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DEAN RODERICK E. MANZANO
COLLEGE OF LAW
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Cases Penned by Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa
(2022 Bar Examinations Chair)
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Table of Contents
Marlon Dominguez vs. People of the Philippines
G. R. No. 235898, 13 March 2019………………………………………………………… 1
People of the Philippines vs. Nono Tanes Y Belmonte
G.R. No. 240596, 3 April 2019…………………………………………………………… 1
Ramon Picardal vs. People of the Philppines
G.R. No. 235749, 19 June 2019…………………………………………………………… 2
People of the Philippines vs. MarlonCristobal Y Ambrosio
G.R. No. 234207, 10 June 2019……………………………………………………………. 3
In Re: The Writ of Habeas Corpus for Michael Abellana vs. Paredes
G.R. No. 232006, 10 July 2019……………………………………………………………. 4
Paulo Jackson Francisco vs. People
G.R. No. 239866, 11 September 2019…………………………………………………….
4
PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation vs. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines
G.R. No. 224936, 4 September 2019……………………………………………………..
5
Gaspar, Jr. vs. Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. No. 229032, 16 June 2021 ………………………………………………………….. 6
Philip Hernandez Piccio vs. HRET and Vergara
G.R. No. 248985, 5 October 2021 ………………………………………………………. 7
CA vs. Cobarrubias
845 SCRA 644, 22 November 2017 ……………………………………………………..
8
Belgica vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 210503, 8 October 2019 ………………………………………………………. 9
Valmores vs. Achacoso
G.R. No. 217453, 19 July 2017 ………………………………………………………… 10
PHAPI vs. Medialdea
G.R. No. 234448, 6 November 2018 ……………………………………………………. 11
Governor Cerriles vs. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 180545, 22 November 2017 …………………………………………………… 11
City of Batangas vs. Philippine Shell
826 SCRA 297, 7 June 2017 …………………………………………………………… 13
CoteSCUP vs. Secretary of Education
882 SCRA 471, 9 October 2018 ……………………………………………………….
14
PNP-Criminal Investigation and Detective Group vs. Villafuerte
880 SCRA 305, 18 September 2018 …………………………………………………… 15
Ancheta vs. Villa
929 SCRA 116, 15 January 2020 ………………………………………………………. 16
Marlon Dominguez vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019
Problem: At around 2:00 in the morning of August 17, 2010, SPO1 Gerardo Parchaso (SPO1
Parchaso) was conducting monitoring and possible arrest of violators of RA 9165 at Purok 3,
Brgy. Poblacion, Muntinlupa City. SPO1 Parchaso grabbed the hands of Dominguez and seized
therefrom one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing the substance suspected to be
shabu. The RTC held that the prosecution sufficiently established all the elements for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, and that the integrity of the shabu seized from Dominguez had
been duly preserved. The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Dominguez, holding that the
prosecution was able to prove the elements of the crime charged. The CA also held that there
was no showing that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item was compromised.
Is there a valid search and seizure conducted by the police officer?
Suggested Answer: No. The search and seizure conducted by the police officers is not valid.
Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and
should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence
obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding.
Dominguez' acts of standing on the street and holding a plastic sachet in his hands, are not by
themselves sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough
to justify a warrantless arrest.
Hence, there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on Dominguez.
Note: A conviction can only be obtained after the prosecution discharges its constitutional
burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, this Court is duty-bound to uphold the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
People of the Philippines vs. Novo Tanes Y Belmonte
G.R. No. 240596, April 03, 2019
Problem: On April 6, 2011, an Information was filed against Tanes for violating Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165. Tanes pleaded not guilty to the charge. On April 10, 2015, he filed a
Petition for Bail. The RTC grants Tanes’ application for bail. Aggrieved, petitioner went to the
CA via petition for certiorari. CA dismissed the petition.
Did the CA err in affirming the Order of the RTC which granted Tanes application for
bail?
1
Suggested Answer: No. The CA did not err in affirming the RTC decision.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution states that all persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
In this regard, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that capital offense or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, is not bailable. No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage
of the criminal prosecution. Thus, before conviction, bail is a matter of right when the offense
charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua.
The prosecution failed to substantiate its allegation to prove that the guilt of the accused is
strong. Clearly, therefore, the prosecution evidence as such does not meet the required standard
of "strong evidence" to justify the denial of the accused's right to bail.
Note: There being non-compliance with the rule on chain of custody of the drug seized during
the buy-bust operation, the evidence of guilt for the crime of illegal sale of drugs against
respondent is deemed not strong. Accordingly, he is entitled to bail.
Ramon Picardal vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 235749, June 19, 2019
Problem: Picardal was charged with Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms. Accused
attempted to escape when brought to the police precinct but failed and was caught. PO1
Peniano frisked accused-appellant and was able to recover a caliber .38 revolver from his waist
loaded with 5 bullets. Accused-appellant was brought to the police station, after PO1 Cristobal
apprised him of his constitutional rights. The RTC convicted Picardal of the crime charged.
The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Picardal.
Is there a valid search and seizure conducted by the police officer?
Suggested Answer: No. The search and seizure conducted by the police officers is not valid.
It is mandated under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution that a search and seizure
must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the
existence of probable cause, absent of which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable"
within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable
searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence
obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion
2
of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
As the firearm was discovered through an illegal search, the same cannot be used in any
prosecution against him as mandated by Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. As
there is no longer any evidence against Picardal in this case, he must perforce be acquitted.
Note: Even if it is true that the accused-appellant did urinate in a public place (hence illegal),
the police officers involved in this case still conducted an illegal search when they frisked for
allegedly violating a regulation. It was not a search incidental to a lawful arrest as there was no
or there could not have been any lawful arrest to speak of.
People of the Philippines vs. Marlon Cristobal Y Ambrosio
G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019
Problem: At around 6:00 in the evening accused-appellant was riding his wife's motorcycle
on his way to SM Hypermart when he was flagged down by PO2 Ramos at a police checkpoint.
After giving his driver's license, he was asked to produce the OR/CR of the motorcycle but was
not able to produce the same. PO2 Ramos ordered him to empty his pockets which he did then
left him momentarily and went to the police mobile car. He returned to him and said "positive".
PO2 Ramos frisked him on his waist but found nothing else in his body. Accused-appellant
told PO2 Ramos that he can prove that he is the owner of the motorcycle if he will come with
him to his house but PO2 Ramos only ignored him and ordered him to board the mobile car.
The RTC convicted Cristobal for violating Section 11 of RA 9165. The CA affirmed the RTC's
conviction of Cristobal
Is there a valid search and seizure conducted by the police officer?
Suggested Answer: No. The search and seizure conducted by the police officers is not valid.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the
meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches
and seizures, Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained
from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
Applying the foregoing in the present case, the police officers’ act of proceeding to search
Cristobal's body, despite their own admission that they were unable to find any weapon on him,
constitutes an invalid and unconstitutional search.
3
Note: One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be
affected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In the case, the law requires that there first be
a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed.
In Re: The Writ Of Habeas Corpus for Michael Labrador Abellana vs. Hon. Meinrado P.
Paredes
G.R. No. 232006, July 10, 2019
Problem: Before the Court is a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus under
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner Michael Labrador Abellana (petitioner) prays for his
release from prison on the ground that he has been deprived of his rights to due process and to
competent counsel. RTC found accused Michael Abellana guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of violation of Section 11, Art. II, RA 9165. The CA adopted the RTC’s findings that
petitioner had due notices of the hearings set for defense evidence and promulgation of
judgment but failed to appear. The CA also agreed with the RTC that the petition for relief was
filed out of time and that the proper remedy should have been an appeal from the denial of
petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration. On June 20, 2017, petitioner filed a Petition
for the Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus before the Court.
Should the petition for the writ of habeas corpus be granted?
Suggested Answer: No. The petition should be denied. The rule is that when there is a
deprivation of a person's constitutional rights, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed
ousted of its jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of
his detention. The inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus is addressed, not to errors committed by
a court within its jurisdiction, but to the question of whether the proceeding or judgment under
which the person has been restrained is a complete nullity. The concern is not merely whether
an error has been committed in ordering or holding the petitioner in custody, but whether such
error is sufficient to render void the judgment, order, or process in question.
Petitioner, however, failed to convince the Court that the proceedings before the trial court
were attended by violations of his rights to due process or competent counsel as to oust the
RTC of its jurisdiction. Thus, the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus is unwarranted.
Paulo Jackson Polangcos Y Francisco vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 239866, September 11, 2019
Problem: An Information was filed against Polangcos for violating Section 11 of RA 9165.
On cross-examination, SPO2 Juntanilla clarified that he apprehended appellant at about 11:40
p.m. He stated that appellant was arrested for violation of a city ordinance. SPO2 Juntanilla
narrated that he frisked appellant first before issuing the Ordinance Violation Receipt. He also
recalled that he marked the plastic sachet seized from appellant along J.P. Rizal. Afterwards,
SPO2 Juntanilla turned over the seized item to PO2 Diola who was not named in the Chain of
Custody Form. RTC convicted Polangcos of the crime charged. CA affirmed the RTC's
conviction of Polangcos.
4
Is there a valid search and seizure conducted by the police officer?
Suggested Answer: No. The search and seizure conducted by the police officers is not valid.
The Court thus stresses that any evidence seized as a result of searches and seizures conducted
in violation of Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution is inadmissible "for any purpose
in any proceeding" in accordance with the exclusionary rule in Section 3(2), Article III of the
1987.
The case of Cristobal squarely applies to this case. There was likewise no valid arrest to speak
of in this case as Polangcos’ violations were also punishable by fine only and there could thus
be no valid “search incidental to lawful arrest.” Ultimately, Polangcos must be similarly
acquitted, as the corpus delicti of the crime, i.e., the seized drug, is excluded evidence,
inadmissible in any proceeding, including this one, against him.
SPO2 Juntanilla admitted that he “immediately frisked the accused before the issuance of the
ticket and mentioned that he conducted the frisking due to his initial traffic violation.” It was a
unilateral decision on the part of SPO2 Juntanilla to frisk Polangcos even if he had no reason
to because, as discussed, the penalty for the latter's violations was only by fine. It was not
intimated, much less was it proved, that Polangcos knowingly consented to any search
conducted on him by SPO2 Juntanilla. Thus, there could be no valid consented search in this
case.
Note: Even if a judgment of conviction exists, as long as the same remains pending appeal, the
accused is still presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation vs. National Grid Corporation of the Philippines
G.R. No. 224936, September 04, 2019
Problem: The instant case stems from a Complaint or Expropriation (Complaint) filed by
respondent National Grid Corporation of the Philippines against petitioners PAFC, Orica
Philippines, Inc. (Orica), et. al. RTC issued the assailed Order of Expropriation and ruled that
respondent NGCP has a lawful right to expropriate the subject property upon payment of just
compensation. Petitioner PAFC filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC's assailed
Order of Expropriation, which was denied by the RTC in its Order. Hence, the instant appeal
before the Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner PAFC prays that the Court set
aside the RTC's Orders and hold that respondent NGCP's expropriation of petitioner PAFC's
property is improper and without legal basis.
Is the RTC correct in issuing the assailed Order of Expropriation, which held that
respondent NGCP is empowered to expropriate the subject property under R.A. No.
9511?
5
Suggested Answer: Yes. The RTC’s assailed order of expropriation is correct.
Article III, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution states that “private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation.” It has been held that, as an inherent sovereign
prerogative, the power to expropriate pertains primarily to the legislature. The power of
eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government.
Therefore, with respondent NGCP's power to expropriate being a mere delegated power from
Congress by virtue of R.A. No. 9511, respondent NGCP's exercise of the right of eminent
domain over the subject property must conform to the limits set under the said law.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511 is clear, plain, and free from any ambiguity. Respondent NGCP is
allowed to exercise the right of eminent domain only with respect to private property.
Therefore, this unequivocal provision of the law must be given its literal meaning and applied
without any other interpretation.
Note: The mere fact that a parcel of land is owned by the state or any of its instrumentalities
does not necessarily mean that such land is of public dominion and not private property. If land
owned by the State is considered patrimonial property, then such land assumes the nature of
private property, hence, can be subjected to expropriation.
Claudio Delos Santos Gaspar, Jr. vs. Field Investigation Office of the Ombudsman
G.R. No. 229032, June 16, 2021
Problem: Petitioner was found guilty of serious dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service and was meted with the penalty of dismissal from service, among others.
The charge originated from the fact that the petitioner, as part of the inspection committee on
the purchase of three brand new Light Police Operational Helicopters (LPOH) for the PNP,
and despite his technical expertise, ignored the glaring tell-tale signs that the LPOHs delivered
were no longer brand new.
Petitioner claims that he was not aware that the helicopters which the PNP intended to purchase
were supposed to be brand new as he never saw the technical specification. According to him,
his participation was limited to his supposed assistance to see if the helicopters were
operational visually and functionally.
The Ombudsman found him guilty of the aforementioned administrative charges, with the CA
affirming. Thus, he filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme
Court.
Is the CA correct in affirming the Ombudsman’s decision finding the petitioner guilty of
serious dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service?
Suggested Answer: No. The CA is NOT correct in affirming the Decision of the Ombudsman.
6
In the case of Lukban v. Carpio-Morales, dishonesty was defined as the “concealment or
distortion of truth, which shows lack of integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive, or
betray, and an intent to violate the truth.” On the other hand, although there is no concrete
definition of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, jurisprudence instructs that
for an act to constitute such an administrative offense, it need not be related to or connected
with the public officer's official functions. What is essential is that the questioned conduct
tarnishes the image and integrity of his public office.
Here, Petitioner cannot be held administratively liable for serious dishonesty or conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service for his simple act of signing the inspection report.
The lack of determination on whether the helicopters were brand new or used did not mean
that petitioner, by simply affixing his signature thereto, was representing that the helicopters
were brand new or that he concealed the truth. The Court held that the Petitioner’s
administrative liability as a signatory was to check the compliance of the helicopters with the
NAPOLCOM specifications—the requirement that the helicopters be brand new was not listed
in these specifications.
The Report which Petitioner signed did reflect that the helicopters failed to comply with the
NAPOLCOM specifications. Petitioner cannot therefore be held administratively liable for
having signed an accurate report as there was nothing in the Report which shows that Petitioner
distorted or concealed the truth, or that he caused serious damage to the government or that he
abused his authority. His conduct did not also tarnish the image and integrity of his public
office, thus his act of signing an accurate report was not considered as conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service.
Philip Hernandez Piccio vs. HRET and Rosanna Vergara
G.R. No. 248985, October 05, 2021
Problem: Piccio, as a registered voter, filed a Petition against Vergara to Deny Due Course and/or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging the latter’s
failure to comply with the citizenship, residency, and voter registration requirements for Members of
the House, but the COMELEC dismissed it for lack of merit.
After Vergara won the elections and took her oath, Piccio filed a quo warranto petition before
the HRET, averring that Vergara was ineligible to sit as a Member of the House, as she
remained to be an American citizen, not having complied with the requirements of RA 9225
for re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship. The HRET, however, held that Piccio utterly failed
to establish claims on Vergara’s citizenship and dismissed the petition. Piccio's MR was
denied. Thus, he filed a Petition for Certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 before the SC.
Public respondent HRET, through the OSG, in its Comment, averred that the Petition must be
dismissed outright for being moot and academic, as Vergara had already fully served her 20162019 term as Representative of Nueva Ecija. Moreover, the OSG submits that as petitioner
failed to prove his allegations, the dismissal of the quo warranto petition was warranted and
the general rule that the HRET's judgment is beyond judicial interference must be upheld.
1.
Should the Petition be dismissed for being moot and academic?
7
2.
Did the HRET gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the quo warranto
petition and ruled that Vergara is qualified to sit as a Member of the House?
Suggested Answer:
1.
No. The case cannot be dismissed for being moot and academic. A case becomes moot
when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would be
without practical use and value. Here, the issue of Vergara's eligibility to sit as a Member of
the House on the ground of her citizenship was not mooted by the expiration of her 2016 term,
nor by the passing of the 2019 elections.
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office, pursuant
to the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code. Qualifications for public office
are continuing requirements and must be possessed, not only at the time of election or
assumption of office, but during the officer's entire tenure. Hence, the resolution of the
present case remains relevant as Vergara's continued tenure as a Member of the House hinges
on the resolution of the issue of whether she had validly re-acquired her Philippine citizenship.
The issue of her citizenship remains to be a justiciable controversy because if the Court find
her ineligible for not being a Philippine citizen, she must be removed from office; hence, the
case should not be rendered moot and academic.
2.
No. The HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion by dismissing the quo
warranto petitions. “Grave abuse of discretion” has been defined as the capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner, where the abuse
is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty. The abuse of discretion must
be grave as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged
misappreciation of facts and evidence. A writ of certiorari may not be used to correct a lower
tribunal's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. By reason of the special knowledge
and expertise of an administrative body like the HRET over matters falling under its
jurisdiction, it is in a better position to pass judgment upon such matters. Thus, its findings of
facts in that regard are generally accorded great respect, if not finality by the courts, except
when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Cobarrubias
845 SCRA 644, November 22, 2017
Problem: The surviving spouse of Rodrigo Ramos, Jr. (Rodrigo) wrote a letter: (a) informing
the Court that Rodrigo passed away on December 5, 2016, and (b) imploring the Court to
reduce the penalty of suspension of six months and one day without pay meted on him in its
Decision dated February 21, 2017 in A.M. No. SCC-10-15-P to fine in view of his demise.
8
Is Jurisdiction over an administrative case lost by the demise of the respondent public
official during the pendency of his case?
Suggested Answer: No. Jurisdiction over an administrative case is not lost by the demise of
the respondent public official during the pendency of his case. This is especially true when the
respondent had already been given the opportunity to answer the complaint and substantiate
his defenses, as in this case, and the fact of his death has been reported to the Court only after
a decision was rendered in the administrative case against him. Thus, the Court retains its
jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent official innocent of the charges or declare him
guilty thereof because a contrary rule would be fraught with injustices and pregnant with
dreadful and dangerous implications.
However, considering Rodrigo's demise, the penalty of suspension imposed on him is no longer
possible. In a previous case where the respondent was similarly found guilty of frequent
unauthorized absences but was no longer in the service at the time of the promulgation of the
decision, the Court imposed a fine of ₱20,000.00 in lieu of suspension. The Court finds it apt
to impose the same penalty here. As reprimanding him would no longer be possible, the said
charge had become moot and academic. Finally, the charge against him for violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations is DISMISSED for being moot and academic.
Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 210503, October 08, 2019
Problem: On January 13, 2014, Belgica filed the instant Petition (petition for certiorari under
Rule 65), seeking to declare all lump-sum appropriations in the 2014 GAA unconstitutional,
including the specifically assailed appropriations. Petitioner asserts that the lump-sum
discretionary funds in the 2014 GAA was passed in violation of the Constitution, since these
funds are of the same character as the pork barrel funds which were declared unconstitutional
in the 2013 Belgica case, and should thus be prohibited. Petitioner likewise sought the issuance
of a status quo ante order to prevent the use and disbursement of the specifically assailed lumpsum funds pending resolution of the Petition.
Is assailing Rule 65 the proper remedy?
Suggested Answer: Yes. The requirement of an actual case or controversy stems from Section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution, which includes within the sphere of judicial power “the duty
x x x to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.”
Jurisprudence defines an actual case or controversy as “one which involves a conflict of legal
rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished
from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.” Subsumed in the requirement of an
actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness, and “[f]or a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
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performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must
allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action.” To be sure, the Court may not wield its power of judicial review to address a
hypothetical problem. “Without any completed action or a concrete threat of injury to the
petitioning party, the act is not yet ripe for adjudication.”
By challenging the validity of the specifically assailed appropriations, Petitioner questions the
implementation of what he characterizes as unconstitutional provisions of the 2014 GAA. Such
a challenge has been deemed by the Court as sufficient to afford ripeness to a controversy,
involving as it does the possible misapplication of public funds which causes "injury or
hardship to taxpayers.”
Valmores vs. Achacoso
G.R. No. 217453, July 19, 2017
Problem: Petitioner Valmores is a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, whose
fundamental beliefs include the strict observance of the Sabbath as a sacred day. Valmores
enrolled at the MSU-Colleges of Medicine as a 1st year student. To avoid conflicts between his
academic and church worship on Saturday, Valmores wrote to Achoso, requesting that he be
excused from attending his classes in the event that a regular weekly session is rescheduled to
a Saturday, and expressed his willingness to make up for any missed activity or session due to
his absence. Some of Valmores classes and examinations were moved from weekdays to
Saturdays. In one instance, Valmores was unable to take his Histo-Pathology examination, a
Saturday. Despite his request for exemption, no accommodation was given. As a result, he
received a failing grade of 5 for that particular module and was considered ineligible to retake
the exam. Several pastors and officers of the Seventh-day Adventist church sent a letter to
respondent, requesting for possible audience with the MSU school board. Valmores again
wrote a letter to Achacoso to seek reconsideration regarding the situation and yet his request
fell on deaf ears. Hence, aggrieved by respondent’s lack of consideration, Valmores elevated
the matter before the CHED.
Was the petitioner constitutional right to freedom of religion violated by respondents
when they refused to enforce the 2010 CHED Memorandum?
Suggested Answer: Yes. Petitioner’s constitutional right to freedom of religion was violated.
Respondents suggest that the “sacrifices” of other students of the common faith justified their
refusal to give petitioner Valmores exeptional treatment. This is non-sequitur. Respondents
brushed aside Valmores’ religious beliefs as if it were subject of compromise: one man’s
conviction and another man’s transgression are theirs alone to bear. That the other fellow
believers have chosen to violate their creed is irrelevant to the case at hand, for in religious
discipline, adherence is always the general rule, and compromise is the exception.
Respondents’ concerned refusal to accommodate Valmores’ request rest mainly on extra-legal
ground, which cannot, by no stretch of legal verbiage, defeat the latter’s constitutionallyenshrined rights. That Petitioner Valmores is being made by respondents to choose between
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honoring his religious obligations and finishing his education is a patent infringement of his
religious freedoms. As the final bulwark of the fundamental rights, this Court will not allow
such violation to perpetuate any further.
Note: While in some cases the Court has sustained government regulation of religious rights,
the Court fails to see in the present case how public order and safety will be served by the
denial of petitioner Valmores’ request for exemption (from all his Sabbath - from sunset Friday
to sunset Saturday classes, exams, and other non-religious activities). Neither is there any
showing that petitioner Valmores’ absence from Saturday classes would be injurious to the
rights of others.
Private Hospitals Associations of the Philippines (PHAPI) vs. Medialdea
G.R. No. 23448, November 6, 2018
Problem: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of select provisions of RA 10932, or the Act
Strengthening the Anti-Hospital Deposit Law in the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.
Should the petition be granted?
Suggested Answer: No. The petition should not be granted. For the Court to exercise the power
of review to determine the constitutionality of a law, it is indispensable that certain
requirements must first be met, namely: (i) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
of judicial power; (ii) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge; he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (iii) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest possible opportunity; and (iv) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case. The Petition here fails the first two (2) requisites.
There is no actual case or controversy calling for the Court's exercise of judicial power in this
case, since the Petition does not allege that any medical institution or practitioner has actually
been held liable under RA 10932. Hence, the averments are merely conjectural or anticipatory.
Likewise, the petitioner has no locus standi to question the constitutionality of RA 10932.
Applying the direct injury test, the petitioners in this case has not sustained, nor will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
Gov. Aurora E. Cerilles vs. Civil Service Commission Et Al.
G.R. No. 180845, November 22, 2017
Problem: On November 7, 2000, Republic Act No. 8973 entitled "An Act Creating the
Province of Zamboanga Sibugay from the Province of Zamboanga del Sur" was passed. As a
consequence thereof, the private respondents were not given placement preference and were
instead terminated allegedly without valid cause and against their will. Meanwhile, new
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appointments were made by Gov. Cerilles for the province. On various dates, private
respondents filed their respective letters of appeal respecting their termination with petitioner.
Civil Service Commission Regional Office (CSCRO) found that the subject appointments
violated RA 6656 for allegedly failing to grant preference in appointment to employees
previously occupying permanent positions in the old plantilla. As a result, the CSCRO
invalidated 96 appointments made by Gov. Cerilles after the reorganization. The CSC upheld
the CSCRO's invalidation of the subject appointments
1.
2.
Were the former employees occupying plantilla position of the government validly
terminated?
Does the CSC have the power to invalidate the subject appointments?
ANSWER:
1.
No. The former employees occupying plantilla positions were not validly terminated.
Under RA 6656: An officer or employee may be validly removed from service pursuant to a
bona fide reorganization; in such case, there is no violation of security of tenure and the
aggrieved employee has no cause of action against the appointing authority. If, on the other
hand, the reorganization is done in bad faith, as when the enumerated circumstances in Section
2 are present, the aggrieved employee, having been removed without valid cause, may demand
for his reinstatement or reappointment. Officers and employees holding permanent
appointments in the old staffing pattern shall be given preference for appointment to the new
positions in the approved staffing pattern, which shall be comparable to their former position
or in case there are not enough comparable positions, to positions next lower in rank. And
lastly, no new employees shall be taken in until all permanent officers and employees have
been appointed unless such positions are policy-determining, primarily confidential, or highly
technical in nature.
2.
Yes. The CSC is vested with jurisdiction to review the decision of the appointing
authority.
Appointment, by its very nature, is a highly discretionary act. As an exercise of political
discretion, the appointing authority is afforded a wide latitude in the selection of personnel in
his or he department or agency and seldom questioned, the same being a matter of wisdom and
personal preference. In certain occasions, however, the selection of the appointing authority is
subject to review by respondent CSC as the central personnel agency of the Government.
Note: There is no vacancy having legally been created by the illegal dismissal. Hence, no
appointment may be validly made to that position and the new appointee has no right
whatsoever to that office. She should be returned to where she came from or be given another
equivalent item. No person, no matter how qualified and eligible for certain position, may be
appointed to an office which is not yet vacant. The incumbent must have been lawfully
removed or his appointment validly terminated, since an appointment to an office which is not
vacant is null and void ab initio.
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City of Batangas vs. Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC)
826 SCRA 297, June 07, 2017
Problem: The Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted the assailed ordinance which requires heavy
industries operating along the portions of Batangas Bay within the territorial jurisdiction of
Batangas City to construct desalination plants to facilitate the use of seawater as a coolant for
their industrial facilities. The PSPC filed against Batangas City and the Sangguniang
Panlungsod a Petition for Declaration of Nullity before the RTC praying that the Assailed
Ordinance be declared null and void. The RTC concluded that the power granted to the city
mayor to cause the issuance of cease and desist orders against the use of groundwater without
prior notice and hearing constitutes a violation of the due process clause. During the appeal,
PSPC alleged that the Assailed Ordinance unduly singles out heavy industries, and holds them
solely accountable for the loss of water and destruction of aquifers without basis, resulting in
the deprivation of their property rights without due process of law. CA affirmed RTC’s
decision declaring the ordinance invalid.
Did the CA err in affirming the RTC’s decision declaring the assailed ordinance invalid?
Suggested Answer: No. The CA did not err in affirming the RTC’s decision.
The ordinance in this case is considered void for being ultra vires, for being contrary to existing
law, and for lack of evidence showing the existence of a factual basis for its enactment.
In order for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
concerned LGU to enact, but must also be passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed
by law. Substantively, the ordinance: (i) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(ii) must not be unfair or oppressive; (iii) must not be partial or discriminatory; (iv) must not
prohibit, but may regulate trade; (v) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (vi)
must not be unreasonable.
In the case at bar, Batangas City acted in excess of the powers granted to it as an LGU,
rendering the ordinance ultra vires. Being ultra vires, the ordinance, in its entirety, is null and
void. Thus, the CA did not err in upholding RTC’s decision.
Note: It is fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in state and subordinate
to the laws of the State. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and
statewide application is universally held to be invalid. The principle is frequently expressed as
in the declaration that municipal authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt
ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy the state.
In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied restriction that
the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law.
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Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines (CoTeSCUP)
vs. Secretary of Education
882 SCRA 471, October 09, 2018
Problem: Before the Court are consolidated petitions under Rule 65, assailing the
constitutionality of RA 10533, among others, which effectively adds two years to the then 10year education plan in the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the K to 12 Law is unconstitutional
for violating the due process clause. They claim that the assailed law is violative of the due
process clause because, allegedly, the law serves the interests of only a selected few.
Is RA 10533 (K to 12 Law) unconstitutional as it violates petitioners’ right to substantive
due process and equal protection of the laws?
Suggested Answer: No. The Court held that the K to 12 Law did not violate petitioners’ right
to due process nor did it violate the equal protection clause.
Due process is comprised of two components, (i) substantive due process which requires the
intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty, or
property, and (ii) procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights of notice and
hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal.
Substantive due process, the aspect of due process invoked in this case, requires an inquiry on
the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his or her property.
In this case at bar, it showed no conflict between the K to 12 Law and the right to due process
of the students.
The equal protection clause is directed principally against undue favor and individual or class
privilege. It is not intended to prohibit legislation that is limited to the object to which it is
directed or by the territory in which it is to operate. It does not require absolute equality, but
merely that all persons be treated alike under like conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities imposed. In this case, the petitioner sufficiently failed to show that
the challenged government act was motivated by animosity or at least irrational discrimination.
Therefore the K to 12 law is constitutional.
Note: (1)Those adversely affected may invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show
that the assailed government act, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common goal,
was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support
in reason-Bautista vs Juinio. (2) The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid
classification for so long as such classification is based on real and substantial differences
having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation. (3) The Court, no matter
how vast its powers are, cannot trample on the previously discussed right of schools to enhance
their curricula and the primary right of parents to rear their children, which includes the right
to determine which schools are best suited for their children’s needs. Even before the passage
of the k-12 law, private educational institutions had already been allowed to enhance the
prescribed curriculum, considering the State’s recognition of the complementary roles of public
and private institutions in the educational system.
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Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNPCIDG) vs.
Villafuerte
880 SCRA 305, September 18, 2018
Problem: Villafuerte is a member of the BAC Secretariat and a member of the bar. He is
administratively charged for preparing documents upon the direction of his superior, in
connection with the anomalous procurement of helicopters by the Philippine National Police
(PNP). The Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) found substantial evidence to hold Villafuerte
guilty of Serious Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. The
CA reversed, and ordered Villafuerte’s reinstatement.
Did the CA commit a reversible error in the OMB Resolution finding Villafuerte liable
for Serious Dishonesty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service?
Suggested Answer: No. The CA did not commit reversible error in reversing the OMB
resolution.
In administrative cases, substantial evidence is required to sustain a finding of culpability, that
is, such amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion. And the Amended IRRA of RA 9184 confirms that Villafuerte does not possess
recommendatory authority of any kind.
Based on the foregoing, petitioner miserably failed to establish a nexus between the ministerial
act of drafting the said documents and a scheme to defraud the Government. The BAC
Secretariat is clearly given the mandate to only safekeep the documents and facilitate the
procurement process. They only rely on the decision of the members of the BAC itself and to
prepare whatever document they are instructed to do so. Hence, it cannot be determined what
was the extent of petitioners’ culpability in committing the alleged conspiracy.
Note: The OMB is, by special designation of the Constitution, the “protector of the people”.
As such, the Constitution has bequeathed upon it a unique arsenal of powers to investigate any
and all acts or omissions of public officers that appear to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It is empowered as well to impose penalties in the exercise of its administrative
disciplinary authority. In this regard, while the nature of its functions is largely prosecutorial,
the Office of the Ombudsman is not, by any means, exempted from upholding the fundamental
rights of all citizens as safeguarded by the Constitution.
Ancheta vs. Villa
929 SCRA 116, January 15, 2020
Problem: Villa filed an administrative complaint against Ancheta for Grave Misconduct and
Dishonesty and for violation of RA 3019 in connection with Ancheta's alleged irregular
Issuance of an Order granting the quashal of a writ of execution in favor of Villa.
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Villa learned from close friends and relatives that the opposing party would recover the subject
property after giving a huge amount of money to Ancheta. Villa further claimed that some
employees of the DARAB-Talavera secretly told him that there was indeed a resolution or
order reversing the writ of execution issued in his favor. Thus, Villa was constrained to file an
Urgent Motion for Inhibition against Ancheta. The Ombudsman found Ancheta guilty of
simple neglect of duty and imposed on him a fine in lieu of suspension. Ancheta filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA. The CA dismissed Ancheta's petition.
Did the CA err in dismissing the petition outright?
Suggested Answer: Yes. The CA erred in dismissing his petition outright.
In Republic v. Francisco, court ruled that decisions of administrative or quasi-administrative
agencies which are declared by law final and unappealable are subject to judicial review if they
fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.
When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly misappreciate evidence of such
nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to reverse the factual
findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or reversed via
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no
jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.
Ancheta was correct in filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 instead of Rule 43 before
the CA to assail the Ombudsman’s decision considering that the same was final, executory and
unappealable and he was able to show that the Ombudsman grossly misappreciated the
evidence so as to compel a contrary conclusion. Thus, the CA erred in dismissing Ancheta’s
petition for being the wrong remedy.
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College of Law, New Era University
Professional Schools Building, No. 9 CentralAve., New Era, Quezon City, Philippines, 1107
The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom, and knowledge of the Holy One is
understanding.
(Proverbs 9:10)