ALSO
BY
DAVID
F R O M K I N
The
Independence
of
The
Question
Government
of
Nations
DAVID F R O M K I N
A PEACE TO
END A L L PEACE
T H E
F A L L
AND
T H E
O F
T H E
O T T O M A N
CREATION
M I D D L E
O F
T H E
E A S T
AN OWL BOOK
HENRY
HOLT AND
NEW
YORK
COMPANY
E M P I R E
M O D E R N
Henry Holt and Company, L L C
Publishers since 1866
115 West 18th Street
New York, N e w York 10011
Henry Holt® is a registered trademark
o f Henry Holt and Company, L L C .
Copyright © 1989 by David Fromkin
All rights reserved.
Distributed in Canada by H. B. Fenn and Company L t d .
L i b r a r y of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication D a t a
Fromkin, David.
A peace to end all peace.
Bibliography : p.
Includes index.
I S B N 0-8050-6884-8
1. Great Britain—Foreign relations—Middle East. 2. Middle E a s t — F o r e i g n
relations—Great Britain. 3. Middle East—Politics and government—1914-1945.
I. Title.
DS63.2.G7F76
1989
327.41056
88-34727
Henry Holt books are available for special promotions and
premiums. For details contact: Director, Special Markets.
First published in hardcover in 1989 by Henry Holt and Company
First Owl Books Edition 2001
Printed in the United States of America
13
15
16
14
"After 'the war to end war' they s e e m
to have been pretty successful in Paris
at m a k i n g a 'Peace to end P e a c e . ' "
A r c h i b a l d Wavell (later F i e l d M a r s h a l Earl
Wavell), an officer who s e r v e d u n d e r Allenby
in the Palestine c a m p a i g n , c o m m e n t i n g on
the treaties b r i n g i n g the F i r s t World War
to an e n d
C O N T E N T S
List of Illustrations and Maps
Photo Credits
Acknowledgments
A Note on Spelling
Introduction
10
11
12
14
15
P A R T I At the C r o s s r o a d s of History
1
T H E L A S T DAYS OF OLD EUROPE
23
2
T H E L E G A C Y OF T H E G R E A T GAME IN ASIA
26
3
T H E M I D D L E E A S T B E F O R E T H E WAR
33
4
T H E YOUNG T U R K S URGENTLY S E E K AN ALLY
45
5
W I N S T O N C H U R C H I L L O N T H E E V E O F WAR
51
6
C H U R C H I L L S E I Z E S T U R K E Y ' S WARSHIPS
54
7
AN I N T R I G U E AT T H E SUBLIME PORTE
62
8
K I T C H E N E R T A K E S COMMAND
9
KITCHENER'S LIEUTENANTS
88
96
P A R T I I Kitchener o f K h a r t o u m L o o k s A h e a d
79
10
KITCHENER S E T S OUT TO CAPTURE ISLAM
11
INDIA P R O T E S T S
106
12
T H E MAN IN T H E M I D D L E
111
P A R T I I I Britain i s D r a w n into the
Middle Eastern Quagmire
13
T H E T U R K I S H C O M M A N D E R S A L M O S T L O S E T H E WAR
119
14
KITCHENER ALLOWS BRITAIN TO A T T A C K T U R K E Y
124
15
ON TO VICTORY AT T H E DARDANELLES
130
16
RUSSIA'S GRAB FOR T U R K E Y
137
17
DEFINING BRITAIN'S GOALS IN T H E MIDDLE EAST
146
18
AT T H E NARROWS OF F O R T U N E
150
19
T H E WARRIORS
155
20
T H E POLITICIANS
159
21
THE LIGHT THAT FAILED
163
8
CONTENTS
22
C R E A T I N G T H E ARAB B U R E A U
168
23
MAKING PROMISES TO T H E ARABS
173
24
MAKING PROMISES TO T H E EUROPEAN A L L I E S
188
25
TURKEY'S TRIUMPH AT T H E TIGRIS
200
26
BEHIND ENEMY LINES
27
KITCHENER'S LAST MISSION
216
28
HUSSEIN'S REVOLT
218
29
T H E F A L L OF T H E A L L I E D GOVERNMENTS: BRITAIN AND FRANCE
231
30
T H E OVERTHROW OF T H E CZAR
239
PART
IV
Subversion
207
P A R T V T h e Allies a t the N a d i r o f T h e i r F o r t u n e s
P A R T VI
N e w Worlds and Promised
Lands
31
T H E NEW W O R L D
32
LLOYD GEORGE'S ZIONISM
253
263
33
TOWARD T H E BALFOUR D E C L A R A T I O N
276
34
T H E PROMISED LAND
284
P A R T VII
I n v a d i n g the M i d d l e E a s t
35
J E R U S A L E M FOR CHRISTMAS
305
36
T H E ROAD T O D A M A S C U S
315
37
T H E B A T T L E FOR SYRIA
332
38
T H E P A R T I N G O F T H E WAYS
39
BY T H E S H O R E S OF T R O Y
P A R T V I I I T h e S p o i l s o f Victory
351
'
363
P A R T I X T h e T i d e G o e s Out
40
THE TICKING CLOCK
383
41
BETRAYAL
389
42
T H E U N R E A L WORLD OF T H E PEACE C O N F E R E N C E S
403
43
T H E T R O U B L E S B E G I N : 1919—1921
44
E G Y P T : T H E W I N T E R O F 1918—1919
417
45
A F G H A N I S T A N : T H E S P R I N G O F 1919
421
46
A R A B I A : T H E S P R I N G O F 1919
424
47
T U R K E Y : J A N U A R Y 1920
427
P A R T X S t o r m over Asia
415
CONTENTS
9
48
S Y R I A A N D L E B A N O N : T H E S P R I N G A N D S U M M E R O F 1920
435
49
E A S T E R N P A L E S T I N E ( T R A N S J O R D A N ) : 1920
441
50
P A L E S T I N E — A R A B S A N D J E W S : 1920
51
M E S O P O T A M I A ( I R A Q ) : 1920
52
P E R S I A ( I R A N ) : 1920
4 45
449
45 5
P A R T X I R u s s i a R e t u r n s t o the M i d d l e E a s t
53
UNMASKING BRITAIN'S ENEMIES
465
54
T H E SOVIET CHALLENGE IN T H E MIDDLE EAST
471
55
MOSCOW'S G O A L S
475
56
A D E A T H IN B U K H A R A
480
57
WINSTON CHURCHILL T A K E S CHARGE
493
58
C H U R C H I L L AND T H E QUESTION OF PALESTINE
515
59
T H E A L L I A N C E S COME APART
530
P A R T X I I T h e M i d d l e E a s t e r n Settlement o f 1922
60
A GREEK TRAGEDY
540
61
T H E S E T T L E M E N T OF T H E MIDDLE EASTERN QUESTION
558
Notes
569
Bibliography
607
Index
621
L I S T
O F
I L L U S T R A T I O N S
AND
MAPS
1 Lord Kitchener
2 Sir Mark Sykes
3 Enver
4 Talaat
5 Djemal
6 Crowds gather outside the Sublime Porte, 1913
7 Turkish soldiers at Dardanelles fort, 1915
8 Allied fleet at entrance to Dardanelles
9 Pictorial map of the Dardanelles
10 H . M . S . Cornwallis
11 Anzac beach
12 Australian troops at Gallipoli
13 Winston Churchill
14 Russian troop column
15 Russian advance-guard in Turkey, 1916
16 Russian occupation of Erzerum
17 Russian troops in Trebizond
18 British camel column in the Jordan Valley
19 British survey party in Palestine
20 Transport camels
21 View of Beersheba
22 The Hejaz flag
23 Prince Feisal
24 King Hussein of the Hejaz
25 T . E . Lawrence with Lowell Thomas
26 David Ben-Gurion
27 Vladimir Jabotinsky
28 Chaim Weizmann with Lord Balfour
29 Union Jack hoisted above Basra
30 Street scene in Baghdad
31 Reading of General Allenby's proclamation of martial law, 1917
32 Australian Light Horse entering Damascus, 1918
33 General Allenby enters Aleppo, 1919
34 Ottoman soldiers surrender, November 1918
35 British sentry, Constantinople, 1920
36 Admiral Calthorpe's flagship, 1918
10
L I S T OF I L L U S T R A T I O N S AND MAPS
11
37 Woodrow Wilson
38 Lloyd George
39 Signing of the Treaty of Sevres, 1920
40 British bluejackets in Constantinople, 1920
41 French quarter of Smyrna after the fall of the city, 1922
42 French troops enter Damascus, 1920
43 Bodies of Greek soldiers in a Turkish field, 1922
44 Mustapha Kemal
45 Reza Khan
46 Amanullah Khan
47 King Fuad of Egypt
48 Zaghlul Pasha
49 Sons of King Hussein of the Hejaz: Feisal, King of Iraq; Abdullah,
Emir of Transjordan; and Ali, later briefly to be King of the Hejaz
50 Ibn Saud with Sir Percy Cox and Gertrude Bell
Photo Credits
1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24,
29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 80 are
reproduced courtesy of The Illustrated London News Picture Library,
London.
2, 5, 25 , 45 , 49 are reproduced courtesy of UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos,
New York.
26 is reproduced courtesy of the Bettmann Archive, New York.
27 and 28 are reproduced courtesy of the Zionist Archives and Library.
Maps (Between pages 20 and 21)
The Middle East in 1914
T h e Campaign in Central Asia
The Greek-Turkish War
The Middle East in the 1920s
Cartography by Sue Lawes
A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S
T h e idea of writing this book c a m e to me in the c o u r s e of a conversation with T i m o t h y D i c k i n s o n in which he asked my views a b o u t
the history of the M i d d l e E a s t . L a t e r I p u t my ideas in written f o r m .
J a s o n E p s t e i n s u g g e s t e d that the book be s t r u c t u r e d a r o u n d a personality. I took his s u g g e s t i o n a n d c h o s e Winston Churchill. N o w I
cannot think of how the book could have been s t r u c t u r e d any other
way.
As books on my subject a p p e a r e d in L o n d o n , my friend and
colleague R o b e r t L . S i g m o n would b u y t h e m for m e a n d s e n d t h e m
to me by airmail. A n d Professor S t a n l e y Mallach of the University
of Wisconsin-Milwaukee helped me find b o o k s I could not find
elsewhere.
Alain Silvera, Professor of H i s t o r y at Bryn M a w r College a n d a
lifelong friend, kept me abreast of the latest scholarship by s u p p l y i n g
me with articles from learned j o u r n a l s as well as valuable ideas,
information, a n d s u g g e s t i o n s . He r e a d and re-read the m a n u s c r i p t
and offered detailed marginal corrections and c o m m e n t s . He showed
the m a n u s c r i p t also t o his P h . D . student K a y Patterson, who offered
extensive a n d careful c o m m e n t s . At my request, Professor E r n e s t
Gellner of C a m b r i d g e University kindly arranged for me to meet
Professor Elie K e d o u r i e , w h o m I wanted to p e r s u a d e to be the other
a c a d e m i c reader of my m a n u s c r i p t . Professor K e d o u r i e read the
m a n u s c r i p t and g a v e me the benefit of his i m m e n s e erudition a n d
authoritative c o m m e n t s . I am grateful to him, and to M r s K e d o u r i e
for her kindness a n d patience in p u t t i n g up with my d e m a n d s on her
h u s b a n d ' s time. D r N i c h o l a s R i z o p o u l o s read the G r e e k - T u r k i s h
episodes a n d offered valuable s u g g e s t i o n s . I hope I need not a d d
that Professor K e d o u r i e , Professor Silvera, D r R i z o p o u l o s , a n d M r s
Patterson are not r e s p o n s i b l e in any way for the opinions and conclusions I e x p r e s s in the book. M o r e o v e r , the m a n u s c r i p t has been
extensively rewritten since they saw it, so there may well be factual
or other s t a t e m e n t s in it they would have advised me to c h a n g e .
A c a d e m i c r e a d e r s , in particular, will observe in reading the book
12
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
13
that I owe an i m m e n s e intellectual d e b t to the b o o k s and e s s a y s of
m a n y other s c h o l a r s — m o r e , indeed, than there is s p a c e to n a m e
here. Chief a m o n g those to w h o m I am thus indebted are Elie
K e d o u r i e , for his masterful s t u d i e s of M i d d l e E a s t e r n a n d British
history and politics, a n d M a r t i n G i l b e r t , whose great life of Winston
Churchill is essential to anyone writing a b o u t this p e r i o d . I have
leaned heavily on G i l b e r t ' s v o l u m e s — a s everyone now m u s t . A n d I
was inspired by the e x a m p l e of H o w a r d S a c h a r to believe that a
history of the M i d d l e E a s t can be w r i t t e n — a s I was a t t e m p t i n g to
d o — o n a very b r o a d scale.
S a m u e l C l a y t o n , the son of Sir G i l b e r t Clayton, was kind e n o u g h
to s p e n d the best part of an afternoon talking to me a b o u t his father.
My thanks to h i m , a n d to his wife, the L a d y M a r y , for their hospitality in having me to tea at K e n s i n g t o n Palace.
In the c o u r s e of my research in archives in Britain a n d elsewhere
over the years, I have benefited f r o m the kindness and patience of
s u c h unfailingly helpful librarians as L e s l e y F o r b e s of the University
of D u r h a m , Clive H u g h e s of the I m p e r i a l War M u s e u m , N o r m a n
H i g s o n of the University of Hull, Alan Bell of R h o d e s H o u s e ,
O x f o r d , a n d Gillian G r a n t o f the M i d d l e E a s t C e n t r e , S t Antony's
College, O x f o r d . My heartfelt thanks to t h e m all.
I owe an i m m e n s e d e b t of g r a t i t u d e to R o b Cowley, my editor at
H e n r y Holt and an authority on the F i r s t World War, for his knowledgeable a n d helpful s u g g e s t i o n s and for his constant e n c o u r a g e m e n t
and e n t h u s i a s m . M a r i a n W o o d at H e n r y Holt and S a r a M e n g u g at
A n d r e D e u t s c h saw me through the publication p r o c e s s with unfailing cheer and a w e s o m e efficiency.
F o r permission to r e p r o d u c e q u o t a t i o n s from d o c u m e n t s I am
indebted to the following:
— T h e C l e r k of the R e c o r d s , H o u s e of L o r d s R e c o r d Office, for
permission to quote from the L l o y d G e o r g e Papers in the Beaverbrook
Collection in the custody of the H o u s e of L o r d s R e c o r d Office;
— t h e S u d a n Archive of the University of D u r h a m , on whose
extensive collection I have d r a w n freely;
— M r s T h e r e s a S e a r i g h t , and the R h o d e s H o u s e L i b r a r y , for
permission to q u o t e from the diaries of R i c h a r d M e i n e r t z h a g e n ;
— t h e B r y n m o r J o n e s L i b r a r y of the University of Hull a n d S i r
T a t t o n S y k e s , B a r t . , for permission to q u o t e from the p a p e r s of Sir
Mark Sykes;
— t h e M i d d l e E a s t C e n t r e , St Antony's College, O x f o r d , for permission to q u ot e from their extensive collection, including the p a p e r s
o f S i r H u b e r t Y o u n g , T . E . L a w r e n c e , L o r d Allenby, William Y a l e ,
F . R . S o m e r s e t , C . D . B r u n t o n , a n d the K i n g Feisal and Balfour
Declaration files;
— t h e Warden and Fellows of N e w College, O x f o r d , for per-
14
A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S
mission t o q u o t e from L o r d Milner's f i l e s ;
— t h e T r u s t e e s of the L i d d e l l H a r t C e n t r e for Military A r c h i v e s at
K i n g ' s College, L o n d o n , for p e r m i s s i o n t o q u o t e f r o m L o r d Allenby's
papers.
T r a n s c r i p t s / T r a n s l a t i o n s of C r o w n copyright r e c o r d s in the P u b l i c
R e c o r d Office a p p e a r by p e r m i s s i o n of the Controller of H. M.
Stationery Office.
F o r access to d o c u m e n t a r y material, I wish also to thank the
British L i b r a r y , L o n d o n ; Camellia I n v e s t m e n t s , Pic, L o n d o n ; the
Weizmann Archives, R e h o v o t , I s r a e l ; the Bodleian L i b r a r y , O x f o r d ;
the I m p e r i a l War M u s e u m , L o n d o n ; the H o u g h t o n L i b r a r y of
H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y ; a n d the N e w Y o r k Public L i b r a r y .
A
Note
on
Spelling
In spelling T u r k i s h , A r a b i c , a n d Persian n a m e s a n d titles, I have
u s e d whatever form of spelling I am m o s t familiar with f r o m my
reading over the years. So there is no s y s t e m or consistency in it; b u t
I would g u e s s that the spellings m o s t familiar to me will be the m o s t
familiar to the general reader as well.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
T h e M i d d l e E a s t , a s w e know i t f r o m today's headlines, e m e r g e d
f r o m decisions m a d e by the Allies d u r i n g and after the F i r s t World
War. In the p a g e s that follow I set out to tell in one v o l u m e the
wide-ranging story of how a n d w h y — a n d out of what hopes a n d
fears, loves a n d h a t r e d s , mistakes a n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s — t h e s e
decisions were m a d e .
R u s s i a n a n d F r e n c h official a c c o u n t s of what they were doing in
the M i d d l e E a s t at that time were, not unnaturally, works of p r o p a g a n d a ; British official a c c o u n t s — a n d even the later m e m o i r s of the
officials c o n c e r n e d — w e r e untruthful too. British officials who played
a major role in the m a k i n g of these decisions provided a version of
events that was, at best, edited a n d , at worst, fictitious. T h e y s o u g h t
to hide their m e d d l i n g in M o s l e m religious affairs ( p a g e s 96—105)
a n d to pretend that they had entered the M i d d l e E a s t as p a t r o n s of
A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e — a cause in which they did not in fact believe.
Moreover, the A r a b Revolt that f o r m e d the centerpiece of their narrative o c c u r r e d not so m u c h in reality as in the wonderful imagination
of T. E. L a w r e n c e , a teller of fantastic tales w h o m the A m e r i c a n
s h o w m a n L o w e l l T h o m a s t r a n s f o r m e d into " L a w r e n c e o f A r a b i a . "
T h e truth has c o m e out over the c o u r s e of d e c a d e s in bits a n d
pieces, and now, toward the end, in one great h e a p , with the o p e n i n g
of archives of hitherto secret official d o c u m e n t s a n d private p a p e r s .
It s e e m e d to m e — i n 1979, when I started my r e s e a r c h — t h a t we h a d
arrived at a point where at last it w o u l d be possible to tell the real
story of what h a p p e n e d ; hence this b o o k .
D u r i n g the past d e c a d e I have w o r k e d in the archives, s t u d i e d the
literature, and p u t together the findings of m o d e r n scholarship to
show the picture that is f o r m e d when the pieces of the puzzle are
a s s e m b l e d . T h e a u t h o r s whose works I cite in the N o t e s at the e n d of
the book m a d e m o s t of the new discoveries, t h o u g h I have m a d e
s o m e too: what the Y o u n g T u r k leaders m a y have done in order to
p e r s u a d e the G e r m a n s to ally with t h e m on 1 A u g u s t 1914 ( p a g e s
60—6), for e x a m p l e , and why the A r a b negotiator a l - F a r u q i m a y
15
16
INTRODUCTION
have d r a w n a line t h r o u g h inland S y r i a as the frontier of A r a b
national independence ( p a g e 178).
T h e n , too, I m a y be the first to disentangle, or at any rate to d r a w
attention to, the m a n y m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s which in 1916 set off a
hidden tug-of-war within the British b u r e a u c r a c y between S i r M a r k
S y k e s , L o n d o n ' s desk m a n in charge of the M i d d l e E a s t , and his
friend G i l b e r t C l a y t o n , the head of intelligence in C a i r o ( p a g e
193). I found that neither S y k e s nor Clayton ever realized that
S y k e s , in the 1916 negotiations with F r a n c e , m i s u n d e r s t o o d what
Clayton h a d asked him to d o . S y k e s did the exact o p p o s i t e , believing
in all innocence that he was carrying out Clayton's wishes, while
C l a y t o n felt s u r e that S y k e s h a d knowingly let h i m d o w n . S i n c e
Clayton never mentioned the m a t t e r to him, S y k e s r e m a i n e d u n a w a r e
that differences h a d arisen between him a n d his colleague. So in the
m o n t h s a n d years that followed, S y k e s mistakenly a s s u m e d that he
and Clayton were still at one, when in fact within the b u r e a u c r a c y
Clayton had b e c o m e an a d v e r s a r y of his p o l i c y — a n d p e r h a p s the
m o s t d a n g e r o u s one.
G e t t i n g the b u r e a u c r a t i c politics r i g h t — a n d I hope that is what I
have d o n e — h a s been one of my chief endeavors. B u t I have tried to
do m o r e than clarify specific p r o c e s s e s and e p i s o d e s . T h e b o o k is
meant to give a p a n o r a m i c view of what was h a p p e n i n g to the M i d d l e
E a s t as a whole, and to show that its reshaping was a function of
G r e a t Power politics at a u n i q u e t i m e : the exact m o m e n t when the
waves of western E u r o p e a n imperial e x p a n s i o n i s m flowed forward to
hit their high-water m a r k , a n d then felt the first powerful t u g s of
the tide that was g o i n g to pull t h e m b a c k .
T h e M i d d l e E a s t , as I conceive it, m e a n s not only E g y p t , Israel,
I r a n , T u r k e y , a n d the A r a b states of Asia, b u t also Soviet Central
A s i a and A f g h a n i s t a n : the entire arena in which Britain, from the
N a p o l e o n i c Wars o n w a r d , fought to shield the road to I n d i a from
the o n s l a u g h t s first of F r a n c e a n d t h e n of R u s s i a in what c a m e to be
known a s "the G r e a t G a m e . "
Other studies of the F i r s t World War and its aftermath in the
region have t e n d e d to deal with a single country or area. E v e n those
dealing with E u r o p e a n policy in the A r a b or T u r k i s h E a s t as a whole
have focused solely, for e x a m p l e , on the role of Britain, or of Britain
a n d F r a n c e . B u t I place the creation of the m o d e r n M i d d l e E a s t in a
wider f r a m e w o r k : I see what h a p p e n e d as the culmination of the
nineteenth-century G r e a t G a m e , a n d therefore show R u s s i a , too,
playing a leading role in the story. It was in whole or in part b e c a u s e
of R u s s i a that K i t c h e n e r initiated a British alliance with the A r a b
M o s l e m world ( p a g e s 9 7 — 8 ) ; that Britain and F r a n c e , though they
would have preferred to preserve the T u r k i s h E m p i r e in the region,
decided instead to o c c u p y a n d partition the M i d d l e E a s t ( p a g e s
137—42); that the F o r e i g n Office publicly proclaimed British s u p p o r t
INTRODUCTION
17
for the establishment of a J e w i s h National H o m e in Palestine ( p a g e s
184—93); a n d that, after the war, a n u m b e r of British officials felt
that Britain was obliged to hold the line in the M i d d l e E a s t against
c r u s a d i n g B o l s h e v i s m ( p a g e s 4 6 5 — 8 ) . Yet, so far as I know, this is
the first b o o k to tell the story as that of the M i d d l e E a s t in the widest
s e n s e : the G r e a t G a m e sense, in which R u s s i a plays a central role.
As you will see when you r e a d the book, M i d d l e E a s t e r n p e r s o n alities, c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a n d political cultures do not figure a g r e a t deal
in the narrative that follows, except when I s u g g e s t the outlines a n d
d i m e n s i o n s of what E u r o p e a n politicians were ignoring when they
m a d e their decisions. T h i s is a book a b o u t the decision-making
p r o c e s s , a n d in the 1914—22 p e r i o d , E u r o p e a n s and A m e r i c a n s were
the only ones seated a r o u n d the table when the decisions were m a d e .
It was an era in which M i d d l e E a s t e r n countries a n d frontiers were
fabricated in E u r o p e . I r a q a n d what we now call J o r d a n , for e x a m p l e ,
were British inventions, lines d r a w n on an e m p t y m a p by British
politicians after the F i r s t World W a r ; while the b o u n d a r i e s of S a u d i
A r a b i a , K u w a i t , a n d I r a q were established by a British civil servant
in 1922, a n d the frontiers between M o s l e m s and C h r i s t i a n s were
d r a w n by F r a n c e in S y r i a - L e b a n o n a n d by R u s s i a on the b o r d e r s of
A r m e n i a a n d Soviet A z e r b a i j a n .
T h e E u r o p e a n powers at that time believed they could c h a n g e
M o s l e m A s i a in the very f u n d a m e n t a l s of its political existence, a n d
in their a t t e m p t to do so i n t r o d u c e d an artificial state s y s t e m into the
M i d d l e E a s t that has m a d e it into a region of countries that have not
b e c o m e nations even t o d a y . T h e b a s i s of political life in t h e M i d d l e
E a s t — r e l i g i o n — w a s called into question by the R u s s i a n s , who p r o p o s e d c o m m u n i s m , a n d by the British, who p r o p o s e d nationalism or
dynastic loyalty, in its place. K h o m e i n i ' s Iran in the Shi'ite world
and the M o s l e m B r o t h e r h o o d in E g y p t , S y r i a , and elsewhere in the
S u n n i world keep that issue alive. T h e F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t , which in
the M i d d l e E a s t did allow religion to be the basis of politics—even of
its o w n — c h a m p i o n e d one sect against the others; and that, too, is an
issue kept alive, notably in the c o m m u n a l strife that has r a v a g e d
L e b a n o n in the 1970s a n d 1980s.
T h e year 1922 s e e m s to me to have been the point of no return in
setting the various clans of the M i d d l e E a s t on their collision c o u r s e s ,
so that the especial interest a n d excitement of the years with which
this book is concerned, 1914 t h r o u g h 1922, is that they were the
creative, formative y e a r s , in which everything s e e m e d (and may
indeed have been) p o s s i b l e . It was a time when E u r o p e a n s , not
implausibly, believed A r a b and J e w i s h nationalism to be natural
allies; when the F r e n c h , not the A r a b s , were the d a n g e r o u s enemies
of the Zionist m o v e m e n t ; a n d when oil was not an important factor
in the politics of the M i d d l e E a s t .
By 1922, however, the choices had narrowed a n d the c o u r s e s had
18
INTRODUCTION
been set; the M i d d l e E a s t h a d started along a road that was to lead to
the endless w a r s (between Israel a n d her neighbors, a m o n g others,
a n d between rival militias in L e b a n o n ) a n d to the always-escalating
acts of terrorism (hijacking, assassination, a n d r a n d o m m a s s a c r e )
that have been a characteristic feature of international life in the
1970s a n d 1980s. T h e s e are a part of the legacy of the history
recounted in the p a g e s that follow.
T w o stories are told in the book a n d then m e r g e into one. T h e
first b e g i n s with L o r d K i t c h e n e r ' s decision at the outset of the F i r s t
World War to partition the M i d d l e E a s t after the war between
Britain, F r a n c e , a n d R u s s i a , a n d with his a p p o i n t m e n t o f S i r M a r k
S y k e s to work out the details. T h e b o o k then follows S y k e s d u r i n g
the w a r t i m e years, as he worked out Britain's blueprint for the
M i d d l e E a s t ' s future. It g o e s on to show that, in large part, the
p r o g r a m S y k e s had formulated was realized after the war, a n d w a s
e m b o d i e d in d o c u m e n t s formally a d o p t e d (for the m o s t part) in
1922.
T h i s was the story that I originally set out to write. It was meant
to show that if you p u t together a n u m b e r of the d o c u m e n t s a n d
decisions of 1922—the Allenby D e c l a r a t i o n establishing nominal ind e p e n d e n c e for E g y p t , the Palestine M a n d a t e a n d the Churchill
White P a p e r for Palestine (from which Israel a n d J o r d a n s p r i n g ) , the
British treaty establishing the s t a t u s of I r a q , the F r e n c h M a n d a t e for
S y r i a and L e b a n o n , Britain's placing new m o n a r c h s on the thrones
of E g y p t a n d I r a q a n d s p o n s o r i n g a new princely ruler for (what was
to b e c o m e ) J o r d a n , the R u s s i a n proclamation of a Soviet U n i o n in
which R u s s i a would re-establish her rule in M o s l e m Central A s i a —
you would see that when taken together they a m o u n t e d to an overall
settlement of the M i d d l e E a s t e r n Q u e s t i o n . Moreover, this settlement
of 1922 (as I call it, b e c a u s e m o s t of its elements cluster in a n d
a r o u n d that year) flowed from the wartime negotiations which S i r
M a r k S y k e s h a d c o n d u c t e d with F r a n c e a n d R u s s i a to agree u p o n a
partition o f the postwar M i d d l e E a s t between them. T h e F r e n c h
received a bit less than had been a g r e e d , a n d the R u s s i a n s were only
allowed to keep what they had already taken before the war, but
the principle of allowing t h e m to s h a r e with Britain in the partition
and rule of M o s l e m A s i a was r e s p e c t e d . Within the British s p h e r e ,
all went a c c o r d i n g to the S y k e s p l a n : Britain ruled for the m o s t
part indirectly, as protector of nominally independent A r a b m o n archies, a n d p r o c l a i m e d herself the s p o n s o r of both A r a b a n d J e w i s h
nationalism.
In addition to establishing that there h a d been a settlement of 1922
in the M i d d l e E a s t , I show that our quarrel with that settlement (to
the extent that with hindsight we would have designed the new
M i d d l e E a s t differently) is not what we s o m e t i m e s believe it to b e . It
INTRODUCTION
19
is not even that the British g o v e r n m e n t at that time failed to devise a
settlement that would satisfy the n e e d s a n d desires of the p e o p l e s of
the M i d d l e E a s t ; it is that they were trying to do s o m e t h i n g altogether
different. F o r L o r d K i t c h e n e r a n d his delegated agent M a r k S y k e s
the M i d d l e E a s t e r n Q u e s t i o n was what it had been for m o r e than a
century: where w o u l d the F r e n c h frontier in the M i d d l e E a s t be
d r a w n a n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t , where w o u l d the R u s s i a n frontier in the
Middle East be drawn?
T h a t , as I say, is the story which I set out to tell. B u t in the telling
of it, another e m e r g e d : the story of how, between 1914 a n d 1922,
Britain c h a n g e d , a n d British officials a n d politicians c h a n g e d their
m i n d s , so that by 1922—when they formally c o m m i t t e d themselves
to their p r o g r a m for r e m a k i n g the M i d d l e E a s t — t h e y no longer
believed in it. In the c o u r s e of the narrative we see the British
g o v e r n m e n t of 1914, 1915, a n d 1916, which w e l c o m e d a R u s s i a n a n d
a F r e n c h p r e s e n c e in the postwar M i d d l e E a s t , turn into a postwar
g o v e r n m e n t that r e g a r d e d R u s s i a in the M i d d l e E a s t as a d a n g e r a n d
F r a n c e in the region as a disaster. We see the p r o - Z i o n i s t s of 1917
turn into the anti-Zionists of 1921 a n d 1922; and the enthusiasts for
Feisal's A r a b M o v e m e n t turn against Feisal a s untrustworthy a n d
against his brother A b d u l l a h as hopelessly ineffectual. A b o v e all, we
see Britain e m b a r k i n g on a vast new imperial enterprise in the
M i d d l e E a s t — o n e that w o u l d take generations to achieve, if its object
were to r e m a k e the M i d d l e E a s t as I n d i a had been r e m a d e — a t the
very time that the British p u b l i c was t u r n i n g to a policy of scaling
down overseas c o m m i t m e n t s a n d was deciding it wanted no m o r e
imperial a d v e n t u r e s .
It m a y well be that the crisis of political civilization that the
M i d d l e E a s t e n d u r e s today s t e m s not merely from Britain's d e s t r u c tion of the old order in the region in 1918, a n d her decisions in 1922
about how it should be replaced, b u t also from the lack of conviction
she b r o u g h t in s u b s e q u e n t years to the p r o g r a m of i m p o s i n g the
settlement of 1922 to which she was p l e d g e d .
T h e b o o k I intended to write was only about how E u r o p e went
about c h a n g i n g the M i d d l e E a s t ; the book that e m e r g e d was also
about how E u r o p e c h a n g e d at the s a m e time, a n d a b o u t how the two
m o v e m e n t s interacted.
L l o y d G e o r g e , Woodrow Wilson, K i t c h e n e r of K h a r t o u m ,
L a w r e n c e of A r a b i a , L e n i n , S t a l i n , a n d M u s s o l i n i — m e n who helped
s h a p e the twentieth c e n t u r y — a r e a m o n g those who played leading
roles in the d r a m a that unfolds in A Peace to End All Peace, striving
to remake the world in the light of their own vision. Winston
Churchill, above all, p r e s i d e s over the p a g e s of this b o o k : a dominating figure whose g e n i u s a n i m a t e d events a n d whose larger-thanlife personality colored and enlivened t h e m .
20
INTRODUCTION
F o r Churchill, a s for L l o y d G e o r g e , Wilson, L e n i n , S t a l i n , and
the o t h e r s — a n d for s u c h m e n a s J a n Christian S m u t s , L e o A m e r y ,
a n d L o r d M i l n e r — t h e M i d d l e E a s t was an essential c o m p o n e n t or a
testing area of their worldview. T h e i r vision of the future of the
M i d d l e E a s t was central to their idea of the sort of twentieth century
they passionately believed would or s h o u l d e m e r g e as a phoenix from
the ashes of the F i r s t World War. In that sense, the history recounted
in the p a g e s that follow is the story of how the twentieth century was
created, as well as the m o d e r n M i d d l e E a s t .
PART I
AT THE
CROSSROADS OF
HISTORY
1
T H E L A S T DAYS OF OLD EUROPE
i
In the late s p r i n g of 1912, the graceful yacht Enchantress put out to
sea from rainy G e n o a for a M e d i t e r r a n e a n p l e a s u r e cruise—-a carefree
cruise without itinerary or t i m e - s c h e d u l e . T h e skies brightened as
she s t e a m e d s o u t h . S o o n she was b a t h e d in s u n s h i n e .
Enchantress b e l o n g e d to the British A d m i r a l t y . T h e a c c o m m o dation a b o a r d was as g r a n d as that on the K i n g ' s own yacht. T h e
crew n u m b e r e d nearly a h u n d r e d a n d served a dozen or so g u e s t s ,
who had c o m e from Britain via P a r i s , where they had stayed at the
R i t z . A m o n g them were the British P r i m e Minister, H e r b e r t A s q u i t h ;
his brilliant 25-year-old d a u g h t e r Violet; the civilian head of the
A d m i r a l t y , Winston C h u r c h i l l ; and Churchill's small party of family
m e m b e r s a n d close colleagues. In the final enchanted years before
the F i r s t World War b r o u g h t their world to an end, they were as
privileged a g r o u p as any the world has known.
Violet A s q u i t h kept a diary of her j o u r n e y . In Pompeii she a n d her
friends w a n d e r e d "down the long lovely silent streets" that once had
p u l s a t e d with the life of I m p e r i a l R o m e ; now, she noted, those once
lively streets were overgrown with g r a s s a n d v e g e t a t i o n . In Sicily
her party c l i m b e d to the ruins of an ancient G r e e k fortress a n d ,
a m i d s t wild lavender and h e r b s , had a picnic lunch, sitting on blocks
of stone f r o m the fallen walls. L a t e r they went higher still to watch
the sunset over the sea f r o m what r e m a i n e d of the old G r e e k theater
on the heights. T h e r e they lay " a m o n g wild thyme a n d h u m m i n g
bees and watched the sea c h a n g i n g from b l u e to flame a n d then to
cool j a d e green as the s u n d r o p p e d into it a n d the s t a r s c a m e o u t . "
1
2
Rotations and revolutions—the heavenly m o v e m e n t s that c a u s e
day to b e c o m e night a n d s p r i n g / s u m m e r to b e c o m e a u t u m n / w i n t e r —
were reflected in her observations of the l a n d s c a p e a n d its lighting;
but a sense of the mortality of civilizations and of political p o w e r s
a n d dominations did not o v e r s h a d o w Violet's cheerful vision of her
youthful voyage to the l a n d s of antiquity. H e r father p r e s i d e d over
23
24
AT THE CROSSROADS OF HISTORY
an e m p i r e roughly twice as large as the R o m a n E m p i r e at its zenith;
she m a y well have t h o u g h t that her father's e m p i r e would last twice
as long too.
T h e P r i m e Minister, a n enthusiastic sightseer, was inseparable
from his Baedeker g u i d e b o o k . An ardent classicist, he read a n d
wrote with ease a n d pleasure in classical G r e e k a n d L a t i n . Winston
Churchill, no scholar of ancient l a n g u a g e s or literature, was as jealous
as a child. " T h o s e G r e e k s a n d R o m a n s , " he protested, "they are so
overrated. T h e y only said everything first. I've said just as g o o d
things myself. B u t they got in before m e . "
Violet noted that, "It was in vain that my father pointed out that
the world had been g o i n g on for q u i t e a long time before the G r e e k s
and R o m a n s a p p e a r e d u p o n the s c e n e . " T h e Prime Minister was a n
intellectual, aware that the trend a m o n g historians of the ancient
world was away f r o m an exclusive concern with the E u r o p e a n cultures o f the G r e e k s a n d R o m a n s . T h e American professor J a m e s
H e n r y B r e a s t e d had won wide a c c e p t a n c e for the thesis that m o d e r n
civilization—that is, E u r o p e a n civilization—had its b e g i n n i n g s not
in G r e e c e and R o m e , b u t in the M i d d l e E a s t : in E g y p t and J u d a e a ,
B a b y l o n i a a n d A s s y r i a , S u m e r a n d A k k a d . Civilization—whose roots
stretched t h o u s a n d s of years into the past, into the soil of those
M i d d l e E a s t e r n monarchies that long a g o had c r u m b l e d into d u s t —
was seen to have c u l m i n a t e d in the global s u p r e m a c y of the E u r o pean peoples, their ideals, a n d their way of life.
3
4
In the early years of the twentieth century, when Churchill a n d his
g u e s t s v o y a g e d a b o a r d the Enchantress, it was usual to a s s u m e that
the E u r o p e a n peoples w o u l d continue to play a d o m i n a t i n g role in
world affairs for as far ahead in time as the mind's eye could see. It
was also not u n c o m m o n to s u p p o s e that, having already a c c o m p l i s h e d
m o s t of what m a n y r e g a r d e d as the West's historical m i s s i o n — s h a p i n g
the political destinies of the other p e o p l e s of the g l o b e — t h e y would
eventually c o m p l e t e it. C o n s p i c u o u s a m o n g the d o m a i n s still to be
dealt with were those of the M i d d l e E a s t , one of the few regions left
on the planet that had not yet been socially, culturally, a n d politically
reshaped in the i m a g e of E u r o p e .
II
T h e M i d d l e E a s t , although it had been of great interest to western
d i p l o m a t s a n d politicians d u r i n g the nineteenth century as an arena
in which G r e a t G a m e rivalries were played out, was of only marginal
concern to them in the early years of the twentieth century when
those rivalries were a p p a r e n t l y resolved. T h e region had b e c o m e a
political backwater. It was a s s u m e d that the E u r o p e a n powers would
THE L A S T DAYS OF OLD EUROPE
25
one day take the region in hand, but there was no longer a sense of
urgency about their doing so.
F e w E u r o p e a n s of Churchill's generation knew or cared what went
on in the l a n g u i d e m p i r e s of the O t t o m a n S u l t a n or the Persian
S h a h . An occasional T u r k i s h m a s s a c r e of A r m e n i a n s would lead to a
p u b l i c outcry in the West, b u t w o u l d evoke no m o r e lasting concern
than R u s s i a n m a s s a c r e s of J e w s . Worldly statesmen who privately
believed there was nothing to be d o n e w o u l d go t h r o u g h the p u b l i c
m o t i o n s of u r g i n g the S u l t a n to r e f o r m ; there the matter w o u l d end.
Petty intrigues at court, a c o r r u p t officialdom, shifting tribal alliances, and a s l u g g i s h , apathetic population c o m p o s e d the picture
that E u r o p e a n s formed of the region's affairs. T h e r e was little in
the picture to c a u s e o r d i n a r y p e o p l e living in L o n d o n , or P a r i s , or
N e w Y o r k to believe that it affected their lives or interests. In Berlin,
it is t r u e , planners looked to the o p e n i n g up of railroads a n d new
markets in the region; b u t these were commercial ventures. T h e
p a s s i o n s that now drive t r o o p s a n d terrorists to kill a n d be k i l l e d — a n d
that c o m p e l global a t t e n t i o n — h a d not yet been a r o u s e d .
At the t i m e , the political l a n d s c a p e of the M i d d l e E a s t looked
different f r o m that of today. Israel, J o r d a n , S y r i a , I r a q , a n d S a u d i
A r a b i a did not exist then. M o s t of the M i d d l e E a s t still rested, as it
had for centuries, u n d e r the d r o w s y a n d negligent sway of the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e , a relatively tranquil d o m a i n in which history, like
everything else, m o v e d slowly.
T o d a y , toward the close of the twentieth century, the politics
of the M i d d l e E a s t present a completely different a s p e c t : they are
explosive. No m a n played a m o r e crucial role—at times unintentionally—in g i v i n g birth to the M i d d l e E a s t we live with today than
did Winston Churchill, who before the F i r s t World War was a rising
but widely d i s t r u s t e d y o u n g E n g l i s h politician with no particular
interest in M o s l e m A s i a . A c u r i o u s destiny d r o v e Churchill and the
M i d d l e E a s t to interfere repeatedly in one another's political lives.
T h i s left its m a r k s ; there are frontier lines now r u n n i n g a c r o s s the
face of the M i d d l e E a s t that are scar-lines from those encounters with
him.
* T h e Baghdad Railway project remains the best-known example of German
economic penetration of the region. T h e story is a tangled one and often misunderstood, but the British originally encouraged and supported the project, little aware
at the outset of the dangers it might pose. Eventually the project became a source of
discord between Britain and Germany which, however, was resolved by an agreement reached between the two countries in 1914.
T H E LEGACY OF T H E GREAT
GAME IN ASIA
i
Churchill, A s q u i t h , a n d s u c h C a b i n e t colleagues as the F o r e i g n
Secretary, S i r E d w a r d G r e y , the Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r , D a v i d
L l o y d G e o r g e , a n d , later, the War Minister, L o r d K i t c h e n e r , were
to play a decisive role in creating the m o d e r n M i d d l e E a s t ; b u t in
d o i n g so they were u n a b l e to e s c a p e f r o m a Victorian political legacy
that A s q u i t h ' s L i b e r a l g o v e r n m e n t thought it had rejected. A s q u i t h
and G r e y , having turned their b a c k s on the nineteenth-century rivalry
with F r a n c e a n d R u s s i a in the M i d d l e E a s t , believed that they could
walk away from it; b u t events were to prove them w r o n g .
II
T h e s t r u g g l e for the M i d d l e E a s t , pitting E n g l a n d against E u r o p e a n
rivals, was a result of the imperial expansion ushered in by the
voyages o f C o l u m b u s , V a s c o d a G a m a , Magellan, a n d D r a k e . H a v i n g
discovered the sea routes in the fifteenth a n d sixteenth centuries, the
E u r o p e a n powers went on to vie with one another for control of the
rest of the world. E n g l a n d w a s a relatively late starter in the race, but
eventually s u r p a s s e d the others.
D u r i n g the eighteenth century the British Isles, despite their small
size, finally established an e m p i r e that encircled the g l o b e . L i k e the
S p a n i a r d s and the D u t c h before t h e m , the British b o a s t e d that their
m o n a r c h now reigned over d o m i n i o n s on which the sun never set. By
1912, when Winston Churchill a n d Herbert A s q u i t h cruised a b o a r d
the Enchantress, their m o n a r c h , G e o r g e V, ruled a q u a r t e r of the
land surface of the planet.
Of none of their c o n q u e s t s were the British m o r e p r o u d than those
in the storied E a s t . Y e t there was irony in these t r i u m p h s ; for in
besting F r a n c e in A s i a a n d the Pacific, a n d in crowning that achievement by winning I n d i a , Britain had stretched her line of transport
26
THE LEGACY OF THE GREAT GAME
IN
ASIA
27
a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s so far that it could be cut at rnany points.
N a p o l e o n B o n a p a r t e e x p o s e d this vulnerability in 1798, when
he i n v a d e d E g y p t a n d m a r c h e d on S y r i a — i n t e n d i n g , he later m a i n tained, from there to follow the p a t h of legend a n d glory, p a s t
B a b y l o n , to I n d i a . T h o u g h checked in his own p l a n s , N a p o l e o n
afterwards p e r s u a d e d the m a d C z a r Paul to launch the R u s s i a n a r m y
on the s a m e p a t h .
Britain's r e s p o n s e was to s u p p o r t the native r e g i m e s of the M i d d l e
E a s t against E u r o p e a n e x p a n s i o n . S h e d i d not desire to control the
region, b u t to keep any other E u r o p e a n power from d o i n g s o .
T h r o u g h o u t the nineteenth century, successive British g o v e r n m e n t s therefore p u r s u e d a policy of p r o p p i n g up the tottering I s l a m i c
r e a l m s in A s i a against E u r o p e a n interference, s u b v e r s i o n , a n d invasion. In d o i n g so their principal o p p o n e n t s o o n b e c a m e the R u s s i a n
E m p i r e . D e f e a t i n g R u s s i a n d e s i g n s in A s i a e m e r g e d as the o b s e s s i v e
goal of generations of British civilian a n d military officials. T h e i r
a t t e m p t to do so w a s , for t h e m , "the G r e a t G a m e , " in which the
stakes ran high. G e o r g e C u r z o n , the future Viceroy of I n d i a , defined
the stakes clearly: " T u r k e s t a n , A f g h a n i s t a n , T r a n s c a s p i a , P e r s i a — t o
m a n y these n a m e s breathe only a sense of utter r e m o t e n e s s . .. To
m e , I confess, they are the pieces on a c h e s s b o a r d u p o n which is
b e i n g played out a g a m e for the d o m i n i o n of the w o r l d . " Q u e e n
Victoria put it even m o r e clearly: it w a s , she said, "a q u e s t i o n of
R u s s i a n or British s u p r e m a c y in the w o r l d . "
1
2
3
Ill
It a p p e a r s to have been a British officer n a m e d A r t h u r Conolly who
first called it "the G r e a t G a m e . " He played it gallantly, along the
H i m a l a y a n frontier a n d in the deserts and oases of Central A s i a , a n d
lost in a terrible w a y : an U z b e k e m i r cast him for two m o n t h s into
a well which w a s filled with vermin a n d reptiles, a n d then what remained o f h i m was b r o u g h t u p a n d b e h e a d e d . T h e p h r a s e "the G r e a t
G a m e " was found in his p a p e r s a n d q u o t e d by a historian of the F i r s t
A f g h a n W a r . R u d y a r d K i p l i n g m a d e it f a m o u s in his novel Kim, the
story of an A n g l o - I n d i a n boy a n d his A f g h a n mentor foiling R u s s i a n
intrigues along the highways to I n d i a . *
4
T h e g a m e had b e g u n even before 1829, when the D u k e o f
Wellington, then P r i m e Minister, entered into official c o r r e s p o n dence on the subject of how best to protect India against a R u s s i a n
* These activities of the rival intelligence services are what some writers mean by
the Great G a m e ; others use the phrase in the broader sense in which it is used in
this book.
28
AT
THE
CROSSROADS
OF
HISTORY
attack through A f g h a n i s t a n . T h e best way, it was a g r e e d , was by
keeping R u s s i a out of A f g h a n i s t a n . British strategy thereafter was to
employ the decaying regimes of I s l a m i c A s i a as a gigantic buffer
between British I n d i a a n d its route to E g y p t , and the threatening
R u s s i a n s . T h i s policy was associated especially with the n a m e of
L o r d P a l m e r s t o n , who developed it d u r i n g his many years as F o r e i g n
Minister ( 1 8 3 0 - 4 , 1 8 3 6 - 4 1 , a n d 1 8 4 6 - 5 1 ) a n d P r i m e Minister
( 1 8 5 5 - 8 and 1 8 5 9 - 6 5 ) .
T h e battle to s u p p o r t friendly buffer regimes raged with particular
intensity at the western a n d eastern e n d s of the Asian continent,
where the control of d o m i n a t i n g strategic positions was at stake.
In western A s i a the locus of strategic concern was C o n s t a n t i n o p l e
( I s t a n b u l ) , the ancient B y z a n t i u m , which for centuries had d o m i n a t e d
the c r o s s r o a d s of world politics. S i t u a t e d above the narrow straits
of the D a r d a n e l l e s , it c o m m a n d e d both the east/west p a s s a g e between E u r o p e and A s i a a n d the north/south p a s s a g e between the
M e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d the Black S e a . So long as C o n s t a n t i n o p l e w a s not
in unfriendly h a n d s , the powerful British navy could sail t h r o u g h the
D a r d a n e l l e s into the Black S e a to d o m i n a t e the R u s s i a n coastline.
B u t if the R u s s i a n s were to c o n q u e r the straits they could not merely
keep the British fleet from c o m i n g in; they could also send their own
fleet out, into the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , where its presence could threaten
the British lifeline.
T o w a r d the far side of the A s i a n continent, the locus of strategic
concern was the stretch of high m o u n t a i n ranges in a n d adjoining
Afghanistan, f r o m which invaders could p o u r down into the plains of
British India. Britain's aim in eastern Asia was to keep R u s s i a from
establishing any sort of presence on those d o m i n a t i n g heights.
S o m e t i m e s as a cold war, s o m e t i m e s as a hot one, the struggle
between Britain a n d R u s s i a r a g e d f r o m the D a r d a n e l l e s to the
H i m a l a y a s for almost a h u n d r e d y e a r s . Its o u t c o m e was s o m e t h i n g of
a draw.
IV
T h e r e were vital m a t t e r s at stake in Britain's long s t r u g g l e against
R u s s i a ; a n d while s o m e of these eventually fell by the wayside,
others r e m a i n e d , alongside newer ones that e m e r g e d .
In 1791 Britain's P r i m e Minister, William Pitt, e x p r e s s e d fear that
the R u s s i a n E m p i r e m i g h t be able to overthrow the E u r o p e a n balance
of power. T h a t fear revived after R u s s i a played a crucial role in the
final defeat of N a p o l e o n in 1 8 1 4 - 1 5 , but diminished again after
1856, when R u s s i a was defeated in the C r i m e a n War.
F r o m 1830 o n w a r d , L o r d P a l m e r s t o n and his successors feared
T H E LEGACY OF T H E G R E A T GAME IN ASIA
29
that if R u s s i a d e s t r o y e d the O t t o m a n E m p i r e the s c r a m b l e to pick up
the pieces might lead to a m a j o r war between the E u r o p e a n p o w e r s .
T h a t always remained a concern.
By the m i d d l e of the nineteenth century, British t r a d e with the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e b e g a n to a s s u m e a m a j o r i m p o r t a n c e , a n d economic
issues were a d d e d to the controversy, pitting free trade Britain against
protectionist R u s s i a . T h e d e e p financial involvement o f F r a n c e a n d
Italy in O t t o m a n affairs, followed by G e r m a n economic penetration,
turned the area in which R u s s i a a n d Britain c o n d u c t e d their s t r u g g l e
into a minefield of national e c o n o m i c interests.
Oil entered the picture only in the early twentieth century. B u t it
did not play a m a j o r role in the G r e a t G a m e even then, both b e c a u s e
there were few politicians who foresaw the c o m i n g i m p o r t a n c e of oil,
a n d b e c a u s e it was not then known that oil existed in the M i d d l e E a s t
in s u c h a g r e a t quantity. M o s t of Britain's oil ( m o r e than 80 percent,
before a n d d u r i n g the F i r s t World War) c a m e from the U n i t e d
S t a t e s . At the t i m e , Persia was the only significant M i d d l e E a s t e r n
p r o d u c e r other than R u s s i a , a n d even Persia's o u t p u t was insignificant
in terms of world p r o d u c t i o n . In 1913, for e x a m p l e , the U n i t e d
S t a t e s p r o d u c e d 140 t i m e s m o r e oil than d i d P e r s i a .
s
F r o m the
century, the
safety of the
of E m p r e s s
evolution of
Empire and
lifeline, b u t
the c z a r s .
b e g i n n i n g of the G r e a t G a m e until far into the twentieth
m o s t deeply felt concern of British leaders was for the
r o a d to the E a s t . When Q u e e n Victoria a s s u m e d the title
of I n d i a in 1877 formal recognition was given to the
Britain into a species of d u a l m o n a r c h y — t h e British
the E m p i r e of I n d i a . T h e line between them was t h u s a
over it, a n d casting a long s h a d o w , h u n g the s w o r d of
British leaders s e e m e d not to take into account the possibility that,
in e x p a n d i n g s o u t h w a r d s a n d e a s t w a r d s , the R u s s i a n s were impelled
by internal historical imperatives of their own which h a d nothing to
do with I n d i a or Britain. T h e c z a r s a n d their ministers believed that
it was their country's destiny to c o n q u e r the south a n d the east, j u s t
as the A m e r i c a n s at the time believed it their manifest destiny to
c o n q u e r the west. In each c a s e , the d r e a m was to fill out an entire
continent f r o m ocean t o ocean. T h e R u s s i a n Imperial Chancellor,
Prince G o r c h a k o v , put it m o r e or less in those t e r m s in 1864 in a
m e m o r a n d u m in which he set forth his g o a l s for his country. He
a r g u e d that the need for s e c u r e frontiers obliged the R u s s i a n s to go
on d e v o u r i n g the rotting r e g i m e s to their s o u t h . He pointed out that
"the U n i t e d S t a t e s in A m e r i c a , F r a n c e in Algiers, H o l l a n d in her
colonies—all have been d r a w n into a c o u r s e where ambition plays a
smaller role than i m p e r i o u s necessity, a n d the greatest difficulty is
knowing where to s t o p . "
6
T h e British feared that R u s s i a did not know where to s t o p ; a n d , as
30
AT
THE
CROSSROADS
OF
HISTORY
an increasingly d e m o c r a t i c society e n g a g e d generation after generation
in the conflict with despotic R u s s i a , they eventually developed a
hatred of R u s s i a that went b e y o n d the particular political and economic differences that divided the two countries. Britons grew to
object to R u s s i a n s not merely for what they did but for who they
were.
At the s a m e time, however, L i b e r a l s in and out of Parliament
began to e x p r e s s their abhorrence of the corrupt and despotic M i d d l e
E a s t e r n r e g i m e s that their own g o v e r n m e n t s u p p o r t e d against the
R u s s i a n threat. In d o i n g s o , they struck a responsive chord in the
country's electorate. Atrocities c o m m i t t e d by the O t t o m a n E m p i r e
against Christian minorities were thunderingly d e n o u n c e d by the
L i b e r a l leader, William E w a r t G l a d s t o n e , in the 1880 election c a m paign in which he overthrew and replaced the C o n s e r v a t i v e P r i m e
Minister, B e n j a m i n Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield.
C l a i m i n g that the Sultan's r e g i m e was "a b o t t o m l e s s pit of fraud
and f a l s e h o o d , " G l a d s t o n e , in his 1880—5 administration, washed
Britain's h a n d s of the O t t o m a n involvement, and the British government withdrew its protection and influence from C o n s t a n t i n o p l e .
T h e T u r k s , u n a b l e to stand on their own, turned therefore for
s u p p o r t to another power, B i s m a r c k ' s G e r m a n y ; and G e r m a n y took
Britain's place at the S u b l i m e P o r t e .
7
When the C o n s e r v a t i v e s returned to office, it was too late to go
back. R o b e r t Cecil, 3rd M a r q u e s s of S a l i s b u r y ( P r i m e Minister:
1 8 8 5 - 6 , 1 8 8 6 - 9 2 , 1 8 9 5 - 1 9 0 0 , 1 9 0 0 - 2 ) , aware that the O t t o m a n
rulers were j e o p a r d i z i n g their own sovereignty through m i s m a n a g e ment, h a d thought of u s i n g s u c h influence as Britain could exert to
g u i d e a n d , to s o m e extent, reform the r e g i m e . Of G l a d s t o n e ' s having
dissipated that influence, he l a m e n t e d : " T h e y have just thrown it
away into the sea, without getting anything whatever in e x c h a n g e . "
8
V
G e r m a n y ' s entry on the scene, at Constantinople and elsewhere,
marked the beginning of a new age in world politics. T h e G e r m a n
E m p i r e , formally created on 18 J a n u a r y 1871, within d e c a d e s had
replaced R u s s i a as the principal threat to British interests.
In part this was b e c a u s e of Britain's relative industrial decline. In
the m i d d l e of the nineteenth century, Britain p r o d u c e d about twothirds of the world's coal, a b o u t half of its iron, and m o r e than 70
percent of its steel; indeed over 40 percent of the entire world output
of t r a de d m a n u f a c t u r e d g o o d s was p r o d u c e d within the British Isles
at that time. Half the world's industrial production was then Britishowned, but by 1870 the figure had sunk to 32 percent, and by 1910,
T H E L E G A C Y OF T H E G R E A T GAME IN ASIA
31
9
to 15 p e r c e n t . In newer a n d increasingly more important industries,
such as chemicals and machine-tools, G e r m a n y took the lead. E v e n
Britain's pre-eminent position in world finance—in 1914 she held 41
percent of g r o s s international i n v e s t m e n t — w a s a facet of decline;
British investors preferred to place their money in dynamic economies
in the A m e r i c a s and elsewhere a b r o a d .
Military factors were also involved. T h e development of railroads
radically altered the strategic balance between land power and sea
power to the detriment of the latter. Sir Halford M a c k i n d e r , the
prophet of geopolitics, underlined the realities of a new situation in
which enemy railroad trains would speed troops and munitions directly to their destination by the straight line which constitutes the
shortest distance between two points, while the British navy would
sail slowly a r o u n d the circumference of a continent and arrive too
late. T h e railroad network of the G e r m a n E m p i r e m a d e the K a i s e r ' s
realm the m o s t a d v a n c e d military power in the world, and Britain's
precarious naval s u p r e m a c y began to seem less relevant than it had
been.
10
Walter B a g e h o t , editor of the influential L o n d o n m a g a z i n e , The
Economist, drew the conclusion that, b e c a u s e of G e r m a n y , R u s s i a n
expansion no longer needed to be feared: " . . . the old idea that
R u s s i a is already so great a power that E u r o p e needs to be afraid of
her . . . belongs t o the p r e - G e r m a n i c a g e . "
Russia's disastrous
defeat by J a p a n ( 1 9 0 4 — 5 ) , followed by revolutionary u p r i s i n g s in St
P e t e r s b u r g and throughout the country in 1905, s u g g e s t e d that, in
any event, the C z a r ' s a r m i e s were no longer strong enough to remain
a cause for concern.
11
T h e C o n s e r v a t i v e g o v e r n m e n t o f A r t h u r J a m e s Balfour (1902—5)
nonetheless continued to p u r s u e the old rivalry as well as the new
one, allying Britain not only with J a p a n against R u s s i a , but also
with F r a n c e against G e r m a n y . B u t S i r E d w a r d G r e y , F o r e i g n S e c retary in the successor L i b e r a l administration of Henry C a m p b e l l B a n n e r m a n (1905 — 8 ) , pictured the two policies as contradictory.
" R u s s i a was the ally of F r a n c e , " he wrote, "we could not p u r s u e at
one and the s a m e time a policy of agreement with F r a n c e and a
policy of counteralliances against R u s s i a . "
1 2
G r e y therefore negotiated a treaty with R u s s i a , executed in 1907,
that reconciled the differences between the two countries in A s i a .
T i b e t was neutralized; R u s s i a gave up her interest in Afghanistan,
and left control of that country's foreign policy in Britain's h a n d s ;
and Persia was divided into a R u s s i a n zone, a neutral zone, and a
British zone. T h e G r e a t G a m e had seemingly been b r o u g h t to an
end.
It could have been anticipated that the settlement of 1907 would
arouse fears in Constantinople that Britain would no longer protect
32
AT THE CROSSROADS OF HISTORY
T u r k e y against R u s s i a . A P a l m e r s t o n or a S t r a t f o r d C a n n i n g might
have allayed such fears, but neither S i r E d w a r d G r e y nor his a m b a s s a d o r in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e took the trouble to do s o .
VI
T h e r e was an intellectual time lag between L o n d o n and the o u t p o s t s
of e m p i r e . G r e y , A s q u i t h , and their L i b e r a l colleagues saw Britain's
traditional rivals, F r a n c e and R u s s i a , as British friends and allies in
the post-Victorian a g e . But British officers, agents, a n d civil servants
stationed along the great arc that s w u n g from E g y p t and the S u d a n
to India failed in m a n y cases to a d o p t the new outlook. H a v i n g spent
a lifetime countering R u s s i a n and F r e n c h intrigues in the M i d d l e
E a s t , they continued to regard R u s s i a and F r a n c e as their country's
enemies. E v e n t s in 1914 and the s u c c e e d i n g years were to b r i n g their
Victorian political views back into unexpected p r o m i n e n c e .
In one respect officers in the field and ministers in L o n d o n were in
a g r e e m e n t : both shared the a s s u m p t i o n that what remained of the
independent M i d d l e E a s t would eventually fall under E u r o p e a n
influence and g u i d a n c e . A s q u i t h and G r e y had no desire for Britain
to e x p a n d further into the M i d d l e E a s t , while junior British officers
in C a i r o and K h a r t o u m harbored d e s i g n s on the A r a b - s p e a k i n g provinces to their east. Both g r o u p s believed, however, that the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e in the M i d d l e E a s t would collapse one day and that one or
m o r e of the E u r o p e a n powers would have to pick up the pieces. T h i s
a s s u m p t i o n — t h a t when the O t t o m a n E m p i r e d i s a p p e a r e d , E u r o p e
would have to take its p l a c e — p r o v e d to be one of those m o t o r s that
drive history.
3
T H E M I D D L E EAST BEFORE
T H E WAR
i
F o r d e c a d e s and indeed centuries before the outbreak of the First
World War in 1914, the native r e g i m e s of the M i d d l e E a s t had been,
in every sense, losing g r o u n d to E u r o p e . T h e khanates of Central
Asia, including K h i v a and B u k h a r a , had fallen to R u s s i a , as had
portions of the Persian E m p i r e . T h e A r a b s h e i k h d o m s along the
Gulf coast route from S u e z to I n d i a had been brought under British
sway; and C y p r u s a n d E g y p t , though formally still attached to
T u r k e y , were in fact occupied a n d administered by Britain. T h e
A n g l o - R u s s i a n A g r e e m e n t of 1907 b r o u g h t Afghanistan into the
British s p h e r e , and divided most of Persia between Britain and
R u s s i a . In the M o s l e m M i d d l e E a s t , only the O t t o m a n E m p i r e
effectively retained its i n d e p e n d e n c e — t h o u g h precariously, as its
frontiers c a m e under p r e s s u r e .
I n d e e d , the still-independent T u r k i s h S u l t a n a t e looked out of
place in the m o d e r n world. L i k e a ruined temple of classical antiquity, with s o m e of its shattered c o l u m n s still erect and visible to
tourists s u c h as those a b o a r d the Enchantress, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e
was a structure that had survived the bygone era to which it belonged. It was a relic of invasions from the east a millennium a g o :
beginning a r o u n d AD 1,000, waves of n o m a d horsemen s t r e a m e d
forth from the s t e p p e s and deserts of central and northeast A s i a ,
c o n q u e r i n g the peoples and lands in their path as they rode west.
Pagan or animist in religious belief, and speaking one or other of the
Mongolian or T u r k i s h languages, they carved out a variety of principalities and k i n g d o m s for themselves, a m o n g them the e m p i r e s of
G e n g h i s K h a n a n d T a m e r l a n e . T h e O t t o m a n (or O s m a n l i ) E m p i r e ,
founded by T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g horsemen who had converted to I s l a m ,
was another such e m p i r e ; it took its n a m e from O s m a n , a b o r d e r l a n d
ghazi (warrior for the M o s l e m faith) born in the thirteenth century,
who c a m p a i g n e d on the outskirts of the E a s t e r n R o m a n (or
Byzantine) E m p i r e in Anatolia.
34
AT THE CROSSROADS OF HISTORY
In the fifteenth century O s m a n ' s s u c c e s s o r s c o n q u e r e d and replaced the Byzantine E m p i r e . R i d i n g on to new c o n q u e s t s , the
O t t o m a n T u r k s e x p a n d e d in all directions: north to the C r i m e a , east
to B a g h d a d and B a s r a , south to the coasts of A r a b i a and the Gulf,
west to E g y p t and N o r t h A f r i c a — a n d into E u r o p e . At its peak, in
the sixteenth century, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e included most of the
M i d d l e E a s t , N o r t h Africa, and what are now the Balkan countries of
E u r o p e — G r e e c e , Y u g o s l a v i a , A l b a n i a , R u m a n i a , and B u l g a r i a — a s
well as m u c h of H u n g a r y . It stretched from the Persian G u l f to the
river D a n u b e ; its a r m i e s s t o p p e d only at the g a t e s of Vienna. Its
population was estimated at between thirty and fifty million at a time
when E n g l a n d ' s population was p e r h a p s four million; and it ruled
more than twenty nationalities.
1
T h e O t t o m a n s never entirely outgrew their origins as a m a r a u d i n g
war b a n d . T h e y enriched themselves by c a p t u r i n g wealth and slaves;
the slaves, conscripted into the O t t o m a n ranks, rose to replace the
c o m m a n d e r s who retired, and went on to c a p t u r e wealth and slaves
in their turn. I n v a d i n g new territories was the only path they knew
to economic g r o w t h . In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
when the c o n q u e s t s turned into defeats and retreats, the d y n a m i c of
O t t o m a n existence was lost; the T u r k s had m a s t e r e d the arts of war
but not those of g o v e r n m e n t .
O t t o m a n leaders in the nineteenth century attempted p r o g r a m s of
sweeping reform. T h e i r g o a l s were the centralization of g o v e r n m e n t ;
the establishment of an executive branch under the S u l t a n ' s chief
minister, the G r a n d Vizier; the rationalization of taxation and conscription; the establishment of constitutional g u a r a n t e e s ; the founding of secular public schools offering technical, vocational, and other
training; and the like. A s t a r t — b u t not m u c h m o r e — w a s m a d e along
these lines. M o s t of the reforms took place only on p a p e r ; and as an
anachronism in the m o d e r n world, the ramshackle O t t o m a n r e g i m e
s e e m e d d o o m e d to d i s a p p e a r .
T h e e m p i r e was incoherent. Its O t t o m a n rulers were not an ethnic
g r o u p ; though they s p o k e T u r k i s h , m a n y were descendants of onceChristian slaves from Balkan E u r o p e and elsewhere. T h e empire's
s u b j e c t s (a wide variety of p e o p l e s , speaking T u r k i s h , S e m i t i c ,
K u r d i s h , S l a v i c , A r m e n i a n , G r e e k , and other languages) had little in
c o m m o n with, and in m a n y cases little love for, one another.
T h o u g h E u r o p e a n o b s e r v e r s later were to generalize a b o u t , for
e x a m p l e , " A r a b s , " in fact E g y p t i a n s and A r a b i a n s , S v r i a n s and
Iraqis were peoples of different history, ethnic b a c k g r o u n d , and
outlook. T h e multinational, multilingual empire was a mosaic of
peoples who did not m i x ; in the towns, A r m e n i a n s , G r e e k s , J e w s ,
and others each lived in their own separate q u a r t e r s .
Religion had s o m e sort of unifying effect, for the empire was a
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t h e o c r a c y — a M o s l e m rather than a T u r k i s h s t a t e — a n d most of its
s u b j e c t s were M o s l e m s . T h e O t t o m a n S u l t a n was regarded a s caliph
(temporal and spiritual s u c c e s s o r to the Prophet, M o h a m m e d ) by the
majority g r o u p within I s l a m , the S u n n i s . B u t a m o n g others of the
seventy-one sects of I s l a m , especially the n u m e r o u s Shi'ites, there
was doctrinal opposition to the Sultan's S u n n i faith and to his claims
to the caliphate. A n d for those who were not M o s l e m ( p e r h a p s 25
percent of the population at the beginning of the twentieth c e n t u r y ) ,
but G r e e k O r t h o d o x , R o m a n C a t h o l i c , A r m e n i a n Catholic, A r m e n i a n
G r e g o r i a n , J e w i s h , Protestant, M a r o n i t e , S a m a r i t a n , Nestorian
Christian, S y r i a n U n i t e d O r t h o d o x , M o n o p h y s i t e , or any one of a
n u m b e r of others, religion was a divisive rather than a unifying
political factor.
T h e extent to which religion g o v e r n e d everyday life in the M i d d l e
E a s t was s o m e t h i n g that E u r o p e a n visitors in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries found r e m a r k a b l e ; for religion had played
no such role in E u r o p e for centuries. I n d e e d , E u r o p e a n s visited the
M i d d l e E a s t largely to see the past. T h e y c a m e to see Biblical sites,
or excavated w o n d e r s of the ancient world, or n o m a d s who lived as
they had in the time of A b r a h a m .
T h e Porte, too, a p p e a r e d to live in the p a s t . O t t o m a n officials
continued to pretend, for e x a m p l e , that Bulgaria formed part of the
e m p i r e long after losing control of that territory in 1878, a n d counted
E g y p t i a n s as a m o n g its s u b j e c t s even after Britain occupied E g y p t in
1882. F o r this and other reasons, O t t o m a n statistics were unreliable,
and it is only in the roughest sense that we can say that the empire's
population in the early twentieth century may have been a b o u t
twenty to twenty-five million, in a t e r r i t o r y — d e p e n d i n g on how it is
d e f i n e d — a b o u t six times the size of T e x a s . It c o m p r i s e d , broadly
speaking, most of the A r a b i a n peninsula and what is now T u r k e y ,
Israel, L e b a n o n , J o r d a n , S y r i a , and I r a q .
Until the early twentieth century, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was for
most of the time under the absolute personal rule of the S u l t a n . In at
least one respect he was quite unlike a E u r o p e a n m o n a r c h : as the son
of a w o m a n of the h a r e m , he was always half-slave by birth. U n d e r
his rule civil, military, and Holy L a w administrations could be
discerned in an e m p i r e carefully divided into provinces and cantons.
B u t the a p p e a r a n c e of orderly a d m i n i s t r a t i o n — i n d e e d of effective
administration of any s o r t — w a s chimerical. As G e r t r u d e Bell, an
experienced English traveler in M i d d l e E a s t e r n lands, was later to
write, " N o country which turned to the eye of the world an a p p e a r ance of established rule and centralized G o v e r n m e n t was, to a greater
extent than the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , a land of m a k e - b e l i e v e . " T h e r e
were army g a r r i s o n s , it is t r u e , scattered about the e m p i r e , but
otherwise power was diffuse and the centralized authority was m o r e
2
36
AT
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HISTORY
myth than reality. G e r t r u d e Bell, in the course of her travels, found
that outside the towns, O t t o m a n administration vanished a n d the
local sheikh or h e a d m a n ruled instead. T h e r e were districts, too,
where b r i g a n d s r o a m e d a t will. T h e rickety T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t was
even incapable of collecting its own t a x e s , the m o s t b a s i c act of
imperial administration. On the eve of the F i r s t World War, only
a b o u t 5 percent of taxes w a s collected by the g o v e r n m e n t ; the other
95 percent w a s collected by i n d e p e n d e n t tax f a r m e r s .
3
F o r e i g n countries exercised v a r y i n g d e g r e e s of influence a n d control within the e m p i r e . It w a s not only that E g y p t a n d C y p r u s were
in fact g o v e r n e d by Britain, which had occupied them in the late
nineteenth century; a n d that the s h e i k h d o m s along the G u l f coast
were u n d e r British control. L e b a n o n , a s e p a r a t e canton u n d e r arr a n g e m e n t s established in 1864, w a s g o v e r n e d by a Christian military
governor directly serving u n d e r the Porte which, however, w a s o b liged to act only in consultation with six E u r o p e a n p o w e r s . R u s s i a
a n d F r a n c e reserved to t h e m s e l v e s the right to protect, respectively,
the O r t h o d o x a n d Catholic p o p u l a t i o n s of the e m p i r e ; a n d other
p o w e r s also asserted a right to intervene in T u r k i s h affairs on behalf
of the g r o u p s they s p o n s o r e d .
What w a s m o r e than a little unreal, then, w a s the claim that the
S u l t a n a n d his g o v e r n m e n t ruled their d o m a i n s in the s e n s e in which
E u r o p e a n s u n d e r s t o o d g o v e r n m e n t a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . What was
real in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e t e n d e d to be local: a t r i b e , a clan, a sect,
or a town was the t r u e political unit to which loyalties a d h e r e d .
T h i s c o n f u s e d E u r o p e a n o b s e r v e r s , w h o s e m o d e r n notions of citizenship a n d nationality were i n a p p l i c a b l e to the crazy quilt of O t t o m a n
politics. E u r o p e a n s a s s u m e d that eventually they themselves would
take control of the O t t o m a n d o m a i n s a n d organize them on a m o r e
rational b a s i s . In the early years of the twentieth century it w a s
reasonable to believe that the d a y s of T u r k i s h dominion were
numbered.
By 1914 the m u c h - d i m i n i s h e d O t t o m a n E m p i r e no longer ruled
N o r t h Africa or H u n g a r y or m o s t of southeastern E u r o p e . It had
been in a retreat since the eighteenth century that finally looked like
a rout. F o r d e c a d e s , in the O t t o m a n a r m y a n d in the schools,
discontented m e n had told one another in the course of clandestine
m e e t i n g s that the e m p i r e h a d to be rapidly c h a n g e d to meet the
intellectual, industrial, a n d military challenges of m o d e r n E u r o p e .
S t i m u l a t e d but c o n f u s e d by the nationalism that had b e c o m e E u r o p e ' s
c r e e d , intellectuals a m o n g s t the diverse T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g a n d A r a b i c speaking p e o p l e s of the e m p i r e s o u g h t to discover or to forge s o m e
sense of their own political identity.
In the final years before the o u t b r e a k of the F i r s t World War,
o b s c u r e but a m b i t i o u s new m e n took power in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ,
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37
relegating the S u l t a n to a figurehead position. T h e new m e n , leaders
of the Y o u n g T u r k e y Party, were at once the result a n d the c a u s e of
ferment in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , the O t t o m a n capital, as they tried to
meet the challenge of b r i n g i n g T u r k e y ' s e m p i r e into the twentieth
century before the m o d e r n world h a d t i m e to destroy it.
II
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e — t h e city originally called B y z a n t i u m a n d today
known as I s t a n b u l — w a s for m o r e than eleven centuries the capital
of the R o m a n E m p i r e in the E a s t , a n d then for m o r e than four
centuries the capital of its s u c c e s s o r , the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . L i k e
R o m e , C o n s t a n t i n o p l e w a s built on seven hills a n d , like R o m e , it was
an eternal city: its strategic location g a v e it an a b i d i n g i m p o r t a n c e in
the world's affairs.
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e is a collection of towns located principally on the
E u r o p e a n side of the great waterway that links the M e d i t e r r a n e a n to
the Black S e a , at a point where the channel s e p a r a t i n g E u r o p e from
A s i a n a r r o w s to w i d t h s of as little as a half-mile. T h e site is a natural
fortress, difficult to c o n q u e r or even to attack. A b a y s o m e four miles
long, known as the G o l d e n H o r n , f o r m s a magnificent natural harbor
that p r o v i d e s shelter a n d protection for a defending fleet.
In 1914 the p o p u l a t i o n of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e stood at a b o u t a million.
It w a s a c o s m o p o l i t a n a n d polyglot p o p u l a t i o n : most residents of the
city were M o s l e m , G r e e k , or A r m e n i a n , b u t there w a s also a considerable colony of E u r o p e a n a n d other foreigners. A E u r o p e a n
influence w a s evident in the architectural style of the newer b u i l d i n g s ,
in the style of d r e s s , a n d in s u c h innovations as street lights.
R u d i m e n t a r y modernization h a d only just b e g u n . In 1912 electric
lighting h a d been i n t r o d u c e d into C o n s t a n t i n o p l e for the first t i m e .
A start h a d been m a d e toward c o n s t r u c t i n g a d r a i n a g e s y s t e m for the
city's narrow, filthy s t r e e t s ; a n d the p a c k s of wild d o g s that for
centuries had patrolled the city were, by decision of the municipal
council, s h i p p e d to a waterless island to d i e . S o m e work h a d been
done on the p a v i n g of r o a d s , b u t not m u c h ; m o s t streets still t u r n e d
to m u d in the frequent r a i n s t o r m s , or c o u g h e d dry d u s t into the air
as winds blew t h r o u g h the city.
4
5
Violent alternating north a n d south w i n d s d o m i n a t e d the city's
climate, b r i n g i n g s u d d e n c h a n g e s of e x t r e m e heat or cold. T h e
political climate, too, w a s s u b j e c t to s u d d e n and e x t r e m e c h a n g e s at
the beginning of the twentieth century; and for m a n y years prior to
1914 British o b s e r v e r s had shown that they had no idea where the
winds were c o m i n g from or which way they were blowing. Political
m a n e u v e r i n g s at the S u b l i m e Porte, the g a t e to the G r a n d Vizier's
38
AT
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offices from which the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t took its n a m e , were
c o n d u c t e d behind a veil of mystery that the British e m b a s s y time a n d
again h a d failed to penetrate.
Ill
T h e British e m b a s s y , like those of the other G r e a t Powers, was
located in Pera, the E u r o p e a n q u a r t e r of the city, which lay to the
north of the G o l d e n H o r n . F o r e i g n c o m m u n i t i e s h a d g r o w n up in
proximity to their e m b a s s i e s , a n d lived their own lives, separately
f r o m that of the city. In P e r a , F r e n c h was the l a n g u a g e of legation
parties a n d entertainments; G r e e k , not T u r k i s h , was the l a n g u a g e of
the streets. T h r e e theaters offered revues a n d plays i m p o r t e d from
Paris. T h e Pera Palace Hotel offered physical facilities c o m p a r a b l e
with those available in the palatial hotels of the m a j o r cities of
Europe.
M o s t E u r o p e a n s s u c c u m b e d to the temptation to live in the isolation of their own enclave. F e w were at home in the narrow, dirty
lanes of S t a m b o u l , the old section of the city south of the G o l d e n
H o r n , with its walls a n d fortifications c r u m b l i n g into ruin. O n e of
the few who felt at ease on either side of the G o l d e n H o r n was an
E n g l i s h m a n n a m e d W y n d h a m D e e d e s , who h a d c o m e t o play a n
important role in the new Y o u n g T u r k e y administration.
D e e d e s was from a county family of K e n t : four centuries of
E n g l i s h country gentlemen h a d p r e c e d e d h i m . After E t o n , he took a
c o m m i s s i o n in the K i n g ' s O w n Rifles, a n d for twenty-two years
thereafter he r e m a i n e d a British officer. (When asked once a b o u t the
horrors of the B o e r War, he replied, "Well, anything was better than
E t o n . " ) E a r l y in his military career, D e e d e s volunteered to serve
in the O t t o m a n G e n d a r m e r i e , a newly created T u r k i s h police force
c o m m a n d e d by E u r o p e a n officers. Its creation was a reform forced
u p o n the S u l t a n by the E u r o p e a n p o w e r s , for the old police force
h a d b e c o m e indistinguishable from the r o b b e r b a n d s it was s u p p o s e d
to s u p p r e s s . D e e d e s a n d his E u r o p e a n colleagues were c o m m i s s i o n e d
as officers of the new force while, at the s a m e time, retaining their
c o m m i s s i o n s in their respective national armies.
6
As viewed in old p h o t o g r a p h s , D e e d e s looked an oddity in the
oriental s u r r o u n d i n g s in which service in the G e n d a r m e r i e placed
h i m . S m a l l , painfully thin, a n d light-complexioned, he did not blend
into the O t t o m a n l a n d s c a p e . Ascetic a n d deeply Christian, he had
little use for sleep, rest, or food. He worked fifteen h o u r s a day,
indifferent to comfort a n d careless of d a n g e r ; n o b o d y could have
been m o r e unlike the T u r k i s h officers who, if E u r o p e a n accounts
were to be believed, were in m a n y cases corrupt a n d cowardly. He
THE
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39
m a d e a s u c c e s s of his challenging a s s i g n m e n t , a n d won popularity
with the T u r k s .
D e e d e s was an unknown figure when he entered the G e n d a r m e r i e
in 1910. F o u r years later he had achieved s u c h high s t a n d i n g that he
was co-opted by the leading figure in the new O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t
to help run the Ministry of the Interior. By the time of his thirty-first
birthday in 1914, D e e d e s , who had learned to speak T u r k i s h fluently,
was one of the few E n g l i s h m e n who u n d e r s t o o d T u r k i s h affairs. Y e t
his g o v e r n m e n t d i d not m a k e real use of his experience a n d knowle d g e . O n e of the c o n t i n u o u s t h e m e s of the years to c o m e was that
D e e d e s was a C a s s a n d r a : his g o v e r n m e n t chose to d i s r e g a r d his
warnings and to ignore his accurate analyses of T u r k i s h political
motives.
T h e minister u n d e r w h o m D e e d e s served i n the O t t o m a n g o v e r n ment in 1914 was M e h m e d T a l a a t . M o s t of what the British government thought it knew at the time a b o u t T a l a a t a n d a b o u t the political
party that T a l a a t led w a s e r r o n e o u s ; a n d at least s o m e of it could have
been corrected by D e e d e s . B u t the British e m b a s s y in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e
believed that it knew the truth a b o u t O t t o m a n politics already, and
therefore that it did not have to inquire further.
IV
M e h m e d T a l a a t , the Minister of the Interior a n d the leader of the
largest faction within the g o v e r n i n g political party, was a figure
whom British d i p l o m a t s did not r e g a r d as a gentleman. T h e y believed
that he lacked race and b r e e d i n g ; they scornfully reported that he
was of g y p s y origin. He had thick black hair, heavy black eyebrows,
a hawk-like nose, and what one of the few s y m p a t h e t i c British
observers d e s c r i b e d as "a light in his eyes, rarely seen in m e n but
s o m e t i m e s in a n i m a l s at d u s k . "
7
T a l a a t was the single m o s t i m p o r t a n t figure in T u r k i s h politics.
He was very m u c h a self-made m a n . Little is known of his origins
and b a c k g r o u n d except that they were h u m b l e . He b e g a n life as a
minor e m p l o y e e of the Post a n d T e l e g r a p h Office a n d is believed
to have been a Bektashi, that is, a m e m b e r of the largest of the
T u r k i s h D e r v i s h o r d e r s . ( T h e D e r v i s h e s were M o s l e m religious
b r o t h e r h o o d s . ) He is believed to have joined a F r e e m a s o n lodge, is
known to have organized a secret political society, and to have been
i m p r i s o n e d for a time for his u n d e r g r o u n d activities.
J o i n i n g a secret organization was a c o m m o n activity in the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e o f T a l a a t ' s youth. U n d e r the autocratic S u l t a n A b d u l H a m i d ,
who reigned f r o m 1876 to 1909, open political activity was d a n g e r o u s .
40
AT THE CROSSROADS OF HISTORY
T h e S u l t a n , who s u s p e n d e d the constitution a n d d i s b a n d e d Parliament, was intolerant of dissent a n d e m p l o y e d a secret police force to
deal with it. T h e political life of the e m p i r e was driven u n d e r g r o u n d ,
where secret societies proliferated. T h e earliest ones took their inspiration f r o m nineteenth-century E u r o p e a n revolutionary g r o u p s ,
especially the Italian carbonari, a n d organized themselves into cells
of a handful of m e m b e r s , only one of w h o m , typically, would know a
m e m b e r of another cell. M a n y of t h e m , including the forerunner of
the Y o u n g T u r k e y Party, were f o u n d e d by university and military
a c a d e m y s t u d e n t s . T h e a r m y , too, was an especially fertile b r e e d i n g
g r o u n d for s u c h societies; its younger m e m b e r s were s h a m e d by
their empire's d i s a s t r o u s s h o w i n g on one battlefield after another.
A b d u l H a m i d ' s police forces s u c c e e d e d in s m a s h i n g the secret
societies in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d elsewhere. B e y o n d their g r a s p , however, was S a l o n i k a , the b u s t l i n g a n d u n - T u r k i s h M a c e d o n i a n port in
what is now G r e e c e . S a l o n i k a is where a n u m b e r of the secret
societies established their h e a d q u a r t e r s , developing close relationships
with m e m b e r s of the O t t o m a n T h i r d A r m y , which had its headq u a r t e r s there. T h e disorder a n d disintegration with which the T h i r d
A r m y had to deal in M a c e d o n i a — a frontier region of the e m p i r e — i n
itself was a formative experience that helped the secret societies to
enlist recruits within the ranks of the a r m y .
T a l a a t , who lived a n d worked in S a l o n i k a , was one of the founders
of one s u c h secret society which eventually b e c a m e the principal
faction within a m e r g e d g r o u p that called itself the C o m m i t t e e of
U n i o n a n d P r o g r e s s — t h e C . U . P . as it will be called hereafter. It was
known, too, as the Y o u n g T u r k e y Party, and later its m e m b e r s were
called the Y o u n g T u r k s . U p o n joining it, initiates swore an oath on
the K o r a n a n d a g u n . D j e m a l Bey, a staff officer who later played a
major role in M i d d l e E a s t e r n politics, was T a l a a t ' s initial recruit
a m o n g the leadership of the T h i r d A r m y .
O n e day in 1908 a junior a r m y officer n a m e d E n v e r , who was
stationed in S a l o n i k a a n d who had also joined T a l a a t ' s g r o u p , was
ordered to return to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . Afraid that his m e m b e r s h i p had
been discovered by the secret police, he s l i p p e d out of S a l o n i k a a n d
took to the hills, to which another Y o u n g T u r k e y a r m y colleague had
already e s c a p e d . T h e n another a r m y officer followed his e x a m p l e ,
taking t r o o p s a n d a m m u n i t i o n with h i m . T h e S u l t a n sent t r o o p s
against t h e m , b u t the troops joined the rebels. T h e r e was a s p o n taneous c o m b u s t i o n of a bloodless revolution in S a l o n i k a : the C . U . P .
took control. T h e Y o u n g T u r k s seized control o f the T e l e g r a p h
Office—it m a y have been no coincidence that T a l a a t was one of
its officials—and established contact with C . U . P . cells that honeyc o m b e d the a r m y a n d the e m p i r e . When the s m o k e had cleared the
constitution had been restored, parliamentary and party politics had
THE
MIDDLE
EAST
BEFORE
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41
WAR
r e s u m e d , a n d the following year the S u l t a n a b d i c a t e d in favor of his
brother.
T h e old politicians took office, while the Y o u n g T u r k s r e m a i n e d
in the . b a c k g r o u n d . B u t the C . U . P . had b e c o m e a force with which
to reckon, a n d not merely b e c a u s e of its s t r o n g representation in the
officer c o r p s of the a r m y . In a d i s o r g a n i z e d society, the strength of
the C . U . P . was that it had b r a n c h e s everywhere, criss-crossing the
empire.
T h e leaders of the successful u p r i s i n g at first enjoyed a g o o d enough p r e s s in the western world so that in c o m m o n parlance
" Y o u n g T u r k s " c a m e to m e a n any b r a s h g r o u p of y o u n g people with
d y n a m i c ideas who rebel against an o u t m o d e d leadership. T h e y were
viewed with s y m p a t h y by the F o r e i g n Office in L o n d o n , but were
disliked a n d d i s d a i n e d in the British e m b a s s y in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e
a m b a s s a d o r , S i r G e r a r d L o w t h e r , s e e m s t o have fallen completely
u n d e r the influence of G e r a l d F i t z M a u r i c e , his F i r s t D r a g o m a n , or
official interpreter a n d adviser on oriental affairs; a n d F i t z M a u r i c e
detested the C . U . P . almost f r o m the very outset.
F i t z M a u r i c e ' s interpretation of the events of 1908 was colored by
the fact that they had o c c u r r e d in S a l o n i k a , a b o u t half of whose
130,000 inhabitants were either J e w s or D u n m e h s ( m e m b e r s of a
J e w i s h sect that had converted to I s l a m in the seventeenth c e n t u r y ) .
S a l o n i k a was also a city in which there were F r e e m a s o n l o d g e s .
E m m a n u e l C a r a s s o (or K a r a s u ) , a J e w i s h lawyer, h a d f o u n d e d an
Italian F r e e m a s o n lodge in which he apparently allowed T a l a a t ' s
secret society to meet when it was in h i d i n g from the Sultan's secret
police. F i t z M a u r i c e concluded that the C . U . P . was a Latin-influenced
international J e w i s h F r e e m a s o n c o n s p i r a c y ; and L o w t h e r duly reported this to the F o r e i g n Office in L o n d o n . L o w t h e r referred to the
C . U . P . a s "the J e w C o m m i t t e e o f U n i o n and P r o g r e s s . "
8
F i t z M a u r i c e later c o n d u c t e d an investigation of the C . U . P . , the
results of which were reflected in a confidential report sent by Lowther
u n d e r his own n a m e on 29 M a y 1910, to the official head of the
F o r e i g n Office, S i r C h a r l e s H a r d i n g e . I n his report, L o w t h e r pointed
out that "liberie, egalite, fraternite" (liberty, equality, fraternity),
words d r a w n f r o m the F r e n c h Revolution, were both the slogan of
the Italian F r e e m a s o n s (hence K a r a s u ' s lodge) a n d of the Y o u n g
T u r k e y m o v e m e n t . T h e Y o u n g T u r k s , h e claimed, were "imitating
the F r e n c h Revolution a n d its g o d l e s s a n d levelling m e t h o d s . T h e
d e v e l o p m e n t s of the F r e n c h Revolution led to a n t a g o n i s m between
E n g l a n d a n d F r a n c e , a n d should the T u r k i s h revolution develop o n
the s a m e lines, it m a y find itself similarly in a n t a g o n i s m with British
ideals a n d i n t e r e s t s . "
9
In his detailed report of m o r e than 5,000 w o r d s , L o w t h e r alleged
that J e w s had taken over a F r e e m a s o n network ( " T h e Oriental J e w
42
AT
THE
CROSSROADS
OF
HISTORY
is an a d e p t at m a n i p u l a t i n g occult forces . . . " ) a n d t h r o u g h it h a d
taken control of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . A m o n g s t the ringleaders of
the J e w i s h F r e e m a s o n c o n s p i r a c y , a c c o r d i n g to L o w t h e r , was the
U . S . a m b a s s a d o r t o T u r k e y , O s c a r S t r a u s , whose b r o t h e r s owned
the N e w Y o r k d e p a r t m e n t stores M a c y ' s and A b r a h a m & S t r a u s .
T h e d a n g e r t o E n g l a n d , wrote L o w t h e r , i s that " T h e J e w hates
R u s s i a a n d its G o v e r n m e n t , a n d the fact that E n g l a n d is now friendly
to R u s s i a has the effect of m a k i n g the J e w to a certain extent antiBritish . . . a consideration to which the G e r m a n s are, I think,
a l i v e . " I n d e e d , L o w t h e r c o n c l u d e d , "I have reason to believe that
my G e r m a n colleague is aware of the extent to which J e w i s h a n d
L a t i n M a s o n r y inspires the C o m m i t t e e , a n d that he has confidentially
kept his G o v e r n m e n t informed as to this feature of Y o u n g T u r k e y
politics."
10
11
However, when the 2 8 8 - m a n O t t o m a n Parliament was elected in
1908, only four J e w s were elected to it, a n d when the C . U . P . created
a Central C o m m i t t e e in 1909, K a r a s u was not elected to m e m b e r ship on it, nor did he ever rise to a leadership position either in the
party or in the g o v e r n m e n t ; he was never the influential figure that
foreigners s u p p o s e d h i m t o b e . A s d e p u t i e s i n Parliament, K a r a s u
a n d the three other J e w s bent over b a c k w a r d s to p r o v e that they
were T u r k s f i r s t and J e w s only s e c o n d ; indeed, they s u p p o r t e d the
C . U . P . ' s m e a s u r e s against Zionist settlement in Palestine. L o w t h e r
explained this away by c l a i m i n g that the new goal of Z i o n i s m was to
create a J e w i s h h o m e l a n d not in Palestine but instead in a section of
what is now I r a q .
T h e F i t z M a u r i c e and L o w t h e r report won wide acceptance a m o n g
British officials a n d led the British g o v e r n m e n t into at least three
p r o f o u n d m i s c o n c e p t i o n s that h a d important c o n s e q u e n c e s .
T h e first of these concerned the inner workings of the C . U . P .
F i t z M a u r i c e a n d L o w t h e r misled their g o v e r n m e n t into believing
that the Y o u n g T u r k s were controlled by two m e n . T a l a a t a n d
D j a v i d ("who is a C r y p t o - J e w " ) were, a c c o r d i n g to F i t z M a u r i c e and
L o w t h e r , "the official manifestations of the occult power of the
C o m m i t t e e . T h e y are the only m e m b e r s of the C a b i n e t who really
count, a n d are also the apex of F r e e m a s o n r y in T u r k e y . " In fact
the C . U . P . was split into factions—factions with which the British
g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d have intrigued, had it known that they e x i s t e d .
It was an ironic coincidence that D j a v i d , w h o m F i t z M a u r i c e a n d
L o w t h e r feared as a C r y p t o - J e w , was the leader of the pro-British
faction; but F i t z M a u r i c e a n d L o w t h e r did not know that.
1 2
13
A second misconception was that a g r o u p of J e w s wielded political
K a r a s u , however, did attempt at various times to reconcile the aims of Zionism
with those of C . U . P . nationalism.
THE
MIDDLE
EAST
BEFORE
THE
WAR
43
power in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e — o r indeed anywhere else in the world
at that t i m e . A few y e a r s later F i t z M a u r i c e drew an o b v i o u s conclusion from his m i s c o n c e p t i o n : that the world war (in which Britain
was by then e n g a g e d ) could be won by b u y i n g the s u p p o r t of this
powerful g r o u p . I t s s u p p o r t c o u l d b e b o u g h t , h e d e c i d e d , b y p r o m i s ing to s u p p o r t the establishment of a J e w i s h h o m e l a n d in Palestine
(he h a d by then determined that the Zionist m o v e m e n t desired to
return to Z i o n , not to I r a q ) . T h i s reasoning helped to p e r s u a d e the
F o r e i g n Office that it o u g h t to p l e d g e British s u p p o r t to the Zionist
p r o g r a m — w h i c h it eventually d i d in 1917.
F i t z M a u r i c e ' s misinformation led to yet another conclusion
with important c o n s e q u e n c e s : that the Y o u n g T u r k leaders were
foreigners, not T u r k s , a n d that they served foreign interests. T h i s
was the o p p o s i t e of the truth, a n d led British o b s e r v e r s to miscalculate what the Y o u n g T u r k g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d d o . I n fact, a s even
F i t z M a u r i c e a n d L o w t h e r saw, a principal failing of the C . U . P . was
its T u r k i s h c h a u v i n i s m . I t d i s c r i m i n a t e d against J e w s , A r m e n i a n s ,
G r e e k s , A r a b s , a n d others. Its s t r e n g t h was that it was o p p o s e d to all
foreign interests; its a n t i - E u r o p e a n bias attracted wide p o p u l a r
support.
T h e British government never learned that Lowther and FitzMaurice
had s u p p l i e d it with a w a r p e d view of O t t o m a n politics. J o h n
B u c h a n , who b e c a m e w a r t i m e D i r e c t o r of Information for the British
g o v e r n m e n t , d e s c r i b e d the C . U . P . leaders as "a collection of J e w s
a n d g i p s i e s , " p i c t u r e d the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t as the tool of world
J e w r y , a n d called E n v e r P a s h a "a Polish a d v e n t u r e r " — c o n f u s i n g him
with another T u r k i s h officer whose n a m e was similar a n d whose
father was Polish t h o u g h not J e w i s h .
1 4
V
T h e years after 1908 p r o v e d to be a disaster for the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ,
in a war against Italy a n d in another against a Balkan coalition; a n d ,
in 1913, it w a s in the p r o c e s s of losing a s e c o n d Balkan War when the
C . U . P . s u d d e n l y seized control o f the g o v e r n m e n t . Y o u n g E n v e r —
the s a m e officer who h a d precipitated the events of 1908 in S a l o n i k a —
i m p e t u o u s l y led a raid on the S u b l i m e Porte; his raiding party killed
the Minister of War. E n v e r a n d his friends took office; he was
p r o m o t e d to a field c o m m a n d in which he covered himself with
glory, a n d on 4 J a n u a r y 1914, he took over the War M i n i s t r y for
himself. T h i r t y - o n e years old, E n v e r m a r r i e d the niece of the S u l t a n ,
m o v e d into a p a l a c e , a n d b e c a m e the center of attention in T u r k i s h
politics.
D j e m a l P a s h a b e c a m e Military G o v e r n o r of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , a n d
44
AT
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CROSSROADS
OF
HISTORY
in that position consolidated the C . U . P . ' s hold on the seat of government. Halil Bey, President of the C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s , also a s s u m e d
an important role, as did M e h m e d D j a v i d , an economics teacher who
was a p p o i n t e d Minister o f F i n a n c e . T a l a a t , the principal C . U . P .
leader, b e c a m e Minister of the Interior and the real leader of the
g o v e r n m e n t . T h e courtly Prince S a i d H a l i m provided respectability
as G r a n d Vizier and F o r e i g n Minister.
T h e British g o v e r n m e n t sent out a new a m b a s s a d o r , S i r L o u i s
Mallet, who was s y m p a t h e t i c t o the Y o u n g T u r k s . H e too, however,
was uninformed a b o u t what was h a p p e n i n g in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . Where
his p r e d e c e s s o r had detected J e w i s h a n d G e r m a n control, Mallet sent
d i s p a t c h e s to L o n d o n that radiated a m i s l e a d i n g o p t i m i s m about the
Porte's intentions. L i k e the previous a m b a s s a d o r , Mallet failed to
u n d e r s t a n d what the C . U . P . leaders believed T u r k e y ' s interests to
be.
In L o n d o n the C a b i n e t persisted in accepting L o w t h e r a n d
F i t z M a u r i c e ' s mistaken notion that the C . U . P . was a monolithic
b o d y . L o w t h e r a n d F i t z M a u r i c e had reported that it was controlled
by T a l a a t and D j a v i d , while a c c o r d i n g to later reports—followed by
most historians—it was ruled by a dictatorial triumvirate of E n v e r ,
T a l a a t , a n d D j e m a l . In fact, as the G e r m a n archives now show,
power was wielded by the C . U . P . ' s Central C o m m i t t e e of about
forty m e m b e r s , and especially by its general directorate of a b o u t
twelve m e m b e r s who functioned as a sort of politburo, in which
personal rivalries a b o u n d e d . D e c i s i o n s of the Central C o m m i t t e e
were reflected in the positions taken by party m e m b e r s in the C a b i n e t
and in the C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s .
The
faction
nature
nature
C . U . P . e n c o m p a s s e d a variety of opinions, and was rife with
a n d intrigue. T h e r e was, however, a c o n s e n s u s about the
of the threat that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e faced a n d about the
of the policy that ought to be a d o p t e d to counter it.
4
T H E YOUNG T U R K S U R G E N T L Y
S E E K AN A L L Y
i
T h e Y o u n g T u r k outlook o n current affairs was colored b y the
t r a u m a of continuing territorial disintegration. T h e provinces of
Bosnia a n d H e r c e g o v i n a (in what is now Y u g o s l a v i a ) , nominally still
T u r k i s h , were formally annexed by A u s t r o - H u n g a r y in 1 9 0 8 — a
troubling m o v e that p r o v i d e d the b a c k g r o u n d in 1914 to the assassination of the A r c h d u k e F r a n c i s F e r d i n a n d and the o u t b r e a k of
the F i r s t World War. Italy, a latecomer to imperial e x p a n s i o n , m a d e
no secret of her d e s i g n s on O t t o m a n territory a n d , on a flimsy
pretext, attacked T u r k e y and in 1911 — 12 c a p t u r e d the coast of what
is now L i b y a , as well as R h o d e s a n d other islands off the T u r k i s h
coast. At a b o u t the s a m e time, Albania revolted against O t t o m a n
rule, raising a serious question as to whether the e m p i r e could hold
the loyalties of its n o n - T u r k i s h s u b j e c t s .
Meanwhile, in the F i r s t Balkan War (1912—13) the Balkan L e a g u e
( B u l g a r i a , G r e e c e , M o n t e n e g r o , a n d S e r b i a ) defeated T u r k e y and
annexed almost all of the territory the O t t o m a n E m p i r e still held in
E u r o p e . In the S e c o n d Balkan War ( 1 9 1 3 ) , the O t t o m a n E m p i r e
m a n a g e d to regain s o m e territory in T h r a c e , immediately across the
water from Asiatic T u r k e y ; b u t that looked to offer merely a brief
respite in the empire's continuing disintegration. In C o n s t a n t i n o p l e ,
the b a n d of Y o u n g T u r k a d v e n t u r e r s who had seized power and who
ruled the e m p i r e as the S u l t a n ' s ministers, feared that their d o m a i n s
were in mortal d a n g e r and that the E u r o p e a n p r e d a t o r s were closing
in for the kill.
Only a short time before, the nations of E u r o p e had divided up the
African continent a m o n g themselves. S o m e of them were now hungry
for new c o n q u e s t s . T h e r e were not many directions in which they
could look. M u c h of the surface of the globe was already taken: a
quarter by the British E m p i r e a n d a sixth by the R u s s i a n E m p i r e .
T h e western h e m i s p h e r e fell within the a m b i t of the M o n r o e Doctrine
and thus was shielded by the U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h e M i d d l e E a s t was
45
46
AT
THE
CROSSROADS
OF
HISTORY
the only vulnerable region left. T h e r e were r u m o r s of F r e n c h a m bitions in S y r i a ; of Italian a n d R u s s i a n d e s i g n s further north; a n d of
rival G r e e k , B u l g a r i a n , a n d A u s t r i a n claims to the west. B e y o n d the
eampfires, the C . U . P . leaders c o u l d sense the a n i m a l s in the dark
m o v i n g in for the attack.
II
T h e C . U . P . leadership w a s convinced that its p r o g r a m o f freeing
the empire from E u r o p e a n c o n t r o l — a p r o g r a m that British statesmen, a m o n g others, either did not know a b o u t or did not u n d e r s t a n d — w o u l d precipitate the attack. A m b i v a l e n t in its attitude t o w a r d
E u r o p e — s c o r n i n g it as n o n - M o s l e m , while a d m i r i n g its m o d e r n ways
and a c h i e v e m e n t s — t h e C . U . P . intended to throw off the shackles of
E u r o p e i n order t o imitate E u r o p e m o r e closely. T h e Y o u n g T u r k s
s e e m to have had no coherent plan for b r i n g i n g E u r o p e a n economic
domination to an end, but they w a n t e d , s o m e h o w , to do it.
A vital item on the C.LT.P.'s internal a g e n d a was the modernization
of transport and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . E u r o p e a n interests were willing to
s u p p l y the networks and s y s t e m s which the O t t o m a n E m p i r e lacked,
but of course wanted to own them, preferably on the basis of exclusive concessions. T h e C . U . P . leaders, like other O t t o m a n leaders
before them, wanted the E u r o p e a n technologies to be introduced but
were determined to avoid E u r o p e a n ownership or control. D u r i n g
the nineteenth century, T u r k e y h a d created her own postal service,
even though it coexisted within the e m p i r e alongside postal services maintained for themselves by various E u r o p e a n p o w e r s . R e jecting an offer from a British c o m p a n y , the O t t o m a n E m p i r e also
created its own telegraph n e t w o r k . A few telephones were in u s e in
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e and S m y r n a in 1914; a foreign g r o u p had been given
a concession to install a telephone s y s t e m in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e in 1911,
but had not m a d e m u c h p r o g r e s s .
1
2
3
T h e c o m i n g of the s t e a m s h i p h a d put O t t o m a n m a r i t i m e traffic
largely in the hands of foreign i n t e r e s t s . S u c h as they were, the
empire's few railway lines were also in foreign h a n d s . * T h e r e were
few roads and still fewer a u t o m o b i l e s to m a k e use of t h e m : 110 in
Constantinople and 77 elsewhere by 1914. T h e traditional f o r m of
transportation w a s the caravan of c a m e l s , horses, mules, a n d animaldrawn carts—and it could not c o m p e t e against the foreign-owned
4
"It is a measure of the iow degree of development of the Ottoman Empire that
in 1914, its 1,900,000 square kilometers had only 5,991 kilometers of railways," all
of it single-track.
3
THE
YOUNG
TURKS
URGENTLY
SEEK
AN
ALLY
47
railroads. T h e usual s p e e d of a m i x e d c a r a v a n was between two a n d
three miles an hour, a n d its daily s t a g e w a s only between fifteen and
twenty m i l e s . R a i l r o a d s p e e d s were at least ten times greater, and
the railroad cost of t r a n s p o r t i n g g o o d s was p e r h a p s only 10 percent
of the caravan c o s t .
T h e C . U . P . d i l e m m a lay in wanting to switch from caravan to
railroad without allowing the e m p i r e to p a s s into the control of the
E u r o p e a n s who owned the r a i l r o a d s . E u r o p e a n s already exercised an
economic p r e p o n d e r a n c e which the C . U . P . resented b u t could d o
nothing a b o u t . T u r k e y was in the u n e q u a l position of b e i n g able
to s u p p l y only natural r e s o u r c e s a n d having to i m p o r t her m a n u factured needs. Industrialization was necessary in order to r e d r e s s
the b a l a n c e ; but the Porte had no p r o g r a m to achieve it. T h e e m p i r e
could s u p p l y only unskilled l a b o r ; as the E u r o p e a n s constructed
railroads a n d other types of machinery, they b r o u g h t along E u r o peans to maintain t h e m . T e c h n i c a l training for the local population
was what was n e e d e d ; again the Porte h a d no p r o g r a m to p r o v i d e it.
6
7
E u r o p e a n s also shared in the control of what is at the heart of a
political entity: its finances. B e c a u s e the Porte h a d defaulted on a
public d e b t of m o r e than a t h o u s a n d million dollars in 1875, the
S u l t a n was o b l i g e d to issue a decree in 1881 that placed a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
of the O t t o m a n p u b l i c debt in E u r o p e a n h a n d s . A council was
created for the p u r p o s e a n d was given control of almost one-quarter
of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ' s revenues. It wielded exclusive authority
over the c u s t o m s duties on s u c h b a s i c items as alcoholic spirits,
s t a m p s , salt, and f i s h . T h e S u b l i m e Porte was n o longer master
even o f its own T r e a s u r y o r C u s t o m s H o u s e . T h e C . U . P . wanted t o
take back control in these areas, t h o u g h it had no refinancing p r o g r a m
to p r o p o s e .
8
Bitterly resented by all O t t o m a n leaders were the C a p i t u l a t i o n s ,
the concessions that p r o v i d e d E u r o p e a n s with a privileged economic
position within the e m p i r e a n d which placed them for m a n y p u r p o s e s
under the jurisdiction of their own consuls rather than of the
O t t o m a n c o u r t s . No T u r k i s h policeman could enter the p r e m i s e s of a
E u r o p e a n or A m e r i c a n without the p e r m i s s i o n of the latter's consul.
T h e C . U . P . wanted t o cancel these Capitulation privileges.
A n o t h e r g r o u n d for C . U . P . resentment was that the E u r o p e a n
powers h a d , on occasion, violated O t t o m a n sovereignty in intervening in defense of Christian minorities a n d Christian rights. T h e
E u r o p e a n disposition to do so p o s e d a threat to the C . U . P . ' s secret
a g e n d a , for the Y o u n g T u r k s p r o p o s e d to assert their power not only
against foreigners but also against other g r o u p s inhabiting the e m p i r e .
T h i s ran contrary to what they had p l e d g e d in 1908. T h e p u b l i c
p r o g r a m of the C . U . P . h a d called for equal rights for all the m a n y
48
AT T H E CROSSROADS OF HISTORY
religious, ethnic, a n d linguistic g r o u p s that resided within the e m p i r e .
O n c e in power the C . U . P . s h o w e d the d a r k side of its nationalism by
asserting instead the h e g e m o n y of T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g M o s l e m s over
all others. T h e T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g a n d A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p o p u l a t i o n s of
the e m p i r e were roughly e q u a l — e a c h a b o u t 10 million people, or
a b o u t 40 percent of the total p o p u l a t i o n apiece—yet in the O t t o m a n
C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s there were p e r h a p s 150 T u r k s as against only
a b o u t 60 A r a b s . ( T h e figures are not exact b e c a u s e it is not clear in
every c a s e who was A r a b a n d who was T u r k . ) T h e r e m a i n i n g 2 0
percent of the population, including the important G r e e k , A r m e n i a n ,
K u r d i s h , a n d J e w i s h c o m m u n i t i e s , was discriminated against even
m o r e severely than were the A r a b s . A c c o r d i n g to the eleventh edition
of the Encyclopaedia Britannica ( 1 9 1 0 — 1 1 ) , the O t t o m a n E m p i r e at
the time was inhabited by twenty-two different "races", yet "no s u c h
thing as an O t t o m a n nation has ever been c r e a t e d . " If ever there
were a chance of creating one, the C . U . P . leaders threw it away by
excluding 60 percent of the population from its purview.
T a l a a t , E n v e r , a n d their colleagues were nationalists without a
nation. Within the e m p i r e (as distinct from the s t e p p e s to its e a s t ) ,
even those who s p o k e T u r k i s h were often of n o n - T u r k i s h origin. Sir
M a r k S y k e s , a British M e m b e r of' Parliament who had traveled
extensively in A s i a , b e g a n one of his b o o k s by a s k i n g : "How m a n y
people realize, when they s p e a k of T u r k e y a n d the T u r k s , that there
is no s u c h place a n d no s u c h p e o p l e . . . ? " T h e ancient h o m e l a n d of
the T u r k i s h peoples, T u r k e s t a n , w a s in the p o s s e s s i o n of R u s s i a a n d
C h i n a . M o r e than half the T u r k i s h p e o p l e s of A s i a lived either there
or elsewhere outside the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , so that the C z a r could lay
greater claim to s p e a k for the ethnic T u r k s than could the S u l t a n .
E n v e r P a s h a was later associated with the d r e a m of reuniting all the
T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g peoples a n d d o m a i n s of A s i a , a n d certainly the
idea was familiar to him in 1914—intellectually it was in the a i r — b u t ,
as of then, it did not enter into his plans. A small m a n , m u c h
a d d i c t e d to theatrical g e s t u r e s a n d to large p r o g r a m s that b e g a n with
the prefix "pan-," E n v e r was also s u p p o s e d to harbor p a n - I s l a m i c
a m b i t i o n s . H i s treatment of A r a b fellow-Moslems shows that this,
too, was a slogan that he d i d not translate into policy.
9
In the view of the C . U . P . leadership, E u r o p e would not let the
e m p i r e survive in any e v e n t — a n d certainly would not allow the
C . U . P . to carry t h r o u g h its p r o g r a m — u n l e s s one of the G r e a t Powers
could be induced to b e c o m e T u r k e y ' s protector. T h u s the search for
a E u r o p e a n ally was the urgent a n d overriding item on the C . U . P .
a g e n d a . D j e m a l P a s h a w a s p r o - F r e n c h , but when eventually he heard
that E n v e r had p r o p o s e d an alliance with G e r m a n y , he a p p r o v i n g l y
c o m m e n t e d that "I should not hesitate to accept any alliance which
rescued T u r k e y f r o m her present position of i s o l a t i o n . "
10
THE
YOUNG
TURKS
URGENTLY
SEEK AN
ALLY
49
III
All s h a d e s of opinion within the C . U . P . were in agreement that the
most urgent item on T u r k e y ' s a g e n d a was to secure a powerful
E u r o p e a n ally. T h e Y o u n g T u r k s believed that one o f the E u r o p e a n
blocs or indeed any one of the leading G r e a t P o w e r s — B r i t a i n ,
F r a n c e , o r G e r m a n y — c o u l d protect the O t t o m a n E m p i r e against
further e n c r o a c h m e n t s on its territory. Other than R u s s i a , the
countries that were m o s t likely to invade the O t t o m a n E m p i r e were
powers of lesser s t r e n g t h : Italy, A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , G r e e c e , or
Bulgaria.
D j a v i d , the p r o - B r i t i s h C . U . P . Minister o f F i n a n c e , had already
appealed to Britain. H i s a p p e a l had been m a d e in 1911, at the time
of the initial Italian attack on T u r k e y . Churchill was the only senior
C a b i n e t minister who had wanted to r e s p o n d positively. A r g u i n g
that T u r k e y ' s friendship was m o r e i m p o r t a n t than Italy's, Churchill
wrote to the F o r e i g n Secretary that T u r k e y "is the greatest land
weapon wh the G e r m a n s cd use against us." At the end of 1911,
when D j a v i d wrote to p r o p o s e a p e r m a n e n t alliance with Britain,
Churchill wanted to s e n d an e n c o u r a g i n g reply, but the F o r e i g n
Office would not agree to his d o i n g s o .
Between M a y a n d J u l y 1914, with increasing urgency the C . U . P .
leaders secretly a p p r o a c h e d three other E u r o p e a n G r e a t Powers in
search of an a l l y . D j e m a l , the Minister of M a r i n e , who was p r o F r e n c h , m a d e overtures to F r a n c e b u t was rebuffed. T a l a a t , in
desperation, a p p r o a c h e d R u s s i a — w h i c h was like asking the chief
burglar to b e c o m e chief of p o l i c e — a n d his proposal, too, was
rebuffed. Finally, the C . U . P . leaders conferred together at the villa
of the G r a n d Vizier a n d authorized E n v e r , who had served in Berlin,
to a p p r o a c h G e r m a n y with a r e q u e s t for an alliance. E n v e r m a d e his
a p p r o a c h o n 2 2 J u l y 1914. H i s p r o p o s a l was turned d o w n b y H a n s
von W a n g e n h e i m , G e r m a n y ' s a m b a s s a d o r i n C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e
O t t o m a n E m p i r e ' s diplomatic isolation was c o m p l e t e ; no G r e a t Power
would agree to protect it.
11
1 2
13
T h e O t t o m a n War Minister was q u i t e open in explaining to the
G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r why the Y o u n g T u r k s were seeking an ally.
E n v e r explained to von W a n g e n h e i m that the domestic r e f o r m s
planned by the C . U . P . could be carried out only if the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e were "secured against attacks f r o m a b r o a d . " H e e x p r e s s e d
his belief that the e m p i r e could be s e c u r e d against s u c h attacks only
by "the s u p p o r t of one of the g r o u p s of G r e a t P o w e r s . " A p p a r e n t l y
he was unable to p e r s u a d e the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r that the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e had anything of sufficient value to give in return.
1 4
10
T h e g o v e r n m e n t of Britain, meanwhile, was unaware of the flurry
of T u r k i s h diplomatic activity a n d d i d not realize that the Porte was
50
AT THE CROSSROADS OF HISTORY
urgently seeking a G r e a t Power alliance. A few days after the G e r m a n
a m b a s s a d o r in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e rejected the O t t o m a n p r o p o s a l , British
ministers received their first intimation that a war crisis might
arise in E u r o p e that could involve Britain. Between 23 J u l y 1914,
when A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y sent an u l t i m a t u m to S e r b i a , a n d 4 A u g u s t ,
when Britain unexpectedly f o u n d herself at war alongside the
Entente Powers ( F r a n c e a n d R u s s i a ) a n d against the Central Powers
( G e r m a n y a n d A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ) , few thoughts were s p a r e d for the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e ; but to the extent that they were, the c o m m o n
a s s u m p t i o n was that G e r m a n y m i g h t a t t e m p t to entice the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e into an alliance.
British leaders at the t i m e never s u s p e c t e d that it was the other
way a r o u n d : that T u r k e y was seeking an alliance with G e r m a n y , a n d
that G e r m a n y was reluctant to grant it. E v e n after the war was over,
when it was discovered that T a l a a t a n d Enver had s o u g h t the alliance,
details of how the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d G e r m a n y forged their alliance r e m a i n e d o b s c u r e . C o n t e m p o r a r i e s a n d a n u m b e r of historians
b l a m e d Winston Churchill, who w a s said to have driven the T u r k s
into G e r m a n y ' s a r m s ; but the still-emerging evidence f r o m d i p l o m a t i c
archives tells a different a n d m o r e c o m p l e x story—which b e g a n in
1914, on the eve of a s u d d e n war crisis that neither Churchill nor his
C a b i n e t colleagues h a d foreseen.
5
WINSTON C H U R C H I L L ON T H E
EVE OF WAR
i
In 1914, at the age of thirty-nine, Winston Churchill w a s a b o u t to
begin his fourth year as F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y in the L i b e r a l
g o v e r n m e n t o f P r i m e Minister H e r b e r t A s q u i t h . T h o u g h h e a d m i n istered his i m p o r t a n t d e p a r t m e n t a l office ably a n d vigorously, he was
not then the i m p o s i n g figure the world later c a m e to know. H i s
energy a n d t a l e n t — a n d his gift for publicizing his own e x p l o i t s — h a d
b r o u g h t h i m forward at an early a g e ; b u t it was largely the a m u s e d
indulgence of the P r i m e Minister a n d the powerful s p o n s o r s h i p of
D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e , the Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r , that sustained
him in his governmental position. He was a decade or m o r e younger
than the other m e m b e r s of the C a b i n e t , a n d the opinion was wides p r e a d that he was not sufficiently steady or m a t u r e to have been
entrusted with high office.
He still s p o k e with the trace of a schoolboy lisp. H i s face h a d just
b e g u n to lose its last hints of adolescence. Only recently h a d the
belligerent tilt of the head, the b r o o d i n g scowl, a n d the thrusting
cigar started to take c o m m a n d ; a n d his s a n d y hair had b e g u n to thin
a bit. He h a d put on s o m e weight in recent years, b u t was not yet
portly. Of r u d d y c o m p l e x i o n , m e d i u m height, a n d with a hint of
r o u n d e d lines, he was physically u n p r e p o s s e s s i n g ; only with hindsight could it have been seen that he would one day a p p e a r f o r m i d a b l e .
It was not his p e r s o n b u t his driving personality that fascinated
those who encountered h i m . He w a s a mercurial figure, h a u n t e d by
the specter of his brilliant, diseased father who h a d died a political
failure at the a g e of forty-five. F e a r i n g that he, too, w o u l d die y o u n g ,
Churchill had shamelessly elbowed friend and foe a s i d e in his d a s h to
the top in the short time that he believed still remained to h i m . S o m e
s u s p e c t e d that, like his father, he w a s emotionally u n b a l a n c e d , while
others r e g a r d e d h i m as merely too y o u n g . He c o m b i n e d a s p e c t s of
greatness with those of childishness; b u t his colleagues recognized
the childishness m o r e readily than they did the g r e a t n e s s . He was
51
52
AT
THE
CROSSROADS
OF
HISTORY
m o o d y ; he took things personally; a n d he often e m b a r k e d on lengthy
tirades when instead he s h o u l d have been listening or o b s e r v i n g .
T h o u g h g e n e r o u s a n d w a r m - h e a r t e d , he was not sensitive to the
thoughts a n d feelings of others, a n d often was unaware of the effect
p r o d u c e d by his own w o r d s a n d behavior. He was noisy; he b r o u g h t
p a s s i o n into everything he u n d e r t o o k . Colleagues who a i m e d at
detachment and understatement found him tiresome.
He often c h a n g e d his views; a n d since he always held his views
passionately, his c h a n g e s of m i n d were as violent a n d e x t r e m e as they
were frequent. He h a d been a T o r y a n d now was a L i b e r a l . He h a d
been the m o s t p r o - G e r m a n of ministers a n d h a d b e c o m e the m o s t
a n t i - G e r m a n . He h a d been the l e a d i n g p r o - T u r k in the C a b i n e t and
was t o b e c o m e the m o s t a n t i - T u r k . T o his enemies h e a p p e a r e d
d a n g e r o u s l y foolish, a n d even his friends r e m a r k e d that he allowed
himself to be too easily carried away.
Unlike the others, he d i s d a i n e d to play it safe. He had soldiered in
I n d i a , seen war in C u b a a n d the S u d a n , a n d b e c o m e a hero by
e s c a p i n g from a prisoner-of-war c a m p in S o u t h Africa. T a k i n g risks
had b r o u g h t him f a m e a n d h a d c a t a p u l t e d him to the top in politics.
He w a s h a p p y in his m a r r i a g e a n d in his high g o v e r n m e n t office, but
his t e m p e r a m e n t w a s restless: he s o u g h t worlds to c o n q u e r .
T h r e e years before—in the s u m m e r o f 1911—an u n e x p e c t e d o p portunity h a d o p e n e d up for h i m to fulfill s o m e of his a m b i t i o n s . At
that t i m e , d u r i n g the c o u r s e of a brief international crisis, the A s q u i t h
g o v e r n m e n t had been s h o c k e d to learn that the A d m i r a l t y was not
p r e p a r e d to carry out w a r t i m e m i s s i o n s in s u p p o r t of the a r m y . To
their a m a z e m e n t , C a b i n e t ministers at the time were told that the
Royal N a v y was u n a b l e to t r a n s p o r t a British E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e
across the E n g l i s h Channel. T h e y also learned that the A d m i r a l t y
was unwilling to create a N a v a l War Staff. It b e c a m e clear to A s q u i t h
and his colleagues that a new F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y h a d to be
a p p o i n t e d to institute basic r e f o r m s .
Churchill, then H o m e S e c r e t a r y , angled for the j o b , a n d his
mentor, L l o y d G e o r g e , p r o p o s e d h i m for it. Predictably, his c a n d i dacy was h a m p e r e d by his youth. At thirty-six he was already, with a
solitary exception, the y o u n g e s t p e r s o n ever to serve as H o m e S e c retary; a n d his m a n y enemies, who claimed that he h a d p u s h e d
himself forward with u n s e e m l y haste, a r g u e d that he had run ahead
of himself. To t h e m he a p p e a r e d to p o s s e s s in excess the characteristic
faults of y o u t h : obstinacy, inexperience, poor j u d g m e n t , a n d i m p u l siveness. T h e other leading contender for the position of F i r s t L o r d
e x p r e s s e d w a r m a d m i r a t i o n for Churchill's energy and c o u r a g e , b u t
echoed the usual accusation that the y o u n g H o m e Secretary was too
apt to act first and think a f t e r w a r d .
1
F o r whatever reason, the P r i m e Minister decided to take a chance
W I N S T O N C H U R C H I L L O N T H E E V E O F WAR
53
on C h u r c h i l l ; a n d the record of the A d m i r a l t y from the s u m m e r of
1911 to the s u m m e r of 1914 showed that he had won his wager.
Inspired by L o r d F i s h e r , the retired b u t still controversial A d m i r a l
of the Fleet, Churchill had t r a n s f o r m e d the coal-burning nineteenthcentury fleet into an oil-burning twentieth-century navy.
II
Elected to Parliament for the first time in 1900, Churchill took his
seat (in 1901) as a m e m b e r of the Conservative P a r t y : a Unionist
(the term usually u s e d at this p e r i o d ) , or a C o n s e r v a t i v e , or ( u s i n g
the older w o r d ) a T o r y . B u t on the bitterly d i s p u t e d issue of free
t r a d e , in 1904, he c r o s s e d the floor of the H o u s e a n d joined the
Liberals.
As a political r e n e g a d e , Churchill was distrusted by both
p a r t i e s — n o t entirely without r e a s o n , for his political instincts were
never wholly at one with either of t h e m . He tended toward L i b e r a l i s m
on social a n d e c o n o m i c issues, b u t on q u e s t i o n s of foreign a n d
defense policy his instincts were T o r y . Churchill was belligerent
by nature a n d out of s y m p a t h y with the streak of idealistic pacifism
that ran through the L i b e r a l P a r t y . He inherited a g e n i u s for warfare f r o m Britain's greatest general, his ancestor the D u k e of
M a r l b o r o u g h ; he had been schooled at a military a c a d e m y rather
than at a university; he had served on active duty as an a r m y officer;
a n d he was enthralled by the profession of a r m s . When Violet
A s q u i t h , a b o a r d the Enchantress in 1912, looked out at the lovely
M e d i t e r r a n e a n coastline a n d e x c l a i m e d , "How perfect!", he replied,
" Y e s — r a n g e perfect—visibility p e r f e c t — I f we had got s o m e six-inch
g u n s o n b o a r d how easily w e could b o m b a r d . . . "
2
As war c l o u d s s u d d e n l y g a t h e r e d over the s u m m e r t i m e skies of
1914, L i b e r a l pacifists s e e m e d to be out of touch with events while
Churchill at the A d m i r a l t y s e e m e d to be the right m a n at the right
place at the right t i m e .
C H U R C H I L L SEIZES T U R K E Y ' S
WARSHIPS
i
On the outbreak of war, Winston Churchill briefly b e c a m e a national
hero in Britain. A l t h o u g h the C a b i n e t had refused him p e r m i s s i o n to
do s o , he had mobilized the fleet on his own responsibility in the last
days of peacetime a n d had sent it north to S c a p a F l o w , where it
would not be vulnerable to a G e r m a n s u r p r i s e attack. What he had
done was p r o b a b l y illegal, but events had justified his actions, which
in Britain were a p p l a u d e d on all s i d e s .
M a r g o t A s q u i t h , the P r i m e Minister's wife, once wondered in her
diary what it w a s that m a d e Winston Churchill pre-eminent. "It
certainly is not his m i n d , " she wrote. "Certainly not his j u d g m e n t — h e
is constantly very w r o n g indeed . . . " S h e concluded that: "It is of
c o u r s e his c o u r a g e a n d c o l o u r — h i s a m a z i n g m i x t u r e of industry a n d
enterprise. He can a n d d o e s always—all w a y s p u t s himself in the
pool. He never shirks, h e d g e s , or protects himself—though he thinks
of himself perpetually. He takes huge risks [original e m p h a s i s ] . "
1
Mobilizing the fleet despite the Cabinet's decision not to do so was
a h u g e risk that e n d e d in t r i u m p h . In the days following Britain's
entry into the war even his bitterest political enemies wrote to
Churchill to e x p r e s s their a d m i r a t i o n of h i m . F o r m u c h of the rest of
his life, his p r o u d e s t boast was that when war c a m e , the fleet was r e a d y .
At the time, his c o m m a n d e e r i n g of T u r k i s h battleships for the
Royal N a v y was a p p l a u d e d almost a s m u c h . A n illustrated p a g e
in the Taller of 12 A u g u s t 1914 r e p r o d u c e d a p h o t o g r a p h of a
determined-looking Churchill, with an inset of his wife, u n d e r the
heading " B R A V O W I N S T O N ! T h e R a p i d Mobilisation and P u r c h a s e o f
the T w o F o r e i g n D r e a d n o u g h t s S p o k e V o l u m e s for your Work a n d
Wisdom."
2
T h e battleships were the Reshadieh a n d the larger Sultan Osman I.
B o t h h a d been built in British shipyards a n d were i m m e n s e l y p o w e r ful; the Osman m o u n t e d m o r e heavy g u n s than any battleship ever
built b e f o r e . E a c h originally had been ordered by Brazil, but then
3
54
CHURCHILL
SEIZES
TURKEY'S
WARSHIPS
55
had been built instead for the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e Reshadieh,
though launched in 1913, had not been delivered b e c a u s e the T u r k s
had lacked a d e q u a t e m o d e r n d o c k i n g facilities to a c c o m m o d a t e her.
With Churchill's s u p p o r t , R e a r - A d m i r a l S i r A r t h u r H . L i m p u s ,
head of the British naval m i s s i o n , had lobbied successfully with
the O t t o m a n authorities to secure the contract to build docking
facilities for two British f i r m s — V i c k e r s , and A r m s t r o n g Whitworth.
T h e docking facilities having been c o m p l e t e d , the Reshadieh was
scheduled to leave Britain soon after the Sultan Osman I, which was
to be c o m p l e t e d in A u g u s t 1914.
Churchill was aware that these vessels meant a great deal to the
Ottoman E m p i r e . T h e y were intended to be the m a k i n g of the
m o d e r n O t t o m a n navy, a n d it was a s s u m e d that they would enable
the e m p i r e to face G r e e c e in the A e g e a n and R u s s i a in the Black S e a .
T h e i r p u r c h a s e had been m a d e p o s s i b l e b y patriotic public s u b s c r i p tion throughout the e m p i r e . T h e tales m a y have been i m p r o v e d in
the telling, b u t it was said that w o m e n had sold their jewelry a n d
schoolchildren had given up their pocket-money to contribute to the
popular s u b s c r i p t i o n . A d m i r a l L i m p u s had put out to sea from
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e on 27 J u l y 1914, with ships of the T u r k i s h navy,
waiting to greet the Sultan Osman I a n d escort her back t h r o u g h the
straits of the D a r d a n e l l e s to the O t t o m a n capital, where a "navy
week" had been s c h e d u l e d with lavish ceremonies for the Minister
of M a r i n e , A h m e d D j e m a l , and for the cause of B r i t i s h - O t t o m a n
friendship.
4
Churchill, who was reckoned the m o s t p r o - T u r k m e m b e r of the
A s q u i t h C a b i n e t , had followed with care, a n d had s u p p o r t e d with
e n t h u s i a s m , the m i s s i o n of A d m i r a l L i m p u s in T u r k e y ever since its
inception years before. T h e British advisory mission to the O t t o m a n
navy was a l m o s t as large as the similar G e r m a n mission to the
O t t o m a n a r m y , led by the P r u s s i a n G e n e r a l of Cavalry, O t t o L i m a n
von S a n d e r s . T h e two m i s s i o n s t o s o m e extent c o u n t e r - b a l a n c e d
each other. British influence was thought to be strong in the M a r i n e
Ministry. G e r m a n influence was strongest in the War Ministry. In
L o n d o n little was known of M i d d l e E a s t e r n politics, but Churchill
enjoyed the rare a d v a n t a g e of having personally met three of the five
leading figures in the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t : T a l a a t , E n v e r , and the
Minister of F i n a n c e , D j a v i d . He therefore had been given an o p p o r tunity to learn that Britain's conduct as naval s u p p l i e r a n d adviser
could have political repercussions in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e .
T h e E u r o p e a n war crisis, however, propelled the newly built
T u r k i s h vessels into significance in both L o n d o n a n d Berlin. T h e
Reshadieh a n d Sultan Osman I were battleships of the new
D r e a d n o u g h t class. As s u c h , they o v e r s h a d o w e d other surface vessels
a n d , in a sense, r e n d e r e d them obsolete. By the s u m m e r of 1914 the
56
AT T H E CROSSROADS OF HISTORY
R o y a l N a v y h a d taken delivery of only e n o u g h to give B r i t a i n a m a r gin over G e r m a n y o f seven D r e a d n o u g h t s . S i n c e the E u r o p e a n war
was e x p e c t e d to be a s h o r t one, there s e e m e d to be no t i m e to b u i l d
m o r e o f t h e m before battle was j o i n e d a n d d e c i d e d . T h e a d d i t i o n o f
the two D r e a d n o u g h t s built for T u r k e y w o u l d increase the p o w e r of
the R o y a l N a v y significantly. Conversely, their a c q u i s i t i o n by the
G e r m a n E m p i r e or its allies c o u l d decisively shift the b a l a n c e of
forces a g a i n s t Britain. It was not fanciful to s u p p o s e that the
Reshadieh a n d Sultan Osman I c o u l d p l a y a material role in d e t e r m i n ing the o u t c o m e of what was to b e c o m e the F i r s t World War.
E a r l y in the week of 27 J u l y 1914, as the F i r s t L o r d of the
A d m i r a l t y took precautionary m e a s u r e s in the war crisis, he raised
the issue of whether the two T u r k i s h battleships could be taken by
the Royal N a v y . T h e chain of events which apparently flowed from
Churchill's initiative in this matter eventually led to him being b l a m e d
for the tragic outbreak of war in the M i d d l e E a s t . In turn he later
a t t e m p t e d to defend himself by p r e t e n d i n g that he had done no m o r e
than to carry into effect s t a n d i n g o r d e r s . T h e history of these matters
has been confused ever since b e c a u s e both Churchill's story a n d the
story told by his detractors were false.
A c c o r d i n g to Churchill's history of the F i r s t World War, British
contingency p l a n s a d o p t e d in 1912 provided for the taking of all
foreign warships b e i n g built in British yards in the event that war
should ever occur. When the war broke out in 1914, w a r s h i p s were
being built in British yards for T u r k e y , Chile, G r e e c e , Brazil, and
H o l l a n d . A c c o r d i n g to Churchill, he d i d nothing m o r e than follow
the regulations a d o p t e d in 1912. H i s version of the matter implied
that he did not single out the O t t o m a n vessels, but instead issued
orders applicable to all foreign w a r s h i p s then under construction; he
wrote that the a r r a n g e m e n t s for the taking of such vessels "comprised
an elaborate s c h e m e " that had been devised years before a n d had
been b r o u g h t up to date in 1 9 1 2 .
s
T h i s account was not t r u e . S e i z i n g the T u r k i s h warships was an
original idea of Churchill's a n d it c a m e to him in the s u m m e r of
1914.
D u r i n g the week before the war, the question of taking foreign
vessels was raised for the first time on T u e s d a y , 28 J u l y 1914, in an
inquiry that Churchill directed to the F i r s t S e a L o r d , Prince L o u i s
o f B a t t e n b e r g , a n d t o the T h i r d S e a L o r d , S i r A r c h i b a l d M o o r e .
"In case it m a y b e c o m e necessary to acquire the 2 T u r k i s h battleships that are nearing completion in British y a r d s , " he wrote,
"please formulate p l a n s in detail s h o w i n g exactly the administrative
action involved in their acquisition a n d the p r o s p e c t i v e financial
transactions."
6
A d m i r a l M o o r e looked into the matter, and found no administrative
CHURCHILL
SEIZES
TURKEY'S
WARSHIPS
57
or legal p r o c e d u r e that would justify seizing the T u r k i s h s h i p s . He
consulted one of the legal officers of the F o r e i g n Office, who told
him that there was no precedent for taking any s u c h action. T h e
F o r e i g n Office lawyer said that if Britain were at war it could be
a r g u e d that national interests take precedence over legal rights, b u t
that since Britain was not at war it w o u l d be illegal for Churchill to
take the foreign-owned vessels. T h e lawyer advised the A d m i r a l t y
that, if it really needed the s h i p s , it s h o u l d try to p e r s u a d e the
O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t to sell t h e m .
7
T h e T u r k s s u s p e c t e d what Churchill had in m i n d , for on 29 J u l y
the F o r e i g n Office warned the A d m i r a l t y that the Sultan Osman I
was taking on fuel a n d was u n d e r o r d e r s to depart for C o n s t a n t i n o p l e
immediately,
even t h o u g h u n f i n i s h e d .
Churchill immediately
ordered the b u i l d e r s of both battleships to detain t h e m . He also
ordered British security forces to g u a r d the vessels and to prevent
T u r k i s h crews from b o a r d i n g them or from raising the O t t o m a n flag
over them (which w o u l d have converted them, u n d e r prevailing
international law, into O t t o m a n territory).
8
T h e following day the A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l advised Churchill that
what he was d o i n g was not justified by statute, but that the welfare
of the C o m m o n w e a l t h took precedence over other considerations and
might e x c u s e his temporarily detaining the v e s s e l s . A high-ranking
p e r m a n e n t official in the F o r e i g n Office took the s a m e point of view
that day b u t p l a c e d it in a b r o a d e r a n d m o r e practical political
perspective. "I think we m u s t let the A d m i r a l t y deal with this q u e s tion as they consider n e c e s s a r y , " he m i n u t e d , "and afterwards m a k e
such defence of our action to T u r k e y as we c a n . "
9
1 0
On 31 J u l y the C a b i n e t accepted Churchill's view that he o u g h t to
take both T u r k i s h vessels for the Royal N a v y for possible use against
G e r m a n y in the event of war; w h e r e u p o n British sailors b o a r d e d the
Sultan Osman I. T h e O t t o m a n a m b a s s a d o r called at the F o r e i g n
Office to ask for an explanation, b u t was told only that the battleship
was being detained for the time b e i n g .
T o w a r d m i d n i g h t on 1 A u g u s t Churchill wrote instructions to
A d m i r a l M o o r e , in connection with the mobilization of the fleet, to
notify both Vickers a n d A r m s t r o n g that the O t t o m a n w a r s h i p s were
to be detained a n d that the A d m i r a l t y p r o p o s e d to enter into negotiations for their p u r c h a s e .
F o r the first time Churchill noted that w a r s h i p s were also being
built in British s h i p y a r d s for countries other than T u r k e y . A d m i r a l
M o o r e had b r o u g h t this to the F i r s t L o r d ' s attention several d a y s
before, but Churchill had not r e s p o n d e d ; n o w — a l t h o u g h the other
1 1
1 2
* T h i s opinion was rendered a week before, the outbreak of war between Britain
and Germany.
58
AT THE CROSSROADS OF HISTORY
foreign vessels were not of equal i m p o r t a n c e — h e ordered them to be
detained, too, for completion and eventual p u r c h a s e .
On 3 A u g u s t the A d m i r a l t y entered into a r r a n g e m e n t s with
A r m s t r o n g for taking the Sultan Osman I into the Royal N a v y
i m m e d i a t e l y . T h a t evening the F o r e i g n Office cabled the British
e m b a s s y in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e with instructions to inform the O t t o m a n
g o v e r n m e n t that Britain desired to have the contract for the p u r c h a s e
of the Osman transferred to H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t . T h e following day Sir E d w a r d G r e y sent a further cable to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e ,
saying that he was s u r e the T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t would u n d e r s t a n d
Britain's position, a n d that "financial & other loss to T u r k e y will
receive all d u e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . "
13
1 4
15
A key, but overlooked, point is that the O t t o m a n government did
not learn for the first time of Churchill's seizure of the battleship
when officially informed of it in the 3 A u g u s t cable. T h e T u r k s knew
that the battleships were b e i n g taken on 31 J u l y , and on or before 29
J u l y strongly s u s p e c t e d that they were g o i n g to be taken. T h e significance of these dates will b e c o m e clear presently.
II
In Berlin the onset of the war crisis on 23 J u l y led to s o m e second
t h o u g h t s a b o u t the value of T u r k e y as an ally. On 24 J u l y 1914,
K a i s e r Wilhelm II personally overruled the negative decision of his
a m b a s s a d o r to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , a n d ordered that Enver's offer of an
alliance should be e x p l o r e d . An Austrian u l t i m a t u m to S e r b i a — t h e
u l t i m a t u m that initiated the war crisis in E u r o p e — h a d been delivered the previous evening, a n d the K a i s e r decided that "at the
present m o m e n t " O t t o m a n interest in contracting an alliance should
be taken a d v a n t a g e of "for reasons of e x p e d i e n c y . " '
Secret talks b e g a n at once in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . On the O t t o m a n
side, the negotiators were Prince S a i d H a l i m , the G r a n d Vizier and
F o r e i g n Minister; T a l a a t Bey, Minister of the Interior; and E n v e r
P a s h a , Minister of War. A l t h o u g h E n v e r had told the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r that a majority of the m e m b e r s of the C . U . P . Central
C o m m i t t e e were in favor of an alliance with G e r m a n y , the three
O t t o m a n leaders kept their negotiations secret from the Central
C o m m i t t e e and even from their powerful colleague D j e m a l Pasha,
Minister of the M a r i n e .
On 28 J u l y the O t t o m a n leaders forwarded their draft of a p r o p o s e d
treaty of alliance to Berlin. D e s p i t e the K a i s e r ' s views, the G e r m a n
Prime Minister, Chancellor T h e o b a l d von B e t h m a n n Hollweg, remained unenthusiastic a b o u t the potential entanglement. On 31 J u l y ,
the day the G e n e r a l Staff told him to issue the order to go to war,
6
1 7
CHURCHILL
SEIZES
TURKEY'S
WARSHIPS
59
B e t h m a n n H o l l w e g sent a wire to his a m b a s s a d o r in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e ,
instructing him not to sign a treaty of alliance with the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e u n l e s s he w a s certain that " T u r k e y either can or will undertake s o m e action against R u s s i a worthy of the n a m e . "
A u g u s t 1 w a s the crucial day in the negotiations. D e t a i l s of what
was said in the c o u r s e of the b a r g a i n i n g are still not known. On the
G e r m a n side, von W a n g e n h e i m w a s o p e r a t i n g under direct instructions from the head of his g o v e r n m e n t : the Chancellor in Berlin had
m a d e it quite clear that the O t t o m a n p r o p o s a l s h o u l d be rejected
unless the T u r k s h a d s o m e t h i n g u n e x p e c t e d l y significant to contribute
to the G e r m a n c a u s e in the war. In fact, the T u r k s did not want to
join in the fighting at all. As later events were to show, the G r a n d
Vizier a n d his associates h o p e d that they would not be d r a g g e d into
the war. T h u s on the face of it they h a d little to offer. Yet by the end
of the day the three Y o u n g T u r k s had w r u n g an alliance agreement
from the G e r m a n s , which both s i d e s s i g n e d the following afternoon.
1 8
N o t merely h a d the negotiations been conducted in secret, b u t
Article 8 of the treaty p r o v i d e d that the agreement should continue
to be kept secret. Article 4 was what the C . U . P . leaders had chiefly
s o u g h t : " G e r m a n y obligates itself, by force of a r m s if need b e ,
to defend O t t o m a n territory in c a s e it should be t h r e a t e n e d . "
G e r m a n y ' s obligation was a c o n t i n u i n g one for the length of the
treaty, which w a s s c h e d u l e d to expire on 31 D e c e m b e r 1918.
19
T h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e i n turn u n d e r t o o k t o o b s e r v e strict neutrality
in the then current conflict between S e r b i a and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y and
to go to war only if G e r m a n y were r e q u i r e d to enter the fighting by
the t e r m s of her treaty with A u s t r i a . In such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a n d in
s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s only, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e p l e d g e d that it too
would intervene, a n d w o u l d allow the G e r m a n military m i s s i o n in
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to exercise "effective influence" over the c o n d u c t of
its a r m i e s .
T h e day after the treaty w a s s i g n e d , the Porte ordered general
mobilization to b e g i n , b u t also p r o c l a i m e d neutrality in the E u r o p e a n
conflict. T h e treaty r e m a i n e d a s e c r e t ; and E n v e r a n d his coc o n s p i r a t o r s c l a i m e d that the p r o g r a m of mobilization was not directed against the Allied P o w e r s . T h e O t t o m a n leaders went out of
their way in conversations with Allied representatives to stress the
possibility of friendly relationships, a n d E n v e r went so far as to
s u g g e s t that T u r k e y m i g h t join the Allies.
* T h e treaty was signed the day after Germany had declared war on Russia.
Germany had not been required to declare war by the terms of her treaty with
Austria; as it happened, Germany declared war several days before Austria-Hungary
did. T h e oddly drawn treaty with the Ottoman Empire therefore did not—if read
literally—obligate the Turks to enter the war.
60
AT T H E C R O S S R O A D S OF HISTORY
Berlin, hitherto skeptical of what the O t t o m a n E m p i r e could contribute, now b e c a m e a n x i o u s to obtain T u r k i s h a s s i s t a n c e . On
5 A u g u s t the Chief of the G e r m a n General Staff, who only weeks
before had said that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e at G e r m a n y ' s side w o u l d
not be an "asset," b e g a n to p r e s s for T u r k i s h aid against Britain as
well as R u s s i a ; b u t the T u r k s refused to be hurried into taking
action. Indeed the lack of transportation facilities m a d e it i m p o s s i b l e
for the e m p i r e to mobilize swiftly.
2 0
T h e a r m y had been g u i d e d for several years by a G e r m a n military
m i s s i o n , s o the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r p r e s u m a b l y had been i n f o r m e d
that it would be physically i m p o s s i b l e for the O t t o m a n E m p i r e to
enter the war until the late a u t u m n or the winter. S i n c e a l m o s t
everybody's a s s u m p t i o n on 1 A u g u s t was that the war would be
over within a few m o n t h s , von W a n g e n h e i m had g r a n t e d the
Y o u n g T u r k s an alliance even t h o u g h he m u s t have believed that the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e would not be r e a d y to fight until the war was
a l m o s t over. Y e t his instructions from Berlin were that he s h o u l d not
conclude an alliance unless the Y o u n g T u r k s could p r o v e to him that
they had s o m e t h i n g meaningful to contribute to the G e r m a n war
effort. What was that "something meaningful"?
T h e c o m m o n a s s u m p t i o n o f historians s e e m s t o b e that the T u r k s
offered nothing new that d a y — t h a t , in effect, von W a n g e n h e i m
ignored his instructions f r o m Berlin. If s o , he m a y have been seeking
to please the K a i s e r ; or it m a y be that the threatened o u t b r e a k of a
general E u r o p e a n war led h i m to view the O t t o m a n E m p i r e as m o r e
significant militarily than he had believed ten d a y s before. If, however, von Wangenheim did a t t e m p t to follow the instructions he had
received from Berlin, then the q u e s t i o n which historians have not
asked b e c o m e s intriguing: what d i d E n v e r offer G e r m a n y on 1 A u g u s t
that was so i m p o r t a n t that the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r c h a n g e d his
m i n d and agreed that, in return, G e r m a n y would protect the O t t o m a n
Empire?
Ill
A couple of d e c a d e s a g o , a c u r i o u s fact c a m e to light. A student of
the G e r m a n diplomatic archives disclosed that they showed that on
1 A u g u s t 1914 E n v e r and T a l a a t , in a meeting with A m b a s s a d o r
von W a n g e n h e i m , s u d d e n l y offered to t u r n over to G e r m a n y one of
the m o s t powerful w a r s h i p s in the world: the Sultan Osman. Von
W a n g e n h e i m a c c e p t e d the offer; a n d B r i t i s h Intelligence r e p o r t s
from behind G e r m a n lines two weeks later showed that officers of
the G e r m a n fleet had eagerly e x p e c t e d to receive the vitally important
21
CHURCHILL
SEIZES
TURKEY'S
WARSHIPS
61
new w a r s h i p — a n d a p p a r e n t l y were bitterly d i s a p p o i n t e d when
Churchill seized the vessel i n s t e a d .
H i s t o r i a n s have not e x a m i n e d this e p i s o d e in any great detail,
p o s s i b l y b e c a u s e on the s u r f a c e it s e e m s so difficult to explain. E n v e r
a n d T a l a a t could not p o s s i b l y have intended to give away T u r k e y ' s
prize battleship, in which the p o p u l a c e had invested so m u c h emotion
as well as money; a n d in which the e m p i r e took s u c h p r i d e ; it would
have been political suicide for any O t t o m a n leader to even p r o p o s e to
do s o . Y e t the evidence cannot be d i s p u t e d ; in secret, they m a d e von
W a n g e n h e i m the offer.
In another connection, s o m e twenty years ago a student of the
O t t o m a n archives m e n t i o n e d , in p a s s i n g , a conversation that might
p r o v i d e a n explanation. O n the s a m e d a y that E n v e r a n d T a l a a t
m a d e their offer to G e r m a n y — 1 A u g u s t 1 9 1 4 — E n v e r revealed to
fellow Y o u n g T u r k leaders that Britain had seized the Osman.
T h u s on 1 A u g u s t he already knew! I n d e e d — s i n c e it is now known
that, in L o n d o n , the T u r k s s u s p e c t e d on 29 J u l y that Churchill was
a b o u t to seize the Osman, and on 31 J u l y protested that he had
already d o n e s o — i t is entirely p o s s i b l e that even before 1 A u g u s t
Enver knew that the battleship had b e e n taken by B r i t a i n .
2 2
21
M i g h t this not p r o v i d e the answer to an earlier question? V o n
W a n g e n h e i m was not s u p p o s e d to g r a n t the O t t o m a n E m p i r e an
alliance unless the T u r k s could show that they would m a k e a material
contribution to the defeat of the Allies. B u t nonetheless he a g r e e d to
an alliance on 1 A u g u s t , when the week before he had not believed
that the O t t o m a n a r m e d forces could m a k e s u c h a contribution. Was
not the offer of the Osman on 1 A u g u s t , therefore, the material
contribution that b o u g h t E n v e r a n d T a l a a t their G e r m a n alliance?
If E n v e r a n d T a l a a t knew before m a k i n g their secret offer that
they had already lost the Osman to B r i t a i n — t h a t it was therefore no
longer theirs to d i s p o s e of—they could have m a d e the offer; they
could have m a d e it with impunity. In fact the G e r m a n s never discovered that they had been d u p e d . T h e y s e e m to have a s s u m e d that
E n v e r a n d T a l a a t meant to keep their side of the b a r g a i n , a n d only
learned they could not do so when they received official notification
of Churchill's action several d a y s later—after G e r m a n y h a d already
signed a p l e d g e to protect the O t t o m a n E m p i r e against its enemies,
largely in return (it is s p e c u l a t e d here) for E n v e r ' s a n d T a l a a t ' s
worthless p r o m i s e .
7
AN I N T R I G U E AT T H E S U B L I M E
PORTE
i
In the c o u r s e of the secret negotiations between G e r m a n y and the
Y o u n g T u r k s in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e on 1 A u g u s t , E n v e r , the Minister
of War, held a private meeting in the G e r m a n e m b a s s y in C o n s t a n tinople with the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r , H a n s von W a n g e n h e i m , and
with the head of the G e r m a n military mission, Otto L i m a n von
S a n d e r s . T h e three m e n d i s c u s s e d the form that military collaboration between their countries m i g h t take if T u r k e y a n d B u l g a r i a
should contract with each other to join in a war against R u s s i a on
G e r m a n y ' s side. It s e e m e d to t h e m that naval m a s t e r y was essential
if a successful c a m p a i g n were to be m o u n t e d . T h e y concluded that
the G e r m a n M e d i t e r r a n e a n fleet, consisting of the powerful Goeben
and its sister s h i p , the Breslau, s h o u l d c o m e to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to
strengthen the O t t o m a n fleet in the Black S e a so as to give the
T u r k i s h - B u l g a r i a n armies a free hand in invading R u s s i a . Significantly, none of the three m e n a p p e a r s to have believed that the
Osman might be available to fulfill that function. P r e s u m a b l y E n v e r
already knew that he had lost the battleship to B r i t a i n ; while the
G e r m a n s believed that the v e s s e l — u n d e r orders from E n v e r — w a s
g o i n g to join the G e r m a n fleet at a N o r t h S e a port, so that the
Goeben a n d the Breslau, which already were in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n ,
could m o r e conveniently c o m e t o C o n s t a n t i n o p l e .
1
After the conference, L i m a n a n d von Wangenheim r e q u e s t e d their
g o v e r n m e n t to send the G e r m a n s h i p s to T u r k e y . On 3 A u g u s t the
G e r m a n A d m i r a l t y d i s p a t c h e d o r d e r s to that effect to R e a r - A d m i r a l
Wilhelm S o u c h o n , c o m m a n d e r o f the Mediterranean S q u a d r o n . T h e
wireless m e s s a g e reached S o u c h o n in the early m o r n i n g of 4 A u g u s t ,
when he was close to the coast of Algeria where he intended to
disrupt the flow of t r o o p s f r o m F r e n c h N o r t h Africa to the m a i n l a n d
of F r a n c e . D e c i d i n g not to turn back immediately, S o u c h o n first
shelled two port cities of Algeria, a n d only then t u r n e d back to refuel
in the neutral Italian port of M e s s i n a in Sicily, where G e r m a n
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coaling-stations awaited him. S l o w e d d o w n by defective boilers on
the Goeben, the s q u a d r o n did not reach M e s s i n a until the m o r n i n g of
5 August.
At his refueling s t o p , S o u c h o n received a telegram from Berlin
apparently c h a n g i n g his o r d e r s again. E n v e r had not consulted his
colleagues before inviting the G e r m a n warships to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e ;
they were by no m e a n s a n x i o u s to be drawn into the fighting, and
when the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t learned that the s h i p s were en route,
it warned Berlin not to let t h e m c o m e . Berlin cabled S o u c h o n that
his call on the O t t o m a n capital was "not possible"; b u t S o u c h o n
chose to interpret this merely as a w a r n i n g rather than as an order,
and determined to p r o c e e d to T u r k e y to force the i s s u e . T h i s personal decision of the G e r m a n admiral was a turning point in events.
Meanwhile, the British, w h o m Churchill had o r d e r e d to s h a d o w
the Goeben, had lost sight of her u n d e r cover of night on 4 A u g u s t ;
but on the 5th s h e was sighted again, a n d the c o m m a n d i n g E n g l i s h
admiral positioned his naval s q u a d r o n to intercept her when she
should c o m e out of the straits of M e s s i n a after refueling. He placed
his s q u a d r o n west of Sicily, to meet her as she returned to attack
N o r t h Africa again, which is what he s u p p o s e d she would d o . A
m u c h smaller force was already stationed in the Adriatic S e a , far to
the northeast, to block her s h o u l d she attempt to return to her h o m e
port of Pola (in what "was then A u s t r i a , b u t is now Y u g o s l a v i a ) .
On the British side there was as m a s s i v e a failure of political
imagination in L o n d o n , as there was of military c o m p e t e n c e at sea.
It s e e m s never to have occurred to the F o r e i g n Office, the War
Office, or the A d m i r a l t y that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ought to figure in
strategic calculations. Neither in L o n d o n nor in the field did anybody
in c o m m a n d consider the possibility that A d m i r a l S o u c h o n might be
h e a d e d toward C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e y a s s u m e d that when he h e a d e d
east it was in order to elude them a n d d o u b l e back t o w a r d the west.
When the Goeben and her sister s h i p , the Breslau, e m e r g e d from
the straits of M e s s i n a on 6 A u g u s t , A d m i r a l S o u c h o n expected to
find his way blocked by a superior British force. Instead he found
the way clear, a n d set his c o u r s e toward the A e g e a n .
"It was all the A d m i r a l s ' fault," the P r i m e Minister's daughter
later told Churchill. "Who but an A d m i r a l would not have p u t a
battle-cruiser at both e n d s of the M e s s i n a S t r a i t s , instead of p u t t i n g
two at one end a n d none at the o t h e r ? " S h e advised him to retire all
his a d m i r a l s a n d p r o m o t e captains in their place.
S o u c h o n did encounter a British naval contingent as he s t e a m e d
eastward, but it withdrew rather than risk battle with the formidable
Goeben. After p r o d i g i e s of exertion on the part of the G e r m a n s , a n d
of b l u n d e r i n g on the part of the E n g l i s h p u r s u e r s , S o u c h o n ' s force
arrived at the entrance to the straits of the D a r d a n e l l e s .
2
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II
At 1:00 in the m o r n i n g on 6 A u g u s t , the G r a n d Vizier d i s c u s s e d the
fate of the Goeben a n d Breslau with the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r . T h e
British M e d i t e r r a n e a n S q u a d r o n was following close behind the two
G e r m a n s h i p s , so that if T u r k e y refused t h e m admittance to the
straits, they would be t r a p p e d between the T u r k i s h forts in front of
them a n d the British s q u a d r o n behind t h e m . T h e G r a n d Vizier, S a i d
H a l i m , a n n o u n c e d that his g o v e r n m e n t had decided to allow the
G e r m a n ships to enter the straits so that they could m a k e g o o d their
e s c a p e . B u t , he said, conditions were attached to this p e r m i s s i o n ;
a n d when he a n n o u n c e d what they were, it b e c a m e clear that his
t e r m s were s t e e p . T h e y showed t h a t — c o n t r a r y to what British observers believed—the Y o u n g T u r k g o v e r n m e n t intended t o escape
domination by the G e r m a n s , as well as other E u r o p e a n s . T h e Porte
d e m a n d e d that G e r m a n y accept six far-reaching p r o p o s a l s , the first
of which was high on the list of C . U . P . priorities—abolition of
the C a p i t u l a t i o n s , a n d thus of privileges hitherto a c c o r d e d to the
G e r m a n s a n d other E u r o p e a n s . Other p r o p o s a l s guaranteed T u r k e y
a share of the spoils of victory if G e r m a n y won the war. F r o m a
G e r m a n point of view these p r o p o s a l s were o u t r a g e o u s , b u t unless
von W a n g e n h e i m wanted to a b a n d o n the Goeben a n d Breslau to the
long-range g u n s of the British navy, he had no choice b u t to a g r e e .
T h e T u r k s had h i m a t g u n point.
At the A d m i r a l t y in L o n d o n , T u r k e y ' s decision to admit the
G e r m a n w a r s h i p s looked like collusion between Constantinople and
Berlin. Churchill a n d his colleagues had no idea that what really was
going on was extortion; a n d Churchill angrily d a s h e d off a telegram
to his forces ordering them to institute a blockade of the D a r d a n e l l e s .
He had no authority to issue s u c h an order on his own a n d , had
the order been carried out, it could have been c o n s t r u e d in
Constantinople as an act of war. In reply to a request for clarification,
the A d m i r a l t y cabled back that there had been a "mistake in
wording" a n d "no blockade i n t e n d e d . " Instead the British ships
were to wait in international waters for the G e r m a n s h i p s to c o m e
out.
3
4
Britain protested to the S u l t a n ' s g o v e r n m e n t that under accepted
conventions of international law T u r k e y , as a neutral, was obliged
either to send the G e r m a n s h i p s b a c k out or to intern t h e m . T h e
O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t did neither. I n s t e a d , the legal situation
p r o m p t e d the Porte to extract further concessions from the G e r m a n s .
V o n W a n g e n h e i m h a d barely recovered from the extortionate
d e m a n d s of 6 A u g u s t when, on 9 A u g u s t , the G r a n d Vizier had m o r e
news for the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r . S a i d H a l i m a n n o u n c e d that the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e might join with G r e e c e a n d R u m a n i a in a public
pact of neutrality in the E u r o p e a n conflict. If s o , s o m e t h i n g would
AN
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PORTE
have to be done a b o u t the continuing presence of the Goeben a n d the
Breslau in T u r k i s h waters so as not to c o m p r o m i s e T u r k i s h neutrality. T h e Porte p r o p o s e d a fictitious p u r c h a s e of the two w a r s h i p s :
the T u r k s w o u l d take over ownership of the vessels, and w o u l d
pretend to have p a i d for t h e m . In that way there could be no
objection to the s h i p s r e m a i n i n g in T u r k e y ; there w o u l d be no
breaching of the laws of neutrality.
On 10 A u g u s t the G e r m a n Chancellor cabled von W a n g e n h e i m
from Berlin rejecting this T u r k i s h p r o p o s a l a n d u r g i n g i m m e d i a t e
T u r k i s h entry into the war. T h e Y o u n g T u r k leaders, however,
were reluctant to involve the e m p i r e in the E u r o p e a n conflict. Von
Wangenheim was s u m m o n e d that day to the S u b l i m e Porte, where
the G r a n d Vizier angrily r e p r o a c h e d him for the p r e m a t u r e arrival of
the Goeben a n d the Breslau. I g n o r i n g his own government's c o m plicity in the affair of the G e r m a n w a r s h i p s , S a i d H a l i m repeated his
p r o p o s a l that the ships should be transferred to T u r k i s h o w n e r s h i p .
Von W a n g e n h e i m refused the p r o p o s a l .
T h e O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t t h e r e u p o n unilaterally issued a public
declaration falsely claiming that it had b o u g h t the two G e r m a n
cruisers a n d had p a i d eighty million m a r k s for them. Public opinion
t h r o u g h o u t the e m p i r e was elated, a n d on 14 A u g u s t a frustrated von
W a n g e n h e i m a d v i s e d Berlin that there w a s no choice b u t to go along
with the "sale"; to d i s a v o w it risked turning local sentiment violently
a r o u n d against the G e r m a n c a u s e . H i s advice was heeded, a n d at a
ceremony on 16 A u g u s t the Minister of the M a r i n e , D j e m a l P a s h a ,
formally received the vessels into the O t t o m a n navy.
T h e T u r k s did not have the trained officers and crews that were
needed to operate a n d maintain s u c h sophisticated vessels, a n d d e cided that, for the time being, the G e r m a n s should do it for t h e m .
A d m i r a l S o u c h o n was a p p o i n t e d c o m m a n d e r of the O t t o m a n Black
S e a Fleet, while his sailors were given fezzes a n d O t t o m a n u n i f o r m s ,
and went t h r o u g h the f o r m s of enlisting in the S u l t a n ' s n a v y . In
L o n d o n the entire e p i s o d e was viewed as a calculated G e r m a n
m a n e u v e r d e s i g n e d to show that G e r m a n y was generously restoring
to the O t t o m a n E m p i r e the type of m o d e r n warships that Churchill
had wrongfully taken a w a y ; a n d , even today, historians continue to
repeat that account of the affair.
5
It was little m o r e than a week since angry schoolchildren had
p o u r e d into the streets of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to protest at Churchill's
seizure of the battleships that had been p u r c h a s e d with their m o n e y .
British g o v e r n m e n t leaders were certain that there was a connection between the two events. T h e P r i m e Minister's c o m m e n t a b o u t
T u r k e y ' s " p u r c h a s e " of the G e r m a n s h i p s was that " T h e T u r k s are
very a n g r y — n o t u n n a t u r a l l y — a t Winston's seizure of their battleships
here."
6
7
In turn, Churchill b e c a m e a n g r y at the T u r k s . On 17 A u g u s t the
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AT THE CROSSROADS OF HISTORY
P r i m e Minister noted that "Winston, in his m o s t bellicose m o o d all
for s e n d i n g a t o r p e d o flotilla thro' the D a r d a n e l l e s — t o threaten & if
necessary to sink the Goeben & her c o n s o r t . " C a b i n e t opinion,
however, was swayed by the views of the Secretary of S t a t e for War
and the Secretary of S t a t e for I n d i a , who a r g u e d that it w o u l d be
d a m a g i n g for Britain to a p p e a r to be the a g g r e s s o r against the
Ottoman Empire.
It a p p e a r e d , however, that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was m o v i n g toward
the e n e m y c a m p , and the plausible explanation c o m m o n l y a c c e p t e d
in L o n d o n was that it was Churchill's seizure of the T u r k i s h battleships which had c a u s e d that to h a p p e n . W y n d h a m D e e d e s , who had
returned from T u r k e y to E n g l a n d in a daring journey via Berlin,
went to see his friend, the O t t o m a n a m b a s s a d o r , in L o n d o n a n d
discovered that, in fact, that explanation was u n t r u e : the battleships
were not at the heart of the p r o b l e m . Of course the Porte was u p s e t
a b o u t the seizure of the s h i p s , b u t would not change its p r o - G e r m a n
policy even if the ships were r e t u r n e d .
8
F e a r of R u s s i a n e x p a n s i o n i s m w a s at the heart of the Porte's
policy. T h e T u r k i s h a m b a s s a d o r told D e e d e s that if the Allies won
the war, they would c a u s e or allow the O t t o m a n E m p i r e to be
partitioned, while if G e r m a n y won the war, no s u c h partition would
be allowed to o c c u r . T h a t was why the Porte had b e c o m e proG e r m a n . D e e d e s denied that the Allies would allow the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e to be partitioned, b u t the a m b a s s a d o r had been told by
E n v e r that the Allied Powers had given similar a s s u r a n c e s years
before but had not kept their w o r d . ( E n v e r did not mention that, in
addition, G e r m a n y had given a written g u a r a n t e e to protect O t t o m a n
territory. He a n d his colleagues continued to keep their treaty of
alliance with G e r m a n y a secret, and its existence was not revealed
until m a n y years later.)
9
D e e d e s was a l a r m e d by his conversation with the T u r k i s h a m b a s s a d o r , a n d warned the new British War Minister, L o r d K i t c h e n e r ,
that T u r k e y w a s drifting into the enemy c a m p b e c a u s e of her fears of
Allied intentions. S i n c e Britain had allied herself with R u s s i a — R u s s i a ,
which had been a t t e m p t i n g to d i s m e m b e r the O t t o m a n E m p i r e for a
century a n d a half—it w o u l d be no easy task to reassure the Porte,
but D e e d e s u r g e d that the effort s h o u l d be m a d e .
Churchill, meanwhile, was increasingly belligerent toward the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e , which he r e g a r d e d as b e c o m i n g e n e m y territory.
Information reaching h i m in the last half of A u g u s t indicated that
G e r m a n officers a n d m e n were m o v i n g overland, through neutral
B u l g a r i a , to a s s u m e positions in the O t t o m a n a r m e d forces. As
early as 26 A u g u s t A d m i r a l L i m p u s had reported to Churchill that
"Constantinople is almost completely in G e r m a n h a n d s at this
moment."
10
f:
AN I N T R I G U E AT T H E S U B L I M E PORTE
67
Churchill continued to p r e s s for action. On 1 S e p t e m b e r he initiated staff talks between the A d m i r a l t y a n d the War Office to
plan an attack on T u r k e y in the event of war. T h e following day
he received authority f r o m the C a b i n e t to sink T u r k i s h vessels if
they issued from the D a r d a n e l l e s in c o m p a n y with the Goeben a n d
Breslau. L a t e r he authorized his D a r d a n e l l e s s q u a d r o n c o m m a n d e r
to u s e his own discretion as to whether to turn back T u r k i s h vessels
attempting t o c o m e out from the D a r d a n e l l e s b y themselves. T h i s
was a b l u n d e r : it drove the T u r k s to strike b a c k with s t u n n i n g
effectiveness.
P u r s u a n t to Churchill's authorization, the s q u a d r o n s t o p p e d a
T u r k i s h t o r p e d o boat on 27 S e p t e m b e r a n d turned it back; for,
in violation of O t t o m a n neutrality, it had G e r m a n sailors a b o a r d . In
retaliation, E n v e r P a s h a authorized the G e r m a n officer c o m m a n d i n g
the T u r k i s h defenses of the D a r d a n e l l e s to order the straits to be
sealed off a n d to c o m p l e t e the laying of minefields across t h e m . T h i s
cut off the flow of Allied m e r c h a n t s h i p p i n g a n d thus struck a
crippling blow. T h e D a r d a n e l l e s had been R u s s i a ' s one ice-free
m a r i t i m e p a s s a g e w a y to the west. T h r o u g h them she sent 50 percent
of her export t r a d e , notably her wheat c r o p which, in t u r n , enabled
her to buy a r m s a n d a m m u n i t i o n for the w a r .
H a d the Allied
leaders realized that the F i r s t World War w a s g o i n g to develop into a
long war of attrition, they could have seen that T u r k e y ' s m i n i n g of
the straits threatened to b r i n g d o w n C z a r i s t R u s s i a a n d , with her,
the Allied c a u s e .
1 1
F r e e p a s s a g e t h r o u g h the D a r d a n e l l e s had been a s s u r e d b y treaty;
once again the O t t o m a n authorities were violating their obligations
u n d e r international law, and once again they a p p e a r e d to have been
provoked to do so by the actions of Winston Churchill.
Y e t the O t t o m a n E m p i r e m a d e no m o v e to declare war. Its position
of passive hostility left Churchill baffled a n d f r u s t r a t e d .
12
Ill
T h o u g h Churchill d i d not know it, f r o m the point of view of the
G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t , too, the situation was baffling a n d frustrating;
G e r m a n military officers a t t e m p t i n g to b r i n g T u r k e y into the war
found themselves driven to anger a n d d e s p a i r .
Berlin w a s bitterly d i s a p p o i n t e d that the continuing presence
of the Goeben a n d Breslau did not provoke Britain into declaring
war; a n d the G e r m a n a n d A u s t r i a n a m b a s s a d o r s received repeated
d e m a n d s f r o m their h o m e g o v e r n m e n t s to p u s h the T u r k s into
taking action. B o t h a m b a s s a d o r s recognized, however, that whatever
the Y o u n g T u r k s ' ultimate intentions m i g h t b e , the G r a n d Vizier
68
AT THE CROSSROADS OF HISTORY
and his colleagues had valid reasons for not m o v i n g toward intervention in the E u r o p e a n conflict immediately. Mobilization of the
a r m e d forces was not yet c o m p l e t e d ; a n d it was not clear, once
mobilization had been c o m p l e t e d , how the fragile O t t o m a n exchequer
could continue to s u p p o r t it. M o r e o v e r , T u r k i s h negotiations with
neighboring B a l k a n countries, a n d particularly with B u l g a r i a , had
not yet c o m e to fruition.
F r o m the beginning, the Porte h a d m a d e clear its view that T u r k e y
could intervene in the war only in p a r t n e r s h i p with B u l g a r i a . I n d e e d ,
the c a m p a i g n plan that had been worked out on 1 A u g u s t by E n v e r ,
W a n g e n h e i m , a n d L i m a n von S a n d e r s p r e s u p p o s e d that B u l g a r i a
a n d the O t t o m a n E m p i r e would c o m b i n e forces. B u l g a r i a sat astride
T u r k e y ' s principal land route to the rest of E u r o p e a n d — o f m o r e
i m m e d i a t e i m p o r t a n c e — w a s a n e i g h b o r who coveted additional territory. Were B u l g a r i a to invade T u r k e y while the O t t o m a n armies
were away fighting the R u s s i a n s , the e m p i r e would be helpless.
" S u r e l y , " the G r a n d Vizier r e m a r k e d to the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r ,
" G e r m a n y would not want T u r k e y to c o m m i t s u i c i d e . "
13
T h e B u l g a r i a n s , however, were reluctant to c o m m i t themselves,
a n d while T a l a a t s u c c e e d e d in negotiating a defensive treaty with
B u l g a r i a , signed on 19 A u g u s t , which p r o v i d e d for m u t u a l assistance
in certain c i r c u m s t a n c e s in case either country was attacked by a
third party, the t e r m s of the treaty were inapplicable to the situation
that would arise if T u r k e y s h o u l d join G e r m a n y in the war against
R u s s i a . B u l g a r i a was not p r e p a r e d to intervene in the R u s s o - G e r m a n
conflict; a n d , as the G e r m a n s in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e had been m a d e to
u n d e r s t a n d , this meant that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , too, w o u l d continue to maintain its neutrality.
Berlin a n d L o n d o n b o t h viewed C o n s t a n t i n o p l e with d e s p o n d e n c y .
Churchill, it will be recalled, no longer believed in T u r k i s h neutrality a n d had p r o p o s e d to the C a b i n e t that a flotilla be sent
up to the D a r d a n e l l e s to sink the Goeben a n d Breslau. B u t
in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e only two d a y s later, G e n e r a l L i m a n von
S a n d e r s — f r o m the o p p o s i t e point of v i e w — d e s p a i r e d of b r i n g i n g
T u r k e y into the war a n d sent a r e q u e s t to the K a i s e r that he a n d his
military mission be allowed to return h o m e . L i k e Churchill, he r a g e d
against the Y o u n g T u r k s ; h e s p o k e o f challenging E n v e r a n d D j e m a l
to d u e l s . In his r e q u e s t to the K a i s e r , L i m a n pointed out that
Enver's recent statements and military dispositions indicated that the
C . U . P . intended to keep T u r k e y on the sidelines until the war was
over, or at least until it b e c a m e clear b e y o n d a d o u b t that G e r m a n y
was g o i n g to win it. He also pointed out that the O t t o m a n armies
might collapse even before entering the war, for lack of m o n e y a n d
food, if the Porte continued to keep them in a state of m o b i l i z a t i o n .
A t roughly the s a m e t i m e that A d m i r a l L i m p u s was reporting t o
1 4
15
AN
INTRIGUE
AT
THE
SUBLIME
69
PORTE
Winston Churchill that C o n s t a n t i n o p l e w a s almost completely in
G e r m a n h a n d s , G e n e r a l L i m a n von S a n d e r s w a s reporting t o the
K a i s e r that the whole a t m o s p h e r e of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e m a d e it a l m o s t
u n b e a r a b l e for G e r m a n officers to continue their service t h e r e .
T h e K a i s e r , however, refused L i m a n ' s r e q u e s t that h e s h o u l d b e
allowed to return to G e r m a n y . G e r m a n y ' s plan to win the war
quickly by a r a p i d victory in western E u r o p e h a d collapsed at the
first Battle of the M a r n e in early S e p t e m b e r ; a n d thereafter Berlin
s t e p p e d u p the p r e s s u r e t o b r i n g T u r k e y into the war. T h e G e r m a n
a m b a s s a d o r , von W a n g e n h e i m , w a s u n a b l e to explain to his h o m e
g o v e r n m e n t how unrealistic, at least for the time being, that project
a p p e a r e d to be in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . E v e n E n v e r , w h o m the a m b a s s a d o r
had once d e s c r i b e d as s t a n d i n g "like a rock for G e r m a n y , " believed
that the time for action had not yet c o m e : T u r k e y was not ready
militarily a n d , in any event, E n v e r ' s colleagues were still o p p o s e d to
intervention.
1 6
1 7
T h e difference between the ultimate objectives of the two g o v e r n m e n t s b e c a m e vividly evident on 8 S e p t e m b e r 1914, when the Porte
s udde n l y a n n o u n c e d its unilateral a b r o g a t i o n of the C a p i t u l a t i o n s
privileges o f all foreign p o w e r s — i n c l u d i n g G e r m a n y . T h e G e r m a n
a m b a s s a d o r flew into a rage u p o n receiving the news, a n d threatened
that he a n d the military mission w o u l d p a c k up a n d leave for h o m e
immediately. In the event, however, neither he nor the m i s s i o n left.
T h a t they stayed illustrated the i m p r o v e m e n t in the T u r k i s h b a r g a i n i n g position since late J u l y .
I n a n extraordinary m a n e u v e r , the G e r m a n a n d A u s t r i a n a m b a s s a d o r s joined with their enemies in the war, the British, F r e n c h ,
a n d R u s s i a n a m b a s s a d o r s , in p r e s e n t i n g a joint E u r o p e a n protest to
the Porte, w h e r e u p o n it b e c a m e evident how skillful the T u r k i s h
leaders had been in flirting without c o m m i t t i n g themselves. F o r the
G e r m a n a n d A u s t r i a n a m b a s s a d o r s privately intimated to the Porte
that they w o u l d not p r e s s the issue for the time being, while the
Allied a m b a s s a d o r s , in t u r n , intimated that they w o u l d accept the
T u r k i s h decision if T u r k e y continued to remain neutral.
T h e Porte went
O c t o b e r all foreign
were m a d e s u b j e c t
on foreign i m p o r t s
a h e a d to p u t its decision into effect. In early
p o s t offices in the e m p i r e were c l o s e d ; foreigners
t o T u r k i s h laws a n d c o u r t s ; a n d c u s t o m s d u t ie s
not only were taken over, b u t were also raised.
IV
C o n s i d e r i n g the tangible benefits that h a d b e g u n to flow f r o m the
policy of non-intervention, it s e e m s astonishing that at a b o u t this
time E n v e r P a s h a b e g a n to plot against that policy a n d against its
70
AT THE CROSSROADS OF HISTORY
leading p r o p o n e n t , the G r a n d Vizier. T h e substantial G e r m a n military presence in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , s u p p o r t e d by the Goeben a n d
Breslau, m a y have played a role in his calculations; b u t what E n v e r
had in m i n d is m o r e likely to have been the c o u r s e of the R u s s o G e r m a n war. I n J u l y a n d A u g u s t his policy had been motivated b y
fear of R u s s i a n seizures of T u r k i s h territory; but in S e p t e m b e r , in
the wake of the R u s s i a n collapse, he s e e m s to have turned to t h o u g h t s
of T u r k e y seizing R u s s i a n territory. He switched f r o m a defensive to
an aggressive policy. H i s switch was a turning point in O t t o m a n and
M i d d l e E a s t e r n affairs.
I t m a y b e s u r m i s e d that the spectacular G e r m a n military t r i u m p h s
over the R u s s i a n s at the battle of T a n n e n b e r g at the end of A u g u s t ,
and in the o n g o i n g battle of the M a s u r i a n L a k e s that b e g a n in
S e p t e m b e r , p e r s u a d e d E n v e r that, if T u r k e y wanted to win a share
of R u s s i a n territory, she would have to intervene s o o n , before
G e r m a n y had won an u n a i d e d victory. H u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of
R u s s i a n t r o o p s had been killed or c a p t u r e d by the G e r m a n s , a n d
even a less i m p e t u o u s observer than E n v e r might have c o n c l u d e d
that R u s s i a was a b o u t to lose the war. T h e G e r m a n victory train was
leaving the station, a n d the o p p o r t u n i s t i c E n v e r s e e m s to have been
jolted into believing that it was his last chance to j u m p a b o a r d . On
26 S e p t e m b e r E n v e r personally o r d e r e d the closing of the D a r d a n e l l e s
to all foreign s h i p s (in effect, to Allied s h i p p i n g ) without consulting
his colleagues. A week later he told von Wangenheim that the G r a n d
Vizier was no longer in control of the situation.
A b i d for power was taking place in Constantinople behind closed
d o o r s . T h e British F o r e i g n Office, which knew next to nothing a b o u t
the internal politics of the C . U . P . , took a simplistic view of the
affair. S i r E d w a r d G r e y , the F o r e i g n Secretary, later r e m e m b e r e d
remarking that "nothing but the assassination of E n v e r would keep
T u r k e y from joining G e r m a n y , " a n d a d d i n g "that, in times of crisis
a n d violence in T u r k e y , there were a p t to be two classes of p e r s o n —
a s s a s s i n s a n d a s s a s s i n a t e d , a n d that the G r a n d Vizier was m o r e likely
than his o p p o n e n t to b e l o n g to the latter c l a s s . "
18
W o u l d it have been p o s s i b l e for a well-informed British a m b a s s a d o r to have exerted s o m e influence on the evolution of events in
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e ? H i s t o r i a n s continue to debate the question, a n d of
c o u r s e there is now no way to p u t the matter to the t e s t .
O b s c u r e though the details remain, what was g o i n g on in the
a u t u m n of 1914 was a p r o c e s s in which rival factions and personalities
m a n e u v e r e d for s u p p o r t within the C . U . P . Central C o m m i t t e e .
Enver's g r o w i n g influence c a m e from winning over T a l a a t B e y to his
point of view, for T a l a a t headed the principal faction in the party.
Other C . U . P . leaders, while s h a r i n g Enver's belief that G e r m a n y
would p r o b a b l y win the war, until now h a d seen no reason to hazard
1 9
AN
INTRIGUE
AT
THE
SUBLIME
PORTE
71
their empire's future on the accuracy of that prediction. T h e y were
politicians, while E n v e r was a warrior, younger a n d m o r e i m p e t u o u s
than Churchill b u t filled with m u c h the s a m e passion for glory. As
War Minister a n d G e r m a n y ' s best friend, he stood to benefit personally from the m a n y o p p o r t u n i t i e s to increase his fame a n d position
that war at G e r m a n y ' s side would offer. A d a s h i n g figure who had
enjoyed almost unlimited luck b u t had d e m o n s t r a t e d only limited
ability, he failed to see that bets can be lost as well as won. In
putting his chips on G e r m a n y , he t h o u g h t he was m a k i n g an investm e n t — w h e n he was d o i n g no m o r e than placing a w a g e r .
On 9 O c t o b e r , E n v e r informed von W a n g e n h e i m that he had won
the s u p p o r t of T a l a a t a n d of Halil B e y , President of the C h a m b e r of
D e p u t i e s . T h e next m o v e , he s a i d , w o u l d be to try to g a i n the
s u p p o r t of D j e m a l P a s h a , Minister of the M a r i n e . F a i l i n g that, he
said, he p l a n n e d to provoke a C a b i n e t c r i s i s ; he claimed, on the b a s i s
of his following in the Central C o m m i t t e e — w h i c h , in reality, was
T a l a a t ' s following—that he could install a new pro-interventionist
g o v e r n m e n t . O v e r s t a t i n g his political strength, E n v e r a s s u r e d the
G e r m a n s that he c o u l d b r i n g T u r k e y into the war by m i d - O c t o b e r .
All he n e e d e d , he told t h e m , w a s G e r m a n gold to s u p p o r t the
army.
T h e G e r m a n s , o f c o u r s e , were already aware that the
O t t o m a n forces w o u l d need m o n e y ; L i m a n had reported to the
K a i s e r that they w o u l d be in i m m i n e n t d a n g e r of collapse without it.
2 0
On 10 O c t o b e r , D j e m a l joined the conspiracy. On 11 O c t o b e r ,
E n v e r , T a l a a t , Halil, and D j e m a l conferred, a n d informed the
G e r m a n s that their faction was now c o m m i t t e d to war a n d would
authorize A d m i r a l S o u c h o n to attack R u s s i a as soon as G e r m a n y
deposited two million T u r k i s h p o u n d s in gold in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to
s u p p o r t the a r m e d forces. T h e G e r m a n s r e s p o n d e d b y s e n d i n g a
million p o u n d s on 12 O c t o b e r a n d a further million on 17 O c t o b e r ,
s h i p p i n g the gold b y rail t h r o u g h neutral R u m a n i a . T h e second
s h i p m e n t arrived in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e on 21 October.
T a l a a t a n d Halil then c h a n g e d their m i n d s : they p r o p o s e d to keep
the gold b u t , nonetheless, to remain neutral in the war. E n v e r
reported this to the G e r m a n s on 23 O c t o b e r , but claimed that it did
not matter as long as he could still count on the other military service
minister, D j e m a l . T h o u g h h e later a n n o u n c e d that T a l a a t had s w u n g
back again to the pro-interventionist c a u s e , E n v e r gave up a t t e m p t i n g
to p e r s u a d e his p a r t y and his g o v e r n m e n t to intervene in the war. He
could not get T u r k e y to declare war on the Allies so he pinned his
hopes on a plan to provoke the Allied g o v e r n m e n t s to declare war on
Turkey.
E n v e r a n d D j e m a l issued secret o r d e r s allowing A d m i r a l S o u c h o n
to lead the Goeben a n d Breslau into the Black S e a to attack R u s s i a n
vessels. Enver's plan w a s to claim that the warships had been attacked
72
AT THE CROSSROADS OF HISTORY
by the R u s s i a n s a n d had been forced to defend themselves. A d m i r a l
S o u c h o n , however, d i s o b e y e d E n v e r ' s o r d e r s a n d openly started the
fighting by b o m b a r d i n g the R u s s i a n coast. O n c e again the G e r m a n
admiral gave history a p u s h . H i s p u r p o s e , he stated later, was "to
force the T u r k s , even against their will, to s p r e a d the w a r . " As a
result of his actions, it was all too clear that the Goeben a n d Breslau
had struck a p r e m e d i t a t e d blow; there was now no lie behind which
E n v e r could conceal what he had allowed to h a p p e n .
T h e incident led to an o p e n s h o w d o w n in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e
G r a n d Vizier and the C a b i n e t forced E n v e r to cable an o r d e r to
A d m i r a l S o u c h o n to cease fire. A political crisis ensued that lasted
for nearly two d a y s , the details of which were veiled even f r o m
the normally well-informed G e r m a n s and A u s t r i a n s . T h e r e were
meetings of the O t t o m a n Cabinet a n d of the C . U . P . Central
C o m m i t t e e . D e b a t e was joined, threats were issued, coalitions were
f o r m e d , resignations were tendered, a n d resignations were withd r a w n . A p p a r e n t l y the c o n s e n s u s a p p r o x i m a t e d the thinking of
A s q u i t h in Britain j u s t before the outbreak of war: that the first
priority was to maintain party unity. E v e n though a majority in
the Central C o m m i t t e e s u p p o r t e d the newly f o r m e d triumvirate of
T a l a a t , E n v e r , a n d D j e m a l in the view that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e
now ought to enter the war, it deferred to the views of the minority,
led by the G r a n d Vizier a n d the Minister of F i n a n c e , rather than
allow a party split to occur.
21
On 31 O c t o b e r E n v e r reported to the G e r m a n s that his colleagues
in the Cabinet insisted on d i s p a t c h i n g a note of apology to the
R u s s i a n s . F r o m the G e r m a n point of view this w a s a d a n g e r o u s
p r o p o s a l , b u t E n v e r said that, having " d u p e d " his colleagues a b o u t
the attack on R u s s i a , he now found himself isolated in the C a b i n e t ;
his h a n d s , he s a i d , were t i e d .
T h o u g h E n v e r and his G e r m a n co-conspirators did not yet know
it, there was no need for a l a r m : in L o n d o n the British C a b i n e t had
already risen to the bait. T h e British were unaware of the deep split
in Y o u n g T u r k ranks and believed the Porte to have been in collusion
with G e r m a n y all along. R e s p o n d i n g to S o u c h o n ' s attack even before
the Porte drafted its a p o l o g y , the C a b i n e t authorized the s e n d i n g of
an ultimatum requiring the T u r k s immediately to expel the G e r m a n
military mission a n d to remove the G e r m a n officers and m e n from
the Goeben a n d Breslau. When the T u r k s did not c o m p l y , Churchill
did not bother to refer the matter back to the C a b i n e t ; on his own
initiative he dispatched an order to his forces in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n
on the afternoon of 31 O c t o b e r to " C o m m e n c e hostilities at once
against T u r k e y . "
2 2
2 3
T h e British admiral who received Churchill's order d i d not carry it
out immediately a n d , in c o n s e q u e n c e , T u r k e y was u n a w a r e that
AN I N T R I G U E AT THE S U B L I M E PORTE
73
Britain had g o n e to war against her. In C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , E n v e r still
feared that the T u r k i s h apology t o R u s s i a might b e a c c e p t e d . T o
prevent that f r o m h a p p e n i n g , he again foiled the intentions of his
C a b i n e t colleagues by inserting into the T u r k i s h note an o u t r a g e o u s
allegation that R u s s i a had provoked the a t t a c k . Predictably the
Czar's g o v e r n m e n t rejected the allegation, issued an u l t i m a t u m to the
Porte, a n d on 2 N o v e m b e r declared war.
British naval forces c o m m e n c e d hostile operations against the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e on 1 N o v e m b e r . At a d r a m a t i c meeting of the
O t t o m a n C a b i n e t on the night of N o v e m b e r 1—2, even the G r a n d
Vizier's peace faction was obliged to recognize that the e m p i r e was
now at war, like it or not. Yet no declaration of war was issued from
London.
On 3 N o v e m b e r , on instructions f r o m Churchill, British w a r s h i p s
b o m b a r d e d the outer forts of the D a r d a n e l l e s . Critics later c h a r g e d
that this w a s a piece of childish petulance on Churchill's p a r t which
alerted T u r k e y to the vulnerability of the forts. T h e r e is no evidence,
however, that T u r k e y r e s p o n d e d to the warning. At the time, the
chief significance of the b o m b a r d m e n t s e e m e d to be its demonstration
that hostilities h a d c o m m e n c e d .
On 4 N o v e m b e r , A s q u i t h confided that "we are now frankly at war
with T u r k e y . "
T h e formalities, however, were neglected. It was
not until the m o r n i n g of 5 N o v e m b e r that, at a meeting with the
Privy Council, the p r o c l a m a t i o n s of war against the Hohenzollern
a n d H a b s b u r g e m p i r e s were a m e n d e d to include the O t t o m a n
Empire.
T h e relative c a s u a l n e s s with which the British drifted into the
O t t o m a n war reflected the attitudes of British Cabinet ministers at
the t i m e : it was not a war to which they attached m u c h i m p o r t a n c e ,
and they m a d e no great effort to prevent it. T h e y did not regard
T u r k e y as an especially d a n g e r o u s enemy.
24
2 5
V
In L o n d o n it was still not k n o w n — i n d e e d it would not be known
until years later—that E n v e r h a d taken the initiative in p r o p o s i n g ,
negotiating, and executing a secret treaty of alliance with G e r m a n y
before the A d m i r a l t y had seized the T u r k i s h battleships. It also was
not known that it was the Porte that had seized the Goeben a n d
Breslau, and that it had done so over G e r m a n protest. In D o w n i n g
Street the official account was believed, according to which the
K a i s e r had initiated the transfer to T u r k e y of the G e r m a n vessels to
replace the Osman a n d Reshadieh in order to win over to G e r m a n y
the T u r k s w h o m Churchill had alienated.
74
AT THE CROSSROADS OF HISTORY
It was the c o m m o n view, therefore, that it was Churchill who had
b r o u g h t a b o u t the war with T u r k e y . I n d e e d , L l o y d G e o r g e continued
to level the c h a r g e against h i m as late as 1 9 2 1 . S o u c h o n a n d E n v e r
had in fact started the war between T u r k e y a n d the Allies, b u t in the
public imagination of the British it w a s Churchill who had done so.
Churchill, for his p a r t , b e g a n to point out in A u g u s t 1 9 1 4 — a n d
continued to point out thereafter—that having the O t t o m a n E m p i r e
for an e n e m y had its a d v a n t a g e s . F r e e at last to cut up the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e a n d to offer portions of its territory to other countries at the
eventual p e a c e settlement, Britain could now hold out the lure of
territorial gains in order to b r i n g Italy a n d the Balkan countries into
the war on her side.
Italy, a latecomer to the p u r s u i t of colonial e m p i r e , h a d c o m e to
see the vulnerable O t t o m a n d o m a i n s as the principal territories still
available for acquisition. S h e r e m a i n e d anxious to a c q u i r e even m o r e
O t t o m a n territory. Eventually, the lure of acquisition helped to b r i n g
her into the war on the Allied s i d e .
T h e Balkan countries, too, coveted additional territorial g a i n s . F o r
Britain to forge an alliance with all the Balkan countries by the
p r o m i s e of O t t o m a n territory r e q u i r e d the reconciliation of s o m e of
their rival a m b i t i o n s ; b u t if this c o u l d be achieved, s u c h a c o m b i nation would b r i n g powerful forces to b e a r against the O t t o m a n a n d
H a b s b u r g e m p i r e s , a n d offered the p r o s p e c t of helping b r i n g the war
against G e r m a n y to a swift a n d successful conclusion.
Already on 14 A u g u s t , A s q u i t h noted that "Venizelos, the G r e e k
Prime Minister, has a great s c h e m e on foot for a federation of B a l k a n
S t a t e s against G e r m a n y a n d A u s t r i a . . . " O n 2 1 A u g u s t , A s q u i t h
characterized a n u m b e r of his ministers as looking to Italy, R u m a n i a ,
or B u l g a r i a as potential allies of i m p o r t a n c e ; L l o y d G e o r g e as
being "keen for B a l k a n confederation"; a n d "Winston violently antiT u r k . " He himself, however, was "very m u c h against any aggressive
action vis-a-vis T u r k e y wh. w d . excite our M u s s u l m a n s in I n d i a &
E g y p t . " Churchill was not so i m p e t u o u s as that m a d e him s o u n d .
In fact he had taken the time a n d trouble to c o m m u n i c a t e personally
with E n v e r and other O t t o m a n leaders who were h o p i n g to keep
their country neutral. He had given up on them two m o n t h s too
soon; b u t it was only when he had b e c o m e convinced that there was
no chance of keeping T u r k e y out of the war that he had s w u n g
a r o u n d to pointing out the a d v a n t a g e s of having her in it.
2 6
2 7
2 8
By the end of A u g u s t , Churchill a n d L l o y d G e o r g e were enthusiastic advocates of the B a l k a n a p p r o a c h . On 31 A u g u s t Churchill
wrote a private letter to Balkan leaders u r g i n g the creation of a
confederation o f B u l g a r i a , S e r b i a , R u m a n i a , M o n t e n e g r o , a n d G r e e c e
to join the Allies. On 2 S e p t e m b e r he initiated private talks with the
G r e e k g o v e r n m e n t to d i s c u s s the form that military cooperation
AN
INTRIGUE
AT
THE
SUBLIME
PORTE
75
between their two countries m i g h t take in an offensive operation
against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e .
At the e n d of S e p t e m b e r , Churchill wrote to S i r E d w a r d G r e y
that "in our a t t e m p t to placate T u r k e y we are crippling our policy in
the B a l k a n s . I am not s u g g e s t i n g that we s h o u l d take a g g r e s s i v e
action against T u r k e y or declare war on her ourselves, but we o u g h t
from now to m a k e a r r a n g e m e n t s with the Balkan S t a t e s , particularly
B u l g a r i a , without r e g a r d to the interests or integrity of T u r k e y . " He
c o n c l u d e d his additional r e m a r k s by a d d i n g that "All I am a s k i n g is
that the interests a n d integrity of T u r k e y shall no longer be c o n s i d e r e d
by you in any efforts which are m a d e to s e c u r e c o m m o n action
a m o n g the C h r i s t i a n Balkan S t a t e s . "
2 9
G r e y a n d A s q u i t h were m o r e c a u t i o u s in their a p p r o a c h , a n d less
enthusiastic a b o u t the p r o p o s e d B a l k a n Confederation than were
Churchill a n d L l o y d G e o r g e , b u t in at least one respect their thinking
evolved in a parallel way. In order to p e r s u a d e T u r k e y to r e m a i n
neutral, the representatives of the British g o v e r n m e n t eventually h a d
been instructed to give a s s u r a n c e s that, if she did s o , O t t o m a n territorial integrity w o u l d be r e s p e c t e d . F r o m this there followed a converse proposition, that G r e y h a d m a d e explicit as early as 15 A u g u s t ,
"that, on the other h a n d , if T u r k e y s i d e d with G e r m a n y and A u s t r i a ,
and they were defeated, of c o u r s e we could not answer for what
might b e taken from T u r k e y i n A s i a M i n o r . "
3 0
When the O t t o m a n E m p i r e entered the w a r — p u l l e d into it by
Churchill as it s e e m e d then, p u s h e d into it by E n v e r a n d S o u c h o n as
it s e e m s n o w — t h e conclusion that British policy-makers drew therefore s e e m e d to be i n e s c a p a b l e . In a s p e e c h delivered in L o n d o n on
9 N o v e m b e r 1914, the P r i m e Minister predicted that the war h a d
"rung the death-knell of O t t o m a n d o m i n i o n , not only in E u r o p e , b u t
in A s i a . "
3 1
Earlier in 1914, S i r M a r k S y k e s , the T o r y M . P . who was his
party's leading e x p e r t on T u r k i s h affairs, had w a r n e d the H o u s e of
C o m m o n s that "the d i s a p p e a r a n c e of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e m u s t be
the first step t o w a r d s the d i s a p p e a r a n c e of our own."
Wellington,
C a n n i n g , P a l m e r s t o n , a n d Disraeli had all felt that preserving the
integrity of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was of i m p o r t a n c e to Britain a n d to
E u r o p e . Y e t in a little less than a h u n d r e d days the British g o v e r n ment h a d completely reversed the policy of m o r e than a h u n d r e d
y e a r s , a n d now s o u g h t to destroy the great buffer e m p i r e that in times
p a s t British g o v e r n m e n t s had risked a n d w a g e d w a r s to s a f e g u a r d .
3
T h e Cabinet's new policy was p r e d i c a t e d on the theory that T u r k e y
h a d forfeited any claim to enjoy the protection of Britain. In the
turmoil of war the A s q u i t h g o v e r n m e n t had lost sight of one of the
m o s t important truths a b o u t traditional British foreign policy: that
the integrity of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was to be protected not in order
76
AT
THE
CROSSROADS
OF
HISTORY
to serve the best interests of T u r k e y b u t in order to serve the best
interests of Britain.
In t u r n , the British decision to d i s m a n t l e the O t t o m a n E m p i r e
finally b r o u g h t into play the a s s u m p t i o n that E u r o p e a n s h a d s h a r e d
a b o u t the M i d d l e E a s t for c e n t u r i e s : that its p o s t - O t t o m a n political
destinies w o u l d be taken in h a n d by one or m o r e of the E u r o p e a n
powers.
T h u s the one thing which B r i t i s h leaders foresaw in 1914 with
perfect clarity was that O t t o m a n entry into the war m a r k e d the first
step on the r o a d to a r e m a k i n g of the M i d d l e E a s t : to the creation,
indeed, of the m o d e r n M i d d l e E a s t .
PART II
KITCHENER OF
KHARTOUM LOOKS
AHEAD
8
K I T C H E N E R T A K E S COMMAND
i
D u r i n g the s u m m e r a n d a u t u m n o f 1914, a s the O t t o m a n E m p i r e
was drifting into the war, an i m p o r t a n t new g o v e r n m e n t a l appointment in L o n d o n w a s b e g i n n i n g to affect British policy in the M i d d l e
E a s t . It b e g a n , as so m a n y things d i d , with Winston Churchill.
On 28 J u l y 1914, the s a m e day that he initiated the seizure of the
T u r k i s h vessels, Churchill held a luncheon meeting with F i e l d
M a r s h a l H o r a t i o H e r b e r t K i t c h e n e r to d i s c u s s the d e e p e n i n g international crisis. As p r o c o n s u l in E g y p t , the veteran c o m m a n d e r of
Britain's imperial a r m i e s was r e s p o n s i b l e for the security of the S u e z
C a n a l a n d of the t r o o p s f r o m I n d i a who were to be t r a n s p o r t e d
through it in the event of war. Churchill, the F i r s t L o r d of the
A d m i r a l t y , was r e s p o n s i b l e for the naval escort of the t r o o p s h i p s on
their long voyage to E u r o p e ; a n d over lunch the y o u n g politician a n d
the old soldier e x c h a n g e d views.
Churchill told K i t c h e n e r that "If war c o m e s , you will not go b a c k
to E u r o p e . " It w a s not what the field m a r s h a l wanted to hear.
K i t c h e n e r h a d c o m e to Britain intending to stay only long e n o u g h to
attend the 17 J u l y c e r e m o n i e s elevating h i m to the rank a n d title of
E a r l K i t c h e n e r of K h a r t o u m ; he was anxious to return to his post as
British A g e n t a n d C o n s u l - G e n e r a l in E g y p t as soon as p o s s i b l e . H i s
eyes h a d always been t u r n e d t o w a r d the E a s t ; h e told K i n g G e o r g e
that he wanted to be a p p o i n t e d Viceroy of I n d i a when that post
b e c a m e available as s c h e d u l e d in 1915, t h o u g h he feared that "the
politicians" w o u l d block his a p p o i n t m e n t . T h e c r u s t y , b a d - t e m p e r e d
K i t c h e n e r loathed politicians.
1
2
E v e n the disintegrating international situation could not keep h i m
in L o n d o n . E a r l y in A u g u s t he traveled to D o v e r to catch a Channel
s t e a m e r ; the plan w a s that he w o u l d take the train f r o m C a l a i s to
Marseilles, a n d there w o u l d b o a r d a cruiser for E g y p t . S h o r t l y before
noon on 3 A u g u s t , he b o a r d e d the s t e a m e r at D o v e r , a n d c o m p l a i n e d
79
80
K I T C H E N E R OF KHARTOUM LOOKS AHEAD
impatiently when it failed to set off for C a l a i s at the s c h e d u l e d
departure time.
As it h a p p e n e d , his d e p a r t u r e was a b o u t to be cancelled rather
than delayed. T h e previous evening, in the s m o k i n g r o o m of B r o o k s ' s ,
a L o n d o n c l u b , s o m e o n e who fell into conversation with a C o n s e r v a tive M e m b e r of Parliament r e m a r k e d that the War Office was in an
absolutely chaotic state a n d that it was a pity that K i t c h e n e r had not
been asked to take it over. L a t e r that evening, the M . P . reported his
conversation to two of his party's leaders who were in a semi-private
r o o m of the club d i s c u s s i n g the international situation. A n d r e w
B o n a r L a w a n d S i r E d w a r d C a r s o n — t h e leaders t o w h o m the conversation was r e p o r t e d — t o o k the matter up with A r t h u r Balfour, the
former Conservative P r i m e Minister, who p a s s e d the s u g g e s t i o n on
to Churchill, with w h o m he was on g o o d t e r m s .
On the m o r n i n g of 3 A u g u s t — t h e d a y G e r m a n y declared war on
F r a n c e — a n article a p p e a r e d in The Times, written by its military
c o r r e s p o n d e n t , u r g i n g the a p p o i n t m e n t of K i t c h e n e r to head the War
Office. T h a t s a m e m o r n i n g , Churchill saw the P r i m e Minister a n d
p r o p o s e d K i t c h e n e r ' s a p p o i n t m e n t , t h o u g h apparently without indicating that the p r o p o s a l c a m e from the Conservatives as well as from
himself. Churchill's notes indicate that he thought that A s q u i t h had
accepted the p r o p o s a l at the t i m e ; b u t in fact the P r i m e Minister was
reluctant to make the a p p o i n t m e n t , a n d decided instead to keep
K i t c h e n e r in Britain merely in an a d v i s o r y position.
On b o a r d the C h a n n e l s t e a m e r , which had not yet left D o v e r ,
K i t c h e n e r received a m e s s a g e f r o m the P r i m e Minister asking him to
return immediately to L o n d o n . T h e field marshal at first r e f u s e d ;
and it was with difficulty that he was p e r s u a d e d to d i s e m b a r k . H i s
fears were justified; back in L o n d o n he found that A s q u i t h did not
s e e m to be thinking of a regular position for him, let alone one with
clearly defined p o w e r s a n d responsibilities. U r g e d on by his colleagues, K i t c h e n e r decided to force the i s s u e ; he went to see the
P r i m e Minister for a one-hour meeting on the evening of 4 A u g u s t —
the night Britain decided to go to war, by which time G e r m a n a r m i e s
were already o v e r r u n n i n g B e l g i u m — a n d stated that, if obliged to
remain in L o n d o n , he w o u l d accept no position less than S e c r e t a r y
of S t a t e for War.
P u s h e d by politicians a n d the p r e s s , the P r i m e Minister g a v e way
the next d a y , a n d K i t c h e n e r was a p p o i n t e d War Minister. As he
wrote: " K . was (to do h i m justice) not at all anxious to c o m e in, but
when it was presented to h i m as a d u t y he a g r e e d . It is clearly
u n d e r s t o o d that he has no politics, & that his place at C a i r o is kept
o p e n — s o that he can return to it when peace c o m e s . It is a h a z a r d o u s
experiment, but the best in the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , I think." A s s u m i n g ,
as did nearly everybody else, that the war would last no m o r e than a
3
KITCHENER
TAKES
COMMAND
81
few m o n t h s , A s q u i t h did not replace K i t c h e n e r as A g e n t and C o n s u l G e n e r a l in E g y p t ; he thought that the field m a r s h a l would be returning to his post there shortly. On 6 A u g u s t K i t c h e n e r took up his
new duties in the War Office in Whitehall.
L o r d K i t c h e n e r lived in a b o r r o w e d h o u s e in L o n d o n , m a k i n g it
plain that he d i d not intend to stay. It w a s located just off the
intersection o f C a r l t o n H o u s e T e r r a c e a n d C a r l t o n G a r d e n s , less
than a five-minute walk from the War Office, which m e a n t that he
could s p e n d almost every waking m o m e n t on the j o b . He arose at
6:00 a . m . , arrived at his office at 9 : 0 0 a . m . , generally took a cold
lunch there, returned to his t e m p o r a r y h o m e at 6:00 p . m . to read the
evening p a p e r s a n d n a p , a n d then after dinner would r e a d official
cables until late at n i g h t . T h e g l a s s or two of wine with dinner and
the nightly scotch a n d s o d a that h a d been his c o m f o r t s in E g y p t were
forsworn; at the request of G e o r g e V he h a d p l e d g e d to set a national
e x a m p l e by drinking no alcoholic b e v e r a g e s d u r i n g the war.
4
Asquith's reluctance to b r i n g the f a m o u s soldier into the C a b i n e t
s e e m s to have been p r o m p t e d by the fear that, as S e c r e t a r y for War,
K i t c h e n e r , rather than the P r i m e Minister, would e m e r g e as Britain's
w a r t i m e leader. No great soldier h a d served in a m a j o r office of state
since the D u k e of Wellington's ministry nearly a century b e f o r e ; a n d
no serving a r m y officer h a d been i n c l u d e d in a C a b i n e t since G e n e r a l
G e o r g e M o n k , who in 1660 restored the m o n a r c h y a n d then was
r e w a r d e d with high office. T h e principle of civilian authority had
been u p h e l d jealously since then; b u t A s q u i t h felt obliged to s u b o r d i nate it to his urgent need for F i e l d M a r s h a l Kitchener's services.
K i t c h e n e r w a s a figure of l e g e n d — a national m y t h w h o s e photo
h u n g on walls t h r o u g h o u t the k i n g d o m . After he took up his C a b i n e t
a p p o i n t m e n t , large c r o w d s would gather to watch h i m enter a n d
leave the War Office each d a y . As the P r i m e Minister's d a u g h t e r later
wrote:
He w a s an almost s y m b o l i c figure a n d what he s y m b o l i z e d , I
think, was s t r e n g t h , decision, and a b o v e all s u c c e s s . . . [Everything that he t o u c h e d 'came o f f . T h e r e was a feeling that
K i t c h e n e r c o u l d not fail. T h e psychological effect of his a p p o i n t ment, the tonic to p u b l i c confidence, were instantaneous a n d
overwhelming. A n d he at once g a v e , in his own right, a national
status to the g o v e r n m e n t .
5
T h e p u b l i c , it w a s s a i d , d i d not reason a b o u t K i t c h e n e r , but s i m p l y
trusted him completely, s a y i n g " K i t c h e n e r is there; it is all r i g h t . "
In the p a s t he h a d always b r o u g h t things to a successful conclusion.
6
In March 1915 he moved into York House, St James's Palace, a residence
provided for him by K i n g George.
82
K I T C H E N E R OF KHARTOUM LOOKS AHEAD
He had avenged the m u r d e r of G e n e r a l C h a r l e s G e o r g e G o r d o n in
the fall of K h a r t o u m by d e s t r o y i n g the e m p i r e of the D e r v i s h e s and
r e c o n q u e r i n g the S u d a n . T h e F r e n c h had then a t t e m p t e d t o intrude
u p o n Britain's imperial d o m a i n s , b u t in 1898 K i t c h e n e r firmly confronted t h e m at the fort of F a s h o d a in the S u d a n , a n d the F r e n c h
contingent b a c k e d d o w n a n d withdrew from the fort. In S o u t h
Africa the B o e r War h a d b e g u n b a d l y ; then K i t c h e n e r c a m e to take
charge and b r o u g h t it to a victorious conclusion. As c o m m a n d e r of
the armies of I n d i a in the early twentieth century, he had i m p o s e d
his will as decisively as he had d o n e in E g y p t .
T h e far-off o u t p o s t s of e m p i r e in which he won his brilliant
victories lent h i m their g l a m o r . D i s t a n c e m a d e him s e e m at once
magical a n d larger-than-life, like a s p h i n x presiding over the desert.
A lone, insecure, and secretive figure who u s e d a small g r o u p of
aides as a wall against the world, he a p p e a r e d instead to be the s t r o n g
and silent hero of p o p u l a r m y t h o l o g y . H i s painful shyness w a s not
seen as s u c h ; his fear of his political colleagues a p p e a r e d to be
d i s d a i n . A y o u n g F o r e i g n Office clerk w h o watched the field marshal
at a gathering with the P r i m e Minister, S i r E d w a r d G r e y , a n d D a v i d
L l o y d G e o r g e , recorded in his diary that "Kitchener looked like an
officer who has got m i x e d up with a lot of strolling players a n d is
trying to p r e t e n d he doesn't know t h e m . "
7
T a l l , b r o a d - s h o u l d e r e d , s q u a r e - j a w e d , with b u s h y eyebrows, bristling m o u s t a c h e , cold b l u e eyes set widely apart, a n d an intimidating
glower, he towered physically over his fellows and looked the part for
which destiny a n d the p o p u l a r p r e s s had cast him. F r o m his earliest
c a m p a i g n s , he was fortunate in the journalists who followed his
career a n d who created his p u b l i c i m a g e . He was fortunate, too, in
the timing of his career, which coincided with the rise of imperial
sentiment, literature, a n d ideology in Britain. Disraeli, K i p l i n g ,
A. E. W. M a s o n (author of Four Feathers), L i o n e l C u r t i s (a founder
of the Round Table, the imperialist q u a r t e r l y ) , J o h n B u c h a n , and
others created the tidal wave of feeling on the crest of which he r o d e .
G e o r g e S t e e v e n s of the Daily Mail, who was p e r h a p s the leading
war c o r r e s p o n d e n t of his t i m e , told his readers in 1900 that
Kitchener's "precision is so u n h u m a n l y unerring he is m o r e like a
machine than a m a n . " S t e e v e n s wrote a book a b o u t the S u d a n
c a m p a i g n , telling how K i t c h e n e r (then sirdar, or c o m m a n d e r , of the
E g y p t i a n a r m y ) led his a r m i e s south over nearly a t h o u s a n d miles of
rock and s a n d , from the waters of the N i l e Valley to l a n d s where rain
never falls, to c o n q u e r a country of a million s q u a r e miles. I g n o r i n g
the episodes in which Kitchener's generalship was open to criticism,
the book dwelt at length on the characteristic organizational ability
that derived from the sirdar's b a c k g r o u n d as an engineering officer.
A c c o r d i n g to S t e e v e n s , K i t c h e n e r p r e p a r e d his m o v e m e n t s with s u c h
8
KITCHENER
TAKES
83
COMMAND
care that "he has never given battle without m a k i n g certain of an
annihilating victory . . . " S t e e v e n s wrote that "the m a n has d i s a p peared . . . there i s n o m a n H e r b e r t K i t c h e n e r , b u t only the S i r d a r ,
neither as k i n g affection nor giving it. H i s officers a n d m e n are
wheels in the m a c h i n e : he feeds t h e m e n o u g h to m a k e t h e m efficient,
and works t h e m as mercilessly as he works h i m s e l f . "
When he joined the C a b i n e t , a n d indeed for m a n y m o n t h s afterw a r d , its other m e m b e r s — t o m o s t of w h o m he was a s t r a n g e r — w e r e
in awe of h i m . A l t h o u g h they were jolted by his military p r o n o u n c e m e n t s , which ran counter to everything which they had been led to
believe, they a c c e p t e d his j u d g m e n t s without d e m u r . T h e y h a d
believed the professional British a r m y to be of a d e q u a t e size, but
d u r i n g his first d a y at the War Office, K i t c h e n e r r e m a r k e d , " T h e r e
is no a r m y . " T h e accepted view was that the war would be a short
one, b u t K i t c h e n e r with unerring foresight told an astonished ( a n d ,
according to Churchill, a skeptical) C a b i n e t that Britain would have
to maintain an a r m y of millions of m e n in the field; that the war
w o u l d last at least three y e a r s ; a n d that it would only be d e c i d e d by
bloody battles on the continent of E u r o p e a n d not at s e a . D e f y i n g
the conventional view that a large a r m y could be created only by
conscription, K i t c h e n e r instead raised his m a s s a r m y by a volunteer
recruitment c a m p a i g n , which s u r p r i s e d his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s as m u c h
as it has a m a z e d posterity.
10
1 1
1 2
K i t c h e n e r p r o p o s e d to win the war by organizing his forces as
thoroughly as he h a d d o n e in a d v a n c e of the K h a r t o u m c a m p a i g n .
He w o u l d s p e n d the first years methodically creating, training, a n d
e q u i p p i n g an a r m y of o v e r w h e l m i n g strength, a n d would concentrate
his forces, not d i s s i p a t e t h e m in s i d e s h o w s . T h e i m p e n d i n g O t t o m a n
war, he felt, w o u l d be a s i d e s h o w ; it w o u l d be a waste of r e s o u r c e s to
send additional t r o o p s to fight the T u r k s . He feared a T u r k i s h attack
on the S u e z C a n a l — h i s only military concern in the M i d d l e E a s t —
but he believed that the British forces in E g y p t could deal with it.
T h e M i d d l e E a s t played no role in his plans for winning the war.
B u t that did not m e a n that K i t c h e n e r h a d no M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy;
as will be seen presently, he held s t r o n g views a b o u t what role
Britain s h o u l d play in the region once the E u r o p e a n war was won.
II
It was p u r e accident that the military hero brought into the g o v e r n ment to p r e s i d e over the war effort should have been one who
r e g a r d e d himself, a n d was r e g a r d e d by others, as having the E a s t for
his special province. F r o m that accident c a m e the distinctive outlines
of the policy that e m e r g e d .
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M o s t recently, K i t c h e n e r h a d g o v e r n e d E g y p t , a country officially
still part of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , b u t which h a d in effect been an
independent country until the British h a d o c c u p i e d it in 1882, with
the stated a i m of restoring order and then leaving. I n s t e a d of leaving,
the British stayed on. As of 1914, E g y p t was a relatively recent
addition to the British s p h e r e of influence, a n d British officers who
served there with K i t c h e n e r h a d b e g u n to develop a distinctive
outlook on events. S t a t i o n e d as they were in an A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g
country, they had c o m e to r e g a r d themselves, mistakenly, as e x p e r t s
on A r a b affairs, a n d were all the m o r e frustrated to be e x c l u d e d from
foreign policy m a k i n g by the F o r e i g n Office a n d by the G o v e r n m e n t
of I n d i a — t h e two b o d i e s that traditionally dealt with the A r a b i c s p e a k i n g portions of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . Neither K i t c h e n e r nor his
aides d e m o n s t r a t e d any real awareness of the great differences b e tween the m a n y c o m m u n i t i e s in the M i d d l e E a s t . A r a b i a n s a n d
E g y p t i a n s , for e x a m p l e , t h o u g h both A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g , were otherwise
different—in population mix, history, culture, outlook, a n d c i r c u m stances. E v e n had they been the e x p e r t s on E g y p t which they believed
themselves to b e , that w o u l d not necessarily have m a d e K i t c h e n e r ' s
aides the experts on A r a b i a they c l a i m e d to b e .
In the S u d a n c a m p a i g n , u n d e r t a k e n in the face of m i s g i v i n g s within
both the F o r e i g n Office a n d L o r d C r o m e r ' s E g y p t i a n a d min is t r a t io n ,
K i t c h e n e r had greatly e x p a n d e d the area of Britain's control of the
A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world. I t m a y have been d u r i n g the S u d a n c a m p a i g n
that K i t c h e n e r first b e g a n to d r e a m of carving out a great new
imperial d o m a i n for Britain in the M i d d l e E a s t , in which he w o u l d
serve as her viceroy.
As early as the end of the nineteenth century, British officials were
aware that the K h e d i v e — t h e native prince from behind whose throne
Britain ruled E g y p t — w a s a m b i t i o u s to e x p a n d his authority. Alt h o u g h in theory he was the O t t o m a n Sultan's viceroy in E g y p t ,
there were persistent r u m o r s that he considered the possibility of
taking the S u l t a n ' s place as temporal a n d spiritual l o r d — S u l t a n and
C a l i p h — o f the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g provinces of the e m p i r e , thereby
splitting the e m p i r e in half. A variant was the r u m o r that he p l a n n e d
to annex the M o s l e m H o l y Places in A r a b i a and establish a caliph
there u n d e r his p r o t e c t i o n .
T h e British a n d E g y p t i a n officers
attached to him would u n d e r s t a n d that the achievement of any s u c h
plan would b r i n g greatly enlarged authority to themselves.
13
At the t i m e — t h e end of the nineteenth c e n t u r y — t h e G r e a t Power
principally o p p o s e d to the e x p a n s i o n of British E g y p t was F r a n c e ,
which had aligned herself with R u s s i a . As viewed from Britain's
o u t p o s t s b o r d e r i n g the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , the alliance s e e m e d to be
directed against Britain. B u t R u s s i a was far away; a n d in E g y p t and
the S u d a n , F r a n c e was the enemy whose threatening presence was
KITCHENER
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COMMAND
felt close at h a n d . Rivalry with F r a n c e for position a n d influence in
the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g w o r l d : that was the policy in the service of
which K i t c h e n e r ' s officers h a d been r e a r e d .
L a r g e r c o m b i n a t i o n s a n d considerations in world politics were
beyond the range of the typical officer in British C a i r o , an enclave
that p o s s e s s e d (wrote o n e of K i t c h e n e r ' s a i d e s ) "all the n a r r o w n e s s
a n d p r o v i n c i a l i s m of an E n g l i s h g a r r i s o n t o w n . . . " T h e local
c o m m u n i t y o f B r i t i s h officials a n d their families w a s tight a n d h o m o g e n e o u s . I t s life centered a r o u n d the S p o r t i n g C l u b , the T u r f C l u b ,
and the balls given at a leading hotel six nights out of seven.
14
It was from this provincial g a r r i s o n c o m m u n i t y — i t s views on A r a b
policy hitherto ignored by the m a k e r s of British world policy—that
L o r d Kitchener emerged.
Ill
T h e outbreak of the war against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e m a d e it necessary to clarify the nature of Britain's presence in E g y p t a n d C y p r u s ,
for both were nominally still part of the S u l t a n ' s e m p i r e . T h e C a b i n e t
was in favor of an n e x i n g both countries a n d , indeed, a c c o r d i n g to
what officials in C a i r o were told, h a d already m a d e the decision.
R o n a l d S t o r r s , the Oriental S e c r e t a r y (which is to say, the staff
specialist in E a s t e r n affairs) to L o r d K i t c h e n e r in C a i r o , protested
that, in the case of E g y p t , s u c h a decision violated forty years of
p r o m i s e s by British g o v e r n m e n t s that the British occupation was
merely t e m p o r a r y . T h e A g e n c y (that is, the office of the British
A g e n t in E g y p t , L o r d K i t c h e n e r ) a d v o c a t e d a protectorate s t a t u s for
E g y p t , with at least token reference to, eventual i n d e p e n d e n c e — a
case a r g u e d effectively by Milne C h e e t h a m (acting chief of the A g e n c y
in K i t c h e n e r ' s a b s e n c e ) . T h e C a b i n e t a b a n d o n e d its own views in
deference to those of the A g e n c y , and thus showed the direction of
things to c o m e .
T h e C a b i n e t , in this instance, allowed Kitchener's A g e n c y to
establish the p r o t o t y p e of the form of rule that the field m a r s h a l and
his staff eventually wanted Britain to exercise throughout the A r a b i c speaking world. It was not to be direct rule, s u c h as was practiced in
p a r t s of I n d i a . In K i t c h e n e r ' s E g y p t a hereditary prince a n d native
C a b i n e t ministers a n d g o v e r n o r s went t h r o u g h the motions of governing. T h e y p r o m u l g a t e d u n d e r their own n a m e decisions reco m m e n d e d to t h e m by the British a d v i s e r s attached to their respective
offices; that w a s the form of protectorate g o v e r n m e n t favored by the
K i t c h e n e r g r o u p . In the artful w o r d s of R o n a l d S t o r r s : "We d e p recated the I m p e r a t i v e , preferring the S u b j u n c t i v e , even the wistful,
Optative m o o d . "
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T h e E g y p t i a n decision w a s the forerunner of others in which
S t o r r s a n d other m e m b e r s of K i t c h e n e r ' s entourage m a d e policy
decisions for the M i d d l e E a s t u n d e r cover of the reclusive field
marshal's authority. When the views of the g o v e r n m e n t a b o u t the
E a s t c a m e into conflict with those of L o r d K i t c h e n e r , it was the
latter that were likely to prevail. D e c i s i o n s that normally w o u l d have
been m a d e by the P r i m e Minister, the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , the Viceroy
of I n d i a , or the C a b i n e t were instead m a d e by relatively junior
officials who represented K i t c h e n e r a n d p u r p o r t e d to represent his
views. Only the field marshal's u n i q u e prestige m a d e this p o s s i b l e .
O n one t e l e g r a m f r o m C a i r o , S i r E d w a r d G r e y , the F o r e i g n
Secretary, m i n u t e d " D o e s L o r d K i t c h e n e r agree? If s o , I will a p p r o v e . " He c o u l d have written the s a m e inscription on t h e m all.
K i t c h e n e r was s c r u p u l o u s in clearing foreign-policy decisions with
G r e y , b u t G r e y deferred t o him, a n d a p p r o v e d even those p r o p o s a l s
of the War Minister with which he d i s a g r e e d .
O n e reason that M e m b e r s of Parliament and the C a b i n e t left
eastern questions so m u c h to K i t c h e n e r a n d his e n t o u r a g e was that
they themselves knew little a b o u t t h e m . To a g o v e r n m e n t official in
the 1980s, a c c u s t o m e d to b u l g i n g reference libraries, to worldwide
p r e s s coverage, a n d to the o v e r w h e l m i n g s u p p l y of detailed information a b o u t foreign countries g a t h e r e d by the m a j o r g o v e r n m e n t s ,
British ignorance of the M i d d l e E a s t d u r i n g the 1914 war would be
u n i m a g i n a b l e . Shortly after Britain f o u n d herself at war with the
Porte, S i r M a r k S y k e s , one of the few M . P . s who had traveled in the
E a s t , c o m p l a i n e d that in the E n g l i s h l a n g u a g e there was not so m u c h
as one authentic history of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . Of the histories
then current, none was b a s e d on original research, a n d all were b a s e d
on a G e r m a n work that left off in the year 1744, a n d were therefore
long out of d a t e . As late as 1917, when British armies were poised
to invade northward toward S y r i a , British Intelligence, asked by the
a r m y to p r o v i d e a g u i d e to conditions there, reported that there was
no b o o k in any E u r o p e a n l a n g u a g e that provided a survey of the
social a n d political conditions of the area.
T h e British g o v e r n m e n t lacked even the most elementary type of
i n f o r m a t i o n — i n c l u d i n g m a p s — o f the empire with which it was at
war. In 1913 — 14, one of K i t c h e n e r ' s intelligence officers h a d secretly
surveyed a n d m a p p e d a wilderness area close to British E g y p t ' s
Sinai frontier; it was one of a m e r e handful of s u r v e y s g a t h e r e d by
British I n t e l l i g e n c e . F o r the m o s t part, British officers c o n d u c t i n g
operations in O t t o m a n territory in the first years of the war were
operating in the d a r k . O n e of the m a n y reasons for the failure of
Britain's invasion of T u r k e y in 1915 was that the British invasion
force was s u p p l i e d with only one m a p of the peninsula it was to
a t t a c k — a n d that m a p , it turned out, was inaccurate. When it c a m e to
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9
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the M i d d l e E a s t , the politicians, like the soldiers, were aware that
they were m o v i n g in areas that were literally u n c h a r t e d .
B u t the C a b i n e t ministers who deferred to K i t c h e n e r in M i d d l e
E a s t e r n matters were unaware of how little was really u n d e r s t o o d
about the M i d d l e E a s t either by the War Minister or by the aides in
C a i r o a n d K h a r t o u m on w h o m he relied for advice a n d information.
9
KITCHENER'S LIEUTENANTS
i
A v o i d i n g not merely w o m e n (as he had always done) b u t the outside
world as a whole, the War M i n i s t e r lived in a m a s c u l i n e preserve
with his personal Military S e c r e t a r y , L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l O s w a l d
F i t z G e r a l d , a s his a l m o s t sole a n d constant c o m p a n i o n . F i t z G e r a l d
c o r r e s p o n d e d a n d conversed on K i t c h e n e r ' s behalf; when p e o p l e said
they had written to or heard f r o m K i t c h e n e r , they meant that they
had written to or heard from F i t z G e r a l d .
K i t c h e n e r had always relied heavily on his staff. N o w that he had
m o v e d into the center of power in L o n d o n , not only F i t z G e r a l d , but
also the staff remaining in E g y p t a n d the S u d a n m o v e d toward the
center o f power with h i m . T h u s L o r d K i t c h e n e r i m p o s e d his design
on policy not merely by s h a p i n g a new a p p r o a c h toward the M i d d l e
E a s t , b u t also by delegating power to chosen officers in the field who
would g u i d e a n d execute that policy. Instead of being ignored or
neglected, as they felt they h a d been in the p a s t , British officials in
E g y p t a n d the S u d a n were given a chance to m a k e their weight felt.
K i t c h e n e r ' s old lieutenants in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world rose with
him to p r e - e m i n e n c e in E a s t e r n policy-making. What w a s c o n s p i c u o u s
at the end of 1914 w a s that K i t c h e n e r had s t a m p e d his personal
b r a n d on the g o v e r n m e n t ' s policies, but what t u r n e d out to be of
m o r e lasting i m p o r t a n c e w a s that he h a d chosen the p e o p l e who were
to inform a n d to advise the British g o v e r n m e n t a b o u t the M i d d l e
E a s t t h r o u g h o u t the w a r — a n d afterward. By tranferring authority to
them, K i t c h e n e r m o v e d m u c h of the evaluation of information and
the m a k i n g of policy from the capital city of a world e m p i r e , where
officials—even t h o u g h not specifically knowledgeable a b o u t M i d d l e
E a s t e r n a f f a i r s — t e n d e d toward a b r o a d and c o s m o p o l i t a n view of
matters, to the colonial capitals of E g y p t a n d the S u d a n , where the
prejudices of old h a n d s went unchallenged a n d unchecked. T h e
British enclaves in C a i r o a n d K h a r t o u m were the environment to
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LIEUTENANTS
89
which the War Minister longed to return a n d f r o m which spiritually
he h a d never d e p a r t e d .
T h e War Minister's weakness, a c c o r d i n g t o one observer, w a s that
"He is m o r e or less a foreigner" in E n g l a n d . To him, L o n d o n was
m o r e alien than C a i r o or C a l c u t t a . T h e field marshal was profoundly
ill at ease with unfamiliar faces. I n s t e a d of relying on the War Office
a n d the F o r e i g n Office in L o n d o n for information a n d advice a b o u t
the M i d d l e E a s t , he continued to fall b a c k on his staff in E g y p t .
When he was a p p o i n t e d War Minister, he asked R o n a l d S t o r r s , his
Oriental S e c r e t a r y , to stay on in L o n d o n with h i m . S t o r r s pointed
out that g o v e r n m e n t a l regulations w o u l d not allow it but, when
S t o r r s returned to E g y p t , K i t c h e n e r continued to be inspired by his
s u g g e s t i o n s . S t o r r s , the son of an Anglican c l e r g y m a n , was an
intellectually elegant g r a d u a t e of P e m b r o k e College, C a m b r i d g e ,
then in his mid-thirties. A l t h o u g h he h a d no m o r e than an u n d e r g r a d u a t e education in E a s t e r n l a n g u a g e s and literature, service as
Oriental S e c r e t a r y of the A g e n c y in C a i r o for m o r e than a d e c a d e
h a d established h i m as a specialist in M i d d l e E a s t e r n affairs. H i s
lowly r a n k — a f t e r the o u t b r e a k of war, he finally obtained diplomatic
s t a n d i n g , t h o u g h only as a second s e c r e t a r y — g a v e no indication of
his high position in the field marshal's esteem.
1
II
By the end of 1914, it was clear that the war was not c o m i n g to a
quick conclusion, that the field m a r s h a l would not be able to return
to C a i r o for s o m e time, a n d that therefore a new British proconsul
h a d to be selected for E g y p t . K i t c h e n e r , in order to keep the position
in C a i r o vacant for his return, personally selected S i r H e n r y
M c M a h o n to serve as his replacement ( u n d e r the-new title of H i g h
C o m m i s s i o n e r , rather than A g e n t ) ; M c M a h o n was a colorless official
from I n d i a , on the verge of retirement.
D e s p i t e M c M a h o n ' s a p p o i n t m e n t , R o n a l d S t o r r s a n d his colleagues
in E g y p t a n d the S u d a n continued to look u p o n the War Minister as
their real chief. S i r J o h n M a x w e l l , c o m m a n d i n g general of the British
forces in E g y p t , r e p o r t e d directly to K i t c h e n e r at the War Office
rather than to, or t h r o u g h , the new H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r .
T h e senior figure in the War Minister's following in the M i d d l e
E a s t was L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l S i r F r a n c i s R e g i n a l d Wingate, who had
s u c c e e d e d K i t c h e n e r as s i r d a r of the E g y p t i a n a r m y and G o v e r n o r G e n e r a l of the S u d a n . Wingate's entire career had been one of
military service in the E a s t , principally in Military Intelligence. He
p a s s e d for a m a s t e r of A r a b i c . Of his role in K i t c h e n e r ' s K h a r t o u m
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c a m p a i g n , the journalist G e o r g e S t e e v e n s wrote that "Whatever there
was to know, Colonel Wingate surely knew it, for he m a k e s it his
b u s i n e s s to know everything . . . As for that mysterious child of lies,
the A r a b , Colonel Wingate can converse with him for h o u r s , a n d at
the end know not only how m u c h truth he has told, but exactly what
truth he has s u p p r e s s e d .. . N o t h i n g is hid f r o m Colonel W i n g a t e . "
Wingate governed the S u d a n f r o m K h a r t o u m , a s u n - s c o r c h e d
capital city of s o m e 7 0 , 0 0 0 inhabitants that had been completely
rebuilt to the specifications of L o r d K i t c h e n e r . By steamer and
railroad, it was 1,345 miles away f r o m C a i r o , a n d Wingate felt cut off
a n d neglected. On 18 F e b r u a r y 1915, he sent a letter m a r k e d Very
Private to his A g e n t in the E g y p t i a n capital that cried out with his
sense of hurt:
2
T h e m o r e that I think over the A r a b i a n Policy question &
the peculiar situation into which it has drifted owing to the
n u m b e r of "cooks" c o n c e r n e d in its concoction—the less I consider it desirable we should show our h a n d s unless we are
officially called u p o n for a s t a t e m e n t of our views.
S p e a k i n g for m y s e l f — y o u m u s t r e m e m b e r that in spite of my
position in E g y p t & the S u d a n & the n u m b e r of years I have
been in the country, little u s e has been m a d e of my experience
in this, or in other m a t t e r s connected with the situation.
As I have often said before, I think that our geopolitical
position & our connection with the A r a b i a n Provinces nearest to
u s , has given us opportunities for u n d e r s t a n d i n g the situation
t h e r e — a n d the views of the M o s l e m s of the Holy P l a c e s — b e t t e r
than m a n y others; b u t clearly that view is not s h a r e d by either
the H o m e or I n d i a n authorities & therefore, I prefer to keep
silent for the time b e i n g .
3
In fact Wingate could not bear to keep silent, a n d only twelve days
later he wrote that he had c h a n g e d his m i n d and had decided "that
we ought not to keep entirely to ourselves information & views which
m a y be helpful" to those r e s p o n s i b l e for m a k i n g p o l i c y .
Wingate's A g e n t in C a i r o — t h e official representative in E g y p t of
the S u d a n g o v e r n m e n t — w a s G i l b e r t Clayton, who had also served
under L o r d K i t c h e n e r in the S u d a n c a m p a i g n . After receiving his
c o m m i s s i o n in the Royal Artillery in 1895, Clayton went out to
E g y p t a n d had been stationed there or in the S u d a n ever since.
F r o m 1908 to 1913 he served as Private Secretary to Wingate. F r o m
1913 onward he served as S u d a n A g e n t in C a i r o a n d , at the s a m e
time, as D i r e c t o r of Intelligence of the E g y p t i a n a r m y . C l a y t o n
m o v e d into a central position in m a k i n g Britain's A r a b policy on 31
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October 1914, when, by decision of the C o m m a n d i n g G e n e r a l in
E g y p t , S i r J o h n Maxwell, who r e p o r t e d directly to K i t c h e n e r , he
b e c a m e head of all intelligence services in C a i r o — o f the British
civil authority a n d the British a r m y , as well as the E g y p t i a n a r m y .
T h u s L o n d o n heard only one version of intelligence data from
E g y p t — C l a y t o n ' s — i n s t e a d of three. A former a r m y captain, Clayton
rapidly m o v e d up the ranks during'the war a n d by the e n d of it was a
general.
In this fatherly way, C l a y t o n served as mentor to the a d v e n t u r o u s
y o u n g archaeologists a n d orientalists who flocked to C a i r o to serve in
the intelligence services d u r i n g the war. He m u s t have h a d o u t s t a n d ing h u m a n qualities, for his y o u n g m e n , though diverse in other
r e g a r d s , all liked a n d r e s p e c t e d h i m . T h e y saw h i m as s h r e w d , sober,
sensible, a n d steady. He was a b o u t ten years older than m o s t of them
a n d , whether or not they took it, they listened to his advice. F o r
t h e m he was the incarnation of the old h a n d .
Ill
A l t h o u g h the F o r e i g n Office a n d the I n d i a Office often d i s p u t e d the
views or p r o p o s a l s that Wingate a n d Clayton e s p o u s e d , nobody d u r i n g
the war q u e s t i o n e d their professional ability or their expert knowledge b a s e d on long experience in the M i d d l e E a s t . It was not until
years after the war h a d e n d e d that D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e , u s i n g
information that b e c a m e available f r o m the G e r m a n side, m a d e a
case for the proposition that they were d a n g e r o u s l y in c o mp e t e n t .
A c c o r d i n g to L l o y d G e o r g e , the British authorities in C a i r o were
blind to what w a s h a p p e n i n g behind enemy lines. In particular, he
wrote, there was a point in 1916 when the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was too
exhausted to continue fighting. If the British forces in E g y p t h a d
launched an attack on Sinai and Palestine t h e n — o r even in 1 9 1 5 —
little effort would have been n e e d e d , a c c o r d i n g to L l o y d G e o r g e , to
"have c r u m p l e d . . . u p " the T u r k s , which i n turn w o u l d have
allowed Britain to m o v e t h r o u g h the Balkans to defeat G e r m a n y .
T h e o p p o r t u n i t y was m i s s e d , a c c o r d i n g to him, b e c a u s e the intelligence services either did not know, or failed to report, what was
g o i n g on inside the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . As a result, he claimed, the
British g o v e r n m e n t failed to win the war d u r i n g the years when the
war still could have been won on British t e r m s .
5
A m o r e easily p r o v e d failing of C a i r o Intelligence was that it was
unaware of the extent to which the E g y p t i a n g o v e r n m e n t h a d been
infiltrated by e n e m y a g e n t s . It was not until that expert on O t t o m a n
affairs, W y n d h a m D e e d e s , went to work in C a i r o in 1916, a n d
i
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discovered that the E g y p t i a n police forces were h o n e y c o m b e d with
s p i e s , that the T u r k i s h network was s m a s h e d .
An early sign of the i n a d e q u a c y of Cairo's intelligence a p p a r a t u s
that o u g h t to have sent up a w a r n i n g signal, but d i d not, a p p e a r e d in
the a u t u m n of 1914, a b o u t a m o n t h before the O t t o m a n war b e g a n ,
when the local British a r m y c o m m a n d e r , G e n e r a l Maxwell, wrote
from E g y p t to L o r d K i t c h e n e r that "It is very difficult to p u t a
true value on all the r e p o r t s f r o m C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , A s i a M i n o r a n d
S y r i a . . . I can get n o information direct a s the T u r k s g u a r d the
frontier very closely—our agents cannot get t h r o u g h — t h o s e we had
on the other side have been b a g g e d . " He a d d e d a d i s q u i e t i n g note
a b o u t the intelligence i m b a l a n c e : " T h e E a s t is full of G e r m a n spies
a n d they get fairly g o o d i n f o r m a t i o n . "
6
At least Maxwell was aware that he d i d not know what was g o i n g
on in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . Wingate a n d C l a y t o n fell into the t r a p of
believing that they d i d . T h e y a c c e p t e d G e r a l d F i t z M a u r i c e ' s mistaken
theory that the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t was in the h a n d s of a g r o u p of
p r o - G e r m a n J e w s . At the end of 1914 G e n e r a l Wingate b l a m e d the
war on "a syndicate of J e w s , financiers, a n d low-born intriguers" in
Constantinople.
7
He a n d his colleagues c o m p o u n d e d the error by linking it to
m i s l e a d i n g information a b o u t the state of M o s l e m opinion. J u s t after
the war b e g a n , S t o r r s sent Maxwell a report of r e m a r k s m a d e by a
S y r i a n informant a b o u t p u b l i c opinion b e h i n d enemy lines. A c c o r d i n g
to the informant, the inhabitants of S y r i a were filled with hatred of
the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t b e c a u s e they believed it w o u l d s u p p o r t
Z i o n i s m . " T h e s e Zionists are closely connected with Berlin a n d
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d are the m o s t i m p o r t a n t factor in the policy of
Palestine," the informant s t a t e d . T h e false r u m o r that Berlin a n d
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e were a b o u t to back Z i o n i s m echoed back a n d forth
through the years, a n d later in the w a r misled the British C a b i n e t into
believing that it h a d to issue a p r o - Z i o n i s t Declaration immediately.
8
S t o r r s wrote to K i t c h e n e r (which is to say, to his personal military
secretary, L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l O s w a l d F i t z G e r a l d ) at the end of the
year. H e c o m m e n t e d o n p l a n s for the postwar M i d d l e E a s t , a n d
claimed that M o s l e m s w o u l d o p p o s e a J e w i s h Palestine b e c a u s e they
b l a m e d J e w s for the war. "Again would not I s l a m be extremely
indignant at the idea of h a n d i n g over our c o n q u e s t s to a people
which has taken no p a r t as a nation in the war, a n d a section of
which has u n d o u b t e d l y helped to thrust the T u r k s over the precip i c e . " In fact, as F o r e i g n Office a n d A r a b B u r e a u reports later were
to show, M o s l e m opinion, even in n o n - T u r k i s h areas, generally
s u p p o r t e d the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d its alliance with G e r m a n y . S t o r r s
w a s w r o n g , too, in s u p p o s i n g that M o s l e m s were o p p o s e d to a J e w i s h
Palestine b e c a u s e of the w a r ; M o s l e m opposition to a J e w i s h Palestine
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had arisen long before the war, in the w a k e of Zionist colonization at
the end of the nineteenth century.
A characteristic flaw in the information-gathering c o n d u c t e d by
Clayton a n d S t o r r s was that they frequently accepted information
s u p p l i e d by a single informant without testing a n d checking it.
Instead they seemingly relied on the sort of intuitive ability that
S t e e v e n s had a s c r i b e d to W i n g a t e : the gift of b e i n g able to divine the
extent to which any native is telling the truth. J o h n B u c h a n , who
later b e c a m e w a r t i m e D i r e c t o r of I n f o r m a t i o n in L o n d o n , wrote in
the second chapter of his a d v e n t u r e novel Greenmantle that "the
truth is that we are the only race on earth that can p r o d u c e m e n
c a p a b l e of getting inside the skin of r e m o t e p e o p l e s . P e r h a p s the
S c o t s are better than the E n g l i s h , b u t we're all a t h o u s a n d percent
better than a n y b o d y else." Wingate, C l a y t o n , and S t o r r s acted as
t h o u g h they u n d e r s t o o d the natives of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e as well as
did the S c o t s hero of B u c h a n ' s novel. As it t r a n s p i r e d , their ability to
u n d e r s t a n d the natives w a s quite limited.
In evaluating r e p o r t s that there was dissatisfaction with O t t o m a n
rule in s o m e sections of the e m p i r e , British Cairo particularly misu n d e r s t o o d one of the salient characteristics of the M o s l e m M i d d l e
E a s t : to the extent that it was politically conscious, it was not willing
to be ruled by n o n - M o s l e m s . B e h i n d e n e m y lines there were M o s l e m s
who were dissatisfied with the Y o u n g T u r k g o v e r n m e n t , b u t they
p r o p o s e d to replace it with a different T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t , or at any
rate a different I s l a m i c g o v e r n m e n t . T h e y r e g a r d e d rule by a C h r i s tian E u r o p e a n power, s u c h as Britain, as intolerable.
S t o r r s a p p a r e n t l y believed that he c o u l d get a r o u n d that by p r e tending that it was E g y p t i a n rule that w o u l d be s u b s t i t u t e d for
T u r k i s h rule. He p r o p o s e d to create what would a p p e a r to be a new
E g y p t i a n e m p i r e to replace the O t t o m a n E m p i r e in the A r a b i c speaking M i d d l e E a s t ; it was behind that facade that L o r d K i t c h e n e r
w o u l d rule as Britain's viceroy. S t o r r s derived particular satisfaction
from reports that O t t o m a n rule h a d b e c o m e u n p o p u l a r in S y r i a ; he
believed thai he could offer the S y r i a n s a p o p u l a r alternative. A c c u rate r e p o r t s , received with s o m e frequency, indicated that—other
than the M a r o n i t e s , a Christian sect with ties to the F r e n c h — m o s t
S y r i a n s who held political views objected to the p r o s p e c t of b e i n g
ruled in the postwar world by F r a n c e , and since S t o r r s a n d his
colleagues took it for g r a n t e d that the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g peoples could
not govern t h e m s e l v e s , the only possibility left was the one advocated
by S t o r r s : the incorporation of S y r i a into British E g y p t .
S e e n in that light, reports that S y r i a n s considered the G e r m a n s
and T u r k s to be Zionists a n d the F r e n c h to be detestable meant that
the S y r i a n s m u s t be p r o - B r i t i s h . S u m m a r i z i n g a m e m o r a n d u m s u b mitted by a S y r i a n leader who called for A r a b independence, C l a y t o n
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stated that "it is to E n g l a n d , and to E n g l a n d alone, that both S y r i a n
C h r i s t i a n s a n d P a n - A r a b s are t u r n i n g . " O n 2 F e b r u a r y 1915, S t o r r s
wrote to F i t z G e r a l d / K i t c h e n e r that " T h e r e is no d o u b t that local
S y r i a n feeling, b o t h C h r i s t i a n a n d M u s l i m , is strongly in favor of our
a d d i n g that country t o the E g y p t i a n S u l t a n a t e . . . " T h e question
was whether actively to p r o m o t e that feeling. T h e newly arrived
H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in C a i r o , M c M a h o n , writing the s a m e d a y to
F i t z G e r a l d / K i t c h e n e r to seek g u i d a n c e , outlined the alternatives as
they had u n d o u b t e d l y been d e s c r i b e d to him by S t o r r s a n d C l a y t o n :
" T h e S y r i a n s want our intervention and say that unless we can give
t h e m s o m e a s s u r a n c e of s u p p o r t they will have to turn to the F r e n c h
altho they w o u l d prefer us to the F r e n c h . "
W r o n g - h e a d e d a n d professionally a m b i t i o u s , Britain's m e n on the
s p o t s u p p o s e d that A r a b s w a n t e d t o b e ruled b y E u r o p e a n s , a n d
b u o y e d by this mistaken belief, K i t c h e n e r ' s lieutenants a i m e d at
taking control of S y r i a . F r a n c e ' s m e n on the s p o t were w r o n g - h e a d e d
a n d a m b i t i o u s t o o ; a n d they also a i m e d to take S y r i a .
10
1
1 2
IV
D u r i n g the C r u s a d e s , F r e n c h knights w o n k i n g d o m s a n d built castles
in S y r i a ; a n d in 1 9 1 4 — a millennium later—there were still F r e n c h m e n who r e g a r d e d S y r i a a s p r o p e r l y part o f F r a n c e . F r a n c e m a i n tained close ties with one of the C h r i s t i a n c o m m u n i t i e s a l o n g the
M o u n t L e b a n o n coast of S y r i a , a n d F r e n c h s h i p p i n g , silk, a n d other
interests eyed c o m m e r c i a l possibilities in the area. T h u s for religious, e c o n o m i c , a n d historical r e a s o n s , F r a n c e saw herself as
h a v i n g a role to play in Syria's affairs.
T h e m o m e n t that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e entered the war, F r e n c h
officials in the M i d d l e E a s t (like their British c o u n t e r p a r t s , Wingate,
C l a y t o n , a n d S t o r r s ) therefore f o r m u l a t e d p l a n s t o annex T u r k e y ' s
S y r i a n p r o v i n c e s . F r a n c e ' s minister in C a i r o and C o n s u l - G e n e r a l in
Beirut immediately joined in u r g i n g their g o v e r n m e n t to invade the
L e b a n e s e coast. T h e i r quixotic plan called for a landing of only
about 2,000 French troops, who would be joined—they believed—by
3 0 , 0 0 0 local volunteers. S p e e d w a s of the essence, in their view;
F r a n c e would have to strike before T u r k e y could raise an a r m y a n d
before Britain c o u l d strike f i r s t .
13
T h e i r p r o p o s a l could hardly have been m o r e i n o p p o r t u n e . I t
reached the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t in N o v e m b e r 1914, when it w a s still
in exile in B o r d e a u x , having fled from Paris in the face of the
G e r m a n a d v a n c e to the M a r n e . While there were powerful colonialist
figures in P a r l i a m e n t , the F o r e i g n Ministry, a n d the C a b i n e t ,
N o v e m b e r w a s a m o n t h in which everyone's attention was still f o c u s e d
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o n the mortal s t r u g g l e i n northern F r a n c e a n d B e l g i u m . T h e p r o p o s a l
to d i s p a t c h troops to S y r i a was rejected.
T h e following m o n t h , h o w e v e r — t h e contending a r m i e s i n E u r o p e
having settled d o w n in their trenches, a n d the g o v e r n m e n t having
returned to P a r i s — t h e p r o p o s a l to invade S y r i a did receive attention.
A delegation of colonialist politicians s e c u r e d the agreement, in principle, of A l e x a n d r e M i l l e r a n d , the Minister of War, to s u p p o r t a
S y r i a n expedition. F o r e i g n Minister T h e o p h i l e D e l c a s s e , however,
r e m a i n e d vehemently o p p o s e d : " N o t h i n g a p p e a r s less desirable than
intervention in S y r i a , " he s a i d .
D e l c a s s e was one of the m a n y
F r e n c h officials who believed that a n n e x i n g S y r i a would be of m u c h
less value to his country than p r e s e r v i n g the O t t o m a n E m p i r e w o u l d
b e . As of 1914 F r a n c e s u p p l i e d 45 percent of the foreign capital in
the private sector of the O t t o m a n e c o n o m y a n d 60 percent of the
O t t o m a n p u b l i c debt, a n d thus h a d an e n o r m o u s stake in the empire's
continued existence a n d v i t a l i t y .
1 4
15
O n 30—31 D e c e m b e r 1914, S i r H e n r y M c M a h o n , who was a b o u t
to take up his duties as K i t c h e n e r ' s replacement in C a i r o , visited
Paris. He m e t with officials of the F o r e i g n Ministry and War Ministry
but failed to reply coherently to their q u e s t i o n s a b o u t Britain's M i d d l e
E a s t e r n policy. M c M a h o n was notoriously dull-witted a n d ineffectual,
b u t the F r e n c h , who d i d not know him, a s s u m e d he m u s t be clever
a n d a s t u t e : his i n c o m p e t e n t replies were interpreted by M i l l e r a n d ,
the War Minister, as deliberate a n d s u b t l e evasions, m a s k i n g a secret
British plan to invade a n d o c c u p y S y r i a by t h e m s e l v e s .
16
Millerand immediately r e p o r t e d these conversations to the F r e n c h
C a b i n e t , which authorized h i m to create an expeditionary force to
invade S y r i a whenever Britain d i d , whether invited by her to participate or not. In F e b r u a r y 1915, D e l c a s s e went over to L o n d o n and
took u p the m a t t e r o f S y r i a with S i r E d w a r d G r e y . T h e F r e n c h
F o r e i g n Minister was r e a s s u r e d that Britain would not invade S y r i a
without g i v i n g prior notice. T h e two foreign ministers a p p e a r to
have agreed that if the O t t o m a n E m p i r e were to be partitioned,
Britain would not o p p o s e F r a n c e ' s d e s i g n s on S y r i a , b u t that it
would be far preferable for the e m p i r e not to be broken u p .
T h u s the foreign ministers settled the differences between their
two c o u n t r i e s — t e m p o r a r i l y . B u t their m e n on the s p o t in the M i d d l e
E a s t continued to stir up trouble between Britain a n d F r a n c e ; a n d ,
m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g the region, K i t c h e n e r a n d his lieutenants also went
on to p u r s u e other d a n g e r o u s d e s i g n s there.
10
K I T C H E N E R S E T S OUT T O
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i
T h e West a n d the M i d d l e E a s t have m i s u n d e r s t o o d each other
throughout m o s t of the twentieth century; a n d m u c h of that m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g can be traced b a c k to L o r d K i t c h e n e r ' s initiatives in
the early years of the F i r s t World War. T h e peculiarities of his
character, the deficiencies of his u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the M o s l e m world,
the misinformation regularly s u p p l i e d to him by his lieutenants in
C a i r o a n d K h a r t o u m , a n d his choice of A r a b politicians with w h o m
to deal have colored the c o u r s e of political events ever since.
To a p p r e c i a t e the novelty of K i t c h e n e r ' s a p p r o a c h to the M i d d l e
E a s t , i t m u s t b e r e m e m b e r e d that when the O t t o m a n E m p i r e entered
the F i r s t World War, A s q u i t h , G r e y , a n d Churchill did not intend to
retaliate by seizing any of its d o m a i n s for Britain. T h e y did p r o p o s e
to allow Britain's allies to m a k e territorial g a i n s in E u r o p e a n d A s i a
M i n o r at T u r k e y ' s e x p e n s e ; b u t A s q u i t h ' s Britain h a d no territorial
d e s i g n s of her own on O t t o m a n l a n d s , either in the M i d d l e E a s t or
elsewhere. K i t c h e n e r , however, maintained that when the war was
over, it was in Britain's vital interest to seize m u c h of the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e for herself: the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g part. T h i s would m e a n a
total reversal of Britain's traditional policy.
K i t c h e n e r , like m o s t B r i t o n s who h a d lived in the E a s t , believed
that in the M o s l e m world religion counts for everything. B u t the
field m a r s h a l a n d his colleagues in C a i r o and K h a r t o u m mistakenly
s e e m e d to believe that M o h a m m e d a n i s m was a centralized, authoritarian s t r u c t u r e . T h e y r e g a r d e d I s l a m as a single entity: as an "it," as
an organization. T h e y believed that it o b e y e d its leaders. C e n t u r i e s
before, C o r t e z had won control of M e x i c o by seizing the Aztec
e m p e r o r ; a n d medieval F r e n c h kings h a d tried to control C h r i s t e n d o m
by keeping the p o p e captive in A v i g n o n . In m u c h the s a m e spirit,
K i t c h e n e r a n d his colleagues believed that I s l a m could be b o u g h t ,
m a n i p u l a t e d , or c a p t u r e d by b u y i n g , m a n i p u l a t i n g , or c a p t u r i n g its
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religious l e a d e r s h i p . T h e y were intrigued by the notion that whoever
controlled the p e r s o n of the C a l i p h — M o h a m m e d ' s s u c c e s s o r — c o n trolled I s l a m .
Central to K i t c h e n e r ' s analysis w a s the contention that the C a l i p h
might hurl I s l a m against Britain. S i n c e S u n n i M o s l e m s (who p r e d o m i n a t e d in M o h a m m e d a n I n d i a ) r e g a r d e d the T u r k i s h S u l t a n as a
C a l i p h , K i t c h e n e r perceived this as a continuing threat. In C a i r o a n d
K h a r t o u m it was believed that, as of 1914, the C a l i p h had fallen into
the h a n d s of J e w s a n d G e r m a n s ; the War Minister worried that once
the world war was won, the C a l i p h m i g h t b e c o m e a tool in the h a n d s
of Britain's M i d d l e E a s t rivals, particularly R u s s i a .
I n enemy h a n d s , the caliphate c o u l d b e u s e d ( K i t c h e n e r believed)
to u n d e r m i n e Britain's position in J n d i a , E g y p t , and the S u d a n .
Britain ruled over half of the world's M o s l e m s . In India alone there
were almost seventy million of t h e m , a n d M o h a m m e d a n s constituted
a disproportionately large part of the I n d i a n A r m y . In E g y p t a n d the
S u d a n , Britain ruled millions m o r e , who lived alongside the S u e z
Canal sea r o a d to I n d i a . T i n y British g a r r i s o n s policed these tens of
millions of natives, b u t K i t c h e n e r knew that they could not even
begin to deal with a revolt.
1
T h e British imagination was h a u n t e d b y the I n d i a n M u t i n y
(1857—9), the m y s t e r i o u s u p r i s i n g , incited by religion, that had
b r o u g h t d o w n the rule of the E a s t I n d i a C o m p a n y . M o r e recently
the u p r i s i n g in the S u d a n , which K i t c h e n e r had so brilliantly
avenged, was inspired by a new religious leader who called himself
the M a h d i , a title E u r o p e a n s translated as " M e s s i a h . " P a n - I s l a m i c
unrest in E g y p t in 1905—6 had c a u s e d Britain deep concern. F o r
K i t c h e n e r a n d his e n t o u r a g e , the possibility of a M o s l e m Holy War
against Britain was a recurring n i g h t m a r e .
T h e D i r e c t o r o f I n f o r m a t i o n , J o h n B u c h a n , d r a m a t i z e d these fears
in his 1916 novel Greenmantle, in which G e r m a n y m a k e s use of a
M o s l e m p r o p h e t in a plot to destroy Britain's e m p i r e . T h e prophet
a p p e a r s in T u r k e y ; there are portents of his c o m i n g ; there is an
ancient p r o p h e c y ; there is a m o d e r n revelation; and the region in
which he intends to ignite a rebellion is m a d e explicit. " T h e r e is a
dry wind b l o w i n g t h r o u g h the E a s t , and the parched g r a s s e s wait the
s p a r k . A n d the wind is blowing t o w a r d s the I n d i a n b o r d e r . "
2
K i t c h e n e r believed that a call to a r m s by the C a l i p h against Britain
d u r i n g the 1914 war c o u l d p e r h a p s be offset by the w o r d s or actions
of other M o s l e m religious leaders. After Britain had won the war,
however, m o r e decisive action w o u l d b e necessary. T h e reason was
that when the war h a d been won, R u s s i a was s u r e to take p o s s e s s i o n
of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d — u n l e s s s o m e t h i n g were d o n e a b o u t it—of
the C a l i p h . K i t c h e n e r saw a G e r m a n - c o n t r o l l e d C a l i p h as merely
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d a n g e r o u s — h e would a t t e m p t to foment unrest in I n d i a to throw
Britain off balance in the E u r o p e a n war. B u t he saw a R u s s i a n controlled C a l i p h as a mortal d a n g e r to the British E m p i r e ; for
(unlike A s q u i t h a n d G r e y ) . K i t c h e n e r believed that R u s s i a still harb o r e d a m b i t i o n s of taking I n d i a away from Britain. In K i t c h e n e r ' s
view, G e r m a n y was an e n e m y in E u r o p e a n d R u s s i a was an enemy in
A s i a : the p a r a d o x of the 1914 war in which Britain and R u s s i a were
allied was t h a t by winning in E u r o p e , Britain risked losing in A s i a .
T h e only completely satisfactory o u t c o m e of the war, from
K i t c h e n e r ' s point of view, was for G e r m a n y to lose it without R u s s i a
winning i t — a n d in 1914 it was not clear how that could be acc o m p l i s h e d . So the War Minister p l a n n e d to strike first in the c o m i n g
postwar s t r u g g l e with R u s s i a for control of the road to a n d into
India.
K i t c h e n e r ' s p r o p o s a l was that, after the war, Britain s h o u l d a r r a n g e
for her own nominee to b e c o m e C a l i p h . M o h a m m e d h a d been an
A r a b i a n ; K i t c h e n e r p r o p o s e d to e n c o u r a g e the view that M o h a m m e d ' s
s u c c e s s o r s a s C a l i p h should b e A r a b i a n , too. T h e a d v a n t a g e o f this
was that the coastline of the A r a b i a n peninsula could easily be
controlled by the British navy; Britain would be able to insulate the
C a l i p h f r o m the influence of Britain's E u r o p e a n rivals. O n c e Britain
could install the C a l i p h within her s p h e r e of influence in A r a b i a ,
K i t c h e n e r believed she could g a i n control of I s l a m . A n d even before
the O t t o m a n E m p i r e entered the war, K i t c h e n e r ' s lieutenants in
C a i r o r e m i n d e d the War Minister that an obvious c a n d i d a t e to be the
A r a b i a n c a l i p h — t h e ruler of M e c c a — h a d already been in touch with
him.
II
T o w a r d the end of the s u m m e r of 1914, as the O t t o m a n war a p p r o a c h e d , G i l b e r t Clayton recalled that A b d u l l a h , the favorite son of
H u s s e i n , the ruler of M e c c a , had visited Cairo s o m e m o n t h s earlier
and had s u g g e s t e d that A r a b i a m i g h t be ripe for revolt. At the time,
A b d u l l a h h a d been afraid that the Y o u n g T u r k s were a b o u t to m o v e
against his father; a n d A b d u l l a h , whose indolent disposition hid a
bold intelligence, looked a b o u t for p o s s i b l e s u p p o r t from a b r o a d . B u t
shortly afterward his father a n d the Porte c o m p o s e d their differences,
so that British assistance was no longer needed.
E v e n now, it is not certain what A b d u l l a h said in C a i r o a n d what
was said to him. A b d u l l a h a p p a r e n t l y first met L o r d K i t c h e n e r there
in 1912 or 1913. He met K i t c h e n e r in C a i r o again in F e b r u a r y a n d
April 1914, a n d also m e t with R o n a l d S t o r r s . A b d u l l a h s e e m s to
have s o u g h t a s s u r a n c e s of British help if the Porte were to seek to
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d e p o s e his father. At the t i m e , K i t c h e n e r , who i n q u i r e d in detail
a b o u t the difficulties in A r a b i a , s e e m s to have d i s c l a i m e d any interest
in interfering in internal O t t o m a n affairs. A b d u l l a h m a y have been
less i m p r e s s e d by the disclaimer of interest than by the e x p r e s s i o n of
concern.
T o S t o r r s , A b d u l l a h a p p a r e n t l y c l a i m e d — f a l s e l y — t h a t the rival
chiefs of the A r a b i a n p e n i n s u l a were p r e p a r e d to follow his father in
o p p o s i n g the Porte's d e s i g n s . He s u g g e s t e d a future relationship
between A r a b i a a n d Britain similar to that between A f g h a n i s t a n a n d
Britain, in which the former exercised internal self-rule a n d the latter
a d m i n i s t e r e d all foreign relations. T h o u g h the idea was attractive to
him, S t o r r s , like his chief, was u n a b l e to offer A b d u l l a h the encoura g e m e n t that h e s o u g h t .
3
4
Several A r a b i a n e m i r s had indeed been in conflict for years with
the Y o u n g T u r k leadership i n C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . B u t G i l b e r t Clayton
failed to appreciate the extent to which religious, dynastic, a n d other
differences divided t h e m . A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g e m i g r e s in C a i r o , with
w h o m he met, m a y have misled h i m in this connection. In fact none
of the A r a b i a n e m i r s was willing to accept one of the others as a
leader.
Prominent a m o n g the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g exiles living in C a i r o with
w h o m Clayton s p o k e was a colorful former O t t o m a n a r m y officer a n d
C . U . P . politician n a m e d Aziz Ali a l - M a s r i . A l - M a s r i , o f C i r c a s s i a n
ancestry,* was b o r n a n d b r o u g h t up in E g y p t ; he h a d a t t e n d e d
military school in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . After military service in the
field, he h a d e m e r g e d as a leader of the Y o u n g T u r k e y Party. Y e t he
was a m e r e major attached to the G e n e r a l Staff at a t i m e when
E n v e r , a c l a s s m a t e of w h o m he held a low opinion, h a d b e c o m e
Minister of War. D i s c o n t e n t e d , a l - M a s r i r e s p o n d e d by organizing al'Ahd, a small secret society of a r m y officers who objected to the
C . U . P . ' s centralizing policies a n d its failure to give those who s p o k e
A r a b i c their fair s h a r e of high office. T h e officers of al-'Ahd were
united in their o p p o s i t i o n to the T u r k i f y i n g policies a d o p t e d by the
C . U . P . T h e y advocated either a d m i t t i n g the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p o p u lations to a greater share of power in the central g o v e r n m e n t , or else
decentralizing a n d allowing them g r e a t e r a u t o n o m y at the local level,
or p e r h a p s b o t h .
5
E n v e r P a s h a was responsible for h a v i n g h a d M a j o r a l - M a s r i arrested
and convicted on t r u m p e d - u p c h a r g e s in early 1914. T h u s a l - M a s r i
unwillingly f o u n d himself cast in the role of an A r a b r e v o l u t i o n a r y —
unwillingly, b e c a u s e he a s p i r e d to leadership of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e
as a whole, not a m e r e section of it. R e s p o n d i n g to opinion in C a i r o ,
* T h e Circassians were a people from the Caucasus, once ruled by Turkey and
later by Russia.
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L o r d K i t c h e n e r intervened o n his behalf; a n d D j e m a l P a s h a a r r a n g e d
to have him p a r d o n e d a n d exiled to his native E g y p t . An o p p o n e n t ,
since his childhood, of British rule in E g y p t , anti-British, p r o - G e r m a n ,
a s u p p o r t e r of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e who was o p p o s e d only to its
g o v e r n m e n t , a military politician who n u m b e r e d a m e r e handful of
colleagues a m o n g his s u p p o r t e r s , a l - M a s r i was m i s u n d e r s t o o d by the
British intelligence officers who wrongly r e g a r d e d him both as powerful a n d as a potential ally.
In early S e p t e m b e r 1914, it a p p e a r s that a l - M a s r i visited the
British A g e n c y in C a i r o , a n d met with C l a y t o n . A l - M a s r i knew that
A b d u l Aziz I b n S a u d a n d other A r a b i a n leaders had in the p a s t
considered rising against the P o r t e . P e r h a p s he told C l a y t o n s o .
P e r h a p s Clayton was r e m i n d e d of A b d u l l a h ' s visit and of what he
h a d said to S t o r r s a n d K i t c h e n e r .
After seeing a l - M a s r i , Clayton met with R o n a l d S t o r r s and m a d e
a r r a n g e m e n t s for him to forward a secret m e m o r a n d u m to L o r d
K i t c h e n e r . T h e Clayton m e m o r a n d u m was enclosed in a letter that
S t o r r s was to s e n d to his old chief on the relatively innocuous subject
of c a m e l s .
6
Ill
It was a c o m m o n British concern in 1914 that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ,
if it entered the war, m i g h t launch an attack against the S u e z C a n a l ;
a n d , like officials in the war ministries of E u r o p e who analyzed the
military potential of n e i g h b o r i n g e n e m y countries in t e r m s of railroad
facilities, R o n a l d S t o r r s focused attention on the s u p p l y of c a m e l s
available to the O t t o m a n forces. T h e O t t o m a n a r m y , he wrote in his
letter to K i t c h e n e r , w o u l d count on obtaining its animals from the
c a m e l - b r e e d e r s of the western district of A r a b i a , the H e j a z , and what
S t o r r s p r o p o s e d was to e n c o u r a g e the local r u l e r — t h e E m i r of
M e c c a — n o t to deliver t h e m .
T h e m e s s a g e a b o u t c a m e l s served as his cover: with it S t o r r s
forwarded Clayton's secret m e m o r a n d u m of 6 S e p t e m b e r 1914 to
K i t c h e n e r which u r g e d h i m to enter into conversations with the ruler
of M e c c a for other p u r p o s e s . O n e of the issues raised in Clayton's
m e m o r a n d u m was whether the O t t o m a n S u l t a n could b e replaced a s
C a l i p h of I s l a m by an A r a b i a n leader friendly to Britain. If s o , the
E m i r of M e c c a , the g u a r d i a n of the M o s l e m H o l y Places, was an
o b v i o u s c a n d i d a t e , the m o r e so as he was in a position to p r o v i d e
Britain with important assistance in the matter of p i l g r i m a g e s .
In the r h y t h m of life in the I s l a m i c E a s t , no activity was m o r e
important than the m a s s p i l g r i m a g e each year to the H o l y Places of
A r a b i a — a p i l g r i m a g e that every M o s l e m able to do so is c o m m a n d e d
to m a k e at least once in his lifetime. T h e world war interfered,
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particularly in 1915. E v e n if I n d i a n M o s l e m s were to forgive Britain
for g o i n g to war against the only significant i n d e p e n d e n t I s l a m i c
power, there was a question as to whether they w o u l d forgive the
disruption of the p i l g r i m a g e that played so large a role in their lives.
T h e H o l y Places o f A r a b i a , M e c c a , a n d M e d i n a are located i n the
H e j a z , whose ruler therefore was in a position to s a f e g u a r d the right
of British M o s l e m s to continue visiting their shrines despite the war.
C l a i m i n g descent f r o m the Prophet's family, the E m i r of M e c c a — i n
addition to b e i n g ruler of the H e j a z — w a s in a position to a s s u m e the
mantle of the C a l i p h .
In his secret m e m o r a n d u m , C l a y t o n m a d e the erroneous assertion
that the rival regional leaders of the A r a b i a n p e n i n s u l a — t h e rulers of
Asir a n d the Y e m e n , a s well a s I b n S a u d a n d p e r h a p s I b n R a s h i d o f
N e j d — w e r e c o m i n g together with the ruler of M e c c a to work for "an
A r a b i a for the A r a b s . " A c c o r d i n g to Clayton's m e m o r a n d u m , the
m o v e m e n t was e n c o u r a g e d by the K h e d i v e , the nominal ruler of
E g y p t u n d e r the S u l t a n , who also r e g a r d e d himself as a c a n d i d a t e to
succeed the S u l t a n as C a l i p h of I s l a m . It is not clear how Clayton
intended to reconcile the conflicting a m b i t i o n s of this diverse g r o u p .
7
T h e claim that the other rival leaders w o u l d unite b e h i n d the E m i r
of M e c c a was one that A b d u l l a h h a d a d v a n c e d on his father's behalf
s o m e five m o n t h s before in conversations with R o n a l d S t o r r s . In
presenting it as fresh information, C l a y t o n m a y have been indicating
that the information h a d been recently confirmed to him by a l - M a s r i
or by s o m e other exiled O t t o m a n figure. T h e novelty of the m e m o r a n d u m lay in the suggestion that the A r a b i a n s could be of service to
Britain d u r i n g the war, a n d not merely afterward.
K i t c h e n e r r e s p o n d e d immediately. He sent a cable to C a i r o on 24
S e p t e m b e r 1914, in which he o r d e r e d that S t o r r s be told to s e n d a
trusted m e s s e n g e r to A b d u l l a h to ask a q u e s t i o n in confidence: in the
event of war, w o u l d the H e j a z be for or against Britain? Before
s e n d i n g his c a b l e , K i t c h e n e r cleared it with S i r E d w a r d G r e y , who
was i m p r e s s e d by Clayton's m e m o r a n d u m , which he t e r m e d "very
important."
8
A few weeks later the m e s s e n g e r returned from his undercover
j o u r n e y to O t t o m a n A r a b i a with a v a g u e but e n c o u r a g i n g reply. It
invited the War Minister to spell out what he h a d in m i n d . C a i r o
cabled K i t c h e n e r that " C o m m u n i c a t i o n is g u a r d e d , b u t friendly a n d
favourable."
9
Meanwhile the A g e n c y h a d again been in c o m m u n i c a t i o n with
M a j o r a l - M a s r i and also other A r a b i c e m i g r e s in C a i r o . T h e s e exiles
from the O t t o m a n E m p i r e continued to carry on the d e c a d e s - o l d
discussion of who the various a n d diverse A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p e o p l e s of
the e m p i r e were, or o u g h t to b e . T h i s question of national identity
was one which h a d been raised in the coffee h o u s e s of D a m a s c u s a n d
Beirut, and in the student q u a r t e r s of Paris from the nineteenth
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century o n w a r d , a n d h a d given rise to a variety of literary c l u b s a n d
secret societies within the O t t o m a n E m p i r e .
In the context of O t t o m a n politics, the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g exiles in
C a i r o were r e s p o n d i n g to those policies of the Y o u n g T u r k g o v e r n ment which s u b j e c t e d the majority of the inhabitants of the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e to the h e g e m o n y of the roughly 40 percent of the population
who s p o k e T u r k i s h . In one way or another, what the exiles advocated
was a greater say in g o v e r n m e n t a l matters, a n d m o r e a n d higher
official positions for those who s p o k e A r a b i c — a b o u t the s a m e percentage a s s p o k e T u r k i s h .
T h o u g h often referred to as nationalists, these m e n are m o r e
accurately d e s c r i b e d as s e p a r a t i s t s . T h e y did not ask for independ e n c e ; they asked for a greater m e a s u r e of participation a n d local
rule. T h e y were willing to be ruled largely by T u r k s b e c a u s e the
T u r k s were fellow-Moslems. U n l i k e E u r o p e a n nationalists, they were
people whose beliefs existed in a religious rather than secular framework. T h e y lived within the walls of the city of I s l a m in a sense in
which E u r o p e had not lived within C h r i s t e n d o m since the early
M i d d l e A g e s ; for, like the cities built in the A r a b world in medieval
times, the lives of M o s l e m s circle a r o u n d a central m o s q u e . T h e y did
not represent an ethnic g r o u p , for historically, the only ethnic or
"true" A r a b s were the inhabitants of A r a b i a , while the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g
p o p u l a t i o n s of s u c h provinces as B a g h d a d or D a m a s c u s , or of s u c h
cities as Algiers or C a i r o , were of m i x e d ethnic stock a n d b a c k g r o u n d ,
s p a n n i n g the vast r a n g e of ancient p e o p l e s and cultures that e x t e n d e d
from the Atlantic O c e a n to the Persian G u l f .
10
T h e r e were only a few dozen p e o p l e who were active partisans of
A r a b i c nationalism ( s e p a r a t i s m ) in O c t o b e r 1914, as m e m b e r s of one
or m o r e of the secret societies, s u c h as a l - F a t a t and al-'Ahd, of which
the British A g e n c y in C a i r o was b e c o m i n g increasingly a w a r e . A
great deal m o r e is now known a b o u t these m e n a n d what they
represented than was known to the British at the t i m e . In large part
they were m e m b e r s of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g elites who had been well
connected with the r e g i m e which h a d been overthrown by the Y o u n g
T u r k s and who felt threatened by the p r o - T u r k i s h and centralizing
t r e n d s i n C . U . P . p o l i c y . Milne C h e e t h a m , the acting A g e n t and
C o n s u l - G e n e r a l in C a i r o , cabled an intelligence m e m o r a n d u m a b o u t
the secret societies to K i t c h e n e r on 26 October 1914, as the field
marshal p o n d e r e d the t e r m s of his next m e s s a g e to A r a b i a .
1 1
12
IV
Kitchener's t e l e g r a m , which was cleared and sent by G r e y at the
F o r e i g n Office, told the A g e n c y that S t o r r s s h o u l d reply to A b d u l l a h
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that "If the A r a b nation assist E n g l a n d in this war that has been
forced u p o n us by T u r k e y , E n g l a n d will g u a r a n t e e that no internal
intervention take place in A r a b i a , a n d will give A r a b s every assistance
against foreign a g g r e s s i o n . " ( B y " A r a b s , " K i t c h e n e r here meant those
who lived in A r a b i a . ) In other w o r d s , if the A r a b i a n leaders freed
their p e n i n s u l a f r o m the S u l t a n a n d declared their i n d e p e n d e n c e ,
Britain would help to protect t h e m against any invasion from a b r o a d .
At the A g e n c y , C h e e t h a m a n d S t o r r s were r e s p o n s i b l e for s u p e r vising the translation of this m e s s a g e into A r a b i c . A p p a r e n t l y with
the e n c o u r a g e m e n t of C l a y t o n , they b r o a d e n e d its l a n g u a g e to p l e d g e
British s u p p o r t for "the e m a n c i p a t i o n of the A r a b s . " T h i s went far
in the direction pointed out by R e g i n a l d Wingate. Wingate believed
in stirring up the tribes of A r a b i a on Britain's behalf. U n l i k e
K i t c h e n e r , who p r o p o s e d to deal with A r a b i a at the end of the war,
the impatient Wingate u r g e d i m m e d i a t e action at the b e g i n n i n g of
the war. H i s goal was to lure the A r a b s away from the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e a n d as early as 14 J a n u a r y 1915 he wrote to C l a y t o n that "I
fear British action has been so long delayed that it is doubtful if we
shall now s u c c e e d i n detaching the A r a b s . . . " H i s familiar c o m plaint was that his s u p e r i o r s h a d not heeded his advice in t i m e .
1 3
1 4
As the K i t c h e n e r m e s s a g e w a s b e i n g sent out in A r a b i c translation,
the e m i g r e g r o u p s with which C l a y t o n kept in contact in C a i r o s e e m
to have told him that A r a b s in the H e j a z would be s u s p i c i o u s of
British intentions, a n d that s o m e sort of clarification of what was
b e i n g p r o m i s e d w o u l d be in o r d e r . K i t c h e n e r , with G r e y ' s a p p r o v a l ,
immediately authorized the A g e n c y to issue a further statement.
A g a i n the A g e n c y went b e y o n d its instructions, a n d i s s u e d proclam a t i o n s directed not merely to A r a b i a , but to practically all of
A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g A s i a ("Palestine, S y r i a a n d M e s o p o t a m i a " ) , p r o m i s ing that if their inhabitants threw off the T u r k s , Britain would
recognize a n d g u a r a n t e e their i n d e p e n d e n c e .
15
A l t h o u g h the A g e n c y exceeded its instructions in m a k i n g this
public offer, the p l e d g e itself was a reasonable one. Britain h a d not
yet m a d e any conflicting c o m m i t m e n t to the Allied Powers r e g a r d i n g
the future of A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g A s i a . If the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g provinces,
in defiance of all the probabilities, h a d struck a m a j o r blow for the
Allied c a u s e by s e c e d i n g from the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d by successfully
winning their f r e e d o m by their own exertions, there was no reason
why Britain s h o u l d not have g u a r a n t e e d help in protecting their
future i n d e p e n d e n c e . It would have been in Britain's national interest,
with respect b o t h to w a r t i m e a n d to postwar rivalries, to do s o .
It was rather the m e s s a g e that K i t c h e n e r had authorized that was
troubling, for—reflecting his belief that A r a b i a was important not for
the role it c o u l d play in the war b u t for the role it could play after the
w a r — h e h a d closed his m e s s a g e to M e c c a with his b o m b s h e l l : "It
104
KITCHENER
OF
KHARTOUM
LOOKS
AHEAD
m a y be that an A r a b of true race will a s s u m e the K h a l i f a t e at M e c c a
or M e d i n a , a n d so g o o d m a y c o m e by the help of G o d out of all the
evil that is now o c c u r r i n g . " R e s t o r i n g the caliphate to A r a b i a ,
where it a n d M o h a m m e d were b o r n thirteen centuries before, was
K i t c h e n e r ' s strategy for p r e p a r i n g for the rivalry with R u s s i a which
was b o u n d to follow the conclusion of the war against G e r m a n y . B u t
A r a b i a n s , living within the political confines of their own peninsula,
were not likely to u n d e r s t a n d what he h a d in m i n d . T h e y would not
know that at the outset of one great conflict between E u r o p e a n
p o w e r s he was already thinking a h e a d to the next. T h e y would be
even less likely to recognize that K i t c h e n e r , Wingate, C l a y t o n , a n d
S t o r r s did not u n d e r s t a n d the nature of the caliphate.
16
S c h o l a r s have been kept b u s y ever since explaining to western
s t u d e n t s of the M i d d l e E a s t that the split between t e m p o r a l a n d
spiritual authority, that in medieval E u r o p e pitted p o p e against e m peror, d i d not o c c u r in the world of I s l a m . K i t c h e n e r , Wingate,
C l a y t o n , a n d S t o r r s were mistaken in believing that the C a l i p h could
be a spiritual leader only. In I s l a m , all of life, including g o v e r n m e n t
a n d politics, falls within the g o v e r n a n c e of the H o l y L a w ; so that in
the eyes of S u n n i M o s l e m s , s u c h as the O t t o m a n S u l t a n a n d the
E m i r of M e c c a , the d o m i n i o n of the C a l i p h as u p h o l d e r of the H o l y
L a w is p e r v a s i v e . What B r i t i s h C a i r o d i d not see is that the C a l i p h is
also a p r i n c e : a governor a n d a leader in battle as well as a leader in
prayer.
K i t c h e n e r ' s followers, for all their s u p p o s e d knowledge of the
I s l a m i c world, m i s s e d the i m p o r t a n c e of another point: they ignored
the extent of I s l a m i c disunity a n d f r a g m e n t a t i o n . T h u s the K i t c h e n e r
plan called for I b n S a u d , leader of the fierce puritanical Wahhabi
sect, to recognize the spiritual authority of the S u n n i ruler of M e c c a ;
b u t that was not a realistic possibility, for like so m a n y of the d o z e n s
of c o n t e n d i n g sects into which I s l a m is divided, theirs were at
daggers drawn.
T h e p r o p o s a l which K i t c h e n e r a n d his followers sent off to M e c c a
misled its recipient, who read it as an offer to make him ruler of a
vast k i n g d o m ; for that, of c o u r s e , is what the new C a l i p h of I s l a m
would have been. As will be seen, when the ruler of M e c c a o p e n e d
the di s c u s s i o n of what the b o u n d a r i e s of his new k i n g d o m were to
b e , S t o r r s w a s a p p a l l e d ; for he a n d K i t c h e n e r had not intended that
the area ruled by the E m i r s h o u l d be e x p a n d e d . In the s u m m e r of
1915, S t o r r s wrote to F i t z G e r a l d / K i t c h e n e r that if the ruler of M e c c a
could conciliate the other ruling e m i r s a n d chieftains of the A r a b i a n
peninsula, a n d i m p r e s s u p o n t h e m that "he has no idea of p r e t e n d i n g
to any temporal rights within their territories, his chances of a
g e n e r a l — t h o u g h hardly yet of a universal—recognition as C a l i p h will
be good."
1 7
KITCHENER
SETS
OUT
TO
CAPTURE
ISLAM
105
T h e British intended to s u p p o r t the c a n d i d a c y of H u s s e i n for the
position of "Pope" of I s l a m — a position that ( u n b e k n o w n to t h e m )
did not exist; while ( u n b e k n o w n to t h e m too) the l a n g u a g e they u s e d
e n c o u r a g e d him to a t t e m p t to b e c o m e ruler of the entire A r a b
w o r l d — t h o u g h in fact S t o r r s believed that it w a s a mistake for
H u s s e i n to aim at e x t e n d i n g his rule at all. K i t c h e n e r a n d his lieutenants would have been astonished to learn what their c o m m u n i c a t i o n
signified to M o s l e m s in A r a b i a .
11
INDIA P R O T E S T S
i
A r t h u r Hirtzel, S e c r e t a r y to the Political D e p a r t m e n t of the I n d i a
Office, w a s not shown the K i t c h e n e r m e s s a g e s to H u s s e i n until 12
D e c e m b e r 1914—after they h a d reached M e c c a . He was a g h a s t .
Hirtzel quickly criticized "a very d a n g e r o u s c o r r e s p o n d e n c e " which,
in hinting at an A r a b caliphate, "does the very thing which this
Office has always u n d e r s t o o d that H . M . G . would not d o . " T h e
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a , L o r d C r e w e , privately told the Viceroy
that K i t c h e n e r refused to see that the spiritual prestige of the existing
C a l i p h — t h e T u r k i s h S u l t a n — r e m a i n e d intact, and that M o s l e m s in
I n d i a , who held h i m in high r e g a r d , even if they accepted his being
replaced would never accept his b e i n g replaced as a result of foreign
meddling.
1
2
W h e n h e saw K i t c h e n e r ' s p l e d g e t o protect A r a b i a n i n d e p e n d e n c e ,
H i r t z e l p r o t e s t e d that it w a s "a startling d o c u m e n t , " "a g u a r a n t e e
given . . . i n writing w i t h o u t the a u t h o r i t y o f H . M . G . " H i r t z e l ' s
protest was b u t t r e s s e d by an earlier m e m o r a n d u m from the F o r e i g n
D e p a r t m e n t of the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a , forwarded to the I n d i a
Office with s u p p o r t from the g o v e r n o r s of A d e n , B o m b a y , a n d
elsewhere, which explained that, "What we want is not a U n i t e d
A r a b i a : but a weak a n d disunited A r a b i a , split up into little principalities so far as possible u n d e r o u r s u z e r a i n t y — b u t i n c a p a b l e of
coordinated action against u s , f o r m i n g a buffer against the P o w e r s in
the W e s t . " T h i s m i s u n d e r s t o o d British Cairo's intentions: as Clayton
later wrote to Wingate, " I n d i a s e e m s o b s e s s e d with the fear of a
powerful a n d united A r a b state, which can never exist unless we are
fool e n o u g h to create it."
3
4
5
A t t e m p t i n g to soothe feelings in the India Office and in the
G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a , L o r d C r e w e explained that there had been no
prior consultation a b o u t the K i t c h e n e r pledge b e c a u s e "this was a
private c o m m u n i c a t i o n of L o r d K i t c h e n e r ' s " rather than an official
106
107
INDIA PROTESTS
6
c o m m u n i c a t i o n f r o m H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t . B u t the j u r i s d i c tional d i s p u t e that h a d flared up w a s not extinguished by s u c h
a s s u r a n c e s ; it flamed on heatedly t h r o u g h o u t the war a n d afterward.
II
India's institutional outlook w a s that of a b e l e a g u e r e d g a r r i s o n s p r e a d
too thin along an o v e r e x t e n d e d line. H e r instinct w a s to avoid new
involvements. H e r strategy for the M i d d l e E a s t w a s to hold the bare
m i n i m u m — t h e coastline of the G u l f , to keep o p e n the sea r o a d to
a n d f r o m B r i t a i n — a n d t o refuse t o b e d r a w n inland.
N o n e t h e l e s s the u n w a n t e d war against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e o p e n e d
u p the possibility o f a n n e x i n g n e a r b y B a s r a a n d B a g h d a d . Colonization a n d e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t of these provinces w o u l d b r i n g
great riches, it w a s believed; a n d the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a w a s
t e m p t e d , even t h o u g h in the p a s t its officials h a d often w a r n e d
against a s s u m i n g further territorial responsibilities. Whatever she
did, British I n d i a w a s d e t e r m i n e d to identify her interests with those
o f her s u b j e c t s , m a n y o f w h o m were M o s l e m ; a n d L o r d K i t c h e n e r ' s
I s l a m i c policy p o s e d a threat to this vital interest.
K i t c h e n e r ' s initiatives also i n t r u d e d into a foreign policy s p h e r e in
which the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a jealously g u a r d e d its rights against
c o m p e t i t o r s within the British g o v e r n m e n t . T h e F o r e i g n D e p a r t m e n t
of the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a exercised responsibility for relations
with s u c h n e i g h b o r i n g areas a s T i b e t , A f g h a n i s t a n , Persia, a n d
eastern A r a b i a ; a n d the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a also a d m i n i s t e r e d
Britain's protectorate over A d e n a n d the G u l f s h e i k h d o m s t h r o u g h a
network of g o v e r n o r s a n d resident a g e n t s . T h u s when K i t c h e n e r
entered into d i s c u s s i o n s with the ruler of M e c c a , he intervened in an
area of I n d i a n concern a n d activity.
T h o u g h the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a h a d long followed a policy of
holding the coastal p o r t s along the Persian G u l f sea route to S u e z , it
had avoided involvement in the politics of the interior. E v e n s o ,
C a p t a i n William H e n r y S h a k e s p e a r , an officer in the I n d i a n Political
S e r v i c e , h a d , as Political A g e n t in K u w a i t , entered into relations of
political a n d personal friendship with A b d u l Aziz I b n S a u d , a n
emir and a rising p o w e r in central A r a b i a , in the years immediately
p r e c e d i n g the o u t b r e a k o f w a r . L i k e A b d u l l a h i n C a i r o , I b n S a u d
h a d e x p r e s s e d a willingness for his d o m a i n to b e c o m e a British client
s t a t e ; a n d like K i t c h e n e r a n d S t o r r s , S h a k e s p e a r w a s obliged to
indicate that his g o v e r n m e n t w a s unwilling to interfere in m a t t e r s of
purely d o m e s t i c O t t o m a n concern. T h i s w a s even m o r e t r u e at the
time b e c a u s e the F o r e i g n Office b a c k e d the p r o - T u r k i s h H o u s e of
7
108
K I T C H E N E R OF KHARTOUM LOOKS AHEAD
R a s h i d , the p a r a m o u n t rulers of central A r a b i a a n d the H o u s e of
S a u d ' s hereditary e n e m y . B u t with the o u t b r e a k of war, I n d i a was
free to b a c k her p r o t e g e I b n S a u d , only to find C a i r o b a c k i n g a rival
in M e c c a .
C a i r o , in turn, found its own projects thwarted by I n d i a . In
N o v e m b e r 1914, the m o n t h that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e entered the
war, C a i r o p r o p o s e d (with the a p p r o v a l of Sir E d w a r d G r e y ) to s e n d
M a j o r a l - M a s r i on an expedition to organize agitation a n d p e r h a p s
revolution in M e s o p o t a m i a . E v e r fearful of igniting a conflagration
that c o u l d blaze out of control, I n d i a blocked the p r o p o s a l .
I n d i a believed that if the A r a b s ever were to turn against the
T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t , I b n S a u d s h o u l d lead this revolt; b u t a s o f
D e c e m b e r 1914, the Viceroy a r g u e d that action along these lines
would be p r e m a t u r e . T a k i n g a contrary view, K i t c h e n e r a n d his
followers in C a i r o a n d K h a r t o u m looked to Sherif H u s s e i n as Britain's
important A r a b i a n ally, a n d i s s u e d p r o c l a m a t i o n s u r g i n g A r a b s t o
revolt. A p a r t f r o m this difference in overall strategy, S i m l a , on the
b a s i s of prewar dealings, was aware of others in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g
world who might be alienated by British s u p p o r t for the E m i r of
Mecca's pretensions. T h e r e w a s S h e i k h M u b a r a k of K u w a i t , long a
friend of B r i t a i n ; there was the friendly ruler of the Persian port of
M u h a m m a r a ; there was even S a y y i d T a l i b , the m a g n a t e o f B a s r a ,
"dangerous scoundrel" t h o u g h Hirtzel believed him to b e . A F o r e i g n
Office official, in warning of r e p e r c u s s i o n s in A r a b i a , noted that the
E m i r o f Mecca's two enemies t h e r e — I b n S a u d a n d S e y y i d
M o h a m m e d a l - I d r i s i , the ruler of A s i r — w e r e , in his view, Britain's
friends.
8
9
10
I n d i a n officials m a d e the point that Cairo's policies were reckless;
worse, they w o u l d not work. Britain's s p o n s o r s h i p of an A r a b caliphate would not only adversely affect M o s l e m opinion in I n d i a ( a n d
M o s l e m opinion in I n d i a was, f r o m the British point of view, what
the caliphate issue was principally a b o u t ) ; it would also do no g o o d
in the A r a b world. Percy C o x , of the Indian Political S e r v i c e , reported in D e c e m b e r 1915 that he h a d held meetings with the S h e i k h
of K u w a i t a n d I b n S a u d , a n d that he had f o u n d the caliphate
question to be of no interest to t h e m . I b n S a u d said that a m o n g the
A r a b i a n chiefs "no one cared in the least who called himself C a l i p h , "
a n d claimed that his W a h h a b i sect did not recognize any caliphs after
the first four (the last of w h o m h a d died m o r e than a t h o u s a n d years
before).
1 1
* "Simla" is often used to mean the Government of India, whose summer capital
it was.
109
INDIA PROTESTS
III
O d d l y , n o b o d y in L o n d o n or in S i m l a s e e m s to have d r a w n the
a p p r o p r i a t e conclusion f r o m art e p i s o d e at the end of 1914 that
showed the power of the C a l i p h h a d been put to the test a n d had
been shown to be illusory.
In N o v e m b e r 1914, u p o n entering the F i r s t World War, the S u l t a n /
C a l i p h p r o c l a i m e d a jihad, or H o l y War, against Britain, a m i d s t
well-planned d e m o n s t r a t i o n s in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e r e were c r o w d s ,
b a n d s , a n d s p e e c h e s . T h e W i l h e m s t r a s s e o r d e r e d copies o f the proclamation to be forwarded immediately to Berlin for translation into
"Arabic a n d I n d i a n " (sic) for leaflet p r o p a g a n d a a m o n g M o s l e m
t r o o p s i n e n e m y a r m i e s . T h e staff o f the G e r m a n F o r e i g n Ministry
predicted that the S u l t a n ' s actions w o u l d "awaken the fanaticism of
I s l a m " a n d m i g h t lead to a large-scale revolution in I n d i a .
1 2
1 3
T h e G e r m a n military attache in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e believed that the
proclamation w o u l d influence M o s l e m soldiers in the British a n d
F r e n c h a r m i e s not to fire on G e r m a n t r o o p s . However, the skeptical
G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r p r o v e d a better p r o p h e t : he wrote in a private
letter that the p r o c l a m a t i o n would "coax only a few M o s l e m s " to
c o m e over to the side of the Central P o w e r s . He was right. The jihad
p r o v e d to b e , in a coinage of the F i r s t World War, a " d u d " : a shell
that was fired, b u t failed to explode.*
1 4
E n t h u s i a s m for a Holy War was low, even in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e
jihad was p r o c l a i m e d , b u t nothing h a p p e n e d . T h e British, however,
continued to be wary a n d feared that any jolt might c a u s e the unexp l o d e d shell s u d d e n l y to go off. In O c t o b e r 1915 G i l b e r t C l a y t o n
wrote a m e m o r a n d u m a r g u i n g that although the jihad until then had
been a failure, it still m i g h t c o m e a l i v e . A c c o r d i n g to L o r d C r e w e ,
Secretary of S t a t e for I n d i a , the only reason it had not worked was
b e c a u s e the Porte did not control the Holy Places of the H e j a z : "If
the C o m m i t t e e of U n i o n a n d P r o g r e s s get control of M e c c a , they
might be able to declare a regular J e h a d [sic], p r o b a b l y affecting
Afghanistan, a n d g i v i n g serious t r o u b l e in I n d i a . "
15
1 6
Meanwhile Wingate, Clayton, a n d S t o r r s were actively p u r s u i n g
the K i t c h e n e r plan that called for an association in the postwar world
with A r a b i a a n d with a n A r a b i a n religious p r i m a t e . T h e cautious
Clayton w a r n e d that the A r a b caliphate was a delicate matter a n d
should b e p r o p o s e d b y A r a b s t h e m s e l v e s ; but Wingate, a s always
impatient to m o v e forward, a s s u r e d F i t z G e r a l d / K i t c h e n e r that "We
shall do what we can to p u s h the A r a b m o v e m e n t & I have got
various irons in the fire in this c o n n e c t i o n . "
17
18
* Troubles caused by groups such as the nomadic Senussi on Egypt's Libyan
frontier were minor, and might well have occurred in any event.
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K I T C H E N E R OF
KHARTOUM
LOOKS
AHEAD
B u t the I n d i a Office continued to fear that, as a result of these
activities, M e c c a would be d r a w n into the vortex of world p o l i t i c s — a n
eventuality that might d i s t u r b opinion in I n d i a at a time when any
d i s t u r b a n c e could prove fatal. D u r i n g the c o u r s e of the war, S i m l a
was g o i n g to s e n d m a n y of its E u r o p e a n soldiers to E u r o p e , a n d large
n u m b e r s of I n d i a n t r o o p s as well. F o r the duration of the war it was
in a weak position to quell whatever u p r i s i n g s m i g h t occur. C a i r o
a n d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e both s e e m e d to S i m l a to be p u r s u i n g policies
that threatened to inflame M o s l e m p a s s i o n s in I n d i a a n d t h u s to
imperil the I n d i a n E m p i r e .
As the war p r o g r e s s e d , British officials who ruled I n d i a increasingly
c a m e to believe that their m o s t d a n g e r o u s adversaries were neither
the T u r k s nor the G e r m a n s , b u t the British officials g o v e r n i n g
E g y p t ; for despite India's p r o t e s t s , B r i t i s h C a i r o went a h e a d with its
intrigues in M e c c a .
12
T H E MAN IN T H E M I D D L E
i
M e c c a , where M o h a m m e d was b o r n , a n d M e d i n a , t o which h e
e m i g r a t e d , are the holy cities that for M o s l e m s everywhere give
u n i q u e i m p o r t a n c e to the m o u n t a i n o u s H e j a z , the long a n d narrow
western section of the A r a b i a n p e n i n s u l a b o r d e r i n g the R e d S e a .
H e j a z m e a n s " s e p a r a t i n g " — a reference to the highlands that divide it
f r o m the plateau to the east. In the early twentieth century A r a b i a
was an e m p t y a n d desolate land, a n d the H e j a z , in the w o r d s of the
1910 Encyclopaedia Britannica, w a s "physically the m o s t desolate
and uninviting province in A r a b i a . " Whole sections of it were u n watered a n d u n i n h a b i t e d wilderness. A b o u t 750 miles long a n d , at its
widest, a b o u t 200 miles a c r o s s , the H e j a z precariously s u p p o r t e d a
population estimated at 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 , half-Bedouin a n d half-townsmen.
A l t h o u g h it f o r m e d part of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , its distance f r o m
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , magnified by the primitive state of transportation
a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , h a d always lent it considerable a u t o n o m y .
D a t e s , of which a h u n d r e d varieties were said to grow, were the
staple c r o p ; but the real industry of the province was the annual
p i l g r i m a g e . A b o u t 7 0 , 0 0 0 p i l g r i m s m a d e the journey t o M e c c a each
year. Protecting the p i l g r i m s from m a r a u d i n g B e d o u i n tribes was a
principal function of the local representative of the O t t o m a n government ; a n d the authorities m a d e a practice of offering s u b s i d i e s to the
tribes in the hope of p e r s u a d i n g t h e m that there was better pay in
s a f e g u a r d i n g than in molesting the visitors.
M e c c a was a two-day camel j o u r n e y , or a b o u t forty-five miles,
f r o m the nearest coastal p o r t . It lay in a hot a n d b a r r e n valley, a n d
controlled the p a s s a g e s t h r o u g h the s u r r o u n d i n g hills. Its population
was estimated at 6 0 , 0 0 0 . E n t r a n c e into its precincts was prohibited
to n o n - M o s l e m s , a n d exercised the powerful lure of the f o r b i d d e n .
Only a few E u r o p e a n travelers had s u c c e e d e d in penetrating the city
in d i s g u i s e a n d b r i n g i n g back detailed descriptions of it.
Ill
112
KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM LOOKS AHEAD
T h e s e E u r o p e a n s reported that even in the holy city certain dark
practices lingered from a primitive p a s t . A c c o r d i n g to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, " T h e u n s p e a k a b l e vices of M e c c a are a scandal to
all I s l a m , a n d a constant s o u r c e of wonder to pious p i l g r i m s . T h e
slave trade has connexions with the p i l g r i m a g e which are not
thoroughly clear; b u t u n d e r cover of the p i l g r i m a g e a great deal of
importation a n d exportation of slaves g o e s on."
Y e t E u r o p e a n travelers also r e p o r t e d that the people of the H e j a z ,
and indeed of all A r a b i a , were a m o n g nature's aristocrats. A c c o r d i n g
to the Britannica:
Physically the A r a b s are one of the strongest a n d noblest races
of the world . .. T h u s , physically, they yield to few races, if
any, of m a n k i n d ; mentally, they s u r p a s s m o s t , a n d are only
kept b a c k in the m a r c h of p r o g r e s s by the r e m a r k a b l e defect of
organizing power and incapacity for c o m b i n e d action. L a x a n d
imperfect as are their f o r m s of g o v e r n m e n t , it is with impatience
that even these are b o r n e . . .
T h e j o b of the E m i r of M e c c a , if the Britannica was to be believed,
was not an easy one.
F o r M o s l e m s , M e c c a had always been the center of the world. N o w ,
the a m b i t i o n s of K i t c h e n e r ' s C a i r o a n d of the C . U . P . ' s C o n s t a n t i n o p l e
b r o u g h t the arid H e j a z into the center of twentieth-century politics.
T h e new attentions that M e c c a received in the 1914 war b r o u g h t it
into the center in other ways, less welcome to its E m i r ; he found
himself caught in the m i d d l e .
H u s s e i n ibn Ali, who ruled the H e j a z on behalf of the O t t o m a n
S u l t a n , was styled the Sherif of M e c c a a n d its E m i r . To be a sherif,
or notable, was to be a d e s c e n d a n t of M o h a m m e d ; a n d H u s s e i n , like
M o h a m m e d himself, was a m e m b e r of the H o u s e of H a s h e m . F o r
s o m e time it had been the practice of the O t t o m a n regime to appoint
the E m i r of M e c c a from a m o n g rival sherifs. In 1908 H u s s e i n , of the
D h a w u - ' A w n clan, was personally selected by the S u l t a n , over the
opposition of the C . U . P . , which backed the candidate of a rival clan.
H u s s e i n , like his courtly friend the G r a n d Vizier and like the
S u l t a n himself, w a s a m a n of old-fashioned b r e e d i n g a n d learning
whose style of expression was ornate. Of m e d i u m height, with a
white b e a r d , a n d a b o u t sixty years of a g e in 1914, he had spent
m u c h of his life in glorified captivity at the court in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e .
T h e r e , even the p r y i n g eyes of enemies were unable to detect him in
any i m p r o p e r c o n d u c t ; he spent his time in meditation.
H u s s e i n continually e x p r e s s e d s t r o n g personal loyalty to the S u l t a n .
T h e S u l t a n , however, was a figurehead. Real power at the Porte was
Hussein referred to himself and his family as "Hashemites."
T H E MAN
IN THE MIDDLE
113
wielded by the Y o u n g T u r k s , new m e n without family b a c k g r o u n d ,
with w h o m he was out of s y m p a t h y . T h o u g h loyal to the S u l t a n , he
found himself increasingly at o d d s with the Sultan's g o v e r n m e n t ,
a n d in particular with its policy of centralization.
Hussein's a m b i t i o n was to m a k e his position as E m i r s e c u r e for
himself a n d , in perpetuity, for his family. He strove to increase his
independence, while the centralizing C . U . P . g o v e r n m e n t c o n s p i r e d
to decrease it. T h e g o v e r n m e n t p u s h e d forward with construction of
the H e j a z railroad, a i m e d , a m o n g other things, at curtailing the
E m i r ' s a u t o n o m y . T h e railroad already ran from D a m a s c u s , capital
of what is now S y r i a , to M e d i n a in the H e j a z . What the g o v e r n m e n t
p r o p o s e d was to extend the line to M e c c a and to the port of J e d d a h .
T h i s was a threat to the c a m e l - o w n i n g B e d o u i n tribes of the H e j a z
and to their lucrative control of the pilgrim routes to the Holy
Places. U s i n g the railroad and also the t e l e g r a p h , the C . U . P . threatened to exercise direct rule over M e d i n a , M e c c a , and the rest of the
H e j a z . If carried into effect, the T u r k i s h government's plan would
make H u s s e i n into a m e r e s u b o r d i n a t e functionary. H u s s e i n res p o n d e d by inspiring civil d i s t u r b a n c e s .
F o r H u s s e i n , who h a d b e g u n his administration of affairs by u s i n g
T u r k i s h t r o o p s against the A r a b i a n tribes, this represented a c h a n g e
in policy, b u t not a c h a n g e in allegiance. He remained in the a m b i g u ous position of s u p p o r t i n g the O t t o m a n E m p i r e while o p p o s i n g its
government.
In the years just before the b e g i n n i n g of the E u r o p e a n war, the
secret societies in D a m a s c u s a n d the various rival lords of A r a b i a
were in frequent touch with one another; they explored the possibility
of uniting against the Y o u n g T u r k s in s u p p o r t of greater rights for
the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g half of the e m p i r e . At one time or another most
of the principal A r a b i a n chiefs were involved in s u c h conversations.
In 1911, the A r a b d e p u t i e s in the O t t o m a n Parliament asked H u s s e i n
to lead the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p e o p l e s in throwing off the T u r k i s h
yoke; he r e f u s e d . A year later the secret societies s e e m to have
a p p r o a c h e d his rivals, b u t not H u s s e i n . By 1913 A r a b nationalists
apparently r e g a r d e d him as "a tool in the hands of the T u r k s for
striking the A r a b s . " Y e t the T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t also strongly distrusted him, a n d e x p l o r e d the possibility of d e p o s i n g h i m .
1
T w o of H u s s e i n ' s sons were active politically. A b d u l l a h , his
favorite, was a d e p u t y from M e c c a in the O t t o m a n Parliament,
while Feisal was a d e p u t y from J e d d a h . A b d u l l a h counselled his
father to resist the g o v e r n m e n t ; he believed that with the s u p p o r t of
the secret societies a n d of Britain it could be d o n e . F e i s a l advised
against o p p o s i n g the g o v e r n m e n t . A b d u l l a h , a short, heavy-set, astute
man with a politician's conciliating manner, was for b o l d n e s s . Feisal,
tall, quick, a n d n e r v o u s , was for caution.
114
KITCHENER
OF
KHARTOUM
LOOKS
AHEAD
H u s s e i n , who h a d played off his enemies against one another for
years, was inclined to t e m p o r i z e a n d delay. With each year in office
as E m i r he had increased his prestige and his m a s t e r y over the
c o m p l e x web of personal, family, a n d tribal relationships that m a d e
for authority in the H e j a z . He h a d r e d u c e d the political influence of
the local C . U . P . l o d g e s in M e c c a a n d M e d i n a . H i s p r i m a c y within
his own emirate was established firmly.
In 1913 a n d 1914, however, he found himself s u r r o u n d e d by
external enemies. T h e r e were his neighbors a n d traditional rivals,
the A r a b i a n lords to his south a n d east, w h o m he h a d threatened a n d
who threatened him. T h e r e were the A r a b nationalists, s o m e of
w h o m r e g a r d e d him as an essentially T u r k i s h official. T h e r e were
the British, whose navy could easily d o m i n a t e the long coastline of
the H e j a z once they went to war against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e — a n d
he knew that they w o u l d b e c o m e his enemies if he threw in his lot
with the e m p i r e . Finally, there was the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t which
threatened a s h o w d o w n on the issue of the E m i r ' s a u t o n o m y .
N o w , for the duration of the war, the C . U . P . p o s t p o n e d completion
of the railroad a n d the a d o p t i o n of its new governmental regulations,
as well as its secret plan to a p p o i n t a new emir in H u s s e i n ' s p l a c e .
B u t it o r d e r e d H u s s e i n to s u p p l y m a n p o w e r for the a r m y . H u s s e i n
a n d A b d u l l a h m a y well have s u s p e c t e d a C . U . P . p l o t : the m e n of the
H e j a z w o u l d be sent as soldiers to distant battlefields, while regular
T u r k i s h t r o o p s would be sent to take their place in g a r r i s o n i n g the
H e j a z , a n d would then seize control of it.
H u s s e i n a s s u r e d all his d a n g e r o u s neighbors that he would a c t in
a c c o r d a n c e with their w i s h e s — b u t p u t off d o i n g so until s o m e time
in the f u t u r e . He asked the advice of A b d u l Aziz I b n S a u d , his rival
a n d a powerful warlord to the east, as to whether or not he s h o u l d
associate M e c c a with the S u l t a n ' s call for a Holy War against Britain
a n d her allies; a n d he d i s c u s s e d with A r a b i c nationalist leaders from
D a m a s c u s the possibility of joint action against the Porte. In reply to
r e q u e s t s a n d d e m a n d s from the Porte, he asked for mo n e y to raise
t r o o p s a n d s u p p l i e s for the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , but continued to postp o n e s e n d i n g any contingents to the T u r k i s h a r m y .
He gave Kitchener's messages and promises a warm response. At
the s a m e t i m e — a t the e n d of 1 9 1 4 — w h e n D j e m a l P a s h a p r e p a r e d to
attack the British at the S u e z C a n a l , H u s s e i n wrote to him, p r o m i s i n g
to s e n d t r o o p s to join in the attack; while A b d u l l a h replied to S t o r r s
in British C a i r o that the H e j a z h a d d e c i d e d to side with Britain in the
war. A b d u l l a h explained, however, that this would have to be kept a
secret. F o r the m o m e n t , it was not p o s s i b l e for the E m i r to reveal his
intention of allying with Britain, nor could he take action. A c c o r d i n g
to A b d u l l a h a n d H u s s e i n , the time was not yet ripe.
THE
MAN
IN
THE
115
MIDDLE
II
S t o r r s w a s p l e a s e d that his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e h a d p l a c e d the R e s i d e n c y ,
the office of the British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r , on t e r m s of close
cordiality with M e c c a . O n 2 7 J a n u a r y 1915, h e wrote F i t z G e r a l d /
K i t c h e n e r that "I am still in very friendly a n d intimate contact with
the Sherif of M e c c a , a n d am firmly convinced that he is a m o r e
p a y i n g p r o p o s i t i o n for our care a n d attention than any purely local
Chieftain (however powerful in himself) who cannot enjoy the p r e s tige of receiving the annual h o m a g e of the representatives of I s l a m
t h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d . "
2
F o r the m o m e n t all that K i t c h e n e r a n d the R e s i d e n c y really asked
of H u s s e i n was neutrality. S i n c e H u s s e i n ' s desire was to avoid b e i n g
d r a w n into the perilous war, the two parties to the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e
were in a c c o r d . H u s s e i n d i d nothing to associate himself or M e c c a
with the p r o c l a m a t i o n of a H o l y War. F o r the R e s i d e n c y , the corres p o n d e n c e therefore h a d a c c o m p l i s h e d everything that could reasonably have been d e s i r e d . T h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r , S i r H e n r y
M c M a h o n , r e p o r t e d to K i t c h e n e r on 2 F e b r u a r y 1915, that "there is
no need for i m m e d i a t e action . . . as all that is necessary for the
m o m e n t , with the Sherif of M e c c a — h a d been d o n e . "
3
T h e War Minister w a s satisfied. H e did not share Wingate's belief
that a tribal revolt in A r a b i a could affect Britain's fortunes in the
war; he g a v e no sign of d i s a p p o i n t m e n t when H u s s e i n d i d not
p r o p o s e to lead s u c h a revolt. K i t c h e n e r believed that G e r m a n y was
the enemy that m a t t e r e d and that E u r o p e w a s the only battlefield
that c o u n t e d . H i s long-term plan to c a p t u r e the caliphate w a s d e signed for the p o s t w a r world. In his view, he a n d i t — a n d the M i d d l e
E a s t — c o u l d wait until the war w a s over.
PART III
BRITAIN IS DRAWN
INTO THE MIDDLE
EASTERN QUAGMIRE
13
T H E T U R K I S H COMMANDERS
A L M O S T L O S E T H E WAR
i
At the time of his a p p o i n t m e n t as War Minister, K i t c h e n e r did not
intend Britain to be d r a w n into any involvement in the M i d d l e E a s t
d u r i n g the war. When he started a l o n g the road that led to s u c h an
involvement, he was not aware that this was what he was d o i n g .
L a t e r , in 1915—16, when he found his country fully e n g a g e d in the
M i d d l e E a s t , he m u s t have w o n d e r e d how he had allowed such a
situation to c o m e a b o u t . F r o m the outset of the war, it had been his
unwavering doctrine to d i s r e g a r d the E a s t while focusing on the
western front.
K i t c h e n e r ' s opinion that T u r k e y a n d the M i d d l e E a s t c o u l d safely
be ignored for the duration of the E u r o p e a n conflict derived in part
from the a s s u m p t i o n that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e d i d not p o s e a significant military threat. T h i s was an a s s u m p t i o n that was widely
shared.
British officials viewed O t t o m a n military capability with c o n t e m p t ;
a n d the record of the first six m o n t h s of warfare in the E a s t confirmed
them in their view. F r o m O c t o b e r 1914, when the Goeben a n d
Breslau o p e n e d fire on the R u s s i a n coast, until F e b r u a r y 1915, when
an a v e n g i n g British fleet b e g a n its b o m b a r d m e n t of the straits of the
D a r d a n e l l e s a n d then s t e a m e d t o w a r d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , the O t t o m a n
a r m i e s b l u n d e r e d f r o m one defeat to another.
T h e S u p r e m e C o m m a n d e r o f the T u r k i s h a r m e d forces was E n v e r
P a s h a , who a week before the war b e g a n had p r o c l a i m e d himself
"vice-generalissimo." In theory this placed h i m s e c o n d only to the
figurehead S u l t a n . In practice it placed h i m second to none.
E n v e r h a d the qualities of a lone adventurer, not those of a
general. T h o u g h a u d a c i o u s a n d c u n n i n g , he was an incompetent
c o m m a n d e r . L i m a n von S a n d e r s , the P r u s s i a n a r m y adviser with
w h o m he frequently f o u n d himself at o d d s , r e g a r d e d E n v e r as a
buffoon in military m a t t e r s .
E n v e r , however, pictured himself as a leader of a wholly different
119
120
THE
M I D D L E
EASTERN
QUAGMIRE
character. He portrayed himself as an heir to the founders of the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e : the b a n d of ghazis—crusading warriors for the
Islamic faith—who in the fourteenth century had galloped f r o m the
obscurity of the Byzantine frontier onto the center stage of history.
At the outset of the war, he hastened to attack the R u s s i a n E m p i r e .
T h e r e was an obstacle in his p a t h : the forbidding C a u c a s u s mountain
r a n g e , which formed the land frontier between the two e m p i r e s .
Against the advice of L i m a n von S a n d e r s , he d e t e r m i n e d to launch
a frontal attack across that d a u n t i n g natural frontier, which the
R u s s i a n s , in secure p o s s e s s i o n of the high g r o u n d , had heavily fortified—and to do so in the d e p t h s of winter. He p r o p o s e d initially to
g r o u p his forces along an e n o r m o u s territory within T u r k e y , 600
miles long a n d 300 miles wide, t h r o u g h which there was no railroad
to t r a n s p o r t t r o o p s or s u p p l i e s . T h e few roads were steep a n d narrow.
T h e rivers could be c r o s s e d only by fording, the b r i d g e s having
collapsed long before a n d having never been repaired. B e c a u s e the
nearest railhead was over 600 miles away, every bullet, every shell,
had to be t r a n s p o r t e d by c a m e l — a journey of six weeks. M u c h of the
territory was without track or habitation, unexplored a n d uncharted.
L o n g winters a n d m o u n t a i n s n o w s t o r m s m a d e whole sections of it
u n p a s s a b l e m u c h of the year.
1
E n v e r ' s plan, as he explained it to L i m a n von S a n d e r s , was to
then m o v e out of this s t a g i n g area, cross the frontier into Czarist
territory, a n d attack the fortified R u s s i a n position on the C a u c a s u s
plateau by the sort of orchestrated m o v e m e n t pictured in military
textbooks, with s o m e c o l u m n s attacking directly, and others m o v i n g
out at an angle and then wheeling a b o u t to flank or encircle. He was
u n m o v e d by the reminder that, without railroads or other t r a n s p o r t ,
the strategic mobility r e q u i r e d for the military m o v e m e n t s that he
envisaged would be unavailable. He entertained no d o u b t s of his
s u c c e s s . H a v i n g c r u s h e d the R u s s i a n s , said E n v e r , he would then
m a r c h via Afghanistan to the c o n q u e s t of India.
On 6 D e c e m b e r 1914, E n v e r left Constantinople a n d on 21
D e c e m b e r took c o m m a n d of the O t t o m a n T h i r d A r m y . He led the
attack on the C a u c a s u s plateau in p e r s o n . T h e R u s s i a n s were terrified
and appealed to Britain to help s o m e h o w ; they had no idea they
faced a foe who was utterly inept.
E n v e r left his artillery behind b e c a u s e of the deep snow. H i s
troops were forced to bivouac in the bitter cold (as low as m i n u s
thirty degrees Fahrenheit without t e n t s ) . T h e y ran short of food. An
epidemic of t y p h u s broke out. With routes blocked by the winter
snows, they lost their way in the tangled mountain p a s s e s . Enver's
plan was for his forces to launch a coordinated s u r p r i s e attack on the
R u s s i a n b a s e called S a r i k a m i s h , which blocked the invasion highway;
THE TURKISH COMMANDERS
121
but, having lost touch with one another, the various T u r k i s h c o r p s
arrived at different times at S a r i k a m i s h to attack a n d to be destroyed
piecemeal.
T h e r e m n a n t s of what had once been an a r m y s t r a g g l e d b a c k into
eastern T u r k e y in J a n u a r y 1915. Of the p e r h a p s 100,000 m e n who
took part in the a t t a c k , 86 percent were lost. A G e r m a n officer
attached to the O t t o m a n G e n e r a l Staff d e s c r i b e d what h a p p e n e d to
the T h i r d A r m y by s a y i n g that it h a d "suffered a disaster which for
rapidity a n d c o m p l e t e n e s s is without parallel in military history."
Y e t even as he r o d e back f r o m the catastrophe in the northeast,
E n v e r o r d e r e d another ill-conceived offensive. In c o m m a n d was
D j e m a l P a s h a , the Minister of the M a r i n e . J e a l o u s of E n v e r , whose
prestige a n d power had b e g u n to o v e r s h a d o w those of the other
Y o u n g T u r k s , D j e m a l took the field as c o m m a n d e r of the O t t o m a n
F o u r t h A r m y , b a s e d in S y r i a a n d Palestine. On 15 J a n u a r y 1915, he
b e g a n his m a r c h toward E g y p t to launch a s u r p r i s e attack across the
Suez Canal.
2
3
A g a i n , the logistical p r o b l e m s were ignored. T h e r o a d s of S y r i a
and Palestine were so b a d that not even horse-drawn carts could
m o v e along m a n y of t h e m ; a n d the wastes of the 130-mile wide
Sinai desert were trackless. T h e O t t o m a n soldiery nonetheless perf o r m e d p r o d i g i e s of e n d u r a n c e a n d valor. S o m e h o w they t r a n s p o r t e d
themselves a n d their e q u i p m e n t f r o m S y r i a t o S u e z . K r e s s von
K r e s s e n s t e i n , a G e r m a n engineering officer, d u g wells along the
route, which enabled t h e m to survive the m a r c h through the desert.
T h e time of year, for once, was well c h o s e n : J a n u a r y is the best
m o n t h in E g y p t for avoiding the terrible heat.
4
B u t when the F o u r t h A r m y reached the b a n k s of the S u e z C a n a l ,
D j e m a l d i s c o v e r e d that m o s t of his t r o o p s could not use the b r i d g i n g
p o n t o o n s that were meant to t r a n s p o r t t h e m to the other side. T h e
G e r m a n engineers h a d b r o u g h t the p o n t o o n s from G e r m a n y , b u t the
troops had not been trained in their u s e . D j e m a l o r d e r e d the attack
to c o m m e n c e nonetheless. E a r l y in the m o r n i n g of 3 F e b r u a r y , while
the sky was still half-dark, it b e g a n . T h e British, from b e h i n d their
fortifications, awoke to discover an O t t o m a n a r m y on the o p p o s i t e
b a n k of the e n o r m o u s d i t c h ; a n d with their superior w e a p o n r y they
o p e n e d fire u p o n it. In the battle a n d the s u b s e q u e n t rout, 2 , 0 0 0
O t t o m a n t r o o p s — a b o u t 10 percent of D j e m a l ' s forces—were killed.
D j e m a l o r d e r e d a retreat; a n d kept on g o i n g all the way b a c k to
Syria.
5
T u r k i s h g e n e r a l s h i p b e c a m e a j o k e . A u b r e y H e r b e r t wrote from
S h e p h e a r d ' s Hotel in C a i r o to his friend M a r k S y k e s that the latest
O t t o m a n plan was "that the T u r k s are to b r i n g t h o u s a n d s of c a m e l s
down to the C a n a l a n d then set a light to their hair. T h e c a m e l ,
122
THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE
u s i n g its well known reasoning p o w e r s , will d a s h to the C a n a l to put
the fire out. When they have done this in sufficient quantities the
T u r k s will m a r c h over t h e m . "
I n L o n d o n the P r i m e Minister lightly d i s m i s s e d the O t t o m a n
invasion by saying that " T h e T u r k s have been trying to throw a
b r i d g e across the S u e z C a n a l & in that ingenious fashion to find a
way into E g y p t . T h e poor things & their w o u l d - b e b r i d g e were
blown into smithereens, and they have retired into the d e s e r t . "
6
7
II
E n v e r had a s s u m e d that the war w o u l d be short, a n d that it would
be decided in a few lightning c a m p a i g n s . He had neither a plan for a
war of attrition nor an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of what s u c h a war m i g h t
entail. He had no gift for organization, no head for logistics, a n d no
patience for administration. As War Minister he thoughtlessly led his
country into c h a o s .
He b e g a n by o r d e r i n g all eligible m e n throughout the imperial
d o m a i n s to report for induction into the a r m y immediately, b r i n g i n g
with t h e m enough food for three d a y s . When they reported as
o r d e r e d — w h i c h is to say, all at the s a m e time—their n u m b e r s
dwarfed the conscription offices, which could not deal with so m a n y
at once. H a v i n g flooded in from the countryside, the draftees ate up
their three d a y s ' s u p p l y of food a n d then had nothing to eat. S o o n
they b e g a n to drift away, labeled as deserters, afraid to return either
to the conscription offices or to their h o m e s .
B r i n g i n g in the m a n p o w e r f r o m the countryside ruined what w o u l d
have been the bountiful harvest of 1914. It set a terrible p a t t e r n :
t h r o u g h o u t the war, the draft of m e n a n d pack animals b r o u g h t
famine in g o o d years as well as b a d . D u r i n g the war years, the
s u p p l y of draft animals fell, horses to 40 percent and oxen a n d
buffaloes to 15 percent of what they had been. T h e shrinkage in
agricultural activity was equally d r a m a t i c : cereal acreage was cut
in half, a n d cotton fell to 8 percent of its prewar p r o d u c t i o n
level. Control of the scarce s u p p l i e s of food a n d other g o o d s b e c a m e
the key to wealth a n d power. In the sprawling metropolis of
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , a Chicago-style political b o s s with g a n g l a n d connections fought against E n v e r ' s G e n e r a l Director of the C o m m i s s a r i a t
for effective control of the e c o n o m y .
T h e transportation s y s t e m of the e m p i r e was also shattered by the
war. In the a b s e n c e of railroads a n d u s a b l e r o a d s , in the past g o o d s
had been mostly s h i p p e d by sea. N o w the empire's 5,000 miles of
coastline were u n d e r the g u n s of the Allied navies. In the north the
G e r m a n s a n d T u r k s pulled back the Goeben and Breslau for the
8
THE
TURKISH
COMMANDERS
123
defense of the D a r d a n e l l e s , a b a n d o n i n g the Black S e a to the newly
built battleships o f the R u s s i a n s . T h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n was d o m i n a t e d
by the F r e n c h a n d British navies. Allied s h i p s cut off the O t t o m a n
coal s u p p l y ; thereafter the e m p i r e d e p e n d e d for its fuel on the
m e a g r e s u p p l i e s that could b e b r o u g h t overland from G e r m a n y .
On the eve of war, there were only a b o u t 17,000 industrial workers
in an e m p i r e of 25 million p e o p l e ; for practical p u r p o s e s , the country
h a d no i n d u s t r y . All that it h a d was agriculture, which was now
ruined. By the e n d of the war, the export trade was down to a
q u a r t e r a n d the i m p o r t trade d o w n to a tenth of what they had been.
T h e Porte ran u p h u g e b u d g e t deficits d u r i n g the wartime years,
a n d helplessly ran p a p e r m o n e y off the printing p r e s s e s to pay for
t h e m . D u r i n g the war prices rose 1,675 percent.
Before long, the war h a d b r o u g h t the O t t o m a n e c o n o m y a l m o s t to
its knees; a n d the Y o u n g T u r k g o v e r n m e n t had no idea what to do
a b o u t it.
9
14
K I T C H E N E R ALLOWS BRITAIN
TO ATTACK TURKEY
i
T h e British g o v e r n m e n t , too, e n c o u n t e r e d u n e x p e c t e d p r o b l e m s with
which it h a d no idea how to deal. At the outset of war n o b o d y in
Britain h a d foreseen that the w a r r i n g a r m i e s w o u l d d i g trenches
across western E u r o p e . N o w that they had done s o , n o b o d y in
Britain had any idea of how to b r e a k t h r o u g h enemy lines.
As 1914 turned into 1915, the British C a b i n e t b e c a m e increasingly
u n h a p p y a b o u t the direction of the war. L o r d Kitchener's strategy of
concentrating all forces in western E u r o p e s e e m e d to offer no hope
of victory in the foreseeable f u t u r e . T h e wiliest politician in the
C a b i n e t — D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e — w a s c o n s p i c u o u s a m o n g those who
looked for a way out.
L l o y d G e o r g e , after A s q u i t h the m o s t powerful politician in the
L i b e r a l Party a n d in the C a b i n e t , was not one who willingly goes
down with a sinking s h i p . He was, a b o v e all, a s u r v i v o r : years later it
could be seen that he was the only B r i t i s h minister who s u c c e e d e d in
staying in the C a b i n e t from the o u t b r e a k of the F i r s t World War
until its e n d .
T h e glowing, d y n a m i c political wizard from Wales was the s u p r e m e
s t r a t e g i s t — o r , s o m e w o u l d say, o p p o r t u n i s t — o f his time. " T o L l o y d
G e o r g e no policy was p e r m a n e n t , no p l e d g e final," wrote one of his
c o n t e m p o r a r i e s ; the zig-zags in his policy forced him to seek s u p p o r t
first f r o m one g r o u p then from another, so that "He b e c a m e like a
trick rider at the circus, as he w a s c o m p e l l e d to leap from one b a c k to
another
H i s d e v i o u s n e s s was a b y w o r d , so that even an
admirer said that his truth w a s not a straight line but "more of a
c u r v e . " T h e way he himself p u t it was that, "I never believed in
costly frontal attacks either in war or politics, if there were a way
round."
No minister felt m o r e greatly frustrated than he did by the way
Allied c o m m a n d e r s were fighting the war in F r a n c e a n d F l a n d e r s :
hopeless direct assaults on entrenched enemy positions. E v e r y time
2
3
124
BRITAIN
TO
ATTACK
TURKEY
125
that he s o u g h t a way out or a way a r o u n d , he f o u n d the route
blocked either by the War Office on behalf of Britain's generals, or
by the F o r e i g n Office on behalf of Britain's allies.
F r o m the b e g i n n i n g , L l o y d G e o r g e looked for a solution in the
E a s t . He was a m o n g those who favored entering into Balkan alliances,
notably with G r e e c e , in order to defeat the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d to
turn the G e r m a n flank. Other C a b i n e t ministers a g r e e d . S o did
M a u r i c e H a n k e y , Secretary of the War C a b i n e t a n d m o s t influential
of the civil s e r v a n t s . Hankey's m e m o r a n d u m of 28 D e c e m b e r 1914,
p r o p o s i n g an assault on the D a r d a n e l l e s in collaboration with Balkan
allies, cogently outlined the a r g u m e n t s underlining the Cabinet's
belief that " G e r m a n y can p e r h a p s be struck m o s t effectively, a n d
with the m o s t lasting results on the p e a c e of the world through her
allies, a n d particularly through T u r k e y . "
4
T h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , S i r E d w a r d G r e y , blocked this a p p r o a c h .
It was G r e y , a c c o r d i n g to L l o y d G e o r g e ' s associates in the left wing
of the L i b e r a l Party, who had closed off Britain's alternative of
remaining neutral in the war; he h a d d o n e this, they c l a i m e d , by his
secret prewar a r r a n g e m e n t s with F r a n c e . ( T h e philosopher B e r t r a n d
Russell later w r o t e : "I h a d noticed d u r i n g previous years how c a r e fully S i r E d w a r d G r e y lied in order to prevent the p u b l i c from
knowing the m e t h o d s by which he w a s c o m m i t t i n g us to the s u p p o r t
of F r a n c e in the event of w a r . " ) N o w again it was G r e y , who h a d
entered into secret p r e w a r a r r a n g e m e n t s with R u s s i a r e g a r d i n g the
D a r d a n e l l e s , who a r g u e d that Allied claims to postwar territorial
gains p r e c l u d e d b r i n g i n g the Balkan states into the war. It was the
F o r e i g n Office's view not only that Bulgaria's rivalry with R u m a n i a
a n d G r e e c e rendered an alliance that included all three states unfeasible, but that G r e e k help in c a p t u r i n g C o n s t a n t i n o p l e was unacceptable b e c a u s e it w o u l d offend the R u s s i a n s .
6
Y e t it was a g r e e d by the A d m i r a l t y , the War Office, a n d "the
C a b i n e t alike that C o n s t a n t i n o p l e could not be c a p t u r e d by the Royal
N a v y alone. An a r m y , they a r g u e d , w a s needed as well. If the G r e e k
army or another B a l k a n a r m y were not to be allowed to help, then
the British a r m y w o u l d b e n e e d e d ; b u t L o r d K i t c h e n e r s u p p o r t e d
those Allied field c o m m a n d e r s who decreed that no t r o o p s s h o u l d be
diverted f r o m the trenches of the western front until the war in
E u r o p e was won.
Yet, notwithstanding
the field, nothing in the
to the leading m e m b e r s
war was b e i n g won or
the hopeful views of Allied c o m m a n d e r s in
first m o n t h s a n d years of the war s u g g e s t e d
of the C a b i n e t that on the western front the
even could be won. As early as 7 O c t o b e r
5
* T h e historical evidence now shows that this was not t r u e . But the left wing of
the Liberal Party continued to believe that it was.
126
THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE
1914, A s q u i t h noted that K i t c h e n e r "thinks it is not i m p r o b a b l e that
. . . the b i g o p p o s i n g a r m i e s m a y i n s o m e months' t i m e c o m e t o
s o m e t h i n g like s t a l e m a t e . " By the end of D e c e m b e r , Winston
Churchill (as he informed the P r i m e Minister) thought it "quite
p o s s i b l e that neither side will have the strength to penetrate the
other's lines in the Western theatre"; while, at the s a m e time, L l o y d
G e o r g e , in a m e m o r a n d u m to C a b i n e t colleagues, d i s m i s s e d the
p r o s p e c t s of a b r e a k t h r o u g h on the western front as an "impossibility."
History had seen nothing like the trench warfare that s p o n t a n e o u s l y
e m e r g e d in the a u t u m n of 1914; a n d K i t c h e n e r , t h o u g h he quickly
divined the p r o b l e m , a d m i t t e d that he saw no solution. T h e E n t e n t e
Powers a n d the Central Powers m a n n e d parallel lines of fortifications
that soon stretched all the way f r o m the Atlantic O c e a n to the A l p s .
E a c h side thus decisively b a r r e d the way to the other.
T r e n c h warfare b e g a n as an e n d u r a n c e contest a n d e n d e d as a
survival contest. Beneath the g r o u n d , in the p e r h a p s 3 5 , 0 0 0 miles of
trenches that they eventually d u g , the o p p o s i n g a r m i e s lived in
bloody s q u a l o r a n d s u b j e c t e d one another to p u n i s h i n g a n d almost
ceaseless artillery b a r r a g e s , p u n c t u a t e d by suicidally futile charges
against the other side's b a r b e d wire a n d machine g u n s . Alternately
executioners a n d executed, one side played the role of the firing
s q u a d whenever the other side launched one of its frequent attacks.
No g r o u n d was g a i n e d . It was a deadlock.
7
8
T h e civilian ministers turned for g u i d a n c e to the military oracle in
their m i d s t , but the oracle s o m e t i m e s was awkwardly silent a n d at
other times s p o k e a g i b b e r i s h that u n d e r m i n e d belief in his p o w e r s of
divination. In the C a b i n e t , unfortunately, F i t z G e r a l d was not available to s p e a k a n d listen for h i m . F i e l d M a r s h a l K i t c h e n e r always had
f o u n d it immensely difficult to explain his military views, even to
close colleagues; in the c o m p a n y of those w h o m he f e a r e d — s t r a n g e r s ,
civilians, politicians—he w a s s t r u c k d u m b . T o break the silence, h e
s o m e t i m e s launched into long d i s c o u r s e s on nonmilitary s u b j e c t s of
which he knew little or nothing. He s p o k e of Ireland to the Irish
leader, C a r s o n , and of Wales to L l o y d G e o r g e ; both m e n were
s u r p r i s e d to find him ignorant a n d foolish.
T h e r e was genius within h i m , b u t it manifested itself only on
occasion. Y e a r s after the war, having remarked that K i t c h e n e r "talked
t w a d d l e , " L l o y d G e o r g e took it back by a d d i n g :
N o ! He was like a great revolving lighthouse. S o m e t i m e s the
b e a m of his m i n d u s e d to shoot out, s h o w i n g one E u r o p e a n d
the a s s e m b l e d a r m i e s in a vast a n d illimitable perspective, till
one felt that one was looking along it into the heart of reality—
a n d then the shutter w o u l d turn a n d for weeks there w o u l d be
nothing b u t a blank d a r k n e s s .
9
BRITAIN
TO
ATTACK
TURKEY
127
K i t c h e n e r ' s failure to show t h e m a way out of the d e a d l o c k on the
western front led the country's civilian leaders to devise p l a n s of their
own. T h e plans r e s e m b l e d one another in p r o p o s i n g to swing a r o u n d
the fortified western front in order to attack from the north, the
south, or the east. T h e doctrine of the generals was to attack the
enemy at his strongest point; that of the politicians was to attack at
his weakest.
L l o y d G e o r g e ' s m i n d inclined t o w a r d collaboration with G r e e c e in
the vulnerable southeast of E u r o p e . Churchill, inspired by A d m i r a l
L o r d F i s h e r ( w h o m he had b r o u g h t b a c k f r o m retirement to serve as
F i r s t S e a L o r d ) , p r o p o s e d a landing in the northwest of E u r o p e , on
an island off G e r m a n y ' s Baltic S e a coast. M a u r i c e H a n k e y , however, carried all before him with his p e r s u a s i v e m e m o r a n d u m of 28
D e c e m b e r 1914.
Hankey p r o p o s e d that Britain s h o u l d m o v e three a r m y c o r p s to
participate with G r e e c e , B u l g a r i a , a n d R u m a n i a in an attack on
T u r k e y at the D a r d a n e l l e s that w o u l d lead to the occupation of
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d the s u b s e q u e n t defeat of G e r m a n y ' s two allies,
the O t t o m a n and H a b s b u r g e m p i r e s . T h e political p r o b l e m o f reconciling B u l g a r i a with G r e e c e a n d R u m a n i a , he pointed out, would
have to be o v e r c o m e ; b u t he believed that this could be done as a
result of Allied military participation in the c a m p a i g n a n d Allied
g u a r a n t e e s that all three states would receive a fair s h a r e of the spoils
of victory.
When shown the m e m o r a n d u m , Churchill c o m m e n t e d that he
himself had a d v o c a t e d an attack at the D a r d a n e l l e s two m o n t h s
earlier, but that K i t c h e n e r had refused to s u p p l y the needed m a n power; a n d that such an action w o u l d be m u c h m o r e difficult to
m o u n t in J a n u a r y than it would have been in N o v e m b e r . Churchill
continued to believe that the Baltic S e a project was a m o r e p r o m i s i n g
m o v e , but recognized that he a n d H a n k e y thought alike in e s p o u s i n g
s o m e sort of flanking attack.
Hankey's plan, however, was never put to the test. It foundered
on the usual s h o a l s : K i t c h e n e r ' s unwillingness to divert t r o o p s from
the west, a n d S i r E d w a r d G r e y ' s worry that a G r e e k m a r c h
on C o n s t a n t i n o p l e might be t r o u b l i n g to R u s s i a . G r e y was not hopeful of reconciling B u l g a r i a n claims with those of the other B a l k a n
states b u t , a b o v e all, what led h i m to o p p o s e a G r e e k attack at the
D a r d a n e l l e s was the fear that it m i g h t s u c c e e d ; for if the G r e e k s
were to c o n q u e r their old imperial capital, C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , the
B y z a n t i u m of their great d a y s , they would be unlikely to give it u p ;
while R u s s i a , rather than let any other country seize it, m i g h t well
(in G r e y ' s view) c h a n g e sides in the war.
T h e situation in A t h e n s was that the P r i m e Minister, Venizelos,
who at the outset of the world war h a d offered to enter into a war
128
THE
MIDDLE
EASTERN
QUAGMIRE
with T u r k e y , was still inclined to join the Allies, while his political a d v e r s a r y , the K a i s e r ' s brother-in-law, p r o - G e r m a n K i n g
C o n s t a n t i n e , acted to prevent him f r o m d o i n g so. I n s t e a d of throwing
its weight behind Venizelos, the British F o r e i g n Office, like K i n g
C o n s t a n t i n e , o p p o s e d G r e e k entry into the war.
In retrospect it s e e m s clear that if the G r e e k a r m y h a d m a r c h e d
on C o n s t a n t i n o p l e in early 1915, a l o n g s i d e the British navy, the
O t t o m a n capital w o u l d have been defenseless. T h e a n g u i s h of Winston
Churchill when this w a s not allowed to h a p p e n is evident in the
p h r a s e s of a letter that he wrote to G r e y in the winter of 1915 b u t
never sent:
I beseech you . . . Half-hearted m e a s u r e s will ruin a l l — & a
million m e n will die t h r o u g h the prolongation of the war . . .
[ N ] o i m p e d i m e n t m u s t be p l a c e d in the way of G r e e k
c o o p e r a t i o n — I am so afraid of your losing G r e e c e , & yet paying
all the future into R u s s i a n h a n d s . If R u s s i a prevents G r e e c e
helping, I will d o m y u t m o s t t o o p p o s e her having C p l e . . . P S
If you don't back up this G r e e c e — t h e G r e e c e of Venizelos—you
will have another who will cleave to G e r m a n y .
1 0
II
When 1915 b e g a n , L o r d K i t c h e n e r s u d d e n l y c h a n g e d his m i n d a n d
p r o p o s e d that Britain s h o u l d attack the D a r d a n e l l e s . T h e R u s s i a n
high c o m m a n d h a d urgently asked h i m to stage a diversionary attack
there, a n d he was fearful that if he did not c o m p l y R u s s i a might be
driven out of the w a r — w h i c h at that point would have been fatal for
Britain a n d F r a n c e , for it w o u l d have allowed the G e r m a n s to
concentrate all their forces in the west. K i t c h e n e r insisted, however,
that the attack h a d to be m o u n t e d by the Royal N a v y on its o w n : he
would m a k e no troops available. No m a t t e r ; civilian m e m b e r s of the
C a b i n e t leaped at the chance to e s c a p e f r o m the western front strategy
which they (unlike the Allied generals) r e g a r d e d as hopeless.
Enver's attack on the C a u c a s u s was responsible for the R u s s i a n
plea a n d hence for K i t c h e n e r ' s c h a n g e of m i n d . R u s s i a ' s cry for help
c a m e before her quick, easy, a n d decisive victory over Enver's T u r k s
in J a n u a r y 1915. L o g i c a l l y , after c r u s h i n g the O t t o m a n invaders
that m o n t h , the R u s s i a n s s h o u l d have told L o r d K i t c h e n e r that it
was no longer necessary for h i m to launch a diversionary attack on
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e — o r K i t c h e n e r s h o u l d have drawn that conclusion for
himself. I n s t e a d , t h r o u g h o u t J a n u a r y a n d F e b r u a r y , Britain's leaders
considered how best to attack C o n s t a n t i n o p l e in order to relieve
R u s s i a from a T u r k i s h threat that no longer existed.
BRITAIN
TO
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TURKEY
129
T h u s b e g a n the D a r d a n e l l e s c a m p a i g n , which was to so alter the
fortunes o f Churchill a n d K i t c h e n e r , A s q u i t h a n d L l o y d G e o r g e ,
Britain a n d the M i d d l e E a s t .
15
ON TO VICTORY AT T H E
DARDANELLES
i
When L o r d K i t c h e n e r p r o p o s e d that an expedition to the D a r d a n e l l e s
should be m o u n t e d by the Royal N a v y alone, Churchill's reply from
the A d m i r a l t y echoed what every informed p e r s o n in the military
and in g o v e r n m e n t s a i d : that the D a r d a n e l l e s could be forced only
by a c o m b i n e d operation in which the navy was joined by the a r m y .
A glance at the m a p w o u l d show why. T h e 38-mile-long straits are at
no point m o r e than 4 miles w i d e . W a r s h i p s a t t e m p t i n g to force their
p a s s a g e against the s t r o n g current w o u l d face lines of m i n e s in front
of t h e m a n d a crossfire of cannon b a r r a g e s from the E u r o p e a n a n d
A s i a n s h o r e s . T h i r t e e n miles after entering the waterway, s h i p s
reach the N a r r o w s , a m e r e 1,600 y a r d s a c r o s s , which can be d o m i nated by the g u n s of the forts on shore. Only if an attacking a r m y
took p o s s e s s i o n of the coastline could it silence the artillery on shore
a n d give its fleet a chance to s w e e p the m i n e s ahead of it; the forts,
in other w o r d s , h a d to be s t o r m e d or destroyed to allow the navy to
get t h r o u g h .
K i t c h e n e r m e t with his advisers at the War Office to ask t h e m to
reconsider their position a b o u t the opening of the new front, but
they were a d a m a n t in reiterating that no troops could be m a d e
available. In t u r n , Churchill, on the m o r n i n g of 3 J a n u a r y 1915, met
with his War G r o u p at the A d m i r a l t y to reconsider whether, given
the i m p o r t a n c e of keeping R u s s i a in the war, it really would be out of
the question to m o u n t a wholly naval operation. T h e idea of employing only w a r s h i p s that were old a n d e x p e n d a b l e was r a i s e d ; and the
War G r o u p decided to ask the c o m m a n d e r on the spot for his views.
S o o n after the m e e t i n g a d j o u r n e d , Churchill sent an inquiry to the
c o m m a n d e r of the British naval s q u a d r o n off the D a r d a n e l l e s , A d m i r a l
Sackville C a r d e n . In his cable Churchill a s k e d : " D o you consider the
forcing of the D a r d a n e l l e s by s h i p s alone a practicable o p e r a t i o n ? " —
a d d i n g that older s h i p s would be u s e d , a n d that the i m p o r t a n c e of
the operation would justify severe l o s s e s .
1
130
ON
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VICTORY
AT
THE
DARDANELLES
131
T o everybody's s u r p r i s e , A d m i r a l C a r d e n replied t o Churchill
that, while the D a r d a n e l l e s could not be "rushed"—in other w o r d s ,
could not be seized in a single a t t a c k — " T h e y might be forced by
extended operations with a large n u m b e r of s h i p s . " C a r d e n h a d
been in c o m m a n d at the D a r d a n e l l e s for m o n t h s , a n d his views
carried the day.
T h e C a b i n e t overruled C h u r c h i l l — w h o a r g u e d in favor of a naval
strike in the Baltic i n s t e a d — a n d authorized him to put C a r d e n ' s
D a r d a n e l l e s plan into operation. Churchill was not o p p o s e d to the
D a r d a n e l l e s p l a n ; it was s i m p l y that he preferred his Baltic p l a n .
O n c e the D a r d a n e l l e s decision h a d been taken, he m o v e d to carry
it out with all of his energy and e n t h u s i a s m .
2
II
T h o u g h gifted in m a n y other ways, Churchill was insensitive to
the m o o d s a n d reactions of his colleagues, and oblivious to the effect
he p r o d u c e d u p o n others. When he g a v e o r d e r s that naval officers
felt ought properly to have been i s s u e d by one of t h e m s e l v e s , he
inspired a collegia] a n d institutional hostility of which he was una w a r e ; he did not know that they viewed him as an interfering
a m a t e u r , a n d that his imprecision in the u s e of their technical
l a n g u a g e fueled their resentment.
He also did not know (for they did not tell him) how m u c h his
colleagues in the C a b i n e t were alienated by his other traits. He
b u b b l e d over with ideas for their d e p a r t m e n t s , which they r e g a r d e d
as m e d d l i n g . He talked at s u c h length that they could not e n d u r e it.
Neither s u b o r d i n a t e s nor colleagues d a r e d to tell h i m to his face that
he was often i m p o s s i b l e to work with. E v e n F i s h e r , his naval idol
a n d mentor, w h o m he had chosen as F i r s t S e a L o r d , found it
difficult to c o m m u n i c a t e with h i m ; t h o u g h , it s h o u l d be said, the
p r o b l e m was m u t u a l .
L o r d F i s h e r , w h o s e intuitive g e n i u s a n d extreme eccentricity were
rather like K i t c h e n e r ' s , h a d a s u d d e n h u n c h , on or before 19 J a n u a r y ,
that s e n d i n g a naval expedition to the D a r d a n e l l e s was a m i s t a k e . B u t
he was never able to articulate the basis for his foreboding, so he
could not p e r s u a d e Churchill to c h a n g e c o u r s e .
S u p p o r t for the D a r d a n e l l e s expedition initially h a d been unanim o u s , b u t from that rising high tide of e n t h u s i a s m there h a d been a
turn, an e b b i n g , so that within d a y s the tide had reversed direction
a n d was flowing swiftly the other way.
M a u r i c e H a n k e y , to w h o m F i s h e r h a d c o m p l a i n e d of Churchill in
J a n u a r y , b e g a n establishing a record that he, too, w a s o p p o s e d to the
expedition unless the a r m y participated in it. As the m o s t skillful
132
THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE
b u r e a u c r a t of his t i m e , H a n k e y w a s m o r e sensitive to the currents of
opinion that prevailed in Churchill's A d m i r a l t y than was Churchill
himself. He was aware that by the m i d d l e of F e b r u a r y , A d m i r a l t y
opinion h a d t u r n e d against the idea of a purely naval venture,
although the attack was s c h e d u l e d to begin in a matter of d a y s . * On
15 F e b r u a r y , S i r H e n r y J a c k s o n , who a m o n t h earlier h a d u r g e d
Churchill to i m p l e m e n t C a r d e n ' s p l a n s immediately, circulated a
m e m o r a n d u m in which he said that the purely naval plan "is not
r e c o m m e n d e d as a s o u n d military o p e r a t i o n . " C a p t a i n H e r b e r t
William R i c h m o n d , Assistant D i r e c t o r of O p e r a t i o n s , w a s also a s sociated with this criticism, h a v i n g written a m e m o r a n d u m of his
own along similar lines the day before, a copy of which he had
forwarded to H a n k e y .
6
E a r l y in the m o r n i n g of 16 F e b r u a r y F i s h e r sent a similar warning
to Churchill, who was t h u n d e r s t r u c k : he was driven to seek an
i m m e d i a t e e m e r g e n c y session with whatever m e m b e r s of the War
Council of the C a b i n e t were available. T h e dire situation was this:
the British naval a r m a d a off the T u r k i s h coast was d u e to c o m m e n c e
its attack within forty-eight to seventy-two h o u r s ; the a r m a d a could
not p o s t p o n e its attack while r e m a i n i n g in the area, for enemy
s u b m a r i n e s m i g h t soon be sent to sink i t ; b u t if the a r m a d a p r o c e e d e d
to attack, it w o u l d fail, a c c o r d i n g to this s u d d e n l y revised opinion of
the naval leadership of the A d m i r a l t y , unless a substantial b o d y of
troops was sent to s u p p o r t i t — t r o o p s that K i t c h e n e r h a d repeatedly
refused to s e n d a n d which, in any event, could hardly be expected to
arrive in time even if d i s p a t c h e d immediately.
7
Before attending the War C o u n c i l , K i t c h e n e r s p o k e with W y n d h a m
D e e d e s , the officer who had s e r v e d in the O t t o m a n G e n d a r m e r i e
before the war, now a captain in intelligence serving in L o n d o n , and
asked his opinion of a naval attack on the D a r d a n e l l e s . D e e d e s
replied that in his view s u c h a plan w o u l d be fundamentally u n s o u n d .
As he b e g a n to explain why that w o u l d be so, an enraged K i t c h e n e r
cut him short, told h i m he did not know what he was talking a b o u t ,
and a b r u p t l y d i s m i s s e d h i m .
* He told the Cabinet so; he told the Prime Minister so; and he recorded his
opinion in letters and memoranda. In a diary entry for 19 March he recorded that
"On the first day proposal was made I warned P. M . , Lord K, Chief of Staff, L.
George and Balfour that Fleet could not effect passage and that all naval officers
thought so." Hankey indeed had issued such warnings, but a month later than he
claimed. It was not on 13 January (when the Cabinet committee decided on the
Dardanelles expedition) but on 10 February that he wrote to Balfour along those
lines. Later still he spoke to Asquith. On 13 February, the Prime Minister noted
that "I have just been having a talk with Hankey, whose views are always worth
hearing. He thinks very strongly that the naval operations . . . should be supported
by landing a fairly strong military force. I have been for some time coming to the
same opinion .. . "
3
4
5
ON TO VICTORY AT THE DARDANELLES
133
Y e t the interview with D e e d e s c h a n g e d K i t c h e n e r ' s m i n d . A few
h o u r s later, K i t c h e n e r told m e m b e r s of the War C o u n c i l that he
would agree to send the 29th D i v i s i o n — t h e only regular a r m y
division that r e m a i n e d in B r i t a i n — t o the A e g e a n to s u p p o r t the
navy's attack. In addition, the new A u s t r a l i a n a n d N e w Z e a l a n d
t r o o p s who had arrived in E g y p t c o u l d be d i s p a t c h e d if necessary.
T h e plan, which now met the r e q u i r e m e n t s of F i s h e r , J a c k s o n ,
R i c h m o n d , a n d the others, was that once the navy's ships had won
the battle for the straits, the t r o o p s w o u l d c o m e in behind t h e m to
o c c u p y the adjacent shore a n d , thereafter, C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . A c c o r d i n g
to a diary entry, " L o r d K ' s w o r d s to Winston were: ' Y o u get t h r o u g h !
I will find the m e n . ' "
8
T h e plan was f l a w e d . I f the T u r k i s h defenders h a d c o m p e t e n t
leadership a n d a d e q u a t e a m m u n i t i o n , a c o m b i n e d assault w a s called
for. I n s t e a d of waiting for the navy to win the battle, the a r m y o u g h t
to have helped by attacking the D a r d a n e l l e s forts. T h e civilian
M a u r i c e H a n k e y saw this clearly; the a d m i r a l s a n d generals did not.
On 22 F e b r u a r y , the A d m i r a l t y i s s u e d a public c o m m u n i q u e announcing that the D a r d a n e l l e s attack h a d b e g u n a n d d e s c r i b i n g it in
detail. T h e n e w s p a p e r s took up the story, focusing attention on the
attack a n d a r o u s i n g public expectations. The Times noted that
" b o m b a r d m e n t f r o m the sea will not carry s u c h a project very far
unless it is c o m b i n e d with troops"; a n d w a r n e d that " T h e one thing
the Allies d a r e not risk in a persistent attack on the D a r d a n e l l e s is
failure."
K i t c h e n e r i s s u e d a similar w a r n i n g of his own to C a b i n e t colleagues. A l t h o u g h he had originally p r o p o s e d to "leave off the b o m b a r d m e n t if it were ineffective,"
when L l o y d G e o r g e a r g u e d in
favor of a d h e r i n g to that plan ("If we failed at the D a r d a n e l l e s we
ought to be immediately ready to try s o m e t h i n g else"), K i t c h e n e r
c h a n g e d his m i n d . At a meeting of the War Council on 24 F e b r u a r y ,
the War Minister cited the A d m i r a l t y ' s public c o m m u n i q u e as his
reason for the c h a n g e . " T h e effect of a defeat in the Orient w o u l d be
very s e r i o u s . T h e r e c o u l d b e n o g o i n g b a c k . T h e publicity o f the
a n n o u n c e m e n t had c o m m i t t e d u s . " If the fleet failed, he s a i d , "the
a r m y o u g h t to see the b u s i n e s s t h r o u g h . "
9
1
11
F i r s t he had s u g g e s t e d s e n d i n g in the navy. N o w he h a d decided
to send in the a r m y . S t e p by s t e p , without m e a n i n g to, K i t c h e n e r
was allowing Britain to be d r a w n into a major e n g a g e m e n t in the
Middle East.
Ill
T h e T u r k s expected Churchill's attack o n the D a r d a n e l l e s ; b u t for
the m o m e n t they had no m e a n s to defend against it. N o t even
134
THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE
W y n d h a m D e e d e s — u s u a l l y so well informed on O t t o m a n a f f a i r s —
knew this secret, although the G e r m a n s were well aware of it. At the
outset of the war, the O t t o m a n forces a n d their G e r m a n advisers h a d
b e g u n to strengthen the forts on b o t h sides of the straits of the
D a r d a n e l l e s , b u t saw their efforts nullified by the lack of a m m u n i t i o n .
At the end of 1914 a n d at the b e g i n n i n g of 1915, Berlin learned that
the s u p p l y of a m m u n i t i o n at the straits was e n o u g h to fight only
a b o u t one e n g a g e m e n t , a n d that s o m e of the O t t o m a n g u n b o a t s h a d
e n o u g h shells to fire for a b o u t one m i n u t e each.
D u r i n g the next six weeks, the O t t o m a n high c o m m a n d received a
n u m b e r of intelligence r e p o r t s indicating that an Allied naval attack
on the straits was i m m i n e n t . On 15 F e b r u a r y 1915, detailed information was received on a concentration of British a n d F r e n c h war
vessels in the eastern M e d i t e r r a n e a n .
On the m o r n i n g of 19 F e b r u a r y , A d m i r a l C a r d e n ' s British w a r s h i p s
fired the o p e n i n g shots i n the D a r d a n e l l e s c a m p a i g n . T h e U . S .
a m b a s s a d o r to T u r k e y noted that the s u c c e s s of the Allied forces
s e e m e d inevitable, a n d the inhabitants of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e thought
that their city w o u l d fall within d a y s .
It was a m e a s u r e of the Porte's despair that it even considered
seeking help f r o m R u s s i a , its age-old enemy. T h e d a y after the
British attack b e g a n , the T u r k i s h a m b a s s a d o r t o G e r m a n y s u g g e s t e d
the creation of a R u s s i a n - T u r k i s h - G e r m a n alliance: R u s s i a , he p r o p o s e d , s h o u l d be offered free p a s s a g e through the D a r d a n e l l e s in
return for switching s i d e s in the w a r . As the G r a n d Vizier explained
to the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , "One o u g h t to
m a k e peace with R u s s i a so that one could then hit E n g l a n d all the
h a r d e r . " T h e G e r m a n s relayed the p r o p o s a l t o R u s s i a , b u t nothing
c a m e of it. F o r the T u r k s there s e e m e d to be no way out of a losing
battle for the straits.
1 2
1 3
14
T h e roar of the British naval g u n s at the m o u t h of the D a r d a n e l l e s
echoed politically t h r o u g h the capital cities of the strategically crucial
Balkan countries. In A t h e n s , in B u c h a r e s t , a n d in Sofia politicians
started m o v i n g toward the Allied c a m p . It was evident that all of
them, even B u l g a r i a , w o u l d enter the war alongside the E n t e n t e
Powers i f the D a r d a n e l l e s c a m p a i g n were w o n . A s L l o y d G e o r g e
had repeatedly a r g u e d , with the B a l k a n countries as allies, Britain
could b r i n g the war to an end by m o v i n g through the disaffected
A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n E m p i r e to invade G e r m a n y from the relatively
undefended south.
1 5
When the a r m a d a of British w a r s h i p s , s u p p o r t e d by a F r e n c h
s q u a d r o n , o p e n e d fire at long r a n g e on the m o r n i n g of 19 F e b r u a r y ,
the T u r k i s h shore batteries at the m o u t h of the D a r d a n e l l e s lacked
the range even to reply. In order to inflict greater d a m a g e on the
T u r k i s h shore fortifications, C a r d e n m o v e d his w a r s h i p s closer to
ON TO VICTORY AT T H E D A R D A N E L L E S
135
shore. T h a t night the weather t u r n e d , a n d the navy was o b l i g e d to
discontinue operations for five d a y s b e c a u s e of poor visibility a n d icy
gales. On 25 F e b r u a r y the attack r e s u m e d . British m a r i n e s who were
put on shore at the tip of the peninsula found the forts at the
entrance of the straits d e s e r t e d ; the T u r k s a n d G e r m a n s h a d withdrawn to the N a r r o w s , where the artillery defenses of the D a r d a n e l l e s
were concentrated.
T h e British mission in Sofia r e p o r t e d that the Bulgarian a r m y
might join in the attack on T u r k e y . T h e P r i m e Minister of R u m a n i a
indicated to the British representative in B u c h a r e s t that not only was
his own country a friend to the Allies b u t that "Italy would m o v e
s o o n . " In early M a r c h a joyful a n d excited Churchill received a
secret cable from Venizelos-—still serving as Prime Minister—-promising G r e e k s u p p o r t , including three a r m y divisions for G a l l i p o l i ;
a n d , a c c o r d i n g to Venizelos, even the p r o - G e r m a n K i n g C o n s t a n t i n e
was p r e p a r e d to join the A l l i e s .
16
17
Victory was in the air. T h o u g h suffering from influenza, Churchill
was elated. He confessed to Violet A s q u i t h , the P r i m e Minister's
daughter, that "I think a c u r s e s h o u l d rest on me b e c a u s e I am so
h a p p y . I know this war is s m a s h i n g a n d shattering the lives of
t h o u s a n d s every m o m e n t — a n d y e t — I cannot help i t — I enjoy every
second I live."
A c c o r d i n g to a cable from A d m i r a l C a r d e n to Churchill dated 4
M a r c h , the fleet could expect to arrive at C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , weather
permitting, in a b o u t fourteen d a y s . T h e postwar fate of the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e leaped to the t o p of the international a g e n d a ; even the
Italians, who had not yet entered the war, b e g a n to claim their
"share in the eventual partition of T u r k e y . " Churchill s e e m s to
have sensed that such claims were p r e m a t u r e : in a confidential letter
to the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , he p r o p o s e d that E u r o p e a n T u r k e y should
be c a p t u r e d but that the Allies s h o u l d dictate an armistice that would
leave O t t o m a n A s i a in O t t o m a n h a n d s at least t e m p o r a r i l y .
8
1 9
2 0
21
Only F i s h e r r e m a i n e d skeptical for a few d a y s m o r e . "The more I
consider the Dardanelles, the less I like it I" (original e m p h a s i s ) , he
w r o t e . B u t on 10 M a r c h , even he was converted when intercepted
G e r m a n wireless m e s s a g e s revealed that the remaining D a r d a n e l l e s
forts, including the key ones d o m i n a t i n g the N a r r o w s , were a b o u t to
run out of a m m u n i t i o n . Shifting s u d d e n l y to great e n t h u s i a s m , F i s h e r
p r o p o s e d to go out to the A e g e a n a n d personally a s s u m e c o m m a n d of
the a r m a d a . T h e rush to take credit for the i m p e n d i n g victory was
on.
2 2
O n e evening after d i n n e r — a rare social occasion for the War
Minister—Violet A s q u i t h s p o k e with L o r d Kitchener, and told him
that it was Churchill who would deserve the accolades of t r i u m p h .
S h e said that "If the D a r d a n e l l e s c o m e s off W. will deserve full and
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QUAGMIRE
almost sole credit. He has shown s u c h c o u r a g e a n d consistency in
taking the responsibility t h r o u g h o u t all the vacillations of F i s h e r and
others." I n her diary she r e c o r d e d that " L o r d K . replied indignantly:
'Not at a l l — I was always strongly in favour of it.' "
2 3
16
RUSSIA'S GRAB FOR T U R K E Y
i
It was at R u s s i a ' s u r g i n g that K i t c h e n e r a n d Churchill h a d launched
the expedition to the D a r d a n e l l e s , b u t when it looked as t h o u g h that
expedition m i g h t s u c c e e d , the C z a r ' s g o v e r n m e n t p a n i c k e d . An Allied
victory at the D a r d a n e l l e s m i g h t s e e m an occasion for rejoicing; b u t
it w o u l d m e a n that C o n s t a n t i n o p l e would fall into British h a n d s — a n d
s udd e n l y a century of G r e a t G a m e fears a n d jealousies revived in
R u s s i a n m i n d s . T h e R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t worried that once the
British c a p t u r e d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e they m i g h t decide to keep it.
On 4 M a r c h 1915 the R u s s i a n F o r e i g n Minister, S e r g e i S a z a n o v ,
sent a secret circular t e l e g r a m to L o n d o n a n d Paris conveying a
m e s s a g e f r o m C z a r Nicholas I I , d e m a n d i n g that the Allies turn over
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e and the s t r a i t s — a n d also adjacent territories—to
R u s s i a . In return, the C z a r and S a z a n o v p r o m i s e d to listen with
s y m p a t h e t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g to British a n d F r e n c h plans to achieve
their own national a m b i t i o n s in other regions of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e
and elsewhere.
In Paris the R u s s i a n d e m a n d was received with d i s m a y . Afraid
that p o s s e s s i o n of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e w o u l d enable R u s s i a to b e c o m e
France's rival in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t att e m p t e d to put off the R u s s i a n s with v a g u e expressions of "goodwill." D e l c a s s e s u g g e s t e d that a detailed territorial settlement s h o u l d
await the eventual peace conference.
1
Sir E d w a r d G r e y u n d e r c u t the F r e n c h position. I n his s y m p a t h y
for the susceptibilities of his country's Allies, G r e y , who h a d allayed
F r e n c h s u s p i c i o n s of British intentions in S y r i a , now m o v e d to allay
R u s s i a n s u s p i c i o n s of British intentions at the D a r d a n e l l e s . In d o i n g
so he o p e n e d P a n d o r a ' s box. If R u s s i a n claims were g r a n t e d in
a d v a n c e of the peace conference, then F r a n c e would be m o v e d to
s u b m i t her claims, and L o r d K i t c h e n e r would b e m o v e d t o s u b m i t
his. H o w e v e r alive he m a y have been to s u c h d a n g e r s , G r e y g a v e
priority to t h e need to reassure R u s s i a .
H7
138
THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE
II
A c c o r d i n g to the British F o r e i g n Office, the position of the p r o Allied ministry in P e t r o g r a d might be u n d e r m i n e d by p r o - G e r m a n
o p p o n e n t s if R u s s i a were not given satisfaction in the C o n s t a n t i n o p l e
matter.
G r e y later explained how p r o - G e r m a n elements at the R u s s i a n
court-—whom he s e e m s to have genuinely f e a r e d — w o u l d m i s r e p resent British military operations at the D a r d a n e l l e s if s u c h an
a s s u r a n c e were not given:
It had always been British policy to keep R u s s i a out of
Constantinople a n d the S t r a i t s . . . of course it was our policy
still. Britain was now g o i n g to o c c u p y Constantinople in order
that when Britain a n d F r a n c e h a d been enabled, by R u s s i a ' s
help, to win the war, R u s s i a should not have Constantinople at
the peace. If this were not s o , why were British forces being
sent to the D a r d a n e l l e s at a time when the F r e n c h and British
armies were being so h a r d p r e s s e d in F r a n c e that the R u s s i a n
A r m i e s were m a k i n g u n h e a r d of sacrifices to save t h e m ?
2
G r e y a n d A s q u i t h , the leaders of the L i b e r a l administration, were,
in any event, d i s p o s e d to m a k e the concession that Britain's wartime
ally r e q u e s t e d . H e i r s to the political tradition of G l a d s t o n e , they
were a n t i - T u r k a n d sympathetic to R u s s i a n aspirations; a n d they
could point to the conclusion of the C o m m i t t e e of I m p e r i a l D e f e n c e ,
arrived at in 1903 d u r i n g a C o n s e r v a t i v e administration, that to
exclude R u s s i a from C o n s t a n t i n o p l e w a s no longer a vital British
interest. At the outset of the O t t o m a n war, the P r i m e Minister wrote
that " F e w things wd. give me greater pleasure than to see the
T u r k i s h E m p i r e finally d i s a p p e a r from E u r o p e , & Constantinople
either b e c o m e R u s s i a n (which I think is its p r o p e r destiny) or if that
is i m p o s s i b l e neutralised .. . " In M a r c h 1915, when the issue a r o s e ,
he wrote of Constantinople and the straits that "It has b e c o m e quite
clear that R u s s i a m e a n s to incorporate them in her own E m p i r e , "
and a d d e d that "Personally I have always been & am in favour of
Russia's claim . . . "
3
4
U n b e k n o w n s t to the rest of the C a b i n e t , S i r E d w a r d G r e y had
already c o m m i t t e d the country to eventual R u s s i a n control of
Constantinople, having m a d e p r o m i s e s along these lines to the
R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t in 1 9 0 8 . H i s view was that if R u s s i a ' s legitimate
aspirations were satisfied at the straits, she would not p r e s s claims in
Persia, eastern E u r o p e , or elsewhere.
T h e month before, G r e y had refused t o encourage a n a n t i - G e r m a n
coup d'etat in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , aimed at taking T u r k e y out of the
war, b e c a u s e it would have prevented him from giving C o n s t a n t i n o p l e
to R u s s i a . What he had done w a s in line with British decisions
5
6
RUSSIA'S
GRAB
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TURKEY
139
regarding G r e e c e a n d the Balkan s t a t e s , not b r i n g i n g t h e m into the
war on the Allied side b e c a u s e d o i n g so m i g h t have meant, in G r e y ' s
w o r d s , "the unsettlement of R u s s i a ' s wholeheartedness in the w a r . "
Churchill d i s s e n t e d . H e was o p p o s e d t o issuing anything m o r e
than a general statement of s y m p a t h y for R u s s i a n a s p i r a t i o n s , a n d
wrote to G r e y that he h a d instructed the A d m i r a l t y to u n d e r t a k e a
s t u d y of how R u s s i a n control of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d the straits would
affect British interests. H e u r g e d looking b e y o n d i m m e d i a t e w a r t i m e
concerns: " E n g l i s h history will not e n d with this war," he c a u t i o n e d .
D e s p i t e Churchill's counsel, the g o v e r n m e n t , m o v e d by an overriding fear that R u s s i a m i g h t seek a s e p a r a t e p e a c e , a g r e e d to the
t e r m s p r o p o s e d b y S a z a n o v and the C z a r . T h e British ( 1 2 M a r c h
1915), belatedly followed by the F r e n c h (10 April 1915), formally
accepted the secret p r o p o s a l , reiterating that their a c c e p t a n c e was
conditional on their own desires with respect to the O t t o m a n E m p i r e
being realized, a n d on the war b e i n g p r o s e c u t e d by all of t h e m to a
final successful conclusion.
7
8
In an additional British m e m o r a n d u m , also dated 10 M a r c h 1915,
G r e y p r o v i d e d S a z a n o v with a n u m b e r of other B r i t i s h c o m m e n t s
a n d qualifications. O b s e r v i n g that R u s s i a h a d originally asked only
for C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d the straits b u t was now a s k in g for adjacent
territories as well, G r e y also p o i n t e d out that before Britain h a d been
given a chance to decide u p o n her o w n war g o a l s , " R u s s i a is a s k in g
for a definite p r o m i s e that her wishes shall be satisfied with r e g a r d to
what is in fact the richest prize of the entire war." G r e y repeatedly
e m p h a s i z e d that in a g r e e i n g to the C z a r ' s p r o p o s a l s , the British
g o v e r n m e n t was g i v i n g the greatest p o s s i b l e proof of its friendship
and loyalty to R u s s i a . It w o u l d be i m p o s s i b l e , wrote G r e y , for any
British g o v e r n m e n t to do any m o r e than A s q u i t h was d o i n g in meeting R u s s i a ' s desires, for the c o m m i t m e n t into which he h a d j u s t
entered "involves a c o m p l e t e reversal of the traditional policy of H i s
Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t , a n d is in direct opposition to the opinions
a n d sentiments at one time universally held in E n g l a n d a n d which
have still by no m e a n s died out."
G r e y went on to outline what R u s s i a m i g h t be expected to concede
in return. He m a d e it clear that his g o v e r n m e n t h a d not yet f o r m u lated m o s t of its o w n objectives in the E a s t , b u t that one of t h e m
would be revision of the 1907 A n g l o - R u s s i a n A g r e e m e n t so as
to give Britain the hitherto neutral third of Persia in addition to
the third she already o c c u p i e d . He e m p h a s i z e d , too, that the
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a g r e e m e n t they h a d just reached was to be kept
secret.
T h e a g r e e m e n t was t o b e kept secret b e c a u s e G r e y was worried
a b o u t the effect on M o s l e m opinion in I n d i a if its t e r m s were revealed. He feared that Britain w o u l d be seen as a party to the
destruction of the last r e m a i n i n g independent M o h a m m e d a n power
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QUAGMIRE
of any c o n s e q u e n c e . A c c o r d i n g l y , G r e y told the R u s s i a n s that if the
t e r m s of their a g r e e m e n t were to b e c o m e known, he w o u l d want to
state publicly "that t h r o u g h o u t the negotiations, H i s Majesty's
G o v e r n m e n t have stipulated that the M u s s u l m a n Holy Places a n d
A r a b i a shall u n d e r all c i r c u m s t a n c e s remain u n d e r independent
Mussulman dominion."
As G r e y viewed it, Britain w o u l d have to c o m p e n s a t e I s l a m for
destroying the O t t o m a n E m p i r e by establishing a M o s l e m state elsewhere, a n d M e c c a a n d M e d i n a m a d e it unthinkable from a religious
point of view that it s h o u l d be established anywhere b u t in A r a b i a .
B e s i d e s , the p r o m i s e was an easy one to m a k e ; it was a territory that
none of the G r e a t Powers coveted. D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e later wrote
that "no one c o n t e m p l a t e d that foreign t r o o p s s h o u l d o c c u p y any
p a r t of A r a b i a . It was too arid a country to m a k e it worth the while
of any ravenous Power to o c c u p y as a p e r m a n e n t p a s t u r e . " It w a s
not then known that there were i m m e n s e deposits of oil in the
region.
9
1 0
Ill
A r a b i a d i d , however, play a role in the postwar plans of the powerful
British S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for War. R u s s i a ' s d e m a n d s of 4 M a r c h
1915, a n d their a c c e p t a n c e by Britain on 12 M a r c h , led L o r d
K i t c h e n e r to warn the C a b i n e t in a m e m o r a n d u m dated 16 M a r c h
that after the war "old enmities a n d jealousies which have been
stilled by the existing crisis in E u r o p e m a y revive" and that Britain
m i g h t be "at enmity with R u s s i a , or with F r a n c e , or with both in
c o m b i n a t i o n . " What he anticipated was no less than a revival of the
G r e a t G a m e . H e , too, u r g e d the creation o f a n independent A r a b i a n
k i n g d o m to include M e c c a a n d M e d i n a , but he a d d e d that it s h o u l d
exist u n d e r British a u s p i c e s . It w a s essential that it s h o u l d do so in
order to give Britain a hold on the spiritual leadership of the M o s l e m
world.
11
In K i t c h e n e r ' s c o m p r e h e n s i v e design for the postwar M i d d l e E a s t ,
Britain, f r o m its recently a n n e x e d M e d i t e r r a n e a n island of C y p r u s ,
would control a convenient land route to India safe from disruption
by F r a n c e or R u s s i a . T h e War Minister's plan was for Britain to take
p o s s e s s i o n of Alexandretta, the great natural port on the A s i a n
m a i n l a n d o p p o s i t e C y p r u s , a n d to construct a railroad f r o m it to the
M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces (now in I r a q ) , of which Britain would also
* Now called Iskenderun, and located in the extreme south of what is now
Turkey, near the frontier of what is now Syria.
RUSSIA'S
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141
take p o s s e s s i o n . It was generally believed (though not yet p r o v e n )
that the M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces contained large oil reserves
which were d e e m e d i m p o r t a n t by Churchill a n d the A d m i r a l t y .
It was believed, too, by K i t c h e n e r a n d others, that the ancient
M e s o p o t a m i a n l a n d s watered b y the T i g r i s and E u p h r a t e s rivers
could be developed so as to p r o d u c e agricultural riches; b u t in
K i t c h e n e r ' s view the principal a d v a n t a g e s of his p r o p o s a l were strategic. T h e British railroad from the M e d i t e r r a n e a n to the head of the
Persian G u l f w o u l d enable t r o o p s to m o v e to a n d f r o m I n d i a rapidly.
T h e b r o a d swath of British-owned territory it w o u l d traverse w o u l d
p r o v i d e a shield for the Persian Gulf, as well as a r o a d to I n d i a . If
Britain failed to take p o s s e s s i o n of it, he feared that R u s s i a would.
S i r A r t h u r Hirtzel of the I n d i a Office wrote a similar m e m o r a n d u m
at a b o u t the s a m e time, with one significant difference in e m p h a s i s :
he u r g e d that the M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces should be incorporated
into the I n d i a n E m p i r e . He viewed it as an area that could be
irrigated and m a d e rich by colonists f r o m I n d i a . In his s c h e m e , the
administration of the area would be e n t r u s t e d to the G o v e r n m e n t of
I n d i a a n d w o u l d fall within the jurisdiction of the I n d i a Office. It
was b e c o m i n g increasingly clear that in L o n d o n two of the c o n t e n d i n g
rival p o w e r s fighting one another for a s h a r e of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e
were the British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in C a i r o a n d the British Viceroy in
Simla.
1 2
U n d e r l y i n g b o t h Hirtzel's a n d K i t c h e n e r ' s m e m o r a n d a w a s the
a s s u m p t i o n , s h a r e d by m o s t m e m b e r s of the g o v e r n m e n t , that it was
now in Britain's interest to carve up the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d to take
a large piece of it. T h e P r i m e Minister was practically alone in seeing
a need to e x a m i n e that a s s u m p t i o n in a critical light. He a d m i t t e d ,
however, that politicians s u c h as Churchill, who felt that Britain
ought to do as well out of the war as her allies, s p o k e for practically
everybody else on this i s s u e .
A s q u i t h wrote:
I believe that, at the m o m e n t , G r e y a n d I are the only two m e n
who d o u b t & d i s t r u s t any s u c h settlement. We b o t h think that
in the real interest of our own future, the best thing w o u l d be
if, at the e n d of the War, we c o u l d say that . . . we have taken &
gained nothing. A n d that not from a merely moral & sentimental
point of view .. . b u t from purely material considerations.
T a k i n g on M e s o p o t a m i a , for instance—with or without
Alexandretta . .. m e a n s s p e n d i n g millions in irrigation & develo p m e n t with no i m m e d i a t e or early r e t u r n ; keeping up q u i t e a
large a r m y white & coloured in an unfamiliar c o u n t r y ; tackling
every kind of tangled administrative question, worse than we
have ever h a d in I n d i a with a hornet's nest of A r a b t r i b e s .
1 3
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QUAGMIRE
T h e P r i m e Minister told m e m b e r s of his C a b i n e t that when they
d i s c u s s e d the future of the O t t o m a n territories, their "discussion h a d
r e s e m b l e d that of a g a n g of b u c c a n e e r s . " B u t it was typical of h i m
that he did not take a s t a n d against t h e m . What he told the C a b i n e t
was that, while he was in s y m p a t h y with G r e y ' s view "that we have
already as m u c h territory as we are able to h o l d , " he did not r e g a r d
himself a n d his colleagues as "free a g e n t s " who were entitled to hold
back f r o m taking m o r e . If "we were to leave the other nations to
s c r a m b l e for T u r k e y without taking anything ourselves, we s h o u l d
not b e d o i n g our d u t y . "
14
15
In the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e that c o m p r i s e d the C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a g r e e ment, R u s s i a in effect h a d challenged the western p o w e r s to formulate
their own territorial d e m a n d s . A s q u i t h took up the challenge: he
appointed an interdepartmental g r o u p under the c h a i r m a n s h i p of
a career d i p l o m a t , S i r M a u r i c e de B u n s e n , to study the matter a n d
to r e c o m m e n d what Britain o u g h t to ask from an O t t o m a n peace
settlement.
L a r g e l y unnoticed a n d u n d i s c u s s e d , another m a j o r step had been
taken. In the 100 days between the o u t b r e a k of the G e r m a n war a n d
the outbreak of the O t t o m a n war, Britain h a d overturned the foreign
policy of m o r e than a century by a b a n d o n i n g any c o m m i t m e n t to the
preservation of the territorial integrity of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . N o w ,
in the 150 d a y s since the o u t b r e a k of the O t t o m a n war, the A s q u i t h
g o v e r n m e n t h a d c o m e a r o u n d to the view that dividing up the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e was positively desirable, a n d that Britain w o u l d
benefit f r o m taking part in it.
IV
T h e A s q u i t h government's m o v e to plan the b r e a k u p of the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e was p r o m p t e d b y the R u s s i a n d e m a n d for
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . L o r d K i t c h e n e r h a d anticipated that d e m a n d at the
outset of the war. M o n t h s before A s q u i t h a p p o i n t e d the interdepartmental c o m m i t t e e chaired by the d i p l o m a t S i r M a u r i c e de B u n s e n to
outline Britain's a i m s in the postwar M i d d l e E a s t , K i t c h e n e r h a d
initiated informal inquiries of his own along these lines, which
his lieutenants p u r s u e d before, d u r i n g , a n d after the de B u n s e n
proceedings.
K i t c h e n e r turned to his former staff in C a i r o to elaborate the
details of his p l a n s for the p o s t w a r M i d d l e E a s t , with special reference
to the possibility that R u s s i a a n d F r a n c e might r e s u m e their traditional hostility to Britain in that part of the world.
A p p a r e n t l y O s w a l d F i t z G e r a l d , K i t c h e n e r ' s aide, wrote t o S t o r r s
asking for c o m m e n t s on the role of Palestine after the war with
RUSSIA'S
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143
TURKEY
respect to a p r o b a b l e F r e n c h a n d / o r R u s s i a n position further north.
It was one of the first t i m e s that Z i o n i s m — t h e m o v e m e n t to create a
J e w i s h h o m e l a n d in Palestine—entered into British wartime s p e c u lations. S t o r r s replied at the e n d of 1914:
With r e g a r d to Palestine, I s u p p o s e that while we naturally do
not want to b u r d e n ourselves with fresh responsibilities as would
be i m p o s e d u p o n us by annexation, we a r e , I take it, averse to
the p r o s p e c t of a R u s s i a n a d v a n c e S o u t h w a r d s into S y r i a , or of
a too great extension of the inevitable F r e n c h Protectorate over
the L e b a n o n , etc. F r a n c e would be a better n e i g h b o u r than
R u s s i a , b u t we cannot count on the p e r m a n e n c e of any E n t e n t e ,
however C o r d i a l e , when the generation that is full of war
m e m o r i e s p a s s e s away. A buffer S t a t e is m o s t desirable, but can
we get one u p ? T h e r e is no visible indigenous elements out of
which a M o s l e m K i n g d o m of Palestine can be c o n s t r u c t e d . T h e
J e w i s h S t a t e is in theory an attractive idea; but the J e w s ,
t h o u g h they constitute a majority in J e r u s a l e m itself are very
m u c h in a minority in Palestine generally, a n d form indeed a
b a r e sixth of the whole p o p u l a t i o n .
After considering the alternatives, S t o r r s c o n c l u d e d that the m o s t
attractive a p p r o a c h w o u l d be to annex a n d incorporate Palestine into
E g y p t . H e e n d e d b y saying, "Please r e m e m b e r m e t o the Chief.
E g y p t i a n s are h o p i n g that he will continue to direct their fate from
afar."
S t o r r s wrote again at the b e g i n n i n g of M a r c h 1915, p r o p o s i n g that
after the war K i t c h e n e r s h o u l d return to a new " N o r t h African or
N e a r E a s t e r n Vice-Royalty including E g y p t and the S u d a n a n d across
the way from A d e n to A l e x a n d r e t t a . " T h i s , he s u g g e s t e d , w o u l d
offer K i t c h e n e r an attractive alternative to b e c o m i n g Viceroy of
I n d i a . In effect he was p r o p o s i n g that m o s t of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g
world s h o u l d be o r g a n i z e d into a confederation that would be a
British protectorate ruled b y K i t c h e n e r from C a i r o .
16
7
1 8
As he developed a M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy for Britain, the War
Minister b a s e d it on the S t o r r s p r o p o s a l . On 11 N o v e m b e r 1914,
K i t c h e n e r wrote to S i r E d w a r d G r e y that the F r e n c h s h o u l d be
p e r s u a d e d to forego their traditional interest in S y r i a , a n d s h o u l d in
exchange be given m o r e of N o r t h Africa after the w a r ; while S y r i a
should be nominally independent under a British protectorate a n d
should be joined to A r a b i a u n d e r the spiritual leadership of an A r a b
caliph. ( T h i s w a s the matter a b o u t which K i t c h e n e r h a d c o r r e s p o n d e d
with H u s s e i n of M e c c a m o n t h s b e f o r e . )
K i t c h e n e r later s u g g e s t e d to G r e y that negotiations might be
opened with A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g leaders without telling the F r e n c h
g o v e r n m e n t ; b u t L o r d C r e w e , the Secretary of S t a t e for I n d i a , told
144
THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE
G r e y that s u c h a course of p r o c e e d i n g s would not be "feasible."
In
any event, K i t c h e n e r , S t o r r s , a n d S i r M a r k S y k e s , the T o r y M . P .
who joined the K i t c h e n e r e n t o u r a g e in 1915, all wrongly believed
that the F r e n c h could be p e r s u a d e d to a b a n d o n their interest in S y r i a
(except for the C h r i s t i a n a r e a s of M o u n t L e b a n o n , where their
presence m i g h t prove to b e , a c c o r d i n g to S t o r r s , " i n e v i t a b l e " ) .
As to the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p e o p l e s , it long had been an article of
faith a m o n g the British officials who dealt with oriental affairs that
they were incapable of g e n u i n e i n d e p e n d e n c e . G e r t r u d e Bell, the
most f a m o u s of prewar British travelers in A r a b i a n lands, repeated
what was r e g a r d e d as o b v i o u s when she wrote that "the A r a b s can't
govern t h e m s e l v e s . " A s u s e d b y B r i t i s h officials a m o n g themselves
d u r i n g the war, "independence" for A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g a r e a s merely
meant independence from the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , a n d indicated that
such areas would m o v e instead into the orbit of s o m e E u r o p e a n
20
21
22
power.
T h r o u g h o u t the next two years, K i t c h e n e r and his colleagues
continued to p r e s s their s c h e m e . On 26 A u g u s t 1915, the field
marshal's colleague, R e g i n a l d Wingate, G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l of the
S u d a n , wrote the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l of I n d i a that "I conceive it to be
not i m p o s s i b l e that in the d i m future a federation of s e m i - i n d e p e n d e n t
A r a b S t a t e s might exist u n d e r E u r o p e a n g u i d a n c e a n d s u p p o r t ,
linked together by racial a n d linguistic g r o u n d s , owing spiritual
allegiance to a single A r a b P r i m a t e , a n d looking to G r e a t Britain as
its patron a n d p r o t e c t o r . "
T a k i n g the lead in p u s h i n g for an A r a b caliphate, Wingate corr e s p o n d e d with K i t c h e n e r ' s c a n d i d a t e for the p o s i t i o n — H u s s e i n , the
ruler of M e c c a a n d M e d i n a — t h r o u g h an A r a b religious leader in
the S u d a n , S i r S a y y i d Ali a l - M i r g h a n i . C a p t a i n G . S . S y m e s ,
Wingate's private secretary, p r o d u c e d a detailed m e m o r a n d u m outlining the p a n - A r a b s c h e m e of which the caliphate would be p a r t ;
and S t o r r s s u b m i t t e d another m e m o r a n d u m s u p p o r t i n g the A r a b
caliphate on 2 M a y 1915. G i l b e r t C l a y t o n , the C a i r o Intelligence
chief, s u p p o r t i n g the plan for Britain to take S y r i a a n d for the
caliphate to be brought to A r a b i a , m a d e it s e e m that m a n y voices
were urging the s c h e m e , when in fact it was only a single faction
s p e a k i n g , t h o u g h with several v o i c e s .
I n L o n d o n , L o r d K i t c h e n e r explained t o his c o l l e a g u e s — i n c l u d i n g
the representative of I n d i a , which h a d been a l a r m e d by his corres p o n d e n c e with H u s s e i n m o n t h s b e f o r e — w h y the m o v i n g of the
caliphate was central to his strategy for the postwar world. At a
meeting of the War C o m m i t t e e of the Cabinet on 19 M a r c h 1915,
L o r d C r e w e said that two different views were taken in the India
Office about the future of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e Political D e p a r t m e n t wanted to sacrifice T u r k e y to A r a b i a , while the Military
23
24
RUSSIA'S
GRAB
FOR
TURKEY
145
D e p a r t m e n t wanted to make T u r k e y as s t r o n g as possible as a barrier
against a potential R u s s i a n threat. M i n u t e s of the m e e t i n g record
that
L O R D K I T C H E N E R objected to the Military D e p a r t m e n t ' s p l a n .
T h e T u r k s , h e s a i d , would always b e u n d e r p r e s s u r e from their
s t r o n g R u s s i a n n e i g h b o u r , with the result that the K h a l i f a t e
m i g h t be to a great extent u n d e r R u s s i a n domination, and
the R u s s i a n influence m i g h t indirectly assert itself over the
M o h a m m e d a n part of the p o p u l a t i o n of I n d i a . If, on the other
h a n d , the K h a l i f a t e were transferred to A r a b i a , it would r e m a i n
to a g r e a t extent under our i n f l u e n c e .
25
T h e F o r e i g n Office d e e m e d it unwise to interfere in M o s l e m
religious affairs; the I n d i a Office went further and called it dangero u s . B u t the F o r e i g n Office would not, and the I n d i a Office could
not, overrule the j u d g m e n t of H e r b e r t K i t c h e n e r . He was m o r e than
the head of the War Office, m o r e than a C a b i n e t minister, m o r e than
an old hand at African a n d A s i a n affairs, m o r e than the empire's
greatest soldier. He was a living legend west a n d east of S u e z . He
was K i t c h e n e r of K h a r t o u m ; a n d in the sunset of his career, the tall
old soldier cast a long s h a d o w over the future of the M i d d l e E a s t .
T h e image is one used by Lord Beaverbrook.
17
D E F I N I N G BRITAIN'S GOALS IN
THE MIDDLE EAST
T h e d e B u n s e n c o m m i t t e e — t h e interdepartmental g r o u p that
A s q u i t h created to a d v i s e the C a b i n e t as to what Britain o u g h t to
want in the M i d d l e E a s t — w a s a p p o i n t e d on 8 April 1915, a n d p r o d u c e d its report on 30 J u n e 1915. T h e committee was c o m p o s e d of
one representative each from the F o r e i g n Office, the A d m i r a l t y , the
India Office, a n d other relevant d e p a r t m e n t s . K i t c h e n e r ' s War Office
was represented on the c o m m i t t e e by G e n e r a l Sir C h a r l e s Calwell,
D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l of Military O p e r a t i o n s . In addition, K i t c h e n e r
placed S i r M a r k S y k e s on the c o m m i t t e e as his personal (as distinct
from his d e p a r t m e n t a l ) representative; a n d t h r o u g h S y k e s , the War
Minister d o m i n a t e d the committee's p r o c e e d i n g s . T h e r e a f t e r S y k e s
remained the L o n d o n b u r e a u c r a t charged with responsibility for
M i d d l e E a s t e r n affairs t h r o u g h o u t the war.
S y k e s , a wealthy, 36-year-old R o m a n Catholic T o r y baronet, had
been elected to the H o u s e of C o m m o n s in 1911. D u r i n g and after his
u n d e r g r a d u a t e years at C a m b r i d g e , he h a d traveled widely in Asiatic
T u r k e y a n d h a d p u b l i s h e d a c c o u n t s o f his j o u r n e y s . T h i s h a d m a d e
him one of the Conservative Party's experts on O t t o m a n affairs, b u t
as O t t o m a n affairs had not played any significant role in British
politics between 1911 a n d 1914, a n d as his party was out of office,
S y k e s was not well known either to the public or to his fellow
politicians.
S y k e s was the p r o d u c t of a c u r i o u s b a c k g r o u n d . He was the only
child of an u n h a p p y m a r r i a g e : his w a r m - h e a r t e d b u t wanton mother
a n d his harsh elderly father lived a p a r t . At the age of three, when
his mother converted to R o m a n C a t h o l i c i s m , he b e c a m e a Catholic,
too. When he was seven his father took him on a trip to the E a s t . H i s
religion a n d his travels in the E a s t remained lifelong p a s s i o n s .
H i s education was fitful. He was m o v e d from school to school a n d
there were times when he was not at school at all. He spent two years
at J e s u s C o l l e g e , C a m b r i d g e , b u t d i d not stay to take his d e g r e e . He
was restless. T h e vast estates that he inherited a n d his horse-breeding
stables did not keep him at h o m e . He r o a m e d the E a s t , and spent
146
DEFINING
BRITAIN'S
147
GOALS
four years attached to the e m b a s s y in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . He was welc o m e d everywhere for his talents. He w a s a caricaturist a n d a m i m e ,
in both cases of almost professional quality. He was a m u s i n g a n d
m a d e friends easily. H e held opinions strongly, b u t c h a n g e d t h e m
rapidly.
When the war c a m e , S y k e s m a d e an effort to find a j o b that w o u l d
m a k e use of his M i d d l e E a s t e r n e x p e r t i s e . In the s u m m e r of 1914 he
wrote a letter to Winston Churchill a s k i n g for a j o b "on the spot"
working against T u r k e y , offering to "raise native scallywag c o r p s ,
win over notables, or any other o d d m e n t . " He wrote that "I know
you won't think me self-seeking if I say all the knowledge I have of
local tendencies a n d possibilities, are at your d i s p o s a l
but
Churchill either d i d not have a position for h i m or did not offer it.
S y k e s fell into K i t c h e n e r ' s orbit as a result of meeting L i e u t e n a n t Colonel O s w a l d F i t z G e r a l d , the field marshal's close friend a n d
personal military secretary. F i t z G e r a l d a r r a n g e d for S y k e s to
be b r o u g h t into the War Office early in 1915, where he served u n d e r
Calwell p r e p a r i n g information booklets for troops in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n
area. While there, he m a d e an especial friend of G. M. W. M a c d o n o g h ,
a fellow R o m a n Catholic who h a d attended the s a m e p u b l i c school;
as D i r e c t o r of Military Intelligence, M a c d o n o g h p r o v e d a valuable
ally in a d v a n c i n g S y k e s ' s career.
S h o r t l y after his arrival at the War Office, S y k e s was given his de
B u n s e n a s s i g n m e n t . K i t c h e n e r r e q u i r e d a y o u n g politician who knew
the M i d d l e E a s t , a n d y o u n g S i r M a r k S y k e s was one of the handful
of M e m b e r s of Parliament who knew the area. As a T o r y , he s h a r e d
m a n y of K i t c h e n e r ' s sentiments a n d p r e j u d i c e s . In every sense they
were m e m b e r s of the s a m e c l u b .
Y e t , at the t i m e of his a p p o i n t m e n t , he barely knew K i t c h e n e r ;
and was never to know him m u c h better. S y k e s was directed to call
F i t z G e r a l d every evening to give a full report of the de B u n s e n
committee's d i s c u s s i o n s . F i t z G e r a l d would later tell him what
K i t c h e n e r wanted him to say or do at the meetings that followed. H i s
few a t t e m p t s at actually seeing the reclusive national legend evidently
p r o v e d unsatisfactory; S y k e s later c o m m e n t e d that " T h e less I saw
of him, the easier it was to do what he required . .. "
2
F r o m the outset, t h o u g h , the other m e m b e r s a s s u m e d that he
spoke with the full weight of L o r d K i t c h e n e r ' s authority. T h e relatively inexperienced M . P . controlled the interdepartmental c o m mittee. H e was o u t s p o k e n a n d opinionated. H e was the only m e m b e r
of the c o m m i t t e e who h a d been to m o s t parts of the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e ; he alone could speak f r o m first-hand knowledge. T h e n , too,
* Both belonged to the Other Club, founded by Winston Churchill and F. E.
Smith.
148
THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE
he was a politician. He m a d e the other key m e m b e r of the c o m m i t t e e ,
M a u r i c e H a n k e y , into a friend a n d personal s u p p o r t e r . H a n k e y ,
also in his thirties, was S e c r e t a r y to the C o m m i t t e e of I m p e r i a l
D e f e n c e a n d S e c r e t a r y to the War C o u n c i l of the C a b i n e t , and was to
b e c o m e the first holder of the office of Secretary of the British
C a b i n e t . Controlling the a g e n d a , a n d writing the m i n u t e s of what
was said a n d decided at meetings, H a n k e y was on the r o a d to
b e c o m i n g the m o s t valuable a n d i m p o r t a n t m a n in the b u r e a u c r a c y ,
a n d his s u p p o r t p r o v e d invaluable to S y k e s .
In the de B u n s e n p r o c e e d i n g s , it was S y k e s who outlined the
alternatives that were available to Britain. He explored the relative
a d v a n t a g e s of several different k i n d s of territorial settlement: annexation of the O t t o m a n territories by the Allied P o w e r s ; dividing
the territories into s p h e r e s of influence instead of annexing them
outright; leaving the O t t o m a n E m p i r e in place, b u t rendering its
g o v e r n m e n t s u b m i s s i v e ; or decentralizing the administration of the
e m p i r e into s e m i - a u t o n o m o u s units. (Eventually the c o m m i t t e e reco m m e n d e d trying the last choice first, as being the easiest.)
In order to d i s c u s s these m a t t e r s , the c o m m i t t e e had to decide
what n a m e s to give to the various areas into which they m i g h t want
to divide the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . It is indicative of the spirit in which
they a p p r o a c h e d their task that they saw no need to follow the lines
of existing political s u b d i v i s i o n s of the e m p i r e , the vilayets (or
p r o v i n c e s ) , a n d felt free to r e m a k e the face of the M i d d l e E a s t as
they saw fit. In any event, the tendency of the c o m m i t t e e m e m b e r s ,
like that of the British g o v e r n i n g class in general, was to be g u i d e d in
s u c h m a t t e r s by the G r e e k a n d L a t i n classics they had studied
at public school: they e m p l o y e d the v a g u e G r e e k t e r m s u s e d by
Hellenistic g e o g r a p h e r s two t h o u s a n d years earlier. T h e A r a b i c s p e a k i n g areas of A s i a to the north of A r a b i a thus collectively were
referred to as " M e s o p o t a m i a " in the east and " S y r i a " in the west,
though the areas to be included in each were unclear. T h e southern
part of S y r i a was called "Palestine," a corruption of "Philistia," the
coastal strip o c c u p i e d by the Philistines m o r e than a t h o u s a n d years
before C h r i s t ; a n d while no country had ever called itself Palestine,
it was a g e o g r a p h i c t e r m current in the Christian western world to
describe the H o l y L a n d .
T h e c o m m i t t e e , led by M a r k S y k e s , p r o p o s e d the creation of five
largely a u t o n o m o u s provinces in the decentralized O t t o m a n E m p i r e
which they e n v i s a g e d . T h e y were to be S y r i a , Palestine, A r m e n i a ,
Anatolia, a n d J a z i r a h - I r a q (the northern and southern p a r t s of
M e s o p o t a m i a ) , As the c o m m i t t e e saw it, British influence or control
would be desirable in a wide swath across the M i d d l e E a s t from the
Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. A British railroad was to be
constructed from a M e d i t e r r a n e a n port to M e s o p o t a m i a , to p r o v i d e
149
DEFINING BRITAIN'S GOALS
the overland r o a d to the E a s t . K i t c h e n e r continued to insist on
Alexandretta as the port, but S y k e s d e m a n d e d that it be H a i f a , a n d
F i t z G e r a l d , m e d i a t i n g between the two, let S y k e s have his way.
In all other respects S y k e s hewed close to the K i t c h e n e r line,
though with slight modifications of his own. L i k e K i t c h e n e r , he
advocated m o v i n g the caliphate to the s o u t h to put it out of the reach
of R u s s i a ' s influence; b u t he a d d e d that it also would put it out of
reach of financial control by F r a n c e , for he a s s u m e d that O t t o m a n
finances would be largely controlled by the F r e n c h in view of the
large F r e n c h investment in the O t t o m a n public d e b t .
T h e overall a p p r o a c h , however, was K i t c h e n e r ' s . S y k e s , who had
been a c o n s p i c u o u s m e m b e r of the p r o - T u r k i s h bloc in Parliament,
a b a n d o n e d his conviction that the integrity of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e
o u g h t to be maintained. To his intimate friend a n d fellow p r o T u r k i s h M . P . , A u b r e y H e r b e r t , h e wrote o n April Fool's D a y :
3
I perceive by your letter that you are p r o - T u r k still. I got a
s u m m o n s f r o m F i e l d to attend a meeting of the O t t o m a n Society
to which I never b e l o n g e d . . . I immediately wired to M c K e n n a
[ H o m e S e c r e t a r y ] a n d I have every hope that the whole c r o w d
have been c l a p p e d into b a r b e d w i r e — h a ! ha! H o w furious this
m u s t m a k e y o u ha! ha! again. Y o u r Policy i s wrong. T u r k e y
m u s t cease to b e . S m y r n a shall be G r e e k . Adalia Italian,
S o u t h e r n T a u r u s and N o r t h S y r i a F r e n c h , Filistin [Palestine]
British, M e s o p o t a m i a British a n d everything else R u s s i a n —
including C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , .. . and I shall sing a Te Deum in S t .
S o p h i a and a Nunc Dimittis in the M o s q u e of O m a r . We will
s i n g it in Welsh, Polish, K e l t i c , a n d A r m e n i a n in honour of all
the gallant little nations.
After m o r e of the s a m e , S y k e s closed with a note:
T o the C e n s o r
T h i s is a brilliant letter from one g e n i u s to another. M e n of
b a s e clay cannot be expected to u n d e r s t a n d . Pray p a s s on without fear.
M a r k S y k e s L t . Col. F R G S , M P , C C , J P .
4
18
AT T H E NARROWS OF F O R T U N E
i
L o n d o n was dealing quickly with the political c o n s e q u e n c e s of the
i m p e n d i n g victory at the D a r d a n e l l e s b u t , at the scene of battle, the
f l e e t m o v e d slowly. T h e weather kept the w a r s h i p s f r o m b r i n g i n g
their full fire power to bear. As the d a y s went by, the T u r k i s h troops
along the shore b e g a n to regain their confidence, and learned to
harass the British m i n e s w e e p e r s by firing on t h e m with howitzers
and small m o b i l e g u n s . On 13 M a r c h Churchill received a cable from
C a r d e n s a y i n g that m i n e s w e e p i n g was not p r o c e e d i n g satisfactorily
d u e to what C a r d e n claimed was heavy T u r k i s h fire, although no
British casualties h a d been suffered. T h i s , noted Churchill, "makes
me s q u i r m " ; "I do not u n d e r s t a n d why m i n e s w e e p i n g s h o u l d be
interfered with by fire which c a u s e s no casualties. T w o or three
h u n d r e d casualties w o u l d be a small price to pay for s w e e p i n g up as
far as the N a r r o w s . "
Part of the p r o b l e m — a n d it was one of the defects in A d m i r a l
C a r d e n ' s original p l a n — w a s that the m i n e s w e e p e r s were m a n n e d by
civilian e m p l o y e e s , who were not willing to operate u n d e r fire; b u t
the major p r o b l e m was that A d m i r a l C a r d e n was losing his nerve.
Churchill h a d cabled h i m on 13 M a r c h reporting that "we have information that the T u r k i s h F o r t s are short of a m m u n i t i o n a n d that
the G e r m a n officers have m a d e d e s p o n d i n g r e p o r t s , " to which C a r d e n
replied that he w o u l d launch the m a i n attack into the straits a n d
w a g e the battle for the crucial N a r r o w s on or a b o u t 17 M a r c h ,
d e p e n d i n g on the weather; b u t the admiral worried, a n d could
neither eat nor sleep. He had lost no s h i p s a n d reported that he h a d
suffered no casualties, b u t the strain of anxiety proved too m u c h for
him a n d s u d d e n l y his nerves b r o k e .
On the eve of the m a i n battle for the straits, A d m i r a l C a r d e n told
his s e c o n d s - i n - c o m m a n d that he could no longer go on. He s u m m o n e d
a fleet physician, who e x a m i n e d h i m and certified that he was suffering from indigestion a n d that he s h o u l d be placed on the sick list
1
2
150
AT THE
NARROWS
OF
FORTUNE
151
for three or four weeks. On 16 M a r c h C a r d e n cabled Churchill
" M u c h regret obliged to go on the sick list. Decision of Medical
Officer follows."
Churchill p r o m p t l y appointed J o h n d e R o b e c k , the second-inc o m m a n d , to take his place. De R o b e c k , according to his cabled
report to the A d m i r a l t y , then c o m m e n c e d the main attack at 10:45
on the m o r n i n g of 18 M a r c h .
T h e day b e g a n to go badly when a F r e n c h battleship mysteriously
e x p l o d e d a n d d i s a p p e a r e d just before 2:00 in the afternoon. T w o
hours later two British battleships struck mines. A vessel sent to
rescue one of t h e m , the Irresistible, also struck a m i n e ; a n d it a n d
the Irresistible both sank. T h e n a F r e n c h warship d a m a g e d by gunfire
was b e a c h e d . De R o b e c k reported to the A d m i r a l t y , however, that
the rest of his s h i p s would be ready to r e c o m m e n c e action in three or
four d a y s . At the A d m i r a l t y in L o n d o n , there was elation, for N a v a l
Intelligence had discovered that when the action r e c o m m e n c e d , the
enemy would collapse. On the afternoon of 19 M a r c h , C a p t a i n
William R e g i n a l d Hall, the D i r e c t o r of N a v a l Intelligence, b r o u g h t
Churchill and F i s h e r an intercepted, d e c o d e d m e s s a g e from the
G e r m a n K a i s e r ; they g r a s p e d its significance immediately. Churchill
cried out in excitement that "they've c o m e to the end of their a m munition," as indeed they h a d . F i s h e r waved the m e s s a g e over his
head a n d s h o u t e d , "By G o d , I'll go t h r o u g h tomorrow" and then
repeated " T o m o r r o w ! We shall p r o b a b l y lose six s h i p s , b u t I'm
going t h r o u g h . " Churchill a n d F i s h e r did not tell the C a b i n e t , for
fear of c o m p r o m i s i n g their intelligence s o u r c e s , nor did they tell de
R o b e c k ; they merely cabled him that it was important not to give
the i m p r e s s i o n that operations were s u s p e n d e d .
3
4
U n k n o w n to Churchill and F i s h e r , at M a u r i c e Hankey's s u g g e s tion, the D i r e c t o r of N a v a l Intelligence, C a p t a i n Hall, had initiated
negotiations with T a l a a t Bey, the y o u n g T u r k leader, a i m e d at
inducing the O t t o m a n E m p i r e to leave the war in return for a large
p a y m e n t of m o n e y . T h e British a n d T u r k i s h negotiators met at a
seaport in E u r o p e a n T u r k e y on 15 M a r c h . T h e negotiations failed
because the British g o v e r n m e n t felt unable to give a s s u r a n c e s that
the O t t o m a n E m p i r e could retain C o n s t a n t i n o p l e — s o deeply were
the British now c o m m i t t e d to satisfying R u s s i a ' s a m b i t i o n s . C a p t a i n
Hall had not yet learned of the collapse of the negotiations when, on
the night of 19 M a r c h , he told Churchill of the plan to offer four
million p o u n d s to T u r k e y if she would leave the war. Churchill was
aghast a n d F i s h e r was furious. At their insistence, Hall cabled his
emissaries to withdraw the offer. Hall later recalled that F i s h e r
started up f r o m his chair a n d s h o u t e d " F o u r million? N o , no. I tell
you I'm g o i n g t h r o u g h t o m o r r o w . "
5
6
152
THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE
II
All that stood between the British-led Allied fleet a n d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e
were a few s u b m e r g e d mines, a n d O t t o m a n s u p p l i e s of these were so
depleted that the T u r k s were driven to catch and re-use the mines
that the R u s s i a n s were u s i n g against t h e m .
M o r a l e in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e disintegrated. A m i d s t r u m o r s and panic,
the evacuation of the city c o m m e n c e d . T h e state archives a n d the
gold reserves of the b a n k s were sent to safety. Special trains were
p r e p a r e d for the S u l t a n a n d for the foreign diplomatic colony. T h e
well-to-do sent wives a n d families ahead to the interior of the country.
T a l a a t , the Minister of the Interior, requisitioned a powerful
M e r c e d e s for his personal use, a n d e q u i p p e d it with extra petrol
tanks for the long drive to a distant place of refuge. P l a c a r d s denouncing the g o v e r n m e n t b e g a n to a p p e a r in the streets of the city.
T h e G r e e k a n d A r m e n i a n c o m m u n i t i e s were expected b y the a u thorities to welcome the Allies, b u t now the police b e g a n to arrest
s u s p e c t s within the T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g c o m m u n i t y as well.
Meanwhile those m e m b e r s of the E n v e r - T a l a a t faction who had
s u p p o r t e d it to the bitter end g a t h e r e d up petrol a n d p r e p a r e d to
b u r n down the city when the Allies a r r i v e d , a n d wired St S o p h i a a n d
the other great m o n u m e n t s with d y n a m i t e . T h e Goeben m a d e ready
to escape into the Black S e a .
E n v e r bravely planned to remain a n d defend the city, b u t his
military dispositions were so incompetent t h a t — a s L i m a n von
S a n d e r s later r e c a l l e d — a n y T u r k i s h attempt at o p p o s i n g an Allied
landing in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e had been rendered i m p o s s i b l e .
Ill
L o n d o n rejoiced a n d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e d e s p a i r e d , but in the straits of
the D a r d a n e l l e s , the m o o d of the British c o m m a n d was bleak. T h e
casualties a n d losses from m i n e s on 18 M a r c h had left A d m i r a l de
R o b e c k d e s p o n d e n t . He feared for his career. A c c o r d i n g to one
report, when evening c a m e on the 18th and de R o b e c k s u r v e y e d the
results of the day's battle, he s a i d "I s u p p o s e I am done f o r . "
De R o b e c k was u n n e r v e d b e c a u s e he did not know what had
caused his losses. In fact his s h i p s had run into a single line of m i n e s
running parallel to the shore rather than across the straits. T h e y had
been placed there the night before a n d had e s c a p e d notice by British
aerial o b s e r v e r s . It was a one-time fluke.
F a t e now a p p e a r e d in the c h a r m i n g person of General S i r Ian
H a m i l t o n , w h o m K i t c h e n e r had sent out in advance of the forthc o m i n g t r o o p s . H a m i l t o n was to be their c o m m a n d e r , with o r d e r s to
7
AT THE NARROWS OF FORTUNE
153
let the navy win the c a m p a i g n a n d then to d i s e m b a r k a n d take
possession of the shore. If the navy failed to win t h r o u g h on its own,
Hamilton's alternative orders were to invade the E u r o p e a n shore of
the straits, c a p t u r e the N a r r o w s , a n d let the navy t h r o u g h .
O n c e A d m i r a l de R o b e c k realized that he had an alternative to
going back into battle—that in L o n d o n it was r e g a r d e d as acceptable
for him to turn over the responsibility to H a m i l t o n a n d the a r m y if
he chose to do s o — h e saw no reason to run further risks. Whoever
said it first, de R o b e c k and H a m i l t o n a g r e e d that the navy s h o u l d
wait until the a r m y could c o m e into action. H a m i l t o n had already
cabled his views to K i t c h e n e r , who on 18 M a r c h s h o w e d the cable to
the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ; the cable p e r s u a d e d A s q u i t h that " T h e A d m i r a l t y
have been o v e r - s a n g u i n e as to what they c d . do by s h i p s a l o n e . "
De R o b e c k cabled Churchill, after m e e t i n g with I a n H a m i l t o n on
22 M a r c h , that "having m e t G e n e r a l H a m i l t o n . . . and heard his
p r o p o s a l s I now consider" that the a r m y has to enter the c a m p a i g n .
8
9
On the m o r n i n g of 23 M a r c h the War G r o u p met at the A d m i r a l t y
to d i s c u s s de R o b e c k ' s decision. Winston Churchill was a p p a l l e d a n d
shocked, but the F i r s t S e a L o r d , A d m i r a l F i s h e r , took the view that
the decision of the m a n on the s p o t h a d to be a c c e p t e d , like it or not,
a n d in this view he was s u p p o r t e d by A d m i r a l of the Fleet S i r A r t h u r
Wilson and A d m i r a l Sir H e n r y J a c k s o n . Churchill violently disa g r e e d , a n d took the matter to the C a b i n e t when the War G r o u p
m e e t i n g e n d e d . He h a d drafted a s t r o n g cable to de R o b e c k which he
b r o u g h t along for the Cabinet's a p p r o v a l , a n d which in no uncertain
t e r m s o r d e r e d the a d m i r a l to renew the attack. At the Cabinet
meeting Churchill received s u p p o r t from both the P r i m e Minister
a n d from K i t c h e n e r , who drafted a p p r o p r i a t e l y s t r o n g cables to S i r
Ian H a m i l t o n .
R e t u r n i n g to the A d m i r a l t y that afternoon, Churchill found that
F i s h e r , Wilson, a n d J a c k s o n r e m a i n e d a d a m a n t l y o p p o s e d t o his
s e n d i n g the cabled order to de R o b e c k . As a civilian minister att e m p t i n g to overrule the F i r s t S e a L o r d a n d his fellow a d m i r a l s on a
naval matter, Churchill felt obliged to return to A s q u i t h a n d ask for
the P r i m e Minister's consent. A s q u i t h , however, refused to give it.
H i s personal view was that the attack s h o u l d be r e s u m e d , b u t he
would not order it over the o p p o s i t i o n of the S e a L o r d s at the
Admiralty.
K n o w i n g as he did that the a m m u n i t i o n crisis in T u r k e y meant
that the r o a d to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e w a s o p e n , Churchill fought back
against the decision to let the navy a b a n d o n the c a m p a i g n . S i n c e he
could not give de R o b e c k o r d e r s to r e s u m e the attack, he a t t e m p t e d
to get him to do it through p e r s u a s i o n . He sent cables in which he
a t t e m p t e d to reason with the a d m i r a l a n d to show h i m why a res u m p t i o n of the naval attack was i m p o r t a n t . He s p o k e again with the
154
THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE
P r i m e Minister who e x p r e s s e d his "hope" that the attack would
r e s u m e s o o n . It was to no avail. O n l y a few h u n d r e d casualties
had been suffered, b u t the A d m i r a l t y ' s D a r d a n e l l e s c a m p a i g n was
over.
1 0
IV
After the battle of 18 M a r c h — t h e battle that so a l a r m e d de R o b e c k
that he decided to t u r n his s h i p s a r o u n d a n d s t e a m a w a y — t h e
O t t o m a n c o m m a n d e r s c o n c l u d e d that their cause was lost. While
A d m i r a l de R o b e c k , a b o a r d s h i p , was g i v i n g his o r d e r s to give up the
fight, on shore the T u r k i s h d e f e n d i n g forces, unaware of de R o b e c k ' s
decision, received o r d e r s to fire their remaining r o u n d s of a m munition a n d then to a b a n d o n their coastal positions. If A d m i r a l de
R o b e c k , who h a d led his fleet in battle for only one day, had p l u n g e d
b a c k into battle for a s e c o n d day he w o u l d have seen the enemy
forces withdraw a n d melt a w a y . In a few h o u r s his m i n e s w e e p e r s ,
working without interruption or o p p o s i t i o n , could have cleared a
path t h r o u g h the N a r r o w s ; a n d once the lines of m i n e s s u r r o u n d i n g
the N a r r o w s had g o n e , there were no m o r e laid. T h e fleet w o u l d
have s t e a m e d into C o n s t a n t i n o p l e without opposition.
F o r Winston Churchill, who was only h o u r s away f r o m victory,
the nearness of it—the knowledge that he was almost there, that it
was within his g r a s p — w a s to b e c o m e the torment of a lifetime. It
was m o r e than a personal t r i u m p h that h a d s l i p p e d t h r o u g h his
fingers. It was also his last chance to s a v e the world in which he h a d
g r o w n u p : to win the war while the familiar, traditional E u r o p e of
established monarchies and e m p i r e s still survived.
It was also the lost last chance for Britain, F r a n c e , a n d R u s s i a to
i m p o s e their d e s i g n s on the M i d d l e E a s t with e a s e . T h o u g h they
w o u l d continue to p u r s u e their nineteenth-century goals in the region,
thereafter they w o u l d do so in the uncongenial environment of the
twentieth century.
T h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e , which h a d been sentenced t o death, h a d
received an u n e x p e c t e d last-minute reprieve. Its leaders rushed to
m a k e use of the time that Britain h a d allowed t h e m before the new
trial of a r m s b e g a n .
* Historians still debate the question of whether victory in the Ottoman war in
1915 would have led to a rapid Allied victory in the German war. T h e "Easterners,"
led by Lloyd George, never doubted that it would have done so.
19
T H E WARRIORS
i
S h a k e n by the Allied b o m b a r d m e n t of 18 M a r c h , E n v e r P a s h a announced an uncharacteristic and important decision: he relinquished
c o m m a n d of the O t t o m a n forces at the D a r d a n e l l e s to the G e r m a n
general, L i m a n von S a n d e r s . It ran counter to all of Enver's instincts
to turn over his M o s l e m warriors to a f o r e i g n — a n d C h r i s t i a n —
c o m m a n d e r . Until that m o m e n t he h a d resisted p r e s s u r e s to turn
over authority, even to the G e r m a n experts who served as d e p a r t mental a n d staff a d v i s e r s . A l t h o u g h he h a d allowed G e r m a n officers
in his War Ministry to m o v e into key p o s t s in the D e p a r t m e n t s of
O p e r a t i o n s , Intelligence, R a i l r o a d s , S u p p l y , M u n i t i o n s , C o a l , and
F o r t r e s s e s , he h a d jealously q u e s t i o n e d the j u d g m e n t s a n d c i r c u m scribed the authority of his G e r m a n colleagues; and in m a n y a r e a s he
continued to do s o . Y e t u n d e r the g u n s of the Allied a r m a d a he
finally s t e p p e d aside on the battlefield that m o s t m a t t e r e d .
L i m a n h a d little t i m e , a n d wasted none. H e a s s e m b l e d s u c h forces
a n d s u p p l i e s as were to be f o u n d a m i d s t the wreckage of the empire's
resources. H e m a d e his own c o m m a n d a p p o i n t m e n t s , notably giving
a responsible position to M u s t a p h a K e m a l , a T u r k i s h officer who
a d m i r e d E u r o p e a n ways a n d whose scorn o f O t t o m a n b a c k w a r d n e s s
a n d bitter c o n s c i o u s n e s s that he was superior to those a d v a n c e d over
his h e a d h a d , until then, kept h i m in o b s c u r e a n d u n r e w a r d i n g
a s s i g n m e n t s . K e m a l was to prove the battlefield genius of the c o m i n g
c o m b a t : the c o m m a n d e r with the eye for the key tactical position,
who would seize the high g r o u n d a n d d o m i n a t e the field.
L i m a n w a s kept well informed of B r i t i s h p r o g r e s s in o r g a n i z i n g an
invasion force. N e w s of the British expedition's a s s e m b l y and e m barkation in E g y p t was p u b l i s h e d by n e w s p a p e r s in C a i r o and rep o r t e d t o the T u r k s b y m e r c h a n t s i n A l e x a n d r i a . L a t e r , O t t o m a n
agents in neutral G r e e c e could hardly have m i s s e d noticing the vast
fleet as it m o v e d t h r o u g h the islands of the A e g e a n , its lights and
155
156
THE
MIDDLE
EASTERN
QUAGMIRE
signal l a m p s shining brightly t h r o u g h the night, its military b a n d s
blaring a b o v e the s o u n d of winds a n d waves by day.
Well-officered for once, the O t t o m a n defending forces u n d e r
L i m a n ' s workmanlike direction were waiting for the British invasion
when it c a m e . It was the t y p e of e n g a g e m e n t in which the steadfastness of the O t t o m a n soldiery could be e m p l o y e d fo best a d v a n t a g e .
S i r M a r k S y k e s had pointed this out in late F e b r u a r y in a letter to
Churchill. He wrote that t h o u g h they could be routed by a s u r p r i s e
attack, " T u r k s always g r o w f o r m i d a b l e if given time to think."
1
II
F o r S i r I a n H a m i l t o n , the British C o m m a n d e r , the c a m p a i g n began
the m o r n i n g of 12 M a r c h when L o r d K i t c h e n e r u n e x p e c t e d l y — a n d
without e x p l a n a t i o n — s u m m o n e d h i m to the War Office to offer him
the c o m m a n d . He told the War Minister that he knew nothing a b o u t
T u r k e y , a n d therefore that he needed at least s o m e w o r d of explanation
and guidance.
As H a m i l t o n later recalled, at their meeting the War Minister,
while giving him c o m m a n d of the division that initially was b e i n g
sent out to the D a r d a n e l l e s in s u p p o r t of the navy, warned that the
t r o o p s were "only to be a loan a n d are to be returned the m o m e n t
they can be s p a r e d . " He explained that "all things e a r m a r k e d for the
E a s t are looked on by powerful interests both at h o m e a n d in F r a n c e
as having been stolen from the W e s t . "
2
T h e Director of Military O p e r a t i o n s at the War Office then briefed
H a m i l t o n by showing h i m a m a p a n d a plan of attack b o r r o w e d from
the G r e e k G e n e r a l Staff. T h e War Office h a d not taken the time or
trouble to work out one of their own.
G e n e r a l H a m i l t o n was sent out with an inaccurate a n d out-of-date
m a p , a n d little else to g u i d e h i m . On seeing the Gallipoli peninsula
for the first time, he r e m a r k e d immediately that "the Peninsula looks
a tougher nut to crack than it did on L o r d K . ' s small and featureless
m a p . " It was a r u g g e d l a n d s c a p e of ravines, a n d hills that divided
the shoreline into tiny beaches cut off from one another.
3
H a v i n g traveled on a fast naval cruiser from Marseilles, H a m i l t o n
reached the coast of Gallipoli on 18 M a r c h , in time to influence de
R o b e c k to call off the naval c a m p a i g n . By late April he was s t e a m i n g
back toward the straits to c o m m a n d the army's attack. He carefully
followed the instructions that the War Minister h a d given him for the
c a m p a i g n . He was to attack only the E u r o p e a n side of the s t r a i t s : the
Gallipoli peninsula. He was not to attack until he had his whole
force, which is why (despite his own misgivings) he had o r d e r e d the
navy to take him back from T u r k e y to E g y p t to a s s e m b l e his forces.
It took h i m a b o u t three weeks to organize his expeditionary force;
THE WARRIORS
157
then the navy took h i m back to T u r k e y to launch his invasion of
Gallipoli, the western (or E u r o p e a n ) shore of the D a r d a n e l l e s .
It was a risky v e n t u r e : indeed p r e w a r British military studies that
were revealed to the C a b i n e t by A s q u i t h at the end of F e b r u a r y had
c o n c l u d e d that an attack on Gallipoli by the British a r m y was too
risky to be u n d e r t a k e n . K i t c h e n e r h a d o r d e r e d that it s h o u l d be
done nonetheless, s a y i n g that he believed the O t t o m a n generals had
left the E u r o p e a n side of the straits m o r e or less u n d e f e n d e d .
At a War C o u n c i l meeting, its only T o r y m e m b e r — t h e former
P r i m e Minister A r t h u r B a l f o u r — a s k e d "whether the T u r k s were
likely, if cut off, to s u r r e n d e r or to fight with their b a c k to the wall."
L l o y d G e o r g e said he "thought it m o r e p r o b a b l e that they w o u l d
m a k e a s t a n d " ; b u t K i t c h e n e r replied that they w o u l d p r o b a b l y
surrender.
4
5
A year later, a verdict on the matter was returned by Allied a r m i e s
serving in the field. C o m p t o n M a c k e n z i e , the y o u n g novelist-turnedwar c o r r e s p o n d e n t , r e p o r t e d f r o m the D a r d a n e l l e s that " F r e n c h officers who have fought in the West say that as a fighting unit one
T u r k is worth two G e r m a n s ; in fact, with his back to the wall the
T u r k i s magnificent."
6
Ill
At dawn on 25 April 1915, the B r i t i s h , D o m i n i o n , a n d Allied a r m i e s
w a d e d ashore onto six narrow, unconnected beaches on the Gallipoli
peninsula. T h e T u r k s , who h a d known when b u t not where the
Allies would attack, were taken by s u r p r i s e a n d p r o b a b l y could have
been o v e r w h e l m e d that d a y .
T h e n o r t h e r n m o s t invasion site, A r i B u r n u , also p r o v e d a s u r p r i s e
to the A u s t r a l i a n a n d N e w Z e a l a n d t r o o p s who landed t h e r e — t h e
navy h a d taken t h e m to the w r o n g b e a c h . A s c e n d i n g the steep slopes
to the ridge a b o v e , they encountered T u r k i s h soldiers who fled until
rallied b y their c o m m a n d e r , M u s t a p h a K e m a l . T h e battle r a g e d all
day. T h e r e were m o m e n t s when it could have gone either way; but
in the end the T u r k s d r o v e the i n v a d e r s b a c k down the s l o p e .
At the tip of G a l l i p o l i , the five other Allied landings were at
b e a c h h e a d s c o d e - n a m e d S, V, W, X, a n d Y. At Y there were no
T u r k s , and the invaders c l i m b e d u n o p p o s e d to the top of the cliff
that d o m i n a t e d the b e a c h ; but instead of m a r c h i n g on, they s t o p p e d
b e c a u s e of confusion as to who was in c o m m a n d . At X, m e e t i n g little
opposition, the attackers also m o u n t e d the cliff—and also s t o p p e d
there. A t S , the landing party m e t little opposition, b u t m a d e c a m p
on the beach without a t t e m p t i n g to a s c e n d to the top of the s l o p e
that overlooked it.
T h e Allies held a n o v e r w h e l m i n g numerical superiority that d a y —
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m o s t of L i m a n ' s forces were held in reserve at a distance f r o m the
battlefield—and at b e a c h e s Y, X, a n d S the invasion forces could
have exploited their s u r p r i s e attack by a d v a n c i n g a n d d e s t r o y i n g the
small T u r k i s h g a r r i s o n in the vicinity.
B y 2 6 April the situation h a d c h a n g e d . T u r k i s h reinforcements
started to p o u r in, a n d in a s e n s e it w a s all over: a cheap victory at
Gallipoli w a s no longer in sight for the Allies. G e n e r a l B i r d w o o d ,
c o m m a n d e r of the A N Z A C forces, on the advice of his officers,
r e c o m m e n d e d r e - e m b a r k i n g a n d a b a n d o n i n g the positions his forces
o c c u p i e d . B u t S i r I a n H a m i l t o n , B i r d w o o d ' s c o m m a n d i n g officer,
d e c i d e d instead to d i g in.
U n k n o w i n g l y , H a m i l t o n thereby c o n c e d e d that the expedition he
l e d — a n d which w a s intended to b r e a k the military stalemate in the
w a r — w a s d o o m e d to fail. As h a d been shown in F r a n c e a n d
F l a n d e r s , d i g g i n g in w a s m o r e likely to p r o d u c e a stalemate than
b r e a k o n e ; a n d indeed, in futile, b l o o d y a s s a u l t s on fixed positions,
Gallipoli was to b e c o m e a d r a w n - o u t replay of the trench warfare on
the western front.
H a m i l t o n h a d positioned his t r o o p s at best to fight the T u r k s to a
d r a w , b u t at worst to suffer disaster. While the T u r k s d u g in on the
d o m i n a t i n g heights, the British c o m m a n d e r s o r d e r e d their t r o o p s to
entrench on the b e a c h e s ; a n d there at the water's e d g e the Allied
fight eventually b e c a m e one for survival. S o o n m o s t m e m b e r s of the
British g o v e r n m e n t in L o n d o n c a m e to view evacuation as the only
solution, but Churchill a n d K i t c h e n e r fought against it: Churchill
b e c a u s e he w a s never willing to a c c e p t defeat, a n d K i t c h e n e r b e c a u s e
he believed it w o u l d be a d i s a s t e r for a British a r m y to be seen to be
defeated by a M i d d l e E a s t e r n one.
20
THE
POLITICIANS
i
Winston Churchill's d o g g e d determination to fight on at Gallipoli
until victory was won kept him in the spotlight even after the army
had taken over the D a r d a n e l l e s c a m p a i g n from the navy. He a p p e a r e d
to be both the m a n who had b r o u g h t the O t t o m a n war a b o u t , a n d
the m a n who had c a u s e d Britain to suffer one defeat after another in
that war.
Although from April o n w a r d the battle for the straits was no
longer the A d m i r a l t y ' s operation, Churchill was m a d e the s c a p e g o a t
for the continuing casualties a n d setbacks as the Allied a r m i e s fought
on hopelessly at Gallipoli. K i t c h e n e r ' s prestige was so great that the
p r e s s , the p u b l i c , a n d Parliament f o u n d it inconceivable that he had
been responsible for the b l u n d e r s that had been c o m m i t t e d ; b u t
Churchill was an interfering civilian a n d it was easy to believe the
a d m i r a l s who claimed that his a m a t e u r i s h m e d d l i n g in naval m a t t e r s
had been the c a u s e of British s e t b a c k s . The Times gave voice to a
gathering c o n s e n s u s in 1915 when its 18 M a y editorial p r o c l a i m e d
that
What long ago p a s s e d b e y o n d the stage of mere r u m o u r is the
c h a r g e , which has been repeatedly a n d categorically m a d e in
public, that the F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y has been a s s u m i n g
responsibilities a n d overriding his expert advisers to a degree
which m i g h t at any time e n d a n g e r the national safety . . . When
a civilian Minister in charge of a fighting service persistently
seeks to g r a s p p o w e r which s h o u l d not p a s s into his u n g u i d e d
hands, a n d a t t e m p t s to u s e that power in perilous ways, it is
time for his colleagues in the C a b i n e t to take s o m e definite
action.
1
O u t s i d e of the War C a b i n e t , it was not generally known that L o r d
K i t c h e n e r w a s the author of the plan to send the navy on its own to
attack the D a r d a n e l l e s . Churchill w a s b l a m e d for the decision, and
159
160
THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE
therefore for the several weeks of a d v a n c e warning that had been
given to E n v e r and L i m a n von S a n d e r s , which enabled them to
entrench their armies to repel the Allied assault on Gallipoli. T h e
officers on the Gallipoli beaches saw the earlier naval attack as a
show-off stunt by the F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y , a coup that had
failed and threatened to lose t h e m their lives. A u b r e y H e r b e r t , who
served in the a r m e d forces there, wrote in his diary that "Winston's
n a m e fills everyone with r a g e . R o m a n e m p e r o r s killed slaves to m a k e
themselves p o p u l a r , he is killing free m e n to m a k e himself f a m o u s . If
he hadn't tried that coup but had cooperated with the A r m y , we
might have got to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e with very little l o s s . " L a t e r he
wrote that "As for Winston, I would like him to die in s o m e of the
t o r m e n t s I have seen so m a n y die in h e r e . "
2
3
A b u s e was heaped on Churchill f r o m all q u a r t e r s , a n d his political
position deteriorated rapidly. A final split between Churchill and
Britain's greatest sailor, A d m i r a l of the Fleet L o r d F i s h e r , the F i r s t
S e a L o r d , b r o u g h t m a t t e r s to a h e a d . Churchill and F i s h e r had
conferred and had reached agreement on a p r o g r a m of reinforcements
of the fleet s u p p o r t i n g the Gallipoli c a m p a i g n on F r i d a y , 14 M a y .
E a r l y the following m o r n i n g F i s h e r received several m e m o r a n d a
f r o m Churchill s u m m a r i z i n g the points on which they had a g r e e d ,
b u t also a d d i n g new s u g g e s t i o n s of his own. Infuriated, F i s h e r , who
had a n n o u n c e d that he was resigning on eight previous occasions,
walked over from the A d m i r a l t y to n e a r b y 11 D o w n i n g Street a n d
told the Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r , D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e , that he
was resigning his office. L l o y d G e o r g e sent for the Prime Minister,
who was next door at 10 D o w n i n g Street, a n d the two of them
a t t e m p t e d to p e r s u a d e F i s h e r that he had to remain at his post at
least temporarily. F i s h e r refused, a n d then went back to his r o o m at
the A d m i r a l t y , locked the door, a n d drew the blinds. L a t e r , he
d i s a p p e a r e d from view for a time.
Churchill learned of the situation from his colleagues, for F i s h e r
refused to see him. T h e i m m e d i a t e p r o b l e m was that the navy—in
the m i d d l e of a w a r — w a s without its chief c o m m a n d i n g officer, and
that the intentions of the other m e m b e r s of the A d m i r a l t y B o a r d
were unknown. Churchill was a s s u r e d on S u n d a y , 16 M a y , that the
S e c o n d , T h i r d , a n d F o u r t h S e a L o r d s were all willing to continue in
their positions. He also secured the agreement of A d m i r a l of the
Fleet Sir A r t h u r Wilson to return to his prewar position of F i r s t S e a
L o r d in Fisher's place. S i n c e the p r e s s and the political world did
not yet know of Fisher's resignation, Churchill planned to a n n o u n c e
both Fisher's resignation a n d the new dispositions at the A d m i r a l t y to
the H o u s e of C o m m o n s on M o n d a y m o r n i n g — b e f o r e the O p p o s i t i o n
h a d time to d i s r u p t his p l a n s .
F i s h e r , however, sent a hint of what he had done to A n d r e w B o n a r
THE
POLITICIANS
161
L a w , leader of the O p p o s i t i o n . B o n a r L a w g u e s s e d what it meant,
a n d called o n L l o y d G e o r g e first thing M o n d a y m o r n i n g . H e asked
the Chancellor whether F i s h e r had r e s i g n e d . When L l o y d G e o r g e
confirmed that he h a d , B o n a r L a w explained his own view of the
g r a v e political c o n s e q u e n c e s that could b e expected t o e n s u e . T h e
O p p o s i t i o n theretofore had refrained f r o m challenging the government in w a r t i m e , but B o n a r L a w s a i d that he could no longer
restrain his followers: F i s h e r w a s their hero, and they would not let
Churchill stay at the A d m i r a l t y if F i s h e r went. N o r would they s t o p
their attacks there, for the T o r y M e m b e r s of Parliament, in the face
of one military failure after another, no longer felt that they could
give the L i b e r a l g o v e r n m e n t their unqualified s u p p o r t .
B o n a r L a w ' s solution w a s t o b r o a d e n the g o v e r n m e n t . H e p r o p o s e d
that the L i b e r a l g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d be replaced by a coalition government, r e p r e s e n t i n g the two m a j o r parties in Parliament, a n d
Labour.
L l o y d G e o r g e instantly saw the force of the a r g u m e n t . He asked
B o n a r L a w to wait at 11 D o w n i n g S t r e e t while he went next d o o r to
consult the P r i m e M i n i s t e r . L l o y d G e o r g e then put the case for a
coalition forcefully to A s q u i t h , who a b r u p t l y a g r e e d .
Churchill knew none of this. E a r l y that afternoon he went to the
H o u s e of C o m m o n s to a n n o u n c e that the S e a L o r d s had a g r e e d to
stay on with A d m i r a l of the Fleet Wilson as their new head. He
arrived to find that L l o y d G e o r g e a n d A s q u i t h would not let him
m a k e his s p e e c h . A s q u i t h said that he did not want the s c h e d u l e d
d e b a t e between the parties to take p l a c e . He told Churchill that he
would f o r m a new g o v e r n m e n t in which the L i b e r a l s would share
office with the C o n s e r v a t i v e s a n d with L a b o u r .
On 19 M a y 1915, the new g o v e r n m e n t w a s a n n o u n c e d . Churchill
w a s r e m o v e d f r o m the A d m i r a l t y a n d given the minor position of
Chancellor of the D u c h y of L a n c a s t e r — i n effect, Minister Without
P o r t f o l i o — a l t h o u g h he r e m a i n e d in the War C a b i n e t .
T h e political world d i d not know at the time that, if Churchill had
been listened to, the D a r d a n e l l e s c a m p a i g n could have been won at a
time when only a few h u n d r e d casualties had been i n c u r r e d ; and that
it w a s b e c a u s e the a d m i r a l s a n d g e n e r a l s h a d overruled h i m that
Britain h a d e m b a r k e d on a c a m p a i g n that was in the p r o c e s s of
costing her m o r e than 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 casualties. T h u s it failed to g r a s p the
essential fact that Britain's generals a n d a d m i r a l s were losing the war
for her a n d that the country urgently needed not less but m o r e
civilian control of the military.
T h e political world in Britain also failed to g r a s p another essential
fact: the war in the E a s t w a s not merely being lost by the Allies, it
was being won by the other side. T h e results of the c a m p a i g n were a
reflection of the fact that the c o u r a g e a n d tenacity of the A u s t r a l i a n ,
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N e w Z e a l a n d , British, and F r e n c h soldiery was being m a t c h e d by
the c o u r a g e a n d tenacity of their O t t o m a n o p p o n e n t s .
II
L l o y d G e o r g e had b r o u g h t a b o u t the creation of this first coalition
g o v e r n m e n t , which e x c l u d e d Churchill f r o m a major C a b i n e t p o sition. He claimed that "he had fought to get Winston high office .. .
H i s colleagues would not, however, a g r e e to Winston's having anything but a minor p o s i t i o n . " L l o y d G e o r g e was aware, however,
that a hurt a n d a n g r y Churchill p l a c e d the b l a m e on h i m . Churchill's
wife, even years later, s p o k e bitterly of the Chancellor as a J u d a s
w h o s e "Welsh trickiness" h a d shattered the F i r s t L o r d ' s career; and
the D u k e of M a r l b o r o u g h , Churchill's cousin, sent a note on 24 M a y
s a y i n g "Pro tern L G has d o n e you i n . " Churchill himself e x c l a i m e d :
"I am the victim of a political intrigue. I am finished!'"
4
5
6
L l o y d G e o r g e had always r e g a r d e d the O t t o m a n war a s Churchill's
fault. In the s p r i n g of 1915 the Chancellor took an even wider view
of his former protege's failings. When it b e c a m e clear that Churchill
would have to leave the A d m i r a l t y , L l o y d G e o r g e c o m m e n t e d : "It is
the N e m e s i s of the m a n who has fought for this war for years. When
the war c a m e he saw in it the c h a n c e for glory for himself, & has
accordingly entered on a risky c a m p a i g n without caring a straw for
the misery a n d h a r d s h i p it would b r i n g to t h o u s a n d s , in the hope
that he would p r o v e to be the o u t s t a n d i n g m a n m this w a r . "
21
T H E L I G H T T H A T FAILED
i
T h e U n i o n i s t - C o n s e r v a t i v e m e m b e r s of the new British g o v e r n m e n t
took office in the belief that their task would be to protect the
country's military leadership f r o m civilian interference. H a v i n g s u c ceeded in r e m o v i n g Churchill f r o m the A d m i r a l t y , they took it that
the next item on the a g e n d a s h o u l d be the defense of L o r d K i t c h e n e r
against his principal a d v e r s a r y , the L i b e r a l politician L l o y d G e o r g e .
D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e , the Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r , held the
distinction of having b e e n the first m e m b e r of the C a b i n e t to q u e s t i o n
a decision of F i e l d M a r s h a l K i t c h e n e r ' s after the latter b e c a m e S e c retary of S t a t e for W a r . O n c e started on questioning K i t c h e n e r ' s
j u d g m e n t s , L l o y d G e o r g e never s t o p p e d . A v o i d i n g the pitfall that
was Churchill's u n d o i n g at the A d m i r a l t y , the L i b e r a l politician did
not at first d a r e to challenge the field m a r s h a l on issues that were
strictly military. I n s t e a d the Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r w a g e d his
c a m p a i g n on g r o u n d s of his o w n choosing. T h e issue that he raised
was the s h o r t a g e of munitions a n d other s u p p l i e s . Involving q u e s t i o n s
of labor, p r o d u c t i o n , and finance, it w a s an issue r e g a r d i n g which his
qualifications to s p e a k were greater than K i t c h e n e r ' s .
On 19 M a y 1915, the day on which formation of the new government was a n n o u n c e d , L l o y d G e o r g e i n a u g u r a t e d the final p h a s e s of a
c a m p a i g n that s u c c e e d e d in d e t a c h i n g the munitions a n d s u p p l y
functions f r o m K i t c h e n e r ' s War Office a n d placing t h e m u n d e r himself as Minister of M u n i t i o n s . In his new ministry he s u c c e e d e d in
starting to do what K i t c h e n e r h a d not been able to d o : e x p a n d i n g
civilian p r o d u c t i o n of war material a n d finding new s o u r c e s of s u p p l y .
T h e U n i o n i s t - C o n s e r v a t i v e M . P . s who entered the new coalition
g o v e r n m e n t b e g a n t o take another look a t L l o y d G e o r g e a n d L o r d
K i t c h e n e r , whose q u a r r e l they h a d p r e j u d g e d . As Minister of
M u n i t i o n s , L l o y d G e o r g e b e c a m e a t o r n a d o twisting with elemental
force t o d e s t r o y the e n e m y . T h e T o r i e s c a m e t o a d m i r e a n d a p p l a u d
his efforts. B o n a r L a w and his colleagues h a d c o m e into the C a b i n e t
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QUAGMIRE
to protect K i t c h e n e r and the military from interference by amateurish
L i b e r a l civilians, but to their s u r p r i s e found themselves r a n g e d
alongside L l o y d G e o r g e in q u e s t i o n i n g Kitchener's c o m p e t e n c e .
T h e i m m e d i a t e military decision facing the new g o v e r n m e n t was
what to do about the Gallipoli expedition. T h e War C o u n c i l of the
Cabinet reconstituted itself as the D a r d a n e l l e s C o m m i t t e e , a n d held
its first meeting in A s q u i t h ' s r o o m s at the H o u s e of C o m m o n s on 7
J u n e 1915, to deliberate the matter. T h e r e a f t e r it met often. T h e
T o r i e s discovered that the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for War did not s u p p l y
them with the information they required in order to form a j u d g m e n t .
K i t c h e n e r was secretive a n d reluctant to disclose military information to civilians. At times he a v o i d e d answering questions b e c a u s e
he was not fully a n d accurately i n f o r m e d . At times he e s p o u s e d
positions that were contradictory.
B o n a r L a w and his principal T o r y colleague, the new AttorneyG e n e r a l , S i r E d w a r d C a r s o n , were inclined either to a b a n d o n the
venture or else to send e n o u g h reinforcements to Gallipoli to e n s u r e
s u c c e s s . T h e question was what level of reinforcements w o u l d e n s u r e
s u c c e s s , b u t K i t c h e n e r would not say how m a n y t r o o p s the T u r k s
h a d at Gallipoli or how m a n y B r i t i s h troops were needed in order
to win. I n s t e a d he continued to talk in t e r m s of how m a n y t r o o p s
could be s p a r e d f r o m the western front. In exasperation, by early
S e p t e m b e r C a r s o n was writing that "What I feel so acutely a b o u t is
that all our calculations (if we can dignify t h e m by that n a m e ) are
absolutely h a p h a z a r d — w e are always told what we can send & not
how m a n y are necessary . . . "
l
By q u e s t i o n i n g the War Office on one occasion, ministers found
that an important piece of c a b l e d information h a d been received
there although the War Minister denied all knowledge of it. Either
K i t c h e n e r h a d forgotten the cable or h a d m i s u n d e r s t o o d it. On 10
D o w n i n g Street stationery, C a r s o n p e n n e d a note a n d p a s s e d it along
the C a b i n e t table t o L l o y d G e o r g e : " K doesn't read the t e l e g r a m s — &
we don't see t h e m — i t is i n t o l e r a b l e . "
2
C a r s o n b e g a n c r o s s - e x a m i n i n g K i t c h e n e r in C a b i n e t m e e t i n g s as
though he were an a c c u s e d criminal in the dock. T h e field marshal's
evasiveness, c o m b i n e d with hopeful predictions f r o m S i r I a n
H a m i l t o n that never s e e m e d to be fulfilled, b r o u g h t the T o r y leaders
to frustration and d e s p a i r . T y p i c a l c o m m e n t s d u r i n g sessions of the
D a r d a n e l l e s C o m m i t t e e were " S I R E . C A R S O N said that the slaughter
which h a d g o n e on w a s no s u c c e s s , and inquired if it were to be
continued" and " M R . B O N A R L A W asked i f S i r Ian Hamilton was t o
continue attacking when such action was obviously h o p e l e s s . "
3
T h e question of what to do d r a g g e d on into the late a u t u m n .
C a b i n e t opinion b e g a n to h a r d e n in favor of withdrawal from
Ga l l i p o l i ; for K i t c h e n e r failed to offer an alternative that p r o m i s e d
THE
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165
s u c c e s s . K i t c h e n e r d i s s e n t e d , a r g u i n g that Britain should soldier on.
He claimed that " a b a n d o n m e n t w o u l d be the m o s t d i s a s t r o u s event
in the history of the E m p i r e , " t h o u g h he a d m i t t e d that he "would
like to liquidate the s i t u a t i o n . "
T h e C a b i n e t was unwilling to order a withdrawal from Gallipoli
without L o r d K i t c h e n e r ' s sanction, the m o r e s o a s the c o m m a n d e r
on the spot, S i r I a n H a m i l t o n , r e m a i n e d hopeful. On the Gallipoli
b e a c h e s the situation was d e s p e r a t e , a n d W y n d h a m D e e d e s , the
officer who had w a r n e d K i t c h e n e r against the D a r d a n e l l e s adventure
but who was serving there, joined together with two other officers,
G e o r g e L l o y d a n d G u y D a w n a y , t o d o s o m e t h i n g a b o u t it. T h e y
s c h e m e d to get one of their n u m b e r sent back to L o n d o n to tell the
C a b i n e t the truth a b o u t their situation. D a w n a y h a d the chance, and
seized it.
4
B a c k in L o n d o n , D a w n a y saw K i t c h e n e r and other British leaders,
even including the recently d e m o t e d Churchill. He tried to get his
m e s s a g e through to t h e m , b u t they were reluctant to accept the
unpa l a t a b l e truth. D e e d e s had also g u e s s e d what D a w n a y would
discover, a n d told h i m s o : "And I bet the best you found was
Winston after all!"
In the end, I a n H a m i l t o n w a s r e p l a c e d ; a n d the new British
c o m m a n d e r saw at once that the situation w a s hopeless a n d called for
an i m m e d i a t e evacuation. B u t the C a b i n e t continued to hesitate; the
p r o b l e m , a s always, was L o r d K i t c h e n e r .
5
II
In L l o y d G e o r g e ' s vivid i m a g e , K i t c h e n e r ' s m i n d was pictured as the
m o v i n g , t u r n i n g turret of a lighthouse; b u t s o m e w h e r e in the r a g i n g
s t o r m of the Gallipoli c a m p a i g n the light h a d s u d d e n l y gone out.
T h e f i e l d m a r s h a l ' s colleagues waited with g r o w i n g anger a n d impatience in the d a r k n e s s for the powerful b e a m of light that never
again s w u n g a r o u n d to dispel the night.
E v e n the T o r y B o n a r L a w had c o m e a r o u n d s o far a s t o p r o p o s e
that L l o y d G e o r g e s h o u l d replace K i t c h e n e r at the War Office, b u t
the P r i m e Minister resisted the p r o p o s a l . Only the inner g r o u p in the
g o v e r n m e n t was aware of the field marshal's failings; he retained his
following in the country, a n d A s q u i t h felt that to replace him would
be politically i m p o s s i b l e . T h e P r i m e Minister's typical solution was
to s e n d K i t c h e n e r out to the D a r d a n e l l e s on a fact-finding expedition
in the hope that he would be detained there indefinitely.
In the event, o n c e he went out a n d saw the battlefield himself,
K i t c h e n e r felt c o m p e l l e d to agree that Gallipoli s h o u l d be a b a n d o n e d .
A r m e d with K i t c h e n e r ' s a p p r o v a l , the C a b i n e t finally i s s u e d the
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necessary authorization; a n d , at the b e g i n n i n g of 1916, the evacuation—which was far a n d away the m o s t brilliant operation of the
c a m p a i g n — w a s c o m p l e t e d . D e e d e s called the evacuation "one of the
m o s t r e m a r k a b l e things in h i s t o r y . "
6
Ill
On 25 April 1915, the Allies c o u l d have won an easy, b l o o d l e s s
victory by their s u r p r i s e attack; b u t 2 5 9 d a y s later, when they
withdrew in defeat f r o m their last positions on the b l o o d - s o a k e d
beaches of the D a r d a n e l l e s , it e m e r g e d that they h a d lost one of the
costliest military e n g a g e m e n t s in history. Half a million soldiers h a d
been e n g a g e d in battle on each side, a n d each h a d suffered a q u a r t e r
of a million casualties.
It was a decisive battle, in that the Allies could have won it, a n d ,
with it, the M i d d l e E a s t e r n w a r — b u t did not. It f o r e s h a d o w e d , too,
things to c o m e ; a s u p p o s e d l y b a c k w a r d A s i a n a r m y h a d defeated a
m o d e r n E u r o p e a n one.
It h a d the effect of d r a w i n g E u r o p e into M i d d l e E a s t e r n affairs on
a long-term b a s i s . T h e military involvement which K i t c h e n e r h a d
feared b u t failed to prevent was s u s p e n d e d temporarily by the Allied
evacuation, but w o u l d r e s u m e a year later. M o r e i m p o r t a n t , the
setback to Allied fortunes d r o v e Britain both in a specific a n d a
general sense to involve herself m o r e deeply in M i d d l e E a s t e r n
affairs. In a specific sense, as will be seen presently, it d r o v e
K i t c h e n e r ' s lieutenants to ally themselves with a M i d d l e E a s t e r n
ruler they believed c o u l d help to s a v e S i r I a n Hamilton's a r m i e s at
Gallipoli f r o m perishing. A n d in a general sense, the sheer m a g n i t u d e
of Britain's c o m m i t m e n t and loss at Gallipoli m a d e it s e e m vital years
later that she s h o u l d play a m a j o r role in the postwar M i d d l e E a s t to
give s o m e sort of m e a n i n g to so g r e a t a sacrifice.
IV
On 18 N o v e m b e r 1915, having resigned as Chancellor of the D u c h y
of L a n c a s t e r , Winston Churchill c r o s s e d over to F r a n c e to serve, at
his own r e q u e s t , as an a r m y officer on the western front. T h e
political world continued to place the b l a m e for Gallipoli on h i m . In
the C a b i n e t , however, K i t c h e n e r was b l a m e d too; a n d K i t c h e n e r
knew it.
L o r d K i t c h e n e r was aware that his C a b i n e t colleagues h o p e d he
w o u l d not return f r o m his trip to the D a r d a n e l l e s , b u t deliberately
d i s a p p o i n t e d t h e m . On returning to L o n d o n at the end of 1915, he
THE
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167
s p o k e frankly with the P r i m e Minister a b o u t his loss of s u p p o r t
within the C a b i n e t , a n d offered to resign. When an a c c e p t a b l e replacement could not be f o u n d for h i m , he a d o p t e d a different a p p r o a c h . With the P r i m e Minister's a p p r o v a l , he a r r a n g e d for a b a s i c
change in the nature of the position he held as War Minister, r e d u c ing the p o w e r s a n d responsibilities of the j o b . A fighting soldier f r o m
the western front, F i e l d M a r s h a l S i r William R o b e r t s o n , was then
b r o u g h t into office as Chief of the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff with
widely e x p a n d e d p o w e r s that until then h a d fallen within K i t c h e n e r ' s
d o m a i n as War Minister.
Y e t K i t c h e n e r retained authority in formulating political policy for
the M i d d l e E a s t . When he returned to L o n d o n at the end of 1915,
his aide S i r M a r k S y k e s also returned to L o n d o n f r o m a long factfinding trip, b r i n g i n g with h i m exciting news of a M i d d l e E a s t e r n
ruler who m i g h t ally himself with Britain, a n d a revolutionary
p r o g r a m on the basis of that alliance for t u r n i n g the tide in the
O t t o m a n w a r — a p r o g r a m that K i t c h e n e r was t o p u s h t h r o u g h the
Cabinet.
22
CREATING T H E ARAB BUREAU
i
In the winter of 1915—16, as the Allies p l a n n e d and executed their
evacuation of Gallipoli a n d as L o r d K i t c h e n e r took a lesser role in
the c o n d u c t of the war, British policy in the M i d d l e E a s t took a new
t u r n : K i t c h e n e r a n d his colleagues b e g a n to focus in an organized
way on the uses Britain might m a k e of discontented A r a b leaders a n d
soldiers within the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e y acted on the basis of
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s b r o u g h t back f r o m the E a s t b y S i r M a r k S y k e s ,
Kitchener's personally a p p o i n t e d M i d d l e E a s t expert. S y k e s was
returning h o m e from a long mission of inquiry into how the Allies
s h o u l d deal with the defeated M i d d l e E a s t — a mission without m u c h
urgency after T u r k e y ' s victory at Gallipoli.
Projects often develop a m o m e n t u m of their own: in the winter of
1915 the British naval attack on the D a r d a n e l l e s had g o n e forward
even after the R u s s i a n p r o b l e m it was meant to alleviate h a d been
solved, and when the winter was over the planning of how to carve
up the M i d d l e E a s t went forward even t h o u g h Churchill's expected
c o n q u e s t of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e — w h i c h was the reason for d o i n g the
p l a n n i n g — h a d not materialized.
After the de B u n s e n c o m m i t t e e — w h i c h Sir M a r k S y k e s had
g u i d e d — s u b m i t t e d its report on the postwar M i d d l e E a s t on 30 J u n e
1915, the British g o v e r n m e n t sent S y k e s out to the E a s t to d i s c u s s
the committee's r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s with officers a n d officials on the
s p o t . He traveled to the B a l k a n s , to E g y p t twice (on the way out and
on the way b a c k ) , to the Persian Gulf, to M e s o p o t a m i a , a n d to
I n d i a . It was a m a j o r u n d e r t a k i n g ; Sykes's journey lasted half a year.
It g a v e him a u n i q u e e x p o s u r e to a range of different points of view,
but it was almost 1916 before he was able to meet with C a b i n e t
m e m b e r s in L o n d o n to tell t h e m in p e r s o n what he h a d learned.
In his first s t o p in C a i r o — o n the way out, in the s u m m e r of
1 9 1 5 — S y k e s met with K i t c h e n e r ' s M i d d l e E a s t advisers in E g y p t .
R o n a l d S t o r r s , w h o m he had known before the war, introduced him
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C R E A T I N G T H E ARAB BUREAU
169
to G i l b e r t C l a y t o n . Religion f o r m e d an instant b o n d : Clayton was a
devout C h r i s t i a n whose s e r i o u s n e s s i m p r e s s e d S y k e s deeply. T h e y
b e c a m e friends as well as colleagues, although S y k e s w a s . m o r e o p e n
in his dealings with Clayton than C l a y t o n was in r e t u r n .
S y k e s was introduced by his friends to A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p e r s o n alities of engagingly p r o - B r i t i s h views, a n d b e c a m e an advocate of
Clayton's view that S y r i a s h o u l d b e c o m e British. He w a s led by
Clayton a n d S t o r r s to believe that the populations of the region
would welcome s u c h a d e v e l o p m e n t . F r a n c e could be given c o m p e n sation elsewhere, he s a i d ; a n d , in any event, the only g r o u p s in
F r a n c e that wanted S y r i a were clerics or p r o m o t e r s of c o m m e r c i a l
c o n c e s s i o n s . Attracted by the plan e s p o u s e d at that time by his
friends a n d by Wingate for the Sherif H u s s e i n to be elevated to the
caliphate, a plan that a c c o r d e d perfectly with his own view that the
caliphate s h o u l d be m o v e d s o u t h , S y k e s was won over to the S t o r r s
" E g y p t i a n E m p i r e " s c h e m e . T h i s p r o p o s e d a single A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g
entity, u n d e r the spiritual rule of the Sherif a n d the nominal t e m p o r a l
rule of the figurehead m o n a r c h of E g y p t , to be governed f r o m C a i r o
by the British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r — w h o was to be L o r d K i t c h e n e r .
1
T h e r e was, however, a current of opinion in C a i r o that S y k e s
found d i s t u r b i n g : the talk of rivalry between Britain a n d F r a n c e in
the M i d d l e E a s t . S y k e s did not believe that there were any serious
g r o u n d s for d i s a g r e e m e n t between the two wartime allies; he t h o u g h t
that F r a n c e did not really care a b o u t S y r i a , a n d could be i n d u c e d to
look elsewhere for her share of the winnings. H i s a s s u m p t i o n was
that the talk of rivalry was inspired by enemy p r o p a g a n d i s t s . Only
many m o n t h s later did he learn that the a n t i - F r e n c h talk ( a n d m o r e
than talk) c a m e f r o m s o m e of his own friends in C a i r o ; a n d he never
learned that one of the ringleaders of the g r o u p was his friend
Gi l ber t C l a y t o n .
II
In I n d i a , at the o p p o s i t e political pole, S y k e s found a reception that
was less than cordial. He was a y o u n g m a n , halfway t h r o u g h his first
year in his first g o v e r n m e n t a l j o b , and he had c o m e out f r o m L o n d o n
to tell I n d i a a b o u t the E a s t . T h e m a n he had c o m e to see was two
de c a d e s his senior, h a d spent a lifetime in g o v e r n m e n t service, a n d
was one of Britain's m o s t distinguished foreign policy professionals.
C h a r l e s H a r d i n g e , a former a m b a s s a d o r to R u s s i a , had been the
career official in charge of the F o r e i g n Office before c o m i n g out to
India as Viceroy. As G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l , he served in a family tradition that harked b a c k to the previous century; his g r a n d f a t h e r h a d
been G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l of I n d i a in the 1840s, the d e c a d e before the
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THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE
Mutiny. H a r d i n g e ' s policy was for I n d i a to o c c u p y a n d annex
M e s o p o t a m i a , a n d his view of C a i r o ' s p r o p o s a l s was that they were
"absolutely fantastic" a n d "perfectly fatal." He rejected the notion of
A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e , however n o m i n a l ; he wrote that "Sykes d o e s not
s e e m to be able to g r a s p the fact that there are p a r t s of T u r k e y unfit
for representative institutions."
M o r e inclined than ever to s u p p o r t C a i r o against S i m l a , S y k e s also
c a m e to believe that the conflict in views a n d in jurisdictions was
harmful in itself. He a r g u e d that "our traditional way of letting
various offices run their own s h o w s , which was allright in the past
when such sectors dealt with varying p r o b l e m s which were not
related, but it is b a d now that each sector is dealing in reality with a
c o m m o n e n e m y . " T h e r e was n o central policy: S i m l a , C a i r o , the
F o r e i g n Office, the War Office, a n d the A d m i r a l t y each ran its own
operation, as did officials in the field, each working in ignorance of
what the others were doing, and often at c r o s s - p u r p o s e s . T h e o b stacles in the way of arriving at a policy were f o r m i d a b l e : S y k e s once
counted eighteen agencies that would have to be consulted before an
a g r e e d decision could b e r e a c h e d .
2
3
4
D u r i n g the course of his trip, S y k e s explored the idea of establishing an overall b u r e a u to a s s u m e charge of A r a b affairs. C a i r o was
enthusiastic; on 13 D e c e m b e r 1915, C l a y t o n reported that he had
started to a s s e m b l e the nucleus of a N e a r E a s t Office a n d h o p e d that
S y k e s w o u l d p r e s s forward with the p r o j e c t . R e t u r n i n g to L o n d o n
at the end of 1915, S y k e s did p r e s s forward by p r o p o s i n g the creation
of a central agency to coordinate policy: an A r a b B u r e a u , to be
established in C a i r o u n d e r his own direction. T h e new S e c r e t a r y for
I n d i a , A u s t e n C h a m b e r l a i n , at the s a m e time u r g e d the creation of
an I s l a m i c B u r e a u , to c o m b a t seditious e n e m y p r o p a g a n d a in I n d i a ,
Persia, and A f g h a n i s t a n . T h e Viceroy of I n d i a , in r e s p o n s e , m a d e it
clear that he o p p o s e d the creation of any b u r e a u that planned to
intrude into areas within his jurisdiction, especially if S y k e s a n d his
friends were to be in c h a r g e . E a r l y in J a n u a r y 1916 A s q u i t h o r d e r e d
an interdepartmental conference to consider the creation of an I s l a m i c
Bureau.
s
At the conference, agreement was reached to accept the S y k e s
p r o p o s a l , b u t with a m a j o r modification that cut the s u b s t a n c e out of
it. T h e A r a b B u r e a u (as it was to be called) was not to be a s e p a r a t e
body, but merely a section of the C a i r o Intelligence D e p a r t m e n t .
T h i s was insisted on by K i t c h e n e r (represented by F i t z G e r a l d ) and
by the F o r e i g n Office; they did not intend to s u r r e n d e r the control
they exercised over British policy. C a i r o was authorized to establish
and staff a new entity; b u t a central agency to take c h a r g e of overall
policy was not c r e a t e d — a n d that h a d been the point of the S y k e s
C R E A T I N G T H E ARAB
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171
p r o p o s a l . T h e various d e p a r t m e n t s of g o v e r n m e n t continued to m a k e
a n d carry out their independent a n d often conflicting policies. T h e
leading role continued to be played by K i t c h e n e r , to w h o m the
F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y deferred. S y k e s continued to m a k e policy only as a
representative of K i t c h e n e r , a n d not in his own right as chief of an
independent agency; K i t c h e n e r , who d i d not wish to relinquish
control, insisted that the situation s h o u l d remain that way.
T h e head of N a v a l Intelligence q u e s t i o n e d the desirability of
creating the new b u r e a u in C a i r o a l o n g the lines that S y k e s a n d
Clayton p r o p o s e d ; t o placate him, his c a n d i d a t e , D a v i d G . H o g a r t h ,
an O x f o r d archaeologist serving as a N a v a l Intelligence officer, was
n a m e d to be its h e a d . H o g a r t h was a s h a d o w y figure who had worked
with British intelligence agencies before the war.
H o g a r t h replaced the acting head of the A r a b B u r e a u , Alfred
Parker, a career a r m y officer who was Kitchener's nephew. F r o m the
outset H o g a r t h worked directly u n d e r C l a y t o n , whose principal views
he s e e m s to have s h a r e d . U n d e r H o g a r t h , the b u r e a u fought to assert
the views of Wingate a n d C l a y t o n — w h o wanted to e x p a n d British
E g y p t ' s control of the A r a b w o r l d — a s against those of the F o r e i g n
Office a n d the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a .
An e v e n - t e m p e r e d , low-keyed officer of the S u d a n g o v e r n m e n t
n a m e d K i n a h a n Cornwallis b e c a m e H o g a r t h ' s d e p u t y , a n d Wingate's
secretary, a n officer n a m e d G . S . S y m e s , c a m e over t o the A r a b
B u r e a u from the S u d a n . Philip G r a v e s , a former Times c o r r e s p o n d ent, also joined the b u r e a u ; a n d H o g a r t h b r o u g h t i n T h o m a s E d w a r d
( " T . E . " ) L a w r e n c e , a y o u n g m a n who had worked for him at the
A s h m o l e a n M u s e u m in O x f o r d a n d over whose career he had p r e s i d e d
ever since.
L a w r e n c e was later to win renown as " L a w r e n c e of
Arabia."
At the b e g i n n i n g Clayton did not have an expert in T u r k i s h
a f f a i r s — a n d in w a g i n g an intelligence w a r against T u r k e y that was
an evident d i s a d v a n t a g e . T h e n he h a d a stroke of luck. On 10
D e c e m b e r 1915, W y n d h a m D e e d e s — w h o had served in the O t t o m a n
G e n d a r m e r i e before the w a r — a r r i v e d in Cairo from G a l l i p o l i ; in
early J a n u a r y Clayton s u c c e e d e d in co-opting h i m as d e p u t y head of
E g y p t i a n Intelligence, where his k n o w l e d g e of T u r k i s h affairs p r o v e d
an invaluable asset.
S o o n C a i r o was bustling with y o u n g M e m b e r s of Parliament a n d
others a m b i t i o u s to have a say in M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy, revolving
a r o u n d the A r a b B u r e a u . A m o n g t h e m were A u b r e y H e r b e r t , M . P . ,
and G e o r g e L l o y d , M . P . , both M a r k Sykes's friends f r o m before the
Lawrence worked closely with the Arab Bureau, but was not officially posted to
it until the end of 1916.
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QUAGMIRE
war. At last C a i r o had b e c o m e a center of British p o l i c y - m a k i n g for
the M i d d l e E a s t ; a n d Clayton had the satisfaction of knowing that in
L o n d o n the real m a k e r s of Britain's M i d d l e E a s t policy were Cairo's
leader, L o r d K i t c h e n e r , a n d his representative, M a r k S y k e s .
23
M A K I N G PROMISES TO T H E
ARABS
i
When S y k e s r e t u r n e d f r o m the E a s t at the end of 1915, he b r o u g h t
back t o L o n d o n s o m e t h i n g m o r e i m m e d i a t e l y startling a n d o f m o r e
lasting i m p o r t a n c e than his idea of creating an A r a b B u r e a u . What he
b r o u g h t was news of a m y s t e r i o u s y o u n g A r a b who claimed that he
and his friends c o u l d help Britain win the war. T h e y o u n g m a n ' s
n a m e w a s M u h a m m e d Sharif a l - F a r u q i .
N o t h i n g w a s known of a l - F a r u q i then; a n d little is known of h i m
now. He e m e r g e d f r o m obscurity in the a u t u m n of 1915, a n d held
the attention of the British g o v e r n m e n t well into 1916, b e f o r e s l i p p i n g
b a c k into o b s c u r i t y a n d d y i n g y o u n g , killed on a road in I r a q in 1920
d u r i n g a tribal r a i d . D u r i n g his m o n t h s in the spotlight in 1915—16,
he directly or indirectly led Britain to p r o m i s e concessions to F r a n c e ,
R u s s i a , A r a b s , a n d others i n the p o s t w a r M i d d l e E a s t . A s m i d d l e m a n
between B r i t i s h officials a n d A r a b l e a d e r s , he w a s either m i s u n d e r stood or else m i s r e p r e s e n t e d each to the other. O n e can only g u e s s at
his m o t i v e s . To the twentieth-century M i d d l e E a s t , he left a legacy
of m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g that time h a s not yet entirely d i s s i p a t e d .
II
T h e b a c k g r o u n d t o the a s t o n i s h i n g a l - F a r u q i e p i s o d e w a s the q u a s i a g r e e m e n t L o r d K i t c h e n e r h a d r e a c h e d with the E m i r H u s s e i n o f
M e c c a at the outset of the war. As noted earlier, L o r d K i t c h e n e r ,
r e g a r d i n g the E m i r H u s s e i n as a spiritual rather than a material
force,* had initiated a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with him in the a u t u m n of
* Reginald Wingate, who governed the Sudan, was alone among Kitchener's
followers in believing from the very outset of the Ottoman war that Hussein could
be of military assistance to Britain.
173
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THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE
1914 that had been c o n c l u d e d on t e r m s satisfactory to both m e n .
Hussein* was to do nothing for the m o m e n t ; he would not use his
spiritual prestige against Britain in the O t t o m a n war (as K i t c h e n e r
had feared he m i g h t d o ) a n d , at s o m e future point, he w o u l d use it in
favor of Britain (as K i t c h e n e r h o p e d he w o u l d do when the war was
over a n d British rivalry with R u s s i a r e s u m e d ) .
M a t t e r s having been settled early in 1915, the British R e s i d e n c y in
C a i r o was s u r p r i s e d to receive another letter from H u s s e i n half a year
later, in the s u m m e r of 1915, s u d d e n l y d e m a n d i n g — w i t h o u t explanation—that almost all of A r a b A s i a s h o u l d b e c o m e an independent
k i n g d o m u n d e r his rule. ( A s indicated earlier, British officials were
u n a w a r e that H u s s e i n w o u l d u n d e r s t a n d that they were offering him
a k i n g d o m when they s u g g e s t e d that he should b e c o m e the A r a b
caliph; a n d it was the k i n g d o m , not the caliphate, that t e m p t e d h i m
at the t i m e . )
H u s s e i n ' s u n e x p e c t e d d e m a n d , c o m i n g without explanation after
m o n t h s of silence, a r o u s e d wonder a n d mirth in British C a i r o . An
a m u s e d R o n a l d S t o r r s c o m m e n t e d that H u s s e i n ought to be satisfied
to be allowed to keep the province of the H e j a z . S t o r r s c o m m e n t e d
that H u s s e i n "knows he is d e m a n d i n g , possibly as a b a s i s of negotiations, far m o r e than he has the right, the hope, or the p o w e r to
expect." S i r H e n r y M c M a h o n , the British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r i n
E g y p t , not wishing to d i s c o u r a g e H u s s e i n , gently replied to him that
discussion of M i d d l e E a s t e r n frontiers ought to be p o s t p o n e d until
the e n d of the war.
B u t H u s s e i n ' s s u d d e n d e m a n d for a n independent A r a b k i n g d o m
was by no m e a n s the u n r e a s o n a b l e act that it a p p e a r e d to be at the
time in C a i r o . U n b e k n o w n s t to M c M a h o n and S t o r r s , what had
h a p p e n e d in M e c c a was that in J a n u a r y 1915 H u s s e i n had discovered
written evidence that the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t was p l a n n i n g to
d e p o s e him at the end of the w a r — a n d indeed had p o s t p o n e d d e p o s ing him only b e c a u s e of the c o m i n g of the w a r . He p r o m p t l y sent
his s o n Feisal to see the G r a n d Vizier in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , b u t learned
that there was little c h a n c e of p e r s u a d i n g the Porte to reverse this
decision.
1
2
T h e Y o u n g T u r k plan t o d e p o s e h i m forced H u s s e i n , against his
inclinations, to consider o p p o s i n g T u r k e y in the war. F e a r i n g that
to do so might isolate h i m in the A r a b world, H u s s e i n sent F e i s a l
to D a m a s c u s to s o u n d out the possibility of obtaining s u p p o r t
from the A r a b secret societies h e a d q u a r t e r e d there. In carrying
out this mission, Feisal s t o p p e d in D a m a s c u s twice: en route to
Hussein ibn Ali, the Sherif of Mecca and its Emir, is referred to variously as
Hussein, the Sherif, the Sherif Hussein, the Emir Hussein and, later, K i n g Hussein.
He is also referred to as the ruler of the Hejaz and, later, as K i n g of the Hejaz.
MAKING PROMISES TO THE ARABS
175
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to see the G r a n d Vizier, a n d again on his way back
from C o n s t a n t i n o p l e afterwards.
On his first s t o p in D a m a s c u s , in late M a r c h 1915, Feisal was told
that there were three O t t o m a n a r m y divisions with mainly A r a b
soldiers concentrated in the D a m a s c u s area, a n d that the secret
society c o n s p i r a t o r s believed that these divisions would follow their
lead. T h o u g h they talked of leading a revolt against T u r k e y , the
m e m b e r s of the secret societies also e x p r e s s e d reservations a b o u t
doing s o . F o r one thing, m o s t o f t h e m believed G e r m a n y would s o o n
win the w a r ; they were b o u n d to ask themselves why they s h o u l d
join the losing side. F o r another, as between the O t t o m a n E m p i r e
and the E u r o p e a n Allies, they preferred to be ruled by M o s l e m
T u r k s than b y E u r o p e a n C h r i s t i a n s .
A l t h o u g h evidence of what they were p l a n n i n g is scanty, the secret
societies a p p a r e n t l y were inclined to set up a b i d d i n g competition
between Britain a n d T u r k e y for A r a b loyalties. T h e y a d v i s e d H u s s e i n
(through F e i s a l ) not to join the Allies unless Britain p l e d g e d to
s u p p o r t i n d e p e n d e n c e for m o s t of A r a b western A s i a . With s u c h a
British p l e d g e in h a n d , the secret societies c o u l d then have asked the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e to m a t c h it.
After his m e e t i n g s in D a m a s c u s , F e i s a l p r o c e e d e d to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e
to meet with the G r a n d Vizier. When he returned to D a m a s c u s on
23 M a y 1915, on his way h o m e , he f o u n d the situation considerably
c h a n g e d . D j e m a l P a s h a , the T u r k i s h governor o f S y r i a , h a d scented
an A r a b plot a n d taken s t e p s to s m a s h it. He h a d c r u s h e d the secret
societies, arresting m a n y of the ringleaders a n d d i s p e r s i n g others. He
had broken up the three A r a b a r m y divisions, a n d h a d sent m a n y of
their officers away to Gallipoli a n d e l s e w h e r e .
3
A handful of the r e m a i n i n g c o n s p i r a t o r s — s i x men a c c o r d i n g to
one account, nine a c c o r d i n g to a n o t h e r — n o w told Feisal that they
could no longer initiate a revolt against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ; H u s s e i n
should do it, a n d they would follow him—if H u s s e i n could first
induce the British to p l e d g e s u p p o r t for A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e .
T h e m e n of the secret societies h a d drafted a d o c u m e n t defining
the territories that were to be A r a b a n d independent. T h e d o c u m e n t
w a s called the D a m a s c u s Protocol. Feisal b r o u g h t it b a c k from
D a m a s c u s to M e c c a . It set forth the d e m a n d s that the E m i r H u s s e i n
was to s u b m i t to B r i t a i n . H u s s e i n h a d nothing to lose in m a k i n g the
d e m a n d s . D o i n g s o w o u l d help him obtain s u p p o r t f r o m the secret
societies—for whatever that m i g h t be worth—when he launched his
revolt; it would also stake his c l a i m to leadership in A r a b i a n a n d
A r a b politics, a n d w o u l d help to justify his s u p p o r t of C h r i s t i a n s
against M o s l e m T u r k e y . So in the s u m m e r of 1915 he sent his letter
incorporating the D a m a s c u s Protocol d e m a n d s to the British
Residency in C a i r o , where the d e m a n d s — a s has been s e e n — w e r e not
taken seriously.
4
176
THE
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QUAGMIRE
III
L i e u t e n a n t M u h a m m e d S h a r i f a l - F a r u q i , a 24-year-old A r a b O t t o m a n
staff officer from M o s u l (in what is now I r a q ) , was a secret society
m e m b e r stationed in D a m a s c u s at the time of Feisal's first s t o p there
in early 1915. He m a y have been a m o n g those who m e t with Feisal
there at that t i m e ; if not, he learned what had been said from
colleagues who had a t t e n d e d the meeting.
A l - F a r u q i was one of the secret society officers o r d e r e d out of
D a m a s c u s a n d sent by D j e m a l P a s h a to the Gallipoli front, where
casualties were high. S e n d i n g s u s p e c t e d A r a b plotters to the front
lines to be killed looked to be a deliberate policy of D j e m a l ' s in
crushing sedition. On the other h a n d , there were valid military
reasons for s e n d i n g t r o o p s to reinforce the Gallipoli front where the
O t t o m a n r e g i m e was fighting for survival. A l - F a r u q i m a y have s u s pected, but could not have been s u r e , that his p o s t i n g to Gallipoli
showed that D j e m a l s u s p e c t e d h i m of treason.
A l - F a r u q i kept in touch with secret society officers who r e m a i n e d
in D a m a s c u s . F r o m t h e m he learned further details of what F e i s a l
a n d H u s s e i n were d o i n g . He learned that the remnant of the secret
societies in D a m a s c u s h a d e n c o u r a g e d H u s s e i n to lead an A r a b revolt
against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e if Britain would first agree to s u p p o r t
the D a m a s c u s Protocol: the secret society p r o g r a m for A r a b i n d e p e n d ence. He learned, too, that H u s s e i n had in fact written to the
British in C a i r o in the s u m m e r of 1915 incorporating the D a m a s c u s
Protocol in his letter a n d presenting it as his own set of d e m a n d s for
his establishment as m o n a r c h of an A r a b k i n g d o m c o m p r i s i n g a l m o s t
all of A r a b western A s i a .
In the a u t u m n of 1915, L i e u t e n a n t a l - F a r u q i deserted the O t t o m a n
forces at Gallipoli and c r o s s e d over to Allied lines. He claimed to
have important information for British Intelligence in C a i r o , a n d was
p r o m p t l y sent to E g y p t for interrogation. P e r h a p s he feared that
D j e m a l was a b o u t to obtain proof of his m e m b e r s h i p in the antiT u r k i s h conspiracy, a n d d e c i d e d to e s c a p e while there was time.
P e r h a p s he h o p e d to win glory by playing a lone hand in world
politics. Whatever his motives, he acted on an i m p u l s e of his o w n :
n o b o d y had entrusted h i m with a m i s s i o n .
A l - F a r u q i s p o k e little E n g l i s h , a n d it is difficult to tell f r o m the
f r a g m e n t a r y historical record the extent to which he was correctly
u n d e r s t o o d or the extent to which w o r d s were put in his m o u t h by
those who wanted to hear what they claimed he s a i d . U n d e r interrogation by British Intelligence officials, the y o u n g officer c l a i m e d
to be a m e m b e r of the secret A r a b military society a l - A h d . He
invoked the n a m e of its leading figure stationed in D a m a s c u s ,
G e n e r a l Y a s i n a l - H a s h i m i , Chief of Staff of the O t t o m a n 12th
Division, a n d although a l - F a r u q i a d m i t t e d that "I am not authorized
MAKING
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THE
177
ARABS
to d i s c u s s with you officially" the p r o p o s a l s of al-'Ahd, the y o u n g
deserter p r e t e n d e d — f o r whatever r e a s o n — t o be a s p o k e s m a n for the
organization a n d was accepted as s u c h by G i l b e r t C l a y t o n , the head
of British Intelligence in C a i r o . T h o u g h his story was unverified,
British Intelligence believed it and did not investigate further. He
was not in fact a representative of al-'Ahd or indeed of any other
g r o u p : Clayton had been d u p e d .
5
What g a v e plausibility to a l - F a r u q i ' s claim to represent al-'Ahd
was t h a t — f r o m his colleagues in D a m a s c u s — h e knew the details of
the British c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with Sherif H u s s e i n a n d knew a b o u t the
d e m a n d s that H u s s e i n h a d sent to C a i r o in the s u m m e r of 1915.
A l - F a r u q i , p u r p o r t e d l y s p e a k i n g for the A r a b a r m y officers in
D a m a s c u s , d e m a n d e d that Britain give a p l e d g e to s u p p o r t an independent A r a b state within the frontiers that H u s s e i n had outlined.
When he did so the pieces s u d d e n l y s e e m e d to fall into place for
British Intelligence. Clayton g r a s p e d the essential fact it was no
coincidence that the two sets of d e m a n d s were identical a n d that
both were the s a m e as those that a l - M a s r i — t h e founder of a l - ' A h d —
a n d other A r a b exiles in C a i r o had been m a k i n g since the outset of
the war. If the secret societies were b a c k i n g H u s s e i n , the E m i r of
M e c c a was no longer to be thought of as representing merely his
section of the A r a b i a n p e n i n s u l a . F o r if the A r a b secret societies
were as powerful as a l - F a r u q i represented t h e m to be and as C l a y t o n
erroneously i m a g i n e d t h e m to be, H u s s e i n would be s p e a k i n g for
h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of O t t o m a n t r o o p s a n d millions of O t t o m a n
subjects.
A l - F a r u q i w a r n e d C l a y t o n a n d his colleagues that they m u s t reply
to H u s s e i n immediately. A c c o r d i n g to a l - F a r u q i , the British h a d to
g u a r a n t e e the i n d e p e n d e n c e of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g M i d d l e E a s t if
they wanted al-'Ahd to lead an A r a b rising within the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e . Presenting an u l t i m a t u m , the y o u n g man g a v e Britain only a
few weeks to accept the offer; otherwise, he s a i d , the A r a b m o v e m e n t
would throw all of its s u p p o r t behind G e r m a n y a n d the O t t o m a n
Empire.
C a i r o was seized with excitement. R o n a l d S t o r r s wrote to
F i t z G e r a l d / K i t c h e n e r on 10 O c t o b e r 1915, that " T h e A r a b q u e s t i o n
is reaching an acute s t a t e . " At a b o u t the s a m e time Clayton c o m p o s e d a m e m o r a n d u m outlining his conversations with a l - F a r u q i
for General Maxwell, the British army c o m m a n d e r in E g y p t , who
urgently cabled K i t c h e n e r on 12 O c t o b e r that a "powerful organisation" existed b e h i n d enemy lines, that Hussein's p r o p o s a l s had
actually c o m e from that organization, and that unless a g r e e m e n t
were reached with it, the A r a b s would go over to the e n e m y .
6
7
Kitchener's followers in C a i r o apparently believed that an A r a b
* A curious assertion, since the Arabs were already in the enemy camp.
178
THE
MIDDLE
EASTERN
QUAGMIRE
rebellion would enable t h e m to s a v e the Allied a r m i e s who were
fighting for their lives at the e d g e s of the Gallipoli peninsula in the
D a r d a n e l l e s . T h e British a r m y c o m m a n d e r a t Gallipoli was Ian
H a m i l t o n , a K i t c h e n e r p r o t e g e , a n d K i t c h e n e r ' s C a i r o followers m a y
well have been in touch with h i m to help t h e m p e r s u a d e the reluctant
H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in E g y p t , S i r H e n r y M c M a h o n , to meet the
A r a b d e m a n d s . T h a t they did so is s u g g e s t e d by a statement m a d e
by M c M a h o n a year later, d i s a v o w i n g responsibility for the (by then
u n s u c c e s s f u l ) A r a b Revolt. A c c o r d i n g t o M c M a h o n ,
It was the m o s t unfortunate date in my life when I was left in
charge of the A r a b m o v e m e n t a n d I think a few words are
necessary to explain that it is nothing to do with m e : it is purely
military b u s i n e s s . It b e g a n at the urgent request of S i r I a n
H a m i l t o n at Gallipoli. I was b e g g e d by the F o r e i g n Office to
take i m m e d i a t e action and draw the A r a b s out of the war. At
that m o m e n t a large portion of the forces at Gallipoli a n d nearly
the whole o f the force i n M e s o p o t a m i a were A r a b s . . .
8
While urgently pleading with L o n d o n for authorization to meet alF a r u q i ' s d e m a n d s , the R e s i d e n c y r e p o r t e d that those d e m a n d s were
o p e n to negotiation: the y o u n g A r a b would make concessions where
necessary. In the weeks a n d m o n t h s that followed, a l - F a r u q i s u c ceeded in r e m a i n i n g at the center of the dialogue. In what was
b e c o m i n g a great hoax, the y o u n g m a n drew a n d redrew the frontiers
of countries a n d e m p i r e s , in the c o u r s e of exchanges a m o n g the
British R e s i d e n c y , the E m i r of M e c c a , a n d A r a b nationalist leaders,
each of w h o m took a l - F a r u q i to be the emissary of one of the other
parties. A l - F a r u q i introduced himself in a letter to H u s s e i n as an al'Ahd m e m b e r who h a d the ear of the British, while in C a i r o he
p u r p o r t e d to negotiate for H u s s e i n . Feisal tried to discover the
identity of the m y s t e r i o u s A r a b w h o h a d b e c o m e so important in
C a i r o , b u t learned only his n a m e , which told him nothing: "I did not
know h i m , " Feisal wrote in a report to H u s s e i n .
9
IV
Clayton, who was strongly d i s p o s e d to o p p o s e F r e n c h claims to the
interior of S y r i a (on a line that r u n s from A l e p p o to D a m a s c u s
through H o r n s and H a m a ) , reported that a l - F a r u q i said H u s s e i n
would never allow F r a n c e to have A l e p p o , Horns, H a m a , and
D a m a s c u s . Whether C l a y t o n was q u o t i n g , m i s q u o t i n g , o r p a r a p h r a s i n g what a l - F a r u q i actually told him m a y never be known.
Clayton recognized that F r a n c e could not be excluded from the coast
MAKING PROMISES TO THE ARABS
179
of S y r i a - L e b a n o n , where C h r i s t i a n s u n d e r F r e n c h p a t r o n a g e res i d e d ; a n d again he reported that a l - F a r u q i fell in with his views, a n d
s e e m e d willing, in H u s s e i n ' s n a m e , to s u r r e n d e r A r a b claims in that
area. A l - F a r u q i informed H u s s e i n that he had been asked to m a k e
s u c h a c o n c e s s i o n — a n d h a d refused.
B a s e d o n Clayton's r e p o r t s , the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r , S i r H e n r y
M c M a h o n , in a cable to the F o r e i g n Office quoted a l - F a r u q i as
saying that the E m i r of M e c c a w o u l d not insist on maintaining his
original d e m a n d that his western frontier should extend to the sea,
b u t that he would o p p o s e "by force of a r m s " any F r e n c h attempt to
occupy the districts o f A l e p p o , Horns, H a m a , a n d D a m a s c u s .
M c M a h o n a n d Clayton wanted authorization to accept these t e r m s .
B u t the geographical references m a d e by M c M a h o n were hazy.
Was reference m a d e , for e x a m p l e , to the city of D a m a s c u s , the
environs of D a m a s c u s , or the province of D a m a s c u s ? D i d "districts"
mean wilayahs (environs) or vilayets (provinces)? Was it a l - F a r u q i
who s p o k e of districts, or was it M c M a h o n or Clayton? By districts,
did the British m e a n towns?
T h e significance o f the A l e p p o - H o m s - H a m a - D a m a s c u s d e m a n d
has been bitterly d e b a t e d ever since. F o r d e c a d e s afterward p a r t i s a n s
of an A r a b Palestine a r g u e d that if these four geographical t e r m s
were properly u n d e r s t o o d , British C a i r o had p r o m i s e d that Palestine
would be A r a b ; while partisans of a J e w i s h Palestine a r g u e d the
reverse. In a sense the debate was pointless; as will be seen, when
the time c a m e to m a k e pledges, M c M a h o n deliberately u s e d p h r a s e s
so devious as to c o m m i t himself to nothing at all.
If Clayton was the author of the A l e p p o - H o m s - H a m a - D a m a s c u s
geographical definition, he was p r o b a b l y thinking of S y r i a and
L e b a n o n a n d of how to split off the interior of the country from the
French-influenced coast. T h e seacoast represented one of the two
north-south lines of civilization in S y r i a ; the four towns represented
the other. S i t u a t e d between m o u n t a i n a n d unrelieved desert, they
defined the long narrow corridor which w a s the agriculturally cultivated region of inland S y r i a . On the m a p of S y r i a in the then-current
(1910) edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, D a m a s c u s , A l e p p o ,
Horns, a n d H a m a are shown as the only towns of inland S y r i a ; so
they were the towns an E n g l i s h m a n might specify if he sought to
define the territory of inland S y r i a . G r a n t e d , the towns are dissimilar,
so that leading historians* have thought it illogical to g r o u p them
together; b u t to a reader of the Encyclopaedia the logic of g r o u p i n g
them together would be evident.
1 0
T h e towns had another important feature in c o m m o n : they constituted the railroad line. T h e F r e n c h - b u i l t line of the Societe O t t o m a n e
* Professor Elie Kedourie among them.
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THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE
du C h e m i n de F e r D a m a s - H a m a et P r o l o n g e m e n t s , which was
opened in 1895, connected A l e p p o in the north of Syria to D a m a s c u s
in the s o u t h . D a m a s c u s , A l e p p o , H o r n s , and H a m a were its four
s t o p s . At D a m a s c u s one m a d e the connection with the H e j a z railroad,
which ran south to M e d i n a , connecting S y r i a with H u s s e i n ' s d o m a i n .
S u r e l y this would have a p p e a r e d to be of i m m e n s e significance at the
t i m e ; a n d if a l - F a r u q i , not C l a y t o n , was the one who first mentioned
the four towns by n a m e , surely it was this that he h a d in m i n d .
1 1
In an era in which railroads were considered to be of p r i m e
military and political i m p o r t a n c e , any soldier or politician representing H u s s e i n in a territorial negotiation would p r e s u m a b l y have insisted on gaining control of the railroad stations: not merely of
D a m a s c u s , as the metropolis of the south, a n d of A l e p p o , as the
metropolis of the north, but also of the two railroad towns that
connected t h e m : H o m s a n d H a m a .
Recent experience dictated the d e m a n d . T h e Y o u n g T u r k s (before
the war intervened) had planned to d o m i n a t e the H e j a z by control of
the railroad line r u n n i n g from D a m a s c u s down to the main cities of
the H e j a z . It was only to be expected that if H u s s e i n were on the
winning side of the war he would p u r s u e the mirror o p p o s i t e of their
strategy: he would d o m i n a t e inland S y r i a by control of its railroad
line.
Whether or not they formulated a l - F a r u q i ' s A l e p p o - t o - D a m a s c u s
d e m a n d s , C l a y t o n a n d his friends were afraid that other British
officials might not u n d e r s t a n d the i m p o r t a n c e of meeting t h e m .
Referring to S i r Milne C h e e t h a m , his superior at the R e s i d e n c y who
had been acting head until M c M a h o n arrived, R o n a l d S t o r r s wrote
to F i t z G e r a l d / K i t c h e n e r at C h r i s t m a s i m p l o r i n g t h e m to give priority
to the A r a b negotiation a n d a d d i n g " E x c u s e my worrying you with
these difficulties, b u t if you knew the difficulty Clayton a n d I had all
last a u t u m n in getting S i r Milne to m a k e any proposal a b o u t , or take
any interest in, the A r a b q u e s t i o n , vou would u n d e r s t a n d our
•
»12
anxiety.
Clayton's luck was that S i r M a r k S y k e s — a s mentioned e a r l i e r — h a d
s t o p p e d in C a i r o again on his way back from India to L o n d o n in
N o v e m b e r 1915. H a v i n g told S y k e s the a l - F a r u q i story, Clayton a n d
his colleagues infected S y k e s with their belief in the electrifying
possibility that the A r a b half of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e m i g h t c o m e
over to the Allied side of the war. T h i s was the a m a z i n g news that
greeted S y k e s on his arrival, a n d that necessarily altered all
calculations.
T h a t the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world could be a major factor in the war
c a m e as especial news to S y k e s . His view of politics in the area had
been that a r r a n g e m e n t s were m a d e between the rival foreign G r e a t
P o w e r s ; the interests and aspirations of native populations had not
MAKING
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181
ARABS
entered in any significant way into his calculations. He h a d always
a d m i r e d the T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g ruling class but had not thought m u c h
of the subject populations of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e in Asia. H i s
u n d e r g r a d u a t e d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e m had been an exercise in pejorative
vocabulary.
Of town A r a b s , he h a d written that they were "cowardly," "insolent
yet d i s p i c a b l e [ s i c ] , " "vicious as far as their feeble bodies will a d m i t . "
B e d o u i n A r a b s were "rapacious, greedy . . . a n i m a l s . " Y e t these
were to be Britain's key allies in the M i d d l e Eastern fighting, according to the new information s u p p l i e d by C l a y t o n . S y k e s , who had a
reputation for picking up opinions a n d a r g u m e n t s without taking the
time to think them t h r o u g h , now showed that he could discard them
with equal e a s e . He b e c a m e a s u d d e n convert to the c a u s e of the
native peoples of the M i d d l e E a s t .
l j
F r o m school days o n w a r d , S y k e s had harbored a n a b i d i n g and
almost obsessive fear of J e w s , whose web of d a n g e r o u s international
intrigue he discerned in m a n y an o b s c u r e corner. Y e t there was
another g r o u p a b o u t which his feelings had been even m o r e violent.
"Even J e w s have their g o o d points," he had written, "but A r m e n i a n s
have n o n e . " N o w S y k e s met with A r m e n i a n leaders in C a i r o , a n d
enthusiastically p r o p o s e d the creation of an A r m e n i a n a r m y , to be
recruited from prisoners-of-war a n d A r m e n i a n s in the U n i t e d S t a t e s ,
to invade T u r k e y . He g a v e it as his opinion that he could have the
a r m y in b e i n g in a b o u t eight w e e k s .
14
15
Newly enthusiastic about M i d d l e E a s t e r n e r s , S y k e s was entirely
won over to Clayton's view that A r a b a r m i e s could s u p p l y the key to
victory. Clayton p r i m e d him to return to L o n d o n p r e p a r e d to a r g u e
Cairo's new thesis that H u s s e i n could be m o r e i m p o r t a n t than the
F r e n c h in b r i n g i n g the war in the E a s t to a swift conclusion.
Clayton also coached A u b r e y H e r b e r t , an M . P . serving in C a i r o
Intelligence, who was returning to L o n d o n , and who undertook to
see L o r d K i t c h e n e r a n d the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , Sir E d w a r d G r e y , t o
explain m a t t e r s to t h e m . H e r b e r t , with Clayton's help, drafted a
s t r o n g m e m o r a n d u m u r g i n g the F r e n c h to give up their claim to
D a m a s c u s , A l e p p o , H o m s , and H a m a , s o that the towns could b e
ceded to H u s s e i n .
V
With m u c h that was new to report and to advocate, S y k e s returned
to a w a r m w e l c o m e in L o n d o n in D e c e m b e r 1915. It was then that
he p r o p o s e d creating an A r a b B u r e a u a n d took the first s t e p s leading
to its establishment (see C h a p t e r 2 2 ) .
No other man had m e t with every important British officer from
182
THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE
the B a l k a n s a n d E g y p t to I n d i a . M a u r i c e H a n k e y a r r a n g e d an audience for h i m with K i n g G e o r g e . H a n k e y also a r r a n g e d for S y k e s to
go before the inner War C o m m i t t e e of the C a b i n e t , of which he was
Secretary.
T h e principal m e s s a g e that S y k e s b r o u g h t back to the C a b i n e t was
that the A r a b s — w h o m he h a d previously d i s r e g a r d e d as a factor in
the w a r — w e r e now of p r i m e i m p o r t a n c e to the Allies; and that it was
vitally and urgently important to reach agreement with H u s s e i n .
Although C a i r o a n d S y k e s s e e m e d unaware of the fact, in L o n d o n
it was recognized that Britain w o u l d have to pay a p r i c e — a n d a high
one-—to obtain F r a n c e ' s consent to the m a k i n g of p r o m i s e s to H u s s e i n ;
she would have to m a k e major concessions to the F r e n c h in return
for the privilege of b e i n g allowed to m a k e concessions to the A r a b s .
K i t c h e n e r and G r e y were willing to p a y the price. O t h e r s were not.
It was the view of L o r d C u r z o n , former Viceroy of I n d i a , that no
p r o m i s e s should be m a d e to the A r a b s b e c a u s e they were "a p e o p l e
who are at this m o m e n t fighting against us as h a r d as they c a n . "
T h e new Secretary of S t a t e for I n d i a , A u s t e n C h a m b e r l a i n , was also
o p p o s e d t o d o i n g s o ; but K i t c h e n e r , b a c k i n g S y k e s , C l a y t o n , a n d
S t o r r s , vehemently insisted on authorizing C a i r o to r e s p o n d immediately a n d to reach agreement with H u s s e i n ; a n d K i t c h e n e r ' s
views carried the day. A u t h o r i z e d a n d directed to do so by L o n d o n ,
Sir H e n r y M c M a h o n then r e s u m e d the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with
M e c c a — t h e f a m o u s M c M a h o n letters, the m e a n i n g of which has
been d e b a t e d so m u c h a n d so long by partisans of A r a b and J e w i s h
c a u s e s in Palestine.
1 6
In the interim, H u s s e i n h a d written M c M a h o n a second letter. In
it he accused M c M a h o n of "lukewarmth a n d hesitancy" b e c a u s e of
his reluctance to d i s c u s s frontiers and b o u n d a r i e s . H a d they been
merely his own claims (the E m i r continued) s u c h a discussion indeed
could have been p o s t p o n e d until the end of the war. B u t they were
not his own claims. T h e y did not even represent his own s u g g e s t i o n s .
T h e y were d e m a n d s that h a d been formulated by o t h e r s : by "our
p e o p l e . " C a i r o R e s i d e n c y officials now knew that this m e a n t the
mysterious secret society conspirators whom they imagined had a
m a s s following in the A r a b world.
17
On 24 October 1915 M c M a h o n replied in a quite different spirit to
H u s s e i n . Instructed b y L o r d K i t c h e n e r t o m a k e the necessary
p l e d g e s , he reluctantly a g r e e d to enter into a discussion of specific
territories a n d frontiers; b u t as he evidently was unwilling to a s s u m e
* As noted earlier, advocates of an Arab Palestine have argued for decades that
the geographical terms employed by McMahon, if properly interpreted, indicate that
McMahon was pledging that Palestine would be Arab; and advocates of a Jewish
Palestine have argued the reverse.
MAKING
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183
personal responsibility for m a k i n g definite c o m m i t m e n t s , he u s e d
l a n g u a g e evasively. On the one h a n d , he a g r e e d that after the war the
A r a b s s h o u l d have their i n d e p e n d e n c e ; b u t , on the other, he indicated
that E u r o p e a n advisers and officials would be needed to establish the
administration of A r a b countries, a n d insisted that these advisers
and officials s h o u l d be exclusively British. In other w o r d s , any
"independent" A r a b k i n g d o m in the postwar M i d d l e E a s t would have
to be a British protectorate.
What territories should be included in the British-protected independent A r a b k i n g d o m ? M c M a h o n replied b y dividing the lands
claimed by H u s s e i n into four areas a n d explaining that Britain could
not bind herself to s u p p o r t H u s s e i n ' s claims in any one of t h e m .
M c M a h o n b e g a n b y r e m a r k i n g that H u s s e i n m u s t give u p claim t o
territory west of the districts of D a m a s c u s , A l e p p o , Horns, a n d
H a m a . A l - F a r u q i already had a g r e e d (or at least M c M a h o n thought
he h a d ) that H u s s e i n would concede this point. M c M a h o n later
wrote that he intended to say that the territories H u s s e i n a n d the
A r a b s were not to have were coastal S y r i a , L e b a n o n , a n d Palestine,
with an eastern frontier that might be d r a w n s o m e w h e r e in what is
now J o r d a n . H i s l a n g u a g e can be read that way, but on a m o r e
natural reading he was referring only to S y r i a - L e b a n o n here, not
Palestine.
In the eastern portion of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g M i d d l e E a s t , the
M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces o f B a s r a a n d B a g h d a d , M c M a h o n o b s e r v e d
that the established position a n d interests of Britain were s u c h that
she would have to establish "special administrative a r r a n g e m e n t s "
with respect to t h e m ; whether s u c h a r r a n g e m e n t s would leave any
r o o m for an assertion of A r a b s o v e r e i g n t y — a n d if so when a n d to
what e x t e n t — w a s left u n s a i d .
In the western p o r t i o n — S y r i a and P a l e s t i n e — B r i t a i n could extend
a s s u r a n c e s to H u s s e i n only in those territories "in which she can act
without detriment to the interests of her ally F r a n c e . " S i n c e F r a n c e
at the time claimed those territories in their entirety (indeed S y k e s
discussed F r a n c e ' s claim to Palestine with a l - F a r u q i in N o v e m b e r
1915) it followed that Britain could not p l e d g e s u p p o r t for A r a b
claims with respect to them either—not even to D a m a s c u s , A l e p p o ,
Horns, and H a m a .
T h a t left only A r a b i a , which at the time was divided a m o n g a
n u m b e r of leaders, of w h o m H u s s e i n was one. Britain at the time
enjoyed treaty relationships with other A r a b i a n chiefs, including
H u s s e i n ' s rival, I b n S a u d . In his letter, M c M a h o n pointed out that
he could not p r o m i s e anything to H u s s e i n that w o u l d p r e j u d i c e
Britain's relationships with other A r a b chiefs. By p r o c e s s of elimination, therefore, Britain did not bind herself to s u p p o r t H u s s e i n ' s
claims anywhere at all.
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THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE
A c c o r d i n g to a s u m m a r y later p u b l i s h e d in the secret Arab Bulletin
(no. 5, 18 J u n e 1916), for Britain's military, political, a n d intelligence leaders, the u p s h o t of the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e was that H i s
Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t had indicated a willingness to p r o m o t e indep e n d e n c e in A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g A s i a b u t had refused to c o m m i t itself
with respect to the f o r m s of g o v e r n m e n t that would be installed in
the area or with respect to precise b o u n d a r i e s .
M c M a h o n , an experienced b u r e a u c r a t , had seen the need to be
completely noncommittal. T h e negotiations between S y k e s a n d the
F r e n c h a b o u t the future of the M i d d l e E a s t — t o be d e s c r i b e d
p r e s e n t l y — h a d not yet taken place, a n d n o b o d y in the British government knew with any certainty what would have to be conceded to
F r a n c e or, afterwards, t o R u s s i a . M c M a h o n was u n d e r o r d e r s from
K i t c h e n e r not to lose the alliance with H u s s e i n ; b u t the H i g h C o m missioner m u s t have feared that he w o u l d be m a d e the s c a p e g o a t if
he did go ahead to meet H u s s e i n ' s d e m a n d s , and later it was discovered that those d e m a n d s clashed with other conflicting c o m m i t m e n t s Britain might be called u p o n to m a k e .
S u c h fears were b y n o m e a n s u n r e a s o n a b l e . A s W y n d h a m
D e e d e s — t h e C a i r o Intelligence expert o n the O t t o m a n E m p i r e —
analyzed the situation early in 1916, there were three g r o u p s of
A r a b s ; a n d in all honesty Britain could not agree to satisfy the
d e m a n d s of any one of the three. T h e r e were the S y r i a n s , whose
m a i n aim w a s that the hated F r e n c h s h o u l d not be allowed in ("It is
difficult rather to account for this extraordinary dislike
he
wrote, b u t nonetheless it was t h e r e ) ; a n d of course that ran counter
to the d e m a n d s of F r a n c e . T h e r e was H u s s e i n , whose aim w a s to
head an A r a b k i n g d o m ; b u t D e e d e s said that m o s t A r a b s a n d all
T u r k s would be o p p o s e d to this. He wrote that "I think it is the view
of m o s t of u s , a n d is the view of m a n y of the A r a b s a n d all of the
T u r k s themselves" that "this idea is not a practical one." Other
A r a b s , wrote D e e d e s , were unwilling to accept H u s s e i n as their
leader. Finally, there were the A r a b s of I r a q , who (he believed)
wanted i n d e p e n d e n c e for themselves, b u t were up against the intention of the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a to annex and rule t h e m . D e e d e s
feared that the difficulties in the way of arriving at an u n d e r s t a n d i n g
with the A r a b s accordingly might p r o v e " i n s u p e r a b l e . "
18
It therefore w o u l d have been d a n g e r o u s for M c M a h o n as H i g h
C o m m i s s i o n e r to have m a d e any firm c o m m i t m e n t s to H u s s e i n . He
believed that the impatient Wingate had tried to p u s h h i m into doing
so. B u t R e g i n a l d Wingate wrote to Clayton that M c M a h o n had
misinterpreted his views, as had L o r d H a r d i n g e , the Viceroy of
India:
I am afraid b o t h the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r a n d L o r d H a r d i n g e
are u n d e r the i m p r e s s i o n that I am a believer in the creation of
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ARABS
a consolidated A r a b K i n g d o m u n d e r the S h e r i f — O f course any
such notion is altogether remote f r o m my real views, b u t it has
suited m e , as I believe it has suited all of u s , to give the leaders
of the A r a b m o v e m e n t this i m p r e s s i o n a n d we are quite sufficiently covered by the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e which has taken place to
show that we are acting in g o o d faith with the A r a b s as far as
w e have g o n e .
1 9
G i l b e r t C l a y t o n , who strongly o p p o s e d defining Britain's relations
with the A r a b s until the war w a s over, believed that the M c M a h o n
letters had s u c c e e d e d in p u t t i n g the matter off a n d in a v o i d i n g the
giving of any meaningful c o m m i t m e n t . M o n t h s later C l a y t o n
s u m m a r i z e d what M c M a h o n h a d d o n e by writing that " L u c k i l y we
have been very careful indeed to c o m m i t ourselves to nothing
whatsoever."
20
H u s s e i n replied to M c M a h o n that he could not accept the
A l e p p o - H o m s - H a m a - D a m a s c u s f o r m u l a . H e insisted o n having
the provinces of A l e p p o a n d B e i r u t . N o t i n g F r a n c e ' s c l a i m to
L e b a n o n , he wrote that "any concession d e s i g n e d to give F r a n c e or
any other P o w e r p o s s e s s i o n of a single s q u a r e foot of territory in
those p a r t s is quite out of the q u e s t i o n . " So he failed to reach
agreement with M c M a h o n , b u t felt compelled to s u p p o r t the Allies
nonetheless: the Y o u n g T u r k s were g o i n g t o d e p o s e h i m , s o h e had
to rebel against t h e m whether Britain met his t e r m s or not. In a
conversation s o m e years later with D a v i d H o g a r t h , of the A r a b
B u r e a u of British Intelligence in C a i r o , H u s s e i n indicated that with
r e g a r d to Palestine a n d also with r e g a r d to L e b a n o n a n d the other
lands in the M i d d l e E a s t , he did not r e g a r d matters as h a v i n g been
settled. He indicated that he r e g a r d e d all m a t t e r s as b e i n g s u b j e c t to
negotiation at the Peace C o n f e r e n c e . A c c o r d i n g to H o g a r t h , "He
c o m p a r e d o u r s e l v e s a n d himself . . . t o two p e r s o n s a b o u t t o inhabit
one house, b u t not a g r e e d which s h o u l d take which floors or r o o m s . "
2 1
In L o n d o n the F o r e i g n Office took the view that the p r o m i s e s
would never b e c o m e d u e for p a y m e n t : that Britain had p l e d g e d
herself to s u p p o r t A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e only if the A r a b half of the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e rose against the S u l t a n — w h i c h (the F o r e i g n Office
believed) it would never d o . S i n c e the A r a b s would not keep their
side of the b a r g a i n (so ran the a r g u m e n t ) , the British w o u l d be u n d e r
no obligation to keep theirs. T h e F o r e i g n Office, which did not rely
on Clayton, b u t h a d its own sources of information, did not believe
that the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world w a s a b o u t to change sides in the war,
b u t the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , S i r E d w a r d G r e y , saw no h a r m in letting
K i t c h e n e r a n d his lieutenants p r o m i s e anything they wanted as an
inducement to the A r a b s to defect. G r e y told A u s t e n C h a m b e r l a i n
not to worry a b o u t the offers b e i n g m a d e by Cairo as "the whole
thing was a castle in the air which w o u l d never m a t e r i a l i z e . "
22
186
THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE
M c M a h o n , on the other h a n d , worried that the whole thing might
not be a castle in the air. He c a m e , after all, from the G o v e r n m e n t of
I n d i a , whose constant anxiety was the prospect of nationalist agitation. M c M a h o n confided to W y n d h a m D e e d e s that his fear was not
that the plan for an A r a b revolt would break down, but rather that it
w o u l d s u c c e e d — a n d then w o u l d p o s e a danger to B r i t a i n .
To the Viceroy of I n d i a , who claimed that India's interests were
neglected in the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with H u s s e i n , M c M a h o n explained
that "I had necessarily to be v a g u e as on the one hand H M G disliked
being c o m m i t t e d to definite future action, and on the other h a n d any
detailed definition of our d e m a n d s would have frightened off the
A r a b . " He claimed that the negotiations with H u s s e i n w o u l d neither
"establish our rights . . . o r b i n d our h a n d s . "
23
2 4
T h i s explanation d i s t u r b e d the Viceroy, who wrote to the Secretary
of S t a t e for I n d i a a b o u t M c M a h o n ' s claim "that the negotiations are
merely a matter of w o r d s a n d will neither establish our rights, nor
bind our h a n d s in that country. T h a t m a y prove eventually to be the
case, especially if the A r a b s continue to help the enemy, b u t I did
not like p l e d g e s given when there is no intention of keeping t h e m . "
In early 1916 A z i z a l - M a s r i , the A r a b secret society leader, wrote
t o L o r d K i t c h e n e r a p p r o a c h i n g the a r g u m e n t from the other side.
He wrote (in F r e n c h , the l a n g u a g e of d i p l o m a c y ) that Britain could
not achieve her objectives in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g M i d d l e E a s t unless
she were willing to leave its peoples free to exercise full a n d genuine
i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h o s e for w h o m he s p o k e wanted from Britain "non
pas une domination ou un protectorat," that is, they d i d not want
British d o m i n a t i o n or a British p r o t e c t o r a t e . T h e y w o u l d not accept
what M c M a h o n a n d C l a y t o n called A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e : they dem a n d e d the real thing. T h e y w o u l d not s u p p o r t Britain, he wrote, if
she intended to g o v e r n t h e m — w h i c h of course was exactly what
M c M a h o n a n d C l a y t o n intended Britain t o d o .
25
26
A l - M a s r i had spotted the falseness in the British position. K i t c h e n e r
and his followers badly wanted to win A r a b s u p p o r t b u t were unwilling
to pay the price the E m i r H u s s e i n d e m a n d e d for it; so instead they
were a t t e m p t i n g to cheat, by p r e t e n d i n g to meet H u s s e i n ' s d e m a n d s
when in fact they were giving him the counterfeit coin of m e a n i n g l e s s
language.
T h o u g h C l a y t o n a n d his colleagues did not know it, a l - M a s r i , alF a r u q i , and the E m i r H u s s e i n were offering Britain coin that was
equally counterfeit. H u s s e i n had no a r m y , a n d the secret societies
had no visible following. T h e i r talk of rallying tens or h u n d r e d s of
t h o u s a n d s of A r a b t r o o p s to their c a u s e , whether or not they believed
it themselves, was sheer fantasy.
A l - F a r u q i , who had p r o m i s e d an A r a b revolt when he first arrived,
c h a n g e d his story by 15 N o v e m b e r , when he met S i r M a r k S y k e s : he
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187
now said that there c o u l d be no A r a b u p r i s i n g until a n d unless Allied
a r m i e s first landed in force on the S y r i a n coast. H u s s e i n , too, h o p i n g
Britain would take the military lead, refused to go into action by
claiming it would be p r e m a t u r e to launch an u p r i s i n g . T h e A r a b s , in
other w o r d s , w o u l d do nothing until British armies arrived on the
scene. S y k e s , a c c e p t i n g these s t a t e m e n t s at face value, c o n c l u d e d
that it was u r g e n t for Britain to invade S y r i a and Palestine.
24
MAKING PROMISES TO T H E
EUROPEAN A L L I E S
i
In D e c e m b e r 1915 S y k e s reported to his g o v e r n m e n t that in C a i r o he
had been told by a l - F a r u q i that if British E g y p t were to launch an
invasion of Palestine a n d S y r i a , it w o u l d trigger a revolt in which the
A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g t r o o p s a n d p r o v i n c e s of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e w o u l d
c o m e over to the Allied s i d e . T h e p r o b l e m was that Britain needed
F r a n c e ' s p e r m i s s i o n to divert the resources from the western front to
launch s u c h an offensive; a n d what S y k e s told the C a b i n e t ministers
was that they o u g h t to seek s u c h p e r m i s s i o n from the F r e n c h immediately. ( F r a n c e was reluctant to allow any diversion of resources
from E u r o p e , a n d not without r e a s o n ; early in 1916 G e r m a n y attacked
V e r d u n in what by 1918 was to b e c o m e the biggest battle in world
history. S e v e n h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d m e n on both sides were to be
killed, w o u n d e d , g a s s e d , or c a p t u r e d at V e r d u n in 1916, a n d 1,200,000
at the S o m m e ; it was not a year in which the Allies could easily
afford to send m a n p o w e r elsewhere.)
At the s a m e time, S y k e s raised a related matter: the Sherif H u s s e i n
hesitated to c o m e over to the Allied side ( S y k e s r e p o r t e d ) for fear of
F r e n c h a m b i t i o n s in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world. N e g o t i a t i o n s with
F r a n c e a i m e d at allaying s u c h fears were the answer, he s a i d . If these
p r o b l e m s with F r a n c e were not resolved soon, S y k e s w a r n e d , the
Sherif m i g h t be d e p o s e d a n d killed by the T u r k s , a n d events in the
Holy Places m i g h t ignite a real H o l y W a r .
1
T h e radical new view that S y k e s had b r o u g h t back with h i m f r o m
the M i d d l e E a s t was that in t e r m s of winning the war, the A r a b s
were m o r e important than the F r e n c h . F r a n c e was a m o d e r n industrial power that had mobilized eight million m e n to fight the war,
while H u s s e i n , without industrial, financial, military, or m a n p o w e r
resources, b r o u g h t with him only an uncertain prospect of s u b v e r t i n g
loyalty in the O t t o m a n c a m p ; in retrospect, Sykes's new view was
u n b a l a n c e d , b u t his g o v e r n m e n t nonetheless a t t e m p t e d to p e r s u a d e
F r a n c e to m a k e the concessions S y k e s believed to be necessary.
2
188
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189
In fact, the British g o v e r n m e n t already h a d initiated talks with
F r a n c e . Britain could not m a k e p r o m i s e s a b o u t S y r i a to the E m i r
H u s s e i n without F r a n c e ' s p e r m i s s i o n , for the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , S i r
E d w a r d G r e y , h a d recognized F r a n c e ' s special interest in that area.
Moreover, a l - F a r u q i had p e r s u a d e d L o r d K i t c h e n e r a n d his followers that H u s s e i n ' s claims to S y r i a also h a d to be a c c o m m o d a t e d ,
at least to s o m e extent. T h e F o r e i g n Office, having authorized
M c M a h o n to m a k e p l e d g e s to H u s s e i n on 20 O c t o b e r 1915, therefore
immediately r e q u e s t e d the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t to send a delegate
over to L o n d o n to negotiate the future frontiers of S y r i a so as to
define the extent to which Britain was free to deal with H u s s e i n .
T h u s not only the M c M a h o n letters, but a l s o — a n d m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y —
the negotiations with F r a n c e , R u s s i a , a n d later Italy that ultimately
resulted in the S y k e s - P i c o t - S a z a n o v A g r e e m e n t and s u b s e q u e n t
Allied secret treaty u n d e r s t a n d i n g s were a m o n g the results of
L i e u t e n a n t a l - F a r u q i ' s hoax.
II
T h e F r e n c h representative, F r a n c o i s G e o r g e s Picot, c a m e over t o
L o n d o n a n d c o m m e n c e d negotiations o n 2 3 N o v e m b e r 1915. T h e
British negotiating team was at first h e a d e d by S i r A r t h u r N i c o l s o n ,
Permanent U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y at the F o r e i g n Office, a n d included
senior representatives from the F o r e i g n , I n d i a , a n d War Offices. T h e
talks h a d d e a d l o c k e d by the time S y k e s returned to L o n d o n in
D e c e m b e r ; late that m o n t h the British g o v e r n m e n t delegated
S y k e s — K i t c h e n e r ' s m a n — t o take the place of the N i c o l s o n t e a m in
order to break the deadlock. In effect the F o r e i g n Office t u r n e d the
responsibility over t o L o r d K i t c h e n e r .
S y k e s p o s s e s s e d s o m e of the qualifications necessary to carry out
his a s s i g n m e n t . He passionately wanted to succeed in reaching an
a g r e e m e n t with the other side. He was p r o - F r e n c h . As a result of
early schooling a b r o a d , he s p o k e F r e n c h — t h o u g h it is not clear how
well. As a R o m a n Catholic himself, he was not p r e j u d i c e d against
F r a n c e ' s goal of p r o m o t i n g Catholic interests in L e b a n o n . He h a d
lived and traveled in the E a s t , a n d h a d m e t with and knew the views
of Britain's soldiers a n d civil s e r v a n t s there.
On the other h a n d , he h a d held g o v e r n m e n t office for less than a
year, a n d it was his first d i p l o m a t i c a s s i g n m e n t . He had no experience
in negotiating with a foreign g o v e r n m e n t , a n d was in a weak b a r g a i n ing position b e c a u s e he wanted too m u c h from the other side, too
obviously.
Until 3 J a n u a r y 1916 S y k e s went to the F r e n c h e m b a s s y on a daily
basis to negotiate. He reported in detail at night to F i t z G e r a l d a n d
190
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3
through him continued to receive the ghostly g u i d a n c e of K i t c h e n e r .
It is i m p o s s i b l e to know what S y k e s s a i d or was told: K i t c h e n e r a n d
F i t z G e r a l d kept no p r o p e r files, a n d n o n e of the three m e n left a
record of what occurred. T h e r e m a y have been a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g
between them as to what S y k e s w a s instructed to d e m a n d a n d what
he was told to c o n c e d e . L a t e r , in d e s c r i b i n g his dealings with L o r d
K i t c h e n e r , M a r k S y k e s r e m a r k e d that "I could never m a k e myself
u n d e r s t o o d ; I could never u n d e r s t a n d what he thought, and he could
never u n d e r s t a n d what I t h o u g h t . "
4
T h e r e is m o r e evidence from the F r e n c h side of the negotiations
than f r o m the British s i d e as to the secret hopes a n d p l a n s that were
involved. D o c u m e n t s exist that establish what Picot a n d his political
associates h o p e d to gain f r o m the negotiations and how they h o p e d to
achieve their g o a l s .
Picot, the scion of a colonialist dynasty in F r a n c e — h i s father w a s a
founder of the C o m i t e de l'Afrique F r a n c a i s e , a n d his brother was
treasurer of the C o m i t e de l'Asie F r a n c a i s e , of which his father was
also a m e m b e r — a c t e d effectively as the advocate of the colonialist
party within the Q u a i d'Orsay a n d was as dedicated a p r o p o n e n t of a
F r e n c h S y r i a as his g o v e r n m e n t could have chosen to represent i t .
Earlier in 1915 Picot had inspired a parliamentary c a m p a i g n in Paris
against the ministers who were p r e p a r e d to give way to Britain in the
M i d d l e E a s t . T h e m i x t u r e o f d o m e s t i c F r e n c h commercial, clerical,
a n d political interests in s u p p o r t of Picot's position p r o v e d potent.
T h e L y o n s a n d Marseilles C h a m b e r s o f C o m m e r c e sent resolutions
to the Quai d'Orsay in s u p p o r t of a F r e n c h S y r i a . P r o p o n e n t s of a
F r e n c h S y r i a took control of the C o m m i t t e e on F o r e i g n Affairs of
the C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s .
5
6
Pierre-Etienne F l a n d i n , leader of the F r e n c h S y r i a m o v e m e n t in
the S e n a t e , issued a report on S y r i a and Palestine in 1915 that
b e c a m e the manifesto of the " S y r i a n P a r t y " in F r e n c h politics—the
party that Picot c h a m p i o n e d . S y r i a a n d Palestine form one country,
he a r g u e d , that for centuries had been s h a p e d by F r a n c e , to s u c h an
extent that it f o r m e d the F r a n c e of the N e a r E a s t . ( H i s a r g u m e n t
harked back nearly a t h o u s a n d years, to the C r u s a d e s a n d the e s t a b lishment of L a t i n C r u s a d e r k i n g d o m s in S y r i a and Palestine.) It was
i n c u m b e n t u p o n F r a n c e to continue its "mission historique" there, he
wrote. T h e potential wealth of the country was i m m e n s e , he c l a i m e d ,
so that for c o m m e r c i a l r e a s o n s , as well as historic a n d g e o g r a p h i c
ones, it was vital for the F r e n c h E m p i r e to p o s s e s s it. T h e n , too,
a c c o r d i n g to F l a n d i n , it was vital for strategic r e a s o n s . Paralleling
K i t c h e n e r ' s views a b o u t M e c c a and the caliphate, F l a n d i n claimed
that D a m a s c u s was the third holiest city in I s l a m a n d was the
potential center of an A r a b i c I s l a m ; F r a n c e d a r e d not let another
MAKING
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191
7
power direct it a n d p e r h a p s u s e it a g a i n s t F r a n c e . F l a n d i n claimed
that at heart Syria-Palestine was F r e n c h already. I t s inhabitants,
according to him a n d his colleagues, were u n a n i m o u s in desiring to
b e ruled b y F r a n c e .
T h e F r e n c h d e l u d e d themselves. O p p o s i t i o n t o F r e n c h rule was
intense a m o n g the e d u c a t e d classes in S y r i a (other than the
M a r o n i t e s , the E a s t e r n - r i t e R o m a n Catholic c o m m u n i t y s p o n s o r e d
by F r a n c e ) . S y k e s a n d his friends in C a i r o believed that the F r e n c h
were blinding themselves when they ignored this o p p o s i t i o n . ( C l a y t o n
a n d his colleagues did not see, however, that they were d e l u d i n g
themselves in the s a m e way by thinking that the p e o p l e s of those
areas ardently desired to be g o v e r n e d by B r i t a i n . )
Picot drafted his own negotiating instructions outlining a strategy
to win the concessions that he w a n t e d from the British. T h e y show
that he w o u l d have preferred to p r e s e r v e the O t t o m a n E m p i r e intact,
for its "feeble condition" offered F r a n c e "limitless s c o p e " to e x p a n d
her economic i n f l u e n c e . Partition h a d b e c o m e inevitable, however;
it therefore was a d v i s a b l e to take control of S y r i a a n d Palestine, even
t h o u g h F r a n c e w o u l d d i s m e m b e r the O t t o m a n E m p i r e b y d o i n g s o .
8
T h e F r e n c h F o r e i g n Office recognized that policing inland S y r i a
w o u l d strain F r e n c h r e s o u r c e s ; what Picot a n d his g o v e r n m e n t m o s t
desired was to assert direct F r e n c h rule only over the M e d i t e r r a n e a n
coastline a n d an e n l a r g e d L e b a n o n , a n d to control the rest of S y r i a
indirectly t h r o u g h A r a b p u p p e t rulers. Picot's plan was to pretend to
S y k e s that F r a n c e insisted on o b t a i n i n g direct rule over all of S y r i a ,
so that when he m o d e r a t e d the claim he c o u l d obtain s o m e concession
in return. What he h o p e d to get was an extension of the F r e n c h
sphere of influence e a s t w a r d f r o m S y r i a to M o s u l (in what is now
Iraq).
In secretly p l a n n i n g to take M o s u l , Picot w a s unaware that
K i t c h e n e r a n d S y k e s were secretly p l a n n i n g to give it to h i m . T h e y
wanted the F r e n c h s p h e r e of influence to be ex t e n d e d f r o m the
M e d i t e r r a n e a n coast on the west all the way to the east so that it
paralleled a n d a d j o i n e d R u s s i a n - h e l d z o n e s ; the F r e n c h zone was to
p r o v i d e Britain with a shield against R u s s i a . F r a n c e and R u s s i a
would be b a l a n c e d one against the other, so that the F r e n c h M i d d l e
E a s t , like the G r e a t Wall of C h i n a , would protect the British M i d d l e
E a s t f r o m attack by the R u s s i a n b a r b a r i a n s to the north. T h i s concept
had a p p e a r e d in the de B u n s e n p r o c e e d i n g s . It h a d been s u g g e s t e d to
K i t c h e n e r , p e r h a p s by S t o r r s , a n d it b e c a m e central to his strategic
plan for the p o s t w a r E a s t . E v e n Britain's claim to M o s u l , with the oil
riches strongly s u s p e c t e d to exist there, was to be sacrificed in order
to place the F r e n c h in the front line, at a point where the R u s s i a n s
might be e x p e c t e d one day to attack. T h e War Office point of view
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was that " F r o m a military point of view, the principle of inserting a
w e d g e of F r e n c h territory between any British zone a n d the R u s s i a n
C a u c a s u s would seem in every way d e s i r a b l e . "
On the British side of the negotiations S y k e s also wanted F r a n c e ' s
agreement to an E g y p t i a n offensive; K i t c h e n e r wanted A l e x a n d r e t t a ,
and an agreement that Britain could invade the O t t o m a n E m p i r e at
A l e x a n d r e t t a ; S y k e s held a brief from C a i r o to reserve the towns in
S y r i a that were being p r o m i s e d to the Sherif H u s s e i n ; a n d n o b o d y in
the British g o v e r n m e n t wanted to see any other G r e a t Power e s t a b lished in the postwar world astride the road to I n d i a . It was a
challenging a g e n d a , especially for S y k e s , a neophyte in d i p l o m a c y .
9
T h e British feared that Picot w o u l d not c o m p r o m i s e on F r a n c e ' s
claim to exercise direct rule over all of S y r i a , while the F r e n c h feared
that they w o u l d not be allowed to rule any of it, not even coastal
L e b a n o n . Picot a r g u e d that C h r i s t i a n L e b a n o n would not tolerate
even the nominal rule of the E m i r of M e c c a , while Paul C a m b o n , the
F r e n c h a m b a s s a d o r in L o n d o n , w a r n e d that F r e n c h rule would be
necessary to avert the o u t b r e a k of a religious war: "It is e n o u g h to
know the intensity of rivalries between the various rites a n d religions
in the Orient to foresee the violence of the internal strife in L e b a n o n
as soon as no external authority is there to c u r b i t . "
10
In the end both S y k e s a n d Picot o b t a i n e d what they wanted f r o m
one another: F r a n c e was to rule a G r e a t e r L e b a n o n and to exert an
exclusive influence over the rest of S y r i a . S y k e s s u c c e e d e d in giving,
and Picot s u c c e e d e d in taking, a s p h e r e of F r e n c h influence that
extended t o M o s u l . B a s r a a n d B a g h d a d , the two M e s o p o t a m i a n
provinces, were to go to Britain.
Palestine p r o v e d to be a s t u m b l i n g block. S y k e s wanted it for
Britain, even though L o r d K i t c h e n e r did not, while Picot w a s d e termined to get it for F r a n c e . In the end a c o m p r o m i s e w a s r e a c h e d :
Britain was to have the p o r t s of A c r e a n d H a i f a (rather than
Alexandretta, north of S y r i a , the h a r b o r that K i t c h e n e r preferred)
a n d a territorial belt on which to construct a railroad from there to
M e s o p o t a m i a , while the rest of the country was to fall u n d e r s o m e
sort of international a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
E x c e p t for Palestine a n d for the a r e a s in which F r a n c e or Britain
exercised direct rule, the M i d d l e E a s t was to form an A r a b state or
confederation of states, nominally i n d e p e n d e n t but in reality divided
into F r e n c h and British s p h e r e s of influence.
T h e a g r e e m e n t reached by S y k e s a n d Picot was to c o m e into effect
only after the A r a b Revolt was p r o c l a i m e d . Picot a n d the F r e n c h
a m b a s s a d o r , C a m b o n , were not p e r s u a d e d that H u s s e i n w o u l d contribute anything of value to the Allied c a u s e ; they told their F o r e i g n
Minister to ratify the preliminary S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t ( c o n c l u d e d
on 3 J a n u a r y 1916) as soon as p o s s i b l e , before the British h a d a
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chance to b e c o m e disillusioned a b o u t the A r a b s , a n d therefore to
regret the extensive c o n c e s s i o n s they h a d m a d e to F r a n c e in order to
be free to deal with H u s s e i n .
1 1
Ill
Sir M a r k S y k e s believed that he h a d won for the A r a b s what H u s s e i n
and a l - F a r u q i h a d d e m a n d e d . S y k e s characterized A r a b s a s wanting
recognition of their essential unity, but only as an ideal; in practice,
he s a i d , s u c h unity would not be in h a r m o n y with their national
genius, nor would it p r o v e feasible f r o m the point of view of finance
a n d administration. He h a d told the War C a b i n e t that A r a b s "have
no national spirit in o u r sense of the w o r d , but they have got a sense
of racial p r i d e , which is as g o o d . " T h e y s h o u l d be content, he said,
with a "confederation of A r a b i c s p e a k i n g states, under the aegis of an
A r a b i a n p r i n c e . " S y k e s failed to recognize that H u s s e i n a n d the
secret societies were asking for a unified A r a b state, just as they were
asking for a state that w a s fully i n d e p e n d e n t rather than a E u r o p e a n
protectorate.
1 2
13
S y k e s also h a d m i s u n d e r s t o o d his British friends a n d colleagues in
C a i r o . U n d e r his veneer of worldliness, S y k e s w a s . a n innocent: he
believed that p e o p l e m e a n t what they s a i d . C l a y t o n , directly, and
also t h r o u g h A u b r e y H e r b e r t , h a d told h i m that it was i m p o r t a n t to
the Allied c a u s e t o p r o m i s e D a m a s c u s , A l e p p o , Horns, a n d H a m a t o
H u s s e i n ' s i n d e p e n d e n t A r a b confederation. S y k e s therefore asked
Picot to agree to this ( a n d imagined that he h a d won Picot's consent,
not knowing that Picot wanted to give i t ) . T h e S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e ment p r o v i d e d that the four towns s h o u l d be excluded from the area
of direct F r e n c h rule a n d instead s h o u l d fall within the s c o p e of an
independent A r a b state or s t a t e s — t h o u g h subject, of c o u r s e , to exclusive F r e n c h influence. To S y k e s it a p p e a r e d that he had tailored
the c o m m i t m e n t s to F r a n c e and to the A r a b s to fit together, a n d also
that he h a d s e c u r e d precisely the concession f r o m F r a n c e that his
friends in C a i r o h a d asked for.
S y k e s h a d concentrated on satisfying what C a i r o h a d told him
were H u s s e i n ' s c l a i m s , and did not see that b e h i n d t h e m C a i r o was
advancing c l a i m s of its own. What S y k e s did not u n d e r s t a n d was that
when Clayton a n d S t o r r s said they wanted inland S y r i a for the
A r a b s , they really m e a n t that they wanted it for Britain, a n d for
themselves as Britain's representatives in the region, a d v a n c i n g b e hind an A r a b f a c a d e ; a n d when they said they wanted it to be
independent, they m e a n t that they wanted it to be a d m i n i s t e r e d by
Britain rather than F r a n c e .
S y k e s did not see that H u s s e i n ' s S y r i a n d o m a i n s w o u l d be any the
194
THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE
less independent for b e i n g a d v i s e d by F r e n c h rather than by British
officials. In C a i r o , however, a world of difference was seen between
British and F r e n c h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . N o t entirely without r e a s o n ,
Clayton a n d his colleagues believed F r e n c h colonial a d m i n i s t r a t o r s to
be incapable of allowing a country to retain its own character. What
the F r e n c h termed their "civilizing mission" was seen as annexationism by the B r i t i s h ; often it s e e m e d to involve i m p o s i n g the
F r e n c h l a n g u a g e a n d culture on a native society. T h e British, on the
other h a n d , in E g y p t a n d elsewhere, kept to t h e m s e l v e s , dwelt in
their own c l u b s and c o m p o u n d s , a n d , a p a r t from s u p e r v i s i n g the
administration of the g o v e r n m e n t , left the country a n d its people
alone. In the eyes of C l a y t o n a n d his colleagues, this was the greatest
degree of i n d e p e n d e n c e to which A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g peoples could a s pire. As one of Clayton's colleagues told s t u d e n t s at a British Military
Staff College a few years later, e d u c a t e d A r a b s regarded British rule
as "the only decent alternative" to O t t o m a n r u l e .
1 4
E q u a t i n g , as they d i d , a F r e n c h presence with annexation a n d a
British presence with i n d e p e n d e n c e , Clayton a n d his colleagues
(though they did not tell S y k e s so) r e g a r d e d the Sykes-Picot A g r e e ment as a betrayal of the p l e d g e to g r a n t independence to the p r o p o s e d A r a b confederation. K i t c h e n e r ' s followers a s p i r e d to rule S y r i a
themselves, a n d believed that S y k e s had let them d o w n . B u t that is
not the way they p u t it. What they said w a s : S y k e s has let down the
Arabs (as t h o u g h it were the A r a b s rather than themselves who
desired Britain to rule S y r i a ) .
F o r whatever it meant to them politically, and p e r h a p s even personally, Clayton a n d S t o r r s saw that S y k e s had foreclosed the p o s s i bility of their creating a new E g y p t i a n e m p i r e . S i m l a had already
staked out a claim to the n e a r b y M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces, so B a g h d a d
a n d B a s r a — t h e principal British zone in the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t — w o u l d be ruled by their a d v e r s a r y , the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a ;
while S y r i a , which c o u l d have b e e n in Cairo's s p h e r e , was instead
s u r r e n d e r e d t o F r a n c e . T h e a g r e e m e n t allowed C a i r o a n d K h a r t o u m
to e x p a n d their influence only in arid, inhospitable A r a b i a .
K i t c h e n e r , after the war, could go out to I n d i a as Viceroy; but
Clayton and S t o r r s were A r a b i s t s , tied emotionally a n d professionally
to the fortunes of the C a i r o R e s i d e n c y . T h e y could hardly help b u t
b e d i s m a y e d b y what S y k e s had d o n e .
S y k e s never u n d e r s t o o d that his friends in C a i r o held these views;
he thought that he had done what they had a s k e d . He thought he
had won inland S y r i a for the A r a b s ; he did not realize that they
thought he h a d lost it. He never s u s p e c t e d that C a i r o was g o i n g to
try to u n d e r m i n e the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t . He was p r o u d of the
agreement, and it was ironic that the A r a b B u r e a u which he had
created b e c a m e the center of the plot to destroy it.
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H i s old friend A u b r e y H e r b e r t worked with the A r a b B u r e a u in
C a i r o a n d so H e r b e r t knew (while S y k e s did not) that Clayton
bitterly believed that the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t had r e d u c e d Cairo's
A r a b policy to tatters. H e r b e r t cast the b l a m e on Picot. He wrote:
I am afraid that swine M o n s i e u r Pficot] has let M . S . [ M a r k
S y k e s ] b a d l y down. I told h i m I thought it would h a p p e n . It is
an awful pity both for the thing itself, a n d for M. a n d also
b e c a u s e it is one up to the old early Victorians who are in a
position to say "We told you s o . T h i s is what c o m e s of disreg a r d i n g the A B C of D i p l o m a c y , and letting A m a t e u r s have a
shy at delicate and important n e g o t i a t i o n s . "
15
IV
T h e Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t was a p p r o v e d b y the British a n d F r e n c h
C a b i n e t s at the b e g i n n i n g of F e b r u a r y 1916. B u t its t e r m s and even
its existence were kept secret; the very fact that the Allies had
reached an agreement a b o u t the p o s t w a r M i d d l e E a s t was not revealed
until almost two years later. S o m e of the few officials in L o n d o n who
knew of the agreement e x p r e s s e d reservations a b o u t it. T h e c o m m o n
British c o m p l a i n t was that it g a v e away too m u c h to the F r e n c h .
F o r S y k e s , s o m e of the justification for giving way to the F r e n c h
was soon d e s t r o y e d . S y k e s had wanted to win France's a p p r o v a l of
Cairo's proposal to invade S y r i a a n d thereby s p a r k a l - F a r u q i ' s p r o m ised A r a b Revolt. B u t the P r i m e Minister, deferring to the generals
who insisted on concentrating all forces on the western front in
E u r o p e , ruled out a new M i d d l e E a s t e r n c a m p a i g n b e c a u s e of the
diversion of resources that it would entail.
A furious S y k e s delivered a s p e e c h in the H o u s e of C o m m o n s
denouncing A s q u i t h ' s leadership as m u d d l e d , and d e m a n d i n g the
establishment of a f o u r - m e m b e r C a b i n e t c o m m i t t e e to run the war.
Delivered at a time when the P r i m e Minister was faltering as a
leader, the speech attracted wide a n d favorable publicity. It also led
S y k e s to two meetings that p r o v e d i m p o r t a n t in his c l i m b up the
political l a d d e r : one with L l o y d G e o r g e , and one with the former
proconsul in S o u t h Africa, L o r d Milner, a n d his influential coterie,
including Geoffrey R o b i n s o n , editor of The Times.
D e s p i t e his failure to win a p p r o v a l for an invasion of S y r i a , S y k e s
believed that it was important to c o n c l u d e the a r r a n g e m e n t s with
F r a n c e o n the b a s i s that h a d been a g r e e d . T h e Sykes-Picot A g r e e ment achieved what K i t c h e n e r , at least, wanted to achieve: the
containment of R u s s i a in the postwar M i d d l e E a s t . M o r e o v e r , S y k e s
seemed to believe that for the Allies to resolve their differences a n d
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THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE
arrive at a definite a g r e e m e n t was in itself a g o o d thing. R u s s i a n
ratification was required, so the i m m e d i a t e assignment for S y k e s was
to join Picot—who was already in P e t r o g r a d — t o help secure R u s s i a n
approval of their a g r e e m e n t .
V
T h e r e was a c u r i o u s o m i s s i o n in the a g r e e m e n t S y k e s a n d Picot were
bringing to P e t r o g r a d . As r e g a r d s Palestine, the d o c u m e n t took a c count of the interests of F r a n c e , Britain, the other Allies, a n d the
M o s l e m A r a b leader H u s s e i n of M e c c a ; but no reference was m a d e
to the interests of the people of the Biblical Holy L a n d — t h e J e w s .
Yet political Z i o n i s m — t h e organized J e w i s h m o v e m e n t a i m i n g at a
national return of the J e w i s h people to P a l e s t i n e — h a d been an active
force in the world for two or three d e c a d e s . J e w i s h resettlement of
Palestine had g o n e on in the nineteenth a n d early twentieth centuries,
and by 1916 there was a substantial J e w i s h population living and
working there.
Before S y k e s e m b a r k e d for R u s s i a , his attention w a s c a u g h t by an
observation m a d e a b o u t this by C a p t a i n William R e g i n a l d Hall, the
head of intelligence at the A d m i r a l t y . Hall objected to the inducements b e i n g offered to H u s s e i n ' s A r a b s , saying that the British
should land troops in Palestine, for only then would the A r a b s c o m e
over to the Allies. " F o r c e is the best A r a b p r o p a g a n d a , " claimed
Hall, and b e s i d e s p r o m i s e s to the A r a b s might be o p p o s e d by J e w s ,
who had "a strong material, a n d a very strong political, interest in
the future of the country [original e m p h a s i s ] . " S y k e s was struck by
the mention of J e w s . Until then they had not figured in his calculations. Before leaving for R u s s i a , S y k e s therefore contacted H e r b e r t
S a m u e l , the H o m e S e c r e t a r y , who w a s J e w i s h , h o p i n g to learn about
Zionism.
1 6
It will be r e m e m b e r e d that in their negotiations, S y k e s and Picot
had c o m p r o m i s e d their differences a b o u t Palestine by agreeing that
m o s t of it would be placed under an international regime, the precise
form of which would be determined after consultation with the other
interested A l l i e s — R u s s i a a n d I t a l y — a n d with H u s s e i n of M e c c a .
C a p t a i n Hall's c o m m e n t s led S y k e s to worry, however, that the
c o m p r o m i s e at which he a n d Picot had arrived had left a principal
factor out of a c c o u n t : they had not taken into consideration the
possibility that J e w s m i g h t be concerned in the political future of
Palestine.
Evidently S y k e s was afraid that when he b r o u g h t this omission
to the attention of Picot, the F r e n c h m a n would think that he was
d o i n g so in o r d e r to back out of their agreement. Accordingly, on
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his arrival in P e t r o g r a d he was at p a i n s to establish his g o o d faith. In
his innocence he did not know-—or even s u s p e c t — t h a t the F r e n c h
g o v e r n m e n t h a d already g o n e b e h i n d his back to renege on the
Palestine c o m p r o m i s e they had a g r e e d u p o n . In secret negotiations
with the R u s s i a n s initiated by the F r e n c h Premier, Aristide B r i a n d ,
on 25 M a r c h 1916, the F r e n c h s e c u r e d R u s s i a n agreement that an
international r e g i m e for Palestine-—the a r r a n g e m e n t S y k e s h a d a g r e e d
u p o n with P i c o t — w o u l d be impractical a n d that instead a F r e n c h
r e g i m e o u g h t to be installed. A secret F r a n c o - R u s s i a n e x c h a n g e of
notes on 26 April 1916 outlined an a g r e e m e n t between the governm e n t s as to their respective s p h e r e s of influence in the O t t o m a n
territories, a n d e m b o d i e d a R u s s i a n p l e d g e to F r a n c e "to s u p p o r t in
negotiations with the British g o v e r n m e n t the d e s i g n s of the g o v e r n ment of the R e p u b l i c [ F r a n c e ] on P a l e s t i n e . "
17
T h e R u s s i a n s h a d n o s y m p a t h y for J e w s o r for J e w i s h claims, and
when S y k e s arrived in P e t r o g r a d , his C z a r i s t hosts p e r s u a d e d him
that Zionist J e w s were a great a n d potentially hostile power within
R u s s i a . T h e r e a f t e r S y k e s was seized with the conviction that J e w s
were a power in a great m a n y places a n d might s a b o t a g e the Allied
c a u s e . B u t unlike the R u s s i a n s , S y k e s believed in a t t e m p t i n g to win
t h e m over. He reported to the F o r e i g n Office that he h a d told Picot
that, while Britain h a d no interest in taking possession of Palestine, it
was what the Z i o n i s t s wanted, a n d that they ought to be propitiated
if the Allies were to have a chance of winning the war.
H i s own
notion was to offer the Zionists an incorporated land c o m p a n y in
Palestine; his question to the F o r e i g n Office was "Is a land c o m p a n y
e n o u g h ? " — t o which the b r u s q u e r e s p o n s e from the F o r e i g n Office
was that he s h o u l d keep his t h o u g h t s to h i m s e l f . ( E v i d e n t l y the
F o r e i g n Office did not want S y k e s to m e d d l e in a matter a b o u t
which-—it was c l e a r — h e knew n o t h i n g . )
8
19
R e t u r n i n g to L o n d o n in April 1916, S y k e s took further s t e p s to
learn a b o u t Z i o n i s m . He again s a w S a m u e l , who introduced him to
D r M o s e s G a s t e r , chief R a b b i o f the S e p h a r d i c J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y .
A c c o r d i n g to S y k e s , G a s t e r "opened my eyes to what Z i o n i s m
meant."
S y k e s then introduced G a s t e r to the F r e n c h negotiator,
G e o r g e s Picot, a n d s u g g e s t e d to Picot that F r a n c e a n d Britain,
instead of o p e r a t i n g independently of one another in the M i d d l e
E a s t , s h o u l d work together as p a t r o n s of A r a b s a n d J e w s . Picot was
i m p r e s s e d neither by G a s t e r nor by S y k e s ' s p r o p o s a l , a n d held fast to
his territorial d e s i g n s .
2
S y k e s b e g a n to worry, at a time when a decisive Allied victory
s e e m e d at best a remote possibility, that J e w i s h forces w o u l d tilt the
scales in favor of the G e r m a n s a n d T u r k s . He a t t e m p t e d to p e r s u a d e
* Jews whose ancestors in the Middle Ages lived in Spain and Portugal.
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Picot that if the Allies failed to offer J e w s a position in Palestine,
F r a n c e m i g h t lose the war a n d , with it, cities a n d provinces in
F r a n c e herself, of m u c h m o r e c o n s e q u e n c e to F r e n c h m e n than
Palestine. He u r g e d Picot to tell his g o v e r n m e n t that s a v i n g Paris
a n d V e r d u n a n d regaining A l s a c e were worth concessions in the
Middle East.
While S y k e s was in the p r o c e s s of discovering the Zionist i s s u e —
before, d u r i n g , a n d after his P e t r o g r a d trip)—so was the F o r e i g n
Office in L o n d o n , p r o m p t e d by S y k e s ' s old friend G e r a l d
F i t z M a u r i c e . F i t z M a u r i c e , who h a d attended the s a m e p u b l i c school
( B e a u m o n t ) a n d h a d a c q u i r e d m a n y o f the s a m e views a n d p r e j u d i c e s
as h a d S y k e s , w a s — i t will be r e m e m b e r e d — t h e principal s o u r c e
within the British g o v e r n m e n t of the fallacy that the S u b l i m e Porte
had fallen into the h a n d s of J e w s . At the A d m i r a l t y early in 1916,
F i t z M a u r i c e hit u p o n the converse of that p r o p o s i t i o n : he inspired a
F o r e i g n Office colleague—another O l d B o y of B e a u m o n t , n a m e d
H u g h O ' B e i r n e — t o s u g g e s t that "if we could offer the J e w s an
a r r a n g e m e n t as to Palestine which w o u l d strongly appeal to t h e m we
might conceivably be able to strike a b a r g a i n with t h e m as to withdr a w i n g their s u p p o r t from the Y o u n g T u r k G o v e r n m e n t which
would then automatically c o l l a p s e . "
J u s t as C a i r o believed in
powerful, m y s t e r i o u s A r a b societies that could overthrow the Y o u n g
T u r k s , L o n d o n believed in powerful, m y s t e r i o u s J e w i s h societies
that could do s o , too.
21
O'Beirne evidently intended to p u r s u e the matter within the
F o r e i g n Office himself, but d i d not get the chance to do s o : he died
in the s p r i n g of 1916. So it was, after all, left to S y k e s to raise the
issue of Z i o n i s m within the British b u r e a u c r a c y , little t h o u g h he
knew of J e w s or their affairs.
L i k e F i t z M a u r i c e , S y k e s retained his childhood belief in the existence of a cohesive world J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y that m o v e d in h i d d e n
ways to control the world. Britain's foremost a c a d e m i c authority on
the M i d d l e E a s t , E d w a r d G r a n v i l l e B r o w n e , A d a m s Professor o f
A r a b i c at C a m b r i d g e University, who h a d known S y k e s as a pupil,
t h o u g h he h a d praise for him in other respects, c o m m e n t e d that
S y k e s "sees J e w s in e v e r y t h i n g . "
22
VI
Z i o n i s m , however, was far f r o m b e i n g the chief issue with which
S y k e s dealt in wintry P e t r o g r a d in 1916. T h e b r o a d outlines of the
M i d d l e E a s t e r n settlement were at i s s u e , a n d when he arrived he
found that the R u s s i a n leaders—like British officials in L o n d o n —
claimed that F r a n c e was b e i n g p r o m i s e d too m u c h . In r e s p o n s e , the
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F r e n c h a m b a s s a d o r , M a u r i c e Paleologue, explained t o the R u s s i a n
F o r e i g n Minister that the reason Britain h a d p u s h e d F r a n c e to extend
her claims so far to the east was to p r o v i d e Britain with a buffer
against R u s s i a . T h i s w a s perfectly t r u e , but the F o r e i g n Office i n
L o n d o n was furious a t b e i n g given away, a n d b o m b a r d e d P e t r o g r a d
with official denials. Privately, F o r e i g n Office officials d e s c r i b e d
Paleologue as "really i n c o r r i g i b l e . "
2 3
24
It was b e c a u s e C a i r o , taken in by a l - F a r u q i ' s hoax a n d believing
fully in the potency of A r a b secret societies, h a d p e r s u a d e d L o n d o n
that H u s s e i n of M e c c a could tear d o w n the O t t o m a n E m p i r e that all
of these c o m m i t m e n t s , m o r t g a g i n g the future of the postwar M i d d l e
E a s t , h a d been m a d e by the A s q u i t h coalition g o v e r n m e n t . W a s it
worth the price? Within a few weeks of the S y k e s - P i c o t - S a z a n o v
A g r e e m e n t , Britain was to find out.
25
T U R K E Y ' S TRIUMPH A T T H E
TIGRIS
i
As the A r a b B u r e a u in C a i r o waited a n d hoped for an A r a b rebellion
that would b r i n g d o w n the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , it was called u p o n to
help British India liquidate yet another d i s a s t r o u s a n d m u d d l e - h e a d e d
enterprise in the war against T u r k e y : a smaller-scale b u t m o r e
shameful Gallipoli by the shores of the T i g r i s river in M e s o p o t a m i a .
A m o n t h before the o u t b r e a k of the O t t o m a n war in the a u t u m n of
1914, L o n d o n had o r d e r e d a s t a n d b y force to be sent from I n d i a to
the Persian G u l f to protect Britain's oil s u p p l i e s from Persia in case
they should be threatened. I t s initial objective in case of war was
to protect the oil refinery at A b a d a n , a Persian island in the Shatt
al-'Arab, the waterway at the head of the Persian G u l f where the
E u p h r a t e s a n d T i g r i s rivers meet. On 6 N o v e m b e r 1914, the day
after Britain declared war on T u r k e y , this force, by now a u g m e n t e d ,
m o v e d forward. T h e T u r k i s h fort at F a o at the m o u t h of the S h a t t
al-'Arab fell after a brief b o m b a r d m e n t by a British g u n b o a t , the
river sloop Odin; and a fortnight later, several t h o u s a n d British
troops occupied the M e s o p o t a m i a n city of B a s r a seventy-five miles
upriver. A l t h o u g h the British Indian force had landed in M e s o p o t a m i a ,
it did so to shield neighboring Persia f r o m attack.
1
T u r k i s h resistance was feeble, for the B a s r a front was h u n d r e d s of
miles from the main concentrations of O t t o m a n t r o o p s a n d s u p p l i e s
near B a g h d a d . As the British Indian expeditionary force went a b o u t
rounding out its position in B a s r a province, it parried T u r k i s h
counterattacks with ease.
D r a w n into the interior of m a r s h y lower M e s o p o t a m i a by the
T u r k i s h retreat, an a m b i t i o u s newly a p p o i n t e d British c o m m a n d i n g
officer, S i r J o h n N i x o n , who had arrived in April 1915, sent his
officer in the field, M a j o r - G e n e r a l C h a r l e s Vere F e r r e r s T o w n s h e n d ,
further and further u p s t r e a m in q u e s t of new victories b u t with no
great sense of direction or strategic p u r p o s e . Finally, N i x o n ordered
the t r o o p s — d e s p i t e T o w n s h e n d ' s m i s g i v i n g s — t o keep on m a r c h i n g
all the way to B a g h d a d .
TURKEY'S
TRIUMPH
AT
THE
TIGRIS
201
A successful a d v a n c e from B a s r a to B a g h d a d w o u l d have r e q u i r e d
a m a s t e r y of logistics a n d an a b u n d a n c e of troops, river transport,
hospital e q u i p m e n t , artillery, and s u p p l i e s that British I n d i a d i d not
make available to the expeditionary force. T h e troops were a d v a n c i n g
into a country of s w a m p s and deserts, without r o a d s or railroads, a n d
were therefore obliged to follow the m e a n d e r i n g course of the shallow, treacherous T i g r i s river. F o r this they needed flotillas of riverboats suited to the T i g r i s . T h e country was pestilential—there were
m a d d e n i n g , sickening s w a r m s of flies a n d m o s q u i t o s — s o m o b i l e
hospitals a n d medical s u p p l i e s w o u l d be r e q u i r e d . Whereas in B a s r a
the weakened T u r k s were at the end of their long s u p p l y line, in
front of B a g h d a d T o w n s h e n d ' s forces w o u l d be at the e n d of t h e i r s —
and would need to have b r o u g h t with t h e m a d e q u a t e s u p p l i e s of food
and ammunition.
T h o u g h his forces lacked these a p p a r e n t necessities, T o w n s h e n d ,
whose talent for generalship was close to g e n i u s , almost fought his
way t h r o u g h to victory. B u t his final t r i u m p h , if it can be so
t e r m e d — a t C t e s i p h o n , a b o u t twenty-five miles southeast of B a g h d a d ,
and h u n d r e d s of river miles from the b a s e of his s u p p l y line at
B a s r a — w a s P y r r h i c : he lost half of his small force. On the night of
25 N o v e m b e r he b e g a n his retreat.
T o w n s h e n d h a d learned that F i e l d M a r s h a l C o l m a n von der G o l t z ,
w h o m he r e g a r d e d as one of the great strategists of his t i m e , had
a s s u m e d overall c o m m a n d of O t t o m a n forces in M e s o p o t a m i a . He
h a d learned, too, that 3 0 , 0 0 0 T u r k i s h t r o o p s were a b o u t to reinforce
the 13,000 that h a d o p p o s e d him at C t e s i p h o n . T o w n s h e n d ' s own
fighting forces now n u m b e r e d 4 , 5 0 0 ; a n d they were short of a m m u nition a n d food.
T o w n s h e n d believed—with g o o d r e a s o n — t h a t the closest safe place
for him to m a k e a s t a n d was s o m e 250 miles d o w n s t r e a m , but
d e c i d e d — u n w i s e l y — t h a t his e x h a u s t e d t r o o p s could not go that distance. After a p u n i s h i n g week-long retreat of nearly a h u n d r e d miles,
p u n c t u a t e d b y battles with the p u r s u i n g T u r k s , T o w n s h e n d , who
had suffered a t h o u s a n d m o r e casualties, chose to s t o p and m a k e his
stand a t K u t e l - A m a r a .
K u t was a m u d village caught in a loop in the T i g r i s river, a n d
s u r r o u n d e d by water on three s i d e s . Sheltering within it a n d entrenching the fourth side, T o w n s h e n d i m p r i s o ne d himself in a
fortress-like position. It m a d e it difficult for the T u r k s to get in or
for him to get out. In the event, von der Goltz's O t t o m a n a r m i e s left
a sufficient force at K u t to g u a r d against a British breakout, a n d then
m a r c h e d on to entrench themselves downriver so as to block any
force Britain m i g h t send to the rescue.
T o w n s h e n d planned to be r e s c u e d , but ruined his own chances.
Although he had s u p p l i e s sufficient to last until April 1916, he
cabled that he c o u l d only hold out until J a n u a r y . T h e full forces
202
THE
MIDDLE
EASTERN
QUAGMIRE
available to rescue him c o u l d not be a s s e m b l e d by t h e n — a few weeks
m o r e were r e q u i r e d — b u t driven o n b y T o w n s h e n d ' s inconsistent
a n d increasingly u n b a l a n c e d c a b l e s , the partial forces available
launched one p r e m a t u r e attack after another a n d were beaten back.
H a d they waited until they could attack in force, they m i g h t have
fought their way t h r o u g h .
II
On 26 April 1916, the g a r r i s o n at K u t having e x h a u s t e d its last
rations of food, the War Office in L o n d o n offered T o w n s h e n d the
services o f C a p t a i n s A u b r e y H e r b e r t a n d T . E . L a w r e n c e i n negotiating a s u r r e n d e r . B o t h were a s s o c i a t e d with the A r a b B u r e a u in
C a i r o , a n d H e r b e r t , a M e m b e r of Parliament, had been a well-known
friend of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e before the war. B o t h h a d just arrived
in M e s o p o t a m i a , a n d L a w r e n c e h a d already been stricken with the
prevalent local fever.
T h e siege of K u t h a d by then lasted 146 d a y s , exceeding the
records previously set by the f a m o u s sieges of L a d y s m i t h (in the
Boer War) a n d Plevna (in the R u s s o - T u r k i s h war of 1877). It was an
epic of h e r o i s m — a s the defenders faced disease, starvation, a n d
f l o o d s — a n d of heartbreak, as s u p p l i e s p a r a c h u t e d to t h e m were
blown offcourse into the river, a n d riverboats sent to their aid went
a g r o u n d or were s t o p p e d by chains the T u r k s stretched a c r o s s the
river.
T o w n s h e n d , who h a d never quite recovered from a fever contracted
in 125-degree heat the s u m m e r before, had b e c o m e emotionally
u n b a l a n c e d . At s o m e point d u r i n g the siege he h a d d e c i d e d that the
T u r k s m i g h t let him a n d his m e n go free on parole in return for a
p a y m e n t of a million p o u n d s . H e r b e r t a n d L a w r e n c e , who went with
h i m on 27—8 April to negotiate t e r m s , were authorized by L o n d o n
to offer even m o r e : a s h a m e d t h o u g h they were of doing s o , they
offered the T u r k s two million p o u n d s . O n o r d e r s from E n v e r , who
apparently enjoyed Britain's humiliation in b e g g i n g to b u y the freed o m of her t r o o p s , the T u r k i s h c o m m a n d e r rejected the offer.
T h e British defenders o f K u t t h e r e u p o n destroyed their g u n s a n d
unconditionally s u r r e n d e r e d . T o w n s h e n d was treated with courtesy,
a n d sent by the T u r k s to live in c o m f o r t — a n d indeed l u x u r y — i n
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . H i s d i s e a s e d , s t a r v i n g t r o o p s , however, were sent on
a death m a r c h — 1 0 0 miles to B a g h d a d , then 500 m o r e to A n a t o l i a —
and then were p u t to work on railroad chain g a n g s . F e w of t h e m
s ur v i v e d .
T o w n s h e n d ' s forces suffered m o r e than 10,000 casualties between
TURKEY'S
TRIUMPH
AT
THE
TIGRIS
203
the start of their a d v a n c e on B a g h d a d a n d their s u r r e n d e r . T w e n t y three t h o u s a n d casualties were suffered by the British forces seeking
to rescue t h e m f r o m K u t ; yet the g a r r i s o n w a s carried off into
captivity a n d f o u n d d e a t h along the w a y .
It w a s another national humiliation inflicted u p o n Britain by an
O t t o m a n foe British officials h a d always r e g a r d e d as ineffectual—and
w h o m the A r a b B u r e a u p r o p o s e d t o b r i n g crashing down b y internal
s u b v e r s i o n later in 1916.
P A R T IV
SUBVERSION
26
BEHIND ENEMY L I N E S
i
In 1916 the question s e e m e d to b e : which of the w a r r i n g coalitions,
G e r m a n y a n d her allies or Britain a n d her allies, w o u l d collapse first
u n d e r the e n o r m o u s strains i m p o s e d by the war? C a i r o , with its
own special point of view, was betting that T u r k e y w o u l d be the first
to crack. W o u l d H u s s e i n ' s revolt, s c h e d u l e d to occur in m i d - 1 9 1 6 , be
able to s u b v e r t the loyalty of h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of O t t o m a n
soldiers a n d millions of O t t o m a n s u b j e c t s ? B r i t i s h Intelligence
thought it not i m p r o b a b l e , always having r e g a r d e d the Sultan's
regime as feeble.
In the western world it h a d been a s s u m e d for d e c a d e s that one day
or another the r a m s h a c k l e O t t o m a n E m p i r e would collapse or disinteg r a t e . By s u c h reckoning, the strain of w a g i n g war against Britain,
F r a n c e , a n d R u s s i a would b r i n g it crashing d o w n ; a n d s u b v e r s i o n
from within w o u l d a d d to the strain.
Y e t the record as of m i d - 1 9 1 6 s u g g e s t e d otherwise. As nationalists
who c a m p a i g n e d against foreign influence a n d to eradicate the vestiges of colonialism, the Y o u n g T u r k leaders were sensitive to any
alien presence in their m i d s t — e v e n that of their allies. B o t h E n v e r
a n d T a l a a t e x p r e s s e d concern a b o u t the reach of G e r m a n influence
in the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of T u r k e y ' s wartime effort. Y e t no serious
w e d g e was driven between T u r k s a n d G e r m a n s .
A l t h o u g h m a n y G e r m a n s serving with the O t t o m a n forces exp r e s s e d frustration a n d d i s g u s t at the obstacles placed in the way of
getting their o r d e r s executed, they d i d not allow their relationship
* After Gallipoli, Enver resumed his earlier campaign to curb German influence.
In early 1916 he indicated that even the 5,500 German troops then in the Ottoman
Empire were too many, and should be withdrawn. To demonstrate that Turkey had
no need of them, he insisted on sending seven Ottoman divisions to southern
Europe to fight alongside the armies of other of the Central Powers. His efforts were
not entirely successful; indeed, by the end of the war, there were 25,000 German
officers and men serving in the Ottoman Empire.
207
208
SUBVERSION
with the T u r k s to break d o w n . G e r m a n y exerted influence only with
a view toward winning the war a n d m a d e no m o v e to s u b v e r t the
independence of the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t or the position of the
C . U . P . leaders. M o r e than any other G r e a t Power o n either s i d e ,
G e r m a n y d e m o n s t r a t e d an ability to keep postwar a m b i t i o n s in A s i a
from intruding into w a r t i m e d e c i s i o n s ; a n d as a result she was best
able to take a d v a n t a g e of o p p o r t u n i t i e s to stir up trouble behind
enemy lines. T h e H a b s b u r g a n d O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t s were s u s picious of each other, as well as of the G e r m a n s , a n d there was the
inevitable bickering in the field between jealous officers; b u t , on the
whole, the G e r m a n s i m p o s e d u p o n their allies, in the first years of
the war in A s i a , a sense that winning the war took priority over other
objectives.*
A f g h a n i s t a n was an e x c e p t i o n : where it was concerned, officers in
the field let their m u t u a l m i s t r u s t get the better of t h e m . T h e i r
mission was to s u b v e r t B r i t i s h control of that fierce I s l a m i c
country—-a control exercised u n d e r the terms of the a g r e e m e n t of
1907 that ended the G r e a t G a m e between R u s s i a a n d Britain. As a
result of bickering between G e r m a n s a n d T u r k s a n d between
G e r m a n s a n d other G e r m a n s , only one of the four overland expeditions to A f g h a n i s t a n sent out at the b e g i n n i n g of the war went on
to reach K a b u l , where the G e r m a n s spent six m o n t h s vainly a t t e m p t ing to p e r s u a d e the E m i r to c o m e into the war against Britain. T h e
E m i r declined to act unless the Central Powers could place a r m i e s in
the field to e n s u r e the s u c c e s s of his rebellion. T h e y could not do s o ,
so the E m i r quietly remained within the British fold.
-
In Persia, however, the C e n t r a l Powers enjoyed a considerable
s u c c e s s . T h e G e r m a n s , long before the war, had solidified their
relations with leading Persian politicians, and in 1915 they s u c c e e d e d
in i n d u c i n g the P r i m e Minister to sign a secret treaty of alliance. T h e
G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r also s e c u r e d the s u p p o r t of the 7 , 0 0 0 - s t r o n g
Swedish-officered g e n d a r m e r i e , while his secret agents built up s u p port a m o n g the various tribes that constituted a b o u t 20 percent of
the total p o p u l a t i o n . By the end of 1915 the Allies found the situation
so m e n a c i n g that the R u s s i a n s , s u p p o r t e d by the 8 , 0 0 0 - s t r o n g
It was not easy. As the archives of Austria-Hungary show, Habsburg officials
expressed deep distrust of the ambitions for expansion that they ascribed to the
German and Turkish empires. For centuries, Austria-Hungary had been encroaching
on Ottoman territories in Europe. Her annexation of Ottoman Bosnia had brought
on the Balkan Wars and set the stage for Sarajevo. She continued to dispute the
Ottoman title to Albania, which she occupied in the earlier part of the world
war. Harboring territorial designs of their own, Habsburg officials suspected that
Hohenzollern officials were thinking along similar lines, so that Djemal's Suez
campaign brought expressions of concern from them that Germany might attempt to
annex Egypt; while Ottoman officials, as always, distrusted their European partners.
1
BEHIND
ENEMY
LINES
209
Russian-officered Persian C o s s a c k s , o c c u p i e d the north of the
country, taking over the capital city of T e h e r a n a n d , with it, the
weak, recently crowned y o u n g S h a h . T h e m o s t p r o - G e r m a n o f the
politicians fled, initially to the holy city of Q u m , a n d later to
K e r m a n s h a h , near the O t t o m a n frontier, where a G e r m a n p u p p e t
g o v e r n m e n t was established, backed by O t t o m a n t r o o p s .
In the s o u t h , the m o s t successful of the G e r m a n agents, Wilhelm
W a s s m u s s , stirred up a fierce tribal u p r i s i n g that was quelled only
with the u t m o s t difficulty by B r i g a d i e r G e n e r a l S i r Percy S y k e s , of
the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a , who" in 1916 created an 1 1 , 0 0 0 - m a n
British-officered native force, the S o u t h Persia Rifles, and took c o m m a n d of the south with a b a s e of authority in S h i r a z . T h e S o u t h
Persia Rifles, the Persian C o s s a c k s , the tattered r e m n a n t s of the
g e n d a r m e r i e , a n d the G e r m a n - s p o n s o r e d tribal confederations were
the only o r g a n i z e d a r m e d forces that r e m a i n e d in what had b e e n at
one time a sovereign, a n d indeed considerable, country. T h e S h a h
had no effective forces at his disposal to u p h o l d Persia's neutrality,
enforce her laws, or defend her territorial integrity. In the north the
province of A z e r b a i j a n had been a battlefield between T u r k e y a n d
R u s s i a ever since E n v e r ' s attack on the C a u c a s u s at the outset of the
war; a n d as the war went on, R u s s i a n a n d O t t o m a n t r o o p s s u r g e d
back a n d forth, m o v i n g t h r o u g h a n d o c c u p y i n g Persian territory at
will.
T h e G e r m a n - O t t o m a n allies converted Persia, which had been
an Allied preserve, into a contested battlefield. By 1915 — 16 the
country had, for all practical p u r p o s e s , d i s a p p e a r e d as a sovereign
entity, let alone one fully controlled by the Allied Powers.
II
Britain's efforts to s u b v e r t the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g population behind
O t t o m a n lines had met with no c o m p a r a b l e s u c c e s s . B u t D j e m a l
P a s h a , the C . U . P . triumvir o p e r a t i n g out of D a m a s c u s , took the
subversion threat seriously e n o u g h to crack down on those he s u s pected of treason. In the wake of his raids in 1915 on the A r a b secret
societies in S y r i a , he published in S t a m b o u l in 1916, under the
imprint of the O t t o m a n F o u r t h A r m y , a book entitled La Verite sur
la question syrienne, setting forth the evidence that he claimed
would justify his treatment of the alleged plotters. In the b o o k he
d i s c u s s e d the secret societies a n d their a i m s in s o m e detail, and
a r g u e d that the convicted m e n were traitors, not nationalists.
Whether because or in spite of D j e m a l ' s crackdown, the A r a b i c speaking p o p u l a t i o n did not waver in its loyalty. M o r e i m p o r t a n t to
the Porte, A r a b soldiers d e m o n s t r a t e d loyalty not only to I s l a m but
210
SUBVERSION
also to the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t . A B r i t i s h Intelligence m e m o r a n d u m
b a s e d on interviews with c a p t u r e d A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g officers in
prisoner-of-war c a m p s r e p o r t e d that m o s t of the officers actually
s u p p o r t e d the Y o u n g T u r k s , and that even the minority who did not
were "unable to s q u a r e their consciences with a military revolt in the
face of the e n e m y . "
2
IP
In the eyes of the Y o u n g T u r k s , the loyalty of n o n - M o s l e m inhabitants of the e m p i r e was o p e n to q u e s t i o n . T h e Porte was s u s p i c i o u s ,
not only of C h r i s t i a n s , b u t also of J e w s — e s p e c i a l l y the 6 0 , 0 0 0 or
m o r e of t h e m in Palestine.
It d i s t u r b e d T a l a a t a n d his colleagues that at least half of the J e w s
in Palestine were not O t t o m a n s u b j e c t s . A l m o s t all of those who were
not O t t o m a n s u b j e c t s had c o m e f r o m the R u s s i a n E m p i r e , mostly
d u r i n g the half century before 1914 a n d r e m a i n e d — i n t h e o r y —
s u b j e c t s of the C z a r .
T h e Y o u n g T u r k e y m o v e m e n t h a d n o reason t o m i s t r u s t t h e m ;
they h a d left E u r o p e to e s c a p e f r o m politics and conspiracies, not to
e n g a g e in t h e m . F l e e i n g the p o g r o m s of R u s s i a , the U k r a i n e , a n d
Poland, they c o u l d have f o u n d a new h o m e — a s m a n y J e w s d i d — i n
lands of o p p o r t u n i t y s u c h as the U n i t e d S t a t e s , which w e l c o m e d
i m m i g r a n t s . T h o s e who chose instead the h a r d s h i p s of pioneer life
in barren Palestine were d r e a m e r s who asked only to be allowed to
practice their religion or their ideals in peace.
S o m e were d r a w n to the H o l y L a n d by religion; others were
inspired to re-create the J u d a e a n nationality that the R o m a n s had
detroyed 2 , 0 0 0 years b e f o r e ; b u t m o s t were socialist idealists who
a i m e d at establishing an egalitarian, cooperative society in selfsufficient agricultural settlements in a country distant from E u r o p e a n
a n t i - S e m i t i s m . O n c e arrived, they revived the ancient H e b r e w
l a n g u a g e , restored the depleted soil, a n d cultivated self-reliance. By
the early part of the twentieth century their settlements had b e g u n to
flourish; m o r e than forty of t h e m dotted the landscape of the H o l y
L a n d . T h e y constructed towns as well; in 1909, on b a r r e n s a n d
d u n e s by the sea, they b e g a n to build what is now T e l Aviv. T h e y
were e n c o u r a g e d a n d s u p p o r t e d from a b r o a d by the relatively small
g r o u p of J e w s whose p r o g r a m called for a return to Z i o n : the Zionist
movement.
At the end of 1914, just after the O t t o m a n E m p i r e entered the
F i r s t World War, D j e m a l P a s h a , who b e c a m e T u r k e y ' s ruler of S y r i a
and Palestine, took violent action against the J e w i s h settlers. Influenced by a bitterly anti-Zionist O t t o m a n official n a m e d B e h a - e d - d i n ,
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D j e m a l m o v e d t o destroy the Zionist settlements a n d o r d e r e d the
expulsion of all foreign J e w s — w h i c h is to s a y , most of J e w i s h Palestine.
T h e e x p u l s i o n s h a d already b e g u n before the G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t —
fearful of alienating J e w i s h opinion in neutral c o u n t r i e s — i n d u c e d
T a l a a t a n d E n v e r t o intervene. T h e A m e r i c a n a m b a s s a d o r , H e n r y
M o r g e n t h a u , acted together with von W a n g e n h e i m in the matter.
T h o u g h the A m e r i c a n a n d G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t s were a b l e t o
influence the Porte, the Porte was not always able to control the
actions of D j e m a l , who frequently played a lone hand and looked
u p o n the Palestinian J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y a s potentially seditious. T o
s o m e extent this p r o v e d to be a self-fulfilling p r o p h e c y . While m o s t
Palestinian J e w s chose to avoid involvement in the world war, D a v i d
B e n - G u r i o n a n d Itzhak B e n Zvi, former law s t u d e n t s at the U n i v e r sity of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e who were leaders of the L a b o r Zionist m o v e ment, offered to organize a Palestinian J e w i s h a r m y in 1914 to
defend O t t o m a n Palestine. B u t , instead of accepting their offer,
D j e m a l d e p o r t e d t h e m a n d other Zionist leaders in 1915. B e n - G u r i o n
a n d B e n Zvi went to the U n i t e d S t a t e s , where they continued to
c a m p a i g n for the creation of a p r o - O t t o m a n J e w i s h a r m y . B u t early
in 1918 they rallied to a J e w i s h a r m y formation that was to fight in
Palestine on the British side against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . N o t h i n g
the w a r t i m e O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t h a d done h a d given t h e m c a u s e to
remain p r o - T u r k .
Y e t despite D j e m a l ' s capricious and often cruel m e a s u r e s , m o s t
J e w i s h settlers in Palestine did nothing to s u b v e r t the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e ; a n d only a tiny m i n o r i t y — a l b e i t a highly effective o n e —
worked against it. Of that tiny minority, led by an agricultural
scientist n a m e d A a r o n A a r o n s o h n , m o r e will be said later.
IV
A c c o r d i n g to the T u r k s , in 1914—15 R u s s i a n efforts at s u b v e r s i o n
behind O t t o m a n lines were directed across the frontier at the
A r m e n i a n s of northeastern Anatolia, adjacent to R u s s i a n A r m e n i a .
T h e e p i s o d e has been a subject of violent controversy ever since.
T u r k i s h A r m e n i a w a s the s t a g i n g area for Enver's initial attack
on the C a u c a s u s plateau, a n d it was the initial objective of the
R u s s i a n a r m i e s when, in turn, b e g i n n i n g in 1915, they s t r e a m e d
down f r o m the C a u c a s u s to invade T u r k e y . As C h r i s t i a n s , the
A r m e n i a n s were inclined to prefer the R u s s i a n to the T u r k i s h c a u s e .
N o t h i n g in the history of O t t o m a n rule p r e d i s p o s e d t h e m to r e m a i n
loyal to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e T u r k i s h m a s s a c r e s of A r m e n i a n s in
1894, 1895, 1896, a n d 1909 were still fresh in their m i n d s . T h e n ,
too, E n v e r h a d sent their blood enemies, the K u r d s , into A r m e n i a in
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SUBVERSION
O t t o m a n military units, rekindling ancient f e u d s a n d giving rise to
new ones.
In early 1915, E n v e r , as Minister of War, a n d T a l a a t , as Minister
of the Interior, claimed that the A r m e n i a n s were openly s u p p o r t i n g
R u s s i a , a n d h a d taken to m o b violence. In reprisal they ordered the
deportation of the entire A r m e n i a n p o p u l a t i o n from the northeastern
provinces to locations outside of Anatolia. T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t r e p resentatives even today insist that "At the instigation a n d with the
s u p p o r t of C z a r i s t R u s s i a , A r m e n i a n insurgents s o u g h t to establish
an A r m e n i a n state in an area that was p r e d o m i n a n t l y T u r k i s h " a n d
that, prior to the d e p o r t a t i o n s , " A r m e n i a n forces h a d already m a s sacred the M o s l e m p o p u l a t i o n of the city of Van a n d e n g a g e d in hita n d - r u n actions against the flanks of the T u r k i s h a r m y . "
3
T h e deportations, o r g a n i z e d by T a l a a t as Minister of the Interior,
are still r e m e m b e r e d as the A r m e n i a n M a s s a c r e s of 1915. R a p e a n d
beating were c o m m o n p l a c e . T h o s e who were not killed at once were
driven through m o u n t a i n s a n d deserts without food, drink, or shelter.
H u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of A r m e n i a n s eventually s u c c u m b e d or were
killed; A r m e n i a n s o u r c e s have put the figure as high as 1,500,000,
and t h o u g h the figures are still the s u b j e c t of bitter d i s p u t e , there can
b e n o d i s p u t i n g the result: T u r k i s h A r m e n i a was d e s t r o y e d , a n d
a b o u t half its p e o p l e p e r i s h e d .
T h e r e are historians today who continue to s u p p o r t the claim of
E n v e r and T a l a a t that the O t t o m a n rulers acted only after A r m e n i a
h a d risen against t h e m . B u t o b s e r v e r s at the time who were by no
m e a n s a n t i - T u r k r e p o r t e d that s u c h was not the case. G e r m a n officers
stationed there agreed that the area was quiet until the deportations
began.
4
5
At the G e r m a n and A u s t r i a n e m b a s s i e s , the first reports of the
deportations were i g n o r e d : officials clearly believed that m a s s a c r e s of
C h r i s t i a n s were a b o u t to take place, b u t did not want to know a b o u t
t h e m . T h e y accepted T a l a a t ' s r e a s s u r a n c e s eagerly.
By M a y 1915 m a s s a c r e reports were too persuasive to be ignored
any longer. T h e A u s t r i a n a m b a s s a d o r told his g o v e r n m e n t that he
thought he ought to "alert the T u r k i s h statesmen in a friendly
manner" to the possible a d v e r s e r e p e r c u s s i o n s of their p r o c e e d i n g s .
He later reported that he h a d in fact s p o k e n with T a l a a t , had u r g e d
that the matter be handled carefully, a n d h a d s u g g e s t e d avoiding
"persecution of women and children" b e c a u s e it would play into the
h a n d s of Allied p r o p a g a n d i s t s . On 24 M a y the Allied g o v e r n m e n t s
d e n o u n c e d the Porte's policy of " m a s s m u r d e r " ; to which the Porte
replied that responsibility rested on the Allies for having organized
the insurrection in A r m e n i a . (Whether there h a d been s u c h an
insurrection, a n d , if s o , whether R u s s i a organized or merely encoura g e d it, r e m a i n , as noted earlier, controversial i s s u e s . )
6
7
8
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213
R e p o r t s p o u r e d in f r o m G e r m a n officials in the field with g r u e s o m e
details of atrocities; von W a n g e n h e i m , the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r ,
found it increasingly difficult to overlook what was g o i n g on. By the
m i d d l e of J u n e , he cabled Berlin that T a l a a t had a d m i t t e d that the
m a s s deportations were not being carried out b e c a u s e of "military
considerations a l o n e . " T h o u g h they received no g u i d a n c e from
their h o m e g o v e r n m e n t s , von W a n g e n h e i m a n d his A u s t r i a n counterpart, Pallavicini, c o m m u n i c a t e d to the Porte their feelings that the
indiscriminate m a s s d e p o r t a t i o n s , especially when a c c o m p a n i e d by
pillagings a n d m a s s a c r e s , created a very b a d impression a b r o a d ,
especially in the U n i t e d S t a t e s , a n d that this adversely affected the
interests that G e r m a n y a n d T u r k e y had i n c o m m o n .
9
1 0
In J u l y , von W a n g e n h e i m reported to the G e r m a n Chancellor that
there no longer was any d o u b t that the Porte was trying to "exterminate the A r m e n i a n race in the T u r k i s h e m p i r e . " He a n d Pallavicini
both c o n c l u d e d that a t t e m p t i n g to interfere did no g o o d . H i s reco m m e n d a t i o n to his g o v e r n m e n t was to build a record s h o w i n g that
G e r m a n y was not responsible for what was h a p p e n i n g .
Other
G e r m a n officials d i s a g r e e d , a n d tried to interfere, as did the G e r m a n
Pastor J o h a n n u s L e p s i u s , but the Wilhelmstrasse accepted von
Wangenheim's advice. In O c t o b e r it asked the Porte to issue a p u b l i c
statement clearing G e r m a n y of complicity and stating that G e r m a n
representatives in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e h a d tried to s a v e the
A r m e n i a n s . When the Porte refused, the Wilhelmstrasse threatened
to issue such a statement on its own, but then backed d o w n for fear
of d a m a g i n g the T u r k i s h alliance.
11
1 2
1 3
T h e A r m e n i a n M a s s a c r e s provided useful a n d effective p r o p a g a n d a
for the Allied Powers, as the G e r m a n a n d A u s t r i a n a m b a s s a d o r s h a d
feared. P e r h a p s the m a s s a c r e s also affected Allied thinking a b o u t
the t e r m s of a future postwar settlement, for they reinforced the
a r g u m e n t that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e could not be left in control of
n o n - M o s l e m p o p u l a t i o n s , and possibly not even of n o n - T u r k i s h speaking p o p u l a t i o n s .
It was evident to neutral opinion that T a l a a t and E n v e r were
h a p p y to have rid themselves of the A r m e n i a n s . T h e i r public position
was that they had foiled an a t t e m p t at s u b v e r s i o n . Certainly they h a d
s u c c e e d e d in eliminating unrest; A r m e n i a b e c a m e as quiet as death
itself.
* T h e Liberal statesman, historian, and jurist, James Bryce, a pro-Armenian who
headed a commission to investigate the 1915 — 16 Armenian Massacres during the
war, issued a report that was damning to the C . U . P . government. Turkish spokesmen still claim that the Bryce report was a one-sided and distorted work of wartime
propaganda, and cite the admission of Arnold Toynbee, one of Bryce's assistants,
that the report was intended to further Britain's propaganda and policy objectives.
In this it succeeded.
14
214
SUBVERSION
V
T h e Allies did have one clear o p p o r t u n i t y to subvert the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e , b u t they deliberately p a s s e d it u p . It was offered to t h e m by
Djemal Pasha.
Alone a m o n g the Y o u n g T u r k t r i u m v i r s , D j e m a l took s t e p s t o
distance himself from the A r m e n i a n M a s s a c r e s . H i s a p p a r e n t a i m
was to keep open his avenues to the Allied P o w e r s . S i n c e his defeat
at the S u e z C a n a l in early 1915, D j e m a l h a d settled in D a m a s c u s a n d
had c o m e to rule G r e a t e r S y r i a — t h e southwestern provinces that
today c o m p r i s e S y r i a , L e b a n o n , J o r d a n , a n d I s r a e l — a l m o s t a s his
private fiefdom. At the end of 1915, while the A r m e n i a n M a s s a c r e s
were taking place, he p r o p o s e d , with Allied help, to seize the O t t o m a n
throne for himself.
M a k i n g use of the representative of the d o m i n a n t A r m e n i a n political society, the D a s h n a k t s u t i u m ( A r m e n i a n Revolutionary F e d e r ation), to convey his p r o p o s a l s , D j e m a l a p p e a r s to have acted on the
mistaken a s s u m p t i o n that s a v i n g the A r m e n i a n s — a s distinct from
merely exploiting their plight for p r o p a g a n d a p u r p o s e s — w a s an important Allied objective. In D e c e m b e r 1915 Dr Zavriev, a D a s h n a k
emissary to the Allies, informed the R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t that D j e m a l
was p r e p a r e d to overthrow the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t . T h i s w a s the
m o n t h that the Allied evacuation from Gallipoli b e g a n ; in the wake
of that d i s a s t r o u s expedition it could have been expected that the
Allies would be willing to pay a price to b r i n g hostilities with T u r k e y
to an end.
D j e m a l ' s t e r m s , a s outlined b y S a z a n o v , the R u s s i a n F o r e i g n
Minister, envisaged a free a n d i n d e p e n d e n t Asiatic T u r k e y (consisting
of S y r i a , M e s o p o t a m i a , a Christian A r m e n i a , Cilicia, a n d K u r d i s t a n
a s a u t o n o m o u s provinces) whose s u p r e m e ruler w o u l d b e D j e m a l a s
S u l t a n . D j e m a l agreed in a d v a n c e to the inevitable R u s s i a n d e m a n d
to be given C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d the D a r d a n e l l e s . He also offered to
take i m m e d i a t e s t e p s to save the surviving A r m e n i a n s . He p r o p o s e d ,
with Allied help, to m a r c h on C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to d e p o s e the S u l t a n
and his g o v e r n m e n t ; and in return he asked financial aid to help
reconstruct his country after the war.
T h e R u s s i a n s p r o p o s e d t o accept D j e m a l ' s proposal, a n d S a z a n o v
seemed confident that his allies w o u l d agree to do s o .
B u t , in
M a r c h 1916, F r a n c e rejected the p r o p o s a l a n d insisted on h a v i n g
Cilicia (in the south of what is now T u r k e y ) a n d G r e a t e r S y r i a for
herself.
S i r E d w a r d G r e y , the British F o r e i g n Secretary, also showed himself to be unwilling to encourage revolt b e h i n d enemy lines if doing
so meant foregoing the territorial g a i n s in Asiatic T u r k e y that Britain
had p r o m i s e d to her allies. In their p a s s i o n for booty, the Allied
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215
g o v e r n m e n t s lost sight of the condition u p o n which future g a i n s were
p r e d i c a t e d : winning the war. B l i n d e d by the prize, they did not see
that there w a s a contest.
D j e m a l ' s offer afforded the Allies their one great o p p o r t u n i t y to
subvert the O t t o m a n E m p i r e from within; a n d they let it g o . E n v e r
and T a l a a t never discovered D j e m a l ' s secret c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with the
enemy, and D j e m a l continued the fight against the Allies at their
side.
VI
T h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e benefited from the fact that it w a s not the
principal theater of war for any of its o p p o n e n t s , all of whose forces
a n d energies were concentrated elsewhere. E v e n s o , its wartime
p e r f o r m a n c e was surprisingly successful. E n g a g e d in a three-front
war, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e defeated Britain a n d F r a n c e in the west in
1915 — 16, c r u s h e d the a d v a n c i n g a r m i e s of British I n d i a in the east
at the s a m e t i m e , a n d in the north held off the R u s s i a n invasion
forces.
B e h i n d e n e m y lines, the O t t o m a n p e r f o r m a n c e was equally outstanding. T u r k i s h a n d G e r m a n s u b v e r s i o n had m a d e a s h a m b l e s of
the Allied-controlled Persian E m p i r e . In striking contrast, as of
mid-1916 Britain had failed in her efforts to win over the A r a b i c speaking p e o p l e s of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , a n d R u s s i a ' s a p p e a l to the
A r m e n i a n s had been followed only by their dreadful m a s s a c r e .
Would H u s s e i n ' s i m m i n e n t revolt in J u n e 1916 turn the situation
a r o u n d ? Would it p r o v e any m o r e successful than p r e v i o u s Allied
efforts to stir up trouble behind O t t o m a n lines? On the basis of the
record to m i d - 1 9 1 6 the chances would have had to be rated as low,
but Clayton a n d his colleagues were hopeful, a n d if they were right
they stood to win a great prize. F o r H u s s e i n ' s imminent revolt was
Cairo's chance to win the war in the E a s t , a n d to salvage the w a r t i m e
reputation of its leader, L o r d K i t c h e n e r .
27
K I T C H E N E R ' S L A S T MISSION
In L o n d o n direction of the war w a s now entrusted not to the War
Minister, b u t to the Chief of the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff. T h e C a b i n e t
h a d reason to believe that K i t c h e n e r h a d lost his touch even in the
area he was s u p p o s e d to know b e s t — t h e E a s t . T h e only British
military operation he h a d o p p o s e d there until the e n d — t h e evacuation
from G a l l i p o l i — w a s the only one to have p r o v e d a brilliant s u c c e s s .
A s q u i t h , who believed it politically i m p o s s i b l e to let K i t c h e n e r
resign a n d yet f o u n d it a w k w a r d to retain him in office, hit on the
expedient of s e n d i n g the War Minister a w a y on another long m i s s i o n —
a mission to R u s s i a . A trip t h e r e — h e of course was obliged to travel
by s h i p — w o u l d take m o s t of the last half of 1916. A long, d a n g e r o u s
voyage in arctic seas w a s m u c h to ask of the aging soldier f r o m the
tropics, b u t he accepted his new a s s i g n m e n t and m a d e his p r e p a r a t i o n s
to d e p a r t .
H i s long run of luck h a d finally r u n out. If he had died in 1914 he
w o u l d have been r e m e m b e r e d as the greatest British general since
Wellington. H a d he died in 1915 he w o u l d have been r e m e m b e r e d as
the p r o p h e t who foretold the nature a n d duration of the F i r s t World
War and as the organizer of Britain's m a s s a r m y . B u t in 1916 he had
b e c o m e the a g i n g veteran of a b y g o n e era who c o u l d not c o p e with
the d e m a n d s placed u p o n him in c h a n g i n g times. " T h e y expect too
m u c h of m e , these fellows," he is s u p p o s e d to have confided to a
C a b i n e t c o l l e a g u e ; "I don't know E u r o p e , I don't know E n g l a n d ,
and I don't know the British A r m y . " H i s heart a n d m i n d r e m a i n e d
with the colonial a r m i e s of E g y p t a n d I n d i a that he had reorganized
and that were trained to do his b i d d i n g . In m o d e r n E u r o p e he was
lost.
1
Shortly before noon on F r i d a y , 2 J u n e 1916, L o r d K i t c h e n e r went
to the K i n g ' s C r o s s railroad station almost unattended a n d unnoticed.
T h e train was a m i n u t e a n d a half late in starting, a n d he was seized
with i m p a t i e n c e ; he hated delay. O n c e started, the train s p e d him to
his port of e m b a r k a t i o n .
At S c a p a F l o w , the h e a d q u a r t e r s of the G r a n d Fleet off the
KITCHENER'S
LAST
MISSION
217
northern tip of S c o t l a n d , K i t c h e n e r a n d the faithful F i t z G e r a l d
b o a r d e d the a r m o r e d cruiser Hampshire the afternoon of 5 J u n e
1916, b o u n d for the R u s s i a n port of A r c h a n g e l . T h e d e p a r t u r e route
of the Hampshire had already been plotted, b u t should have been
c h a n g e d . N a v a l Intelligence, which earlier had broken the G e r m a n
radio c o d e , intercepted a m e s s a g e to the G e r m a n minelaying s u b m a rine U 7 5 in late M a y . It indicated that the s u b m a r i n e was to m i n e the
p a s s a g e that the Hampshire intended to follow. T w o further intercepts confirmed the information, as did sightings of the s u b m a r i n e .
In the confusion at British h e a d q u a r t e r s at S c a p a F l o w , A d m i r a l S i r
J o h n Jellicoe, the British naval c o m m a n d e r , a n d his staff s o m e h o w
failed to read or to u n d e r s t a n d the w a r n i n g s that N a v a l Intelligence
sent to their flagship. (At a court of inquiry that convened later in
1916 to look into the matter, A d m i r a l Jellicoe s u c c e e d e d in hiding
the existence of these intelligence w a r n i n g s , which were revealed
only i n 1985. )
2
T h e seas were s t o r m y , but K i t c h e n e r refused to delay his d e p a r t u r e . A d m i r a l Jellicoe's officers h a d m i s r e a d the weather charts,
which should have shown them that the s t o r m would intensify, and
they believed that it w o u l d a b a t e . At 4:45 p . m . the Hampshire p u t
out to sea into a r a g i n g g a l e . T h e weather p r o v e d too m u c h for the
destroyers a s s i g n e d to escort d u t y ; after two h o u r s , they t u r n e d
back. T h e Hampshire s t e a m e d ahead alone. S o m e t i m e between 7:30
and 7:45 it struck one of the U 7 5 ' s m i n e s a n d went d o w n with
almost all h a n d s .
A s soon a s the m i n e e x p l o d e d , K i t c h e n e r a n d F i t z G e r a l d c a m e out
on the s t a r b o a r d q u a r t e r d e c k , followed by officers of their staff. O n e
survivor later recalled that the " C a p t a i n was calling to L o r d K to go
to a boat b u t L o r d K apparently did not hear him or else took no
notice." E s c a p e f r o m the d o o m e d vessel s e e m e d out of the question,
and the field m a r s h a l m a d e no m o v e to a t t e m p t it. He stood on deck,
calm a n d expressionless, for a b o u t a q u a r t e r of an hour. T h e only
survivor of the Hampshire who is still alive has never forgotten a last
g l i m p s e of him, d r e s s e d in a greatcoat, s t a n d i n g on deck a n d waiting
impassively for the ship t o s i n k . T h e n L o r d K i t c h e n e r a n d his ship
went down beneath the turbulent w a v e s .
3
4
F i t z G e r a l d ' s b o d y was washed a s h o r e , b u t K i t c h e n e r d i s a p p e a r e d
into the d e p t h s of the sea. A p o p u l a r legend s p r a n g up in Britain
soon afterward, a c c o r d i n g to which L o r d K i t c h e n e r had e s c a p e d
from death a n d w o u l d one day return.
28
H U S S E I N ' S REVOLT
i
By a coincidence that often has been r e m a r k e d u p o n , L o r d K i t c h e n e r
was lost at sea just as the E m i r H u s s e i n of M e c c a p r o c l a i m e d his
rebellion against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . H u s s e i n ordered it when he
discovered that the Y o u n g T u r k s intended t o d e p o s e h i m . B u t British
officialdom in C a i r o a n d K h a r t o u m , u n a w a r e of this, r e g a r d e d the
rebellion as an a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of the school of K i t c h e n e r — o f
Wingate, C l a y t o n , a n d S t o r r s — a n d of their tactic of d a n g l i n g vague
b u t g r a n d i o s e p r o s p e c t s of future glory in front of the E m i r ' s eyes.
T h e R e s i d e n c y h a d been working to generate the u p r i s i n g for almost
nine m o n t h s . When the news of the desert u p r i s i n g reached C a i r o ,
W y n d h a m D e e d e s called it "a great t r i u m p h for C l a y t o n . "
F o r H u s s e i n , it was s o m e t h i n g closer to an a d m i s s i o n of defeat; his
policy had been to remain neutral a n d collect b r i b e s from both sides.
He m o v e d to the Allied side reluctantly, forced to do so by the
imminent d a n g e r that the Y o u n g T u r k s would overthrow h i m .
H a v i n g already discovered that they intended to d e p o s e him eventually, he f o u n d himself e x p o s e d to new risks, starting in the s u m m e r
of 1915, when D j e m a l P a s h a b e g a n to c r u s h dissent in the A r a b
circles with which H u s s e i n ( t h r o u g h his son F e i s a l ) had been in
contact in D a m a s c u s . D j e m a l acted on the basis of d o c u m e n t s o b tained from the F r e n c h consulates in Beirut a n d D a m a s c u s that
betrayed the n a m e s of A r a b c o n s p i r a t o r s a n d of at least one key
British agent. A r r e s t s were m a d e . Interrogations, torture, a n d trials
by military court took place. On 21 A u g u s t 1915 eleven p e r s o n s
convicted of treason were e x e c u t e d . In the following m o n t h s there
were m o r e arrests a n d m o r e trials. A n u m b e r of those arrested were
prominent figures in A r a b life. A m o n g those u n d e r g o i n g torture a n d
interrogation in jail were p e o p l e who could have revealed details of
Feisal's conversations with the secret societies al-'Ahd a n d a l - F a t a t ,
and o f H u s s e i n ' s p r o m i s e s t o K i t c h e n e r and M c M a h o n . T h e E m i r
could not be s u r e that they would r e m a i n silent. He sent pleas to
1
21S
HUSSEIN'S
219
REVOLT
D j e m a l a n d to the Porte a s k i n g that they show mercy to the p r i s o n e r s .
T h e pleas only c o m p r o m i s e d h i m further.
T h e n , in April 1916, H u s s e i n learned f r o m D j e m a l that a picked
and specially trained O t t o m a n force of 3 , 5 0 0 m e n was a b o u t to
m a r c h t h r o u g h the H e j a z to the tip of the A r a b i a n peninsula, where
an a c c o m p a n y i n g party of G e r m a n officers planned to establish a
telegraph station. T h e O t t o m a n force was sufficiently s t r o n g t o c r u s h
H u s s e i n as it m a r c h e d t h r o u g h his d o m a i n . T h e news threw the
E m i r into hasty and i m p r o v i s e d activity; it obliged h i m to strike first,
and to seek the protection of the Royal N a v y along his coast. On
6 M a y there were twenty-one new executions in Beirut a n d D a m a s c u s ;
the news was u n e x p e c t e d , a n d s p e e d e d u p Hussein's s c h e d u l e .
Prudently, H u s s e i n h a d already obtained m o r e than 5 0 , 0 0 0 gold
p o u n d s from the Porte with which to raise a n d e q u i p forces to
c o m b a t the B r i t i s h . To this he a d d e d the first installment of a
substantial p a y m e n t from Britain with which to raise and e q u i p
forces t o c o m b a t the T u r k s . T h e revolt i n the H e j a z was p r o c l a i m e d
s o m e t i m e between 5 a n d 10 J u n e 1916. T h e Royal N a v y immediately
m o v e d along the H e j a z coastline, which deterred the G e r m a n T u r k i s h force f r o m a d v a n c i n g further.
2
T h e A r a b B u r e a u believed that the u p r i s i n g would d r a w s u p p o r t
throughout the M o s l e m a n d A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g worlds. M o s t important
of all, it believed that the revolt w o u l d d r a w s u p p o r t from what the
British believed to be a largely A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g O t t o m a n a r m y . F e i s a l
a n d H u s s e i n r e p o r t e d that they expected to be joined by a b o u t
100,000 A r a b t r o o p s . T h a t w o u l d have been about a third of the
O t t o m a n a r m y ' s fighting strength. A c c o r d i n g to other r e p o r t s ,
H u s s e i n expected to be joined by a b o u t 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 t r o o p s , or a l m o s t the
whole of the T u r k i s h army's functional c o m b a t t r o o p s .
3
4
In the event, the A r a b revolt for which H u s s e i n h o p e d never took
place. No A r a b i c units of the O t t o m a n a r m y c a m e over to H u s s e i n .
No political or military figures of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e defected to
him a n d the Allies. T h e powerful secret military organization that
a l - F a r u q i h a d p r o m i s e d would rally to H u s s e i n failed to m a k e itself
known. A few t h o u s a n d t r i b e s m e n , s u b s i d i z e d by British money,
constituted H u s s e i n ' s t r o o p s . H e h a d n o regular a r m y . O u t s i d e the
H e j a z and its tribal neighbors, there w a s no visible s u p p o r t for the
revolt in any part of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world. T h e handful of nonHejazi officers who joined the E m i r ' s a r m e d forces were prisoners-ofwar or exiles who already resided in British-controlled territories.
An initial military p r o b l e m was that the E m i r ' s small b a n d of tribal
followers were helpless against O t t o m a n artillery. T h e i r attacks on
the T u r k i s h g a r r i s o n s i n M e c c a and nearby T a i f were r e p u l s e d , a s
were their attacks on M e d i n a a n d on the port of J e d d a h . British s h i p s
a n d airplanes c a m e t o the r e s c u e b y attacking J e d d a h . O n c e the port
220
SUBVERSION
was s e c u r e d the British landed M o s l e m t r o o p s from the E g y p t i a n
a r m y , who m o v e d inland t o help H u s s e i n take M e c c a a n d T a i f . T h e
port of R a b e g h , defended by fewer than thirty T u r k s , was c a p t u r e d
with ease, as was the port of Y a n b o . T h u s the British Royal N a v y
won control of the R e d S e a coast of A r a b i a , and established a British
presence ashore in the p o r t s .
H u s s e i n would not allow Christian British military units to m o v e
inland. H i s e x p r e s s e d view, which the British found parochial, was
that it w o u l d c o m p r o m i s e his position in the M o s l e m world and
would be deeply resented if n o n - M o s l e m s were to enter the land that
e m b r a c e d the H o l y Places.
T h e p r o b l e m was that H u s s e i n on his own was no match for the
T u r k s . T h e activist R e g i n a l d Wingate, G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l o f the
S u d a n , wrote to C l a y t o n that Britain ought to s e n d in t r o o p s whether
H u s s e i n wanted t h e m or not. He noted that he had been in favor of
sending a British expeditionary force to the H e j a z all a l o n g . B u t
Wingate's s u p e r i o r s d i s a g r e e d with h i m , and it b e c a m e British policy,
insofar as it was p o s s i b l e , to s u p p l y professional military assistance to
the H e j a z from a m o n g M o s l e m officers a n d t r o o p s . In a land of
intrigue, this policy was also beset with difficulties.
5
M a j o r a l - M a s r i , strongly r e c o m m e n d e d by the British authorities,
was appointed Chief of Staff of the forces nominally c o m m a n d e d by
the E m i r ' s son Ali. He took up his position in late 1916, a n d within a
m o n t h was r e m o v e d f r o m c o m m a n d as a result of a m u r k y intrigue.
He was replaced by the able J a a f a r al-Askari, an A r a b general in the
O t t o m a n a r m y w h o m the British h a d taken prisoner.
A c c o r d i n g to one account, a l - M a s r i was plotting to take over
control f r o m H u s s e i n in order to negotiate to change sides. He s p o k e
of c o m i n g to an a r r a n g e m e n t whereby the H e j a z forces w o u l d return
to the O t t o m a n fold in return for an agreement by the Porte to grant
local a u t o n o m y to A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g a r e a s .
6
It was not merely that a l - M a s r i a n d his colleagues believed that
G e r m a n y would win the war. T w o years later, when it h a d b e c o m e
clear that it was the Allies who were g o i n g to win, the one-time A r a b
secret society c o m m a n d e r in D a m a s c u s ( w h o m a l - F a r u q i had purp o r t e d to represent when he d u p e d C l a y t o n and the others in C a i r o ) ,
General Y a s i n a l - H a s h i m i , still refused to change sides. G i l b e r t
Clayton had m i s r e a d the politics of the A r a b secret societies: they
were profoundly o p p o s e d to British d e s i g n s in the M i d d l e E a s t . At
the beginning of the war they h a d resolved to s u p p o r t the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e against the threat o f E u r o p e a n c o n q u e s t . T h e y r e m a i n e d
faithful to their resolve. T h e y preferred a u t o n o m y or i n d e p e n d e n c e
if they could get it; b u t if they could not, they preferred to be ruled
b y T u r k i s h M o s l e m s rather than b y C h r i s t i a n s .
7
H u s s e i n himself, from the o p e n i n g d a y s of his revolt, continued-to
221
HUSSEIN'S REVOLT
c o m m u n i c a t e with the Y o u n g T u r k s with a view to c h a n g i n g b a c k to
the O t t o m a n side of the war. T h e Arab Bulletin (no. 2 5 , 7 October
1916) q u o t e d the A r a b i a n warlord A b d u l Aziz I b n S a u d a s c h a r g i n g
that "Sherif's original intention was to play off the British against the
T u r k s , a n d thus get the T u r k s to g r a n t him independence g u a r a n t e e d
by Germany."
Hussein's basic p r o g r a m r e m a i n e d constant: he wanted m o r e power
and a u t o n o m y as E m i r within the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , a n d he wanted
his position to be m a d e hereditary. A l t h o u g h the British were not yet
aware of his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with the enemy, they rapidly b e c a m e
disenchanted with the E m i r for other r e a s o n s . As they c a m e to see it,
H u s s e i n , far from b e i n g the leader of a newly created A r a b nationalism, was a ruler who took little interest in nationalism a n d whose
only concern was for the acquisition of new p o w e r s a n d territories for
himself. D a v i d H o g a r t h , the intelligence officer who headed the
A r a b B u r e a u , drily c o m m e n t e d that, "It is obvious that the K i n g
r e g a r d s A r a b Unity as s y n o n y m o u s with his own K i n g s h i p . . . "
8
T h e E m i r insisted on p r o c l a i m i n g himself king of the A r a b s ,
although R o n a l d S t o r r s on behalf of C a i r o had warned him not to do
so. S t o r r s later wrote that "he knew better than we that he could lay
no kind of genuine claim" to be the king of all the A r a b s . In this
respect, S t o r r s found that "his pretensions b o r d e r e d on the tragicomic," yet felt that Britain was now obliged to s u p p o r t him as far as
p o s s i b l e . T h e A r a b B u r e a u was deeply d i s a p p o i n t e d b y the failure
of H u s s e i n ' s leadership to take hold.
9
10
II
It is d u e to T. E. L a w r e n c e , a j u n i o r m e m b e r of the A r a b B u r e a u ,
that its real views were recorded in convenient f o r m , p r o v i d i n g an
account of the c o n t e m p o r a r y o b s e r v a t i o n s and private t h o u g h t s of
the small b a n d of Kitchener's followers who had organized Hussein's
revolt a n d who had placed so m u c h h o p e in it. It was L a w r e n c e who
s u g g e s t e d that the A r a b B u r e a u p u b l i s h an information bulletin.
Originally issued under the title Arab Bureau Summaries, it then
b e c a m e the Arab Bulletin. It a p p e a r e d at irregular intervals, c o m mencing 6 J u n e 1916, a n d continuing until the end of 1918. T h e first
issue was edited by L a w r e n c e . F o r m o s t of the next three m o n t h s ,
issues were edited by L i e u t e n a n t - C o m m a n d e r D a v i d H o g a r t h , the
O x f o r d archaeologist who served as D i r e c t o r of the A r a b B u r e a u . At
the end of the s u m m e r , C a p t a i n K i n a h a n Cornwallis, H o g a r t h ' s
deputy, took over as the regular editor.
I s s u e d from the A r a b B u r e a u offices in the S a v o y Hotel, C a i r o ,
the Arab Bulletin was labeled " S e c r e t . " Only twenty-six copies were
222
SUBVERSION
printed of each issue. T h e restricted distribution list included the
Viceroy of I n d i a a n d the British commanders-in-chief in E g y p t and
the S u d a n . A copy each also went to the War Office a n d to the
A d m i r a l t y in L o n d o n . T h e issues p r o v i d e d a wide range of confidential current and b a c k g r o u n d information a b o u t the A r a b a n d M o s l e m
worlds.
L a w r e n c e , in the first issue (6 J u n e 1916), which a p p e a r e d just as
the revolt in the H e j a z b e g a n , indicated that there were p r o b l e m s in
holding A r a b s together even for the p u r p o s e s of revolt. He wrote
that whenever there were large tribal gatherings, dissensions soon
a r o s e ; a n d , knowing this, the T u r k s held back a n d did nothing.
T h e y delayed "in the s u r e expectation that tribal dissension w o u l d
soon d i s m e m b e r their o p p o n e n t s . "
T h e Arab Bulletin, no. 5 (18 J u n e 1916), reported the b e g i n n i n g
of H u s s e i n ' s proclaimed revolt a week or two earlier. T h i s issue a n d
issue no. 6 (23 J u n e 1916) indicate that H u s s e i n ' s military operations
had achieved only m o d e s t s u c c e s s , a n d that even this had been d u e
to British forces. A c c o r d i n g to issue no. 6, the T u r k s on the coast
were c a u g h t between British s h i p s a n d seaplanes, a n d the A r a b s .
S e e k i n g cover behind walls, the T u r k s were driven to s u r r e n d e r for
lack of food and water, for their wells were outside the walls. T u r k i s h
prisoners taken at J e d d a h were q u o t e d in the Arab Bulletin, no. 7
(30 J u n e 1916), as saying that E n g l i s h "shells and b o m b s it was that
really took the town."
H u s s e i n ' s t r o o p s were belittled as soldiers. A c c o r d i n g to issue
no. 6, " T h e y are p r e s u m a b l y t r i b e s m e n only"; and " T h e y are all u n trained, and have no artillery or m a c h i n e g u n s . T h e i r preference is
for the showy side of warfare, and it will be difficult to hold them
together for any length of time, unless the pay a n d rations are
attractive." A detailed analysis a n d description written by T. E.
L a w r e n c e , which a p p e a r e d in issue no. 32 (26 N o v e m b e r 1916), w a s
in the s a m e vein: "I think one c o m p a n y of T u r k s , properly entrenched in open country, w o u l d defeat the Sherif's a r m i e s . T h e
value of the tribes is defensive only, a n d their real s p h e r e is guerilla
warfare." He wrote that they were "too individualistic to e n d u r e
c o m m a n d s , or fight in line, or help each other. It would, I think, be
i m p o s s i b l e to m a k e an organized force out of t h e m . "
H u s s e i n ' s call to revolt fell on deaf ears throughout the A r a b
and M o s l e m w o r l d s , a c c o r d i n g to the Arab Bulletin. S o u n d i n g s of
opinion a r o u n d the g l o b e , as reported in issues t h r o u g h o u t 1916,
elicited r e s p o n s e s r a n g i n g from indifference to hostility. I s s u e no. 29
(8 N o v e m b e r 1916), which reported Hussein's proclamation that he
was a s s u m i n g the title of K i n g of the A r a b s , c o m m e n t e d icily that
"the prince, claiming s u c h recognition, is very far from being in
a position to substantiate his pretension," and that H i s Majesty's
HUSSEIN'S
223
REVOLT
G o v e r n m e n t was not g o i n g to sign a blank check on the future
political organization of the A r a b p e o p l e s . In issue no. 41 (6 F e b r u a r y
1917), H o g a r t h wrote that "the p r o s p e c t of A r a b i a united u n d e r
either the K i n g of the H e j a z or anyone else s e e m s very r e m o t e . T h e
'Arab C a u s e ' is evidently a very weak cement in the p e n i n s u l a ;
dislike of the T u r k is stronger; a n d a desire to stand well with us is
p e r h a p s stronger still."
N e a r l y a year after H u s s e i n p r o c l a i m e d the A r a b Revolt, H o g a r t h
was p r e p a r e d to write it off as a failure. In reviewing what he called
"A Y e a r of Revolt" in the H e j a z for the Arab Bulletin, no. 52
(31 M a y 1917), he c o n c l u d e d that it had not fulfilled the hopes
placed in it nor did it justify further expectations: " T h a t the H e j a z
B e d o u i n s were s i m p l y guerillas, a n d not of g o o d quality at that, had
been a m p l y d e m o n s t r a t e d , even in the early sieges; a n d it was never
in d o u b t that they would not attack nor withstand T u r k i s h r e g u l a r s . "
T h e best that could be hoped for in the future from H u s s e i n ' s A r a b
M o v e m e n t , he wrote, was that it would "just hold its own in p l a c e . "
It was not m u c h of a return on the British investment. A c c o r d i n g
to a later account by R o n a l d S t o r r s , Britain spent, in all, 11 million
p o u n d s sterling to s u b s i d i z e H u s s e i n ' s r e v o l t . At the time this was
a b o u t 44 million d o l l a r s ; in today's currency it would be closer to 400
million dollars. Britain's military a n d political investment in H u s s e i n ' s
revolt was also c o n s i d e r a b l e . On 21 S e p t e m b e r 1918 R e g i n a l d
Wingate, who by then had s u c c e e d e d K i t c h e n e r a n d M c M a h o n as
British proconsul in E g y p t , wrote that " M o s l e m s in general have
hitherto r e g a r d e d the H e j a z revolt, a n d our share in it, with suspicion
or dislike"; a n d that it was i m p o r t a n t to make H u s s e i n look as
t h o u g h he had not been a failure in order to keep Britain from
looking b a d .
11
1 2
Ill
T h r e e weeks after H u s s e i n a n n o u n c e d his rebellion, the British War
Office told the C a b i n e t in L o n d o n that the A r a b world was not
following his lead. In a secret m e m o r a n d u m p r e p a r e d for the War
C o m m i t t e e of the C a b i n e t on 1 J u l y 1916, the G e n e r a l Staff of the
War Office reported that H u s s e i n "has always represented himself, in
his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r , as b e i n g the
s p o k e s m a n of the A r a b nation, but so far as is known, he is not
s u p p o r t e d by any organization of A r a b s nearly general enough to
secure . . . a u t o m a t i c acceptance of the t e r m s agreed to by h i m . "
As a result, a c c o r d i n g to the m e m o r a n d u m , the British g o v e r n m e n t
ought not to a s s u m e that a g r e e m e n t s reached with him w o u l d be
honored by other A r a b leaders.
13
224
SUBVERSION
In a secret m e m o r a n d u m entitled " T h e P r o b l e m of the N e a r
E a s t , " p r e p a r e d at about the s a m e time, S i r M a r k S y k e s predicted
that if British aid were not forthcoming, the Sherif H u s s e i n ' s m o v e ment would be c r u s h e d by early 1917. G l o o m i l y , S y k e s foresaw that
by the close of the war, T u r k e y would be the most exhausted of the
belligerent countries a n d , as a result, w o u l d be taken over by her
partner, G e r m a n y . T h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e , wrote S y k e s , w o u l d bec o m e little m o r e than a G e r m a n c o l o n y . H i s analysis in this respect
foreshadowed the new views a b o u t the M i d d l e E a s t that were to
b e c o m e current in British official circles the following year under the
influence of L e o A m e r y and his colleagues.
14
S y k e s had b e c o m e an assistant to his friend M a u r i c e H a n k e y ,
Secretary of A s q u i t h ' s War C a b i n e t . In his new position S y k e s
continued to concern himself with the E a s t . He had p u b l i s h e d an
Arabian Report, a L o n d o n forerunner of Cairo's Arab Bulletin. When
his friend G i l b e r t Clayton arrived f r o m E g y p t in the latter half of
1916, the two m e n went before the War C o m m i t t e e to u r g e s u p p o r t
for H u s s e i n ' s revolt in the H e j a z . T h e y also urged- that S i r H e n r y
M c M a h o n should be replaced as H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in E g y p t ; for
M c M a h o n had been a p p o i n t e d only to keep the position available for
K i t c h e n e r , and when the field m a r s h a l died, K i t c h e n e r ' s followers
wanted the j o b for R e g i n a l d Wingate, one of their own.*
D u r i n g the s u m m e r of 1916, S y k e s spent a g o o d deal of time
m a k i n g public s p e e c h e s . In his s p e e c h e s he gave currency to the new
descriptive p h r a s e , "the M i d d l e E a s t , " which the A m e r i c a n naval
officer a n d historian Alfred T h a y e r M a h a n had invented in 1902 to
designate the area between A r a b i a a n d I n d i a ; a n d he a d d e d to his
public reputation as an expert on that area of the world.
In S e p t e m b e r , as intelligence r e p o r t s from Cairo indicated that the
revolt in the H e j a z was collapsing even m o r e rapidly than he had
anticipated, S y k e s a d v o c a t e d s e n d i n g out military s u p p o r t to H u s s e i n
i m m e d i a t e l y — a plan vigorously a d v a n c e d b y M c M a h o n a n d Wingate.
H i s u r g i n g s were in vain: R o b e r t s o n , the all-powerful new Chief of
the Imperial G e n e r a l Staff, refused to divert troops or efforts from
the western front.
T h e late s u m m e r a n d a u t u m n of 1916 a p p e a r e d to be d e s p e r a t e
times for H u s s e i n ' s c a u s e , t h o u g h in retrospect Britain's naval control
of the R e d S e a coastline p r o b a b l y e n s u r e d the survival of the E m i r ' s
s u p p o r t e r s . T h e British hit on the idea of s e n d i n g a few h u n d r e d
A r a b prisoners-of-war f r o m India's M e s o p o t a m i a n front to join
H u s s e i n . When S i r A r c h i b a l d M u r r a y , c o m m a n d i n g general (since
J a n u a r y 1916) of the British a r m y in E g y p t , reiterated that he could
1 5
* In the end, they succeeded. Wingate was appointed High Commissioner, but
not until January 1917.
HUSSEIN'S
REVOLT
225
s p a r e no t r o o p s to s e n d to H u s s e i n ' s defense, the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r ,
S i r H e n r y M c M a h o n , s u g g e s t e d asking for help from F r a n c e . H e
also sent R o n a l d S t o r r s , his aide at the Residency, on a m i s s i o n to
A r a b i a to inquire as to what else could be done.
IV
At the end of the s u m m e r of 1916, the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t sent a
mission to the H e j a z to attempt to s t o p the Sherif H u s s e i n ' s revolt
from collapsing. L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l E d o u a r d B r e m o n d , h e a d i n g the
F r e n c h mission, arrived in Alexandria 1 S e p t e m b e r 1916, and from
there took ship for A r a b i a , arriving at the Hejazi port of J e d d a h on
20 S e p t e m b e r .
B r e m o n d ' s o p p o s i t e n u m b e r i n J e d d a h w a s Colonel C . E . Wilson,
the senior British officer in the H e j a z and representative of the
G o v e r n m e n t of the S u d a n — w h i c h is to say of Wingate, who was
soon to a s s u m e operational control of the British side of the H e j a z
revolt. H i s assistant, C a p t a i n H u b e r t Y o u n g , was at the British
consulate in J e d d a h (which called itself the P i l g r i m a g e Office, as it
dealt with the affairs of M o s l e m p i l g r i m s from British I n d i a a n d
elsewhere) to greet B r e m o n d when he arrived. B r e m o n d also met
Vice-Admiral S i r R o s s l y n W e m y s s , whose British fleet controlled the
R e d S e a p a s s a g e between E g y p t and the S u d a n and A r a b i a , a n d who
ferried officers a n d m e n across it.
1 6
B r e m o n d ' s a s s i g n m e n t was to s h o r e up the H e j a z revolt by s u p p l y ing a cadre of professional military advisers from a m o n g the
M o h a m m e d a n population of the F r e n c h E m p i r e who, as M o s l e m s ,
would be a c c e p t a b l e to the Sherif. T h e F r e n c h mission led by
B r e m o n d c o m p r i s e d 42 officers a n d 983 m e n . T h e size of the F r e n c h
mission p r o m p t e d the rival British to s e n d out a further c o m p l e m e n t
of officers of their own to serve u n d e r Wilson. B r e m o n d , in t u r n ,
contemplated increasing the size of his forces in order to strengthen
the forces of the Sherif, which were d a n g e r o u s l y weak. I n d e e d ,
A b d u l l a h , the son closest to the Sherif's thinking, was fearful that
the O t t o m a n forces b a s e d in M e d i n a might attack a n d overrun the
rebel positions on the road to M e c c a .
In the m i d d l e of O c t o b e r , R o n a l d S t o r r s , of the British R e s i d e n c y
in C a i r o , took ship from E g y p t to the H e j a z with an alternative
a p p r o a c h . He c a m e in s u p p o r t of M a j o r Aziz a l - M a s r i , the nationalist
secret society leader, w h o m C a i r o had nominated to take in h a n d the
training a n d reorganization of the H e j a z forces, a n d whose brief
tenure in c o m m a n d was d e s c r i b e d earlier (see p a g e 2 2 0 ) . A l - M a s r i
was of the opinion that it would be a political disaster to allow Allied
t r o o p s , even t h o u g h M o s l e m , to b e c o m e too visibly involved in the
226
SUBVERSION
Sherif's c a m p a i g n . H i s view was that the forces of M e c c a could fight
effectively on their own if trained in the techniques of guerrilla
warfare.
S t o r r s a r r a n g e d for his y o u n g friend, the junior intelligence officer
T . E . L a w r e n c e , t o c o m e along o n the s h i p t o J e d d a h . L a w r e n c e had
a c c u m u l a t e d a few weeks of leave time, and wanted to s p e n d t h e m in
A r a b i a , which he had never visited. S t o r r s obtained p e r m i s s i o n for
L a w r e n c e to c o m e along with h i m ; so they arrived in J e d d a h
together.
T h o m a s E d w a r d L a w r e n c e was twenty-eight years old, t h o u g h h e
looked closer to nineteen or twenty. He had been turned down for
a r m y service as too s m a l l ; he stood only a few inches above five feet
in height. H u b e r t Y o u n g called h i m "a quiet little m a n . " R o n a l d
S t o r r s , like most others, called h i m "little L a w r e n c e , " t h o u g h S t o r r s
also called him " s u p e r - c e r e b r a l . "
H i s personal c i r c u m s t a n c e s s e e m e d u n d i s t i n g u i s h e d . H e was
apparently of a poor family and of m o d e s t b a c k g r o u n d , in an A r a b
B u r e a u g r o u p that included M e m b e r s of Parliament, millionaires,
a n d aristocrats. He had attended the City School at h o m e in O x f o r d
rather than a public school (in the British s e n s e ) : E t o n , H a r r o w ,
Winchester, or the like. In A r a b B u r e a u circles he ranked low, and
had no military a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s to his credit.
L a w r e n c e had worked for the archaeologist D a v i d H o g a r t h at the
A s h m o l e a n M u s e u m , a n d H o g a r t h — w h o later b e c a m e head of the
A r a b B u r e a u — h a d gotten him into the geographical section of the
War Office in the a u t u m n of 1914 as a t e m p o r a r y second lieutenantt r a n s l a t o r . F r o m there he went out to the M i d d l e E a s t to do survey
m a p s . He stayed on in C a i r o to do other j o b s .
When S t o r r s a n d L a w r e n c e arrived i n J e d d a h , the E m i r H u s s e i n ' s
son A b d u l l a h met t h e m . A b d u l l a h p r o v e d an i m m e d i a t e disappointment to L a w r e n c e , but L a w r e n c e so i m p r e s s e d A b d u l l a h that he won
coveted permission to go into the field to meet the E m i r of M e c c a ' s
other sons. F o r L a w r e n c e this was a m a j o r coup. Colonel Alfred
Parker, who had been the first head of the A r a b B u r e a u a n d who
served as h e a d of Military Intelligence in the H e j a z revolt, wrote to
Clayton on 24 O c t o b e r 1916, that "Before L a w r e n c e arrived I had
been p u s h i n g the idea of g o i n g up country and had h o p e d to go u p .
Don't think I g r u d g e him, especially as he will do it as well or better
than anyone. S i n c e he has been g o n e " the H e j a z g o v e r n m e n t "is not
inclined to agree to other t r i p s . "
1 7
18
19
2 0
In the field, L a w r e n c e visited F e i s a l and the other leaders and
found Feisal e n c h a n t i n g : "an a b s o l u t e r i p p e r , " he later wrote to a
c o l l e a g u e . L a w r e n c e decided that Feisal should b e c o m e the field
c o m m a n d e r of the H e j a z revolt. A m o n g his other qualities, Feisal
looked the p a r t .
21
HUSSEIN'S
REVOLT
227
On his own initiative, L a w r e n c e sent a written report to R e g i n a l d
Wingate, G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l of the S u d a n , who was soon to be sent
to E g y p t to replace M c M a h o n as H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r . When L a w r e n c e
left the H e j a z in N o v e m b e r , instead of returning directly to C a i r o , he
e m b a r k e d for the S u d a n to introduce himself to Wingate.
L a w r e n c e — t h r o u g h his friendship with G i l b e r t C l a y t o n , the
S u d a n ' s representative in C a i r o — m u s t have been familiar with
Wingate's outlook on the future of M i d d l e E a s t e r n politics. He would
have known that Wingate a i m e d at s e c u r i n g British domination of
the postwar A r a b M i d d l e E a s t a n d (like himself) at preventing F r a n c e
f r o m establishing a position in the region. A l t h o u g h Wingate wanted
Hussein's forces to be s a v e d from defeat a n d possible destruction, he
could not have wanted the rescue to be undertaken by F r e n c h m e n —
for that would risk b r i n g i n g H u s s e i n ' s A r a b M o v e m e n t u n d e r longterm F r e n c h influence.
L a w r e n c e p r o p o s e d to Wingate an alternative to B r e m o n d ' s project
of e m p l o y i n g F r e n c h and other Allied regular a r m y units to do the
bulk of H u s s e i n ' s fighting for h i m : Hussein's t r i b e s m e n s h o u l d
be u s e d as irregulars in a British-led guerrilla warfare c a m p a i g n .
Aziz a l - M a s r i h a d originally s u g g e s t e d the guerrilla warfare idea to
L a w r e n c e , intending t o exclude F r a n c e and Britain f r o m A r a b i a ;
L a w r e n c e modified the plan so as to exclude only F r a n c e . L a w r e n c e
a d d e d that F e i s a l s h o u l d be a p p o i n t e d to c o m m a n d the Sherifian
striking forces, a n d claimed that he himself was the only liaison
officer with w h o m Feisal would work.
Wingate t e n d e d to agree. B a c k in 1914 he had been the first to
u r g e that the A r a b i a n tribes s h o u l d be stirred up to m a k e trouble for
T u r k e y . In a sense it w a s Wingate's own plan that L a w r e n c e was
advocating. I n d e e d , writing to a fellow general s o m e two d e c a d e s
later, Wingate claimed that it w a s h e — a n d not "poor little
L a w r e n c e " — w h o h a d launched, s u p p o r t e d , a n d m a d e p o s s i b l e the
Arab Movement.
2 2
L a w r e n c e ' s p r o p o s a l s were also congenial to the British military
authorities in C a i r o . T h e y did not expect his guerrilla warfare c a m paign to be a great s u c c e s s — q u i t e the c o n t r a r y — b u t they h a d no
troops to s p a r e for the H e j a z a n d therefore were delighted to hear
that none were n e e d e d . L a w r e n c e rose high in their estimation by
not asking for any.
L a w r e n c e left C a i r o again on 25 N o v e m b e r 1916, a n d by early
D e c e m b e r h a d taken up his position with F e i s a l . Wingate b e c a m e
H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in J a n u a r y 1917, a n d s u p p l i e d L a w r e n c e with
increasingly large s u m s of gold with which to b u y s u p p o r t f r o m the
A r a b tribes. Y e t the winter a n d s p r i n g of 1917 went by with no news
of any significant military s u c c e s s that L a w r e n c e ' s t r i b e s m e n h a d
won.
228
SUBVERSION
V
T h e most c o n s p i c u o u s failure of the M e c c a revolt was its failure to
carry with it M e d i n a , the other large holy city of the H e j a z . M e d i n a
lay s o m e 300 miles to the northeast of M e c c a , blocking the route that
continued northward toward S y r i a . F o l l o w e r s of the Sherif H u s s e i n
attacked it in the first d a y s of the revolt, but were beaten off with
e a s e ; and the Sherif's forces were u n a b l e to capture it d u r i n g the
war. N o r could they b y - p a s s it and allow its large T u r k i s h garrison to
attack them on the flank or from the rear.
M e d i n a was s u r r o u n d e d by a solid stone wall, said to date from the
twelfth century, d o m i n a t e d by towers a n d , at the northwest, by a
castle m a n n e d by the O t t o m a n g a r r i s o n . T h e terminal of the H e j a z
railroad from D a m a s c u s was situated within its walls, a n d p r o v i d e d
access to s u p p l i e s and reinforcements. A l t h o u g h the railroad track
was repeatedly d y n a m i t e d d u r i n g the war by Allied-led B e d o u i n
raiding parties, the O t t o m a n g a r r i s o n continued to repair it and keep
it in u s e .
T h e O t t o m a n presence at M e d i n a , blocking the line of a d v a n c e
that the Sherifian t r i b e s m e n w o u l d have to follow in order to participate in the main theater of operations of the M i d d l e E a s t e r n war,
s e e m e d to d e m o n s t r a t e that H u s s e i n w a s not g o i n g anywhere. T h e
rebellion that s t r e a m e d forth from M e c c a was visibly b r o u g h t to a
halt by the centuries-old walls of M e d i n a . T h e structure of O t t o m a n
authority held firm. It had not been in the state of a d v a n c e d decay
that E u r o p e a n o b s e r v e r s had reported it to b e .
PART V
THE ALLIES AT THE
NADIR OF THEIR
FORTUNES
29
THE FALL OF THE ALLIED
GOVERNMENTS: BRITAIN AND
FRANCE
i
Between a u t u m n 1916 a n d a u t u m n 1917, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e held
firm while the g o v e r n m e n t s of its adversaries, the Allied P o w e r s ,
collapsed. T h i s was very m u c h contrary t o what E u r o p e a n political
and military leaders h a d e x p e c t e d .
T h e O t t o m a n a r m y ' s s u c c e s s in h o l d i n g the D a r d a n e l l e s p l a y e d a
direct role in the overthrow of P r i m e M i n i s t e r A s q u i t h ' s g o v e r n m e n t
in Britain a n d that of C z a r N i c h o l a s in R u s s i a . T h e overthrow of the
British a n d R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t s , a n d of the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t in
1917, b r o u g h t to power in the three Allied capitals new leaders who
held s t r o n g views a b o u t the M i d d l e E a s t which were totally at
variance with those of their p r e d e c e s s o r s .
T h e P r i m e Minister w h o h a d b r o u g h t Britain into the war w a s the
first Allied leader to fall victim to it. B o n a r L a w o n c e o b s e r v e d , in a
letter to A s q u i t h , that " I n war it is n e c e s s a r y not only to be active
but to s e e m a c t i v e . " A s q u i t h , with his indolent patrician w a y s ,
s e e m e d the r e v e r s e . He h a d achieved a towering position in British
politics, b u t it w a s an aspect of his special g e n i u s to m a k e his
t r i u m p h s a p p e a r effortless. In the transaction of political a n d g o v e r n mental b u s i n e s s he was u n h u r r i e d : he always s e e m e d to have time
for another dinner party, another visit to the countryside, or—all too
often—another c o g n a c .
1
A s military c a t a s t r o p h e s multiplied i n M e s o p o t a m i a , G a l l i p o l i , a n d
on the western front, the P r i m e Minister's m e t h o d of C a b i n e t
g o v e r n m e n t by c o n s e n s u s s e e m e d indecisive, while his unwillingness
to call u p o n the nation for s u c h s t r o n g m e a s u r e s as c o m p u l s o r y
military service s u g g e s t e d that he w a s less than completely d e d i c a t e d
to winning the war.
L l o y d G e o r g e , i n d r a m a t i c contrast, m a d e the conscription issue
his o w n . In taking the lead on this i s s u e he s h o w e d how m u c h his
231
232
THE ALLIES AT THE NADIR OF THEIR FORTUNES
political position had c h a n g e d . While A s q u i t h , who had b r o u g h t the
country into the war, c o n t i n u e d to u p h o l d p e a c e t i m e civil liberties
a n d L i b e r a l values, L l o y d G e o r g e , the one-time R a d i c a l who until
the last m o m e n t had o p p o s e d entry into the war, e m e r g e d as a leader
p r e p a r e d to sacrifice individual rights for the sake of victory. T r a ditional L i b e r a l s , who h a d always o p p o s e d c o m p u l s i o n , felt that
L l o y d G e o r g e w a s g o i n g over t o the other c a m p .
As he lost his old political friends, L l o y d G e o r g e a c q u i r e d new
ones, two of w h o m p r o v e d to be especially i m p o r t a n t . O n e w a s S i r
E d w a r d C a r s o n , the rebel I r i s h T o r y who led the fight for c o n s c r i p tion in the H o u s e of C o m m o n s . T h e other was the c h a m p i o n of
i m p e r i a l i s m , Alfred Milner, who led the fight for conscription in the
H o u s e of L o r d s a n d , as c h a i r m a n of the National S e r v i c e L e a g u e , in
the country. Milner, an o u t s t a n d i n g colonial administrator, h a d been
largely r e s p o n s i b l e for launching the B o e r War, the venture in S o u t h
Africa at the turn of the century that L l o y d G e o r g e as a y o u n g
idealist h a d vigorously o p p o s e d . A t the time L l o y d G e o r g e had
attacked Milner bitterly. As a R a d i c a l , the y o u n g W e l s h m a n h a d
o p p o s e d imperial e x p a n s i o n , foreign involvement, a n d military vent u r e s ; while L o r d Milner, as a L i b e r a l U n i o n i s t who b e c a m e the
inspiration of right-wing T o r i e s , m a d e himself the center of imperialist thought. H i s ideal w a s imperial u n i o n . T o g e t h e r with the y o u n g
m e n a s s e m b l e d in S o u t h Africa u n d e r his l e a d e r s h i p — " M i l n e r ' s
K i n d e r g a r t e n " — h e h a d s t i m u l a t e d the m o v e m e n t for integration of
the far-flung e m p i r e into one o r g a n i c unit.
Milner was a s u p e r b
a d m i n i s t r a t o r whose skills were later to prove invaluable to L l o y d
G e o r g e in winning the war.
2
II
In 1916, L l o y d G e o r g e b e c a m e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for War when
K i t c h e n e r d i e d , but found himself powerless to put an end to the
sickening military d i s a s t e r s of that year. It has been e s t i m a t e d that
the total of military a n d civilian casualties in all of E u r o p e ' s d o m e s t i c
a n d international conflicts in the 100 years between 1815 a n d 1915
was no greater than a single day's c o m b a t losses in any of the great
battles of 1 9 1 6 . C o m i n g after G a l l i p o l i and M e s o p o t a m i a , a n d such
3
* Milner's ideal was a union of the white peoples of the British Empire. Other
members of the Milner circle, however, advocated a multiracial imperial union.
Lionel George Curtis, his former secretary, in 1910 helped to found the
quarterly review the Round Table which advocated British imperial federalism.
Another former secretary, John Buchan, was a fervent imperialist who won over a
vast public by his popular adventure novels. Another graduate of the Kindergarten,
Geoffrey Robinson, edited The Times.
THE
FALL
OF
THE
ALLIED
GOVERNMENTS
233
gory episodes as the 142,000 British casualties suffered in just four
days of fighting at A r r a s in F r a n c e , the terrible S o m m e offensive of
J u l y 1916 a r o u s e d a climax of d e s p a i r . On 1 J u l y the British lost
6 0 , 0 0 0 m e n , the heaviest casualties ever suffered in a single day by a
British a r m y . By the time the offensive was over, British casualties
a t the S o m m e had m o u n t e d t o 4 2 0 , 0 0 0 . A m o n g them was R a y m o n d
A s q u i t h , the P r i m e Minister's son.
L l o y d G e o r g e d e s p a i r e d of victory as he o b s e r v e d the lengthy a n d
inefficient m e e t i n g s of A s q u i t h ' s large War C a b i n e t , d e b a t i n g endlessly and deciding nothing. On 9 N o v e m b e r he told M a u r i c e H a n k e y
that "We are g o i n g to lose this w a r . "
At a b o u t the s a m e time, the Gallipoli controversy was revived,
r e m i n d i n g the political world how ineptly the A s q u i t h g o v e r n m e n t
had w a g e d war. U n w i s e l y , the g o v e r n m e n t had sanctioned an official
inquiry in J u n e into the D a r d a n e l l e s c a m p a i g n . Churchill, now out
of office, devoted himself to d o c u m e n t i n g the case that his colleagues
were to b l a m e for the Gallipoli disaster. T h e a l a r m e d P r i m e Minister
m a n a g e d to have the report restricted to the C o m m i s s i o n of Inquiry's
conclusions, omitting the testimony a n d other evidence on which
they were b a s e d . Nonetheless, the political d a m a g e was done and the
Gallipoli inquiry c o n t r i b u t e d to the collapse of the first coalition
government.
4
5
T h e story of A s q u i t h ' s overthrow has been told too often for it to
need retelling here at any length. A principal role in his downfall was
played by the British p r e s s , d o m i n a t e d then, as it never has been
before or since, by one m a n . Alfred H a r m s w o r t h , Viscount
Northcliffe, controlled half the L o n d o n p r e s s , at a time, before radio
or television, when publications were the only media of m a s s c o m munication. H i s ownership of The Times, with its prestige, a n d of
the Daily Mail, with its p o p u l a r a p p e a l , gave him both "the classes
and the m a s s e s . " Northcliffe u s e d his i m m e n s e power to d r a m a t i z e
the case that A s q u i t h a n d his civilian colleagues were preventing the
generals a n d a d m i r a l s from winning the war.
6
Northcliffe's n e w s p a p e r s ranged themselves behind S i r E d w a r d
C a r s o n , Britain's leading trial lawyer, who led the revolt against the
g o v e r n m e n t in Parliament and in the country. C a r s o n on the attack
was the m o s t d a n g e r o u s animal in the political j u n g l e . As he lashed
out against the g o v e r n m e n t , the lean, dark, and bitter I r i s h m a n
s e e m e d to be everything the P r i m e Minister was not. As a historian
has written of him, " T h e notion b e c a m e current that he p o s s e s s e d a
drive, a remorseless determination, a n d unrelenting hostility to the
G e r m a n s , which contrasted strongly with the dismal procrastination
attributed to A s q u i t h a n d his c o l l e a g u e s . "
7
A l t h o u g h he denied it, in the a u t u m n of 1916 L l o y d G e o r g e b e g a n
working closely with C a r s o n ; and S i r M a x Aitken (later L o r d
228
SUBVERSION
V
T h e most c o n s p i c u o u s failure of the M e c c a revolt was its failure to
carry with it M e d i n a , the other large holy city of the H e j a z . M e d i n a
lay s o m e 300 miles to the northeast of M e c c a , blocking the route that
continued northward toward S y r i a . Followers of the Sherif H u s s e i n
attacked it in the first days of the revolt, but were beaten off with
e a s e ; and the Sherif's forces were u n a b l e to c a p t u r e it d u r i n g the
war. N o r could they b y - p a s s it and allow its large T u r k i s h garrison to
attack them on the flank or from the rear.
M e d i n a was s u r r o u n d e d by a solid stone wall, said to date from the
twelfth century, d o m i n a t e d by towers a n d , at the northwest, by a
castle m a n n e d by the O t t o m a n g a r r i s o n . T h e terminal of the H e j a z
railroad from D a m a s c u s was situated within its walls, and provided
access to s u p p l i e s and reinforcements. Although the railroad track
was repeatedly d y n a m i t e d d u r i n g the war by Allied-led B e d o u i n
raiding parties, the O t t o m a n garrison continued to repair it a n d keep
it in u s e .
T h e O t t o m a n presence at M e d i n a , blocking the line of a d v a n c e
that the Sherifian tribesmen would have to follow in order to participate in the main theater of o p e r a t i o n s of the M i d d l e Eastern war,
s e e m e d to d e m o n s t r a t e that H u s s e i n was not g o i n g anywhere. T h e
rebellion that s t r e a m e d forth from M e c c a was visibly b r o u g h t to a
halt by the centuries-old walls of M e d i n a . T h e structure of O t t o m a n
authority held firm. It had not been in the state of a d v a n c e d decay
that E u r o p e a n o b s e r v e r s had reported it to b e .
2 S i r M a r k S y k e s at his d e s k in 1916
16 R u s s i a n o c c u p a t i o n of E r z e r u m
17
R u s s i a n t r o o p s in T r e b i z o n d
11 j
I•
i ^
PART V
THE ALLIES AT THE
NADIR OF THEIR
FORTUNES
29
THE FALL OF THE ALLIED
GOVERNMENTS: BRITAIN AND
FRANCE
i
Between a u t u m n 1916 a n d a u t u m n 1917, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e held
firm while the g o v e r n m e n t s of its adversaries, the Allied Powers,
collapsed. T h i s was very m u c h contrary to what E u r o p e a n political
and military leaders h a d e x p e c t e d .
T h e O t t o m a n army's s u c c e s s in h o l d i n g the D a r d a n e l l e s played a
direct role in the overthrow of P r i m e Minister A s q u i t h ' s g o v e r n m e n t
in Britain a n d that of C z a r N i c h o l a s in R u s s i a . T h e overthrow of the
British a n d R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t s , a n d of the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t in
1917, b r o u g h t to power in the three Allied capitals new leaders who
held s t r o n g views a b o u t the M i d d l e E a s t which were totally at
variance with those of their p r e d e c e s s o r s .
T h e P r i m e Minister who h a d b r o u g h t Britain into the war was the
first Allied leader to fall victim to it. B o n a r L a w once o b s e r v e d , in a
letter to A s q u i t h , that "In war it is necessary not only to be active
but to s e e m active." A s q u i t h , with his indolent patrician ways,
s e e m e d the reverse. He h a d achieved a towering position in British
politics, b u t it was an aspect of his special genius to m a k e his
t r i u m p h s a p p e a r effortless. In the transaction of political a n d g o v e r n mental b u s i n e s s he was u n h u r r i e d : he always s e e m e d to have time
for another dinner p a r t y , another visit to the countryside, o r — a l l too
often—another c o g n a c .
1
As military c a t a s t r o p h e s multiplied in M e s o p o t a m i a , G a l l i p o l i , a n d
on the western front, the P r i m e Minister's m e t h o d of C a b i n e t
g o v e r n m e n t by c o n s e n s u s s e e m e d indecisive, while his unwillingness
to call u p o n the nation for s u c h s t r o n g m e a s u r e s as c o m p u l s o r y
military service s u g g e s t e d that he was less than completely dedicated
to winning the w a r .
L l o y d G e o r g e , in d r a m a t i c contrast, m a d e the conscription issue
his own. In taking the lead on this issue he s h o w e d how m u c h his
231
232
THE ALLIES AT THE NADIR OF THEIR FORTUNES
political position had c h a n g e d . While A s q u i t h , who h a d b r o u g h t the
country into the war, continued to u p h o l d peacetime civil liberties
and L i b e r a l values, L l o y d G e o r g e , the one-time R a d i c a l who until
the last m o m e n t had o p p o s e d entry into the war, e m e r g e d as a leader
p r e p a r e d to sacrifice individual rights for the sake of victory. T r a ditional L i b e r a l s , who h a d always o p p o s e d c o m p u l s i o n , felt that
L l o y d G e o r g e w a s g o i n g over t o the other c a m p .
As he lost his old political friends, L l o y d G e o r g e a c q u i r e d new
ones, two of w h o m p r o v e d to be especially i m p o r t a n t . O n e w a s S i r
E d w a r d C a r s o n , the rebel Irish T o r y who led the fight for c o n s c r i p tion in the H o u s e of C o m m o n s . T h e other was the c h a m p i o n of
i m p e r i a l i s m , Alfred Milner, who led the fight for conscription in the
H o u s e of L o r d s a n d , as c h a i r m a n of the National S e r v i c e L e a g u e , in
the country. Milner, an o u t s t a n d i n g colonial a d m i n i s t r a t o r , h a d been
largely r e s p o n s i b l e for l a u n c h i n g the B o e r War, the venture in S o u t h
Africa at the turn of the century that L l o y d G e o r g e as a y o u n g
idealist h a d vigorously o p p o s e d . A t the time L l o y d G e o r g e h a d
attacked Milner bitterly. As a R a d i c a l , the y o u n g W e l s h m a n h a d
o p p o s e d imperial e x p a n s i o n , foreign involvement, a n d military vent u r e s ; while L o r d Milner, as a L i b e r a l U n i o n i s t who b e c a m e the
inspiration of right-wing T o r i e s , m a d e himself the center of imperialist thought. H i s ideal w a s imperial union. T o g e t h e r with the y o u n g
men a s s e m b l e d in S o u t h Africa u n d e r his l e a d e r s h i p — " M i l n e r ' s
K i n d e r g a r t e n " — h e h a d s t i m u l a t e d the m o v e m e n t for integration of
the far-flung e m p i r e into one organic unit.
Milner w a s a s u p e r b
a d m i n i s t r a t o r w h o s e skills were later to prove invaluable to L l o y d
G e o r g e in winning the war.
2
II
In 1916, L l o y d G e o r g e b e c a m e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for War when
K i t c h e n e r d i e d , but found himself powerless to put an end to the
sickening military d i s a s t e r s of that year. It has been estimated that
the total of military a n d civilian casualties in all of E u r o p e ' s d o m e s t i c
a n d international conflicts in the 100 years between 1815 a n d 1915
was no greater than a single day's c o m b a t losses in any of the great
battles of 1 9 1 6 . C o m i n g after Gallipoli a n d M e s o p o t a m i a , a n d such
3
* Milner's ideal was a union of the white peoples of the British Empire. Other
members of the Milner circle, however, advocated a multiracial imperial union.
Lionel George Curtis, his former secretary, in 1910 helped to found the
quarterly review the Round Table which advocated British imperial federalism.
Another former secretary, John Buchan, was a fervent imperialist who won over a
vast public by his popular adventure novels. Another graduate of the Kindergarten,
Geoffrey Robinson, edited The Times.
THE
FALL
OF
THE
ALLIED
GOVERNMENTS
233
gory e p i s o d e s as the 142,000 British casualties suffered in just four
d a y s of fighting at A r r a s in F r a n c e , the terrible S o m m e offensive of
J u l y 1916 a r o u s e d a climax of d e s p a i r . On 1 J u l y the British lost
6 0 , 0 0 0 m e n , the heaviest casualties ever suffered in a single day by a
British a r m y . By the time the offensive was over, British casualties
a t the S o m m e had m o u n t e d t o 4 2 0 , 0 0 0 . A m o n g them was R a y m o n d
A s q u i t h , the P r i m e Minister's son.
L l o y d G e o r g e d e s p a i r e d of victory as he o b s e r v e d the lengthy and
inefficient meetings of A s q u i t h ' s large War C a b i n e t , d e b a t i n g endlessly a n d deciding nothing. On 9 N o v e m b e r he told M a u r i c e H a n k e y
that "We are g o i n g to lose this w a r . "
At a b o u t the s a m e time, the Gallipoli controversy was revived,
r e m i n d i n g the political world how ineptly the A s q u i t h g o v e r n m e n t
had w a g e d war. U n w i s e l y , the g o v e r n m e n t had sanctioned an official
inquiry in J u n e into the D a r d a n e l l e s c a m p a i g n . Churchill, now out
of office, devoted himself to d o c u m e n t i n g the case that his colleagues
were to b l a m e for the Gallipoli disaster. T h e a l a r m e d P r i m e Minister
m a n a g e d to have the report restricted to the C o m m i s s i o n of Inquiry's
conclusions, omitting the testimony a n d other evidence on which
they were b a s e d . Nonetheless, the political d a m a g e was done a n d the
Gallipoli inquiry c o n t r i b u t e d to the collapse of the first coalition
government.
4
5
T h e story of A s q u i t h ' s overthrow has been told too often for it to
need retelling here at any length. A principal role in his downfall was
played by the British p r e s s , d o m i n a t e d then, as it never has been
before or since, by one m a n . Alfred H a r m s w o r t h , Viscount
Northcliffe, controlled half the L o n d o n p r e s s , at a time, before radio
or television, when publications were the only media of m a s s c o m munication. H i s ownership of The Times, with its prestige, a n d of
the Daily Mail, with its p o p u l a r a p p e a l , gave him both "the classes
a n d the m a s s e s . " Northcliffe u s e d his i m m e n s e power to d r a m a t i z e
the case that A s q u i t h a n d his civilian colleagues were preventing the
generals a n d a d m i r a l s from winning the war.
6
Northcliffe's n e w s p a p e r s ranged themselves behind S i r E d w a r d
C a r s o n , Britain's leading trial lawyer, who led the revolt against the
g o v e r n m e n t in Parliament and in the country. C a r s o n on the attack
was the m o s t d a n g e r o u s animal in the political j u n g l e . As he lashed
out against the g o v e r n m e n t , the lean, dark, and bitter I r i s h m a n
s e e m e d to be everything the P r i m e Minister was not. As a historian
has written of him, " T h e notion b e c a m e current that he p o s s e s s e d a
drive, a r e m o r s e l e s s determination, a n d unrelenting hostility to the
G e r m a n s , which contrasted strongly with the dismal procrastination
attributed to A s q u i t h a n d his colleagues."'
A l t h o u g h he denied it, in the a u t u m n of 1916 L l o y d G e o r g e b e g a n
working closely with C a r s o n ; a n d S i r M a x Aitken (later L o r d
234
THE
ALLIES
AT
THE
NADIR
OF
THEIR
FORTUNES
B e a v e r b r o o k ) b r o u g h t B o n a r L a w into a political combination with
them. After intricate m a n e u v e r i n g s , A s q u i t h resigned a n d went into
O p p o s i t i o n , taking half of his L i b e r a l P a r t y — a n d all of its leaders
except L l o y d G e o r g e — w i t h h i m . P u s h e d by Aitken ("It was he who
m a d e B . L . decide t o break u p the A s q u i t h g o v e r n m e n t , " said L l o y d
G e o r g e ) , B o n a r L a w threw the weight of the U n i o n i s t - C o n s e r v a t i v e
Party behind L l o y d G e o r g e . ( A m a j o r condition i m p o s e d b y the
Conservatives was that Churchill s h o u l d be excluded from the new
g o v e r n m e n t . ) A substantial n u m b e r of b a c k b e n c h L i b e r a l s joined
with t h e m , as did the tiny L a b o u r Party. On 7 D e c e m b e r 1916,
D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e b e c a m e P r i m e Minister of Britain as head of the
s e c o n d coalition g o v e r n m e n t .
8
L l o y d G e o r g e m o v e d quickly to i m p o s e a war dictatorship. D i r e c tion of the war was entrusted to a War C a b i n e t , c o m p o s e d initially of
five m e m b e r s . T h e new P r i m e Minister headed it himself. B o n a r
L a w , who also b e c a m e L e a d e r of the H o u s e and Chancellor of the
E x c h e q u e r , b e c a m e a m e m b e r , as did L a b o u r ' s A r t h u r H e n d e r s o n .
T h e work of the War C a b i n e t was d o n e principally by its other two
m e m b e r s , L o r d Milner, o n w h o m L l o y d G e o r g e especially relied,
and to a lesser extent, L o r d C u r z o n . M a u r i c e Hankey b e c a m e S e c retary to the War C a b i n e t , a n d took c h a r g e of seeing that its decisions
were carried out.
It was a sweeping, revolutionary c h a n g e in the way the country
was g o v e r n e d . A r t h u r B a l f o u r , the former P r i m e Minister who bec a m e F o r e i g n Minister in the new g o v e r n m e n t , r e m a r k e d of L l o y d
G e o r g e at the t i m e : "If he wants to be a dictator, let him b e . If he
thinks that he can win the war, I'm all for his having a t r y . "
A chance effect of the c h a n g e in g o v e r n m e n t was that it c h a n g e d
Britain's objectives in the M i d d l e E a s t . A s q u i t h and G r e y , the only
two men in the g o v e r n m e n t who d o u b t e d the desirability of a c q u i r i n g
new territories in the E a s t , h a d been driven from office. L o r d
K i t c h e n e r , who h a d i m p o s e d his own M i d d l e E a s t e r n views on the
C a b i n e t , was d e a d ; and the new P r i m e Minister had been an o p ponent of K i t c h e n e r ' s views all along.
9
Unlike K i t c h e n e r , L l o y d G e o r g e h a d believed, a n d continued t o
believe, that the E a s t could be of great importance in winning the
war. T y p i c a l l y , only a few days after L l o y d G e o r g e took office as
P r i m e Minister, H a n k e y recorded in his diary that "I lunched along
with L I . G . , who d i s c o u r s e d mainly on his plans for a b i g military
coup in S y r i a . "
1 0
As for the future of the area, he was m o v e d in large part by his
hatred of the T u r k i s h r e g i m e . F r o m his first political leader, the
nineteeth-century L i b e r a l , William E w a r t G l a d s t o n e , he had inherited
an abhorrence of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e for its cruelty toward its
THE
FALL
OF
THE
ALLIED
GOVERNMENTS
235
Christian s u b j e c t s . H e was s y m p a t h e t i c t o G r e e c e , which had territorial a m b i t i o n s in A s i a M i n o r , a n d e s p o u s e d Zionist aspirations in
the Holy L a n d . In the latter case he had m a d e clear, however, that
he expected the J e w i s h National H o m e to develop within the context
of British rule. What b e c a m e clear only after L l o y d G e o r g e had been
in office for a year or two was that he envisioned the M i d d l e E a s t ,
not just as the road to I n d i a , but as a prize worth seeking in itself.
Unlike British ministers of the nineteenth century, whose aim was
limited to excluding other E u r o p e a n p o w e r s from the region, L l o y d
G e o r g e therefore s o u g h t British h e g e m o n y in the M i d d l e E a s t .
A s P r i m e Minister, L l o y d G e o r g e m o v e d ever closer t o Milner a n d
i m p e r i a l i s m . H a n k e y later wrote that Milner "was L l o y d G e o r g e ' s
m o s t t r u s t e d colleague; except, p e r h a p s B o n a r L a w — b u t h e was
m o r e for political a d v i c e . " L l o y d G e o r g e was a p r a g m a t i c , intuitive
opportunist who i m p r o v i s e d ; Milner, with his G e r m a n b a c k g r o u n d ,
was methodical in action a n d systematic in thought, s u p p l y i n g what
the P r i m e Minister lacked.
Milner further strengthened his hold on the L l o y d G e o r g e government by p l a c i n g his own followers within Hankey's secretariat.
Hankey was able to retain S i r M a r k S y k e s , his personal choice, as
one of his three assistants,* b u t the other two were L e o A m e r y , one
of Milner's leading adherents, and William O r m s b y - G o r e , Milner's
Parliamentary S e c r e t a r y .
When L l o y d G e o r g e , after the fashion of an A m e r i c a n president in
the White H o u s e , set up his own informal staff, Milner had a h a n d in
including s o m e of his own followers, s u c h as L i o n e l C u r t i s , a founder
of the m a g a z i n e Round Table, which e s p o u s e d imperial union, a n d
Philip K e r r , the magazine's editor. T h e staff was set up in t e m p o r a r y
buildings in the g a r d e n of 10 D o w n i n g Street and was d u b b e d the
"Garden suburb."
A sort of dictatorship of two e m e r g e d from the early days of the
new P r i m e Minister's period of office: at 11:00 each m o r n i n g L l o y d
G e o r g e w o u l d meet with Milner, along with H a n k e y a n d the Chief of
the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff, a n d only at noon would they meet with
the other m e m b e r s of the War C a b i n e t . In 1918 Milner b e c a m e War
Minister in n a m e as well as reality. He had the experience needed for
the j o b : he had run the civilian side of the Boer War a n d now, u n d e r
L l o y d G e o r g e , ran the civilian side of the F i r s t World War.
11
L l o y d G e o r g e ' s association with the Milner circle was intellectual
as well as practical a n d b u r e a u c r a t i c . T h e P r i m e Minister c a m e to
Hankey wrote to Lloyd George that Sykes was "mainly an expert on Arab
affairs" but that he was "by no means a one-sided man" and that his breadth of
vision could be "invaluable in fixing up the terms of p e a c e . "
12
236
THE
ALLIES
AT
THE
NADIR
OF
THEIR
FORTUNES
social gatherings where the R o u n d T a b l e r s met to exchange views.
In the m i d d l e of 1917 H a n k e y o b s e r v e d that " A m o n g the m o s t
influential at the present m o m e n t I would place the R o u n d T a b l e
g r o u p . T h e y dine every M o n d a y . . . Milner is the real leader in this
g r o u p . . . L l o y d G e o r g e s o m e t i m e s a t t e n d s their g a t h e r i n g s . "
T h e influence was m u t u a l . S h o r t l y afterward H a n k e y noted that
Milner had "come completely r o u n d to L I . G . ' s view . . . that it is
necessary to devote our main efforts against T u r k e y . "
13
1 4
Ill
In F r a n c e , several g o v e r n m e n t s h a d fallen d u r i n g the c o u r s e of the
war, but the differences between one g o v e r n m e n t and another were
not d r a m a t i c . In 1917 that c h a n g e d .
T h e m u t i n y of the F r e n c h a r m y in M a y 1917 b r o u g h t a b o u t the
fall of the last of F r a n c e ' s w a r t i m e g o v e r n m e n t s with which her
politicians felt c o m f o r t a b l e .
T h e traditional leadership w a s
discredited. T h e Viviani, B r i a n d , a n d R i b o t g o v e r n m e n t s h a d been
allowed to resign, b u t the Paul Painleve government h a d not b e e n : in
N o v e m b e r of 1917 the F r e n c h Parliament overthrew it. T h e r e was
only one potential p r e m i e r yet untried who might fight on to victory,
but he w a s the m o s t feared a n d detested m a n in p u b l i c life. As L l o y d
G e o r g e r e m a r k e d of h i m , " T h e r e w a s only one m a n left, a n d it is not
too m u c h to say that no one w a n t e d h i m . " He w a s the m a n who
had e x p o s e d the c o r r u p t practices of his political c o l l e a g u e s — a n d
they h a d never forgiven h i m .
1 5
G e o r g e s C l e m e n c e a u w a s , like L l o y d G e o r g e , a political "loner."
H e , too, w a s a R a d i c a l , t h o u g h in F r a n c e the label h a d rather a
different m e a n i n g . L i k e L l o y d G e o r g e , he was believed to have
a b a n d o n e d the leftist tenets of his y o u t h . L i k e L l o y d G e o r g e , the
m a n of "the knock-out blow," he h a d d e n o u n c e d p r o p o n e n t s of a
c o m p r o m i s e p e a c e , a n d indeed h a d b r o u g h t an end to d i s c u s s i o n s
along those lines initiated by the G e r m a n s through Aristide B r i a n d
in 1917. He was g r o w i n g deaf a n d fat a n d was seventy-six years old,
but he r e m a i n e d the fighter he h a d been all his life; a n d the President,
who felt obliged to offer him the p r e m i e r s h i p , noted that this "devil
of a m a n has all patriots on his side, a n d if I did not call on him his
legendary strength would m a k e any alternative cabinet w e a k . "
1 6
17
C l e m e n c e a u w a s a b o v e all a hater, and in all the world what he
most hated w a s G e r m a n y . He was the last survivor of the National
A s s e m b l y that in 1871 h a d protested against the harsh peace t e r m s
G e r m a n y h a d i m p o s e d u p o n a v a n q u i s h e d F r a n c e . H e h a d never
given u p . It had always been his view that F r a n c e s h o u l d concentrate
on b u i l d i n g up her strength against G e r m a n y , a n d therefore that
THE
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ALLIED
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237
diverting strength into colonial a d v e n t u r e s was a mistake. T h u s the
senators a n d d e p u t i e s who a i m e d at a n n e x i n g S y r i a a n d Palestine to
F r a n c e saw in him their chief e n e m y .
Between 1881 a n d 1885, over C l e m e n c e a u ' s protests, F r a n c e had
led the way in new colonial e x p a n s i o n . On a pretext, the F r e n c h first
invaded a n d c o n q u e r e d T u n i s i a in N o r t h Africa, a n d then the states
that b e c a m e I n d o c h i n a in A s i a . Prince Otto von B i s m a r c k , the
G e r m a n leader, s u p p o r t e d and indeed e n c o u r a g e d s u c h F r e n c h ventures. On 27 N o v e m b e r 1884, C l e m e n c e a u told the F r e n c h C h a m b e r
of D e p u t i e s that " B i s m a r c k is a d a n g e r o u s enemy, b u t even m o r e
d a n g e r o u s p e r h a p s as a friend; he s h o w e d us T u n i s , p l a c i n g us in
conflict with E n g l a n d . "
1 8
In Parliament a n d in his journal, La Justice, C l e m e n c e a u denounced the acquisition of colonies as a financial and military b u r d e n ,
a distraction f r o m the p r o b l e m of the G e r m a n frontier, a n d a clever
G e r m a n - i n s p i r e d m o v e that Berlin h o p e d would drive F r a n c e into
quarrels with Britain. In o p p o s i n g the policy, he e x p o s e d the financial
corruption that a c c o m p a n i e d F r e n c h colonial politics. La Justice's
suggestion of sinister m a n i p u l a t i o n s in the T u n i s i a affair were not far
off the m a r k : there were speculations in real estate, railway concessions, a n d s u b m a r i n e cable telegraph concessions, whatever their
relation m i g h t have been to the formulation of g o v e r n m e n t policy.
T h e financial corruption s u r r o u n d i n g the adventure in I n d o c h i n a
was even m o r e lurid. C l e m e n c e a u ' s accusations a n d e x p o s u r e s destroyed reputations a n d b r o u g h t d o w n g o v e r n m e n t s . H e b e c a m e
known as "the wrecker" even before he b e c a m e known as "the
tiger."
Of F r e n c h parliamentary life at the time, Winston Churchill later
wrote, " T h e life of the F r e n c h C h a m b e r , hectic, fierce, p o i s o n o u s ,
flowed t h r o u g h a succession of s c a n d a l s and swindles, of e x p o s u r e s ,
of perjuries, a n d m u r d e r s , of plottings a n d intriguings, of personal
ambitions a n d revenges, of crooking and double-crossing, which
find their m o d e r n parallel only in the underworld of C h i c a g o . "
C l e m e n c e a u s t r o d e t h r o u g h it all in a m u r d e r o u s r a g e . In an age
when it was still the c u s t o m to settle q u a r r e l s on the field of honor,
he was a feared duellist. A speaker in the C h a m b e r t a u n t e d the other
m e m b e r s by saying of C l e m e n c e a u that "he has three things you
fear: his s w o r d , his pistol, and his t o n g u e . "
19
20
F o r fear of h i m the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t in 1882 hesitated to join in
the occupation of E g y p t , with the result that Britain took E g y p t
entirely for herself. H i s opposition to colonial expansion could easily
be p o r t r a y e d — a n d was p o r t r a y e d — a s benefiting the British E m p i r e .
T h a t was the line his o p p o n e n t s took when he b e c a m e vulnerable to
political attack. T h e y p r o d u c e d a forgery to prove that he had sold
out to Britain. Hecklers were hired to follow him a r o u n d shouting
238
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"Aoh yes," a n d free copies of a n e w s p a p e r were circulated containing
a cartoon showing him j u g g l i n g with s a c k s of p o u n d s s t e r l i n g . In
1892 one leading British politician wrote to another that "A F r e n c h m a n
was here yesterday who told me an extraordinary cock a n d bull
which is apparently believed in Paris where they will believe anything . . . It is to the effect that C l e m e n c e a u ' s p a p e r La Justice
which is said to be losing money is financed f r o m E n g l a n d on behalf
of G e r m a n y a n d E n g l a n d . " In 1893 he was defeated for re-election
a n d was driven out of p a r l i a m e n t a r y life for a d e c a d e .
T h i s was the m a n w h o m a d e s p a i r i n g F r a n c e turned to in the
darkest m o m e n t of 1917, a n d who s o o n i m p o s e d his will u p o n the
government of his nation. L i k e L l o y d G e o r g e , he b e c a m e a sort of
war dictator, incarnating a driving determination to fight on until
G e r m a n y was totally c r u s h e d . L i k e L l o y d G e o r g e , too, h e h a p p e n e d
to b r i n g to office a special view a b o u t policy in the M i d d l e E a s t .
As premier, he continued to have no territorial goals for F r a n c e
outside of E u r o p e . Of the traditional F r e n c h claim to S y r i a , reflected
in the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t , C l e m e n c e a u said that if L l o y d G e o r g e
could get F r a n c e the right to install a protectorate r e g i m e there he
would not refuse it, "as it would please s o m e reactionaries," b u t that
he himself attached no i m p o r t a n c e to i t .
T h e fortunes of war a n d politics had b r o u g h t into power in their
respective countries the first British P r i m e Minister who wanted to
acquire territory in the M i d d l e E a s t a n d the only F r e n c h politician
who did not want to do s o .
21
2 2
2 3
30
T H E OVERTHROW OF T H E CZAR
i
It was an i m p r o b a b l e chain of c i r c u m s t a n c e s that led F r a n c e to rally
behind a leader who w a s o p p o s e d to F r e n c h i m p e r i a l i s m in the
M i d d l e E a s t , a n d an even o d d e r chain of c i r c u m s t a n c e s that led
R u s s i a in the s a m e m o n t h to fall u n d e r the sway of a leader who also
claimed to o p p o s e R u s s i a n i m p e r i a l i s m in the region.
If one thing s e e m e d clear by the b e g i n n i n g of 1917, it was that
R u s s i a held the e d g e in the M i d d l e E a s t e r n war against T u r k e y .
Enver's catastrophic defeat in early 1915 on the C a u c a s u s front was
followed by a successful R u s s i a n invasion of eastern Anatolia in
1916. T h e R u s s i a n s h a d s t r e n g t h e n e d their strategic position by
winning m a s t e r y of the Black S e a a n d by constructing railroad lines
from the C a u c a s u s toward their new front line in eastern T u r k e y .
T h e G r a n d D u k e N i c h o l a s , the R u s s i a n c o m m a n d e r , planned t o
m o u n t a new offensive as soon as the railroad lines were c o m p l e t e d .
A c c o r d i n g to a G e r m a n staff officer attached to the O t t o m a n a r m e d
forces, the g r a n d duke's offensive w o u l d "have led to a c o m p l e t e
victory a n d p e r h a p s driven T u r k e y out of the war in the s u m m e r of
1917."
1
Y e t years later, L l o y d G e o r g e told the H o u s e of C o m m o n s that
"the collapse of R u s s i a was almbst entirely d u e " to the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e . T h e b a s i s o f L l o y d G e o r g e ' s opinion was that b y closing
off m o s t of R u s s i a ' s i m p o r t s a n d e x p o r t s , the Y o u n g T u r k m a s t e r s of
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e h a d d e p r i v e d her of a r m a m e n t s a n d revenues. T h o s e
who d i s a g r e e with L l o y d G e o r g e ' s a s s e s s m e n t are able to a r g u e that
even if the C o n s t a n t i n o p l e trade route h a d remained o p e n , w a r t i m e
R u s s i a , with her p e a s a n t f a r m e r s away in the a r m y , p r o d u c e d less
than the normal a m o u n t of food a n d so h a d less to export, and her
Allies had little a m m u n i t i o n to s e n d her. B u t either observation
points to the p a r a d o x i c a l truth that R u s s i a ' s military s u c c e s s e s on the
C a u c a s u s front were in a s e n s e irrelevant: the real war had b e c o m e
an economic a n d social survival contest.
2
239
240
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T h e industrialist Walter R a t h e n a u in G e r m a n y was the pioneer in
u n d e r s t a n d i n g this. In 1914 he o r g a n i z e d a Division of R a w Materials
for a skeptical Ministry of War in Berlin. He was given a secretary
a n d one small r o o m at the back of the ministry. By the e n d of 1918 it
was the largest unit in the m i n i s t r y ; it h a d s p r e a d over several blocks
of b u i l d i n g s and almost o v e r s h a d o w e d the r e s t . In Rathenau's
prescient vision, warfare was u n d e r g o i n g its industrial revolution,
b e c o m i n g a matter of financing, m o v i n g , a n d s u p p l y i n g on a gigantic
scale, a n d therefore r e q u i r e d central allocation, planning, a n d control
over the whole e c o n o m y .
3
L l o y d G e o r g e in his p r a g m a t i c way learned to see things m u c h the
s a m e way. He b r o u g h t war socialism to the hitherto individualistic
British e c o n o m y . When he started the Ministry of M u n i t i o n s in a
requisitioned hotel, he h a d no staff at all. By the end of the war, the
ministry had 6 5 , 0 0 0 e m p l o y e e s a n d it exercised control over three
million w o r k e r s . In industry after industry, s u p p l i e s were requisitioned a n d allocated. N e w workers, including large n u m b e r s of
w o m e n , were b r o u g h t into the labor force.
4
In R u s s i a , as in G e r m a n y a n d Britain, the violent a n d r a p i d social
c h a n g e s that a c c o m p a n i e d this w a r t i m e industrial revolution t u g g e d
at the s t r u c t u r e of society, straining pillars and s u p p o r t s never designed to carry a great weight. T h e r e were d i s p l a c e m e n t s in m o r a l s ,
politics, e m p l o y m e n t p a t t e r n s , investment patterns, family s t r u c t u r e ,
personal h a b i t s , a n d l a n g u a g e . S o m e idea of the m a g n i t u d e of the
c h a n g e s m a y be s u g g e s t e d by the length of the C a r n e g i e E n d o w m e n t ' s
postwar survey of the economic a n d social c h a n g e s that h a d occurred
in twenty-one c ou n t r i e s : it ran to 150 v o l u m e s . T h e British series
alone ran to 24 v o l u m e s .
Of the principal E u r o p e a n belligerents in the F i r s t World War,
Czarist R u s s i a p r o v e d the least a b l e to c o p e with these challenges
for it was weak in the elements of i n f r a s t r u c t u r e — t r a n s p o r t a t i o n
s y s t e m s , c o m m u n i c a t i o n s y s t e m s , engineering industries, a n d capital
m a r k e t s — t h a t m a k e a m o d e r n e c o n o m y resilient a n d a d a p t a b l e .
M o r e than anything else, however, R u s s i a ' s failure was a failure of
leadership.
T h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of the T u r k i s h stranglehold on the D a r d a n e l l e s
u n d e r s c o r e d the lack of patriotism in s o m e elements of the g o v e r n i n g
classes a n d the lack of c o m p e t e n c e in others. T h e r e was no e x c u s e
for the terrible s h o r t a g e s that d e v e l o p e d in 1916 a n d 1917. R u s s i a
was a country naturally rich in a g r i c u l t u r e : the peasantry m a d e up 80
percent of the p o p u l a t i o n , a n d cereals alone constituted half of her
e x p o r t s . With the export trade cut off at C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , all the
food formerly sent out of the country w a s available to be c o n s u m e d
at h o m e ; a n d t h o u g h there was a fall in the production of agricultural
estates c a u s e d by the loss of labor to the a r m y , m o r e than e n o u g h
s
241
T H E OVERTHROW OF T H E CZAR
6
food was p r o d u c e d to feed the c o u n t r y . T h e s h o r t a g e s resulted
instead f r o m disruption of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a n d distribution, d u e in
part to bottlenecks a n d b r e a k d o w n s , b u t d u e also to deliberate
m a n e u v e r s : speculation, profiteering, a n d h o a r d i n g .
T h e C z a r ' s g o v e r n m e n t recklessly i g n o r e d the need to crack down
on the profiteers who accentuated the c o n s e q u e n c e s of T u r k e y ' s
stranglehold on R u s s i a ' s t r a d e route to the West. W i d e s p r e a d industrial strikes a n d the onset of financial c h a o s failed to m o v e the
g o v e r n m e n t to act. By 1917 current interest and sinking fund paym e n t s d u e on its p u b l i c d e b t were greater than the total revenues of
the state in 1916, a national insolvency with which the g o v e r n m e n t
dealt by printing p a p e r m o n e y , so that prices d u r i n g w a r t i m e years
rose by 1,000 p e r c e n t .
7
An o b v i o u s way out of the crisis was to b r i n g the war to an e n d . In
1915 the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d G e r m a n y had offered R u s s i a right of
p a s s a g e t h r o u g h the D a r d a n e l l e s if she would a b a n d o n the Allies.
T h r o u g h o u t 1916 G e r m a n y continued to s o u n d out the possibility of
c o n c l u d i n g a s e p a r a t e peace with R u s s i a . M a n y of the s o u n d i n g s took
place i n neutral S w e d e n . T h e s t u m b l i n g block, s o m e have s a i d , was
the C z a r ' s unwillingness to relinquish his g r i p on P o l a n d . H o w e v e r ,
the R u s s i a n Minister to S w e d e n explained to the G e r m a n s that in his
"personal opinion" R u s s i a would have to continue in the war on the
Allied side until she received the "key to the Black S e a " : which is to
say, C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d the D a r d a n e l l e s . On the field of battle the
C z a r ' s h u n g r y a n d tattered soldiery were s t r u g g l i n g for survival, but
his r e s p o n s e to the G e r m a n overtures s h o w s that N i c h o l a s II continued to give priority to his imperial a m b i t i o n s — a b o v e all, p e r h a p s ,
to the c o n q u e s t of the long-sought-for D a r d a n e l l e s .
8
9
II
T h e history of the R u s s i a n revolutions of 1917, which is still b e i n g
written a n d which r e m a i n s timelessly relevant to the world's condition, falls o u t s i d e the s c o p e of the present s t u d y . O n e aspect of that
history, however, is of concern here a n d will be p u r s u e d in the
following p a g e s : the plot to p r o m o t e the fortunes of the then-unknown
L e n i n that was hatched in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e .
In the d i s a s t r o u s c o u r s e of R u s s i a ' s participation in the E u r o p e a n
war, those in control of R u s s i a ' s g o v e r n m e n t , finance, a n d industry
d e m o n s t r a t e d that their interests d i v e r g e d from those of the p o p u lation at l a r g e . At the leftward fringe of the outlawed revolutionary
u n d e r g r o u n d , an o b s c u r e a n d isolated figure had said as m u c h —
though for theoretical reasons of his o w n — f r o m the m o m e n t the war
began. D u r i n g the war he lived, s t u d i e d , a n d wrote in penniless exile
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in Z u r i c h , Switzerland. He was in his mid-forties and was not yet
f a m o u s b e y o n d police a n d revolutionary circles.
Vladimir Ilyich U l y a n o v , who in 1901 h a d a d o p t e d the p s e u d o n y m
of L e n i n , was a former attorney who h a d devoted his life to M a r x i s t
theory and factional d i s p u t e s . S t o c k y , m u s c u l a r , with the hunched
s h o u l d e r s of a fighter,- he was a brilliant but abrasive a n d intolerant
m a n who fearlessly followed the j u g g e r n a u t of his logic wherever it
m i g h t lead. At the outset of the war he was shocked to see his
socialist colleagues flock to the s u p p o r t of their respective countries.
L e n i n ' s theory led him to s t a n d alone in opposition to the war and
therefore in opposition to his c o u n t r y . It set him a p a r t from the
others. E v e n his own political faction, the Bolsheviks, did not fully
u n d e r s t a n d his views on the war.
At the b e g i n n i n g of S e p t e m b e r 1914, he drafted his Seven Theses
on the War, in which he wrote that: " F r o m the point of view of the
laboring class a n d the toiling m a s s e s of all the peoples of R u s s i a , the
lesser evil would be the defeat of the tsarist m o n a r c h y a n d its a r m y ,
which o p p r e s s e s P o l a n d , the U k r a i n e , a n d a n u m b e r of other peoples
of R u s s i a . " In his Theses he repeatedly d e n o u n c e d the e m p i r e
exercised by the R u s s i a n s over the other peoples ruled by the C z a r .
He w a s a R u s s i a n ; b u t it w a s his d u t y , as he saw it, to aim at R u s s i a ' s
defeat and at the d i s m e m b e r m e n t of the R u s s i a n E m p i r e .
1 0
In C o n s t a n t i n o p l e at the time there lived a former colleague of
L e n i n ' s , a fellow leader of the Socialist S e c o n d International, who
had arrived at similar conclusions. A l e x a n d e r Israel H e l p h a n d , who
had a d o p t e d the u n d e r g r o u n d p s e u d o n y m of " P a r v u s , " was a
R u s s i a n J e w whose professed political objective was the destruction
of the C z a r i s t E m p i r e . Where L e n i n was merely indifferent to the
prospect of a G e r m a n victory, H e l p h a n d was positively enthusiastic
about it. As it h a p p e n e d , H e l p h a n d p o s s e s s e d the money a n d political
contacts that enabled him to p u r s u e his p r o - G e r m a n inclinations.
1 1
Of the s a m e generation as L e n i n ( H e l p h a n d was born in 1869,
L e n i n in 1870), P a r v u s had been one of the other intellectually
c o m m a n d i n g figures on the left w i n g of the revolutionary socialist
m o v e m e n t . L e a v i n g R u s s i a for G e r m a n y in the early 1890s, he had
m a d e his n a m e as a theorist a n d journalist fighting alongside the
Polish-born G e r m a n J e w e s s R o s a L u x e m b u r g for a p u r e revolutionary
position. In the early years of the twentieth century, he had b e c o m e
the mentor of L e o n T r o t s k y , a n d in 1905 he had originated what was
to b e c o m e T r o t s k y ' s theory of the "permanent revolution." R e t u r n i n g
to R u s s i a , P a r v u s was b a n i s h e d to S i b e r i a , but soon e s c a p e d to
western E u r o p e .
B u t there was another s i d e to H e l p h a n d / P a r v u s , which showed
itself only g r a d u a l l y : he was a s h a d y p r o m o t e r who, from the point
of view of his fellow-idealists, did suspiciously well for himself. He
THE OVERTHROW OF T H E CZAR
243
had set up p u b l i s h i n g ventures that were meant to serve the revolutionary c a u s e but s e e m e d to serve his personal interests even better.
L e n i n and his Bolshevik faction h a d g o o d reason for believing that in
1904 P a r v u s had embezzled p e r h a p s 130,000 marks* (roughly 3 0 , 0 0 0
dollars) in literary royalties that the writer M a x i m G o r k y h a d contributed to the Social D e m o c r a t i c Party. T h e y confronted him with
it a n d the explanations that he offered were unconvincing.
A b a n d o n i n g p u b l i s h i n g a n d revolutionary activities, he h a d turned
full-time to a variety of b u s i n e s s e s , m o v i n g on via Vienna to the
Balkans a n d the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , where he b e c a m e interested in the
Y o u n g T u r k e y m o v e m e n t a n d b e g a n dealing in corn a n d other
c o m m o d i t i e s . By 1912 he h a d established close contact with Y o u n g
T u r k g o v e r n m e n t officials, with whose aid he obtained contracts to
provide s u p p l i e s for the O t t o m a n a r m i e s in the Balkan W a r s .
When the F i r s t World War b r o k e out in E u r o p e , Helpharid p u b lished an article in the T u r k i s h p r e s s advising the O t t o m a n government that its interests would be served by a G e r m a n victory. He also
helped foment p r o - G e r m a n feeling in the Balkan countries. When
the O t t o m a n E m p i r e entered the war, he helped the Porte obtain
vital s u p p l i e s of grain a n d railroad p a r t s , t h o u g h of course at a profit
to himself; he also advised the g o v e r n m e n t on various a s p e c t s of
mobilizing its e c o n o m y for the war effort. D e s t r o y i n g the g o v e r n m e n t
of R u s s i a was his goal, and his h o m e in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e b e c a m e a
meeting place for plotters against the C z a r .
T h r o u g h his contacts, H e l p h a n d m a n a g e d to arrange an interview
with the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r to the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . He m e t von
W a n g e n h e i m on 7 J a n u a r y 1915, a n d told him that " T h e interests of
the G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t are identical with those of the R u s s i a n
r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s . " V o n W a n g e n h e i m cabled a report of the meeting
to the G e r m a n F o r e i g n Office two d a y s later, in which he reported
that H e l p h a n d h a d told him "that the R u s s i a n D e m o c r a t s could
achieve their a i m only by the total destruction of C z a r i s m a n d the
division of R u s s i a into smaller s t a t e s . " H e l p h a n d p r o p o s e d that
G e r m a n y s h o u l d help him unite the revolutionaries behind a p r o g r a m
of s u b v e r t i n g the R u s s i a n E m p i r e .
12
13
At a high level, the G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t evinced interest in his
p r o p o s a l . At the end of F e b r u a r y 1915 H e l p h a n d went to Berlin to
meet with officials at the F o r e i g n Ministry. T h e y asked h i m to
recapitulate his p r o p o s a l in writing; in r e s p o n s e , on 9 M a r c h , he
s u b m i t t e d a m e m o r a n d u m to them e m b o d y i n g a vast plan for the
subversion of C z a r i s t R u s s i a by e n c o u r a g i n g socialist revolutionaries
and nationalists. He told the G e r m a n s a b o u t L e n i n a n d his Bolshevik
faction, reported that L e n i n a n d s o m e of his followers were in
* There is some dispute about the exact figure.
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Switzerland, and singled t h e m out a s especially worth G e r m a n s u p port. T h u s H e l p h a n d discovered a n d identified L e n i n for the
Germans.
T h e G e r m a n leaders a g r e e d t o a d o p t H e l p h a n d ' s p r o p o s a l s a n d a t
the end of M a r c h g a v e h i m an initial p a y m e n t of a million m a r k s
(equal at that time to roughly 2 4 0 , 0 0 0 dollars in U . S . currency) to
begin the work of a t t e m p t i n g to unify the various revolutionary
groups.
H i s initial overtures to his former c o m r a d e s were r e b u f f e d . In
Berlin, R o s a L u x e m b u r g d i d not even give him an o p p o r t u n i t y to
s p e a k : she showed him to the d o o r . L e v D a v i d o v i c h B r o n s t e i n , who
called himself T r o t s k y , a d m i t t e d that P a r v u s h a d once been an
important figure, a friend a n d teacher, b u t c o n c l u d e d that in 1914 he
had c h a n g e d , a n d that h e was now "politically d e c e a s e d . " T h e
attitude of P a r v u s ' s former socialist-revolutionary colleagues was described by one of t h e m who said they r e g a r d e d him as "a R u s s i a n
informer, a scoundrel, a confidence trickster, . . . a n d now a T u r k i s h
agent a n d s p e c u l a t o r . "
14
15
In the s p r i n g he m a d e his m o s t i m p o r t a n t a p p r o a c h . He went to
Zurich a n d set u p court a t the l u x u r i o u s B a u r a u L a c H o t e l . T h e r e
he lived ostentatiously, drinking a bottle of c h a m p a g n e each m o r n i n g
at breakfast, s m o k i n g cigars of e n o r m o u s size, a n d s u r r o u n d i n g
himself with showy w o m e n . H e also b e g a n s p r e a d i n g mo n e y a r o u n d
a m o n g the poorer exiles, p e r s u a d i n g t h e m that he had b e c o m e the
p a y m a s t e r of the revolution.
1 6
At the end of M a y he s o u g h t out L e n i n at the restaurant where the
Bolshevik theorist usually was to be f o u n d , went over to the table
where L e n i n a n d his associates were lunching, spoke to t h e m , a n d
a c c o m p a n i e d t h e m b a c k t o L e n i n ' s a p a r t m e n t . H e l p h a n d explained
his m i s s i o n . L e n i n , having listened to his presentation, a c c u s e d him
of having turned into a G e r m a n "chauvinist," a n d o r d e r e d him to
leave a n d never c o m e b a c k .
1 7
Y e t a friend of L e n i n ' s left with H e l p h a n d to start p u t t i n g the
plan of s u b v e r s i o n into effect. T h e i r b a s e of operation was to be
S t o c k h o l m . T h r o u g h his friend, L e n i n was able to learn of developm e n t s as they o c c u r r e d . M o r e o v e r , L e n i n a n d the Bolshevik Party
accepted m o n e y from H e l p h a n d via a Polish and a R u s s i a n Social
D e m o c r a t ; L e n i n later denied this, b u t his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e shows
that his denials were u n t r u e .
1 8
T h e b u s i n e s s in which H e l p h a n d ostensibly e n g a g e d w a s a t r a d i n g
firm, whose activities in fact enriched him enormously. Secretly he
organized s u b v e r s i o n a n d p u b l i s h e d a revolutionary n e w s p a p e r , which
the G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t financed. T h e publication was not a great
success. He a t t e m p t e d to organize a general strike in R u s s i a , even
without the aid of L e n i n a n d the others. It was a m u c h greater
T H E OVERTHROW OF T H E CZAR
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s u c c e s s ; he did not achieve a general strike, but b r o u g h t as m a n y as
4 5 , 0 0 0 protesters into the streets of P e t r o g r a d (as St P e t e r s b u r g , the
R u s s i a n capital, had been called since 1914).
B u t H e l p h a n d h a d focused the G e r m a n government's attention on
the particular i m p o r t a n c e of L e n i n as a disruptive force a n d , t h r o u g h
other agents, the G e r m a n s a r r a n g e d to watch over the Bolshevik
theorist a n d to lend h i m additional m o n e y when he needed it without
his necessarily having to acknowledge the source of the f u n d s .
T h u s H e l p h a n d , the C o n s t a n t i n o p l e - b a s e d intimate o f the Y o u n g
T u r k s , h a d b r o u g h t into play a s t r a n g e new w e a p o n with which
T u r k e y ' s ally G e r m a n y could a t t e m p t to b r i n g their c o m m o n R u s s i a n
foe c r a s h i n g d o w n .
Ill
P e t r o g r a d was a long distance away from the g r a n a r y of the south,
a n d its population suffered f r o m food shortages a n d soaring food
prices t h r o u g h o u t 1916 a n d 1917. D u r i n g that time strikes a n d
protests b e c a m e a way of life: including those inspired by H e l p h a n d ,
between m i d - 1 9 1 5 a n d F e b r u a r y 1917, there were 1,163 s t r i k e s .
Over half of these were politically rather than economically motivated, which showed that the revolt against the r e g i m e had b e g u n to
transcend the issue of s h o r t a g e s .
19
On 8 M a r c h 1917 a d e m o n s t r a t i o n took place in celebration of
International Women's D a y . H o u s e w i v e s , protesting against food
shortages, joined the d e m o n s t r a t i o n ; so did m a n y of the roughly
9 0 , 0 0 0 workers then on strike in a b o u t fifty factories. T h e next day
there were a b o u t 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 on strike, a n d the day afterward the strike
b e c a m e general. T w o d a y s later four regiments of soldiers joined the
p o p u l a c e , strengthening the d e m o n s t r a t o r s against the increasingly
helpless police. T h e a r m y mutiny p r o v e d decisive, only b e c a u s e
effective g o v e r n m e n t had long since vanished. T h e governor of the
city o r d e r e d p r o c l a m a t i o n s of martial law to be put u p , b u t there was
no glue to hold the p o s t e r s on the w a l l s .
2 0
On 15 M a r c h C z a r N i c h o l a s II a b d i c a t e d , effective f r o m the
following day, in favor of his brother, the G r a n d D u k e Michael. T h e
following day the G r a n d D u k e Michael declined to accept the throne,
a n d R u s s i a b e c a m e a republic g o v e r n e d by a Provisional G o v e r n m e n t
originally led b y Prince G . E . L v o v a n d later b y Alexander K e r e n s k y .
Politicians of all s h a d e s of opinion were s u r p r i s e d to find that what
the population of P e t r o g r a d had p u s h e d against was an o p e n door.
As a leading historian of these events has written, " T h e revolutionary
parties played no direct part in the m a k i n g of the revolution. T h e y
did not expect it . . . " Were the events in Petrograd instead the
2 1
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fruition of the conspiracy conceived by P a r v u s , the associate of the
Y o u n g T u r k s ? H e l p h a n d and the G e r m a n General Staff, t h r o u g h
their agents a n d their g o l d , did play a role in inciting R u s s i a n s to
strike a n d to rebel, t h o u g h surely not to the extent s u s p e c t e d by
British Intelligence. At first it was not even clear whether the overthrow of the C z a r could help t h e m to achieve their g o a l — w h i c h was
to defeat R u s s i a . At the time all political parties, including the
Bolsheviks, were in favor of p r o s e c u t i n g the war; now that they no
longer had a g o v e r n m e n t they detested, as R u s s i a n patriots they
wanted to defeat their enemies, the G e r m a n s and T u r k s .
B u t , as H e l p h a n d alone u n d e r s t o o d , L e n i n was of a different
p e r s u a s i o n — a n d was beside himself with frustration. He was in
Z u r i c h , cut off from participation in the great events in R u s s i a ; a n d
his followers in Petrograd m i s u n d e r s t o o d what he wanted t h e m to
do. H e l p h a n d h a d anticipated the Bolshevik theorist's reaction.
Without a s k i n g L e n i n , H e l p h a n d went ahead to make a r r a n g e m e n t s
with the G e r m a n G e n e r a l Staff to have a railroad train placed at
L e n i n ' s disposal to take him a n d his closest political associate,
G r e g o r i Zinoviev, b a c k to P e t r o g r a d . When he then i s s u e d the invitation to L e n i n , the latter warily refused a n d a t t e m p t e d instead to
m a k e a r r a n g e m e n t s that did not involve H e l p h a n d . He also p o s e d
conditions: between twenty a n d sixty R u s s i a n exiles s h o u l d be allowed
on the train, without r e g a r d to their views a b o u t the war, and the train
s h o u l d enjoy extraterritorial rights. T h e G e r m a n Minister in B e r n e
cabled the G e r m a n F o r e i g n Office that L e n i n and Zinoviev "believed
that they h a d , in this way, insured themselves against b e i n g c o m p r o mised in R u s s i a . " T h e G e r m a n government understood and agreed.
In April of 1917 L e n i n was sent in his sealed train on his way to
Russia.
2 2
F r o m the m o m e n t that he arrived at the F i n l a n d station in
P e t r o g r a d , with typically acerbic greetings to those who m e t him,
L e n i n set a b o u t positioning his Bolshevik f a c t i o n — a s H e l p h a n d h a d
e x p e c t e d — a s the only political g r o u p in R u s s i a that a d v o c a t e d ending
the war immediately. H i s followers h a d believed that they s h o u l d
s u p p o r t their country now that it h a d a republican g o v e r n m e n t of the
political left. T h e y had fallen, a c c o r d i n g to L e n i n , into error. In his
view, the war d e m o n s t r a t e d that capitalism had entered into its
imperialist s t a g e , which he r e g a r d e d as its final s t a g e ; it therefore was
the right time for socialist parties throughout E u r o p e to launch
revolutions. It was not the time to w a g e international war, especially
in alliance with g o v e r n m e n t s s u c h as those of F r a n c e a n d Britain that
o u g h t to be overthrown.
In the a u t u m n of 1917, when L e n i n — w i t h the aid of additional
financial s u b s i d i e s from G e r m a n y — s e i z e d power in P e t r o g r a d a n d
m a d e himself dictator of what r e m a i n e d of the shattered R u s s i a n
T H E OVERTHROW OF T H E CZAR
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state, he m o v e d immediately to take his country out of the war. In
M a r c h 1918 he accepted defeat by agreeing to a peace treaty that met
G e r m a n y ' s t e r m s . It a p p e a r e d that H e l p h a n d had served his friends
in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d Berlin well; as he had foretold, b a c k i n g L e n i n
had helped to drive R u s s i a out of the war.
IV
British o b s e r v e r s of the R u s s i a n revolutions in 1917 were s t r u c k by
the apparent conjunction of Bolsheviks, G e r m a n s , a n d J e w s . M a n y
of the Bolshevik leaders were of J e w i s h origin. So was H e l p h a n d ,
who had b r o u g h t them G e r m a n m o n e y a n d s u p p o r t — a n d who had
c o m e from C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d was an intimate of the Y o u n g T u r k s .
T h e Y o u n g T u r k s — a c c o r d i n g to the doctrine long held by British
officials—were controlled by J e w i s h F r e e m a s o n s who had b r o u g h t
the O t t o m a n E m p i r e into alliance with G e r m a n y . It was a longs t a n d i n g British belief that J e w s a n d G e r m a n s were intimately related. It all s e e m e d to fit.
J o h n B u c h a n , the p o p u l a r novelist of i m p e r i a l i s m , who had been
Milner's Private Secretary in S o u t h Africa and who, on Milner's
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n , later b e c a m e director of information services for
L l o y d G e o r g e ' s g o v e r n m e n t , e x p r e s s e d this view in the first chapter
of his classic novel of s u s p e n s e , The Thirty-Nine Steps ( 1 9 1 5 ) :
A w a y behind all the g o v e r n m e n t s and the armies there was
a b i g s u b t e r r a n e a n m o v e m e n t g o i n g on, engineered by very
d a n g e r o u s people . .. [ T ] h a t explained a lot . . . things that
h a p p e n e d in the Balkan War, how one state s u d d e n l y c a m e out
on t o p , why alliances were m a d e a n d broken, why certain m e n
d i s a p p e a r e d , a n d where the sinews of war c a m e from. T h e aim
of the whole conspiracy was to get R u s s i a and G e r m a n y at
l o g g e r h e a d s . . . [ T J h e J e w was behind it, and the J e w hated
R u s s i a worse than hell . . . [ T ] h i s is the return match for the
p o g r o m s . T h e J e w is everywhere . . . with an eye like a rattlesnake .. . [ H ] e is the m a n who is ruling the world just now,
and he has his knife in the e m p i r e of the T s a r .
T h u s the Bolsheviks c a m e to be viewed, not as R u s s i a n s or even as
ideological extremists, but as enemy secret agents called into existence
by G e r m a n s d o i n g the work of J e w s who were devoted to the
vengeful destruction of R u s s i a . In 1917 and for m a n y years afterward
British officials continued to believe that the Bolsheviks were not
principals in their own right, with their own a g e n d a a n d their own
objectives, b u t were m e r e e m p l o y e e s of the G e r m a n G e n e r a l Staff
who took their o r d e r s from J e w s a n d P r u s s i a n s in Berlin.
248
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T h e possibility that R u s s i a m i g h t collapse h a d been Britain's
nightmare ever since S e p t e m b e r 1914, just as it h a d been the d r e a m
of E n v e r P a s h a — a d r e a m which inspired h i m to b r i n g the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e into the war on the s i d e of the Central P o w e r s . T h e Bolshevik
Revolution had t u r n e d the one's n i g h t m a r e a n d the other's d r e a m
into reality. S c h o l a r s still differ in their accounts of how it c a m e
a b o u t , but without q u e s t i o n R u s s i a ' s leaving the war in 1917 was a
severe blow to Britain a n d her allies, a n d an e n o r m o u s victory not
only for G e r m a n y b u t also for O t t o m a n T u r k e y .
V
D u r i n g the Gallipoli a d v e n t u r e , Winston Churchill h a d s a i d , " T h i s is
one of the great c a m p a i g n s in history. T h i n k what C o n s t a n t i n o p l e is
to the E a s t . It is m o r e than L o n d o n , Paris, a n d Berlin all rolled into
one are to the West. T h i n k how it has d o m i n a t e d the E a s t . T h i n k
what its fall will m e a n . "
Y e t its c a p t u r e — w h i c h h a d s e e m e d imminent to Churchill in
M a r c h 1 9 1 5 — c o n t i n u e d to p r o v e elusive. After the Allies' failure to
win t h r o u g h to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e in 1915, it was the turn of the
R u s s i a n s , who s c o r e d s u c c e s s e s in T u r k i s h A r m e n i a in 1916 a n d
were poised to m a r c h toward C o n s t a n t i n o p l e in 1917. T h e n c a m e the
revolutions in P e t r o g r a d , a n d the R u s s i a n armies on T u r k i s h soil,
believing the war was c o m i n g to an end, g a v e up all thought of
launching an attack.
2 3
By then the T u r k s were too e x h a u s t e d to exploit the situation by
launching an attack of their own on the R u s s i a n s . B u t their o p p o n e n t s
were e x h a u s t e d too; sufficiently so to consider giving up s u c h a m bitious g o a l s as winning C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . In 1917 Milner, a n d p e r h a p s
L l o y d G e o r g e , flirted with the idea of c o m i n g to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g
with G e r m a n y , in which the R u s s i a n E m p i r e rather than the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e could be partitioned as the spoils of v i c t o r y .
24
A g a i n s t all o d d s , the O t t o m a n E m p i r e h a d held its own. T h e
g o v e r n m e n t s that h a d b r o u g h t the Allied G r e a t Powers into the war
against T u r k e y — t h e A s q u i t h g o v e r n m e n t i n Britain, the R e n e
Viviani g o v e r n m e n t in F r a n c e , a n d the C z a r and his minister S a z a n o v
in R u s s i a — h a d all been overthrown. In s o m e m e a s u r e it was T u r k e y ' s
successful defense of the D a r d a n e l l e s that was responsible for b r i n g i n g
t h e m d o w n . T h o u g h at first it h a d s e e m e d a m a d l y reckless act of
E n v e r and T a l a a t to b r i n g the tottering O t t o m a n E m p i r e into the
war, they h a d b r o u g h t it off; they h a d lost s o m e territory b u t they
also s e e m e d poised to gain s o m e , a n d at the end of 1917 they were
m o r e powerful than ever within the S u b l i m e P o r t e . T h e y no longer
felt the need to cloak themselves in the respectability of Prince S a i d
THE OVERTHROW OF THE CZAR
249
H a l i m a n d finally allowed him to resign as G r a n d Vizier. T h e selfm a d e party b o s s T a l a a t B e y boldly took the title into his own unaristocratic h a n d s .
Y e t for T a l a a t and E n v e r the road a h e a d was perilous. T h o u g h the
threat from R u s s i a was r e m o v e d , the threat from Britain was renewed. T h e i r enemy, the new P r i m e Minister of Britain, was a
d y n a m o a n d a war leader of g e n i u s . T h o u g h L l o y d G e o r g e was
willing to explore the possibility of a c o m p r o m i s e peace with the
Y o u n g T u r k s , he was a fighter—and his heart was in the fight to
destroy T u r k e y ' s e m p i r e .
PART VI
NEW WORLDS AND
PROMISED LANDS
31
T H E NEW WORLD
i
In 1916—17, the s h a d o w of the U n i t e d S t a t e s first fell over L l o y d
G e o r g e ' s imperial a m b i t i o n s in the M i d d l e E a s t .
By the last q u a r t e r of 1916, the Allies h a d b e c o m e d e p e n d e n t u p o n
the U n i t e d S t a t e s not merely for s u p p l i e s b u t for financing. T h e y
were r u n n i n g out of m o n e y , and the economist J o h n M a y n a r d K e y n e s ,
s p e a k i n g for the British T r e a s u r y , w a r n e d the Cabinet that by the
end of the year "the A m e r i c a n executive a n d the A m e r i c a n p u b l i c
will be in a position to dictate to this c o u n t r y . " President W o o d r o w
Wilson underlined the point by interfering with a J. P. M o r g a n
financing for Britain in D e c e m b e r 1 9 1 6 — d e m o n s t r a t i n g that he c o u l d
destroy the market for Allied loans in the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d thereby
drive Britain and F r a n c e into i n s o l v e n c y .
1
2
T h e Allies were u n s u r e of Wilson's intentions. In fact he was
o p p o s e d to their imperialist a m b i t i o n s a n d intended to thwart t h e m .
" E n g l a n d a n d F r a n c e have not the s a m e views with r e g a r d to peace
that we h a v e , " he noted, a n d he p r o p o s e d to "force t h e m to our way
of thinking." T h e conflict between his goals and t h e i r s — i n the
M i d d l e E a s t as e l s e w h e r e — w a s to s h a p e the politics of the years that
followed. T h e entry of Wilson's A m e r i c a onto the world s t a g e therefore o p e n e d up d a n g e r s as well as opportunities for L l o y d G e o r g e .
3
As a p u b l i c figure, Wilson w a s not easy for t h e m to u n d e r s t a n d .
T h e g r a n d s o n of a p a s t o r a n d the son of a Presbyterian minister,
Wilson had s t u d i e d law a n d g o v e r n m e n t , b e c a m e a professor, then
President of Princeton University, G o v e r n o r of N e w J e r s e y , a n d
finally President of the U n i t e d S t a t e s . Y e t in character, thought, a n d
t e m p e r a m e n t , he was not so m u c h a lawyer, a scholar, or a politician
as he was, like his father a n d g r a n d f a t h e r , a t h e o l o g i a n . He a i m e d at
converting or—failing t h a t — d e f e a t i n g rather than a p p e a s i n g . A
politician takes professional p r i d e in achieving c o m p r o m i s e s , but
Wilson—who did not wish to a p p e a r a politician—prided himself on
avoiding t h e m .
4
253
254
NEW W O R L D S A N D
PROMISED
LANDS
A m a n of high m i n d , character, a n d principles, he often saw. moral
issues in a controversy when others d i d not; he frequently inspired
others to share his vision. He was, a n d still remains, a controversial
figure: p r i m a n d bespectacled, the aloof and scholarly President,
whose features a p p e a r e d finely ascetic to his a d m i r e r s , a p p e a r e d
p r i g g i s h a n d self-righteous to others. He was a c o m p l e x a n d forb i d d i n g figure.
T h e Allies at times misinterpreted the President's w o r d s and
actions as a show put on for p u r p o s e s of domestic politics, a n d failed
to a p p r e c i a t e the sincerity of his desire to keep the U n i t e d S t a t e s out
of the world w a r — a n d to keep them out of the new colonies they
planned to establish for themselves in s u c h areas as the M i d d l e E a s t .
T h u s they m i s u n d e r s t o o d Wilson's attempt to mediate an end to the
w a r — a mission that he undertook at the request of the G e r m a n
Chancellor at the end of 1916.
B e t h m a n n Hollweg, the civilian Chancellor of G e r m a n y , who for
m o n t h s had desired a negotiated settlement, forwarded a note to the
U n i t e d S t a t e s on 12 D e c e m b e r 1916, e x p r e s s i n g a willingness to talk
p e a c e . B e t h m a n n , for reasons of d o m e s t i c politics, was u n a b l e to
m a k e the note m o r e specific; b u t Wilson went a h e a d to issue a peace
note of his own on 18 D e c e m b e r , asking the Allies to define their war
goals in the hope of narrowing the differences between the two sides.
L l o y d G e o r g e had j u s t b e c o m e P r i m e Minister, a n d h e a n d the
F r e n c h believed that Wilson was really asking for a p r o g r a m on the
basis of which he could b r i n g the U n i t e d S t a t e s into the war—which
is what S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e R o b e r t L a n s i n g allowed them to unders t a n d . L a n s i n g , who was pro-intervention, in fact was undercutting
the President's peace policy by s u g g e s t i n g to the Allies the t e r m s of
their reply. T h e Allies o b l i g e d ; they defined their goals in sweeping
t e r m s , a m o n g t h e m — " T h e liberation of the peoples who now live
beneath the m u r d e r o u s tyranny of the T u r k s , a n d the expulsion from
E u r o p e of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , which has p r o v e d itself radically
alien to Western civilization." T h i s w a s not a peace p r o p o s a l b u t a
war cry; clearly the O t t o m a n E m p i r e would not negotiate a c o m p r o mise peace on the basis of it. It was contrary to what the President
had s o u g h t , a n d it is not clear how he would have p r o c e e d e d
if G e r m a n y had not s u d d e n l y p u s h e d him into the a r m s of the Allies.
5
II
B e t h m a n n lost all control of his g o v e r n m e n t in early 1917. T h e new
Chief of the G e n e r a l Staff, Paul von H i n d e n b u r g , a n d his animating
military g e n i u s , E r i c h L u d e n d o r f f , believed that the war could be
T H E NEW W O R L D
255
won speedily and that c o m p r o m i s e was u n n e c e s s a r y . G e r m a n policy
was dictated by the military leaders, who a s s u r e d the K a i s e r in
J a n u a r y 1917 that unrestricted s u b m a r i n e warfare c o u l d force the
British into s u b m i s s i o n within six m o n t h s , a n d that A m e r i c a n intervention in the war, if it c a m e , would c o m e too late.
T h e G e r m a n s u b m a r i n e c a m p a i g n , e x a c e r b a t e d b y the notorious
Z i m m e r m a n t e l e g r a m , p u s h e d the U n i t e d S t a t e s toward a declaration of war, t h o u g h substantial n u m b e r s of A m e r i c a n s resisted the
logic of events and remained a d a m a n t l y o p p o s e d to involvement in
the war. S w e p t against his will into the Allied c a m p , the President
faced the challenge of uniting his country b e h i n d h i m .
T h e President's political p r o b l e m — w h i c h was about to play a role
in s h a p i n g his g o a l s in the M i d d l e E a s t a n d elsewhere—was that he
was the leader of a minority party. In 1912 he h a d won the presidency
only b e c a u s e the majority p a r t y — t h e R e p u b l i c a n s — h a d split in two,
with s o m e voting for William H o w a r d T a f t ' s R e g u l a r s a n d others for
T h e o d o r e Roosevelt's P r o g r e s s i v e s ; a n d in 1916 he had been reelected only with the s u p p o r t of the P r o g r e s s i v e s in the normally
R e p u b l i c a n M i d d l e a n d F a r West. T o carry the country behind his
c a n d i d a t e s a n d his p r o g r a m in future elections he would need to hold
the s a m e s w i n g voting g r o u p s that had thrown the 1916 race to h i m :
the big-city Irish Catholics who were anti-British a n d the mainly
R e p u b l i c a n , M i d d l e Western G e r m a n - A m e r i c a n s ( m a n y of t h e m
b o r n in G e r m a n y ) who were p r o - G e r m a n . H o w was he to b r i n g
the U n i t e d S t a t e s into the Allied c a m p without alienating these
groups?
Yet the U - b o a t s left him no choice: on 17 M a r c h 1917, G e r m a n
s u b m a r i n e s sank three A m e r i c a n m e r c h a n t vessels. O n 2 0 M a r c h the
President m e t with his C a b i n e t to solicit advice. He listened to the
views of his C a b i n e t and said little, although he r e m a r k e d on the
"apparent a p a t h y of the M i d d l e West" as a p r o b l e m to be o v e r c o m e .
He did not tell the C a b i n e t whether he h a d m a d e up his m i n d what
to d o .
6
On 24 M a r c h J o s e p h Patrick T u m u l t y , the President's long-time
private secretary, wrote to him that the opinion of the A m e r i c a n
public, as revealed by editorials in n e w s p a p e r s all over the country,
was that if the U n i t e d S t a t e s went to war against G e r m a n y , "it
should be on an issue directly between us and t h e m . " A m e r i c a
should not be tied to Allied war g o a l s , whatever their m e r i t s ;
A m e r i c a n s s h o u l d not be asked to die for other people's c a u s e s .
7
T h e German Foreign Secretary, Arthur Zimmerman, sent a secret cable instructing his Minister in Mexico to seek an alliance with Mexico against the United
States. Mexico was to be given Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. T h e British
government turned over an intercepted copy of Zimmerman's cable to President
Wilson, who published it.
256
NEW W O R L D S AND P R O M I S E D L A N D S
When Wilson went before C o n g r e s s the evening of 2 April to ask
for a declaration of war against the G e r m a n E m p i r e , it b e c a m e
evident that he was thinking along the s a m e lines, for he devoted
m u c h of his speech to the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' special g o a l s . In explaining
why he felt c o m p e l l e d to ask for a declaration of war, he narrowed
the focus of the quarrel with G e r m a n y to g r o u n d s on which it was
difficult to fault h i m : the G e r m a n s h a d s u n k three A m e r i c a n merchant vessels a n d p r o p o s e d to sink m o r e . A c t s of war were b e i n g
c o m m i t t e d against the U n i t e d S t a t e s , to which she had no honorable
choice b u t to r e s p o n d in kind.
To e m p h a s i z e that the quarrel w a s a b o u t the sinking of A m e r i c a n
s h i p s , the President p o s t p o n e d consideration of relations with
G e r m a n y ' s ally, the H a b s b u r g E m p i r e . H e said that since A u s t r i a H u n g a r y h a d not m a d e war on the U n i t e d S t a t e s , the U n i t e d S t a t e s ,
at least for the m o m e n t , would not m a k e war on her. ( I n the event,
the U n i t e d S t a t e s did not declare war against the H a b s b u r g E m p i r e
until the e n d of 1917.) E m p h a s i z i n g even further that he p r o p o s e d to
enter the war on political g r o u n d s of his own choosing, the President
did not mention the O t t o m a n E m p i r e at all, nor B u l g a r i a , which h a d
recently joined the Central P o w e r s . In fact the U n i t e d S t a t e s never
declared or m a d e war against t h e m , although the P o r t e — a s a result
of G e r m a n p r e s s u r e — b r o k e off d i p l o m a t i c relations with the U n i t e d
States.
B u t he d e p a r t e d from the specific quarrel about the merchant
vessels to challenge the G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t — a n d the Allied governm e nt s t o o — o n m o r e general g r o u n d s . T h e actions o f the K a i s e r ' s
g o v e r n m e n t , he told C o n g r e s s , constituted "a war against all nations";
a n d so " T h e challenge is to all m a n k i n d . " T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , he
said, would fight "for the ultimate p e a c e of the world, a n d for the
liberation of its p e o p l e s , the G e r m a n peoples included"; a n d , in a
p h r a s e that b e c a m e f a m o u s , he asserted that " T h e world m u s t be
m a d e safe for d e m o c r a c y . " Implicitly distinguishing A m e r i c a n policy
from that of the Allied Powers, Wilson p r o c l a i m e d that "We have no
selfish e n d s to serve. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no
material c o m p e n s a t i o n for the sacrifices we shall freely m a k e . "
8
9
1 0
T h e point was later m a d e explicit when the U n i t e d S t a t e s —
keeping her distance f r o m the E u r o p e a n s and their s u s p e c t political
a m b i t i o n s — d e c l i n e d to b e c o m e one of the Allies, a n d chose to be
designated as an associate rather than as an ally. T h i s was an extraordinary decision: to fight a l o n g s i d e Britain, F r a n c e , Italy, a n d
R u s s i a , b u t to refuse to be their ally; a n d to fight against G e r m a n y ,
but to refuse to fight against G e r m a n y ' s allies. It was an indication of
a fundamental conflict between the E u r o p e a n belligerents a n d
Wilson's A m e r i c a as to the p u r p o s e of the war a n d the s h a p e of the
THE
NEW
257
WORLD
peace. T h e intervention of the U n i t e d S t a t e s was to cast a long
s h a d o w over the g a i n s with which the E n t e n t e Powers had p r o m i s e d
to reward one another at the e n d of the war, especially in the M i d d l e
East.
Ill
T h e President was concerned a b o u t the attacks on his war policy by
P r o g r e s s i v e and Socialist leaders in the M i d d l e West, for they represented voting blocs he could not i g n o r e . T h e y d e n o u n c e d his
policy as aiding i m p e r i a l i s m , a n d c l a i m e d the war was b e i n g fought
in the service of major financial interests. T h e y pictured the war as a
greedy s t r u g g l e for spoils.
T h e y attacked where the President felt vulnerable, for he believed,
correctly, that the Allied g o v e r n m e n t s h a d entered into secret agreem e n t s with one another to a g g r a n d i z e their e m p i r e s , a n d feared that
if these a g r e e m e n t s were m a d e known they might confirm the c h a r g e
leveled against him that he h a d associated the U n i t e d S t a t e s with a
war that served essentially imperialistic interests. T h e secret S y k e s Picot A g r e e m e n t , for e x a m p l e , p r o v i d e d for Britain a n d F r a n c e to
divide u p the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g M i d d l e E a s t . Other a g r e e m e n t s p r o vided for R u s s i a a n d Italy to annex portions of what is now T u r k e y .
Wilson i n q u i r e d into the details of the secret treaties—even t h o u g h
his political confidant, E d w a r d M a n d e l l H o u s e , felt these were matters best not g o n e into until the war w a s won. In r e s p o n s e to the
President's inquiry, the British F o r e i g n Secretary, A r t h u r Balfour,
sent copies of the secret a g r e e m e n t s to Washington on 18 M a y 1917.
H o u s e (who u s e d his honorary T e x a s title of colonel) was d i s m a y e d
by their contents. Of the plan to partition the M i d d l e E a s t , Colonel
H o u s e presciently r e m a r k e d that "It is all b a d and I told Balfour s o .
T h e y are m a k i n g it a b r e e d i n g place for future w a r . "
11
T h e Allies would not renounce the claims that they h a d staked out
for themselves in their secret a g r e e m e n t s . T h e President could not
use coercion to m a k e t h e m do s o : while fighting a l o n g s i d e t h e m he
could not hurt t h e m without hurting the U n i t e d S t a t e s . Y e t he knew
that if news of the a g r e e m e n t s leaked out it would hurt t h e m all. As
an o p p o n e n t , on principle, of secret treaties, he was p u s h e d into the
paradoxical position of trying to keep the M i d d l e E a s t e r n a g r e e m e n t s
a secret; b u t he was not able to do s o . When the Bolsheviks seized
power in P e t r o g r a d , they p u b l i s h e d the copies of the secret a g r e e m e nt s that they discovered in the R u s s i a n archives. F e a r f u l of the
effect on A m e r i c a n p u b l i c opinion, Wilson t r i e d — b u t failed—to
prevent the publication of the treaties in the U n i t e d S t a t e s .
258
NEW W O R L D S
AND
PROMISED
LANDS
F a l l i n g back on a s u g g e s t i o n by his brilliant y o u n g journalist
s u p p o r t e r Walter L i p p m a n n , then an editor of the New Republic,
Wilson took the offensive by redefining the goals for which the war
was b e i n g fought, in a way that he j u d g e d would purify the Allied
c a u s e , in the hopes of b o o s t i n g public morale on his own side and
of again a p p e a l i n g to the G e r m a n people over the heads of their
leaders.
Wilson defined the new war goals in several ways a n d on a n u m b e r
of occasions. M o s t f a m o u s were the F o u r t e e n Points, which he
outlined to a joint session of C o n g r e s s on 8 J a n u a r y 1918. Of these,
s o m e were of a general n a t u r e : no m o r e secret a g r e e m e n t s between
countries; d i p l o m a c y and negotiation always to take place in the
public view; freedom of the s e a s ; freedom of trade, a n d an end of
tariff a n d other economic b a r r i e r s ; general d i s a r m a m e n t ; a n d the
establishment of an association of nations to guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of all nations. Others dealt with specific
i s s u e s ; a n d , of these, Point T w e l v e , although the U n i t e d S t a t e s was
not at war with the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , outlined A m e r i c a n objectives
with respect to it: "12. T h e T u r k i s h portions of the present O t t o m a n
e m p i r e should be a s s u r e d a secure sovereignty, but the other
nationalities which are now u n d e r T u r k i s h rule s h o u l d be a s s u r e d an
u n d o u b t e d security of life a n d an absolutely u n m o l e s t e d opportunity
of a u t o n o m o u s d e v e l o p m e n t . " In an earlier draft, Wilson had p r o p o s e d that T u r k e y be wiped off the m a p ; his main interest in the
M i d d l e E a s t was missionary a n d , like L l o y d G e o r g e , he s e e m s to
have kept in m i n d the T u r k i s h m a s s a c r e s of C h r i s t i a n s . T h e final
version, however, drafted by his a d v i s e r s , was in line with the
President's claim that the U n i t e d S t a t e s was fighting the g o v e r n m e n t s
rather than the peoples of her a d v e r s a r i e s .
12
1 3
Point T w e l v e e x p r e s s e d the view, s h a r e d by Wilson a n d H o u s e ,
that the M i d d l e E a s t should not be divided a m o n g the belligerent
p o w e r s ; that peoples hitherto ruled by the T u r k s s h o u l d b e c o m e
a u t o n o m o u s . Only a year before, however, Wilson a n d H o u s e had
a g r e e d that it would be unwise for the President to d i s c u s s in public
his plans for d i s p l a c i n g the O t t o m a n regime b e c a u s e his w o r d s might
endanger the A m e r i c a n missionary colleges in Beirut a n d outside
Constantinople.
1 4
15
A m o n t h later, on 11 F e b r u a r y 1918, Wilson s p o k e to C o n g r e s s
a n d defined in a general way the F o u r Principles u p o n which the
peace settlement should b e m a d e . T h e second and third principles
were:
2. T h a t peoples
from sovereignty
p a w n s in a g a m e ,
of the balance of
a n d provinces are not to be bartered a b o u t
to sovereignty as if they were chattels or
even the great g a m e , now for ever discredited,
p o w e r ; but that
THE
NEW
WORLD
259
3. E v e r y territorial settlement involved in this war m u s t be
m a d e in the interest and for the benefit of the p o p u l a t i o n s
concerned, a n d not as a part of any m e r e a d j u s t m e n t or c o m p r o m i s e of claims a m o n g s t rival states . . .
In a speech on 4 J u l y 1918, Wilson defined the F o u r E n d s for
which the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d its associates were fighting as including
T h e settlement of every question, whether of territory or sovereignty, of economic a r r a n g e m e n t , or of political relationship,
u p o n the b a s i s of the free acceptance of that settlement by the
people immediately concerned, a n d not u p o n the basis of the
material interest or a d v a n t a g e of any other nation or people
which m a y desire a different settlement for the sake of its own
exterior influence or m a s t e r y .
Wilson's peace p r o p o s a l s were received with a r d e n t enthusia s m , b u t , revealingly, not by the Allied g o v e r n m e n t s . As Walter
L i p p m a n n ' s b i o g r a p h e r has written,
At first this p u z z l e d L i p p m a n n , for he had a s s u m e d that
Wilson had coordinated his plan with the Allies before m a k i n g
it p u b l i c . He h a d not, a n d for a g o o d r e a s o n : he knew they
would turn it d o w n . D e f e a t e d in his efforts to p e r s u a d e the
Allies to r e p u d i a t e the secret treaties, he h a d tried to induce the
peoples of E u r o p e to p u t p r e s s u r e on their own g o v e r n m e n t s .
T h e tactic failed, a n d as a result the F o u r t e e n Points were
simply a unilateral A m e r i c a n p r o n o u n c e m e n t rather than a declaration of Allied p o l i c y .
16
I n d e e d they represented a challenge to the Allied as well as to the
enemy g o v e r n m e n t s .
IV
Point T w e l v e was not only unilateral b u t also a n o m a l o u s : the
President was p r o p o s i n g to d i s m e m b e r the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , with
which the U n i t e d S t a t e s was not at war. It also s e e m e d an anomaly
that the U n i t e d S t a t e s should have declared war against G e r m a n y
and later against A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y without also declaring war against
their allies.
T h e S e n a t e F o r e i g n Relations C o m m i t t e e a p p e a r e d t o b e i n
favor of i s s u i n g the additional declarations of war. Its chairman
asked S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e L a n s i n g for a fuller explanation of the
Administration's r e a s o n s for not d o i n g s o . In a lengthy m e m o r a n d u m
s u b m i t t e d by L a n s i n g in reply, the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e cited a n u m b e r
of r e a s o n s .
At the t i m e , the U n i t e d S t a t e s held no significant t r a d e ,
260
NEW W O R L D S
AND
PROMISED
LANDS
economic, or political stakes in the M i d d l e E a s t other than two
Protestant m i s s i o n a r y - s u p p o r t e d c o l l e g e s — R o b e r t College a n d the
S y r i a n Protestant College—with which Wilson's friend a n d chief
f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t e r , Cleveland D o d g e , was intimately concerned. B u t
L a n s i n g a r g u e d that s a f e g u a r d i n g these institutions in itself was of
sufficient i m p o r t a n c e to justify the Administration's policy. He indicated that these institutions were worth millions of dollars and m i g h t
be confiscated in the event of war. He also w a r n e d that, in the event
of war, Christians and J e w s in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e might b e c o m e
the victims of new m a s s a c r e s . L a n s i n g saw no particular a d v a n t a g e to
be gained by declaring war, a n d pointed out that T u r k e y had not
attacked the U n i t e d S t a t e s .
D e s p i t e the m a n y reasons cited by L a n s i n g for the Administration's
decision, C o n g r e s s r e m a i n e d unconvinced, and a resolution was
introduced in the S e n a t e in 1918 calling for the additional declarations
of war. T e s t i f y i n g before the S e n a t e F o r e i g n Relations C o m m i t t e e ,
L a n s i n g said that the decision was essentially one for C o n g r e s s to
m a k e . At the request of the c o m m i t t e e , he agreed to s o u n d out the
Allies as to whether they believed the additional declarations of war
would help or hinder the war effort.
In M a y , L a n s i n g reported to the President that the Allies were of
the opinion that it w o u l d be helpful if the U n i t e d S t a t e s were to
issue the additional declarations of war. L a n s i n g pointed out to the
President, however, that m o r e than a million dollars a m o n t h was
being sent to A m e r i c a n missionaries in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e to feed
and care for S y r i a n s a n d A r m e n i a n s , a n d that this aid w o u l d be cut
off in the event of w a r .
T h e President reaffirmed his decision not to declare war. T h e
S e n a t e F o r e i g n Relations C o m m i t t e e w a s s o informed a n d reluctantly
accepted his decision. T h u s the U n i t e d S t a t e s r e m a i n e d at peace
with the O t t o m a n E m p i r e while the President continued to formulate
his plans for breaking it u p .
1 8
V
At the President's r e q u e s t , Colonel H o u s e , b y - p a s s i n g the S t a t e
D e p a r t m e n t , b e g a n in early S e p t e m b e r 1917 to a s s e m b l e a g r o u p of
assistants to help him formulate America's plans for the postwar
world. It was to be an independent g r o u p to which no publicity was
to be g i v e n : it was c o d e - n a m e d "the I n q u i r y . " It met at first in the
N e w Y o r k Public L i b r a r y . A t Wilson's suggestion, H o u s e drew
participants principally from the a c a d e m i c world, b e g i n n i n g with
n a m e s r e c o m m e n d e d by the president of H a r v a r d University a n d by
the editor of the New Republic. President Wilson personally chose
THE
261
NEW W O R L D
Walter L i p p m a n n . A t its peak, the g r o u p a s s e m b l e d b y H o u s e n u m b e r e d 126. T h e vast majority of its m e m b e r s had received their final
a c a d e m i c d e g r e e s from one of four elite u n i v e r s i t i e s — C h i c a g o ,
C o l u m b i a , H a r v a r d , a n d Y a l e — a n d m a n y were recruited directly
from the faculties of those or similar i n s t i t u t i o n s .
Y e t the I n q u i r y — a p a r t f r o m its professionally d r a w n m a p s —
was c o n d u c t e d a m a t e u r i s h l y . T h e M i d d l e E a s t e r n g r o u p , c o m p o s e d
of ten scholars o p e r a t i n g out of Princeton University, d i d not include
any specialists in the c o n t e m p o r a r y M i d d l e E a s t ; its c h a i r m a n was a
student of the C r u s a d e s . T h e chairman's s o n , also a m e m b e r , was a
specialist in L a t i n A m e r i c a n s t u d i e s . A m o n g other m e m b e r s were an
expert on the A m e r i c a n I n d i a n , an engineer, a n d two p r o f e s s o r s who
specialized in ancient Persian l a n g u a g e s a n d l i t e r a t u r e .
19
2 0
21
T h e choice of the N e w Y o r k Public L i b r a r y as its first h e a d q u a r t e r s
s y m b o l i z e d the a p p r o a c h a d o p t e d by the I n q u i r y : having raised all
the political q u e s t i o n s that divide the h u m a n race, the I n q u i r y p r o ceeded to look t h e m u p . M a n y of the researchers d i d no m o r e than
s u m m a r i z e the information that they found in an encyclopaedia.
M a n y delved into q u e s t i o n s of literature a n d architecture that could
have no conceivable b e a r i n g on the t e r m s of an eventual peace treaty.
F e w of the reports h a d any b e a r i n g on the question of A m e r i c a n
national i n t e r e s t s .
22
It was typical that even in the e c o n o m i c section of the M i d d l e
E a s t e r n g r o u p ' s report, there was no mention of the possibility that
significant d e p o s i t s of p e t r o l e u m m i g h t be found in that part of the
world. Y e t in 1918, in w a g i n g a twentieth-century war in which
tanks a n d airplanes m a d e their a p p e a r a n c e , the U n i t e d S t a t e s discovered ( a s did F r a n c e that s a m e year, a n d as Winston Churchill
h a d done in Britain before the war) that the vast quantities of
petroleum r e q u i r e d in m o d e r n warfare had rendered the potential oil
resources which were s u s p e c t e d to exist in the M i d d l e E a s t of considerable i m p o r t a n c e . T h a t the Inquiry's reports o n the M i d d l e E a s t
ignored the oil issue was an indication of the unworldliness of the
President's m e n that b o d e d ill for the future Peace C o n f e r e n c e .
23
VI
While the President's peace p r o g r a m w a s in s o m e r e s p e c t s quixotic,
the extraordinary r e s p o n s e that it evoked throughout the world
showed that it e x p r e s s e d a w i d e s p r e a d yearning to u n d e r s t a n d why
the war w a s b e i n g f o u g h t . Britain's F o r e i g n Secretary, B a l f o u r , said
that the war "was p e r h a p s the b i g g e s t event in history" b u t that,
beyond that, his m i n d would not g o : " C o m i n g generations m i g h t
find it possible to see the thing as it really existed," b u t he a n d his
262
NEW W O R L D S
AND
PROMISED
LANDS
generation could not.
T h e war, by 1917, had g r o w n so m u c h larger
than the events that c a u s e d it that its c a u s e s s e e m e d a l m o s t a b s u r d l y
insignificant by c o m p a r i s o n .
T h e day after W o o d r o w Wilson delivered his speech to C o n g r e s s
asking for a declaration of war, Walter L i p p m a n n wrote to h i m (in
w o r d s that were to a p p e a r in the New Republic later in the w e e k ) :
"Only a s t a t e s m a n who will be called great could have m a d e America's
intervention m e a n so m u c h to the g e n e r o u s forces of the world,
could have lifted the inevitable horror of war into a deed so full of
m e a n i n g . " L i p p m a n n , as he so often did, had found the word for
it: the President, by a d o p t i n g the g o a l s that he d i d , had given the
war a meaning.
25
Y e a r s later, in off-the-record c o m m e n t s a b o a r d ship en route to the
peace conferences in 1919, Wilson told his associates that "I am
convinced that if this peace is not m a d e on the highest principles of
justice, it will be swept away by the peoples of the world in less than
a generation. If it is any other sort of peace then I shall want to
run away a n d hide . . . for there will follow not m e r e conflict b u t
cataclysm."
H o w e v e r , neither Wilson nor those who took part in his I n q u i r y
had f o r m u l a t e d concrete p r o g r a m s that would translate p r o m i s e s into
realities: the President's p r o g r a m was v a g u e a n d b o u n d to a r o u s e
millennial expectations—which m a d e it practically certain that any
agreement achieved by politicians w o u l d d i s a p p o i n t .
26
32
L L O Y D GEORGE'S ZIONISM
i
As h u m a n b e i n g s , no two men could have been less alike than the
austere A m e r i c a n President a n d the c h a r m i n g b u t morally lax British
P r i m e Minister. As politicians, t h o u g h , they were s i m i l a r : loners
who h a d won power t h r o u g h the fluke of a party split. E a c h carried
on a personal foreign policy, b y - p a s s i n g the D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e and
the F o r e i g n Office. B o t h Wilson a n d L l o y d G e o r g e h a d been reluctant to let their countries enter the war a n d , after o p t i n g for war, h a d
found it difficult to keep their pacifist a n d anti-war s u p p o r t e r s in
line. B o t h m e n were of the political left; b u t there the similarities
c a m e to an end, for while Wilson was m o v i n g in an ever m o r e
progressive a n d idealistic direction, L l o y d G e o r g e was d o i n g j u s t the
opposite.
H a d his political p a s t been a g u i d e to his future p e r f o r m a n c e ,
L l o y d G e o r g e could have been e x p e c t e d t o s h a r e the U n i t e d S t a t e s '
aversion to imperialist d e s i g n s on the M i d d l e E a s t . In his Radical
youth he h a d o p p o s e d British i m p e r i a l i s m a n d it would have been in
character for h i m , on b e c o m i n g P r i m e Minister, to have overturned
the A s q u i t h Cabinet's agreement with the Allies to e x p a n d their
e m p i r e s — b u t he did not do s o .
L l o y d G e o r g e felt m u c h the s a m e need to reformulate war goals
that Wilson d i d , but arrived at different conclusions. Wilson p r o claimed that the enormity of the war required peace without annexations. L l o y d G e o r g e took the other view: the enormity of the war
required indemnities a n d annexations on an e n o r m o u s scale.
B o t h Wilson a n d L l o y d G e o r g e p r o m i s e d the p e o p l e s of the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e a better life, b u t where Wilson held out the h o p e of
self-government, L l o y d G e o r g e , while e m p l o y i n g the rhetoric of
national liberation, p r o p o s e d to give the M i d d l e E a s t better government than it c o u l d give itself. In this the P r i m e Minister's goals
coincided with those of K i t c h e n e r ' s lieutenants who exercised day-today control of British Cairo's M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy; thus the chances
that his policy would actually be carried out were i m p r o v e d .
264
NEW W O R L D S
AND
PROMISED
LANDS
T a k i n g office as 1916 turned into 1917, the new P r i m e Minister
b r o u g h t old-fashioned R a d i c a l fervor to s u c h e m e r g i n g war goals as
the destruction of the reactionary O t t o m a n E m p i r e — g o a l s that harked
back to the glorious d a y s of nineteenth-century L i b e r a l i s m . O n e of
L l o y d G e o r g e ' s first actions on b e c o m i n g P r i m e Minister was to
order his armies in E g y p t onto the offensive. O n e of the others was
to order J o h n B u c h a n , w h o m he installed at Milner's s u g g e s t i o n as
D i r e c t o r of Information, to launch a p r o p a g a n d a c a m p a i g n portraying
the destruction of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e as a m a j o r p u r p o s e of the
war. T h e c a m p a i g n c a p t u r e d the imagination of the p u b l i c : " T h e
T u r k M u s t G o ! " p r o v e d t o b e a n effective s l o g a n . L i k e Wilson's
proclaimed points a n d principles, it also p r o v e d , at least in the short
run, g o o d politics.
1
L l o y d G e o r g e ' s p r o g r a m of s e n d i n g troops to fight in the E a s t
b r o u g h t h i m into i m m e d i a t e conflict with his generals; they continued
to d e m a n d s u p r e m e control over military decisions, a n d in this were
s u p p o r t e d b y K i n g G e o r g e . T h e i r strategy, a s always, was t o concentrate all resources on the western front, and they c o m p l a i n e d that
their professional j u d g m e n t w a s b e i n g defied by the new P r i m e
Minister. T h e i r n e w s p a p e r friends on Fleet Street took up the c a u s e .
In early J a n u a r y the p r e s s lord, L o r d Northcliffe, in a heated conversation threatened "to break" L l o y d G e o r g e unless he called off his
eastern s t r a t e g y . Northcliffe g a v e himself the credit for having
overthrown A s q u i t h in D e c e m b e r , a n d a p p e a r e d confident that he
could b r i n g d o w n L l o y d G e o r g e in J a n u a r y if he chose.
2
At a b o u t the s a m e time, the War Office asked s o m e o n e close to
L l o y d G e o r g e to warn h i m that the generals were going to fight him
a n d that he "might not get the best of it [original e m p h a s i s ] . " In
G e r m a n y the G e n e r a l Staff was in the process of sweeping aside the
civilian Chancellor. With the K i n g , the leaders of his own L i b e r a l
Party, the p r e s s , and the g e n e r a l s against him, the P r i m e Minister
could not be certain that the British I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff would
not attempt s o m e t h i n g similar. It w a s one of those times in world
politics when anything, even the previously u n i m a g i n a b l e , s e e m e d
possible.
3
Yet he stood as firm as he could on his eastern strategy, scornful
of his military advisers. L o n g afterward, he wrote that "nothing a n d
n o b o d y could have saved the T u r k from complete collapse in 1915
and 1916 except our G e n e r a l S t a f f . " A c c o r d i n g to L l o y d G e o r g e , a
victory over the O t t o m a n E m p i r e before the end of 1916, when
B u l g a r i a entered the war, would "have p r o d u c e d a decisive effect on
the fortunes of the W a r . " It would have been easy to beat T u r k e y at
any time, he s a i d : "the resolute facade the T u r k s presented to the
Allies . . . had nothing behind it. It was part of the War Office g a m e
to pretend that the T u r k s had f o r m i d a b l e forces with a m p l e reserves.
4
5
LLOYD
GEORGE'S
ZIONISM
265
T h e y m a y have believed it, b u t if s o , either their information w a s
defective, or they were easily taken i n . "
F r o m the b e g i n n i n g of the war, L l o y d G e o r g e had a r g u e d that
G e r m a n y c o u l d be beaten by an attack t h r o u g h the B a l k a n s . D e f e a t i n g
T u r k e y would open up the B a l k a n s to s u c h an attack. Writing
long afterward, he w a s able to s u p p o r t his position by q u o t i n g von
H i n d e n b u r g , the chief of the G e r m a n G e n e r a l Staff: "If ever there
w a s a p r o s p e c t of a brilliant strategic feat, it w a s here . . . Why did
E n g l a n d never m a k e use o f her o p p o r t u n i t y ? . . . S o m e day history
will p e r h a p s clear up this q u e s t i o n . . . "
6
7
L l o y d G e o r g e wanted to do it, but his p r o b l e m w a s that he lacked
the political strength to face d o w n the g e n e r a l s a n d to c o m m a n d e e r
troops a n d e q u i p m e n t in sufficient quantity to do the j o b . T h r o u g h out 1917 a n d well into 1918, he a n d Britain's military leaders fought
a war of m a n e u v e r a n d intrigue against each other. L l o y d G e o r g e ' s
position w a s p r e c a r i o u s ; he had no d e p t h of s u p p o r t in Parliament,
where he w a s s u s t a i n e d for the time b e i n g by former enemies and
distrusted by former friends. T h e m o s t d a n g e r o u s politician to attack
the g o v e r n m e n t w a s his one-time p r o t e g e Winston Churchill. "His
tone w a s rather bitter in s p e a k i n g of L l o y d G e o r g e w h o m he h a d
evidently c o m e to consider as his detested antagonist," noted a friend
of the two m e n . Churchill had c a u s e to be bitter; L l o y d G e o r g e had
e x c l u d e d him f r o m the C a b i n e t . "He b r o u g h t T u r k e y into the W a r , "
the P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d . " S u c h m e n are too d a n g e r o u s for high
office."
8
9
In s p e e c h e s a n d n e w s p a p e r articles, Churchill b r o u g h t to b e a r his
vast knowledge of military affairs a n d his g r a s p of detail in criticizing
the c o n d u c t of the war. As L l o y d G e o r g e knew well, there w a s m u c h
to criticize; he w a s powerless to i m p o s e his own views on the Allied
c o m m a n d e r s , yet as P r i m e Minister he was responsible to Parliament
for their continuing costly failures. K e e p i n g his lines of c o m m u n i cation open, Churchill sent a private w a r n i n g to the P r i m e Minister
that, dissatisfied with the c o n d u c t of the war, the d i s p a r a t e opposition
g r o u p s in the C o m m o n s might unite to b r i n g him d o w n .
On 10 M a y 1917 Churchill a n d L l o y d G e o r g e h a p p e n e d to meet
after a session of the H o u s e of C o m m o n s , a n d the P r i m e Minister
spoke of his desire to have Churchill in the C a b i n e t . T h o u g h he still
thought Churchill had "spoilt himself by reading a b o u t N a p o l e o n , "
L l o y d G e o r g e confided t o F r a n c e s S t e v e n s o n , his secretary and
mistress, that he n e e d e d Churchill to cheer him up and e n c o u r a g e
him at a time when he w a s s u r r o u n d e d by colleagues with g l o o m y
faces.
1 0
As always, it w a s a q u e s t i o n of whether it was a greater risk to
leave Churchill out or to b r i n g h i m in. In m i d - J u l y he a p p o i n t e d
Churchill M i n i s t e r of M u n i t i o n s ; a n d , even t h o u g h the p o s t did not
266
NEW W O R L D S AND P R O M I S E D L A N D S
carry with it m e m b e r s h i p in the W a r C a b i n e t , the a p p o i n t m e n t
immediately a r o u s e d s u c h o p p o s i t i o n that for a time it endangered
the government's existence.*
Churchill's aunt, writing to c o n g r a t u l a t e him on b e c o m i n g Minister
of M u n i t i o n s , a d d e d " M y advice is stick to munitions & don't try &
run the g o v e r n m e n t ! " T h e new a p p o i n t m e n t p r o m p t e d The Times
to warn that the country "is in no m o o d to tolerate even a forlorn
attempt to resuscitate a m a t e u r s t r a t e g y . " Churchill's family a n d
friends, who were worried for h i m , a n d his legions of enemies a n d
detractors, who were worried for the country, would have been
d i s m a y e d b u t not s u r p r i s e d to learn that, within a week of his
a p p o i n t m e n t , he had a p p r o a c h e d the S e c r e t a r y of the War C a b i n e t
with a revived plan to invade the M i d d l e E a s t . He p r o p o s e d to land
British a r m i e s at the port of A l e x a n d r e t t a to invade northern S y r i a
a n d cut across the lines of transportation and c o m m u n i c a t i o n of the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e W a r C a b i n e t ignored his p r o p o s a l , a n d i t
c a m e to nothing.
12
13
1 4
II
Within m o n t h s of taking office, L l o y d G e o r g e was engaged in secret
negotiations with the Y o u n g T u r k leader, E n v e r P a s h a . T h e P r i m e
Minister's agent in the negotiations was Vincent C a i l l a r d , financial
director of the giant a r m a m e n t s firm Vickers, who had spent m a n y
years in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e as president of the council of administration
of the O t t o m a n Public D e b t . C a i l l a r d , in turn, acted t h r o u g h his
close b u s i n e s s associate, Basil Zaharoff, who had risen from the
underworld of S m y r n a to b e c o m e the world's m o s t notorious a r m s
s a l e s m a n , known in the p o p u l a r p r e s s as the "merchant of d e a t h . "
Zaharoff j o u r n e y e d to G e n e v a in 1917 a n d 1918 a n d reported that he
was able to conduct negotiations there with E n v e r P a s h a , at first
through a go-between and then f a c e - t o - f a c e .
T h r o u g h his emissary, the P r i m e Minister offered b r i b e s — l a r g e
bank a c c o u n t s — t o E n v e r a n d his associates to leave the war on
Britain's terms, which were: A r a b i a to be independent; A r m e n i a
a n d S y r i a to enjoy local a u t o n o m y within the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ;
M e s o p o t a m i a a n d Palestine to b e c o m e de facto British protectorates,
15
Lloyd George was saved by Bonar Law, who held his angry Conservatives in
line. Bonar Law disliked Churchill, and was bitter about not having been consulted
in the matter. Nonetheless, he remained loyal to the Prime Minister. Lloyd George
cleverly told him that Asquith had pledged, if he came back as Prime Minister, to
bring Churchill back to power as First Lord of the Admiralty. T h e implied
message was that a Lloyd George government, with Churchill confined to a relatively
less important position, was preferable.
11
LLOYD
GEORGE'S
267
ZIONISM
like E g y p t before the war, though u n d e r formal O t t o m a n suzerainty;
a n d freedom of navigation t h r o u g h the D a r d a n e l l e s to be s e c u r e d . In
return, L l o y d G e o r g e offered to p l e d g e that the C a p i t u l a t i o n s (the
treaties giving preferential treatment to E u r o p e a n s ) would remain
abolished, a n d that g e n e r o u s financial treatment would be given to
T u r k e y t o aid her economic recovery. T h e t e r m s offered b y L l o y d
G e o r g e differed in two important ways f r o m those envisaged by the
prior A s q u i t h g o v e r n m e n t : F r a n c e , Italy, a n d R u s s i a were to get
nothing; a n d Britain was to take Palestine as well as M e s o p o t a m i a .
Zaharoff's r e p o r t s — t h e veracity of which it is difficult to j u d g e —
indicate that E n v e r , after mercurial c h a n g e s of m i n d a n d m o o d , did
not accept L l o y d G e o r g e ' s offer. It d o e s not s o u n d as t h o u g h he ever
seriously intended to do s o . B u t the instructions that Zaharoff received reveal L l o y d G e o r g e ' s intentions with regard to the M i d d l e
East.
Ill
In a secret session of the H o u s e of C o m m o n s on 10 M a y 1917, the
Prime Minister s u r p r i s e d even a close collaborator by saying u n equivocally that Britain was not g o i n g to give back the G e r m a n
colonies in Africa c a p t u r e d d u r i n g the war, a n d that T u r k e y would
not be allowed to keep Palestine or M e s o p o t a m i a . T h o u g h L l o y d
G e o r g e had definite ideas a b o u t the future of the liberated O t t o m a n
lands, few of his colleagues were aware of them. He avoided official
channels a n d m a d e his ideas known in detail only in the c o u r s e of the
secret negotiations with E n v e r P a s h a ; hence the importance of what
they revealed.
1 6
T h e P r i m e Minister intended to deny F r a n c e the position that S i r
M a r k S y k e s had p r o m i s e d her in the postwar M i d d l e E a s t , a n d took
the view that the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t was u n i m p o r t a n t ; that
physical p o s s e s s i o n was all that m a t t e r e d . R e g a r d i n g Palestine, he
told the British a m b a s s a d o r to F r a n c e in April 1917 that the F r e n c h
would be obliged to accept a fait accompli: "We shall be there by
conquest a n d shall r e m a i n . "
17
L l o y d G e o r g e was the only m a n in his g o v e r n m e n t who had
always wanted to a c q u i r e Palestine for Britain. He also wanted to
encourage the d e v e l o p m e n t of a J e w i s h homeland in Palestine. H i s
colleagues failed to u n d e r s t a n d how strongly he held these views.
T h e r e was a b a c k g r o u n d to L l o y d G e o r g e ' s beliefs of which his
colleagues were largely ignorant. He was not, like A s q u i t h a n d the
other m e m b e r s of the C a b i n e t , educated in an exclusive public
school that s t r e s s e d the G r e e k a n d L a t i n classics; he was b r o u g h t up
on the B i b l e . R e p e a t e d l y he r e m a r k e d that the Biblical place n a m e s
268
NEW W O R L D S
AND
PROMISED
LANDS
were better known to him than were those of the battles a n d the
d i s p u t e d frontiers that figured in the E u r o p e a n war. He expressed
himself a b o u t these places with fervor. In his later m e m o i r s he wrote
that he had objected to the division of Palestine in the Sykes-Picot
A g r e e m e n t (most of it g o i n g to F r a n c e or into an international zone)
on the g r o u n d s that it mutilated the country. He said it was not
worth winning the H o l y L a n d only to "hew it in pieces before the
L o r d . " He asserted that "Palestine, if recaptured, m u s t be one and
indivisible to renew its g r e a t n e s s as a living e n t i t y . "
1 8
19
IV
Unlike his colleagues he was keenly aware that there were centuriesold tendencies in British N o n c o n f o r m i s t and Evangelical thought
toward taking the lead in restoring the J e w s to Zion. I n d e e d they
formed the b a c k g r o u n d of his own N o n c o n f o r m i s t faith. He was only
the latest in a long line of Christian Zionists in Britain that stretched
back to the Puritans a n d the era in which the Mayflower set sail for
the N e w World. P r o m i s e d lands were still m u c h thought a b o u t in
those d a y s , whether in the U n i t e d S t a t e s or in Palestine.
In the mid-seventeenth century, two E n g l i s h Puritans residing in
H o l l a n d — J o a n n a a n d E b e n e z e r C a r t w r i g h t — p e t i t i o n e d their government " T h a t this N a t i o n of E n g l a n d , with the inhabitants of the
N e t h e r l a n d s , shall be the first a n d the readiest to transport Izraell's
sons and d a u g h t e r s in their ships to the L a n d p r o m i s e d by their
forefathers, A b r a h a m , I s a a c , a n d J a c o b for an everlasting Inherit a n c e . " G u i d e d by the S c r i p t u r e s , the Puritans believed that the
advent of the M e s s i a h would occur once the people of J u d a e a were
restored to their native land.
20
T h e idea r e c u r r e d : in the mid-nineteenth century, the social reformer A n t h o n y C o o p e r , who b e c a m e Earl of S h a f t e s b u r y , inspired a
powerful evangelical m o v e m e n t within the C h u r c h of E n g l a n d that
a i m e d at b r i n g i n g the J e w s back to Palestine, converting t h e m to
Christianity, and hastening the S e c o n d C o m i n g . S h a f t e s b u r y also ins p i r e d P a l m e r s t o n , the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y and his relation by m a r riage, to extend British consular protection to J e w s in Palestine:
"Palmerston had already been chosen by G o d to be an instrument of
g o o d to H i s ancient p e o p l e , " S h a f t e s b u r y noted in his d i a r y .
2 1
Palmerston acted from a m i x t u r e of idealistic and practical reasons
not unlike those of L l o y d G e o r g e in the next century. He p r e s s e d a
J e w i s h Palestine on the O t t o m a n E m p i r e in the context of the G r e a t
G a m e rivalry with F r a n c e , at a time in the 1830s and 1840s when the
rebelling Viceroy of E g y p t , M e h e m e t Ali, backed by F r a n c e , m a r c h e d
from E g y p t on S y r i a to threaten the territorial integrity of the e m p i r e
LLOYD
GEORGE'S
ZIONISM
269
and the throne of its S u l t a n . As u s u a l , Palmerston u p h e l d the
O t t o m a n c a u s e . O n e of his p u r p o s e s in advocating a J e w i s h Palestine
was to strengthen the O t t o m a n r e g i m e , by providing it with J e w i s h
s u p p o r t . Another was to foil the F r e n c h a n d their p r o t e g e M e h e m e t
Ali by placing along their line of m a r c h a British-backed J e w i s h
homeland which would block their a d v a n c e . Another was to provide
Britain with a client in the M i d d l e E a s t , and therefore an excuse for
intervention in O t t o m a n affairs. T h e R u s s i a n s , as defenders of the
O r t h o d o x faith, a n d the F r e n c h , as c h a m p i o n s of the important
and strategically located M a r o n i t e ( R o m a n Catholic) c o m m u n i t y in
L e b a n o n , claimed to represent significant M i d d l e E a s t e r n interests
a n d c o m m u n i t i e s . F o r the want of Protestants in the area, Britain
had to a d o p t s o m e other protege in order to be able to m a k e a similar
claim.
Palmerston's notion of restoring the P r o m i s e d L a n d to the J e w i s h
people also p r o v e d to be shrewd d o m e s t i c politics. It struck a responsive c h o r d in British public opinion that harked back to Puritan
enthusiasm.
A c c o r d i n g to the leading authority on Palmerston's
diplomacy, his policy "became connected with" a mystical idea, never
altogether lost in the nineteenth century, that Britain was to be the
chosen instrument of G o d to b r i n g back the J e w s to the Holy
L a n d . " T h i s s o m e h o w coexisted, at least in Britain's u p p e r classes,
with pervasive a n t i - S e m i t i s m .
2 2
In 1914 the entry of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e into the war a p p e a r e d to
have b r o u g h t a b o u t the political c i r c u m s t a n c e s in which the Zionist
d r e a m at last could be realized. "What is to prevent the J e w s having
Palestine a n d restoring a real J u d a e a ? " asked H. G. Wells in an open
newspaper letter p e n n e d the m o m e n t that T u r k e y c a m e into the
war.
A similar thought occurred soon afterward to Sir H e r b e r t S a m u e l ,
P o s t m a s t e r General in Asquith's C a b i n e t , one of the leaders of the
L i b e r a l Party, a n d the first person of the J e w i s h faith to sit in a
British C a b i n e t . In J a n u a r y 1915 he sent a m e m o r a n d u m to P r i m e
Minister A s q u i t h p r o p o s i n g that Palestine should b e c o m e a British
p r o t e c t o r a t e — b e c a u s e it was of strategic importance to the British
E m p i r e — a n d u r g i n g the a d v a n t a g e s of encouraging large-scale J e w i s h
settlement there. T h e P r i m e Minister had j u s t been reading Tancred—
a novel by B e n j a m i n Disraeli, the nineteenth-century British leader
(baptized a Christian, but born of a J e w i s h family), who advocated a
J e w i s h return to P a l e s t i n e — a n d A s q u i t h confided that S a m u e l ' s
m e m o r a n d u m "reads almost like a new edition of Tancred b r o u g h t
up to d a t e . I confess I am not attracted by this p r o p o s e d addition
It was a vision that inspired secular idealists as well. George Eliot, in her novel
Daniel Deronda (1876), proposed a Zionist program.
270
NEW
WORLDS
AND
PROMISED
LANDS
to our responsibilities. B u t it is a curious illustration of Dizzy's
[Disraeli's] favourite m a x i m that 'race is everything' to find this
almost lyrical o u t b u r s t p r o c e e d i n g f r o m the well-ordered a n d m e thodical brain o f H . S . . . . "
In M a r c h 1915 a revised version of S a m u e l ' s m e m o r a n d u m was
circulated to the C a b i n e t . It d i d not attract s u p p o r t , a n d Asquith's
private c o m m e n t was that "Curiously enough the only other partisan
of this proposal is L l o y d G e o r g e , who, I need not say, does not care
a d a m n for the J e w s o r their past o r their future . . . " T h e P r i m e
Minister was unaware of the c o m p l e x of motives behind the position
taken by L l o y d G e o r g e , who told the C a b i n e t that it would be an
outrage to let the Christian Holy Places in Palestine fall into the
h a n d s of "Agnostic Atheistic F r a n c e . " A s q u i t h found it o d d that
S a m u e l a n d L l o y d G e o r g e should a d v o c a t e a British protectorate
for Palestine for s u c h different r e a s o n s : "Isn't it singular that the
s a m e conclusion s h d . be c a p a b l e of being c o m e to by s u c h different
r o a d s ? " It w a s a prescient remark for, in the years to c o m e , British
officials traveling along m a n y different r o a d s h a p p e n e d to arrive at
the s a m e conclusion: a distinctive characteristic of Britain's evolving
Palestine policy was that there was no single reason for it.
2 3
2 4
2 5
2 6
K i t c h e n e r threw the great weight of his authority against S a m u e l ' s
p r o p o s a l . He told the C a b i n e t that Palestine was of little value,
strategic or otherwise, a n d that it did not have even one decent
h a r b o r . S a m u e l ' s p r o p o s a l , therefore, was not a d o p t e d ; b u t L l o y d
G e o r g e continued to disagree with K i t c h e n e r a b o u t the strategic
importance of Palestine.
2 7
V
L l o y d G e o r g e , though of a Welsh family, was born in M a n c h e s t e r ,
Britain's s e c o n d l a r g e s t city, a n d the h o m e of the Radical L i b e r a l
tradition which he was to u p h o l d throughout m u c h of his political
life. M a n c h e s t e r was also, next to L o n d o n , the h o m e of Britain's
largest J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y ; a n d M e m b e r s of Parliament f r o m the
area, such as Balfour a n d Churchill, were aware of the special concerns of their J e w i s h constituents.
:
C P . S c o t t , editor o f the great L i b e r a l newspaper the Manchester
Guardian, was converted to Z i o n i s m in 1914 by C h a i m W e i z m a n n , a
R u s s i a n J e w i s h chemist who had settled in Manchester. S c o t t , who
was considered to be L l o y d G e o r g e ' s closest political confidant, took
up the cause with all the force of his idealistic nature. T h e military
correspondent of the Guardian, H e r b e r t S i d e b o t h a m , saw a c o m plementary, aspect of the m a t t e r : a military a d v a n t a g e to Britain. In
the issue of 26 N o v e m b e r 1915, he wrote that "the whole future of
LLOYD
GEORGE'S
ZIONISM
271
the British E m p i r e as a S e a E m p i r e " d e p e n d e d u p o n Palestine bec o m i n g a buffer state inhabited "by an intensely patriotic r a c e . "
T h e Manchester Guardian's conversion was b r o u g h t a b o u t in the
context of the F i r s t World War, b u t L l o y d G e o r g e h a d c o m e to
Z i o n i s m — o r rather it had c o m e to h i m — m o r e than a d e c a d e before.
In 1903 he had been retained as the British attorney for the Zionist
m o v e m e n t and for its founder, Dr T h e o d o r e Herzl, in connection
with an issue that c a u s e d an agonizing split in Zionist r a n k s : whether
a J e w i s h state necessarily had to be located in Palestine. As one who
represented Herzl at the m o m e n t of decision, he was in a position to
u n d e r s t a n d the movement's d i l e m m a s .
2 8
T h e Zionist m o v e m e n t was new, b u t its roots were as old as
J u d a e a , whose i n d e p e n d e n c e was u n d e r m i n e d a n d later c r u s h e d b y
ancient R o m e , a n d m o s t of whose inhabitants were driven into
foreign l a n d s in the s e c o n d century A D . E v e n in exile the J u d a e a n s —
or J e w s , as they c a m e to be k n o w n — c l u n g to their own religion, with
its distinctive laws a n d c u s t o m s , setting them apart f r o m the p e o p l e s
a m o n g s t w h o m they lived a n d m o v e d . Inferior s t a t u s , persecutions,
frequent m a s s a c r e s , a n d repeated e x p u l s i o n s f r o m one country after
another further reinforced their s e n s e of s e p a r a t e identity a n d special
destiny. In the e n d — a c c o r d i n g to their religious t e a c h i n g s — G o d
would b r i n g them b a c k to Z i o n , a n d in the course of their Passover
ceremony each year they would repeat the ritual prayer, " N e x t year
in J e r u s a l e m ! "
T h e future return to Zion r e m a i n e d a M e s s i a n i c vision until the
ideology of nineteenth-century E u r o p e converted it into a c o n t e m p o rary political p r o g r a m . A representative idea of that t i m e — w h i c h had
been planted everywhere by the a r m i e s of the F r e n c h Revolution a n d
had flourished—was that every nation ought to have an independent
country of its own ( t h o u g h , of c o u r s e , what constituted a nation was
a n o p e n q u e s t i o n ) . T h e Italian revolutionary G i u s e p p e Mazzini was
the o u t s t a n d i n g p r o p o n e n t of this doctrine, according to which each
nation s h o u l d be freed to realize its u n i q u e g e n i u s a n d to p u r s u e its
particular mission in the service of m a n k i n d . T h u s the nationalism of
each nation serves not merely its own interests b u t also those of its
n e i g h b o r s ; a n d in the service of this creed Mazzini's colleague G i u s e p p e
G a r i b a l d i — I t a l y ' s greatest h e r o — f o u g h t for U r u g u a y a n d F r a n c e a s
well as Italy.
A converse of this proposition was that a fundamental c a u s e of the
world's ills was that s o m e nations were being kept f r o m achieving
unity or i n d e p e n d e n c e — a situation that Mazzini and his followers
p r o p o s e d to c h a n g e by war or revolution. T h e i r p r o g r a m was taken
over f r o m the left by the r i g h t — I t a l y and G e r m a n y were f o r m e d into
countries by C a v o u r a n d B i s m a r c k respectively—and b e c a m e a c o m mon theme of E u r o p e a n political d i s c o u r s e . N a t i o n a l i s m was taken a
272
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LANDS
s t e p further in the S w i s s ( 1 8 4 7 ) a n d A m e r i c a n (1861—5) civil w a r s ,
when seven confederated S w i s s c a n t o n s and eleven C o n f e d e r a t e d
S t a t e s of A m e r i c a a t t e m p t e d to s e c e d e — a n d were c r u s h e d by the
a r m i e s of their respective federal g o v e r n m e n t s . T h u s peoples were to
be unified into one nation, like it or not.
T h i s s u g g e s t e d there m i g h t be a d a r k s i d e to the new n a t i o n a l i s m :
intolerance of g r o u p s different from the majority. J e w s encountered
this at once. In the nationalist e n v i r o n m e n t of western E u r o p e , the
J e w i s h question a s s u m e d new g u i s e s : were the J e w s o f G e r m a n y
G e r m a n s ? were the J e w s of F r a n c e F r e n c h ? — a n d , if s o , what of
their special identity? By the end of the nineteenth century, the J e w s
of western E u r o p e h a d achieved legal e m a n c i p a t i o n f r o m m a n y of the
restrictions that h a d confined t h e m for centuries: they could m o v e
out of their ghettos, practice the t r a d e or profession of their choice,
b u y land, and enjoy the rights of c i t i z e n s h i p — b u t they still encountered a wave of hostility f r o m their n e i g h b o r s who c o n s i d e r e d
them alien.
I n eastern E u r o p e — t h e R u s s i a n E m p i r e , including P o l a n d , the
Baltic l a n d s , and the U k r a i n e — t h e J e w i s h situation w a s p e r i l o u s .
M o s t of the world's J e w s then lived within the section of the R u s s i a n
E m p i r e to which they were confined so long as they lived within the
C z a r ' s d o m a i n s : the P a l e , or enclosure (from the w o r d for a wooden
stake u s e d in b u i l d i n g f e n c e s ) . Only a few of t h e m — s o m e illegally,
s o m e by special p e r m i s s i o n — l i v e d in St P e t e r s b u r g , M o s c o w , or
elsewhere o u t s i d e the Pale. T h e six million within the Pale were
R u s s i a n J e w s who were not allowed t o b e J e w i s h R u s s i a n s . T h e y
were not only shackled by legal restrictions, but were victimized by
the organized m a s s a c r e s called p o g r o m s . In the last half of the nineteenth century a n d the first years of the twentieth century, these
g r e w so terrible that J e w s in large n u m b e r fled the R u s s i a n E m p i r e
in search of r e f u g e .
S i n c e nationalism w a s then c o n s i d e r e d the cure-all for political ills,
it w a s inevitable that s o m e b o d y would p r o p o s e it as the answer to the
J e w i s h p r o b l e m . National unity a n d self-determination within an
i n d e p e n d e n t J e w i s h c o m m o n w e a l t h were, in fact, p r o p o s e d in a
n u m b e r of eloquent b o o k s whose a u t h o r s h a d arrived at their conclusions independently.* So T h e o d o r e Herzl was not the first to
f o r m u l a t e s u c h a p r o g r a m , b u t he was the first to give it tangible
political e x p r e s s i o n , a t ' a time when J e w i s h pioneers f r o m R u s s i a
were b e g i n n i n g to colonize Palestine without waiting for the politics
to be t h r a s h e d out.
* Among them were Moses Hess's Rome and Jerusalem (1862) and L e o Pinsker's
Auto-Emancipation
(1882).
LLOYD
GEORGE'S
ZIONISM
273
When H e r z l , an assimilated J e w , conceived the idea of political
Z i o n i s m , his notion h a d been that J e w s needed to have a national
state of their o w n — b u t that its location was not of p r i m a r y i m p o r tance. Of J e w s a n d J u d a i s m Herzl knew next to nothing. He was a
fashionable journalist, the Paris c o r r e s p o n d e n t of a Viennese newsp a p e r who h a d forgotten his J e w i s h origins until the shock of F r e n c h
a n t i - S e m i t i s m in the D r e y f u s case convinced him of the need to
r e s c u e the world's J e w s from their historical plight.
As a m a n of the world, he knew how political b u s i n e s s was transacted in the E u r o p e of his time a n d b e g a n by establishing a Zionist
organization. He then c o m m e n c e d negotiations on its behalf with officials of v a r i o u s g o v e r n m e n t s . Only after he h a d c o m e into working
contact with other J e w s , a n d with J e w i s h organizations that for years
had been fostering settlements in the H o l y L a n d , did he c o m e to
recognize the u n i q u e a p p e a l of the country that the world called
P a l e s t i n e — t h e L a n d of the P h i l i s t i n e s — b u t that J e w s called the
L a n d of I s r a e l .
By the b e g i n n i n g of the twentieth century, Herzl's negotiations
with the O t t o m a n E m p i r e h a d convinced h i m that the S u l t a n w o u l d
not agree to the Zionist p r o p o s a l s — a t least for the time b e i n g . So he
looked elsewhere. In 1902 Herzl held an important meeting with
J o s e p h C h a m b e r l a i n , the powerful Colonial Secretary in the S a l i s b u r y
and Balfour C a b i n e t s a n d the father of m o d e r n British i m p e r i a l i s m .
C h a m b e r l a i n , too, believed in a national solution to the J e w i s h
p r o b l e m , a n d listened sympathetically to Herzl's fall-back p r o p o s a l
that a J e w i s h political c o m m u n i t y should initially be established
across the frontier f r o m Palestine, in the hope that Palestine w o u l d
eventually b e c o m e available, s o m e h o w or other. Herzl was talking in
t e r m s of either C y p r u s or the El A r i s h strip at the e d g e of the Sinai
peninsula, next to Palestine, both areas nominally p a r t s of the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e but in fact o c c u p i e d by Britain. C h a m b e r l a i n ruled
out C y p r u s b u t offered to help Herzl obtain the consent of the
British officials in c h a r g e of S i n a i .
T o a p p l y for this consent, Herzl, t h r o u g h his British representative,
L e o p o l d G r e e n b e r g , d e c i d e d to retain the services of a politically
knowledgeable lawyer, a n d chose D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e , who p e r s o n ally h a n d l e d the matter on behalf of his L o n d o n firm, L l o y d G e o r g e ,
R o b e r t s & C o . T h e p r o p o s a l f o u n d e r e d as a result of o p p o s i t i o n from
the British a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in E g y p t a n d the F o r e i g n Office sent
letters to Dr Herzl on 19 J u n e a n d 16 J u l y 1903 informing him that
his p r o p o s a l was not practical.
C h a m b e r l a i n then s u g g e s t e d that he could offer an area for J e w i s h
settlement within the jurisdiction of his own d e p a r t m e n t a n d offered
the p r o s p e c t of settlement in U g a n d a in British E a s t Africa. T h e
274
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LANDS
P r i m e Minister, A r t h u r J a m e s B a l f o u r , who had also thought deeply
a b o u t the J e w i s h q u e s t i o n a n d h a d c o n c l u d e d that it required a
national solution, s u p p o r t e d C h a m b e r l a i n ' s p r o p o s a l . Herzl a g r e e d ,
a n d L l o y d G e o r g e accordingly drafted a C h a r t e r for the J e w i s h
Settlement, and s u b m i t t e d it formally to the British g o v e r n m e n t for
a p p r o v a l . In the s u m m e r of 1903 the F o r e i g n Office replied in a
g u a r d e d b u t affirmative way that if s t u d i e s a n d talks over the c o u r s e
of the next year were successful, H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t would
consider favorably p r o p o s a l s for the creation of a J e w i s h colony. It
was the first official declaration by a g o v e r n m e n t to the Zionist
m o v e m e n t a n d the first official s t a t e m e n t implying national s t a t u s for
the J e w i s h p e o p l e . It was the first B a l f o u r Declaration.
2 9
A meeting of the World Zionist C o n g r e s s convened shortly thereafter, where Herzl p r e s e n t e d the U g a n d a p r o p o s a l , u r g i n g the settlement of E a s t Africa as a way-station a n d refuge along the road to the
P r o m i s e d L a n d , where the J e w s o f the C z a r i s t E m p i r e could escape
the terrors of the p o g r o m s . Herzl's a r g u m e n t s swayed h e a d s but not
hearts. T h o u g h they let their leader win the vote on the issue, m o s t
delegates were not interested in any land other than that of their
ancestors. T h e Zionist m o v e m e n t w a s at a d e a d - e n d : Herzl d i d not
know how to lead it to Palestine but it would not follow him anywhere
else. In the s u m m e r of 1904 Herzl died, leaving behind a fragmented
and deeply divided l e a d e r s h i p .
In 1906, with a new L i b e r a l g o v e r n m e n t in Britain, L l o y d G e o r g e
again s u b m i t t e d the S i n a i p r o p o s a l for consideration, at the instigation
of L e o p o l d G r e e n b e r g . A g a i n the British g o v e r n m e n t rejected it, a n d
S i r E d w a r d G r e y wrote on 20 M a r c h 1906 to say that the F o r e i g n
Office position had not c h a n g e d .
D u r i n g its formative years, then, D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e h a d r e p resented the Zionist m o v e m e n t as it s o u g h t to define itself. It was no
m o r e than one of his m a n y c l i e n t s — a n d not a major one at that—yet,
as a result of his professional representation of it, no other British
political leader was in a better position than he to u n d e r s t a n d its
character a n d its g o a l s . As he c o n t e m p l a t e d the c o n q u e s t of Palestine
in 1917 a n d 1918, n o b o d y had a clearer idea than he of what to do
with it once it w a s his.
3 0
L i k e W o o d r o w Wilson, whose concern in the M i d d l e E a s t was for
A m e r i c a n Protestant schools a n d m i s s i o n s , L l o y d G e o r g e wanted his
country to carry out what he r e g a r d e d as the L o r d ' s work in the
region. B u t , unlike the President, the P r i m e Minister planned to
a g g r a n d i z e his country's e m p i r e by d o i n g so.
L l o y d G e o r g e had followed his own intellectual path to the conclusion that Britain s h o u l d s p o n s o r J e w i s h nationalism in the postwar
M i d d l e E a s t . A n u m b e r of his colleagues within the British government arrived at the s a m e conclusion in 1917, t h o u g h by different
LLOYD GEORGE'S ZIONISM
275
p a t h s — m a n y r o a d s led to Zion. T h e o d d thing was that, j u s t as they
had s u p p o r t e d the E m i r H u s s e i n b e c a u s e of mistaken notions a b o u t
A r a b s a n d M o s l e m s , they were now a b o u t to s u p p o r t Z i o n i s m b e c a u s e
of mistaken notions a b o u t J e w s .
33
TOWARD T H E BALFOUR
DECLARATION
i
L l o y d G e o r g e — a n " E a s t e r n e r " both in his war strategy a n d in his
war g o a l s — s u c c e e d e d in winning s u p p o r t for his views from important civilian m e m b e r s of the g o v e r n m e n t , who c a m e to view the
M i d d l e E a s t in general, a n d Palestine in particular, as vital imperial
interests, a n d who arrived independently and by various p a t h s at the
conclusion that an alliance with Z i o n i s m would serve Britain's needs
in war a n d p e a c e .
L l o y d G e o r g e p e r s u a d e d L o r d M i l n e r a n d his associates o f the
strategic i m p o r t a n c e of the war in the E a s t in the winter of 1917,
when it w a s by no m e a n s clear that the Allies would be able to win a
decisive victory there or anywhere else. E v e n after the U n i t e d S t a t e s
entered the war in the s p r i n g , it s e e m e d entirely p o s s i b l e that the
A m e r i c a n s might not arrive in time to stave off a negotiated peace
agreement that would leave the belligerent countries m o r e or less in
their existing positions. T h e r e were also those who were worried
about allowing the G e r m a n s a n d T u r k s to retain control of an area
whose vital i m p o r t a n c e h a d been u n d e r s c o r e d by the P r i m e Minister.
T h e assistant secretaries o f the War C a b i n e t , L e o A m e r y a n d
M a r k S y k e s , worried that in the p o s t w a r world the O t t o m a n E m p i r e
might fall completely into the clutches of G e r m a n y . Were that to
h a p p e n , the road to I n d i a would be in enemy h a n d s — a threat that
the British E m p i r e could avert only by ejecting the T u r k s a n d
G e r m a n s , a n d taking into British h a n d s the southern perimeter of
the O t t o m a n d o m a i n s . T h e C a b i n e t , from the beginning, h a d thought
of annexing M e s o p o t a m i a . As for A r a b i a , a r r a n g e m e n t s had been
m a d e with the local rulers who h a d a s s e r t e d their i n d e p e n d e n c e : they
were s u b s i d i z e d a n d could be relied u p o n to remain p r o - B r i t i s h .
T h a t left Palestine as the only point of vulnerability. As the b r i d g e
between Africa a n d A s i a , it blocked the land road f r o m E g y p t to
I n d i a a n d , by its proximity, it threatened the S u e z C a n a l and hence
the sea r o a d as well.
276
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TOWARD THE BALFOUR DECLARATION
A m e r y , the leading figure a m o n g Milner's associates in the
g o v e r n m e n t , d i s c u s s e d the matter in a m e m o r a n d u m to the C a b i n e t
dated 11 April 1917. W a r n i n g against allowing G e r m a n y to strike
again at Britain t h r o u g h domination of E u r o p e or the M i d d l e E a s t
after the war, he a r g u e d that " G e r m a n control of Palestine" was one
of "the greatest of all d a n g e r s which can confront the British E m p i r e
in the f u t u r e . "
1
A m e r y , along with M a r k S y k e s a n d , later, William O r m s b y - G o r e ,
had been a p p o i n t e d assistant to M a u r i c e H a n k e y in h e a d i n g the
secretariat of the War C a b i n e t . A M e m b e r of Parliament a n d an
army officer who had been serving in the War Office, A m e r y had
b e c o m e o n e of the inner b a n d directing the war effort. In the
division of responsibilities within the secretariat, the M i d d l e E a s t fell
outside A m e r y ' s s p h e r e a n d within that of S y k e s . Y e t A m e r y had
already involved himself in a m a t t e r affecting M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy
by lending a h a n d to an old friend.
An a r m y officer w h o m A m e r y had known in S o u t h Africa,
L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l J o h n Henry Patterson, had c o m m a n d e d a J e w i s h
c o r p s in the Gallipoli c a m p a i g n , and asked A m e r y to help get permission from the War Office to create a regiment of non-British J e w s
to fight u n d e r British c o m m a n d . T h i s regiment would then be sent
to fight in Palestine if a n d when Britain invaded the O t t o m a n E m p i r e
from E g y p t a n d the S i n a i . Patterson was an Irish Protestant, a
student of the Bible, a professional a r m y officer a n d a m a t e u r lion
hunter, known for his best-selling book The Man-eaters of Tsavo and
for his b u c c a n e e r i n g spirit. T h e idea of a J e w i s h regiment had c o m e
from V l a d i m i r J a b o t i n s k y , a fiery R u s s i a n J e w i s h journalist who
believed that E n g l i s h m e n resented the presence in Britain of a large
i m m i g r a n t p o p u l a t i o n of a b l e - b o d i e d R u s s i a n J e w s who were not yet
British s u b j e c t s a n d who did not u n d e r t a k e military service. While he
did not at first say s o , J a b o t i n s k y was inspired by the thought that a
J e w i s h military unit helping to liberate Palestine w o u l d go far toward
m a k i n g the Zionist d r e a m a r e a l i t y . Patterson was enthusiastic; the
J e w i s h c o r p s he had c o m m a n d e d at Gallipoli had been created in
large part t h r o u g h the efforts of J a b o t i n s k y ' s associate, C a p t a i n J o s e p h
T r u m p e l d o r , a n d Patterson had enjoyed c o m m a n d i n g i t .
2
3
A m e r y a g r e e d to help Patterson, b u t it was not an easy undertaking. Official J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y leaders o p p o s e d the project bitterly; in their view it e n d a n g e r e d J e w s who lived in the G e r m a n ,
A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n , and O t t o m a n e m p i r e s b y s u g g e s t i n g that J e w s , a s
such, were on the Allied side. T h e Zionist leadership, t h o u g h at
o d d s with the British J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y in m o s t other m a t t e r s ,
joined in d e p l o r i n g the identification of the Zionist c a u s e with one or
the other of the warring E u r o p e a n coalitions. When J a b o t i n s k y raised
the issue for the first time in 1915, the British authorities also saw
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PROMISED
LANDS
little merit in his proposal that the J e w i s h unit should help to liberate
Palestine. " B u t n o b o d y knows yet when we shall go to Palestine,"
said one high official, "and L o r d K i t c h e n e r says n e v e r . "
A m e r y persisted throughout 1916 a n d 1917 a n d s u c c e e d e d in
laying J a b o t i n s k y ' s petition before the War C a b i n e t . T h e British
g o v e r n m e n t then went forward to negotiate a convention with the
other Allied g o v e r n m e n t s , allowing each country to take into military
service the resident nationals of the o t h e r s ; in other w o r d s , R u s s i a n
J e w s living in Britain could join the British a r m y . Parliament authorized the convention, a n d in the s u m m e r of 1917 the J e w i s h unit
(later called the J e w i s h L e g i o n ) was f o r m e d within the British a r m y
under the c o m m a n d of L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l Patterson. L l o y d G e o r g e
was enthusiastic: " T h e J e w s might b e able t o render u s m o r e a s s i s tance than the A r a b s " in the Palestine c a m p a i g n , he s a i d .
4
5
Until his colleague M a r k S y k e s s p o k e to him about Z i o n i s m ,
A m e r y h a d not put his strategic c o n c e r n s a b o u t Palestine a n d his
s u p p o r t of the J e w i s h L e g i o n into a unified focus, even t h o u g h his
general leanings were toward Z i o n i s m . A J e w i s h national entity
had behind it the authority of his political mentor, the late J o s e p h
C h a m b e r l a i n , a n d was viewed favorably by his leader, L o r d Milner,
who had a c q u i r e d a s y m p a t h y for Z i o n i s m early in life. A m e r y
himself felt a similar s y m p a t h y ; he later wrote that, apart from the
U n i t e d S t a t e s , "Bible r e a d i n g a n d Bible thinking E n g l a n d was the
only country where the desire of the J e w s to return to their ancient
homeland has always been r e g a r d e d as a natural aspiration which
ought not to be d e n i e d . "
6
When William O r m s b y - G o r e joined A m e r y a n d S y k e s as one of
the three assistant secretaries of the War C a b i n e t , he b r o u g h t with
him a m o r e concrete interest in the i m m e d i a t e p r o s p e c t s of the
Zionist idea. O r m s b y - G o r e , a M e m b e r of Parliament a n d secretary
to L o r d Milner, h a d g o n e out to the M i d d l e E a s t to work with the
A r a b B u r e a u . U n d e r his personal c o m m a n d was A a r o n A a r o n s o h n ,
leader of a highly effective, intelligence-gathering g r o u p operation
working behind O t t o m a n lines in J e w i s h Palestine to p r o v i d e information a b o u t T u r k i s h troop m o v e m e n t s . L i k e J a b o t i n s k y ,
A a r o n s o h n was attacked by fellow J e w s for identifying Zionist interests
with those of the A l l i e s — a n d thus e n d a n g e r i n g the Palestinian J e w i s h
c o m m u n i t y , which D j e m a l P a s h a w a s t e m p t e d to treat as his colleagues h a d treated the A r m e n i a n s . Aaronsohn's information a b o u t
T u r k i s h defenses a n d military dispositions p r o v e d to be of great
value to the British military c o m m a n d in E g y p t , however, a n d was
appreciated by O r m s b y - G o r e .
Another aspect of A a r o n s o h n ' s life that fascinated O r m s b y - G o r e
w a s his agricultural exploration a n d e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n — t h e career in
which he had b e c o m e f a m o u s . A d e c a d e earlier, A a r o n s o h n had
TOWARD THE BALFOUR DECLARATION
279
joined in the search for the original strain of wild wheat that h a d
flourished t h o u s a n d s of years a g o . S i n c e that time the plant had
deteriorated as a result of intensive inbreeding, b e c o m i n g increasingly
vulnerable to d i s e a s e . To save the planet's basic grain food by finding
nature's original plant was a r o m a n t i c q u e s t for the blue-eyed, fairhaired A a r o n A a r o n s o h n . In the s p r i n g of 1906 he m a d e the find of a
lifetime: wild wheat blowing in the breezes at the foot of M o u n t
H e r m o n , near the J e w i s h settlement of R o s h Pina.
O r m s b y - G o r e was struck by the work A a r o n s o h n h a d done at his
station for agricultural research in Palestine, for it went to the heart
o f the a r g u m e n t a b o u t Z i o n i s m . T h e case against Z i o n i s m , which
was m a d e in the C a b i n e t by L o r d C u r z o n , was that Palestine was too
barren a land to s u p p o r t the millions of J e w s who h o p e d to settle
there. T h e a r g u m e n t m a d e later b y A r a b g r o u p s , who c l a i m e d there
was no r o o m in the country for additional settlers, was that "no r o o m
can be m a d e in Palestine for a s e c o n d nation," as G e o r g e A n t o n i u s ,
an eloquent A r a b s p o k e s m a n , wrote long afterward, "except by dislodging or exterminating the nation in p o s s e s s i o n . " A a r o n s o h n ' s
experiments rebutted that a r g u m e n t . * H i s work tended to show that,
without d i s p l a c i n g any of the 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 or so inhabitants of western
Palestine, millions m o r e could be settled on land m a d e rich a n d
fertile by scientific agriculture. H i s work had wider a p p l i c a t i o n s :
O r m s b y - G o r e b r o u g h t b a c k with him to L o n d o n the idea that Zionist
J e w s could help the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g a n d other p e o p l e s of the M i d d l e
E a s t to regenerate their region of the g l o b e so that the desert could
once m o r e b l o o m .
7
II
A s soon a s L l o y d G e o r g e b e c a m e P r i m e Minister, L e o A m e r y initiated a m o v e that placed Palestine within the context of the future
of the British E m p i r e . At the end of 1916 A m e r y p r o p o s e d creating
an I m p e r i a l War C a b i n e t , a n d sent a note on the subject to L o r d
Milner, who a r r a n g e d for L l o y d G e o r g e to put the idea in m o t i o n .
T h e war h a d created a need for s u c h a b o d y : the e m p i r e had
contributed so m u c h m a n p o w e r to the war effort that t r o o p s from
outside Britain constituted a substantial part of the British a r m e d
forces. T h e D o m i n i o n s alone c o n t r i b u t e d m o r e than a million m e n to
the a r m e d forces, while the I n d i a n E m p i r e contributed at least a half
million fighting m e n a n d h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of s u p p o r t t r o o p s .
8
* At the end of 1984 the population of Israel was 4,235,000 and that of the West
Bank was 1,300,000—a total of 5,535,000 people now living in about 25 percent of
the territory of Palestine as defined by the British Mandate.
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AND
PROMISED
LANDS
Y e t C a n a d a , Australia, N e w Z e a l a n d , I n d i a , a n d Britain's other
p a r t n e r s in the fighting had never been consulted a b o u t whether to
go to war. G e o r g e V h a d declared war, a n d his governor-generals in
his D o m i n i o n s overseas h a d p r o m u l g a t e d declarations on their behalf.
Neither the p a r l i a m e n t s nor the g o v e r n m e n t s of the D o m i n i o n s had
been involved in those decisions. A m e r y ' s p r o p o s a l was to recognize,
however belatedly, the i m p o r t a n c e of these partners by giving them
representation in a central b o d y in L o n d o n dealing with the overall
direction of the war.
A m e r y was convinced, as were L o r d Milner's other friends, that
the structure of the British E m p i r e had to be changed fundamentally;
and by the end of 1916, as the political situation in L o n d o n b e c a m e
fluid, and party a n d other divisions were breaking down, m u c h
s e e m e d p o s s i b l e that w o u l d not h a v e s e e m e d so before.
Until the t i m e of D i s r a e l i , the creation of the e m p i r e had been a
h a p h a z a r d a n d , it was s a i d , an a b s e n t - m i n d e d affair. D i s r a e l i g a v e it
g l a m o r a n d focused attention on it. C o m i n g afterward, A m e r y a n d
his friends in the Milner circle, who had worked in concert with
Cecil R h o d e s a n d J o s e p h C h a m b e r l a i n , were a m o n g the f i r s t conscious a n d systematic p r o p o n e n t s of e m p i r e , while their associates
R u d y a r d K i p l i n g a n d J o h n B u c h a n were a m o n g its deliberate glorifiers. M a n y a m o n g them advocated the creation of an e m p i r e - w i d e
economic s y s t e m , closed to o u t s i d e r s by tariffs. O t h e r s , who recognized that various p a r t s of the e m p i r e often a p p e a r e d to o c c u p y
economic positions in conflict with one another, advocated closer
political association. L i o n e l C u r t i s , a founder of their publication,
the Round Table, claimed that the British E m p i r e had no choice but
federation or disintegration. He s p o k e for those in the Milner circle
whose p r o g r a m was o r g a n i c , political union of the e m p i r e , with an
imperial parliament elected from the D o m i n i o n s as well as from
Britain, g i v i n g rise to an imperial C a b i n e t which w o u l d rule the
e m p i r e as a whole. T h e p r o g r a m had been rejected at an imperial
conference in 1911, b u t the b r e a k d o w n of world political s t r u c t u r e s
d u r i n g the F i r s t World War s e e m e d to offer a second c h a n c e .
On 19 D e c e m b e r 1916, acting on A m e r y ' s s u g g e s t i o n , L l o y d G e o r g e
told the H o u s e of C o m m o n s that "We feel that the t i m e has c o m e
when the D o m i n i o n s o u g h t to be m o r e formally consulted" on the
issues of war a n d p e a c e . A c c o r d i n g l y , he convoked an Imperial War
Conference, confusingly also called the I m p e r i a l War C a b i n e t , to
meet in L o n d o n three m o n t h s later.
N o b o d y was m o r e s u s p i c i o u s of the government's intentions than
the delegate f r o m S o u t h Africa, J a n Christian S m u t s , a lawyerturned-general who h a d fought against the British in the Boer War;
he had no desire to be ruled f r o m L o n d o n . He arrived in L o n d o n for
the conference on 12 M a r c h 1917, a n d his suspicions were d e e p e n e d
9
TOWARD THE BALFOUR DECLARATION
281
when, the s a m e day, he received an invitation to dine at Brooks's
with L o r d Milner, his former a d v e r s a r y .
When the conference o p e n e d , issue was joined at once and S m u t s
won a lasting victory. On 16 M a r c h 1917 he p u s h e d through a
resolution that p o s t p o n e d consideration of the details of how the
British E m p i r e should be reorganized until the end of the war, b u t
c o m m i t t e d the participants in a d v a n c e to the proposition that the
b a s i s of the reorganization w o u l d be the independence of S o u t h
Africa, C a n a d a , Australia, and N e w Z e a l a n d .
L l o y d G e o r g e m a y have been less d i s a p p o i n t e d at this o u t c o m e
than were his colleagues in Milner's circle. T h e P r i m e Minister had
p u r p o s e s of his own, a n d saw ways in which S m u t s , in particular,
could serve t h e m . S m u t s was a s u p e r b administrator of the calibre of
Milner, A m e r y , a n d H a n k e y , a n d c o u l d help them to run the war
effort. As a successful general in his B o e r War days a n d m o r e
recently in E a s t Africa, and a representative of the D o m i n i o n s , he
could also help L l o y d G e o r g e by throwing his weight against the
British generals. L l o y d G e o r g e prevailed u p o n S m u t s to stay on in
L o n d o n a n d serve in the War C a b i n e t "on loan" from his own
country's C a b i n e t . T h u s he served not only as a m e m b e r of the
British C a b i n e t , b u t also as the S o u t h African representative in the
Imperial War C a b i n e t (or I m p e r i a l War C o n f e r e n c e ) . He was the
only C a b i n e t minister in m o d e r n British history to have no connection
with either H o u s e of P a r l i a m e n t ; a n d spent the rest of the war away
from h o m e , living in a hotel r o o m at the S a v o y .
1 0
"General S m u t s had e x p r e s s e d very decided views as to the strategical i m p o r t a n c e of Palestine to the British E m p i r e , " L l o y d G e o r g e
later w r o t e , " and b e c a m e immediately involved with the i s s u e .
P e r h a p s b e c a u s e it had been d e c i d e d that the political links of the
empire were not to be tightened, S m u t s a n d A m e r y m o v e d at the
s a m e time to cement the geographical links of the entities c o m p r i s i n g
the British s y s t e m ; a n d both m e n concentrated on the i m p o r t a n c e of
Palestine. If b r o a d l y defined, a n d in conjunction with M e s o p o t a m i a ,
Palestine g a v e Britain the land road from E g y p t to India and b r o u g h t
together the e m p i r e s of Africa and A s i a . T h e c a p t u r e of G e r m a n
E a s t Africa by B o t h a a n d S m u t s had already created a continuous
stretch of British-controlled territories between, on the one h a n d ,
C a p e T o w n , the Atlantic Ocean port at the southern tip of Africa,
a n d , on the other, S u e z , which b r i d g e d the Mediterranean a n d the
R e d S e a at the continent's northeastern tip. With the addition of
Palestine a n d M e s o p o t a m i a , the C a p e T o w n t o S u e z stretch could b e
linked up with the stretch of territory that ran t h r o u g h Britishcontrolled Persia a n d the I n d i a n E m p i r e to B u r m a , M a l a y a , a n d the
two great D o m i n i o n s in the Pacific—Australia a n d N e w Z e a l a n d . As
of 1917, Palestine was the key m i s s i n g link that could join together
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the parts of the British E m p i r e so that they would form a continuous
chain from the Atlantic to the m i d d l e of the Pacific.
T h e P r i m e Minister, of c o u r s e , saw it the s a m e way. As he wrote
later, " F o r the British E m p i r e , the fight with T u r k e y h a d a special
i m p o r t a n c e of its own . .. T h e T u r k i s h E m p i r e lay right across the
track by land or water to our great p o s s e s s i o n s in the E a s t — I n d i a ,
B u r m a , M a l a y a , B o r n e o , H o n g K o n g , a n d the D o m i n i o n s o f A u s t r a l i a
and N e w Z e a l a n d . "
A m e r y , who was a b o u t to advise the C a b i n e t that continued
O t t o m a n (and thus G e r m a n ) control of Palestine was a future d a n g e r
to the British E m p i r e , believed, with the P r i m e Minister, that
Palestine ought to be invaded i m m e d i a t e l y — a n d that S m u t s was the
general to do it. F o r S m u t s was not only a brilliantly successful
general, b u t also s h a r e d their i m m e d i a t e strategic a n d b r o a d e r geopolitical g o a l s .
12
On 15 M a r c h 1917, the day that S m u t s won his victory at the
Imperial C o n f e r e n c e , A m e r y wrote to him that
T h e one thing, however, that is essential if we are g o i n g to do a
b i g thing quickly in the Palestine direction, is a m o r e d a s h i n g
general . . . If I were dictator, I s h o u l d ask you to do it as
the only leading soldier who h a d h a d experience of mobile warfare .. . a n d has not yet got trenches d u g deep in his m i n d .
1 3
L l o y d G e o r g e offered the c o m m a n d t o S m u t s , who hesitated and
asked the advice of the S o u t h African P r i m e Minister, G e n e r a l
L o u i s B o t h a . S m u t s , who was in favor of accepting, reasoned that
"Position on the other fronts m o s t difficult a n d Palestine is only one
where p e r h a p s with great p u s h it is p o s s i b l e to achieve considerable
s u c c e s s . " After consultation, B o t h a a n d S m u t s decided that the
offer s h o u l d be accepted if the c a m p a i g n were to be m o u n t e d "on a
large scale," "a first class c a m p a i g n in m e n and g u n s . "
14
1 5
S m u t s then conferred with S i r William R o b e r t s o n , Chief of the
Imperial G e n e r a l Staff, who m a d e clear that he was not g o i n g to
release the necessary t r o o p s a n d s u p p l i e s from the western front,
and d i s m i s s e d the M i d d l e E a s t as a private obsession of the P r i m e
Minister's, a n d at best "only a s i d e s h o w . " L l o y d G e o r g e h a d been
in office only a few m o n t h s a n d his position was t e n u o u s ; his authority
over the military was limited; and his p r o m i s e of full s u p p o r t , S m u t s
c o n c l u d e d , was not one that he would be able to keep. T h u s S m u t s
turned d o w n the offer of the Palestine c o m m a n d , feeling that the
c a m p a i g n in the E a s t would be s a b o t a g e d by R o b e r t s o n a n d his
colleagues.
16
S m u t s continued, t h o u g h , to take a keen interest in Palestine. He
and A m e r y later went out together to the M i d d l e E a s t to s t u d y the
situation a n d r e p o r t ; a n d both of t h e m c a m e b a c k u r g i n g a s t r o n g
Palestine offensive.
283
TOWARD THE BALFOUR DECLARATION
As a Boer, s t e e p e d in the B i b l e , S m u t s strongly s u p p o r t e d the
Zionist idea when it was raised in the C a b i n e t . As he later pointed
out, the "people of S o u t h Africa a n d especially the older D u t c h
population has been b r o u g h t up almost entirely on J e w i s h tradition.
T h e Old T e s t a m e n t . . . has been the very marrow of D u t c h culture
here i n S o u t h A f r i c a . "
L i k e L l o y d G e o r g e , h e had g r o w n u p
believing that "the day will c o m e when the w o r d s of the p r o p h e t s
will b e c o m e true, a n d Israel will return to its own l a n d , " a n d he
fully agreed with L l o y d G e o r g e that the J e w i s h h o me la n d s h o u l d be
established in Palestine u n d e r British a u s p i c e s . Whether or not he
originated the idea, S m u t s was r e s p o n s i b l e for finding the f o r m u l a —
acceptable to W o o d r o w W i l s o n — u n d e r which countries like Britain
would a s s u m e responsibility for the administration of territories s u c h
as Palestine a n d M e s o p o t a m i a : they would govern p u r s u a n t to a
"mandate" from the future L e a g u e of N a t i o n s . T h e territories would
be held in trust for their p e o p l e s — a f o r m u l a designed to be c o m p a t ible with A m e r i c a n anti-imperialist notions.
17
18
A m e r y put together the pieces of this new imperial vision at the
end of 1918, when he wrote to S m u t s that Britain's hold on the
M i d d l e E a s t s h o u l d be p e r m a n e n t , a n d not terminate when the
m a n d a t e s d i d . Without spelling out the details, he wrote that even
when Palestine, M e s o p o t a m i a , a n d an A r a b i a n state b e c a m e independent of British t r u s t e e s h i p , they s h o u l d remain within the British
imperial s y s t e m . T h e British E m p i r e of the future, as he saw it,
would be like a smaller L e a g u e of N a t i o n s ; and other s u c h minileagues w o u l d e m e r g e elsewhere in the world. Woodrow Wilson's
overall L e a g u e of N a t i o n s would therefore have relatively few m e m b e r s : there would be one representative from the British s y s t e m , and
one from each of the several other s u b - s y s t e m s .
1 9
T h u s A m e r y saw no incompatibility between a British Palestine
a n d a J e w i s h Palestine. He also saw no reason why either British or
J e w i s h aspirations s h o u l d not be in h a r m o n y with A r a b a s p i r a t i o n s .
D e c a d e s later, he wrote of the p r o p o n e n t s of the Zionist d r e a m in
1917—18 that " M o s t of us younger m e n who s h a r e d this hope were,
like M a r k S y k e s , p r o - A r a b as well as p r o - Z i o n i s t , a n d saw no essential
incompatibility between the two i d e a l s . "
20
34
T H E PROMISED LAND
i
As the eventful year 1917 ran its c o u r s e , Britain's Palestine policy
continued to be s h a p e d by m a n y h a n d s : C a b i n e t ministers at one
level; b u r e a u c r a t s , little known b e y o n d official circles a n d little known
today, at another.
Within the powerful secretariat of the War C a b i n e t , the M i d d l e
E a s t fell within the d o m a i n of K i t c h e n e r ' s protege S i r M a r k S y k e s ,
as it had d o n e since shortly after the outset of the war. M a u r i c e
H a n k e y , his superior, held no s t r o n g views a b o u t the M i d d l e E a s t ,
a n d since the deaths of K i t c h e n e r a n d F i t z G e r a l d , S y k e s h a d been
acting without any real direction f r o m a b o v e . He did not know that
the new P r i m e Minister held d e c i d e d views a b o u t a M i d d l e E a s t e r n
settlement which were considerably different from his o w n ; nor was
he involved in the secret negotiations t h r o u g h Zaharoff in which the
P r i m e Minister's t e r m s for peace in the M i d d l e E a s t were revealed.
On his own, then, and u n g u i d e d , S y k e s continued to circle uncertainly a r o u n d the q u e s t i o n of Palestine. H i s instructions f r o m
K i t c h e n e r a n d F i t z G e r a l d h a d been to regard it as of no strategic
i m p o r t a n c e to Britain, a n d those instructions h a d never been cancelled. Y e t he h a d been m a d e aware in the course of his negotiations
with F r a n c e a n d R u s s i a in 1916 that the Holy L a n d held a p a s s i o n a t e
interest for m a n y J e w s whose s u p p o r t , S y k e s felt, might be vital to
the Allies. Y e t J e w i s h opinion m i g h t be alienated by s o m e of the
a r r a n g e m e n t s for the postwar M i d d l e E a s t that he was negotiating
with Britain's allies a n d potential s u p p o r t e r s . As he held d i s c u s s i o n s
with F r e n c h m e n a n d R u s s i a n s , A r m e n i a n s a n d A r a b s , h e was h a u n t e d
by a f e a r — g r o u n d l e s s , b u t real to h i m nonetheless—that each of his
transactions risked r u n n i n g afoul of J e w i s h opposition.
At the b e g i n n i n g of 1917 S y k e s was e n g a g e d in a dialogue with
J a m e s M a l c o l m , a n A r m e n i a n b u s i n e s s m a n , a b o u t establishing a n
independent A r m e n i a n national state. T h e y c o n s i d e r e d inviting
R u s s i a into the postwar M i d d l e E a s t as the protecting power for a
284
THE PROMISED LAND
285
united A r m e n i a ; b u t , as S y k e s believed J e w i s h opinion to be violently
a n t i - R u s s i a n , he s u g g e s t e d that s o m e t h i n g o u g h t to be done in a d vance to d i s a r m potential J e w i s h o p p o s i t i o n to a s c h e m e that allowed
imperial R u s s i a to e x p a n d . S y k e s a s k e d M a l c o l m to find out for him
who the leaders of Z i o n i s m were so that he could a p p r o a c h t h e m
about this.
M a l c o l m had met L e o p o l d G r e e n b e r g , editor and co-owner of the
Jewish Chronicle who, as it h a p p e n e d , h a d also served as T h e o d o r e
Herzl's British representative. M a l c o l m wrote to ask h i m who were
the leaders of the Zionist organization, a n d p a s s e d on the information
he received in reply to S y k e s . T w o n a m e s a p p e a r e d to be of especial
i m p o r t a n c e : N a h u m S o k o l o w , an official of the international Zionist
m o v e m e n t ; a n d Dr C h a i m W e i z m a n n , an official of the British
Zionist F e d e r a t i o n , who was o p p o s e d to the decision of the Zionist
m o v e m e n t to remain neutral in the world war. M a l c o l m introduced
himself to W e i z m a n n and shortly afterward, on 28 J a n u a r y 1917,
introduced W e i z m a n n to S y k e s .
W e i z m a n n — a l t h o u g h he did not know that the Allies were already
m a k i n g plans for the postwar M i d d l e E a s t — w a n t e d to secure a
c o m m i t m e n t f r o m Britain a b o u t Palestine while the war was still in
p r o g r e s s . As a chemist, he m a d e a significant contribution to the war
effort by d o n a t i n g to the g o v e r n m e n t his discovery of a p r o c e s s to
extract acetone f r o m m a i z e — a c e t o n e b e i n g a vital ingredient in the
m a n u f a c t u r e of explosives.
B u t , despite his war work a n d his increasing a c q u a i n t a n c e with the circle of high-ranking officials who
were directing the war effort, he d i d not know that Britain h a d an
official whose brief was to negotiate the design of the p o s t w a r M i d d l e
E a s t . Another British Zionist leader, R a b b i G a s t e r , knew S y k e s — a n d
knew that S y k e s held that j o b — b u t , seeing W e i z m a n n as a rival,
jealously kept the information to himself. T h u s Weizmann learned of
S y k e s only by a c c i d e n t — i n early 1917 when S y k e s m e n t i o n e d his j o b
to J a m e s de R o t h s c h i l d in the c o u r s e of a chance conversation a b o u t
their respective h o r s e - b r e e d i n g stables. Rothschild p a s s e d on the
information to W e i z m a n n , a n d W e i z m a n n was a b o u t to a r r a n g e
to meet S y k e s when J a m e s M a l c o l m a r r a n g e d for S y k e s to meet
Weizmann.
* Born in Russia and naturalized a British subject, he was passionately pro-Allied
and believed that only the western democracies were compatible with Jewish ideals.
Since he held no official position in the international Zionist movement, he was free
to depart from its neutrality; but as an official of the British Zionist Federation, he
could nonetheless speak in a representative capacity.
Years after the war, Lloyd George—in writing his memoirs—invented the
story that he had given the Balfour Declaration in gratitude for Weizmann's invention. Weizmann's important invention was real, but Lloyd George's story was a work
of fiction.
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AND
PROMISED
LANDS
E a c h wanted to do what the other wanted d o n e . S y k e s wanted to
find s o m e o n e with w h o m he c o u l d negotiate an alliance between
British and Zionist interests; a n d Weizmann wanted to be that
person.
T h e i r first meetings were on an unofficial b a s i s . F r o m the start,
S y k e s , as he always did, tried to fit all M i d d l e E a s t e r n projects
within the e x i s t i n g — b u t still s e c r e t — S y k e s - P i c o t - S a z a n o v A g r e e ment, of which W e i z m a n n knew nothing. In the agreement, the
Holy Places were to be placed u n d e r an international a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ;
so S y k e s began by p r o p o s i n g that a J e w i s h entity in Palestine should
be u n d e r joint A n g l o - F r e n c h rule ( " c o n d o m i n i u m " ) — t h o u g h he
could not reveal to Weizmann why he was m a k i n g the p r o p o s a l .
T h o u g h S y k e s did not realize it, he was out of step not only with the
Zionist leaders but also with the P r i m e Minister. L l o y d G e o r g e — l i k e
W e i z m a n n and his c o l l e a g u e s — w a n t e d Palestine to be British. C. P.
S c o t t , editor of the Manchester Guardian and L l o y d G e o r g e ' s confidant, a d v i s e d Weizmann to take the matter up with the P r i m e
Minister; but W e i z m a n n decided to concentrate on c h a n g i n g Sykes's
m i n d rather than g o i n g over his h e a d .
1
In L o n d o n , on 7 F e b r u a r y 1917, S y k e s met with W e i z m a n n a n d
other British Zionists who told h i m that they were o p p o s e d to the
c o n d o m i n i u m idea a n d wanted Palestine to be ruled by Britain.
S y k e s replied that all the other difficulties could be resolved ("the
A r a b s could be m a n a g e d , " he said) b u t that rejection of the c o n d o m i n i u m a p p r o a c h b r o u g h t them up against a p r o b l e m for which he
had no s u r e solution: F r a n c e , he said, was "the serious difficulty."
F r a n c e , he explained, refused to recognize that concessions to Z i o n i s m
might help win the w a r ; and he confessed to the Zionist leaders that
he could not u n d e r s t a n d F r e n c h policy in this respect. "What was
their m o t i v e ? " he a s k e d .
2
3
T h e next day, at his L o n d o n residence at 9 B u c k i n g h a m G a t e ,
S y k e s introduced the worldly Zionist leader N a h u m Sokolow to
F r a n c o i s G e o r g e s Picot, who told S o k o l o w that, having seen the
results of J e w i s h colonization in Palestine, he believed the p r o g r a m
of J e w i s h settlement was feasible. Sokolow told Picot that J e w s
greatly a d m i r e d F r a n c e but "had long in m i n d the suzerainty of the
British g o v e r n m e n t . " Picot replied that the question of suzerainty
was one for the Allies to decide a m o n g themselves. He said that he
would do his best to m a k e the Zionists' a i m s known to his g o v e r n ment, but that in his view there was no possibility of his g o v e r n m e n t
deciding to renounce its claim to Palestine. I n d e e d , he s a i d , 95
percent of the F r e n c h people wanted F r a n c e to annex P a l e s t i n e .
4
5
All concerned a g r e e d to wait u p o n events, which were not slow in
c o m i n g . Within two m o n t h s the C z a r was overthrown a n d the U n i t e d
S t a t e s had entered the war. S y k e s quickly saw the implications of
287
THE PROMISED LAND
both events for his a r r a n g e m e n t s with Picot. Millions of J e w s lived
within the C z a r i s t E m p i r e ; their s u p p o r t , S y k e s a r g u e d after the
R u s s i a n Revolution in M a r c h , could help induce the new R u s s i a n
g o v e r n m e n t to remain in the w a r . At the s a m e time, the A m e r i c a n
entry into the war strengthened his conviction that the E u r o p e a n
Allies would have to validate their claims to a position in the postwar
M i d d l e E a s t by s p o n s o r s h i p of o p p r e s s e d peoples, s u c h as J e w s ,
A r a b s , and A r m e n i a n s . On both c o u n t s he felt he h a d new a r g u m e n t s with which to p e r s u a d e the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t to a d o p t a
more s y m p a t h e t i c attitude toward Z i o n i s m .
6
M e a n w h i l e his conversations with Picot were about to r e o p e n :
L l o y d G e o r g e s u c c e e d e d in ordering the British a r m y in E g y p t to
a t t e m p t an invasion of Palestine in 1917, leading the F r e n c h government to insist on s e n d i n g Picot to E g y p t to a c c o m p a n y the British
invasion f o r c e s — t o which the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t r e s p o n d e d by
ordering S y k e s to go there, too, to interpose between Picot a n d the
British c o m m a n d i n g general. Picot viewed the p r o p o s e d British invasion as an attack on F r e n c h interests. He reported that " L o n d o n
now considers o u r a g r e e m e n t s a d e a d letter. E n g l i s h troops will enter
S y r i a from the s o u t h " — f r o m E g y p t a n d Palestine—"and d i s p e r s e
our s u p p o r t e r s . " '
L l o y d G e o r g e , impatient with F r a n c e ' s pretensions in the M i d d l e
E a s t , told W e i z m a n n that the future of Palestine was a question that
would b e resolved between B r i t o n s and J e w s . H e professed t o b e
unable to u n d e r s t a n d why S y k e s was so concerned a b o u t F r e n c h
objections a n d told Weizmann that Palestine "was to him the one
really interesting part of the w a r . "
8
9
On the afternoon of 3 April 1917 S y k e s , newly a p p o i n t e d as h e a d
of the political mission to the G e n e r a l Officer C o m m a n d i n g - i n - C h i e f
the E g y p t i a n E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e , went to 10 D o w n i n g Street
to receive his p a r t i n g instructions. T h e r e he met with the P r i m e
Minister, L o r d C u r z o n , and M a u r i c e H a n k e y . S y k e s p r o p o s e d t o try
to raise an A r a b tribal rebellion b e h i n d enemy lines, but L l o y d
G e o r g e a n d C u r z o n i m p r e s s e d u p o n h i m the i m p o r t a n c e of not c o m mitting Britain to an a g r e e m e n t with the tribes that w o u l d be p r e j u dicial to British interests. Specifically they told him not to do anything
that would worsen the p r o b l e m with F r a n c e , and to bear in m i n d the
"importance of not p r e j u d i c i n g the Zionist m o v e m e n t a n d the p o s s i bility of its d e v e l o p m e n t u n d e r British a u s p i c e s . " A c c o r d i n g to
notes of the conference, " T h e P r i m e Minister laid s t r e s s on the
i m p o r t a n c e , if p o s s i b l e , of securing the addition of Palestine to the
British area i n the postwar M i d d l e E a s t . "
T h e P r i m e Minister
warned S y k e s not to m a k e p l e d g e s to the A r a b s "and particularly
none in r e g a r d to P a l e s t i n e . "
10
1 1
12
S y k e s s t o p p e d first in Paris, where he stayed at the Hotel L o t t i on
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NEW W O R L D S AND P R O M I S E D
LANDS
the R u e C a s t i g l i o n e , only a few s t e p s away from the Place V e n d o m e ,
with its m o n u m e n t a l reminder of N a p o l e o n B o n a p a r t e a n d his
c o n q u e s t s . While there, S y k e s told Picot that F r a n c e would have to
change her way of thinking a n d c o m e a r o u n d to a nonannexationist
approach, and that this might involve American or British sponsorship
of a reborn J u d a e a , a n d F r e n c h s p o n s o r s h i p of a reborn A r m e n i a . He
was s u r p r i s e d that Picot a p p e a r e d disconcerted by what he s a i d .
F r o m the H o t e f L o t t i , S y k e s wrote on 8 April 1917 to the F o r e i g n
S e c r e t a r y , A r t h u r B a l f o u r , that the F r e n c h were hostile to the notion
of b r i n g i n g the U n i t e d S t a t e s into Palestine as a patron of Z i o n i s m ;
they feared that, if i n t r o d u c e d into the M i d d l e E a s t , the U n i t e d
S t a t e s might b e c o m e F r a n c e ' s c o m m e r c i a l rival there. "As r e g a r d s
Z i o n i s m itself," he continued, "the F r e n c h are b e g i n n i n g to realize
they are up against a big thing, a n d that they cannot close their eyes
to i t . "
T h e F r e n c h F o r e i g n Ministry, like S y k e s , now believed that
R u s s i a ' s J e w s m i g h t help to keep R u s s i a in the war at a time when
military disasters on the western front m a d e the eastern front especially crucial. N a h u m S o k o l o w , w h o m S y k e s introduced to the
Q u a i d'Orsay, s e e m e d willing to help in this respect. H i s discussions
with the F r e n c h officials went well. On 9 April S y k e s wrote to
Balfour that " T h e situation now is therefore that Zionist aspirations
are recognized as legitimate by the F r e n c h . "
F r a n c e r e m a i n e d a d a m a n t , however, in maintaining her own claims
in the M i d d l e E a s t . S y k e s m e t with the leader of the F r e n c h colonialist bloc, S e n a t o r Pierre-Etienne F l a n d i n ; a n d on 15 April wrote
to the F o r e i g n Office that F l a n d i n continued to insist that F r a n c e
m u s t have the whole sea-coast of S y r i a , L e b a n o n , a n d Palestine
d o w n to El A r i s h in the E g y p t i a n S i n a i . F l a n d i n claimed that "Picot
was a fool who h a d betrayed F r a n c e " by c o m p r o m i s i n g with Britain
in the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t .
1 3
14
1 5
1 6
F r o m P a r i s , S y k e s went on to R o m e , where he a r r a n g e d for
N a h u m S o k o l o w to p l e a d the Zionist case with the P o p e a n d other
Vatican officials. Whatever inspiration he m a y have derived from
these m e e t i n g s w a s c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d by the e m e r g e n c e of a new
p r o b l e m : Italy's F o r e i g n Minister, B a r o n S i d n e y S o n n i n o , strongly
asserted Italian claims to a s h a r e in the postwar M i d d l e E a s t .
O n c e in C a i r o , S y k e s b r o u g h t together his diverse allies to p e r s u a d e
t h e m to work together. He i n t r o d u c e d Picot to A r a b leaders in C a i r o ,
a n d later a r r a n g e d for Picot to c o m e with him on a journey to A r a b i a
to meet with Sherif H u s s e i n to outline for him, at least in a general
way, the t e r m s of the secret S y k e s - P i c o t - S a z a n o v A g r e e m e n t . S y k e s
optimistically believed that he h a d got H u s s e i n to a d m i t that the
F r e n c h c o u l d p r o v e helpful to the A r a b s in S y r i a ; that he h a d pers u a d e d A r a b leaders to see that the A r a b s were too weak to a s s u m e
THE
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LAND
responsibility for an area of s u c h c o m p l e x interests as Palestine; a n d
that he h a d reached an u n d e r s t a n d i n g that Palestinian A r a b s w o u l d
agree to a national status* for the J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y in Palestine if
the A r a b c o m m u n i t y received the s a m e d e s i g n a t i o n .
In C a i r o , S y k e s w a s w a r n e d by C l a y t o n a n d his friends at the A r a b
B u r e a u that a F r e n c h presence in the M i d d l e E a s t would c a u s e
t r o u b l e . B u t S y k e s , faithful a n d g o o d - h e a r t e d as ever, continued to
maintain that his friends had fallen victim to " F a s h o d i s m " — a desire
to best the F r e n c h , as K i t c h e n e r had d o n e at F a s h o d a — a n d that they
ought to show m o r e loyalty to their ally. He continued to a t t e m p t to
convert Picot into a g e n u i n e partner, a n d s u g g e s t e d that the F r e n c h
representative work out a c o m m o n policy with Hussein's sons so that
Britain and F r a n c e could p u r s u e parallel, constructive, cooperative
relationships with the new A r a b rulers of the p o s t w a r M i d d l e E a s t .
On 12 M a y he c a b l e d L o n d o n that "Picot h a s c o m e to t e r m s with the
A r a b r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . " A few weeks later he wrote to a colleague:
"I think F r e n c h will be ready to c o - o p e r a t e with us in a c o m m o n
policy t o w a r d s the A r a b s p e a k i n g p e o p l e . . . "
17
1 8
19
2 0
II
In the first half of 1917, G e n e r a l S i r A r c h i b a l d M u r r a y , c o m m a n d e r
o f the British a r m y i n E g y p t — t h e E g y p t i a n E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e —
sent his t r o o p s lurching in fits a n d starts toward Palestine. Whether
b e c a u s e L o n d o n kept issuing a n d then c o u n t e r m a n d i n g instructions,
or b e c a u s e he himself w a s inept, or a c o m b i n a t i o n of both, M u r r a y
allowed the G e r m a n c o m m a n d e r s a n d their T u r k i s h t r o o p s time t o
r e g r o u p . B u t then h e hastily a t t a c k e d — a t G a z a , which d o m i n a t e d
the coastal road to Palestine—in the early m o r n i n g fog on 26
M a r c h , a n d w a s b e a t e n . K r e s s von K r e s s e n s t e i n , the brilliant
G e r m a n c o m m a n d e r , who h a d fortified G a z a effectively, suffered
only half as m a n y casualties as the B r i t i s h .
C a l l i n g up reinforcements f r o m E g y p t , M u r r a y launched a second
attack on fortified G a z a on 29 A p r i l , a n d K r e s s e n s t e i n defeated him
even m o r e decisively: the ratio of British to T u r k i s h casualties was
three to one. Weary a n d d i s c o u r a g e d , the British a r m i e s withdrew;
a n d within weeks S i r A r c h i b a l d M u r r a y w a s relieved of his c o m m a n d .
L l o y d G e o r g e w a s determined to renew the battle for Palestine in the
a u t u m n b u t , for the m o m e n t , L o n d o n w a s unwilling to c o m m i t fresh
t r o o p s to the c a m p a i g n .
* T h e reference was to "millet" a term used in the Ottoman Empire to designate
a community entitled to a certain amount of autonomy in administering the affairs
of its members.
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M u r r a y ' s two defeats led Sir M a r k S y k e s to worry that the
T u r k s — i n the breathing s p a c e before Britain r e s u m e d the attack in
the a u t u m n — m i g h t retaliate against the J e w i s h , A r a b , and A r m e n i a n
populations whose s u p p o r t he h a d been enlisting on behalf of the
Allies. He cabled the F o r e i g n Office s u g g e s t i n g that Britain should
not go forward with Zionist, A r a b , a n d A r m e n i a n projects so long as
they e x p o s e d these peoples to j e o p a r d y . H i s suggestion met with no
response.
2 1
D i s c o u r a g e d by the war n e w s — t h e failure of the F r e n c h offensive
in C h a m p a g n e , the mutiny of F r e n c h a r m y units there, the disintegration of R u s s i a , a n d M u r r a y ' s failure to invade P a l e s t i n e — S y k e s
attached even greater i m p o r t a n c e to winning the s u p p o r t of the
peoples of the M i d d l e E a s t . To him it s e e m e d , as it did to L e o A m e r y
a n d his colleagues, that even if the Allies were to win the war, their
victory might be an inconclusive one; a n d that such positions as they
might win for themselves in the M i d d l e E a s t could be subject to
continual p r e s s u r e by a G e r m a n - c o n t r o l l e d T u r k e y that would make
full use of the S u l t a n ' s leadership of I s l a m . In his view, that m a d e
the annexationist claims of p r e - C l e m e n c e a u F r a n c e and of B a r o n
Sonnino's Italy all the m o r e s h o r t - s i g h t e d . In a " M e m o r a n d u m on
the A s i a - M i n o r A g r e e m e n t " he wrote that
T h e idea of annexation definitely m u s t be d i s m i s s e d , it is contrary to the spirit of the time, a n d if at any m o m e n t the R u s s i a n
extremists got hold of a copy they could m a k e m u c h capital
against the whole E n t e n t e , this is especially so with the Italian
claim which runs counter to nationality, g e o g r a p h y , a n d c o m m o n sense, and is merely B a r o n Sonnino's concession to a
chauvinist g r o u p who only think in b a l d t e r m s of g r a b .
He went on to say that F r a n c e , if she were wise, would deal with
her areas of influence in the M i d d l e E a s t as Britain planned to deal
with h e r s : in S y r i a a n d the L e b a n o n F r a n c e s h o u l d s p o n s o r A r a b
i n d e p e n d e n c e . If she did not do s o , wrote S y k e s , Britain s h o u l d do
nothing to help F r a n c e deal with the t r o u b l e s she would have brought
on her own head.
Outlining his own vision of the future, S y k e s wrote that "I want to
see a p e r m a n e n t A n g l o - F r e n c h entente allied to the J e w s , A r a b s , a n d
A r m e n i a n s which will render p a n - I s l a m i s m innocuous a n d protect
I n d i a and Africa from the T u r c o - G e r m a n c o m b i n e , which I believe
m a y well survive H o h e n z o l l e r n s . "
S y k e s h a d won over A m e r y to this point of view, a n d A m e r y later
wrote that "the J e w s alone can build up a s t r o n g civilisation in
Palestine which could help that country to hold its own against
G e r m a n - T u r k i s h o p p r e s s i o n . . . It would be a fatal thing if, after
22
THE PROMISED
LAND
291
the war, the interests of the J e w s t h r o u g h o u t the world were enlisted
on the side of the G e r m a n s . "
2 3
Ill
C h a i m W e i z m a n n was elected President of the British Zionist
F e d e r a t i o n in F e b r u a r y 1917, e n a b l i n g h i m to p r o p o s e officially that
the British g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d make a p u b l i c c o m m i t m e n t to s u p p o r t
a J e w i s h h o m e l a n d in Palestine. After his meetings with S y k e s he
continued to meet with p u b l i c officials who e x p r e s s e d s y m p a t h y with
his ideas.
L o r d R o b e r t Cecil, Parliamentary U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for
F o r e i g n Affairs, a n d the third son of L o r d S a l i s b u r y , Victoria's last
P r i m e Minister, b e c a m e a devoted convert. F i v e y o u n g Cecils were
killed in the F i r s t World War, and L o r d R o b e r t was m o v e d to draft
a m e m o r a n d u m outlining a plan for perpetual p e a c e : the first draft
of what later b e c a m e the C o v e n a n t of the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s . H i s
ideas of self-determination disconcerted his political colleagues, who
pointed out that logically his plan w o u l d lead to the dissolution of
the British E m p i r e . A c o n t e m p o r a r y essayist wrote in wonder that
"He took the cross in an o d d international c r u s a d e for p e a c e ; a n d
he f o u n d his allies in places where Cecils normally look for their
e n e m i e s . " In a similar c r u s a d i n g spirit he took up the cause of a
J e w i s h Palestine.
2 4
23
A n o t h e r s y m p a t h i z e r was S i r R o n a l d G r a h a m , a n A r a b i s t who h a d
c o m e back to the F o r e i g n Office after m o r e than a d e c a d e of service
in E g y p t , where he h a d been the first British official to d i s c u s s with
Vladimir J a b o t i n s k y the creation of a J e w i s h unit within the British
a r m y . N o w , having returned to L o n d o n , he u r g e d the F o r e i g n Office
to m a k e its s u p p o r t of Z i o n i s m p u b l i c . While the notion of c o m mitting Britain to Z i o n i s m was inspired by G e r a l d F i t z M a u r i c e a n d
M a r k S y k e s , G r a h a m was p r o b a b l y m o r e responsible than anyone
else in the g o v e r n m e n t for actually e m b o d y i n g the c o m m i t m e n t in
an official d o c u m e n t , t h o u g h his role tends to be p a s s e d over by
h i s t o r i a n s — p o s s i b l y b e c a u s e he failed to leave a significant archive of
private p a p e r s b e h i n d h i m .
G r a h a m and other officials of the F o r e i g n Office were keenly
aware that F r a n c e w a s the obstacle in the way of giving C h a i m
W e i z ma n n the p u b l i c c o m m i t m e n t h e r e q u e s t e d . G r a h a m c o n c l u d e d ,
as h a d S y k e s , that Z i o n i s m was weakened by its exclusive attachment
to Britain. He worried that the Zionists were g a m b l i n g everything on
the p r o s p e c t that Britain w o u l d g o v e r n Palestine—in ignorance of the
secret S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t in which Britain had p l e d g e d not to
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NEW W O R L D S A N D P R O M I S E D L A N D S
do s o . On 19 April 1917 G r a h a m wrote to S y k e s that it was disquieting that the Zionist m o v e m e n t relied so completely on the
prospect of Britain having P a l e s t i n e .
H o w e v e r it was difficult to see how the Zionist m o v e m e n t could
turn to F r a n c e for s u p p o r t . Within the F r e n c h F o r e i g n Ministry
Z i o n i s m w a s spoken of with scorn, a n d i m p o r t a n t s e g m e n t s of F r e n c h
opinion had e x p r e s s e d hostility all along to the m o v e m e n t , which was
r e g a r d e d a s p r o - G e r m a n . Z i o n i s m h a d attracted little s u p p o r t a m o n g
F r a n c e ' s J e w s a n d , as a result, the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t held a low
opinion of its strength—until the revolution in R u s s i a m a d e J e w s
seem m u c h m o r e politically i m p o r t a n t than they were. E v e n after
events in R u s s i a m a d e it s e e m desirable to win Zionist s u p p o r t , the
Quai d'Orsay hesitated to bid for it, fearing that an Allied c o m m i t ment to Z i o n i s m might a m o u n t to an a b a n d o n m e n t of F r a n c e ' s claim
to Palestine.
26
T h e p r o b l e m was solved by N a h u m Sokolow who, in his negotiations with the F r e n c h F o r e i g n Ministry, pointedly d i d not raise
the question of which country s h o u l d be the protecting power for
Palestine. Officials at the Quai d'Orsay therefore were led to a s s u m e
that Zionists would remain neutral on that issue. F r e n c h officials
were not p r e p a r e d to s u p p o r t Z i o n i s m in a postwar P a l e s t i n e — a n d
did not envisage allowing J e w s to achieve a separate national s t a t u s —
b u t they saw no h a r m in offering the Zionists w o r d s of e n c o u r a g e ment so long as they were m e a n i n g l e s s . T h e y believed that those
who held Zionist " d a y d r e a m s " might be won over by g r a n t i n g t h e m
s o m e form of verbal e n c o u r a g e m e n t that did not constitute a real
c o m m i t m e n t . In return for Sokolow's agreement to go to R u s s i a to
use his influence with the J e w s there, on 4 J u n e 1917 J u l e s C a m b o n ,
D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l of the F r e n c h F o r e i g n Ministry, g a v e h i m a written
formal a s s u r a n c e from the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t of its s y m p a t h y in the
following t e r m s :
27
Y o u were g o o d e n o u g h to present the project to which you are
devoting your efforts which has for its object the d e v e l o p m e n t
of J e w i s h colonization in Palestine. Y o u consider that, c i r c u m stances permitting, a n d the i n d e p e n d e n c e of the H o l y Places
b e i n g s a f e g u a r d e d on the other hand, it would be a d e e d of
justice a n d of reparation to assist, by the protection of the
Allied Powers, in the renaissance of the J e w i s h nationality in
that land f r o m which the p e o p l e of Israel were exiled so m a n y
centuries a g o .
T h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t , which entered this present war to
defend a people wrongfully attacked, and which continues the
s t r u g g l e to a s s u r e the victory of right over m i g h t , cannot b u t
THE PROMISED LAND
293
feel s y m p a t h y for your c a u s e , the t r i u m p h of which is b o u n d up
with that of the Allies.
I am h a p p y to give you herewith s u c h a s s u r a n c e .
2 8
It was subtly p h r a s e d . O m i t t e d f r o m the p l e d g e was the c r u x of
the Zionist i d e a : that the renaissance of the J e w i s h nation s h o u l d
occur within the context of a political entity of its own. M o r e o v e r ,
the Holy Places, which were to remain independent of the p l e d g e of
s y m p a t h y , had already been defined by the F r e n c h in the S y k e s Picot A g r e e m e n t as a large enclave that took in most of inhabited
Palestine west of the J o r d a n river. If that definition were to a p p l y ,
F r e n c h s y m p a t h y for the J e w i s h nation in Palestine would be restricted to H a i f a , H e b r o n , northern G a l i l e e , and the N e g e v D e s e r t .
T h e C a m b o n letter w a s , as it was intended to b e , n o n c o m m i t t a l .
N o n e t h e l e s s , the F r e n c h had o u t m a n e u v e r e d themselves. T h e i r
formal a s s u r a n c e was too cautiously p h r a s e d to be meaningful, but
its existence licensed the British to issue an a s s u r a n c e of their own.
O n c e it b e c a m e c o m m o n g r o u n d that the Allies s u p p o r t e d J e w i s h
aspirations in Palestine, however defined, the Zionist m o v e m e n t
would have an important role in selecting its protector, a n d would
choose Britain. T h i s was a matter of less concern to G r a h a m a n d
S y k e s , whose principal objective at that time was to s e c u r e a h o m e l a n d
in Palestine for the J e w s , than to L e o A m e r y a n d his friends, to
w h o m Z i o n i s m was attractive mainly b e c a u s e it e n s u r e d that Palestine
would be B r i t i s h .
A r m e d with the written F r e n c h statement that S o k o l o w h a d
b r o u g h t b a c k with h i m f r o m P a r i s , G r a h a m and Cecil advised a
willing Balfour in m i d - J u n e 1917 that the time had c o m e to issue a
written p u b l i c British c o m m i t m e n t to Z i o n i s m . B a l f o u r invited
Weizmann to participate in the p r o c e s s of drafting an a p p r o p r i a t e
d o c u m e n t . It was what W e i z m a n n a n d S y k e s h a d s o u g h t all along.
T h e p r o c e s s of drafting the a p p r o p r i a t e l a n g u a g e , a n d d e c i d i n g to
w h o m it s h o u l d be a d d r e s s e d , went on through the s u m m e r until
S e p t e m b e r , when Milner a n d L e o A m e r y took charge of it. A l m o s t
all the g o v e r n m e n t a l figures who m a t t e r e d were d i s p o s e d favorably
toward the p r o p o s e d declaration. S y k e s , fortified by O r m s b y - G o r e ,
had converted the War C a b i n e t secretariat to Z i o n i s m . B a l f o u r , the
F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , h a d long s y m p a t h i z e d with Z i o n i s m a n d now
believed that Britain s h o u l d go on record in its favor; a n d within his
own d e p a r t m e n t he was p u s h e d forward in this by Cecil a n d G r a h a m .
* It is sometimes pointed out that the Balfour Declaration was equally vague.
But, unlike the Cambon letter, the Balfour Declaration (a) was published, (b) referred to the whole of Palestine, and (c) referred to the creation of an entity that was to
have a distinctly Jewish national identity—a National Home.
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S m u t s was deeply p r o - Z i o n i s t . M i l n e r a n d his set, including Philip
K e r r of the P r i m e Minister's secretariat, h a d c o m e to view the
establishment of a J e w i s h Palestine as a vital British imperial interest.
T h e P r i m e Minister h a d always p l a n n e d to carry t h r o u g h a Zionist
p r o g r a m ; a n d while he did not e x p r e s s an interest in declaring
Britain's intentions in a d v a n c e , neither did he place any obstacle in
the way of his government's d o i n g so once his colleagues thought it
useful.
Y e t the p r o p o s a l that B a l f o u r s h o u l d issue his pro-Zionist declaration s u d d e n l y encountered o p p o s i t i o n that b r o u g h t it to a halt.
T h e opposition c a m e f r o m leading figures in the British J e w i s h
c o m m u n i t y . E d w i n M o n t a g u , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a , led the
opposition g r o u p within the C a b i n e t . H e , along with his cousin,
H e r b e r t S a m u e l , a n d R u f u s I s a a c s ( L o r d R e a d i n g ) h a d broken new
g r o u n d for their co-religionists: they h a d been the first J e w s to sit in
a British C a b i n e t . T h e s e c o n d son of a successful financier who h a d
been ennobled, M o n t a g u saw Z i o n i s m as a threat to the position in
British society that he a n d his family h a d so recently, and with so
m u c h exertion, attained. J u d a i s m , he a r g u e d , was a religion, not a
nationality, a n d to say otherwise w a s to say that he was less than 100
percent British.
M o n t a g u was r e g a r d e d as by far the m o s t c a p a b l e of the younger
m e n in the L i b e r a l ranks, a n d it was d e e m e d a political m a s t e r s t r o k e
for the P r i m e Minister to have taken h i m and Churchill away from
A s q u i t h . Y e t a typical political c o m m e n t at the time ( f r o m L o r d
D e r b y , the War Minister) was, " T h e a p p o i n t m e n t of M o n t a g u , a
J e w , to the I n d i a Office has m a d e , as far as I can j u d g e , an uneasy
feeling both in I n d i a a n d here"; t h o u g h D e r b y a d d e d that " I , personally, have a very high opinion of his capability a n d I expect he
will do w e l l . " It bothered M o n t a g u that, despite his lack of religious
faith, he c o u l d not avoid b e i n g categorized as a J e w . He was the
millionaire son of an E n g l i s h lord, b u t was driven to lament that "I
have been striving all my life to e s c a p e from the G h e t t o . "
29
3 0
T h e evidence s u g g e s t e d that in his n o n - Z i o n i s m , M o n t a g u was
s p e a k i n g for a majority of J e w s . As of 1913, the last d a t e for which
there were figures, only a b o u t one percent of the world's J e w s h a d
signified their adherence to Z i o n i s m .
British Intelligence reports
indicated a s u r g e of Zionist feeling d u r i n g the war in the Pale of
R u s s i a , b u t there were no figures either to substantiate or to quantify
i t . I n Britain, the Conjoint C o m m i t t e e , which represented British
J e w r y in all m a t t e r s affecting J e w s a b r o a d , h a d been against Z i o n i s m
from the start a n d r e m a i n e d s o .
3 1
3 2
3 3
M o n t a g u ' s opposition b r o u g h t all matters to a halt. In d i s g u s t ,
* Disraeli, of course, though of Jewish ancestry, was baptized a Christian.
THE PROMISED LAND
295
G r a h a m r e p o r t e d that the p r o p o s e d declaration was "hung u p " b y
M o n t a g u , "who represents a certain section of the rich J e w s a n d who
s e e m s to fear that he and his like will be expelled f r o m E n g l a n d a n d
asked to cultivate f a r m s in P a l e s t i n e . "
T h e s u b - C a b i n e t officials who were p u s h i n g for a pro-Zionist
c o m m i t m e n t a t t e m p t e d to allay s u c h fears. A m e r y , who w a s helping
Milner redraft the p r o p o s e d D e c l a r a t i o n , explained the concept
behind it to a C a b i n e t m e m b e r as not really b e i n g a d d r e s s e d to
British s u b j e c t s of the J e w i s h faith, b u t to J e w s who resided in
countries that denied t h e m real citizenship. "Apart f r o m those J e w s
who have b e c o m e citizens of this or any other country in the fullest
sense, there is also a large b o d y , m o r e particularly of the J e w s in
Poland and R u s s i a . . . who are still in a very real sense a separate
nation . . . " D e n i e d the right to b e c o m e R u s s i a n s , they would be
offered a chance to r e b u i l d their own h o m e l a n d in Palestine.
34
3 5
M o n t a g u , however, took little interest in the position of J e w s in
other countries. It was the position of J e w s in British society that
concerned h i m ; feeling threatened, he fought b a c k with a ferocity
that b r o u g h t the Cabinet's deliberations on the matter to a standstill.
M o n t a g u was a i d e d b y L o r d C u r z o n , who a r g u e d that Palestine
was too m e a g r e in r e s o u r c e s to a c c o m m o d a t e the Zionist d r e a m .
M o r e i m p o r t a n t , he was aided by A n d r e w B o n a r L a w — l e a d e r of the
dominant party in the Coalition g o v e r n m e n t a n d the P r i m e Minister's
powerful political p a r t n e r — w h o u r g e d delay. B o n a r L a w a r g u e d that
the time was not yet ripe for a consideration of the Zionist i s s u e .
M o n t a g u was also aided by the U n i t e d S t a t e s , which, until m i d October 1917, cautiously counselled delay. President Wilson was
s y m p a t h e t i c to Z i o n i s m , b u t s u s p i c i o u s of British m o t i v e s ; he favored
a J e w i s h Palestine b u t was less enthusiastic about a British Palestine.
As the British C a b i n e t considered i s s u i n g the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n , it
solicited the advice, a n d by implication the s u p p o r t , of President
Wilson. T h e p r o p o s e d D e c l a r a t i o n was d e s c r i b e d b y the C a b i n e t t o
the A m e r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t as an e x p r e s s i o n of s y m p a t h y for Zionist
aspirations, as t h o u g h it were motivated solely by concern for the
plight of p e r s e c u t e d J e w s . Wilson's foreign policy adviser, Colonel
H o u s e , translated this as follows: " T h e E n g l i s h naturally want the
road to E g y p t a n d I n d i a blocked, a n d L l o y d G e o r g e is not a b o v e
u s i n g us to further this p l a n . "
3 6
T h i s was a fair interpretation of the views of the P r i m e Minister
a n d of the Milner circle which a d v i s e d him. A c c o r d i n g to C h a i m
Weizmann, Philip K e r r (the former Milner aide who served as L l o y d
G e o r g e ' s secretary) "saw in a J e w i s h Palestine a b r i d g e between
Africa, A s i a a n d E u r o p e on the r o a d to I n d i a . " It was not, however,
a fair interpretation of the views of the F o r e i g n Office, which h a d
been won over by the a r g u m e n t that a pro-Zionist declaration would
37
296
NEW W O R L D S AND P R O M I S E D L A N D S
prove a crucial w e a p o n against G e r m a n y in the war a n d afterward.
T h e F o r e i g n Office believed that the J e w i s h c o m m u n i t i e s in A m e r i c a
a n d , a b o v e all, R u s s i a , wielded great power. T h e British a m b a s s a d o r
in P e t r o g r a d , well aware that J e w s were a weak a n d p e r s e c u t e d minority in imperial R u s s i a and of no political c o n s e q u e n c e , r e p o r t e d
that Zionists could not affect the o u t c o m e of the s t r u g g l e for power
in R u s s i a . H i s h o m e g o v e r n m e n t p e r s i s t e d in believing, however,
that the J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y in R u s s i a c o u l d keep the g o v e r n m e n t that
ruled t h e m in the Allied c a m p . As the crisis in R u s s i a d e e p e n e d , the
F o r e i g n Office was seized by a s e n s e of urgency in seeking J e w i s h
support.
IV
F e a r begets fear. In G e r m a n y the p r e s s was a r o u s e d by r u m o r s of
what the British F o r e i g n Office intended to d o . In J u n e 1917 S i r
R o n a l d G r a h a m received from C h a i m W e i z m a n n an issue of a Berlin
n e w s p a p e r known for its close relationship to the g o v e r n m e n t , reporting that the British were flirting with the idea of e n d o r s i n g
Z i o n i s m in o r d e r to a c q u i r e the Palestinian land b r i d g e on the road
from E g y p t to I n d i a , a n d p r o p o s i n g that G e r m a n y forestall the
m a n e u v e r by e n d o r s i n g Z i o n i s m first. ( T h o u g h the British did not
know it, the G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t took little interest in a d o p t i n g a
pro-Zionist s t a n c e ; it w a s the G e r m a n p r e s s that took an interest in
T h a t s u m m e r G r a h a m c o m m u n i c a t e d his fears t o Balfour. I n his
m i n u t e , G r a h a m wrote that he h a d heard there w a s to be another
p o s t p o n e m e n t which he believed w o u l d "jeopardise the whole J e w i s h
situation." T h i s e n d a n g e r e d the position in R u s s i a where, he a s s e r t e d ,
the J e w s were all anti-Ally a n d , to a lesser extent, it w o u l d antagonize
p u b l i c opinion in the U n i t e d S t a t e s . W a r n i n g that Britain m u s t not
"throw the Zionists into the a r m s of the G e r m a n s , " he a r g u e d that
"We might at any m o m e n t be confronted by a G e r m a n m o v e on the
Zionist q u e s t i o n a n d it m u s t be r e m e m b e r e d that Z i o n i s m w a s
originally if not a G e r m a n J e w i s h at any rate an A u s t r i a n J e w i s h
idea."
38
G r a h a m attached to his m i n u t e a list of dates s h o w i n g how extensive the g o v e r n m e n t ' s delays h a d been in dealing with the Zionist
matter. In O c t o b e r , B a l f o u r f o r w a r d e d the minute to the P r i m e
Minister, along with the list of d a t e s which he said showed that the
Zionists h a d reasonable c a u s e to c o m p l a i n , to which he a d d e d his
own r e c o m m e n d a t i o n that the q u e s t i o n be taken up by the C a b i n e t
a s soon a s p o s s i b l e .
3 9
THE PROMISED
LAND
297
On 26 O c t o b e r 1917, The Times p u b l i s h e d a leading article attacking the continuing delay. S t a t i n g that it was no secret that British
a n d Allied g o v e r n m e n t s had b e e n . considering a statement a b o u t
Palestine, The Times a r g u e d that the t i m e had c o m e to m a k e o n e .
Do our statesmen fail to see how valuable to the Allied c a u s e
w o u l d be the hearty s y m p a t h y of the J e w s throughout the world
which an unequivocal declaration of British policy might win?
G e r m a n y has been q u i c k to perceive the d a n g e r to her s c h e m e s
and to her p r o p a g a n d a that w o u l d be involved in the association
of the Allies with J e w i s h national h o p e s , a n d she has not been
idle in a t t e m p t i n g to forestall u s .
On 31 O c t o b e r 1917 the C a b i n e t overrode the o p p o s i t i o n of
M o n t a g u a n d C u r z o n a n d authorized the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y to issue a
m u c h - d i l u t e d version of the a s s u r a n c e of s u p p o r t that W e i z m a n n had
r e q u e s t e d . An ebullient S y k e s r u s h e d over with the news, " D r .
W e i z m a n n , it's a boy"; b u t the Zionist leader was u n h a p p y that the
original l a n g u a g e had been so watered d o w n .
A d d r e s s e d to the m o s t illustrious n a m e in British J e w r y , the
F o r e i g n Secretary's letter of 2 N o v e m b e r 1917 s t a t e d :
4 0
Dear L o r d Rothschild,
I have m u c h pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of H i s
M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t , the following declaration of s y m p a t h y
with J e w i s h Zionist aspirations which has been s u b m i t t e d to,
a n d a p p r o v e d by, the C a b i n e t : "His Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t
view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national
h o m e for the J e w i s h people, a n d will use their best e n d e a v o u r s
to facilitate the achievement of this object, it b e i n g clearly
u n d e r s t o o d that nothing shall be d o n e which m a y p r e j u d i c e the
civil a n d religious rights of existing n o n - J e w i s h c o m m u n i t i e s in
Palestine, or the rights a n d political s t a t u s enjoyed by J e w s in
any other c o u n t r y . " I should be grateful if you would b r i n g this
declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist F e d e r a t i o n .
Britain's leaders anticipated no a d v e r s e reaction f r o m their A r a b
allies; they h a d seen F r a n c e as their only p r o b l e m in this connection,
and that had been resolved. T h e P r i m e Minister later wrote of the
A r a b leaders that "Palestine did not seem to give them m u c h
a n x i e t y . " H e pointed out that his g o v e r n m e n t had informed K i n g
H u s s e i n a n d Prince Feisal of its plans to re-create a J e w i s h h o m e l a n d
in the H o l y L a n d . He caustically a d d e d that "We c o u l d not get in
touch with the Palestinian A r a b s as they were fighting against u s . "
41
4 2
T h e public a n n o u n c e m e n t of the Balfour Declaration was delayed
until the following F r i d a y , the publication date of the weekly Jewish
298
NEW W O R L D S
AND
PROMISED
LANDS
Chronicle. By then the news was o v e r s h a d o w e d by reports from
P e t r o g r a d that L e n i n a n d T r o t s k y had seized power. T h e F o r e i g n
Office had h o p e d the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n would help to swing R u s s i a n
J e w i s h s u p p o r t to the Allied side a n d against B o l s h e v i s m . T h i s hope
remained alive until the Bolsheviks decisively won the R u s s i a n Civil
War in the early 1920s. In N o v e m b e r of 1917 the battle against
B o l s h e v i s m in R u s s i a h a d just b e g u n , a n d those B r i t o n s who s u p p o r t e d the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n , b e c a u s e they mistakenly believed
R u s s i a n J e w s were powerful a n d c o u l d be valuable allies, were driven
to s u p p o r t it all the m o r e by the d r a m a t i c news f r o m P e t r o g r a d .
It was not until 9 N o v e m b e r that The Times was able to report the
a n n o u n c e m e n t of the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n , a n d not until 3 D e c e m b e r
that it p u b l i s h e d c o m m e n t s a p p r o v i n g it. T h e c o m m e n t s followed
u p o n a celebration at the L o n d o n O p e r a H o u s e on 2 D e c e m b e r
organized by the British Zionist F e d e r a t i o n . In addition to the Zionist
leaders, s p e a k e r s included L o r d R o b e r t Cecil, S i r M a r k S y k e s ,
and William O r m s b y - G o r e , as well as a Syrian Christian, an A r a b
nationalist, a n d s p o k e s m e n for A r m e n i a . T h e theme of the meeting,
eloquently p u r s u e d by m a n y of the s p e a k e r s , was the need for J e w s ,
A r a b s , a n d A r m e n i a n s to help one another a n d to m o v e forward in
h a r m o n y . T h e opinion of The Times was that " T h e presence a n d
the words of influential representatives of the A r a b and A r m e n i a n
peoples, a n d their a s s u r a n c e s of a g r e e m e n t a n d cooperation with the
J e w s , would alone have sufficed to m a k e the meeting m e m o r a b l e . "
43
Of the meeting, The Times wrote that "its o u t s t a n d i n g features
were the O l d T e s t a m e n t spirit which p e r v a d e d it a n d the feeling
that, in the s o m e w h a t i n c o n g r u o u s setting of a L o n d o n theatre, the
a p p r o a c h i n g fulfillment of ancient p r o p h e c y was b e i n g celebrated
with faith a n d f e r v o u r . " It was a p p r o p r i a t e that it should be s o :
Biblical p r o p h e c y was the first a n d m o s t e n d u r i n g of the m a n y
motives that led B r i t o n s to want to restore the J e w s to Z i o n .
T h e P r i m e Minister planned to foster a J e w i s h h o m e in Palestine,
in any event, a n d later wrote that the peace treaty would have
p r o v i d e d that Palestine s h o u l d be a h o m e l a n d for the J e w s "even had
there been no previous pledge or p r o m i s e . " T h e i m p o r t a n c e of the
Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n , he wrote, was its contribution to the war effort.
He claimed that R u s s i a n J e w s had given invaluable s u p p o r t to the
war against G e r m a n y b e c a u s e of it. T h e grateful Zionist leaders had
p r o m i s e d to work toward an Allied v i c t o r y — a n d had done s o . Writing
two d e c a d e s later, as the British g o v e r n m e n t was a b o u t to a b a n d o n
the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n , he said that the Zionists "kept their w o r d in
the letter a n d the spirit, a n d the only question that remains now is
whether we m e a n to h o n o u r o u r s . "
44
4 5
4 6
T h e P r i m e Minister u n d e r e s t i m a t e d the effect of the Balfour
Declaration on the eventual peace settlement. Its character as a
THE PROMISED LAND
299
public d o c u m e n t — i s s u e d with the a p p r o v a l of the U n i t e d S t a t e s and
F r a n c e and after consultation with Italy a n d the Vatican, a n d g r e e t e d
with a p p r o v a l by the p u b l i c a n d the p r e s s t h r o u g h o u t the western
w o r l d — m a d e it a c o m m i t m e n t that w a s difficult to ignore when
the peace settlement was b e i n g negotiated. It took on a life a n d
m o m e n t u m of its own.
V
T h e Declaration also played a role in the d e v e l o p m e n t of the Zionist
m o v e m e n t in the A m e r i c a n J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y . A m e r i c a n Z i o n i s m
had been a tiny m o v e m e n t when the war b e g a n . Of the roughly three
million J e w s who then lived in the U n i t e d S t a t e s , only 12,000
belonged to the often ephemeral g r o u p s loosely b o u n d together in
the amateurishly led Zionist F e d e r a t i o n . T h e m o v e m e n t ' s treasury
contained 15,000 d o l l a r s ; its annual b u d g e t never e x c e e d e d 5,200
d o l l a r s . T h e largest single donation the F e d e r a t i o n ever received
prior to 1914 was 2 0 0 d o l l a r s . In N e w Y o r k the m o v e m e n t h a d
only 500 m e m b e r s .
4 7
4 8
49
5 0
5 1
L o u i s D . B r a n d e i s , a n o u t s t a n d i n g B o s t o n lawyer not previously
identified with specifically J e w i s h c a u s e s , had b e c o m e a Zionist in
1912 a n d took over leadership of the m o v e m e n t in 1914. As the
intellectual giant of the P r o g r e s s i v e m o v e m e n t in A m e r i c a n politics,
he was believed to exert great influence over President Wilson.
B r a n d e i s w a s p e r h a p s the first J e w to play an i m p o r t a n t part in
A m e r i c a n politics since the Civil War. Only one J e w h a d ever been
a m e m b e r of a president's cabinet, a n d B r a n d e i s himself w a s to
b e c o m e the first J e w i s h m e m b e r o f the U . S . S u p r e m e C o u r t .
T h e great waves of J e w i s h i m m i g r a t i o n into the U n i t e d S t a t e s
were recent, a n d m o s t i m m i g r a n t s were a n x i o u s to learn E n g l i s h , to
s h e d their foreign accents a n d w a y s , and to b e c o m e A m e r i c a n .
A m e r i c a n - b o r n J e w s , too, wanted to distance themselves from any
foreign taint a n d feared that a t t a c h m e n t to Z i o n i s m on their part
might m a k e t h e m s e e m less than wholehearted in their loyalty to the
United States.
It w a s this i s s u e , a b o v e all, that B r a n d e i s set out to a d d r e s s . As
he saw it, A m e r i c a n J e w s lacked s o m e t h i n g i m p o r t a n t that other
A m e r i c a n s p o s s e s s e d : a national p a s t . O t h e r s could point to an
ancestral h o m e l a n d a n d take p r i d e in it a n d in t h e m s e l v e s . B r a n d e i s
especially a d m i r e d I r i s h - A m e r i c a n s in this respect a n d for manifesting
their opposition to continued British rule in I r e l a n d .
A r g u i n g that this kind of political concern and involvement is
* Oscar Straus, Secretary of Commerce and L a b o r from 1906 to 1909.
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NEW W O R L D S AND P R O M I S E D L A N D S
entirely consistent with A m e r i c a n p a t r i o t i s m , a n d indeed enhances
it, he p r o c l a i m e d that "Every I r i s h - A m e r i c a n who contributed
towards a d v a n c i n g h o m e rule was a better m a n and a better A m e r i c a n
for the sacrifice he m a d e . E v e r y A m e r i c a n J e w who aids in a d v a n c i n g
the J e w i s h settlement in Palestine . . . will likewise be a better m a n
and a better A m e r i c a n for doing s o . "
T h e ethical idealism of B r a n d e i s m a d e a powerful i m p r e s s i o n on
A r t h u r Balfour when the B r i t i s h F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y visited the U n i t e d
S t a t e s in 1917 and d i s c u s s e d the future of Palestine. In t u r n , the
Balfour Declaration vindicated the a r g u m e n t s that B r a n d e i s had u s e d
in his a p p e a l s to the A m e r i c a n J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y . It s h o w e d that
Z i o n i s m w a s in h a r m o n y with patriotism in wartime b e c a u s e a J e w i s h
Palestine was an Allied war goal. S o o n afterward it also b e c a m e an
officially s u p p o r t e d A m e r i c a n goal. On the occasion of the J e w i s h
N e w Y e a r in S e p t e m b e r 1918, President Wilson e n d o r s e d the principles of the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n in a letter of holiday greetings to the
American Jewish community.
5 2
53
Whether b e c a u s e of the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n or b e c a u s e of Brandeis's
effective a n d professional leadership, s u p p o r t for Z i o n i s m within the
J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y grew dramatically. In 1919 m e m b e r s h i p of the
Zionist F e d e r a t i o n grew to m o r e than 175,000, t h o u g h Zionist s u p porters r e m a i n e d a minority g r o u p within A m e r i c a n J e w r y and still
encountered fierce o p p o s i t i o n from the richer a n d m o r e established
J e w s — o p p o s i t i o n that was not really o v e r c o m e until the 1940s. B u t
B r a n d e i s h a d m a d e A m e r i c a n Z i o n i s m into a substantial organization
along the lines pioneered by I r i s h - A m e r i c a n s who s u p p o r t e d indep e n d e n c e for I r e l a n d ; and the B a l f o u r Declaration h a d helped him to
do s o — e v e n though the F o r e i g n Office had issued the declaration in
part b e c a u s e they s u p p o s e d s u c h a force was already in existence a n d
needed to be a p p e a s e d .
VI
A m e a s u r e of how far British war g o a l s had m o v e d in the year since
L l o y d G e o r g e replaced A s q u i t h i s p r o v i d e d b y L e o A m e r y ' s reflections in his diary at the end of 1917. L o o k i n g back a n d evaluating
what he had been able to a c c o m p l i s h d u r i n g the year, he wrote that
one of his m a i n achievements in dealing with British g o v e r n m e n t
colleagues had been "all the work on Peace terms which gradually
drove into their heads the i m p o r t a n c e of E a s t Africa, Palestine, a n d
M e s o p o t a m i a a n d the I m p e r i a l outlook g e n e r a l l y . "
As A m e r y indicated, Britain's m a i n objectives by now were not in
E u r o p e . T h e destruction wrought in the first three years of the war
m a d e a meaningful victory in E u r o p e i m p o s s i b l e . T h e rival warring
54
THE PROMISED
301
LAND
E u r o p e a n coalitions were r u i n e d . It was not feasible to look for an
annexation or acquisition in E u r o p e to m a k e up for what had been
lost. E v e n the destruction of G e r m a n y would not meet Britain's
needs. In a w a r t i m e s p e e c h S m u t s pointed out that G e r m a n y had to
remain a substantial power in order to u p h o l d the E u r o p e a n balance
of power, which it was in Britain's vital interest to m a i n t a i n .
It was an o p e n q u e s t i o n as to whether the Britain that sailed onto
the world ocean a n d a r o u n d the g l o b e u n d e r S i r F r a n c i s D r a k e had
perished forever with the generation of 1914 on the western front. If
that Britain c o u l d be revived, it would have to be t h r o u g h imperial
e x p a n s i o n , partly in Africa b u t principally in the M i d d l e E a s t — t h a t
was the direction in which the P r i m e Minister and the Milner circle
were looking.
s s
T h i s shift in outlook b r o u g h t the O t t o m a n war, which h a d b e g u n
as an accidental irrelevance, f r o m the periphery to the very center of
the P r i m e Minister's world policy. F r o m the beginning he had said
that the G r e a t War c o u l d be won there. N o w he was saying that his
postwar objectives could be won there too. With his political instinct,
he felt that it was an area in which he c o u l d win tangible r e w a r d s for
his c o u n t r y m e n , a n d with his strategic vision he s a w — a s did Milner,
A m e r y , S m u t s , K e r r , a n d O r m s b y - G o r e — t h a t , b y s u p p l y i n g the
m i s s i n g section of the line that led from C a p e T o w n to I n d i a and on
to A u s t r a l i a a n d N e w Z e a l a n d , it offered a new lease on Britain's
e m p i r e in Africa, Asia, a n d the Pacific. Where the A s q u i t h C a b i n e t
eventually c a m e to see h e g e m o n y over portions of the M i d d l e E a s t as
something that Britain merely wanted, the L l o y d G e o r g e g o v e r n m e n t
c a m e to see it as territory that Britain needed. .
PART VII
INVADING THE
MIDDLE EAST
35
J E R U S A L E M FOR CHRISTMAS
i
At the end of 1916, when D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e took office as P r i m e
Minister, British fortunes in the E a s t took a turn for the better. T h e
b l u n d e r i n g incompetence of the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a in c o n d u c t i n g
the M e s o p o t a m i a n c a m p a i g n — t h e a d v a n c e on B a g h d a d late in 1915
that e n d e d in the s p r i n g of 1916 in the defeat a n d s u r r e n d e r of the
British I n d i a n A r m y a t K u t e l - A m a r a — h a d shocked L o n d o n into
m a k i n g a clean sweep at the t o p . T h u s a new chief of the expeditionary a r m y , w h o u n d e r s t o o d its logistical r e q u i r e m e n t s , r e - o p e n e d the
c a m p a i g n u n d e r a new S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a , a new Viceroy,
and a new c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f of the I n d i a n A r m y . M a j o r - G e n e r a l
Stanley M a u d e led his A n g l o - I n d i a n A r m y of the T i g r i s forward into
the M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces in D e c e m b e r 1916, a n d in a methodical
c a m p a i g n c a p t u r e d B a g h d a d on 11 M a r c h 1917.
A l t h o u g h it had never been clear as to what p u r p o s e the B a g h d a d
c a m p a i g n was meant to serve in the overall strategy of the world war,
the c a p t u r e of the ancient capital, g l a m o r o u s f r o m its association
with the Arabian Nights, c a u g h t the imagination of the new P r i m e
Minister. It b r o u g h t h i m cheer at a time when it w a s b a d l y n e e d e d ,
a n d inspired h i m to a i m at J e r u s a l e m for Britain's next great t r i u m p h .
T h e s u c c e s s e s of the A r m y of the T i g r i s raised the question of
what was to be d o n e with the O t t o m a n provinces that it had occupied. T h e G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a , although wary of c o m m i t t i n g itself,
had envisaged all along that the M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces of B a s r a
and B a g h d a d w o u l d fall within its s p h e r e if they were detached from
the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T o S i r M a r k S y k e s a n d his A r a b B u r e a u
friends, the notion that s u c h a r e a s s h o u l d be administered in what
they r e g a r d e d as India's paternalistic way was a b h o r r e n t . In a m e m o r a n d u m written in 1916, S y k e s w a r n e d the C a b i n e t that "if you
work f r o m I n d i a you have all the old traditions of black a n d white,
and you can not r u n the A r a b s on black a n d white lines."
1
T o m a r k the c a p t u r e o f B a g h d a d , S i r Percy C o x , chief political
305
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INVADING THE MIDDLE EAST
officer of G e n e r a l M a u d e ' s e x p e d i t i o n a r y force, drafted a proclamation to the p o p u l a c e that essentially limited itself to calling for
cooperation with the provisional B r i t i s h - I n d i a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; but
L o n d o n o r d e r e d h i m not to issue it. S e v e r a l drafts were written in
L o n d o n , a n d after d i s c u s s i o n the War C a b i n e t chose one written by
S i r M a r k S y k e s as a b a s i s for the text that was finally a p p r o v e d . T h e
p r o c l a m a t i o n invited the A r a b s ' l e a d e r s — t h o u g h it was unclear who
they were to b e — t o participate in the g o v e r n m e n t in collaboration
with the British authorities. It s p o k e — a s was S y k e s ' s wont—in highflown p h r a s e s of liberation a n d f r e e d o m , of p a s t glory a n d future
g r e a t n e s s , a n d e x p r e s s e d the h o p e that the A r a b i c peoples m i g h t find
unity north, s o u t h , east, a n d west. It pointed, however vaguely,
toward an A r a b M i d d l e E a s t e r n confederation u n d e r the leadership
o f K i n g H u s s e i n — a S u n n i M o s l e m , although most o f the inhabitants
of the provinces of B a s r a a n d B a g h d a d were Shi'ite, a n d the differences between S u n n i s and Shi'ites were p r o f o u n d a n d m o r e than a
t h o u s a n d years old.
G e n e r a l M a u d e o b j e c t e d to the S y k e s draft. As a military m a n , he
d e e m e d it essential to install a British administration to maintain
security while the war c o n t i n u e d . M o r e o v e r , he o b s e r v e d that in
offering a m e a s u r e of self-government to the A r a b s of B a g h d a d , the
p r o c l a m a t i o n took no note of the fact t h a t — a c c o r d i n g to h i m — a
majority of the inhabitants of the city were not A r a b s b u t J e w s . *
T h e S y k e s draft nonetheless was i m p o s e d o n G e n e r a l M a u d e a n d
S i r Percy C o x b y L o n d o n , a n d c a u s e d w i d e s p r e a d confusion. A p p a r ently intended to assert that the o c c u p y i n g forces of British I n d i a
were not g o i n g to rule the p r o v i n c e s of M e s o p o t a m i a , the proclam a t i o n did not m a k e clear who w a s g o i n g to rule in their p l a c e .
On 16 M a r c h 1917 the War C a b i n e t created a M e s o p o t a m i a n
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n C o m m i t t e e u n d e r the c h a i r m a n s h i p o f L o r d C u r z o n
to d e t e r m i n e what form of g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d be installed in the
c a p t u r e d p r o v i n c e s . T h e c o m m i t t e e d e c i d e d that the p r o v i n c e of
B a s r a s h o u l d b e c o m e B r i t i s h — n o t B r i t i s h - I n d i a n — w h i l e the province
of B a g h d a d s h o u l d join or s h o u l d b e c o m e an A r a b political entity
subject to a British p r o t e c t o r a t e . M e a n w h i l e I n d i a n personnel s h o u l d
b e w i t h d r a w n f r o m the o c c u p i e d p r o v i n c e s .
G e n e r a l M a u d e had cabled to his s u p e r i o r s that "local conditions
Whether or not they constituted a majority in the city—and the then-current
Encyclopaedia Britannica indicated that they did not—the Jews were economically
preponderant. Baghdad, along with Jerusalem, was one of the two great Jewish
cities of Asia, and a thousand years before had become the seat of the exilarch—the
head of the Jewish religion in the eastern diaspora— and thus the capital of oriental
Judaism. Jews in large numbers had lived in the Mesopotamian provinces since the
time of the Babylonian captivity—about 600 B C — a n d thus were settled in the
country a thousand years before the coming of the Arabs in AD 634.
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do not permit of e m p l o y i n g in r e s p o n s i b l e positions any b u t British
officers c o m p e t e n t to deal with Military authorities a n d with p e o p l e
of the country. Before any truly A r a b f a c a d e can be a p p l i e d to edifice
it s e e m s essential that foundation of law a n d order s h o u l d be well
a n d truly l a i d . " S i r Percy C o x raised the s a m e issues in a different
way when he asked w h o the A r a b leader of B a g h d a d was g o i n g to b e .
It was evident that L o n d o n either was not aware of, or h a d given
no thought to, the p o p u l a t i o n m i x of the M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces.
T h e antipathy between the minority of M o s l e m s who were S u n n i s
a n d the majority who were Shi'ites, the rivalries of tribes and clans,
the historic and g e o g r a p h i c divisions of the provinces, a n d the c o m mercial p r e d o m i n a n c e of the J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y in the city of B a g h d a d
m a d e it difficult to achieve a single unified g o v e r n m e n t that was at
the s a m e time representative, effective, a n d widely s u p p o r t e d .
2
C o x raised other i m m e d i a t e a n d practical issues that obviously had
not been thought t h r o u g h in L o n d o n . T h e laborers a n d other nonc o m b a t a n t s u p p o r t g r o u p s of the A r m y of the T i g r i s were I n d i a n ; if
the C a b i n e t were serious in o r d e r i n g the I n d i a n s out of the
M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces, who would take their place? M o r e o v e r ,
u n d e r T u r k e y , the s y s t e m of law c o u r t s in the provinces had operated u n d e r , a n d with a right of appeal to, the high court in
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , while u n d e r G e n e r a l M a u d e the court s y s t e m of
I n d i a offered similar r i g h t s ; b u t if the connection with I n d i a were to
be broken, what would h a p p e n to the administration of justice?
T h e M e s o p o t a m i a n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n C o m m i t t e e had n o ready replies, for the O t t o m a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of M e s o p o t a m i a h a d been
driven out, and no b o d y of experienced officials other than those of
British I n d i a existed in the provinces to replace it. T h e war continued, a n d o r d e r s h a d to be given a n d administrative decisions taken
daily. Public facilities a n d utilities had to be m a n a g e d . Who was to
do it?
L o n d o n was driven to reconsider, a n d to accept the administration
of the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a so long as it w a s agreed that it s h o u l d
not be p e r m a n e n t . G e n e r a l M a u d e , in whose n a m e the S y k e s p r o c lamation h a d been i s s u e d , was p u t in the position of p r e a c h i n g selfrule while d i s c o u r a g i n g its practice. T h e c o m p r o m i s e f o r m u l a at
which the British had arrived might have been expressly d e s i g n e d to
arouse dissatisfaction a n d u n r e s t : h a v i n g volunteered what s o u n d e d
like a p l e d g e of independence to an area that h a d not asked for it, the
military and civil authorities of the o c c u p y i n g power then p r o c e e d e d
to withhold it.
T h e M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces were the first t o b e c a p t u r e d f r o m
the O t t o m a n E m p i r e by Britain d u r i n g the war. Whitehall's failure to
think through in practical detail how to fulfill the p r o m i s e s g r a t u i tously m a d e to a section of the local inhabitants was revealing, a n d
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INVADING THE MIDDLE EAST
b o d e d ill for the provinces that were the next to be i n v a d e d :
Palestine, S y r i a , and L e b a n o n . I t s h o w e d that S i r M a r k S y k e s a n d
his colleagues h a d a d o p t e d policies for the M i d d l e E a s t without first
considering whether in existing conditions they could feasibly be
i m p l e m e n t e d , a n d , if s o , whether British officers on the spot would
actually allow t h e m to be i m p l e m e n t e d .
It was an inauspicious b e g i n n i n g a n d s u g g e s t e d the extent to
which the British g o v e r n m e n t did not know what it was getting into
when it d e c i d e d to s u p e r s e d e the O t t o m a n E m p i r e in A s i a . If there
was this m u c h m u d d l e when British India o c c u p i e d n e a r b y
M e s o p o t a m i a , it was reasonable to s u p p o s e there w o u l d be even
m o r e m u d d l e when British E g y p t m a r c h e d on an area of s u c h c o m p l e x
international interests as Palestine.
II
T h e new c o m m a n d i n g officer sent out t o E g y p t w a s G e n e r a l Sir
E d m u n d Allenby, a cavalry officer who h a d served a n d c o m m a n d e d
with distinction in F r a n c e . He w a s c h o s e n in J u n e 1917, after S m u t s
h a d definitely decided that he would not accept the a p p o i n t m e n t .
Allenby's c o m m i s s i o n from the P r i m e Minister was to invade a n d
o c c u p y Palestine a n d to take J e r u s a l e m before C h r i s t m a s .
Allenby b r o u g h t drive a n d discipline to the E g y p t i a n E x p e d i t i o n a r y
F o r c e , a n d a new p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m . As head of Military Intelligence
he chose Colonel R i c h a r d M e i n e r t z h a g e n , who had distinguished
himself in a similar capacity with S m u t s in E a s t Africa.
Meinertzhagen chose W y n d h a m D e e d e s , the expert on O t t o m a n
affairs, to serve u n d e r him in c h a r g e of the political section of the
division.
M e i n e r t z h a g e n took c h a r g e of e s p i o n a g e operations b e h i n d e n e m y
l i n e s — o p e r a t i o n s m e a n t to p a v e the way for Allenby to invade
Palestine. T h o u g h he had been strongly anti-Jewish, M e i n e r t z h a g e n
was m o v e d to c h a n g e his m i n d by A a r o n A a r o n s o h n , w h o s e s p y
network in J e w i s h Palestine he r e g a r d e d as invaluable. B u t A a r o n s o h n
paid a high price for winning the respect a n d friendship of British
Military Intelligence: his s p y ring e x p o s e d the J e w i s h settlers in
Palestine to p o s s i b l e T u r k i s h r e p r i s a l s — a t the worst of t i m e s , for the
local O t t o m a n administration was inclined to strike out against the
J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y in any event. In the s p r i n g of 1917, on the feast
of Passover, D j e m a l expelled the J e w s a n d A r a b s of J a f f a ; it was not
clear where he meant t h e m to g o , although he s p o k e vaguely of the
S y r i a n hinterland. T h e plight of the refugees, without m e a n s or
s u p p l i e s , evoked m e m o r i e s of the A r m e n i a n s . S o o n afterward D j e m a l
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indicated that he meant to d e p o r t the civil population of J e r u s a l e m ,
of which the majority was J e w i s h . Only the firm intervention of the
G e r m a n F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y kept the tragedy from o c c u r r i n g .
In these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the Palestinian J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y faced
catastrophe if the extent a n d effectiveness of A a r o n s o h n ' s activities
were u n c o v e r e d — a s eventually they were. Aaron's sister S a r a h a n d a
n u m b e r of her associates were arrested by the T u r k s in O c t o b e r
1917, tortured a n d interrogated. S o m e were h a n g e d . S a r a h A a r o n s o h n ,
after four d a y s of torture, s u c c e e d e d in c o m m i t t i n g s u i c i d e . R e p r i s a l s
against the J e w i s h population m i g h t have followed h a d not the
G e r m a n s and T a l a a t intervened. As it was, only about a third of the
J e w i s h p o p u l a t i o n r e m a i n e d in J e r u s a l e m by the e n d of 1917; m o s t
of the rest h a d died of starvation or d i s e a s e .
Ill
M e i n e r t z h a g e n was i m p r e s s e d by the effectiveness of A a r o n s o h n ' s
J e w s in contributing to the p r e p a r a t i o n s for a British invasion of
Palestine, b u t was less i m p r e s s e d by the effectiveness of Feisal's
Arabs.
T h e British civil authorities i n C a i r o had little contact with T . E .
L a w r e n c e , their liaison with Feisal's A r a b i a n guerrillas: a n d in the
s p r i n g of 1917 he d i s a p p e a r e d into the desert. T h e British military
authorities in C a i r o showed little concern for whatever L a w r e n c e a n d
Feisal might be d o i n g , having given up interest in the A r a b Revolt
the p r e v i o u s year.
L a w r e n c e h a d g o n e off with A u d a a b u T a y i , the fighting chief of
the B e d o u i n tribal confederation of northern A r a b i a , whose adherence
L a w r e n c e h a d s e c u r e d by the p a y m e n t of 10,000 p o u n d s sterling.
T h e i r objective was A q a b a , a sleepy, tiny port at the southern tip of
Palestine, situated at the head of a channel of the R e d S e a so narrow
that the R o y a l N a v y d a r e d not enter it while its shore batteries were
in enemy h a n d s . Its several h u n d r e d O t t o m a n defenders a n d their
g u n positions faced out to sea, so A u d a ' s b a n d planned to steal up
from behind to take A q a b a by a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k . *
It was A u d a who led the expedition, though L a w r e n c e r o d e with
him. With B e d o u i n c u n n i n g , A u d a led his followers from the A r a b i a n
coastline n o r t h w a r d into the desert, where their m o v e m e n t s were lost
from view. When they r e a p p e a r e d in southern Palestine two m o n t h s
later, their c o m i n g was a total s u r p r i s e . On 6 J u l y they o v e r w h e l m e d
* It was probably Lawrence's idea, though Auda and/or Feisal may have thought
of it independently.
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A q a b a ' s small and u n p r e p a r e d T u r k i s h g a r r i s o n . D e s p i t e his two
p u n i s h i n g m o n t h s in the desert, L a w r e n c e immediately set off on an
a r d u o u s a n d d a n g e r o u s trip across a wilderness of enemy-held territories to S u e z to report A u d a ' s c a p t u r e of A q a b a . He astonished
everyone by unexpectedly e m e r g i n g f r o m the Sinai desert, in A r a b
d r e s s , creating a sensation at h e a d q u a r t e r s just after G e n e r a l Allenby
c a m e to take up his new c o m m a n d .
L a w r e n c e p o s s e s s e d m a n y virtues but honesty was not a m o n g
t h e m ; he p a s s e d off his fantasies as the truth. A few m o n t h s before,
he h a d sent a letter to G e n e r a l C l a y t o n that contained an almost
certainly fictitious account of an expedition he claimed to have
undertaken on his o w n . N o w he had real personal exploits to announce a n d to e x a g g e r a t e , as he allowed his listeners to u n d e r s t a n d
that he h a d played the chief role in the A q a b a c a m p a i g n . L a w r e n c e ' s
arrival with the news f r o m A q a b a c o m p l e t e d his nine m o n t h s ' transformation into a military hero. A u d a a b u T a y i , sheikh of the eastern
Howeitat, who had in fact won the victory, did not have a n a m e that
tripped easily off the t o n g u e s of British officers. I n s t e a d they said, as
historians did later, that " L a w r e n c e took A q a b a . "
3
Whoever deserved credit, the c a p t u r e of A q a b a t r a n s f o r m e d the
H e j a z rebellion which h a d hitherto been bottled up in the A r a b i a n
peninsula b y the T u r k i s h g a r r i s o n a t M e d i n a . N o w the Royal N a v y
could transport A r a b i a n t r i b e s m e n to Palestine; a n d t h u s , for the
first time, Hussein's forces could reach a battlefield on which the
B r i t i s h - T u r k i s h war was actually to be fought, for L a w r e n c e pers u a d e d Allenby that A r a b irregulars could assist British forces in the
c o m i n g Palestine and S y r i a c a m p a i g n s .
Feisal still r e m a i n e d at h e a d q u a r t e r s in the H e j a z when Allenby
a p p r o v e d L a w r e n c e ' s plan to transport h i m and a small striking force
of his t r i b e s m e n by sea from the British-held coast of A r a b i a to
A q a b a — a sea voyage of 250 miles. T h e r e they could act as a diversionary force on the right flank of the British a r m y in the c o m i n g
Palestine c a m p a i g n which Allenby p l a n n e d to launch in the a u t u m n .
Feisal accepted the plan, although it meant cutting himself off f r o m
the H e j a z , his father, a n d his b r o t h e r s ; he was deputized as a British
general a n d c a m e u n d e r Allenby's c o m m a n d .
A few m o n t h s earlier, the A r a b B u r e a u had considered the p r o b lems that would arise from any a t t e m p t to employ Feisal's forces in
the Palestine a n d S y r i a c a m p a i g n s . T h e b u r e a u h a d reported t o
Clayton on 16 M a y 1917 that Feisal's B e d o u i n s could not s t a n d up to
regular t r o o p s , and that an additional d i s a d v a n t a g e of e m p l o y i n g
t h e m was that their g o i n g into settled districts w o u l d be u n w e l c o m e
to town dwellers. A c c o r d i n g to the A r a b B u r e a u , the p r o b l e m could
be solved by recruiting S y r i a n deserters from the O t t o m a n a r m y to
serve u n d e r F e i s a l . T h i s w o u l d "change the character of Sherif
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311
Feisal's c a m p a i g n from a series of desultory raids against the railway
to an organized a t t e m p t to free the c o u n t r y . " *
4
IV
In the a u t u m n of 1917 Allenby invaded Palestine. T h e T u r k s and
their G e r m a n c o m m a n d e r s expected h i m to launch his attack on
coastal G a z a , the o b v i o u s gateway to Palestine; but its defenses a n d
defenders were well p r e p a r e d and A l l e n b y merely feinted at it while,
with stealth a n d s p e e d , his m a i n forces s w u n g a r o u n d t h r o u g h the
desert to attack inland at B e e r s h e b a instead. T h e O t t o m a n forces
were taken by s u r p r i s e , a n d fell back in disarray.
O n e reason for the T u r k s ' s u r p r i s e was a r u s e devised a n d executed
by M e i n e r t z h a g e n . On 10 O c t o b e r he r o d e into no man's l a n d ; when
an O t t o m a n cavalry patrol fired at him he pretended to be hit, and
d r o p p e d a blood-stained sack that contained apparently confidential
British d o c u m e n t s indicating that the m a i n attack would be at G a z a .
"Meinertzhagen's device won the b a t t l e , " D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e later
wrote; he was "One of the ablest a n d m o s t successful b r a i n s I had
met in any a r m y . " L l o y d G e o r g e a d d e d that " N e e d l e s s to say he
never rose in the war a b o v e the rank of C o l o n e l . "
6
While Allenby's forces were rolling up the G a z a - t o - B e e r s h e b a line,
Feisal's forces h a r a s s e d the T u r k s on the British right flank. As
liaison officer between the British a n d A r a b officers, first as a m a j o r
and then as a colonel, T. E. L a w r e n c e enjoyed a colorful c a m p a i g n
that later won him great p u b l i c i t y — b u t also m u c h envy.
B r e m o n d , the F r e n c h representative in the H e j a z , later jealously
o b s e r v e d that L a w r e n c e "represented" 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 p o u n d s s t e r l i n g , but
it was m o r e than that: by the end of the war, the A r a b Revolt had
cost Britain m o r e than fifty times that a m o u n t . Whatever the s u m , it
was i m m e n s e in those d a y s — a n d m o r e so by desert B e d o u i n stand a r d s . T h e tribes h a d never known s u c h wealth a s L a w r e n c e b r o u g h t
t h e m . Eventually the wealth t r a n s f o r m e d not merely the face of
7
* British officers put this program into effect when Feisal came to Aqaba, and
served with him to provide professional advice and guidance. Lieutenant-Colonel
Pierce Charles Joyce, stationed at Aqaba, was the senior British officer serving with
Feisal's corps, as O . C . (Officer Commanding) Hejaz operations, reporting to
Colonel Alan Dawnay of Allenby's General Staff. Dawnay at the planning level and
Joyce at the operations level were the principal British officers placed in charge of
the Arab army corps. General Harry Chauvel, commander of the Australian army in
the Palestine and Syria campaigns, later wrote that "Joyce was the organiser of the
only fighting force of any real value in the whole of the Arab Army and I always
thought that he had more to do with the success of the Hejaz operations than any
other British officer."
5
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INVADING THE MIDDLE EAST
tribal allegiances b u t also the a p p e a r a n c e of the y o u n g E n g l i s h m a n
who served as p a y m a s t e r ; his A r a b w a r d r o b e grew to be even m o r e
splendid than Feisal's. N e a r l y half a century later, when asked if he
r e m e m b e r e d L a w r e n c e , a B e d o u i n sheikh replied "He was the m a n
with the g o l d . "
T h e sheer logistics of getting the g o l d safely to L a w r e n c e p o s e d a
p r o b l e m , for not m a n y p e o p l e could be trusted with the p o s s e s s i o n of
it. I n C a i r o , W y n d h a m D e e d e s u s e d t o s p e n d his S a t u r d a y afternoons
personally p a c k i n g gold sovereigns into cartridge cases a n d watching
them b e i n g loaded onto c a m e l s for the journey to L a w r e n c e in the
desert.
8
A p a r t f r o m the tribes, whose role was s p o r a d i c , Feisal's a r m y
consisted of a b o u t 1,000 B e d o u i n s s u p p l e m e n t e d by a b o u t 2 , 5 0 0
O t t o m a n ex-prisoners of war. British expectations that the exprisoners of war w o u l d t r a n s f o r m F e i s a l ' s forces into s o m e t h i n g akin
to a regular army were, at first, a d i s a p p o i n t m e n t . A representative
of the U . S . D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e in C a i r o reported at the end of 1917
that Feisal's a r m y r e m a i n e d "incapable of c o p i n g with disciplined
troops"; and his report u n d o u b t e d l y echoed official British opinion
in C a i r o at the t i m e .
Another d i s a p p o i n t m e n t w a s the p e r f o r m a n c e of L a w r e n c e ' s raiding
party when a s s i g n e d a specific operational task by A l l e n b y : they were
to d y n a m i t e a high-arched viaduct to cut the railroad c o m m u n i c a t i o n s
of the O t t o m a n forces h e a d q u a r t e r e d in J e r u s a l e m . L a w r e n c e a n d his
m e n failed in the task, b u t Allenby, h a v i n g p u s h e d the T u r k i s h right
flank north of J a f f a , then t h r u s t t h r o u g h the J u d a e a n hills, and
c a p t u r e d J e r u s a l e m a n y w a y — e v e n earlier than C h r i s t m a s . T h o u g h
L a w r e n c e bitterly b l a m e d himself for his failure, Allenby did n o t —
a n d s h o w e d it by inviting L a w r e n c e to attend, as staff officer of the
day to G e n e r a l C l a y t o n , the c e r e m o n y of entrance into J e r u s a l e m .
9
V
On 11 D e c e m b e r 1917 G e n e r a l S i r E d m u n d Allenby a n d his officers
entered the H o l y City of J e r u s a l e m at the J a f f a G a t e , on foot. At the
Citadel, Allenby read out a p r o c l a m a t i o n placing the city u n d e r
martial law. T o the F r e n c h representative, Picot, Allenby explained
that the city fell within the military zone, so that authority in the
area was vested solely in the c o m m a n d i n g general. As c o m m a n d i n g
general, Allenby would decide how long the area would r e m a i n
u n d e r an exclusively military a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Only when he d e e m e d
that the military situation p e r m i t t e d him to do s o , said Allenby,
w o u l d he allow civil a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to be instituted. Until then, the
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question of the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t a n d the ultimate disposition
of Palestine would be d e f e r r e d .
T h e liberation of what he called "the m o s t f a m o u s city in the
world" was what the P r i m e Minister h a d wanted for C h r i s t m a s ; with
it, he later wrote, C h r i s t e n d o m had been able "to regain p o s s e s s i o n
o f its s a c r e d s h r i n e s . " T h e c a p t u r e o f B a g h d a d a n d J e r u s a l e m h a d
p r o d u c e d a t r e m e n d o u s psychological effect, he c l a i m e d , but also a
material o n e . " T h e calling of the T u r k i s h bluff was not only the
beginning of the c r a c k i n g - u p of that military i m p o s t e r s h i p which the
incompetence of our war direction h a d p e r m i t t e d to intimidate us for
y e a r s ; it was itself a real contribution to ultimate v i c t o r y . "
10
11
After the c a p t u r e of J e r u s a l e m , Feisal's A r a b forces, u n d e r various
A r a b a n d B r i t i s h officers, s h o w e d their worth. C a m p a i g n i n g in
T r a n s j o r d a n , the raiding parties continued their hit-and-run attacks,
while the r e g u l a r s , trained by J o y c e a n d t r a n s p o r t e d by his colleague
H u b e r t Y o u n g , d i s p r o v e d the contention—frequently a d v a n c e d b y
British intelligence officers in the p a s t — t h a t they could not stand up
to the T u r k i s h a r m y . A significant role was planned for t h e m in the
next p h a s e of the c a m p a i g n by Allenby, who intended t h e m to
s p r e a d d i s o r d e r a m o n g the T u r k s on his right flank.
Allenby w a s now in a position to m a r c h on D a m a s c u s , a n d then on
C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to deliver the knock-out blow to the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ,
but just a t that m o m e n t his h a n d w a s stayed. T h e G e r m a n s were
p r e p a r i n g a n offensive against western E u r o p e , m a d e p o s s i b l e b y
R u s s i a ' s s u r r e n d e r , which allowed L u d e n d o r f f to b r i n g b a c k
G e r m a n y ' s a r m i e s from the eastern front. S u d d e n l y Allenby was
obliged to s e n d b a c k to E u r o p e almost all of his British t r o o p s . On
the first d a y of s p r i n g 1918, G e r m a n t r o o p s launched a s u r p r i s e
attack that s m a s h e d t h r o u g h Allied lines in northern F r a n c e and
threatened to win the war before A m e r i c a n reinforcements could
arrive. It w a s not until the s u m m e r that the fury of L u d e n d o r f f ' s
offensive was s p e n t . Meanwhile Allenby remained in Palestine, rebuilding his forces for the future.
F r o m C h r i s t m a s until s u m m e r ' s e n d , as Allenby awaited a chance
to r e s u m e his offensive, political battle lines were f o r m i n g within the
British g o v e r n m e n t a n d the Allied c a m p as to the ultimate disposition
of the l a n d s c o m p o s i n g the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . M e a n w h i l e E n v e r
P a s h a was starting on a sort of L u d e n d o r f f offensive of his own in
the north, d e s i g n e d to c a p t u r e the T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g l a n d s of the
C z a r i s t E m p i r e — A z e r b a i j a n a n d T u r k e s t a n — a n d p e r h a p s then t o
d e s c e n d on P e r s i a , A f g h a n i s t a n , a n d I n d i a to destroy Britain's eastern
e m p i r e while all of her British t r o o p s were away in E u r o p e .
In retrospect, E n v e r ' s offensive, like L u d e n d o r f f ' s , looks like having
been a last d e s p e r a t e throw of the dice. B u t at the time the O t t o m a n
314
INVADING THE MIDDLE EAST
E m p i r e ' s capabilities a n d intentions were less easy to a s s e s s ; a n d the
O t t o m a n offensive b r o u g h t vast a r e a s of the northern M i d d l e E a s t ,
hitherto uncontested in the war, into the spotlight of world war and
politics.
While E n v e r was attacking north a n d east, Allenby was at last able
to r e s u m e his attack on Enver's forces in the west.
36
T H E ROAD TO DAMASCUS
i
Between C h r i s t m a s of 1917 a n d the s u m m e r of 1918, Allenby laid
the foundation for r e s u m i n g his c a m p a i g n against the T u r k s . In
J a n u a r y a n d F e b r u a r y h e restored a n d extended J e r u s a l e m ' s railway
connections to the coast, so as to relieve his army's d e p e n d e n c e u p o n
pack a n i m a l s a n d ruined r o a d s . He r a i d e d enemy forces to keep t h e m
off balance. M e a n w h i l e he trained his raw Indian t r o o p s for the
coming campaign.
D a m a s c u s was the next objective on his line of m a r c h . E v e n m o r e
than B a g h d a d a n d J e r u s a l e m , it was an important city for all historical ages. Believed to be the oldest continuously inhabited u r b a n
center in the world, its origins were lost in the mists of time.
D a m a s c u s was a flourishing oasis town before there were J e w s or
Arabs, Moslems or Christians, Englishmen or G e r m a n s . T h e capture
of D a m a s c u s w o u l d symbolically c o m p l e t e not merely the British
occupation of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g O t t o m a n E m p i r e , b u t also a s s u r e
Britain's place in the line of legitimate succession from the ancient
world c o n q u e r o r s who had sealed their t r i u m p h s by achieving m a s t e r y
of the oases of S y r i a .
Britain c l a i m e d to be s o m e t h i n g other than a traditional c o n q u e r o r ,
for she was acting on behalf of an array of associated p o w e r s and
c a u s e s . Allenby w a s an Allied c o m m a n d e r , a n d his a r m i e s were
p r e p a r e d t o a d v a n c e under m a n y f l a g s . A m o n g their b a n n e r s w a s one
designed b y S i r M a r k S y k e s for H u s s e i n a n d the A r a b c a u s e . Its
c o l o r s — b l a c k , white, g r e e n , a n d r e d — w e r e meant to s y m b o l i z e the
past glory of M o s l e m A r a b e m p i r e s a n d to s u g g e s t that H u s s e i n w a s
their c o n t e m p o r a r y c h a m p i o n . H u s s e i n ' s only modification of the
design was to c h a n g e the hue of the r e d . S y k e s h a d o r d e r e d flags to
be m a d e up by the British military s u p p l y offices in E g y p t , a n d then
had them delivered to the H e j a z forces.
1
T h e B r i t i s h - d e s i g n e d , B r i t i s h - p r o d u c e d f l a g o f A r a b nationalism
signaled a critical issue as Allenby's a r m i e s p r e p a r e d to m a r c h on
315
316
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THE MIDDLE EAST
D a m a s c u s : the extent to which the particular British officials who
mattered m o s t in s h a p i n g M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy were sincere or
cynical in their espousal of the v a r i o u s causes to which they had
s u p p o s e d l y been converted along the way. S i r M a r k S y k e s , who
before 1914 had a d m i r e d the T u r k s as a ruling p e o p l e , had b e c o m e
converted d u r i n g the war to the c a u s e of liberating the subject
peoples from O t t o m a n tyranny. An o u t s p o k e n a n t i - S e m i t e , he had
c o m e to e x p r e s s his concern for the J e w s , as did M e i n e r t z h a g e n , also
an avowed a n t i - S e m i t e . Colonial officials s u c h as S t o r r s and Clayton,
who had always maintained that A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g natives were inc a p a b l e of self-government, a p p e a r e d to s u p p o r t S y k e s as he hailed
the renaissance of A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e . N o t all of these conversions
were genuine.
At one end of the s p e c t r u m w a s S y k e s , who believed in honoring
the pledges of which, in large part, he was the author. At the other
end were operational officers who d e p l o r e d the p l e d g e s , a n d at times
d e p r e c a t e d the c a u s e s in whose n a m e s they had been m a d e . At the
beginning of 1918 S y k e s , in L o n d o n , m o v e d into a F o r e i g n Office
position in charge of the politics of the O t t o m a n theater of war.
T h o s e in charge of the politics of the O t t o m a n theater of war in the
field—Clayton in Palestine, Wingate in E g y p t , a n d the G o v e r n m e n t
of I n d i a in B a g h d a d — w e r e skeptical of the politics of idealism that
S y k e s had c o m e to e s p o u s e , t h o u g h they did not tell h i m so openly.
Beneath the surface civility of British g o v e r n m e n t interchanges in
1918 there ran a hidden line on which the F o r e i g n Office a n d officers
in the field pulled in o p p o s i t e directions. B a g h d a d , J e r u s a l e m , a n d ,
b e y o n d Allied lines, D a m a s c u s , awaited word of their eventual fate,
unaware that a tug- of war within the British b u r e a u c r a c y m i g h t
decide it.
II
B r i g a d i e r G e n e r a l G i l b e r t C l a y t o n s e r v e d as chief political officer to
G e n e r a l Allenby, b u t r e m a i n e d the political alter ego of S i r R e g i n a l d
Wingate, the British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in C a i r o . He thus occupied
a c o m m a n d i n g position in d e t e r m i n i n g the politics of both E g y p t a n d
the S u d a n , as well as those of the a r m y of occupation in Palestine.
C l a y t o n was a career a r m y officer whose professional caution often
kept h i m f r o m e x p r e s s i n g his views freely when they contradicted
those of his s u p e r i o r s . He therefore e x p r e s s e d his views candidly to
Wingate, with w h o m he a g r e e d , b u t g u a r d e d l y to S y k e s , with w h o m
he did not.
C l a y t o n a n d S t o r r s e n v i s a g e d a n A r a b k i n g d o m o r confederation
g u i d e d by the British in a M i d d l e E a s t in which there was no r o o m
T H E ROAD TO DAMASCUS
317
for F r a n c e (except p e r h a p s in L e b a n o n ) . C l a y t o n denied that he was
a n t i - F r e n c h ; it was not, he e x p l a i n e d , as though he wanted to
e x c l u d e the F r e n c h from S y r i a . It w a s the fault of the F r e n c h
t h e m s e l v e s : they were detested by the S y r i a n s a n d , if given a chance
to rule S y r i a , w o u l d b u n g l e it. C l a y t o n s a i d he would not connive at
b r i n g i n g a b o u t that result; it w a s s i m p l y that he w a s p r e d i c t i n g it.
"You need not be afraid of any F a s h o d a - i s m on my p a r t , " he wrote
to S y k e s on 20 A u g u s t 1 9 1 7 . It w a s rather that he feared Britain
w o u l d be b l a m e d for F r a n c e ' s failure, a n d told S y k e s that the important thing w a s to establish a record s h o w i n g that it w a s not
Britain's fault.
2
T h o u g h d e n y i n g a n t i - F r e n c h bias, h e d i d admit h a v i n g reservations
about Britain's other M i d d l e E a s t e r n allies. E v e n by the s t a n d a r d s of
the time, C l a y t o n and his colleague, W i n g a t e , were strongly d i s p o s e d
to be a n t i - J e w i s h . Wingate h a d b l a m e d J e w s for inciting the o u t b r e a k
of the O t t o m a n war. In 1916 C l a y t o n r e p o r t e d to W i n g a t e that J e w s
were b e h i n d the m o v e m e n t to m a k e p e a c e with the O t t o m a n E m p i r e
as well.
B u t when the issue of a c o m p r o m i s e p e a c e with T u r k e y again
c a m e to the fore in 1917, Clayton a r g u e d that Britain h a d no moral
right to negotiate b e c a u s e "We are c o m m i t t e d to the s u p p o r t of
A r a b s , S y r i a n s , J e w s , and A r m e n i a n s " and therefore h a d t o p r e s s
forward to c o m p l e t e v i c t o r y . At the s a m e time, he o p p o s e d entering
into just s u c h c o m m i t m e n t s , including the c o m m i t m e n t to Z i o n i s m .
As the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n w a s b e i n g d r a f t e d , he wrote to S y k e s that
it w o u l d be b e s t to keep A a r o n A a r o n s o h n a n d the J e w s "in play"
without m a k i n g any statement of B r i t i s h i n t e n t i o n s . Politics, he
wrote, tended to distract J e w s a n d A r a b s from the war effort. By
nature c a u t i o u s , he saw no need in any event to m a k e p l e d g e s in
advance.
4
5
A m o n t h after the i s s u a n c e of the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n , Clayton
wrote to S y k e s s u g g e s t i n g that it might have been a m i s t a k e .
I am not fully aware of the weight which Zionists carry, especially in A m e r i c a a n d R u s s i a , a n d of the c o n s e q u e n t necessity
of giving t h e m everything for which they may ask, b u t I m u s t
* In the summer of 1916, when the Tory leader Lord Lansdowne privately
argued in favor of a compromise peace, Clayton was in London; and on returning to
Cairo wrote Wingate that "One impression I gained which confirmed what I have
always thought, and which I know you take an interest in, was the widespread
influence of the Jews. It is everywhere and always on the 'moderation' tack. The
Jews do not want to see anyone 'downed'. There are English Jews, French Jews,
German Jews, Austrian Jews & Salonika Jews—but all are J E W S .. . You hear
peace talk and generally somewhere behind is the Jew. You hear pro-Turk talk and
desires for a separate peace with Turkey—again the Jew (the mainspring of the
C . U . P . ) [original emphasis]."
3
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INVADING THE MIDDLE
EAST
point out that, by p u s h i n g them as hard as we a p p e a r to be
doing, we are risking the possibility of A r a b unity b e c o m i n g
s o m e t h i n g like an a c c o m p l i s h e d fact a n d b e i n g ranged against
us.
6
Nonetheless, Clayton was not p r o - A r a b , in the sense of favoring
A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e . On the contrary, early in 1917 he and Wingate
p r o p o s e d to abolish even the nominal independence of E g y p t and to
move toward outright annexation-—a j u d g m e n t which the F o r e i g n
Office successfully o p p o s e d . Writing to S y k e s at the time, in s u p p o r t
of his own p r o p o s a l a n d against the officials in L o n d o n who had
blocked it, Clayton claimed that
It is s t r o n g a n d I know d e a d against their policy, b u t , m a r k my
w o r d s , I know I am right. All this c l a p t r a p about S u l t a n s & self
g o v e r n m e n t for E g y p t is rot. T h e y are not nearly ready for it
and if you have a Palace, every ounce of power a n d self government which you think you are giving to the People will go
straight into the h a n d s of the S u l t a n & his minister to be u s e d
against you. Beautiful theories are all very nice, b u t hard facts
remain.
7
A l t h o u g h Clayton had been the first to make m u c h of the A r a b
secret societies, even before the outbreak of the O t t o m a n war, he
consistently ignored what they told h i m : they did not want to be
ruled by C h r i s t i a n s or E u r o p e a n s — n o t even the British. A reminder
of. this c a m e in early 1918 in the diplomatic p o u c h from M a d r i d ,
where the British a m b a s s a d o r had seen Aziz a l - M a s r i , the secret
society leader, and reported receiving a p r o p o s a l from him to organize
the overthrow of the E n v e r - T a l a a t government in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e .
T h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e would then b e reorganized along federal lines,
offering local a u t o n o m y to A r a b s a n d others, a n d reconciling the
reorganized e m p i r e with the Allied P o w e r s . A l - M a s r i had often said
m u c h the s a m e thing to Clayton in C a i r o at the beginning of the war,
b u t it did not s e e m to register on Clayton that it meant that those for
w h o m a l - M a s r i s p o k e , t h o u g h willing to be ruled by the T u r k i s h
Porte, refused to be ruled by the British R e s i d e n c y . What C l a y t o n
was p r o p o s i n g — a British protectorate for the A r a b M i d d l e E a s t — w a s
what a l - M a s r i indicated he would never accept.
8
T h u s Clayton, the officer who a d v i s e d Allenby a b o u t the policies
t o b e p u r s u e d i n occupied Palestine, T r a n s j o r d a n , L e b a n o n , a n d
S y r i a , t h o u g h he claimed he w a s not an enemy of the F r e n c h , a n d
insisted he was a friend of both the Zionists a n d the A r a b s , in
practice o p p o s e d the a m b i t i o n s of all three.
# * *
T H E ROAD TO DAMASCUS
319
III
S i r M a r k S y k e s was a novice in g o v e r n m e n t — i n 1917 he h a d held
executive office for only two y e a r s — a n d was a mercurial personality
who remained subject to s u d d e n e n t h u s i a s m s . As r e m a r k e d earlier,
he was q u i c k to take up a c a u s e or to p u t it d o w n . B u t t h o u g h
inconsistent, he was not d i s h o n e s t : he did not d i s s e m b l e . H a v i n g
converted f r o m a n t i - A r a b , a n t i - J e w , a n t i - A r m e n i a n to p r o - A r a b , proJ e w , p r o - A r m e n i a n , he knew no way b u t one to keep faith with his
new friends—with a whole heart.
S y k e s , who believed in keeping the p r o m i s e s he h a d m a d e to
A r a b s , J e w s , A r m e n i a n s , and F r e n c h m e n , continued to labor in
1917—18 to keep his d i s p a r a t e coalition together. C h a i m W e i z m a n n
d e s c r i b e d his o u t s t a n d i n g qualities by writing that "He was not very
consistent or logical in his thinking, b u t he was g e n e r o u s a n d w a r m h e a r t e d . " B e c a u s e of his role in helping to fulfill J e w i s h national
aspirations, it was a p p r o p r i a t e that the door to S y k e s ' s office was
known to the Zionist leader N a h u m S o k o l o w as "the D o o r of H o p e . "
B u t within his own g o v e r n m e n t there were those who objected to
this generosity to foreigners. I n d e e d Sykes's principal p r o b l e m was
to secure the s u p p o r t of his own colleagues, who were p u z z l e d by his
v i e w s — p u z z l e d , b e c a u s e it s e e m s not to have occurred to t h e m that
he was, by their s t a n d a r d s , naive.
9
1 0
Part of Sykes's p r o b l e m was that he d i d not know which of his
colleagues were in favor of what; he did not u n d e r s t a n d that s o m e of
them kept their motives and p l a n s h i d d e n . In confidential conferences
a n d c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with t r u s t e d British g o v e r n m e n t colleagues, he
felt that he c o u l d e x p r e s s his views openly a n d fully, a n d wrongly
a s s u m e d that they felt the s a m e way. Civil servants a n d career a r m y
officers like C l a y t o n were cautious by profession a n d , unlike S y k e s ,
were d i s p o s e d not to show their h a n d s . S y k e s was a H o u s e of
C o m m o n s m a n ; it was his t r a d e to m a k e speeches. By profession he
spoke u p ; while, by profession, m e n like Clayton kept their own
counsel.
R e t u r n i n g to L o n d o n in the s u m m e r of 1917, S y k e s discovered
that p r o - O t t o m a n m e m b e r s of the F o r e i g n Office, in c o m b i n a t i o n
with the former A m e r i c a n a m b a s s a d o r in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , H e n r y
M o r g e n t h a u , h a d a t t e m p t e d in his a b s e n c e to negotiate a s e p a r a t e
peace with T u r k e y — a n a t t e m p t a b o r t e d by the p r o m p t opposition of
C h a i m W e i z m a n n , a m o n g others. S y k e s wrote to Clayton that "On
my arrival I f o u n d that the F o r e i g n Office h a d been carefully destroying everything I h a d d o n e in the past 2 years. S t i m u l a t i n g antiEntente feelings [i.e., a n t i - F r e n c h feelings] a n d p u s h i n g s e p a r a t e
negotiations with T u r k e y ideas. I n d e e d I just arrived in the nick of
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INVADING THE MIDDLE EAST
time. L u c k i l y Z i o n i s m held g o o d . . . " H e was right a b o u t Z i o n i s m ,
b u t wrong a b o u t the F o r e i g n Office, which was not a n t i - F r e n c h ; the
a n t i - F r e n c h organization was Clayton's A r a b B u r e a u , which S y k e s
himself had created.
D a v i d H o g a r t h , director of the A r a b B u r e a u , had been in L o n d o n
in 1917 just before S y k e s r e t u r n e d ; a n d had lobbied against the
Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t , against a F r e n c h role in the M i d d l e E a s t ,
a n d in favor of a British protectorate over a H u s s e i n - l e d A r a b confederation. In private G i l b e r t Clayton's views were almost identical
to those e x p r e s s e d by the m o r e c a n d i d H o g a r t h , b u t S y k e s was
unaware of that. S y k e s wrote to C l a y t o n that " H o g a r t h arrived a n d
played hell by writing an a n t i - F r e n c h a n d anti A g r e e m e n t m e m o r a n d u m . P o u r i n g cold water on the A r a b m o v e m e n t a n d g o i n g
in for . . . a British M e c c a . " S y k e s gleefully r e p o r t e d : "He got
trounced . . . "
R e p e a t i n g that " T h e m a i n thing is never to yield to F a s h o d a - i s m
F r e n c h or B r i t i s h , " S y k e s a n n o u n c e d that he and Picot (referred to
as P) were g o i n g to force both the F r e n c h a n d British g o v e r n m e n t s
to be honest with one another and honest with the A r a b s : " . . . there
is only one p o s s i b l e policy, the E n t e n t e first and last, a n d the A r a b
nation the child of the E n t e n t e . " T h e A r a b s , too, h a d to be taken in
hand and m a d e to see that they s h o u l d not try to split the A n g l o F r e n c h E n t e n t e . "Get your E n g l i s h m e n to stand up to the A r a b s on
this a n d never let t h e m accept flattery of the 'you very g o o d m a n him
very b a d m a n ' kind. I am g o i n g to s l a m into Paris to m a k e the
F r e n c h play up to the A r a b c a u s e as their only hope. C o l o n i a l i s m is
m a d n e s s a n d I believe P and I can p r o v e it to t h e m . " S y k e s did not
s e e m to s u s p e c t that Picot himself r e m a i n e d a colonialist, who saw
Britain as his country's rival in the M i d d l e E a s t , nor did he suspect
that Clayton h o p e d to keep F r a n c e out of the region altogether.
11
Clayton p r o v e d to be quite unwilling even to work with Picot a n d
protested against c a r r y i n g out an a g r e e m e n t — r e a c h e d with the F r e n c h
d u r i n g the A s q u i t h government—-whereby a joint A n g l o - F r e n c h a d ministration would be introduced into the territories in the M i d d l e
E a s t occupied d u r i n g the war. Picot, acting as the F r e n c h representative at Allenby's h e a d q u a r t e r s , asserted that S i r E d w a r d G r e y had
p r o m i s e d it to h i m ; but C l a y t o n wrote to S y k e s that "If this is s o , I
have heard nothing of it, a n d I cannot protest too strongly against
any s u c h unworkable a n d m i s c h i e v o u s a r r a n g e m e n t . " In any event,
General A l l e n b y exercised his authority to p o s t p o n e consideration of
s u c h m a t t e r s until the military situation was d e e m e d suitable by him,
which, in effect, cancelled that particular agreement for the time
being.
12
With respect t o A r a b s , J e w s , a n d A r m e n i a n s , Clayton e x p r e s s e d
his views to S y k e s m o r e g u a r d e d l y . In the week following the publication of the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n , an exuberant S y k e s sent a cypher
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T H E ROAD TO DAMASCUS
cable to an unenthusiastic C l a y t o n i n f o r m i n g him that the Zionist
m o v e m e n t was p r e p a r e d to work on behalf of A r a b s a n d A r m e n i a n s
and that he, S y k e s , was in p r o c e s s of f o r m i n g a joint c o m m i t t e e to
unify the three g r o u p s .
C h a i m W e i z m a n n would represent the
Z i o n i s t s ; J a m e s M a l c o l m , the A r m e n i a n s ; a n d a S y r i a n Christian
a n d a n A r a b M o s l e m w o u l d jointly represent the A r a b s . I t was
important that m o r e A r a b s s h o u l d join, a d d e d S y k e s , for it would
help A r a b s everywhere.
1 3
A few weeks later S y k e s cabled C l a y t o n again, r e p o r t i n g that he
had prevailed on the Zionist leadership to a d o p t a s t r o n g p r o - A r a b
l i n e . He asked Clayton to tell the S y r i a n A r a b g r o u p s in C a i r o that
if the T u r k s a n d G e r m a n s c a p t u r e d Zionist s u p p o r t , it would be b a d
for t h e m as well as everyone else whose h o p e s rode with the Allies.
He thus implied that the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n was i s s u e d in the A r a b
as well as in the British interest. Shortly after cabling C l a y t o n , S y k e s
sent a m e s s a g e to Picot, telling him that A r a b interests were b e i n g
a m p l y s a f e g u a r d e d a n d that J e w s i n Palestine would pay s c r u p u l o u s
attention to A r a b r i g h t s . S y k e s also sent a letter to C l a y t o n telling
him that the Zionist a n d A r m e n i a n leaders were in c o m p l e t e a c c o r d
and that it was important that A r a b leaders s h o u l d also join "the
combine."
14
1 5
16
P o u r i n g cold water, Clayton in reply cabled that "in spite of all
a r g u m e n t s M e c c a dislikes J e w s a n d A r m e n i a n s and wishes t o have
nothing to do with t h e m , while A r a b s of S y r i a and Palestine fear repetition of the story of J a c o b a n d E s a u . In any case an A r a b - J e w i s h A r m e n i a n c o m b i n a t i o n is so foreign to any p r e v i o u s experience and
to existing sentiment that we m u s t p r o c e e d with great c a u t i o n . " He
a d d e d that it w o u l d not be feasible to s e n d an A r a b delegation to
L o n d o n to join the c o m m i t t e e , as S y k e s had a s k e d , b e c a u s e the
A r a b s were too d i v i d e d .
A few d a y s later he wrote to S y k e s in a m o r e conciliatory vein that
"I quite see your a r g u m e n t s r e g a r d i n g an A r a b - J e w - A r m e n i a n c o m bine a n d the a d v a n t a g e s that would a c c r u e if it could be b r o u g h t
off. We will try it, b u t it m u s t be d o n e very cautiously a n d , honestly,
I see no great chance of any real s u c c e s s . It is an a t t e m p t to c h a n g e
in a few weeks the traditional sentiment of centuries." C a u t i o n i n g
especially against the J e w i s h aspect of the c o m b i n e , he a d d e d that
"We have . . . to consider whether the situation d e m a n d s out a n d out
s u p p o r t of Z i o n i s m at the risk of alienating the A r a b s at a critical
moment."
17
18
T h e next day Clayton's closest associate, the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r
in E g y p t , S i r R e g i n a l d Wingate, wrote to Allenby that " M a r k S y k e s
is a bit carried away with 'the e x u b e r a n c e of his own verbosity' in
regard to Z i o n i s m a n d unless he goes a bit slower he m a y quite
unintentionally u p s e t the a p p l e c a r t . However C l a y t o n has written
h i m an excellent letter which, I h o p e , m a y have an a n o d y n e e f f e c t . "
19
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INVADING THE MIDDLE EAST
Nonetheless Clayton held a m e e t i n g with S y r i a n representatives in
C a i r o , as S y k e s had a s k e d , a n d a p p e a r s to have told t h e m , as he had
been instructed, that only if J e w i s h s u p p o r t for the Allied side were
forthcoming would the A r a b c a u s e , which was b o u n d up with that of
the Allies, s t a n d a chance of winning. He told them that J e w s desired
a h o m e in Palestine but had no intention of creating a J e w i s h state
there.
2 0
T h e S y r i a n A r a b s r e s p o n d e d favorably, a n d a n A r a b B u r e a u report
to C l a y t o n q u o t e d a s p o k e s m a n for the S y r i a n c o m m i t t e e as s a y i n g
that its m e m b e r s "fully realized that their best and only policy was to
co-operate with the J e w s on the lines you s u g g e s t e d . He a s s u r e d me
that the S y r i a n s quite u n d e r s t a n d the power and position of the J e w s
and that they now wish to d i s s e m i n a t e p r o p a g a n d a to e m p h a s i z e
S y r i a n - J e w i s h fraternity a n d unity as r e g a r d s P a l e s t i n e . "
21
Clayton reported to S y k e s that he believed J e w s a n d A r a b s were in
fact c o m i n g together. H e also r e p o r t e d that h e h a d instructed T . E .
L a w r e n c e , the British liaison officer with Feisal, to i m p r e s s u p o n
Feisal his need to form an entente with the J e w s .
In a d m i n i s t e r i n g the liberated a r e a s of Palestine, however, British
officials m a d e no a t t e m p t to take a d v a n t a g e of this favorable d i s p o sition. A l t h o u g h the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n was p u b l i s h e d in L o n d o n a
m o n t h before Allenby entered J e r u s a l e m , the British military authorities refused to p u b l i s h it in J e r u s a l e m . T h u s it did not enter into the
policy of the provisional military a d m i n i s t r a t i o n established by Allenby
under R o n a l d S t o r r s , who declined to raise potentially d i s t u r b i n g
issues while the war was b e i n g fought. C a i r o Intelligence told the
F o r e i g n Office that applications by J e w s to proceed to settle in
Palestine s h o u l d be denied until the military situation was resolved
a n d until an organization h a d been created to deal with the various
p r o b l e m s that might b e expected t o a r i s e .
2 2
2 3
T h e r e was an evident tendency on the part of military a d m i n i s tration officials to believe that officials at h o m e in L o n d o n d i d not
appreciate the very real difficulty of reconciling M o s l e m s in Palestine
to the p r o s p e c t of an increase in J e w i s h settlement in the country.
T h e y therefore g a v e the i m p r e s s i o n of b e i n g unwilling to carry the
Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n into effect. S o m e observers noted, too, a tendency to prefer M o s l e m s , who were treated as "natives," to C h r i s t i a n s
and J e w s , w h o m it was m o r e difficult to treat as s u c h . William
O r m s b y - G o r e , one of the three assistant secretaries of the War C a b i net, wrote to his colleague M a r k S y k e s from T e l Aviv in the s u m m e r
of 1918 that the military occupation officers, drawn from service in
E g y p t a n d the S u d a n , were p e r s o n s "whose experience . . . d o e s not
m a k e for a r e a d y realisation of the very wide questions of world
policy which affect Palestine. O n e can't help noticing the ineradicable
tendency of the E n g l i s h m a n w h o has lived in India or the S u d a n to
THE ROAD TO DAMASCUS
323
favour quite unconsciously the M o s l e m both against C h r i s t i a n a n d
J e w . " He a d d e d that " T h e A r a b s in Palestine are, I gather, showing
their old tendency to c o r r u p t m e t h o d s a n d b a c k s h e e s h a n d are end e a v o u r i n g to 'steal a m a r c h ' on the J e w s . "
Clayton forwarded the O r s m b y - G o r e letter to S y k e s with a covering
letter of his own, s a y i n g that he felt it was somewhat m i s l e a d i n g .
Clayton protested that he personally was in favor of Z i o n i s m .
A p p a r e n t l y he h a d c o m e a r o u n d to the view that an agreement
between A r a b s and J e w s c o u l d b e w o r k e d out. H e held n o high
opinion of the local A r a b s a n d he wrote to G e r t r u d e Bell, the author
and traveler in the E a s t who was serving in the British administration
in B a g h d a d , that the "so-called A r a b s of Palestine are not to be
c o m p a r e d with the real A r a b of the D e s e r t or even of other civilised
districts i n S y r i a a n d M e s o p o t a m i a . "
2 4
2 5
26
R o n a l d S t o r r s , who was a p p o i n t e d military governor of J e r u s a l e m ,
wrote to S y k e s in the s u m m e r of 1918 that non-Jewish elements in
the population, having eventually to take "a lower place in the land
which the others are in the e n d absolutely certain to p o s s e s s , the
transaction s h o u l d be effected so far as p o s s i b l e with decency, gentleness, a n d tact, a n d that the o u t g o i n g g a r r i s o n s h o u l d be allowed
something of the h o n o u r s of W a r . " U r g i n g a policy of g o i n g slowly,
he wrote that "It will take m o n t h s , p o s s i b l y y e a r s , of patient work to
show the J e w s that we are not run by the A r a b s , a n d the A r a b s that
we are not b o u g h t by the J e w s . "
2 7
In the s a m e letter, S t o r r s wrote that "it is one thing to see clearly
enough the p r o b a b l e future of this country, a n d another thing to fail
to m a k e allowances for the position of the weaker a n d p r o b a b l y
d i s a p p e a r i n g element. T h e results of the c h a n g e s will be m o r e satisfactory a n d m o r e lasting if they are b r o u g h t a b o u t g r a d u a l l y with
patience, a n d without violent e x p r e s s i o n s of illwill, leaving b e h i n d
them an abiding r a n c o u r . "
28
T h e q u e s t i o n this raised for S y k e s a n d his colleagues in L o n d o n
was whether this policy advocated by the m a n on the s p o t was better
calculated to achieve, or to defeat, their objectives.
IV
In early 1918 S y k e s a n d his colleagues at the F o r e i g n Office took
s t e p s to carry their Palestine policy into effect. On 13 F e b r u a r y the
F o r e i g n Office d i s p a t c h e d a cable to S i r R e g i n a l d Wingate at the
R e s i d e n c y in C a i r o to inform him that a Zionist C o m m i s s i o n h a d
been created a n d was b e i n g sent out to the M i d d l e E a s t . C o m p o s e d
of representatives from British a n d other Zionist m o v e m e n t s , it was
headed by Dr C h a i m Weizmann a n d was to be p l a c e d in the c h a r g e
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INVADING THE MIDDLE EAST
of William O r m s b y - G o r e . Its object w a s to p r e p a r e the way to carry
out the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n .
I n a u g u r a t i n g the work of the Zionist C o m m i s s i o n , A l a n D a w n a y ,
of Allenby's staff, a r r a n g e d for W e i z m a n n to meet Prince Feisal, a n d
wrote to L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l P. C. J o y c e , the senior British officer
with F e i s a l , that " F r o m what I gathered of the Zionist a i m s , in
rather a short conversation, I think there should be no difficulty in
establishing a friendly relationship between t h e m . "
W e i z m a n n was introduced to Prince Feisal and was enthusiastic
a b o u t h i m . Of F e i s a l , W e i z m a n n wrote to his wife that "He is the
first real A r a b nationalist I have met. He is a leader! He's q u i t e
intelligent and a very honest m a n , h a n d s o m e as a p i c t u r e ! He is not
interested in Palestine, but on the other hand he wants D a m a s c u s
a n d the whole of northern S y r i a . . . He is c o n t e m p t u o u s of the
Palestinian A r a b s w h o m h e doesn't even regard a s A r a b s ! "
29
30
3 1
T h i s was in line with what O r m s b y - G o r e told a Zionist m e e t i n g in
L o n d o n s o m e m o n t h s later. A c c o r d i n g to a s u m m a r y of his speech,
he told the Zionist Political C o m m i t t e e that
the true A r a b m o v e m e n t really existed outside Palestine. T h e
m o v e m e n t led by Prince Feisal w a s not unlike the Zionist
m o v e m e n t . It contained real A r a b s who were real m e n . T h e
A r a b s in t r a n s - J o r d a n i a were fine p e o p l e . T h e west of the
J o r d a n the people were not A r a b s , but only A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g .
Zionists should recognise in the A r a b m o v e m e n t , originally
centered in the H e j a z , b u t now m o v i n g north, a fellow m o v e ment with high i d e a l s .
3 2
Feisal's senior British military adviser, L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l J o y c e ,
attended the W e i z m a n n - F e i s a l meeting a n d reported his personal
opinion that Feisal w e l c o m e d the p r o s p e c t of J e w i s h cooperation a n d
in fact r e g a r d e d it as essential to the realization of A r a b a m b i t i o n s .
T h o u g h Feisal w a s u n a b l e to e x p r e s s definite views without receiving
authorization from his father, a c c o r d i n g to J o y c e , he would accept a
J e w i s h Palestine if d o i n g so would influence the Allies to s u p p o r t his
claim to S y r i a . T h e m e e t i n g went well, and p a v e d the way for the
p u b l i c s u p p o r t of Z i o n i s m offered by Feisal at the Peace Conference
the following year.
3 3
In J e r u s a l e m , W e i z m a n n found his M o s l e m audiences less receptive, t h o u g h he a s s u r e d them that Palestine was large e n o u g h to
a c c o m m o d a t e all its c o m m u n i t i e s a n d that J e w i s h settlement would
not be undertaken at the e x p e n s e of M o s l e m s or C h r i s t i a n s . He w a s
* T h i s may have been the first indication that high-ranking British officials were
thinking of restricting Zionism to those sections of Biblical Palestine that lay west of
the Jordan river.
325
THE ROAD TO DAMASCUS
disquieted by the attitude of British administrative officials in
Palestine: when W e i z m a n n u r g e d t h e m to avow their government's
Balfour Declaration policy openly a n d to explain it to the M o s l e m
c o m m u n i t y , R o n a l d S t o r r s a n d his colleagues refused.
In his c o m m e n t s to the F o r e i g n Office, S t o r r s took issue with
Weizmann's contention that it was the b u s i n e s s of the military a d ministration to b r i n g h o m e to the M o s l e m population the s e r i o u s n e s s
of Britain's pro-Zionist intentions. T h a t h a d already been d o n e , he
s a i d , by B a l f o u r in L o n d o n a n d by the world's n e w s p a p e r s . What
was needed was for the Zionist C o m m i s s i o n to i m a g i n e itself in the
position of n o n - J e w i s h inhabitants of the country a n d to recognize
how very m u c h r e a s s u r a n c e they w o u l d need. "Palestine, up to now a
M o s l e m country, has fallen into the h a n d s of a Christian Power
which on the eve of its c o n q u e s t a n n o u n c e s that a considerable
portion of its land is to be h a n d e d over for colonisation p u r p o s e s to a
nowhere very p o p u l a r p e o p l e . " It w a s not lost on the u r b a n e R o n a l d
S t o r r s that he was g o v e r n o r of J e r u s a l e m in line of succession from
Pontius Pilate; a n d as s u c h he w a s h e d his h a n d s of an issue for which
he did not hold himself r e s p o n s i b l e . He insisted to the F o r e i g n
Office, however, that he s p o k e "as a convinced Z i o n i s t . "
34
G i l b e r t C l a y t o n also advocated delay. H i s strategy, of which he
g a v e an indication in early 1918, was not merely to p o s t p o n e the
Zionist issue b u t to link it to the issue of an A r a b S y r i a , as Feisal also
p r o p o s e d t o d o . T o the strongly pro-Zionist L e o A m e r y , C l a y t o n
explained that "the two m o s t i m p o r t a n t points are not to m a k e too
m u c h of a s p l a s h locally with Z i o n i s m until the A r a b s have got a slice
of cake themselves, i.e., D a m a s c u s , a n d to get the F r e n c h to c o m e
out clearly . . . d i s a v o w i n g any ideas of Colonial annexation a n d
e m p h a s i z i n g their adherence to the idea of A r a b a u t o n o m y . "
35
Neither Clayton nor S t o r r s a d d r e s s e d the question of whether, if
they refused to a d m i t in J e r u s a l e m that their g o v e r n m e n t h a d issued
the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n in L o n d o n , A r a b s a n d J e w s in Palestine
w o u l d ever learn to trust the British any m o r e than M o s l e m s in S y r i a
a n d L e b a n o n trusted the F r e n c h . As it was, the Zionist leaders were
given c a u s e to worry that the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n policy p r o c l a i m e d
in L o n d o n might be u n d e r m i n e d in Palestine by C l a y t o n , S t o r r s ,
and other officers on the s p o t .
V
In B a g h d a d a n d B a s r a , not m u c h m o r e than lip service w a s p a i d to
the p r o - A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e policies p r o c l a i m e d by S y k e s a n d the
F o r e i g n Office. S i r Percy C o x was obliged to leave on a lengthy tour
a n d eventually to return to Persia; in his a b s e n c e , his d e p u t y , C a p t a i n
326
INVADING THE MIDDLE EAST
A r n o l d T. Wilson, acted in his place a n d then s u c c e e d e d him as civil
c o m m i s s i o n e r . Wilson, an officer in the Indian A r m y , believed
neither in independence for the provinces he governed nor in a role
for K i n g H u s s e i n of the far-off H e j a z in their affairs.
T h e m o s t f a m o u s author of b o o k s a b o u t A r a b lands of her day,
G e r t r u d e Bell, had c o m e up to B a g h d a d with the A r m y of the T i g r i s
and served as Wilson's assistant. S h e at first employed her great
prestige a n d extensive network of family a n d social friendships to
back up his policy. N o t m u c h of a political thinker, she was given to
e n t h u s i a s m s a n d , at the time, w a s enthusiastic a b o u t Wilson's views.
In F e b r u a r y 1918 she wrote to her old friend C h a r l e s H a r d i n g e ,
P e r m a n e n t U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of the F o r e i g n Office, that "amazing
strides have been m a d e t o w a r d s o r d e r e d government . . . T h e r e ' s n o
important element against u s . . . T h e stronger the hold w e are able
to keep here the better the inhabitants will be pleased. What they
d r e a d is any half m e a s u r e . . . " S h e c o n c l u d e d that no one in B a g h d a d
or B a s r a could conceive of an independent A r a b g o v e r n m e n t .
36
T h i s was a far cry from the proclamation drafted by S i r M a r k
S y k e s on the liberation of B a g h d a d , calling for a renaissance of the
A r a b nation, such as was p r o p o s e d by the E m i r of M e c c a in the
H u s s e i n - M c M a h o n c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , a n d hinting that H u s s e i n would
b e c o m e the leader of the A r a b nation.
Elsewhere, too, Sykes's alliance politics were modified as British
officials m o v e d away f r o m their wartime enthusiasm for the ruler of
M e c c a . While S y k e s continued to c h a m p i o n Hussein's c a u s e , British
officials noted the deterioration of the K i n g ' s position vis-d-vis his
rival, A b d u l Aziz I b n S a u d , lord of the Arabian district of N e j d ,
w h o m I n d i a had backed all along. S y k e s had received a hint of this
deterioration when he visited the H e j a z in the s p r i n g of 1917; H u s s e i n
had been surprisingly conciliatory in agreeing to cooperate with
Britain in M e s o p o t a m i a a n d even with F r a n c e in S y r i a , a d d i n g "but
we do ask that G r e a t Britain will help us with I b n S a u d . " *
3 7
One of the great failures of Kitchener and his colleagues in the intelligence field
had been their ignorance of the spectacular revival of the puritanical Wahhabi sect in
Arabia which had begun under the sponsorship of Ibn Saud, and, in late 1912, gave
birth to a warrior brotherhood: the fierce Ikhwan. Minutes of a Cabinet War
Committee meeting on 16 December 1915, to hear testimony from Sir Mark Sykes
on the Arab question, show Lord Kitchener asking, "Wahabism, does that still
exist?" and Sykes answering, "I think it is a dying fire."
T w o years later—and a full five years after the Wahhabi warrior brotherhood
began to form—Gilbert Clayton for the first time reported to Sykes that "we have
indications of considerable revivalist movement on Wahhabi lines in Central Arabia,
such as has in the past occurred when the prestige of Islam has fallen low. We are
not yet in a position to appreciate the strength of this movement," but conditions
"conduce to fostering it. This question is engaging our serious attention here . . . it
may modify the whole situation considerably.
38
THE ROAD TO DAMASCUS
327
I n J a n u a r y 1918 K i n g H u s s e i n told a n A r a b B u r e a u officer, M a j o r
K i n a h a n C o r n w a l l i s , that he w a s thinking of p r o c l a i m i n g himself
C a l i p h . T h r e e years earlier this h a d b e e n L o r d K i t c h e n e r ' s plan,
p r o m p t e d b y m e m o r a n d a f r o m C l a y t o n and S t o r r s , a n d had b e e n
c h a m p i o n e d by the officers who later f o r m e d the A r a b B u r e a u (see
Chapter 22).
B y J a n u a r y 1918, however, the A r a b B u r e a u , which now held
H u s s e i n in low e s t e e m , had c o m e a r o u n d to the o p p o s i t e view.
Cornwallis, a t t e m p t i n g to d i s c o u r a g e H u s s e i n , pointed out to him
that serious p r o b l e m s would arise if he a t t e m p t e d to a s s u m e the
caliphate. On receipt of Cornwallis's news, the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r ,
S i r R e g i n a l d Wingate, sent off a d i s p a t c h to the F o r e i g n Office
saying that he h o p e d for an o p p o r t u n i t y of "checking p r e m a t u r e or
ill-considered action" b y H u s s e i n .
T h i s was the s a m e G e n e r a l
Wingate who on 17 N o v e m b e r 1915 h a d i n d u c e d an A r a b religious
leader to tell H u s s e i n that he w a s "the right m a n to take over his
rightful
heritage a n d
verify the h o p e s of his
people—the
M o h a m m e d a n s and A r a b s to recover their stolen K h a l i f a t e " and
calling u p o n the H a s h e m i t e leader to establish "the H a s h e m i t e
Arabian Khalifate."
4 0
41
K i t c h e n e r ' s followers found it inconvenient to r e m e m b e r that once
they a n d their chief had e n c o u r a g e d H u s s e i n to claim the c a l i p h a t e ;
erasing it from their m i n d s , they w o u l d later ignore it in their b o o k s
and edit it out of official d o c u m e n t s . In m e m o i r s p u b l i s h e d three
d e c a d e s later, S i r R o n a l d S t o r r s deleted the caliphate section from
K i t c h e n e r ' s historic c a b l e i n 1914 t o H u s s e i n . T . E . L a w r e n c e wrote
that K i t c h e n e r a n d his followers h a d believed in A r a b nationalism
from the b e g i n n i n g — w h e n in fact they did not believe in it at all.
T h e y believed instead in the potency of the caliphate; that H u s s e i n
could c a p t u r e it for t h e m ; a n d that in the E a s t nationalism was
nothing while religion w a s everything.*
I n d e e d , in 1918 politics a n d the desire to rewrite history both
dictated a shift in e m p h a s i s : F e i s a l , not H u s s e i n , b e g a n to e m e r g e as
Cairo's preferred A r a b leader, for F e i s a l s h o w e d a disposition, lacking
in his father, to accept British counsel a n d g u i d a n c e .
By the a u t u m n of 1918, the a r m i e s c o m m a n d e d by H u s s e i n ' s sons
were reckoned by British s o u r c e s to total only a few t h o u s a n d trained
troops. In p u b l i c the British c l a i m e d that vast n u m b e r s of A r a b s h a d
flocked to the s t a n d a r d of the Hejazi p r i n c e s ; in private they h a d a
If their purpose had been to raise a nationalist revolt, they would not have
sought out Hussein, the Turkish-appointed guardian of the Holy Places, who
employed Turkish troops to quell Arab discontent. They would have sought out a
nationalist warlord. That indeed is the way Lawrence later told the story in his book Seven Pillars of Wisdom, portraying Feisal, rather than his father, as such a leader.
328
INVADING THE MIDDLE EAST
different story to tell. Secret British g o v e r n m e n t d o c u m e n t s filed in
1919 a d m i t that " T h e followings q u o t e d d u r i n g the war were grossly
e x a g g e r a t e d . " A report f r o m the British A g e n c y in J e d d a h in 1919
pictured K i n g H u s s e i n as militarily inconsequential: his following
was estimated at only 1,000 regulars, 2 , 5 0 0 irregulars, a n d possibly
several t h o u s a n d m o r e f r o m B e d o u i n tribes, a n d their fighting qualities were rated as "poor." A c c o r d i n g to the report, K i n g H u s s e i n
"indulged in wild d r e a m s of c o n q u e s t , " but the withdrawal of
British s u p p o r t would leave h i m "at the mercy of I b n S a u d a n d the
rising wave of W A H H A B I S M . "
42
43
An A r a b B u r e a u report on the H e j a z revolt in 1918 stated that
" T h e real i m p o r t a n c e of this revolt has only m a d e itself felt in the
c o u r s e of the last few m o n t h s a n d it is s p r e a d i n g from d a y to d a y . At
the s a m e time it m u s t be said that 9 0 % of the Sherif's t r o o p s are
nothing m o r e than r o b b e r s . . . " A c c o r d i n g t o the report, A r a b s rose
up against the T u r k s only when British forces had already arrived, so
that "In a w o r d , the extent of the Sherif's revolt d e p e n d s entirely on
the ability of the British to a d v a n c e . " Colonel Meinertzhagen, the
head of Allenby's intelligence, wrote that "It is safe to say that
L a w r e n c e ' s D e s e r t C a m p a i g n h a d not the slightest effect on the main
theatre west of J o r d a n . "
44
4 5
B u t others d i s a g r e e d . S y k e s , continuing to stand by the alliance
with H u s s e i n a n d believing that F e i s a l a n d his brothers were m a k i n g
a significant contribution to the war effort, a r g u e d that in A r a b i a a n d
elsewhere, by 1918 the H e j a z revolt was o c c u p y i n g the attention of
3 8 , 0 0 0 O t t o m a n t r o o p s . T h e m e m o i r s o f the enemy c o m m a n d e r ,
L i m a n von S a n d e r s , show that in 1918 when his a r m i e s turned to
f l e e , they found themselves painfully h a r a s s e d b y A r a b B e d o u i n s .
T h e tone of G i l b e r t Clayton's m e m o r a n d a show that he believed
Feisal and L a w r e n c e were a c c o m p l i s h i n g important objectives on
Allenby's right flank. Other evidence, too, s u g g e s t s that the A r a b
forces in T r a n s j o r d a n s u c c e e d e d in s p r e a d i n g disorder in T u r k i s h held areas.
4 6
4 7
M i r e d in politics then a n d ever since, the question of how m u c h
Feisal contributed to the Allied s u c c e s s remains u n r e s o l v e d ; at the
time it raised the q u e s t i o n of whether Britain should back H u s s e i n
and Feisal against i n d i g e n o u s S y r i a n A r a b leadership, a n d whether
Britain should s u p p o r t F e i s a l against H u s s e i n .
Within the Sherifian c a m p there were strains, as F e i s a l , physically
cut off f r o m the H e j a z a n d his family, m o v e d into the British orbit.
In cables that the British military authorities secretly intercepted and
read, H u s s e i n c o m p l a i n e d that "they have turned my son against me
to live u n d e r other countries, who is rebellions & dishonest to his
F a t h e r [original e m p h a s i s ] . " H e c o m p l a i n e d that " L i v i n g u n d e r the
4 8
T H E ROAD TO DAMASCUS
329
o r d e r s of a disobedient son a n d a traitor has b u r d e n e d my shoulder
with this m i s e r y . " He threatened that "If F e i s a l still persists in
destroying his g o o d fortune his nation a n d his honour" it would be
necessary to a p p o i n t a war council in his p l a c e . M e a n w h i l e , a c c o r d ing t o A r a b B u r e a u r e p o r t s f r o m C a i r o , S y r i a n s p o k e s m e n indicated
that they w o u l d be willing to accept F e i s a l as their constitutional
m o n a r c h , b u t only in his own right, a n d not if he acted as d e p u t y or
representative o f H u s s e i n .
4 9
5 0
VI
A l t h o u g h British leaders f r o m 1914 o n w a r d h a d p r o f e s s e d faith in
the leadership of H u s s e i n within the A r a b world, in 1917 a n d 1918
they felt driven to reassess the validity of that belief.
As Britain m o v e d to c o m p l e t e her c o n q u e s t of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g
world of the M i d d l e E a s t , British officials b e g a n to worry a b o u t the
local o p p o s i t i o n that they might encounter. Clayton's e n d e a v o r s ,
beginning in 1914, to arrive at an u n d e r s t a n d i n g with separatist
leaders from B a g h d a d and D a m a s c u s h a d f o u n d e r e d on their objection
to being ruled by n o n - M o s l e m s . N o w that D a m a s c u s was on Britain's
line of m a r c h the q u e s t i o n was how D a m a s c e n e s could be w o n over
to the Allied c a u s e a n d to the Allied s c h e m e for the future of the
M i d d l e E a s t . T h a t F e i s a l had a g r e e d t o the Allied p r o g r a m might
carry no weight with t h e m .
In the s u m m e r of 1918 William O r m s b y - G o r e told the Zionist
Political C o m m i t t e e in L o n d o n that " T h e S y r i a n 'Intelligentzia' lawyers a n d t r a d e r s constituted the m o s t difficult a n d thorny p r o b l e m
of the N e a r E a s t . T h e y h a d no civilisation of their own, a n d they had
a b s o r b e d all the vices of the L e v a n t . "
5 1
Sir M a r k S y k e s s e e m s to have started worrying a b o u t the S y r i a n
p r o b l e m the year before in the context of p l e d g e s he intended Britain
to keep to her a l l i e s — a n d her allies to keep to her. H i s concern was
that S y r i a n s might not accept the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t and the
terms outlined by S i r H e n r y M c M a h o n to the Sherif H u s s e i n . In
1917 he asked the A r a b B u r e a u to set up a meeting for h i m with
Syrian A r a b s leaders in C a i r o , apparently in order to arrive at an
agreement with t h e m that would be consistent with the secret a c c o r d s
with F r a n c e a n d with the H e j a z — a c c o r d s whose existence, however,
he could not reveal to t h e m . He c l a i m e d he h a d s u c c e e d e d ; in his
own hand he noted that " T h e main difficulty was to m a n o e u v r e the
delegates into a s k i n g for what we were p r e p a r e d to give them, without letting t h e m know that any precise geographical a g r e e m e n t h a d
been c om e t o . " T h e "precise geographical agreement" m u s t have
5 2
330
INVADING THE MIDDLE EAST
meant the D a m a s c u s - H o m s - H a m a - A l e p p o line that was to be the
westward frontier of A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e in S y r i a u n d e r the agreement with a l - F a r u q i in 1915 a n d with F r a n c e in 1916.
B u t reports arrived f r o m various q u a r t e r s that the O t t o m a n government m i g h t b e p l a n n i n g t o p r e - e m p t A r a b nationalism b y g r a n t i n g
a u t o n o m y to S y r i a immediately. T h a t w o u l d leave Britain in the
awkward position of s p o n s o r i n g the c l a i m s of K i n g H u s s e i n as against
an indigenous A r a b i c leadership in D a m a s c u s that threatened to be
far m o r e p o p u l a r in the S y r i a n p r o v i n c e s .
T o w a r d the end of 1917 S y k e s cabled C l a y t o n : "I am anxious
a b o u t A r a b m o v e m e n t . L e t t e r s indicate difficulty of c o m b i n i n g
M e c c a n Patriarchalism with S y r i a n U r b a n intelligensia." Q u ic k as
always to invent a new expedient, S y k e s p r o p o s e d to create an A r a b
executive c o m m i t t e e to p r o m o t e unity. Clayton m u s t have said it
could not be d o n e , for S y k e s r e s p o n d e d : "Agree as to difficulty but
military s u c c e s s s h o u l d m a k e this easier." S y k e s said that Picot
s h o u l d be p e r s u a d e d to r e a s s u r e the S y r i a n s that F r a n c e w a s in favor
of their eventual i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h e s a m e a r g u m e n t s were to be u s e d
on Picot on behalf of the A r a b s that h a d been u s e d on him on behalf
of Z i o n i s m : that it was better to give up s o m e t h i n g in the far-off
M i d d l e E a s t than to risk losing the war, a n d with it a chance to
regain A l s a c e a n d L o r r a i n e — p r o v i n c e s closer t o h o m e .
5 3
S y k e s was a r g u i n g that Britain c o u l d honor all p l e d g e s , a n d acc o m m o d a t e the S y r i a n s as well, if only reasonable concessions were
m a d e all a r o u n d . C l a y t o n , as always, pictured Britain's wartime
c o m m i t m e n t s as e m b a r r a s s m e n t s to be shed, a n d replied to S y k e s
that " T h e r e is no d o u b t a very real fear a m o n g s t S y r i a n s of finding
themselves u n d e r a G o v e r n m e n t in which patriarchalism of M e c c a is
p r e d o m i n a n t . T h e y realize that reactionary principles f r o m which
Sherif of M e c c a cannot break loose are incompatible with p r o g r e s s
on m o d e r n lines." P r o p o s i n g to m o v e away from the alliance with
H u s s e i n , he said that Feisal as an individual might be a c c e p t a b l e as
head of a S y r i a n confederation, but only with a spiritual, not a
political, role for his father. No s u c h plan, however, a n d no c o m mittee or a n n o u n c e m e n t or p r o p a g a n d a would be of any effect,
Clayton continued, if the b a s i c p r o b l e m were not a d d r e s s e d . A n d
that p r o b l e m , he hinted ( t h o u g h he did not put it in these w o r d s ) ,
was p o s e d by the p l e d g e s S y k e s h a d m a d e to the F r e n c h a n d to the
Zionists. As against the p r o b a b l e T u r k i s h maneuver of setting up an
a u t o n o m o u s S y r i a n g o v e r n m e n t , nothing would be of any avail, he
a r g u e d , b e c a u s e of the general fear in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world that
Britain planned to turn S y r i a over to F r a n c e . T h i s was c o m p o u n d e d ,
he claimed, by the p u b l i c p l e d g e just m a d e to Z i o n i s m . T h e only
solution was to obtain from F r a n c e a clear public a n n o u n c e m e n t
denying that she intended to annex any part of S y r i a .
5 4
T H E ROAD TO DAMASCUS
331
A n o t h e r a p p r o a c h was u r g e d by O s m o n d Walrond, a former m e m ber of L o r d Milner's staff who knew E g y p t f r o m before the war a n d
who h a d c o m e out to serve in the A r a b B u r e a u in C a i r o . As Walrond
saw it, Britain was neglecting the A r a b secret societies, a n d a c c o r d ingly he set out to cultivate their s u p p o r t . W a l r o n d wrote to Clayton
in the s u m m e r of 1918 to d e s c r i b e his conversations with m e m b e r s of
these societies. He said that he h a d asked t h e m to elect a small
c o m m i t t e e to represent t h e m so that he could deal with t h e m . T h e y
had elected a c o m m i t t e e of seven m e m b e r s . A p p a r e n t l y Walrond's
intention was to repeat Sykes's m a n e u v e r of the year before with
another g r o u p of C a i r o A r a b s s u s p i c i o u s of H u s s e i n : a r r a n g e for
t h e m to accept a statement of Britain's plans for the M i d d l e E a s t
so that they, like H u s s e i n , w o u l d be tied into acceptance of those
plans.
5 5
In m i d - 1 9 1 8 S i r M a r k S y k e s accordingly a d d r e s s e d a declaration
of British intentions to Walrond's c o m m i t t e e of seven S y r i a n s in
answer to q u e s t i o n s ostensibly raised by t h e m . It was an official
declaration, a p p r o v e d by Sykes's s u p e r i o r s at the F o r e i g n Office, but
did not break new g r o u n d . L i k e so m u c h that c a m e from the pen of
Sir M a r k S y k e s , it restated the s a m e intentions for the p o s t w a r
M i d d l e E a s t b u t in different w o r d s . O u t s i d e the A r a b i a n peninsula,
the A r a b world was to fall u n d e r v a r y i n g degrees of E u r o p e a n influence or control. In effect, Sykes's D e c l a r a t i o n to the S e v e n — l a t e r to
be a subject of m u c h c o n t r o v e r s y — r e c o g n i z e d c o m p l e t e A r a b indep e n d e n c e only within the A r a b i a n peninsula, for it offered s u c h
recognition only to areas that h a d been independent before the war
or that h a d been liberated by the A r a b s by themselves as of the date
of the declaration.
S y k e s could go no further in a s s u a g i n g A r a b s u s p i c i o n s of F r e n c h
intentions in S y r i a a n d L e b a n o n without securing F r a n c e ' s cooperation in i s s u i n g a joint p l e d g e . In the a u t u m n of 1918 the F r e n c h
g o v e r n m e n t was finally p e r s u a d e d to join the British F o r e i g n Office
in issuing a new statement of Allied intentions designed to allay A r a b
f e a r s — a n d A m e r i c a n s u s p i c i o n s . T h e A n g l o - F r e n c h declaration o f
8 N o v e m b e r 1918 was b r o a d l y p h r a s e d to s u g g e s t full s u p p o r t for the
creation of i n d i g e n o u s g o v e r n m e n t s in the M i d d l e E a s t ; b u t it was
designed to m i s l e a d , for, on F r e n c h insistence, it did not refer
specifically to A r a b " i n d e p e n d e n c e . "
F r e n c h officials s e e m e d as
unlikely as their British c o u n t e r p a r t s to follow the idealistic p a t h that
S i r M a r k S y k e s — w i t h an eye t o w a r d a c c o m m o d a t i n g the views of
Wilson a n d the A m e r i c a n s — h a d m a r k e d out for t h e m .
56
37
T H E B A T T L E FOR SYRIA
i
As the s u m m e r of 1918 drew to a close, S i r E d m u n d Allenby g a v e
the order to a d v a n c e on S y r i a , a n d foresaw that L i m a n von S a n d e r s
would expect him to repeat the strategy he had e m p l o y e d in southern
Palestine. In the J e r u s a l e m c a m p a i g n , Allenby had feinted at the
coast but lunged eastward to deliver his attack in the interior. In
attacking northern Palestine, he therefore did exactly the reverse: he
feinted inland, while launching his m a i n attack along the coast. H i s
p u r p o s e was to achieve o v e r w h e l m i n g local numerical superiority
along the coast so as to break t h r o u g h the T u r k i s h lines at the m o s t
favorable point for his A u s t r a l i a n a n d N e w Z e a l a n d ( A N Z A C ) cavalry.
A l t h o u g h he held an overall two-to-one a d v a n t a g e in effectives
( 6 9 , 0 0 0 against 3 6 , 0 0 0 , a c c o r d i n g to his e s t i m a t e s ) , he boldly left
m u c h of his roughly 65-mile-long line undefended in order to concentrate the m a x i m u m n u m b e r of t r o o p s on the coast; he relied on
control of the air a n d on brilliantly effective intelligence o p e r a t i o n s to
keep the e n e m y away from the g a p s in his own defensive line.
By night the bulk of Allenby's forces silently m o v e d west to
concentrate in the olive a n d citrus g r o v e s of the lightly defended
coastal plain, where they were c a m o u f l a g e d and remained undetected.
By day small units m a r c h e d east, a n d then returned to m a r c h east
over a n d over again, raising great c l o u d s of d u s t which p e r s u a d e d the
T u r k s that a vast a r m y was on the m a r c h to attack inland. In the
east, too, small British units threw up what a p p e a r e d to be large
c a m p s , stabled with what a p p e a r e d to be horses. E a s t of the J o r d a n ,
British agents allowed it to be discovered that they were b a r g a i n i n g
for large quantities of forage.
D e c e i v e d , L i m a n von S a n d e r s concentrated his forces inland in
eastern Palestine, a n d when the attack c a m e his a r m i e s were caught
off balance. So effective was Allenby's offensive that it was not until
days after it had b e g u n that the O t t o m a n c o m m a n d e r s c a m e to
appreciate the real situation.
332
THE
BATTLE
FOR
333
SYRIA
At 4:30 in the m o r n i n g of 19 S e p t e m b e r 1918 nearly 400 British
cannon s u d d e n l y o p e n e d f i r e o n the s u r p r i s e d a n d o u t n u m b e r e d
( 4 5 , 0 0 0 against 8,000) O t t o m a n d e f e n d e r s of the coastal plain. Fifteen
m i n u t e s later the infantry attack c o m m e n c e d . British, F r e n c h , and
I n d i a n t r o o p s p u s h e d the o v e r w h e l m e d d e f e n d e r s a s i d e , as the cavalry
p o u r e d through the g a p i n g hole in the O t t o m a n lines to win the
battle of M e g i d d o — t h e " A r m a g e d d o n " of the B i b l e .
At d a w n , special b o m b e r s q u a d r o n s of the R o y a l Air F o r c e attacked
telephone a n d telegraph e x c h a n g e s b e h i n d e n e m y lines, effectively
cutting off all c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . Other R . A . F . w a r p l a n e s g u a r d e d the
skies over e n e m y a i r p o r t s , keeping G e r m a n reconnaissance planes on
the g r o u n d . L i m a n a n d his field c o m m a n d e r s were cut off from
information a n d f r o m one another.
As O t t o m a n units reeled b a c k w a r d , they found their lines of
retreat blocked by British units which had raced before a n d behind
t h e m t o s e c u r e control o f the key r o a d s . T h e A N Z A C cavalry galloped northward for thirty miles along the coastal plain, b u t then cut
inland, threatening to cut off the O t t o m a n line of retreat toward
D a m a s c u s . British military aircraft b o m b e d and strafed the retreating
T u r k s . M e a n w h i l e the few units Allenby had d e p l o y e d in the east
finally attacked inland. In the p r e d a w n d a r k n e s s of 23 S e p t e m b e r
battalions of the J e w i s h L e g i o n seized control of the crucial U m m
esh S h e r t ford across the J o r d a n river. T h e S e c o n d A u s t r a l i a n L i g h t
H o r s e B r i g a d e went a c r o s s it, a n d by evening the O t t o m a n forces
east of the river found themselves enveloped in a giant pincer.
At M a ' a n , in the s o u t h of T r a n s j o r d a n , a b o v e A q a b a , the T u r k i s h
garrison which h a d been beseiged by Feisal's forces ever since their
arrival f r o m A q a b a the year before, held out until A u s t r a l i a n cavalry
arrived to accept their s u r r e n d e r a n d protect them against the m a s sacre threatened by the A r a b besiegers. F u r t h e r north, Feisal's C a m e l
C o r p s d i s r u p t e d the railroad lines u p o n which the m a i n T u r k i s h
forces d e p e n d e d .
On 25 S e p t e m b e r Allenby o r d e r e d an a d v a n c e on D a m a s c u s , while
the r e m n a n t of the O t t o m a n forces b r o k e a n d fled. T h e occupation
of the principal towns of the S y r i a n provinces was i m m i n e n t ; decisions a b o u t occupation policy were m a d e rapidly. T h e r e is still
controversy as to who m a d e t h e m a n d why.
1
II
In the s u m m e r Allenby had told L o n d o n that, subject to his own
s u p r e m e military authority, he would accept F r e n c h a d v i s e r s to deal
with civil a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in areas of special interest to F r a n c e , so
long as L o n d o n would tell him what areas these were a n d whether
334
INVADING THE MIDDLE EAST
2
they were still defined by the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t . A l t h o u g h
the C a b i n e t a n d its E a s t e r n C o m m i t t e e strongly favored d i s c a r d i n g
the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t , the F o r e i g n Office reaffirmed the agreem e n t by directing Allenby to follow its territorial outlines. L e o
A m e r y , of the War C a b i n e t secretariat, bitterly b l a m e d the political
chiefs of the F o r e i g n O f f i c e — B a l f o u r a n d C e c i l — f o r t h i s . A m e r y ' s
colleague, S i r M a r k S y k e s , however, w a s the F o r e i g n Office official
directly responsible for policy in S y r i a a n d , p r e s u m a b l y , the person
who m a d e or r e c o m m e n d e d the decision in the first instance.
3
On 25 S e p t e m b e r the War Office instructed Wingate in C a i r o a n d
Allenby at h e a d q u a r t e r s that if S y r i a were to fall within the s p h e r e of
any E u r o p e a n power, that power w a s t o b e F r a n c e . T h e t e r m s o f
that instruction left o p e n the possibility that it might not fall within
the s p h e r e of a E u r o p e a n p o w e r — t h a t Feisal m i g h t achieve his
i n d e p e n d e n c e . H o w e v e r , Allenby w a s instructed to e m p l o y F r e n c h
officers for all areas of civil (as distinct f r o m military) a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
A c c o r d i n g to the War Office cables, if Allenby were to take
D a m a s c u s , "it would be desirable that in conformity with A n g l o F r e n c h a g r e e m e n t of 1916 he s h o u l d if possible work t h r o u g h an
A r a b administration by m e a n s of a F r e n c h liaison."
4
5
F l a g s were to indicate the d e s i g n a t e d a r e a s of t e m p o r a r y a d m i n i s tration. T h e hoisting o f H u s s e i n ' s f l a g over D a m a s c u s a n d other
i m p o r t a n t S y r i a n cities once they were c a p t u r e d was authorized, a n d
indeed o r d e r e d , b y the F o r e i g n O f f i c e . T h e f l a g was the black,
white, green, a n d red one that S y k e s h a d designed (see p a g e 315)
a n d it served two political p u r p o s e s : it b o o s t e d H u s s e i n ' s claim to
leadership in A r a b S y r i a , * a n d it r e m i n d e d F r a n c e that inland S y r i a
was designated for at least nominal A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e .
6
At a conference in the Palestinian town of J e n i n on 25 S e p t e m b e r ,
Allenby a p p r o v e d the p l a n s of A u s t r a l i a n General H a r r y C h a u v e l —
who was in charge of the o p e r a t i o n — f o r the a d v a n c e on D a m a s c u s .
C h a u v e l , a c c o r d i n g to his later notes, raised the issue of occupation
policy. D a m a s c u s , he s a i d , was a city of 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 p e o p l e ; it was too
b i g to be h a n d e d over to a military governor a n d a m e r e handful of
a s s i s t a n t s . A l l e n b y replied that C h a u v e l should retain the O t t o m a n
governor a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a n d s u p p l y them with whatever extra
military police they m i g h t need to keep o r d e r . C h a u v e l asked a b o u t
r u m o r s that the A r a b m o v e m e n t w a s to have the g o v e r n m e n t of
S y r i a , but Allenby replied that any decision would have to wait until
* In early 1918 Gilbert Clayton had written to Sykes that "If Feisal makes good in
a military sense he may well carry Syria with him" but that if he did not, nobody
from Mecca would matter in Syrian politics. T h e raising of the flag constituted a
symbolic affirmation of Feisal's military success that could pave the way for his
political leadership.
7
THE
BATTLE
FOR
335
SYRIA
he c a m e to D a m a s c u s himself. He a d d e d that, "if Feisal gives you
any t r o u b l e , deal with h i m t h r o u g h L a w r e n c e who will be your
liaison officer."
T h e r e w a s a flurry of cables between L o n d o n , P a r i s , a n d the
M i d d l e E a s t . A l t h o u g h Allenby h a d told C h a u v e l to keep the Turkish
administration in D a m a s c u s in place for the t i m e being, the F o r e i g n
Office told the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t that Allenby w o u l d deal with a
provisional Arab administration in D a m a s c u s — i n line with the S y k e s Picot A g r e e m e n t — t h r o u g h a F r e n c h liaison officer. In t u r n , the
F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t a g r e e d that the Allies s h o u l d recognize the A r a b s
as a belligerent p o w e r — i n other w o r d s , as an a l l y . T h e s e c o m munications between Britain a n d F r a n c e show that the F o r e i g n Office
expected Allenby to replace the T u r k i s h administration in D a m a s c u s
with an A r a b one sooner or later; but that it believed the S y k e s - P i c o t
a r r a n g e m e n t s w o u l d not c o m e into play until then.
8
9
10
A r m e d with these a g r e e m e n t s , the F o r e i g n Office got the War
Office to s e n d Allenby new a n d i m p o r t a n t instructions, developing
policy t h e m e s that had been hinted at before. T h e S y r i a n l a n d s that
Allenby w a s in p r o c e s s of o c c u p y i n g were to be treated as "allied
territory enjoying the s t a t u s of an i n d e p e n d e n t state" rather than as
occupied e n e m y territory. It w a s in this connection that the F o r e i g n
Office issued its m u c h - d i s c u s s e d directive that "It would be desirable
to m a r k the recognition a n d establishment of native A r a b rule by
s o m e c o n s p i c u o u s or formal act s u c h as the hoisting a n d saluting of
the A r a b flag at i m p o r t a n t c e n t r e s . "
11
S y k e s (if that is who it was) went on in the cable to outline a
characteristically ingenious s c h e m e . T h e existing a g r e e m e n t with
F r a n c e was that wherever in the S y r i a n provinces Britain established
a military administration, F r a n c e w a s entitled to have her officers
exercise all civilian administration on behalf of the Ailies. In the
telegram of 1 O c t o b e r , Allenby was instructed to limit his area of
military administration to the b a r e m i n i m u m , limiting the F r e n c h
role c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y . T h e F o r e i g n Office also told him to r e d u c e
British military administration in T r a n s j o r d a n as well, so that the
F r e n c h c o u l d not say that Britain's action in inland S y r i a was part of
a plot to r e d u c e F r a n c e ' s role there—which of c o u r s e it w a s .
Wingate, who had read the c a b l e s , wrote to Allenby that "it will be
very interesting to see how the Sherifian F l a g a n d the F r e n c h liaison
is taken by all a n d s u n d r y . "
In effect, the F o r e i g n Office had
instructed Allenby to carry out the formal r e q u i r e m e n t s of the
Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t , while (as a d v o c a t e d by M a r k S y k e s ) revising
the spirit of the a g r e e m e n t . T h i s was a solution satisfactory neither
to the F r e n c h , who wanted m o r e , nor to Feisal or the A r a b B u r e a u ,
who wanted F r a n c e to have nothing at all.
1 2
As required by the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t , F r a n c e was to be given
•1
336
INVADING THE MIDDLE EAST
direct control of the coastline. I n l a n d S y r i a was to be i n d e p e n d e n t —
not independent in n a m e only, as envisaged by the a g r e e m e n t — b u t
substantively i n d e p e n d e n t ; b u t F r a n c e would have her official liaison
officer, as r e q u i r e d , a n d later w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y have her official
adviser at Feisal's court. Syria's ruler, as, indicated in the M c M a h o n
c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , would be a H a s h e m i t e . T h e hoisting of S y k e s ' s flag
over D a m a s c u s a n d the towns o f H o r n s , H a m a , a n d A l e p p o thus
would s y m b o l i z e the weaving together of all the s t r a n d s of British
M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy along the lines that S y k e s h a d always a d v o c a t e d .
He h a d said all along that he h a d s h a p e d Britain's c o m m i t m e n t s to be
consistent with one another, and that all would fit within the formal
framework of the agreement that he h a d devised.
Meanwhile on 29 S e p t e m b e r it was d e c i d e d at G e n e r a l Allenby's
field h e a d q u a r t e r s that Feisal's A r a b s s h o u l d be the only Allied
troops to enter a n d o c c u p y D a m a s c u s — p r e s u m a b l y to forestall resistance by a possibly hostile M o s l e m metropolis to a Christian
occupation.* Feisal was three d a y s away, so in the m e a n t i m e the
A N Z A C cavalry units p u r s u i n g the f l e e i n g T u r k s were instructed t o
ride a r o u n d , rather than t h r o u g h , D a m a s c u s .
B u t in the confusion of a d v a n c e a n d retreat, the actors in the
d r a m a of D a m a s c u s ' s liberation did not follow the script that Allenby
a n d Clayton had written for t h e m . T h e O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t did not
remain in the city; it fled with the retreating T u r k i s h a r m y at a b o u t
noon on 30 S e p t e m b e r , leaving d i s o r d e r b e h i n d . L o c a l A r a b notables,
the E m i r A b d el K a d e r a n d his brother S a i d , d e s c e n d a n t s of the
Algerian warrior who h a d fought the F r e n c h a century before and
h a d been s u b s i d i z e d to live in exile, m o v e d at s o m e point into s o m e
sort of control of the city. T h e A b d el K a d e r b r o t h e r s , w h o m
L a w r e n c e r e g a r d e d a s personal enemies a n d , p e r h a p s , a s s u p p o r t e r s
of H u s s e i n a n d I s l a m rather than of Feisal and nationalism,
claimed
* Evidence is scanty as to who made the decision and why. A report to the
Foreign Office from Allenby's chief political officer, General Gilbert Clayton,
suggests that Clayton must have feared there would be unrest in the city if the
Australians occupied it, presumably because Damascenes would guess that Britain
intended to turn them over to France. Clayton had expressed fears all along that
Britain—by allowing herself to be associated with France—might excite the hostility
of Syrian Arabs. Clayton later reported to the Foreign Office that "Our permitting
the occupation of Damascus by the Sherifians has allayed some of the suspicions of
French intentions."
Nobody knows for sure what the quarrel between Lawrence and the Abd el
Kaders was about, though a number of possibilities have been suggested. T h e Abd
el Kaders may have feared that Hussein was being duped by the British or that
Feisal was under Lawrence's influence; while Lawrence may have considered them
to be pan-Islam, anti-Christian chauvinists. Or Lawrence may have believed them
to be pro-French or pro-Turk. It has also been suggested that the quarrel was
mainly or entirely personal, and that perhaps the Abd el Kaders were about to reveal
damaging information about Lawrence's personal life.
13
THE
BATTLE
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SYRIA
337
to have raised the H e j a z flag on the afternoon of 30 S e p t e m b e r in the
n a m e of H u s s e i n . T h u s when the A r a b flag w a s finally hoisted, it had
nothing to do with the F o r e i g n Office's p l a n ; D a m a s c e n e A r a b s did
it on their own.
At first light on the m o r n i n g of 1 O c t o b e r , an Australian cavalry
b r i g a d e that had been ordered to cut the O t t o m a n retreat a l o n g the
Horns road north of D a m a s c u s , d e c i d e d to go t h r o u g h D a m a s c u s to
reach the H o m s r o a d , a n d entered the city; whereupon S a i d A b d el
K a d e r , s u r r o u n d e d b y notables, officially welcomed t h e m . T h u s the
honor of b e i n g the first Allied t r o o p s to enter D a m a s c u s fell to the
A u s t r a l i a n s , contrary to plan.
An hour later G e n e r a l C h a u v e l and his staff joined M a j o r - G e n e r a l
S i r G e o r g e B a r r o w , the local divisional c o m m a n d e r , a few miles
south of the city. L a w r e n c e was s u p p o s e d to be staying with B a r r o w ,
and C h a u v e l wanted to see him in order to start m a k i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s
for p r e s e r v i n g the existing civil administration of the city. To his
chagrin, C h a u v e l discovered that L a w r e n c e had s l i p p e d away early in
the morning, without p e r m i s s i o n a n d without informing anyone, to
follow the F i f t h C a v a l r y D i v i s i o n into D a m a s c u s . C h a u v e l borrowed
a car a n d drove into D a m a s c u s himself to find out what was
happening.
By now the Allenby-Clayton plan for Feisal to liberate the city
was in tatters. Feisal w a s still d a y s away, while the British and
Australians were in D a m a s c u s , either trying to m o v e t h r o u g h the
streets or h o p i n g to find out what was going on. C h a u v e l , who had
been ordered not to lead his m e n into the city, now followed them in
instead.
T . E . L a w r e n c e , Chauvel's A . W . O . L . staff liaison officer, had
taken his favorite battered old R o l l s - R o y c e a r m o r e d car that m o r n i n g
and—-with a fellow British officer, W. E. Stirling, and N u r i el-Sa'id,
an e x - O t t o m a n officer who was a chief F e i s a l loyalist—had driven to
the city a n d found that s o m e of Feisal's tribal allies, who had arrived
earlier, had accepted the A b d el K a d e r s as D a m a s c u s ' s g o v e r n o r s .
E x e c u t i n g a swift coup d'etat, N u r i o r d e r e d the A b d el K a d e r s to
withdraw and a p p o i n t e d his own p r o - F e i s a l candidate as governor.
T h e n an irate G e n e r a l C h a u v e l arrived, d e m a n d i n g explanations.
L a w r e n c e , m a k i n g excuses, said h e had a s s u m e d C h a u v e l wanted
him to scout out the situation, a n d claimed that he had been on the
verge of returning to tender his r e p o r t .
When C h a u v e l then asked L a w r e n c e to b r i n g the governor to him,
L a w r e n c e presented Nuri's c a n d i d a t e , claiming that he was the
governor. C h a u v e l called that nonsense, pointing out that N u r i ' s
candidate was obviously an A r a b , while the O t t o m a n governor would
have been a T u r k . B u t L a w r e n c e replied that the O t t o m a n governor
had fled (which was t r u e ) , a n d that the people had elected N u r i ' s
candidate to take his place (which was false).
338
INVADING THE MIDDLE EAST
T a k i n g L a w r e n c e ' s word for it, C h a u v e l confirmed the appointment of N u r i ' s p r o - F e i s a l c a n d i d a t e as governor. A c c o r d i n g to
Chauvel's o w n account, he soon learned that N u r i ' s c a n d i d a t e was
s u p p o r t e d by only a small p r o - F e i s a l clique, a n d that the population
as a whole was d i s t u r b e d by the a p p o i n t m e n t ; but C h a u v e l d i d not
see how he could c h a n g e the a p p o i n t m e n t after having a n n o u n c e d it.
However, faced with serious d i s o r d e r s , he m a r c h e d his British forces
through the city on 2 O c t o b e r in an attempt to overawe opposition.
T h i s was exactly what Allenby a n d C l a y t o n had hoped to avoid: the
population a r o u s e d , Christian t r o o p s defiling through the streets of a
great M o s l e m city to restore order, a n d Feisal's A r a b t r o o p s — w h o s e
presence was meant to r e a s s u r e local opinion—still nowhere in sight.
It was not until the m o r n i n g of 3 O c t o b e r that L a w r e n c e a n n o u n c e d
that F e i s a l a n d several h u n d r e d followers were a b o u t to arrive, a n d
asked p e r m i s s i o n to stage a ' t r i u m p h a l entry into the city for t h e m .
L a t e r , C h a u v e l g r u m b l i n g l y wrote that " S e e i n g that he, F e i s a l , had
had very little to do with the 'conquest' of D a m a s c u s , the s u g g e s t e d
triumphal entry did not appeal to me very m u c h but I thought it
would not d o h a r m a n d g a v e p e r m i s s i o n a c c o r d i n g l y . "
It was arranged for 3:00 that afternoon, b u t G e n e r a l Allenby's
schedule would not allow for it. Allenby had only a few h o u r s to
s p e n d that afternoon in D a m a s c u s , a n d called on Feisal a n d L a w r e n c e
to attend him at the Hotel Victoria, where he had established himself.
Allenby's visit was p r o m p t e d by Chauvel's a p p o i n t m e n t of the p r o Feisal A r a b to the g o v e r n o r s h i p which, in turn, activated the S y k e s Picot A g r e e m e n t a n d the inter-Allied a g r e e m e n t that Allenby would
deal with an Arab administration in S y r i a through the F r e n c h . H a d
Allenby's original o r d e r s been carried o u t — t o retain a T u r k i s h
governor for the time b e i n g — t h i s complication would have been
p o s t p o n e d , but now it had to be faced. Allenby did not b l a m e
Chauvel, but indicated that what he had done had given rise to
complications with the F r e n c h which required a meeting with Feisal
immediately.
14
Allenby, C h a u v e l , F e i s a l , a n d their respective chiefs of staff were
present at the conference, as were officers of the British mission to
the H e j a z , an officer of the A r a b B u r e a u from C a i r o , a n d Feisal's
chief c o m m a n d e r . L a w r e n c e acted as interpreter.
At the meeting the British c o m m a n d e r spelled out in specific detail
for the A r a b i a n prince the a r r a n g e m e n t s that had been a g r e e d u p o n
by Britain a n d F r a n c e , and a s s e r t e d his determination to enforce
them until a n d unless they were modified at the Peace C o n f e r e n c e .
T h e t e r m s were exactly those that S i r M a r k S y k e s a n d the F o r e i g n
Office had instructed h i m to u p h o l d . A n y hopes that L a w r e n c e m a y
have entertained, or inspired in F e i s a l , that C l a y t o n a n d Allenby
would help them connive at s u b v e r t i n g the F o r e i g n Office's policy
THE
BATTLE
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SYRIA
339
were d a s h e d that afternoon. Feisal's bitter d i s a p p o i n t m e n t was not
that the A r a b confederation w o u l d not include Palestine—he said he
accepted t h a t — b u t that it did not include the L e b a n o n (that is to
say, the L e b a n o n , or "white," M o u n t a i n s ) , a n d that S y r i a was not to
be free of F r e n c h control.
A c c o r d i n g to C h a u v e l ' s m i n u t e s of the meeting, Allenby (referred
to as "the Chief") plainly told F e i s a l :
(a) T h a t F r a n c e was to be the Protecting Power over S y r i a .
( b ) T h a t he, F e i s a l , a s representing his F a t h e r , K i n g H u s s e i n ,
was to have the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of S y r i a (less Palestine a n d
the L e b a n o n Province) u n d e r F r e n c h g u i d a n c e a n d f i n a n c i a l
backing.
(c) T h a t the A r a b s p h e r e w o u l d include the hinterland of S y r i a
only a n d that he, F e i s a l , w o u l d not have anything to do
with the L e b a n o n .
( d ) T h a t he w a s to have a F r e n c h L i a i s o n Officer at once, who
w o u l d work for the present with L a w r e n c e , who w o u l d be
expected to give him every a s s i s t a n c e .
Feisal objected very strongly. He said that he knew nothing
of F r a n c e in the m a t t e r ; that he was p r e p a r e d to have British
A s s i s t a n c e ; that he u n d e r s t o o d f r o m the Adviser w h o m Allenby
had sent h i m that the A r a b s were to have the whole of S y r i a
including the L e b a n o n but e x c l u d i n g Palestine; that a C o u n t r y
without a Port was no g o o d to h i m ; a n d that he declined to
have a F r e n c h L i a i s o n Officer or to recognise F r e n c h g u i d a n c e
in any way.
T h e Chief turned t o L a w r e n c e a n d s a i d : " B u t did you not
tell him that the F r e n c h were to have the Protectorate over
S y r i a ? " L a w r e n c e s a i d : " N o , S i r , I know nothing a b o u t it."
T h e Chief then s a i d : " B u t you knew definitely that he, Feisal,
was to have nothing to do with the L e b a n o n . " L a w r e n c e s a i d :
" N o , S i r , I did not."
After s o m e further discussion, the Chief told F e i s a l that he,
S i r E d m u n d Allenby, was C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f a n d that he,
Feisal, was at the m o m e n t a L i e u t . - G e n e r a l u n d e r his c o m m a n d
and that he would have to obey o r d e r s . T h a t he m u s t accept the
situation until the whole matter w a s settled at the conclusion of
the War. Feisal accepted this decision a n d left with his ent o u r a g e , except L a w r e n c e .
1 5
Neither Feisal nor L a w r e n c e had been candid with the plainspoken Allenby. T h e t e r m s outlined to them were those of the
Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t , with which all of t h e m were well a c q u a i n t e d .
What Feisal meant in denying knowledge of those t e r m s ( L a w r e n c e
explained later in L o n d o n ) was that he had not been informed of
340
INVADING THE MIDDLE EAST
t h e m officially.
F o r himself, L a w r e n c e had not even that e x c u s e ;
he h a d s i m p l y lied.*
As Feisal left the meeting, L a w r e n c e told Allenby that he was
unwilling to serve alongside a F r e n c h adviser to F e i s a l . L a w r e n c e
said that he h a d a c c u m u l a t e d s o m e leave time and would like to take
it i m m e d i a t e l y and return to Britain. Allenby a g r e e d . By all indications, he w a s not at all a n g r y with L a w r e n c e ; far from it, for he
e n c o u r a g e d L a w r e n c e to go to L o n d o n to a r g u e his c a s e to the
F o r e i g n Office in p e r s o n .
F e i s a l , having withdrawn f r o m the meeting, returned to lead his
tardy and c o m p r o m i s e d t r i u m p h a l entry into D a m a s c u s , riding at the
head of between 300 and 600 m o u n t e d m e n . P e r h a p s with encoura g e m e n t from L a w r e n c e (who later denied it), F e i s a l then sent a
c o m m a n d o force of a h u n d r e d of his followers to B e i r u t , which they
entered u n o p p o s e d a n d where they raised the A r a b flag of the H e j a z
on 5 O c t o b e r . T h e following day the a l a r m e d F r e n c h sent w a r s h i p s
into B e i r u t harbor a n d l a n d e d a small contingent of t r o o p s . On 8
O c t o b e r I n d i a n t r o o p s of Allenby's E g y p t i a n E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e
entered the city. Allenby took c o m m a n d of the situation by o r d e r i n g
Feisal's force to lower the A r a b flag a n d withdraw; when they did so,
the F r e n c h were left in control. L a t e r F r a n c o i s G e o r g e s Picot arrived
to act as F r a n c e ' s civil a n d political representative in the area, subject
to the s u p r e m e authority of Allenby as commander-in-chief.
Clayton a d v i s e d F e i s a l to rein b a c k his followers in L e b a n o n ; on
11 O c t o b e r , he wrote to Wingate that "I have told Feisal . . . that he
will only p r e j u d i c e his case before the Peace Conference if he tries to
g r a b . . . It is not an easy p r o b l e m . I h o p e that with a certain a m o u n t
of give & take on both sides a m o d u s vivendi will be reached . . . "
1 7
T h e F r e n c h a r m e d forces in Beirut in fact p r o v e d too weak to
affect the full annexationist p r o g r a m that the colonialist p a r t y in
F r a n c e desired, a n d F r e n c h a g e n t s therefore p u r s u e d a fall-back
position to p r o v i d e for the possibility that their claim to the whole of
S y r i a might fail. * T h e p l a n , conceived by F r e n c h officers in the
field, was to carve out of S y r i a an independent state that would
include not only the Christian areas of M o u n t L e b a n o n but also a
large area of p r e d o m i n a n t l y M o s l e m territories, a n d which w a s to be
ruled b y M a r o n i t e C h r i s t i a n s u n d e r F r e n c h s p o n s o r s h i p . Activities
1 9
* In Chapter 101 of Seven Pillars of Wisdom, he admitted that he had known of
the agreement and that "Fortunately, I had earlier betrayed the treaty's existence to
Feisal . . . "
** Some of the French troops were Armenian refugees who had been conscripted.
Others were native troops from North Africa. T h e entire force has been described as
"only 3,000 Armenians, 3,000 Africans 'and 800 Frenchmen who had been promised
that they would not have to fight.' "
18
THE
BATTLE
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341
SYRIA
on behalf of this plan further contributed to the fragmentation of
political life that h a d already b e g u n to c a u s e unrest behind Allied
lines.
Beneath the surface of Allenby's orderly a r r a n g e m e n t s of the chain
of c o m m a n d , f e u d s , intrigues, a n d factionalism seethed in the wake
of the d i s a p p e a r a n c e of O t t o m a n authority. B e d o u i n s clashed with
city dwellers. F o r m e r enemies m o v e d to take over Feisal's m o v e m e n t
from within. O b s c u r e q u a r r e l s were settled in dark places. In
D a m a s c u s , E m i r A b d e l K a d e r was shot and killed b y p r o - F e i s a l
police, s u p p o s e d l y while trying to e s c a p e when they c a m e to arrest
him.
T h e natural environment was even m o r e out of control. T h e
British cavalry had been afflicted by malaria as it p a s s e d t h r o u g h
T u r k i s h - h e l d territories where sanitation had been neglected; after a
fortnight of incubation, the disease struck down whole r e g i m e n t s as
the c o n q u e s t of the S y r i a n provinces was b e i n g c o m p l e t e d . M a l a r i a
was followed by influenza that p r o v e d to be not just debilitating but
massively fatal.
Ill
A l l e n b y — f r o m his h e a d q u a r t e r s in the M i d d l e E a s t — a r r a n g e d a
w a r m reception for Colonel L a w r e n c e in L o n d o n as he arrived to
plead the case against F r a n c e . At the end of O c t o b e r , L a w r e n c e
a p p e a r e d before the E a s t e r n C o m m i t t e e of the C a b i n e t a n d reported
that Picot p r o p o s e d to i m p o s e F r e n c h advisers on F e i s a l , b u t that
Feisal claimed the right to choose whatever advisers he wanted.
M o r e o v e r , he wanted either British o r — o d d l y , in view of the enmities
that developed l a t e r — A m e r i c a n Zionist J e w i s h a d v i s e r s .
2 0
F e i s a l , a c c o r d i n g to L a w r e n c e , relied on the provisions of the
D e c l a r a t i o n to the S e v e n , the d o c u m e n t in which S i r M a r k S y k e s
outlined Allied intentions to anti-Feisal S y r i a n e m i g r e leaders in
C a i r o . I n Feisal's n a m e , L a w r e n c e m i s c o n s t r u e d the declaration,
claiming that it p r o m i s e d i n d e p e n d e n c e to the A r a b s in any area they
liberated t h e m s e l v e s . ( I n context, it is clear that the declaration
p r o m i s e d i n d e p e n d e n c e only in areas that had already been liberated
by A r a b s as of the date of the declaration in J u n e 1918; areas in
O t t o m a n h a n d s as of that date were placed in a s e p a r a t e c a t e g o r y . )
Feisal himself m i s c o n s t r u e d the declaration even further; reportedly,
he claimed to have an agreement with the British and F r e n c h a c c o r d ing to which the first one to arrive at any city won the right to g o v e r n
it.
2 1
L a w r e n c e b e g a n to maintain that Feisal's troops in fact had been
the first to enter D a m a s c u s , declaring that 4 , 0 0 0 tribesmen associated
342
INVADING THE
MIDDLE EAST
with Feisal's cause had slipped into the city d u r i n g the night of 30
September— 1 October a n d thus had been the first Allied t r o o p s to
arrive. B u t there was first-hand evidence that the 4 , 0 0 0 t r i b e s m e n
were entirely imaginary. N o b o d y saw them there; and n o b o d y saw
them enter or leave—even t h o u g h they would have had to p a s s
t h r o u g h British lines t o d o s o .
In the E a s t e r n C o m m i t t e e and in the C a b i n e t , L a w r e n c e nonetheless f o u n d a s y m p a t h e t i c audience for his plea that F r e n c h influence
or control should not be introduced into the M o s l e m A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g
M i d d l e E a s t . He also f o u n d i m p o r t a n t allies in the p r e s s .
At the end of N o v e m b e r 1918, The Times p u b l i s h e d several anonym o u s articles, written by L a w r e n c e , providing a m u c h e x a g g e r a t e d
account of what had been a c c o m p l i s h e d by Feisal's forces a n d stating
that the account c a m e from an eyewitness c o r r e s p o n d e n t . L a w r e n c e ' s
version of the facts b e g a n to be circulated in other periodicals as
well, m u c h to the annoyance of the Australian t r o o p s in S y r i a . T h e
official "pool" news c o r r e s p o n d e n t of the L o n d o n n e w s p a p e r s with
Allenby's E g y p t i a n E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e wrote that "An article was
printed in an official p a p e r circulated a m o n g the troops that the A r a b
A r m y was first in D a m a s c u s . T h e credit of winning D a m a s c u s and
b e i n g the first in the city belongs to the Australian L i g h t H o r s e , a n d
General Chauvel was q u i c k to have the error rectified."
2 2
23
F o r personal as well as political r e a s o n s , L a w r e n c e continued to
maintain the pretense that Feisal's forces had liberated D a m a s c u s ;
and so great w a s his artistry that he s u c c e e d e d in insinuating at least
s o m e of his version into the historical record. Y e t he m u s t have
known that sooner or later his fraudulent claim would be e x p o s e d for
what it w a s . In the 1920s, when the poet and novelist R o b e r t G r a v e s ,
a friend who was writing a b i o g r a p h y of L a w r e n c e , p r o p o s e d to
b a s e his account of the liberation of D a m a s c u s on that s u p p l i e d by
L a w r e n c e in his Seven Pillars of Wisdom, L a w r e n c e cautioned h i m :
"I was on thin ice when I wrote the D a m a s c u s chapter a n d anyone
who copies me will be through it, if he is not careful. S . P . [Seven
Pillars] is full of half-truth h e r e . "
24
IV
L a w r e n c e u s e d his version of the D a m a s c u s c a m p a i g n to attempt to
p e r s u a d e his g o v e r n m e n t to jettison the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t ,
which almost all officials with w h o m he spoke wanted to disavow.
G i l b e r t Clayton had written to L a w r e n c e in 1917 that t h o u g h Britain
was b o u n d in honor to the a g r e e m e n t , it would die of its o w n accord
if i g n o r e d : "It is in fact d e a d a n d , if we wait quietly, this fact will
THE
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343
SYRIA
25
soon be r e a l i z e d . " In 1918 Clayton told Picot that the agreement no
longer could be applied b e c a u s e it was "completely out of d a t e . "
T h e E a s t e r n C o m m i t t e e hoped t o r e s c i n d — r a t h e r than merely
i g n o r e — t h e S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t , a n d had thought that the
F o r e i g n Office would arrange to modify or rescind it in the context
of negotiations with respect to how the o c c u p i e d territories were to
be a d m i n i s t e r e d . T h e F o r e i g n Office did no such thing, but took the
position that Britain was absolutely b o u n d by the agreement unless
F r a n c e a g r e e d to change or cancel it. When L o r d C u r z o n , the
chairman of the E a s t e r n C o m m i t t e e , learned the terms that had been
worked out with F r a n c e , he o b s e r v e d with s o m e asperity that " T h e
F o r e i g n Office a p p e a r e d now to be relying u p o n the Sykes-Picot
A g r e e m e n t from which the C o m m i t t e e had hitherto been doing their
best to e s c a p e . "
2 6
27
Sir M a r k S y k e s , who had worked out the terms of the administrative a r r a n g e m e n t s with the F r e n c h , p e r s i s t e d in believing that the
Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t met current n e e d s . In the s p r i n g of 1917 he
wrote to Percy C o x , chief political officer of the British administration
in M e s o p o t a m i a , that one of its virtues was that it was f r a m e d in
such a way as not to violate the principles that Woodrow Wilson's
A m e r i c a a n d the new socialist R u s s i a e s p o u s e d with respect to
national self-determination and nonannexation. " T h e idea of A r a b
nationalism m a y be a b s u r d , " he wrote, "but our C o n g r e s s case will
be g o o d if we can say we are helping to develop a race on nationalist
lines under our protection." H u s s e i n m a y not give m u c h help in the
war physically, he continued, b u t he gives moral help that F r a n c e
ought to recognize, and "I think F r e n c h will be ready to co-operate
with us in a c o m m o n policy towards the A r a b speaking p e o p l e . "
28
D a v i d H o g a r t h , head of the A r a b B u r e a u , wrote to G i l b e r t Clayton
at that time that n o b o d y both took the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t
seriously a n d s u p p o r t e d it, except for S i r M a r k S y k e s . T h i s was a
slight exaggeration, b e c a u s e officials of the Foreign Office, which
S y k e s joined, also took the pact seriously, but it was not far from the
truth.
L o r d C u r z o n stated that the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t was not only
obsolete "but absolutely i m p r a c t i c a b l e . " As chairman of the E a s t e r n
C o m m i t t e e , which was in charge of defining British desiderata for
the postwar M i d d l e E a s t , he m a d e it clear that Britain would like the
F r e n c h out of S y r i a a l t o g e t h e r . B u t a War Office representative
told the c o m m i t t e e that the only way to break the agreement was to
operate behind "an A r a b facade" in a p p e a l i n g to the U n i t e d S t a t e s to
s u p p o r t Wilson's theories of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n .
C u r z o n said that "When the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t was drawn
up it was, no d o u b t , intended by its authors . . . as a sort of fancy
sketch to suit a situation that had not then arisen, a n d which it was
2 9
30
31
32
344
INVADING THE MIDDLE EAST
thought extremely unlikely would ever a r i s e ; that, I s u p p o s e , m u s t
be the principal explanation of the g r o s s ignorance with which the
b o u n d a r y lines in that a g r e e m e n t were d r a w n . "
L l o y d G e o r g e also felt that the pact h a d been s u p e r s e d e d by
events, but then, he h a d been against it from the start. As w a s his
wont with his favorites, he m a d e e x c u s e s for S y k e s , and rewrote
history to absolve h i m from b l a m e . He wrote, d e c a d e s later, that
33
It is inexplicable that a m a n of S i r M a r k S y k e s ' fine intelligence
s h o u l d ever have a p p e n d e d his s i g n a t u r e to s u c h an a r r a n g e ment. He w a s always a s h a m e d of it, a n d he defended his action
in agreeing to its t e r m s by e x p l a i n i n g that he w a s acting u n d e r
definite instructions received f r o m the F o r e i g n Office. F o r that
reason he hotly resented the constant a n d indelible reminder
that his n a m e was a n d always w o u l d be associated with a pact
with which he had only a nominal personal responsibility a n d of
which he thoroughly d i s a p p r o v e d .
4
In the opinion of L l o y d G e o r g e , the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t "was a
fatuous a r r a n g e m e n t j u d g e d from any a n d every point of v i e w . "
E v e n S y k e s himself finally c a m e to a g r e e : on 3 M a r c h 1918 he
wrote to Wingate and Clayton that the agreement h a d to be a b a n d o n e d b e c a u s e of s u c h events as the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' entry into the
war, W o o d r o w Wilson's F o u r t e e n Points, the Bolshevik Revolution,
a n d the publication by the Bolsheviks of the terms of the Sykes-Picot
A g r e e m e n t to an apparently indignant w o r l d . On 18 J u n e 1918 he
told the E a s t e r n C o m m i t t e e that, while the Sherifians had no right to
be indignant a b o u t the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t , for he had fully
informed H u s s e i n of its t e r m s , Britain s h o u l d ask F r a n c e to agree
that the a g r e e m e n t no longer a p p l i e d . A m o n t h later he told the
c o m m i t t e e that " T h e A g r e e m e n t of 1916 was d e a d , although the
F r e n c h refused to a d m i t it. What w a s required now w a s s o m e m o d i fication of, or s u b s t i t u t e for, that A g r e e m e n t . " When the F r e n c h
refused to a g r e e to modify the a g r e e m e n t , however, he went ahead to
negotiate t e r m s for the administration of o c c u p i e d territories on the
b a s i s that the a g r e e m e n t therefore remained in force.
35
3 6
3 7
38
On 5 O c t o b e r 1918 L e o A m e r y noted in his d i a r y : " T a l k with
S y k e s a b o u t what to do with the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t . He has
evolved a new a n d m o s t ingenious s c h e m e by which the F r e n c h are
to clear out of the whole A r a b region except the L e b a n o n " and in
return get all of K u r d i s t a n a n d A r m e n i a "from A d a n a to Persia and
the C a u c a s u s . " B u t the F r e n c h did not agree.
Picking up on Feisal's protest to Allenby "that a C o u n t r y without a
Port w a s no g o o d to him" S y k e s explored a possible c o m p r o m i s e in
which the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t would be modified by transferring
one coastal port f r o m the area of direct F r e n c h control to the area in
3 9
THE
BATTLE
FOR
345
SYRIA
which Feisal w o u l d serve as ruler. G e n e r a l Allenby s e e m e d hopeful
a b o u t this a p p r o a c h . On 15 D e c e m b e r he wrote to his wife that
"Sykes is all for soothing the A r a b s & g i v i n g them a p o r t ; & Picot is
less Chauvinist than he w a s . " B u t nothing c a m e of this a p p r o a c h
either.
T h e F r e n c h refused to waive any of their rights u n d e r the agreement; b u t there was a c h o r u s of opinion f r o m British officers serving
in the field to the effect that it would be d i s a s t r o u s to attempt to
enforce its t e r m s .
T h e followers of the late L o r d K i t c h e n e r , saying the s a m e thing
through m a n y voices, as they so often did, had been a r g u i n g for
s o m e time that the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t had to be annulled in
the interests of J e w i s h - A r a b friendship in Palestine. J e w i s h - A r a b
friendship was a c a u s e in which S i r M a r k S y k e s sincerely believed;
whether his colleagues who raised the point shared his belief in it is
doubtful.
4 0
R o n a l d S t o r r s , governor of J e r u s a l e m , reported that the A r a b s
were ready to accept the Zionist p r o g r a m , but only under a British
g o v e r n m e n t for P a l e s t i n e . G i l b e r t C l a y t o n reported that the A r a b
a n d Zionist c a u s e s were "interdependent," and that both of t h e m
could be satisfied a n d would cooperate, b u t only if the F r e n c h could
be m a d e to agree that the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t "is no longer a
practical i n s t r u m e n t . " C i W e i z m a n n assisted i n the c a m p a i g n
by writing to B a l f o u r a l o n g the s a m e lines, and a d d e d that F r e n c h
intrigues a i m e d at s e c u r i n g exclusive commercial concessions were
o b s c u r i n g the c a u s e of self-determination for J e w s as well as for
A r a b s . T . E . L a w r e n c e told the E a s t e r n C o m m i t t e e that "there
would be no difficulty in reconciling Zionists a n d A r a b s in Palestine
and S y r i a , p r o v i d e d that the administration of Palestine r e m a i n e d in
British h a n d s . "
41
42
n
a
m
4 3
4 4
If the a g r e e m e n t were to be a b r o g a t e d with respect to Palestine,
there was no reason why it s h o u l d not be a b r o g a t e d with respect
to Syria as well—though P r i m e Minister L l o y d G e o r g e repeatedly
asserted that Britain had no desire to take over S y r i a for herself, a n d
British officers in the field m a d e the s a m e claim. T h e y asserted that
they wanted F r a n c e to relinquish her claims, not in favor of Britain,
but in favor of an independent A r a b nation led by F e i s a l . T h i s was
sheer dishonesty, for the A r a b B u r e a u officers did not believe that
A r a b s were c a p a b l e of self-government. By an independent country
ruled by F e i s a l they meant a country g u i d e d by themselves as agents
of Britain.
D a v i d H o g a r t h , the head of the A r a b B u r e a u who s u c c e e d e d
Clayton as chief political officer in the field, reported f r o m newly
liberated D a m a s c u s that Feisal's A r a b administration was incompetent. He wrote that a E u r o p e a n power must run t h i n g s . If F r a n c e
45
1
346
INVADING THE MIDDLE EAST
were to be excluded, it was evident which E u r o p e a n power (in his
view) w o u l d be obliged to a s s u m e that responsibility.
V
N e a r l y a fortnight after his interview with Feisal at the Hotel Victoria
i n D a m a s c u s , S i r E d m u n d Allenby returned t o D a m a s c u s t o b e the
dinner g u e s t of Prince F e i s a l . He r e p o r t e d to his wife that "He g a v e
me an excellent dinner; A r a b dishes, but all g o o d , served in the
ordinary ways of civilization. Water to drink; b u t g o o d , fresh, cool
water; not tepid barley water!" A l l e n b y a d d e d that " Y o u would like
F e i s a l . He is a keen, slim, highly s t r u n g m a n . He has beautiful
h a n d s , like a w o m a n ' s ; a n d his fingers are always m o v i n g nervously
when he talks. B u t he is s t r o n g in will, a n d straight in principle." As
to politics, "He is n e r v o u s a b o u t the peace settlement; b u t I tell h i m
he m u s t trust the E n t e n t e p o w e r s to treat him f a i r l y . "
46
" T r u s t the E n t e n t e Powers": F e i s a l c o u l d not have thought that
was a particularly firm foundation on which to b a s e his future p r o s p e c t s . T h e Entente P o w e r s did not even trust one another. T h e
F r e n c h did not believe that the B r i t i s h were s p o n s o r i n g J e w i s h a n d
A r a b aspirations in g o o d faith, while the British d i s c u s s e d how,
rather than whether, to break their a g r e e m e n t s with F r a n c e . Neither
Britain nor F r a n c e p l a n n e d to honor wartime c o m m i t m e n t s to Italy.
Neither Britain nor F r a n c e was d i s p o s e d to carry out the idealistic
p r o g r a m of Woodrow Wilson with which, when Washington was
listening, they p r e t e n d e d to be in s y m p a t h y .
Feisal was aware that only the year before, British leaders had
c o n t e m p l a t e d behind his b a c k a c o m p r o m i s e peace in which the
R u s s i a n rather than the O t t o m a n E m p i r e would have been p a r t i t i o n e d — t h u s a b a n d o n i n g h i m a n d his father to the mercies of the
T u r k s . H e knew, too, that Britain a n d F r a n c e had secretly agreed
two years before to divide the A r a b world between t h e m , a n d that
they h a d revealed details of their a g r e e m e n t to h i m only when they
were forced to do s o .
T r u s t was not a part of the a t m o s p h e r e in which Feisal lived. He
himself h a d c o r r e s p o n d e d with the T u r k s that year a b o u t his changing
sides in the war. H i s father h a d held similar c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with the
T u r k s . Neither of t h e m h a d kept faith with Britain, a n d Feisal h a d
not kept faith with his father either.
H i s only regular t r o o p s were d e s e r t e r s from the enemy c a m p , who
m i g h t as easily desert him, in t u r n , if his star w a n e d . T h e B e d o u i n
tribes that were his allies were notoriously fickle, often c h a n g i n g
sides in A r a b i a even on the field of battle itself; and they were b o u n d
to h i m principally by the g o l d that was L a w r e n c e ' s , not his, to
r
T H E B A T T L E FOR SYRIA
347
d i s p e n s e . As for the S y r i a n s , they a c c e p t e d h i m only b e c a u s e he was
placed over t h e m by the British a r m y .
E v e n his own b o d y betrayed h i m ; his w o r r y - b e a d fingers g a v e him
away. He was n e r v o u s — a n d h a d every reason to b e .
PART VIII
THE SPOILS OF
VICTORY
" T h e victor b e l o n g s to the s p o i l s . "
— F . Scott Fitzgerald
38
T H E PARTING OF T H E WAYS
i
G i d d y with fatigue a n d c a u g h t up in the last hysterical convulsions
of the war, the O t t o m a n a n d British e m p i r e s launched themselves
into far-off deserts a n d inland s e a s to fight a barely r e m e m b e r e d
series of final c a m p a i g n s that p r o d u c e d no decisive result. Y e t in the
course of the military a n d political m a n e u v e r i n g two new developments arose that were to affect p r o f o u n d l y the future of the twentieth
century. Western a r m i e s f o u n d themselves at war with R u s s i a , their
former ally; a n d oil b e c a m e a crucial issue in the battle for the
Middle East.
It all b e g a n b e c a u s e E n v e r P a s h a , instead of a t t e m p t i n g to deal
with the losing situation in S y r i a , o p e n e d up a new theater of o p e r a tions against a less f o r m i d a b l e o p p o n e n t . As a result, while the
British were m a r c h i n g from s u c c e s s to s u c c e s s in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g
provinces of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , O t t o m a n forces to the north were
m a r c h i n g f r o m s u c c e s s to s u c c e s s in what u s e d to be the R u s s i a n
E m p i r e . In the last half of 1918 T u r k e y a n d Britain were e n g a g e d in
what a p p e a r e d to be not so m u c h one war as two parallel w a r s in
which they p u r s u e d similar g o a l s : to e x c l u d e their allies f r o m a s h a r e
in the winnings. E n v e r P a s h a , like L l o y d G e o r g e , was so captivated
by the p r o s p e c t i v e spoils of victory that he could not bear to s h a r e
t h e m with other countries. T h e near-dictatorial T u r k i s h leader, like
his near-dictatorial British c o u n t e r p a r t , therefore took the risk of
e n d a n g e r i n g his alliances for the sake of imperial a m b i t i o n s .
L e n i n h a d it the w r o n g way a r o u n d . Imperialism-—defined as the
q u e s t for c o l o n i e s — d i d not c a u s e the war; the war e n g e n d e r e d imperialism. T h e i r s t a g g e r i n g losses d r o v e the belligerent p o w e r s to try
to c o m p e n s a t e by seeking new g a i n s . T h e collapse of the R u s s i a n
E m p i r e a n s w e r e d the need for new worlds to c o n q u e r ; its d o m a i n s
were there to be taken. L o r d Milner worried that once R u s s i a was
out of the war G e r m a n y might be m o r e difficult to defeat, a n d raised
the possibility of a negotiated c o m p r o m i s e peace in which Britain
351
352
THE
SPOILS
OF
VICTORY
would be c o m p e n s a t e d by dividing the R u s s i a n rather than the
O t t o m a n E m p i r e . G e r m a n y , however, having s m a s h e d the C z a r ' s
E m p i r e , was in no m o o d to s h a r e her winnings with the Entente
P o w e r s . T h e G e r m a n s continued to p u r s u e their c a m p a i g n s of war
and s u b v e r s i o n against R u s s i a . T h e i r postwar goals of a g g r a n d i z e ment grew m o r e far-reaching as the w a r t i m e need for agricultural
p r o d u c t s a n d raw materials b e c a m e m o r e p r e s s i n g ; a n d as they
p u r s u e d those g o a l s , they collided with their T u r k i s h allies.
E n v e r P a s h a had d r e a m e d of one day uniting all the T u r k i s h s p e a k i n g p e o p l e s of A s i a u n d e r O t t o m a n leadership, b u t this b e c a m e
his operational political p r o g r a m only when the disintegration of
Petrograd's authority dangled that p r o s p e c t in front of h i m . After the
war, Winston Churchill, a m o n g others, fostered the legend that the
Y o u n g T u r k s h a d been a n i m a t e d b y p a n - T u r k i s h ( " p a n - T u r a n i a n " )
ideology all along a n d h a d b r o u g h t T u r k e y into the war in order to
p u r s u e expansionist p l a n s in C e n t r a l A s i a . T h e evidence now available
is to the contrary: the d e m a n d s the C . U . P . m a d e of G e r m a n y in
1914 a n d t h r o u g h 1917 show that the O t t o m a n leaders were thinking
in essentially defensive t e r m s at that t i m e , h o p i n g at m o s t to shore
up their existing frontiers in order to win a m o r e c o m p l e t e independence within t h e m . It w a s only in 1917 that E n v e r seriously planned
to e x p a n d the O t t o m a n E m p i r e e a s t w a r d . Vast territories, no longer
held by the C z a r , s e e m e d there for the taking, and could c o m p e n s a t e
for what Britain had taken in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g s o u t h .
A British Intelligence report on the m o v e m e n t to unite all the
T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g p e o p l e s , the P a n - T u r a n i a n M o v e m e n t , p r e p a r e d
by the D e p a r t m e n t of Information in the a u t u m n of 1917, estimated
that outside the O t t o m a n E m p i r e m o r e than seventeen million people
in A s i a s p o k e one or m o r e of the T u r k i c l a n g u a g e s . A c c o r d i n g to the
report, " T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g Central A s i a is one of the largest continuous l a n g u a g e areas in the w o r l d — l a r g e r than the G r e a t R u s s i a n area
and almost as large as the E n g l i s h or S p a n i s h - s p e a k i n g area in
A m e r i c a . " While disdainful of p a n - T u r a n i a n i s m as an ideology, the
report p i c t u r e d it as a d a n g e r o u s i n s t r u m e n t in the h a n d s of the
Y o u n g T u r k leaders. " T h e whole population i s T u r k i s h ; the whole
population is S u n n i ; a n d the present p o s s e s s o r [i.e. R u s s i a ] is not an
ancient M o s l e m S t a t e , b u t a recent Christian c o n q u e r o r . " Were the
C . U . P . to create a T u r k i s h - I s l a m i c state there, in alliance with
Persia a n d A f g h a n i s t a n , I n d i a w o u l d be directly threatened. "It
would create a vast anti-British hinterland behind the anti-British
tribes on the N o r t h - W e s t e r n frontier."
1
E n v e r , t h o u g h aware of these possibilities, m a d e no precipitate
m o v e but allowed events to evolve favorably on their own. T h e
overthrow of the C z a r left a R u s s i a n army of half a million soldiers in
northeastern T u r k e y , h o l d i n g s u c h m a j o r towns a s T r e b i z o n d ,
T H E P A R T I N G OF T H E WAYS
353
E r z e r u m , a n d K a r s . T h e t r o o p s , initially a t least, were not Bolshevik
in sentiment, b u t suffered from war weariness. As discipline disintegrated, they deserted a n d returned to R u s s i a . In agreement with
the G e r m a n G e n e r a l Staff, the O t t o m a n forces did not attack the
thinning R u s s i a n lines but allowed the R u s s i a n a r m y to dwindle to
nothing of its own a c c o r d .
By the time the Bolsheviks seized power in P e t r o g r a d in the
a u t u m n of 1917, practically all that r e m a i n e d was a volunteer force
f r o m the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n areas across the frontier a n d a few h u n d r e d
R u s s i a n o f f i c e r s . Still E n v e r held b a c k , expecting the Bolsheviks to
sue for p e a c e , as they did several weeks later.
T h e T u r k i s h military situation on the eastern frontier with Persia
also i m p r o v e d of its own a c c o r d . British forces in the south of Persia
had been o p e r a t i n g behind the shield of R u s s i a n forces in the north,
b u t could no longer do so with a s s u r a n c e . As revolutionary fervor
took hold of the R u s s i a n t r o o p s , they b e c a m e increasingly friendly to
the Persian nationalists w h o m they h a d hitherto held in check. On 27
M a y 1917 the pro-Allied r e g i m e in T e h e r a n collapsed, and on 6 J u n e
was replaced by a g o v e r n m e n t of nationalist hue which a p p r o a c h e d
P e t r o g r a d with a view toward r e d u c i n g the R u s s i a n military presence.
2
H i g h - r a n k i n g officials in the War Office in L o n d o n a n d in the
G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a feared that T u r k e y m i g h t attack t h r o u g h Persia
toward A f g h a n i s t a n — a l t h o u g h the Chief of the Imperial G e n e r a l
Staff did not s h a r e these views. T h e C a b i n e t wavered between m a k i n g
concessions to the new Persian r e g i m e or allowing relations to deteriorate; d a n g e r s were a p p a r e n t either way.
As the authority of the K e r e n s k y g o v e r n m e n t in P e t r o g r a d evaporated, the R u s s i a n a r m y in the north of Persia a p p e a r e d to British
officials to be increasingly unreliable. On 31 O c t o b e r 1917 an interd e p a r t m e n t a l c o m m i t t e e in Whitehall decided to p u t the antiBolshevik s e g m e n t s of the R u s s i a n a r m y in northern Persia on the
British payroll; but the R u s s i a n s nonetheless proved unwilling to do
Britain's b i d d i n g .
3
O n c e the Bolsheviks seized power in P e t r o g r a d the following week,
matters rapidly c a m e to a h e a d . Within m o n t h s , on 29 J a n u a r y 1918,
T r o t s k y , as S o v i e t C o m m i s s a r for External Affairs, r e n o u n c e d the
Convention of 1907, which f o r m e d the basis of the A n g l o - R u s s i a n
occupation of Persia. D i s c l a i m i n g responsibility for any antiBolshevik R u s s i a n t r o o p s remaining on Persian soil, he e x p r e s s e d the
hope that the other foreign armies o c c u p y i n g Persian soil—the T u r k s
a n d the B r i t i s h — w o u l d withdraw as well.
T h e British g o v e r n m e n t feared that the R u s s i a n withdrawal would
e x p o s e the I n d i a n A r m y in M e s o p o t a m i a to an attack from b e h i n d by
O t t o m a n a r m i e s wheeling t h r o u g h P e r s i a ; for despite the long conflict
between the two e m p i r e s in that area, Britain h a d c o m e to rely on
354
THE SPOILS OF VICTORY
R u s s i a to hold the line against the T u r k s in northern Persia, a n d was
uncertain what course to p u r s u e when that protection was abruptly
withdrawn.
II
I n M a r c h 1918 G e r m a n y i m p o s e d c r u s h i n g armistice t e r m s o n the
defeated R u s s i a n s . As soon as they h a d signed the armistice with
R u s s i a , the O t t o m a n a n d G e r m a n e m p i r e s b e g a n t o d i s p u t e p o s s e s s i o n
of the provinces that the R u s s i a n E m p i r e had ruled adjoining the
T u r k i s h frontier. Christian G e o r g i a a n d A r m e n i a , a n d M o s l e m
A z e r b a i j a n — t h e three states collectively called T r a n s c a u c a s i a — w e r e
now i n d e p e n d e n t . G e r m a n y urgently needed the agricultural a n d
mineral wealth a n d the railroad s y s t e m of G e o r g i a , a n d even m o r e so
the oil wells of A z e r b a i j a n , to sustain her war effort. T h i n k i n g ahead
to the postwar world, G e r m a n leaders also intended to use
T r a n s c a u c a s i a as a s p e a r h e a d into the markets of the M i d d l e E a s t .
T h e O t t o m a n leaders also looked to the commercial u s e s of the
provinces across their frontier. T h e y thought in t e r m s of restoring
the old trade route with I r a n , a n d of reviving their Black S e a a n d
C r i m e a n c o m m e r c e . E n v e r , a b o v e all, a i m e d at the creation of a
new T u r k i s h e m p i r e that stretched into Central A s i a , to which
T r a n s c a u c a s i a would be the link.
C o n v i n c e d that G e r m a n y had d i s r e g a r d e d T u r k i s h interests when
she negotiated the t e r m s of the armistice with R u s s i a , E n v e r p r o ceeded to d i s r e g a r d G e r m a n interests in T r a n s c a u c a s i a , and sent the
flower of his remaining a r m i e s across the frontier to c o n q u e r G e o r g i a
a n d A r m e n i a a n d t o m a r c h o n A z e r b a i j a n . F o r the p u r p o s e h e
created a special a r m y c o r p s , d e t a c h e d from the regular O t t o m a n
a r m y which was p e r m e a t e d with G e r m a n officers. H i s new " A r m y of
I s l a m " contained no G e r m a n s : it consisted only of O t t o m a n troops
a n d Azerbaijani T a r t a r s . Its o r d e r s were to m a r c h on the Azerbaijani
metropolis of B a k u , which had been taken over by a local Soviet.
B a k u , an industrialized city of s o m e 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 people on the shores of
the C a s p i a n S e a , was only half M o s l e m a n d quite unlike the surr o u n d i n g T a r t a r hinterland. At the time it was the great o i l - p r o d u c i n g
city of the M i d d l e E a s t .
By 1918 the military i m p o r t a n c e of oil b e g a n to be generally recognized. B e f o r e the war, Churchill's A d m i r a l t y had switched to oil as
* Winston Churchill, who had recognized it before the war and had arranged at
that time for the British government to purchase a majority shareholding in the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, aroused a great deal of opposition, especially within
the Government of India, from British officials who did not see the need for it.
4
THE PARTING
355
OF T H E WAYS
fuel for the navy's s h i p s a n d , d u r i n g the war, the Allies c a m e to rely
heavily on f u e l - c o n s u m i n g trucks for land t r a n s p o r t . T a n k s a n d
aircraft h a d b e g u n to c o m e fully into their own in the last d a y s of the
war and they, too, c o n s u m e d quantities of g a s a n d oil. In 1918
C l e m e n c e a u ' s g o v e r n m e n t i n F r a n c e and the U . S . D e p a r t m e n t o f
the N a v y both c a m e to recognize that oil had b e c o m e of cardinal
importance.
G e r m a n y , beset by s h o r t a g e s , h a d c o u n t e d on replenishing her
resources f r o m the c a p t u r e d s o u t h a n d west of R u s s i a , a n d controlled
m u c h of the e c o n o m y of G e o r g i a d u r i n g 1918; b u t in Berlin the
resources of G e o r g i a were not r e g a r d e d as sufficient. E n v e r ' s race to
B a k u , in A z e r b a i j a n , threatened to deprive G e r m a n y of the oil she so
desperately n e e d e d , a n d also threatened to wreck the armistice arr a n g e m e n t with R u s s i a . T h e e n r a g e d h e a d s o f the G e r m a n G e n e r a l
Staff sent a n g r y notes to E n v e r , which he d i s r e g a r d e d .
T h e state secretary o f the G e r m a n N a v y D e p a r t m e n t told the
leaders of his country's F o r e i g n Office and G e n e r a l Staff that it was
absolutely crucial for G e r m a n y to get hold of B a k u ' s oil a n d that the
O t t o m a n attack o n the city therefore had t o b e s t o p p e d . T h e G e r m a n
leaders told the R u s s i a n a m b a s s a d o r in Berlin that they would take
steps to s t o p the O t t o m a n a d v a n c e if R u s s i a gave a s s u r a n c e s that she
w o u l d s u p p l y at least s o m e of B a k u ' s oil to G e r m a n y . "Of c o u r s e , we
will a g r e e , " L e n i n c a b l e d to Stalin in r e p o r t i n g this d e v e l o p m e n t .
5
6
B a k u was also important strategically. As a m a j o r port it d o m i n a t e d
C a s p i a n s h i p p i n g and would enable E n v e r to m o v e his a r m i e s by
sea, if he c h o s e , to the eastern shore of the C a s p i a n , where the
M o s l e m s of T u r k e s t a n could be e x p e c t e d to rally to his s t a n d a r d a n d
where he would avail himself of the railroad network that the
R u s s i a n s h a d built there to enable t h e m to reach A f g h a n i s t a n a n d
attack I n d i a .
T h e British, keenly aware of the d a n g e r , viewed Enver's p r o g r e s s
with f o r e b o d i n g .
Ill
T w o tiny British military m i s s i o n s in northern Persia watched these
events from across the frontier with no clear idea of what role they
should play in t h e m .
M a j o r - G e n e r a l L . C . D u n s t e r v i l l e w a s appointed chief o f the
British m i s s i o n to the C a u c a s u s in early 1918. H a d he ever reached
Tiflis, the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n capital, he w o u l d have s e r v e d as British
Representative there as well, where his objective w o u l d have b e e n to
help stiffen the resistance of the R u s s i a n a r m y in T u r k e y against an
Ottoman advance.
7
356
THE
SPOILS
OF
VICTORY
Dunsterville's convoy of forty-one F o r d cars a n d vans traveled via
M e s o p o t a m i a into Persia a n d h e a d e d toward a Persian port on the
C a s p i a n S e a then called Enzeli (later r e n a m e d Pahlevi) on the road
to T r a n s c a u c a s i a . By the t i m e the British arrived, m o s t of
T r a n s c a u c a s i a had fallen into O t t o m a n or G e r m a n h a n d s . A worried
British g o v e r n m e n t o r d e r e d D u n s t e r v i l l e to clear the r o a d to Enzeli
of a revolutionary b a n d of Persian nationalists, allied to the Bolsheviks
but also acting in the interests of the a d v a n c i n g O t t o m a n A r m y of
Islam.
A s E n v e r ' s forces a p p r o a c h e d B a k u , the British g o v e r n m e n t d e bated what role Dunsterville's tiny force s h o u l d or could play in the
u n e x p e c t e d battle for Central A s i a in which T u r k s , G e r m a n s ,
R u s s i a n s , a n d others were involved. T h e question also arose of what
M a j o r - G e n e r a l Wilfred Malleson's mission ought to be. G e n e r a l
Malleson was an officer in the Military Intelligence b r a n c h of the
I n d i a n A r m y , who had served for years on the staff of L o r d
K i t c h e n e r . S i m l a h a d sent him out with six officers to M e s h e d , in
eastern P e r s i a , to watch over d e v e l o p m e n t s in the vast lands of
R u s s i a n T u r k e s t a n that were believed to be Enver's next objective.
D u n s t e r v i l l e was to watch over the l a n d s to the west of the C a s p i a n
S e a , a n d Malleson was to watch over the lands to the east.
In Malleson's area of responsibility, there were several m a t t e r s that
concerned the British military leaders. O n e of these was the large
store of cotton which might fall into e n e m y h a n d s . Another was the
presence o f s o m e 3 5 , 0 0 0 G e r m a n a n d Austrian prisoners-of-war who
might be released either by the B o l s h e v i k s or by E n v e r ' s forces.
To the British leaders the intentions of the enemy forces at work
west a n d east of the C a s p i a n were o b s c u r e d by the g r o w i n g political
fragmentation in those a r e a s . Politically the G e r m a n s a p p e a r e d not
only to be hand-in-glove locally with the anti-Bolsheviks in Tiflis,
but also to be involved with the Bolsheviks in P e t r o g r a d , while
having fallen out with the T u r k s , who were their p u b l i c allies b u t
their secret enemies. E n v e r ' s allied force of O t t o m a n a n d Azerbaijani
M o s l e m T u r k s a n d T a r t a r s was o n the m a r c h toward B a k u , which
was g o v e r n e d by a divided Soviet that reflected a division within the
city itself. T h e Azerbaijani half of the population favored the O t t o m a n
E m p i r e , while the A r m e n i a n s , fearing m a s s a c r e , were in favor of
a n y b o d y b u t the T u r k s . T h e Social Revolutionaries a n d other nonBolshevik R u s s i a n s feared British intervention, b u t in the end grew
to fear T u r k e y m o r e . S t e p a n S h a u m i a n , the Bolshevik c h a i r m a n of
the Soviet, while leading the resistance to the O t t o m a n - A z e r b a i j a n i
allies, even preferred T u r k i s h rule to a British intervention a n d , in
any event, h a d received direct o r d e r s from L e n i n a n d S t a l i n not to
accept British a i d .
In T u r k e s t a n a Bolshevik-controlled R u s s i a n Soviet was in control
T H E P A R T I N G O F T H E WAYS
357
of the oasis town of T a s h k e n t , b u t its forces h a d been beaten by the
native T u r k s of B u k h a r a , and had been obliged to recognize the
E m i r of B u k h a r a — w h o s e d o m a i n s h a d fallen u n d e r R u s s i a n sway
d u r i n g the G r e a t G a m e in the nineteenth c e n t u r y — a s once again an
independent ruler. R u m o r s reaching L o n d o n indicated that the newly
independent khanates of B u k h a r a a n d K h i v a m i g h t be entering into
alliance with the P o r t e .
8
As viewed f r o m L o n d o n , the c h a o s in Central A s i a w a s a s o u r c e of
d a n g e r a n d p r o m i s e . T h e d a n g e r was that it might p e r m i t an assault
on I n d i a , a n d on the I n d i a n Army in Persia a n d M e s o p o t a m i a , that
could ignite flames i m p o s s i b l e to e x t i n g u i s h . A c c o r d i n g to a G e n e r a l
Staff m e m o r a n d u m :
[ G e r m a n y ] will m a k e u s e of the P a n - T u r a n i a n m o v e m e n t and
of M o h a m m e d a n fanaticism to fan into a flame the ever glowing
e m b e r s of a religious war, in order to let loose on I n d i a the
p e n t - u p tide of a M o s l e m invasion . .. While R u s s i a was healthy
a n d while Persia was u n d e r control we were able to deal with
this difficulty, but if G e r m a n a g e n t s had free access to the
lawless tribes of Afghanistan a n d the frontiers of I n d i a , b r e d as
they have been on tales of the legendary wealth of loot which
m i g h t be theirs, i n n u m e r a b l e h o r d e s of s a v a g e warriors could
s w a r m into the plains, ravaging, m u r d e r i n g , destroying. T h e
institutions built by long years of careful g o v e r n m e n t would be
swept away in a few short weeks a n d the attenuated g a r r i s o n of
the country would have to be largely reinforced f r o m t r o o p s
badly needed elsewhere. N o n e b u t White
troops could be
trusted.
9
S i n c e British policy-makers believed the R u s s i a n Bolshevik government was in the pay of imperial G e r m a n y , a n d were not aware of the
extent to which the Porte a n d the Wilhelmstrasse had p a r t e d c o m p a n y , it a p p e a r e d in 1918 that the G e r m a n s had taken control of
northern Asia, were in p r o c e s s of taking over the center of A s i a , a n d
were p r e p a r i n g to m o u n t an attack on British positions in southern
Asia. It fitted in with the wartime view that G e r m a n y a i m e d at a
world e m p i r e a n d with the fear that, when the war w a s over, all of
A s i a might be left as a vast slave colony in G e r m a n y ' s p o s s e s s i o n ,
a n d its wealth a n d raw materials w o u l d fuel G e r m a n industry a n d
allow it to d o m i n a t e the g l o b e .
L e o A m e r y p r o p o s e d to L l o y d G e o r g e that Britain s h o u l d a d o p t a
strategy to counter that threat. If Britain were to c a p t u r e the center
of A s i a , then the partition of R u s s i a between G e r m a n y a n d Britain,
which Milner had p r o p o s e d the year before, would in effect be
"White troops": British rather than Indian soldiers of the Indian Army.
358
T H E SPOILS OF VICTORY
achieved. At the end of 1917 A m e r y noted in his diary that " T h e
war is g o i n g E a s t with a v e n g e a n c e a n d we shall find ourselves
fighting for the rest of it to decide where the A n g l o - G e r m a n b o u n d a ry shall run across A s i a . " T h e F r e n c h , looking to eastern E u r o p e for
their p o s t w a r gains, would fail, he p r e d i c t e d , "while we poor meek
British will p r o b a b l y find our n o n - a g g r e s s i v e little E m p i r e at the end
of the war including T u r k e s t a n , Persia, a n d the C a u c a s u s ! "
T h i s represented yet a further enlargement of the vast section of
the globe that A m e r y r e g a r d e d as p r o p e r l y falling u n d e r British
h e g e m o n y . L i k e Milner's other associates, his essential focus was on
"the whole of the great semi-circle which runs from C a p e T o w n to
C a i r o , thence t h r o u g h Palestine, M e s o p o t a m i a a n d Persia to I n d i a
a n d s o t h r o u g h S i n g a p o r e t o Australia a n d N e w Z e a l a n d . " Within
that area, he wrote to the P r i m e Minister of Australia in late 1917,
"What we want . . . is a British M o n r o e D o c t r i n e which should keep
that portion of the world free f r o m future interference of a m b i t i o u s
powers . . . "
1 0
n
By J u n e of 1918 A m e r y had c o m e to feel (and to advise L l o y d
G e o r g e ) that, if G e r m a n expansion in A s i a were not s t o p p e d , this
" S o u t h e r n British World" could not "go a b o u t its peaceful b u s i n e s s
without constant fear of G e r m a n a g g r e s s i o n . " He wrote that "as soon
as this 'little s i d e show' in the West is over . . . we shall have to take
the war for the m a s t e r y of A s i a in h a n d s e r i o u s l y . " T h i s harked
back to his view that British foreign policy was flawed by giving
Britain's interests in E u r o p e priority over her interests elsewhere. He
wrote in 1917 that " T h e great d a n g e r to my mind is that the F o r e i g n
Office a n d the public .. . take too E u r o p e a n a point of view about
peace t e r m s , instead of looking at them from the perspective of an
E m p i r e which i s distributed all over the world . . . " H e also thought
that they were taking too E u r o p e a n a point of view a b o u t the war.
He discerned fresh d a n g e r s in A s i a .
12
1 3
He wrote to S m u t s on 16 O c t o b e r 1917, warning that E n v e r would
gain "some five million" T u r k s w h o dwelt in T r a n s c a u c a s i a and then
would link up with the T u r k s of T u r k e s t a n . E v e n t s early in the
following year s e e m e d to confirm this view.
A m e r y , like other British military a n d political leaders in the first
half of 1918, was p e r s u a d e d that the G e r m a n a n d O t t o m a n c o n q u e s t
of T r a n s c a u c a s i a d e m o n s t r a t e d that G e r m a n y was in process of executing the " G r a n d D e s i g n " outlined in J o h n Buchan's Greenmantle.
In B u c h a n ' s adventure novel, the G e r m a n s were planning a sweep
t h r o u g h I s l a m i c A s i a to a n d a c r o s s the Indian frontier to destroy the
British E m p i r e in the east and replace it with their o w n . T h u s in
w a g i n g war as in m a k i n g peace, a c c o r d i n g to A m e r y , British forces
should be m o v e d up to a defensive line running all the way a c r o s s the
former R u s s i a n E m p i r e from the U r a l s in the west to S i b e r i a in the
east.
1 4
1 5
1 6
359
T H E P A R T I N G OF T H E WAYS
Neither the War Office nor the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a was willing
to m a k e available the forces for s u c h l a r g e s c h e m e s in distant p l a c e s ;
and A m e r y went so far as to p r o p o s e that J a p a n a n d the U n i t e d
S t a t e s s h o u l d be invited to associate themselves in the enterprise of
o c c u p y i n g the U r a l s to S i b e r i a l i n e . British a n d Allied military
leaders also u r g e d that J a p a n s h o u l d be asked to s e n d a r m i e s t h r o u g h
S i b e r i a a n d across A s i a to join battle with Enver's forces west of the
Caspian S e a .
17
1 8
B u t L l o y d G e o r g e a n d L o r d Milner were s o completely occupied
with the war in E u r o p e a n d Palestine that A m e r y c o u l d not attract
their attention; a n d in the a b s e n c e of their leadership, their s u b o r d i nates failed to develop a coherent policy. Breathtakingly a m b i t i o u s
geopolitical g o a l s were outlined by A m e r y a n d by general officers of
the high c o m m a n d , but no r e s o u r c e s were allocated a n d no strategy
was put in motion to achieve t h e m .
S o , without g u i d a n c e and without s u p p o r t , the tiny m i s s i o n s sent
out by the British G o v e r n m e n t of India headed into the interior of
Asia.
IV
B a k u , the oil capital of Central Asia, w a s a focus of activity in the
s u m m e r of 1918, as Bolshevik leaders fled the city. A new nonBolshevik g o v e r n m e n t was hastily f o r m e d , which called in the British.
Dunsterville asked and received p e r m i s s i o n from his s u p e r i o r s to
enter a n d defend B a k u . H i s a d v a n c e g u a r d arrived in B a k u 4 A u g u s t ,
thwarting G e r m a n h o p e s of obtaining B a k u ' s oil, w h e r e u p o n the
G e r m a n s d e c i d e d that T u r k e y was a lesser danger than Britain just
a s the Bolsheviks were reaching the o p p o s i t e c o n c l u s i o n .
The
G e r m a n s asked p e r m i s s i o n of the Bolshevik g o v e r n m e n t to launch an
attack on British-held B a k u , either alone or in c o m b i n a t i o n with
Enver's A r m y of I s l a m . T h e Bolshevik g o v e r n m e n t agre.ed to accept
a G e r m a n o c c u p a t i o n of B a k u , but not in combination with the
A r m y of I s l a m ; for even the British, a c c o r d i n g to P e t r o g r a d , were
preferable to the T u r k s . B u t the G e r m a n force in G e o r g i a w a s too
weak to s p a r e t r o o p s in time for a c a m p a i g n against B a k u — a n d that
left the A r m y of I s l a m a n d the British mission as the only contestants
in the field.
19
Dunsterville's force a m o u n t e d to a b o u t 900 officers a n d men according to one s o u r c e , or a b o u t 1,400 according to a n o t h e r . T h e
A r m y of I s l a m was estimated to be ten or twenty times greater.
When it attacked B a k u , the British were on their o w n ; local forces
proved to be of little help. On 14 S e p t e m b e r Dunsterville evacuated
his forces from the city and withdrew to Persia, having o c c u p i e d the
c i t y — a n d d e p r i v e d the enemy of oil—for six weeks. A British
20
360
THE SPOILS OF VICTORY
R e u t e r s ' d i s p a t c h d e s c r i b e d the B a k u evacuation as one of the
"thrillingest c h a p t e r s " of the w a r .
At a b o u t the time that D u n s t e r v i l l e m a r c h e d to the relief of B a k u ,
G e n e r a l M a l l e s o n , also by invitation, m a r c h e d to the relief of
T u r k e s t a n , whose g o v e r n m e n t h a d been f o r m e d b y anti-Bolshevik
R u s s i a n M e n s h e v i k s a n d Social Revolutionaries with the aid of railroad workers. T h e T u r k e s t a n g o v e r n m e n t p r o c l a i m e d its i n d e p e n d ence from the Bolshevik R u s s i a n authorities; a n d , in r e s p o n d i n g to
its a p p e a l , Malleson in effect w a s intervening in a R u s s i a n civil
war—-an act p r o m p t e d by fears that G e r m a n y would get T u r k e s t a n ' s
cotton s u p p l i e s , a n d that the G e r m a n a n d A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n
prisoners-of-war would be freed.
2 1
T h e T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g native p o p u l a t i o n o f T u r k e s t a n , while o p p o s e d to both the Bolshevik a n d the anti-Bolshevik R u s s i a n settlers,
threw their s u p p o r t behind the latter when forced to choose between
the two. It was expected that once Enver's A r m y of I s l a m arrived,
they would s u p p o r t it.
T h e r e on the plains of T u r k e s t a n — i n the m i d d l e of nowhere, as
far as the western world was c o n c e r n e d — t h e confused a r m i e s clashed.
On the battlefields of D u s h a k , K a a k h a , a n d M e r v , G e n e r a l
Malleson's B r i t i s h - I n d i a n forces fought alongside E n v e r ' s T u r k i s h
s u p p o r t e r s against Soviet R u s s i a n s aided b y imperial G e r m a n a n d
A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n prisoners-of-war who had been released a n d a r m e d
by the Bolsheviks. Alliances had been r e v e r s e d : it was now Britain
and Turkey versus Russia and Germany.
General Malleson did not withdraw from Central A s i a until April
1919, half a year after the war e n d e d ; a n d he withdrew only when
the anti-Bolshevik White a r m i e s of G e n e r a l Denikin o c c u p i e d the
area. H i s intervention, which initially was a i m e d at s t o p p i n g the
p r o g r e s s of the O t t o m a n a n d G e r m a n e m p i r e s , in the end was
directed against the Bolsheviks.* At the time the British authorities
did not distinguish clearly a m o n g the three; all of them s e e m e d to be
r a n g e d together on the e n e m y side in the world war.
T h e G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a had also sent out a third mission,
consisting of three officers who were u n a w a r e of the Dunsterville a n d
Malleson forays into former R u s s i a n territory. T h e y were sent to
K a s h g a r in C h i n e s e T u r k e s t a n to o b s e r v e d e v e l o p m e n t s from a c r o s s
the b o r d e r . O n c e there they decided to cross into R u s s i a n T u r k e s t a n
Interventions elsewhere in the Russian Empire by British and Allied troops fail
outside the scope of this volume. T h e Government of India did not coordinate its
three missions, discussed above with the other interventions, nor did Simla send out
the three missions in .the context of some more general plan or pattern of
intervention.
361
T H E P A R T I N G OF T H E WAYS
a n d to p r o c e e d to T a s h k e n t — t h e seat of the local S o v i e t government—-in an a t t e m p t to win the cooperation of the Bolshevik authorities in the m a t t e r s of the prisoners-of-war a n d of the cotton. Only
when they arrived in T a s h k e n t did they learn that M a l l e s o n had
intervened on behalf of the rival g o v e r n m e n t .
T w o o f the three officers returned t o K a s h g a r . T h e third, Colonel
F r e d e r i c k M a r s h m a n Bailey, d e c i d e d to r e m a i n in T a s h k e n t to represent British interests in the event that the local Bolshevik r e g i m e
collapsed. When he learned that the local authorities were p r e p a r i n g
to take m e a s u r e s against him, he d i s g u i s e d himself a n d d i s a p p e a r e d .
In hiding he took m a n y identities, a m o n g t h e m those of a H u n g a r i a n
cook, a R u m a n i a n c o a c h m a n , and an A l b a n i a n butterfly collector. He
r e m a i n e d u n d e r c o v e r until 1920, g a t h e r i n g information as events
unfolded. At the end he p o s e d as an agent of Bolshevik R u s s i a n
counterintelligence. Soviet authorities, greatly e x a g g e r a t i n g , credited
him with b e i n g the m a s t e r m i n d of vast intrigues against t h e m .
L o n d o n a n d P e t r o g r a d , having been wartime allies not long before,
were now enemies. Between 1917 a n d 1918, the political world had
turned u p s i d e d o w n .
V
As O t t o m a n fortunes p r o s p e r e d in the east, they c r u m b l e d in the
south a n d west. A secret report to D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e in 1918
indicated that E n v e r was talking of an O t t o m a n e m p i r e from the
Adriatic to I n d i a ; yet at other times he s u p p o s e d l y s p o k e of surrendering. E n v e r was reported to have predicted gloomily that "if the
G e r m a n s won this War, T u r k e y would b e G e r m a n y ' s v a s s a l . "
L u d e n d o r f f , the p r e s i d i n g g e n i u s of the G e r m a n G e n e r a l Staff,
claimed that the Porte could not be t r u s t e d . T h e oil of B a k u was
essential to G e r m a n y , he s t a t e d , but the T u r k s h a d shown that they
intended to keep all the resources of T r a n s c a u c a s i a for t h e m s e l v e s .
In r e s p o n s e to an inquiry from the Wilhelmstrasse to the G e n e r a l
Staff, L u d e n d o r f f reported in S e p t e m b e r 1918 that the military
authorities had been s t u d y i n g the c o n s e q u e n c e s s h o u l d T u r k e y betray
G e r m a n y a n d g o over t o the Allied s i d e .
2 2
23
2 4
T h e close collaboration between G e r m a n y and Bolshevik R u s s i a
infuriated the Porte. A g a i n s t a b a c k g r o u n d of T u r k i s h p r e s s criticism
of G e r m a n m e d d l i n g in T r a n s c a u c a s i a , T a l a a t sent word to Berlin
that if G e r m a n y continued to m a k e a r r a n g e m e n t s with R u s s i a — t h e
"enemy of y e s t e r d a y a n d the enemy of t o m o r r o w " — a t T u r k e y ' s
expense, the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t m i g h t have to go its own way in
the w a r . On 7 S e p t e m b e r 1918 T a l a a t went to Berlin to a r g u e for
2 5
362
THE
SPOILS
OF
VICTORY
organizing the T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g millions of Central A s i a for a military
c r u s a d e against B r i t a i n — a n d R u s s i a .
At the s a m e time Britain, too, m o v e d closer to war against
R u s s i a . Malleson remained in C e n t r a l A s i a , where the execution of a
g r o u p of Bolshevik c o m m i s s a r s by his anti-Bolshevik allies was b l a m e d
on Britain by the P e t r o g r a d g o v e r n m e n t . On the other side of the
C a s p i a n , a s u d d e n collapse of the Central Powers followed by the
s o o n - t o - b e - d i s c u s s e d armistices of a u t u m n 1918, led British forces to
return through B a k u to replace O t t o m a n a n d G e r m a n t r o o p s in the
independent republics o f T r a n s c a u c a s i a . T h u s the s o u t h e r n stretches
of the former R u s s i a n E m p i r e on both sides of the C a s p i a n S e a
a p p e a r e d to be in the h a n d s of anti-Bolshevik or separatist g r o u p s
u n d e r British protection.
2 6
A significant observation was m a d e by a British participant in the
first battle between Malleson's force a n d the Bolsheviks in Central
A s i a . B o t h the anti-Bolshevik t r o o p s a n d the Bolshevik t r o o p s , he
noted, were wearing the s a m e u n i f o r m s . "At close q u a r t e r s , " he
wrote, "it was difficult to d i s t i n g u i s h friend f r o m e n e m y . " By the
a u t u m n of 1918 that w a s true not merely in Central A s i a but all
across the M i d d l e E a s t .
27
39
BY T H E SHORES OF TROY
i
In the s u m m e r of 1918 the Chief of the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff
advised the I m p e r i a l War C a b i n e t in L o n d o n that victory in E u r o p e
could not be won before the m i d d l e of 1919 a n d was far m o r e likely
to be won in the s u m m e r of 1920. C o m m a n d e r s in the field took a
m o r e hopeful view of the p r o s p e c t s for an early victory, b u t they h a d
frequently been w r o n g in the p a s t , a n d in L o n d o n their cheerful
predictions were viewed with c o n s i d e r a b l e s k e p t i c i s m .
L u d e n d o r f f ' s powerful offensives of the s p r i n g a n d early s u m m e r ,
which h a d once again threatened P a r i s , h a d been s t o p p e d , a n d the
G e r m a n s were falling b a c k ; b u t b y S e p t e m b e r 1918 L u d e n d o r f f h a d
established a s t r o n g defensive line a n d there was no reason to believe
that he could not hold it for a long t i m e . T h e war in the E a s t , too,
s e e m e d likely to d r a g on, for E n v e r ' s forces driving t o w a r d the
C a s p i a n s e e m e d poised to continue their offensive toward Persia,
A f g h a n i s t a n , or I n d i a .
S u d d e n l y — a n d u n e x p e c t e d l y — a n Allied b r e a k t h r o u g h c a m e in
B u l g a r i a , where G e n e r a l L o u i s - F e l i x - F r a n c p i s F r a n c h e t d ' E s p e r e y ,
the new F r e n c h c o m m a n d e r of the Allied forces in hitherto-neglected
Salonika in G r e e c e , launched a lightning offensive at the e n d of the
s u m m e r . B u l g a r i a collapsed a n d , on 26 S e p t e m b e r 1918, asked for an
armistice. T h e r e q u e s t s h o u l d have been forwarded t o the S u p r e m e
War Council of the Allies in P a r i s , b u t F r a n c h e t d'Esperey d a r e d not
chance the delay. He c o m p o s e d the t e r m s of an armistice himself,
a n d h a d it s i g n e d within a matter of days so that he could turn
immediately to m o u n t a devastating offensive on the D a n u b e against
the G e r m a n s a n d A u s t r i a n s , t h u s successfully executing the
" E a s t e r n " strategy that L l o y d G e o r g e h a d been a d v o c a t i n g in vain
ever since the war b e g a n .
On 29 S e p t e m b e r L u d e n d o r f f , learning that a B u l g a r i a n armistice
* But of course it can be argued that it would not have worked before 1918.
363
364
THE
SPOILS
OF
VICTORY
h a d been c o n c l u d e d that day, a d v i s e d his g o v e r n m e n t that G e r m a n y
w o u l d therefore have to s u e for an a r m i s t i c e t o o : he h a d no t r o o p s
with which to make a s t a n d on the new southeastern front—the
D a n u b e front—that Franchet d'Esperey had opened up.
T h e British C a b i n e t had not e x p e c t e d the e n e m y to collapse so
soon or so s u d d e n l y , was not p r e p a r e d for it, and did not entirely
believe it. A r m i s t i c e t e r m s for the various enemy p o w e r s h a d not
been drafted or even c o n s i d e r e d . A d a y after F r a n c h e t d ' E s p e r e y
received the B u l g a r i a n request for an armistice, the B r i t i s h Chief of
the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff i n q u i r e d "what our F o r e i g n Office was
g o i n g to do if T u r k e y followed s u i t . " B a l f o u r , the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y ,
replied—with c o m p l e t e c a n d o r — t h a t he did not know.
1
B u t the issue h a d to be faced i m m e d i a t e l y : it p r e s e n t e d itself
within a matter of d a y s . Between 1 a n d 6 October b o t h the g o v e r n ment of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d several prominent individual
T u r k i s h leaders launched peace feelers. On the night of 3—4 O c t o b e r
G e r m a n y , too, sent a note to President Wilson, i n a u g u r a t i n g armistice
negotiations that were to go on for several weeks, as fighting continued a n d as G e r m a n t r o o p s successfully held on to a defensive line
that ran t h r o u g h eastern F r a n c e a n d B e l g i u m .
On 1 O c t o b e r the British War C a b i n e t d e c i d e d to convoke a
m e e t i n g of the S u p r e m e War C o u n c i l of the Allies in order to
a d d r e s s the question of peace t e r m s for T u r k e y . At the s a m e time,
however, the War C a b i n e t d e c i d e d to s e n d two British D r e a d n o u g h t class battleships to the A e g e a n to strengthen Britain against F r a n c e
in the waters off T u r k e y .
T h e C a b i n e t was seized by a panicky fear that the war m i g h t c o m e
to an end before the British a r m e d forces could o c c u p y the vital
M i d d l e E a s t e r n areas it hoped to d o m i n a t e . A m e r y warned S m u t s
and the Chief of the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff that only actual p o s s e s s i o n
of the M i d d l e E a s t before a cease-fire went into effect w o u l d enable
the C a b i n e t to b r i n g the region into the British o r b i t . T h e a r m i e s of
British I n d i a in M e s o p o t a m i a were still weeks away f r o m strategically
important a n d oil-rich M o s u l ; on 2 O c t o b e r its c o m m a n d e r was
advised by the War Office to "occupy as large a portion of the oilbearing regions as p o s s i b l e . "
2
3
On 3 O c t o b e r the War C a b i n e t d i s c u s s e d at length the q u e s t i o n of
a n armistice o r peace a g r e e m e n t with the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e
P r i m e Minister, who h o p e d to r e d u c e F r a n c e ' s a n d Italy's share in
Britain's winnings in O t t o m a n A s i a , a r g u e d that in all fairness her
Allies were not entitled to what they h a d originally been p r o m i s e d .
A c c o r d i n g to an extract from m i n u t e s of the meeting,
T h e P r i m e Minister said h e h a d been refreshing his m e m o r y
a b o u t the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t , a n d h a d c o m e to the conclusion that it was quite inapplicable to present c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,
BY THE
SHORES
OF
TROY
365
a n d was altogether a m o s t u n d e s i r a b l e a g r e e m e n t from the
British point of view. H a v i n g been c o n c l u d e d m o r e than two
years a g o , it entirely overlooked the fact that our position in
T u r k e y had b e e n won by very large British forces, whereas our
Allies h a d c o n t r i b u t e d but little to the r e s u l t .
4
It was s p e c i o u s reasoning, b u t B a l f o u r , r e s p o n d i n g as though the
P r i m e Minister were sincere in u r g i n g fair play, pointed out the
fallacy in his reasoning.
Mr Balfour r e m i n d e d the War C a b i n e t that the original idea
had been that any territories that the Allies m i g h t a c q u i r e
should be pooled and should not be r e g a r d e d as the p r o p e r t y of
the nation which had won t h e m . T h e theory had been that the
fighting in one theatre of war, where there was little to g a i n ,
m i g h t be j u s t as i m p o r t a n t a contribution to the c a u s e of the
Allies as m u c h easier fighting in other theatres where great
s u c c e s s e s were achieved. He believed that s o m e statement of
this kind had been m a d e .
5
B o n a r L a w confirmed Balfour's recollection.
L l o y d G e o r g e to