to success. New York, NY: American
Management Association.
Moi ̈si, D. (2009). The geopolitics of emotion: How cultures of fear, humiliation, and hope are reshaping the
world. New York, NY: Doubleday.
Moran, R.T., Harris, P.R., & Moran, S.V. (2007). Managing cultural differences: Global leadership strategies for
the 21st century. Amsterdam: Elsevier Butterworth-Heinemann.
Wunderle, W.D. (2006). Through the lens of cultural awareness: A primer for U.S. Armed Forces deploying to
Arab and Middle Eastern countries. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press.
Zenger, J.H., & Folkman, J. (2009). A case study in leadership development: The US Marine Corps. In The
extraordinary leader: Turning good managers into great leaders (pp. 191-212). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
106
Develops Others (DO)
Competency Overview
Leaders encourage and support others to grow as individuals and teams. They facilitate the achievement of
organizational goals through assisting others to develop. They prepare others to assume new positions elsewhere
in the organization, making the organization more versatile and productive.
The competency Develops Others is composed of four components:
Component
Page #
Assesses developmental needs of others
108
Counsels, coaches, and mentors
110
Facilitates ongoing development
112
Builds team or group skills and processes
114
(Hold Ctrl and click on heading to jump to section)
107107107
107
Assesses developmental
needs of others
“The greatest leader in the world could never win a campaign unless he understood the men he had to
lead.”
-General Omar Bradley
Component Overview
Active monitoring and evaluation of your subordinates allows you to have a greater knowledge of their
capabilities—including their strengths and limitations. This knowledge not only can be used to optimize
Soldier and unit performance (via improved staffing decisions) it demonstrates to Soldiers that you care
about their performance and their development. Investing time and resources into your team members’
and subordinates’ developmental needs fosters enhanced well-being for the individual and leads to
improved unit and Army performance as a whole. For more information on this component see ADRP 622 Sections 7-55 to 7-58 and Table 7-4.
Strength Indicators
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Identifies team member and subordinate
“internal drivers” and uses those
motivators to analyze developmental
needs.
Gathers information about a subordinate’s
development needs from multiple sources.
Reviews assessments or reports pertaining
to a subordinate’s interests or capabilities.
Observes and monitors subordinates under
different conditions (e.g., situation in
which he/she is challenged, where he/she
excels).
Helps subordinate to develop an ILDP.
Need Indicators
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Gathers information about a subordinate’s
performance from only one source or at
only a few points in time.
Assesses Soldiers on a small number of
performance dimensions or competencies
or those performance dimensions that are
most important/salient to the leader.
Reviews only one completed assessment
or report.
Takes notice of subordinates only when he
or she is challenged.
Generalizes subordinates’ leadership
patterns and strengths and weaknesses
based on limited observation.
Underlying Causes
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Does not allocate the necessary time to get to know subordinates and understand their
developmental needs.
Does not actively monitor subordinate performance on the full range of performance
dimensions/competencies.
Lacks a clear understanding of subordinates’ job requirements.
Is uncomfortable delivering constructive feedback.
Believes time pressures hinder ability to provide immediate feedback.
Views an individual’s continuous development as a low priority.
108108108
108
Assesses developmental
needs of others
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Hold development discussions with subordinates at least once every three months.
Integrate these discussions into the normal duty hours.
Communicate to people that their work is important, even if it just means saying a
simple, “thank you – I appreciate your hard work.”
Be open and tactfully forthright with people when discriminating between the
developmental needs of subordinates. Make decisions in the best interest of the Army.
Elicit input and feedback from NCOs as well as Junior Officers on the developmental
needs of your unit or team.
Become familiar with personal and career goals of subordinate leaders, as appropriate.
Become knowledgeable of the roles, responsibilities, and requirements of subordinates’
jobs with which you are less familiar. This allows you to have a better understanding of
what “right looks like” so you can better evaluate your Soldiers.
During the normal work day, analyze your organization or unit’s overall approach to
managing multiple priorities. How does this approach affect your subordinates and their
developmental needs?
Observe the behaviors of another leader as he or she analyzes the current
developmental needs of a subordinate. Analyze the communication skills he or she uses.
Record the types of questions asked, language used, time spent listening vs. delivering
feedback, and the balance between positive and negative feedback.
Read a reference book and/or learn from resources listed at the end of this section.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete the following developmental
material: Library of 13 Counseling/Coaching Videos; Supporting the Developing Leader;
Leading the Success of Your Unit Event (Commander/Director); Supporting Your Unit
Event (Unit POC); Overview: Fundamentals of Unit Leadership Development;
Fundamentals of Unit Leadership Development: Unit Leader Programs.
Allocate time during the duty day to help your subordinates create and implement an
individual leader development plan. Be sure to have subordinates identify only one or
two concrete goals at a time in order to build confidence and decrease frustration with
vague, overly-ambitious goals.
Set up an “office hour” each week during which subordinates can freely come to talk
with you about their developmental needs
Spend time each day “among your Soldiers” so you have a chance to observe their
performance first-hand, to talk with them about their jobs, and to give immediate
feedback. Also talk with NCOs and Junior Officers who are in a good position to observe
Soldier performance. These actions demonstrate to Soldiers that their performance is a
priority.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Gets Results: Identifies and accounts for capabilities and commitment to task
Builds trust: Takes direct action to build trust
Communicates: Listens actively
Creates a positive environment: Anticipates people’s on the job needs
109109109
109
Counsels, coaches,
and mentors
“If your actions inspire others to dream more, learn more, do more, and become more, you are a
leader.”
-John Quincy Adams
Component Overview
Counseling, coaching, and mentoring stand as the principal ways by which you provide others with
knowledge and feedback. Counseling occurs when you review with the subordinate his or her
demonstrated performance and potential. Coaching occurs when you guide another’s development in
new or existing skills during the practice of those skills. Mentoring occurs when you have greater
experience than a mentee and provide guidance and advice to assist the mentee in his or her
professional growth. For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 7-59 to 7-71 and
Table 7-4.
Strength Indicators
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Sets up regular counseling, coaching, or
mentoring sessions with subordinates.
Clearly defines the purpose of a
counseling, coaching, or mentoring
session.
Encourages subordinates through actions
while guiding them.
Helps an individual understand his or her
current level of performance and instructs
and guides them on how to reach the next
level of knowledge and skill.
Candidly discusses a subordinate’s
strengths and weaknesses and the courses
of action to improve strengths and address
weaknesses.
Need Indicators
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Inconsistently or infrequently sets up
counseling sessions.
Counsels or mentors only those
subordinates who are considered to have
the most potential.
Uses a “one size fits all” mentality when
designing counseling, coaching, and
mentoring sessions.
Fails to provide coaching and feedback
during the workday—provides feedback
only during scheduled sessions.
Avoids providing negative feedback.
Talks at subordinates instead of with
subordinates.
Displays personal biases (e.g., likes,
dislikes, prejudices) and judges too rashly.
Underlying Causes
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Engages with other duties (i.e., completing the mission) that coaching, counseling, and
mentoring take on a lower priority.
Allocates insufficient time on the calendar for counseling, coaching, and mentoring sessions.
Does not see value in spending time and resources on counseling, coaching, or mentoring
subordinates who are perceived as having little potential.
Allows desire to avoid personal conflict with subordinates to interfere with providing
feedback.
Has difficulty telling subordinates things they may not want to hear.
110110110
Does not want to impose on subordinates’ time with frequent follow-up calls, emails, or
meetings.
110
Counsels, coaches,
and mentors
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Ask peers about helpful training or learning materials they have been exposed to in this area,
whether it is civilian or military. Determine what they specifically found to be beneficial
about the training or learning material.
Find out the attitudes that subordinates in your unit hold towards counseling, coaching, and
mentoring. If these practices are viewed negatively or as resources for the weak, set out a
plan for changing that perception.
Contact other units and find out how they have instituted and structured their counseling,
coaching, or mentoring programs. Document this information and share it with your unit.
Have a discussion with someone you have counseled, coached, or mentored in the past. Ask
them to provide feedback on what you did right and what you could improve on.
Identify individuals who served as counselors, coaches, and mentors to you. Document the
actions they took to help you develop; identify those actions that were beneficial and
analyze why that was the case.
Study and read about counseling, coaching, or mentoring relationships in other, non-Army
fields. Identify the qualities that counselors, coaches, and mentors in these fields exhibit, and
then determine how you can best apply them within your unit.
Next time you counsel, coach, or mentor a subordinate, take a moment following the session
to record what you did and how the subordinate reacted. Reflect your actions and the
responses of the subordinate and attempt to identify actions that you could have taken to
improve the counseling, coaching, or mentoring session.
Actively observe how other leaders provide effective (or ineffective) coaching and feedback
to Soldiers during the work day. Determine what the leader could have done to improve the
effectiveness of the coaching or feedback.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Supporting the Developing Leader; Every Leader as a Coach; Library
of 13 Counseling/Coaching Videos.
Schedule time on your calendar to regularly contact subordinates you counsel, coach, or
mentor to check-in and support their development. Consider sending an email as simple as
“How’s everything going? Let’s catch up.”
Seek out on-the-job or in-the-moment opportunities to reinforce or coach on specific issues,
making links to broader developmental goals for that individual.
Emphasize to your subordinates the benefits of taking time to engage in developmental
activities. Focus on the benefits it provides to both your unit and to the Army.
Spend time “walking around your unit” each day. This provides you with the opportunity to
observe and providing immediate feedback and coaching to your subordinates.
Facilitate a unit culture that values feedback and coaching by evaluating your subordinate
leaders (e.g., Junior NCOs and Junior Officers) on the feedback and coaching that they
provide to Soldiers.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):



Creates a Positive Environment/Fosters esprit de corps: Creates a learning environment
Develops Others: Assesses developmental needs of others; Facilitates ongoing development
111111111
Stewards the Profession: Supports professional and personal growth; Improves the organization
111
Facilitates ongoing
development
“The education of a man is never completed until he dies.”
-General Robert E. Lee
Component Overview
As a lifelong learning institution, the Army seeks to continuously shape and develop their leaders (you)
who learn and adapt as conditions and operating environments evolve. As a leader, you must instill in
your subordinates a thirst for knowledge and continued development, and then must support them
throughout the process.For more information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 7-72 to 7-76
and Table 7-4.
Strength Indicators

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


Maintains awareness of existing individual
and organizational development programs.
Nominates and encourages subordinates
to take advantage of developmental
opportunities.
Arranges training opportunities as needed
that help subordinates to improve selfawareness, confidence, and competence.
Pushes tasks and decisions down to the
lowest practical level in order to develop
subordinates’ capabilities and decisionmaking confidence.
Identifies and removes barriers to
development.
Provides subordinates with (or directs
them to) the necessary resources for
development.
Need Indicators

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

Fails to stay up-to-date on individual and
organizational development programs.
Displays ambivalence towards
opportunities for self development.
Selects only some subordinates to take
advantage of developmental
opportunities.
Adopts an “I’ll do it all” mentality—failing
to identify tasks that may be delegated.
Ignores barriers to development.
Underlying Causes
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Does not devote the time necessary to stay up-to-date on individual and organizational
development programs.
Feels that the organization will suffer if too many members are engaged in developmental
activities.
Feels that individual development should be left up to the individual.
Believes that mission or task effectiveness might suffer if tasks are delegated.
Is not personally affected by developmental barriers so treats them as if they do not exist.
Is overly narcissistic.
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Facilitates ongoing
development
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Ask members of your unit to help you identify any barriers to development that exist. Request
that they provide recommendations for eliminating the identified barriers.
Talk with subordinates you counsel, coach, or mentor. Ask what you can do to support their
development, and what you can do better to support the development of the unit.
Have a conversation with one of your superiors about how well you are supporting
development. Then ask them to share successful tips and tricks they have learned.
Talk with a leader from another organization about ways in which he or she facilitates ongoing
development. Share what you learned with your unit.
Ask trusted members of your unit how supportive they think you and leadership are of: 1)
Soldier training and development activities that take place during the workday, and 2) Soldier
self development that takes place outside the workday.
Allocate time to research the development programs that are available to your subordinates
and learn specifics about them. Then recommend specific programs to individuals based on
their developmental needs.
Investigate the development practices of other organizations (the Air Force, private sector
companies) and incorporate techniques they use into the Army, if possible.
Add leader development indicators to the unit quarterly training brief. Have subordinate units
track and report on indicators of the “health” of leader development similar to other key unit
systems (e.g., training, maintenance, budget).
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: The Leader's Role in Providing On-the-Job Learning and Support;
Supporting the Developing Leader; Creating and Supporting Challenging Job Assignments;
Enabling Subordinates Using Mission-Focused Delegation; Leading the Success of Your Unit
Event (Commander/Director); Fundamentals of Unit Leadership Development: Unit Leader
Programs.
Encourage subordinate leaders of the same position to form a community-of-practice group
and allocate training time to support them. Provide each group with an opportunity to present
recommendations from their group to your command or leadership team.
Encourage your subordinates to hold others accountable for self-development , inquiring
after development goals, and actions and providing targeted feedback.
Encourage other leaders and your subordinates to use reflective journaling. Emphasize how it
leads to a greater self-awareness and as a reference for passing along lessons learned to
others during times of transition or promotion.
Hold brown bag lunches about various leadership development topics. Solicit input from other
leaders and subordinates regarding topics they’d like to learn more about. Ask for volunteers
to present during the sessions.
Have a subordinate leader assist you in completing a task or making a decision in order to
build his or her confidence and competence.
Encourage subordinates to support one another (as peers) during the implementation of their
ILDPs.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Creates a Positive Environment/Fosters esprit de corps: Creates a learning environment; Encourages
subordinates to exercise initiative, accept responsibility, and take ownership
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Develops Others: Counsels, coaches and mentors
Stewards the profession: Supports professional and personal growth; Improves the organization
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Builds team or group skills
and processes
“Coming together is a beginning, keeping together is progress, and working together is success.”
-Henry Ford
Component Overview
Building team or group skills and processes means that you inspire, motivate, and guide others toward
accomplishing a common goal through cooperative efforts. Effective cooperation and communication
within (and between) teams facilitates unit success. Indeed, no single Soldier, squad, platoon, company,
brigade, or battalion ever won a war; it was the collaboration and teamwork among Soldiers at and
between each of those levels that enabled mission success. For more information on this component see
ADRP 6-22 Sections 7-77 to 7-90 and Table 7-4.
Strength Indicators
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Presents challenging assignments that
require team or group interaction and
cooperation.
Sustains and improves the relationships
among team or group members.
Facilitates effective and ongoing
communication between team members.
Provides realistic, mission-oriented
training.
Provides feedback on team processes.
Emphasizes the importance of working
together to achieve a “common purpose.”
Need Indicators
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Presents assignments that do not stretch
the team or group beyond their respective
comfort zones.
Provides minimal resources and support.
Focuses on the group dynamics without
spending time on intra-group dynamics
and relationships.
Focuses on the efforts and successes of
individual subordinates.
Conducts training exercises, but never
provides teamwork-specific feedback.
Fails to prioritize team goals above
individual goals.
Underlying Causes
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Does not have the time or desire to help teams accomplish challenging assignments.
Is more comfortable and experienced teaching through lectures than through experiential
activities.
Is unaware of the importance of providing teamwork-specific feedback.
Feels that encouraging individual achievement is a more effective motivator than providing
feedback and targeting motivation to groups or teams.
Does not communicate the importance of teamwork.
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Builds team or group skills
and processes
Feedback
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Study
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Practice
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Ask your subordinates about activities they engage in outside of the Army that require
teamwork. Then compile these examples, and share any best practices with the unit.
Use an open-ended questionnaire to survey your unit and determine how well you are
supporting teambuilding and the improvement of group skills and processes. Use the
answers to determine what is working well, what is not working, and how to enhance team
performance.
Following a training exercise, incorporate feedback specifically related to teamwork and skillbuilding as part of your review.
Whenever you conduct a training exercise, ensure that you reference the teamwork lessons
learned when speaking with your unit. Reinforce lessons-learned during staff and all-hands
meeting to ensure your unit remembers the role of teamwork in the activities they complete.
Assess how well you interact with other leaders as part of a team. Although the command
structure specifies who is accountable/responsible within an Army “team,” ask yourself
whether you are soliciting input from lower-ranking members of your team and making them
feel like their input is valued.
Observe another leader engaging in a team-building exercise with his or her unit. Record the
types of activities they perform, and how the leader delivers feedback about what teams did
well and what they need to improve upon.
Study how teamwork and team-building is used in other organizations or in other fields (e.g.,
sports teams, business organizations). Then document tips and strategies that stand out to
you that could be adapted for use within your unit.
Access the Virtual Improvement Center (link) and complete one of the following
developmental lessons: Building Working Relationships Across Boundaries; Fostering Team
Unity; Leading the Success of Your Unit Event (Commander/Director); Fundamentals of Unit
Leadership Development: Unit Leader Programs.
Promote discussions in your unit about teamwork. Encourage your subordinates to share
their views on what a team is, and the similarities and differences between teamwork and
other types of collaboration (e.g., partnerships).
Conduct frequent problem solving or brainstorming sessions with groups of subordinates (it
is beneficial to change the composition of this group depending upon the problems/tasks
being discussed) to identify unit challenges/tasks, potential courses of action and strengths,
weaknesses, and likely consequences associated with each.
Emphasize to squads, platoons, or other “teams” in your unit the fact that teamwork involves
shared responsibility. There can be no blaming a “bad team” for not accomplishing a goal –
each member of a team contributes to the success or failure.
Dedicate time to develop Army-specific, realistic, and mission-oriented team-building
exercises for your unit.
For other developmental activities, refer to (Hold ctrl and click on component for link):
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Creates a Positive Environment/Fosters esprit de corps: Fosters teamwork, cohesion, cooperation, and
loyalty (esprit de corps); Encourages open and candid communications; Sets and maintains high expectations
for individuals and teams
Gets results: Makes feedback part of work processes; Identifies and accounts for capabilities and
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commitment to task; Seeks, recognizes, and takes advantage of opportunities to improve performance
Communicates: Creates shared understanding
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Develops Others
Additional Information
MSAF Virtual Improvement Center (VIC). https://msaf.army.mil/My360/VIC/Default.aspx
Biswas-Diener, R., & Dean, B. (2007). Positive psychology coaching: Putting the science of happiness to
work for your clients. New York, NY: Wiley.
Clutterbuck, D., & Megginson, D. (2005). Making coaching work: Creating a coaching culture. London,
UK: Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development.
Cox, E. (2010). Grey Eminence: Fox Conner and the art of mentorship. Stillwater, OK: New Forums
Press.
Daniels, A. (2000). Bringing out the best in people (Rev. ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Dunham, A., & Spurgeon, K. (2008). The motivation factor: The invisible barriers to organizational
effectiveness. In G.H. Williams, J.A Brennan, & D. Deitterick (Eds.), Perspectives on leadership (pp. 6677). Fort Belvoir, VA: Army Management Staff College.
Grant Halvorson, H. (2011). Nine things successful people do differently. Boston, MA: Harvard
Business Review Express.
Hart, E. W., (2009). Seven keys to successful mentoring. Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative
Leadership.
Harvard Business School Press (2009). Developing employees: Expert solutions to everyday
challenges. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing
Kloster, T.W., & Swire, W.S. (2009). Anytime coaching: Unleashing employee performance. Vienna,
VA: Management Concepts.
Maxwell, J. (2008). Mentoring 101. London, UK: Thomas Nelson.
McCauley, C.D., & Van Velsor, E. (2004). The Center for Creative Leadership: Handbook of leadership
development (2nd ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Morgan, H., Harkins, P., & Goldsmith, M. (Eds.). (2005). The art and practice of leadership coaching:
50 top executive coaches reveal their secrets. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Strand, K. (2008). Mastering teambuilding principles. G.H. Williams, J.A Brennan, & D. Deitterick
(Eds.), Perspectives on leadership (pp. 66-77). Fort Belvoir, VA: Army Management Staff College.
United States Air Force. (2012, August). Doctrine. Document 1-1. 18, Leadership and Force
Development.
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U.S., Department of the Army. (2012). ADRP 6-22, Army Leadership. Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office.
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Stewards the Profession (SP)
Competency Overview
The Army requires its leaders to think beyond their current team, mission, and direct chain of leadership in order
to plan for the future. Leaders steward the profession when they act to improve the organization even when the
effects may not be realized until after their tenure. Stewarding the profession is about lifelong learning, a
commitment to an effective future organization, and developing others.
The competency Stewards the Profession is composed of two components:
Component
Page #
Supports professional and personal growth
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Improves the organization
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Supports professional
and personal growth
“Leadership and learning are indispensable to each other.”
-John F. Kennedy
Component Overview
Supporting institutional-based development means that you should focus on your personal and
subordinate development at both the macro- and micro-levels: leaders are responsible for the
development of the Army as an institution (i.e., the macro-level), and for the development of each
subordinate as an individual (i.e., the micro-level). By supporting the development of each subordinate,
leaders strengthen the Army organization as a whole and ensure that it produces multi-skilled leaders,
capable of adapting and excelling in today’s constantly changing strategic environment. For more
information on this component see ADRP 6-22 Sections 7-92 to 7-94 and Table 7-5.
Strength Indicators
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Encourages subordinates to pursue
institutional learning opportunities and
gives them time to attend training.
Provides information about institutional
training and career progression to
subordinates.
Maintains resources related to institutional
development.
Participates in discussions across units to
see the types of learning opportunities
they recommend to their team members
and subordinates.
Updates team members and subordinates
on learning opportunities that will occur.
Need Indicators
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Does not allow subordinates to attend
institutional training/educational
opportunities.
Fails to stay up-to-date on individual and
organizational development programs.
Shows little personal interest in helping
subordinates pursue institutional
development opportunities.
Tells subordinates to go find their own
learning opportunities.
Sends an implicit message to
subordinates… “self-development and
organizational development are what
Soldiers should be focusing
upon...institutional training and education
is a luxury.”
Underlying Causes
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Believes that providing Soldiers time to attend institutional training and development is too
large of a drain on the unit.
Is too busy accomplishing the mission or task to spend time thinking about the long-term
developmental needs of subordinates.
Believes that individual development should be left up to the individual and performed on
his/her own time.