WRITTEN REPORT ON
LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Prepared by:
BACALLA, SANLIE
DANAO, CARLS RAVEN
MILLORA, JOAQUIN MIGUEL
Group 12
LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
PUBLIC OFFICE- It is the right,
authority, and duty created and
conferred by law, by which for a
given period, either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the
sovereign
functions
of
the
government, to be exercised by him
for the benefit of the public.
(Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No.
116418, March 7, 1995)
PURPOSE OF PUBLIC OFFICERS- A
public office is created to effect the
end for which government has been
instituted which is the common
good; not profit, honor, or private
interest of any person, family or
class of persons. (63C Am. Jur. 2d
Public Officers and Employees 667
[1997])
Legislature or through legislative
authority;
4.
Duties
are
performed
Independently
without
control
unless those of a subordinate; and
5. Continuing and permanent.
(Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No.
116418, March 7, 1995; Tejada v.
Domingo, G.R. No. 91860, January
13, 1992)
PUBLIC OFFICER- The public
officer, generally, is the one who
holds a “public office.” A public
officer is such an officer as is
required by law to be elected or
appointed, who has a designation or
title given to him by law, and who
exercise functions concerning the
public, assigned to him by law.
ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC OFFICE
1. Created by Constitution or by law
or by some body or agency to which
the power to create the office has
been delegated;
2. Vested with Authority to exercise
some portion of the sovereign
power of the State;
3. The powers conferred and the
duties to be discharged must be
defined directly or impliedly by the
● CAAP-EU v. CAAP
Facts:
Petitioner argues that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion
in the issuance and implementation
of the assailed Authority Orders and
Memoranda because they placed the
tenure of the CAAP personnel in
jeopardy in clear violation of the
latter's security of tenure which is
protected by the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 6656; that the Minutes
of the Discussion of the Bicameral
Conference Committee on the
Disagreeing Provisions of HBN 3156
and the amendments agreed upon
on "The Creation of the Civil
Aviation Authority," and asserts
that the real intention of R.A. No.
9497 was merely reorganization of
the agency and not its entire
abolition; that while Section 86 of
R.A. No. 9497 categorically states
that "the incumbent Assistant
Secretary of the ATO shall continue
to hold office and assume the
powers of the Director General until
his successor shall have been
appointed and inducted into office,"
the law made no mention of the
status of the employment of the
personnel of the defunct ATO.
The employees' hold-over status as
indicated in the IRR and in the Joint
Senate Resolutions is opposed to
Section 86 of R.A. No. 9497 which
merely limits such status to the
incumbent Assistant Secretary of
the ATO as acting CAAP Director
General. Likewise, petitioner asserts
that the IRR expanded and modified
the law and that the legislature
through the issuance of said
Resolutions encroached on the
functions
of
this
Court
in
interpreting the same. All told,
petitioner submits that R.A. No.
9497 simply mandated that the
selection and appointment of the
heads of offices within CAAP are
limited
to
the
rank-and-file
employees of the concerned or
corresponding offices of the defunct
ATO and that the personnel of the
same, unless they opted to retire,
are legally deemed transferred to
the newly created CAAP. The
hold-over status accorded to the
incumbent personnel of the ATO
deviated from the law and the same
personnel were placed in a
disadvantageous situation and were
stripped of their security of tenure.
FIRST ISSUE:
Whether ATO was abolished under
R.A. No. 9497
Ruling: No. Well entrenched in this
jurisdiction is the rule that the
power to abolish a public office is
lodged with the legislature. This
proceeds from the legal precept that
the power to create includes the
power to destroy. A public office is
created either by the Constitution,
by statute, or by authority of law.
Thus, except where the office was
created by the Constitution itself, it
may be abolished by the same
legislature that brought it into
existence.
SECOND ISSUE:
Whether
the
incumbent
ATO
employees' constitutional right to
security of tenure was impaired
Ruling:
No.
According
to
Jurisprudence, A valid order of
abolition must not only come from a
legitimate body, it must also be
made in good faith. An abolition is
made in good faith when it is not
made for political or personal
reasons, or when it does not
circumvent
the
constitutional
security of tenure of civil service
employees. Abolition of an office
may be brought about by reasons of
economy, or to remove redundancy
of functions, or a clear and explicit
constitutional mandate for such
termination of employment. Where
one office is abolished and replaced
with another office vested with
similar functions, the abolition is a
legal nullity. When there is a void
abolition, the incumbent is deemed
to have never ceased holding office.
Petitioner posits that abolition of an
office cannot have the effect of
removing an officer holding it if the
office is restored under another
name. However, the court found no
bad faith in the abolition of the ATO
as the latter was not simply restored
in another name in the person of the
CAAP.
CAAP is an independent regulatory
body with quasi- judicial and
quasi-legislative
powers
and
possessing corporate attributes,
having an authorized capital stock
of fifty billion pesos which shall be
fully subscribed by the Republic of
the Philippines. It is attached to the
DOTC only for the purpose of policy
coordination. While the Director
General is responsible for the
exercise of all powers and the
discharge of all duties including the
control over all personnel and
activities of the CAAP, the latter's
corporate powers are vested in its
Board of Directors. It enjoys fiscal
autonomy to fund its operations.
THIRD ISSUE:
Whether there was grave abuse of
discretion when Section 60 of the
IRR provided a "hold-over" status
for ATO employees, which was not
expressly provided for under R.A.
No. 9497.
Ruling:
No.
A
petition
for
prohibition will prosper only if
grave abuse of discretion is
manifested.
Mere
abuse
of
discretion is not enough; it must be
grave. The term grave abuse of
discretion is defined as a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment
so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner because of passion
or hostility.
● ALCONERA V. PALLANAN
FACTS:
Complainant was the counsel for
Morito Rafols, the defendant in Civil
Case No. 5967-2, an unlawful
detainer case entitled Cua Beng a.k.a.
Manuel Sy and Ka Kieng v. Morito
Rafols, et al., filed before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Branch 2 in General Santos
City, South Cotabato. After trial, the
MTCC ruled against Rafols and his
co-defendants in a Judgment dated
March 12, 2009.
Therefrom,
Rafols,
through
complainant Alconera, appealed the
case to the RTC, Branch 36,
docketed as Civil Case No. 675.
Pending appeal, the court issued an
Order dated February 18, 2011
granting Cua Beng’s motion for
execution she filed in Civil Case No.
5967-2, the unlawful detainer case.
Alconera sought reconsideration but
the motion was denied through
another Order dated March 14, 2011.
On March 17, 2011, a troubled Evelyn
Rafols, Rafols’ daughter-in-law,
called up Alconera, who at that time
was in Manila, to report that the
sheriff, respondent Pallanan, was
about to implement the adverted
writ of execution. Evelyn Rafols
informed Alconera that respondent
sheriff arrived along with the lawyer
of the opposing party and 30 other
men to enforce the writ. Respondent
sheriff then allegedly demanded
payment of PhP720,000 to settle
Rafols’ obligation to which the
latter protested on the ground that
the amount is too exorbitant when
they
have
been
religiously
depositing monthly rentals in court
to satisfy the judgment.
After explaining the matter to
Alconera, Evelyn Rafols passed her
phone to respondent sheriff. Over
the phone, a verbal disagreement
between the two ensued. Alconera
claims that he has a pending motion
for reconsideration on the issuance
of the writ of execution, but the
respondent said that the motion has
already been denied. And since no
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
has been issued enjoining the
implementation,
respondent
claimed that he is legally mandated
to perform his ministerial duty of
enforcing the writ. Complainant
countered that he has not yet
received a copy of the denial of the
motion, rendering the execution
premature and, at the same time,
preventing him from securing a TRO
from
the
higher
courts.
Nevertheless,
respondent
still
pushed through with the execution
of the judgment.
On March 18, 2011, complainant
returned to General Santos City and,
at his law office, found a copy of the
Order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration, which was only
served that very same day. The RTC
ruled that there was no pending
Motion to Approve Supersedeas
Bond filed with it. Instead, what was
filed not with the RTC but with the
MTCC was a “NOTICE OF APPEAL —
and — MOTION TO APPROVE
PROPERTY SUPERSEDEAS BOND,”
which was not granted.
That afternoon, Alconera went to
RTC Br. 36 with his daughter to
confront respondent sheriff. The
face-off escalated into a heated
argument caught on video. It was
complainant’s daughter, Shyla Mae
Zapanta, who is coincidentally his
office clerk, who filmed the incident
and transcribed the dialogue during
the altercation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent can
be held administratively liable for
grave
misconduct
and
false
testimony.
RULING:
Yes.
The
foregoing
notwithstanding, the Court adopts
in part the recommendation of the
investigating judge that respondent
should nonetheless be penalized for
discourtesy in the performance of
his official duties. As a public officer
and a trustee for the public, it is the
ever existing responsibility of
respondent to demonstrate courtesy
and civility in his official actuations
with the public.
According to jurisprudence: Public
service requires integrity and
discipline. For this reason, public
servants must exhibit at all times
the highest sense of honesty and
dedication to duty. By the very
nature
of
their
duties
and
responsibilities,
they
must
faithfully adhere to, hold sacred and
render inviolate the constitutional
principle that a public office is a
public trust; that all public officers
and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
In the case at bar, it is readily
apparent that respondent has
indeed been remiss in this duty of
observing courtesy in serving the
public. He should have exercised
restraint in dealing with the
complainant instead of allowing the
quarrel to escalate into a hostile
encounter. The balm of a clean
conscience
should have been
sufficient to relieve any hurt or
harm
respondent
felt
from
complainant’s criticisms in the
performance of his duties. On the
contrary, respondent’s demeanour
tarnished the image not only of his
office but that of the judiciary as a
whole, exposing him to disciplinary
measure.
● LAUREL V. DESIERTO
FACTS:
President Ramos issued E.O. No.
128, “reconstituting the Committee
and renamed the Committee as the
“National Centennial Commission.”
Appointed to chair the reconstituted
Commission was Vice-President
Salvador H. Laurel. The Philippine
Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation
(Expocorp)
was
created
and
petitioner was among the nine
incorporators, and was elected
Expocorp Chief Executive Officer.
However,
there
were
alleged
anomalies in the construction and
operation
of
the
Centennial
Exposition Project at the Clark
Special Economic Zone that were
was referred to the Blue Ribbon
Committee
for
investigation.
President Joseph Estrada issued A.O.
No. 35, creating an ad hoc and
independent Citizens’ Committee to
investigate all the facts and
circumstances
surrounding the
Philippine centennial projects.
Among
the
Committee’s
recommendations
was
“the
prosecution by the Ombudsman/DOJ
of Laurel, chair of National
Centennial Commission (NCC) and
of Expocorp for violating the rules
on public bidding, relative to the
award of centennial contracts to AK
Corp.; for exhibiting manifest bias
in the issuance of the NTP (Notice to
Proceed) to AK to construct the FR
(Freedom Ring) even in the absence
of a valid contract that has caused
material injury to government and
for participating in the scheme to
preclude audit by COA of the funds
infused by the government for the
implementation
of
the
said
contracts all in violation of the
anti-graft law.”
Probable cause was found to indict
respondents SALVADOR H. LAUREL
and TEODORO Q. PEÑA before the
Sandiganbayan for conspiring to
violate Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act
No. 1594.” The resolution also
directed that an information for
violation of the said law be filed
against
Laurel
and
Peña.
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto
approved the resolution with
respect to Laurel but dismissed the
charge against Peña.
Petitioner assails the jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman on the ground that
he is not a public officer as defined
by R.A. No. 3019 and that NCC was
not a public office.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner, as Chair of the
NCC, was a public officer.
RULING:
Yes. The Constitution describes the
Ombudsman and his Deputies as
“protectors of the people,” who
“shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against
public officials or employees of the
government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or
controlled corporations.”
Among the awesome powers,
functions, and duties vested by the
Constitution upon the Office of the
Ombudsman is to “investigate… any
act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears
to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.”
In sum, the Ombudsman has the
power
to
investigate
any
malfeasance,
misfeasance
and
nonfeasance by a public officer or
employee of the government, or of
any
subdivision,
agency
or
instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations.
Petitioner submits that some of
these characteristics are not present
in the position of NCC Chair,
namely: (1) the delegation of
sovereign functions; (2) salary,
since he purportedly did not receive
any
compensation;
and
(3)
continuance, the tenure of the NCC
being temporary.
● VETERANS FEDERATION OF
THE PHILIPPINES V. REYES
FACTS:
Petitioner Veterans Federation of
the Philippines (VFP) is a corporate
body organized under Republic Act
No. 2640. Sometime in August 2002,
petitioner received a letter from
Undersecretary of the Department
of National Defense (DND) to
conduct Management Audit of VFP
pursuant to RA 2640, where it
stated that VFP is under the
supervision and control of the
Secretary of National Defense.
Petitioner complained about the
broadness of audit and requested
suspension until issues are threshed
out, which was subsequently denied
by DND. As a result, petitioner
sought relief under Rule 65
assailing that it is a private
non-government corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not veterans federation
created by law is a public office,
considering that it does not possess
a portion of the sovereign functions
of the government and considering
further that, it has no budgetary
appropriation from DBM and that
its funds come from membership
dues.
RULING:
Yes,
petitioner
is
a
public
corporation.
According
to
jurisprudence, Laurel v. Desierto,
public office is defined as the right,
authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which, for a
given period, is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions
of the government, to be exercised
for the benefit of the public. In the
instant case, the functions of VFP –
the protection of the interests of
war veterans which promotes social
justice and reward patriotism –
certainly fall within the category of
sovereign functions. The fact that
VFP has no budgetary appropriation
is only a product of erroneous
application of the law by public
officers in the DBM which will not
bar subsequent correct application.
Hence, placing it under the control
and supervision of DND is proper.
● REYES V. OMBUDSMAN
FACTS:
Facts:
Petitioners are all charged as
co-conspirators for their respective
participations in the anomalous
Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) scam, involving, as
reported by whistleblowers Benhur
Luy (Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and
MerlinaSuñas (Suñas), the illegal
utilization and pillaging of public
funds sourced from the PDAF of
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator
Enrile) for the years 2004 to 2010, in
the
total
amount
of
P172,834,500.00. The charges are
contained in two (2) complaints,
namely: (1) a Complaint for Plunder
filed by the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) on September
16, 2013, (NBI Complaint); and (2) a
Complaint for Plunder and violation
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 filed by
the Field Investigation Office of the
Ombudsman (FIO) on November 18,
2013, (FIO Complaint).
it determines the existence or
non-existence of probable cause for
the arrest of the accused.
A total of sixteen (16) Informations
were filed by the the Ombudsman
before
the
Sandiganbayan,
charging, Reyes, Janet Napoles, and
De Asis with one (1) count of
Plunder; and Reyes, Janet Napoles,
the Napoles siblings, and De Asis
with fifteen (15) counts of violation
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, which
were raffled to the Sandiganbayan's
Third Division.
NO. There is no grave of discretion
in
judicially
determining
the
existence of probable cause.
On July 3, 2014, resolving Criminal
Case, "along with several other
related cases," the Sandiganbayan
issued a Resolution finding probable
cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest against "all the accused,"
stating that the filing of a motion
for
judicial
determination
of
probable cause was a mere
superfluity given that it was its
bounden duty to personally evaluate
the resolution of the Ombudsman
and the supporting evidence before
ISSUE:
WON there is a grave abuse of
discretion in judicially determining
the existence of probable cause?
RULING:
Once the public prosecutor (or the
Ombudsman) determines probable
cause and thus, elevates the case to
the
trial
court
(or
the
Sandiganbayan),
a
judicial
determination of probable cause is
made in order to determine if a
warrant of arrest should be issued
ordering the detention of the
accused.
● REPUBLIC V. SERENO
FACTS:
Sereno was concurrently employed
as legal counsel of the Republic in
two
international
arbitrations
known as the PIATCO cases, and a
Deputy
Commissioner
of the
Commissioner on Human Rights.
The Human Resources Development
Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified
that there was no record on
Sereno’s file of any permission to
engage in limited practice of
profession. Moreover, out of her 20
years of employment, only nine (9)
Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and
Net Worth (SALN) were on the
records of UP HRDO. In a
manifestation, she attached a copy
of a tenth SALN, which she
supposedly sourced from the “filing
cabinets” or “drawers of UP”. The
Ombudsman likewise had no record
of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC
has certified to the existence of one
SALN. In sum, for 20 years of
service, 11 SALNs were recovered.
On August 2010, Sereno was
appointed as Associate Justice. On
2012, the position of Chief Justice
was declared vacant, and the JBC
directed the applicants to submit
documents, among which are “all
previous SALNs up to December 31,
2011” for those in the government
and “SALN as of December 31, 2011”
for those from the private sector.
The JBC announcement further
provided that “applicants with
incomplete
or
out-of-date
documentary requirements will not
be interviewed or considered for
nomination.”
On August 2017, an impeachment
complaint was filed by Atty. Larry
Gadon against Sereno, alleging that
Sereno failed to make truthful
declarations in her SALNs. The
House of Representatives proceeded
to hear the case for determination
of probable cause, and it was said
that Justice Peralta, the chairman of
the JBC then, was not made aware of
the incomplete SALNs of Sereno.
Sereno then filed a Motion for
Inhibition against AJ Bersamin,
Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and
Leonardo-De
Castro,
imputing
actual bias for having testified
against her on the impeachment
hearing before the House of
Representatives.
ISSUE:
1.
2.
Whether
the
Court can
assume jurisdiction and give
due course to the instant
petition for quo warranto.
Whether Sereno may be the
3.
respondent in a quo warranto
proceeding notwithstanding
the fact that an impeachment
complaint has already been
filed with the House of
Representatives.
Whether Sereno, who is an
impeachable officer, can be
the respondent in a quo
warranto proceeding
RULING:
1.
A quo warranto petition is
allowed against impeachable
officials
and
SC
has
jurisdiction.
The SC have concurrent jurisdiction
with the CA and RTC to issue the
extraordinary writs, including quo
warranto. A direct invocation of the
SC’s original jurisdiction to issue
such writs is allowed when there are
special and important reasons
therefor, and in this case, direct
resort to SC is justified considering
that the action is directed against
the Chief Justice. Granting that the
petition
is
likewise
of
transcendental importance and has
far-reaching implications.
2, Simultaneous quo warranto
proceeding
and
impeachment
proceeding is not forum shopping
and is allowed.
Quo warranto and impeachment
may proceed independently of each
other as these remedies are distinct
as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3)
applicable rules pertaining to
initiation, filing and dismissal, and
(4) limitations.
Lastly, there can be no forum
shopping because the impeachment
proceedings before the House is not
the impeachment case proper, since
it is only a determination of
probable cause. The impeachment
case is yet to be initiated by the
filing
of
the
Articles
of
Impeachment before the Senate.
Thus, at the moment, there is no
pending impeachment case against
Sereno. The process before the
House is merely inquisitorial and is
merely a means of discovering if a
person may be reasonably charged
with a crime.
3. Impeachment is not an exclusive
remedy by which an invalidly
appointed or invalidly elected
impeachable
official
may
be
removed from office.
The principle in case law is that
during
their
incumbency,
impeachable officers cannot be
criminally prosecuted for an offense
that carries with it the penalty of
removal, and if they are required to
be members of the Philippine Bar to
qualify for their positions, they
cannot be charged with disbarment.
The proscription does not extend to
actions assailing the public officer’s
title or right to the office he or she
occupies.
CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC
OFFICE
● It is a Public trust – The
principle of “public office is a
public trust” means that the
officer holds the public office
in trust for the benefit of the
people—to
whom
such
officers are required to be
accountable at all times, and
to
serve
with
utmost
responsibility, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest
lives.
It is not a Property and is
●
outside commerce of man. It
cannot be the subject of a
contract.–
The
concept
"public office is not a
property” means that no
officer an acquire vested right
in the holding of a public
office, nor can his right to
hold the office be transmitted
to his heirs upon his death.
Nevertheless, the right to
hold a public office is a
protected right-secured by
due process and the provision
of Constitution on security of
tenure.
It is Personal to the public
●
officer – It is not a property
transmissible to the heirs of
the officer upon the latter’s
death.
● It is not a Vested right.
However, right to a public
office
is nevertheless a
protected right. Nevertheless,
right to a public office is a
protected right. It cannot be
taken from its incumbent
without due process.
● It is not a Natural right –
Under our political system,
the right to hold public office
exists only because and by
virtue of some law expressly
or impliedly creating and
conferring it.
● SANTOS V. SECRETARY
OF LABOR
FACTS:
Segundo Santos was, for a number
of years, employed as Labor
Conciliator I (Regional Office No. 4)
of the Department of Labor. On
August 24, 1960, he was extended
an appointment (promotion) as
Labor Conciliator II (Regional Office
No. 3, Manila) with compensation
per annum of P3,493, vice Juan
Mendoza,
Jr.,
resigned.
This
appointment, effective September 1,
1960, was approved by the
Commissioner of Civil Service on
May 14, 1962, and released to the
Department of Labor on May 25,
1962.
Petitioner's
demand
for
the
revocation of respondent Tionco's
appointment and payment to him
(Santos) of salary differentials was
rejected by respondent Secretary of
Labor. From the foregoing events
stemmed the present petition for
mandamus filed on August 20, 1962
three days before Santos actually
retired from the service which was
an August 23, 1962. 2 The petition
prays, inter alia, that respondents be
commanded
to
nullify
the
appointment of Tiongco, and to
uphold as legal and existing
petitioner's appointment, as Labor
Conciliator II, from September 1,
1960;
and
that
the
salary
differentials aforesaid be paid
petitioner.
ISSUE:
1.
May the Estate of Segundo
Santos,
deceased,
be
substituted
in
place
of
petitioner herein?
RULING:
1.
Public office is a public trust.
It
is
personal
to
the
incumbent
thereof
or
appointee thereto. In this
sense, it is not property which
passes to his heirs. None of
the heirs may replace him in
that position. It is in this
context that we say that the
Estate
of
the
deceased
Segundo Santos may not
press Santos' claim that he be
allowed to continue holding
office as Labor Conciliator II.
Actio personalis moritur cum
persona. (a personal right of
action dies with the person'.)
● ABEJA V. TANADA
FACTS:
Petitioner Abeja and respondent
Radovan
(deceased)
were
contenders for the office of
municipal mayor of Pagbilao,
Quezon, in the 1992 elections.The
election contest was a very close
fight. Thereafter, Abeja filed an
election
contest
covering
22
precincts. Consequently, Radovan
filed a Counter-Protest covering 36
precincts. Radovan prayed that the
ballots of the 36 counter-protested
precincts should only be revised and
recounted if it is shown after the
revision of the contested ballots of
the 22 precincts that petitioner
leads by at least one (1) vote.
Radovan died with the case left on
pendency. He was substituted by
Vice-Mayor Conrado de Rama and,
surprisingly, by his surviving
spouse, Ediltrudes Radovan. The
case was left by Judge Lopez and
was turned over to Judge Tanada. In
the interim, private respondent
failed to commence the revision of
the ballots in the counter-protested
precincts.
Eventually,
the
respondents prayed for the prompt
resolution to the pending cases.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the surviving spouse
of the Respondent has the right for a
counterclaim on the matter?
RULING:
No. The substitution of the deceased
Rosauro
Radovan's
widow,
Ediltrudes Radovan, on the ground
that private respondent had a
counter-claim for damages is
completely erroneous. “Public office
is personal to the incumbent and is
not a property which passes to his
heirs." The heirs may no longer
prosecute the deceased protestee's
counterclaim for damages against
the protestant for that was
extinguished
when
death
terminated his right to occupy the
contested office. Hence, SC granted
the petition.
● NATIONAL LAND TITLE AND
DEEDS
REGISTRATION
ADMINISTRATION V. CSC
FACTS:
Garcia was an LLB grad and a first
grade civil service. She was
appointed Deputy Register of Deeds
VII. She was later appointed as
Deputy Register of Deeds III, upon
reclassification of the position. She
was designated as Acting Branch
Register of Deeds of Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Executive Order No. 649
was enacted. It authorized the
restructuring
of
the
Land
Registration
Commission
to
National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration, and it
regionalized the offices of the
registers therein. The law imposed a
new
requirement
of
BAR
membership
to
qualify
for
permanent appointment as Deputy
Register of Deeds II or higher.
Garcia issued an appointment as
Deputy Register of Deeds II on
temporary status for not being a
member of the Philippine Bar.
Secretary of Justice notified Garcia
of the termination of her services on
the ground that she was receiving
Bribe Money.
Garcia appealed, but the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
dropped her appeal on the ground
that the termination of her services
was due to the expiration of her
temporary appointment.
The CSC issued a resolution,
directing that Garcia be restored to
her position.
According to the CSC, under the
vested right theory , the new
requirement
of
the
BAR
membership will not apply to her
but only to the filling up of vacant
lawyer position on or after Feb 9,
1981, the date the order took effect.
NALTDRA assailed the validity of
the CSC Resolution
ISSUE:
WON membership in the bar, which
is a qualification requirement
prescribed for appointment to the
position of Deputy Register of Deeds
under EO. No. 649, Section 4, should
be applied only to new applicants
and not to those who were already
in service of the LRC as deputy
register of deeds at the time of the
issuance and implementation of the
EO.
RULING:
HELD:
No. The requirement shall also
apply to those already in service.
RATIO:
EO No. 649, in express terms,
provided for the abolition of
existing positions
Section 8.
Abolition of Existing Positions.
All structural units in the LRC and
in the registries of deeds, and all
positions therein shall cease to exist
from the date specified in the
implementing order to be issued by
the president pursuant to the
preceding paragraph .The pertinent
functions,
applicable
appropriations, records, equipment
and property shall be transferred to
the appropriate staff or offices
therein created.
The law, therefore, mandates that
from the moment an implementing
order is issued, all positions in the
LRC is deemed non-existent. This is
NOT removal. Removal implied post
subsists and one is merely separated
therefrom, while here, there is no
position at all. Thus, there can be no
tenure to speak of.
HELD:
Abolition of office is valid if (1)
carried out by a legitimate body and
(2) done in good faith.
(1) LEGITIMATE BODY
In this case, it was by LEGITIMATE
BODY. There is no dispute over the
authority to carry out a valid
reorganization
in
any
branch/agency of gov’t under Sec 8,
Article
XVII
of
the
1973
Constitution.
(2) GOOD FAITH
Re: good faith, if the newly created
office
has
substantially
new,
different or additional functions,
duties or powers, so that it may be
said in fact to create an office
different from the one abolished,
even though it embraces all or some
of the duties of the old office, it will
be considered an abolition and
creation of new one. The same is
true if the office is abolished and its
duties, for reasons of economy, are
given to an existing office.
HELD:
In this case, EO No. 649 was enacted
to improve the services and better
systematize
the
LRC.
The
requirement of Bar membership
was imposed to meet changing
circumstances
and
new
developments. It was imposed
concomitant
with
a
valid
reorganization measure.
Re: “Vested right theory,” no such
thing as a vested interest or estate
in an office, except constitutional
offices which provide for special
immunity as regards salary and
tenure.
JUDGMENT
: Garcia has no vested property right
to be re-employed in a reorganized
office. She cannot be reinstated to
her former position. CSC Resolution
reinstating Garcia was set aside.
● BIRAOGO V. PTC
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1
establishing
Philippine
Truth
Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated
July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad
hoc body formed under the Office of
the President with the primary task
to investigate reports of graft and
corruption
committed
by
third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during
the previous administration, and to
submit
its
finding
and
recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC
has
all
the
powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a
quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle,
or render awards in disputes
between contending parties. All it
can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and
make recommendations. It may
have subpoena powers but it has no
power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest.
Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant
the filing of an information in our
courts of law.
Petitioners asked
the
Court
to
declare
it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the
PTC from performing its functions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not E.O. No. 1 violates
the principle of separation of
powers by usurping the powers of
Congress
to
create
and
to
appropriate funds for public offices,
agencies and commissions
RULING:
No. There will be no appropriation
but only an allotment or allocations
of
existing
funds
already
appropriated.
There
is
no
usurpation on the part of the
Executive of the power of Congress
to appropriate funds. There is no
need to specify the amount to be
earmarked for the operation of the
commission
because,
whatever
funds the Congress has provided for
the Office of the President will be
the very source of the funds for the
commission. The amount that
would be allocated to the PTC shall
be subject to existing auditing rules
and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.