Prudential Bank vs. Castro
A.C. No. 2756, March 15, 1988
Facts:
Acting on the "Petition for Redress and Exoneration and for Voluntary Inhibition" filed
by respondent Benjamin M. Grecia himself, dated February 8, 1988, praying that the decision of
November 12, 1987, and the resolution of the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the
said decision be set aside and a new one entered by this Court dismissing the administrative
complaint and exonerating the respondent, the Court RESOLVED (1) the EXPUNGE said Petition,
it being in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration filed without leave of Court,
besides the fact that the first motion for reconsideration filed by the same respondent had
already been denied with finality on January 12, 1988; (2) to STRIKE OUT Annex "1" of the
Petition and its exclosures, Annex "1" being a xerox copy of a letter dated 04 August 1986
written by Judge Dionisio N. Capistrano to an unknown addressee, for being immaterial and
impertinent to this case for disbarment (Sec. 5, Rule 9, Rules of Court). The Court will not allow
the filing of such kinds of Petitions/Annexes that are not only irrelevant to the issue and
presented out of time as hereinafter explained, but are also scurrilous and defamatory.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the Court’s decision is violative of the 1987 Constitution due to lack of
certification by the Chief Justice that the conclusions of the Court were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the
Court, is bereft of basis.
2. Whether or not a constitutional provision was disregarded in the Court’s Minute
Resolution.
Ruling:
The certification requirement refers to decisions in judicial, not administrative cases.
From the very beginning, resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have not
been accompanied by any formal certification. In fact, such a certification would be a
superfluity in administrative cases, which by their very nature, have to be deliberated upon
considering the collegiate composition of this Court. The certification in AM No. R-510-P
entitled "Apolinario de Sarigumba v. Deputy Sheriff Pasok," cited in the Petition, is but an
oversight. But even if such a certification were required, it is beyond doubt that the conclusions
of the Court in its decision were arrived at after consultation and deliberation. The signatures of
the members who actually took part in the deliberations and voted attest to that. Besides,
being a per curiam decision, or an opinion of the Court as a whole, there is no ponente
although any member of the Court may be assigned to write the draft. In such cases, a formal
certification is obviously not required.
No constitutional provision has been disregarded either in the Court’s Minute
Resolution, dated January 12, 1988, denying the motion for reconsideration "for lack of merit,
the issues raised therein having been previously duly considered and passed upon." It bears
repeating that this is an administrative case so that the Constitutional mandate that "no . . .
motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be . . . denied without stating the
legal basis therefor" is inapplicable. And even if it were, said Resolution stated the legal basis
for the denial and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the Constitutional requirement. "Lack of
merit," which was one of the grounds for denial, is a legal basis (see Sec. 3, Rule 45).