 Naguiat vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 269 SCRA 564, G.R. No. 116123 March 13,
1997
Same; Same; Same; Torts; Corporate Torts; Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the definite scope of
“corporate tort.”—Essentially, “tort” consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty
imposed by law. Simply stated, tort is a breach of a legal duty. Article 283 of the Labor Code mandates
the employer to grant separation pay to employees in case of closure or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, which is the
condition obtaining at bar. CFTI failed to comply with this law-imposed duty or obligation. Consequently,
its stockholder who was actively enginaged in the management or operation of the business should be
held personally liable.
 Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, 525 SCRA 11, G.R. No. 141309 June 19, 2007
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Damages; The general rule is that a public officer is not liable for
damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within
the scope of his assigned tasks; However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer
protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.— An officer who acts within his authority to
administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been
caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to
judgment for monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from
damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his
authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.
 Vinzona-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, 575 SCRA 23, G.R. No. 141309 December 23,
2008
Same; Same; In determining whether a public officer is liable for an improper performance or nonperformance of a duty, it must first be determined which of the two classes of duties is involved.—For,
indeed, as the eminent Floyd R. Mechem instructs, “[t]he liability of a public officer to an individual or
the public is based upon and is co-extensive with his duty to the individual or the public. If to the one or
the other he owes no duty, to that one he can incur no liability.” Stated differently, when what is
involved is a “duty owing to the public in general,” an individual cannot have a cause of action for
damages against the public officer, even though he may have been injured by the action or inaction of
the officer. In such a case, there is damage to the individual but no wrong to him. In performing or
failing to perform a public duty, the officer has touched his interest to his prejudice; but the officer owes
no duty to him as an individual. The remedy in this case is not judicial but political.
Same; Same; Exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers a particular or special
injury on account of the public officer’s improper performance or non-performance of his public duty.—
An individual can never be suffered to sue for an injury which, technically, is one to the public only; he
must show a wrong which he specially suffers, and damage alone does not constitute a wrong. A
contrary precept (that an individual, in the absence of a special and peculiar injury, can still institute an
action against a public officer on account of an improper performance or non-performance of a duty
owing to the public generally) will lead to a deluge of suits, for if one man might have an action, all men
might have the like—the complaining individual has no better right than anybody else. If such were the
case, no one will serve a public office. Thus, the rule restated is that an individual cannot have a
particular action against a public officer without a particular injury, or a particular right, which are the
grounds upon which all actions are founded.
Same; Same; A public officer, such as the petitioner, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-making power,
owes a duty to the public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of valid
administrative regulations.—What is involved is a public officer’s duty owing to the public in general.
The petitioner, as the then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, is being taken to task for
Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 37-93 which she issued without the requisite notice, hearing
and publication, and which, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 236
(1996), we declared as having “fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance.” A public
officer, such as the petitioner, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes a duty to the
public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of valid administrative
regulations. But it is a duty owed not to the respondent alone, but to the entire body politic who would
be affected, directly or indirectly, by the administrative rule.
Same; Damages; To have a cause of action for damages against the petitioner, respondent must allege
that it suffered a particular or special injury on account of the non-performance by petitioner of the
public duty.— A careful reading of the complaint filed with the trial court reveals that no particular
injury is alleged to have been sustained by the respondent. The phrase “financial and business
difficulties” mentioned in the complaint is a vague notion, ambiguous in concept, and cannot translate
into a “particular injury.” In contrast, the facts of the case eloquently demonstrate that the petitioner
took nothing from the respondent, as the latter did not pay a single centavo on the tax assessment
levied by the former by virtue of RMC 37-93.
Same; Same; With no “particular injury” alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no delict or
wrongful act or omission attributable to the petitioner that would violate the primary rights of the
respondent; Elements of a cause of action.—With no “particular injury” alleged in the complaint, there
is, therefore, no delict or wrongful act or omission attributable to the petitioner that would violate the
primary rights of the respondent. Without such delict or tortious act or omission, the complaint then
fails to state a cause of action, because a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates
a right of another.
A cause of action exists if the following elements are present:
(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an
act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of defendant to plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of damages.
Damages; Under Article 32 of the Civil Code, the liability of the public officer may accrue even if he/she
acted in good faith, as long as there is a violation of constitutional rights.—The June 19, 2007 Decision
and the dissent herein reiterates that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, the liability of the public officer
may accrue even if he/she acted in good faith, as long as there is a violation of constitutional rights,
citing Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 602 (1999), where we said: Under the aforecited
article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough
that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioners, even on the pretext of justifiable
motives or good faith in the performance of duties.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Dissenting Opinion:
Civil Law; Damages; As long as there was a violation of constitutional rights, a public officer may be held
liable for damages, and it is not even required that he/she acted with malice or bad faith.—
Jurisprudence is settled that to be liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code, a public officer or a private
individual must have an act in violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights regardless of whether
he/she acted in good faith or whether the act was done within or beyond the bounds of authority of
said public officer. The act may have been committed in any manner; what is pivotal is that the act
resulted in a violation of another person’s constitutional rights. No distinction was made whether the
public officer acted within or beyond the scope of authority in order to hold him/her liable. As long as
there was a violation of constitutional rights, a public officer may be held liable for damages, and it is
not even required that he/she acted with malice or bad faith. That the Legislature did not intend to hold
the public officer liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code for violation of constitutional
rights only if he/she acted beyond the scope of authority, is further made clear by the fact that under
Article 32, a private individual is similarly held accountable.
 Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 115, G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
Civil Law; Damages; The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong.— Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that
would have made it so.
Same; Same; Same; Article. 21 of the Civil Code designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict
in this jurisdiction grants adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.—This
notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept
of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books.
Same; Same; Same; Damages pursuant to Article 21 may be awarded not because of promise to marry
but because of fraud and deceit behind it—ln the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We
are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of
the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes
the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality,
no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to
entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award
of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and
deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is
essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
 PACALNA SANGGACALA, ALI MACARAYA MATO, MUALAM DIMATINGCAL, AND CASIMRA
SULTAN, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Respondent.
Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an
Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes
not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission
responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts with certain exceptions, are
to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article
2176 of the Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of
Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that
together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law
on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on
torts.77
In subsequent cases, this Court referred to torts and quasi-delict interchangeably when enumerating the
following elements:
(1) damages suffered by the plaintiff;
(2) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he or she must respond;
and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Environmental tort is a hybrid of two disciplines—tort law and environmental law, and may provide an
"institutional answer that addresses the remaining gaps in public health protection." Environmental
harm may include "immediate and future physical injury to people, emotional distress from fear of
future injury, social and economic disruption, remediation costs, property damage, ecological damage,
and regulatory harms."
While environmental laws are principally concerned with the "prevention or correction of
environmental harm" and tort laws are principally concerned with "righting [a] wrong[,]" the core
principles of these two disciplines show room for overlap:
Tort law is mainly supported by principles of corrective justice or compensation based on fault, and
deterrence, while much of environmental law is supported by principles of prevention, which include
environmental protection and conservation, and deterrence. It therefore follows that where an
environmental law or action principally furthers corrective justice and deterrence, the underlying
principles would appear to support overlap with tort law most fully. In areas where an environmental
law or interest is principally concerned with other policy determinations, for instance prevention and
conservation, tort law would appear less suited or appropriate for overlap.
Such a formulation helps to explain why a law establishing a nature preserve, which many courts and
commentators might consider an environmental law, does not implicate or overlap with tort law. The
principles and policy objectives supporting the law are entirely distinct from that of tort law. Conversely,
a law imposing liability for the cleanup of hazardous substances, which is law designed to mete out
corrective justice and compensate for a direct injury, would overlap with tort law principles.
Thus, tort law provides a means to address environmental harms, where the "harm is to a well-defined
area or specific person or class of persons, is readily supported by general and specific causation, and
closely fits the traditional elements of a tort cause of action[;]" to wit:
Tort law has traditionally provided a blunt instrument for remedying harms to the environment. Indeed,
the lack of a neat fit between certain harms to environmental interests and a remedy through the
common law tort system has been a significant catalyst for the increase in environmental statutes and
regulations over the past several decades. Nevertheless, general tort law theories have been
successfully applied to remedy numerous types of harm to the environment. This occurs in areas where
the harm is to a well-defined area or specific person or class of persons, is readily supported by general
and specific causation, and closely fits the traditional elements of a tort cause of action.
In addition, the interests remedied by the tort system are always direct harms to an individual or legally
recognized entity. This requirement of a direct injury is necessary to establish standing to maintain a tort
suit. The tort system has never provided a remedy for harm to environmental interests in the absence of
a direct injury, and has been reluctant to recognize a harm suffered where the injury alleged is marginal
or highly attenuated from the plaintiff. For example, courts have historically viewed with great
skepticism claims brought by environmentalist groups or taxpayers solely alleging harm to the
environment, often pointing to failure to satisfy standing or direct injury requirements.
In the "classic" environmental tort action involving negligence, or nuisance, or both, an accident occurs
releasing a hazardous substance onto another's land. The polluter is clearly identifiable, the impacted
area relatively confined, the injuries caused and capable of being caused in the absence of remediation
are known, and the extent of the damage both to persons and property are readily quantifiable. The
elements of the tort actions are satisfied, and the common law can provide an effective remedy.
But rarely in environmental tort actions are these issues quite so clear-cut. Problems and disputes
among the parties often develop over the scope of the impacted area, the parties responsible, causation,
and the potential long-term effects of a hazardous substance release. Where there is no immediate
accident or event giving rise to the action, but rather a gradual release involving multiple hazardous
substances with differing degrees of potential toxicity and exposure routes, or multiple potential
sources or defendants, the benefits of the tort system quickly begin to break down and can result in a
very costly, protracted, and unsatisfactory resolution of the claim. Virtually all modern environmental
tort actions also involve dueling experts with competing views regarding causation and the scope of the
harm and remediation necessary. It is in these more complex toxic tort cases where the tort system
often becomes far less efficient and effective in responding to alleged environmental harms.
Regardless of the relative efficiency of the common law, tort law remains an important source of law to
resolve harms to the environment. In the case of comparatively simple and straightforward harms. for
instance flooding someone's land and killing off plant life, tort law may provide the only means of
redress available. Similarly, where a release of a substance onto another's property or public land is not
necessarily toxic in nature, for example dumping a dirt pile or causing unwanted vegetation, the remedy
will likely rest exclusively with the tort system. These are, again, areas where the tort elements readily
fit and the scope of the injury is well defined and understood, as is the measure and form of corrective
action. Where the situation is more serious and complex, numerous parties are involved, and the scope
of alleged injury is more widespread, the common law has been less up to the task and environmental
legislation has proved both helpful and necessary.86 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
More importantly, for an environmental tort action to prosper, there must "be an actual injury to a
person or group of persons or to property." The essential purpose of an environmental tort action is "to
provide corrective justice based upon the relative fault or blameworthiness of another."
 Coca Cola Bottlers vs. Meñez, Nov. 22, 2017 (INUM PA KAG GAS)
ART. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be
liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual
relationship exists between them and the consumers.
Quasi-delict being the source of obligation upon which Meñez bases his cause of action for damages
against CCBPI, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable. Such is not a
condition precedent required in a complaint for damages with respect to obligations arising from quasidelicts under Chapter 2, Title XVII on Extra-Contractual Obligations, Article 2176, et seq. of the Civil Code
which includes Article 2187.
The cases when moral damages may be awarded are specific. Unless the case falls under the
enumeration as provided in Article 2219, which is exclusive, and Article 2220 of the Civil Code, moral
damages may not be awarded. Article 2219 provides:
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
xxxx (Emphasis supplied)
Article 2220 provides the following additional legal grounds for awarding moral damages: (1) willful
injury to property if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due;
and (2) breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
In justifying the award of moral damages to Meñez, the CA invoked the US cases Escola v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. 16 and Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc. 17 The CA, however, failed to show the
direct connection of these cases with the instances when moral damages may be awarded under the
Civil Code.
Apparently, the only ground which could sustain an award of moral damages in favor of Meñez and
against CCBPI is Article 2219 (2) — quasi-delict under Article 2187 causing physical injuries.
Unfortunately, Meñez has not presented competent, credible and preponderant evidence to prove that
he suffered physical injuries when he allegedly ingested kerosene from the "Sprite" bottle in question.
Nowhere in the CA Decision is the physical injury of Meñez discussed. The RTC Decision states the
diagnosis of the medical condition of Meñez in the medical abstract prepared by Dr. Abel Hilario Gomez,
who was not presented as a witness, and signed by Dr. Magbanua, Jr. (Exhibit "R"): "the degree of
poisoning on the plaintiff [Meñez] was mild, since the amount ingested was minimal and did not have
severe physical effects on his body." 19 In his testimony, Dr. Magbanua, Jr. stated: "To my mind, [Meñez]
had taken in kerosene of exactly undetermined amount, apparently or probably, only a small amount
because the degree of adverse effect on his body is very minimal knowing that if he had taken in a large
amount he would have been in xxx very serious trouble and we would have seen this when we
examined him." The statements of the doctors who tended to the medical needs of Meñez were
equivocal. "Physical effects on the body" and "adverse effect on his body de él" are not very clear and
definite as to whether or not Meñez suffered physical injuries and if these statements indicate that he
did, what their nature de él was or how extensive they were.
Consequently, in the absence of sufficient evidence on physical injuries that Meñez sustained, he is not
entitled to moral damages.
As to exemplary or corrective damages, these may be granted in quasi-delicts if the defendant acted
with gross negligence pursuant to Article 2231 21 of the Civil Code.
The CA justified its award of exemplary damages in the following manner:
On the liability of manufacturers, the principle of strict liability applies. It means that proof of negligence
is not necessary. It appl[i]es even if the defendant manufacturer or processor has exercised all the
possible care in the preparation and sale of his product xx x. Extra-ordinary diligence is required of them
because the life of the consuming public is involved in the consumption of the foodstuffs or processed
products.
Evidently, the CA's reasoning is not in accordance with the gross negligence requirement for an award of
exemplary damages in a quasi-delict case.
Furthermore, Meñez has failed to establish that CCBPI acted with gross negligence. Other than the
opened "Sprite" bottle containing pure kerosene allegedly served to him at the Rosante Bar and
Restaurant (Rosante), Meñez has not presented any evidence that would show CCBPFs purported gross
negligence. The Court agrees with the RTC's finding that there was failure on the part of Meñez to
categorically establish the chain of custody of the "Sprite" bottle which was the very core of the
evidence in his claim for damages and that, considering that the "Sprite" "Bottle allegedly contained
pure kerosene, it was quite surprising why the employees of Rosante did not notice its distinct,
characteristic smell. Thus, Meñez is not entitled to exemplary damages absent the required
evidence.The only evidence presented by Meñez is the opened "Sprite" bottle containing pure kerosene .
Nothing more.
 Abrogar vs. Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc., 820 SCRA 301, G.R. No. 164749 March 15, 2017
Negligence; Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person
that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury.— Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, it consists of the “omission of that
diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of
the person, of the time and of the place.” The Civil Code makes liability for negligence clear under Article
2176, and Article 20.
Same; To determine the existence of negligence, the following time-honored test has been set in Picart
v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918): the test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular
case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not,
then he is guilty of negligence.— The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by
the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a
given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before
him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what would constitute the
conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light of
human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot
here be of much value but this much can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by
the circumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be,
omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before
them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee
harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to
guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born
of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the
proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be
negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect
harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
Same; Intergames had full awareness of the higher risks involved in staging the race alongside running
vehicles, and had the option to hold the race in a route where such risks could be minimized, if not
eliminated.— But it did not heed the danger already foreseen, if not expected, and went ahead with
staging the race along the plotted route on Don Mariano Marcos Highway on the basis of its supposedly
familiarity with the route. Such familiarity of the organizer with the route and the fact that previous
races had been conducted therein without any untoward incident were not in themselves sufficient
safeguards. The standards for avoidance of injury through negligence further required Intergames to
establish that it did take adequate measures to avert the foreseen danger, but it failed to do so.
Same; Another failing on the part of Intergames was the patent inadequacy of the personnel to man the
route.— As borne by the records, Intergames had no personnel of its own for that purpose, and relied
exclusively on the assistance of volunteers, that is, “seven (7) traffic operatives, five (5) motorcycle
policemen, fifteen (15) patrolmen deployed along the route, fifteen (15) boy scouts, twelve (12) CATs,
twenty (20) barangay tanods, three (3) ambulances and three (3) medical teams” to ensure the safety of
the young runners who would be running alongside moving vehicular traffic, to make the event safe and
well coordinated.
Same; The evidence presented undoubtedly established that Intergames’ notion of coordination only
involved informing the cooperating agencies of the date of the race, the starting and ending points of
the route, and the places along the route to man.—The evidence presented undoubtedly established
that Intergames’ notion of coordination only involved informing the cooperating agencies of the date of
the race, the starting and ending points of the route, and the places along the route to man. Intergames
did not conduct any general assembly with all of them, being content with holding a few sporadic
meetings with the leaders of the coordinating agencies. It held no briefings of any kind on the actual
duties to be performed by each group of volunteers prior to the race. It did not instruct the volunteers
on how to minimize, if not avert, the risks of danger in manning the race, despite such being precisely
why their assistance had been obtained in the first place.
Same; Proper coordination in the context of the event did not consist in the mere presence of the
volunteers, but included making sure that they had been properly instructed on their duties and tasks in
order to ensure the safety of the young runners.—Intergames had no right to assume that the
volunteers had already been aware of what exactly they would be doing during the race. It had the
responsibility and duty to give to them the proper instructions despite their experience from the past
races it had organized considering that the particular race related to runners of a different level of
experience, and involved different weather and environmental conditions, and traffic situations. It
should have remembered that the personnel manning the race were not its own employees paid to
perform their tasks, but volunteers whose nature of work was remotely associated with the safe
conduct of road races. Verily, that the volunteers showed up and assumed their proper places or that
they were sufficient in number was not really enough. It is worthy to stress that proper coordination in
the context of the event did not consist in the mere presence of the volunteers, but included making
sure that they had been properly instructed on their duties and tasks in order to ensure the safety of the
young runners.
Same; As the Supreme Court (SC) has emphasized in Corliss v. The Manila Railroad Company, 27 SCRA
674 (1969), where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is
a want of ordinary care under the circumstances.—It is relevant to note that the participants of the 1st
Pop Cola Junior Marathon were mostly minors aged 14 to 18 years joining a race of that kind for the first
time. The combined factors of their youth, eagerness and inexperience ought to have put a reasonably
prudent organizer on higher guard as to their safety and security needs during the race, especially
considering Intergames’ awareness of the risks already foreseen and of other risks already known to it
as of similar events in the past organizer. There was no question at all that a higher degree of diligence
was required given that practically all of the participants were children or minors like Rommel; and that
the law imposes a duty of care towards children and minors even if ordinarily there was no such duty
under the same circumstances had the persons involved been adults of sufficient discretion. In that
respect, Intergames did not observe the degree of care necessary as the organizer, rendering it liable for
negligence. As the Court has emphasized in Corliss v. The Manila Railroad Company, 27 SCRA 674 (1969),
where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of
ordinary care under the circumstances.
Same; In order for liability from negligence to arise, there must be not only proof of damage and
negligence, but also proof that the damage was the consequence of the negligence.— The Court has
said in Vda. de Gregorio v. Go Chong Bing, 102 Phil. 556 (1957): x x x Negligence as a source of obligation
both under the civil law and in American cases was carefully considered and it was held: We agree with
counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted doctrine in the United
States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a
recovery, must establish by competent evidence: (1) Damages to the plaintiff. (2) Negligence by act or
omission of which defendant personally or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty. (3)
The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage. (Taylor v. Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Co., supra at p. 15) In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, in
order that a person may be held guilty for damage through negligence, it is necessary that there be an
act or omission on the part of the person who is to be charged with the liability and that damage is
produced by the said act or omission.
Proximate Cause; Words and Phrases; Proximate cause is “that which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produces an event, and without which the event would not have
occurred.”—We hold that the negligence of Intergames was the proximate cause despite the
intervening negligence of the jeepney driver. Proximate cause is “that which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any new cause, produces an event, and without which the event would not have
occurred.” In Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, 102 Phil. 181 91957), the Court, borrowing from
American Jurisprudence, has more extensively defined proximate cause thusly: “* * * ‘that cause, which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury
and without which the result would not have occurred.’ And more comprehensively, ‘the proximate
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection
with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably
result therefrom.’”
Same; Negligence; To be considered the proximate cause of the injury, the negligence need not be the
event closest in time to the injury; a cause is still proximate, although farther in time in relation to the
injury, if the happening of it set other foreseeable events into motion resulting ultimately in the
damage.—According to an authority on civil law: “A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of
an action, if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion
by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the
injury a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause, even though such injury would not have
happened but for such condition or occasion. If no damage exists in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior
defective condition, such act or condition is the proximate cause.”
Same; Same; .—The negligence of Intergames was the proximate cause of the death of Rommel; and
that the negligence of the jeepney driver was not an efficient intervening cause. First of all, Intergames’
negligence in not conducting the race in a road blocked off from vehicular traffic, and in not properly
coordinating the volunteer personnel manning the marathon route effectively set the stage for the
injury complained of. The submission that Intergames had previously conducted numerous safe races
did not persuasively demonstrate that it had exercised due diligence because, as the trial court
pointedly observed, “[t]hey were only lucky that no accident occurred during the previous marathon
races but still the danger was there.” Secondly, injury to the participants arising from an unfortunate
vehicular accident on the route was an event known to and foreseeable by Intergames, which could
then have been avoided if only Intergames had acted with due diligence by undertaking the race on a
blocked-off road, and if only Intergames had enforced and adopted more efficient supervision of the
race through its volunteers. And, thirdly, the negligence of the jeepney driver, albeit an intervening
cause, was not efficient enough to break the chain of connection between the negligence of Intergames
and the injurious consequence suffered by Rommel. An intervening cause, to be considered efficient,
must be “one not produced by a wrongful act or omission, but independent of it, and adequate to bring
the injurious results. Any cause intervening between the first wrongful cause and the final injury which
might reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated by the original wrongdoer is not such an efficient
intervening cause as will relieve the original wrong of its character as the proximate cause of the final
injury.”
Doctrine of Assumption of Risk; Words and Phrases; The doctrine of assumption of risk means that one
who voluntarily exposes himself to an obvious, known and appreciated danger assumes the risk of injury
that may result therefrom.—It rests on the fact that the person injured has consented to relieve the
defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him and to take his chance of injury from a known risk,
and whether the former has exercised proper caution or not is immaterial. In other words, it is based on
voluntary consent, express or implied, to accept danger of a known and appreciated risk; it may
sometimes include acceptance of risk arising from the defendant’s negligence, but one does not
ordinarily assume risk of any negligence which he does not know and appreciate. As a defense in
negligence cases, therefore, the doctrine requires the concurrence of three elements, namely:
(1) the plaintiff must know that the risk is present;
(2) he must further understand its nature; and
(3) his choice to incur it must be free and voluntary. According to Prosser: “Knowledge of the risk is the
watchword of assumption of risk.”
Proximate Cause; Cosmos’ mere sponsorship of the race was, legally speaking, too remote to be the
efficient and proximate cause of the injurious consequences.—We uphold the finding by the CA that the
role of Cosmos was to pursue its corporate commitment to sports development of the youth as well as
to serve the need for advertising its business. In the absence of evidence showing that Cosmos had a
hand in the organization of the race, and took part in the determination of the route for the race and
the adoption of the action plan, including the safety and security measures for the benefit of the
runners, we cannot but conclude that the requirement for the direct r immediate causal connection
between the financial sponsorship of Cosmos and the death of Rommel simply did not exist. Indeed,
Cosmos’ mere sponsorship of the race was, legally speaking, too remote to be the efficient and
proximate cause of the injurious consequences.
Exemplary Damages; Article 2231 of the Civil Code stipulates that exemplary damages are to be
awarded in cases of quasi-delict if the defendant acted with gross negligence.— The foregoing
characterization by the RTC indicated that Intergames’ negligence was gross. We agree with the
characterization. Gross negligence, according to Mendoza v. Spouses Gomez, 726 SCRA 505 (2014), is
the absence of care or diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of persons or property;
it evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Indeed,
the failure of Intergames to adopt the basic precautionary measures for the safety of the minor
participants like Rommel was in reckless disregard of their safety. Conduct is reckless when it is an
extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation in which a high degree of danger is apparent; it
must be more than any mere mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more
than mere thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simple inattention.
Loss of Earning Capacity; Damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded to the heirs of a
deceased nonworking victim simply because earning capacity, not necessarily actual earning, may be
lost.—The RTC did not recognize the right of the petitioners to recover the loss of earning capacity of
Rommel. It should have, for doing so would have conformed to jurisprudence whereby the Court has
unhesitatingly allowed such recovery in respect of children, students and other nonworking or still
unemployed victims. The legal basis for doing so is Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code, which stipulates that
the defendant “shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by
the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant,
had no earning capacity at the time of his death.” Indeed, damages for loss of earning capacity may be
awarded to the heirs of a deceased nonworking victim simply because earning capacity, not
necessarily actual earning, may be lost.
Same; The basis for the computation of earning capacity is not what he would have become or what he
would have wanted to be if not for his untimely death, but the minimum wage in effect at the time of
his death.—The petitioners sufficiently showed that Rommel was, at the time of his untimely but much
lamented death, able-bodied, in good physical and mental state, and a student in good standing. It
should be reasonable to assume that Rommel would have finished his schooling and would turn out to
be a useful and productive person had he not died. Under the foregoing jurisprudence, the petitioners
should be compensated for losing Rommel’s power or ability to earn. The basis for the computation of
earning capacity is not what he would have become or what he would have wanted to be if not for his
untimely death, but the minimum wage in effect at the time of his death. The formula for this purpose is:
Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income Less Necessary Living Expenses].
Same; Life Expectancy Formula; Life expectancy is equivalent to two-thirds (2/3) multiplied by the
difference of eighty (80) and the age of the deceased.—Life expectancy is equivalent to 2/3 multiplied
by the difference of 80 and the age of the deceased. Since Rommel was 18 years of age at the time of his
death, his life expectancy was 41 years. His projected gross annual income, computed based on the
minimum wage for workers in the nonagricultural sector in effect at the time of his death, then fixed at
P14.00/day, is P5,535.83. Allowing for necessary living expenses of 50% of his projected gross annual
income, his total net earning capacity is P113,484.52.
 Ocean Builders Construction Corp. vs. Cubacub, 648 SCRA 605, G.R. No. 150898 April 13, 2011
(CHICKEN POX)
Damages; Torts; To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements must be present,
viz.: (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and proximate causation.—At the onset, the Court notes that the
present case is one for damages based on torts, the employer-employee relationship being merely
incidental. The assailed decision of the appellate court held that it was the duty of petitioners to provide
adequate medical assistance to the employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, failing which a breach
is committed.
Same; Same; Proximate Cause; Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which, the result would not
have occurred.—An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act, whenever it
appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing
about or actually causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result
or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission.
BERSAMIN, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Damages; Torts; View that under the concept of quasi-delict, whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.— To sustain a claim
based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a) there must be damage caused to the
plaintiff; (b) there must be negligence by act or omission, of which the defendant or some other person
for whose acts the defendant must respond was guilty; and (c) there must be a connection of cause and
effect between such negligence and the damage.
Same; Same; View that negligence is a relative term, not an absolute one, because its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the reasonable degree of care and vigilance that the
surrounding circumstances reasonably impose.— Consequently, when the danger is great, a high degree
of care is required, and the failure to observe such degree of care amounts to want of ordinary care.
Same; Same; View that the essential linkage between the negligence or fault, on one hand, and the
injury or damage, on the other hand, must be credibly and sufficiently established.—An injury or
damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act whenever it appears from the evidence that
the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage;
and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act
or omission.
Same; Same; View that the chain of the events from the time respondent was exposed to chicken pox
afflicting his co-worker due to their staying together in a cramped space of the workers’ barracks, to the
time when petitioner directed Silangga to rush the collapsed respondent to the community hospital, and
until respondent succumbed in Quezon City General Hospital (QCGH) indicated a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, demonstrating how petitioners’ neglect of their
employee’s plight led to or caused the wrongful death.—Unlike the Majority, I find a direct link between
the petitioners’ acts and omissions and Bladimir’s death. The chain of the events from the time when
Bladimir was exposed to the chicken pox afflicting his co-worker due to their staying together in the
cramped space of the workers’ barracks, to the time when Hao directed Silangga to rush the collapsed
Bladimir to the community hospital, and until Bladimir succumbed in QCGH indicated a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, demonstrating how their gross
neglect of their employee’s plight led to or caused the wrongful death.
Same; Same; View that by the time petitioner acted and had respondent brought to the community
hospital, the complications of the disease were already irreversible… undoubtedly, petitioners did not
use reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation.—Contrary to the Majority’s conclusion, Hao willfully disregarded Bladimir’s deteriorating
condition and prevented him from taking time off from his job to have the much needed complete rest.
Hao’s attitude enabled the complications of chicken pox, like pneumonia, to set in to complicate
Bladimir’s condition. Hao did not need to have a medical background to realize Bladimir’s worsening
condition and the concomitant perils, for such condition was not concealed due to Bladimir’s body
notoriously bearing the signs of his affliction and general debility. By the time Hao acted and had
Bladimir brought to the community hospital, the complications of the disease were already irreversible.
Undoubtedly, the petitioners did not use that reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation.
 Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil., 607, No. 48006 July 8, 1942
1.Damages; Quasi-delict or "Culpa Aquiliana"; Primary and Direct Responsibility of Employers under
Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.—A head-on collision between a taxi and a carretela resulted in the
death of a 16-year-old boy, one of the passengers of the carretela. A criminal action was filed against the
taxi driver and he was convicted and sentenced accordingly. The court in the criminal case granted the
petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. Thereafter the parents of the
deceased brought suit for damages against the proprietor of the taxi, the employer of the taxi driver,
under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Defendant contended that his liability was governed by the Revised
Penal Code, according to which his responsibility was only secondary, but no civil action had been
brought against the taxi driver. Held: That this separate civil action lies, the employer being primarily
and directly responsible in damages under articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
2.Id.; Id.; Id.—A quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with
a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime.
Upon this principle, and on the wording and spirit of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and
direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
3.Id.; Id.; Id.—The individuality of cuati-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable.
This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman
Law. In fact, in Spanish legal términology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The
Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code: for
instance, Law 6, Title 16, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, cómo quier que el non
fizo a sabiendas el daño al otro, pero acaesció por su culpa."
4.Id.; Id.; Id.—The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089,
one of the five sources of oblig­ations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual:
"los actos * * * en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093
provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning
articles 1902-1910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana.
5.Id.; Id.; Id.; Distinction between Crimes under the Penal Code and the "Culpa Aquiliana" or "CuasiDelito" under the Civil Code.—A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the
responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an
action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Plaintiffs
were free to choose which remedy to enforce. Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal
Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are enumerated in the decision.
 Elcano vs. Hill, 77 SCRA 98, No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
Civil law; Damages; Quasi-delicts; The concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in
character, whether voluntary or negligent.—Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a
reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia—that the concurrence of the Penal Code
and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplates only acts of negligence and not intentional
voluntary acts—deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so
limited, but that in fact is actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made
therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a
case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here
at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations “which are derived from acts or omissions in
which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter 11, Title XV of
this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)” And it is precisely the underlined qualification, “not punishable
by law,” that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an undesirable construction or interpretation of
the letter of the law that “killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth life” hence, the ruling that “(W)e will
not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient
origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or causi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.” And so, because Justice Bocobo was
Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted
that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, “not
punishable by law,” thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are
criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent.
Same; Same; Same; A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the victim do not recover damages on
both scores.—. . . It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against
him.
Same; Same; Same; The vicarious liability of the parents on account of a delict committed by their minor
child is not extinguished by the fact that said, child who is Hiring with and dependent upon said parents
is married.—Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald’s emancipation by marriage
on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion
of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld. . . . . It must be borne in
mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor
children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear
implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue
or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it
freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, id.,
Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the
marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a
minor, does not give cause to any litigation, in the same manner that the parents are answerable for the
borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their
minor married child without their consent, (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.) Accordingly, in Our considered
view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty.
Hill has become merely subsidiary to that of his son.
 Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 195, G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
Civil Law; Action; The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it including the period of
prescription is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action made in his argument or
brief but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.—It is axiomatic that the
nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the
cause of action. The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it, including the period of
prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or
brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief. The nature of an action is
not necessarily determined or controlled by its title or heading but by the body of the pleading or
complaint itself.
Same; Same; Quasi-delicts; Elements of quasi-delict.—A careful examination of the aforequoted
complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasidelicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners; Case at bar.—Clearly, from petitioners’ complaint,
the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land
of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these
waterpaths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or
negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the
petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence
and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no preexisting contractual obligation
between the parties make a clear case of a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.—While the property involved
in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property subject of the instant case is privately
owned, the fact ramains that petitioners’ complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained
and will continue to sustain damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation.
Same; Same; Same; A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted provided that the offended party is not allowed to
recover damages on both scores.—Article 2176, whenever it refers to “fault or negligence”, covers not
only acts “not punishable by law” but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary
or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
the two cases vary.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from
a crime under the Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the
Civil Code.—In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime—a distinction exists between
the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra contractual.
The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal
Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore,
the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course,
in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action
arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability.
 Cinco vs. Canonoy, 90 SCRA 369, No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
Criminal Law; Civil Law; There can be independent civil action for damage to property based on quasidelict during the pendency of the criminal action.—Liability being predicated on quasi delict, the civil
case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177
of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Distinctions between criminal negligence and quasi-delict.—Firstly, the Revised Penal Code
in Article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple imprudence. If we were to hold that Articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the
literal import of Article 1903 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very
little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any
degree of negligence—even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of
civil liability arising from crime. x x x Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make
the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which cannot be shown
beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the
defendant can and should be made responsible in a Civil action under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code, otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Actions referred to in Secs. 3 a & b of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
interpreted.—Stated otherwise, the Civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from
the criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi-delict.
Same; Same; Quasi-delict, Concept Of.—It bears emphasizing that petitioner’s cause of action is based
on quasi-delict. The concept of quasi-delict, as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code supra, is so
broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction
between “damage to persons” on the one hand and “damage to property” on the other. Indeed, the
word “damage” is used in two concepts: the “harm” done and “reparation” for the harm done. And with
respect to “harm” it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since “harm” is not
limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-delict in the law itself include
damage to property. An instance is Article 2191 (2) of the Civil Code which holds proprietors responsible
for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful “to persons or property.”
 Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil. 768, No. 12191 October 14, 1918
1.MASTER AND SERVANT; CONTRACT; NEGLIGENCE..—Failure to perform a contract cannot be excused
upon the ground that the breach was due to the negligence of a servant of the obligor, and that the
latter exercised due diligence in the selection and control of the servant.
2.CONTRACTS; NEGLIGENCE; CULPA AQUILIANA; CULPA CONTRACTUAL.—The distinction between
negligence as the source of an obligation (culpa aquiliana) and negligence in the performance of a
contract (culpa contractual) pointed out.
3.CARRIERS; PASSENGERS; NEGLIGENCE; ALIGHTING FROM MOVING TRAIN.—It is not negligence per se
for a traveler to alight from a slowly moving train.
 Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 292, G.R. No. 110295
October 18, 1993
Civil Law; Torts and Damages; Quasi-delict; The public respondent’s conclusion that the cause of action
in Civil Case No. D-9629 is founded on quasi-delict and that, therefore, pursuant to Article 1146 of the
Civil Code, it prescribes in four (4) years is supported by the allegations in the complaint, more
particularly paragraph 12 thereof, which makes reference to the reckless and negligent manufacture of
“adulterated food items intended to be sold for public consumption.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Vendee’s “remedies against a vendor with respect to warranties against
hidden defects of or encumbrances upon the thing sold not limited to those prescribed in Article 1567 of
the Civil Code.
7ertqwq
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; —The vendee may also ask for the annulment of the contract upon
proof of error or fraud, in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable. Under the law
on obligations, responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations and any waiver of an
action for future fraud is void. Responsibility arising from negligence is also demandable in any
obligation, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. Those
guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay in the performance of their obligations and those who in any
manner contravene the tenor thereof are liable for damages.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; .—The vendor could likewise be liable for quasi-delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based thereon may be brought by the vendee. While it may be true
that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law
on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e., the act which breaks the
contract may also be a quasi-delict.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of
contractual relations.—Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of
contractual relations.
 Calalas vs. Court of Appeals, 332 SCRA 356, G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000
(TARUNGA UG PARKING BOSS)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Proximate Cause; The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable
only in actions for quasi-delicts, not in actions involving breach of contract.—There is, thus, no basis for
the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the
damage to petitioner’s jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of
the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of
proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract.
The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and
another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and
the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Negligence; Upon the happening of the accident, the
presumption of negligence at once arises, and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he
observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.—In the case at bar, upon the happening
of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to
prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. Now, did the driver of
jeepney carry Sunga “safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence
of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances” as required by Art. 1755? We do not
think so. Several factors militate against petitioner’s contention.
Same; Same; Fortuitous Event; Words and Phrases; The taking of an “extension seat” is not an implied
assumption of risk on the part of the passenger; A caso fortuito is an event which could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable; Requisites.—We find it hard to give serious
thought to petitioner’s contention that Sunga’s taking an “extension seat” amounted to an implied
assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas
should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by
boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner’s contention that the jeepney being bumped
while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the following requirements be
present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtor’s will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner; and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner
should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the
highway.
Same; Same; Damages; As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code.—As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the
death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the
cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.
Same; Bad Faith; The common carrier’s admission in open court that his driver failed to assist the injured
passenger in going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith.—In this case,
there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the appellate
court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga’s
contention that petitioner’s admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in
going to a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the
driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly
indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena that
he was the one at fault for the accident.
Air France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
a single act can become an independent source of action
WHITE MAN ON THE PLANE
Common carriers; Contracts; First class tickets.—A written document speaks a uniform language; the
spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between
passenger and air carrier, adherence to the terms of a ticket is desirable.
Same; Damages; Moral damages; Trial; Bad faith in breach of contract of carriage.—Where at the start
of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on guard that he intended to prove that, while sitting
in the plane in Bangkok, the respondent was ousted .by petitioner's manager, who gave his seat to a
white man, and evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection
on the part of the petitioner, it is therefore unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is
sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint,
if any, was cured by the evidence.
Same; Exemplary damages.—The New Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary
damages in contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner. The manner of ejectment of
respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept.
Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 671, G.R. No. 108164, February 23,
1995 February 23, 1995
Civil Law; Damages; In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is
shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract.—In culpa contractual,
moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with
malice in the breach of the contract. Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence.
Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger
attributable to the fault (which is presumed) of the common carrier.
Same; Same;—Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice
or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.
Same; Same; Application of Article 21 of the Code can be warranted only when the defendant's
disregard of his contractual obligation is so deliberate as to appropriate a degree of misconduct certainly
no less worse than fraud or bad faith.—Article 21 of the Code, it should be observed, contemplates a
conscious act to cause harm. Thus, even if we are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a
breach of contract, its application can be warranted only when the defendant's disregard of his
contractual obligation is so deliberate as to approximate a degree of misconduct certainly no less worse
than fraud or bad faith. Most importantly, Article 21 is a mere declaration of a general principle in
human relations that clearly must, in any case, give way to the specific provision of Article 2220 of the
Civil Code authorizing the grant of moral damages in culpa contractual solely when the breach is due to
fraud or bad faith.
Same; Same; A quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the
application of applicable principles on tort even where there is a pre-existing contract between the
plaintiff and the defendant.—The Court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasidelict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable
principles on tort even where there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant
(Phil. Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 143; Singson vs. Bank of Phil Islands, 23 SCRA 1117; and Air
France vs. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155). This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private
respondents' case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained of would
constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be
deemed to underlie the breach of a contract) can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing
contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by
itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict
provisions to the case. Here, private respondents' damage claim is predicated solely on their contractual
relationship; without such agreement, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to
stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort.
 Phil. School of Business Administration vs. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 729, G.R. No. 84698
February 4, 1992 (G.donggab sa sulod sa school)
Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that the damage should have been
caused by pupils or students of the educational institution.—Article 2180, in conjunction with Article
2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This Court discussed this doctrine in the
afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently, in Amadora vs. Court of Appeals. In
all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly provides that the damage should
have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable
for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this material situation does not exist
in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for
whose acts the school could be made liable.
Same; Contracts; An academic institution enters into a contract when it accepts students for enrollment;
The contract between school and student is one "imbued with public interest".—Institutions of learning
must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student
can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other
sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the
school premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate
steps are taken to maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown
thereof.
Same; Human Relations; Article 21; Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.—
Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's employee to
forcibly oust the private respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a better
right to the seat." In Austro-American, supra, the public embarrassment caused to the passenger was
the justification for the Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter. From
the foregoing, it can be concluded that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith
and be violative of Article 21, then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict. In the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract
between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper
security measures. This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of
negligence, the same could give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test
of Cangco, supra, the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that
negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In
other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the school's liability. The negligence of
the school cannot exist independently on the contract, unless the negligence occurs under the
circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Court finds the award of moral damages to be inordinate and substantially devoid of legal
basis.—The Court finds, therefore, the award of moral damages made by the court a quo, affirmed by
the appellate court, to be inordinate and substantially devoid of legal basis.
 Light Rail Transit Authority vs. Navidad, 397 SCRA 75, G.R. No. 145804 February 6, 2003
(sumbagay sa seyku nya g.tagak sa train nabanggaan patay)
Same; Obligations; Tort; The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the
part of the employee.—Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for
tort under the provisions of Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the
Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the
employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing
due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been
shown.
Same; Same; Same; In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which
breaches the contract.—A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or
omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article
2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where
tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of
contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed
between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules
on tort to apply.
Same; Damages; Nominal Damages; It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory damages.—The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable.
Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with
compensatory damages.
 Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. vs. Tanjangco, 556 SCRA 154, G.R. No. 160795 June 27,
2008
Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Evidence; Damages; In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the
fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred.—The instant
case is obviously one for tort, as governed by Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides: ART. 2176.
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Same; Same; Negligence; Test to Determine Negligence; Words and Phrases; “Negligent Act,” Defined—
A negligent act is an inadvertent act; it may be merely carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence
and may be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the
expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal, or a force of nature.
A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actor’s position, in the same or
similar circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to
do the act or to do it in a more careful manner.
The test to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in committing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinary person would have used in the same situation? (PICART v SMITH)
If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet paterfamilias in Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in a man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence, and determines liability according to that standard.
Same; Same; It is not just or equitable to relieve a subdivision association of any liability arising from the
erection of a perimeter fence which encroached upon another person’s lot when, by its very own
Manual of Rules and Regulations, it imposes its authority over all its members to the end that “no new
construction can be started unless the plans are approved by the Association and the appropriate cash
bond and pre-construction fees are paid.”—By its Manual of Rules and Regulations, it is reasonable to
assume that Corinthian, through its representative, in the approval of building plans, and in the conduct
of periodic inspections of on-going construction projects within the subdivision, is responsible in insuring
compliance with the approved plans, inclusive of the construction of perimeter walls, which in this case
is the subject of dispute between the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. It is not just or equitable to relieve
Corinthian of any liability when, by its very own rules, it imposes its authority over all its members to the
end that “no new construction can be started unless the plans are approved by the Association and the
appropriate cash bond and pre-construction fees are paid.” Moreover, Corinthian can impose sanctions
for violating these rules. Thus, the proposition that the inspection is merely a “table inspection” and,
therefore, should exempt Corinthian from liability, is unacceptable. After all, if SEthe supposed
inspection is merely a “table inspection” and the approval granted to every member is a mere formality,
then the purpose of the rules would be defeated. Compliance therewith would not be mandatory, and
sanctions imposed for violations could be disregarded. Corinthian’s imprimatur on the construction of
the Cuasos’ perimeter wall over the property of the Tanjangcos assured the Cuasos that everything was
in order.
 Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty, 506 SCRA 685, G.R. No. 169891 November 2, 2006
(Bangaan ug TRAIN patay ang KANA)
Torts and Damages; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Words and Phrases; Negligence is want of the care
required by the circumstances—it is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances
reasonably require.— Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. In Corliss v. Manila Railroad Company, 27
SCRA 674 (1969), this Court held that negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is
a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the
parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. In determining
whether or not there is negligence on the part of the parties in a given situation, jurisprudence has laid
down the following test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, the person is
guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary
conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites to Sustain a Claim Based on Quasi-Delict.—In a long line of cases, the
Court held that in order to sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (1)
damage to plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose
acts he must respond was guilty; and (3) connection of cause and effect between such negligence and
damage.
Same; Same; Same; Railways; Every corporation constructing or operating a railway shall make and
construct at all points where such railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings
and erect at such points, at a sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of
every kind, a sign with large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the
railway, and warn persons of the necessity of looking out for trains.—It may broadly be stated that
railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to
persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both in the operation of trains and in
the maintenance of the crossings. Moreover, every corporation constructing or operating a railway shall
make and construct at all points where such railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe
crossings and erect at such points, at a sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of
vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the
proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the necessity of looking out for trains. This Court has
previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its failure to put a cross bar, or signal light,
flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the
safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it because public safety demands
that said device or equipment be installed.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which
he is required to conform for his own protection.—As to whether or not Mercelita was guilty of
contributory negligence, we agree with petitioner. To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries,
it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or
signs of an impending danger to health and body. To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary
to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the
succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to
the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Last Clear Chance; The doctrine of last clear chance states that
where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other,
or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss—the antecedent
negligence of plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening
negligence of defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of
due diligence.—As to whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable, we rule in the
negative. The proximate cause of the injury having been established to be the negligence of petitioner,
we hold that the above doctrine finds no application in the instant case.
Same; Same; Damages; A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as to the fact and
amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have suffered, and on evidence
of the actual amount thereof.—Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to
compensate a party for an injury or loss he suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice, aimed
at repairing the wrong done. To be recoverable, they must be duly proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty. Respondents, however, failed to present evidence for such damages; hence, the award of
actual damages cannot be sustained. However, as the heirs of Rhonda Brunty undeniably incurred
expenses for the wake and burial of the latter, we deem it proper to award temperate damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. This is in lieu of actual damages as it would
be unfair for the victim’s heirs to get nothing, despite the death of their kin, for the reason alone that
they cannot produce receipts.
Same; Same; Same; The relatives of the victim who incurred physical injuries in a quasi-delict are not
proscribed from recovering moral damages in meritorious cases.— We, therefore, sustain the award of
moral damages in favor of the heirs of Rhonda Brunty. Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but
are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages
must nevertheless be somehow proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. In the
instant case, the moral suffering of the heirs of Rhonda Brunty was sufficiently established by Ethel
Brunty in her deposition.
 Philippine National Railways vs. Court of Appeals, 536 SCRA 147, G.R. No. 157658 October 15,
2007 (banggaan ug TRAIN c amores)
Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Proximate Cause; Words and Phrases; Negligence is the failure to
observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury—all that the
law requires is that it is perpetually compelling upon a person to use that care and diligence expected of
sensible men under comparable circumstances.—We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the case
and we find no cogent reason to reverse the appellate court’s decision.” Using the aforementioned
philosophy, it may be reliably concluded that there is no hard and fast rule whereby such degree of care
and vigilance is calibrated; it is dependent upon the circumstances in which a person finds himself. All
that the law requires is that it is perpetually compelling upon a person to use that care and diligence
expected of sensible men under comparable circumstances.
Transportation Laws; Common Carriers; Railroad Companies; Railroad companies owe to the public a
duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad
crossings, which duties pertain both to the operation of trains and to the maintenance of the
crossings.—As held in the case of Philippine National Railway v. Brunty, 506 SCRA 685 (2006), it may
broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of
care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both to the
operation of trains and to the maintenance of the crossings. Moreover, every corporation constructing
or operating a railway shall make and construct at all points where such railway crosses any public road,
good, sufficient, and safe crossings, and erect at such points, at sufficient elevation from such road as to
admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with large and distinct letters placed thereon, to
give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons of the necessity of looking out for trains.
The failure of the PNR to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphore is evidence
of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it,
because public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed.
Same; Same; Same; Land Transportation and Traffic Code; While it is true that a person driving an
automobile must use his faculties of seeing and hearing when nearing a railroad crossing, the obligation
to bring to a full stop vehicles moving in public highways before traversing any “through street” only
accrues from the time the said “through street” or crossing is so designated and sign-posted.— From the
records of the case, it can be inferred that Amores exercised all the necessary precautions required of
him as to avoid injury to himself and to others. The witnesses’ testimonies showed that Amores
slackened his speed, made a full stop, and then proceeded to cross the tracks when he saw that there
was no impending danger to his life. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that Amores did
everything, with absolute care and caution, to avoid the collision.
Same; Same; Same; The authority in this jurisdiction is that the failure of a railroad company to install a
semaphore or at the very least, to post a flagman or watchman to warn the public of the passing train
amounts to negligence.—It is settled that every person or motorist crossing a railroad track should use
ordinary prudence and alertness to determine the proximity of a train before attempting to cross. We
are persuaded that the circumstances were beyond the control of Amores for no person would sacrifice
his precious life if he had the slightest opportunity to evade the catastrophe. Besides, the authority in
this jurisdiction is that the failure of a railroad company to install a semaphore or at the very least, to
post a flagman or watchman to warn the public of the passing train amounts to negligence.
Same; Same; Same; The employer is actually liable for the negligence or fault on the part of its employee
on the assumption of juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in
the selection and supervision of its employees.—We will now discuss the liability of petitioner PNR.
Article 2180 of the New Civil Code discusses the liability of the employer once negligence or fault on the
part of the employee has been established. The employer is actually liable on the assumption of juris
tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision
of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not been demonstrated. Even the
existence of hiring procedures and supervisory employees cannot be incidentally invoked to overturn
the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer.
 Huang vs. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc., 687 SCRA 162, G.R. No. 180440 December 5, 2012
(DUSIT THANII)
Civil Law; “Quasi-Delicts” and “Breach of Contract,” Distinguished.—In that regard, this Court finds it
significant to take note of the following differences between quasi-delict (culpa aquilina) and breach of
contract (culpa contractual). In quasi-delict, negligence is direct, substantive and independent, while in
breach of contract, negligence is merely incidental to the performance of the contractual obligation;
there is a pre-existing contract or obligation. In quasi-delict, the defense of “good father of a family” is a
complete and proper defense insofar as parents, guardians and employers are concerned, while in
breach of contract, such is not a complete and proper defense in the selection and supervision of
employees. In quasi-delict, there is no presumption of negligence and it is incumbent upon the injured
party to prove the negligence of the defendant, otherwise, the former’s complaint will be dismissed,
while in breach of contract, negligence is presumed so long as it can be proved that there was breach of
the contract and the burden is on the defendant to prove that there was no negligence in the carrying
out of the terms of the contract; the rule of respondeat superior is followed.
Same; Quasi-Delicts; Actions; In an action based on quasi-delict, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to
prove the presence of the following requisites before the defendant can be held liable, to wit: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.— Further, since petitioner’s case is for
quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established as it is the basis of her action. The
burden of proof is upon petitioner.
Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Res Ipsa Loquitur; Words and Phrases; Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which
literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself”; The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies
where, (1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency
or instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the
negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.—It relates to the fact of an injury that sets out an
inference to the cause thereof or establishes the plaintiff’s prima facie case. The doctrine rests on
inference and not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant the supposition of negligence
and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is lacking. Simply stated,
this doctrine finds no application if there is direct proof of absence or presence of negligence. If there is
sufficient proof showing the conditions and circumstances under which the injury occurred, then the
creative reason for the said doctrine disappears. Further, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies where,
(1) the accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened
except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured.
 Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363, No. L-73998 November 14, 1988
Civil Law; Torts and Damages; Negligence, Defined; The existence of negligence in a given case is not
determined by the personal judgment of the actor in a given situation; It is the law that determines
what would be reckless or negligent.—The question before us is who was negligent? Negligence is the
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily
regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do, or as Judge Cooley defines it, "(T)he failure to observe for the protection
of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury." In Picart vs. Smith, decided
more than seventy years ago but still a sound rule, we held: The test by which to determine the
existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the
standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman
Law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The Law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by
that.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, Defined.—At this juncture, it may be
enlightening and helpful in the proper resolution of the issue of negligence to examine the doctrine of
Res ipsa loquitur. This doctrine is stated thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be
under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things
does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. Or as Black's
Law Dictionary puts it: Res ipsa loquitur. The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference
that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing injury was in
defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in
absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer
may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened provided character accident and circumstances
attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that
thing which caused injury is shown to have been under management and control of alleged wrongdoer.
Hillen v. Hooker Const. Co., Tex. Civ. App., 484 S.W. 2d 113, 115. Under doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur"
the happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial
evidence that injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under exclusive control and
management of defendant, and that the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things
would not happen if reasonable care had been used.
{MOST IMPORTANT}
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur can be invoked when and only
when, under the circumstance involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.—The
doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is particular to the law of negligence which recognizes
that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for
specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is not a rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or
a mere procedural convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular
case, is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on
the part of the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence
thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty of due care. The doctrine
can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and
not readily available. Hence, it has generally been held that the presumption of inference arising from
the doctrine cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or
presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of or
where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accident and all the facts and circumstances
attendant on the occurrence clearly appear. Finally, once the actual cause of injury is established
beyond controversy, whether by the plaintiff or by the defendant, 110 presumptions will be involved
and the doctrine becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so completely elucidated
that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made, whatever the source of the evidence,
as in this case.
Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Negligence of Master or Employer; The presumption of negligence
on the part of the master or employer is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and consequently, may be
rebutted; It may be overcome by proof that the employer exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection or supervision of his employees.—The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176
in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph 5, of the Civil Code. In the latter, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or
in supervision over him after selection, or both. Such presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure
and consequently, may be rebutted. If follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction
of the court that in the selection and in the supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. In disclaiming liability
for the incident, the private respondent stresses that the negligence of his employee has already been
adequately overcome by his driver's statement that he knew his responsibilities as a driver and that the
truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving.
 Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334, G.R. No. 118231 July 5, 1996
Same; Same; It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts
and disbelieve his testimony with respect to other facts.—The petitioners emphasize that the private
respondents never reconciled Dr. Kho’s testimony with Dr. Batiquin’s claim on the witness stand that
when Dr. Batiquin confronted Dr. Kho about the foreign body, the latter said that there was a piece of
rubber but that she threw it away. Although hearsay, Dr. Batiquin’s claim was not objected to, and
hence, the same is admissible but it carries no .probative value. Nevertheless, assuming otherwise, Dr.
Batiquin’s statement cannot belie the fact that Dr. Kho found a piece of rubber near private respondent
Villegas’s uterus. And even if we were to doubt Dr. Kho as to what she did to the piece of rubber, i.e.,
whether she threw it away or sent it to Cebu City, we are not justified in distrusting her as to her
recovery of a piece of rubber from private respondent Villegas’s abdomen. On this score, it is perfectly
reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve his testimony
with respect to other facts. And it has been aptly said that even when a witness is found to have
deliberately falsified in some material particulars, it is not required that the whole of his uncorroborated
testimony be rejected, but such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited.
Same; Same; Well-settled is the rule that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony.—It is
here worth noting that the trial court paid heed to the following portions of Dr. Batiquin’s testimony:
that no rubber drain was used in the operation, and that there was neither any tear on Dr. Batiquin’s
gloves after the operation nor blood smears on her hands upon removing her gloves. Moreover, the trial
court pointed out that the absence of a rubber drain was corroborated by Dr. Doris Sy, Dr. Batiquin’s
assistant during the operation on private respondent Villegas. But the trial court failed to recognize that
the assertions of Drs. Batiquin and Sy were denials or negative testimonies. Well-settled is the rule that
positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony.
 DM. Consunji, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 357 SCRA 249, G.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2001
Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available,
provided the following requisites are present:
(1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person
charged with negligence; and
(3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing work in a
construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the application of the rule of
res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and
human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and management of
appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also present. No contributory negligence was attributed to the
appellee’s deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of
appellant’s negligence arises.
Same; Same; Same; Res Ipsa Loquitur; As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar
to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct
proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.—Petitioner’s contention, however,
loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine is
to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person
having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be
established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred when the plaintiff establishes
the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur; The presumption or inference may be rebutted or
overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such as
that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference.—As stated earlier, the defendant’s
negligence is presumed or inferred when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the application of res
ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the burden then shifts
to defendant to explain. The presumption or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence
and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence,
may outweigh the inference. It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the
presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only
after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established.
Same; Actions; A claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and prosecute
an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code.—When a party having knowledge of the facts makes
an election between inconsistent remedies, the election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding
inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election
acts as a bar. Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible
unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their
choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a
double redress for a single wrong. The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a
waiver by election. Hence, the rule in Floresca that a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery
under the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by
his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.
 Tan vs. JAM Transit, Inc., 605 SCRA 659, G.R. No. 183198 November 25, 2009
Civil Law; Negligence; Res Ipsa Loquitur; Res Ipsa Loquitur is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the
occurrence of an injury taken with the surrounding circumstances may permit an inference or raise a
presumption of negligence or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation.—Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase that literally means “the
thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an
injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of
negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to
meet with an explanation. Where the thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to be under
the management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things,
would not happen if those who had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence—in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant—that the
accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. This rule is grounded on the
superior logic of ordinary human experience, and it is on the basis of such experience or common
knowledge that negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, the
rule is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.
Same; Same; Same; Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and does not constitute an
independent or separate ground for liability; Mere invocation and application of the doctrine do not
dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence; Requisites Before the Doctrine may be Allowed.—
Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and does not constitute an independent or separate
ground for liability. Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere
procedural convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of
producing a specific proof of negligence. In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine
do not dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such
proof, permitting plaintiff to present, along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending
circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and thereby
placing on defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. Still, before resort to the doctrine may
be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
Same; Same; Quasi-Delicts; To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its employee, an employer
must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.—Whenever an
employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris
tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the section (culpa in eligiendo)
or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its
employee, an employer must overcome the presumption, by presenting convincing proof that he
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee.
 Cantre vs. Go, 522 SCRA 547, G.R. No. 160889 April 27, 2007
Civil Law; Negligence; Damages; Intent is immaterial in negligence cases because where negligence
exists and is proven, it automatically gives the injured a right to reparation for the damages caused.—
The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial consideration to the well-being of their
patients. If a doctor fails to live up to this precept, he is accountable for his acts. This notwithstanding,
courts face a unique restraint in adjudicating medical negligence cases because physicians are not
guarantors of care and, they never set out to intentionally cause injury to their patients.However, intent
is immaterial in negligence cases because where negligence exists and is proven, it automatically gives
the injured a right to reparation for the damage caused.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites in Order for the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur to Apply in Cases Involving
Medical Negligence.—In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the
mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who
controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that the following requisites concur: 1. The accident
is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; 2. It is caused by an
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and 3. The possibility of
contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
Same; Same; Same; Captain of the Ship Doctrine; The doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an
operation liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time when those assistants are under the
surgeon’s control.—Whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by the blood pressure cuff is of
no moment. Both instruments are deemed within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under
the “captain of the ship” doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for
the negligence of his assistants during the time when those assistants are under the surgeon’s control.
In this particular case, it can be logically inferred that petitioner, the senior consultant in charge during
the delivery of Nora’s baby, exercised control over the assistants assigned to both the use of the
droplight and the taking of Nora’s blood pressure. Hence, the use of the droplight and the blood
pressure cuff is also within petitioner’s exclusive control.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioner is obliged to pay Nora for moral damages suffered by the latter as a
proximate result of petitioner’s negligence.—Based on the foregoing, the presumption that petitioner
was negligent in the exercise of her profession stands unrebutted. In this connection, the Civil Code
provides: ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. . . . ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may
be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. Clearly, under
the law, petitioner is obliged to pay Nora for moral damages suffered by the latter as a proximate result
of petitioner’s negligence.
 Sicam vs. Jorge, 529 SCRA 443, G.R. No. 159617 August 8, 2007
Corporation Law; Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction; The rule is that the veil of corporate fiction may
be pierced when made as a shield to perpetrate fraud and/or confuse legitimate issues—the theory of
corporate entity was not meant to promote unfair objectives or otherwise to shield them.—The CA
correctly pierced the veil of the corporate fiction and adjudged petitioner Sicam liable together with
petitioner corporation. The rule is that the veil of corporate fiction may be pierced when made as a
shield to perpetrate fraud and/or confuse legitimate issues. The theory of corporate entity was not
meant to promote unfair objectives or otherwise to shield them. Notably, the evidence on record shows
that at the time respondent Lulu pawned her jewelry, the pawnshop was owned by petitioner Sicam
himself. As correctly observed by the CA, in all the pawnshop receipts issued to respondent Lulu in
September 1987, all bear the words “Agencia de R.C. Sicam,” notwithstanding that the pawnshop was
allegedly incorporated in April 1987. The receipts issued after such alleged incorporation were still in the
name of “Agencia de R.C. Sicam,” thus inevitably misleading, or at the very least, creating the wrong
impression to respondents and the public as well, that the pawnshop was owned solely by petitioner
Sicam and not by a corporation.
Obligations and Contracts; Fortuitous Events; Elements; Words and Phrases; Fortuitous events by
definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable—it is therefore, not enough that the
event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid.—Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not
foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere
difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. To constitute a fortuitous
event, the following elements must concur: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence
or of the failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of human will; (b) it must
be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
obligations in a normal manner; and, (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury or loss.
Same; Same; In order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has
committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss; When the effect is found to
be partly the result of a person’s participation—whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to
act—the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.—The
burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it. And, in order
for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence
or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. It has been held that an act of God cannot be invoked
to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a
loss. One’s negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to
another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a
fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of
a person’s participation—whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act—the whole
occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
Same; Same; Pawnshops; Robbery; Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event;
Merely presenting the police report on the robbery committed based on the report of the employees of
the pawnshop owner is not sufficient to establish robbery.—Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a
fortuitous event. It does not foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein petitioners. In
Co v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 111 (1998), the Court held: It is not a defense for a repair shop of
motor vehicles to escape liability simply because the damage or loss of a thing lawfully placed in its
possession was due to carnapping. Carnapping per se cannot be considered as a fortuitous event. The
fact that a thing was unlawfully and forcefully taken from another’s rightful possession, as in cases of
carnapping, does not automatically give rise to a fortuitous event. To be considered as such, carnapping
entails more than the mere forceful taking of another’s property. It must be proved and established that
the event was an act of God or was done solely by third parties and that neither the claimant nor the
person alleged to be negligent has any participation. In accordance with the Rules of Evidence, the
burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it—which in this
case is the private respondent. However, other than the police report of the alleged carnapping incident,
no other evidence was presented by private respondent to the effect that the incident was not due to its
fault. A police report of an alleged crime, to which only private respondent is privy, does not suffice to
establish the carnapping. Neither does it prove that there was no fault on the part of private respondent
notwithstanding the parties’ agreement at the pre-trial that the car was carnapped. Carnapping does
not foreclose the possibility of fault or negligence on the part of private respondent. Just like in Co,
petitioners merely presented the police report of the Parañaque Police Station on the robbery
committed based on the report of petitioners’ employees which is not sufficient to establish robbery.
Such report also does not prove that petitioners were not at fault.
Same; Same; Same; Article 2123 of the Civil Code provides that with regard to pawnshops and other
establishments which are engaged in making loans secured by pledges, the special laws and regulations
concerning them shall be observed, and subsidiarily, the provisions on pledge, mortgage and
antichresis.—. The provision on pledge, particularly Article 2099 of the Civil Code, provides that the
creditor shall take care of the thing pledged with the diligence of a good father of a famil0y. This means
that petitioners must take care of the pawns the way a prudent person would as to his own property.
Same; Same; Same; Negligence; Words and Phrases; Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.—We
expounded in Cruz v. Gangan, 211 SCRA 517 (1992), that negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do; or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
It is want of care required by the circumstances. A review of the records clearly shows that petitioners
failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation. Petitioners were guilty of negligence in the operation of their pawnshop business.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Central Bank considered it not feasible to require insurance of pawned
articles against burglary—there was no statutory duty imposed on the pawnshop owner to insure the
pawned jewelry.—Under Section 17 of Central Bank Circular No. 374, Rules and Regulations for
Pawnshops, which took effect on July 13, 1973, and which was issued pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 114, Pawnshop Regulation Act, it is provided that pawns pledged must be insured, to wit: Sec. 17.
Insurance of Office Building and Pawns.—The place of business of a pawnshop and the pawns pledged
to it must be insured against fire and against burglary as well as for the latter(sic), by an insurance
company accredited by the Insurance Commissioner. However, this Section was subsequently amended
by CB Circular No. 764 which took effect on October 1, 1980, to wit: Sec. 17. Insurance of Office Building
and Pawns.—The office building/premises and pawns of a pawnshop must be insured against fire.
(emphasis supplied). where the requirement that insurance against burglary was deleted. Obviously, the
Central Bank considered it not feasible to require insurance of pawned articles against burglary. The
robbery in the pawnshop happened in 1987, and considering the above-quoted amendment, there is no
statutory duty imposed on petitioners to insure the pawned jewelry in which case it was error for the CA
to consider it as a factor in concluding that petitioners were negligent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The diligence with which the law requires the individual at all times to govern
his conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which he is placed and the importance of the act
which he is to perform.—The preponderance of evidence shows that petitioners failed to exercise the
diligence required of them under the Civil Code. The diligence with which the law requires the individual
at all times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which he is placed and the
importance of the act which he is to perform. Thus, the cases of Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527
(1971), Hernandez v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, 179 SCRA 39 (1989), and Cruz v. Gangan, 211
SCRA 517 (1992), cited by petitioners in their pleadings, where the victims of robbery were exonerated
from liability, find no application to the present case.
 Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 30, G.R. No. 130068, G.R. No.
130150 October 1, 1998
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Damages; A pilot is personally liable for damages caused by his
own negligence or default to the owners of the vessel, and to third parties for damages sustained in a
collision, such negligence in the performance of duty constitutes a maritime tort.—In general, a pilot is
personally liable for damages caused by his own negligence or default to the owners of the vessel, and
to third parties for damages sustained in a collision. Such negligence of the pilot in the performance of
duty constitutes a maritime tort. At common law, a shipowner is not liable for injuries inflicted
exclusively by the negligence of a pilot accepted by a vessel compulsorily. The exemption from liability
for such negligence shall apply if the pilot is actually in charge and solely in fault. Since, a pilot is
responsible only for his own personal negligence, he cannot be held accountable for damages
proximately caused by the default of others, or, if there be anything which concurred with the fault of
the pilot in producing the accident, the vessel master and owners are liable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The fact that the law compels the master to take the pilot
does not exonerate the vessel from liability—it cannot be maintained that the circumstance of having a
pilot on board, and acting in conformity to his directions operate as a discharge of responsibility of the
owners.—Since the colliding vessel is prima facie responsible, the burden of proof is upon the party
claiming benefit of the exemption from liability. It must be shown affirmatively that the pilot was at fault,
and that there was no fault on the party6of the officers or crew, which might have been conducive to
the damage. The fact that the law compelled the master to take the pilot does not exonerate the vessel
from liability. The parties who suffer are entitled to have their remedy against the vessel that
occasioned the damage, and are not under necessity to look to the pilot from whom redress is not
always had for compensation. The owners of the vessel are responsible to the injured party for the acts
of the pilot, and they must be left to recover the amount as well as they can against him. It cannot be
maintained that the circumstance of having a pilot on board, and acting in conformity to his directions
operate as a discharge of responsibility of the owners. Except insofar as their liability is limited or
exempted by statute, the vessel or her owner are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or
other wrongs of the owners or those in charge of the vessel. Where the pilot of a vessel is not a
compulsory one in the sense that the owner or master of the vessel are bound to accept him, but is
employed voluntarily, the owners of the vessel are, all the more, liable for his negligent act.
Same; Same; Same; Damages; Obligations; Joint and Solidary Liability; Where several causes producing
an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have
happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any
or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one
of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same—
each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of
the injury.—It may be said, as a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not
be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient
causes other than plaintiff’s, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes
combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one
of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause
without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not
attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury
would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other
concurrent tortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient
cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of
the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the
circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed
by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor’s negligence ceases to be a proximate cause
merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the
entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose
liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage.—There is no contribution between
joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the
concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it
is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is
responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a
third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article
2194 of the Civil Code.
 Amedo vs. Rio y Olabarrieta, Inc., 95 Phil. 33, No. L-6870 May 24, 1954
1.WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT; CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO HOLD EMPLOYER LIABLE.—The
employer shall be liable to compensate his employee for a personal injury sustained by him from an
accident if the accident (1) arises out of the employment; (2) happens in the course of the employment;
and (3) is not caused by the notorious negligence" of the employee.
2.ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS MUST CONCUR BEFORE EMPLOYEE CAN RECOVER.—Where the death of an
employee was due to an accident which took place "in the course of" but did not "arise out of'' his
employment, he is not entitled to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
3.ID.; ID.; "NOTORIOUS NEGLIGENCE" ILLUSTRATED.—"Notorious negligence" has been held to be
tantamount to "gross negligence", which, in turn, has been defined as "want of even slight care and
diligence." Jumping into the sea, one mile and a half from the seashore, to recover a fallen 2-peso bill, is
an open and reckless disregard of one's safety and the resulting death is undoubtedly caused by
notorious negligence.
 Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al., 99 Phil.
480, No. L-8110 June 30, 1956
1.WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION; "EX PARTE" EVIDENCE, WHEN PERMISSIBLE.—Section 48 of Act No.
3428, as amended, permits the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner to take testimony without
notice provided such ex parte evidence is reduced to writing, and the adverse party is afforded
opportunity to examine and rebut the same.
2.ID.; LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE INDEMNITY GRANTED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.—
The indemnity granted the heirs of the injured employee in a criminal prosecution of any other person
besides the employer does not affect the liability of the latter employer to pay compensation.
3.ID.; STEALING RIDES IN VIOLATION OF EMPLOYER'S PROHIBITION; EFFECT ON RIGHT TO RECOVER
INDEMNITY.—Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence because
transportation by truck is not dangerous per se. The violation of the employer's prohibition against such
ride may be considered merely as possible evidence of negligence, but not negligence per se, since the
prohibition has nothing to do with the personal safety of the riders.
 Ilao-Oreta vs. Ronquillo, 535 SCRA 633, G.R. No. 172406 October 11, 2007
Actions; Negligence; Damages; Words and Phrases; “Gross negligence” implies a want or absence of or
failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care.—“Gross negligence” implies a
want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces
a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. It is characterized by
want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as
other persons may be affected.
Marriage; Honeymoon; Judicial Notice; It is of common human knowledge that excitement attends the
preparations for the honey-moon.—It bears noting that when she was scheduling the date of her
performance of the procedure, Dr. Ilao-Oreta had just gotten married and was preparing for her
honeymoon, and it is of common human knowledge that excitement attends its preparations. Her
negligence could then be partly attributed to human frailty which rules out its characterization as gross.
The doctor’s negligence not being gross, the spouses are not entitled to recover moral damages.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; The list of expenses cannot replace receipts when they should have been
issued as a matter of course in business transactions, as in the case of purchase of gasoline and of
food.—The only piece of documentary evidence supporting the food and fuel expenses is an unsigned
listing. As the fuel and food expenses are not adequately substantiated, they cannot be included in the
computation of the amount of actual damages. So Premiere Development Bank v. Court of Appeals, 427
SCRA 686 (2004), instructs: x x x The list of expenses cannot replace receipts when they should have
been issued as a matter of course in business transactions as in the case of purchase of gasoline and of
food.
 Picart vs. Smith., 37 Phil. 809, No. 12219 March 15, 1918 (pulang kabayo)
1.NEGLIGENCE; CRITERION FOR DETERMINING EXISTENCE OF NEGLI-GENCE.—The test for determining
whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or
property of another is this: Would a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued. If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precaution
against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of
harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is the constitutive fact in
negligence. (fictitiously prudent person)
2.ID.; CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE; SUCCESSIVE NEGLIGENT ACTS.—Where both parties are guilty of
negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds that of the other by an appreciable interval of time,
the one who has the last reasonable opportunity to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR.—The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge, Seeing an automobile ahead he
improperly pulled his horse over to the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile, however,
guided his car toward the plaintiff without diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away. He
then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse that the latter being frightened, jumped
around and was killed by the passing car. Held: That although the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in
being on the wrong side of the bridge, the defendant was nevertheless civilly liable for the legal
damages resulting from the collision, as he had a fair opportunity to avoid the accident after he realized
the situation created by the negligence of the plaintiff and failed to avail himself of that opportunity;
while the plaintiff could by no means then place himself in a position of greater safety.
Sicam vs. Jorge, 529 SCRA 443, G.R. No. 159617 August 8, 2007
Obligations and Contracts; Fortuitous Events; Elements; Words and Phrases; Fortuitous events by
definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable—it is therefore, not enough that the
event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid.—Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not
foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere
difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. To constitute a fortuitous
event, the following elements must concur: (a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence
or of the failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of human will; (b) it must
be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be
impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
obligations in a normal manner; and, (d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury or loss.
Same; Same; In order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has
committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss; When the effect is found to
be partly the result of a person’s participation—whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to
act—the whole occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.—The
burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it. And, in order
for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed no negligence
or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. It has been held that an act of God cannot be invoked
to protect a person who has failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a
loss. One’s negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and injury to
another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a
fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability. When the effect is found to be partly the result of
a person’s participation—whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act—the whole
occurrence is humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
Same; Same; Pawnshops; Robbery; Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event;
Merely presenting the police report on the robbery committed based on the report of the employees of
the pawnshop owner is not sufficient to establish robbery.—Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a
fortuitous event. It does not foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein petitioners. In
Co v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 111 (1998), the Court held: It is not a defense for a repair shop of
motor vehicles to escape liability simply because the damage or loss of a thing lawfully placed in its
possession was due to carnapping. Carnapping per se cannot be considered as a fortuitous event. The
fact that a thing was unlawfully and forcefully taken from another’s rightful possession, as in cases of
carnapping, does not automatically give rise to a fortuitous event. To be considered as such, carnapping
entails more than the mere forceful taking of another’s property. It must be proved and established that
the event was an act of God or was done solely by third parties and that neither the claimant nor the
person alleged to be negligent has any participation. In accordance with the Rules of Evidence, the
burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who invokes it—which in this
case is the private respondent. However, other than the police report of the alleged carnapping incident,
no other evidence was presented by private respondent to the effect that the incident was not due to its
fault. A police report of an alleged crime, to which only private respondent is privy, does not suffice to
establish the carnapping. Neither does it prove that there was no fault on the part of private respondent
notwithstanding the parties’ agreement at the pre-trial that the car was carnapped. Carnapping does
not foreclose the possibility of fault or negligence on the part of private respondent. Just like in Co,
petitioners merely presented the police report of the Parañaque Police Station on the robbery
committed based on the report of petitioners’ employees which is not sufficient to establish robbery.
Such report also does not prove that petitioners were not at fault.
Same; Same; Same; Article 2123 of the Civil Code provides that with regard to pawnshops and other
establishments which are engaged in making loans secured by pledges, the special laws and regulations
concerning them shall be observed, and subsidiarily, the provisions on pledge, mortgage and
antichresis.—Article 2123 of the Civil Code provides that with regard to pawnshops and other
establishments which are engaged in making loans secured by pledges, the special laws and regulations
concerning them shall be observed, and subsidiarily, the provisions on pledge, mortgage and antichresis.
The provision on pledge, particularly Article 2099 of the Civil Code, provides that the creditor shall take
care of the thing pledged with the diligence of a good father of a family. This means that petitioners
must take care of the pawns the way a prudent person would as to his own property.
Same; Same; Same; Negligence; Words and Phrases; Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.—We
expounded in Cruz v. Gangan, 211 SCRA 517 (1992), that negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do; or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
It is want of care required by the circumstances. A review of the records clearly shows that petitioners
failed to exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation. Petitioners were guilty of negligence in the operation of their pawnshop business.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Central Bank considered it not feasible to require insurance of pawned
articles against burglary—there was no statutory duty imposed on the pawnshop owner to insure the
pawned jewelry.—Under Section 17 of Central Bank Circular No. 374, Rules and Regulations for
Pawnshops, which took effect on July 13, 1973, and which was issued pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 114, Pawnshop Regulation Act, it is provided that pawns pledged must be insured, to wit: Sec. 17.
Insurance of Office Building and Pawns.—The place of business of a pawnshop and the pawns pledged
to it must be insured against fire and against burglary as well as for the latter(sic), by an insurance
company accredited by the Insurance Commissioner. However, this Section was subsequently amended
by CB Circular No. 764 which took effect on October 1, 1980, to wit: Sec. 17. Insurance of Office Building
and Pawns.—The office building/premises and pawns of a pawnshop must be insured against fire.
(emphasis supplied). where the requirement that insurance against burglary was deleted. Obviously, the
Central Bank considered it not feasible to require insurance of pawned articles against burglary. The
robbery in the pawnshop happened in 1987, and considering the above-quoted amendment, there is no
statutory duty imposed on petitioners to insure the pawned jewelry in which case it was error for the CA
to consider it as a factor in concluding that petitioners were negligent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The diligence with which the law requires the individual at all times to govern
his conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which he is placed and the importance of the act
which he is to perform.—The preponderance of evidence shows that petitioners failed to exercise the
diligence required of them under the Civil Code. The diligence with which the law requires the individual
at all times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which he is placed and the
importance of the act which he is to perform. Thus, the cases of Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527
(1971), Hernandez v. Chairman, Commission on Audit, 179 SCRA 39 (1989), and Cruz v. Gangan, 211
SCRA 517
(1992), cited by petitioners in their pleadings, where the victims of robbery were exonerated from
liability, find no application to the present case. Sicam vs. Jorge, 529 SCRA 443, G.R. No. 159617 August
8, 2007
The Heirs of Redentor Completo vs. Albayda, Jr., 624 SCRA 97, G.R. No. 172200<br/> July 6, 2010
Torts and Damages; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence the motorist’s breach in his duty of care owed to the
plaintiff, that the motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid injury to
the plaintiff, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury suffered.—The instant case
involved a collision between a taxicab and a bicycle which resulted in serious physical injuries to the
bicycle rider, Albayda. It is a rule in negligence suits that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of evidence the motorist’s breach in his duty of care owed to the plaintiff, that the
motorist was negligent in failing to exercise the diligence required to avoid injury to the plaintiff, and
that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury suffered. Article 2176 of the Civil Code
provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. In this regard, the question of the motorist’s
negligence is a question of fact.
Same; Same; Same; Bicycles; Right of Way; The bicycle occupies a legal position that is at least equal to
that of other vehicles lawfully on the highway, and it is fortified by the fact that usually more will be
required of a motorist than a bicyclist in discharging his duty of care to the other because of the physical
advantages the automobile has over the bicycle; While the duty of using reasonable care falls alike on a
motorist and a bicyclist, due to the inherent differences in the two vehicles, more care is required from
the motorist to fully discharge the duty than from the bicyclist. At the slow speed of ten miles per hour,
a bicyclist travels almost fifteen feet per second, while a car traveling at only twenty-five miles per hour
covers almost thirty-seven feet per second, and split-second action may be insufficient to avoid an
accident. It is obvious that a motor vehicle poses a greater danger of harm to a bicyclist than vice versa.
Accordingly, while the duty of using reasonable care falls alike on a motorist and a bicyclist, due to the
inherent differences in the two vehicles, more care is required from the motorist to fully discharge the
duty than from the bicyclist. Simply stated, the physical advantages that the motor vehicle has over the
bicycle make it more dangerous to the bicyclist than vice versa.
Same; Same; Same; Vicarious Liability of Employers; When an injury is caused by the negligence of an
employee, a legal presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent, which presumption
may be rebutted only by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.—Under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, the obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions,
but also for those persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees, but the employers’ responsibility shall cease upon proof that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employees. When
an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, a legal presumption instantly arises that the
employer was negligent. This presumption may be rebutted only by a clear showing on the part of the
employer that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
his employee. If the employer successfully overcomes the legal presumption of negligence, he is relieved
of liability. In other words, the burden of proof is on the employer.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The civil liability of the employer for the negligent acts of his employee is also
primary and direct, owing to his own negligence in selecting and supervising his employee.—The trial
court’s finding that Completo failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid collision with Albayda at the
intersection of 11th and 8th Streets of VAB gives rise to liability on the part of Completo, as driver, and
his employer Abiad. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary.
The civil liability of the employer for the negligent acts of his employee is also primary and direct, owing
to his own negligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The civil liability of the employer
attaches even if the employer is not inside the vehicle at the time of the collision.
Same; Same; Same; Same; With respect to the supervision of employees, employers should formulate
standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for
breaches thereof.—In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them
as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. On the other hand, with respect to the
supervision of employees, employers should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. To establish these factors in a
trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.
Damages; Temperate Damages; Temperate damages, more than nominal but less than compensatory
damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its
amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty—the damages must be
reasonable under the circumstances. While the amount of actual damages was not duly established with
certainty, the Court recognizes the fact that, indeed, Albayda incurred a considerable amount for the
necessary and reasonable medical expenses, loss of salary and wages, loss of capacity to earn increased
wages, cost of occupational therapy, and harm from conditions caused by prolonged immobilization.
Temperate damages, more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when
the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of
the case, be proved with certainty. Temperate damages must be reasonable under the circumstances.
Thus, the Court finds the award of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as temperate damages
reasonable under the circumstances.
Pacis vs. Morales, 613 SCRA 607, G.R. No. 169467 February 25, 2010
Quasi-Delicts; Torts and Damages; Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, an injured party may enforce his
claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code or he may opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code; Unlike
the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, the liability of the
employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct,
based on a person’s own negligence.—This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of
petitioners’ son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages
based on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code or they
may opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of
enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an
independent civil action for damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s employer.
Petitioners based their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Unlike the
subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, the liability of the
employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct,
based on a person’s own negligence. Article 2176 states: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Same; Same; A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his
control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances.
Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional
precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business
which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a
higher degree of care.
Same; Same; Gun Stores; A gun store owner is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and
should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or
injury to others.— Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded.
Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed
for ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be
loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what
happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and
placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective
gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent
should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent
should never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has
personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not
loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether
respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its
original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.
Jarco Marketing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 375, G.R. No. 129792 December 21, 1999
Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Words and Phrases; “Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance,” Explained.—One who
maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract
children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or
resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is
technically a trespasser in the premises. The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or
appliance in question although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to
children of tender years as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an
implied invitation to such children. (Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. v. Balandan, et al., 91 Phil. 488, 490 [1952]).
Same; Same; Same; “Accident,” Explained.—An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no
fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is “a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an
event happening without any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an
event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.”
Same; Same; Same; “Negligence,” Explained.—Negligence is the omission to do something which a
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is
“the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.”
Same; Same; Same; Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory—one cannot exist with the
other.—Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other.
Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of
any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence.
Same; Same; Test in Determining Existence of Negligence.—The test in determining the existence of
negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith, thus: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Same; Same; Evidence; Hearsay Rule; Res Gestae; Witnesses; It is axiomatic that matters relating to
declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a physician are generally considered
declarations and admissions.—It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering
and statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and admissions. All that is
required for their admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the
influence of a startling event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as
witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus described, it is
unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom
she trusted with her life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales’ testimony on the matter, i.e.,
ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did, through their
negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counter’s base.
Witnesses; It is settled that when the issue concerns the credibility of witnesses, the appellate courts
will not as a general rule disturb the findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to determine
the same.—It is settled that when the issue concerns the credibility of witnesses, the appellate courts
will not as a general rule disturb the findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to determine
the same. The trial court has the distinct advantage of actually hearing the testimony of and observing
the deportment of the witnesses. However, the rule admits of exceptions such as when its evaluation
was reached arbitrarily or it overlooked or failed to appreciate some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance which could affect the result of the case. In the instant case, petitioners failed to bring
their claim within the exception.
Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Children; Presumptions; Children below nine (9) years old are conclusively
presumed incapable of contributory negligence.—Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply
the conclusive presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of
contributory negligence. In his book, former Judge Cezar S. Sangco stated: In our jurisdiction, a person
under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that
account, exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from criminal
liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that he
has acted with discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required
discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by
analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of
discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is
a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be
conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Ylarde vs. Aquino, 163 SCRA 697, No. L-33722 July 29, 1988
Torts and Damages; Schools and Colleges; Liability of teachers for torts committed by their students.—It
is only the teachers and not the principal or head of an academic school who should be answerable for
torts committed by their students. In a school of arts and trades, it is only the head of the school who
can be held liable. Under Section 2180 of the Civil Code, the teacher-in-charge of school children should
be held liable for negligence in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary
precautions to prevent any injury on their persons.
Same; Same; Teacher's responsibility.—A teacher who stands in loco parentis to his pupils should make
sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company.
Same; Same; Same; Work Education.—Excavation should not be placed in the category of school
gardening, planting trees, and the like as these undertakings do not expose the children to any risk that
can result in death or physical injuries.
Same; Same; Same; Existence of reckless imprudence, determination.—In determining whether or not
reckless imprudence exists, the degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of
the person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an
adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and
experience.
Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc., vs. Balandan, et al., 91 Phil. 488, No. L-3422 June 13, 1952
1.ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE, WHAT CONSTITUTES; MAINTAINER LIABLE FOR INJURIES CAUSED TO CHILD.—
One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to
attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing
therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child
is technically a trespasser in the premises.
2.ID.; DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE TO SWIMMING POOL OR WATER TANK.—The attractive nuisance
doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of
some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location.
Culion Ice, Fish & Elec. Co. vs. Phil. Motors Corporation, 55 Phil. 129, No. 32611 November 3, 1930
1.NEGLIGENCE; SKILL REQUIRED OF PERSON WHO UNDERTAKES PARTICULAR WORK.—A person who
holds himself out as being competent to do work requiring special skill is guilty of negligence if he fails to
exhibit the care a prudent person would exhibit who is reasonably well skilled in the particular work
undertaken.
2.ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR.—The manager of the defendant corporation, which was engaged chief ly in
selling and repairing automobiles, but which had authority, under its charter, to deal in all sorts of
machinery engines, and motors, and their equipment, undertook to change the gasoline engine on
plaintiff's boat, with a view to enabling it to use a fuel of lower grade. After a new carburetor had been
introduced and a new fuel tank installed, the boat was taken out for a trial, in the course of which a back
fire took place in the cylinder of the engine, and flames were communicated; through the carburetor, to
the outside, with the result that the boat was destroyed. Held, upon the facts stated in the opinion, that
the loss of the boat was attributable to the negligence or lack of skill on the part of the manager of the
defendant corporation.
United States vs. Pineda., 37 Phil. 456, No. 12858 January 22, 1918
1.EVIDENCE; "RES INTER ALIOS ACTA."—As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by
a defendant is inadmissible. As one exception, however, it is permissible to ascertain defendant's
knowledge and intent and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion
performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and
fraudulent intent may even be established. There is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency
of accidents.
2.ID.; DISCRETION OF TRIAL JUDGE.—On the trial of a criminal case where the question relates to the
tendency of certain testimony to throw light upon a particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a
particular person, there is a certain discretion on the part of the trial judge which a court of error will
not interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the
question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused. (Moore vs. U. S. [1893], 150 U. S., 57.)
3.ID.; CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.—Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumstantial
evidence, either from the nature of the inquiry or the failure of direct proof, objections to the testimony
on the ground of irrelevancy are not favored. (Moore vs. U. S. [1893], 150 U. S., 57.)
4.ID.; MOTIVE.—Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although it
tends to prove the commission of another offense by the defendant. (Moore vs. U. S. [1893], 150 U. S.,
57.)
5.ID.; ID.—A druggist filled a prescription calling for potassium chlorate with barium chlorate, a poison,
causing the death of two horses. After analyzing the packages, two chemists went to the drug store of
the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate.
Held: That the testimony of the chemist was admissible in order to demonstrate defendant's motive and
negligence.
6.DRUGGISTS; RESPONSIBILITY.—The profession of pharmacy is one demanding care and skill. The
responsibility of the druggist to use care can be qualified as the highest degree of care known to
practical men. The skill required of the druggist can be qualified as high or ample. In other words, the
care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond
with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.
7.ID.; ID.—The rule of caveat emptor cannot be applied to the purchase and sale of drugs. An imperative
duty is on the druggist to take precautions to prevent death or serious injury to any one who relies on
his absolute honesty and peculiar learning. The nature of drugs is such that examination will not avail
the purchaser anything. Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug
called for.
8.ID.; ID.—In civil cases, the druggist is made liable for any injury approximately resulting from his
negligence. "Pharmacists or apothecaries who compound or sell medicines, if they carelessly label a
poison as a harmless medicine, and send it so 'labelled into the market are liable to all persons, who,
without fault on their part, are injured by using it as such medicine, in consequence of the false label; the rule being that the. liability in such a case arises, not out of any contract or direct privity between
the wrongdoer and the person injured, but out of the duty which the law imposes on him to avoid acts
in their nature dangerous to the lives of others."
9.PHARMACY LAW; "FRAUDULENT" CONSTRUED.—The Pharmacy Law makes it unlawful for any person
to sell any drug under any "fraudulent name." The word "fraudulent" is not here used in all of its
strictness. Rather considering the responsibility for the quality of drugs which the law imposes on
druggists and the position of the word "fraudulent" in juxtaposition to "name" what is made unlawful is
the giving of a false name to the drug asked for.
10.ID.; PENALTY.—The law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it be
through negligence or mistake.
11.ID.; ID.—A druggist in filling a prescription calling for potassium chlorate gave instead to the
customer barium chlorate, a poison, and placed this poison in a package labelled potassium chlorate.
The customer gave a portion of the prescription to two of his sick horses with the result that they died
shortly afterwards. Held: That the druggist is guilty of a violation of the Pharmacy Law.
Mercury Drug Corporation vs. De Leon, 569 SCRA 432, G.R. No. 165622 October 17, 2008
Pharmacists; Druggists must exercise the highest practicable degree of prudence and vigilance, and the
most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, so that
human life may not constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons
for harmless medicines.—Mercury Drug and Ganzon can not exculpate themselves from any liability. As
active players in the field of dispensing medicines to the public, the highest degree of care and diligence
is expected of them. Likewise, numerous decisions, both here and abroad, have laid salutary rules for
the protection of human life and human health. In the United States case of Tombari v. Conners, 85
Conn. 231 (1912), it was ruled that the profession of pharmacy demands care and skill, and druggists
must exercise care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men. In
other words, druggists must exercise the highest practicable degree of prudence and vigilance, and the
most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, so that
human life may not constantly be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons
for harmless medicines.
Same; One holding himself out as competent to handle drugs, having rightful access to them, and relied
upon by those dealing with him to exercise that high degree of caution and care called for by the
peculiarly dangerous nature of the business, cannot be heard to say that his mistake by which he
furnishes a customer the most deadly of drugs for those comparatively harmless, is not in itself gross
negligence. In our own jurisdiction, United States v. Pineda, 37 Phil. 456 (1918), and Mercury Drug
Corporation v. Baking, 523 SCRA 184 (2007) are illustrative. In Pineda, the potassium chlorate demanded
by complainant had been intended for his race horses. When complainant mixed with water what he
thought and believed was potassium chlorate, but which turned out to be the potently deadly barium
chlorate, his race horses died of poisoning only a few hours after. The wisdom of such a decision is
unquestionable. If the victims had been human beings instead of horses, the damage and loss would
have been irreparable.
Same; This Court once more reiterated that the profession of pharmacy demands great care and skill.—
This Court once more reiterated that the profession of pharmacy demands great care and skill. It
reminded druggists to exercise the highest degree of care known to practical men. In cases where an
injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection or supervision of one’s
employees. This presumption may be rebutted by a clear showing that the employer has exercised the
care and diligence of a good father of the family. Mercury Drug failed to overcome such presumption.
Same; This Court has ruled that in the purchase and sale of drugs, the buyer and seller do not stand at
arms length.—As a buyer, De Leon relied on the expertise and experience of Mercury Drug and its
employees in dispensing to him the right medicine. This Court has ruled that in the purchase and sale of
drugs, the buyer and seller do not stand at arms length. There exists an imperative duty on the seller or
the druggist to take precaution to prevent death or injury to any person who relies on one’s absolute
honesty and peculiar learning. The Court emphasized: x x x The nature of drugs is such that examination
would not avail the purchaser anything. It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an
examination of a compound of which he can know nothing. Consequently, it must be that the druggist
warrants that he will deliver the drug called for.
Damages; The award of damages must be commensurate to the loss or injury suffered.—Moral damages
are not intended to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer or to enrich the claimant at the expense of
defendant. There is no hard and fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of
moral damages since each case must be governed by its peculiar circumstances. However, the award of
damages must be commensurate to the loss or injury suffered.
Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital vs. Capanzana, 821 SCRA 258, G.R. No. 189218 March 22, 2017
Quasi-delicts; Medical Negligence; In order to successfully pursue a claim in a medical negligence case,
the plaintiff must prove that a health professional either failed to do something which a reasonably
prudent health professional would have or have not done; and that the action or omission caused injury
to the patient.—In order to successfully pursue a claim in a medical negligence case, the plaintiff must
prove that a health professional either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health
professional would have or have not done; and that the action or omission caused injury to the patient.
Proceeding from this guideline, the plaintiff must show the following elements by a preponderance of
evidence: duty of the health professional, breach of that duty, injury of the patient, and proximate
causation between the breach and the injury. Meanwhile, in fixing a standard by which a court may
determine whether the physician properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient, expert
medical testimonies from both plaintiff and defense are resorted to. In this case, the expert testimony of
witness for the respondent Dr. Godfrey Robeniol, a neurosurgeon, provided that the best time to treat
hypoxic encephalopathy is at the time of its occurrence; i.e., when the patient is experiencing difficulty
in breathing and showing signs of cardiac arrest.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) has emphasized that a higher degree of caution and an exacting
standard of diligence in patient management and health care are required of a hospital’s staff, as they
deal with the lives of patients who seek urgent medical assistance.—We agree with the courts below in
their finding that when she was gasping for breath and turning cyanotic, it was the duty of the nurses to
intervene immediately by informing the resident doctor. Had they done so, proper oxygenation could
have been restored and other interventions performed without wasting valuable time. That such high
degree of care and responsiveness was needed cannot be overemphasized — considering that according
to expert medical evidence in the records, it takes only five minutes of oxygen deprivation for
irreversible brain damage to set in. Indeed, the Court has emphasized that a higher degree of caution
and an exacting standard of diligence in patient management and health care are required of a
hospital’s staff, as they deal with the lives of patients who seek urgent medical assistance. It is
incumbent upon nurses to take precautions or undertake steps to safeguard patients under their care
from any possible injury that may arise in the course of the latter’s treatment and care.
Same; Same; There was a delay in the administration of oxygen to the patient, caused by the delayed
response of the nurses of petitioner hospital.—The Court further notes that the immediate response of
the nurses was especially imperative, since Regina herself had asked for oxygen. They should have been
prompted to respond immediately when Regina herself expressed her needs, especially in that
emergency situation when it was not easy to determine with certainty the cause of her breathing
difficulty. Indeed, even if the patient had not asked for oxygen, the mere fact that her breathing was
labored to an abnormal degree should have impelled the nurses to immediately call the doctor and to
administer oxygen. In this regard, both courts found that there was a delay in the administration of
oxygen to the patient, caused by the delayed response of the nurses of petitioner hospital. They
committed a breach of their duty to respond immediately to the needs of Regina, considering her
precarious situation and her physical manifestations of oxygen deprivation.
Same; Same; The records also show another instance of negligence, such as the delay in the removal of
Regina’s consumed dextrose, a condition that was already causing her discomfort.—The records also
show another instance of negligence, such as the delay in the removal of Regina’s consumed dextrose, a
condition that was already causing her discomfort. In fact, Balad had to inform the nurses and the
patient had to instruct one of them, on what to do.
Same; Same; Proximate Cause; A failure to act may be the proximate cause if it plays a substantial part
in bringing about an injury.—We affirm the findings of the courts below that the negligent delay on the
part of the nurses was the proximate cause of the brain damage suffered by Regina. In Ramos v. Court of
Appeals, 321 SCRA 584 (1999), the Court defines proximate cause as follows: Proximate cause has been
defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is
proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case, that
the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage;
and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act
or omission. It is the dominant, moving or producing cause. (Underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, a failure to act may be the proximate cause if it plays a substantial part in bringing about an injury.
Note also that the omission to perform a duty may also constitute the proximate cause of an injury, but
only where the omission would have prevented the injury. The Court also emphasizes that the injury
need only be a reasonably probable consequence of the failure to act. In other words, there is no need
for absolute certainty that the injury is a consequence of the omission. Applying the above definition to
the facts in the present case, the omission of the nurses — their failure to check on Regina and to refer
her to the resident doctor and, thereafter, to immediately provide oxygen — was clearly the proximate
cause that led to the brain damage suffered by the patient. As the trial court and the CA both held, had
the nurses promptly responded, oxygen would have been immediately administered to her and the risk
of brain damage lessened, if not avoided.
Same; Same; Vicarious Liability; For the negligence of its nurses, petitioner is thus liable under Article
2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Under Article 2180, an employer like petitioner
hospital may be held liable for the negligence of its employees based on its responsibility under a
relationship of patria potestas. The liability of the employer under this provision is “direct and
immediate; it is not conditioned upon a prior recourse against the negligent employee or a prior
showing of the insolvency of that employee.” The employer may only be relieved of responsibility upon
a showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
its employees. The rule is that once negligence of the employee is shown, the burden is on the employer
to overcome the presumption of negligence on the latter’s part by proving observance of the required
diligence.
Same; Same; Same; While the question of diligent supervision depends on the circumstances of
employment, the Supreme Court (SC) finds that by the very nature of a hospital, the proper supervision
of the attendance of its nurses, who are its frontline health professionals, is crucial considering that
patients’ conditions can change drastically in a matter of minutes.—There is no proof of actual
supervision of the employees’ work or actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance
with the rules. The testimony of petitioner’s Assistant Nursing Service Director, Lourdes H. Nicolas is
belied by the actual records of petitioner. These show that Nurses David and Padolina had been
observed to be latecomers and absentees; yet they were never sanctioned by those supposedly
supervising them. While the question of diligent supervision depends on the circumstances of
employment, we find that by the very nature of a hospital, the proper supervision of the attendance of
its nurses, who are its frontline health professionals, is crucial considering that patients’ conditions can
change drastically in a matter of minutes. Petitioner’s Employee Handbook recognized exactly this as it
decreed the proper procedure in availing of unavoidable absences and the commensurate penalties of
verbal reprimand, written warning, suspension from work, and dismissal in instances of unexcused
absence or tardiness. Petitioner’s failure to sanction the tardiness of the defendant nurses shows an
utter lack of actual implementation and monitoring of compliance with the rules and ultimately of
supervision over its nurses.
Casumpang vs. Cortejo, 752 SCRA 379, G.R. No. 171228 March 11, 2015
Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Medical Malpractice; Negligence; To successfully pursue a medical malpractice
suit, the plaintiff (in this case, the deceased patient’s heir) must prove that the doctor either failed to do
what a reasonably prudent doctor would have done, or did what a reasonably prudent doctor would not
have done; and the act or omission had caused injury to the patient.—The claim for damages is based
on the petitioning doctors’ negligence in diagnosing and treating the deceased Edmer, the child of the
respondent. It is a medical malpractice suit, an action available to victims to redress a wrong committed
by medical professionals who caused bodily harm to, or the death of, a patient. As the term is used, the
suit is brought whenever a medical practitioner or health care provider fails to meet the standards
demanded by his profession, or deviates from this standard, and causes injury to the patient. To
successfully pursue a medical malpractice suit, the plaintiff (in this case, the deceased patient’s heir)
must prove that the doctor either failed to do what a reasonably prudent doctor would have done, or
did what a reasonably prudent doctor would not have done; and the act or omission had caused injury
to the patient. The patient’s heir/s bears the burden of proving his/her cause of action.
Same; Same; Same; Physician-Patient Relationship; A physician-patient relationship is created when a
patient engages the services of a physician, and the latter accepts or agrees to provide care to the
patient; The mere fact that an individual approaches a physician and seeks diagnosis, advice or
treatment does not create the duty of care unless the physician agrees.—The elements of medical
negligence are: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation. Duty refers to the standard
of behavior that imposes restrictions on one’s conduct. It requires proof of professional relationship
between the physician and the patient. Without the professional relationship, a physician owes no duty
to the patient, and cannot therefore incur any liability. A physician-patient relationship is created when
a patient engages the services of a physician, and the latter accepts or agrees to provide care to the
patient. The establishment of this relationship is consensual, and the acceptance by the physician
essential. The mere fact that an individual approaches a physician and seeks diagnosis, advice or
treatment does not create the duty of care unless the physician agrees.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Once a physician-patient relationship is established, the legal duty of care
follows. The doctor accordingly becomes duty-bound to use at least the same standard of care that a
reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a medical condition under similar circumstances.—
Once a physician-patient relationship is established, the legal duty of care follows. The doctor
accordingly becomes duty-bound to use at least the same standard of care that a reasonably competent
doctor would use to treat a medical condition under similar circumstances. Breach of duty occurs when
the doctor fails to comply with, or improperly performs his duties under professional standards. This
determination is both factual and legal, and is specific to each individual case. If the patient, as a result
of the breach of duty, is injured in body or in health, actionable malpractice is committed, entitling the
patient to damages. To successfully claim damages, the patient must lastly prove the causal relation
between the negligence and the injury. This connection must be direct, natural, and should be unbroken
by any intervening efficient causes. In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the
injury. The injury or damage is proximately caused by the physician’s negligence when it appears, based
on the evidence and the expert testimony, that the negligence played an integral part in causing the
injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result, or a reasonably probable
consequence of the physician’s negligence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; With respect to Dr. Miranda, her professional relationship with Edmer arose
when she assumed the obligation to provide resident supervision over the latter.—With respect to Dr.
Miranda, her professional relationship with Edmer arose when she assumed the obligation to provide
resident supervision over the latter. As second year resident doctor tasked to do rounds and assist other
physicians, Dr. Miranda is deemed to have agreed to the creation of physician-patient relationship with
the hospital’s patients when she participated in the diagnosis and prescribed a course of treatment for
Edmer. The undisputed evidence shows that Dr. Miranda examined Edmer twice (at around 12:00 and
3:30 in the afternoon of April 23, 1988), and in both instances, she prescribed treatment and
participated in the diagnosis of Edmer’s medical condition. Her affirmative acts amounted to her
acceptance of the physician-patient relationship, and incidentally, the legal duty of care that went with
it.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Expert Witnesses; It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert
testimony is essential to establish not only the professional standards observed in the medical
community, but also that the physician’s conduct in the treatment of care falls below such standard.—A
determination of whether or not the petitioning doctors met the required standard of care involves a
question of mixed fact and law; it is factual as medical negligence cases are highly technical in nature,
requiring the presentation of expert witnesses to provide guidance to the court on matters clearly falling
within the domain of medical science, and legal, insofar as the Court, after evaluating the expert
testimonies, and guided by medical literature, learned treatises, and its fund of common knowledge,
ultimately determines whether breach of duty took place. Whether or not Dr. Casumpang and Dr.
Miranda committed a breach of duty is to be measured by the yardstick of professional standards
observed by the other members of the medical profession in good standing under similar circumstances.
It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only the
professional standards observed in the medical community, but also that the physician’s conduct in the
treatment of care falls below such standard.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In Spouses Flores v. Spouses Pineda, 571 SCRA 83 (2008), a case involving a
medical malpractice suit, the Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the petitioner doctors were negligent
because they failed to immediately order tests to confirm the patient’s illness.—In Spouses Flores v.
Spouses Pineda, 571 SCRA 83 (2008), a case involving a medical malpractice suit, the Court ruled that
the petitioner doctors were negligent because they failed to immediately order tests to confirm the
patient’s illness. Despite the doctors’ suspicion that the patient could be suffering from diabetes, the
former still proceeded to the D&C operation. In that case, expert testimony showed that tests should
have been ordered immediately on admission to the hospital in view of the symptoms presented. The
Court held: When a patient exhibits symptoms typical of a particular disease, these symptoms should, at
the very least, alert the physician of the possibility that the patient may be afflicted with the suspected
disease.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A wrong diagnosis is not by itself medical malpractice.—Even assuming that
Edmer’s symptoms completely coincided with the diagnosis of bronchopneumonia (so that this
diagnosis could not be considered “wrong”), we still find Dr. Casumpang guilty of negligence. First, we
emphasize that we do not decide the correctness of a doctor’s diagnosis, or the accuracy of the medical
findings and treatment. Our duty in medical malpractice cases is to decide — based on the evidence
adduced and expert opinion presented — whether a breach of duty took place. Second, we clarify that a
wrong diagnosis is not by itself medical malpractice. Physicians are generally not liable for damages
resulting from a bona fide error of judgment. Nonetheless, when the physician’s erroneous diagnosis
was the result of negligent conduct (e.g., neglect of medical history, failure to order the appropriate
tests, failure to recognize symptoms), it becomes an evidence of medical malpractice. Third, we also
note that medicine is not an exact science; and doctors, or even specialists, are not expected to give a
100% accurate diagnosis in treating patients who come to their clinic for consultations. Error is possible
as the exercise of judgment is called for in considering and reading the exhibited symptoms, the results
of tests, and in arriving at definitive conclusions. But in doing all these, the doctor must have acted
according to acceptable medical practice standards.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Apart from failing to promptly detect dengue fever, Dr. Casumpang also
failed to promptly undertake the proper medical management needed for this disease.—Apart from
failing to promptly detect dengue fever, Dr. Casumpang also failed to promptly undertake the proper
medical management needed for this disease. As Dr. Jaudian opined, the standard medical procedure
once the patient had exhibited the classic symptoms of dengue fever should have been: oxygen
inhalation, use of analgesic, and infusion of fluids or dextrose; and once the patient had twice vomited
fresh blood, the doctor should have ordered: blood transfusion, monitoring of the patient every 30
minutes, hemostatic to stop bleeding, and oxygen if there is difficulty in breathing. Dr. Casumpang failed
to measure up to these standards. The evidence strongly suggests that he ordered a transfusion of
platelet concentrate instead of blood transfusion. The tourniquet test was only conducted after Edmer’s
second episode of bleeding, and the medical management (as reflected in the records) did not include
antibiotic therapy and complete physical examination.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While attending and resident physicians share the collective responsibility to
deliver safe and appropriate care to the patients, it is the attending physician who assumes the principal
responsibility of patient care.—The attending physician, on the other hand, is primarily responsible for
managing the resident’s exercise of duties. Because he/she exercises a supervisory role over the
resident, and is ultimately responsible for the diagnosis and treatment of the patient, the standards
applicable to and the liability of the resident for medical malpractice is theoretically less than that of the
attending physician. These relative burdens and distinctions, however, do not translate to immunity
from the legal duty of care for residents, or from the responsibility arising from their own negligent act.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Expert Witnesses; The competence of an expert witness is a matter for the
trial court to decide upon in the exercise of its discretion.—The competence of an expert witness is a
matter for the trial court to decide upon in the exercise of its discretion. The test of qualification is
necessarily a relative one, depending upon the subject matter of the investigation, and the fitness of the
expert witness. In our jurisdiction, the criterion remains to be the expert witness’ special knowledge
experience and practical training that qualify him/her to explain highly technical medical matters to the
Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; United States (US) jurisprudence on medical malpractice
demonstrated the trial courts’ wide latitude of discretion in allowing a specialist from another field to
testify against a defendant specialist.—A close scrutiny of Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584
(1999), and Cereno v. Court of Appeals, 682 SCRA 18 (2012), reveals that the Court primarily based the
witnesses’ disqualification to testify as an expert on their incapacity to shed light on the standard of care
that must be observed by the defendant-physicians. That the expert witnesses’ specialties do not match
the physicians’ practice area only constituted, at most, one of the considerations that should not be
taken out of context. After all, the sole function of a medical expert witness, regardless of his/her
specialty, is to afford assistance to the courts on medical matters, and to explain the medical facts in
issue. Furthermore, there was no reasonable indication in Ramos and Cereno that the expert witnesses
possess a sufficient familiarity with the standard of care applicable to the physicians’ specialties. US
jurisprudence on medical malpractice demonstrated the trial courts’ wide latitude of discretion in
allowing a specialist from another field to testify against a defendant specialist.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Although he specializes in pathology, it was established during trial
that he had attended not less than thirty (30) seminars held by the Pediatric Society, had exposure in
pediatrics, had been practicing medicine for sixteen (16) years, and had handled not less than fifty (50)
dengue-related cases.—In the case and the facts before us, we find that Dr. Jaudian is competent to
testify on the standard of care in dengue fever cases. Although he specializes in pathology, it was
established during trial that he had attended not less than 30 seminars held by the Pediatric Society, had
exposure in pediatrics, had been practicing medicine for 16 years, and had handled not less than 50
dengue related cases. As a licensed medical practitioner specializing in pathology, who had practical and
relevant exposure in pediatrics and dengue-related cases, we are convinced that Dr. Jaudian
demonstrated sufficient familiarity with the standard of care to be applied in dengue fever cases.
Furthermore, we agree that he possesses knowledge and experience sufficient to qualify him to speak
with authority on the subject.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Dr. Casumpang failed to timely diagnose Edmer with dengue fever despite
the presence of its characteristic symptoms; and as a consequence of the delayed diagnosis, he also
failed to promptly manage Edmer’s illness.—Dr. Casumpang failed to timely diagnose Edmer with
dengue fever despite the presence of its characteristic symptoms; and as a consequence of the delayed
diagnosis, he also failed to promptly manage Edmer’s illness. Had he immediately conducted
confirmatory tests, (i.e., tourniquet tests and series of blood tests) and promptly administered the
proper care and management needed for dengue fever, the risk of complications or even death, could
have been substantially reduced. Furthermore, medical literature on dengue shows that early diagnosis
and management of dengue is critical in reducing the risk of complications and avoiding further spread
of the virus. That Edmer later died of “Hypovolemic Shock/hemorrhagic shock,” “Dengue Hemorrhagic
Fever Stage IV,” a severe and fatal form of dengue fever, established the causal link between Dr.
Casumpang’s negligence and the injury.
Labor Law; Employer-Employee Relationship; Independent Contractors; Based on the records, no
evidence exists showing that San Juan de Dios Hospital (SJDH) exercised any degree of control over the
means, methods of procedure and manner by which the petitioning doctors conducted and performed
their medical profession. SJDH did not control their diagnosis and treatment; In these lights, the
petitioning doctors were not employees of SJDH, but were mere independent contractors.—In
determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists between the parties, the following
elements must be present: (1) selection and engagement of services; (2) payment of wages; (3) the
power to hire and fire; and (4) the power to control not only the end to be achieved, but the means to
be used in reaching such an end. Control, which is the most crucial among the elements, is not present
in this case. Based on the records, no evidence exists showing that SJDH exercised any degree of control
over the means, methods of procedure and manner by which the petitioning doctors conducted and
performed their medical profession. SJDH did not control their diagnosis and treatment. Likewise, no
evidence was presented to show that SJDH monitored, supervised, or directed the petitioning doctors in
the treatment and management of Edmer’s case. In these lights, the petitioning doctors were not
employees of SJDH, but were mere independent contractors.
Same; Same; Same; As a rule, hospitals are not liable for the negligence of its independent
contractors.—Despite the absence of employer-employee relationship between SJDH and the
petitioning doctors, SJDH is not free from liability. As a rule, hospitals are not liable for the negligence of
its independent contractors. However, it may be found liable if the physician or independent contractor
acts as an ostensible agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the “doctrine of apparent
authority.”
Civil Law; Hospitals; Vicarious Liability; A hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a
physician (or an independent contractor) providing care at the hospital if the plaintiff can prove these
two (2) factors: first, the hospital’s manifestations; and second, the patient’s reliance.—A hospital can
be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician (or an independent contractor) providing
care at the hospital if the plaintiff can prove these two factors: first, the hospital’s manifestations; and
second, the patient’s reliance.
Same; Quasi-Delicts; Medical Malpractice; Health Care Plans; The only effect of the availment of her
Fortune Care card benefits is that her choice of physician is limited only to physicians who are accredited
with Fortune Care. Thus, her use of health care plan in this case only limited the choice of doctors (or
coverage of services, amount etc.) and not the liability of doctors or the hospital.—We also stress that
Mrs. Cortejo’s use of health care plan (Fortune Care) did not affect SJDH’s liability. The only effect of the
availment of her Fortune Care card benefits is that her choice of physician is limited only to physicians
who are accredited with Fortune Care. Thus, her use of health care plan in this case only limited the
choice of doctors (or coverage of services, amount etc.) and not the liability of doctors or the hospital.
Cruz vs. Agas, Jr., 757 SCRA 549, G.R. No. 204095 June 15, 2015
Civil Law; Quasi-delicts; Medical Negligence; A medical negligence case can prosper if the patient can
present solid proof that the doctor, like in this case, either failed to do something which a reasonably
prudent doctor would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably prudent doctor would not
have done, and such failure or action caused injury to the patient. To successfully pursue this kind of
case, a patient must only prove that a health care provider either failed to do something which a
reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did something that a reasonably
prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Simply
put, the elements are duty, breach, injury and proximate causation. In this case, Dr. Cruz has the burden
of showing the negligence or recklessness of Dr. Agas. Although there is no dispute that Dr. Cruz
sustained internal hemorrhage due to a tear in the serosa of his sigmoid colon, he failed to show that it
was caused by Dr. Agas’s negligent and reckless conduct of the colonoscopy procedure. In other words,
Dr. Cruz failed to show and explain that particular negligent or reckless act or omission committed by Dr.
Agas. Stated differently, Dr. Cruz did not demonstrate that there was “inexcusable lack of precaution”
on the part of Dr. Agas.
Same; Same; Res Ipsa Loquitur; Literally, res ipsa loquitur means the thing speaks for itself. It is the rule
that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. The requisites for the applicability of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury
was under the control and management of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the
ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who had control or management used
proper care; and (4) the absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most
instrumental is the control and management of the thing which caused the injury.
Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584, G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999
Same; Evidence; Res Ipsa Loquitur; Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur.—Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase
which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” The phrase “res ipsa loquitur” is a
maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s
prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the
thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or
his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have
its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of
care.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Res Ipsa Loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common
knowledge.—The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter
of common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an
inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in
the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the
superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge,
negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is
applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of negligence; Requisites before resort to the doctrine may be allowed.—Much
has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does not create or
constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary
or in the nature of a procedural rule. It is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural
convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing
specific proof of negligence. In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such proof,
permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending
circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and to
thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. Still, before resort to the
doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown: 1. The accident is of a
kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; 2. It is caused by an
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and 3. The possibility of
contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-tur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for
expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence.—
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a
physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is
dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general
rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of
medical science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be
testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and
experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a
reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and
surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given
by non-expert witnesses.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used
but a rule to be cautiously applied depending upon the circumstances of each case.—Despite the fact
that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all
cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that
he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be
perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It
is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of
common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as
would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is
that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished.—It must be conceded that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which
involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at
his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific
treatment did not produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit
if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished.
Hospitals; Damages; Proximate Cause Defined.—Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act
or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a
substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or
damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. It is the
dominant, moving or producing cause.
Same; Same; For the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employeremployee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.—
Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting “consultant” staff.
While “consultants” are not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in
denying all responsibility for the patient’s condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to
terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the
exception of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control
test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. This being the case, the question now arises as to
whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for petitioner’s condition.
Same; Same; The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee
is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code.—The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for
the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person
accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former’s responsibility
under a relationship of patria potestas. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned
prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. In other
words, while the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the
burden shifts to the respondents (parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who should prove that they
observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Same; Same; Amount of damages awarded may be a continuing one where the injury is chronic and
continuing, as when the patient is comatose.—In these cases, the amount of damages which should be
awarded, if they are to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one which
compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of trial; and one which would meet
pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not, from the nature of the case, be made with
certainty. In other words, temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or
compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the
unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are
provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.
Bontilao vs. Gerona, 630 SCRA 561, G.R. No. 176675 September 15, 2010
Evidence; Res Ipsa Loquitur; It is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged wrongdoer may
be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened, provided that the character of the accident
and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to the belief that in the absence of negligence it would
not have occurred and that the thing which caused injury is shown to have been under the management
and control of the alleged wrongdoer.—The trial court erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
to pin liability on respondent for Allen’s death. Res ipsa loquitur is a rebuttable presumption or
inference that the defendant was negligent. The presumption only arises upon proof that the
instrumentality causing injury was in the defendant’s exclusive control, and that the accident was one (1)
which ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence. It is a rule of evidence whereby
negligence of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened,
provided that the character of the accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to the belief
that in the absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that the thing which caused injury is
shown to have been under the management and control of the alleged wrongdoer.
Same; Same; Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be
cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case.—Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or
ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the
circumstances of each case. In malpractice cases, the doctrine is generally restricted to situations where
a layman is able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of
professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. In
other words, as held in Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584 (1999), the real question is whether or
not in the process of the operation, any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine
performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of professional activity in such operations, and
which, if unexplained, would themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or
causes of the untoward consequence.
Same; Same; The instrument which caused the damage or injury was not even within respondent’s
exclusive management and control as Dr. Jabagat was exclusively in control and management of the
anesthesia and endotracheal tube. Requirements before the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can allow the
mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who
controls the instrument causing the injury.—The instrument which caused the damage or injury was not
even within respondent’s exclusive management and control as Dr. Jabagat was exclusively in control
and management of the anesthesia and the endotracheal tube. The doctrine of Torts includes
intentional criminals acts asuitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of
negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that the
following requisites concur: 1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone’s negligence; 2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant
or defendants; and 3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible
is eliminated.
Nogales vs. Capitol Medical Center, 511 SCRA 204, G.R. No. 142625 December 19, 2006
Hospitals; Medical Malpractice; Employer-Employee Relationship; The control test essentially
determines whether an employment relationship exists between a physician and a hospital based on the
exercise of control over the physician as to details.—While the Court in Ramos did not expound on the
control test, such test essentially determines whether an employment relationship exists between a
physician and a hospital based on the exercise of control over the physician as to details. Specifically, the
employer (or the hospital) must have the right to control both the means and the details of the process
by which the employee (or the physician) is to accomplish his task.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Apparent Authority; Words and Phrases; An exception to the general
rule that a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician is when the
physician is the “ostensible” agent of the hospital, which exception is also known as the “doctrine of
apparent authority.”—In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent
contractor-physician. There is, however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the
physician is the “ostensible” agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the “doctrine of
apparent authority.” In Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital, the Illinois Supreme Court explained the
doctrine of apparent authority in this wise: [U]nder the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can be
held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of
whether the physician is an independent contractor, unless the patient knows, or should have known,
that the physician is an independent contractor. The elements of the action have been set out as follows:
“For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the
hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the
individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital; (2) where the acts
of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had
knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the
hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.” The element of “holding out” on the
part of the hospital does not require an express representation by the hospital that the person alleged
to be negligent is an employee. Rather, the element is satisfied if the hospital holds itself out as a
provider of emergency room care without informing the patient that the care is provided by
independent contractors. The element of justifiable reliance on the part of the plaintiff is satisfied if the
plaintiff relies upon the hospital to provide complete emergency room care, rather than upon a specific
physician.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Estoppel; The doctrine of apparent authority is a species of the doctrine of
estoppel.—The doctrine of apparent authority is a species of the doctrine of estoppel. Article 1431 of
the Civil Code provides that “[t]hrough estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive
upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.”
Estoppel rests on this rule: “Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally
and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in
any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court cannot close its eyes to the reality that hospitals are in the
business of treatment.—CMC’s defense that all it did was “to extend to [Corazon] its facilities” is
untenable. The Court cannot close its eyes to the reality that hospitals, such as CMC, are in the business
of treatment. In this regard, the Court agrees with the observation made by the Court of Appeals of
North Carolina in Diggs v. Novant Health, Inc., to wit: “The conception that the hospital does not
undertake to treat the patient, does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but undertakes
instead simply to procure them to act upon their own responsibility, no longer reflects the fact. Present
day hospitals, as their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for
treatment. They regularly employ on a salary basis a large staff of physicians, nurses and internes [sic],
as well as administrative and manual workers, and they charge patients for medical care and treatment,
collecting for such services, if necessary, by legal action. Certainly, the person who avails himself of
‘hospital facilities’ expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other
employees will act on their own responsibility.” x x x
Same; Same; Same; Same; Contracts of Adhesion; Consent and Release Forms; A blanket release in favor
of hospitals “from any and all claims,” which includes claims due to bad faith or gross negligence, would
be contrary to public policy and thus void.—Likewise unconvincing is CMC’s argument that petitioners
are estopped from claiming damages based on the Consent on Admission and Consent to Operation.
Both release forms consist of two parts. The first part gave CMC permission to administer to Corazon
any form of recognized medical treatment which the CMC medical staff deemed advisable. The second
part of the documents, which may properly be described as the releasing part, releases CMC and its
employees “from any and all claims” arising from or by reason of the treatment and operation. The
documents do not expressly release CMC from liability for injury to Corazon due to negligence during
her treatment or operation. Neither do the consent forms expressly exempt CMC from liability for
Corazon’s death due to negligence during such treatment or operation. Such release forms, being in the
nature of contracts of adhesion, are construed strictly against hospitals. Besides, a blanket release in
favor of hospitals “from any and all claims,” which includes claims due to bad faith or gross negligence,
would be contrary to public policy and thus void.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Even simple negligence is not subject to blanket release in favor
of establishments like hospitals but may only mitigate liability depending on the circumstances.—Even
simple negligence is not subject to blanket release in favor of establishments like hospitals but may only
mitigate liability depending on the circumstances. When a person needing urgent medical attention
rushes to a hospital, he cannot bargain on equal footing with the hospital on the terms of admission and
operation. Such a person is literally at the mercy of the hospital. There can be no clearer example of a
contract of adhesion than one arising from such a dire situation. Thus, the release forms of CMC cannot
relieve CMC from liability for the negligent medical treatment of Corazon.
Professional Services, Inc. vs. Agana, 513 SCRA 478, G.R. No. 126297, G.R. No. 126467, G.R. No. 127590
January 31, 2007 (corporate liability- pro hac vice)
Civil Law; Damages; Negligence; The leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after
the incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon.— An operation
requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until the sponges are properly removed,
and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after the incision
has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. To put it simply, such act is
considered so inconsistent with due care as to raise an inference of negligence. There are even legions
of authorities to the effect that such act is negligence per se.
Same; Same; Same; To the mind of the Court, what was initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has
ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of deceiving his patient.—Here, Dr. Ampil did not inform
Natividad about the missing two pieces of gauze. Worse, he even misled her that the pain she was
experiencing was the ordinary consequence of her operation. Had he been more candid, Natividad could
have taken the immediate and appropriate medical remedy to remove the gauzes from her body. To our
mind, what was initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of
deceiving his patient.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur; Requisites for the Applicability of the Doctrine.—
Literally, res ipsa loquitur means “the thing speaks for itself.” It is the rule that the fact of the occurrence
of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption
of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to
meet with an explanation. Stated differently, where the thing which caused the injury, without the fault
of the injured, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such that it should not
have occurred if he, having such control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence
of explanation that the injury arose from the defendant’s want of care, and the burden of proof is
shifted to him to establish that he has observed due care and diligence. From the foregoing statements
of the rule, the requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence
of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the
defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened
if those who had control or management used proper care; and (4) the absence of explanation by the
defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the “control and management of the
thing which caused the injury.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se
create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule.—In
this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se create or
constitute an independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule. In other words,
mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of
negligence. Here, the negligence was proven to have been committed by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr.
Fuentes.
Same; Same; Same; Professionals are considered personally liable for the fault or negligence they
commit in the discharge of their duties and their employer cannot be held liable for such fault or
negligence.—A prominent civilist commented that professionals engaged by an employer, such as
physicians, dentists, and pharmacists, are not “employees” under this article because the manner in
which they perform their work is not within the control of the latter (employer). In other words,
professionals are considered personally liable for the fault or negligence they commit in the discharge of
their duties, and their employer cannot be held liable for such fault or negligence. In the context of the
present case, “a hospital cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of a physician or surgeon in the
treatment or operation of patients.”
Same; Same; Same; In this jurisdiction, the nature of the relationship between the hospital and the
physicians is rendered inconsequential in view of the pronouncement in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 321
SCRA 584 (1999), that for purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an
employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians.—In our shores, the nature of the relationship between the hospital and the physicians is
rendered inconsequential in view of our categorical pronouncement in Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 321
SCRA 584 (1999), that for purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an
employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians.
Same;Same; Same; PSI’s liability is also anchored upon the agency principle of apparent authority or
agency by estoppel and the doctrine of corporate negligence.—But the Ramos pronouncement is not
our only basis in sustaining PSI’s liability. Its liability is also anchored upon the agency principle of
apparent authority or agency by estoppel and the doctrine of corporate negligence which have gained
acceptance in the determination of a hospital’s liability for negligent acts of health professionals. The
present case serves as a perfect platform to test the applicability of these doctrines, thus, enriching our
jurisprudence. Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the “holding out” theory, or
doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel, has its origin from the law of agency. It imposes
liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions of
a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the
authority exists. The concept is essentially one of estoppel and has been explained in this manner: “The
principal is bound by the acts of his agent with the apparent authority which he knowingly permits the
agent to assume, or which he holds the agent out to the public as possessing. The question in every case
is whether the principal has by his voluntary act placed the agent in such a situation that a person of
ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages and the nature of the particular business, is
justified in presuming that such agent has authority to perform the particular act in question.
Same; Same; Same; In cases where it can be shown that a hospital, by its actions, has held out a
particular physician as its agent and/or employee and that a patient has accepted treatment from that
physician in the reasonable belief that it is being rendered in behalf of the hospital, then the hospital will
be liable for the physician’s negligence.—The applicability of apparent authority in the field of hospital
liability was upheld long time ago in Irving v. Doctor Hospital of Lake Worth, Inc., 415 So. 2d 55 (1982).
There, it was explicitly stated that “there does not appear to be any rational basis for excluding the
concept of apparent authority from the field of hospital liability.” Thus, in cases where it can be shown
that a hospital, by its actions, has held out a particular physician as its agent and/or employee and that a
patient has accepted treatment from that physician in the reasonable belief that it is being rendered in
behalf of the hospital, then the hospital will be liable for the physician’s negligence.
Same; Same; Same; By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their qualifications,
the hospital created the impression that they were its agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical
services for its patients.—In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the
names and specializations of the physicians associated or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil
and Dr. Fuentes. We concur with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that it “is now estopped from passing
all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory leading the public
to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence.” Indeed, PSI’s act is tantamount to holding out
to the public that Medical City Hospital, through its accredited physicians, offers quality health care
services. By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their qualifications, the
hospital created the impression that they were its agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical
services for its patients. As expected, these patients, Natividad being one of them, accepted the services
on the reasonable belief that such were being rendered by the hospital or its employees, agents, or
servants.
Cantre vs. Go, 522 SCRA 547, G.R. No. 160889 April 27, 2007
Civil Law; Negligence; Damages; Intent is immaterial in negligence cases because where negligence
exists and is proven, it automatically gives the injured a right to reparation for the damages caused.—
The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial consideration to the well-being of their
patients. If a doctor fails to live up to this precept, he is accountable for his acts. This notwithstanding,
courts face a unique restraint in adjudicating medical negligence cases because physicians are not
guarantors of care and, they never set out to intentionally cause injury to their patients. However, intent
is immaterial in negligence cases because where negligence exists and is proven, it automatically gives
the injured a right to reparation for the damage caused.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites in Order for the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur to Apply in Cases Involving
Medical Negligence.—In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the
mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who
controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that the following requisites concur: 1. The accident
is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; 2. It is caused by an
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and 3. The possibility of
contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
Same; Same; Same; Captain of the Ship Doctrine; The doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an
operation liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time when those assistants are under the
surgeon’s control.—Whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by the blood pressure cuff is of
no moment. Both instruments are deemed within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under
the “captain of the ship” doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for
the negligence of his assistants during the time when those assistants are under the surgeon’s control.
In this particular case, it can be logically inferred that petitioner, the senior consultant in charge during
the delivery of Nora’s baby, exercised control over the assistants assigned to both the use of the
droplight and the taking of Nora’s blood pressure. Hence, the use of the droplight and the blood
pressure cuff is also within petitioner’s exclusive control.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioner is obliged to pay Nora for moral damages suffered by the latter as a
proximate result of petitioner’s negligence.—Based on the foregoing, the presumption that petitioner
was negligent in the exercise of her profession stands unrebutted. In this connection, the Civil Code
provides: ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. . . . ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may
be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission. Clearly, under
the law, petitioner is obliged to pay Nora for moral damages suffered by the latter as a proximate result
of petitioner’s negligence.
Garcia, Jr. vs. Salvador, 518 SCRA 568, G.R. No. 168512 March 20, 2007
Health Care Providers; Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Appeals; Whether a person is negligent or not is a question
of fact which the Supreme Court cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari which is limited
to reviewing errors of law; For health care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is—did the
health care provider either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would
have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not
have done, and that failure or action caused injury to the patient.—We note that the issues raised are
factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon
in a petition for review on certiorari which is limited to reviewing errors of law. Negligence is the failure
to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. For health
care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is: did the health care provider either fail to do
something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did
something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done; and that failure or
action caused injury to the patient; if yes, then he is guilty of negligence. Thus, the elements of an
actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate causation.
Same; Same; Same; Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes,
as well as rules and regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people
by preventing the operation of substandard, improperly managed and inadequately supported clinical
laboratories and by improving the quality of performance of clinical laboratory examinations.—Owners
and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as rules and
regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people by preventing the
operation of substandard, improperly managed and inadequately supported clinical laboratories and by
improving the quality of performance of clinical laboratory examinations. Their business is impressed
with public interest, as such, high standards of performance are expected from them.
Same; Same; Same; Violation of a statutory duty is negligence.—Violation of a statutory duty is
negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the duty to do something, his omission or nonperformance will render him liable to whoever may be injured thereby.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The Clinical Laboratory Law (R.A. No. 4688); The Philippine Medical
Technology Act of 1969 (R.A. No. 5527); Revised Rules and Regulations Governing the Registration,
Operation and Maintenance of Clinical Laboratories in the Philippines (DOH Adm. Order No. 49-B, Series
of 1988); A clinical laboratory must be administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician
authorized by the Secretary of Health, like a pathologist who is specially trained in methods of
laboratory medicine; that the medical technologist must be under the supervision of the pathologist or a
licensed physician; and that the results of any examination may be released only to the requesting
physician or his authorized representative upon the direction of the laboratory pathologist.—It is clear
that a clinical laboratory must be administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician
authorized by the Secretary of Health, like a pathologist who is specially trained in methods of
laboratory medicine; that the medical technologist must be under the supervision of the pathologist or a
licensed physician; and that the results of any examination may be released only to the requesting
physician or his authorized representative upon the direction of the laboratory pathologist. These rules
are intended for the protection of the public by preventing performance of substandard clinical
examinations by laboratories whose personnel are not properly supervised. The public demands no less
than an effective and efficient performance of clinical laboratory examinations through compliance with
the quality standards set by laws and regulations.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; Power of Control and Supervision; Words and Phrases;
“Supervision and control” means the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted
by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts;
review, approve, revise or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units.—Castro’s
infrequent visit to the clinical laboratory barely qualifies as an effective administrative supervision and
control over the activities in the laboratory. “Supervision and control” means the authority to act
directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, revise or modify acts and
decisions of subordinate officials or units.
Same; Same; Same; Art. 20 of the Civil Code provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party
who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision.—Article 20 of
the New Civil Code provides: Art.20.Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. The foregoing provision provides the legal
basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in
violation of some legal provision. This was incorporated by the Code Commission to provide relief to a
person who suffers damage because another has violated some legal provision.
Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 282 SCRA 188, G.R. No. 122445 November 18, 1997
Physicians; Medical Malpractice; Criminal Law; Reckless Imprudence; Elements.—This Court, however,
holds differently and finds the foregoing circumstances insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction
against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The elements of
reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure
to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the
reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and
other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Witnesses; Expert Testimony; Whether or not a physician has committed
an “inexcusable lack of precaution” in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the
standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar
circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the
present state of medical science; Inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions
are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that exp ert testimony
is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.—Whether or not a physician has
committed an “inexcusable lack of precaution” in the treatment of his patient is to be determined
according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under
similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or
the present state of medical science. In the recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L. Pascasio, et
al., this Court stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed
training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such
training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same
level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish
not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the physician’s conduct in the treatment
and care falls below such standard. Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in
malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized
that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While it may be true that certain circumstances pointed out by
the courts below seemed beyond cavil to constitute reckless imprudence on the part of the surgeon,
such conclusion is still best arrived at not through the educated surmises nor conjectures of laymen,
including judges, but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert witnesses. For whether a physician or
surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the
generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion.—All three courts below bewail the inadequacy of the
facilities of the clinic and its untidiness; the lack of provisions such as blood, oxygen, and certain
medicines; the failure to subject the patient to a cardio-pulmonary test prior to the operation; the
omission of any form of blood typing before transfusion; and even the subsequent transfer of Lydia to
the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation performed on her by the petitioner. But while it may be true
that the circumstances pointed about by the courts below seemed beyond cavil to constitute reckless
imprudence on the part of the surgeon, this conclusion is still best arrived at not through the educated
surmises nor conjectures of laymen, including judges, but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert
witnesses. For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the
treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. The deference of courts
to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual
technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. Expert
testimony should have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are
constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good
standing when performing the same operation. It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a
physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he
takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his
clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established. This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion
which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has
the burden of establishing the defendant’s negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence,
there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such
breach and the resulting death of his patient.—In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff
has the burden of establishing appellant’s negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence,
there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such
breach and the resulting death of his patient. In Chan Lugay v. St. Luke’s Hospital, Inc., where the
attending physician was absolved of liability for the death of the complainant’s wife and newborn baby,
this Court held that: “In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown
that the ‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the
connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events,
unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause
of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is
the proximate cause of the injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause of an injury is that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’ ” (Italics supplied.)
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Damages; While a conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable
doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability, thus, even as the Court
was not able to render a sentence of conviction for insufficiency of evidence, the Court is not blind to
the reckless and imprudent manner in which the surgeon carried out her duties.—Nevertheless, this
Court finds the petitioner civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for while a conviction of a crime
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil
liability. The petitioner is a doctor in whose hands a patient puts his life and limb. For insufficiency of
evidence this Court was not able to render a sentence of conviction but it is not blind to the reckless and
imprudent manner in which the petitioner carried out her duties. A precious life has been lost and the
circumstances leading thereto exacerbated the grief of those left behind. The heirs of the deceased
continue to feel the loss of their mother up to the present time and this Court is aware that no amount
of compassion and commiseration nor words of bereavement can suffice to assuage the sorrow felt for
the loss of a loved one. Certainly, the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of
Lydia Umali are proper in the instant case.
Cayao-Lasam vs. Ramolete, 574 SCRA 439, G.R. No. 159132 December 18, 2008
Physicians; Medical Malpractice; Words and Phrases; Medical malpractice is a particular form of
negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine
that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar
conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances; There are four elements involved in medical
negligence cases—duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.—Anent the substantive merits of the
case, petitioner questions the PRC decision for being without an expert testimony to support its
conclusion and to establish the cause of Editha’s injury. Petitioner avers that in cases of medical
malpractice, expert testimony is necessary to support the conclusion as to the cause of the injury.
Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or
surgeon to apply to his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by
the profession generally, under similar conditions, and in like surrounding circumstances. In order to
successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that the physician or surgeon either failed to do
something which a reasonably prudent physician or surgeon would not have done, and that the failure
or action caused injury to the patient. There are four elements involved in medical negligence cases:
duty, breach, injury and proximate causation.
Same; Same; Witnesses; Expert Witnesses; The breach of professional duties of skill and care, or their
improper performance by a physician surgeon, whereby the patient is injured in body or in health,
constitutes actionable malpractice, and as to this aspect of medical malpractice, the determination of
the reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert testimony is essential.—A physician-patient
relationship was created when Editha employed the services of the petitioner. As Editha’s physician,
petitioner was duty-bound to use at least the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor
would use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. The breach of these professional duties of
skill and care, or their improper performance by a physician surgeon, whereby the patient is injured in
body or in health, constitutes actionable malpractice. As to this aspect of medical malpractice, the
determination of the reasonable level of care and the breach thereof, expert testimony is essential.
Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in
the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to
support the conclusion as to causation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Generally, to qualify as an expert witness, one must have acquired special
knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized
authorities on the subject or by practical experience.—In the present case, respondents did not present
any expert testimony to support their claim that petitioner failed to do something which a reasonably
prudent physician or surgeon would have done. Petitioner, on the other hand, presented the testimony
of Dr. Augusto M. Manalo, who was clearly an expert on the subject. Generally, to qualify as an expert
witness, one must have acquired special knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to
testify, either by the study of recognized authorities on the subject or by practical experience. Dr.
Manalo specializes in gynecology and obstetrics, authored and co-authored various publications on the
subject, and is a professor at the University of the Philippines.
Same; Same; Negligence; Proximate Cause; Words and Phrases; Medical malpractice, in our jurisdiction,
is often brought as a civil action for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and the defenses in an
action for damages are provided for under Article 2179; Proximate cause is that which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred.—Medical malpractice, in our jurisdiction, is often brought as a civil
action for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The defenses in an action for damages,
provided for under Article 2179 of the Civil Code are: Art. 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was
only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due
care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. An
injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the
evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually
causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably
probable consequence of the act or omission.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the
plaintiff’s own act, which contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he
cannot recover damages for the injury; Contributory negligence is the act or omission amounting to
want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured, which, concurring with the defendant’s
negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.—Contributory negligence is the act or omission
amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured, which, concurring with the
defendant’s negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury. Difficulty seems to be apprehended in
deciding which acts of the injured party shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. Where
the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiff’s own act, which contributed to
the principal occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover damages for the injury.
Again, based on the evidence presented in the present case under review, in which no negligence can be
attributed to the petitioner, the immediate cause of the accident resulting in Editha’s injury was her own
omission when she did not return for a follow-up check up, in defiance of petitioner’s orders. The
immediate cause of Editha’s injury was her own act; thus, she cannot recover damages from the injury.
Physicians; —Doctors are protected by a special rule of law. They are not guarantors of care. They are
not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences specially so if the patient herself did not exercise
the proper diligence required to avoid the injury.
Lucas vs. Tuaño, 586 SCRA 173, G.R. No. 178763 April 21, 2009
Physicians; Medical Malpractice; Negligence; Damages; Burden of Proof; The present controversy is a
classic illustration of a medical negligence case against a physician based on the latter’s professional
negligence, and in this type of suit, the patient or his heirs, in order to prevail, is required to prove by
preponderance of evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree of skill, care, and learning
possessed by other persons in the same profession, and that as a proximate result of such failure, the
patient or his heirs suffered damages.—Petitioners’ position, in sum, is that Peter’s glaucoma is the
direct result of Dr. Tuaño’s negligence in his improper administration of the drug Maxitrol; “thus, [the
latter] should be liable for all the damages suffered and to be suffered by [petitioners].” Clearly, the
present controversy is a classic illustration of a medical negligence case against a physician based on the
latter’s professional negligence. In this type of suit, the patient or his heirs, in order to prevail, is
required to prove by preponderance of evidence that the physician failed to exercise that degree of skill,
care, and learning possessed by other persons in the same profession; and that as a proximate result of
such failure, the patient or his heirs suffered damages.
Same; Same; Same; Elements; For lack of a specific law geared towards the type of negligence
committed by members of the medical profession, such claim for damages is almost always anchored on
the alleged violation of Article 2176 of the Civil Code; In medical negligence cases, also called medical
malpractice suits, there exist a physician-patient relationship between the doctor and the victim.—For
lack of a specific law geared towards the type of negligence committed by members of the medical
profession, such claim for damages is almost always anchored on the alleged violation of Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, which states that: ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there
is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. In medical negligence cases, also called medical malpractice suits, there exist
a physician-patient relationship between the doctor and the victim. But just like any other proceeding
for damages, four essential (4) elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate causation,
must be established by the plaintiff/s. All the four (4) elements must co-exist in order to find the
physician negligent and, thus, liable for damages.
Same; Same; Same; When a patient engages the services of a physician, a physician-patient relationship
is generated; In treating his patient, a physician is under a duty to the former to exercise that degree of
care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line
of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases, which standard level of care, skill and diligence is
a matter best addressed by expert medical testimony, because the standard of care in a medical
malpractice case is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of experts in the field.—When a patient
engages the services of a physician, a physician-patient relationship is generated. And in accepting a
case, the physician, for all intents and purposes, represents that he has the needed training and skill
possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field; and that he will employ such training,
care, and skill in the treatment of the patient. Thus, in treating his patient, a physician is under a duty to
[the former] to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general
neighborhood and in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases.
Stated otherwise, the physician has the duty to use at least the same level of care that any other
reasonably competent physician would use to treat the condition under similar circumstances. This
standard level of care, skill and diligence is a matter best addressed by expert medical testimony,
because the standard of care in a medical malpractice case is a matter peculiarly within the knowledge
of experts in the field.
Same; Same; Same; There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of
such duty, by the attending physician when the patient is injured in body or in health [and this]
constitutes the actionable malpractice; In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, it must be
shown that the “injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong
done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes”—that is, the negligence must be the proximate cause
of the injury.—There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such
duty, by the attending physician when the patient is injured in body or in health [and this] constitutes
the actionable malpractice. Proof of such breach must likewise rest upon the testimony of an expert
witness that the treatment accorded to the patient failed to meet the standard level of care, skill and
diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice
ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases. Even so, proof of breach of duty on the part of the
attending physician is insufficient, for there must be a causal connection between said breach and the
resulting injury sustained by the patient. Put in another way, in order that there may be a recovery for
an injury, it must be shown that the “injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct
and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes”; that is, the negligence must
be the proximate cause of the injury. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in the
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Expert Witnesses; Medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions
of expert witnesses belonging in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of
practice as defendant physician or surgeon.—Just as with the elements of duty and breach of the same,
in order to establish the proximate cause [of the injury] by a preponderance of the evidence in a medical
malpractice action, [the patient] must similarly use expert testimony, because the question of whether
the alleged professional negligence caused [the patient’s] injury is generally one for specialized expert
knowledge beyond the ken of the average layperson; using the specialized knowledge and training of his
field, the expert’s role is to present to the [court] a realistic assessment of the likelihood that [the
physician’s] alleged negligence caused [the patient’s] injury. From the foregoing, it is apparent that
medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert witnesses belonging in the same general
neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as defendant physician or surgeon. The deference
of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians [or surgeons] stems from the former’s realization
that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of
intelligently evaluating; hence, the indispensability of expert testimonies.
Same; Same; Same; The mere fact that the patient does not get well or that a bad result occurs does not
in itself indicate failure to exercise due care.—We cannot but agree with Dr. Tuaño’s assertion that
when a doctor sees a patient, he cannot determine immediately whether the latter would react
adversely to the use of steroids; all the doctor can do is map out a course of treatment recognized as
correct by the standards of the medical profession. It must be remembered that a physician is not an
insurer of the good result of treatment. The mere fact that the patient does not get well or that a bad
result occurs does not in itself indicate failure to exercise due care.The result is not determinative of the
performance [of the physician] and he is not required to be infallible.
Same; Same; Same; The critical and clinching factor in a medical negligence case is proof of the causal
connection between the negligence which the evidence established and the plaintiff’s injuries.—Even if
we are to assume that Dr. Tuaño committed negligent acts in his treatment of Peter’s condition, the
causal connection between Dr. Tuaño’s supposed negligence and Peter’s injury still needed to be
established. The critical and clinching factor in a medical negligence case is proof of the causal
connection between the negligence which the evidence established and the plaintiff’s injuries. The
plaintiff must plead and prove not only that he has been injured and defendant has been at fault, but
also that the defendant’s fault caused the injury. A verdict in a malpractice action cannot be based on
speculation or conjecture. Causation must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based
upon competent expert testimony.
Same; Same; Same; Glaucoma; Words and Phrases; In Open-angle glaucoma, which is characterized by
an almost complete absence of symptoms and a chronic, insidious course, halos around lights and
blurring of vision do not occur unless there has been a sudden increase in the intraocular vision.—Dr.
Tuaño does not deny that the use of Maxitrol involves the risk of increasing a patient’s IOP. In fact, this
was the reason why he made it a point to palpate Peter’s eyes every time the latter went to see him—so
he could monitor the tension of Peter’s eyes. But to say that said medication conclusively caused Peter’s
glaucoma is purely speculative. Peter was diagnosed with open-angle glaucoma. This kind of glaucoma is
characterized by an almost complete absence of symptoms and a chronic, insidious course. In openangle glaucoma, halos around lights and blurring of vision do not occur unless there has been a sudden
increase in the intraocular vision. Visual acuity remains good until late in the course of the disease.
Hence, Dr. Tuaño claims that Peter’s glaucoma “can only be long standing x x x because of the large C:D
ratio,” and that “[t]he steroids provoked the latest glaucoma to be revealed earlier” was a blessing in
disguise “as [Peter] remained asymptomatic prior to steroid application.”
Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician
are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases, he takes the
necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless
the contrary is sufficiently established.—It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a
physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases, he
takes the necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his
clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established. In making the judgment call of treating Peter’s EKC
with Maxitrol, Dr. Tuaño took the necessary precaution by palpating Peter’s eyes to monitor their IOP
every time the latter went for a check-up, and he employed the best of his knowledge and skill earned
from years of training and practice.
Same; Same; Same; Civil Law; Evidence; Quantum of Proof; Preponderance of Evidence; Words and
Phrases; The concept of “preponderance of evidence” refers to evidence which is of greater weight or
more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it—in the last analysis, it means probability
of truth, it is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.—The plaintiff in a civil case has the burden of proof as he alleges the
affirmative of the issue. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff’s
prima facie case; otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. The party having the burden
of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. The concept of “preponderance of
evidence” refers to evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that which is offered in
opposition to it; in the last analysis, it means probability of truth. It is evidence which is more convincing
to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Rule 133, Section 1 of
the Revised Rules of Court provides the guidelines for determining preponderance of evidence, thus: In
civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.
In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies the
court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their
intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of
the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want
of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same legitimately appear upon the trial. The
court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Expert Witnesses; It seems basic that what constitutes proper medical
treatment is a medical question that should have been presented to experts—if no standard is
established through expert medical witnesses, then courts have no standard by which to gauge the basic
issue of breach thereof by the physician or surgeon.—It seems basic that what constitutes proper
medical treatment is a medical question that should have been presented to experts. If no standard is
established through expert medical witnesses, then courts have no standard by which to gauge the basic
issue of breach thereof by the physician or surgeon. The RTC and Court of Appeals, and even this Court,
could not be expected to determine on its own what medical technique should have been utilized for a
certain disease or injury. Absent expert medical opinion, the courts would be dangerously engaging in
speculations.
Solidum vs. People, 718 SCRA 263, G.R. No. 192123 March 10, 2014
Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Res Ipsa Loquitur; The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that “where the thing
which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it
affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care.”—Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as “the thing or the transaction speaks for
itself.” The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that “where the thing which causes injury is shown to be
under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things
does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in
the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.” It is simply
“a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very nature
of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who
controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant
who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and
on the basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere
occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of
common knowledge.”
Same; Same; Same; Essential Requisites Before Resorting to the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur.—In order
to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must first be satisfied, to wit:
(1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the
instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged;
and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person
injured.
Same; Same; Negligence; Words and Phrases; Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.—Negligence is defined as the
failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution,
and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Reckless
imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from
which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act. Dr. Solidum’s conviction by the RTC was primarily based on his
failure to monitor and properly regulate the level of anesthetic agent administered on Gerald by
overdosing at 100% halothane.
Same; Same; Same; Medical Negligence; An action upon medical negligence — whether criminal, civil or
administrative — calls for the plaintiff to prove by competent evidence each of the four elements.—An
action upon medical negligence — whether criminal, civil or administrative — calls for the plaintiff to
prove by competent evidence each of the following four elements, namely: (a) the duty owed by the
physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in accordance with the
specific norms or standards established by his profession; (b) the breach of the duty by the physician’s
failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard of care; (3) the causation, i.e., there must be a
reasonably close and causal connection between the negligent act or omission and the resulting injury;
and (4) the damages suffered by the patient.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the patient
against unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as standards of care, set the duty of the physician to
act in respect of the patient.—In the medical profession, specific norms or standards to protect the
patient against unreasonable risk, commonly referred to as standards of care, set the duty of the
physician to act in respect of the patient. Unfortunately, no clear definition of the duty of a particular
physician in a particular case exists. Because most medical malpractice cases are highly technical,
witnesses with special medical qualifications must provide guidance by giving the knowledge necessary
to render a fair and just verdict. As a result, the standard of medical care of a prudent physician must be
determined from expert testimony in most cases; and in the case of a specialist (like an anesthesiologist),
the standard of care by which the specialist is judged is the care and skill commonly possessed and
exercised by similar specialists under similar circumstances. The specialty standard of care may be
higher than that required of the general practitioner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In attempting to fix a standard by which a court may determine whether the
physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical testimony from
both plaintiff and defense experts is required.—The standard of care is an objective standard by which
the conduct of a physician sued for negligence or malpractice may be measured, and it does not depend,
therefore, on any individual physician’s own knowledge either. In attempting to fix a standard by which
a court may determine whether the physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the
patient, expert medical testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is required. The judge, as the
trier of fact, ultimately determines the standard of care, after listening to the testimony of all medical
experts.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses; Civil Liability; In criminal prosecutions, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only
to that arising from the offense charged.—In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the
offense charged. It is puzzling, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng
Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that
Ospital ng Maynila, being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower
courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng
Maynila void as the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability
would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.—Ospital ng Maynila
could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable pursuant to
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions
for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation “engaged
in any kind of industry.” The term industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or
business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry. However, Ospital ng
Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in
charitable and humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry
for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of
his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a consultant of
the hospital. And, thirdly, assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee
(which did not happen here), the execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
Rosit vs. Davao Doctors Hospital, 776 SCRA 303, G.R. No. 210445 December 7, 2015
Civil Law; Torts and Damages; Medical Negligence; In Flores v. Pineda, 571 SCRA 83 (2008), the Supreme
Court (SC) explained the concept of a medical negligence case and the elements required for its
prosecution, viz.: A medical negligence case is a type of claim to redress a wrong committed by a
medical professional, that has caused bodily harm to or the death of a patient.—In Flores v. Pineda, 571
SCRA 83 (2008), the Court explained the concept of a medical negligence case and the elements
required for its prosecution, viz.: A medical negligence case is a type of claim to redress a wrong
committed by a medical professional, that has caused bodily harm to or the death of a patient. There
are four elements involved in a medical negligence case, namely: duty, breach, injury, and proximate
causation. Duty refers to the standard of behavior which imposes restrictions on one’s conduct. The
standard in turn refers to the amount of competence associated with the proper discharge of the
profession. A physician is expected to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably
competent doctor would use under the same circumstances. Breach of duty occurs when the physician
fails to comply with these professional standards. If injury results to the patient as a result of this breach,
the physician is answerable for negligence.
Same; Same; Same; To establish medical negligence, the Supreme Court (SC) has held that an expert
testimony is generally required to define the standard of behavior by which the court may determine
whether the physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient.—To establish
medical negligence, this Court has held that an expert testimony is generally required to define the
standard of behavior by which the court may determine whether the physician has properly performed
the requisite duty toward the patient. This is so considering that the requisite degree of skill and care in
the treatment of a patient is usually a matter of expert opinion.
Same; Same; Same; Expert Witnesses; Res Ipsa Loquitur; Resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as an
exception to the requirement of an expert testimony in medical negligence cases may be availed of if
the following essential requisites are satisfied: (1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily
occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under
the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.—We have further held that resort to the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur as an exception to the requirement of an expert testimony in medical negligence
cases may be availed of if the following essential requisites are satisfied: (1) the accident was of a kind
that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused
the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured.
Same; Same; Same; Had Dr. Gestuvo used the proper size and length of screws and placed the same in
the proper locations, these would not have struck Rosit’s teeth causing him pain and requiring him to
undergo a corrective surgery.—Clearly, had Dr. Gestuvo used the proper size and length of screws and
placed the same in the proper locations, these would not have struck Rosit’s teeth causing him pain and
requiring him to undergo a corrective surgery. Dr. Gestuvo knew that the screws he used on Rosit were
too large as, in fact, he cut the same with a saw. He also stated during trial that common sense dictated
that the smallest screws available should be used. More importantly, he also knew that these screws
were available locally at the time of the operation. Yet, he did not avail of such items and went ahead
with the larger screws and merely sawed them off. Even assuming that the screws were already at the
proper length after Dr. Gestuvo cut the same, it is apparent that he negligently placed one of the screws
in the wrong area thereby striking one of Rosit’s teeth. In any event, whether the screw hit Rosit’s molar
because it was too long or improperly placed, both facts are the product of Dr. Gestuvo’s negligence. An
average man of common intelligence would know that striking a tooth with any foreign object much less
a screw would cause severe pain. Thus, the first essential requisite is present in this case.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Informed Consent; A physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably
prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his
patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so
that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the
proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his judgment by
reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable benefits.—Li v. Soliman, 651 SCRA 32
(2011), made the following disquisition on the relevant Doctrine of Informed Consent in relation to
medical negligence cases, to wit: The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physicianpatient relationships goes far back into English common law. x x x From a purely ethical norm, informed
consent evolved into a general principle of law that a physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably
prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable care would disclose to his
patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment, so
that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and faced with a choice of undergoing the
proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise his judgment by
reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable benefits. x x x x There are four essential
elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of informed consent:
“(1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed
those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to
treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed
treatment.” The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to “point to significant
undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it.”
Remedial Law; Evidence; Affidavits; Hearsay Evidence; In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr., 695 SCRA 599 (2013),
the Supreme Court (SC) reiterated the oft-repeated rule that “an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence
where its affiant/maker did not take the witness stand.”—In Dantis v. Maghinang, Jr., 695 SCRA 599
(2013), the Court reiterated the oft-repeated rule that “an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its
affiant/maker did not take the witness stand.” Here, Dr. Pangan never took the witness stand to affirm
the contents of his affidavit. Thus, the affidavit is inadmissible and cannot be given any weight. The CA,
therefore, erred when it considered the affidavit of Dr. Pangan, more so for considering the same as
expert testimony.
Same; Same; Same; Expert Witnesses; Even if such affidavit is considered as admissible and the
testimony of an expert witness, the Court is not bound by such testimony.—Moreover, even if such
affidavit is considered as admissible and the testimony of an expert witness, the Court is not bound by
such testimony. As ruled in Ilao-Quianay v. Mapile, 474 SCRA 246 (2005): Indeed, courts are not bound
by expert testimonies. They may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in
accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is
peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the
witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has
supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, and any other matters
which serve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of an expert should be considered by the court in
view of all the facts and circumstances of the case. The problem of the evaluation of expert testimony is
left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of an
abuse of that discretion. Thus, the belief of Dr. Pangan whether Dr. Gestuvo is guilty of negligence or not
will not bind the Court. The Court must weigh and examine such testimony and decide for itself the
merits thereof.
Civil Law; Torts and Damages; Medical Negligence; Actual Damages; In Mendoza v. Spouses Gomez, 726
SCRA 505 (2014), the Supreme Court (SC) explained that a claimant is entitled to actual damages when
the damage he sustained is the natural and probable consequences of the negligent act and he
adequately proved the amount of such damage.—The trial court properly awarded Rosit actual damages
after he was able to prove the actual expenses that he incurred due to the negligence of Dr. Gestuvo. In
Mendoza v. Spouses Gomez, 726 SCRA 505 (2014), the Court explained that a claimant is entitled to
actual damages when the damage he sustained is the natural and probable consequences of the
negligent act and he adequately proved the amount of such damage.
Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334, G.R. No. 118231 July 5, 1996
Civil Procedure; Evidence; Certiorari; There are exceptions to the rule that only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari.—While the rule is that only questions of law may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari, there are exceptions, among which are when the factual findings of
the trial court and the appellate court conflict, when the appealed decision is clearly contradicted by the
evidence on record, or when the appellate court misapprehended the facts.
Same; Same; It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts
and disbelieve his testimony with respect to other facts.—The petitioners emphasize that the private
respondents never reconciled Dr. Kho’s testimony with Dr. Batiquin’s claim on the witness stand that
when Dr. Batiquin confronted Dr. Kho about the foreign body, the latter said that there was a piece of
rubber but that she threw it away. Although hearsay, Dr. Batiquin’s claim was not objected to, and
hence, the same is admissible but it carries no probative value. Nevertheless, assuming otherwise, Dr.
Batiquin’s statement cannot belie the fact that Dr. Kho found a piece of rubber near private respondent
Villegas’s uterus. And even if we were to doubt Dr. Kho as to what she did to the piece of rubber, i.e.,
whether she threw it away or sent it to Cebu City, we are not justified in distrusting her as to her
recovery of a piece of rubber from private respondent Villegas’s abdomen. On this score, it is perfectly
reasonable to believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve his testimony
with respect to other facts. And it has been aptly said that even when a witness is found to have
deliberately falsified in some material particulars, it is not required that the whole of his uncorroborated
testimony be rejected, but such portions thereof deemed worthy of belief may be credited.
Same; Same; Well-settled is the rule that positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony.—It is
here worth noting that the trial court paid heed to the following portions of Dr. Batiquin’s testimony:
that no rubber drain was used in the operation, and that there was neither any tear on Dr. Batiquin’s
gloves after the operation nor blood smears on her hands upon removing her gloves. Moreover, the trial
court pointed out that the absence of a rubber drain was corroborated by Dr. Doris Sy, Dr. Batiquin’s
assistant during the operation on private respondent Villegas. But the trial court failed to recognize that
the assertions of Drs. Batiquin and Sy were denials or negative testimonies. Well-settled is the rule that
positive testimony is stronger than negative testimony.
1. Defenses against the charge of negligence
Bernardo vs. Legaspi., 29 Phil. 12, No. 9308 December 23, 1914
NEGLIGENCE;. AUTOMOBILES; COLLISION THROUGH MUTUAL NEGLIGENCE.—Where two automobiles,
going in opposite directions, collide on turning a street corner, and it appears from the evidence and is
found by the trial court that the drivers thereof were equally negligent and contributed equally to the
principal occurrence as determining causes thereof, neither can recover of the. other for the damages
suffered.
Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 94, G.R. No. 57079 September
29, 1989
Torts and Damages; Negligence; Contributory Negligence; Private respondents’ negligence was not
merely contributory but goes to the very cause of the accident, hence, he has no right to recover
damages for the injuries which he and his wife suffered.—The above findings clearly show that the
negligence of respondent Antonio Esteban was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife
but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its determining factors, and
thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known to, hence
appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care and prudence,
respondent Antonio Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming
arguendo that there was some alleged negligence on the part of petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; Last Clear Chance; Private respondent cannot recover notwithstanding the
negligence he imputes to PLDT considering that he had the last clear chance to avoid the injury.—The
presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said
signs was to inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private
respondents already knew of the presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of knowledge of these
excavations which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but the unexplained
sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound. As opined in some
quarters, the omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the
excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have
prevented the injury. It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where
their own failure to exercise due and reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a societal norm
and necessity that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection.
Furthermore, respondent Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid the
accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson Street,
he passed on that street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location of the
excavations there. It was his negligence that exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is solely
responsible for the consequences of his imprudence.
Same; Same; One who claims damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proof to show
existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof.—A person claiming damages for the negligence
of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The
facts constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever
relies on negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence
of the same if contested, otherwise his action must fail.
National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Noble Casionan, 572 SCRA 71, G.R. No. 165969 November 27,
2008
Civil Law; Negligence; Petitioner cannot excuse itself from its failure to properly maintain the wires by
attributing negligence to the victim.—Petitioner cannot excuse itself from its failure to properly
maintain the wires by attributing negligence to the victim. In Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 189 SCRA 88 (1990), this Court held that the responsibility of maintaining the rails for the
purpose of preventing derailment accidents belonged to the company. The company should not have
been negligent in ascertaining that the rails were fully connected than to wait until a life was lost due
to an accident.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest
of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.—Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the
interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. On the other hand, contributory negligence is
conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. There is
contributory negligence when the party’s act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act
could cause him harm or put his life in danger. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary
care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant’s negligence, is the
proximate cause of the injury. The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who
is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear
the consequences of his own negligence. If indeed there was contributory negligence on the part of the
victim, then it is proper to reduce the award for damages. This is in consonance with the Civil Code
provision that liability will be mitigated in consideration of the contributory negligence of the injured
party. Article 2179 of the Civil Code is explicit on this score: When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care,
the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Same; Same; It was held that to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown
that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an
impending danger to health and body.—In Ma-ao Sugar Central, 189 SCRA 88 (1990), it was held that to
hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that
brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs on an impending danger to health and body.
This Court held then that the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence as there was no showing
that the caboose where he was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there
despite warnings or signs of impending danger. In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted
was regularly used by members of the community. There were no warning signs to inform passersby
of the impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the
trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply
doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area.
Same; Same; This Court ruled that the violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the violation
was the proximate cause of the injury, unless the very injury that happened was precisely what was
intended to be prevented by the statute.—In Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals, 441 SCRA 24 (2004), this
Court ruled that the violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the violation was the proximate
cause of the injury, unless the very injury that happened was precisely what was intended to be
prevented by the statute. In said case, the allegation of contributory negligence on the part of the
injured party who violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or install safety
gadgets thereon was struck down.
Quasi-Delicts; Damages; In quasi delicts, exemplary damages are awarded where the offender was guilty
of gross negligence.—In quasi delicts, exemplary damages are awarded where the offender was guilty of
gross negligence. Gross negligence has been defined to be the want or absence of even slight care or
diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of person or property. It evinces a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.
Same; Same; Moral Damages; Moral damages are designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury
suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.—As to the award of moral damages, We
sustain the CA reduction of the award. Moral damages are designed to compensate the claimant for
actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. It is not meant to enrich the
complainant but to enable the injured party to obtain means to obviate the moral suffering experience.
Trial courts should guard against the award of exorbitant damages lest they be accused of prejudice or
corruption in their decision making. We find that the CA correctly reduced the award from P100,000.00
to P50,000.00.
Attorney’s Fees; Well-settled is the rule that the reason for the award must be discussed in the text of
the court’s decision and not only in the dispositive portion.—As for the award for attorney’s fees, wellsettled is the rule that the reason for the award must be discussed in the text of the court’s decision and
not only in the dispositive portion. Except for the fallo, a discussion on the reason for the award for
attorney’s fees was not included by the RTC in its decision. The CA thus correctly disallowed it on appeal.
Genobiagon vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 422, G.R. No. 40452 October 12, 1989
Same; Same; Negligence; The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases
committed through reckless imprudence.—The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any,
does not exonerate the accused. “The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal
cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to
evade the effects of his own negligence.
Same; Same; The prevailing jurisprudence in fact provides that indemnity for death in homicide or
murder is P30,000.00.—The petitioner’s contention that the Court of Appeals unjustly increased his civil
liability to P12,000, is devoid of merit. The prevailing jurisprudence in fact provides that indemnity for
death in homicide or murder is P30,000 (People vs. De la Fuente, [1983] 126 SCRA 518; People vs.
Centeno, 130 SCRA 198). Accordingly, the civil liability of the petitioner is increased to P30,000.
Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil., 359, No. 1719 January 23, 1907
1.CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES.—In order to enforce the liability of an employer for injuries to his
employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action be first prosecuted against the employer or his
representative primarily chargeable with the accident. No criminal proceeding having been taken, the
civil action may proceed to judgment.
2.LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN.—The responsibility of an employer to his employee arises out
of the contractual relations between them and is regulated by article 1101 and the following articles of
the Civil Code.
3.FELLOW-SERVANT RULE.—The doctrine known as the "Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer
where the injury was incurred through the negligence of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not
adopted in Philippine jurisprudence.
4.CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.—The negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury but not
being one of the determining causes of the principal accident, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but
only in reduction of his damages. Each party is chargeable with damages in proportion to his fault.
Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon, 452 SCRA 285, G.R. No. 160709 February 23, 2005
Civil Law; Negligence; Proximate Cause; Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.—Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo,
without first establishing his right of way, was the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life
of Ray and injured Sergio. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Reynaldo
for, as the trial court correctly held, without that left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap in all
probability would not have happened.
Same; Same; Contributory Negligence; The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a
plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but
must bear the consequences of his own negligence.—The underlying precept on contributory negligence
is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages
in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable
only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. The determination of the mitigation of the
defendant’s liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case. The Court had sustained a
mitigation of 50% in Rakes v. AG & P; 20% in Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court
and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. Court of Appeals; and 40% in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals
and Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals.
Same; Same; Damages; Loss of Earning Capacity; Factors to be Considered in Determining the
Compensable Amount of Lost Earnings.—In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an element
of damages, the following factors are considered in determining the compensable amount of lost
earnings: (1) the number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived; and (2) the rate of
loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. Jurisprudence provides that the first factor, i.e., life
expectancy, is computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of Mortality. As to the second
factor, it is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less expenses
necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental expenses. The
net earning is ordinarily computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings. Thus, the formula used
by this Court in computing loss of earning capacity is: Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x (80 – age at time of
death) x (gross annual income – reasonable and necessary living expenses)].
Same; Same; Same; Reason for the Grant of Moral Damages.—Paragraph 3 of the same provision also
serves as the basis for the award of moral damages in quasi-delict. The reason for the grant of moral
damages has been explained, thus: . . . the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the
limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted. The intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the
intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the
offender.
Philippine National Railways vs. Brunty, 506 SCRA 685, G.R. No. 169891 November 2, 2006
Torts and Damages; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Words and Phrases; Negligence is want of the care
required by the circumstances—it is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application
depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances
reasonably require.— Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. In Corliss v. Manila Railroad Company, 27
SCRA 674 (1969), this Court held that negligence is want of the care required by the circumstances. It is
a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the
parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. In determining
whether or not there is negligence on the part of the parties in a given situation, jurisprudence has laid
down the following test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care
and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, the
person is guilty of negligence. The law, in effect, adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the
imaginary conduct of the discreet pater familias of the Roman law.
Same; Same; Same; Requisites to Sustain a Claim Based on Quasi-Delict.—In a long line of cases, the
Court held that in order to sustain a claim based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (1)
damage to plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose
acts he must respond was guilty; and (3) connection of cause and effect between such negligence and
damage.
Same; Same; Same; Railways;—It may broadly be stated that railroad companies owe to the public a
duty of exercising a reasonable degree of care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad
crossings, which duties pertain both in the operation of trains and in the maintenance of the crossings.
Moreover, every corporation constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct at all points
where such railway crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings and erect at such points,
at a sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign with
large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and warn persons
of the necessity of looking out for trains. This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR
for damages for its failure to put a cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such
failure is evidence of negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or
ordinance requiring it because public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which
he is required to conform for his own protection.—As to whether or not Mercelita was guilty of
contributory negligence, we agree with petitioner. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of
the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the
standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. To hold a person as having
contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in
disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and body. To prove contributory
negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although not proximate, between the negligence
of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense, negligence is contributory only when it
contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a condition for its occurrence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Last Clear Chance; The doctrine of last clear chance states that
where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that of the other,
or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the
last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss—the antecedent
negligence of plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening
negligence of defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of
due diligence.—As to whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is applicable, we rule in the
negative. The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent
act of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault
or negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to
do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of plaintiff does not
preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of defendant, who had
the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. The proximate
cause of the injury having been established to be the negligence of petitioner, we hold that the above
doctrine finds no application in the instant case.
Same; Same; Damages; A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as to the fact and
amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have suffered, and on evidence
of the actual amount thereof.—Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to
compensate a party for an injury or loss he suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice, aimed
at repairing the wrong done. To be recoverable, they must be duly proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of
damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have suffered, and on evidence of the
actual amount thereof. Respondents, however, failed to present evidence for such damages; hence, the
award of actual damages cannot be sustained. However, as the heirs of Rhonda Brunty undeniably
incurred expenses for the wake and burial of the latter, we deem it proper to award temperate damages
in the amount of P25,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. This is in lieu of actual damages as it
would be unfair for the victim’s heirs to get nothing, despite the death of their kin, for the reason alone
that they cannot produce receipts.
Same; Same; Same; The relatives of the victim who incurred physical injuries in a quasi-delict are not
proscribed from recovering moral damages in meritorious cases.—The relatives of the victim who
incurred physical injuries in a quasi-delict are not proscribed from recovering moral damages in
meritorious cases. We, therefore, sustain the award of moral damages in favor of the heirs of Rhonda
Brunty. Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in
some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages must nevertheless be somehow proportional to
and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. In the instant case, the moral suffering of the heirs of
Rhonda Brunty was sufficiently established by Ethel Brunty in her deposition.
Lasam vs. Smith, 45 Phil. 657, No. 19495 February 2, 1924
1.DAMAGES; CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS; BREACH OF CONTRACT.—Defendant, the owner
of a public garage, undertook to convey the plaintiffs by automobile from San Fernando, La Union, to
Currimao, Ilocos Norte. While on the way to Currimao the automobile fell down a steep embankment as
a result of which the plaintiffs were injured. Held: That the defendant's liability, if any, was contractual
and that in an action for damages articles 1101-1107 of the Civil Code, and not article 1903, were
applicable.
2.ID.; ID.; FORTUITOUS EVENT.—The expression "events which cannot be foreseen and which having
been foreseen, are inevitable" is synonymous with the term "fortuitous event" of which some
extraordinary circumstance independent of the will of the obligor, or of his employees, is one of the
essential elements.
3.ID.; ID.; CARRIER OF PASSENGERS NOT AN INSURER AGAINST ALL RISKS.—Neither under American nor
Spanish law is a carrier of passengers an absolute insurer against the risks of travel from which the
passenger may protect himself by exercising due care and diligence.
4.DAMAGES; CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE IN FULFILLMENT.—In determining the extent of the liability for
losses or damages resulting from negligence in the fulfillment of a contractual obligation, the courts
have a discretionary power to moderate the liability according to the circumstances. (Civil Code, article
1103; De Guia vs. Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co., 40 Phil., 706.)
Juntilla vs. Fontanar, 136 SCRA 624, No. L-45637 May 31, 1985
Civil Law; Contracts; Common Carriers; Breach of Contract; Fortuitous Event; Tire blow-out of a jeep, not
a fortuitous event, where there exists specific acts of negligence by the carrier consisting of the fact that
the jeepney was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident.—In the case at bar, there are
specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. The records show that the passenger jeepney
turned turtle and jumped into a ditch immediately after its right rear tire exploded. The evidence shows
that the passenger jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident. We agree with the
observation of the petitioner that a public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed will not jump
into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up. There is also evidence to show that the passenger jeepney
was overloaded at the time of the accident. The petitioner stated that there were three (3) passengers
in the front seat and fourteen (14) passengers in the rear. While it may be true that the tire that blew-up
was still good because the grooves of the tire were still visible, this fact alone does not make the
explosion of the tire a fortuitous event. No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due
to adverse road conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any
conditions liable to cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been caused by too
much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney was overloaded and
speeding at the time of the accident.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Characteristics of a fortuitous event.—In Lasam v. Smith (45 Phil. 657), we
laid down the following essential characteristics of caso fortuito: “x x x ‘In a legal sense and,
consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso fortuito presents the following essential
characteristics: (1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the
debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2) It must be impossible
to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to
avoid. (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in
a normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of
the injury resulting to the creditor.’ (5 Encyclopedia Juridica Española, 309.)”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Accident not caused by a fortuitous event, as it was actually caused either
through negligence of the driver or because of mechanical defects in the tire; Common carriers,
enjoined to teach their drivers on correct measures that insure the safety of the passengers at all
times.—In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not
independent of the human will. The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or
because of mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload
their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to take when
a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Legal Liability of a common carrier under the contract of carriage.—It is
sufficient to reiterate that the source of a common carrier’s legal liability is the contract of carriage, and
by entering into the said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, with a due regard for all the
circumstances. The records show that this obligation was not met by the respondents.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts; Findings of fact by city court, not to be disturbed by the Supreme
Court; Where a Court of First Instance confined itself to the question of whether or not the tire blow-out
was a fortuitous event, it impliedly concurred that petitioner has proven his damages including the loss
of his watch.—It should be noted that the City Court of Cebu found that the petitioner had a lacerated
wound on his right palm aside from injuries on his left arm, right thigh and on his back, and that on his
way back to Danao City, he discovered that his “Omega” wrist watch was lost. These are findings of facts
of the City Court of Cebu which we find no reason to disturb. More so when we consider the fact that
the Court of First Instance of Cebu impliedly concurred in these matters when it confined itself to the
question of whether or not the tire blow out was a fortuitous event.
Southeastern College, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 422, G.R. No. 126389 July 10, 1998
Obligations and Contracts; Fortuitous Events; Words and Phrases; The antecedent of fortuitous event or
caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which defines it as “an event which takes place by accident and
could not have been foreseen.”—The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the
Partidas which defines it as “an event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen.”
Escriche elaborates it as “an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor
resisted.” Civilist Arturo M. Tolentino adds that “[f]ortuitous events may be produced by two general
causes: (1) by nature, such as earthquakes, storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc. and (2) by the act of
man, such as an armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery, etc.”
Same; Same; An act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of
gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences.—In order that a fortuitous
event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or
misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned. An act of God cannot be invoked for
the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible
adverse consequences. When a person’s negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or
injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or proximate
cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event. When the effect is found to be partly the result of
the participation of man—whether it be from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act—the
whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
Same; Same; Typhoons; Words and Phrases; “Negligence,” Explained; There is no question that a
typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable
despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care.— In order to be exempt from liability arising from
any adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should have been no human participation
amounting to a negligent act. In other words, the person seeking exoneration from liability must not be
guilty of negligence. Negligence, as commonly understood, is conduct which naturally or reasonably
creates undue risk or harm to others. It may be the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution,
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, or the omission to do something which a prudent
and reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do. From these premises, we proceed to determine whether petitioner was negligent, such that if
it were not, the damage caused to private respondents’ house could have been avoided?
Same; Same; Same; Same; Ocular Inspections; Damages; A person claiming damages for the negligence
of another has the burden of proving the existence of fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss;
As the term imparts, an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or viewing—what is visual to
the eye though, is not always reflective of the real cause behind.—At the outset, it bears emphasizing
that a person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of
fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss. The facts constitutive of negligence must be
affirmatively established by competent evidence, not merely by presumptions and conclusions without
basis in fact. Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner, merely relied on the
aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioner’s school
building after the typhoon. As the term imparts, an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or
viewing. What is visual to the eye though, is not always reflective of the real cause behind. For
instance, one who hears a gunshot and then sees a wounded person, cannot always definitely conclude
that a third person shot the victim. It could have been self-inflicted or caused accidentally by a stray
bullet. The relationship of cause and effect must be clearly shown.
Same; Same; Same; Building Permits; Having obtained both building permit and certificate of occupancy,
these are, at the very least, prima facie evidence of the regular and proper construction of a building.—
On the other hand, petitioner elicited from one of the witnesses of private respondents, city building
official Jesus Reyna, that the original plans and design of petitioner’s school building were approved
prior to its construction. Engr. Reyna admitted that it was a legal requirement before the construction of
any building to obtain a permit from the city building official (city engineer, prior to the passage of the
Building Act of 1977). In like manner, after construction of the building, a certification must be secured
from the same official attesting to the readiness for occupancy of the edifice. Having obtained both
building permit and certificate of occupancy, these are, at the very least, prima facie evidence of the
regular and proper construction of subject school building.
Same; Same; Same; Judicial Notice; It is a matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common
occurrences in this country.—Moreover, the city building official, who has been in the city government
service since 1974, admitted in open court that no complaint regarding any defect on the same
structure has ever been lodged before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench. It is a
matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common occurrences in this country. If subject school
building’s roofing was not firmly anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could not have withstood long
years and several typhoons even stronger than “Saling.”
Same; Same; Damages; It is not enough that the damage be capable of proof but must be actually
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, pointing out specific facts that afford a basis for
measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne.—Private respondents failed to adduce
adequate and competent proof of the pecuniary loss they actually incurred. It is not enough that the
damage be capable of proof but must be actually proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, pointing
out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne. Private
respondents merely submitted an estimated amount needed for the repair of the roof of their subject
building. What is more, whether the “necessary repairs” were caused ONLY by petitioner’s alleged
negligence in the maintenance of its school building, or included the ordinary wear and tear of the
house itself, is an essential question that remains indeterminable.
Afialda vs. Hisole, 85 Phil. 67, No. L-2075 November 29, 1949
DAMAGES; LIABILITY OF OWNER OF ANIMAL FOR DAMAGE CAUSED TO ITS CARETAKER.—Under article
1905 of the Civil Code, the owner of an animal is not liable for injury caused by it to its caretaker.
Ilocos Norte Electric Company vs. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 5, G.R. No. 53401 November 6, 1989
Torts and Damages; Negligence; When an act of God combines with defendant’s negligence to produce
an injury, defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct.—
While it is true that typhoons and floods are considered Acts of God for which no person may be held
responsible, it was not said eventuality which directly caused the victim’s death. It was through the
intervention of petitioner’s negligence that death took place. x x x Indeed, under the circumstances of
the case, petitioner was negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public” . . .
considering that electricity is an agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric
companies must be commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high
degree of diligence and care extends to every place where persons have a right to be” (Astudillo vs.
Manila Electric, 55 Phil. 427). The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it may not now absolve
itself from liability by arguing that the victim’s death was solely due to a fortuitous event. “When an act
of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the defendant is
liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission” (38 Am. Jur., p.
649).
Same; Damages; Attorney’s Fees; Award of damages and attorney’s fees is unwarranted if the action
was filed in good faith; there should be no penalty on the right to litigate.—The exclusion of moral
damages and attorney’s fees awarded by the lower court was properly made by the respondent CA, the
charge of malice and bad faith on the part of respondents in instituting this case being a mere product
of wishful thinking and speculation. Award of damages and attorney’s fees is unwarranted where the
action was filed in good faith; there should be no penalty on the right to litigate (Espiritu vs. CA, 137
SCRA 50). If damage results from a person’s exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque injuria
(Auyong Hian vs. CTA, 59 SCRA 110).
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs. Reyes, 452 SCRA 532, G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005
Actions; Human Relations; Torts and Damages; Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria; The doctrine of
volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury”) refers to a selfinflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.—
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they
cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and
being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a “gate-crasher.” The doctrine of volenti
non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury”) refers to self-inflicted injury
or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and
voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. As formulated by
petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if
respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and
21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to
unnecessary ridicule and shame.
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Where the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and
irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts and evidence of the case, the Supreme Court is left
without choice but to use its latent power to review such findings of facts.—The general rule is that we
are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law. One of the
exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court. The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr.
Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the other
hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not
to finish his food and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts,
however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filart’s invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves.—Another
problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that
he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All his
witnesses—Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva—proved only that it was Dr. Filart who
invited him to the party.
Same; Same; Same; Party Gatecrashers; A person who did not abuse her right in asking a person to leave
a party to which he was not invited cannot be made to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code.—Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was
not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its
employee.
Same; Same; Same; Principle of Abuse of Rights; Article 19 of the Civil Code, known to contain what is
commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social
grievances, the object of the article being to set certain standards which must be observed not only in
the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.—Article 19, known to contain
what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts
and social grievances. Article 19 states: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Elsewhere, we explained that when “a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be responsible.” The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of
one’s duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its
elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for
the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is
proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act
complained of must be intentional.—Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which
does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on
the other hand, states: Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is
legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done
with intent to injure. A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained
of must be intentional.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail
if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.—As applied to herein case and as
earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two
people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had
nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms.
Lim, being “single at 44 years old,” had a “very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly
influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen.” The lameness of this
argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad
faith.—The manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane
under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate court’s
declaration that Ms. Lim’s act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs.
Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action “predicated upon mere rudeness or
lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such
dignity.” Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot
amount to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion who told
her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if
done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
Pantaleon vs. American Express International, Inc., 587 SCRA 551, G.R. No. 174269 May 8, 2009
Credit Cards; Obligations and Contracts; Delay; Mora Solvendi and Mora Accipiendi; Requisites.—
Petitioner correctly cites that under mora solvendi, the three requisites for a finding of default are that
the obligation is demandable and liquidated; the debtor delays performance; and the creditor judicially
or extrajudicially requires the debtor’s performance. Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals had
wrongly applied the principle of mora accipiendi, which relates to delay on the part of the obligee in
accepting the performance of the obligation by the obligor. The requisites of mora accipiendi are: an
offer of performance by the debtor who has the required capacity; the offer must be to comply with the
prestation as it should be performed; and the creditor refuses the performance without just cause. The
error of the appellate court, argues petitioner, is in relying on the invocation by respondent of “just
cause” for the delay, since while just cause is determinative of mora accipiendi, it is not so with the case
of mora solvendi.
Same; Same; Same; Generally, the relationship between a credit card provider and its card holders is
that of creditor-debtor, with the card company as the creditor extending loans and credit to the card
holder, who as debtor is obliged to repay the creditor, a relationship which takes exception to the
general rule that as between a bank and its depositors, the bank is deemed as the debtor while the
depositor is considered as the creditor.—We can see the possible source of confusion as to which type
of mora to appreciate. Generally, the relationship between a credit card provider and its card holders is
that of creditor-debtor, with the card company as the creditor extending loans and credit to the card
holder, who as debtor is obliged to repay the creditor. This relationship already takes exception to the
general rule that as between a bank and its depositors, the bank is deemed as the debtor while the
depositor is considered as the creditor. Petitioner is asking us, not baselessly, to again shift perspectives
and again see the credit card company as the debtor/obligor, insofar as it has the obligation to the
customer as creditor/obligee to act promptly on its purchases on credit.
Same; Same; Same; Notwithstanding the popular notion that credit card purchases are approved “within
seconds,” there really is no strict, legally determinative point of demarcation on how long must it take
for a credit card company to approve or disapprove a customer’s purchase, much less one specifically
contracted upon by the parties, but one hour appears to be an awfully long, patently unreasonable
length of time to approve or disapprove a credit card purchase.—Notwithstanding the popular notion
that credit card purchases are approved “within seconds,” there really is no strict, legally determinative
point of demarcation on how long must it take for a credit card company to approve or disapprove a
customer’s purchase, much less one specifically contracted upon by the parties. Yet this is one of those
instances when “you’d know it when you’d see it,” and one hour appears to be an awfully long, patently
unreasonable length of time to approve or disapprove a credit card purchase. It is long enough time for
the customer to walk to a bank a kilometer away, withdraw money over the counter, and return to the
store.
Same; Same; Same; The culpable failure of the credit card company herein is not the failure to timely
approve the cardholder’s purchase, but the more elemental failure to timely act on the same, whether
favorably or unfavorably.—We do not wish do dispute that respondent has the right, if not the
obligation, to verify whether the credit it is extending upon on a particular purchase was indeed
contracted by the cardholder, and that the cardholder is within his means to make such transaction. The
culpable failure of respondent herein is not the failure to timely approve petitioner’s purchase, but the
more elemental failure to timely act on the same, whether favorably or unfavorably. Even assuming that
respondent’s credit authorizers did not have sufficient basis on hand to make a judgment, we see no
reason why respondent could not have promptly informed petitioner the reason for the delay, and duly
advised him that resolving the same could take some time. In that way, petitioner would have had
informed basis on whether or not to pursue the transaction at Coster, given the attending circumstances.
Instead, petitioner was left uncomfortably dangling in the chilly autumn winds in a foreign land and soon
forced to confront the wrath of foreign folk.
Same; Same; Same; Damages; Moral Damages; Moral damages avail in cases of breach of contract
where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith, and the court should find that under the
circumstances, such damages are due.—Moral damages avail in cases of breach of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith, and the court should find that under the circumstances,
such damages are due. The findings of the trial court are ample in establishing the bad faith and
unjustified neglect of respondent, attributable in particular to the “dilly-dallying” of respondent’s Manila
credit authorizer, Edgardo Jaurique.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Moral damages do not avail to soothe the plaints of the simply impatient, so
this decision should not be cause for relief for those who time the length of their credit card
transactions with a stopwatch.—It should be emphasized that the reason why petitioner is entitled to
damages is not simply because respondent incurred delay, but because the delay, for which culpability
lies under Article 1170, led to the particular injuries under Article 2217 of the Civil Code for which moral
damages are remunerative. Moral damages do not avail to soothe the plaints of the simply impatient, so
this decision should not be cause for relief for those who time the length of their credit card
transactions with a stopwatch. The somewhat unusual attending circumstances to the purchase at
Coster—that there was a deadline for the completion of that purchase by petitioner before any delay
would redound to the injury of his several traveling companions—gave rise to the moral shock, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation sustained by the petitioner, as
concluded by the RTC. Those circumstances are fairly unusual, and should not give rise to a general
entitlement for damages under a more mundane set of facts.
Kramer, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 518, G.R. No. 83524 October 13, 1989
Civil Law; Damages; Prescription; Quasi-delict; An action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted
within four (4) years from the day the quasi-delict was committed.—The petition is devoid of merit.
Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasidelict must be instituted within four (4)
years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia,
this Court ruled that in an action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action
being based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the
collision.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Elements of a cause of action.—In Español vs. Chairman, Philippine
Veterans Administration, this Court held as follows—“The right of action accrues when there exists a
cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation on the part of defendant to
respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff x x x. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a cause
of action has arisen x x x.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The occurrence of the last element is the time when the cause
of action arises.—From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the prescriptive period must be counted
when the last element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the commission of an act or omission
violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause of action arises.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an
administrative body that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he
can file action for damages.—It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the
collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the
collision. The aggrieved party need not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board
of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he
can file an action for damages. The ruling in Vasquez does not apply in this case. Immediately after the
collision the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the
owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel.
Vda. de Bataclán, et al. vs. Medina,, 102 Phil. 181, No. L-10126 October 22, 1957
1.DAMAGES; CARRIER'S LIABILITY; WORDS AND PHRASES; PROXIMATE CAUSE DEFINED.—"The
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the
person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom." (38 Am. Jur. pp. 695-696.)
2.ID.; ID.; OVERTURNING OF Bus; PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH.— When a vehicle turned not only on its
side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or
unexpected; that the coming of the men with lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made
not only by the passenger, but most probably by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that
because it was very dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and
coming as they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a
torch the most handy and available; and what was more natural, than that said rescuers should
innocently approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from
them, Held: That the proximate cause of the death of B was the overturning of the vehicle thru the
negligence of defendant and his agent.
3.ID.; ID.; CARRIER'S NEGLIGENCE; BURNING OF THE BUS.—The burning of the bus wherein some of the
passengers were trapped can also be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through the driver and
conductor who were on the road walking back and forth. They should and must have known that in the
position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank
and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially
over a large area, can be smelt and detected even from a distance, Held: That the failure of the driver
and the conductor to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch
too near the bus, constitutes negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier under the provisions of
the Civil Code, particularly, Article 1733, 1759 and 1763 thereof.
Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Baking, 523 SCRA 184, G.R. No. 156037 May 25, 2007
Civil Law; Negligence; Damages; Requisites to sustain a claim based on Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code.—To sustain a claim based on the above provision, the following requisites must concur: (a)
damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause
and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.
Same; Same; Same; Definition and determination of probable cause.—Proximate cause is defined as any
cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the
facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.
Same; Same; Same; When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of the law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the
selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection; Presumption may be
rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of
a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.—It is thus clear that the
employer of a negligent employee is liable for the damages caused by the latter. When an injury is
caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of the law that there has
been negligence on the part of the employer, either in the selection of his employee or in the
supervision over him, after such selection. The presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear
showing on the part of the employer that he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of his employee. Here, petitioner’s failure to prove that it
exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee
will make it solidarily liable for damages caused by the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Award of moral damages in order.—As regards the award of moral damages, we
hold the same to be in order. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act
or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury in
the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Attorney’s Fees; Attorney’s Fees and Expenses of Litigation; It is settled that the reasons or grounds for
the award thereof must be set forth in the decision of the court.—On the matter of attorney’s fees and
expenses of litigation, it is settled that the reasons or grounds for the award thereof must be set forth in
the decision of the court. Since the trial court’s decision did not give the basis of the award, the same
must be deleted. In Vibram Manufacturing Corporation v. Manila Electric Company, 466 SCRA 178
(2005), we held: Likewise, the award for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses should be deleted. Well-
enshrined is that “an award for attorney’s fees must be stated in the text of the court’s decision and not
in the dispositive portion only” (Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (Solidbank) v. Court of Appeals,
246 SCRA 193 [1995] and Keng Hua Paper Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 257 [1998]). This
is also true with the litigation expenses where the body of the decision discussed nothing for its basis.
Phoenix Construction, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 353, No. L-65295 March 10,
1987
Torts; Evidence; Private respondent had no curfew pass during the night the accident took place. The
certification by a major assigned in Pampanga that respondent has a curfew pass is not credible as it
lacks the necessary details.—Private respondent Dionisio was not able to produce any curfew pass
during the trial. Instead, he offered the explanation that his family may have misplaced his curfew pass.
He also offered a certification (dated two years after the accident) issued by one Major Benjamin N.
Libarnes of the Zone Integrated Police Intelligence Unit of Campo Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga,
which was said to have authority to issue curfew passes for Pampanga and Metro Manila. This
certification was to the effect that private respondent Dionisio had a valid curfew pass. This certification
did not, however, specify any pass serial number or date or period of effectivity of the supposed curfew
pass. We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass
during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have
such a pass during that night. The relevance of possession or non-possession of a curfew pass that night
lies in the light it tends to shed on the other related issues: whether Dionisio was speeding home and
whether he had indeed purposely put out his headlights before the accident, in order to avoid detection
and possibly arrest by the police in the nearby police station for travelling after the onset of curfew
without a valid curfew pass.
Same; Same; Information gathered by a traffic investigator from persons who saw how the accident
took place is admissible as part of the res gestae.—We think that an automobile speeding down a street
and suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to
evoke spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions from observers who happened to be around at that
time. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and should
have been considered by the trial court. Clearly, substantial weight should have been ascribed to such
testimony, even though it did not, as it could not, have purported to describe quantitatively the precise
velocity at which Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck.
Same; Same; Petitioner's theory that respondent deliberately shut off his headlights as he turned the
intersection where his car later on bumped a parked dumptruck is more credible than respondent's
claim that his car's lights suddenly turned off.—A third related issue is whether Dionisio purposely
turned off his headlights, or whether his headlights accidentally malfunctioned, just moments before the
accident. The Intermediate Appellate Court expressly found that the headlights of Dionisio's car went off
as he crossed the intersection but was non-committal as to why they did so. It is the petitioners'
contention that Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as
not to be detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was
not far away from the intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible
explanation than that offered by private respondent Dionisio—i.e., that he had his headlights on but
that, at the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone
off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with
the dump truck.
Same; Same; The fact that a driver smelled of liquor does not necessarily mean he is drunk.—A fourth
and final issue relates to whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The evidence
here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno to the effect that private respondent Dionisio
smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from his smashed car and brought to the Makati Medical
Center in an unconscious condition. This testimony has to be taken in conjunction with the admission of
Dionisio that he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor before dinner with his boss that night. We do not
believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the influence of liquor
as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence. There simply is not
enough evidence to show how much liquor he had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his physical
faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. We are also aware that "one shot or two" of hard
liquor may affect different people differently.
Same; The theory of petitioners that the negligence of the truck driver in parking his truck on the street
without any early warning devices is merely a passive and static condition, while the negligence of the
car driver in ramming against the truck was the efficient, intervening cause, is a theory that has already
been almost entirely discredited.—The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was
merely a "passive and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was an
"efficient intervening cause," and that consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal
and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel. We note that the
petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in
the United States but we are unable to persuade ourselves that these arguments have any validity for
our jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that even in the United States, the distinctions between "cause" and
"condition" which the petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited."
Professors Prosser and Keeton make this quite clear: x x x.
Same; The improper parking of truck created an unreasonable risk for anyone driving on that street for
which the truck driver should be held responsible as the negligence of a car driver bumping that truck
was no more than a forseeable consequence of the risk created by the truck driver.—We believe,
secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was rather an
indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's
car would in all probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any
warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable
risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck
driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than
the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient intervening or
independent cause. What the petitioners describe as an "intervening cause" was no more than a
foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver had
parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private respondent
Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck driver had created.
Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the
chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to
sever the juris vinculum of liability.
Same; Negligence of car driver who bumps an improperly parked truck is merely contributory.—We hold
that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently
respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts
(Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Same; Doctrine of "last clear chance" is a common-law theory adopted to mitigate the harshness of the
"contributory negligence of the plaintiff rule under which in common-law countries plaintiff is barred
from any recovery, unlike in our system of law where the Civil Code expressly states that it will merely
reduce the amount to be recovered.—Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last
clear chance" doctrine. The theory here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was
negligent, private respondent Dionisio had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his
injuries, and that Dionisio having failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone.
The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith
but it is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to mitigate the harshness of
another common law doctrine or rule—that of contributory negligence. The common law rule of
contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the
plaintiff s negligence was relatively minor as compared with the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff
who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty
and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance
doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an
absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
Same; Doctrine of last clear chance in common law cannot be applied as a general rule in negligence
cases in our civil law system.—Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be
extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law
jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is
to determine whose negligence—the plaintiffs or the defendant's—was the legal or proximate cause of
the injury. That task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the
petitioners seem to imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative
location in the continuum of time of the plaintiff s and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is
only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are
the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks
created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver
(and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence
because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had become
necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. To
accept this proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man
must respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasidelicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the
members of society. To accept the petitioners' proposition must tend to weaken the very bonds of
society.
Same; Employer's failure to exercise vigilance over its employee evident from the improper parking of
the truck on the street at night along employee's residence.—Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence
creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his employer Phoenix in supervising its employees
properly and adequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly in our opinion, that
Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence. The circumstance that Phoenix had
allowed its truck driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early
the following morning, when coupled with the failure to show any effort on the part of Phoenix to
supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an
affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.
Same; Contributory negligence may result in 20% reduction of damages.—Turning to the award of
damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private respondent Dionisio on one
hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, we believe that the demands of
substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the
damages awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary
damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only
the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarily liable
therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne
exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. We see no
sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the respondent appellate court.
Dy Teban Trading, Inc. vs. Ching, 543 SCRA 560, G.R. No. 161803 February 4, 2008- sufficient link test
Civil Law; Damages; Quasi-Delict; Requisites to sustain a claim based on quasi-delict.—Article 2176 of
the Civil Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. To sustain a claim based on quasi-delict,
the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of
defendant; and (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the
damage incurred by plaintiff.
Same; Same; Same; Negligence; Words and Phrases; Definition of Negligence; Test of negligence stated
in the landmark case of Picart v. Smith.—Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The Supreme Court stated the
test of negligence in the landmark case Picart v. Smith as follows: The test by which to determine the
existence or negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in
the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard
supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The
existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent
in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. (Italics supplied) The
test of negligence is objective. We measure the act or omission of the tortfeasor with that of an ordinary
reasonable person in the same situation. The test, as applied to this case, is whether Limbaga, in parking
the prime mover, used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary reasonable person would
have used in the same situation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court of Appeals reliance on Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 256
SCRA 746 (1996), as authority for the proposition that kerosene lighted tin cans may act as substitute
early warning device is misplaced.—Anent the absence of an early warning device on the prime mover,
the CA erred in accepting the bare testimony of Limbaga that he placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the
front and rear of the prime mover. The evidence on records belies such claim. The CA reliance on
Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 746 (1996), as authority for the proposition that
kerosene lighted tin cans may act as substitute early warning device is misplaced.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Proximate Cause; Definition of Proximate Cause; There is no exact
mathematical formula to determine proximate cause.—Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred. More comprehensively, proximate cause is that
cause acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based upon mixed
considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Plaintiff must, however, establish a
sufficient link between the act or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not be remote or
far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a natural and probable
result of the act or omission.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The liability of joint tortfeasors is joint and solidary.—Even granting that the
passenger bus was at fault, it’s fault will not necessarily absolve private respondents from liability. If at
fault, the passenger bus will be a joint tortfeasor along with private respondents. The liability of joint
tortfeasors is joint and solidary. This means that petitioner may hold either of them liable for damages
from the collision.
Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 410 SCRA 562, G.R. No. 138569
September 11, 2003
Same; Same; General Banking Act of 2000 (R.A. No. 8791); The new provision in the general banking law,
that the State recognizes the “fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity and
performance,” introduced in 2000, is a statutory affirmation of Supreme Court decisions, starting with
the 1990 case of Simex International v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 360.—The law imposes on banks
high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8791 (“RA 8791”),
which took effect on 13 June 2000, declares that the State recognizes the “fiduciary nature of banking
that requires high standards of integrity and performance.” This new provision in the general banking
law, introduced in 2000, is a statutory affirmation of Supreme Court decisions, starting with the 1990
case of Simex International v. Court of Appeals, holding that “the bank is under obligation to treat the
accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their
relationship.”
Same; Same; Same; The fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s obligation to observe “high
standards of integrity and performance” is deemed written into every deposit agreement between a
bank and its depositor; Although RA 8791 took effect almost nine years after the unauthorized
withdrawal in the instant case, jurisprudence at the time of the withdrawal already imposed on banks
the same high standard of diligence required under R.A. 8791.—This fiduciary relationship means that
the bank’s obligation to observe “high standards of integrity and performance” is deemed written into
every deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires
banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family. Article 1172 of the
Civil Code states that the degree of diligence required of an obligor is that prescribed by law or contract,
and absent such stipulation then the diligence of a good father of a family. Section 2 of RA 8791
prescribes the statutory diligence required from banks—that banks must observe “high standards of
integrity and performance” in servicing their depositors. Although RA 8791 took effect almost nine years
after the unauthorized withdrawal of the P300,000 from L.C. Diaz’s savings account, jurisprudence at the
time of the withdrawal already imposed on banks the same high standard of diligence required under
RA No. 8791.
Same; Same; Same; The fiduciary nature of a bank-depositor relationship does not convert the contract
between the bank and its depositors from a simple loan to a trust agreement, whether express or
implied—the law simply imposes on the bank a higher standard of integrity and performance in
complying with its obligations under the contract of simple loan, beyond those required of non-bank
debtors under a similar contract of simple loan; The fiduciary nature of banking does not convert a
simple loan into a trust agreement because banks do not accept deposits to enrich depositors but to
earn money for themselves.—The fiduciary nature of a bank-depositor relationship does not convert the
contract between the bank and its depositors from a simple loan to a trust agreement, whether express
or implied. Failure by the bank to pay the depositor is failure to pay a simple loan, and not a breach of
trust. The law simply imposes on the bank a higher standard of integrity and performance in complying
with its obligations under the contract of simple loan, beyond those required of non-bank debtors under
a similar contract of simple loan. The fiduciary nature of banking does not convert a simple loan into a
trust agreement because banks do not accept deposits to enrich depositors but to earn money for
themselves. The law allows banks to offer the lowest possible interest rate to depositors while charging
the highest possible interest rate on their own borrowers. The interest spread or differential belongs to
the bank and not to the depositors who are not cestui que trust of banks. If depositors are cestui que
trust of banks, then the interest spread or income belongs to the depositors, a situation that Congress
certainly did not intend in enacting Section 2 of RA 8791.
Same; Negligence; Bank tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the
passbook only to the depositor or to his authorized representative.—Likewise, Solidbank’s tellers must
exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the passbook only to the depositor or his
authorized representative. The tellers know, or should know, that the rules on savings account provide
that any person in possession of the passbook is presumptively its owner. If the tellers give the passbook
to the wrong person, they would be clothing that person presumptive ownership of the passbook,
facilitating unauthorized withdrawals by that person. For failing to return the passbook to Calapre, the
authorized representative of L.C. Diaz, Solidbank and Teller No. 6 presumptively failed to observe such
high degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook, and in insuring its return to the party authorized
to receive the same.
Same; Same; Culpa Contractual; Culpa Aquiliana; While in culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a
breach of contract, there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent and the burden is
on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent, in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the
burden of proving that the defendant was negligent.—In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a
breach of contract, there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on
the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. In contrast, in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff
has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent. In the present case, L.C. Diaz has
established that Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the
authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a presumption that Solidbank was at fault and its
teller was negligent in not returning the passbook to Calapre. The burden was on Solidbank to prove
that there was no negligence on its part or its employees.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees is not a complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana.—
Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under the principle of respondeat superior or
command responsibility. The defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees is not a complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana. The
bank must not only exercise “high standards of integrity and performance,” it must also insure that its
employees do likewise because this is the only way to insure that the bank will comply with its fiduciary
duty. Solidbank failed to present the teller who had the duty to return to Calapre the passbook, and thus
failed to prove that this teller exercised the “high standards of integrity and performance” required of
Solidbank’s employees.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Proximate Cause,” Explained.—Proximate cause is that cause which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury
and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of
each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
Same; Same; There is no law mandating banks to call up their clients whenever their representatives
withdraw significant amounts from their accounts.—There is no law mandating banks to call up their
clients whenever their representatives withdraw significant amounts from their accounts. L.C. Diaz
therefore had the burden to prove that it is the usual practice of Solidbank to call up its clients to verify
a withdrawal of a large amount of money. L.C. Diaz failed to do so.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Doctrine of Last Clear Chance,” Explained.—The doctrine of last clear
chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than
that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss, the
one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss.
Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering
damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to
prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
Same; Same; Doctrine of last clear chance not applicable in a case of culpa contractual.—We do not
apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due
to negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation to L.C. Diaz. This is a case of culpa
contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid
the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance
by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate
the defendant from his breach of contract.
Same; Same; Damages; Pursuant to Article 1172 of the Civil Code, if the defendant bank exercised the
proper diligence in the selection and supervision of its employee, or if the plaintiff depositor was guilty
of contributory negligence, the courts may reduce the award of damages; Where the depositor is guilty
of contributory negligence, damages may be allocated between the depositor and the bank on a 40-60
ratio.—Under Article 1172, “liability (for culpa contractual) may be regulated by the courts, according to
the circumstances.” This means that if the defendant exercised the proper diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employee, or if the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, then the courts may
reduce the award of damages. In this case, L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory negligence in allowing a
withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor. Thus, the
liability of Solidbank should be reduced. In Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals, where the
Court held the depositor guilty of contributory negligence, we allocated the damages between the
depositor and the bank on a 40-60 ratio. Applying the same ruling to this case, we hold that L.C. Diaz
must shoulder 40% of the actual damages awarded by the appellate court. Solidbank must pay the other
60% of the actual damages.
Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 695, G.R. No. 97626 March 14, 1997
Civil Law; Negligence; Elements of a Quasi-delict.—There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Same; Same; Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would do.—Negligence is the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
The seventy-eight (78)-yearold, yet still relevant, case of Picart v. Smith, provides the test by which to
determine the existence of negligence in a particular case which may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily
prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law
here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet
paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by
reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what
would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
Same; Same; Proximate Cause; Definition Of.—Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case
upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina,
reiterated in the case of Bank of the Phil. Islands v. Court of Appeals, defines proximate cause as “that
cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. x x x.” In this case, absent
the act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms.
Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her fraudulent scheme with impunity.
Same; Same; Same; Essence of the Doctrine of “Last Clear Chance.”—Furthermore, under the doctrine
of “last clear chance” (also referred to, at times as “supervening negligence” or as “dis-covered peril”),
petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties
are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it
is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who
had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the
consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a
person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense
against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was
negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to
defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank,
thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully
observing their self-imposed validation procedure.
Same; Same; Same; Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks
are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care.—In the case of
banks, however, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family.
Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty bound to
treat the accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care.
Same; Same; Same; A blunder on the part of the bank, such as the failure to duly credit him his deposits
as soon as they are made, can cause the depositor not a little embarrassment if not financial loss and
perhaps even civil and criminal litigation.—As elucidated in Simex International (Manila), Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, in every case, the depositor expects the bank to treat his account with the utmost fidelity,
whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions. The bank must record every
single transaction accurately, down to the last centavo, and as promptly as possible. This has to be done
if the account is to reflect at any given time the amount of money the depositor can dispose as he sees
fit, confident that the bank will deliver it as and to whomever he directs. A blunder on the part of the
bank, such as the failure to duly credit him his deposits as soon as they are made, can cause the
depositor not a little embarrassment if not financial loss and perhaps even civil and criminal litigation.
Same; Same; Same; It cannot be denied that private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking
its monthly statements of account.—The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that, indeed,
private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account. Had it
done so, the company would have been alerted to the series of frauds being committed against RMC by
its secretary. The damage would definitely not have ballooned to such an amount if only RMC,
particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance in their financial affairs. This omission by
RMC amounts to contributory negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the
private respondent under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code.
PADILLA, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Civil Law; Negligence; Elements of a Quasi-delict; The doctrine of “last clear chance” assumes that the
negligence of the defendant was subsequent to the negligence of the plaintiff and the same must be the
proximate cause of the injury.—Coming now to the doctrine of “last clear chance,” it is my considered
view that the doctrine assumes that the negligence of the defendant was subsequent to the negligence
of the plaintiff and the same must be the proximate cause of the injury. In short, there must be a last
and a clear chance, not a last possible chance, to avoid the accident or injury. It must have been a
chance as would have enabled a reasonably prudent man in like position to have acted effectively to
avoid the injury and the resulting damage to himself.
Same; Same; Same; Negligence of private respondent is not contributory but the immediate and
proximate cause of its injury.—It was private respondent who had the last and clear chance to prevent
any further misappropriation by Yabut had it only reviewed the status of its current accounts on the
bank statements sent to it monthly or regularly. Since a sizable amount of cash was entrusted to Yabut,
private respondent should, at least, have taken ordinary care of its concerns, as what the law presumes.
Its negligence, therefore, is not contributory but the immediate and proximate cause of its injury.
Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 603, G.R. No. 89880 February 6, 1991
Civil Law; Torts and Damages; Doctrine of last clear chance; The doctrine broadly states that the
negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it
appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence.—The respondent court adopted
the doctrine of “last clear chance.” The doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff
does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant,
by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that
even though a person’s own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the
injured person is entitled to recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear
chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or
that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident.
Same; Same; Same; The doctrine does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the
carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.—In the recent case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (G.R. Nos. 66102-04, August 30, 1990), the Court citing the landmark
decision held in the case of Anuran, et al. v. Buno, et al. (123 Phil. 1073) ruled that the principle of “last
clear chance” “in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a
passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other
driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
Same; Same; Same; It cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one
of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of the latter’s peril and it
cannot be involved as between defendants concurrently negligent.—Fur-thermore, “as between
defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only
one of them should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of the latter’s peril,
and it cannot be invoked as between defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a
negligently actor cannot defend by pleading that another had negligentl failed to take action which
could have avoided the injury.”
Same; Same; Same; Respondent Court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear
chance as between the defendants, case at bar.—All premises considered, the Court is convinced that
the respondent Court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between
the defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding
vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of
the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the
cargo truck from liability.
Libi vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 214 SCRA 16, G.R. No. 70890 September 18, 1992
Civil Law; Damages; Liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code.—In imposing sanctions for the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent
court cites Fuellas vs. Cadano, et al. which supposedly holds that “(t)he subsidiary liability of parents for
damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of the New Civil Code covers
obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses,” followed by an extended quotation
ostensibly from the same case explaining why under Article 2180 of the Civil Code and Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code parents should assume subsidiary liability for damages caused by their minor
children. The quoted passages are set out two paragraphs back, with pertinent underscoring for
purposes of the discussion hereunder. Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding
the parents liable, but the categorization of their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature
requires a hard second look considering previous decisions of this court on the matter which warrant
comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings that if the liability of the parents for crimes
or quasidelicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved
of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered direct and primary,
that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense. We believe that the civil liability of
parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is
primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary
liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and
the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such
parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that
“(t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.”
Criminal Law; Civil liability of parents for crimes committed by their minor children.—Accordingly, just
like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, xxx the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by
their minor children is likewise direct and primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or
negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family. That in both
quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is buttressed by the
corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be answerable or shall respond
with his own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former. Thus, for civil liability
ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that “(i)f the minor causing damage has
no parents or guardian, the minor x x x shall be answerable with his own property in an action against
him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.” For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent
provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: “Should there
be no person having such x x x minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person
be insolvent, said x x x minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property exempt from
execution, in accordance with civil law.”
Tamargo vs. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 518, G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
Actions; Quasi-delicts; Parents and Child; Adoption; The natural parents of a minor still living with the
former when the latter accidentally shot a girl with an air rifle are liable for damages thus caused rather
than the adopter even if petition for adoption filed before the accident and granted thereafter.—We do
not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred to and
vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do
not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability
upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when the adopting parents had no actual or physical
custody over the adopted child. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition
for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the
adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively
lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not
have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United
States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such
a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine
of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to
their control at the time the tort was committed.
Same; Same.—Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting
parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely
because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant
case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or had already been completed at the time of the
air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents, not the
adopting parents.
Palisoc vs. Brillantes, 41 SCRA 548, No. L-29025 October 4, 1971
Civil law; Damages; Student need not live with schoolteacher for latter to be liable for former’s tort.—
Under the provisions of Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, the president of a vocational school and the
instructor of the student of the school who caused the death of his classmate are jointly and severally
liable for damages to the parents of the deceased who was fatally injured at the school’s laboratory
room. No liability attaches, however, to a defendant who was sued as a mere member of the school’s
board of directors nor to the school itself which was not impleaded as a party-defendant.
Same; Same; Same.—The phrase used in Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code “so long as they (the students)
remain in their custody” means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and
teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at attendance in the school and
includes recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach, the pupil
or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school, as erroneously held by the
lower court, and in the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed
to have been set aside by the present decision.
Same; Same; School officials must prove due diligence in supervision of students.—The law holds school
officials liable unless they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of
Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code by “(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.”
Same; Same; Amount of compensatory damages in death cases arising from tort.—In view of the decline
in the purchasing power of the peso, the minimum amount of compensatory damages for death caused
by a crime or quasi-delict under Art. 2206 of the New Civil Code is P12,000.00, which amount is to be
awarded even though there may have been mitigating circumstances pursuant to the express provisions
of said codal article.
Same; Same; Discretion of trial court in award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.—The matter
of awarding damages, imposing legal interest on the total damage award and increasing the attorney’s
fees rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court. Under Art. 2231 of the New Civil Code, gross
negligence on the part of the defendant must be shown to entitle the plaintiff to an award of exemplary
damages.
Amadora vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 315, No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
Civil Law; Torts; Article 2180 of the Civil Code should apply to all schools, academic as well as nonacademic.—After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that
the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the
school is academic rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by
the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision.
This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only
he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers in general shall
be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is
the head thereof who shall be anBwerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis, “teachers”
should apply to the words “‘pupHs and students” and “heads of establishments of arts and trades” to
the word “apprentices.”
Same; Same; Same; No substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools
insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned.—There is really no substantial distinction
between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are
concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and
supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching, The suggestion in the Sxconde and
Mercado Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts and
trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if that same tort were committed in
an academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher or the school head. All other circumstances
being the same, the teacher or the head of the academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher
and the head of the nonacademic school would be held liable, and simply because the latter is a school
of arts and trades.
Same; Same; Same; Same; No plausible reason why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by
the school authorities.—The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by
the school authorities on the basis only of the nature of their respective schools. There does not seem to
be any plausible reason for relaxLng that vigilance simply because the school is academic in nature and
for increasing such vigilance where the school is nonacademic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is
caused by the student and not by the school itself nor it is a result of the operations of the school or its
equipment. The injury contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of the school where he is
registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply showing that he is
teaching in an academic school where, on the other hand, the head would be held liable if the school
were non-academic.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Reason for the disparity.—The reason for the disparity can be traced
to the fact that historically the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his
pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the
training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed them on the
technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was such a master and so
was personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually even boarded with him and so
came under his constant control, supervision and influence. By contrast, the head of the academic
school was not as involved with his students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers
who were the persons directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had then (as
now) only a vicarious relationship with the students. Consequently, while he could not be directly
faulted for the acts of the students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties
with them, could be so blamed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Distinction no longer obtains at present—It is conceded that the
distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the
consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and personal
contact of their heads with the students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present state,
the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original mandate until the
legislature, taking into account the changes in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the
necessary amendment.
Same; Same; Custody requirement; Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not mean that the student must
be boarding with the school authorities but the student should be within the control and under its
influence at the time of the occurrence of the injury.—From a reading of the provision under
examination, it is clear that while the custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc vs. Brillantes, does not
mean that the student must be boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the student
should be within the control and under the influence of the school authorities at the time of the
occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean that such custody be co-terminous with the
semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the time
before or after such period, such as the period of registration, and in the case of graduating students,
the period before the commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody
of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its
premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
Same; Same; Same; Extent ofresponsibility;As long as the student is in the school premises in pursuance
of a legitimate purpose, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.—As long
as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student
objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the
student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and
friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and
subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Teacher-in-charge must answer for his student’s torts.—During all these
occasions, it is obviously the teacherin-charge who must answer for his students’ torts, in practically the
same way that the parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher-incharge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise
supervision over the pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not
necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it.
Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the influence
exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence. Thus, for the injuries
caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was
committed within the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly exercised
over him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The school may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even
of the head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior but may exculpate itself from
liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.—In any event, it should be
noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of
the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its nature, may
be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle of
respondent superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the
diligence of a bonus paterfamilias,
Same; Sarne; Same; Same; Same; Same; Such defense also available to the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trade,—Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as the
defendant can show that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of,
he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Liability attaches to the teacher and the head of the
technical school although the wrongdoer was already of age.—In this connection, it should be observed
that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not
require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who will be liable only if his
child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under him
regardless of the student’s age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the teacher and the head
of the technical school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the
parent more favorably than the teacher.
St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos, 376 SCRA 473, G.R. No. 143363 February 6, 2002
Schools and Universities; Persons and Institutions With Special Parental Authority Over Minor Children;
The special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.—Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the
following shall have special parental authority over a minor child while under their supervision,
instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all
authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus,
such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and
students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers. Under Article
219 of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental
authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
Same; Same; For a school to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident.—For petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have
a causal connection to the accident. “In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it
must be shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the
wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural
sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the negligence must be
the proximate cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of
action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause of an
injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.’ ”
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.—Liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence
of the minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned
on the minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote
cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the injury, there intervened the negligence of the
minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. “The proximate cause of an
injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.”
Quasi-Delicts; Torts; Motor Vehicles; The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public
service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter
while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.—Incidentally, there was no question that
the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted
this fact. We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service,
would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the
vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets.” Hence, with the overwhelming evidence
presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the
vehicle who shall be held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
Castilex Industrial Corporation vs. Vasquez, Jr., 321 SCRA 393, G.R. No. 132266 December 21, 1999
Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Employer-Employee Relationships; Words and Phrases; The phrase “even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry” found in the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of
the Civil Code should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in
any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of
his assigned task.—Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should
only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in
the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead,
the fourth paragraph should apply. Petitioner’s interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The
phrase “even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry” found in the fifth
paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any
business or industry to be liable for
Same; Same; Same; Fourth and Fifth Paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, Distinguished;
Admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats—they perform functions which are beyond their
office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.—A distinction must
be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable. Both provisions apply to
employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the
fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry. The fourth
paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the
occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting
within the scope of their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer
coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a
business or industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task,
even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For,
admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are beyond their
office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.
Same; Same; Same; Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business
or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of their
assigned tasks.—Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or
industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned
tasks. But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff
must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned
task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer may find it necessary
to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee.
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Evidence; The rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
entitled to great respect, and even finality at times, is subject to exceptions, such as when the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures.—Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is
the rule that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even finality
at times. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions such as when the conclusion is grounded on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures. Such exception obtain in the present case to warrant review by
this Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving petitioner’s vehicle he was
acting within the scope of his duties as a manager.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; It is not incumbent upon an employer to present evidence that its
employee was not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the motor vehicle
mishap—it is not under obligation to prove such negative averment.—Before we pass upon the issue of
whether ABAD was performing acts within the range of his employment, we shall first take up the other
reason invoked by the Court of Appeals in holding petitioner CASTILEX vicariously liable for ABAD’s
negligence, i.e., that the petitioner did not present evidence that ABAD was not acting within the scope
of his assigned tasks at the time of the motor vehicle mishap. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of
Appeals, it was not incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the same. It was enough for petitioner
CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within the scope of his duties; petitioner was not under
obligation to prove this negative averment. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts,
not he who denies, must prove). The Court has consistently applied the ancient rule that if the plaintiff,
upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts
which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.
Same; Same; Same; The mere fact that an employee was using a service vehicle at the time of the
injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge his employer with liability for the negligent
operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope
of his employment.—The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving by a
manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and
circumstances. We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the
injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation
of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his
employment.
Same; Same; Same; Whether the fault or negligence of an employee is conclusive on his employer as in
American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of negligence on
the part of the employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his employer’s
business or within the scope of his assigned task.—The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are
applicable in our jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not on the principle of
bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or negligence of the employee is conclusive on his
employer as in American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum of
negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is indispensable that the employee was acting in his
employer’s business or within the scope of his assigned task.
Same; Same; Same; Where there is paucity of evidence that an employee was acting within the scope of
the functions entrusted to him when a tortious act occurred, the employer has no duty to show that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing the employee with a service vehicle, and
the employer is thus relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of the
employee.—To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a
personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then
about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD’s working day had
ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it,
was known as a “haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts,” had no connection to
petitioner’s business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service
vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to his
position. Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions
entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that
petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its
vehicle.
Jayme vs. Apostol, 572 SCRA 41, G.R. No. 163609 November 27, 2008
Civil Law; Vicarious Liability; To make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it
must be established that the injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee was
performing his functions.—Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only liable for
one’s own quasi-delictual acts, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible for. This liability is
popularly known as vicarious or imputed liability. To sustain claims against employers for the acts of
their employees, the following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was chosen by the
employer personally or through another; (2) That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders
which the employer has the authority to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was
on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him. Significantly, to make the employee
liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it must be established that the injurious or tortuous act
was committed at the time the employee was performing his functions.
Labor Law; Employer-Employee Relationship; To determine the existence of an employment relationship,
We rely on the four-fold test, this involves: 1) the employer’s power of selection; 2) payment of wages
or other remuneration; 3) the employer’s right to control the method of doing the work; 4) the
employer’s right of suspension or dismissal.—In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to
find out if Mayor Miguel is, indeed, the employer of Lozano and therefore liable for the negligent acts of
the latter. To determine the existence of an employment relationship, We rely on the four-fold test. This
involves: (1) the employer’s power of selection; (2) payment of wages or other remuneration; (3) the
employer’s right to control the method of doing the work; and (4) the employer’s right of suspension or
dismissal.
Same; Same; This Court has, on several occasions, held that an employer-employee relationship exists
even if the employee was loaned by the employer to another person or entity because control over the
employee subsists.—Applying the foregoing test, the CA correctly held that it was the Municipality of
Koronadal which was the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of the accident. It is uncontested that
Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor
Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment. This Court has, on several occasions, held that
an employer-employee relationship still exists even if the employee was loaned by the employer to
another person or entity because control over the employee subsists. In the case under review, the
Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano’s employer notwithstanding Lozano’s assignment to
Mayor Miguel.
Same; In Benson v. Sorrel, 627 NE 2d 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 5th Dist., 1994), the New England Supreme Court
rules that mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over
the vehicle—neither does it render one the employer of the driver.—Even assuming arguendo that
Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano, he still can not be held liable. In
Benson v. Sorrell, 627 NE 2d 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 5th Dist., 1994), the New England Supreme Court ruled
that mere giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over the
vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer of the driver. This Court, in Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon, 209
SCRA 47 (1992), ruled in a similar vein, to wit: x x x The fact that a client company may give instructions
or directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client responsible as an
employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts and omissions. Those
instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for
services entered into with the security agency. x x x
Civil Law; Vicarious Liability; In the absence of an employer-employee relationship establishing liability,
the driver’s negligence should not be attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be an
occupant of the vehicle.—Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee
although the person may have the right to control the manner of the vehicle’s operation. In the absence
of an employer-employee relationship establishing vicarious liability, the driver’s negligence should not
be attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle. Whatever right
of control the occupant may have over the driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of the
doctrine of vicarious liability. Handley v. Lombardi, 122 Cal. App. 22, 9 P. 2d 867 (1st Dist. 1932), is
instructive on this exception to the rule on vicarious liability: Plaintiff was not the master or principal of
the driver of the truck, but only an intermediate and superior employee or agent. This being so, the
doctrine of respondeat superior or qui facit per alium is not properly applicable to him. His power to
direct and control the driver was not as master, but only by virtue of the fact that they were both
employed by Kruse, and the further fact that as Kruse’s agent he was delegated Kruse’s authority over
the driver. x x x In the case of actionable negligence, the rule is well settled both in this state and
elsewhere that the negligence of a subordinate employee or subagent is not to be imputed to a
superior employee or agent, but only to the master or principal. (Hilton v. Oliver, 204 Cal. 535 [61 A. L. R.
297, 269 Pac. 425]; Guild v. Brown, 115 Cal. App. 374 [1 Pac. (2d) 528]; Ellis v. Southern Ry. Co., 72 S. C.
464 [2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 378, 52 S. E. 228]; Thurman v. Pittsburg & M. Copper Co., 41 Mont. 141 [108 Pac.
588]; 2 Cor. Jur., p. 829; and see the elaborate note in 61 A. L. R. 277, and particularly that part
commencing at p. 290.) We can see no logical reason for drawing any distinction in this regard between
actionable negligence and contributory negligence. x x x
Same; Same; It has been held that the failure of a passenger to assist the driver, by providing him
warnings or by serving as lookout does not make the passenger liable for the latter’s negligent acts.—In
Swanson v. McQuown, 139 Colo. 442, 340 P. 2d. 1063 (1959), a case involving a military officer who
happened to be riding in a car driven by a subordinate later involved in an accident, the Colorado
Supreme Court adhered to the general rule that a public official is not liable for the wrongful acts of his
subordinates on a vicarious basis since the relationship is not a true master-servant situation. The court
went on to rule that the only exception is when they cooperate in the act complained of, or direct or
encourage it. In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano’s employer nor the vehicle’s
registered owner. There existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that
will make him accountable for Marvin’s death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the
accident. Parenthetically, it has been held that the failure of a passenger to assist the driver, by
providing him warnings or by serving as lookout does not make the passenger liable for the latter’s
negligent acts. The driver’s duty is not one that may be delegated to others.
State Immunity; The municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in
governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit.—As correctly held by the trial court, the true
and lawful employer of Lozano is the Municipality of Koronadal. Unfortunately for Spouses Jayme, the
municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in governmental functions
and, hence, immune from suit. This immunity is illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v.
Firme, 195 SCRA 692 (1991), where this Court held: It has already been remarked that municipal
corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of
governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in
proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right
to show that the defendant was not acting in governmental capacity when the injury was committed or
that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
Filamer Christian Institute vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 485, G.R. No. 75112 October 16, 1990
Torts; Quasi-Delict; Even assuming that an employer-employee relationship exists between Filamer and
Funtecha, still, Filamer cannot be made liable for the damages sustained by the victim, considering that
at the time of the accident, Funtecha was not acting within the scope of his employment.—But even if
we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, still the primary responsibility for his
wrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner Filamer for the plain reason that at the time of the
accident, it has been satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting within the scope of his supposed
employment. His duty was to sweep the school passages for two hours every morning before his regular
classes. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy jeep from the authorized driver at 6:30 in the evening and then
driving the vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in multiple injuries to a third person were certainly not
within the ambit of his assigned tasks. In other words, at the time of the injury, Funtecha was not
engaged in the execution of the janitorial services for which he was employed, but for some purpose of
his own. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should bear the full brunt of his tortious negligence.
Petitioner Filamer cannot be made liable for the damages he had caused.
National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 209, G.R. No. 119121 August 14, 1998
Labor Law; “Job (Independent) Contracting,” and “Labor-Only Contracting,” Distinguished; Words and
Phrases.—Job (independent) contracting is present if the following conditions are met: (a) the
contractor carries on an independent business and undertakes the contract work on his own account
under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and
direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except
to the result thereof; and (b) the contractor has substantial capital or investments in the form of tools,
equipment, machineries, work premises and other materials which are necessary in the conduct of his
business. Absent these requisites, what exists is a “labor-only” contract under which the person acting
as contractor is considered merely as an agent or intermediary of the principal who is responsible to the
workers in the same manner and to the same extent as if they had been directly employed by him.
Taking into consideration the above distinction and the provisions of the “Memorandum of
Understanding” entered
Same; Same; Same; It is axiomatic that any person (the principal employer) who enters into an
agreement with a job contractor, either for the performance of a specified work or for the supply of
manpower, assumes responsibility over the employees of the latter.—Under this factual milieu, there is
no doubt that PHESCO was engaged in “labor-only” contracting vis-à-vis NPC and as such, it is
considered merely an agent of the latter. In labor-only contracting, an employer-employee relationship
between the principal employer and the employees of the “labor-only” contractor is created.
Accordingly, the principal employer is responsible to the employees of the “labor-only” contractor as if
such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer. Since PHESCO is only a
“laboronly” contractor, the workers it supplied to NPC, including the driver of the ill-fated truck, should
be considered as employees of NPC. After all, it is axiomatic that any person (the principal employer)
who enters into an agreement with a job contractor, either for the performance of a specified work or
for the supply of manpower, assumes responsibility over the employees of the latter.
Same; Same; Quasi-Delicts; Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code determines the liability
of the principal employer in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person for any negligent act
of the employees of the “labor-only” contractor, consistent with the ruling that a finding that a
contractor was a “labor-only” contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee
relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the “labor-only” contractor, including
the latter’s workers.—However, NPC maintains that even assuming that a “labor-only” contract exists
between it and PHESCO, its liability will not extend to third persons who are injured due to the tortious
acts of the employee of the “labor-only” contractor. Stated otherwise, its liability shall only be limited to
violations of the Labor Code and not quasi-delicts. x x x The reliance is misplaced. It bears stressing that
the action was premised on the recovery of damages as a result of quasi-delict against both NPC and
PHESCO, hence, it is the Civil Code and not the Labor Code which is the applicable law in resolving this
case. x x x Given the above considerations, it is apparent that Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the
Labor Code will determine the liability of NPC in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person
for any negligent act of the employees of the “labor-only” contractor. This is consistent with the ruling
that a finding that a contractor was a “labor-only” contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employeremployee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and the “labor-only” contractor,
including the latter’s workers.
Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 303, G.R. No. 115024, G.R. No. 117944 February 7, 1996
Appeals; Evidence; As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive
upon the Supreme Court, and the Court will not normally disturb such factual findings unless the
findings of the said court are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment
itself is based on a misapprehension of facts.—It is plainly evident that the petition for review in G.R. No.
117944 raises no substantial questions of law. What it, in effect, attempts to have this Court review are
factual findings of the trial court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals finding Richard Li grossly
negligent in driving the Mitsubishi Lancer provided by his company in the early morning hours of June 24,
1990. This we will not do. As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and
conclusive upon us, and this Court will not normally disturb such factual findings unless the findings of
fact of the said court are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or unless the judgment itself
is based on a misapprehension of facts.
Torts; Motor Vehicles; Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses—physiological “fight or flight”
mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion,
drowsiness, etc.—One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Li’s disingenuous and
patently self-serving asseverations. The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty
applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the
street, and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan throroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li
would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were alert—as every
driver should be—to those conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Physiological
“fight or flight” mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol,
exhaustion, drowsiness, etc. Li’s failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident
could therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a “very
fast” speed as testified by Rodriguez; and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol. Either factor
working independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he
would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela’s car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to
suddenly apply his brakes.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Contributory Negligence, Defined.—Contributory negligence is
conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Based on the
foregoing definition, the standard or act to which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have
conformed for her own protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking
zone. We cannot agree.
Same; Same; Same; “Emergency Rule,” Explained; An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation
of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.—Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted
with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who
is in no such situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or
dangerous situations and does not require the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from
persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions. Under the “emergency rule”
adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation
of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will
not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard
to other motorists.—A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not
be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to
other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a
dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to
stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking
zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists.
Same; Same; Same; “Negligence,” Explained; Negligence, as it is commonly understood, is conduct
which creates an undue risk of harm to others—it is the failure to observe that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.—Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the
night of the accident. “Negligence, as it is commonly understood, is conduct which creates an undue risk
of harm to others.” It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. We stressed, in Corliss vs.
Manila Railroad Company, that negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances.
Same; Employer-Employee Relationships; The liability of an employer for the negligence of his employee
is not based on the principle of respondeat superior but that of pater familias.—We agree with the
respondent court that the relationship in question is not based on the principle of respondeat superior,
which holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability
ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family
in the selection and supervision of his employees.
Same; Same; Once evidence is introduced showing that the em ployer exercised the required amount of
care in selecting its employees, half of the employer’s burden is overcome, but the question of diligent
supervision depends on the circumstances of employment.—The employer’s primary liability under the
concept of pater familias embodied by Art. 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasidelictual or tortious in character. His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Once evidence is introduced
showing that the employer exercised the required amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the
employer’s burden is overcome. The question of diligent supervision, however, depends on the
circumstances of employment.
Same; Same; Company Car Plans; Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised
diligent supervision of its employee during the performance of the latter’s assigned tasks would be
enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil
Code.—Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its
employee during the performance of the latter’s assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the
liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is not
expected to exercise supervision over either the employee’s private activities or during the performance
of tasks either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employee’s tasks. The case at bench
presents a situation of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with either
their employees of managerial rank or their representatives.
Same; Same; Same; When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its employee, it
in effect guarantees that it is, like every good father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege
reasonably and responsively.—Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars under
the first plan, require rigorous tests of road worthiness from their agents prior to turning over the car
(subject of company maintenance) to their representatives. In other words, like a good father of a family,
they entrust the company vehicle only after they are satisfied that the employee to whom the car has
been given full use of the said company car for company or private purposes will not be a threat or
menace to himself, the company or to others. When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a
company car to its employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like every good father, satisfied that its
employee will use the privilege reasonably and responsively.
Same; Same; Same; A company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or
other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the
company issue capably and responsibly.—Since important business transactions and decisions may
occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited
use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company and only
incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the managerial employee
or company sales agent. As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose
of furthering the company’s image, a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the
managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are
able to use the company issue capably and responsibly.
Same; Same; Same; Where no allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps
necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of its employee to whom it gave
full and unlimited use of a company car, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias,
ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries caused to third persons.—In fine,
Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as
to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving
proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been
able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its
company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and
severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
Same; Damages; While moral damages are not meant to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of a
defendant, the award should nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering inflicted.—Finally, we find
no reason to overturn the amount of damages awarded by the respondent court, except as to the
amount of moral damages. In the case of moral damages, while the said damages are not intended to
enrich the plaintiff at the expense of a defendant, the award should nonetheless be commensurate to
the suffering inflicted. In the instant case we are of the opinion that the reduction in moral damages
from an amount of P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 by the Court of Appeals was not justified considering
the nature of the resulting damage and the predictable sequelae of the injury.
Same; Same; It would be highly speculative to estimate the amount of psychological pain, damage and
injury which goes with the sudden severing of a vital portion of the human body—the resultant anxiety,
sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental and physical pain are inestimable.—The foregoing discussion
does not even scratch the surface of the nature of the resulting damage because it would be highly
speculative to estimate the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury which goes with the
sudden severing of a vital portion of the human body. A prosthetic device, however technologically
advanced, will only allow a reasonable amount of functional restoration of the motor functions of the
lower limb. The sensory functions are forever lost. The resultant anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological,
injury, mental and physical pain are inestimable.
Professional Services, Inc. vs. Agana, 513 SCRA 478, G.R. No. 126297, G.R. No. 126467, G.R. No. 127590
January 31, 2007
Civil Law; Damages; Negligence; The leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after
the incision has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon.— An operation
requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until the sponges are properly removed,
and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or other foreign substances in the wound after the incision
has been closed is at least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. To put it simply, such act is
considered so inconsistent with due care as to raise an inference of negligence. There are even legions
of authorities to the effect that such act is negligence per se.
Same; Same; Same; To the mind of the Court, what was initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has
ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of deceiving his patient.—Here, Dr. Ampil did not inform
Natividad about the missing two pieces of gauze. Worse, he even misled her that the pain she was
experiencing was the ordinary consequence of her operation. Had he been more candid, Natividad could
have taken the immediate and appropriate medical remedy to remove the gauzes from her body. To our
mind, what was initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of
deceiving his patient.
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur; Requisites for the Applicability of the Doctrine.—
Literally, res ipsa loquitur means “the thing speaks for itself.” It is the rule that the fact of the occurrence
of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption
of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to
meet with an explanation. Stated differently, where the thing which caused the injury, without the fault
of the injured, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such that it should not
have occurred if he, having such control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence
of explanation that the injury arose from the defendant’s want of care, and the burden of proof is
shifted to him to establish that he has observed due care and diligence. From the foregoing statements
of the rule, the requisites for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the occurrence
of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the
defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened
if those who had control or management used proper care; and (4) the absence of explanation by the
defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is the “control and management of the
thing which caused the injury.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se
create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule.—In
this jurisdiction, res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law, hence, does not per se create or
constitute an independent or separate ground of liability, being a mere evidentiary rule. In other words,
mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of proof of
negligence. Here, the negligence was proven to have been committed by Dr. Ampil and not by Dr.
Fuentes.
Same; Same; Same; Professionals are considered personally liable for the fault or negligence they
commit in the discharge of their duties and their employer cannot be held liable for such fault or
negligence.—A prominent civilist commented that professionals engaged by an employer, such as
physicians, dentists, and pharmacists, are not “employees” under this article because the manner in
which they perform their work is not within the control of the latter (employer). In other words,
professionals are considered personally liable for the fault or negligence they commit in the discharge of
their duties, and their employer cannot be held liable for such fault or negligence. In the context of the
present case, “a hospital cannot be held liable for the fault or negligence of a physician or surgeon in the
treatment or operation of patients.”
Same; Same; Same; In this jurisdiction, the nature of the relationship between the hospital and the
physicians is rendered inconsequential in view of the pronouncement in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 321
SCRA 584 (1999), that for purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an
employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians.—In our shores, the nature of the relationship between the hospital and the physicians is
rendered inconsequential in view of our categorical pronouncement in Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 321
SCRA 584 (1999), that for purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an
employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians.
Same;Same; Same; PSI’s liability is also anchored upon the agency principle of apparent authority or
agency by estoppel and the doctrine of corporate negligence.—But the Ramos pronouncement is not
our only basis in sustaining PSI’s liability. Its liability is also anchored upon the agency principle of
apparent authority or agency by estoppel and the doctrine of corporate negligence which have gained
acceptance in the determination of a hospital’s liability for negligent acts of health professionals. The
present case serves as a perfect platform to test the applicability of these doctrines, thus, enriching our
jurisprudence. Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the “holding out” theory, or
doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel, has its origin from the law of agency. It imposes
liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions of
a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the
authority exists. The concept is essentially one of estoppel and has been explained in this manner: “The
principal is bound by the acts of his agent with the apparent authority which he knowingly permits the
agent to assume, or which he holds the agent out to the public as possessing. The question in every case
is whether the principal has by his voluntary act placed the agent in such a situation that a person of
ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages and the nature of the particular business, is
justified in presuming that such agent has authority to perform the particular act in question.
Same; Same; Same; In cases where it can be shown that a hospital, by its actions, has held out a
particular physician as its agent and/or employee and that a patient has accepted treatment from that
physician in the reasonable belief that it is being rendered in behalf of the hospital, then the hospital will
be liable for the physician’s negligence.—The applicability of apparent authority in the field of hospital
liability was upheld long time ago in Irving v. Doctor Hospital of Lake Worth, Inc., 415 So. 2d 55 (1982).
There, it was explicitly stated that “there does not appear to be any rational basis for excluding the
concept of apparent authority from the field of hospital liability.” Thus, in cases where it can be shown
that a hospital, by its actions, has held out a particular physician as its agent and/or employee and that a
patient has accepted treatment from that physician in the reasonable belief that it is being rendered in
behalf of the hospital, then the hospital will be liable for the physician’s negligence.
Same; Same; Same; By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their qualifications,
the hospital created the impression that they were its agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical
services for its patients.—In this case, PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the
names and specializations of the physicians associated or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil
and Dr. Fuentes. We concur with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that it “is now estopped from passing
all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory leading the public
to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence.” Indeed, PSI’s act is tantamount to holding out
to the public that Medical City Hospital, through its accredited physicians, offers quality health care
services. By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly advertising their qualifications, the
hospital created the impression that they were its agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical
services for its patients. As expected, these patients, Natividad being one of them, accepted the services
on the reasonable belief that such were being rendered by the hospital or its employees, agents, or
servants.
Lampesa vs. De Vera, Jr., 545 SCRA 290, G.R. No. 155111 February 14, 2008
Quasi-Delicts; Torts; Words and Phrases; Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done, and such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict.—Article 2176 of the Civil
Code provides that whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict. Whether a person is negligent or not is a
question of fact, which we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is
limited to reviewing errors of law.
Same; Same; Employer-Employee Relationship; Presumption of Negligence; Once negligence on the part
of the employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was negli- gent in the
selection and/or supervision of said employee.—Once negligence on the part of the employee is
established, a presumption instantly arises that the employer was negligent in the selection and/or
supervision of said employee. To rebut this presumption, the employer must present adequate and
convincing proof that he exercised care and diligence in the selection and supervision of his employees.
Mercury Drug Corporation vs. Huang, 525 SCRA 427, G.R. No. 172122 June 22, 2007 (atchup laman)
Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Employer-Employee Relationships; The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code is direct or immediate—it is not conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent
employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. It is also joint and solidary with the
employee.—The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or immediate. It is
not conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent em- ployee, or a prior showing of insolvency of
such employee. It is also joint and solidary with the employee. To be relieved of liability, petitioner
Mercury Drug should show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, both in the
selection of the employee and in the supervision of the performance of his duties. Thus, in the selection
of its prospective employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience, and service records. With respect to the supervision of its employees, the employer should
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary
measures for their breach. To establish compliance with these requirements, employers must submit
concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Damages; The employee and his employer are also liable for all damages which are
the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of.—Petitioners are also
liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. The doctors who attended to respondent Stephen are one in their prognosis that his
chances of walking again and performing basic body functions are nil. For the rest of his life, he will need
continuous rehabilitation and therapy to prevent further complications such as pneumonia, bladder and
rectum infection, renal failure, sepsis and severe bed sores, osteoporosis and fractures, and other spinal
cord injury-related conditions. He will be completely dependent on the care and support of his family.
We thus affirm the award of P23,461,062.00 for the life care cost of respondent Stephen Huang, based
on his average monthly expense and the actuarial computation of the remaining years that he is
expected to live; and the conservative amount of P10,000,000.00, as reduced by the trial court, for the
loss or impairment of his earning capacity, considering his age, probable life expectancy, the state of his
health, and his mental and physical condition before the accident.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The amount of the award of moral damages bears no relation whatsoever
with the wealth or means of the offender.—“The award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration,
within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante.” Moral damages are designed to
compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly
caused a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, they must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted. The amount of the award bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of
the offender.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence; Employers should be more circumspect in the observance of due diligence in the selection
and supervision of their employees.—On the matter of exemplary damages, Art. 2231 of the Civil Code
provides that in cases of quasidelicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with
gross negligence. The records show that at the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario was driving
without a license because he was previously ticketed for reckless driving. The evidence also shows that
he failed to step on his brakes immediately after the impact. Had petitioner Del Rosario done so, the
injuries which respondent Stephen sustained could have been greatly reduced. Wanton acts such as that
committed by petitioner Del Rosario need be suppressed; and employers like petitioner Mercury Drug
should be more circumspect in the observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. The award of exemplary damages in favor of the respondents is therefore justified.
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union vs. Firme, 195 SCRA 692, G.R. No. 52179 April 8, 1991
Constitutional Law; Doctrine of State Immunity; The general rule is that the State may not be sued
except when it gives consent to be sued.—The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly
provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: “the State may not be sued without its
consent.” Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State may not be sued except when it
gives consent to be sued. Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.
Same; Same; Same; Express and Implied Consent, defined.—Express consent may be embodied in a
general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims
involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be passed to enable
a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-delict, as in Merritt v. Government of the Philippine
Islands (34 Phil 311). (see United States of America v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607, February 26, 1990, 182
SCRA 644, 654.) Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts, therey
descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus
opening itself to a counterclaim.
Same; Same; Same; Rule that the Municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its
regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions; Case at bar.—
After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that the
municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then
engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger—tragic and
deplorable though it may be—imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.
Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands., 34 Phil. 311, No. 11154 March 21, 1916 (landmark
case for the state is immune from suit)
1.DAMAGES; MEASURE OF.—Where the evidence shows that the plaintiff was wholly incapacitated for
six months it is an error to restrict the damages to a shorter period during which he was confined in the
hospital.
2.SPECIAL STATUTES; CONSENT OF THE STATE TO BE SUED; CONSTRUCTION.—The Government of the
Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the federal and state governments of the United States"
the decisions of the high courts of that country may be used in determining the scope and purpose of a
special statute.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.—The state not being liable to suit except by its express consent, an Act abrogating that
immunity will be strictly construed.
4.ID.; ID. ; ID.—An act permitting a suit against the state gives rise to no liability not previously existing
unless it is clearly expressed in the act.
5.GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; LlABILITY FOR THE NEGLIGENT ACTS OF ITS OFFICERS,
AGENTS, AND EMPLOYEES.—The Government of the Philippine Islands its only liable for the negligent
acts of its officers, agents, and employees when they are acting as special agents within. the meaning of
paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code, and a chauffeur of the General Hospital is not such a
special agent.
SECOND EXAMINATION
Vestil vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA 47, G.R. No. 74431 November 6, 1989
Damages; Possession; The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same shall be
responsible for the damage it may cause; Case at bar.—In the proceedings now before us, Purita Vestil
insists that she is not the owner of the house or of the dog left by her father as his estate has not yet
been partitioned and there are other heirs to the property. Pursuing the logic of the Uys, she claims,
even her sister living in Canada would be held responsible for the acts of the dog simply because she is
one of Miranda’s heirs. However, that is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession of
the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or
of the house. Article 2183 reads as follows: The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the
same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of
the person who has suffered damage. Thus, in Afialda v. Hisole, a person hired as caretaker of a carabao
gored him to death and his heirs thereupon sued the owner of the animal for damages. The complaint
was dismissed on the ground that it was the caretaker’s duty to prevent the carabao from causing injury
to any one, including himself.
Same; Same; Same; Art. 2183 of the Civil Code holds that the possessor liable even if the animal should
“escape or be lost”; Even removed from his control, possessor still liable.—The petitioner’s contention
that they could not be expected to exercise remote control of the dog is not acceptable. In fact, Article
2183 of the Civil Code holds the possessor liable even if the animal should “escape or be lost” and so be
removed from his control. And it does not matter either that, as the petitioners also contend, the dog
was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious
animals but covers even tame ones as long as they cause injury. As for the alleged provocation, the
petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be
faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.
Same; Same; Same; Equity; Obligation imposed by Art. 2183 of the Civil Code is based on natural equity
and principle of social interest.—According to Manresa, the obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the
Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of
the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that
he who possesses animals for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such
animal may cause.
Chapman vs. Underwood., 27 Phil. 374, No. 9010 March 28, 1914
1.MASTER AND SERVANT; NEGLIGENCE OF AUTOMOBILE DRIVER.—The owner of an automobile,
present in the vehicle, is not liable for the negligent acts of a competent driver unless such acts are
continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and
to direct the driver to desist therefrom, and to fail to do so.
2.ID.; ID.—If a competent driver of an automobile in which the owner thereof is at the time present, by a
sudden act of negligence, without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its
continuance, violates the law, the owner of the automobile is not responsible, either civilly or criminally,
therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of
time that he, by acquiescence, makes his driver's act his own.
3.ID.; ID.—Quaere. Whether the owner of an automobile would be responsible for the acts of a
competent driver, whether present or not, where the automobile causing the injury is a part of a
business enterprise and is being driven in furtherance of the owner's business at the time the injury
complained of is caused.
Caedo vs. Yu Khe That, 26 SCRA 410, No. L-20392 December 18, 1968
Civil law; Negligence; Damage; Liability of vehicle owner for his driver's negligence; Basis of master's
liability.—In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was
in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably
presumed that a driver was negligent, if he has been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic
regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months (Art. 2184, Civil Code).
Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the
vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of
due diligence. The rule is not new, although formulated as law for .the first time in the new Civil Code. It
was expressed in Chapman v. Underwood (1914), 27 Phil. 374.
The basis of the master's liability in civil law is not res-pondeat superior but rather the relationship of
paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and
susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to
prevent injury or damage.
Same; Test of imputed negligence; Article 2184, Civil Code, construed.—The test of imputed negligence
under Article 2184 of the Civil Code is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held
to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. In many cases they refrain
from driving their own cars and instead hire other persons to drive for them precisely because they are
not trained or endowed with sufficient discernment to know the rules of traffic or to appreciate the
relative dangers posed by the different situations that are continually encountered on the road. What
would be a negligent omission under the aforesaid Article on the part of a car owner who is in the prime
of age and knows how to handle a motor vehicle is not necessarily so on the part, say, of an old and
infirm person who is not similarly equipped.
The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of skill or proficiency either in
the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a motor vehicle. The
test of his negligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence
of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is
concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger
to one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require
a uniform standard of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by their
very inadequacies, have real need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed.
Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382, G.R. No. 61516 March 21, 1989
Public Corporations; Damages; Liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered
by pedestrians from defective condition of roads expressed in Article 2189 of the Civil Code; The article
requires only that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.___The
liability of public corporations for damages arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the
defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code. It is not even necessary for the defective road
or street to belong to the province, city, or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires
that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.
Same; Same; Same; The charter of Dagupan clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision and
control over the sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located.___In the case at bar, this control or
supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer. The
same charter of Dagupan also provides that the laying out, construction and improvement of streets,
avenues and alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal
Board. Thus the charter clearly indicates that the city indeed has supervision and control over the
sidewalk where the open drainage hole is located.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Liability of the city to the petitioner under Article 2189 of the Civil Code is
clear.___There is, therefore, no doubt that the City Engineer exercises control or supervision over the
public works in question. Hence, the liability of the city to the petitioner under article 2189 of the Civil
Code is clear.
Same; Same; In determining actual damages the court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guess
work as to the amount.___Be all that as it may, the actual damages awarded to the petitioner in the
amount of P10,000.00 should be reduced to the proven expenses of P8,053.65 only. The trial court
should not have rounded off the amount. In determining actual damages, the court can not rely on
“speculation, conjecture or guess work” as to the amount. Without the actual proof of loss, the award of
actual damages becomes erroneous.
Same; Same; Moral damages may be awarded even without proof of pecuniary loss in as much as the
determination of the amount is discretionary on the Court.—On the other hand, moral damages may be
awarded even without proof of pecuniary loss, inasmuch as the determination of the amount is
discretionary on the court. Though incapable of pecuniary estimation, moral damages are in the nature
of an award to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered but which for some reason can not be
proven.
Same; Same; Same; Court has time and again called attention to the reprehensible propensity of trial
judges to award damages without basis resulting in exhorbitant amounts; Amount of moral damages
should be reduced to P20,000.00.—Nevertheless the award of moral damages at P150,000.00 is
excessive. Her handicap was not permanent and disabled her only during her treatment which lasted for
one year. Though evidence of moral loss and anguish existed to warrant the award of damages, the
moderating hand of the law is called for. The Court has time and again called attention to the
reprehensible propensity of trial judges to award damages without basis, resulting in exhorbitant
amounts. Although the assessment of the amount is better left to the discretion of the trial court, under
preceding jurisprudence, the amount of moral damages should be reduced to P20,000.00.
Quezon City Government vs. Dacara, 460 SCRA 243, G.R. No. 150304 June 15, 2005
Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Torts; Negligence; Proximate Cause; Words and Phrases; Proximate cause is
determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy
and precedent.—Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have
occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined
consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Damages; Moral Damages; Requisites; To award moral damages, a court
must be satisfied with proof of the following requisites.—To award moral damages, a court must be
satisfied with proof of the following requisites: (1) an injury—whether physical, mental, or
psychological—clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) a culpable act or omission factually established; (3)
a wrongful act or omission of the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and (4) the award of damages predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 2219 (2) specifically allows moral damages to be
recovered for quasi-delicts, provided that the act or omission caused physical injuries.—Article 2219(2)
specifically allows moral damages to be recovered for quasidelicts, provided that the act or omission
caused physical injuries. There can be no recovery of moral damages unless the quasi-delict resulted in
physical injury. This rule was enunciated in Malonzo v. Galang as follows: “x x x. Besides, Article 2219
specifically mentions ‘quasi-delicts causing physical injuries,’ as an instance when moral damages may
be allowed, thereby implying that all other quasi- delicts not resulting in physical injuries are excluded,
excepting of course, the special torts referred to in Art. 309 (par. 9, Art. 2219) and in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 32, 34 and 35 on the chapter on human relations (par. 10, Art. 2219).”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Intended for the restoration of the psychological or emotional
status quo ante, the award of moral damages is designed to compensate emotional injury suffered, not
to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.—Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to
compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly
inflicted on a person. Intended for the restoration of the psychological or emotional status quo ante, the
award of moral damages is designed to compensate emotional injury suffered, not to impose a penalty
on the wrongdoer. For the court to arrive upon a judicious approximation of emotional or moral injury,
competent and substantial proof of the suffering experienced must be laid before it. Essential to this
approximation are definite findings as to what the supposed moral damages suffered consisted of;
otherwise, such damages would become a penalty rather than a compensation for actual injury suffered.
Furthermore, well-settled is the rule that moral damages cannot be awarded—whether in a civil or a
criminal case—in the absence of proof of physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or similar injury. The award
of moral damages must be solidly anchored on a definite showing that respondent actually experienced
emotional and mental sufferings. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear
and convincing proof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; Article 2231 of the Civil Code mandates that in
cases of quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be recovered if the defendant acted with gross
negligence. Gross negligence means such utter want of care as to raise a presumption that the persons
at fault must have been conscious of the probable consequences of their carelessness, and that they
must have nevertheless been indifferent (or worse) to the danger of injury to the person or property of
others. The negligence must amount to a reckless disregard for the safety of persons or property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The award of exemplary damages is meant to be a deterrent to
socially deleterious actions.—Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good. The award of these damages is meant to
be a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. Public policy requires such imposition to suppress wanton
acts of an offender. It must be emphasized that local governments and their employees should be
responsible not only for the maintenance of roads and streets, but also for the safety of the public. Thus,
they must secure construction areas with adequate precautionary measures. Not only is the work of
petitioners impressed with public interest; their very existence is justified only by public service. Hence,
local governments have the paramount responsibility of keeping the interests of the public foremost in
their agenda. For these reasons, it is most disturbing to note that the present petitioners are the very
parties responsible for endangering the public through such a rash and reckless act.
Jimenez vs. City of Manila, 150 SCRA 510, No. L-71049 May 29, 1987
Civil Law; Civil liability of Provinces, Cities and Municipalities for quasi-delict; Article 1, Sec. 4, RA No. 409
(Revised Charter of Manila) refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object,
while Article 2189 of the Civil Code governs liability due to "defective streets, public buildings and other
public works" in particular.—This issue has been laid to rest in the case of City of Manila v. Teotico (22
SCRA 269-272 [1968]) where the Supreme Court squarely ruled that Republic Act No. 409 establishes a
general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for "damages or injury to persons or property
arising from the failure of city officers" to enforce the provisions of said Act, "or any other law or
ordinance or from negligence" of the City "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities x x x liable
for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason"—specifically—"of the
defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision." In other words, Art. 1, sec. 4, R.A. No. 409 refers to liability arising from
negligence, in general, regardless of the object, thereof, while Article 2189 of the Civil Code governs
liability due to "defective streets, public buildings and other public works" in particular and is therefore
decisive on this specific case.
Same; Same; Same; For liability under Article 2189 of the Civil Code to attach, control or supervision by
the province, city or municipality over the public building in question is enough; Case at bar.—In the
same suit, the Supreme Court clarified further that under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not
necessary for the liability therein established to attach, that the defective public works belong to the
province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the
province, city or municipality has either "control or supervision" over the public building in question. In
the case at bar, there is no question that the Sta. Ana Public Market, despite the Management and
Operating Contract between respondent City and Asiatic Integrated Corporation remained under the
control of the former. The fact of supervision and control of the City over subject public market was
admitted by Mayor Ramon Bagatsing in his letter to Secretary of Finance Cesar Virata. In fact, the City of
Manila employed a market master for the Sta. Ana Public Market whose primary duty is-to take direct
supervision and control of that particular market, more specifically, to check the safety of the place for
the public.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Respondent City of Manila failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of
a family which is a defense in quasi-delict.—As a defense against liability on the basis of a quasidelict,
one must have exercised the diligence of a good father of a family. (Art. 1173 of the Civil Code). There is
no argument that it is the duty of the City of Manila to exercise reasonable care to keep the public
market reasonably safe for people frequenting the place for their marketing needs. While it may be
conceded that the fulfillment of such duties is extremely difficult during storms and floods, it must
however, be admitted that ordinary precautions could have been taken during good weather to
minimize the dangers to life and limb under those difficult circumstances. For instance,. the drainage
hole could have been placed under the stalls instead of on the passage ways. Even more important is
the fact, that the City should have seen to it that the openings were covered. Sadly, the evidence
indicates that long before petitioner fell into the opening, it was already uncovered, and five (5) months
after the incident happened, the opening was still uncovered. (Rollo, pp. 57; 69). Moreover, while there
are findings that during floods the vendors remove the iron grills to hasten the flow of water (Decision,
AC-G.R. CV No. 01387, Rollo, p. 17), there is no showing that such practice has ever been prohibited,
much less penalized by the City of Manila. Neither was it shown that any sign had been placed
thereabouts to warn passers-by of the impending danger.
Nakpil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 334, No.L-47851, No. L47863, No.L-47896 April 15, 1988
Civil Law; Obligations and Contracts; Damages; PBA building did not collapse after the 1968 earthquake
but further damage caused to the property resulted in its eventual collapse or demolition after the 1970
earthquake; Needed demolition is a form of “collapse”; The Nakpils and the United Construction are
liable for damages.—The bone of contention is therefore, not on the fact of collapse but on who should
shoulder the damages resulting from the partial and eventual collapse. As ruled by this Court in said
decision, there should be no question that the NAKPILS and UNITED are liable for the damage.
Same; Same; Same; Charging the building owner with full time supervision of the construction of the
building has no basis as the services of architects and engineers can provide effective supervision of the
construction.—UNlTED argues that it is the legal duty of PBA to provide full-time and active supervision
in the construction of subject building. Failing to cite any provision of law to support its arguments,
UNITED insists on the inherent legal duty of the owner, reinforced by practice, usage and custom, to
exercise such supervision. Apart from the fact that UNITE D seems to have completely contradicted its
own view that this construction involves highly technical matters and therefore beyond the ambit of
ordinary understanding and experience, the contrary appears to be more in accord with ordinary
practice, which is to avail oneself of the services of architects and engineers whose training and
expertise make them more qualified to provide effective supervision of the construction. In fact, it was
on the suggestion of Juan F. Nakpil, one of the petitioners herein, that the construction was undertaken
on an administration basis (Decision, p. 3). Thus, the trial court did not err in holding that charging the
owner with full time supervision of the construction has no legal or contractual basis (Decision, p. 7).
Same; Same; Same; Bad faith; Vtanton negligence of both defendant and third party defendants in
effecting the plans, designs, specifications and construction of the PBA building is equivalent to bad faith
in the performance of their respective tasks.—A careful study of the decision will show that there is no
contradiction between the above finding of negligence by the trial court which was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and the ruling of this Court. On the contrary, on the basis of such finding, it was held
that such wanton negligence of both the defendant and the third-party defendants in effecting the plans,
designs, specifications, and construction of the PBA building is equivalent to bad faith in the
performance of their respective tasks (Decision, p. 28).
Same; Sarne; Same; Five-fold increase in the award of damages, justified because the actual cost of total
reconstruction of the building was not considered by the commissioners and is a very conservative
estimate arrived at almost 20 years later.—It will be recalled that the estimate of the Commissioner was
limited to Pl ,100,000.00 for costs of repairs after the partial collapse of the building on April 2,1968 but
not after its total collapse resulting from the subsequent earthquakes. It is therefore evident that the
actual cost of total reconstruction of the building in question was not considered by the commissioner in
the computation. Considering further the present cost of reconstruction, the new amount (arrived at
almost 20 years later) is far from being excessive. It is indeed a very conservative estimate.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The unrealized rental income awarded to the building owner should be
computed on a continuing basis; Indemnity in favor of the owner, proper, as it was to cover all damages
was occasioned by the loss of the building.—ln addition, there is merit in the PBA claim that the
unrealized rental income awarded to it should not be limited to a period of one-half year but should be
computed on a continuing basis at the rate of Pl 78,671.76 a year until judgment for the principal
amount shall have been satisfied. Thus, this Court awarded an “indemnity in favor of the Philippine Bar
Association of FIVE MILLION (P5,000,000.00) Pesos to cover all damages (with the exception of
attorney’s fees) occasioned by the loss of the building (including interest charges and lost rentals) x x x.”
Same; Same; Same; Attorney’s fees; An award of 10% of the total recovery for attorney’s fees is
reasonable.—As for the award of attorney’s fees, there is no question that the size of attorney’s fees as
well as the amount of damages, is subject to the sound discretion of the court (Magbanua v. IAC, 137
SCRA 332 [1985]). Earlier this Court has ruled that an award of 10% of the amount of total recovery, for
attorney’s fees, is reasonable. (Central Bank of the Phil. v. Court of Appeals, 63 SCRA 435 [1975]).
Same; Same; Same; Interest; Delay in the payment of the final judgment will cause the imposition of
interest; Rate of interest is imposed on the total sum or as part of the judgment for damages.— There
should be no dispute that the imposition of 12% interest pursuant to Central Bank Circular No. 416
(passed pursuant to the authority granted to the Central Bank by P.D. No. 116 which amended Act No.
2655, otherwise known as the Usury Law) is applicable only in the following: (1) loans; (2) forbearance of
any money, goods or credit; and (3) rate allowed in judgments (judgments spoken of refer to judgments
involving loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits. (Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. v, Cruz,
143 SCRA 160–161 [1986]; Reormina v. Tomoi, Jr., 139 SCRA 260 [1985]). It is true that in the instant
case, there is neither a loan or a forbearance, but then no interest is actually being imposed provided
the sums referred to in the judgment are paid upon the finality of the judgment. It is delay in the
payment of such final judgment, that will cause the imposition of the interest. It will be noted that in the
cases already adverted to, the rate of interest is imposed on the total sum, from the filing of the
complaint until paid; in other words, as part of the judgment for damages. Clearly they are not
applicable to the instant case.
Candano Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Sugata-on, 518 SCRA 221, G.R. No. 163212 March 13, 2007
Labor Law; Employee’s Compensation; The employees may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation
Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will
exclude the other and that the acceptance of the compensation under the remedy chosen will exclude
the other remedy.—In its Petition, Candano Shipping argues that the application of the measure
stipulated under Article 194 of the Labor Code is erroneous since it applies only to death compensation
to be paid by the Social Security System to the beneficiaries of a deceased member, to which
proposition Florentina concedes. We agree. The remedy availed by Sugataon in filing the claim under
the New Civil Code has been validly recognized by the prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. In the
case of Floresca v. Philex Mining Company, 136 SCRA 141 (1985), we declared that the employees may
invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the
consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and that the acceptance of the
compensation under the remedy chosen will exclude the other remedy. The exception is where the
claimant who had already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for
damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he
opted for the first remedy.
Same; Same; An employee cannot pursue both remedies simultaneously but has the option to proceed
by interposing one remedy and waiving his right over the other.—Stated differently, save for the
recognized exception, an employee cannot pursue both remedies simultaneously but has the option to
proceed by interposing one remedy and waiving his right over the other. As we have explained in
Floresca, this doctrinal rule is rooted on the theory that the basis of the compensation under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act is separate and distinct from the award of damages under the Civil Code,
thus: The rationale in awarding compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act differs from that
in giving damages under the Civil Code. The compensation acts are based on a theory of compensation
distinct from the existing theories of damages, payments under the acts being made as compensation
and not as damages (99 C.J.S. 53). Compensation is given to mitigate harshness and insecurity of
industrial life for the workman and his family. Hence, an employer is liable whether negligence exists or
not since liability is created by law. Recovery under the Act is not based on any theory of actionable
wrong on the part of the employer (99 D.J.S. 36). In other words, under compensation acts, the
employer is liable to pay compensation benefits for loss of income, as long as the death, sickness or
injury is work-connected or work-aggravated, even if the death or injury is not due to the fault of the
employer (Murillo v. Mendoza, 66 Phil. 689). On the other hand, damages are awarded to one as a
vindication of the wrongful invasion of his rights. It is the indemnity recoverable by a person who has
sustained injury either in his person, property or relative rights, through the act or default of another (25
C.J.S. 452).
Same; Same; Life Expectancy Formula; When the employee died or was injured in the occasion of
employment, the obligation of the employer for indemnity automatically attaches, which indemnity may
partake of the form of actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages, as the case
may be depending on the factual milieu of the case and considering the criterion for the award of these
damages.—The employer shall be liable for the death or personal injury of its employees in the course
of employment as sanctioned by Article 1711 of the New Civil Code. The liability of the employer for
death or personal injury of his employees arose from the contract of employment entered into between
the employer and his employee which is likewise imbued with public interest. Accordingly, when the
employee died or was injured in the occasion of employment, the obligation of the employer for
indemnity, automatically attaches. The indemnity may partake of the form of actual, moral, nominal,
temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages, as the case may be depending on the factual milieu of the
case and considering the criterion for the award of these damages as outlined by our jurisprudence. In
the case at bar, only the award of actual damages, specifically the award for unearned income is
warranted by the circumstances since it has been duly proven that the cause of death of Melquiades is a
fortuitous event for which Candano Shipping cannot be faulted. The formula for the computation of
unearned income is: Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x (gross annual income reasonable and
necessary living expenses). Life expectancy is determined in accordance with the formula: 2 / 3 x [80 –
age of deceased at the time of death]
Same; Same; Same; The formula for life expectancy has been repeatedly adopted in our jurisprudence in
fixing the amount of indemnity for the death of a party; In several cases, the Supreme Court reduced the
life expectancy multiplier considering the medical history such as when the deceased previously
underwent a major surgery or when it was shown that he was treated for chest pains, backache or
occasional feeling of tiredness and the fact that the deceased has been consistently engaged in a
dangerous and risky activity tending to shorten his life.—The argument raised by Candano Shipping that
the formula for determining the life expectancy under Villa Rey cannot be automatically applied without
proof of the basis for the expected length of life of a Filipino does not merit our consideration. The
formula for life expectancy has been repeatedly adopted in our jurisprudence in fixing the amount of
indemnity for the death of a party. This was adopted from the American Expectancy Table of Mortality
or the Actuarial of Combined Experience Table of Mortality which was used by insurers in determining
the capital sum to be charged for annuity. Admittedly, in several cases, this Court reduced the life
expectancy multiplier considering the medical history such as when the deceased previously underwent
a major surgery or when it was shown that he was treated for chest pains, backache or occasional
feeling of tiredness and the fact that the deceased has been consistently engaged in a dangerous and
risky activity tending to shorten his life. Failing to prove, however, that any of these circumstances is
attendant in the case at bar, Candano Shipping cannot validly assert that the standard life expectancy
factor laid down in Villa Rey cannot be applied in this case.
Alarcon vs. Alarcon, 2 SCRA 473, No. L-15692 May 31, 1961
Workmen’s Compensation; Death of casual laborer in the course of employment; Article 1711 refers to
persons engaged in business or industry.—Under the principle of ejusdem generis, the “other
employers” mentioned in Article 1711 of the Civil Code must be construed to refer to persons who
belong to a class analogous to “Owners of enterprises”, such as those operating a business or engaged in
particular industry or trade, requiring its managers to contract the services of laborers, workers and/or
employees. Moreover, said Article 1711 is a part of Section 2, Chapter 3, Title VII of the Civil Code, and
the terms “capital”, “management”, “industrialist”, “manager” and “owners of enterprises”, used to
describe the employers alluded to in said section 2, indicate that they contemplate those engaged more
or less in business or industry.
Same; Same; Article 1711 to be interpreted in relation to the Workmen’s Compensation Act.—Article
1711 of the Civil Code merely states the philosophy underlying the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act
No. 3428) and must be interpreted in relation thereto, for Article 2196 of the same Code provides that
“compensation for workmen and other employees in case of death, injury or illness is regulated by
special laws”. Pursuant to Section 39(b) of the Said Act, the term “laborer” does not include a person
whose employment is purely casual and is not for the purposes of the occupation or business of the
employer.
Same; Same; Deceased not covered by the Act.—Where the employment of the deceased was “purely
casual”, and was not “for the purposes of the occupation or business” of the person employing him, he
is not covered by the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, although he died in the course of
his employment due to an accidental cause or fortuitous event. Neither may the benefits or the
Employer’s Liability Act (Act No. 1874) be availed of where it is not claimed that the death was due to “a
defect in the condition of the ways, works or machinery connected with or used in the business of the
employer”, or to “the negligence of a person in the service of the employer”. Hence, there is no means
by which the person who employed him may be held liable for the laborer’s death.
Gilchrist vs. Cuddy., 29 Phil. 542, No. 9356 February 18, 1915
1.DAMAGES; INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTS BY STRANGERS.—The interference with lawful contracts
by strangers thereto gives rise to an action for damages in favor of the injured person. The law does not
require that the responsible person shall have known the identity of the injured person.
2.INJUNCTION; WHEN IT ISSUES; GENERAL DOCTRINE.—The general doctrine as to when injunction
issues, as stated in Devesa vs. Arbes (13 Phil. Rep., 273), affirmed.
3.ID.; INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTS BY STRANGERS.—The interference with lawful contracts by
strangers thereto does not of itself give the injured person a remedy by injunction.
4.ID.; WHEN INJUNCTION ISSUES.—Courts usually grant an injunction where the profits of the injured
person are derived from his contractual relations with a large and indefinite number of individuals, thus
reducing him to the necessity of proving in an action against the tort feasor that the latter is responsible
in each case for the broken contract, or else obliging him to institute individual suits against each
contracting party, and so exposing him to a multiplicity of suits.
5.ID.; ID.; FACTS OF THIS CASE.—The defendants induced the owner of a cinematograph film to break his
contract of lease with a theater owner and lease the film to them, with the avowed purpose of
exhibiting it in another theater in the same city. As the profits of the lessee depended upon the
patronage of the public and hence the task of estimating his damages with accuracy would be quite
difficult if not impossible: Held, That injunction against further interference with the contract was
properly issued.
So Ping Bun vs. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 751, G.R. No. 120554 September 21, 1999
Torts and Damages; Quasi-Delicts; Actions; Damages; Words and Phrases; Damage is the loss, hurt, or
harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of
another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other has property rights and
privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the invasion is substantial, (c) the
defendant’s conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the invasion is either intentional and
unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Elements of Tort Interference.—The elements of tort interference are: (1)
existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract;
and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the property of
others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person
of the enjoyment by the other of his private property.—A duty which the law of torts is concerned with
is respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an
unlawful interference by one person of the enjoyment by the other of his private property. This may
pertain to a situation where a third person induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under
a contract. In the case before us, petitioner’s Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease
contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latter’s property
right. Clearly, and as correctly viewed by the appellate court, the three elements of tort interference
above-mentioned are present in the instant case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Contracts; Where there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and
the impulse behind one’s conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a
party cannot be a malicious interferer.—As early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, we held that where there was no
malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one’s conduct lies in a proper business
interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged
interferer is financially interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that he is
an officious or malicious intermeddler.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While lack of malice precludes damages, it does not relieve the
interferer of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones.—While we
do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude into existing contracts at
the expense of others, however, we find that the conduct herein complained of did not transcend the
limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. The business desire is
there to make some gain to the detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice, however, precludes
damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing
breach of existing ones. The respondent appellate court correctly confirmed the permanent injunction
and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding
damages. The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioner’s
interference.
Damages; Attorney’s Fees; In connection with attorney’s fees, the award should be commensurate to
the benefits that would have been derived from a favorable judgment.—The recovery of attorney’s fees
in the concept of actual or compensatory damages, is allowed under the circumstances provided for in
Article 2208 of the Civil Code. One such occasion is when the defendant’s act or omission has compelled
the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. But we have
consistently held that the award of considerable damages should have clear factual and legal bases. In
connection with attorney’s fees, the award should be commensurate to the benefits that would have
been derived from a favorable judgment. Settled is the rule that fairness of the award of damages by the
trial court calls for appellate review such that the award if far too excessive can be reduced. This ruling
applies with equal force on the award of attorney’s fees. In a long line of cases we said, “It is not sound
policy to place a penalty on the right to litigate. To compel the defeated party to pay the fees of counsel
for his successful opponent would throw wide open the door of temptation to the opposing party and
his counsel to swell the fees to undue proportions.”
Lagon vs. Court of Appeals, 453 SCRA 616, G.R. No. 119107 March 18, 2005
Actions; Contracts; Torts; Tortuous Interference with Contractual Relations; The tort recognized in
Article 1314 of the Civil Code is known as interference with contractual relations.—Article 1314 of the
Civil Code provides that any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party. The tort recognized in that provision is known as interference
with contractual relations. The interference is penalized because it violates the property rights of a party
in a contract to reap the benefits that should result therefrom.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Elements.—The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals, laid
down the elements of tortuous interference with contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid contract;
(b) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the contract and (c) interference of the
third person without legal justification or excuse. In that case, petitioner So Ping Bun occupied the
premises which the corporation of his grandfather was leasing from private respondent, without the
knowledge and permission of the corporation. The corporation, prevented from using the premises for
its business, sued So Ping Bun for tortuous interference.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Notarial Law; Evidence; Settled is the rule that until overcome by clear, strong
and convincing evidence, a notarized document continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that
gave rise to its execution and delivery.—As regards the first element, the existence of a valid contract
must be duly established. To prove this, private respondent presented in court a notarized copy of the
purported lease renewal. While the contract appeared as duly notarized, the notarization thereof,
however, only proved its due execution and delivery but not the veracity of its contents. Nonetheless,
after undergoing the rigid scrutiny of petitioner’s counsel and after the trial court declared it to be valid
and subsisting, the notarized copy of the lease contract presented in court appeared to be incontestable
proof that private respondent and the late Bai Tonina Sepi actually renewed their lease contract. Settled
is the rule that until overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, a notarized document
continues to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to its execution and delivery.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Knowledge on the part of the interferer of the subsistence of the contract is
an essential element to state a cause of action for tortuous interference.—The second element, on the
other hand, requires that there be knowledge on the part of the interferer that the contract exists.
Knowledge of the subsistence of the contract is an essential element to state a cause of action for
tortuous interference. A defendant in such a case cannot be made liable for interfering with a contract
he is unaware of. While it is not necessary to prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be aware of
the facts which, if followed by a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete disclosure of the contractual
relations and rights of the parties in the contract.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted
with malice or must have been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff—in other words,
his act of interference cannot be justified.—Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the
contract, such knowledge alone was not sufficient to make him liable for tortuous interference. Which
brings us to the third element. According to our ruling in So Ping Bun, petitioner may be held liable only
when there was no legal justification or excuse for his action or when his conduct was stirred by a
wrongful motive. To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with
malice or must have been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff. In other words, his act
of interference cannot be justified.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The word “induce” refers to situations where a person
causes another to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation.—The records do not
support the allegation of private respondent that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell
the property to him. The word “induce” refers to situations where a person causes another to choose
one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. The records show that the decision of the heirs of
the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property was completely of their own volition and that petitioner did
absolutely nothing to influence their judgment. Private respondent himself did not proffer any evidence
to support his claim. In short, even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the renewal of
his lease contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on
the part of petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was
never established.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A financial or profit motivation will not necessarily make a person an officious
interferer liable for damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith involved.—In our view,
petitioner’s purchase of the subject property was merely an advancement of his financial or economic
interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by improper motives. In the very early case of Gilchrist
v. Cuddy, the Court declared that a person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct is impelled by a
proper business interest. In other words, a financial or profit motivation will not necessarily make a
person an officious interferer liable for damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith involved.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act
which does not amount to legal injury or wrong—damnum absque injuria; “Injury” is the legal invasion
of a legal right while “damage” is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury.—This case is one
of damnum absque injuria or damage without injury. “Injury” is the legal invasion of a legal right while
“damage” is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury. In BPI Express Card Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, the Court turned down the claim for damages of a cardholder whose credit card had
been cancelled by petitioner corporation after several defaults in payment. We held there that there can
be damage without injury where the loss or harm is not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In that
instance, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone since the law affords no remedy
for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to legal injury or wrong. Indeed, lack of
malice in the conduct complained of precludes recovery of damages.
MHP Garments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 227, G.R. No. 86720 September 2, 1994
Same; Same; Same; Damages; Where a warrantless search and seizure is conducted despite the fact that
there is sufficient time to apply for a judicial warrant, the persons who participate therein take the risk
of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right against unreasonable
search and seizure.—We hold that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of
private respon-dents’ goods. Petitioner corporation received information that private respondents were
illegally selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia in October 1983. The specific date and time are not
established in the evidence adduced by the parties. Petitioner de Guzman then made a surveillance of
the stores of private respondents. They reported to the Philippine Constabulary and on October 25,
1983, the raid was made on the stores of private respondents and the supposed illicit goods were seized.
The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of private
respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a
judicial warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of
private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be
proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Private persons who instigate an illegal warrantless search and seizure may
be held liable for damages.—Petitioners would deflect their liability with the argument that it was the
Philippine Constabulary that conducted the raid and their participation was only to report the alleged
illegal activity of private respondents. While undoubtedly, the members of the PC raiding team should
have been included in the complaint for violation of the private respondents’ constitutional rights, still,
the omission will not exculpate petitioners. In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, we ruled for the
recovery of damages for violation of constitutional rights and liberties from public officer or private
individual.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Private persons who initiate an illegal warrantless search and seizure,
accompany the raiding team and stand by during the operation, apparently assenting thereto, are liable
for damages to the same extent as the public officers themselves.—Applying the aforecited provisions
and leading cases, the respondent court correctly granted damages to private respondents. Petitioners
were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against unreasonable search
and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement
to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. The raid was conducted
with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a finger to stop the seizure
of the boy and girl scouts items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was liable to the
same extent as the officers themselves. So with the petitioner corporation which even received for
safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to
surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.
Damages; Moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for
the injuries he may have suffered.—We have consistently ruled that moral damages are not awarded to
penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the injuries he may have suffered.
Conformably with our ruling in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, op. cit., moral damages can be awarded in the
case at bench. There can be no doubt that petitioners must have suffered sleepless nights, serious
anxiety, and wounded feelings due to the tortious raid caused by petitioners. Private respondents’
avowals of embarrassment and humiliation during the seizure of their merchandise were supported by
their testimonies.
Same; The award of exemplary damages for the wantonness of the wrongful seizure also serves as a
stern reminder to all and sundry that the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and
seizure is a virile reality and not a mere burst of rhetoric.—Needless to state, the wantonness of the
wrongful seizure justifies the award of exemplary damages. It will also serve as a stern reminder to all
and sundry that the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is a virile reality
and not a mere burst of rhetoric. The all encompassing protection extends against intrusions directly
done both by government and indirectly by private entities.
Silahis International Hotel, Inc. vs. Soluta, 482 SCRA 660, G.R. No. 163087 February 20, 2006
Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only
public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in Article 32 of
the Civil Code.—As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in one’s person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable search and seizures, occupy a lofty position in every civilized and
democratic community and not infrequently susceptible to abuse, their violation, whether constituting a
penal offense or not, must be guarded against. The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold
not only public officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of rights enumerated in
Article 32 of the Civil Code. That is why it is not even necessary that the defendant under this Article
should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose, which is the
effective protection of individual rights. It suffices that there is a violation of the constitutional right of
the plaintiff.
Same; Same; A violation of one’s constitutional right against illegal search and seizure can be the basis
for the recovery of damages under Article 32 in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the New Civil
Code.—That a violation of one’s constitutional right against illegal search and seizure can be the basis
for the recovery of damages under Article 32 in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the New Civil Code,
there is no doubt. Since the complaint filed before the trial court was for damages due to malicious
prosecution and violation of constitutional right against illegal search and seizure, the award by the trial
court of actual damages to respondent union was correctly set aside by the appellate court.
Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, 525 SCRA 11, G.R. No. 141309 June 19, 2007
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Damages; The general rule is that a public officer is not liable for
damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within
the scope of his assigned tasks; However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer
protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.— The general rule is that a public officer is not
liable for damages which a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and
within the scope of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs
of the office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it
would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary
claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her
personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no
longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.
Same; Same; Same; A public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another,
may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted
with malice or bad faith; Instances Where a Public Officer May Be Validly Sued in His/Her Private
Capacity for Acts Done in the Course of the Performance of the Functions of the Office.—In addition, the
Court held in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 602 (1999), that a public officer who directly
or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of another, may be validly sued for damages under Article
32 of the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith. Thus, the rule in this
jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the
course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with malice,
bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Same; Same; Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil
liability of superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of their duties;
while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of government officials, the subject thereof is
general, i.e., “acts” done in the performance of official duties, without specifying the action or omission
that may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned.— On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39,
Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil liability of superior and subordinate
public officers for acts done in the performance of their duties. For both superior and subordinate public
officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital elements that will make them liable
for damages. Note that while said provisions deal in particular with the liability of government officials,
the subject thereof is general, i.e.,“acts” done in the performance of official duties, without specifying
the action or omission that may give rise to a civil suit against the official concerned.
Same; Same; Article 32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional
rights by public officers.— Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms
a particular specie of an “act” that may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and
that is, a tort for impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals
specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public officers. All other actionable acts of public
officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code. While the Civil Code, specifically,
the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same Chapter is a special and specific
provision that holds a public officer liable for and allows redress from a particular class of wrongful acts
that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of the Administrative Code,
which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the performance of duties, Article 32 of the
Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied in the instant case precisely filed to seek
damages for violation of constitutional rights.
Remedial Law; Cause of Action; Considering that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action
based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will not amount to failure
to state a cause of action.—The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil
Code. Considering that bad faith and malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the
Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege the same will not amount to failure to state a cause of action.
The courts below therefore correctly denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers a violation of a constitutional right of the
plaintiff.
Vinzona-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, 575 SCRA 23, G.R. No. 141309 December 23, 2008
Administrative Law; Public Officers; Two Kinds of duties exercised by public officers: the “duty owing to
the public collectively” (the body politic), and the “duty owing to particular individuals.”—There are two
kinds of duties exercised by public officers: the “duty owing to the public collectively” (the body politic),
and the “duty owing to particular individuals.”
Same; Same; In determining whether a public officer is liable for an improper performance or nonperformance of a duty, it must first be determined which of the two classes of duties is involved.—In
determining whether a public officer is liable for an improper performance or non-performance of a
duty, it must first be determined which of the two classes of duties is involved. For, indeed, as the
eminent Floyd R. Mechem instructs, “[t]he liability of a public officer to an individual or the public is
based upon and is co-extensive with his duty to the individual or the public. If to the one or the other he
owes no duty, to that one he can incur no liability.” Stated differently, when what is involved is a “duty
owing to the public in general,” an individual cannot have a cause of action for damages against the
public officer, even though he may have been injured by the action or inaction of the officer. In such a
case, there is damage to the individual but no wrong to him. In performing or failing to perform a public
duty, the officer has touched his interest to his prejudice; but the officer owes no duty to him as an
individual. The remedy in this case is not judicial but political.
Same; Same; Exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers a particular or special
injury on account of the public officer’s improper performance or non-performance of his public duty.—
The exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers a particular or special injury on
account of the public officer’s improper performance or non-performance of his public duty. An
individual can never be suffered to sue for an injury which, technically, is one to the public only; he must
show a wrong which he specially suffers, and damage alone does not constitute a wrong. A contrary
precept (that an individual, in the absence of a special and peculiar injury, can still institute an action
against a public officer on account of an improper performance or non-performance of a duty owing to
the public generally) will lead to a deluge of suits, for if one man might have an action, all men might
have the like—the complaining individual has no better right than anybody else. If such were the case,
no one will serve a public office. Thus, the rule restated is that an individual cannot have a particular
action against a public officer without a particular injury, or a particular right, which are the grounds
upon which all actions are founded.
Same; Same; A public officer, such as the petitioner, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-making power,
owes a duty to the public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of valid
administrative regulations.—What is involved is a public officer’s duty owing to the public in general.
The petitioner, as the then Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, is being taken to task for
Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 37-93 which she issued without the requisite notice, hearing
and publication, and which, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 236
(1996), we declared as having “fallen short of a valid and effective administrative issuance.” A public
officer, such as the petitioner, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes a duty to the
public to promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of valid administrative
regulations. But it is a duty owed not to the respondent alone, but to the entire body politic who would
be affected, directly or indirectly, by the administrative rule.
Same; Damages; To have a cause of action for damages against the petitioner, respondent must allege
that it suffered a particular or special injury on account of the non-performance by petitioner of the
public duty. A careful reading of the complaint filed with the trial court reveals that no particular injury
is alleged to have been sustained by the respondent. The phrase “financial and business difficulties”
mentioned in the complaint is a vague notion, ambiguous in concept, and cannot translate into a
“particular injury.” In contrast, the facts of the case eloquently demonstrate that the petitioner took
nothing from the respondent, as the latter did not pay a single centavo on the tax assessment levied by
the former by virtue of RMC 37-93.
Same; Same; With no “particular injury” alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no delict or
wrongful act or omission attributable to the petitioner that would violate the primary rights of the
respondent; Elements of a cause of action.—With no “particular injury” alleged in the complaint, there
is, therefore, no delict or wrongful act or omission attributable to the petitioner that would violate the
primary rights of the respondent. Without such delict or tortious act or omission, the complaint then
fails to state a cause of action, because a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates
a right of another. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of
the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the
part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of
defendant to plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
Damages; Under Article 32 of the Civil Code, the liability of the public officer may accrue even if he/she
acted in good faith, as long as there is a violation of constitutional rights.—The June 19, 2007 Decision
and the dissent herein reiterates that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, the liability of the public officer
may accrue even if he/she acted in good faith, as long as there is a violation of constitutional rights,
citing Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 602 (1999), where we said: Under the aforecited
article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough
that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioners, even on the pretext of justifiable
motives or good faith in the performance of duties.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Dissenting Opinion:
Civil Law; Damages; As long as there was a violation of constitutional rights, a public officer may be held
liable for damages, and it is not even required that he/she acted with malice or bad faith.—
Jurisprudence is settled that to be liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code, a public officer or a private
individual must have an act in violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights regardless of whether
he/she acted in good faith or whether the act was done within or beyond the bounds of authority of
said public officer. The act may have been committed in any manner; what is pivotal is that the act
resulted in a violation of another person’s constitutional rights. No distinction was made whether the
public officer acted within or beyond the scope of authority in order to hold him/her liable. As long as
there was a violation of constitutional rights, a public officer may be held liable for damages, and it is
not even required that he/she acted with malice or bad faith. That the Legislature did not intend to hold
the public officer liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code for violation of constitutional
rights only if he/she acted beyond the scope of authority, is further made clear by the fact that under
Article 32, a private individual is similarly held accountable.
Madeja vs. Caro, 126 SCRA 293, No. L-51183 December 21, 1983
Civil Law; Damages; Article 33 of the Civil Code; Civil action allowed to be instituted is ex-delicto.—The
civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex delicto, This is manifest from the provision
which uses the expressions ''criminal action" and "criminal prosecution."
Same; Same; Same; Physical injuries, scope of.—The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It
is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical
injuries but consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.
Same; Same; Same; Corpus vs. Paje (28 SCRA 1062) holding that reckless imprudence or criminal
negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code, not authoritative; Reason.—Corpus vs. Paje,
L26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not
included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the
decision and four of them merely concurred in the result.
Same; Same; Same; Civil action for damages may proceed independently of the criminal action for
homicide through reckless imprudence.—ln the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action
against Dr. Japzon may proceed independently of the criminal action against her.
Aquino, J., concurring:
Civil Law; Damages; Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict or may create a civil
action or an action based on culpa aquiliana.—Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or
quasidelict. It may create a civil action based on article 100 of the Penal Code or an action based on
culpa aquiliana under article 2176 of the Civil Code. These alternatives are assumed in article 2177 of
the Civil Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the defendant"
(Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil 607 and Sudario vs. Acro Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil. 1. See Formento vs. CA,
L26442, August 29,1969, 29 SCRA 437).
Same; Same; Physical injuries under Article 33 of the Civil Code, scope of.—The term "physical injuries"
in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give rise to an independent civil action (Dyogi vs.
Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).
Arafiles vs. Philippine Journalists, Inc., 426 SCRA 336, G.R. No. 150256 March 25, 2004
Libel; A civil action for libel under Article 33 shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and
proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely independent of the institution,
pendency or result of the criminal action.—Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of
damages that is entirely unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for libel under
this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of
evidence separately from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal
action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code
governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom.
Same; In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous
material must be examined and viewed as a whole.—In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that
the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole.
Heirs of Eduardo Simon vs. Chan, 644 SCRA 13, G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011
Criminal Procedure; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; Civil Liability; Civil liability to the offended party cannot be
denied; the payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless
check was issued.—The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22 can
give rise to civil liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr., 156 SCRA 325 (1987), holding: x x x Civil liability to
the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of
money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to
recompense.
Same; Same; Same; There is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check issued
in contravention of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action; No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.—There is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing
check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective
December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides: x x x (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such
civil action separately shall be allowed.
Same; Same; Same; It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate
any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable; The
reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws;
except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require a lesser
quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the offenses.—
The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil
Case No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that the retroactive
application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected,
nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, or arise from, procedural laws. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending
at the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of
procedure, except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require
a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the commission of the
offenses, because such retroactivity would be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the
Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Although the court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in
two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the procedures for
the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and noninterchangeable.—The CA’s reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association v. Velez, 371 SCRA 72 (2001),
to give due course to the civil action of Chan independently and separately of Criminal Case No. 275381
was unwarranted. DMPI Employees, which involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours with this
case, which is a prosecution for a violation of BP 22. Although the Court has ruled that the issuance of a
bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22, the
procedures for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and
non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended party may opt to reserve his right to file a
separate civil action, or may institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the
Civil Code, as DMPI Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of violations of BP 22, however, the Court
has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil
liability arising from the issuance of the bouncing check upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial
Manufacturing Corporation, supra.
Remedial Law; Actions; Litis Pendentia; Requisites for litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar
to an action.—For litis pendentia to be successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the
following requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least such as
represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be
such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites, the possibility of the
existence of the third becomes nil.
Velayo, etc. vs. Shell Co. of the Phils., et al., 100 Phil. 186, No. L-7817 October 31, 1956
1.INSOLVENCY; PREFERENCE OF CREDITS; A CREDITOR’S TRANSFER OF CREDIT TO ANOTHER WITHOUT
KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER CREDITORS OF INSOLVENT.—A creditor’s transfer of assignment of its credit to
another without the knowledge and at the back of other creditors of the insolvent may be a shrewd and
surprise move that enables the transferor creditor to collect almost if not the entire amount of its credit,
but the Courts of Justice cannot countenance such attitude at all, and much less from a foreign
corporation to the detriment of the Government and local business.
2.ID.; POWERS AND DUTIES OF ASSIGNEE.—In accordance with the spirit of the Insolvency Law and with
the provisions of Chapter V thereof which deal with the powers and duties of a receiver, the assignee
represents the insolvent as well as the creditors in voluntary and involuntary proceedings.
3.ID.; CREDITOR’S LIABILITY IN ASSIGNING ITS CREDIT TO ANOTHER; KNOWLEDGE OF THE IMPENDING
INSOLVENCY PROCEEDINGS OF DEBTOR.—Where a creditor taking advantage of his knowledge that
insolvency proceedings were to be instituted by C if the creditors did not come to an understanding as
to the manner of distribution of the insolvent assets among them, and believing it most probable that
they would not arrive at such understanding as if really the case schemed and affected the transfer of its
credits to its sister corporation in the United States, where C’s plane C-54 was and by that swift and
unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said insolvent’s property depriving the latter and the
assignee that was later appointed, of the opportunity to recover said plane, said creditor acted in bad
faith and betrayed the confidence and trust of the other creditors of the insolvent for which it is held
liable in accordance with pertinent provisions of the Civil Code.
4.ID.; ID.; SECTION 37 OF INSOLVENCY LAW NOT APPLICABLE.—The provision of section 37 of the
Insolvency Law making the person coming within its purview liable for double the value of the property
sought to be disposed of constitúte a sort of penal clause Which shall be strictly construed, and since the
same result may be obtained by applying only the provisions of the Civil Code, the said provisions of the
insolvency law is not applicable to a creditor disposing its own credit and not the insolvent’s property.
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778, G.R. No. 81262 August 25,
1989
Torts and Damages; Human Relations; Labor Law; Dismissal; The employer is liable for damages to the
employee if the dismissal is done abusively.—The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer
to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the
effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to
the employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974,
58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September 27, 1966, 18
SCRA 107]. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a
legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under
Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Malicious Prosecution; The right to institute criminal prosecutions cannot be exercised
maliciously and in bad faith.—While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons
shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v.
Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)], the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised
maliciously and in bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 587]. Hence,
in Yutuk v. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that the right
to file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an
indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the
courts of justice. And in Hawpia v. CA, G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 536, the Court upheld
the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney’s fees after making a
finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints against respondent, all of
which were dismissed.
Same; Same; Same; Mere dismissal of a criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for
malicious prosecution in the absence of competent evidence showing bad faith on the part of
complainant.—To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the
defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No.
L-44190, October 30, 1980, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly, the filing of a suit, by itself, does not render a
person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May 30, 1983, 122
SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of
damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had
acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 60].
Same; Same; Same; The fact that the 6 criminal cases were filed notwithstanding the police reports
exculpating private respondent from the anomalies, and the eventual dismissal of all such criminal cases,
lead to the conclusion that petitioner was motivated by malicious intent in filing the criminal cases.—In
fine, considering the haste in which the criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed
during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by Hendry, the fact
that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in
the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases,
the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in
filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias.
Same; Same; Quasi Delict; The principle of damnum absque injuria does not apply in the instant case
considering the abusive manner in which petitioner exercised its right to dismiss private respondent,
and the several other quasi-delictual acts committed by the former.—According to the principle of
damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount
to a legal wrong is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197;
See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 29 Phil. 542 (1915); The Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805,
August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that
even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive
manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be
held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive
manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts
committed by petitioners.
Same; Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; Award of exemplary damages is proper when the act
performed is deliberate, malicious, and tainted with bad faith.—Lastly, the award of exemplary damages
is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides that “[i]n quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence,” the Court, in Zulueta
v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L-28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled that if gross
negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition justified when
the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As in the Zulueta case, the nature
of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for
the award of exemplary damages to the latter.
Albenson Enterprises Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 16, G.R. No. 88694 January 11, 1993
Civil Law; Damages; Article 19 sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of
one’s right but also in the performance of one’s duties.—Article 19, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in
the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith.
Same; Same; Same; A right though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality.—A right, though by itself legal because recognized
or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible.
Same; Same; Same; There is no hard and fast rule which can be applied to determine whether or not the
principle of abuse of rights may be invoked.—There is however, no hard and fast rule which can be
applied to determine whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked. The question of
whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated, resulting in damages under Articles 20
and 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case.
Same; Same; Same; Elements of an abuse of right under Article 19.—The elements of an abuse of right
under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Same; Same; In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages
cannot be awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful
and subject the actor to the payment of damages for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty
on the right to litigate.—The criminal complaint filed against private respondent after the latter refused
to make good the amount of the bouncing check despite demand was a sincere attempt on the part of
petitioners to find the best possible means by which they could collect the sum of money due them. A
person who has not been paid an obligation owed to him will naturally seek ways to compel the debtor
to pay him. It was normal for petitioners to find means to make the issuer of the check pay the amount
thereof. In the absence of a wrongful act or omission or of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be
awarded and that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and subject
the actor to the payment of damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right
to litigate.
Same; Same; Malicious Prosecution; The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution
does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.—To constitute malicious prosecution, there must
be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that
it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless.
Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one
liable for malicious prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Essential elements for a case of malicious prosecution to prosper.—True, a
civil action for damages for malicious prosecution is allowed under the New Civil Code, more specifically
Articles 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8) thereof. In order that such a case can prosper, however,
the following three (3) elements must be present, to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further
fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an
acquittal; (2) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The
prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice.
Same; Same; Same; A party injured by the filing of a court case against him even if he is later on
absolved may file a case for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights or on malicious
prosecution.—Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later on
absolved, may file a case for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights, or on
malicious prosecution. As earlier stated, a complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution will
prosper only if the three (3) elements aforecited are shown to exist. In the case at bar, the second and
third elements were not shown to exist.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is well settled that one cannot be held liable for maliciously instituting a
prosecution where one has acted with probable cause.—It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable
for maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with probable cause. “Probable cause is
the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on
the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for
which he was prosecuted. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been
carried on without probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it would be a very great
discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to
be sued at law when their indictment miscarried.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The presence of probable cause signifies as a legal consequence the
absence of malice. In the instant case, it is evident that petitioners were not motivated by malicious
intent or by sinister design to unduly harass private respondent, but only by a well-founded anxiety to
protect their rights when they filed the criminal complaint against private respondent.
Same; Same; The adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the
actor to the payment of moral damages.—Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se
make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have
meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, such right is so precious that moral damages may not
be charged on those who may even exercise it erroneously. And an adverse decision does not ipso facto
justify the award of attorney’s fees to the winning party.
Same; Same; Same; An award of damages and attorney’s fees is unwarranted where the action was filed
in good faith.—Thus, an award of damages and attorney’s fees is unwarranted where the action was
filed in good faith. If damage results from a person’s exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque
injuria.
Same; Same; In determining actual damages, the court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or
guesswork as to the amount.—Coming now to the claim of private respondent for actual or
compensatory damages, the records show that the same was based solely on his allegations without
proof to substantiate the same. He did not present proof of the cost of the medical treatment which he
claimed to have undergone as a result of the nervous breakdown he suffered, nor did he present proof
of the actual loss to his business caused by the unjust litigation against him. In determining actual
damages, the court cannot rely on speculation, conjectures or guesswork as to the amount. Without the
actual proof of loss, the award of actual damages becomes erroneous.
Same; Same; Same; Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss
and the same must be proved otherwise if the proof is flimsy and unsubstantiated no damages will be
given.—Actual and compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary lossade,
property, profession, job or occupation—and the same must be proved, otherwise, if the proof is flimsy
and unsubstantiated, no damages will be given (Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 [1986]). For
these reasons, it was gravely erroneous for respondent court to have affirmed the award of actual
damages in favor of private respondent in the absence of proof thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Neither may exemplary damages be awarded where there is no evidence of
the other party having acted in wanton, fraudulent or reckless or oppressive manner.—Where there is
reckless, or oppressive manner, neither may exemplary damages be awarded.
Same; Same; Attorney’s fees; The award of attorney’s fees must be disallowed where the award of
exemplary damages is eliminated.—As to the award of attorney’s fees, it is well-settled that the same is
the exception rather than the general rule. Needless to say, the award of attorney’s fees must be
disallowed where the award of exemplary damages is eliminated.
University of the East vs. Jader, 325 SCRA 804, G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000
Civil Law; Damages; It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient
notice and information to each and every student as to whether he or she had already complied with all
the requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they would be included among those who
will graduate.—The Court takes judicial notice of the traditional practice in educational institutions
wherein the professor directly furnishes his/her students their grades. It is the contractual obligation of
the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to
whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree or
whether they would be included among those who will graduate. Although commencement exercises
are but a formal ceremony, it nonetheless is not an ordinary occasion, since such ceremony is the
educational institution’s way of announcing to the whole world that the students included in the list of
those who will be conferred a degree during the baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all the
requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to the ceremony, the school has the obligation to
promptly inform the student of any problem involving the latter’s grades and performance and also
most importantly, of the procedures for remedying the same.
Same; Same; Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the
aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.—Petitioner, in belatedly
informing respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly at a time when he had
already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of
good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit
for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain
from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together
with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.
Same; Same; The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by
not promptly submitting a student’s grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the
school, being his employer.—The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an
academic program, enforcement of rules and regulations, and the supervision of faculty and student
services. He must see to it that his own professors and teachers, regardless of their status or position
outside of the university, must comply with the rules set by the latter. The negligent act of a professor
who fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly submitting a student’s grade, is
not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer.
Same; Same; Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious
knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable.—
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for
the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of
the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. Want
of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause
naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable.
Same; Same; The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of
right, even when the act is not illicit.—Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its
own negligence that led to the delayed relay of information to respondent. When one of two innocent
parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred must bear it. The modern tendency is to
grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. If
mere fault or negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with
more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be protected only when he acts
in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not
when he acts with negligence or abuse.
Same; Same; While petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latter’s
actual damages, Court holds that respondent should not have been awarded moral damages.—While
petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latter’s actual damages, we hold
that respondent should not have been awarded moral damages. We do not agree with the Court of
Appeals’ findings that respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain when he was informed that he could
not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very least, it behooved on
respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for
the bar examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should have been responsible enough to
ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. Given
these considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have suffered untold embarrassment in
attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review classes and not being able to take the bar
exams. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself
by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including his school records, before preparing
himself for the bar examination.
Diaz vs. Davao Light and Power Co., Inc., 520 SCRA 481, G.R. No. 160959 April 4, 2007
Compromise Agreements; While the purpose of compromise is to settle the claims of the parties and bar
all future disputes and controversies, criminal liability is not affected by compromise for it is a public
offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion, though
complete reparation should have been made of the damages suffered by the offended party.—Article
2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise as a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. The purpose of compromise is to
settle the claims of the parties and bar all future disputes and controversies. However, criminal liability
is not affected by compromise for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the
Government on its own motion, though complete reparation should have been made of the damages
suffered by the offended party. A criminal case is committed against the People, and the offended party
may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for the commission of the offense.
Moreover, a compromise is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the
extinction of criminal liability.
Actions; Abuse of Rights; Elements; Words and Phrases; Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not
in response to duty—it implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm; Malice is bad faith or
bad motive.—The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty;
(b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Thus,
malice or bad faith is at the core of the above provisions. Good faith refers to the state of the mind
which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from
taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Good faith is presumed and he who
alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote
bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a
wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of
fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do
ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.
Same; Same; “Damage” and “Injury,” Distinguished; Words and Phrases; Injury is the illegal invasion of
a legal right while damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury, and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.—Petitioner may have suffered
damages as a result of the filing of the complaints. However, there is a material distinction between
damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which
results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not
the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured
person alone; the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a
legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria. Whatever damages Diaz
may have suffered would have to be borne by him alone since it was his acts which led to the filing of
the complaints against him.
Same; Same; Malicious Prosecution; Requisites; Words and Phrases; Malicious prosecution has been
defined as an action for damages brought by or against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other
legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of
such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein; Malice and want of
probable cause must both be clearly established to justify an award of damages based on malicious
prosecution.—Malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for damages brought by or against
whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and
without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of
the defendant therein. It is an established rule that in order for malicious prosecution to prosper, the
following requisites must be proven by petitioner: (1) the fact of prosecution and the further fact that
the defendant (respondent) was himself the prosecutor, and that the action finally terminated with an
acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (3) that the
prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is, by improper or sinister motive. The
foregoing are necessary to preserve a person’s right to litigate which may be emasculated by the undue
filing of malicious prosecution cases. From the foregoing requirements, it can be inferred that malice
and want of probable cause must both be clearly established to justify an award of damages based on
malicious prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; One cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where
he acted with probable cause—there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister
design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately knowing that the charge was
false and baseless to entitle the victims to damages.—It cannot be concluded that respondent DLPC
acted without probable cause when it instituted the actions. The events which led to the filing of the
complaints are undisputed, and respondent DLPC cannot be faulted for filing them. In the early case of
Buchanan v. Esteban, 32 Phil. 363 (1915), this Court had already stressed that “one cannot be held liable
in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause.” As Justice
Moreland explained in that case: Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The general rule is well
settled that one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he
acted with probable cause. In other words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has
been carried on without probable cause. And the reason for the rule as stated by Blackstone, is that it
would be a very great discouragement to public justice if prosecutors, who had a tolerable ground of
suspicion, were liable to be sued at law when their indictments miscarried. Thus, the element of malice
and the absence of probable cause must be proved. There must be proof that the prosecution was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately
knowing that the charge was false and baseless to entitle the victims to damages. The two elements
must simultaneously exist; otherwise, the presence of probable cause signifies, as a legal consequence,
the absence of malice. In the instant case, it is evident that respondent DLPC was not motivated by
malicious intent or by a sinister design to unduly harass petitioner, but only by a well-founded anxiety to
protect its rights. Respondent DLPC cannot therefore be faulted in availing of the remedies provided for
by law.
Garcia, Jr. vs. Salvador, 518 SCRA 568, G.R. No. 168512 March 20, 2007
Health Care Providers; Torts; Quasi-Delicts; Appeals; Whether a person is negligent or not is a question
of fact which the Supreme Court cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari which is limited
to reviewing errors of law; For health care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is—did the
health care provider either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would
have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not
have done, and that failure or action caused injury to the patient.—We note that the issues raised are
factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon
in a petition for review on certiorari which is limited to reviewing errors of law. Negligence is the failure
to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. For health
care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is: did the health care provider either fail to do
something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did
something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done; and that failure or
action caused injury to the patient; if yes, then he is guilty of negligence. Thus, the elements of an
actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate causation.
Same; Same; Same; Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes,
as well as rules and regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people
by preventing the operation of substandard, improperly managed and inadequately supported clinical
laboratories and by improving the quality of performance of clinical laboratory examinations.—Owners
and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as rules and
regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people by preventing the
operation of substandard, improperly managed and inadequately supported clinical laboratories and by
improving the quality of performance of clinical laboratory examinations. Their business is impressed
with public interest, as such, high standards of performance are expected from them.
Same; Same; Same; Violation of a statutory duty is negligence.—Violation of a statutory duty is
negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the duty to do something, his omission or nonperformance will render him liable to whoever may be injured thereby.
Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The Clinical Laboratory Law (R.A. No. 4688); The Philippine Medical
Technology Act of 1969 (R.A. No. 5527); Revised Rules and Regulations Governing the Registration,
Operation and Maintenance of Clinical Laboratories in the Philippines (DOH Adm. Order No. 49-B, Series
of 1988); A clinical laboratory must be administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician
authorized by the Secretary of Health, like a pathologist who is specially trained in methods of
laboratory medicine; that the medical technologist must be under the supervision of the pathologist or a
licensed physician; and that the results of any examination may be released only to the requesting
physician or his authorized representative upon the direction of the laboratory pathologist.—It is clear
that a clinical laboratory must be administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician
authorized by the Secretary of Health, like a pathologist who is specially trained in methods of
laboratory medicine; that the medical technologist must be under the supervision of the pathologist or a
licensed physician; and that the results of any examination may be released only to the requesting
physician or his authorized representative upon the direction of the laboratory pathologist. These rules
are intended for the protection of the public by preventing performance of substandard clinical
examinations by laboratories whose personnel are not properly supervised. The public demands no less
than an effective and efficient performance of clinical laboratory examinations through compliance with
the quality standards set by laws and regulations.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; Power of Control and Supervision; Words and Phrases;
“Supervision and control” means the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted
by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts;
review, approve, revise or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units.—Castro’s
infrequent visit to the clinical laboratory barely qualifies as an effective administrative supervision and
control over the activities in the laboratory. “Supervision and control” means the authority to act
directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve, revise or modify acts and
decisions of subordinate officials or units.
Same; Same; Same; Art. 20 of the Civil Code provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party
who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision.—Article 20 of
the New Civil Code provides: Art.20.Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. The foregoing provision provides the legal
basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers damage whenever one commits an act in
violation of some legal provision. This was incorporated by the Code Commission to provide relief to a
person who suffers damage because another has violated some legal provision.
Wassmer vs. Velez, 12 SCRA 648, No. L-20089 December 26, 1964 (no-show sa wedding day)
Damages; Breach of promise to marry; When actionable wrong.—Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise
to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the necessary
preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which the erring promissor
must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
While mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go
through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
Same; Same; Same; Moral and exemplary damages may be awarded in an actionable breach of promise
suit.—When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral
damages may be awarded under Article 2219(10) of ,the said Code. Exemplary damages may also be
awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton,
reckless and oppressive manner.
Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 18 SCRA 994, No. L-18630 December 17, 1966
Damages; Seduction falling under Article 21 of the New Civil Code.—The case under Article 21, cited as
an example by the Code Commission, ref ers to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The
essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of promise
of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer, to which the woman has yielded. Where for one whole year,
from 1958 to 1959, plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with
the defendant, with repeated acts of intercourse, such conduct is incompatible with the idea of
seduction. Plainly, there is here a voluntariness and mutual passion, for had the plaintiff been deceived,
had she surrendered exclusively because of deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment
of the alleged promises of marriage,' and she would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that
the defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil
Code and, no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance
in dismissing the complaint. Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to
whatever actions may correspond to the child of the plaintiff against defendant-appellant, if any.
Pe vs. Pe, 5 SCRA 200, No. L-17396 May 30, 1962 (ig-agaw)
Damages; Acts contrary to morals.—Defendant won Lolita's affection thru an ingenious scheme or
trickery and seduced her to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray
the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family defendant was allowed free access
because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually
fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but also in Boac
where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the
knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing
Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national.
Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental
home. Held:The wrong defendant has caused Lolita and her family is indeed immeasurable considering
the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.
Que vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 137, G.R. No. 66865 January 13, 1989
Civil Law; Damages; Malicious Prosecution; Probable Cause; One cannot be held liable in damages for
maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause.—As early as in 1932, in
Buchanan v. Esteban, this court had already stressed that “one cannot be held liable in damages for
maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause.” As Justice Moreland
explained in that case: “Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite
the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the
person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The general rule is well settled that
one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with
probable cause. In other words, a suit will lie only cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on
without probable cause. And the reason for the rule as stated by Blackstone, is that it would be a very
great discouragement to public justice if prosecutors, who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable
to be sued at law when their indictments miscarried.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Presence of probable cause signifies as a legal consequence the
absence of malice. Malicious prosecution presupposes the existence of a sinister design to vex and
humiliate a person.—The presence of probable cause signifies as a legal consequence the absence of
malice. It is evident that the petitioner was not motivated by ill feeling but only by an anxiety to protect
his rights when he filed the criminal complaint for estafa with the fiscal’s office. If he averred that the
private respondent had no funds in the bank when he issued the post-dated checks and intended to
cheat the payee, it was because the circumstances of the case as Que saw them led him to this
conclusion. Even if the fiscal found that no deceit was involved and that the petitioner’s claim was
unfounded, the mistaken charge was nonetheless, in the legal sense, not malicious. As the Court has
held: “To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a
sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing
that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the
authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to litigate is an escape valve to relieve the pressures of
personal disagreements that might otherwise explode into physical violence.—In a free society,
controversies are heard and settled under the rule of law in the forum of the courts of justice. It is one
of the virtues of our system of government that if a person feels he has been aggrieved, he does not
have to take the law into his hands or resort to the use of force for the vindication of his injury. The
courts are there to hear and act on his complaint. The right to litigate is an escape valve to relieve the
pressures of personal disagreements that might otherwise explode in physical confrontation. It is
necessary not only for upholding one’s claims when they are unjustly denied but also for the
maintenance of peace if not goodwill among incipient antagonists. Without the right to litigate,
conflicting claims cannot be examined and resolved in accordance with one of the primary purposes of
government, which is to provide for a just and orderly society.
Same; Same; Same; Proof and motive that the institution of the action was prompted by a sinister
design to vex and humiliate a person must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the
victims to damages.—"While we must look upon the plight of hapless victims of unfounded and
malicious prosecutions with tolerance and sympathy, sound principles of justice and public policy dictate
that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindications of their rights
without fear of later on standing trial for damages whereby lack of sufficient evidence, legal
technicalities or a different interpretation of the laws on the matter the case would lose ground and
therein defendants aquitted. Proof and motive that the prosecution or institution of the action was
prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and to cast dishonor and disgrace must be
clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages and other rights granted by law;
otherwise, there would always be a civil action for damages after every prosecution’s failure to prove its
cause resulting in the consequent acquittal of the accused therein.” Furthermore: “The adverse result of
an action does not per se make the act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages.
The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, such right is so precious that
moral damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously.”
Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. vs. Espino, Jr., 94 SCRA 953, No. L-48250 December 28, 1979
Civil Law; Damages; Where petitioners wilfully caused loss or injury to private respondent in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy, they are liable for damages under Arts. 19 and 21 in
relation to Art. 2219 of the Civil Code.—Nonetheless, the false accusation charged against the private
respondent after detaining and interrogating him by the uniformed guards and the mode and manner in
which he was subjected, shouting at him, imposing him a fine, threatening to call the police and in the
presence and hearing of many people at the Supermarket which brought and caused him humiliation
and embarrassment, sufficiently rendered the petitioners liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21
relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. We rule that under the facts of the case at bar, petitioners
wilfully caused loss or injury to private respondent in a manner that was contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. It is against morals, good customs and public policy to humiliate, embarrass
and degrade the dignity of a person. Everyone must respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace
of mind of his neighbors and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code). And one must act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith (Article 19, Civil Code).
Same; Same; Moral damages; Proof of pecuniary loss necessary for moral, nominal, temperate,
liquidated or exemplary damages to be adjudicated; Assessment of such damages left to the discretion
of the court.—While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate,
liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated, the assessment of such damages, except
liquidated ones, is left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of each case (Art.
2216, New Civil Code).
Same; Same; Same; Reduction of moral damages to be recovered against petitioners justified due to
contributory negligence of respondent; case at bar.—In the case at bar, there is no question that the
whole incident that befell respondent had arisen in such a manner that was created unwittingly by his
own act of forgetting to pay for the file. It was his forgetfullness in checking out the item and paying for
it that started the chain of events which led to his embarrassment and humiliation, thereby causing him
mental anguish, wounded feelings and serious anxiety. Yet, private respondent’s act of omission
contributed to the occurrence of his injury or loss and such contributory negligence is a factor which
may reduce the damages that private respondent may recover (Art. 2214, New Civil Code).
Same; Same; Same; Purpose of moral damages; Award of moral damages must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted.—As succinctly expressed by Mr. Justice J.B. L. Reyes in his concurring and dissenting
opinion in Pangasinan Transportation Company, Inc. vs. Legaspi, 12 SCRA 598, the purpose of moral
damages is essentially indemnity or reparation, both punishment or correction. Moral damages are
emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant; they are awarded
only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate
the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant’s culpable action. In other words, the
award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status
quo ante and, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
Same; Same; Exemplary or corrective damages; Purpose of imposition; Cannot be recovered as a matter
of right but left to the discretion of the court; Facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant the
grant of exemplary damages in favor of respondent.—The grant of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages is unjustified. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way
of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages (Art. 2229, New Civil Code). Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a
matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they could be adjucidated (Art. 2223, New Civil
Code). Considering that exemplary damages are awarded for wanton acts, that they are penal in
character granted not by way of compensation but as a punishment to the offender and a warning to
others as a sort of deterrent, We hold that the facts and circumstances of the case at bar do not warrant
the grant of exemplary damages.
Same; Same; Same; Exemplary damages not awarded; Defense of property; Where petitioners acted in
good faith in trying to protect and recover their property, and they acted upon probable cause in
stopping and investigating respondent for taking the file without paying for it, they are considered in
lawful exercise of their right of defense of property under Art. 429 of the Civil Code and are exempt
from the imposition of exemplary damages against them.—Petitioners acted in good faith in trying to
protect and recover their property, a right which the law accords to them. Under Article 429, New Civil
Code, the owner or lawful possessor of a thing has right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and
disposal thereof and for this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repeal
or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. And since a
person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office exempts him
from civil or criminal liability, petitioner may not be punished by imposing exemplary damages against
him. We agree that petitioners acted upon probable cause in stopping and investigating private
respondent for taking the file without paying for it, hence, the imposition of exemplary damages as a
warning to others by way of a deterrent is without legal basis. We, therefore, eliminate the grant of
exemplary damages to the private respondent.
Carpio vs. Valmonte, 438 SCRA 38, G.R. No. 151866 September 9, 2004
Civil Law; Damages; Abuse of Rights; To find the existence of an abuse of right, the following elements
must be present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole
intent of prejudicing or injuring another.—In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a
wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy or
recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not
only principles of equity but also universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms
that spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve as guides for human
conduct. First of these fundamental precepts is the principle commonly known as “abuse of rights”
under Article 19 of the Civil Code. It provides that “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith.” To find the existence of an abuse of right, the following elements must be present: (1) there is a
legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another. When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable.
Same; Same; Same; A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his
right, that is when he acts with prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or
abuse.—One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner which would cause unnecessary prejudice
to another or if he would thereby offend morals or good customs. Thus, a person should be protected
only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and good
faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
Same; Same; Same; To be recoverable, actual damages must be duly proved with reasonable degree of
certainty and the courts cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork.—Owing to the rule that
great weight and even finality is given to factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm those
of the trial court, we sustain the findings of the trial court and the appellate court that respondent’s
claim for actual damages has not been substantiated with satisfactory evidence during the trial and
must therefore be denied. To be recoverable, actual damages must be duly proved with reasonable
degree of certainty and the courts cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork.
Quisaba vs. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood, Inc., 58 SCRA 771, No. L-38088 August 30, 1974
Civil law; Human relations; The abusive exercise of the right of dismissal by employer may be subject of
action for moral damages.—Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute “matters
involving employee-employer relations” as Quisaba’s dismissal was the severance of a pre-existing
employee-employer relation, his complaint is grounded not on his dismissal per se, as in fact he does not
ask for reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his dismissal and the consequent effects of
such dismissal.
xxx
The “right” of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which the
right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was done anti-socially or
oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated article 1701 of the Civil Code
which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and article 21, which
makes a person liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, the sanction for which, by way of moral damages is
provided in article 2219, no. 10.
St. Louis Realty Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 179, No. L-46061 November 14, 1984
Damages; Quasi-Delict; Use of a person’s house as advertisement material without the owner’s consent
entitles him to award of actual and moral damages where no appropriate apology was made.—St. Louis
Realty’s employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely
circulated publication like the the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology
and explanation of the mixup. It just contented itself with a cavalier “rectification”.
Same; Same; Same.—Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the
distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased
it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered
diminution of income and mental anguish.
Guanio vs. Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc., 641 SCRA 591, G.R. No. 190601 February 7, 2011
Civil Law; Contracts; Breach of Contract; Words and Phrases; Breach of contract is defined as the failure
without legal reason to comply with the terms of a contract.—Breach of contract is defined as the failure
without legal reason to cmmomply with the terms of a contract. It is also defined as the [f]ailure,
without legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms the whole or part of the contract. The
appellate court, and even the trial court, observed that petitioners were remiss in their obligation to
inform respondent of the change in the expected number of guests. The observation is reflected in the
records of the case. Petitioners’ failure to discharge such obligation thus excused, as the above-quoted
paragraph 4.5 of the parties’ contract provide, respondent from liability for “any damage or
inconvenience” occasioned thereby.
HUMAN RELATION TORTS
People vs. Ballesteros, 285 SCRA 438, G.R. No. 120921 January 29, 1998
Same; Same; Same; Damages; Trial court was also correct in the award of damages to the heirs of the
victims; Damages, Defined.—The trial court was also correct in the award of damages to the heirs of the
victims. Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an
injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the
breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded
in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained, whereas moral damages may be invoked
when the complainant has experienced mental anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock
and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offender’s
wrongful act or omission.
Custodio vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 483, G.R. No. 116100 February 9, 1996
Civil Law; Action; Damages; To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be a right of action for a
legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff.—However, the mere fact
that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the
recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant,
and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong,
does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the
injury caused by a breach or wrong.
Same; Same; Same; Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right, damage is the harm which results from
the injury and damages are the compensation awarded for the damage suffered.—There is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss,
hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in
which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.
Same; Same; Same; To maintain an action for injuries, plaintiff must establish that such injuries resulted
from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff.—In order that a plaintiff may maintain
an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a
breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff—a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and
legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the
premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of
some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not
sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain
and suffering.
Same; Same; Same; The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong.—Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or
omissions which cause damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person,
and consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be borne
by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does
not amount to a legal injury or wrong.
Same; Same; Same; In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must not
only be hurtful, but also wrongful.—In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act
causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as
may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or
property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an
injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.
Civil Law; Article 21, Civil Code; Principle of Abuse of Right; Requisites.—In the case at bar, although
there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners
could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of
right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites
concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.
Same; Same; Same; There is no cause of action for lawful acts done by one person on his property
although such acts incidentally caused damage or loss to another.—A person has a right to the natural
use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such
property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one
person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause
damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. When the
owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used,
such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured,
because the inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of
community life.
Same; Same; Same; One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the
means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latter’s favor.—The
proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the
act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may use any lawful means
to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause
of action arises in the latter’s favor. Any injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria.
The courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated
to achieve a lawful end by lawful means.
Oceaneering Contractors (Phils.), Inc. vs. Barretto, 642 SCRA 596, G.R. No. 184215 February 9, 2011
Civil Law; Damages; Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code of the Philippines there must be pleading and
proof of actual damages suffered for the same to be recovered; It must also be actually proven with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable; The
burden of proof of the damage suffered is, consequently, imposed on the party claiming the same who
should adduce the best evidence available in support thereof; Courts are required to state the factual
bases of the award.—Conformably with the foregoing provision, the rule is long and well settled that
there must be pleading and proof of actual damages suffered for the same to be recovered. In addition
to the fact that the amount of loss must be capable of proof, it must also be actually proven with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. The
burden of proof of the damage suffered is, consequently, imposed on the party claiming the same who
should adduce the best evidence available in support thereof, like sales and delivery receipts, cash and
check vouchers and other pieces of documentary evidence of the same nature. In the absence of
corroborative evidence, it has been held that self-serving statements of account are not sufficient basis
for an award of actual damages. Corollary to the principle that a claim for actual damages cannot be
predicated on flimsy, remote, speculative, and insubstantial proof, courts are, likewise, required to state
the factual bases of the award.
Same; Attorney’s Fees; In the absence of stipulation, the rule is settled that there can be no recovery of
attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation other than judicial costs except in the instances enumerated
under Article 2208 of the Civil Code.—For lack of sufficient showing of bad faith on the part of Barretto,
we find that the CA, finally, erred in granting Oceaneering’s claim for attorney’s fees, albeit in the much
reduced sum of P30,000.00. In the absence of stipulation, after all, the rule is settled that there can be
no recovery of attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation other than judicial costs except in the instances
enumerated under Article 2208 of the Civil Code. Being the exception rather than the rule, attorney’s
fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit, in view of the policy that no premium should
be placed on the right to litigate. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to
incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded where, as here, no
sufficient showing of bad faith can be reflected in the party’s persistence in a case other than an
erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 402, G.R. No. 107518
October 8, 1998
Damages; There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: One is the loss of what a person
already possesses (daño emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which
would have pertained to him (lucro cesante).—Under Article 2199 of the Civil Code, actual or
compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury
sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has
been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In actions based on torts
or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of. There are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: one is the loss of
what a person already possesses (daño emergente), and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit
that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante).
Same; Evidence; To enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required
to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof
and on the best evidence available—damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award must
point out specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual
damages are borne.—As stated at the outset, to enable an injured party to recover actual or
compensatory damages, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of
certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. The burden of proof is on
the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side. He must establish
his case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one
side is superior to that of the other. In other words, damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making
an award must point out specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory
or actual damages are borne.
Same; Same; Same; Damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence.—Accordingly, as
stated at the outset, damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence.
Same; Same; In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, a party is entitled to
nominal damages.—Nonetheless, the non-admissibility of said exhibits does not mean that it totally
deprives private respondent of any redress for the loss of its vessel. This is because in Lufthansa German
Airlines v. Court of Appeals, the Court said: “In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage
suffered, private respondent is ‘entitled to nominal damages which, as the law says, is adjudicated in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by defendant, may be vindicated
and recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.’ ” [Italics
supplied].
Same; Nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact.—Actually, nominal damages are
damages in name only and not in fact. Where these are allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of
a wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. However, the amount to
be awarded as nominal damages shall be equal or at least commensurate to the injury sustained by
private respondent considering the concept and purpose of such damages. The amount of nominal
damages to be awarded may also depend on certain special reasons extant in the case.
Same; Pleadings and Practice; Allegations in the original and amended complaints can be the basis for
determination of a fair amount of nominal damages inasmuch as a complaint alleges the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action.—Applying now such principles to the instant case, we have
on record the fact that petitioner’s vessel Petroparcel was at fault as well as private respondent’s
complaint claiming the amount of P692,680.00 representing the fishing nets, boat equipment and
cargoes that sunk with the M/V Maria Efigenia XV. In its amended complaint, private respondent alleged
that the vessel had an actual value of P800,000.00 but it had been paid insurance in the amount of
P200,000.00 and, therefore, it claimed only the amount of P600,000.00. Ordinarily, the receipt of
insurance payments should diminish the total value of the vessel quoted by private respondent in his
complaint considering that such payment is causally related to the loss for which it claimed
compensation. This Court believes that such allegations in the original and amended complaints can be
the basis for determination of a fair amount of nominal damages inasmuch as a complaint alleges the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. Private respondent should be bound by its
allegations on the amount of its claims.
Same; Same; Docket Fees; A plaintiff’s failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim
for damages under the amended complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the lower
court’s jurisdiction—the unpaid docket fee should be considered as a lien on the judgment.—With
respect to petitioner’s contention that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the amended
complaint increasing the amount of damages claimed to P600,000.00, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case when private respondent paid the
docket fee corresponding to its claim in its original complaint. Its failure to pay the docket fee
corresponding to its increased claim for damages under the amended complaint should not be
considered as having curtailed the lower court’s jurisdiction. Pursuant to the ruling in Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, the unpaid docket fee should be considered as a lien on the judgment
even though private respondent specified the amount of P600,000.00 as its claim for damages in its
amended complaint.
Actions; Jurisdiction; Estoppel; Participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, including
invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel from
challenging the court’s jurisdiction.—We note that petitioner did not question at all the jurisdiction of
the lower court on the ground of insufficient docket fees in its answers to both the amended complaint
and the second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
lower court after it had received an adverse decision. As this Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, that included invoking its
authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the
court’s jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its answer to the second amended complaint on April
16, 1985, petitioner did not question the lower court’s jurisdiction. It was only on December 29, 1989
when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the lower court’s decision that petitioner raised the
question of the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of
jurisdiction by its own inaction.
People vs. Jugueta, 788 SCRA 331, G.R. No. 202124 April 5, 2016
Same; Murder; Penalties; For crimes where the imposable penalty is death in view of the attendance of
an ordinary aggravating circumstance but due to the prohibition to impose the death penalty, the actual
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the latest jurisprudence pegs the amount of P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P100,000.00 as moral damages. For the qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the
ordinary aggravating circumstances present, the amount of P100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary
damages aside from civil indemnity and moral damages.—For crimes where the imposable penalty is
death in view of the attendance of an ordinary aggravating circumstance but due to the prohibition to
impose the death penalty, the actual penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the latest jurisprudence
pegs the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P100,000.00 as moral damages. For the
qualifying aggravating circumstance and/or the ordinary aggravating circumstances present, the amount
of P100,000.00 is awarded as exemplary damages aside from civil indemnity and moral damages.
Regardless of the attendance of qualifying aggravating circumstance, the exemplary damages shall be
fixed at P100,000.00. “[T]his is not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law
and the financial fluctuation over time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the
incidence of heinous crimes x x x.”
Same; Same; When the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion
perpetua only, there being no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that the proper
amounts should be P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00
exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating circumstances present.—When
the circumstances surrounding the crime call for the imposition of reclusion perpetua only, there being
no ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court rules that the proper amounts should be P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P75,000.00 exemplary damages, regardless of the
number of qualifying aggravating circumstances present.
Same; Same; If it is multiple murder without any ordinary aggravating circumstance but merely a
qualifying aggravating circumstance, but the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) wherein the maximum penalty shall be imposed, then, for every victim who dies, the
heirs shall be indemnified with P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.—When it comes to compound and complex crimes, although the
single act done by the offender caused several crimes, the fact that those were the result of a single
design, the amount of civil indemnity and moral damages will depend on the penalty and the number of
victims. For each of the victims, the heirs should be properly compensated. If it is multiple murder
without any ordinary aggravating circumstance but merely a qualifying aggravating circumstance, but
the penalty imposed is death because of Art. 48 of the RPC wherein the maximum penalty shall be
imposed, then, for every victim who dies, the heirs shall be indemnified with P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Same; Special Complex Crimes; If there is another composite crime included in a special complex crime
and the penalty imposed is death, an additional P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 moral
damages and P100,000.00 exemplary damages shall be awarded for each composite crime
committed.—If the penalty is death but it cannot be imposed due to RA No. 9346 and what is actually
imposed is the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity and moral damages will be P100,000.00
each, and another P100,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of the heinousness of the crime and to
set an example. If there is another composite crime included in a special complex crime and the penalty
imposed is death, an additional P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 moral damages and
P100,000.00 exemplary damages shall be awarded for each composite crime committed.
Same; Civil Indemnity; In awarding civil indemnity and moral damages, it is also important to determine
the stage in which the crime was committed and proven during the trial.—In awarding civil indemnity
and moral damages, it is also important to determine the stage in which the crime was committed and
proven during the trial. x x x As discussed earlier, when the crime proven is consummated and the
penalty imposed is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA No. 9346, the civil indemnity
and moral damages that should be awarded will each be P100,000.00 and another P100,000.00 for
exemplary damages or when the circumstances of the crime call for the imposition of reclusion
perpetua only, the civil indemnity and moral damages should be P75,000.00 each, as well as exemplary
damages in the amount of P75,000.00. If, however, the crime proven is in its frustrated stage, the civil
indemnity and moral damages that should be awarded will each be P50,000.00, and an award of
P25,000.00 civil indemnity and P25,000.00 moral damages when the crime proven is in its attempted
stage. The difference in the amounts awarded for the stages is mainly due to the disparity in the
outcome of the crime committed, in the same way that the imposable penalty varies for each stage of
the crime. The said amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages awarded in cases of felonies in their
frustrated or attempted stages shall be the bases when the crimes committed constitute complex crime
under Article 48 of the RPC. For example, in a crime of murder with attempted murder, the amount of
civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is P100,000.00 each, while in the attempted
murder, the civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages is P25,000.00 each.
Same; Special Complex Crimes; Damages; Civil Indemnity; Moral Damages; Exemplary Damages; The
nature and severity of the injuries sustained by the victims must still be determined for the purpose of
awarding civil indemnity and damages. If a victim suffered mortal wounds and could have died if not for
a timely medical intervention, the victim should be awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and
exemplary damages equivalent to the damages awarded in a frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered
injuries that are not fatal, an award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should
likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages awarded in an attempted stage.—In a special complex
crime, like robbery with homicide, if, aside from homicide, several victims (except the robbers) sustained
injuries, they shall likewise be indemnified. It must be remembered that in a special complex crime,
unlike in a complex crime, the component crimes have no attempted or frustrated stages because the
intention of the offender/s is to commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the process of
committing the said crime, another crime is committed. For example, if on the occasion of a robbery
with homicide, other victims sustained injuries, regardless of the severity, the crime committed is still
robbery with homicide as the injuries become part of the crime, “Homicide,” in the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, is understood in its generic sense and now forms part of the essential
element of robbery, which is the use of violence or the use of force upon anything. Hence, the nature
and severity of the injuries sustained by the victims must still be determined for the purpose of
awarding civil indemnity and damages. If a victim suffered mortal wounds and could have died if not for
a timely medical intervention, the victim should be awarded civil indemnity, moral damages, and
exemplary damages equivalent to the damages awarded in a frustrated stage, and if a victim suffered
injuries that are not fatal, an award of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages should
likewise be awarded equivalent to the damages awarded in an attempted stage.
Same; Damages; In other crimes that resulted in the death of a victim and the penalty consists of
divisible penalties, like homicide, death under tumultuous affray, reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide, the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim shall be P50,000.00 and P50,000.00
moral damages without exemplary damages being awarded.—In other crimes that resulted in the death
of a victim and the penalty consists of divisible penalties, like homicide, death under tumultuous affray,
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim shall be
P50,000.00 and P50,000.00 moral damages without exemplary damages being awarded. However, an
award of P50,000.00 exemplary damages in a crime of homicide shall be added if there is an aggravating
circumstance present that has been proven but not alleged in the information.
Same; Same; Temperate Damages; The award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or
murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial
court.—Aside from those discussed earlier, the Court also awards temperate damages in certain cases.
The award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no
evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. Under Article 2224 of the Civil
Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims
suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. In this case, the Court now increases
the amount to be awarded as temperate damages to P50,000.00.
Philippine Hawk Corporation vs. Lee, 612 SCRA 576, G.R. No. 166869 February 16, 2010
Torts; Damages; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence—to be
negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man
would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably subjected to a general
but definite class of risks.—A review of the records showed that it was petitioner’s witness, Efren
Delantar Ong, who was about 15 meters away from the bus when he saw the vehicular accident.
Nevertheless, this fact does not affect the finding of the trial court that petitioner’s bus driver, Margarito
Avila, was guilty of simple negligence as affirmed by the appellate court. Foreseeability is the
fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a defendant must have acted or failed to act in such a
way that an ordinary reasonable man would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were
unreasonably subjected to a general but definite class of risks. In this case, the bus driver, who was
driving on the right side of the road, already saw the motorcycle on the left side of the road before the
collision. However, he did not take the necessary precaution to slow down, but drove on and bumped
the motorcycle, and also the passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road, showing that the bus
was negligent in veering to the left lane, causing it to hit the motorcycle and the passenger jeep.
Same; Same; Same; Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there
instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection or supervision of its employees.—Whenever an employee’s negligence causes
damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise
the due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or supervision of its employees. To avoid
liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome the presumption by
presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee. The Court upholds the finding of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals that petitioner is liable to respondent, since it failed to exercise the diligence of a good father
of the family in the selection and supervision of its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to
sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the road. Indeed, petitioner’s tests were
concentrated on the ability to drive and physical fitness to do so. It also did not know that Avila had
been previously involved in sideswiping incidents.
Damages; Loss of Earning Capacity; The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is
awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of capacity to earn money; As a rule, documentary
evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity;
Exceptions.—The indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased is provided for by Article 2206
of the Civil Code. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of
capacity to earn money. As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim
for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity
may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when: (1) the deceased is selfemployed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial
notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased’s line of work no documentary evidence is available;
or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.
Same; Same; In the computation of loss of earning capacity, only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to
be considered; that is, the total of the earnings less expenses necessary for the creation of such earnings
or income, less living and other incidental expenses.—In the computation of loss of earning capacity,
only net earnings, not gross earnings, are to be considered; that is, the total of the earnings less
expenses necessary for the creation of such earnings or income, less living and other incidental expenses.
In the absence of documentary evidence, it is reasonable to peg necessary expenses for the lease and
operation of the gasoline station at 80 percent of the gross income, and peg living expenses at 50
percent of the net income (gross income less necessary expenses).
Quirante vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA 769, G.R. No. 73886 January 31, 1989
Attorney’s fees; Damages; Claim for attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the action in which the
services have been rendered, or in a separate action; Rule against multiplicity of suits is subserved.—
Well settled is the rule that counsel’s claim for attorney’s fees may be asserted either in the very action
in which the services in question have been rendered, or in a separate action. If the first alternative is
chosen, the Court may pass upon said claim, even if its amount were less than the minimum prescribed
by law for the jurisdiction of said court, upon the theory that the right to recover attorney’s fees is but
an incident of the case in which the services of counsel have been rendered.” It also rests on the
assumption that the court trying the case is to a certain degree already familiar with the nature and
extent of the lawyer’s services. The rule against multiplicity of suits will in effect be subserved.
Same; Same; Contract for professional services different from attorney’s fees as an item of damages
wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel.—What is being claimed here as
attorney’s fees by petitioners is, however, different from attorney’s fees as an item of damages
provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is made in favor of the litigant, not
of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment
for attorney’s fees by execution. Here, the petitioners’ claims are based on an alleged contract for
professional services, with them as the creditors and the private respondents as the debtors.
Same; Same; Confirmation of attorney’s fees in case at bar is premature.—In filing the motion for
confirmation of attorney’s fees, petitioners chose to assert their claims in the same action. This is also a
proper remedy under our jurisprudence. Nevertheless, we agree with the respondent court that the
confirmation of attorney’s fees is premature. As it correctly pointed out, the petition for review on
certiorari filed by PHILAMGEN in this Court (G.R. No. 64334) “may or may not ultimately result in the
granting to the Isasola (sic) family of the total amount of damages” awarded by the trial court. This is
especially true in the light of subsequent developments in G.R. No. 64334. In a decision promulgated on
May 21, 1987, the Court rendered judgment setting aside the decision of May 4, 1983 of the
Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. 00202 and ordering the respondent Regional Trial Court of
Manila to certify the appeal of PHILAMGEN from said trial Court’s decision in Civil Case No. 122920 to
the Court of Appeals. Said decision of the Court became final and executory on June 25, 1987.
Same; Same; Attorney’s fees cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and
the subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court.—Since the main case from which the
petitioner’s claims for their fees may arise has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety
of said fees and the amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure gains added validity in
the light of the rule that the remedy for recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of the main action may
be availed of only when something is due to the client.
Same; Same; Contract for attorney’s fees subject to contingency.—It is further observed that the
supposed contract alleged by petitioners as the basis for their fees provides that the recovery of the
amounts claimed is subject to certain contingencies. It is subject to the condition that the fee shall be
P30,000.00 in case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, plus an additional amount in case the
award is in excess of said P120,000.00 bond, on the sharing basis hereinbefore stated.
Same; Same; Confirmation of fees should be determined by the trial court as it involves the same
contingency in determining the propriety and assessing the extent of recovery of attorney’s fees.—With
regard to the effect of the alleged confirmation of the attorney’s fees by some of the heirs of the
deceased, We are of the considered view that the orderly administration of justice dictates that such
issue be likewise determined by the court a quo inasmuch as it also necessarily involves the same
contingency in determining the propriety and assessing the extent of recovery of attorney’s fees by both
petitioners herein. The court below will be in a better position, after the entire case shall have been
adjudicated, inclusive of any liability of PHILAMGEN and the respective participations of the heirs of Dr.
Casasola in the award, to determine with evidentiary support such matters like the basis for the
entitlement in the fees of petitioner Dante Cruz and as to whether the agreement allegedly entered into
with the late Dr. Casasola would be binding on all his heirs, as contended by petitioner Quirante.
Same; Same; Objection of prematurity obtains in case at bar and the holding of the confirmation of
attorney’s fees may be preemptive of facts and evidentiary matters to be presented before the court.—
We, therefore, take exception to and reject that portion of the decision of the respondent court which
holds that the alleged confirmation of attorneys fees should not adversely affect the non-signatories
thereto, since it is also premised on the eventual grant of damages to the Casasola family, hence the
same objection of prematurity obtains and such a holding may be preemptive of factual and evidentiary
matters that may be presented for consideration by the trial court.
Manila Electric Company vs. Ramoy, 547 SCRA 559, G.R. No. 158911 March 4, 2008
Civil Law; Negligence; As a public utility, MERALCO has the obligation to discharge its functions with
utmost care and diligence.—Article 1173 also provides that the fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. The Court emphasized
in Ridjo Tape & Chemical Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 544 (1998), that “as a public utility,
MERALCO has the obligation to discharge its functions with utmost care and diligence.”
Same; Same; Actions of MERALCO cannot be considered wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent; Exemplary damages should not be awarded.—The Court finds that MERALCO fell short of
exercising the due diligence required, but its actions cannot be considered wanton, fraudulent, reckless,
oppressive or malevolent. Records show that MERALCO did take some measures, i.e., coordinating with
NPC officials and conducting a joint survey of the subject area, to verify which electric meters should be
disconnected although these measures are not sufficient, considering the degree of diligence required
of it. Thus, in this case, exemplary damages should not be awarded.
Same; Same; Moral Damages; No other person could have proven such damages except the respondent
himself as they were extremely personal to him.—Leoncio Ramoy, the lone witness for respondents,
was the only one who testified regarding the effects on him of MERALCO’s electric service disconnection.
His co-respondents Matilde Ramoy, Rosemarie Ramoy, Ofelia Durian and Cyrene Panado did not present
any evidence of damages they suffered. It is a hornbook principle that damages may be awarded only if
proven. In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr., 419 SCRA 118 (2004), the Court held thus: In order that moral
damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright
and the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to prove them during the trial. Indeed, respondent should
have taken the witness stand and should have testified on the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings and other emotional and mental suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain his claim for moral
damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. No
other person could have proven such damages except the respondent himself as they were extremely
personal to him.
Briones vs. Macabagdal, 626 SCRA 300, G.R. No. 150666<br/> August 3, 2010
Same; Negligence; Damages; Requisites for Recovery of Damages under Article 2176.—Under this
provision, it is the plaintiff who has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered
by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must
respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages
incurred.
Same; Attorney’s Fees; Attorney’s fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit; court must
explicitly state in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal
reason for the award of attorney’s fees.—It must also be noted that aside from the following, the body
of the trial court’s decision was devoid of any statement regarding attorney’s fees. In Scott Consultants
& Resource Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 393 (1995), we reiterated that
attorney’s fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the court to award
attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal, and equitable justification;
its basis cannot be left to speculation or conjecture. Where granted, the court must explicitly state in the
body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of
attorney’s fees.
Bank of America NT & SA vs. Philippine Racing Club, 594 SCRA 301, G.R. No. 150228 July 30, 2009
Same; Doctrine of Last Clear Chance; In instances where both parties are at fault, this Court has
consistently applied the doctrine of last clear chance in order to assign liability.—Even if we assume that
both parties were guilty of negligent acts that led to the loss, petitioner will still emerge as the party
foremost liable in this case. In instances where both parties are at fault, this Court has consistently
applied the doctrine of last clear chance in order to assign liability. In Westmont Bank v. Ong, 375 SCRA
212 (2002), we ruled: …[I]t is petitioner [bank] which had the last clear chance to stop the fraudulent
encashment of the subject checks had it exercised due diligence and followed the proper and regular
banking procedures in clearing checks. As we had earlier ruled, the one who had a last clear opportunity
to avoid the impending harm but failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof.
Damages; Following established jurisprudential precedents, we believe the allocation of sixty percent
(60%) of the actual damages, involved in this case (represented by the amount of the checks with legal
interest) to petitioner is proper under the premises.—Following established jurisprudential precedents,
we believe the allocation of sixty percent (60%) of the actual damages involved in this case (represented
by the amount of the checks with legal interest) to petitioner is proper under the premises. Respondent
should, in light of its contributory negligence, bear forty percent (40%) of its own loss.
Attorney’s Fees; An adverse decision does not ipso facto justify an award of attorney’s fees to the
winning party.—We find that the awards of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in favor of
respondent are not justified under the circumstances and, thus, must be deleted. The power of the
court to award attorney’s fees and litigation expenses under Article 2208 of the NCC demands factual,
legal, and equitable justification. An adverse decision does not ipso facto justify an award of attorney’s
fees to the winning party. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of
bad faith could be reflected in a party’s persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the
righteousness of his cause.
Frias vs. San Diego-Sison, 520 SCRA 244, G.R. No. 155223 April 3, 2007
Interest Rates; The payment of regular interest constitutes the price or cost of the use of money and
thus, until the principal sum due is returned to the creditor, regular interest continues to accrue since
the debtor continues to use such principal amount.—The payment of regular interest constitutes the
price or cost of the use of money and thus, until the principal sum due is returned to the creditor,
regular interest continues to accrue since the debtor continues to use such principal amount. It has been
held that for a debtor to continue in possession of the principal of the loan and to continue to use the
same after maturity of the loan without payment of the monetary interest, would constitute unjust
enrichment on the part of the debtor at the expense of the creditor.
Same; The interest rate of 25% per annum awarded by the Court of Appeals to a P2 million loan is fair
and reasonable.—In Bautista v. Pilar Development Corp., 312 SCRA 611 (1999), we upheld the validity of
a 21% per annum interest on a P142,326.43 loan. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 815 (1988), we
sustained the agreement of the parties to a 24% per annum interest on an P8,649,250.00 loan. Thus, the
interest rate of 25% per annum awarded by the CA to a P2 million loan is fair and reasonable.
Contracts; Obligations; Damages; Moral damages may be awarded in culpa contractual or breach of
contract cases when the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.—We agree with the findings of
the trial court and the CA that petitioner’s act of trying to deprive respondent of the security of her loan
by executing an affidavit of loss of the title and instituting a petition for the issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT No. 168173 entitles respondent to moral damages. Moral damages may be
awarded in culpa contractual or breach of contract cases when the defendant acted fraudulently or in
bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose
or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong. It partakes of the nature of fraud.
Damages; The entitlement to moral damages having been established, the award of exemplary damages
is proper.—The entitlement to moral damages having been established, the award of exemplary
damages is proper. Exemplary damages may be imposed upon petitioner by way of example or
correction for the public good. The RTC awarded the amount of P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages. While the award of moral and exemplary damages in an aggregate amount may not be the
usual way of awarding said damages, no error has been committed by CA. There is no question that
respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages.
Attorney’s Fees; Attorney’s fees as part of the damages are not meant to enrich the winning party at the
expense of the losing litigant. They are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the
policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.—Article 2208 of the New Civil Code
enumerates the instances where such may be awarded and, in all cases, it must be reasonable, just and
equitable if the same were to be granted. Attorney’s fees as part of damages are not meant to enrich
the winning party at the expense of the losing litigant. They are not awarded every time a party prevails
in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. The award of
attorney’s fees is the exception rather than the general rule. As such, it is necessary for the trial court to
make findings of facts and law that would bring the case within the exception and justify the grant of
such award. The matter of attorney’s fees cannot be mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the
decision. They must be clearly explained and justified by the trial court in the body of its decision. On
appeal, the CA is precluded from supplementing the bases for awarding attorney’s fees when the trial
court failed to discuss in its Decision the reasons for awarding the same. Consequently, the award of
attorney’s fees should be deleted.
Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, 703 SCRA 439, G.R. No. 189871 August 13, 2013
Same; Same; Same; Article 279 of the Labor Code provides for the consequences of illegal dismissal in no
uncertain terms, qualified only by jurisprudence in its interpretation of when separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement is allowed.—That the amount respondents shall now pay has greatly increased is a
consequence that it cannot avoid as it is the risk that it ran when it continued to seek recourses against
the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Article 279 provides for the consequences of illegal dismissal in no
uncertain terms, qualified only by jurisprudence in its interpretation of when separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement is allowed. When that happens, the finality of the illegal dismissal decision becomes the
reckoning point instead of the reinstatement that the law decrees. In allowing separation pay, the final
decision effectively declares that the employment relationship ended so that separation pay and
backwages are to be computed up to that point.
Interest Rates; In the absence of an express stipulation as to the rate of interest that would govern the
parties, the rate of legal interest for loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate
allowed in judgments shall no longer be twelve percent (12%) per annum — as reflected in the case of
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 78 (1994), and Subsection X305.1 of the Manual
of Regulations for Banks and Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations for
Non-Bank Financial Institutions, before its amendment by BSP-MB Circular No. 799 — but will now be six
percent (6%) per annum effective July 1, 2013.—In the absence of an express stipulation as to the rate
of interest that would govern the parties, the rate of legal interest for loans or forbearance of any
money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in judgments shall no longer be twelve percent (12%) per
annum — as reflected in the case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 78 (1994)
and Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and
4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial Institutions, before its amendment by BSPMB Circular No. 799 — but will now be six percent (6%) per annum effective July 1, 2013. It should be
noted, nonetheless, that the new rate could only be applied prospectively and not retroactively.
Consequently, the twelve percent (12%) per annum legal interest shall apply only until June 30, 2013.
Come July 1, 2013 the new rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be the prevailing rate of interest
when applicable.
Same; Monetary Board; The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas-Monetary Board may prescribe the maximum
rate or rates of interest for all loans or renewals thereof or the forbearance of any money, goods or
credits, including those for loans of low priority such as consumer loans, as well as such loans made by
pawnshops, finance companies and similar credit institutions.—In the recent case of Advocates for Truth
in Lending, Inc. and Eduardo B. Olaguer v. Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, 688 SCRA 530 (2013), this
Court affirmed the authority of the BSP-MB to set interest rates and to issue and enforce Circulars when
it ruled that “the BSP-MB may prescribe the maximum rate or rates of interest for all loans or renewals
thereof or the forbearance of any money, goods or credits, including those for loans of low priority such
as consumer loans, as well as such loans made by pawnshops, finance companies and similar credit
institutions. It even authorizes the BSP-MB to prescribe different maximum rate or rates for different
types of borrowings, including deposits and deposit substitutes, or loans of financial intermediaries.”
Same; When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or
forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing; In the
absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e.,
from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
Code.—When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan
or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing.
Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In
the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e.,
from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil
Code.
Same; When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on
the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per
annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages, except when or
until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is
established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have
been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be
on the amount finally adjudged.
Same; When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate
of legal interest, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction.—When the judgment of
the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the
case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its
satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 572, G.R. No. 128690 January 21,
1999
Civil Law; Contracts; Damages; Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to
compensation for actual damages only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.—
We find for ABS-CBN on the issue of damages. We shall first take up actual damages. Chapter 2, Title
XVIII, Book IV of the Civil Code is the specific law on actual or compensatory damages. Except as
provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to compensation for actual damages only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. The indemnification shall comprehend not only
the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the profits that the obligee failed to obtain. In contracts
and quasi-contracts the damages which may be awarded are dependent on whether the obligor acted
with good faith or otherwise. In case of good faith, the damages recoverable are those which are the
natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation and which the parties have foreseen
or could have reasonably foreseen at the time of the constitution of the obligation. If the obligor acted
with fraud, bad faith, malice, or wanton attitude, he shall be responsible for all damages which may be
reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the
defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of, whether or not such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably
been foreseen by the defendant.
Same; Same; Same; Actual damages may likewise be recovered for loss or impairment of earning
capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury, or for injury to the plaintiff’s business
standing or commercial credit.—Actual damages may likewise be recovered for loss or impairment of
earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury, or for injury to the plaintiff’s
business standing or commercial credit. The claim of RBS for actual damages did not arise from contract,
quasi-contract, delict, or quasidelict. It arose from the fact of filing of the complaint despite ABS-CBN’s
alleged knowledge of lack of cause of action.
Same; Same; Same; In cases where a writ of preliminary injunction is issued, the damages which the
defendant may suffer by reason of the writ are recoverable from the injunctive bond.—It may further be
observed that in cases where a writ of preliminary injunction is issued, the damages which the
defendant may suffer by reason of the writ are recoverable from the injunctive bond. In this case, ABSCBN had not yet filed the required bond; as a matter of fact, it asked for reduction of the bond and even
went to the Court of Appeals to challenge the order on the matter. Clearly then, it was not necessary for
RBS to file a counterbond. Hence, ABS-CBN cannot be held responsible for the premium RBS paid for the
counterbond.
Same; Same; Same; The general rule is that attorney’s fees cannot be recovered as part of damages
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.—As regards attorney’s
fees, the law is clear that in the absence of stipulation, attorney’s fees may be recovered as actual or
compensatory damages under any of the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
The general rule is that attorney’s fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy
that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party
wins a suit. The power of the court to award attorney’s fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal,
and equitable justification. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of
bad faith could be reflected in a party’s persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the
righteousness of his cause.
Same; Same; Same; Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The award is not
meant to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured party to
obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to obviate the moral suffering he has undergone.
It is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante, and
should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Trial courts must then guard against the award of
exorbitant damages; they should exercise balanced restrained and measured objectivity to avoid
suspicion that it was due to passion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of the trial court.
Same; Same; Same; The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because,
being an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no
emotions, no senses. It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish, which
can be experienced only by one having a nervous system. The statement in People v. Manero and
Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB that a corporation may recover moral damages if it “has a good
reputation that is debased, resulting in social humiliation” is an obiter dictum. On this score alone the
award for damages must be set aside, since RBS is a corporation.
Same; Same; Same; The basic law on exemplary damages is Section 5, Chapter 3, Title XVIII, Book IV of
the Civil Code.—The basic law on exemplary damages is Section 5, Chapter 3, Title XVIII, Book IV of the
Civil Code. These are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral,
temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. They are recoverable in criminal cases as part of the
civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances; in quasidelicts, if the defendant acted with gross negligence; and in contracts and quasicontracts, if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
Same; Same; Same; Bad Faith; Malice or bad faith is at the core of Articles 19, 20, and 21. Malice or bad
faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral
obliquity. Such must be substantiated by evidence.—It may be reiterated that the claim of RBS against
ABS-CBN is not based on contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict. Hence, the claims for moral and
exemplary damages can only be based on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The elements of
abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) the existence of a legal right or duty, (2) which is
exercised in bad faith, and (3) for the sole intent of preju-dicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of
the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own
sanction; while Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: (1) there
is an act which is legal, (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy,
and (3) and it is done with intent to injure. Verily then, malice or bad faith is at the core of Articles 19, 20,
and 21. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. Such must be substantiated by evidence.
Same; Same; Same; The adverse result of an action does not per se make the action wrongful and
subject the actor to damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate. If damages result from a person’s exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria.—There is no
adequate proof that ABS-CBN was inspired by malice or bad faith. It was honestly convinced of the
merits of its cause after it had undergone serious negotiations culminating in its formal submission of a
draft contract. Settled is the rule that the adverse result of an action does not per se make the action
wrongful and subject the actor to damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on
the right to litigate. If damages result from a person’s exercise of a right, it is damnum absque injuria.
B.F. Metal (Corporation) vs. Lomotan, 551 SCRA 618, G.R. No. 170813 April 16, 2008
Civil Law; Quasi-delicts; Damages; To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent
proof of the actual amount of loss; Credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by
receipts.—Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only
for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as
actual or compensatory damages. Actual damages are such compensation or damages for an injury that
will put the injured party in the position in which he had been before he was injured. They pertain to
such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. To justify an award
of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be given
only to claims which are duly supported by receipts.
Same; Same; Same; In Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos, 345 SCRA 509 (2000), the Court
particularly disallowed the award of actual damages, considering that the actual damages suffered by
private respondents therein were based only on a job estimate and a photo showing the damage to the
truck and no competent proof on the specific amounts of actual damages suffered was presented.—In
People v. Gopio, 346 SCRA 408 (2000), the Court allowed the reimbursement of only the laboratory fee
that was duly receipted as “the rest of the documents, which the prosecution presented to prove the
actual expenses incurred by the victim, were merely a doctor’s prescription and a handwritten list of
food expenses.” In Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos, 345 SCRA 509 (2000), the Court
particularly disallowed the award of actual damages, considering that the actual damages suffered by
private respondents therein were based only on a job estimate and a photo showing the damage to the
truck and no competent proof on the specific amounts of actual damages suffered was presented.
Same; Same; Same; Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining
the fact and amount of damages.—In the instant case, no evidence was submitted to show the amount
actually spent for the repair or replacement of the wrecked jeep. Spouses Lomotan presented two
different cost estimates to prove the alleged actual damage of the wrecked jeep. Exhibit “B,” is a job
estimate by Pagawaan Motors, Inc., which pegged the repair cost of the jeep at P96,000.00, while
Exhibit “M,” estimated the cost of repair at P130,655.00. Following Viron, neither estimate is competent
to prove actual damages. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in
determining the fact and amount of damages.
Same; Same; Same; Moral Damages; In order that an award of moral damages can be aptly justified, the
claimant must be able to satisfactorily prove that he has suffered such damages and that the injury
causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.—In the
case of moral damages, recovery is more an exception rather than the rule. Moral damages are not
punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person. In order that an award of moral damages
can be aptly justified, the claimant must be able to satisfactorily prove that he has suffered such
damages and that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and
2220 of the Civil Code. Then, too, the damages must be shown to be the proximate result of a
wrongful act or omission. The claimant must establish the factual basis of the damages and its causal tie
with the acts of the defendant. In fine, an award of moral damages would require, firstly, evidence of
besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly,
a culpable act or omission factually established; thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case
is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the
Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner’s liability is based on a quasi-delict or on its negligence in the
supervision and selection of its driver; Rivera is also liable for moral damages to respondent Umuyon
based on either culpa criminal or quasi-delict.—In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when an act or
omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, moral damages
may aptly be recovered. This rule also applies, as aforestated, to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. In culpa criminal, moral damages could be lawfully due
when the accused is found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or
arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation. Undoubtedly, petitioner is liable for the
moral damages suffered by respondent Umuyon. Its liability is based on a quasi-delict or on its
negligence in the supervision and selection of its driver, causing the vehicular accident and physical
injuries to respondent Umuyon. Rivera is also liable for moral damages to respondent Umuyon based on
either culpa criminal or quasi-delict.
Same; Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be
proved, the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be
awarded.—Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Exemplary damages
cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the
question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded.
Expertravel & Tours, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 141, G.R. No. 130030 June 25, 1999 (landmark
case on moral damages)
Actions; Damages; Requisites for Award of Moral Damages.—Moral damages are not punitive in nature
but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
injury unjustly caused to a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages,
nevertheless, must somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. Such
damages, to be recoverable, must be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission the factual basis
for which is satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party. An award of moral damages would require
certain conditions to be met; to wit: (1) first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or
psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there must be a culpable act or omission
factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of
the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the
cases stated in Article 2219.
Same; Same; Same; Contracts; Statutory Construction; Ejusdem Generis; In culpa contractual or breach
of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of
gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation and,
exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries;
The term “analogous cases,” referred to in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, following the ejusdem generis
rule, must be held similar to those expressly enumerated by the law.—Under the provisions of this law,
in culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant
acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of
his contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive
of tort resulting in physical injuries. By special rule in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil
Code, moral damages may also be awarded in case the death of a passenger results from a breach of
carriage. In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b)
where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, moral damages may aptly be recovered. This rule also
applies, as aforestated, to contracts when breached by tort. In culpa criminal, moral damages could be
lawfully due when the accused is found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or
concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation. Malicious
prosecution can also give rise to a claim for moral damages. The term “analogous cases,” referred to in
Article 2219, following the ejusdem generis rule, must be held similar to those expressly enumerated by
the law.
Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a
legal justification for an award of attorney’s fees, such filing, however, has almost invariably been held
not to be a ground for an award of moral damages.—Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil
suit can at times be a legal justification for an award of attorney’s fees, such filing, however, has almost
invariably been held not to be a ground for an award of moral damages. The rationale for the rule is that
the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. The anguish suffered by a
person for having been made a defendant in a civil suit would be no different from the usual worry and
anxiety suffered by anyone who is haled to court, a situation that cannot by itself be a cogent reason for
the award of moral damages. If the rule were otherwise, then moral damages must every time be
awarded in favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful plaintiff.
Kierulf vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 433, G.R. No. 99301, G.R. No. 99343 March 13, 1997 (guba ang
sexlife sa spouses) (deprivation of marital consortium)
Civil Law; Damages; The social and financial standing of a claimant of moral damages may be considered
in awarding moral damages only if he or she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the
offender’s knowledge of his or her social and financial standing.—The social and financial standing of
Lucila cannot be considered in awarding moral damages. The factual circumstances prior to the accident
show that no “rude and rough” reception, no “menacing attitude,” no “supercilious manner,” no
“abusive language and highly scornful reference” was given her. The social and financial standing of a
claimant of moral damages may be considered in awarding moral damages only if he or she was
subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender’s knowledge of his or her social and financial
standing.
Same; Same; Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; Certain requirements before
exemplary damages may be awarded.—Exemplary damages are designed to permit the courts to mould
behavior that has socially deleterious consequences, and its imposition is required by public policy to
suppress the wanton acts of an offender. However, it cannot be recovered as a matter of right. It is
based entirely on the discretion of the court. Jurisprudence sets certain requirements before exemplary
damages may be awarded, to wit: “(1)(T)hey may be imposed by way of example or correction only in
addition, among others, to compensatory damages, and cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their
determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the
claimant; (2) the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages; and (3) the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the award would be allowed
only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.”
Same; Same; Moral damages though incapable of pecuniary estimation are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimants for actual injury and are not meant to enrich complainant at the
expense of defendant.—Lost income in the amount of P16,500.00 is also claimed by Legaspi stating that
his “whole future has been jeopardized.” This, in turn, is not rebutted by Pantranco. It should be noted
that Respondent Court already considered this when it stated that the award of P25,000.00 included
compensation for “mental anguish and emotional strain of not earning anything with a family to
support.” Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury and are not meant to enrich complainant at the
expense of defendant.
Same; Same; A party is entitled to adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered and
duly proved.—We agree with the findings of Respondent Court that Lucila’s claim of loss of earning
capacity has not been duly proven. The alleged loss must be established by factual evidence for it
partakes of actual damages. A party is entitled to adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss
actually suffered and duly proved. Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof,
but must actually be shown with a reasonable degree of certainty. We have emphasized that these
damages cannot be presumed, and courts in making an award must point out specific facts which can
serve as basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.
Sulpicio Lines, Inc. vs. Curso, 615 SCRA 575, G.R. No. 157009 March 17, 2010 (The boat is sinking) (claim
of siblings for moral damages: Not proper as provided under article 2206)
Common Carriers; Damages; Statutory Construction; The omission from Article 2206(3) of the brothers
and sisters of the deceased passenger reveals the legislative intent to exclude them from the recovery of
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased—the solemn power and duty
of the courts to interpret and apply the law do not include the power to correct the law by reading into
it was is not written therein.—As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for
damages predicated on a breach of contract, unless there is fraud or bad faith. As an exception, moral
damages may be awarded in case of breach of contract of carriage that results in the death of a
passenger, in accordance with Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206 (3), of the Civil Code, which
provide: x x x The foregoing legal provisions set forth the persons entitled to moral damages. The
omission from Article 2206 (3) of the brothers and sisters of the deceased passenger reveals the
legislative intent to exclude them from the recovery of moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
the death of the deceased. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. The solemn power and duty of the courts
to interpret and apply the law do not include the power to correct the law by reading into it what is not
written therein. Thus, the CA erred in awarding moral damages to the respondents.
Same; Same; Moral Damages; To be entitled to moral damages, a party must have a right based upon
law.—The purpose of moral damages is indemnity or reparation, that is, to enable the injured party to
obtain the means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has
undergone by reason of the tragic event. According to Villanueva v. Salvador, 480 SCRA 39 (2006), the
conditions for awarding moral damages are: (a) there must be an injury, whether physical, mental, or
psychological, clearly substantiated by the claimant; (b) there must be a culpable act or omission
factually established; (c) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant must be the proximate cause of
the injury sustained by the claimant; and (d) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases
stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. To be entitled to moral damages, the respondents must have a
right based upon law. It is true that under Article 1003 of the Civil Code they succeeded to the entire
estate of the late Dr. Curso in the absence of the latter’s descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children,
and surviving spouse. However, they were not included among the persons entitled to recover moral
damages, as enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Ejusdem Generis; The usage of the phrase analogous cases in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code means simply that the situation must be held similar to those expressly enumerated in the
law in question following the ejusdem generis rule.—Article 2219 circumscribes the instances in which
moral damages may be awarded. The provision does not include succession in the collateral line as a
source of the right to recover moral damages. The usage of the phrase analogous cases in the provision
means simply that the situation must be held similar to those expressly enumerated in the law in
question following the ejusdem generis rule. Hence, Article 1003 of the Civil Code is not concerned with
recovery of moral damages.
Arcona vs. Court of Appeals, 393 SCRA 524, G.R. No. 134784 December 9, 2002
(automatic award of damages is case of death)
Same; Same; Damages; Moral damages must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and
proof of the heirs’ emotional suffering.—On the other hand, the award of moral damages in the sum of
P10,000.00 must be increased to P50,000.00. As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent
death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s
family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the
victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from the family of
the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but often leaves
them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this reason, moral damages
must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ emotional suffering.
Industrial Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Bondad, 330 SCRA 706, G.R. No. 136722 April 12, 2000
Civil Law; Attorney’s Fees; Attorney’s fees may be awarded by a court if one who claims it is compelled
to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect one’s interests by reason of an unjustified
act or omission on the part of the party from whom it is sought.—Attorney’s fees may be awarded by a
court if one who claims it is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect one’s
interests by reason of an unjustified act or omission on the part of the party from whom it is sought, x x
x In impleading respondents, petitioner clearly acted in wanton disregard of facts that were as obvious
then as they are now. To repeat, even a cursory examination of the police investigation report and other
pertinent data at the time would show that there was no reason to implead respondents. The
carelessness and lack of diligence of petitioner destroy its claim of good faith. Accordingly, the award of
attorney’s fees should be sustained.
Same; Damages; Requisites in order that the award of moral damages may be sustained.—In the same
vein, we affirm the award of moral damages. To sustain this award, it must be shown that (1) the
claimant suffered injury, and (2) such injury sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220
of the Civil Code. It is not enough that the claimant alleges mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded
feelings, social humiliation, and the like as a result of the acts of the other party. It is necessary that such
acts be shown to have been tainted with bad faith or ill motive.
Same; Same; A person’s right to litigate, as a rule, should not be penalized; Right must be exercised in
good faith.—The Court affirms the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses. The facts of this case clearly show that petitioner was motivated by bad faith in
impleading respondents. Indeed, a person’s right to litigate, as a rule, should not be penalized. This right,
however, must be exercised in good faith.
Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, 299 SCRA 608, G.R. No. 129584 December 3, 1998
(Landmark nasad) (kayod kalabaw sa saudi, halang nga labud)
Same; Same; Well-settled is the rule that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the
employer and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.—Well-settled is
the rule that if doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the
scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. Thus, in controversies between a worker and her
employer, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence or in the interpretation of agreements should be
resolved in favor of the former.
Same; Same; In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal
is for a just cause.—The present case being one for illegal dismissal, it was incumbent upon petitioner
employer to show by substantial evidence that the termination was validly made. In termination cases,
the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just cause. Having failed to
file its position paper and to support its denials and affirmative defenses in its answer, petitioner cannot
now fault the labor arbiter and the NLRC for relying on the facts as laid down by Osdana in her position
paper and supported by other documents. The essence of due process is that a party be afforded
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense,
and this is exactly what petitioner was accorded, although it chose not to fully avail thereof.
Same; Labor Code; The manner by which Osdana was terminated was clearly in violation of the Labor
Code and its implementing rules and regulations.—Viewed in the light of the foregoing provisions, the
manner by which Osdana was terminated was clearly in violation of the Labor Code and its
implementing rules and regulations. In the first place, Osdana’s continued employment despite her
illness was not prohibited by law nor was it prejudicial to her health, as well as that of her co-employees.
In fact, the medical report issued after her second operation stated that “she had very good
improvement of the symptoms.” Besides, “Carpal Tunnel Syndrome” is not a contagious disease.
Same; Same; The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be
dispensed with.—If, indeed, Osdana was physically unfit to continue her employment, her employer
could have easily obtained a certification to that effect from a competent public health authority in
Saudi Arabia, thereby heading off any complaint for illegal dismissal. The requirement for a medical
certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction
the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employee’s
illness and thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor.
Same; Same; Damages; Moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was
attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.—With respect to the award of moral and exemplary
damages, the same is likewise proper but should be reduced. Worth reiterating is the rule that moral
damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or
constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or
public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner.
Regala vs. Carin, 647 SCRA 419, G.R. No. 188715 April 6, 2011
Civil Law; Moral Damages; To be entitled to such an award, the claimant must satisfactorily prove that
he has suffered damages and that the injury causing it has sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles
2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code; The damages must be shown to be the proximate result of a wrongful
act or omission.—In prayers for moral damages, however, recovery is more an exception rather than the
rule. Moral damages are not meant to be punitive but are designed to compensate and alleviate the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person. To be entitled to such an
award, the claimant must satisfactorily prove that he has suffered damages and that the injury causing it
has sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the
damages must be shown to be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission. The claimant must
thus establish the factual basis of the damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant.
Same; Same; Requisites for the Award of Moral Damages.—In fine, an award of moral damages calls for
the presentation of 1) evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering
sustained by the claimant; 2) a culpable act or omission factually established; 3) proof that the wrongful
act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and
4) the proof that the act is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219
and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice
or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.—Malice
or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or
moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. While the Court
harbors no doubt that the incidents which gave rise to this dispute have brought anxiety and anguish to
respondent, it is unconvinced that the damage inflicted upon respondent’s property was malicious or
willful, an element crucial to merit an award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
203902
Estrada vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., 831 SCRA 349, G.R. No. 203902 July 19, 2017
Civil Law; Damages; Moral Damages; Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may
be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission.—Moral
damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s
wrongful act or omission. Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the
following and analogous cases: (1) a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) quasi-delicts
causing physical injuries; (3) seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts; (4) adultery or
concubinage; (5) illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) illegal search; (7) libel, slander, or any other
form of defamation; (8) malicious prosecution; (9) acts mentioned in Article 309; and (10) acts and
actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
Same; Same; Same; Breach of Contract of Carriage; Since breach of contract is not one of the items
enumerated under Article 2219, moral damages, as a general rule, are not recoverable in actions for
damages predicated on breach of contract.—Since breach of contract is not one of the items
enumerated under Article 2219, moral damages, as a general rule, are not recoverable in actions for
damages predicated on breach of contract. “x x x As an exception, such damages are recoverable [in an
action for breach of contract:] (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as
provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in x x x cases in which the
carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Article 2220.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Bad Faith; Fraud; Allegations of bad faith and fraud must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence.—It has been held, however, that “allegations of bad faith and fraud must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence.” They are never presumed considering that they are serious
accusations that can be so conveniently and casually invoked. And unless convincingly substantiated by
whoever is alleging them, they amount to mere slogans or mudslinging. In this case, the fraud or bad
faith that must be convincingly proved by petitioners should be one which was committed by Philippine
Rabbit in breaching its contract of carriage with Dionisio. Unfortunately for petitioners, the Court finds
no persuasive proof of such fraud or bad faith. Fraud has been defined to include an inducement
through insidious machination. Insidious machination refers to a deceitful scheme or plot with an evil or
devious purpose. Deceit exists where the party, with intent to deceive, conceals or omits to state
material facts and, by reason of such omission or concealment, the other party was induced to give
consent that would not otherwise have been given.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Bad faith “does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a
known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.”—Bad faith,
on the other hand, “does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty through
some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.” There is no showing here that
Philippine Rabbit induced Dionisio to enter into a contract of carriage with the former through insidious
machination. Neither is there any indication or even an allegation of deceit or concealment or omission
of material facts by reason of which Dionisio boarded the bus owned by Philippine Rabbit. Likewise, it
was not shown that Philippine Rabbit’s breach of its known duty, which was to transport Dionisio from
Urdaneta to La Union, was attended by some motive, interest, or ill will. From these, no fraud or bad
faith can be attributed to Philippine Rabbit.
Same; Same; Actual Damages; Loss of Earning Capacity; It is settled that “damages for loss [or
impairment] of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages.”—It is settled that “damages for loss
[or impairment] of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages x x x.” Actual or compensatory
damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for an injury or loss he suffered. They arise
out of a sense of natural justice, aimed at repairing the wrong done. To be recoverable, they must be
duly proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture, or
guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they
have suffered, and on evidence of the actual amount thereof. Thus, as a rule, documentary evidence
should be presented to substantiate the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of
exception, damages for loss [or impairment] of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of
documentary evidence when (1) the deceased [or the injured] was self-employed and earning less than
the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that
in the deceased’s line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased was employed
as a daily worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
Same; Same; Temperate Damages; Under Article 2224, “[t]emperate or moderate damages, which are
more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that
some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved
with certainty.”—Nonetheless, since it was established that Dionisio lost his right arm, temperate
damages in lieu of actual damages for loss/impairment of earning capacity may be awarded in his favor.
Under Article 2224, “[t]emperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.”
Legal Interest; The amounts of damages awarded are declared subject to legal interest of six percent
(6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until full satisfaction.—In addition, the amounts of
damages awarded are declared subject to legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this
Decision until full satisfaction.
Caguioa, J., Concurring Opinion:
Civil Law; Breach of Contract of Carriage; Quasi-Delicts; View that in cases of breach of contract of
carriage (culpa contractual) the liability of the common carrier or employer is direct and immediate, not
merely subsidiary or secondary while in cases of quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana), the liability of the
common carrier (employer) and the negligent driver (employee) is direct, primary, and solidary.—While
the trial court treated Dionisio’s complaint for damages as one predicated on breach of contract of
carriage, it nonetheless found that Philippine Rabbit failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its negligent driver, rendering it solidarily liable for damages.
This standard (diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of an employee) is
applicable in cases of quasi-­delict, not breach of contract of carriage, as the latter carries a different
standard (exercise of extraordinary diligence in the performance of its contractual obligation). Moreover,
in cases of breach of contract of carriage (culpa contractual) the liability of the common carrier or
employer is direct and immediate, not merely subsidiary or secondary, while in cases of quasi­-delict
(culpa aquiliana), the liability of the common carrier (employer) and the negligent driver (employee) is
direct, primary, and solidary. Thus, in a case of breach of contract of carriage, the common carrier is the
person liable and not the driver, while in a case of quasi-delict, both the common carrier and the driver
are liable.
Same; Damages; Actual Damages; View that testimonial evidence may be sufficient to establish the
award of actual damages for loss of compensation, in cases where the victim is: (1) self-employed and
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be
taken of the fact that in the deceased’s line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (2) was
employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.—On
the issue of actual damages, I believe that they could have been granted based on the testimony of
Dionisio. Testimonial evidence may be sufficient to establish the award of actual damages for loss of
compensation, in cases where the victim is: (1) self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage
under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased’s
line of work, no documentary evidence is available; or (2) was employed as a daily wage worker earning
less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
Same; Same; Same; Loss of Earning Capacity; View that as a self-employed part-time tricycle driver, who
was earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws and judicial notice is taken that no
documentary evidence is available to prove the minimum wage in that line of work, Dionisio’s testimony
is sufficient to support the award of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) for loss of earning
capacity as computed by him.—While Dionisio was employed as a public schoolteacher at the time of
the accident, he also worked part-time as a tricycle driver. Dionisio testified that P80.00 is his average
daily earnings in his sideline as a tricycle driver. The amount could not possibly pertain to his loss of
income as a public schoolteacher because he continued practicing his profession despite the amputation
of his right arm. Rather, the loss of his right arm has a direct bearing on his ability to drive a tricycle. That
Dionisio has to drive a tricycle to augment his salary as a public schoolteacher is both lamentable and
condemnable. If a tricycle passenger pays P20.00 for a special trip, which is a conservative estimate,
then P80.00 covers only four (4) trips. Thus, as a self-employed part-time tricycle driver, who was
earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws and judicial notice is taken that no
documentary evidence is available to prove the minimum wage in that line of work, Dionisio’s testimony
is sufficient to support the award of P500,000.00 for loss of earning capacity as computed by him.
Republic vs. Tuvera, 516 SCRA 113, G.R. No. 148246 February 16, 2007
Civil Law; Damages; An action for recovery of sum of money must prove the amount sought to be
recovered; The Republic failed to prove damages.—It bears to the most primitive of reasons that an
action for recovery of sum of money must prove the amount sought to be recovered. In the case at bar,
the Republic rested its case without presenting any evidence, documentary or testimonial, to establish
the amount that should be restituted to the State by reason of the illegal acts committed by the
respondents. There is the bare allegation in the complaint that the State is entitled to P48 million by way
of actual damages, but no single proof presented as to why the State is entitled to such amount. Actual
damages must be proven, not presumed. The Republic failed to prove damages. It is not enough for the
Republic to have established, as it did, the legal travesty that led to the wrongful obtention by Twin
Peaks of the TLA. It should have established the degree of injury sustained by the State by reason of
such wrongful act.
Same; Same; A juridical person is not entitled to moral damages under Article 2217 of the Civil Code; It
may avail of moral damages under the analogous cases listed in Article 2219, such as for libel, slander or
any other form of defamation.—As explained, a juridical person is not entitled to moral damages under
Article 2217 of the Civil Code. It may avail of moral damages under the analogous cases listed in Article
2219, such as for libel, slander or any other form of defamation. Suffice it to say that the action at bar
does not involve any of the analogous cases under Article 2219, and indeed upon an intelligent reading
of Article 2219, it is difficult to see how the Republic could sustain any of the injuries contemplated
therein. Any lawyer for the Republic who poses a claim for moral damages in behalf of the State stands
in risk of serious ridicule.
Temperate Damages; Jurisprudence applying Article 2224 is clear that temperate damages may be
awarded even in instances where pecuniary loss could theoretically have been proved with certainty.—
There is sufficient basis for an award of temperate damages, also sought by the Republic
notwithstanding the fact that a claim for both actual and temperate damages is internally inconsistent.
Temperate or moderate damages avail when “the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount can not from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.” The textual
language might betray an intent that temperate damages do not avail when the case, by its nature, is
susceptible to proof of pecuniary loss; and certainly the Republic could have proved pecuniary loss
herein. Still, jurisprudence applying Article 2224 is clear that temperate damages may be awarded even
in instances where pecuniary loss could theoretically have been proved with certainty.
Same; Exemplary Damages; The allowance of temperate damages also paves the way for the award of
exemplary damages.—The allowance of temperate damages also paves the way for the award of
exemplary damages. Under Article 2234 of the Civil Code, a showing that the plaintiff is entitled to
temperate damages allows for the award of exemplary damages. Even as exemplary damages cannot be
recovered as a matter of right, the courts are empowered to decide whether or not they should be
adjudicated. Ill-gotten wealth cases are hornbook demonstrations where damages by way of example or
correction for the public good should be awarded. Fewer causes of action deserve the stigma left by
exemplary damages, which “serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially
deleterious actions.”
Lopez, et al. vs. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431, No. L-22415 March 30, 1966
Carriers; Breach of contract to provide first class accommodations; Case at bar.—Plaintiffs made first
class reservations with defendant in its Tokyo-San Francisco flight. The reservations having been
confirmed, first class tickets were subsequently issued in favor of plaintiffs. Through mistake, however,
defendant’s agents cancelled the said reservations. Expecting that some cancellations of bookings would
be made before the flight time, the reservations supervisor decided to withhold from plaintiffs the
information that their reservations had been cancelled. Upon arrival in Tokyo, defendant informed
plaintiffs that there was no accommodation for them in the first class stating that they could not go
unless they take the tourist class. Due to pressing engagements in the United States, plaintiffs were
constrained to take the flight as tourist passengers, but they did so under protest. Query: Whether
defendant acted in bad faith in the breach of its contract with plaintiffs. Held: In so misleading
plaintiffs into purchasing first class tickets in the conviction that they had confirmed reservations for the
same, when in fact they had none, defendant wilfully and knowingly placed itself into the position of
having to breach its aforesaid contracts with plaintiffs should there be no last-minute cancellation by
other passengers before flight time, as it turned out in this case. Such actuation of defendant may
indeed have been promoted by nothing more than the promotion of its self-interest in holding on to
plaintiffs as passengers in its flight and foreclosing their chances to seek the services of other airlines
that may have been able to afford them first class accommodations. All the same, in legal contemplation,
such conduct already amounts to action in bad faith.
Same; Meaning of bad faith.—Bad faith means a breach of a known duty through some motive of
interest or illwill. Selfenrichment or fraternal interest, and not personal illwill, may have been the motive,
but it is malice nevertheless.
Same; Moral damages and exemplary are recoverable for breach of contract of carriage in bad faith.—As
a proximate result of defendant’s breach in bad faith of its contracts with plaintiffs, the latter suffered
social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety and mental anguish. For plaintiffs were travelling
with first class tickets issued by defendant and yet they were given only the tourist class. At stopovers,
they were expected to be among the first-class passengers by those awaiting to welcome them, only to
be found among the tourist passengers. It may not be humiliating to travel as tourist passengers; it is
humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the
contractual undertaking.
The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the name implies, to provide an example or
correction for public good. Defendant having breached its contracts in bad faith, the court may award
exemplary damages in addition to moral damages (Articles 2229, 2232, New Civil Code). In view of its
nature, it should be imposed in such amount as to sufficiently and effectively deter similar breach of
contracts in the future by defendant or other airlines.
Same; Attorney’s fees; When written contract for attorney’s fees controls the amount to be paid
therefor is a case of breach of contract of carriage.—A written contract for attorney’s services shall
control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
A consideration of the subject matter of the present controversy, of the professional standing of the
attorney for plaintiffs-appellants, and of the extent of the services rendered by him, shows that the
amount provided for in the written agreement is reasonable.
Same; Factors considered in fixing damages.—In the case at bar the damages were determined by
considering the official, political, social and financial standing of the offended parties on one hand and
the business and financial position of the offender on the other.
Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 303, G.R. No. 115024, G.R. No. 117944 February 7, 1996
Torts; Motor Vehicles; Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses—physiological “fight or flight”
mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion,
drowsiness, etc.—One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Li’s disingenuous and
patently self-serving asseverations. The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty
applying the brakes to a car traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light rainfall, the visibility of the
street, and the road conditions on a principal metropolitan throroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li
would have had ample time to react to the changing conditions of the road if he were alert—as every
driver should be—to those conditions. Driving exacts a more than usual toll on the senses. Physiological
“fight or flight” mechanisms are at work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol,
exhaustion, drowsiness, etc. Li’s failure to react in a manner which would have avoided the accident
could therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors: 1) that he was driving at a “very
fast” speed as testified by Rodriguez; and 2) that he was under the influence of alcohol. Either factor
working independently would have diminished his responsiveness to road conditions, since normally he
would have slowed down prior to reaching Valenzuela’s car, rather than be in a situation forcing him to
suddenly apply his brakes.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Contributory Negligence, Defined.—Contributory negligence is
conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered,
which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Based on the
foregoing definition, the standard or act to which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have
conformed for her own protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking
zone. We cannot agree.
Same; Same; Same; “Emergency Rule,” Explained; An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation
of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.—Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted
with an emergency is not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who
is in no such situation. The law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or
dangerous situations and does not require the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from
persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes threatening conditions. Under the “emergency rule”
adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation
of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own
negligence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will
not be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard
to other motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn
on a dark street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her
not to stop and assess the emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a noparking zone) because the hobbling vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists.
Same; Same; Same; “Negligence,” Explained; Negligence, as it is commonly understood, is conduct
which creates an undue risk of harm to others—it is the failure to observe that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury.—Obviously in the case at bench, the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the
night of the accident. “Negligence, as it is commonly understood, is conduct which creates an undue risk
of harm to others.” It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. We stressed, in Corliss vs.
Manila Railroad Company, that negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances.
Same; Employer-Employee Relationships; The liability of an employer for the negligence of his employee
is not based on the principle of respondeat superior but that of pater familias.—We agree with the
respondent court that the relationship in question is not based on the principle of respondeat superior,
which holds the master liable for acts of the servant, but that of pater familias, in which the liability
ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family
in the selection and supervision of his employees.
Same; Same; Once evidence is introduced showing that the em ployer exercised the required amount of
care in selecting its employees, half of the employer’s burden is overcome, but the question of diligent
supervision depends on the circumstances of employment.—The employer’s primary liability under the
concept of pater familias embodied by Art. 2180 (in relation to Art. 2176) of the Civil Code is quasidelictual or tortious in character. His liability is relieved on a showing that he exercised the diligence of a
good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Once evidence is introduced
showing that the employer exercised the required amount of care in selecting its employees, half of the
employer’s burden is overcome. The question of diligent supervision, however, depends on the
circumstances of employment.
Same; Same; Company Car Plans; Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised
diligent supervision of its employee during the performance of the latter’s assigned tasks would be
enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil
Code.—Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent supervision of its
employee during the performance of the latter’s assigned tasks would be enough to relieve him of the
liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The employer is not
expected to exercise supervision over either the employee’s private activities or during the performance
of tasks either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employee’s tasks. The case at bench
presents a situation of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies with either
their employees of managerial rank or their representatives.
Same; Same; Same; When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its employee, it
in effect guarantees that it is, like every good father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege
reasonably and responsively.—Most pharmaceutical companies, for instance, which provide cars under
the first plan, require rigorous tests of road worthiness from their agents prior to turning over the car
(subject of company maintenance) to their representatives. In other words, like a good father of a family,
they entrust the company vehicle only after they are satisfied that the employee to whom the car has
been given full use of the said company car for company or private purposes will not be a threat or
menace to himself, the company or to others. When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a
company car to its employee, it in effect guarantees that it is, like every good father, satisfied that its
employee will use the privilege reasonably and responsively.
Same; Same; Same; A company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the managerial or
other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the
company issue capably and responsibly.—Since important business transactions and decisions may
occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited
use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company and only
incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the managerial employee
or company sales agent. As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purpose
of furthering the company’s image, a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the
managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are
able to use the company issue capably and responsibly.
Same; Same; Same; Where no allegations were made as to whether or not the company took the steps
necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of its employee to whom it gave
full and unlimited use of a company car, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias,
ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries caused to third persons.—In fine,
Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as
to whether or not the company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving
proficiency and history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been
able to overcome the burden of demonstrating that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its
company car to Li, said company, based on the principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and
severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.
Same; Damages; While moral damages are not meant to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of a
defendant, the award should nonetheless be commensurate to the suffering inflicted.—Finally, we find
no reason to overturn the amount of damages awarded by the respondent court, except as to the
amount of moral damages. In the case of moral damages, while the said damages are not intended to
enrich the plaintiff at the expense of a defendant, the award should nonetheless be commensurate to
the suffering inflicted. In the instant case we are of the opinion that the reduction in moral damages
from an amount of P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00 by the Court of Appeals was not justified considering
the nature of the resulting damage and the predictable sequelae of the injury.
Same; Same; It would be highly speculative to estimate the amount of psychological pain, damage and
injury which goes with the sudden severing of a vital portion of the human body—the resultant anxiety,
sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental and physical pain are inestimable.—The foregoing discussion
does not even scratch the surface of the nature of the resulting damage because it would be highly
speculative to estimate the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury which goes with the
sudden severing of a vital portion of the human body. A prosthetic device, however technologically
advanced, will only allow a reasonable amount of functional restoration of the motor functions of the
lower limb. The sensory functions are forever lost. The resultant anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological,
injury, mental and physical pain are inestimable. (1m for moral damages)
Robes-Francisco Realty & Development Corporation vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal (Branch XXXIV),
86 SCRA 59, No. L-41093 October 30, 1978
Contracts; Sale; Damages; A contract of sale which stipulate payment of interest at 4% per annum in
case vendor fails to issue a certificate of title to vendee is not a penal clause because even without it
vendee would be entitled to interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum.—The foregoing argument of
petitioner is totally devoid of merit. We would agree with petitioner if the clause in question were to be
considered as a penal clause. Nevertheless, for very obvious reasons, said clause does not convey any
penalty, for even without it, pursuant to Article 2209 of the Civil Code, the vendee would be entitled to
recover the amount paid by her with legal rate of interest which is even more than the 4% provided for
in the clause. It is therefore inconceivable that the aforecited provision in the deed of sale is a penal
clause which will preclude an award of damages to the vendee Millan. In fact the clause is so worded as
to work to the advantage of petitioner corporation.
Same; Same; Same; Nominal damages are not for indemnification of loss but vindication of right violated
or invaded. They are recoverable where some injury has been done the amount of which the evidence
fails to show, the assessment of damages being left to the discretion of the court according to the
circumstances of the case. (there are just small amount, not really commensurate the sa damages
suffered)
Same; Same; Same; P10,000.00 awarded as nominal damages is not unreasonable.—To conclude, We
hold that the sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) by way of nominal damages is fair and just under
the following circumstances, viz: respondent Millan bought the lot from petitioner in May, 1962, and
paid in full her installments on December 22, 1971, but it was only on March 2, 1973, that a deed of
absolute sale was executed in her favor, and notwithstanding the lapse of almost three years since she
made her last payment, petitioner still failed to convey the corresponding transfer certificate of title to
Millan who accordingly was compelled to file the instant complaint in August of 1974.
Gonzales, Jr. vs. People, 515 SCRA 480, G.R. No. 159950 February 12, 2007
Damages; The records do not show concrete proof of the amount of actual damages suffered by each
complaining witness—thus, we cannot grant actual damages—however, we may award nominal and
temperate damages.—On the damages, we have consistently held that proof is required to determine
the reasonable amount of damages that may be awarded to the victims of conflagration. As a rule,
therefore, actual or compensatory damages must be proved and not merely alleged. The records do not
show concrete proof of the amount of actual damages suffered by each complaining witness. Thus, we
cannot grant actual damages. However, we may award nominal and temperate damages.
Francisco vs. Ferrer, Jr., 353 SCRA 261, G.R. No. 142029 February 28, 2001 (wa kaabot ang wedding
cake sa reception)
Civil Law; Damages; Moral damages may be awarded in breaches of contracts where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith.—“To recover moral damages in an action for breach of contract, the
breach must be palpably wanton, reckless, malicious, in bad faith, oppressive or abusive.” “Under the
provisions of this law, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered
when the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in
wanton disregard of his contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract
itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries.” “Moral damages may be awarded in breaches
of contracts where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.”
Same; Same; Same; Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence.—“Bad faith does
not simply connote bad judgment or negligence, it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity
and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that
partakes of the nature of fraud.”
Same; Same; Same; The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear
and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith; It must be shown that the proximate
cause thereof was the unlawful act or omission of the wrongdoer.—“Moral damages are in the category
of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty
on the wrongdoer.” “The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear
and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely
suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as the result of the actuation of the other
party. Invariably such action must be shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive.”
“Mere allegations of besmirched reputation, embarrassment and sleepless nights are insufficient to
warrant an award for moral damages. It must be shown that the proximate cause thereof was the
unlawful act or omission of the [private respondent] petitioners.”
Same; Same; Same; Certain Conditions Required in Awarding Moral Damages.—“An award of moral
damages would require certain conditions to be met, to wit: (1) first, there must be an injury, whether
physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there must be culpable
act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages is
predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219” of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; To warrant the award of exemplary damages, the wrongful act must he accompanied by
bad faith and the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner;
Requirements of an Award of Exemplary Damages.—In the same fashion, to warrant the award of
exemplary damages, “[t]he wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages
would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner.”
“The requirements of an award of exemplary damages are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example
in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimant’s right to them has been established;
(2) that they can not be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount
of compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by
bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Guanio vs. Makati Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc., 641 SCRA 591, G.R. No. 190601 February 7, 2011
(ask in the bar already)
Civil Law; Contracts; Breach of Contract; Words and Phrases; Breach of contract is defined as the failure
without legal reason to comply with the terms of a contract.—Breach of contract is defined as the failure
without legal reason to comply with the terms of a contract. It is also defined as the [f]ailure, without
legal excuse, to perform any promise which forms the whole or part of the contract. The appellate court,
and even the trial court, observed that petitioners were remiss in their obligation to inform respondent
of the change in the expected number of guests. The observation is reflected in the records of the case.
Petitioners’ failure to discharge such obligation thus excused, as the above-quoted paragraph 4.5 of the
parties’ contract provide, respondent from liability for “any damage or inconvenience” occasioned
thereby.
People vs. Marquez, 648 SCRA 694, G.R. No. 181440 April 13, 2011
Same; Same; Moral Damages; The crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor is analogous to
illegal and arbitrary detention or arrest, thereby justifying the award of moral damages.—In People v.
Bernardo, 378 SCRA 708 (2002), we held that the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor
under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code is clearly analogous to illegal and arbitrary detention or
arrest, thereby justifying the award of moral damages.
Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 584, G.R. No. 124354 December 29, 1999
Same; Evidence; Res Ipsa Loquitur; Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur.—Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase
which literally means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” The phrase “res ipsa loquitur” is a
maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s
prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the
thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or
his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have
its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendant’s want of
care.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Res Ipsa Loquitur is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common
knowledge.—The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter
of common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an
inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in
the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the
superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge,
negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is
applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of negligence; Requisites before resort to the doctrine may be allowed.—Much
has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and, as such, does not create or
constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. Instead, it is considered as merely evidentiary
or in the nature of a procedural rule. It is regarded as a mode of proof, or a mere procedural
convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing
specific proof of negligence. In other words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not
dispense with the requirement of proof of negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such proof,
permitting the plaintiff to present along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending
circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of negligence, and to
thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward with the proof. Still, before resort to the
doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown: 1. The accident is of a
kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; 2. It is caused by an
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and 3. The possibility of
contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; When the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-tur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for
expert medical testimony is dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence.—
Although generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove that a
physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is availed by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony is
dispensed with because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence. The reason is that the general
rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only to such matters clearly within the domain of
medical science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be
testified to by anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and
experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been treated or operated upon with a
reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of physicians and
surgeons, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given
by non-expert witnesses.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used
but a rule to be cautiously applied depending upon the circumstances of each case.—Despite the fact
that the scope of res ipsa loquitur has been measurably enlarged, it does not automatically apply to all
cases of medical negligence as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the defendant to show that
he is not guilty of the ascribed negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be
perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case. It
is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a matter of
common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as
would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit if the only showing is
that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished.—It must be conceded that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon which
involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not required at
his peril to explain why any particular diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular scientific
treatment did not produce the desired result. Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice suit
if the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished.
Hospitals; Damages; Proximate Cause Defined.—Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act
or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a
substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or
damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. It is the
dominant, moving or producing cause.
Same; Same; For the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employeremployee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.—
Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting “consultant” staff.
While “consultants” are not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in
denying all responsibility for the patient’s condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to
terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the
exception of the payment of wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control
test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between
hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. This being the case, the question now arises as to
whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors for petitioner’s condition.
Same; Same; The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee
is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code.—The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for
the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person
accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former’s responsibility
under a relationship of patria potestas. Such responsibility ceases when the persons or entity concerned
prove that they have observed the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage. In other
words, while the burden of proving negligence rests on the plaintiffs, once negligence is shown, the
burden shifts to the respondents (parent, guardian, teacher or employer) who should prove that they
observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Same; Same; Amount of damages awarded may be a continuing one where the injury is chronic and
continuing, as when the patient is comatose.—In these cases, the amount of damages which should be
awarded, if they are to adequately and correctly respond to the injury caused, should be one which
compensates for pecuniary loss incurred and proved, up to the time of trial; and one which would meet
pecuniary loss certain to be suffered but which could not, from the nature of the case, be made with
certainty. In other words, temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or
compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing. And because of the
unique nature of such cases, no incompatibility arises when both actual and temperate damages are
provided for. The reason is that these damages cover two distinct phases.
Tan vs. OMC Carriers, Inc., 639 SCRA 471, G.R. No. 190521 January 12, 2011 (landmark case on
temperate damages)
Damages; Actual Damages; Evidence; Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of
proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty—courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages.—We begin by
discussing the petitioners’ claim for actual damages arising from the damage inflicted on petitioner
Leticia Tan’s house and tailoring shop, taking into account the sewing machines and various household
appliances affected. Our basic law tells us that to recover damages there must be pleading and proof of
actual damages suffered. As we explained in Viron Transportation Co., Inc. v. Delos Santos, 345 SCRA
509 (2000): Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or
guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. To justify an award of actual damages, there
must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss, credence can be given only to claims which are
duly supported by receipts.
Same; Evidence; Absent competent proof on the actual damages suffered, a party still has the option of
claiming temperate damages, which may be allowed in cases where, from the nature of the case,
definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced although the court is convinced that the aggrieved
party suffered some pecuniary loss.—Nonetheless, absent competent proof on the actual damages
suffered, a party still has the option of claiming temperate damages, which may be allowed in cases
where, from the nature of the case, definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced although the
court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some pecuniary loss. As defined in Article 2224 of
the Civil Code: Article 2224. Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less
than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
Same; Temperate Damages; Temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for loss of earning capacity
may be awarded where earning capacity is plainly established but no evidence was presented to support
the allegation of the injured party’s actual income.—According to the petitioners, prior to his death,
Celedonio was a self-employed tailor who earned approximately P156,000.00 a year, or P13,000.00 a
month. At the time of his death in 1995, the prevailing daily minimum wage was P145.00, or P3,770.00
per month, provided the wage earner had only one rest day per week. Even if we take judicial notice of
the fact that a small tailoring shop normally does not issue receipts to its customers, and would probably
not have any documentary evidence of the income it earns, Celedonio’s alleged monthly income of
P13,000.00 greatly exceeded the prevailing monthly minimum wage; thus, the exception set forth above
does not apply. In the past, we awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for loss of
earning capacity where earning capacity is plainly established but no evidence was presented to support
the allegation of the injured party’s actual income.
Interest Rates; Legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the amounts awarded starts to run from
the time when the trial court rendered judgment, and from the time this judgment becomes final and
executory, the interest rate shall be 12% per annum on the judgment amount and the interest earned
up to that date.—Accordingly, legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the amounts awarded starts
to run from May 14, 2003, when the trial court rendered judgment. From the time this judgment
becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% per annum on the judgment amount and the
interest earned up to that date, until the judgment is wholly satisfied.
Pentacapital Investment Corporation vs. Mahinay, 623 SCRA 284, G.R. No. 181482 July 5, 2010
Same; Same; Interests; An interest rate of 25% from February 17, 1997 until fully paid is excessive and
thus, void.—Aside from the payment of the principal obligation of P1,936,800.00, the parties agreed
that respondent pay interest at the rate of 25% from February 17, 1997 until fully paid. Such rate,
however, is excessive and thus, void. Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if there was
no express contract thereon. To be sure, courts may reduce the interest rate as reason and equity
demand. In this case, 12% interest is reasonable.
Same; Same; Penalty Clauses; A penalty charge of 3% per month is unconscionable.—The promissory
notes likewise required the payment of a penalty charge of 3% per month or 36% per annum. We find
such rates unconscionable. This Court has recognized a penalty clause as an accessory obligation which
the parties attach to a principal obligation for the purpose of ensuring the performance thereof by
imposing on the debtor a special prestation (generally consisting of the payment of a sum of money) in
case the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or inadequately fulfilled. However, a penalty charge of
3% per month is unconscionable; hence, we reduce it to 1% per month or 12% per annum, pursuant to
Article 1229 of the Civil Code which states: Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when
the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has
been no performance, the penalty may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.
Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; Courts are empowered to reduce attorney’s fees if the same are
iniquitous or unconscionable.—Respondent promised to pay 25% of his outstanding obligations as
attorney’s fees in case of non-payment thereof. Attorney’s fees here are in the nature of liquidated
damages. As long as said stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly
binding upon respondent. Nonetheless, courts are empowered to reduce such rate if the same is
iniquitous or unconscionable pursuant to the above-quoted provision. This sentiment is echoed in
Article 2227 of the Civil Code, to wit: Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity
or a penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable. Hence, we reduce the
stipulated attorney’s fees from 25% to 10%.
Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Pilhino Sales Corporation, 804 SCRA 266, G.R. No. 185765
September 28, 2016
Same; Same; Same; Liquidated Damages; Mutual restitution under Article 1191 is no license for the
negation of contractually stipulated liquidated damages.—Contrary to respondent’s assertion, mutual
restitution under Article 1191 is, however, no license for the negation of contractually stipulated
liquidated damages. Article 1191 itself clearly states that the options of rescission and specific
performance come with “with the payment of damages in either case.” The very same breach or delay in
performance that triggers rescission is what makes damages due. When the contracting parties, by their
own free acts of will, agreed on what these damages ought to be, they established the law between
themselves. Their contemplation of the consequences proper in the event of a breach has been
articulated. When courts are, thereafter, confronted with the need to award damages in tandem with
rescission, courts must not lose sight of how the parties have explicitly stated, in their own language,
these consequences. To uphold both Article 1191 of the Civil Code and the parties’ will, contractually
stipulated liquidated damages must, as a rule, be maintained.
Damages; Liquidated Damages; Words and Phrases; By definition, liquidated damages are a penalty,
meant to impress upon defaulting obligors the graver consequences of their own culpability.—By
definition, liquidated damages are a penalty, meant to impress upon defaulting obligors the graver
consequences of their own culpability. Liquidated damages must necessarily make noncompliance more
cumbersome than compliance. Otherwise, contracts might as well make no threat of a penalty at all:
Liquidated damages are those that the parties agree to be paid in case of a breach. As worded, the
amount agreed upon answers for damages suffered by the owner due to delays in the completion of the
project. Under Philippine laws, these damages take the nature of penalties. A penal clause is an
accessory undertaking to assume greater liability in case of a breach. It is attached to an obligation in
order to ensure performance.
Titan Construction Corporation vs. Uni-Field Enterprises, Inc., 517 SCRA 180, G.R. No. 153874 March 1,
2007
Same; Damages; Penalty Clauses; A stipulation on liquidated damages is a penalty clause where the
obligor assumes a greater liability in case of breach of an obligation; Courts are empowered to reduce
the penalty if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.—On the other hand, the law also allows parties to a
contract to stipulate on liquidated damages to be paid in case of breach. A stipulation on liquidated
damages is a penalty clause where the obligor assumes a greater liability in case of breach of an
obligation. The obligor is bound to pay the stipulated amount without need for proof on the existence
and on the measure of damages caused by the breach. Articles 1229 and 2227 of the Civil Code
empower the courts to reduce the penalty if it is iniquitous or unconscionable. The determination of
whether the penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable is addressed to the sound discretion of the court
and depends on several factors such as the type, extent, and purpose of the penalty, the nature of the
obligation, the mode of breach and its consequences.
Attorney’s Fees; The Court finds the award of attorney’s fees “equivalent to 25% of whatever amount is
due and payable” to be exorbitant because it includes (1) the principal of P1,404,114.00, (2) the interest
charges of P504,114.00 plus accrued interest charges at 24% per annum compounded yearly reckoned
from July 1995 up to the time of full payment, and, (3) liquidated damages of P324,147.94—moreover,
the liquidated damages and attorney’s fees serve the same purpose, that is, as penalty for breach of the
contract.—The Court notes that respondent had more than adequately protected itself from a possible
breach of contract because of the stipulations on the payment of interest, liquidated damages, and
attorney’s fees. The Court finds the award of attorney’s fees “equivalent to 25% of whatever amount is
due and payable” to be exorbitant because it includes (1) the principal of P1,404,114.00; (2) the interest
charges of P504,114.00 plus accrued interest charges at 24% per annum compounded yearly reckoned
from July 1995 up to the time of full payment; and (3) liquidated damages of P324,147.94. Moreover,
the liquidated damages and the attorney’s fees serve the same purpose, that is, as penalty for breach of
the contract. Therefore, we reduce the award of attorney’s fees to 25% of the principal obligation, or
P351,028.50.
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 309, G.R. No. 116181 April 17, 1996
Evidence; Receipts; Words and Phrases; ”Receipt,” Defined; A receipt is merely presumptive evidence
and is not conclusive.—A “receipt” is defined as: A written and signed acknowledgment that money has
been paid or goods have been delivered. A receipt is merely presumptive evidence and is not conclusive.
A written acknowledgment that money or a thing of value has been received. Since a receipt is a mere
acknowledgment of payment, it may be subject to explanation or contradiction. A receipt may be used
as evidence against one just as any other declaration or admission. A simple receipt not under seal is
presumptive evidence only and may be rebutted or explained by other evidence of mistake in giving it,
or of non-payment or of the circumstances under which it was given.
Same; Same; Best Evidence Rule; Banks and Banking; Evidence based solely on the testimonies of bank
employees who were the very ones involved in the fiasco, and not on any other independent evidence,
is not sufficient to rebut the contents of the receipt issued by the bank—the subject receipt remains to
be the primary or best evidence or ”that which affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question.”—
In the instant case, petitioner’s contention that Flores paid P900,000.00 only instead of P1,000,000.00
(exclusive of bank charges) in the following denominations: a manager’s check worth P450,000.00;
P430,000.00 in P100.00 bills; and P20,000.00 in P500.00 bills, was based solely on the testimonies of
petitioner’s bank employees—the very ones involved in the fiasco, and not on any other independent
evidence. Hence, having failed to adduce sufficient rebuttal evidence, petitioner is bound by the
contents of the receipt it issued to Flores. The subject receipt remains to be the primary or best
evidence or “that which affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question.”
Banks and Banking; A bank’s act of issuing manager’s checks and corresponding receipt before payment
thereof is completely counted is reckless and grossly negligent, an appalling breach of bank
procedures.—Finally, we find petitioner’s act of issuing the manager’s checks and corresponding receipt
before payment thereof was completely counted reckless and grossly negligent. It is an appalling breach
of bank procedures and must never be repeated. In Bautista v. Mangaldan Rural Bank, Inc., we stated,
thus: The banking system has become an indispensable institution in the modern world and plays a vital
role in the economic life of every civilized society. Whether as mere passive entities for the safe-keeping
and saving of money or as active instruments of business and commerce, banks have attained an
ubiquitous presence among the people, who have come to regard them with respect and even gratitude
and, most of all, confidence. (Simex International [Manila], Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88013,
March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 360).
Damages; Moral damages must be commensurate with the loss or injury suffered.—The award of moral
damages in the amount of P1,000,000 is obviously not proportionate to the actual losses of P100,000.00
sustained by Flores. In other words, the moral damages awarded must be commensurate with the loss
or injury suffered. It is because of the foregoing reasons that we have had to constantly remind the
courts to desist from awarding excessive damages disproportionate to the peculiar circumstances of the
case. “Judicial discretion granted to the courts in the assessment of damages must always be exercised
with balanced restraint and measured objectivity.”
Same; Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to serve as a
deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.—However, the award of
P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages is also far too excessive and should likewise be reduced to an
equitable level. Exemplary damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to
serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.