CASE DIGESTS
ON
PROBLEM AREAS IN LEGAL ETHICS
SECTION 3D
A.Y. 2019-2020
LIST OF CASES
Under Canon 1
1. Brion, Jr. v. Brillantes, Jr., Adm Case No. 5305, 2003
2. Feliciano v. Bautista-Lozada, Adm. Case No. 7593 2015
3. Bautista v. Gonzales, Adm. Matter No. 1625 1990
Rule 1.01
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
Arciga v. Maniwang AC 1608 1981
Zaguirre v. Castillo AC 4921 2003
Mortel v. Aspiras 100 PHIL. 586, 592N (1956)
Cordova v. Cordova, AC 3249 1989
In re Basa
PP vs. Tuanda (supra)
In re Al Argosino (BM 712 1995)
Teves v. comelec GR 180363 2009 (list of crimes involving moral turpitude)
Atty. Roldolfo D. Pactolin (Adm. Case No. 7940, 2012)
In re: Lontok, 43 Phil. 293 (1922)
In re: Vailoces AC 439 1982
In re: Revero, Adm Case No. 126 December 1980
In re: Gutierrez AC 363 1962
Lizaso v. ante AC 2019, June 3, 1991
Piat v. Abordo 58 Phil. 350 (1933)
Toledo v. Abalos AC 5141 1999
Sebastian v. Calis AC 5118 b1999
Reyes v. Gaa AM 1048 1995
Nadayag v. Grageda AC 3232 1994
Nunga v. Viray AC 4758 1999
Villarin, et al. v. Sabate, Jr. AC 3324 2000
Isenhardt v. Real AC 8254 2012
Agbulos v. Viray AC 7350 2013
Flores v. Chua AC 4500 1999
Imson-Souwelha v. Rondez AC 3961 1997
1.02
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
In re: Terrell GR 1203 1903 / 2 Phil. 266
Donton v. Tansingco AC 6057 2006
Oronce v. CA GR 125766 1998
Guarin v. Limpin AC 10576 2015
Coronel v. Cunanan AC 6738 2015
Rule 1.03
34. Delos Santos II v. Barbosa, Adm. Case 6681 2015
Rule 1.04
35. Castaneda v. Ago GR 28546 1975
36. De Ysasi III v LNRC GR 104599 1994
Canon 2
37. Ledesma V. Climaco GR L-23815 1974
38. In re: Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 1929
39. Linsangan v. Tolentino AC 6672 2009
Canon 3
40. Ulep vs. The Legal Clinic (Supra)
41. Dacanay v. Baker & McKenzie AC 2131 1985
Canon 5
42.
43.
44.
45.
PP vs. Gacott GR. 116049 1995
Payod v. Metila AC 3944 2007
Sanchez v. Aguilos, AC 10543 2016
Cabiles v. Cedo AC 10245 2017
Canon 6
46. Collantes v. Renomeron AC 3056 1991
47. Reyes v. Gaa Adm. Matter No. 1048 July 14, 1995
48. Pimentel v. Llorente, et al., AC 4680 2000
49. Berenguer-Kanders v. Florin AC 5119 2013
Rule 6.01
50. Suzrez v. Platon 69 Phil. 556 1940
Rule 6.02
51. Lahm v. Mayor AC 7430 2012
Rule 6.03
52. PCCG v. Sandiganbayan, et al., GR 1518098-12 2005
53. Pasok v. Zapatos AC 7388 2016
Canon 7
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
Santos Jr. v. Llamas AC 4749
Leda v. Tabang AC. 2505 1992
Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez BM 1154 2004
In re: Parazo GR 120348 1949
Tapucar v. Tapucar AC 4148 1998
Victory v. Masrcado AC 10580 2017
Canon 8
60. Bugarin v. Espanol GR 133090 2001
61. Noble III v. Ailes AC 10628 2015
62. Buenviaje v. Magdamo AC 11616 2017
Rule 8.02
63. In re Clemente M. Soriano GR 24114 1970
64. Likong v. Lim AC 3149 1994
65. Camacho v. Pangulayan, et al., AC 4807 2000
Canon 9
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
Bonifacio v. Era AC 11754 2017
U.S. v. Ney 8 Phil. 146 1907
Tapay v. Bancolo AC 9604 2013
Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation 529 Phil. 876 (2006)
Alawi v. Alauya AM SDC 97-2-P 19976
Rule 9.01
71. Five J. Taxi v. NLRC GR 111474 1994
72. Amalgamated Laborers Assn. v. CIR GR L-23467 1968
73. Heirs of Carlos v. Linsangan AC 11494 2017
Canon 10
74. Masinsin v. Albano GR 86421 1994
Rule 10.1
75. Libit v. Oliva AC 2837 1994
Rule 10.02
76. Insular life Assurance Co. Employees Assn. V. Insular life Assurance Co. GR L-25291 1971
77. Comelec v. Noynay GR 132365 1998
78. Alez Realty, Inc. v. CA GR 100643 1992
79. Torres v. Dalangin AC 10758 2017
Rule 10.3
80. Cobb-Perez v. Lantin GR L-22320 1968
81. Avida Land V. Argosino, AC 7437 2016
82. Festin V. Zubiri AC No. 11600 2017
Rule 11.01
83. Peck v. Stone, 304 NYS2d 881
Rule 11.02
84. De Gracia v. Warden of Makati GR L-42032 1976
Rule 11.03
85. Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court GR 71169 August 30, 1989
Rule 11.04
86.
87.
88.
89.
Penticostes v. Hidalgo AM RTJ 89-331-1990
Mocles v. Maravilla AM MTJ93-873
Wicker v. Arcangel GR 112869 1996
Alpajora v. Calayan AC 8208 2018
Rule 11.05
90. Maceda V. Vasquez GR. 102781 1993
Canon 12
91. Garcia v. Francisco AC 3923 1993
92. Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Flores, AC4058 1998
93. Alcantara, et al. v. De Vera AC 5859 2010
94. Olivares v. Aillalon AC 6323 2007
Rule 12.03
95. Bergonia V. Merrera AC 5024 2003
96. Economic Insurance Co. v. Uy Realty Co. GR L-28056 1970
97. Afurong v. Aquino AC 1571 1999
Rule 12.09
98. PNB v Lu Teng Piao 57 Phil. 337 1932
Canon13
99. Nestle’ Philippines v. Sanchez, GR No. L-75209 1987
Rule 13.01
100. Lantoruia v. Bunyi AC 1769 1992
Rule 13.02
101. In re Almacen GR L-27654 1970
Rule 13.03
102. Maglasang v. People GR 90083 1990
103. Fajardo v. Alvarez AC 9018 2016
Canon 15
104. Santiago, et al v. Fojas CA 4103 1995
105. Llunar v. Ricafort Ac 6484 2015
106. Villahermosa Sr. v. Caracol AC 7325Villahermosa Sr. v. Caracol AC 7325 2015
Rule 15.03
107.
108.
109.
110.
Camilla, et al v. Marino jr. AC 4763 2003
Abragan, et al v. Rodriguez AC 4346 2002
Maturan v. Gonzales AC 2597 1998
Pormento Sr., v. Pontevedra AC 5128 2005
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
Pacana v. Pascual-Lopez Ac 8243 2009
Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation Inc. v. Funk AC 9094 2012
Artezuela v. Maderazo AC 5354 2002
Bernardino v.Santos AC 10583 and 10584 2015
Anglo v. Valencia AC 10567 2015
Mabino Colleges v. Pajarillo AC 10687 2015
Aninon v. Sabitsana AC 5098 2012
Nakpil v. Valdez AC 2040 1998
PNB v. CEdo AC 3701 1995
Anglo v. Valecoa supra
Coveney v. Tannahil 37 am Dec. 287 (1841)
Dee v. CA GR 77439 1989
In re Atty. Melchor E. Ruste AC 632 1940 (70 Phil 243)
Hernandez v. Villanueva 40 Phil. 775
Ordonio v. Eduarte AM 3216 1992
Licuanan v. Melo AC 2361 1989
Dumadag v. Lumaya Ca 2614 1991
Burbe v. Magulta AC 5713 2002
Manalang et al v Angeles AC 1558 2003
Tanhueco v. De Dumo AC 1437 1989
Rule 16.04
131. Bautista v. Gonzales AM 1625 1990
132. JBP Holdings Corp. v. US 166 F sup. 324 1958
133. Sps. Concepocion v. Dela Rosa AC 10681 2015
Canon 17
134. Cantiller v. Potenciano AC 3195 1989
135. Solatan v. Inocentes AC 6504 2005
136. Villafuerte v. Cortez AC 3455 1998
Canon 18
137. Edquibal v. Ferrer AC 5687 2005
138. Nonato v. Fudolin Jr. AC 10138 2015
Rule 18.03
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
Moton v. Cadiao AC 5169 1999
Provident Insurance Corp. v. CA GR 110504 1994
Reontoy v. Abadlit AC CBD 190 1998
Ramos v. Dajoyag Jr. AC 5174 2002
Hernandez v. Padilla AC 9387 2012
PP. v. Ingco GR L-32994 1971
Barbuco vs. Beltran AC no. 5092 2004
Legarda v. CA GR 94457 1992
Suarez v. CA GR 91133 1993
Rule 19.01
148. Ong v. Unto nAC 2417 2002
149. Trinidad, et al. v. Villarin AC 9310 2013
Canon 20
150. MBTC v. Ca GR 86100-03 1990
151. Albano v. Coloma AC 528 1967
152. Corpuz nv. CA GR L-40424 1980
153. Mendoza-Parker v. CA GR 109219 1994
154. Research and Services Realty Inc V. R 124074 1997
155. Yu vs. Bondail AC 5534 2005
156. Trader’s Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC GR 120592 1997
157. Quirante v. IAC GR 73886 1989
158. Miranda v. Carpio AC 6281 2011
159. Aquino v. Casabar GR 191470 2015
160. Regala et al v. Sandiganbayan Supra
161. Hilado v. David GR L 961 1949
162. Uy Chico v. Union life 29 Phil. 163 1915
163. Mercadol v. Vitrilo AC 5108 2005
164. Palm v. Iledaqn Jr. AC 8242 2009
165. Venterez at al. v. Cosme AC 7421 2007
166. Arambulo v. CA? GR 105818 1993
167. Orcino v. Gaspar AC 3773 1997
168. Laput v. Ramotigue AC 219 1962
169. Gonzaga v. Villanueva Ac 1954 2004
170. Municipal of Pililla , Rizal v CA GR 105909 1994
171. Nacuray v. NLRC supra
172. Domingo v. Aquino GR L-28078 1971
1. BRION, JR. V. BRILLANTES, JR.,
A.C. No. 5305
March 17, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Brion Jr., in this petition for disbarment, averse that respondent violated the court’s decree of perpetual
disqualification imposed upon respondent Brillantes Jr., from assuming any post in government service, including
any posts in government owned and controlled corporations, when he accepted a legal consultancy post at the Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), from 1998 to 2000. The said consultancy included an appointment by
LWUA as sixth member of the Board of Directors of the Urdaneta Water District. Upon expiration of the legal
consultancy agreement, this was subsequently renewed as a special consultancy agreement. Respondent claims that
under Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27, series of 1993, services rendered pursuant to a
consultancy contract shall not be considered government services, and therefore are not covered by Civil Service
Law, rules and regulations.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., is found liable for having willfully violated a lawful order
of this Court in our decision of March 29, 1995 rendered in A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza
vs. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes, Jr. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year and ordered
to pay a FINE of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar conduct shall be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
The lawyer’s primary duty as enunciated in the Attorney’s Oath is to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the
land, and promote respect for law and legal processes. 19 That duty in its irreducible minimum entails obedience to
the legal orders of the courts. Respondent’s disobedience to this Court’s order prohibiting his reappointment to any
branch, instrumentality, or agency of government, including government owned and controlled corporations, cannot
be camouflaged by a legal consultancy or a special consultancy contract.
2. FELICIANO V. BAUTISTA-LOZADA
A.C. No. 7593
March 11, 2015
FACTS:
Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in appearing as counsel while still suspended from the practice of
law constitutes willfull disobedience to the resolutions of the Court which suspended her from the practice of law for
two
(2)
years.
Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced by circumstances and her desire to defend the rights of her husband who
is embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed that she believed in good faith that her appearance as wife of Edilberto
Lozada is not within the prohibition to practice law, considering that she is defending her husband and not a client.
She insisted that her husband is a victim of grave injustice, and his reputation and honor are at stake; thus, she has no
choice
but
to
give
him
legal
assistance.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is found GUILTY of violating Section
27,19 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months from the practice of
law, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
When this Court orders a lawyer suspended from the practice of law, as in the instant case, the lawyer must desist
from performing all functions requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. An officer
of
the
court
is
bound
to
obey
the
lawful
order
of
the
Court.
3. BAUTISTA V. GONZALES,
A.M. No. 1625
February 12, 1990
FACTS:
Atty. Ramon Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath by
Angel Bautista. The following acts constituting the charge were alleged: engaging into a champertous contract with
client, representing conflicting interests, transferring to himself one-half of the properties while litigation is still
pending, inducement of a complainant to enter a contract with him, falsifying documents, disloyalty, and treachery
to client, misleading the court, harassment through filing several complaints. Respondent prepared a document
entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was signed by the Fortunados assigning to respondent one-half (1/2) of the
properties of the Fortunados for and in consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the time the document was
executed, respondent knew that the abovementioned properties were the subject of a civil case pending before the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said case. The purchase
by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious misconduct, the Court
Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6) months.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
"A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process".
Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to obey the laws [of the Republic
of the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein. The transgression of any
provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance.
Rule 1.01
4. ARCIGA V. MANIWANG
A.C. No. 1608
August 14, 1981
FACTS:
Complainant Magdalena T. Arciga filed a complaint for disbarment against lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang on the
ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her- After repeated acts
of cohabitation between complainant and respondent, then a medical technology student and a law student
respectively, who were sweethearts, their illicit relationship resulted in the birth of their child, Michael Dino
Maniwang. Despite Segundino’s repeated assurance to Magdalena that he would marry her once he passed the bar
examinations and even made Magdalena’s father believe that they were already married but that the church wedding
was being deferred until after he has passed said examinations, he married another woman after his oath taking. In
his answer he admitted the allegations of the complaint against him but claimed that he breached his promise because
of Magdalena’s shady past.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The
complaint
for
disbarment
against
the
respondent
is
hereby
dismissed.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community". A lawyer may be disbarred for
"grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." A member of the bar
should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.
5. ZAGUIRRE V. CASTILLO
A.C. No. 4921
March 6, 2003
FACTS:
Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became officemates at the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). Respondent courted complainant and promised to marry her while representing himself to be
single. Soon they had an intimate relationship that started sometime in 1996 and lasted until 1997. During their affair,
respondent was preparing for the bar examinations which he passed. On May 10, 1997, he was admitted as a member
of the Philippine Bar. It was only around the first week of May 1997 that complainant first learned that respondent
was already married when his wife went to her office and confronted her about her relationship with respondent. On
September 10, 1997, respondent, who by now is a lawyer, executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the
complainant and recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his. On December 09, 1997, complainant gave
birth to a baby girl, Aletha Jessa. By this time however, respondent had started to refuse recognizing the child and
giving her any form of support.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct and
ordered to suffer INDEFINITE SUSPENSION from the practice of law.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good
moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically,
a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping
of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards. A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
6. MORTEL V. ASPIRAS
Adm. Case No. 145
December 28, 1956.
FACTS:
Sometime in August, 1952, the respondent, representing himself as single, courted her and eventually won her
affection. On December 22, 1952, following his instructions, she came to Manila so they could get married, and she
stayed with her sister at No. 10 Espiritu, Pasay City. On and after December 31, 1952, upon being assured of marriage
she allowed him to live with her as her husband. On January 3, 1953, a marriage license was applied for, with the son
of the respondent, Cesar Aspiras, as one of the applicants. Upon suggestion of respondent, she was married to said
Cesar Aspiras, although she was not in love with the latter. After the marriage, she and respondent continued
cohabiting together, the ceremony being a mere formality performed at the indication of respondent, who was a
married man and who used his knowledge and education to abuse and destroy her.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Wherefore it becomes the duty of this Court to strike, as it does hereby strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Disbarred.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
The continued possession of a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice
of the law and its loss requires suspension or disbarment, even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground for
disbarment.
7. CORDOVA V. CORDOVA
A.C. No. 3249
November 29, 1989
FACTS:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and out of this marriage, two (2) children were
born. Respondent Cordova left his family as well as his job at Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy,
Bislig, Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself married and left her own husband
and children to stay with Respondent as couple. On 6 April 1986, respondent Cordova and his complainant wife had
an apparent reconciliation.
In February 1987, complainant found, upon returning from a trip to Manila necessitated by hospitalization of her
daughter Loraine, that respondent Cordova was no longer living with her (complainant’s) children in their conjugal
home; that respondent Cordova was living with another mistress, one Luisita Magallanes, and had taken his younger
daughter Melanie along with him. Respondent and his new mistress hid Melanie from the complainant, compelling
complainant to go to court and to take back her daughter by habeas corpus. The Regional Trial Court, Bislig, gave
her
custody
of
their
children.
Notwithstanding respondent’s promises to reform, he continued to live with Luisita Magallanes as her husband and
continued
to
fail
to
give
support
to
his
legitimate
family.
Finally, the Commission received a telegram message from complainant, stating that complainant and respondent
had
been
reconciled
with
each
other.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law indefinitely and until further
orders from this Court. The Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits proof
satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate
family and that he has given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
Reconciliation between complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away
the misconduct and immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting
upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission to membership in
the bar is required to show that he is possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and
dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar.
8. IN RE: CARLOS S. BASA
December 7, 1920
FACTS:
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine Islands.
Recently he was charged in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent,
was found guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M. V. del Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was
sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correcional.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa shall be discharged from prison, he be
suspended from his office of lawyer for one year.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
"Moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
9. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. TUANDA
A.M. No. 3360
January 30, 1990
FACTS:
Respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry for sale on a commission basis, with
the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez.
Sometime in February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry, issued three checks which
were subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor,
respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring of checks which had bounced and made no
effort to settle her obligations to Ms. Marquez. A case was filed for violation of BP 22 and she was found guilty
therein. Being guilty of an offense involving moral turpitude, she was suspended from the practice of law and shall
not practice her profession until further action from the Supreme Court.
A Motion to Lift Order of Suspension was subsequently filed by respondent claiming that suspension from the
practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the lower court's penalty of fine considering
that accused-appellant's action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has always been motivated
purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein
plaintiff-appellee.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain
suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
The nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good moral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not to the
exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person
convicted of such offense.
10. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL
BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO
B.M. No. 712
July 13, 1995
FACTS:
A criminal information was filed charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the
crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul
Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as
part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with
the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless
imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. They were subsequently put under probation.
Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact
of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations. He
passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be
now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to
the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community
who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he
has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the
community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person
now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application
for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission
to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.
11. G.R. No. 180363, April 28, 2009
EDGAR Y. TEVES, Petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G. TEVES
FACTS:
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative district of Negros Oriental during
the May 14, 2007 elections.
Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that he was convicted of violating Section
3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial
interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) of
1991. Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because he was convicted of
a crime involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from public
office. The COMELEC First Division disqualified petitioner from running for the position of member of House of
Representatives and ordered the cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy. Upon MR, COMELEC en banc denied
the motion saying that since petitioner lost in the last 14 May 2007 congressional elections, it thereby rendered the
instant MR moot and academic.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated May 11,
2007 and October 9, 2007 disqualifying petitioner Edgar Y. Teves from running for the position of Representative of
the 3rd District of Negros Oriental, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaring that the
crime committed by petitioner (violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. 3019) did not involve moral turpitude.
DOCTRINE:
The Court clarified that not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this reason that "as to what
crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine." In resolving the foregoing question, the Court
is guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do
not.
Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not. It
must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not
its prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude.
Consequently, considering all circumstances, the Court held that petitioner’s conviction does not involve moral
turpitude.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered
inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing
gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit
12. IN RE: QUINCIANO D. VAILOCES
FACTS:
This is a petition filed by Quinciano D. Vailoces for readmission to the practice of law and the inclusion of his name
in the roll of attorneys. on September 30, 1955 found Quinciano guilty of falsification of public document, penalized
under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, and imposed on him an indeterminate sentence ranging from 2 years,
4 months and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the
accessory penalties of the law, plus fine and costs. In its decision the court found that petitioner, as a member of the
bar and in his capacity as a notary public, acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be the last will
and testament of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. Presented for probate before the Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental, the genuineness of the document was impugned by the forced heirs of the alleged testatrix, and the court,
finding that the document was a forgery, denied probate to the will.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, petitioner Quinciano D. Vailoces is hereby ordered reinstated in the roll of attorneys.
DOCTRINE:
The court Ruled that When Quinciano has regained the respect and confidence of his fellow attorneys as well as of
the citizens of his community. The favorable indorsements of both the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and its Negros
Oriental Chapter, the testimonials expressed in his behalf by the provincial governor of Negros Oriental as well as
the municipal and barrio officials of Bindoy, Negros Oriental, his active participation in civic and social undertakings
in the community attest to his moral reform and rehabilitation and justify his reinstatement. Petitioner, now 69 years
of age, has reached the twilight of his life. He has been barred from the practice of his profession for a period of 21
years. Adequate punishment has been exacted.
Chastened by his painful and humiliating experience, he further "pledges with all his honor x x x that if reinstated in
the roll of attorneys he will surely and consistently conduct himself honestly, uprightly and worthily." Indeed, there
is reasonable expectation that he will endeavor to lead an irreproachable life and maintain steadfast fidelity to the
lawyer's oath.
13. RE: SC DECISION DATED MAY 20, 2008 IN G.R. NO. 161455 UNDER RULE 139-B OF THE RULES
OF COURT,
vs.
ATTY. RODOLFO D. PACTOLIN, Respondent.
FACTS:
In May 1996, Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of the Ozamis City volleyball team, wrote Mayor Benjamin A.
Fuentes of Ozamis City, requesting financial assistance for his team. Mayor Fuentes approved the request and sent
Abastillas’ letter to the City Treasurer for processing. Mayor Fuentes also designated Mario R. Ferraren, a city council
member, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the city while Mayor Fuentes was away. Abastillas eventually got the
₱10,000.00 assistance for his volleyball team. Meanwhile, respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, then a
Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of Misamis Occidental, got a photocopy of Abastillas’ letter and, using it, filed
on June 24, 1996 a complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao against Ferraren for alleged
illegal disbursement of ₱10,000.00 in public funds. Atty. Pactolin attached to the complaint a copy of what he claimed
was a falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed that it was Ferraren, not Mayor Fuentes, who approved the
disbursement. Aggrieved, Ferraren filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 25665 a complaint against Atty.
Pactolin for falsification of public document.1 On November 12, 2003 the Sandiganbayan found Atty. Pactolin guilty
of falsification under Article 172 and sentenced him to the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 2 years and 4
months of prision correccional as minimum to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days of prision correccional as maximum, to
suffer all the accessory penalties of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of ₱5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. Atty. Pactolin appealed to this Court but on May 20, 2008 it affirmed his conviction.2 Since the
Court treated the matter as an administrative complaint against him as well under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
it referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate action.
Because complainant Ferraren neither appeared nor submitted any pleading during the administrative proceedings
before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, on October 9, 2010 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution
XIX-2010-632, adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation that the case
against Atty. Pactolin be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin is hereby DISBARRED and his name REMOVED from the Rolls of
Attorney. Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal records and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
DOCTRINE:
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or suspended on the following grounds:
(1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case without authority so to do. This Court
has ruled that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and,
therefore, involves moral turpitude. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes
his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. As a rule, this Court exercises the
power to disbar with great caution.1âwphi1 Being the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only
for the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Yet this Court has also consistently pronounced that
disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Here,
Atty. Pactolin’s disbarment is warranted. The Sandiganbayan has confirmed that although his culpability for
falsification has been indubitably established, he has not yet served his sentence. His conduct only exacerbates his
offense and shows that he falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
This Court once again reminds all lawyers that they, of all classes and professions, are most sacredly bound to uphold
the law. The privilege to practice law is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually,
academically and, equally important, morally. As such, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in
their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.
14. In Re MARCELINO LONTOK
April 7, 1922
FACTS:
Marcelino Lontok was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Zambales of the crime of bigamy. This judgement
was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court, while a further attempt to get the case before the United States Supreme
Court was unsuccessful. On February 9, 1921, a pardon was issued by the Governor-General of the following tenor:
By virtue of the authority conferred upon by the Philippine Organic Act on August 29, 1916, the sentence in the case
of Marcelino Lontok convicted by the Court of First Instance of Zambales of bigamy and sentenced on February 27,
1918, to imprisonment for eight years, to suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of the
proceedings, which sentence was, on September 8, 1919, confirmed by the Supreme Court is hereby remitted, on
condition that he shall not again be guilty of any misconduct.The Attorney-General relies in asking for the disbarment
of Attorney Lontok, the law provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended form his office of
lawyer by the Supreme Court "by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude." That conviction of
the crime of bigamy involves moral turpitude, within the meaning of the law, cannot be doubted. The debatable
question relates to the effect of the pardon by the Governor-General. On the one hand, it is contended by the
Government that while the pardon removes the legal infamy of the crime, it cannot wash out the moral stain; on the
other hand, it is contended by the respondent that the pardon reaches the offense for which he was convicted and
blots it out so that he may not be looked upon as guilty of it. Lontok was given a Pardon by the Philippine Organic
Act on August 29, 1916.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, It results, therefore, that the petition of the Attorney-General cannot be granted, and that the
proceedings must be dismissed. Costs shall be taxed as provided by section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. So
ordered.
DOCTRINE:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the
pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the
offender is an innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any
of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it
removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new
man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. There is only this limitation to its operation; it does not restore
offices forfeited, or property or interest vested in others in consequence of the conviction and judgement.
Although much which is contained in the opinion of the four dissenting justices, in the Garland case, appeals
powerfully to the minds of the court, we feel ourselves under obligation to follow the rule laid down by the
majority decision of the higher court. We do this with the more grace when we recall that according to the
article 130 of the Penal Code, one of the different ways by which criminal liability is extinguished is by
pardon. We must also remember that the motion for disbarment is based solely on the judgement of
conviction for a crime of which the respondent has been pardoned, We must also remember that the motion
for disbarment is based solely on the judgment of conviction for crime of which the respondent has been
pardoned, and that the language of the pardon is not such as to amount to a conditional pardon similar in
nature to a parole. It may be mentioned however, in this connection, that if Marcelino Lontok should again
be guilty of any misconduct, the condition of his pardon would be violated, and he would then become subject
to disbarment.
15. IN RE: ATTY. TRANQUILINO ROVERO
FACTS:
Tranquilino Rovero had been found guilty by a competent court of a violation of Section 2703 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended, (Smuggling) and sentenced to pay a fine of P2,500.00, ordered his disbarment and
the surrender of the lawyer's certificate issued to him. Almost four (4) years thereafter, or on July 7, 1956, the said
respondent filed a petition for reinstatement, claiming, among others, that his disbarment had caused him untold
misery and mental anguish, and that he had been granted an absolute and unconditional pardon for his crime and
restored to full civil and political rights, and pledged, "on bended knees", "not to commit the same or similar mistake
in the future nor to involve himself further in any transaction which might tend to drag down his name as lawyer and
as
an
ordinary
dignified
citizen."
The
Court,
however,
denied
his
petition.
Not one to be disheartened, on March 10, 1958, the respondent Tranquilino Rovero again implored the Court to be
readmitted to the practice of law, but the Court turned a deaf ear to his plea.
Once more, the respondent Tranquilino Rovero, "now in his twilight years (71 years old)" asks humbly and earnestly
of the Court to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys "before crossing the bar to the great beyond."
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the order of disbarment is lifted and Attorney Tranquilino Rovero is hereby reinstated in the legal
profession and restored to the practice of law. The Clerk of Court is directed to return to him his lawyer's diploma,
his certificate of admission to the Bar, and any other certificate issued to him relative to his admission to the Bar.
DOCTRINE:
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction.
In the case of IN RE MARCELINO LONTOK, the Court, in dismissing the disbarment proceeding against the
respondent therein, who had been convicted of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude, upon the ground that the
respondent had been granted plenary pardon for his crime, applied the rule that "a person reaches both the punishment
prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and
blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed
the crime," and, "if granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all
his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man and gives him a new credit and capacity."
Under the circumstances, and considering that more than 28 years had already passed since he was disbarred, the
respondent
Tranquilino
Rovero
has
been
sufficiently
punished
and
disciplined.
16. IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ATTY. DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ
FACTS:
Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5, 1945. In criminal case No. R793 of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of the murder of Filemon Samaco, former
municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death. Upon
review by this Court the judgment of conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G. R. No. L-7101), but the penalty
was changed to reclusión perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional
pardon by the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was remitted "on condition
that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library
On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a verified complaint
before this Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5.
Respondent presented his answer in due time, admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding his previous
conviction but pleading the conditional pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this Court in the case
of
In
re
Lontok,
43
Phil.
293.
Under section 5 of Rule 127 a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a
crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted rule of right and duty between man and man.
DISPOSITIVE
PORTION:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the nature of the crime for which respondent
Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of lawyers.
DOCTRINE:
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and
moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic
preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good moral character. These standards are neither dispensed with
nor lowered after admission; the lawyer must continue to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or
removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law ed., 552, 556; "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer
is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate
and override the laws, to trample them under foot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues recreancy to his
position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic."
17. SHIRLEY CUYUGAN LIZASO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. SERGIO AMANTE, respondent
FACTS:
On 27 March 1979, Shirley Cuyugan-Lizaso filed a sworn Complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Sergio
G. Amante charging the latter with deceitful and grossly immoral conduct. The Court required respondent Amante to
file an Answer to the complaint, and respondent did so on 25 May 1979. A Reply dated 23 September 1980 was filed
by complainant. On August 7, 1978, complainant handed to respondent Prudential Bank Check No. 655615 dated
August 4, 1978 in the amount of P5,000.00 payable to the latter and which, per agreement between the two of them,
was to be invested in respondent's business venture in the casino. Complainant was enticed into investing in the
business by respondent's proposition that the business will guarantee her an interest of 10% profit a day. Lizaso was
further convinced because she knows of her sister's friend who deals in the same business in the casino and who even
accepts jewelries from gamblers who have lost heavily. The check was encashed by respondent as shown by his
signature appearing at the back of the check. Afraid that her investment will not be returned, complainant sought the
help of the U.E Legal Department Head, Atty. Pedro Siojo and presented her written complaint dated August 27,
1978 against respondent . Atty. Siojo scheduled a confrontation but the respondent failed to come. The second
scheduled confrontation likewise resulted in respondent's failure to appear. In view of these, Atty. Siojo informed her
that he cannot do anything if respondent refuses to appear.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sergio G. Amante is hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of
law.1âwphi1 Copies of this Resolution shall be furnished to all courts of the land. Copies shall also be finished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of
respondent attorney.
DOCTRINE:
As important as it is that an attorney be competent to deal with the oftentimes intricate matters which may be entrusted
to him, it is infinitely more so that he be upright and trustworthy. Unfortunately, it is not easy to limit membership in
the profession to those who satisfy the standard test of fitness. But scant progress in that direction can be hoped for
if, in the determination of the qualification of professional fitness, non-professional dishonor and dishonesty in
whatsoever path of life is to be ignored. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment
of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. So it is that we, in common with other courts, hold, as did Lord
Mansfield more than a century ago, that misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be
professional or non-professional, justifies dismission as well as exclusion from the bar.
The rule in this jurisdiction was stated by Mr. Justice Malcolm in Piatt v. Abordo in the following terms: that an
attorney may be removed or otherwise disciplined "not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also
for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which showed him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer to him."
18. C.E. PIATT, Chief of Police of Manila, complainant,
vs.
PERFECTO ABORDO, respondent.
September 1, 1933
FACTS:
On February 19, 1932, Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar, accepted the offer of two individuals to sell
him a quantity of opium, a prohibited drug, and agreed to pay P1.50 per tin for the opium. On the afternoon of the
same day, Abordo was picked up at the corner of Taft Avenue extension and Vito Cruz in the City of Manila, by one
of the individuals who had made him the opium proposition, and was taken to Rizal Avenue Extension outside of the
city limits where they found a number of persons awaiting them in an automobile. A can was disclosed to Abordo as
containing opium, and believing that it was opium, he delivered to one Cabrales the amount of P600 in payment of
the stuff. The can was loaded in the automobile which brought Abordo to the scene of the delivery, but in returning
to Manila another automobile overtook them and the parties riding therein, pretending to be constabulary soldiers,
told Abordo to stop. Instead Abordo drew his revolver and commanding the driver of the car to turn into Calle Vito
Cruz was able to evade his pursuers and to arrive safely at his home in Pasay. Once in his home Abordo examined
the contents of the can and found it to contain fake opium and sand. Thereupon Abordo reported to the Luneta Police
Station of Manila that he had been robbed of P600. Two individuals were later arrested, charged with the crime
of estafa, and convicted.
Abordo admits that he entered into the transaction detailed above, adding that "he is sincerely sorry for it and vows
not to repeat". His defense is that "there being no evidence in the record establishing the relationship of attorney and
client between the respondent and the malefactors", and "the act complained of not having been committed in the
exercise of his profession of attorney-at-law", the acts he committed could not affect his status as attorney-at-law and
could not, therefore, constitute a ground for disciplinary action.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
It is the order of the court that the respondent Perfecto Abordo be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one year to begin on September 1, 1933.
DOCTRINE:
The Supreme Court stated that, the courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time the profession
is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As
good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is
bad in such respect as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts
retain the power to discipline him. Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar, attempted to engage in an opium
deal in direct contravention of the criminal law of the Philippine Islands. All that kept the nefarious plan from
succeeding was the treacherous conduct of his co-conspirators. The intention to flaunt the law was present even if
consummation of the overt act was not accomplished. In the eyes of the canons of professional ethics which govern
the conduct of attorneys, the act was as reprehensible as if it had been brought to a successful culmination. "Of all
classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws" .
19. PRISCILA L. TOLEDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ERLINDA ABALOS, respondent
[A.C. No. 5141. September 29, 1999]
FACTS:
On July 9, 1981, Atty. Erlinda Abalos obtained a loan of P20,000.00 from Priscila Toledo, payable within six months
from date, plus interest of 5% per month. To guarantee the payment of said obligation, respondent executed a
Promissory Note (Exhibit B). After the lapse of six months, and despite repeated demands, respondent failed to pay
her obligation. Afraid that she will not recover her money, Ms.Toledo sought the help of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), which referred the matter to the Commission on Bar Discipline.
On February 1, 1995, the Commission issued an order directing Atty. Abalos to file her Answer to the letter-complaint
of Ms. Toledo. Despite receipt of said order, respondent did not answer the complaint.
On August 17, 1995, Investigating Commissioner Benjamin B. Bernardino, issued an order setting the case for
hearing on September 29, 1995 at 2 p.m. Despite due notice, respondent failed to appear. Accordingly, complainant
was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte after which, the case was considered submitted for resolution.
Respondent received this order as shown by the registry return. However, she again did not do anything about it.
On June 19, 1999, the Commission passed a resolution recommending the suspension from the practice of law of
respondent for a period of six months for her flouting resistance to lawful orders of the Court and illustrating her
despiciency of her oath of office as a lawyer. The Commission, however, declined to discipline her for failing to meet
her financial obligation, the same having been incurred in her private capacity.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Erlinda Abalos is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
ONE MONTH from the date of the finality of this Resolution. Copies of this Resolution shall be furnished all courts
of the land and the Office of the Bar Confidant. This Resolution shall likewise be spread on the personal record of
respondent attorney.
DOCTRINE:
The Supreme court ruled that, a lawyer thus submits himself to the disciplinary authority of the organization.
However, as the complaint lodged against the respondent in the case at hand did not pertain to an act that she
committed in the exercise of her profession, the IBP need not assume jurisdiction to discipline respondent. As the
Commission on Bar Discipline correctly suggested, complainants remedy is to file the necessary collection case in
court for her to recover the amount respondent owed her. It was, however, still necessary for respondent to
acknowledge the orders of the Commission in deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP. Her wanton
disregard of its lawful orders subjects her to disciplinary sanction. Thus, her suspension from the practice of law for
one month is warranted.
20. MARILOU SEBASTIAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DOROTHEO CALIS, respondent.
A.C. CBD No. 97-485)
FACTS:
Complainant (Marilou Sebastian) in November, 1992 engaged the servies of Atty. Calis in order to secure A VISA
to the U.S.of A, she was referred to the respondent who promised to process all necessary documents required for
complainant's trip to the USA for a fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00). On December 1, 1992
the complainant made a partial payment of the required fee in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00),
which was received by Ester Calis, wife of the respondent for which a receipt was issued. From the period of January
1993 to May 1994 complainant had several conferences with the respondent regarding the processing of her travel
documents. To facilitate the processing, respondent demanded an additional amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos
(P65,000.00) and prevailed upon complainant to resign from her job as stenographer with the Commission on Human
Rights. On June 20, 1994, to expedite the processing of her travel documents complainant issued Planters
Development Bank Check No. 12026524 in the amount of Sixty Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) in favor of Atty.
D. Calis who issued a receipt. After receipt of said amount, respondent furnished the complainant copies of
Supplemental to U.S. Nonimmigrant Visa Application and a list of questions which would be asked during interviews.
nWhen complainant inquired about her passport, Atty. Calis informed the former that she will be assuming the name
Lizette P. Ferrer married to Roberto Ferrer, employed as sales manager of Matiao Marketing, Inc. The complainant
was furnished documents to support her assumed identity.1âwphi1.nêt
Realizing that she will be travelling with spurious documents, the complainant demanded the return of her money,
however she was assured by respondent that there was nothing to worry about for he has been engaged in the business
for quite sometime; with the promise that her money will be refunded if something goes wrong.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, respondent Dorotheo Calis is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be FURNISHED to the IBP and the Bar Confidant to be spread on the
personal records of respondent. Respondent is likewise ordered to pay to the complainant immediately the amount of
One Hundred Fourteen Thousand (P114,000.00) Pesos representing the amount he collected from her.
DOCTRINE:
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal moral flaws in a
lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer's relationship with others should be characterized by the highest
degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer's oath. The lawyer's oath is not mere facile
words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an
attorney requires that he should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a condition precedent
to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. We
have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his
moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. The
practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue
to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. We must stress that membership
in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege to practice law only during good
behavior. He can be deprived of his license for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after
giving him the opportunity to be heard.
21. REYES V. GAA AM 1048 1995
FACTS:
A complaint for extortion was filed against Atty. Salvador Gaa. Thereafter, an entrapment was conducted and the
respondent's hands were found positive of the yellow florescent powder applied to the marked money. Atty. Gaa
denied the charge of extortion and retorted that the marked money was planted by complainant but such contention
is bereft of merit. Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that respondent be
disbarred. Said recommendation was approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its resolution.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The respondent is disbarred and his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
DOCTRINE:
When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges; he must meet the
issue and overcome the evidence against him and must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and
integrity which at all times is expected of him. Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such
a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a
member of the bar on such grounds
The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also constitutes a violation
of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer's oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice.
It serves as a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary
action.
22. NADAYAG V. GRAGEDA AC 3232 1994
FACTS:
Nadayag charged respondent Atty. A. Grageda, a practicing attorney and notary public in Iligan City, with conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer in connection with a "Pacto de Retro" transaction wherein complainant was the vendee. In
the complainant’s affidavit, it was alleged that Atty.Grageda prepared and notarized a pacto de retro sale with
Nadayag as the Vendee-a-Retro using an Original Certificate of Land Title stolen from the Office of the Register of
Deeds as a result of which the complainant was swindled in the amount of One hundred eight thousand pesos
(P108,000.00) because the said land sold to her by pacto de Retro was already sold ahead of time to another party,
using the owner's duplicate copy of the title. When the matter was brought to Atty. Jose A. Grageda, he simply
answered that the title was all right and that he told the complainant not to worry as he is an attorney and besides he
knew very well the Vendor-a- Retro whose business transactions, especially notarial matter, has been and in fact
always handled by him.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Accordingly, and as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent
Atty. Jose A. Grageda from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months commencing from receipt of this
Resolution, with the warning that a repetition of the same or any other misconduct will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be spread on the records of said respondent, with copies thereof furnished to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and duly circularized to all courts.
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily
reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession,
the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts, and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal
fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity
of the profession.
Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court. (Marcelo vs. Javier, Sr., supra).
In the case at bar, respondent should have been conscientious in seeing to it that justice permeated every aspect of a
transaction for which his services had been engaged, in conformity with the avowed duties of a worthy member of
the Bar. He should have fully explained the legal intricacies and consequences of the subject transaction as would aid
the parties in making an informed decision. Such responsibility was plainly incumbent upon him, and failing therein,
he must now face the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. After all, notarization is not an
empty routine. Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one and renders it admissible
in court without further proof of its authenticity.
23. NUNGA V. VIRAY AC 4758 1999
FACTS:
Victor D. Nunga, president of the Masantol Rural Bank filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Venancio M.
Viray on the ground of gross and serious misconduct for notarizing documents when he was not commissioned to do
so at the time the said documents were executed, including the Absolute Deed of Sale of a foreclosed lot to his 18year old son. Respondent alleged that he was always commissioned as notary public and the fact that Pampanga is
under several feet of floodwaters. Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of Pampanga negated respondent’s
allegation that he [had been] commissioned as notary public since 1965. The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP
Board of Governors recommended that if respondent is presently commissioned as notary public, the same should be
revoked, and [he should] not be granted any commission as notary public up to December 31, 2002.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The Court hereby adopts the findings and conclusions of Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, which the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved, but MODIFIES the penalty
recommended by the said Board of Governors. As modified, respondent ATTY. VENANCIO VIRAY is hereby
BARRED from being commissioned as notary public for THREE (3) years and his present commission, if any, is
revoked, and SUSPENDED from the practice of law also for THREE (3) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of
this Resolution.1âwphi1.nêt
DOCTRINE:
By such misconduct as a notary public, the lawyer violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
directs every lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
What aggravated respondent’s unlawful notarization in 1987 was the fact that the transaction involved was in favor
of his son, who was then only eighteen years old and, therefore, a minor. Under Article 402 of the Civil Code, which
was the governing law as of 22 May 1987 when the said transaction was made, the age of majority was twenty-one
years. Republic Act No. 6809, which reduced the age of majority to eighteen years was approved only on 13
December 1989 and became effective two weeks after publication in two newspapers of general circulation.
24. VILLARIN, ET AL. V. SABATE, JR. AC 3324 2000
FACTS:
Atty. Restituto Sabate was a counsel in a case defending his clients, in the verification it shows that he was the one
who signed for the defendants, alleging that it was done in good faith and the word “BY” which suggests that he did
not in any manner make it appear that those persons signed in his presence; aside from the fact that his clients
authorized him to sign for and in their behalf, considering the distance of their place of residence to that of the
respondent and the reglementary period in filing said pleadings he had to reckon with.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
For lack of diligence in the observance of the Notarial Law, respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. is SUSPENDED
from his Commission as Notary Public for a period of one (1) year.
DOCTRINE:
The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangements. That function
would be defeated if the notary public were one of the signatories to the instrument. For then, he would be interested
in sustaining the validity thereof as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. It would place him in
an inconsistent position, and the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud, would be thwarted.
A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before said notary public to attest
to the contents and truth of what are stated therein. The acts of affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are
stated therein are facts they have personal knowledge of and swore to the same personally and not through any
representative. Otherwise, their representative’s names should appear in the said documents as the ones who executed
the same and that is only the time they can affix their signatures and personally appear before the notary public for
notarization
of
said
document.
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties pertaining to
his office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost
respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgement or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility
is incumbent upon and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional
indiscretion.
25. ISENHARDT V. REAL AC 8254 2012
FACTS:
Atty. Real executed a Special Power Attorney (SPA) authorizing the complainant's brother to mortgage her real
property located in Antipolo City. Complainant averred that she never appeared before respondent. She maintained
that it was impossible for her to subscribe to the questioned document in the presence of respondent. Complainant
submitted that because of respondent's act, the property subject of the SPA was mortgaged and later foreclosed by
the Rural Bank of Antipolo City.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The notarial commission of respondent Atty. Leonardo M. Real is hereby REVOKED. He is disqualified from
reappointment as notary public for a period of two (2) years and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year, effective immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE:
The duties of a notary public is dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.It is not a meaningless
ministerial act of acknowledging documents executed by parties who are willing to pay the fees for notarization. It is
of no moment that the subject SPA was not utilized by the grantee for the purpose it was intended because the property
was allegedly transferred from complainant to her brother by virtue of a deed of sale consummated between them.
What is being penalized is respondent’s act of notarizing a document despite the absence of one of the parties. By
notarizing the questioned document, he engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. 17 A notarized
document is by law entitled to full credit upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries public must observe the
basic requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in notarized documents will be
undermined
26. AGBULOS V. VIRAY AC 7350 2013
FACTS:
A complaint was filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) by complainant Mrs. Patrocinio V. Agbulos
against respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray for allegedly notarizing a document denominated as Affidavit of NonTenancy in violation of the Notarial Law. The said affidavit was supposedly executed by complainant, but the latter
denies said execution and claims that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC) she allegedly presented
are not hers. She further claims that the CTC belongs to a certain Christian Anton. Complainant added that she did
not personally appear before respondent for the notarization of the document. She, likewise, states that respondent’s
client, Rolando Dollente (Dollente), benefited from the said falsified affidavit as it contributed to the illegal transfer
of a property registered in her name to that of Dollente. In his Comment, respondent admitted having prepared and
notarized the document in question at the request of his client Dollente, who assured him that it was personally signed
by complainant and that the CTC appearing therein is owned by her. He, thus, claims good faith in notarizing the
subject document.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The Court finds respondent Atty. Roseller A. Viray GUILTY of breach of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one
(1) year; REVOKES his incumbent commission, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary
public for two (2) years, effective immediately. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE:
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act but one invested with substantive public interest. The
notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document, making it admissible in evidence
without further proof of its authenticity. A notarized document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. It is for this reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance
of his duties; otherwise, the publics confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would be undermined.
Respondent’s failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to those directly affected by the
notarized document but also in undermining the integrity of a notary public and in degrading the function of
notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. The
responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is more
pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn oath under the Code of Professional
Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers commissioned as
notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public
policy and impressed with public interest.
27. FLORES V. CHUA AC 4500 1999
FACTS:
Complainant Ban Hua U. Flores seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua, a practicing lawyer and
a notary public, in the City of Bacolod for various offenses amounting to "malpractice, gross misconduct, violation
of his lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Conduct and Responsibility, as well as the provisions of the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines. This involves forgery of the signature on a Deed of Sale notarized by respondent Chua,
misrepresentation, unlawful advertisement, bribery and corruption, illegal tapping of conversations, perjury, forum
shopping, and filing a false suit misleading the clerk of court in order to evade the patment of docket fees.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Atty. Chua is guilty of grave misconduct rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal profession.
He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name stricken off of the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately.
DOCTRINE:
The role then of the notary public in this ritual cannot be taken lightly. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver
responsibility is placed upon his shoulder by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or
consent tot he doing of any. The Code of Professional Responsibility also commands him not to engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct and to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
In Maligsa v. Cabanting, it is emphatically pronounced that:
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties appertaining to
his office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost
respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility
is incumbent upon and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional
indiscretion. By his effrontery of notarizing a fictitious or spurious document, he has made a mockery of the legal
solemnity of the oath in an Acknowledgment.
28. IMSON-SOUWELHA V. RONDEZ AC 3961 1997
FACTS:
Complainant Souweha charged respondent Atty. Rondez of being a privy, or instrumental, in the forgery of her
signature appearing in the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of her deceased parents purportedly agreed upon by
her father’s (Anastacio Imson) two sets of children with his first and second wives. She claimed that she could not
have signed (nor has she authorized anybody to sign in her behalf) said agreement as she was in the United States.
Complainant Souweha thus accused respondent Atty. Rondez, in having notarized the extrajudicial settlement despite
her absence, of failing in his legal duties and responsibilities and violating his lawyer’s oath, by (1) causing it to
appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; (2) attributing
to persons who have participated in any act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them; and (3)
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The administrative case filed against respondent Atty. Teopisto Rondez is DISMISSED.
DOCTRINE:
The present case is a typical example of a 37racticing lawyer whose family friends and at the same time clients
succumbed to a serious family feuds and litigations over the bounty which they inherited from their predecessors. As
a consequence of which the lawyer is caught between the cross-fire of the factions that led to the filing of an
administrative case against him under the belief that the problem arose out of the fault of him. If respondent is to be
faulted at all, it is simply because of his complete trust and confidence on his clients whom the respondent never
suspected would commit the grievous scheme of misrepresenting themselves as the representatives of the complainant
in the matter of the settlement deed. The penalty of reprimand was imposed on respondent not on the basis of the acts
complained of by complainant involved in this case, but on account of the motu proprio finding of the investigating
commissioner that respondent is guilty of having represented the conflicting interests of the late Anastacio Imson’s
two sets of children. This cannot be done without seriously violating the very fundamental and constitutionally
protected right of a person to be informed of the nature of the charge for which he is being held accountable.
29. IN RE: TERRELL GR 1203 1903 / 2 PHIL. 266
FACTS:
Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, was ordered to show cause in the Court of First Instance, in the city of Manila,
why he should not be suspended as a member of the bar of the city of Manila for the reasons:
First, that he had assisted in the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he had been notified that the
said organization was made for the purpose of evading the law then in force in said city; and,
Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the time of and after its organization, which
organization was known to him to be created for the purpose of evading the law.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
It is directed that Atty. Howard D. Terrell be suspended from the practice of law for a term of one year
DOCTRINE:
The promoting of organizations, with knowledge of their objects, for the purpose of violating or evading the laws
against crime constitutes such misconduct on the part of an attorney, an officer of the court, as amounts to malpractice
or gross misconduct in his office, and for which he may be removed or suspended. (Code of Civil Procedure, sec.
21.) The assisting of a client in a scheme which the attorney knows to be dishonest, or the conniving at a violation of
law, are acts which justify disbarment.
In this case, however, inasmuch as the defendant in the case of United States vs. Terrell was acquitted on the charge
of estafa, and has not, therefore, been convicted of crime, and as the acts with which he is charged in this proceeding,
while unprofessional and hence to be condemned, are not criminal in their nature, we are of opinion that the ends of
justice will be served by the suspension of said Howard D. Terrell from the practice of law in the Philippine Islands
for the term of one year from the 7th day of February, 1903.
30. DONTON V. TANSINGCO AC 6057 2006
FACTS:
The petitioner filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a public document against Duane O. Stier
Emelyn A. Maggay and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement. Complainant
averred that respondent's act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign
national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation
of the Code. Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in violation of
Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and assisting Stier in carrying out a
dishonest scheme.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law
for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws which he
is bound to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the
law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.
CANON 1 – RULE 1.02
31. FELICIDAD ORONCE v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 125766 OCTOBER 19, 1988
FACTS:
Priciliano B. Gonzales Development Corporation was the registered owner of a parcel of land. It obtained a
loan from the China Bank and used its property as a guarantee. Due to irregular payment of amortization, interests
and penalties on the loan accumulated through the years. It signed and executed a Deed of Sale with Assumption of
Mortgage covering the property in favor of petitioners Rosita Flaminiano and Felicidad L. Oronce. In fulfillment of
the terms and conditions embodied in the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage, petitioners paid private
respondent's indebtedness with the bank. However, private respondent reneged on its obligation to deliver possession
of the premises to petitioners upon the expiration of the one-year period. Petitioners caused the registration of the
Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with the Register of Deeds and simultaneously, they obtained a new title.
Petitioners sent private respondent a demand letter asking it to vacate the premises. During the dispute over land,
Flaminiano illegally took possession of the property in litigation using abusive methods. She was aided by her
husband, a lawyer. The illegal entry took place while the case was pending in the CA & while a writ of preliminary
injunction was in force.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the questioned Decision
of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED without prejudice to the filing by either party of an action regarding the
ownership of the property involved. The temporary restraining order issued on October 13, 1997 is hereby made
permanent. Petitioners and their agents are directed to turn over possession of the property to private respondent.
Petitioner Rosita Flaminiano is hereby held guilty of contempt of court for disobeying the writ of injunction issued
by the Court of Appeals and accordingly fined P20,000.00 therefor. Her counsel and husband, Atty. Eduardo B.
Flaminiano, is ordered to pay a fine of P25,000.00 for committing contumacious acts unbecoming of a member of
the Philippine Bar with a stern warning that a repetition of the same acts shall be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer is prohibited from counseling or abetting activities aimed at the defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
32. ARCATOMY GUARIN v. ATTY. CHRISTINE LIMPIN
A.C. NO. 10576 JANUARY 14, 2015
FACTS:
Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and thereafter as President of
OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned from his post. Atty. Limpin, the
Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a
GIS for LCI for “updating purposes”. The GIS identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and
President. Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, LCI applied for voluntary
dissolution with the SEC. Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing
him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she knew that he had already resigned and
had never held any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI. Atty. Limpin admits
that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD and President of LCI.
She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that her certification served to attest to the
information from the last BOD meeting.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Christine
A.C. Limpin from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision, with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE:
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than
seek exceptions as loopholes. A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the
law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.
33. GABRIELA CORONEL v. ATTY. NELSON CUNANAN
A.C. NO. 6738 AUGUST 12, 2015
FACTS:
A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Nelson Cunanan for the transfer of Original Certificate of Title No.
9616 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-72074, which were both registered in the name of their deceased
grandparents, to her name and to the names of her co-heirs by direct registration with the Office of the Register of
Deeds in violation of the proper legal procedure. He had received from her the amount of P70,000.00 for the payment
of the transfer and other fees, and had misappropriated the same; and that he had not returned the money and the
owner's duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-72074. In a report of an investigating commissioner of
the IBP it found that Complainant recounts that sometime in October 2003, she engaged the services Respondent to
transfer to her name and her co-heirs the parcels of land covered under TCT No. T-72074 and OCT. No. 9616, which
certificates of title are both registered under the name of Complainant's deceased grandparents. Respondent advised
Complainant that for the registration of TCT. No. T-72074, the transfer may be effected by two means namely
"ordinary procedure"; and second, by way of "direct registration"
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the Resolution dated May, 14, 2011 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, WITH MODIFICATION as to the recommended penalty by
suspending respondent Atty. Nelson A. Cunanan from the practice of law for one year effective immediately upon
his receipt of this decision.
The Court ORDERS respondent Atty. Cunanan to RETURN to the complainant the amount of P70,000.00
within 10 days from receipt of this decision, and to report on his compliance within five days thereafter.
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes. He shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; or counsel or abet activities
aimed at a defiance of the law or at a lessening of confidence in the legal system. He should advise his client to uphold
the law, not to violate or disobey it. Conversely, he should not recommend to his client any recourse or remedy that
is contrary to law, public policy, public order, and public morals.
CANON 1 – RULE 1.03
34. VICTOR DE LOS SANTOS II v. ATTY. NESTOR BARBOSA
A.C. NO. 6681 JUNE 17, 2015
FACTS:
Victor D. De Los Santos II, filed a complaint with the prosecutor charging the respondent Atty. Nestor C.
Barbosa for obstruction of justice. However, the prosecutor dismissed the obstruction of justice complain for
insufficiency of evidence because the respondent argued that the name of his client Canaco’s son was Victor C. De
Los Santos and not Victor P. De Los Santos as stated in the Information charging Canaco with violation of PD No.
651. In February 2005, De Los Santos filed a petition for disbarment with the Court charging the respondent with
multiple gross violations of his oath as a lawyer and Canons of Professional Ethics for unlawfully obstructing and
delaying the proceedings. Thus, referred to the IBP for investigation. Respondent sent letters to Office of Civil
registrar of Qeuzon City, National Census and Statistics office and St.Luke Hospital which states that the certificate
of live birth should not be released by such offices, otherwise they will be held liable under the law for violation of
confidentiality of records. This move was made to prevent the prosecutor from obtaining a certified true copy of the
birth certificate of Victor De Los Santos
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds respondent Atty. Nestor C. Barbosa GUILTY of
violating Rules 1.01 and 1.03 of Canon 1, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10, and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
DOCTRINE:
Lawyers should uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for the law and legal
processes. Lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s
cause.
CANON 1 – RULE 1.04
35. VENANCIO CASTANEDA v. PASTOR AGO
G.R. NO. L-28546 JULY 30, 1975
FACTS:
Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson filed a replevin suit against Pastor Ago to recover certain
machineries. Ago failed to redeem, and on April 17, 1964 the sheriff executed the final deed of sale in favor of the
vendees Castañeda and Henson. Upon their petition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of possession
to the properties. Pastor Ago seeks to annul the sheriff’s sale with the CFI of Quezon. The CFI of Quezon issued an
ex parte writ of preliminary injunction restraining the petitioners, the Register of Deeds and the sheriff of Quezon
City, from registering the latter's final deed of sale, from cancelling the respondents' certificates of title and issuing
new ones to the petitioners and from carrying out any writ of possession. While the battle on the matter of the lifting
and restoring of the restraining order was being fought in the Quezon City court, the Agos filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with this Court under date of May 26, 1966. The Court found no merit in the petition and dismissed
it. The Court of Appeals also dismissed the petition. The respondents then appealed to this Court. The Court dismissed
the petition in a minute resolution on February 8, 1967. The Ago spouses repaired once more to the Court of Appeals
where they filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals under review is set aside. Civil case Q-7986 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal is ordered dismissed, without prejudice to the re-filing of the petitioners' counterclaim
in a new and independent action. Treble costs are assessed against the spouses Pastor Ago and Lourdes Yu Ago,
which shall be paid by their lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Luison.
DOCTRINE:
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries of the law,
on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty
to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims
and caprices of his client, and temper his clients propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice
is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.
36. JON DE YSASI v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATION COMMISSION
G.R. NO. 104599 MARCH 11, 1994
FACTS:
Jon De Ysasi and Jon De Ysasi III are father and sons respectively. The private respondent (father) owns a
hacienda in Negros Occidental. petitioner (son) is employed in the hacienda as the farm administrator. In November
1982, petitioner underwent surgery and so he missed work. He was confined and while he’s nursing from his
infections he was terminated, without due process, by his father. De Ysasi III filed against his father for illegal
dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission. His father invoked that his son actually abandoned his
work.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby SET ASIDE.
Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for a period not exceeding three (3) years, without
qualification or deduction,58 and, in lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year
of service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
DOCTRINE:
It is the counsel’s ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with zeal goes beyond merely presenting
their clients' respective causes in court. It is just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all
reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in consideration of the direct
and immediate consanguineous ties between their clients.
CANON 2
37. ADELINO LEDESMA v. HON. RAFAEL CLIMACO
G.R. NO. L-23815 JUNE 28, 1974
FACTS:
Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the sala of the
respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz,
Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position as counsel
de parte. The respondent Judge denied him and also appointed him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. On
November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the Comelec requires
full time service which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Judge denied the motion. So
Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.
DOCTRINE:
The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the
performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof,
especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his
services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal.
38. IN RE: LUIS TAGORDA
FACTS:
Luis B. Tagorda was an attorney who was elected as the third member of the provincial board of Isabela. He
admits that prior to his election, he made use of a card2 written in Spanish and Ilocano, which contains a list of tasks
he may undertake as a notary public, and a lawyer, as well as a general invitation to consult with him for free. Tagorda
also admits that after he was elected into office, he wrote a letter3 to one of his hometown”s barrio lieutenants. The
letter basically informed the recipient of Tagorda”s intention to continue residing in Echague, despite having to attend
board sessions in Ilagan, in order that he may continue to serve his hometown as a notary public and lawyer. The
letter subtly offered information regarding Tagorda”s office hours, together with an express request that the recipient
spread the word as to his willingness to accept land registration cases for a fee of P3.00 per title.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda
be and is hereby suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month.
DOCTRINE:
The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially with his
brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
39. PEDRO LINSANGAN v. ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
A.C. NO. 6672 SEPTEMBER 24, 2009
FACTS:
A complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of
clients and encroachment of professional services. Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal
Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial
assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them
and sent them text messages. Complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano
tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents services instead,
in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also presented respondents calling card. Respondent, in his defense,
denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and
Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this
resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
DOCTRINE:
Lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.
CANON 3
40. MAURICIO ULEP v. THE LEGAL CLINIC
A.C. NO. L-553 JUNE 17, 1993
FACTS:
In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales was to move
toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio
Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the latter’s advertisements which contains the following:
SECRET MARRIAGE? P560.00 for a valid marriage. Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT.
VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041 8:30am – 6:00pm 7 th Flr. Victoria
Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE - DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning
Monday to Friday during office hours. Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa
Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina
Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. 7 th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy Tel. 521-7232, 5217251, 522-2041, 521-0767
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal Problems” in Star Week of
Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is composed of specialists that can take care of a
client’s problem no matter how complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can take care
of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico legal problems, labor, litigation and
family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys. As for its
advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the US which now allows it (John
Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the advertisement is merely making known to the public the
services that The Legal Clinic offers.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic,
Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same
or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any
activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. Advertise his talents or skill as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The prescription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of
legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession.
41. ADRIANO E. DACANAY vs.
BAKER & MCKENZIE
FACTS:
Lawyer Adriano E. Dacanay, admitted to the bar in 1954, in his 1980 verified complaint, sought to enjoin Juan G.
Collas, Jr. and nine other lawyers from practising law under the name of Baker & McKenzie, a law firm organized
in Illinois.
In a letter dated November 16, 1979 respondent Vicente A. Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which
contains the names of the ten lawyers, asked Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products
International, Inc. to H.E. Gabriel, a client.
Attorney Dacanay, in his reply dated December 7, 1979, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested
that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie "and if not, what is your purpose in using
the letterhead of another law office." Not having received any reply, he filed the instant complaint.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled
to practice law.
42. PP vs Gacott
FACTS:
For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio Gacott, Jr.
dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the SC. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and
a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of the SC.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the basic and supplemental motions for reconsideration of the judgment in the case at bar are hereby
DENIED. This resolution is immediately final and executory.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Section 11, Article VIII of the present Constitution which reads: "The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power
to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon." This provision is an expansion of and was taken
from the second sentence of Section 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution which provided: "The Supreme Court shall
have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal."
43. Payod Vs Metila
FACTS:
Atty. Metila failed to submit important documents to the Court of Appeals (CA) and the serious consequences
brought by such act became prejudicial to the case of Lea Payod. Payod said they made sufficient follow ups with
Atty. Metila but the latter failed to show up in appointed meetings at the Court. Pagod thereafter charged Atty. Romeo
P. Metila for willful neglect and gross misconduct in the discharge of her duties.
Atty. Metila denied the charges and insisted that there was no attorney-client relationship between him and Payod for
there was no Special Power of Attorney authorizing Payod’s mother to hire him as a lawyer.
After investigation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline, to which the complaint was
referred, found Atty. Metila guilty of simple negligence and recommended that he be seriously admonished. The
IBP Board of Directors adopted the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that Atty. Metila
be seriously admonished.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the basic and supplemental motions for reconsideration of the judgment in the case at bar are hereby
DENIED. This resolution is immediately final and executory.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A lawyer who accepts a case must give it his full attention, diligence, skill, and competence, and his negligence in
connection therewith renders him liable.
44. Sanchez v. Aguilos
FACTS:
Complainant Nenita D. Sanchez has charged respondent Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos (respondent) with misconduct for
the latter's refusal to return the amount of P70,000.00 she had paid for his professional services despite his not having
performed the contemplated professional services. She avers that in March 2005, she sought the legal services of the
respondent to represent her in the annulment of her marriage with her estranged husband, Jovencio C. Sanchez; that
the respondent accepted the engagement, fixing his fee at P150,000.00, plus the appearance fee of P5,000.00/hearing;
that she then gave to him the initial amount of P90,000.00;[1] that she had gone to his residence in May 2005 to
inquire on the developments in her case, but he told her that he would only start working on the case upon her full
payment of the acceptance fee; that she had only learned then that what he had contemplated to file for her was a
petition for legal separation, not one for the annulment of her marriage; that he further told her that she would have
to pay a higher acceptance fee for the annulment of her marriage;[2] that she subsequently withdrew the case from
him, and requested the refund of the amounts already paid, but he refused to do the same as he had already started
working on the case;[3] that she had sent him a letter, through Atty. Isidro S.C. Martinez, to demand the return of her
payment less whatever amount corresponded to the legal services he had already performed;[4] that the respondent
did not heed her demand letter despite his not having rendered any appreciable legal services to her;[5] and that his
constant refusal to return the amounts prompted her to bring an administrative complaint against him[6] in the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 20, 2007.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution No. XVIII-2008-476 dated September 20, 2008 of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, with the MODIFICATION that Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos is hereby FINED
P10,000.00 for misrepresenting his professional competence to the client, and REPRIMANDS him for his use of
offensive and improper language towards his fellow attorney, with the stern warning that a repetition of the offense
shall be severely punished.
The Court ORDERS Atty. Romeo G. Aguilos to RETURN to the complainant within thirty (30) days from notice the
sum of P70,000.00, plus legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the date of this decision until full payment.
DOCTRINES RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A.) That lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal developments and participate in continuing legal education
program (Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) in order to prevent repetition of such kind of
advise that respondent gave to the complainant. In giving an advise, he should be able to distinguish between
the grounds for legal separation and grounds for annulment of marriage. But as the respondent stated in his
answer, it appears that he is mixed up with the basic provisions of the law.
B.) CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal serviee which he knows or should know that he is
not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain
as
collaborating
counsel
a
lawyer
who
is
competent
on
the
matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. (Emphasis supplied)
The attorney's fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer's agreement between the client and the attorney, which
constitutes the law between the parties for as long as it is not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public
policy or public order.
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees - An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover
from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the
subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney.
No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may
disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.
45. Cabiles Vs. Cedo
FACTS:
According to Elibena, she engaged the services of respondent lawyer to handle an illegal dismissal case, entitled
"Danilo Ligbos v. Platinum Autowork and/or Even Cabiles and Rico Guido," where therein respondents were
Elibena's business partners. Respondent lawyer was paid Php5,500.002 for drafting therein respondents' position
paper3 and Php2,000.004 for his every appearance in the NLRC hearings.
During the hearing, only Danilo Ligbos (Danilo), the complainant therein, showed up and submitted his Reply. On
the other hand respondent lawyer did not file a Reply for his clients, 6 despite being paid his appearance fee earlier.
According to Elibena, respondent lawyer misled them by claiming that it was Danilo who was absent during the said
hearing and that moreover, because of the failure to submit a Reply, they were prevented from presenting the cash
vouchers10 that would refute Danilo's claim that he was a regular employee.
Elibena moreover claimed that respondent lawyer failed to indicate his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) compliance11 in the position paper and in the memorandum of appeal that he prepared.
Elibena also averred that, she hired respondent lawyer to file a criminal case for unjust vexation against Emelita
Claudit; that as evidenced by a handwritten receipt, 14 she paid respondent lawyer his acceptance fees, the expenses
for the filing of the case, and the appearance fees totalling Php45,000.00; and that in order to come up with the
necessary amount, she sold 'to respondent lawyer her 1994 Model Mitsubishi Lancer worth Php85,000.00, this sale
being covered by an unnotarized Deed of Sale .
Elibena claimed that, despite payment of his professional fees, respondent lawyer did not exert any effort to
seasonably file her Complaint for unjust vexation before the City Prosecutor's Office.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Leandro S. Cedo is hereby found GUILTY of violating Canons 5, 17, 18, and
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year effective upon receipt of this Decision, and warned that a repetition of the same or a similar
act will be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINES RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Case law further illumines that a lawyer's duty of competence and diligence includes not merely reviewing the cases
entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists of properly representing the client before
any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings,
prosecuting the handled cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or
the court to prod him or her to do so.
Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While such negligence
or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently held that the lawyer's mere failure to
perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation.
46. Collantes vs. Renomeron
FACTS:
This complaint for disbarment is relative to the administrative case filed by Atty. Collantes, house counsel for V&
G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against Atty. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the
latter’s irregular actuations with regard to the application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute
Sale with Assignment (in favor of GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.
Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, respondent suspended the registration of the documents with
certain “special conditions” between them, which was that V&G should provide him with weekly round trip ticket
from Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondent’s Quezon
City house and lot by V&G or GSIS representatives.
Eventually, respondent formally denied the registration of the documents. He himself elevated the question on the
registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio (of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration-NLTDRA). The Administrator then resolved in favor of the registrability of the documents. Despite
the resolution of the Administrator, the respondent still refused the registration thereof but demanded from the parties
interested the submission of additional requirements not adverted in his previous denial
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron be disbarred from the practice of law in the
Philippines, and that his name be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
DOCTRINES RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and
employees to process documents and papers expeditiously (Sec. 5, subpars. [c] and [d] and prohibits them from
directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office,
and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any transaction which
may be affected by the functions of their office (See. 7, subpars. [a] and [d]), the Code of Professional Responsibility
forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule 1.01, Code of Professional
Responsibility), or delay any man's cause "for any corrupt motive or interest" (Rule 103).
47. Reyes vs Gaa
FACTS:
Wellington Reyes, complainant, reported to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim
of extortion by respondent Atty. Salvador Gaa, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a complaint
for estafa filed by complainant’s business rival. The NBI agents then apprehended respondent in an entrapment
operation set up by them.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISBARRED and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on
the personal records of respondent.
DOCTRINES RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
It is settled that affirmative testimony is given greater weight than negative testimony (Delos Reyes v. Aznar, 179
SCRA 653 [1989]). When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him (Malcolm, Legal and Judicial
Ethics 93 [1949]). He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times
is expected of him.
48. Pimentel vs Llorente
FACTS:
Complainant was then a candidate during the May 8, 1995 elections. He filed this complaint against respondent Attys.
Antonio M. Llorente and Lgaya P. Salayon, in their capacity as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers, for
gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyer’s oath. Complainant alleges that respondents
tampered with the votes received by him, with the result that, as shown in the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and
Certificate of Canvass (CoC), other senatorial candidates were credited with votes which were above the number of
votes they actually received while, on the other hand, petitioner’s votes were reduced. Respondents denied the
allegations, claiming that the errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest mistake, oversight,
and/or fatigue.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon GUILTY of misconduct and
imposes on each of them a FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 with a WARNING that commission of similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINES RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or
shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct.
Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the
Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By
express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise
violated their oath of office as lawyers to "do no falsehood."
49. Berenguer-landers vs Florin
FACTS:
Berenguers were denied due process so they filed a disbarment complaint against Florin, the RARAD and two others.
The Court affirms the decision of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend Florin. It ruled that if the misconduct as a
government official (an official exercising quasi-judicial functions here in this case) also constitutes a violation of
his oath as a lawyer, he may be disciplined by the Court as a member of the bar.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. ISABEL E. FLORIN is found guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is penalized with SUSPENSION from the practice of law for
three (3) months effective upon notice hereof. The complaint against Atty. Marcelino Jornales and Atty. Pedro Vega
is DISMISSED for lack of sufficient evidence.
DOCTRINES RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private
practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 644 of said
Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus, they should
be more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant
scrutiny of the public.
x x x For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen
the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all
times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.1âwphi1 Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service
is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her
brethren in private practice.
50. Suarez Vs Platon
FACTS:
In May 1935, respondent Lieutenant Vivencio Orais of the Philippine Constabulary filed a complaint charging
petitioner Fortunato N. Suarez, and one Tomas Ruedas, with sedition for vocally despising the abuses made by
government officers. The case was subsequently dismissed after Lieutenant Orais moved for its temporary dismissal
in obedience to an order of the Provincial Commander of Tayabas. In turn, Suarez charged Orais and Damian Jimenez
with the crime of arbitrary detention for unlawfully arresting and detaining him while riding a train going to Calauag.
During the course of the proceedings, respondent Judge Serviliano Platon was appointed to preside over the case.
Judge Planton thereafter dismissed the case after due consideration of all the facts and proofs submitted. Thus, the
petition for writ of mandamus, compelling Judge Platon to reinstate the criminal case.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
The petition is hereby dismissed, without pronouncement regarding cost. So ordered.
DOCTRINES RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
MANDAMUS; PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC OFFENSES; DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF
PROSECUTING OFFICERS. — We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of
prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this court is averse to any form of vacillation by such
officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do
justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding informations. In
the language of Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United States, the prosecuting officer "is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially
is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that
it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness
and vigor — indeed, he should do so. But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is
as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one." (69 United States Law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309.)
51. LAHM V. MAYOR
AC 7430
FEBRUARY 15, 2012
FACTS:
Toze filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission against the members of the Board of Trustees of the International School, Manila. The case was raffled
to the sala of the respondent, Labor Arbiter Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. During the proceedings, Toze filed a Verified
Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, to which the complainants,
Martin Lahm III and James P. Concepcion, opposed. Thereafter, the respondent issued an Order directing the parties
in the said case to maintain the status quo ante, which consequently reinstated Toze to his former position as
superintendent of the International School Manila. Despite the complainants’ motion for an early resolution of their
motion to dismiss the said case, respondent maintained his Order. Thus, the complaint praying for the respondent’s
disbarment for alleged gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath.
Under the 2005 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiters no longer have the authority to issue writs of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining orders. However, the respondent, in violation of the said rule,
vehemently insist that he has the authority to issue writs of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Jovencio Ll. Mayor, Jr. guilty of gross ignorance of the law in violation of
his lawyer’s oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court resolved to SUSPEND respondent from
the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense
in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
DOCTRINE:
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the
government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of lawyers
"shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks." Thus, where a lawyer’s
misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds.
52. PCCG V. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.,
GR 1518098-12
2005
FACTS:
In 1976, General Bank & Trust Company (Genbank) encountered financial difficulties. Central Bank extended loans
to Genbank in the hope of rehabilitating it (P310M). Nonetheless, Genbank failed to recover. It was declared
insolvent. A public bidding of Genbank's assets was held with the Lucio Tan Group winning the bid. Solicitor General
Mendoza, representing the government, intervened with the liquidation of Genbank.
After EDSA I, Cory established the PCGG to recover the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos, his family and cronies. It filed
a case against Lucio Tan and others. In relation to this case, PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties
allegedly acquired by the respondents by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with Marcos.
Sandiganbayan heard the case. Estelito Mendoza (Solicitor General during the time of Marcos) represented the
respondents. PCGG filed a motion to disqualify Mendoza, because of his participation in the liquidation of Genbank.
Genbank (now Allied Bank) is one of the properties that PCGG is seeking to be sequestered from the Lucion Tan
group. PCGG invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Sandiganbayan denied PCGG's motion. According to the Sandiganbayan, Mendoza did not take an adverse position
to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank. And Mendoza's appearance as counsel was beyond the 1 year prohibitory
period since he retired in 1986.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 (resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the
Sandiganbayan denied the other PCGG's motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza) and December 5, 2001 (The
PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated December 5, 2001.) of
the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.
DOCTRINE:
Rule 6.03 “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter which he had intervened while in said service.”
"Matter” is defined any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular
situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law. The act of advising the Central Bank, on how
to proceed with the said bank”s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila is
not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
53. PASOK V. ZAPATOS
AC 7388
OCTOBER 19, 2016
FACTS:
This administrative case concerns the respondent, a retired judge who took on the case that he had intervened in
during his incumbency on the Bench. The complainant was the counsel of record of the plaintiff in the case. The
charge specified that the respondent was guilty of "representing adverse interest, illegal practice of law, conduct and
becoming as a former member of the bench and conduct unbecoming in violation of the canons of legal ethics with
prayer for disbarment"
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES ATTY. FELIPE G. ZAPATOS guilty of violating Rule 6.03
of Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for a period of
ONE (1) MONTH effective immediately upon receipt of this decision, with warning that a similar offense by him
will be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE:
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
54. SANTOS JR. V. LLAMAS
AC 4749
JAN. 20, 2000
FACTS:
Soliman M. Santos, Jr. a member of the bar, filed a complaint against Atty. Francisco R. Llamas for misrepresentation
and non-payment of bar membership dues. Llamas has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data in
his pleadings. Llamas only indicates ―IBP Rizal 259060.
Llamas alleged that he was exempt from payment of IBP dues under R.A. 7432, Sec. 4, for being a senior citizen
since 1992 and that he was engaged only in limited practice of law. Llamas, also added, that if despite such honest
belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately
failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past dues even with
interests, charges and surcharges and penalties.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The Court ruled to impose the penalty of one year suspension upon Llamas from the practice of law or until he has
paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.
DOCTRINE:
Canon 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
55. EVANGELINE LEDA VS. ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG
A.C. NO. 2505
FEBRUARY 21 1992
FACTS:
Tabang and Leda contracted marriage at Iloilo and was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code as marriage of
exceptional
character. Both of them kept their marriage a secret until Tabang finishes his law studies, they had not yet lived as
husband and wife.
Tabang, having finished his law studies, declared in his application to take the bar that he was single. After Tabang
passed the bar, Leda blocked him of taking his oath by instituting a complaint, Bar Matter No. 78, that he acted
fraudulently in filling out his application. Thus, Tabang should be considered as unworthy to take the lawyer‘s oath
for lack of good moral character. Tabang admitted that he legally married Leda but that the marriage was not yet
made and declared public so that he could
properly take the Bar exams and ensure their future. Bar Matter No. 78 was dismissed because Tabang said that it
just arose out of misunderstanding between him and Leda.
Leda then instituted an Administrative Case for Tabang‘s disbarment on grounds of using his legal knowledge to
contract an invalid marriage with Leda, misrepresented himself as single, and for lack of good moral character. It was
found out that the marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the
Civil Code, or the five-year minimum cohabitation before celebration of marriage and that they were both twenty
years old when they got married, below the required Minimum age of twenty-one years old. He contended that he
and Leda agreed not to disclose that their marriage was void from the beginning because he wanted to finish his
Studies and take the bar first. He also believed that when he applied for the Bar, he honestly believed that in the eyes
of the law, he was single.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Tabang is SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders.
DOCTRINE:
Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility: "A lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for admission
to the bar."
56. IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN
THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.
BM 1154
2004
FACTS:
Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify
Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary
penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Cotabato City. Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of
Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S.
Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine
Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
DOCTRINE:
Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is
not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional
integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good
moral character includes at least common honesty.
Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making
a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar."
57. IN RE INVESTIGATION OF ANGEL J. PARAZO FOR ALLEGED LEAKAGE OF QUESTIONS IN
SOME SUBJECTS IN THE 1948 BAR EXAMINATIONS.
GR 120348
DECEMBER 3, 1948
FACTS:
Angel J. Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of general circulation, manifested a story
with the headline — "CLAIM 'LEAK' IN LAST BAR TESTS," "Applicants In Uproar, Want Anomaly Probed; One
School Favored,"
Parazo stated in said report that students of a private university in Sampaloc had been seen with copies of the
mimeographed questions one week prior the exams.
Mr. Justice Padilla, Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners, by authority of the Court, instructed Mr. Jose de
la Cruz as Commissioner with the assistance of Mr. E. Soriano, Clerk of Court to cite Parazo for questioning and
investigation. Parazo repeatedly stated during the investigation that he knew the names and identities of the persons
who furnished him the information but refused to reveal the same. In refusing to make the revelation which the Court
required of him, he committed contempt of Court. He omitted and still refused to do an act commanded by the Court
which is yet in his power to perform.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The majority of the members of this Court have decided to order, as it hereby orders, his immediate arrest and
confinement in jail for a period of one (1) month, unless, before the expiration of that period he makes to this Court
the revelation demanded of him. So ordered.
DOCTRINE:
The Supreme Court and the Philippine Bar have always tried to maintain a high standard for the legal profession,
both in academic preparation and legal training, as well as in honesty and fair dealing. The Court and the licensed
lawyers themselves are vitally interested in keeping this high standard; and one of the ways of achieving this end is
to admit to the practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest, possess good moral
character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set by this Court by passing the Bar
Examinations honestly and in the regular and usual manner.
58. REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. Atty. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.
AC 4148
July 30, 1998
FACTS:
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of
continuing grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous
circumstances.
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for conduct unbecoming an
officer of the court. In Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge
of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six months suspension without pay, while in Administrative Matter Nos.
1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated, this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from
service of respondent.
Atty. Tapucar continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than his lawfully-wedded wife, despite previous
sanctions imposed upon him by the Court.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED and his name be stricken out from the Roll.
DOCTRINE:
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
59. SPOUSES GERALDY AND LILIBETH VICTORY, Complainants vs. ATTY. MARIAN JOS.
MERCADO, Respondent
AC 10580
July 12, 2017
FACTS:
Spouses Geraldy and Lilibeth Victory (Spouses Victory) were enticed by respondent to enter into a financial
transaction with her with a promise of good monetary returns. As respondent is a lawyer and a person of reputation,
Spouses Victory entrusted their money to respondent to invest, manage, and administer into some financial
transactions that would earn good profit for the parties. Respondent called and asked Geraldy Victory (Geraldy)
whether he wanted to invest his money. The respondent promised that for an investment of PhP 400,000, she will
give Geraldy PhP 600,000 in 30days; and for PhP 500,000, she will give Geraldy PhP 625,000.
Later on, respondent became evasive in returning to Spouses Victory the money that the latter were supposed to
receive as part of the agreement. Respondent failed to settle and account the money entrusted to her by Spouses
Victory.
Spouses Victory filed a criminal complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 with the Office if the
City Prosecutor of Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
After the filing of said criminal case, respondent met with Spouses Victory. Respondent proposed to reduce her
obligation from PhP 8.3 Million to PhP 7.5 Million in staggered payments, to which Spouses Victory agreed.
Respondent then issued three postdated checks in the amount of PhP 300,000 each. However, said checks bounced.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found that respondent indeed lured
Spouses Victory in entering into a series of financial transactions with a promise of return of profit. Respondent,
however, failed to deliver such promise.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, We resolve to SUSPEND Atty. Marian Jo S. Mercado from the practice of law
for one (1) year to commence immediately from the receipt of this Decision, with a WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The bar should maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
60. REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING AND ROYAL BECHTEL BUILDERS, INC., petitioners, vs. HON.
DOLORES S. ESPAÑOL, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch 90, Imus,
Cavite, respondent.
GR 133090
January 19, 2001
FACTS:
During a hearing for the annulment of Sale and Certificates of Title in the case of Royal Bechtel Builders, Inc. v.
Spouses Luis Alvaran and Beatriz Alvaran, et. al., petitioner (here-in counsel for Alvarans), together with his assistant
operating a video camera and taking pictures of the proceedings, manifested that he was ready to mark his
documentary evidence pursuant to his Motion to cite in contempt of court the Deputy Register of Deeds of Cavite,
Diosdado Concepcion. Despite the court asking petitioner to allow the defendant’s counsel to finish his manifestation
and respect the court’s decision to give defendant counsel time to write their comment, petitioner kept insisting that
he be allowed to mark his evidence and even accused the court of being antagonistic and biased and threatening to
file an inhibition to the Hon. Court.The court cited petitioner in direct contempt and ordered for him to be put in jail
for three days and fined P3,000. Petitioner served his sentence but afterwards filed for a declaration of such order as
null and void as it had no legal basis; he also asked for a reimbursement of the fine. CA decision to uphold RTC
judgment was affirmed but P1000 was asked to be returned topetitioner as it was in excess of the ceiling of P2000
under Supreme Court Admin. Circ. No. 22-95.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Atty. Bucgaring is declared in direct contempt of Court and is sentenced to three (3) days imprisonment and payment
of a fine of P2,000.00.
DOCTRINE:
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Ethics obliges a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administrative of justice. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge, as in the case
at bar, and can be punished summarily without hearing.
61. A.C. No. 10628, July 01, 2015
MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO O. AILES, Respondent.
Facts:
This instant administrative case arose from a verified Complaint for disbarment dated April 16, 2012 filed by
complainant Maximino Noble III(Maximino) against respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes (Orlando) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Atty. Orlando O. Ailes filed an action for damages against his brother Marcelo
O. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo) who filed a separate case of Grave Threat and Estafa against the respondent. Maximino was
the counsel of Marcelo who represented him in his civil case (Action for Damages). When Maximino was furnished
a copy of the complaint, he discovered that, through text messages, Orlando had been maligning him and dissuading
Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as
well as the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby ADMONISHED to be more
circumspect in dealing with his professional colleagues and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same
or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Doctrine:
It must be emphasized that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions such that a lawyer's words
and actions directly affect the public's opinion of the legal profession. Lawyers are expected to observe such conduct
of nobility and uprightness which should remain with them, whether in their public or private lives, and may be
disciplined in the event their conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon them.
62. A.C. No. 11616 [Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2141], August 23, 2017
LITO V. BUENVIAJE, Complainant, v. ATTY. MELCHOR G. MAGDAMO, Respondent.
Facts:
Atty. Magdamo was the counsel of Fe's sisters, Lydia and Florenia Gonzalo, who filed a criminal case for bigamy
against Buenviaje. They claimed that Buenviaje was married to a certain Amalia Ventura in 1978, thus, making him
guilty of bigamy. Buenviaje lamented that Atty. Magdamo employed dirty and dishonest means and tactics to ensure
that BPI will prevent him from withdrawing money from the joint account that he has with his late wife. He averred
that in referring to him as a "swindler", Atty. Magdamo succeeded in intimidating BPI-Dagupan into extrajudicially
"freezing" the joint account and in not transacting with him. The records show that Atty. Magdamo referred to
Buenviaje as a "swindler". He made this imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that Buenviaje is
committing swindling activities.
Dispositive Portion:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the October 10, 2014 and May 28, 2016 Resolutions of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Board of Governors in CBD Case No. 08-2141 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Melchor G.
Magdamo from the practice of law for three (3) months effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Doctrine:
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the adversarial nature
of our legal system. Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has
no place in the dignity of judicial forum.
63. [G.R. No. L-24114. June 30, 1970.]
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. CLEMENTE
M. SORIANO IN. L-24114, People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation and University of the Philippines v.
Hon. Eulogio Mencias, Elpidio Tiburcio, Marcelino Tiburcio, Et. Al.
Facts:
On October 10, 1969, Clemente M. Soriano, a member of the Philippine Bar entered his appearance in the present
case (L-24114, PHHC and U.P. vs. Mencias, Tiburcio, et al.) as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents
Marcelino Tiburcio, et al. This act in itself would have been innocuous were it not for the fact that it was done one
year and eight months after the decision in this case became final. Atty. Soriano asked the Court to exhume the case
from the archives. Atty. Soriano's subsequent explanation did not, however, serve to dissuade this Court from
requiring him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for entering an appearance at
such a late date. He alleged that sometime during the first week of October 1969, the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio,
in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other respondents, went to him to engage his professional services in
two cases, to wit: this terminated case (L-24114) and the Varsity Hills case (L-30546). Atty. Soriano allegedly relied
upon the assurance of a mutual acquaintance and representation of Marcelino Tiburcio that the two cases were
pending in the Court. He then agreed to render professional services in the two cases in consideration of a contingent
fee of 143.33 hectares of land out of the 430 hectares (more or less) involved in the two cases.
Dispositive Portion:
Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in the present case, to forthwith withdraw the appearance that he has entered as chief
counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, Et. Al.
Doctrine:
A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another lawyer; however, it
is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against
unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
64. [A.C. No. 3149. August 17, 1994.]
CERINA B. LIKONG, Petitioner, v. ATTY. ALEXANDER H. LIM, Respondent.
Facts:
Cerina filed a complaint for disbarment, alleging that in all the motions, she was prevented from seeking assistance,
advice and signature of any of her two lawyers as she was advised by Atty. Lim that it was not necessary for her to
consult her lawyers under the pretense that: (a) this could only jeopardize the settlement; (b) she would only be
incurring enormous expense if she consulted a new lawyer; (c) respondent was assisting her anyway; (d) she had
nothing to worry about the documents foisted upon her to sign; (e) complainant need not come to court afterwards to
save her time; and in any event respondent already took care of everything. She alleged that she was prevented from
exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud, deception and some other form of mendacity practiced on her by Atty.
Lim who, fraudulently or without authority, assumed to represent complainant and connived in her defeat.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alexander H. Lim is hereby imposed the penalty SUSPENSION from the
practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR, effective immediately upon his receipt of this decision.
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure
of the facts.
65. [A.C. No. 4807. March 22, 2000.]
MANUEL N. CAMACHO, Complainant, v. ATTYS. LUIS MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN, REGINA D.
BALMORES, CATHERINE V. LAUREL and HUBERT JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of PANGULAYAN AND
ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, Respondents.
Facts:
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the lawyers comprising the Pangulayan and Associates Law
Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan, Regina D. Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert
Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the hired counsel of some expelled students from the AMA Computer College
("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages, docketed
Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that respondents, then
counsel for the defendants, procured and effected on separate occasions, without his knowledge, compromise
agreements ("Re-Admission Agreements") with four of his clients in the aforementioned civil case which in effect
required them to waive all kinds of claims they might have had against AMACC, the principal defendant, and to
terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant averred that such an act of
respondents was unbecoming of any member of the legal profession warranting either disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS effective immediately upon his receipt of this decision. The case against the
other respondents is DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence.
Doctrine:
A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel,
much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his counsel.
It is incumbent upon the lawyer most particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a party not represented
by counsel and he should not undertake to advise him as to law.
66. A.C. No. 11754
JOAQUIN G. BONIFACIO, Complainant
vs.
ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA and ATTY. DIANE KAREN B. BRAGAS, Respondents
Facts:
Sometime in 2003, an illegal dismissal case was lodged against Bonifacio and his company, Solid Engine Rebuilders
Corporation entitled Gil Abucejo, Edgar Besmano, Efren Sager, Darlito Sosa, Gerardo G. Talosa, and Salvador
Villanueva v. Solid Engine Rebuilders Corporation and/or Joaquin G. Bonifacio. Complainants therein (Abucejon
Group) were represented by Era and Associates Law Office through Atty. Era. On January 26, 2006, a Writ of
Execution was issued to implement the June 15, 2004 Decision. A Notice of Garnishment dated February 6, 2006
was likewise issued. Two alias writs dated May 8, 2008 and April 16, 2013 were later on issued, directing the sheriff
to collect the sum of ₱4,012,166.43, representing the judgment award plus interest and attorney's fees. Meanwhile,
an administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Era for representing conflicting interests entitled Ferdinand A.
Samson v. Atty. Edgardo 0. Era, docketed as A.C. No. 6664. In a July 16, 2013 Decision, this Court found Atty. Era
guilty of the charge and imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years. Atty. Era, however,
continued to practice law notwithstanding his suspension.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Edgardo O. Era is found GUILTY of willfully disobeying this Court's
lawful order and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, while Atty. Diane
Karen B. Bragas is likewise found GUILTY of violating CANON 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month, effective immediately from receipt of this
Decision. Also, both Attys. Era and Bragas are WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense, or a
commission of another offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
Doctrine:
A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law. Indeed, it is a lawyer's duty to
prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law. Such duty is founded upon public interest
and policy, which requires that law practice be limited only to individuals found duly qualified in
education and character.
67. [G.R. No. L-3593. March 23, 1907. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff, v. C.W. NEY and JUAN GARCIA BOSQUE, Defendants.
Attorney-General Araneta, for Plaintiff.
C.W. Ney, for Defendants.
Facts:
This proceeding is to punish the defendants for contempt. In the year 1902 the court decided that the defendant, J.
Garcia Bosque, was not entitled to admission to practice law in the Philippine Islands, upon the ground that after the
change of sovereignty he had elected to remain a Spanish subject and as such was not qualified for admission to the
bar
(In
re
Bosque,
1
Phil.
Rep.,
88),
and
an
order
was
entered
accordingly.
Dispositive Portion:
The judgment of the court is that each of the defendants is fined in the sum of 200 pesos, to be paid into the office of
the clerk of this court within ten days, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.
Doctrine:
An attempt to practice law by a person who has by order of this court been refused admission to the bar, is a
disobedience of such order and is contempt of court, not qualified by the fact that an appeal has been taken from the
order.
68. A.C. No. 9604
RODRIGO E. TAPAY and ANTHONY J. RUSTIA, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.
Facts:
Tapay and Rustia filed with the IBP a complaint to disbar Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner.
The complainants alleged that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman with the forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Complainants stated further that the signature of Atty.
Bancolo in the Complaint was not the only one that was forged. Complainants attached a Report by the PNP Crime
Laboratory 6 which examined three other letter-complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients, allegedly close
friends of Atty. Jarder. The report concluded that the questioned signatures in the letter-complaints and the submitted
standard signatures of Atty. Bancolo were not written by one and the same person. Thus, complainants maintained
that not only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also involved in
falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Janus T. larder for lack of merit. We find respondent Atty.
Charlie L. Bancolo administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year effective upon finality of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Doctrine:
The lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on public
interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified
in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and limited privilege subject
to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to protect
the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law
and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court.
69. G.R. No. 149576 August 8, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Land Registration Authority, Petitioner,
vs.
KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
Facts:
Kenrick built a concrete fence around some parts of the land behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO) claiming ownership over those lands. Its encroachment resulted to the dispossession of
ATO of some 30,228 square meters of prime land. Kenrick justified its action by presenting TCTs issued in its name
and which allegedly originated from a TCT registered in the name of Alfonso Concepcion. When ATO verified the
TCTs, the Registrar of Deeds reported that it has no record of them and that their ascendant title, allegedly in the
name of Concepcion, was non-existent in their office. Thus, the OSG filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and
cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the Republic against Concepcion and Kenrick. Kenrick filed an answer
which was allegedly signed by its counsel Atty. Onofre Garlitos Jr. When Concepcion could not be located and be
served with summons, the trial court ordered the issuance of an alias summons by publication against him. While the
case was pending, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and Human Rights investigated
Kenrick’s acquisition of fake titles. During the hearing, Atty. Garlitos was summoned and testified that he prepared
Kenrick’s answer and transmitted an unsigned draft to Kenrick’s president, Victor Ong. Apparently, the signature
appearing above Garlitos’ name was not his, he did not authorized anyone to sign it in his behalf, and he did not know
who finally signed it.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision and August 20, 2001 resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the February 19, 1999
resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 declaring respondent in default is
hereby REINSTATED.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for the commencement of disbarment proceedings against Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. for his possible unprofessional
conduct not befitting his position as an officer of the court.
Doctrine:
A counsel’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it to just any person. The
signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
70. A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant,
vs.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.
FACTS:
Ashary Alauya transacted with Sophia Alawi to avail of a contract for the purchase of one housing unit from EB
Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd., a real estate and housing company. Shortly thereafter Alauya wrote to the company
expressing his intent to render the contract void ab initio. Several correspondences ensued, all of which were signed
by Alauya as ATTY. ASHARY M. ALAUYA. Alauya is a member of the Sharia Bar and for that matter he is a
counselor-at-law. Alauya claims that he does not use the title of counselor-at-law for fear of being mistaken as a local
legislator, i.e. councilor. Hence, he affixed the title of attorney before his name. Alawi filed a verified complaint
against Alauya, alleging, among others, that Alawi usurped the title of an attorney which is reserved only for the
members of the Philippine Bar.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and
he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE:
Persons who passed the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Bar and may only practice law before
a Sharia Court, Alauya's disinclination to use the title of counselor-at-law does not warrant his use of the title of an
attorney.
71. FIVE J TAXI v. NLRC
G.R. No. 111474. August 22, 1994
FACTS:
Maldigan and Sabsalon were taxi drivers for Five J Taxi. Five J Taxi had in place a boundary system where
the driver had to pay not only the boundary fee to take out the taxi for the day, but also a PhP 20 car wash fee and a
PhP 15 deposit. Years later, after Maldigan and Sabsalon had left the company, they sought to get the accumulated
deposits, only to be told that as per company practice, the accumulated fees were to answer for the repair expenses
of the taxi cabs handled by the drivers. Maldigan and Sabsalon filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The LA
dismissed the complaint, which decision was concurred in by the NLRC. However, the NLRC modified the decision
of the LA by granting the refund of the deposit and the car wash fee. On the question of the propriety of those awards,
Five J Taxi elevated the case to the SC.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby
MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing said
public respondent to order and effect the computation and payment by petitioners of the refund for private respondent
Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this resolution up to the date of
actual payment thereof.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CPR:
Quantum Meruit – “As much as you deserved.”
The statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable
compensation for his services necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition for
the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer.
72. AMALGAMATED LABORERS’ ASSN. v. CIR
G.R. No. L-23467, March 27, 1968
FACTS:
This case involves a controversy over Attorney’s Fees for legal services in the CIR. Arceo and 47 other
members of their UNION, ALA and Javier lodged complaint against Binalbagan Sugar Central Company (BISCOM)
for unfair labor practices, as specified in the Industrial Peace Act. The CIR rendered judgement in favor of the workers
and it became final on March 1963. The CIR directed the Chief Examiner to go to BISCOM to compute the back
wages of the complainant workers. Atty. Fernandez filed a “Notice of Atty.’s lien” amounting to 25% of their money
claim (PhP79, 755.22). He explained that it was supposed to be 30% but Arsenio Reyes requested him to 25% to
satisfy Atty. Carbonell’s lien of 5%. Atty. Carbonell disputed this claim and even said that the verbal agreement
entered into by the UNION and its officers is that the 30% Atty.’s Fees shall be divided equally by him, Atty.
Fernandez & Felisberto Javier, the UNION’s president.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the award of twenty five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees solely to
respondent Atty. Fernandez contained in CIR's order of March 19, 1964 and affirmed by said court's en banc
resolutions of April 28, 1964 and June 25, 1964, is hereby set aside; and the case is hereby remanded to the Court of
Industrial Relations with instructions to conduct a hearing on, and determine, the respective shares of Attorney
Leonardo C. Fernandez and Attorney Jose Ur. Carbonell in the amount of PhP 19,938.81 herein awarded as attorneys'
fees or both. No costs.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CPR:
Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed
to practice law.
The union president should share in the attorneys' fees. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement
in terms clear and explicit. It says: "No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based
upon a division of service or responsibility." The union president is not the attorney for the laborers. He may seek
compensation only as such president. An agreement whereby a union president is allowed to share in attorneys' fees
is immoral.
73. HEIRS OF CARLOS v. LINSANGAN
A.C. No. 11494, July 24, 2017
FACTS:
Complainants are children of the late Juan De Dios E. Carlos (Juan) who presently seek to disbar respondent
Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan. Atty. Linsangan acted as counsel for their late father in several cases, one of which
involving the recovery of a parcel of land located in Alabang, Muntinlupa City. Complainants alleged that Atty.
Linsangan forced them to sign pleadings and documents, sold the parcel of land in Alabang, Muntinlupa City in
cahoots with complainants' estranged mother, and evaded payment of income taxes when he divided his share in the
subject property as his supposed attorney's fees to his wife and children, all in violation of his oath as lawyer.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Jaime S. Linsangan LIABLE for violations of his lawyer's oath, Article
1491(5) of the Civil Code, Rule 9.02, Canon 9, and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this
Decision. Let copies of this Decision be circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance, and
spread in the personal record of Atty. Linsangan.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CPR:
Canon 9 - a lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed
to practice law.
Canon 16 - a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his
profession.
A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere fact that the
client owes him attorney’s fees. The failure of an attorney to return the client's money upon demand gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice and violation of the general morality, as
well as of professional ethics; it also impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment. The
relationship of attorney and client has consistently been treated as one of special trust and confidence. An attorney
must therefore exercise utmost good faith and fairness in all his relationship with his client.
74. MASINSIN v. ALBANO
G.R. No. 86421, May 31, 1994
FACTS:
This case emerged from an ejectment suit filed by respondent Cañeda then as plaintiffs, against herein
petitioners. MTC rendered ordering the defendants to vacate the premises and to remove their house/apartment and
surrender possession petitioners filed a petition seeking the annulment of the decision was dismissed. No appeal was
taken therefrom.-complaint for "Annulment of Judgment, Lease Contract and Damages" was filed again and was
dismissed on the ground of res judicata. When petitioners refused to remove their house on the premises in question,
an order of demolition was issued. Shortly thereafter, the demolition began. Unfazed by the series of dismissals of
their complaints and petitions, petitioners assailed anew the MTC decision in a petition for certiorari RTC petitioners
contend that the MTC of Manila has lost jurisdiction when the property in question was proclaimed an area for priority
development by National Housing Authority.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioners' counsel of record is hereby strongly CENSURED
and WARNED that a similar infraction of the lawyer's oath in the future will be dealt with most severely. Double
costs against petitioners.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CPR:
Canon 10 - a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
A lawyer is a servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration
of law and the dispensation of justice. Thus, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate and he
should not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer
of the court, which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade the administration of justice is contumacious
calling for both an exercise of disciplinary action and warranting application of the contempt power.
75. LIBIT v. OLIVA
A.C. No. 2837, October 7, 1994
FACTS:
Judge Domingo Panis in Pedro Cutingting v. Alfredo Tan ordered the NBI director to conduct an
investigation to determine the author of the falsified Sheriff’s return in said case. As a result, the NBI charged
respondents Atty. Edelson Oliva and Florando Umali for obstruction of justice. The case was referred to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. In view of NBI’s report that Umali signature in the complaint in the civil
case was not his, the case was dismissed with respect to him.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Accordingly, the Court resolved to impose upon Atty. Edelson Oliva the supreme penalty of DISBARMENT.
His license to practice law in the Philippines is CANCELLED and the Bar Confidant is ordered to strike out his name
from the Roll of Attorneys.The case is ordered dismissed as against Atty. Florando Umali.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CPR:
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and
continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements
is the observance of honesty and candor. It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is
essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty
from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to
satisfy the expectation.
76. INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. EMPLOYEES ASSN. v. INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO.
G.R. No. L-25291, March 10, 1977
FACTS:
Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was formerly the
secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU unions and the Insular Life Building
Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president, in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to
dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade
Unions (NATU), to no avail.
Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the Department
of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956 as assistant corporate secretary and legal
assistant in their Legal Department. Enaje was hired as personnel manager of the Companies, and was likewise made
chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining with the Unions.
Unions jointly submitted proposals to the Companies; negotiations were conducted on the Union’s proposals,
but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a result of which the Unions filed on January 27,
1958 a notice of strike for “deadlock on collective bargaining.” The issue was dropped subsequently but, the parties
negotiated on the labor demands but with no satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
ACCORDINGLY, subject to the above modification as to backwages, the motion for reconsideration is
hereby denied, and the judgment of the Court as embodied in its decision of January 30, 1971 is affirmed in all other
respects. This denial is immediately executor.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CPR:
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or
the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already
rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
77. Comelec v. Noynay
G.R. No. 132365. July 9, 1998
FACTS:
Comelec filed an information against private respondents of this case for violation of Sec. 261(i) of the
Omnibus Election Code for having been engaged in partisan political activities with the RTC Branch 32. Judge
Naynoy, of RTC Br. 32, motu proprio ordered the records of the case to be withdrawn and directed the Comelec Law
Department to file the said cases with the MTC. Judge Naynoy contends that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the
cases because the maximum imposable penalty in each case does not exceed six years imprisonment, citing BP 129
as amended by RA 7691. (uy CivPro.) RTC denied the Comelec”s MR, hence, they filed a special civil action for
certiorari with mandamus before the SC.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders of
public respondent Judge Tomas B. Noynay of 25 August 1997 and 17 October 1997 in Criminal Cases Nos. A1439 and A-1442 to A-1449 are SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is DIRECTED to try and decide said cases
with purposeful dispatch and, further, ADMONISHED to faithfully comply with Canons 4 and 18 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
Atty. Jose P. Balbuena is ADMONISHED to be more careful in the discharge of his duty to the court as
a lawyer under the Code of Professional Responsibility.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CPR:
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
78. ADEZ REALTY, INC. V. CA
GR 100643, August 14, 1992
FACTS:
Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay, guilty of intercalating a material fact in a decision of the Court of Appeals,
which he appealed to this Court on certiorari, thereby altering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals with the
apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment. Consequently, Atty. Dacanay was
disbarred from the practice of law.
He claimed that the inserted words were written by his client, the President of Adez Realty, Inc., in the draft
of the petition to be filed before the Supreme Court and unwittingly adopted by movant's secretary when the latter
formalized the petition. He manifested that he would not risk committing the act for which he was found guilty
considering that he was a nominee of the Judicial and Bar Council to the President for appointment as regional trial
judge.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
ACCORDINGLY, the challenged decision and resolution of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 23773 are AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED.
ATTY. BENJAMIN M. DACANAY is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within five (5 ) days from notice why he
should not be disciplinary dealt with for intercalating a material fact in the judgment of the court a quo thereby altering
and modifying its factual findings with the apparent purpose of misleading this Court in order to obtain a favorable
judgment, and thus failing to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar.
Costs
against
petitioner
Adez
Realty
Incorporated.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CPR:
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument
of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as in fact that which has not been proved] this Court, a serious offense
which constitutes willful disregard of a lawyer’s solemn duty to act at all times in a manner consistent with truth.
79. Torres v. Dalangin
AC No. 10758, December 5, 2017
FACTS:
Atty. Dalangin was accused of maintaining an illicit and immoral affair with one Julita Pascual, a clerk at the
Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Upon review, however, the alleged amorous relationship
was not adequately proved (The quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial evidence). Also, Atty.
Dalangin was said to be misquoting jurisprudence in a pleading he filed in court. In addition, he took an immediate
recourse to the Court via a petition for review that questioned the IBP Board of Governors’ resolve to affirm the
Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation on his administrative liability, notwithstanding the fact that the Court
had not yet taken a final action on the complaints.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court rules as follows:
(1) In A.C. No. 10758, respondent Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is ADMONISHED to be more prudent and
cautious in handling his personal affairs and dealings with courts and the public, with a STERN
WARNING that any repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely;
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CPR:
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be
of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. “As
keepers of public faith, lawyers are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their
personal affairs with great caution.
80. Cobb-Perez v. Lantin
GR L-22320 1968
FACTS:
A civil case was filed by Ricardo Hermoso against Damaso Perez for the latter’s failure to pay a debt of Php
17,000.00. Hermoso won and a writ of execution was issued in his favor. The sheriff was to conduct public sale of
a property owned by Perez worth Php 300,000.00. This was opposed by Perez as he claimed the amount
of said property was more than the amount of the debt. Respondent Judge Lantin,issuing judge, found merit on this,
hence he amended his earlier decision and issued a second writ this time directing the sheriff to conduct a public sale
of Perez’ 210 shares of stock approximately worth Php17,000.00Subsequently, Perez and his wife filed five more
petitions for injunction trying to enjoin the public sale. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court where
the SC ruled that the petition of the Perez spouses are without merit; that their numerous petitions for injunction
are contemplated for delay. I n saiddecision, the Supreme Court ordered petitioners to pay the cost of the suit but said
cost should be paid bytheir counsels, Atty. Baizas and Atty. Bolinao. The counsels now appeal said decision by the
Supreme Court as they claimed that such decision reflected adversely against their professionalism; that “If there was
delay, it was because petitioners’ counsel happened to be more assertive… a quality of the lawyers(which) is not to
be condemned
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of May 22, 1968 is hereby
modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the treble
costs assessed against the petitioners.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CPR:
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
Accordingly, should there be a conflict between his duty to his client and that to court, he should resolve the conflict
against the former and in favor of the latter, his primary responsibility being to uphold the cause of justice.
81. AVIDA LAND CORPORATION v. ATTY. AL C. ARGOSINO
A.C. No. 7437, August 17, 2016
FACTS:
Avida Land Corporation (AVIDA), a Philippine corporation entered into a Contract to Sell with Rodman
Construction and Development Corporation (Rodman),8 under which the latter was to acquire from Avida a
subdivision house and lot in Santa Rosa, Laguna through bank financing. In the event that such financing would
be disapproved, Rodman was to pay the full contract price of P4, 412, 254.00, less the downpayment of
P1,323,676.20, within 15 days from its receipt of the loan disapproval. On March 1999, Rodman settled the
downpayment and took possession of the property. Failing to pay the outstanding balance as agreed, instead,
paying partially, Avida rescinded the contract. Rodman did not vacate the property after Avida demanded for it.
Thereafter, Avida filed an unlawful detainer case against Rodman which was dismissed by the MTC due to lack
of jurisdiction. Rodman, through counsel, Atty. Argosino, filed a complaint before the HLURB Regional Office
seeking the nullification of the rescission of the contract which was similarly dismissed and the arbiter ordered
Rodman to pay damages and attorney’s fees. The order was appealed to the HLURB Board. The board, in its
decision, ordered Rodman to pay Avida its outstanding balance, failure of which will result to the rescission of
the contract subject to refund of payments by Rodman. No appeal was taken by either parties; thus, the decision
became final and executory. However, Rodman moved for reconsideration raising issues on computation of
interests though the HLURB Board enjoined the parties from filing any pleading or appeal on issues already
passed upon. In 2007, Rodman filed a Motion for Computation of Interests in the HLURB Regional Office. The
amount was computed and the execution of the judgment was again ordered. However, Rodman did not comply
but filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution, for Clarification and to Set the Case for Conference
accompanied by new issues claims, and conditions upon payment of interests. Thereafter, Rodman successfully
caused the inhibition of Arbiter Atty. Aquino alleging bias on her part. Arbiter Raymundo A. Foronda took over
the conference then a resolution dated 22 September 2009 put an end to the long-drawn-out dispute, as respondent
did not file any more pleadings. But in 2007 in the midst of squabble over the HLURB case consisting of the
filing of various pleadings, Avida filed a complaint against Atty. Argosino, counsel of Rodman for professional
misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Argosino was found guilty of
professional misconduct. The path to its resolution became long, tedious, and frustrating because of the deliberate
attempts of Atty. Argosino to delay the execution of the judgment. He continued to file pleadings over issues
already passed upon despite being enjoined not to do so. These acts manifest his propensity to disregard the
authority of a tribunal and abuse court processes, to the detriment of the administration of justice. Respondent
cannot hide behind the pretense of advocating his client's cause to escape liability for his actions that delayed and
frustrated the administration of justice.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Al C. Argosino is found GUILTY of violating Rules 10.03 and
12.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year effective upon the finality of this Resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer who has made a mockery of judicial processes, disobeyed judicial orders, and ultimately caused unjust
delays in the administration of justice is acting in direct contravention of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
82. ROMULO DE MESA FESTIN v. ATTY. ROLANDO V. ZUBIRI
A.C. No. 11600, June 19, 2017
FACTS:
Festin alleged that he was elected as Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro in the May 2013
elections. His opponent, Villarosa, filed an election protest against him. After deciding in favor of Villarosa, the
RTC issued an Order granting his motion for execution pending appeal. Festin filed a petition
for certiorari6 before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
against the writ of execution pending appeal. The TRO was granted but counsel Zubiri still filed 5 manifestations
addressed to the COC insisting on the writ's issuance. Notably, he did not serve copies of these manifestations to
the other party. In these manifestations, respondent claimed that his client received the RTC's January 15, 2014
Order on January 18, 2014, and counting from said date, the twenty-day period ended on February 12,
2014.14 Since the COMELEC only issued the TRO on February 13, 2014, the TRO no longer had any effect.
Respondent further asserted that the TRO was addressed only to the RTC Judge, and not to the COC; therefore,
the COC is not bound by the TRO. For these reasons, respondent insisted that the COC could legally issue the
writ of execution pending appeal. The COC eventually issued a Writ of Execution Pending Appeal. Having no
knowledge of the manifestation, complainant argued that respondent violated his ethical duties when he misled
and induced the COC to defy lawful orders. As a result, respondent allegedly violated Canons 1, 10, 15, and 19
of the CPR.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rolando V. Zubiri is found GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Canon 8, and Rule
10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for three (3) months effective from the finality of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer's primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct that tends to delay,
impede, or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes this obligation. Indeed, a lawyer must champion his
client's cause with competence and diligence, but he cannot invoke this as an excuse for his failure to exhibit
courtesy and fairness to his fellow lawyers and to respect legal processes designed to afford due process to all
stakeholders.
83. CAROLYN PECK V. PARKER STONE
304 N.Y.S.2d 881, Oct 30, 1969
FACTS:
On October 3, 1968 petitioner, Carolyn, a young female attorney, appeared before respondent as counsel for an
indigent defendant. Prior to the commencement of any proceedings on behalf of the client, respondent made an
order prohibiting petitioner from appearing as an attorney in his court until petitioner's mode of dress was "suitable,
conventional and appropriate". The record discloses that petitioner was wearing a dress, the hemline of which was
approximately five inches above the knee. The issue is whether respondent's order was arbitrarily made and whether
he exceeded his authority in prohibiting petitioner from reappearing in his court in similar attire. It is well to observe
that the record fails to show that petitioner's appearance in any way created distraction or in any manner disrupted
the ordinary proceedings of the court. There is no suggestion that petitioner's dress was so immodest or revealing
as to shock one's sense of propriety. In fact, with understandable candor, respondent's counsel admitted that no such
claim was made, and, further that her appearance did not create a disruptive condition. Furthermore the record
demonstrates that during appellant's colloquy with the court she was at all times respectful, reserved and at no time
could her demonstrated attitude in any manner be considered contrary to her ethical responsibilities as an officer of
the court. Petitioner asserts, without contradiction, that she appeared similarly dressed in other courts without
objection or comment. In reaching any determination involving such a sensitive matter as evidenced by the facts
here presented, the test to be applied is not what the court personally thinks, but whether there is a reasonable basis
for the determination made. Whatever may be one's personal judgment as to the propriety of petitioner's dress, we
are compelled to conclude that it has become an accepted mode of dress, not only in places of business or recreation,
but, to the consternation of some, in places of worship. In assessing a given situation to determine whether a
discretionary power has been improvidently exercised, we emphasize the time-honored rule of the requirement that
the facts of each case must be examined with particular regard to these powers. In this connection we are presented
with a record showing no lack of respect for the court and indeed, as conceded upon the argument, a complete lack
of distraction or disruption caused by petitioner's appearance.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
We are mindful of respondent's sincerity in his desire to conduct his court with propriety and we are convinced of
the well-intentioned motives in the issuance of his order, but we must conclude that on the basis of the record before
us, respondent's discretion in this matter was improvidently exercised and the judgment appealed from should be
reversed, and the determination of respondent annulled.
DOCTRINE:
An unusual, immodest and exaggerated mode of dress which was a conspicuous departure from accepted courtroom
custom could result in the distraction of others and could disrupt and impede the maintenance of a proper courtroom
atmosphere and decorum. It is reasonable to infer that the judge had observed that dress and appearance had a
disturbing effect and was distracting from the dignity and decorum of the court on both occasions, thereby providing
a plausible basis for the determination.
Related Canon: Rule 11.01 - A Lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.
84. IN THE MATTER OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE BODY OF MANUEL DE GRACIA ON A WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS. MANUEL DE GRACIA,
V.
THE WARDEN, MUNICIPAL JAIL, MAKATI, RIZAL; THE PROVINCIAL WARDEN,
PROVINCIAL JAIL, PASIG, RIZAL; HON. REYNALDO P. HONRADO, JUDGE OF THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH XXV, PASIG, RIZAL; AND MARCIANO P. STA. ANA,
ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL FISCAL, PASIG, RIZAL
G.R. No. L-42032, January 9, 1976
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus alleging that in spite of his service of
sentence for a conviction of serious physical injuries, his release from confinement was held by respondent judge
based upon respondent fiscal’s reason that, the victim of the crime having died, an amended information will be
filed. It is undisputed that while the information against petitioner charged him with the commission of serious
physical injuries, it was later amended to one of frustrated homicide. It is to such lesser offense that on September
10, 1971, he entered a plea of guilty. On the very same day, respondent Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado imposed
upon him the penalty of four months and one day of arresto mayor without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. That period of confinement he had duly served by November 10, 1975. On December 8, 1975, this
Court issued the following resolution: "The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus returnable to this Court on
Friday, December 12, 1975 and required the respondents to make a [return] of the writ not later than the aforesaid
date. As no return of the writ had been filed on the date set for hearing by respondent wardens, a resolution of
the following tenor was adopted by this Court (a) to require Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr.
to file a return of the writ for the respondent wardens not later than 10:30 a.m. of Wednesday, December 17,
1975; and (b) to reset the hearing of this case on the aforesaid date and time On the morning December 17, 1975,
respondent Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marciano P. Sta. Ana, Jr. and the two aforesaid wardens appeared. Neither
petitioner nor his counsel, Salvador N. Beltran, was present. This constitutes a lapse in judicial propriety by
petitioner’s counsel who did not even take the trouble of appearing of the Court on the very day his own petition
was reset for hearing, a lapse explicable, it may be assumed, by his comparative inexperience and paucity of
practice before this Tribunal. It suffices to call his attention to such failing by way of guidance for his future
actuations as a member of the bar.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is dismissed for being moot and academic.
DOCTRINE:
There is a lapse in judicial propriety by a counsel who does not even take the trouble of appearing in Court on
the very day his own petition is set for hearing, a lapse explicable, it may be assumed, by his comparative
inexperience and paucity of practice before this Tribunal. It suffices to call his attention to such failing by way
of guidance for his future actuations as a member of the bar.
Related Canon: Rule 11.02 – A Lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
85. Sangalang v IAC
GR 71169, August 30, 1989
FACTS:
The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against Atty. J. Cezar Sangco, counsel for the
petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang in cases involving residents of Bel- Air Village and Ayala
Corporation. On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring, among other things, Atty. Sangco to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt "for using intemperate and accusatory language." On
March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an explanation stating that the decision of this Court in the above-entitled case
reads more like a Brief for Ayala. He was suggesting that the Court might have been guilty of graft and corruption
in acting on these cases. To be sure, Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult the Court
with derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad hominem. In that event, it is the Court's duty "to act
to preserve the honor and dignity ... and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession."We are not
satisfied with his explanation that he was merely defending the interests of his clients. The Court is not
unreceptive to comment and critique of its decisions, but provided they are fair and dignified. Atty. Sangco has
transcended the limits of fair comment for which he deserves this Court's rebuke.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE Atty. J. Cezar Sangco is (1) SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months effective
from receipt hereof, and (2) ORDERED to pay a fine of P 500.00 payable from receipt hereof. Let a copy of this
Resolution be entered in his record.
DOCTRINE:
Legal ethics; attorneys; counsel is entitled to his own opinion in the presentation of his cause but not licensed to
insult the court with derogatory statements.
86. Prudenciano S. Penticostes v. Judge Rafael Hidalgo
A.M. Nos. RTJ-89-331,355,361,362,438,439, Septmeber 28, 1990
FACTS:
Complainant Prudencio S. Penticostes has filed a series of administrative charges against Judge Hidalgo of RTC
of Tarlac. In the resolution dismissing RTJ-89-294, the court reprimanded the complainant “to exercise more
care and decorum in filing unfounded and unsubstantiated charges against officers of the court in order to
maintain and uphold the dignity of the same of which he is part.” Complainant did not heed this admonition. In
total, the Office of the Court Administrator was able to consolidate 6 administrative complaints filed by
Penticostes against the respondent judge. Subsequent to the admonition, the complainant continued to file charges
against respondent. He also threatened to bang more cases against the respondent. In a memorandum, the OCA
after enumerating some of the charges, noted that complainant’s persistent filing of administrative cases against
respondent “signifies a desire to unjustifiably bring respondent to public disdain and ridicule.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, having found the charges above-mentioned to be absolutely without basis , the Court Resolved
to:
(1) DISMISS outright the following complaints: RTJ-89-331; RTJ-89-362; RTJ-89-438; and RTJ-89-355. RTJ89-361 and RTJ 89-439 are likewise dismissed, except as to charges for which comment has been required; and
(2) IMPOSE upon complainant a FINE of One Thousand Pesos (P 1, 000) payable within 10 days from receipt
of this Resolution or IMPRISONMENT of 10 days in the local jail in case of failure to pay the fine within the
time appointed; and
(3) SUSPEND complainant from the practice of law for 1 year for his willful disregard and disobedience of the
admonition made by the Court in RTJ-89-294, and his violation of Canons 10, 11 and 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.
The suspension shall take effect from the date of receipt of this Resolution.
DOCTRINE:
Canon 10 states that a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. Canon 11 provides that a lawyer
shall observe and maintain the respect due to the court and the judicial officers, while Canon 12 mandates that a
lawyer shall exert very effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
87. Lily Mocles v. Judge Mabini M. Maravilla
A.M. No. MTJ-93-873 December 14, 1994
FACTS:
Civil Case No. 2833-III was decided by the MTCC of General Santos City (per respondent Judge) on 6 April
1993. The respondent judge rendered a decision ordering the defendants to, inter alia, "vacate and surrender their
respective possession and occupation in the area in question to plaintiff including their respective improvements
therein within 10 days from notice," and to each pay the amounts indicated therein as rentals in arrears as of 3
August 1992, and thereafter, from date of demand on 3 September 1992, the amount of P75.00 a month as rental
until they vacate the premises. A copy thereof was received by the complainant's counsel on 16 April 1993 and
on 19 April 1993, the complainant filed a notice of appeal. Records were transmitted to the RTC of General
Santos City and was assigned to Judge Apolinario F. Estoque. Judge Estoque found that the complainant and her
co-defendants did not file any supersedeas bond and did not pay the adjudged monthly rentals; hence he ordered
MTCC Judge Maravilla to cause the issuance of a writ of execution. For this reason, Mocles and her codefendants charged the respondent with ignorance of law and bribery in that the respondent (a) issued a writ of
execution in the said case despite the fact that it was already on appeal with RTC of General Santos City, and (b)
was rumored to have received P20,000.00 in connection with such execution. The Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) found that the issuance of a writ of execution was an error of Judge Maravilla and that
there is no evidence of the alleged bribery. The complainant herself states in her complaint that her charge is
based on a rumor. She did not even disclose the source of the rumor and the occasion, place, and time when she
heard it. Instead of subsequently establishing the truth of the rumor by volunteering to offer some evidence, the
complainant agreed to submit this case on the basis of the pleadings.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. DISMISSING, for utter lack of merit, the charge of bribery against the respondent; and
2. IMPOSING upon respondent Judge Mabini M. Maravilla a FINE of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000.00) for grave abuse of authority, with a warning that a subsequent commission of the same
or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE:
Rumors are not evidence. A complainant is grossly irresponsible when he imputes upon one the commission of
a grave offense solely on the basis of a rumor. The lawyer who assisted his client in the preparation of a complaint
should have, under his oath as a lawyer, prevented the client from making the wild accusation.
Related Canon: Rule 11.04 – A Lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have
no materiality to the case.
88. Wicker v. Arcangel
G.R. No. 112869. January 29, 1996
FACTS: Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia Architects and Engineering Co.,
brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS Enterprises, Inc. and others, for the annulment
of certain deeds by which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which the plaintiffs claimed they had purchased, was
allegedly fraudulently titled in the name of the LFS Enterprises. The case was presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
Later, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition of the respondent judge from the
consideration of the case, alleging that opposing counsel and his wife personally recruited Judge Arcangel.
Considering the allegations to be malicious, derogatory and contemptuous, respondent judge ordered both
counsel and client to appear before him on November 26, 1993 and to show cause why they should not be cited
for contempt of court. Atty. Rayos claimed that the allegations in the motion did not necessarily express his views
because he merely signed the motion "in a representative capacity, in other words, just lawyering," for Kelly
Wicker. Finding petitioners' explanation unsatisfactory, respondent judge, in an order dated December 3, 1993,
held them guilty of direct contempt and sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine
of P100.00.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the order of December 3, 1993 is MODIFIED by DELETING the sentence of imprisonment for
five (5) days and INCREASING the fine from P100.00 to P200.00 for each of the petitioners.
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer is not just an instrument of his client. Based on Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
he bears as much responsibility for the contemptuous allegations as his client. The Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins him to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [t
o] insist on similar conduct by others "and" not [t o] attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or
have materiality to the case."
89. Judge Alpajora v. Atty. Calayan
A.C. No. 8208, January 10, 2018
FACTS:
In an intra-corporate case, Calayan was President and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Calayan Educational
Foundation Inc. (CEFI). He signed and filed pleadings as "Special Counsel pro se" for himself. Court proceedings
ensued despite several inhibitions by judges to whom the case was re-raffled until it was finally re-raffled to
complainant, Judge Alparajo. Complainant issued an Omnibus Order for the creation of a management committee
and the appointment of its members. That Order prompted the filing of the administrative case against the Judge
Alpajora which was dismissed but his counter-complaint was referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
for appropriate action. Complainant claimed that respondent filed thirteen (13) civil and special actions before
the RTC of Lucena City including two (2) related intra-corporate controversy cases - violating the rule on splitting
causes of actions - involving the management and operation of the foundation. According to complainant, these
showed the propensity and penchant of respondent in filing cases, whether or not they are baseless, frivolous or
unfounded, with no other intention but to harass, malign and molest his opposing parties, including the lawyers
and the handling judges. Complainant also revealed that respondent filed two (2) other administrative cases
against a judge and an assisting judge in the RTC of Lucena City, which were dismissed because the issues raised
were judicial in nature. In his oppositions, Calayan consistently attributed unsupported imputations against the
complainant judge in his pleadings. He also accused the complainant judge of being in cahoots and of having
deplorable close ties with the adverse counsels; and that complainant irrefutably coached said adverse counsels.
However, these bare allegations are absolutely unsupported by any piece of evidence. The Supreme Court found
respondent
lawyer
guilty
of
attributing
unsupported
ill-motives
to
complainant.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors dated September 28, 2013. Accordingly, Atty. Ronaldo Antonio V. Calayan is found
GUILTY of violating The Lawyer's Oath and The Code of Professional Responsibility and he is hereby ordered
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same
or a similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.
DOCTRINE:
No matter how passionate a lawyer is towards defending his client's cause, he must not forget to display the
appropriate decorum expected of him, being a member of the legal profession, and to continue to afford proper
and utmost respect due to the courts.
90. Judge Maceda V. Lawyers Vasquez and Abiera
FACTS:
Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner
RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda has falsified his certificate
of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a period of
90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner
Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for
decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case. The court agrees with petitioner that
in the absence of any administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of
service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the Constitution, for
such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers
to the Supreme Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the
judiciary. the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for
determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as the Court has the
necessary records to make such a determination.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the
complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate
action.
DOCTRINE:
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the Court for determination whether said
judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties. Guided by Rule 11. 05 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, states that a Lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.
Canon 12
91. CONCORDIA B. GARCIA vs. ATTY. CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO
AC 3923 1993
March 30, 1993
FACTS:
In 1964, the Garcia spouses, Dionisio spouses and Baetiong leased a parcel of land to Lee for a period of 25
years. Lee refused to vacate after the expiration of the lease claiming that he had an option to lease for another 5 years
and the right of pre-emption over the property. Garcia claims that Lee’s counsel, Atty. Francisco, commenced various
suits before different courts to thwart Garcia's right to regain her property and that all these proceedings were decided
against Lee. The proceedings stemmed from the said lease contract and involved the same issues and parties, thus
violating the proscription against forum-shopping.
PENALTY:
Atty. Francisco is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of
all the rights and privileges appurtenant to membership in the Philippine bar.
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the administration of
justice.
92. BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. V. ATTY. ERNESTO FLORES
AC No. 4058
March 12, 1998
FACTS:
In 1993, Labor Arbiter Rimando issued a Writ of Execution to enforce a decision rendered by the SC. The
writ was issued in order for BENECO to collect the money it paid to Board Member Cosalan during the pendency of
the case before the SC. Atty. Flores, the counsel for BENECO, filed a Motion for Clarification with the SC, the
minute resolution to wit: to note without action the aforesaid motion. Atty. Flores then instituted a suit with the RTC
Baguio seeking to enjoin the defendants Clerk of Court, et al. from levying on their properties in satisfaction of the
said writ of execution but was eventually dismissed. Atty.Flores then filed with another branch of the RTC two
identical but separate actions both entitled Judicial Declaration of Family Home Constituted, ope lege, Exempt from
Levy and Execution; with Damages, etc., which are essentially similar actions to enjoin the enforcement of the
judgment rendered by the NLRC. He also filed an urgent Motion Ex-parte praying for temporary restraining order in
these 2 cases. BENECO alleged that respondents claim for damages against the Sheriff is another improper and
unprocedural maneuver which is likewise a violation of respondent’s oath not to sue on groundless suit since the said
Sheriff was merely enforcing a writ of execution as part of his job.
PENALTY:
For trifling with judicial processes by resorting to forum shopping, Atty. Ernesto B. Flores is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR
Note: In addition, Atty. Flores is also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 1 YEAR for
violating his oath and the CPR to do no falsehood, resulting in a total period 2 YEARS.
DOCTRINE:
The profession of law exacts the highest standards from its members and brooks no violation of its code of
conduct. Accordingly, a lawyer who trifles with judicial processes, engages in forum shopping and blatantly lies in
his pleadings must be sanctioned.
93. ALCANTARA, ET AL. V. ATTY. EDUARDO DE VERA
AC 5859 2010
November 23, 2010
FACTS:
Atty. De Vera was the former counsel of Mercado in a civil case and an administrative case. Pursuant to a
favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in favor of Mercado. Atty. De Vera garnished the
bank deposits of the defendant of the case, but did not turn over the proceeds to Rosario despite demands of the latter.
Such refusal prompted Rosario to file an administrative case for disbarment. IBP Board of Governors held the
respondent guilty of infidelity in the custody and handling of client’s funds and recommending to the Court his oneyear suspension from the practice of law. Following the release of the IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series
of lawsuits against the Mercado family. He also instituted cases against the family corporation, the corporation’s
accountant and the judge who ruled against the reopening of the case where respondent tried to collect the balance of
his alleged fee from Rosario. Later on, the respondent also filed cases against the chairman and members of the IBP
Board of Governors who voted to recommend his suspension from the practice of law for one year. In sum, Atty. De
Vera filed a total of 12 different cases in various fora. Complainants allege that the respondent committed barratry,
forum shopping, exploitation of family problems, and use of intemperate language when he filed several frivolous
and unwarranted lawsuits against the complainants and their family members, their lawyers, and the family
corporation.
PENALTY:
Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law effective immediately upon his
receipt of this Resolution.
DOCTRINE:
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They
do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary.
A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to
advance its ends – the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt
satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but should likewise avoid any
unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary
task of assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
94. PABLO R. OLIVARES and/or OLIVARES REALTY CORPORATION v. ATTY. ARSENIO C.
VILLALON, JR.,
AC 6323
April 13, 2007
FACTS:
Olivares alleged that Atty. Villalon’s client, Sarah Divina Morales Al-Rasheed, repeatedly sued him for
violations of the lease contract which they executed over a commercial apartment.
In 1993, Al-Rasheed filed an action for damages and prohibition with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction in the RTC of Manila. The case was dismissed for improper venue. Six years later, Al-Rasheed filed an
action for breach of contract with damages in the RTC of Paranaque, Branch 274. The case, docketed as Civil Case
No. 99-0233, was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Al-Rasheed, through counsel Atty. Villalon, sought a review of
the order dismissing the casebut the Court of Appeals did not give due course to her appeal. The subsequent Petition
for Review on Certiorari filed in the Supreme Court was likewise denied. In 2004, Al-Rasheed re-filed the 1999 suit
in the RTC of Paranaque, Branch 274 where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 0J-04-009. It was dismissed on the
grounds of res judicata and prescription.
PENALTY:
A six-month suspension from the practice of law to be more commensurate to the violation committed.
However, in view of respondent's death on September 27, 2006, the penalty can no longer be imposed on him.
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice. Lawyers have the
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Filing multiple actions constitutes an abuse of the
Court's processes. It constitutes improper conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade justice. Those who file
multiple or repetitive actions subject themselves to disciplinary action for incompetence or willful violation of their
duties as attorneys to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions that appear to be just
and consistent with truth and honor.
Rule 12.03
95. ARSENIA T. BERGONIA v. Atty. ARSENIO A. MERRERA
AC 5024
February 20, 2003
FACTS:
Bergonia, together with her relatives, filed a case for the quieting of title against her niece as well as Sps.
Parayno. After due trial, the RTC of Pangasinan, Branch 49 favored the Parayno spouses. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the ruling of the trial court and the Decision became final and executory. Since the disputed land was still in the
possession of complainant, the Paraynos instituted Civil Case No. U-6061 to recover possession. After the Answer
was filed, respondent became her counsel of record. After due trial, Branch 48 of the same RTC rendered its Decision
ordering her to vacate the premises and to surrender possession thereof to the Sps. Parayno. Thereafter, complainant
appealed the RTC judgment to the CA. Respondent received a Notice to File Brief on December 17, 1997. Acting on
his Motion for extension to file the appellants brief, the CA granted him until March 17, 1998 to do so. Even before
the first extension had lapsed, however, he again filed an Urgent Second Motion for extension to file brief, praying
that he be given until April 16, 1998 to submit the required pleading. The CA again granted his Second Motion.
Eventually, the deadline, which had already been extended twice, lapsed without his filing the appellants brief. Hence,
the CA dismissed the appeal.
PENALTY:
Atty. Arsenio A. Merrera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer who requests an extension must do so in good faith and with a genuine intent to file the required
pleading within the extended period. In granting the request, the court acts on the presumption that the applicant has
a justifiable reason for failing to comply with the period allowed. Without this implied trust, the motion for extension
will be deemed to be a mere ruse to delay or thwart the appealed decision. The motion will thus be regarded as a
means of preventing the judgment from attaining finality and execution and of enabling the movant to trifle with
procedure and mock the administration of justice.
96. ECONOMIC INSURANCE CO., INC. v. UY REALTY COMPANY, HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL
and THE SHERIFF OF MANILA
GR L-28056
August 31, 1970
FACTS:
Uy Realty filed a complaint for ejectment against a certain Co Hing. Co Hing filed an answer seeking
dismissal of such a suit as well as a counterclaim for reimbursement for alleged improvements made on the leased
premises and for damages. The court ordered Hing to vacate the premises as well as to pay the rents in arrears plus
monthly rents. Upon an appeal being taken, which fell to the sala of respondent Judge, a supersedeas bond was
executed by Co Hing as well as by Economic Insurance Co., Inc. During the pendency of such appeal, a motion for
dismissal of the case and for payment of the supersedeas bond was filed by Uy Realty because Co Hing vacated the
leased premises and possession thereof was surrendered to the plaintiff. Co Hing filed Supersedeas Bond for
P8,800.00 thru the Economic Insurance Company, Inc. to guarantee the payment to the plaintiff of the accrued rentals
up to the time of court judgment plus damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
The case was then dismissed. It was noted in the answer that the order of dismissal has a manifestation and
motion to execute bond to this effect. The prayer was for a writ of execution to be issued against Economic for the
amount represented by its supersedeas bond. Although, Economic Insurance did not deny its liability and it did not
even oppose the motion for its execution, it alleged that the order was issued at a time when the matter was outside
the jurisdiction of respondent Judge, the case having been dismissed. It is on that proposition alone that it seeks to
make out a case for prohibition. If the motion of Uy Realty Co. sought merely the dismissal of the case, the premises
having been vacated, then perhaps the case for petitioner, such as it is, would have been bolstered. As clearly pointed
out, however, the motion precisely sought that petitioner be ordered to pay the amount of P8,800.00 guaranteed by
the supersedeas bond. Unfortunately, through haste or inadvertence, respondent Judge ignored that portion and merely
ordered that the appealed case be dismissed. Within the period, however, before such order attained the stage of
finality, a modification thereof was secured as a result of a manifestation and a motion of respondent Uy Realty Co.
to execute on the bond filed by petitioner. Under the circumstances, what respondent Judge did was clearly within
his authority, and the challenged order can stand the test of the most exacting scrutiny.
PENALTY:
None provided.
DOCTRINE:
It is understandable for a party in the situation of petitioner to make full use of every conceivable legal
defense the law allows it. In the appraisal, however, of such attempts to evade liability to which a party like petitioner
should respond, it must ever be kept in mind that procedural rules are intended as an aid to justice, not as a means for
its frustration. Even if the petition were impressed with a greater degree of plausibility, it would be, considering all
the circumstances, to crown with success an unworthy scheme to evade a just obligation by perverting the ends
procedural requisites are intended to accomplish. Not once but several times, from Alonso v. Villamor that the Court
have stressed that we are not to lend the imprimatur of our approval to any such effort, the result of which would be
to render illusory substantive rights. We do so again. Technicalities, in the appropriate Language of Justice
Makalintal, "should give way to the realities of the situation."
97. PARALUMAN B. AFURONG vs. ATTY. ANGEL G. AQUINO
AC 1571
September 23, 1999
FACTS:
In 1974, Afurong filed a complaint for ejectment for non-payment of rentals against Flores. The court favored
Afurong and issued a writ of execution. Facing eviction from the land he was occupying, Flores sought the assistance
of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office. His case was assigned to Atty. Angel G. Aquino, an employee of said office
at the time. Atty. Angel G. Aquino filed with the City Court of Manila a Petition for Relief from Judgment with
prayer for the issuance of a restraining order. The petition was dismissed for having been filed out of time. Atty.
Aquino subsequently with the CFI a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and the court set the pre-trial conference.
Notwithstanding the fact that he was separated from the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, Atty. Aquino filed an
Urgent Motion for Postponement, signing his name as counsel for Flores and indicating the address of the Citizens
Legal Assistance Office as his office address. In the aforesaid Urgent Motion for Postponement, Atty. Aquino stated
that he would be unable to attend the pre-trial conference because he needed to attend another hearing. However, a
certification from the Clerk of Court of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where Atty. Aquino said he would
attend to, stated that there was no hearing in connection with the case .
Thus, Afurong filed a complaint6 with this Court for disbarment against Atty. Aquino.
PENALTY:
Atty. Aquino is guilty of malpractice and was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 6 months.
DOCTRINE:
The Revised Rules of Court provides that it is the duty of an attorney to counsel or maintain such actions or
proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under
the law.
Rule 12.09
98. THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. UY TENG PIAO
57 Phil. 337
October 21, 1932
FACTS:
In 1924 the CFI of Manila favored the PNB and against Uy Teng Piao in a civil case for the sum of
P17,232.42 with interest plus attorney’s fees and costs. The court ordered the defendant to deposit said amount and
in case of his failure to do so, the mortgaged properties will be sold at public auction and the proceeds will be applied
to the payment of the judgment. Piao failed to comply with the order of the court and the sheriff sold the two parcels
of land at public auction to the PNB. PNB secured from Piao a waiver of his right to redeem one of the properties
and on the same date, the bank sold said property to Santos.
Evidently the other parcel was subsequently resold by the bank for which it credited the defendant with the
full amount realized by it when it resold the two parcels of land. The bank brought the an action to revive the judgment
for the balance of P11,574.38, with interest. Piao alleged that he waived his right to redeem the land in consideration
of an understanding between him and the bank that the bank would not collect from him the balance of the judgment.
It was on this ground that the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint.
One of the attorneys for the PNB testified that Piao renounced his right to redeem the parcel of land because
a friend of him (Piao) was interested in buying it.
PENALTY: None provided.
DOCTRINE:
Although the law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the
courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw from
the active management of the case. (Malcolm: Legal Ethics, p. 148.) Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics reads as
follows:
"When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of
an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of
justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client."
Canon13
99. NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. Vs. HON. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
and THE UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES,
GR No. L-75209
KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY, ACTIVISM AND NATIONALISMOLALIA, vs. NLRC , MANUEL AGUILAR, MA. ESTRELLA ALDAS, CAPT. REY L. LANADA, COL.
VIVENCIO MANAIG and KIMBERLY-CLARK PHILIPPINES, INC.,
GR No. 78791
SEPTEMBER 30, 1987
FACTS:
The Union of Filipro Employees(UFE), Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity (KILUSAN)
intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of the Supreme Court
building setting up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the SC building, at times obstructing access to and
egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional
shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard
of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns
haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud speakers.
These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Yap and Fernan as Chairmen of
the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Espinas, counsel of the UFE, had been called in order that the
pickets might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt
of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. The Court
issued a resolution giving the unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring union leaders of respondent
UFE and their counsel of record, Atty. Espinas; and union leaders of petitioner KILUSAN, to appear before the
Court and then and there to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court. Atty. Espinas was further
required to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with.
Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for the abovedescribed acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court that he
had experienced to the picketers why their actions were wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such
penalty as may be warranted under the circumstances. He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that
the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog Katagalogan"
(PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about 75 unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the
UFE or the KILUS
Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the resolution of their
cases is usually for causes beyond the control of the Court and that the Supreme Court has always remained steadfast
in its role as the guardian of the Constitution.
PENALTY: None provided.
DOCTRINE:
Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as
officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of
justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members.
Rule 13.01
100. CESAR L. LANTORIA v. ATTY. IRINEO L. BUNYI
AC 1769
June 8, 1992
FACTS:
Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of a farm located in Agusan del Sur, and that Lantoria was the manager
and supervisor of said farm. The complaint in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to eject the squatters from the
farm. These cases were assigned to the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, the acting judge of which
was the Honorable Galicia. The defendants in the mentioned civil cases were declared in default. Lantoria, after
allegedly asking permission from the Judge Galicia, wrote a letter to Atty. Bunyi giving him the go signal to write
the decisions of the 3 cases. Atty. Bunyi then wrote the said decisions and mailed them to Lantoria.
Three years after, complainant filed with the Court the present administrative case against respondent Bunyi,
predicated mainly on the letters. Complainant contends that Atty. Bunyi won the said cases because he was the one
who unethically prepared the decisions rendered therein, and that the preparation by respondent of said decisions
warranted disciplinary action against him.
PENALTY:
Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 1 year .
DOCTRINE:
Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were enforced at the time respondent committed
the acts admitted by him), which provides as follows:
"3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court.
Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled for by the personal
relations of the parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to misconstructions of motive and should be avoided.
A lawyer should not communicate or argue privately with the judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves
rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special personal consideration or favor. A
self-respecting independence in the discharge of professional duty, without denial or diminution of the courtesy and
respect due the judge’s station, is the only proper foundation for cordial personal and official relations between bench
and bar."
Rule 13.02
101. In re Almacen GR L-27654 1970
FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen was counsel for the defendant in the case of Virginia Yaptinchay v. Antonio H
Calero. The trial court decided against Atty. Almacen’s client. He then filed motion of reconsideration and furnished
a copy of it to the adverse party. Such copy however failed to state the time and place of the hearing thereby making
it a “useless scrap of paper.” The issue was raised to the CA who agreed with the plaintiff in the case that it should
be dismissed. Atty. Almacen then raised the issue on certiorari to the SC who rejected it via minute resolution.
Atty. Almacen then filed a "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," where he would surrender
his certificate to the Clerk of Court to be held in trust until the time comes when he shall regain faith and confidence
in the SC once again and therefore resume his practice of the noblest profession. He filed said petition in protest
against what he asserted as "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts the
Supreme Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal “peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who
ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity.” He ridiculed the members of the Supreme Court, saying “that justice as administered by the present
members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.”
DISPOSITIVE:
Atty. Almacen is indefinitely suspended from practicing law. At any time after the suspension becomes
effective Atty. Almacen may prove to the Supreme Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of law.
DOCTRINE:
It is true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the
decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary,
has always been encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should have known that a motion
for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of the time and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper
and will not be entertained by the court. He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost.
Rule 13.03
102. Maglasang v. People GR 90083 1990
FACTS:
In 1989, a petition for certiorari (Maglasang vs. People of the Philippines) was filed by registered mail with
the Supreme Court. Due to non-compliance with the requirements of Circular No. 1-88 of the Court, the petition and
the subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.
Thereafter, Atty. Castellano, legal counsel of Maglasang, sent a complaint to the Office of the President
where he accused the five justices of the 2nd division, with biases and ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering
unjust judgments. He accused the court of sabotaging the Aquino administration for being Marcos appointees, and
robbing the Filipino people genuine justice and democracy. He also said that the SC is doing this to protect the judge
who was impleaded in the petition and for money reasons. He alleges further that the court is too expensive to be
reached by ordinary men. The court is also inconsiderate and overly strict and meticulous.
By reason of the strong and intemperate language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of
the President, which, as he should know as a lawyer, has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove, Justices
of the Supreme Court, Atty. Castellano was required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or
administratively dealt with for improper conduct.
In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to
correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices concerned, as Respondents. Atty.
Castellano further disputed the authority and jurisdiction of the Court in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show
cause inasmuch as "they are Respondents in this particular case and no longer as Justices and as such they have no
more jurisdiction to give such order." Thus, according to him, "the most they (Justices) can do by the mandate of the
law and procedure is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that they will not be punished in accordance with the
law just like a common tao."
DISPOSITIVE:
Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT and IMPROPER CONDUCT as
a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is ordered to PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the
finality of this Resolution a fine of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in case
he fails to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for six (6)
months as soon as the Resolution becomes final, with a WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part
will be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE:
The Supreme Court is supreme—the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the
judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency
may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.' Consequently, and owing to the foregoing, not even the
President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment on any of the Court's acts.
In filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division, even the most basic tenet of our
government system—the separation of powers between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches—
has been lost on Atty. Castellano.
103. Fajardo v. Alvarez AC 9018 2016
FACTS:
Fajardo was the Municipal Treasurer of San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. She hired respondent Atty. Nicanor C.
Alvarez to defend her in criminal and administrative cases before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Atty. Alvarez was then working in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental Health. He asked for
P1.4M as acceptance fee. Atty. Alvarez assured Fajardo that he had friends connected with the Office of the
Ombudsman who could help with dismissing her case for a certain fee. As such, Atty. Alvarez said that he needed to
pay the amount of P500,000.00 to his friends and acquaintances working at the Office of the Ombudsman to have the
cases against Teresita dismissed.
However, just two (2) weeks after Fajardo and Atty. Alvarez talked, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
resolution and decision recommending the filing of a criminal complaint against Teresita, and her dismissal from
service, respectively.
Teresita then demanded that Atty. Alvarez return at least a portion of the amount she gave. Atty. Alvarez
failed to return the amount given. Thus, Fajardo filed a complaint against Atty. Alvarez.
DISPOSITIVE:
Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez is guilty of violating the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees, the Lawyer's Oath, and the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely. Respondent is ORDERED to return the amount of P500,000.00 with legal interest to complainant
Teresita P. Fajardo.
DOCTRINE:
Canon 13 mandates that lawyers "shall rely upon the merits of his [or her] cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court."
A lawyer that approaches a judge to try to gain influence and receive a favorable outcome for his or her client
violates Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This act of influence peddling is highly immoral and
has no place in the legal profession.
Lawyers who offer no skill other than their acquaintances or relationships with regulators, investigators,
judges, or Justices pervert the system, weaken the rule of law, and debase themselves even as they claim to be
members of a noble profession. Practicing law should not degenerate to one's ability to have illicit access. Rather, it
should be about making an honest appraisal of the client's situation as seen through the evidence fairly and fully
gathered. It should be about making a discerning and diligent reading of the applicable law. It is foremost about
attaining justice in a fair manner. Law exists to temper, with its own power, illicit power and unfair advantage. It
should not be conceded as a tool only for those who cheat by unduly influencing people or public officials.
It is time that we unequivocally underscore that to even imply to a client that a lawyer knows who will make
a decision is an act worthy of the utmost condemnation. If we are to preserve the nobility of this profession, its
members must live within its ethical parameters. There is never an excuse for influence peddling.
Canon 15
104. Santiago, et al v. Fojas A.C. No. 4103, September 07, 1995
FACTS:
Complainants, officers and member of the FEU Faculty Association, were alleged to have illegally expelled
Salvador from the union. Salvador file a complaint with the DOLE which ruled in his favor. Subsequently, Salvador
filed a complaint for damages and attorney’s fees against the complainants.
Atty. Fojas, counsel for the complainants, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and lack
of jurisdiction. The motion was initially granted but the complaint was later reinstated upon Salvador’s MR. The
complainants were required to file their answer. However, Atty. Fojas, instead of filing an answer, filed a motion for
reconsideration and dismissal of the case. The motion was denied and the respondent filed a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court. Both petition and subsequent MR were denied, and Atty. Fojas still did not file the
complainants’ answer. Thus, Salvador was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. RTC ruled in favor of Salvador. CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision.
Complainants filed a complaint praying that Atty. Fojas be disbarred for malpractice, neglect and other
offenses which ay be discovered during the investigation. They alleged that they lost their case due to Atty. Fojas’
neglect and malpractice.
On the other hand, Atty. Fojas admits the mistake, saying he was a busy man but alleged that it was cured by
his filing of motion for reconsideration. He added that the case was a lost cause. He was supposed to elevate the case
to the SC but complainants. illegally terminated his services.
DISPOSITIVE:
Atty. Fojas is liable for inexcusable negligence. He was REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be more
careful in the performance of his duty to his clients.
DOCTRINE:
The respondent’s negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing
cause" for the complainants.
If indeed the respondent was so convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he should have seasonably
informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility expressly
provides: A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable
results of the client’s case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the case.
105. Llunar v. Ricafort A.C. No. 6484, June 16, 2015
FACTS:
In September 2000, the complainant, as attorney-in-fact of Banez, hired Atty. Romulo Ricafort to file a case
against father and son Ricardo and Ard Cervantes for the recovery of a parcel of land allegedly owned by the Banez
family but was fraudulently registered under the name of Ricardo and later was transferred to Ard.
The property was the subject of foreclosure proceedings at the time Atty. Ricafort was hired. Atty. Ricafort
received from the complainant a total amount of P95,000.00.
Three years later, the complainant learned that no case involving the subject property was ever filed by Atty.
Ricafort with the RTC in Legazpi City. Thus, the complainant demanded that Atty. Ricafort return to her the amount
of P95,000.00.
Atty. Ricafort refused. He argued that a complaint for annulment of title against Ard Cervantes had actually
been filed in court, though not by him, but by another lawyer, Atty. Edgar M. Abitria.
The complainant discovered that the respondent had been suspended indefinitely from the practice of law
since May 29, 2002, pursuant to this Court’s decision in AC No. 5054, which the complainant suspected was the
reason another lawyer, and not the respondent, filed the complaint for annulment of title in court.
DISPOSITIVE:
Atty. Romulo Ricafort is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name REMOVED from the Roll
of Attorneys, effective immediately. Also, he is ORDERED to RETURN the amount of P95,000.00 to complainant
Adelita B. Llunar, within thirty (30) days from notice of the Decision.
DOCTRINE:
Respondent committed dishonesty by not being forthright with the complainant that he was under indefinite
suspension from the practice of law. The respondent should have disclosed this fact at the time he was approached
by the complainant for his services. Canon 15 of the CPR states that “a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and
loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients.” The respondent lacked the candor expected of him as a
member of the Bar when he accepted the complainant’s case despite knowing that he could not and should not practice
law.
106. Villahermosa Sr. v. Caracol A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015
FACTS:
OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had two sons, Fernando and Efren. As
legal heirs, Fernando and Efren partition said land and were issued TCTs under their names.
When the agrarian reform law was enacted, emancipation patents and titles were issued to Hermogena and
Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program, who in turn sold the parcels of land to complainant’s spouse.
On March 2, 1994, the DARAB issued a decision ordering the cancellation of the emancipation patents and
TCTs derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it was not covered by the agrarian reform law.
On September 25, 2002, Atty. Caracol, as “Add’l Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Movant,” filed a motion for
execution with the DARAB praying for the full implementation of the March 2, 1994 decision.
On December 20, 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and
Demolition which he signed as “Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela”.
Villahermosa filed this complaint alleging that Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the motions since he
obtained no authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record. Villahermosa posited that Efren could not have
authorized Atty. Caracol to file the second motion because Efren had already been dead for more than a year. He
claimed that Atty. Caracol’s real client was a certain Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had allegedly bought the same parcel
of land.
DISPOSITIVE:
Atty. Isidro L. Caracol is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective upon finality of
this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
DOCTRINE:
Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he filed the Motion for Issuance of Second
Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an honest, prudent and conscientious lawyer, he should have informed
the Court of his client’s passing and presented authority that he was retained by the client’s successors-in-interest and
thus the parties may have been substituted.
Because of the particular nature of an attorney’s function it is essential that they should act with fairness,
honesty and candor towards the courts and his clients. Under Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice.
This flows out from the lawyer’s oath which each lawyer solemnly swears to uphold the law and court
processes in the pursuit of justice. Thus, a lawyer must be more circumspect in his demeanor and attitude towards
the public in general as agents of the judicial system.
Atty. Caracol, as observed, has been less than candid about his representation. We also observe that he has
used underhanded means to attain his purpose.
Rule 15.03
107. Gamilla, et al v. Marino jr. A.C. No. 4763. March 20, 2003
FACTS:
In 1986, Atty. Mariño Jr., as president of the UST Faculty Union, together with other union officers entered
into a CBA with UST. When the CBA expired, the parties could not reach an agreement which prompted the faculty
members of UST go on strike.
In 1990, UST and the UST Faculty Union entered into a compromise agreement for the payment of P7M
from which P5M was intended to settle the back wages and other claims of the sixteen (16) union officers and
directors of the UST Faculty Union who were earlier ordered reinstated by the Supreme Court, and the sum of P2M
to satisfy the remaining obligations of UST under the 1986 CBA.
In 1992, UST and the UST Faculty Union executed a MOA to settle the salary increases and other benefits
under the CBA effective 1988 for a total of P42M. Out of the 42M was the attorney’s fees of Atty. Mariño worth
P4.2M.
Complainants as members of the union filed the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Mariño
accusing him of compromising their entitlements without the knowledge, consent or ratification of the union
members.
DISPOSITIVE:
Atty. Eduardo J. Mariño Jr. is REPRIMANDED for his misconduct with a warning that a more drastic
punishment will be imposed on him upon a repetition of the same act.
DOCTRINE:
Atty. Mariño failed to avoid conflict of interests, first, when he negotiated for the compromise agreement
wherein he played the diverse roles of union president, union attorney and interested party being one of the dismissed
employees seeking his own restitution, and thereafter, when he obtained the attorney’s fees of P4.2M without full
prior disclosure of the circumstances justifying such claim to the members of the UST Faculty Union.
The test of conflict of interest among lawyers is “whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof.” In the same manner, it is undoubtedly a conflict of
interests for an attorney to put himself in a position where self-interest tempts, or worse, actually impels him to do
less than his best for his client.
Necessarily, a lawyer cannot continue representing a client in an action or any proceeding against a party
even with the client’s consent after the lawyer brings suit in his own behalf against the same defendant if it is uncertain
whether the defendant will be able to satisfy both judgments. No doubt, a lawyer is not authorized to have financial
stakes in the subject matter of the suit brought in behalf of his client.
108. Abragan, et al v. Rodriguez A.C. No. 4346, April 3, 2002
FACTS:
Sometime in 1986, complainants hired the services of Atty. Maximo Rodriguez to represent in a case (Civil
Case No. 11204) for Forcible Entry, which they won. Subsequently, when Atty. Rodriguez allegedly sold their rights
over the property without their consent, complainants severed the lawyer – client relationship.
On August 1991, complainants filed a case of indirect under Civil Case No. 11204 against Sheriff Fernando
Loncion et al., engaging the services of Atty. Salva Sr.., an alleged former student of law of Atty. Rodriguez. Much
to their surprise, Atty. Rodriguez represented the sheriff.
Atty. Salva. later on withdrew the case of Indirect Contempt upon the suggestion of Atty. Rodriguez; and
instead, filed the Motion for the Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution.
Additionally, on January 12, 1993, Atty. Rodriguez without the consent of the complainants, filed a motion
to withdraw their exhibit in Civil Case 11204.
DISPOSITIVE:
Atty. Rodriguez is found guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law. He is warned that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE:
Atty. Rodriguez clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that "a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
full disclosure of the facts."
A lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which
duty to another client requires him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidence
forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any
interest of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.
In the case at bar, petitioners were the same complainants in the indirect contempt case and in the Complaint
for forcible entry in Civil Case No. 11204. Respondent should have evaluated the situation first before agreeing to
be counsel for the defendants in the indirect contempt proceedings. Attorneys owe undivided allegiance to their
clients, and should at all times weigh their actions, especially in their dealings with the latter and the public at large.
They must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times.
109. Maturan v. Gonzales A.C. No. 2597. March 12, 1998
FACTS:
Spouses Antonio and Gloria Casquejo instituted their Glorito V. Maturan as their attorney-in-fact, through a
SPA. Maturan was authorized to file ejectment cases against squatters occupying Lot 1350-A. While said lot was
registered in the name of Celestino Yokingco, Antonio Casquejo had, however, instituted a case for reconveyance of
property and declaration of nullity against the former, docketed as Civil Case No. 2067.
Subsequently, Maturan engaged the services of Atty. Gonzales in ejecting the squatters occupying Lot 1350A. Atty. Gonzales filed Civil Case No. 1783-11 for Forcible Entry and Damages against several individuals. A
judgment was rendered in favor of Maturan. A motion for issuance of a writ of execution was subsequently filed.
On June 22, 1983, while the motion for issuance of a writ of execution was pending, and without withdrawing
as counsel for petitioner, respondent filed, on behalf of Yokingco, et al., an action to annul the judgment rendered in
Civil Case No. 2067. The action was predicated on the lack of authority on the part of Maturan to represent the
Spouses Casquejo, as no such authorization was shown to be on record in Civil Case No. 2067. Atty. Gonzales also
filed Special Civil Case No. 161, on behalf of Yokingco, et al., for injunction with a prayer for preliminary injunction,
with damages, against Maturan.
Aggrieved by respondent’s acceptance of professional employment from their adversary in Civil Case No.
2067, and alleging that privileged matters relating to the land in question had been transmitted by Maturan to Atty.
Gonzales in Civil Case 1783-11, petitioner filed an administrative complaint against the former for immoral,
unethical, and anomalous acts and asked for his disbarment.
DISPOSITIVE:
Atty. Gonzales is suspended from the practice of law for 2 years.
DOCTRINE:
It is improper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for one party against the adverse party who is his client in a
related suit, as a lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He
may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts with
that of his present or former client. That the representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest
intention on the part of the lawyer does not make the prohibition inoperative.
This Court finds respondents actuations violative of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which
provide in part: It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests
when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
Moreover, respondent’s justification for his actions reveal a patent ignorance of the fiduciary obligations
which a lawyer owes to his client. A lawyer-client relationship is not terminated by the filing of a motion for a writ
of execution. His acceptance of a case implies that he will prosecute the case to its conclusion. He may not be
permitted to unilaterally terminate the same to the prejudice of his client.
110. Pormento Sr., v. Pontevedra A.C. NO. 5128, March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Atty. Pontevedra was the Pormento family’s legal counsel between 1964 and 1994. The family;s relationship
with Atty. Pontevedra extends beyond the mere lawyer-client relationship.
The rift between complainant and Atty. Pontevedra began when the complainant’s counterclaim in a civil
case (Civil Case No. 1648) was dismissed. It is alleged that Atty. Pontevedra deliberately failed to inform complainant
of the dismissal of his counterclaim which resulted to the latter being deprived of his right to appeal. Complainant
asserts that he only came to know of the existence of the trial court's order when the adverse party in the said case
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage executed over the parcel of land which is the subject matter of the suit. In
order to recover his ownership over the said parcel of land, complainant was constrained to hire a new lawyer as Atty.
Pontevedra refused to institute an action for the recovery of the subject property.
Complainant also claims that in order to further protect his rights and interests over the said parcel of land,
he was forced to initiate a criminal case for qualified theft (Criminal Case No. 3159). Atty. Pontevedra is the counsel
of the accused in said case.
DISPOSITIVE:
Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra is found GUILTY of representing conflicting interests and is FINED in the amount
of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
DOCTRINE:
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: “A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.”
Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he
represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge
acquired through their connection. Another test to determine if there is a representation of conflicting interests is
whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting
interests arise with respect to the same general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse interest may be.
In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client's confidence or to refrain from
doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him.
It cannot be denied that when Atty. Pontevedra was the counsel of complainant in Civil Case No. 1648, he
became privy to the documents and information that complainant possessed with respect to the said parcel of land.
Hence, whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized against complainant any information given to
him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous relationship should have precluded him from appearing
as counsel for the opposing side.
111. ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR. v. ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ.
A.C. NO. 8243 : July 24, 2009
FACTS:
Complainant was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications Corporation (MCC). MCC is an affiliate
company of Multitel International Holdings Corporation (Multitel).
In mid-2002, Multitel was besieged by demand letters from its members and investors because of the failure of its
investment schemes. Distraught, complainant sought the advice of respondent who also happened to be a member of
the Couples for Christ, a religious organization where complainant and his wife were also active members. From then
on, complainant and respondent constantly communicated, with the former disclosing all his involvement and
interests in relation with Multitel. Respondent gave legal advice to complainant and even helped him prepare standard
quitclaims for creditors.
Complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter from respondent8 asking for the return and immediate
settlement of the funds invested by respondent's clients in Multitel. When complainant confronted respondent about
the demand letter, the latter explained that she had to send it so that her clients - defrauded investors of Multitel would know that she was doing something for them and assured complainant that there was nothing to worry about.
Complainant decided to file an affidavit-complaint against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of respondent.
Respondent insisted that she represented the group of investors of Multitel and that she merely mediated in the
settlement of the claims her clients had against the complainant. She also averred that the results of the settlement
between both parties were fully documented and accounted for.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez is hereby DISBARRED for representing conflicting
interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyer's Oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
full disclosure of the facts.
This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste43 and, more importantly, upon necessity. In the
course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including its
weak and strong points. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be
given to him to take advantage of his client; for if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss
thereof.44 It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double ─ dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which is paramount in the administration of justice.45 It is for these reasons that we have described the attorneyclient relationship as one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.
112. SANTOS VENTURA v. ATTY. RICHARD V. FUNK
A.C. NO. 9094 - August 15, 2012
FACTS:
Atty. Funk used to work as corporate secretary, counsel, chief executive officer, and trustee of the Hocorma
foundation from 1983 to 1985. He also served as its counsel in several criminal and civil cases. Hocorma Foundation
alleged that Atty. Funk filed an action for quieting of title and damages against Hocorma Foundation on behalf of
Mabalacat Institute, Inc. Atty. Funk did so, according to the foundation, using information that he acquired while
serving as its counsel in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and in breach of attorney-client
relationship
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
dated April 16, 2010 and June 26, 2011 and SUSPENDS Atty. Richard Funk from the practice of law for one year
effective immediately.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Here, it is undeniable that Atty. Funk was formerly
the legal counsel of Hocorma Foundation. Years after terminating his relationship with the foundation, he filed a
complaint against it on behalf of another client, the Mabalacat Institute, without the foundation's written consent.
An attorney owes his client undivided allegiance. Because of the highly fiduciary nature of their relationship, sound
public policy dictates that he be prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties.
An attorney may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his present or former client. This rule is so absolute that good faith and honest intention on the
erring lawyer's part does not make it inoperative.
113. LOLITA ARTEZUELA, v. ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO,
A.C.No.4354. April22,2002.
FACTS:
Allan Echavia had a vehicular accident. The car rammed into a small carinderia owned by complainant Lolita
Artezuela. Complainant engaged the services of the respondent in filing a damage suit against Echavia. An Amended
Complaint was thereafter filed. However, the case was dismissed on March 22, 1994, allegedly upon the instance of
the complainant and her husband. Because of the dismissal of Civil Case, complainant filed a civil case for damages
against the Respondent. The case was also dismissed. Artezuela filed before this Court a verified complaint for
disbarment against the Respondent. She alleged that respondent grossly neglected his duties as a lawyer and failed to
represent her interests with zeal and enthusiasm. Complainant claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical
to her interests. While acting as her counsel, respondent prepared Echavia’s Answer to the Amended Complaint. The
said document was even printed in respondent’s office. Complainant further averred that it was respondent who
sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that the dismissal was with her consent.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Resolution of the IBP finding the respondent guilty of violating Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Ethics, and Canon 15 and Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is affirmed. Respondent
is suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months with a stern warning that a similar act in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one party need not also be counsel-of-record
of the adverse party. He does not have to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party, nor make his
efforts to advance the adverse party’s conflicting interests of record although these circumstances are the most
obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation
of the pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that of his original client. To require
that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and reward,
with impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.
114. ROBERTO BERNARDINO. v. ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS.
A.C. No. 10583 [Formerly CBD 09-2555], February 18, 2015
ATTY. JOSE MANGASER CARINGAL. v. ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS.
A.C. NO. 10584 [FORMERLY CBD 10-2827]
FACTS:
Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de Castro Turla, was falsified by Atty. Santos. Atty.
Santos made it appear that Rufina Turla died in 1992, when in fact, she died in 1990. Atty. Santos used the falsified
death certificate to support the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Mariano Turla, husband of Rufina Turla.
Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina and Mariano Turla, filed a Complaint for
sum of money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and temporary restraining order against Bernardino.
The Complaint in the Civil Case alleged that Marilu Turla is an heir of Mariano Turla, which allegedly contradicts
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos drafted. Hence, Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting
interests.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Victor Rey Santos guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 and Canon 10,
Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The findings of fact and recommendations of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014 are ACCEPTED and
ADOPTED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year is
imposed upon Atty. Victor Rey Santos. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule 15.03 specifically proscribes members of the
bar from representing conflicting interests. The Supreme Court has explained that “the proscription against
representation of conflicting interest finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same
general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse interest may be; the fact that the conflict of interests is
remote or merely probable does not make the prohibition inoperative
115. WILFREDO ANGLO. vs. ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J. CIOCON, ATTY.
PHILIP Z. DABAO, ATTY. LILY UYV ALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G.
DIONELA, ATTY. RAYMUNDO T. PANDAN, JR., * ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA,** and ATTY.
WILFRED RAMON M. PENALOSA.
A.C. No. 10567
February 25, 2015
FACTS:
Complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela
Pandan Rubica Law Office for two (2) consolidated labor cases where he was impleaded as respondent. Atty. Dionela,
a partner of the law firm, was assigned to represent complainant. The labor cases were terminated upon the agreement
of both parties.
On September 18, 2009, a criminal case4 for qualified theft was filed against complainant and his wife by FEVE
Farms Agricultural Corporation acting through a certain Michael Villacorta. Villacorta, however, was represented by
the law firm, the same law office which handled complainant’s labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant filed this
disbarment case against respondents, alleging that they violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia, Jose Ma. J. Ciocon, Lily Uy-Valencia, Joey P. De La Paz,
Cris G. Dionela, Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr., Rodney K. Rubica, and Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa are found GUILTY
of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and are therefore REPRIMANDED for said violations, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely. Meanwhile, the case against Atty. Philip Dabao is
DISMISSED in view of his death.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any
manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded
on the principles of public policy and good taste.21 In this case, the Court concurs with the IBP’s conclusions that
respondents represented conflicting interests and must therefore be held liable. As the records bear out, respondents’
law firm was engaged and, thus, represented complainant in the labor cases instituted against him. However, after the
termination thereof, the law firm agreed to represent a new client, FEVE Farms, in the filing of a criminal case for
qualified theft against complainant, its former client, and his wife. As the Court observes, the law firm’s unethical
acceptance of the criminal case arose from its failure to organize and implement a system by which it would have
been able to keep track of all cases assigned to its handling lawyers to the end of, among others, ensuring that every
engagement it accepts stands clear of any potential conflict of interest.
116. MABINI COLLEGES, INC. REPRESENTED BY MARCEL N. LUKBAN, ALBERTO I. GARCIA,
JR., AND MA. PAMELA ROSSANA A. APUYA, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE D.
PAJARILLO, Respondent.
A.C. No. 10687, July 22, 2015
FACTS:
Complainant, Mabini Colleges, Inc., had a Board of Trustees which was divided into two opposing factions. The first
faction, called the Adeva Group. The other faction, called the Lukban Group. Complainant appointed the respondent
as its corporate secretary. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an Order which nullified the
appointment of Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano by the Adeva Group as members of the Board of Trustees of the
complainant. As a result, complainant sent a letter to RBP to inform the latter of the SEC Order. RBP sent a letter to
the complainant acknowledging receipt of the SEC Order and informing the latter that the SEC Order was referred to
RBP's legal counsel, herein respondent. The complainant alleged that it was only upon receipt of such letter that it
became aware that respondent is also the legal counsel of RBP.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Resolution No. XX-2013-770 and Resolution No. XXI-2014-290 of the IBP
Board of Governors imposing a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year against respondent Atty.
Jose D. Pajarillo are hereby AFFIRMED.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
This rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any
manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases.6 Based on the principles of
public policy and good taste, this prohibition on representing conflicting interests enjoins lawyers not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can
litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.
117. JOSEFINA M. ANIÑON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 5098
April 11, 2012
FACTS:
Josefina M. Aniñon (complainant) related that she previously engaged the legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in the
preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband,
Brigido Caneja, Jr. Atty. Sabitsana subsequently filed a civil case against her for the annulment of the Deed of Sale
in behalf of Zenaida L. Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and recommendations of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found
GUILTY of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
Rule 15.03. -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts.
"The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation where the opposing parties are
present clients in the same action or in an unrelated action."7 The prohibition also applies even if the "lawyer would
not be called upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there
would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the
two actions are wholly unrelated."8 To be held accountable under this rule, it is "enough that the opposing parties in
one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective
retainers with each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.
118. A.C. No. 2040 March 4, 1998
IMELDA A. NAKPIL, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, respondent.
FACTS:
Complainant alleged that respondent's law firm (Carlos J. Valdes and Associates) filed the petition for the settlement
of her husband's estate in court, while respondent's auditing firm (C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) acted as accountant of
both the estate and two of its creditors. She claimed that respondent represented conflicting interests when his
accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against her husband's estate
which was represented by respondent's law firm.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of misconduct. He is
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective from receipt of this Decision, with a warning
that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
Rule 15.03. -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts.
It is generally the rule, based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is highly
improper to represent both sides of an issue. 19 The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds
application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter 20 and is applicable however
slight such adverse interest may be. It applies although the attorney's intentions and motives were honest and he acted
in good faith. 21 However, representation of conflicting interests may be allowed where the parties consent to the
representation, after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is not enough for the clients must give their informed
consent to such representation. The lawyer must explain to his clients the nature and extent of the conflict and the
possible adverse effect must be thoroughly understood by his clients.
119. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO, respondent.
A.C. No. 3701 March 28, 1995
FACTS:
Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset Management Group of complainant bank. Complainant
averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in arranging the sale of steel sheets in favor of
Milagros Ong Siy. He even "noted" the gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in favor of Mrs.
Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division Compound. When a civil action
arose out of this transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and complainant bank before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
respondent who had since left the employ of complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.
Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case filed by complainant bank against
his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave misconduct and dishonesty, respondent appeared as counsel for
Elefan.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
ACCORDINGLY, this Court resolves to SUSPEND respondent ATTY. TELESFORO S. CEDO from the practice
of law for THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
Rule 15.03. -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express conflicting consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interest when, in
behalf on one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
120. WILFREDO ANGLO. vs. ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J. CIOCON, ATTY.
PHILIP Z. DABAO, ATTY. LILY UYV ALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ, ATTY. CRIS G.
DIONELA, ATTY. RAYMUNDO T. PANDAN, JR., * ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA,** and ATTY.
WILFRED RAMON M. PENALOSA.
A.C. No. 10567
February 25, 2015
FACTS:
Complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela
Pandan Rubica Law Office for two (2) consolidated labor cases where he was impleaded as respondent. Atty. Dionela,
a partner of the law firm, was assigned to represent complainant. The labor cases were terminated upon the agreement
of both parties.
On September 18, 2009, a criminal case4 for qualified theft was filed against complainant and his wife by FEVE
Farms Agricultural Corporation acting through a certain Michael Villacorta. Villacorta, however, was represented by
the law firm, the same law office which handled complainant’s labor cases. Aggrieved, complainant filed this
disbarment case against respondents, alleging that they violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia, Jose Ma. J. Ciocon, Lily Uy-Valencia, Joey P. De La Paz,
Cris G. Dionela, Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr., Rodney K. Rubica, and Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa are found GUILTY
of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and are therefore REPRIMANDED for said violations, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely. Meanwhile, the case against Atty. Philip Dabao is
DISMISSED in view of his death.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any
manner, whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded
on the principles of public policy and good taste.21 In this case, the Court concurs with the IBP’s conclusions that
respondents represented conflicting interests and must therefore be held liable. As the records bear out, respondents’
law firm was engaged and, thus, represented complainant in the labor cases instituted against him. However, after the
termination thereof, the law firm agreed to represent a new client, FEVE Farms, in the filing of a criminal case for
qualified theft against complainant, its former client, and his wife. As the Court observes, the law firm’s unethical
acceptance of the criminal case arose from its failure to organize and implement a system by which it would have
been able to keep track of all cases assigned to its handling lawyers to the end of, among others, ensuring that every
engagement it accepts stands clear of any potential conflict of interest.
121. Coveney vs. Tannahill
1 Hill & Den. 33
Jan. 1, 1841
Facts:
Edwards & McKibben, defendants and Tannahill, the plaintiff were partners under the name of John
Tannahill & Co. in an action of assumpsit, the plaintiff gave in evidence an account stated in writing on the 3d
September, 1839, with an acknowledgment at the end, signed John Tannahill & Co., in the handwriting of Tannahill,
by which a balance was admitted to be due the plaintiff of $747,36.
The defendants, proposed to show that Tannahill had made this written acknowledgment, after an injunction
out of chancery at the suit of his partners had been served upon him, restraining him from interfering with the
partnership accounts; and that Tannahill signed the acknowledgment for the purpose of defrauding his said copartners.
They called Seth E. Sill the counsel for the plaintiff on the hearing, and put to him the following questions: 1. Whether
he was present when the account stated was signed; 2. If so, when and where was it signed, and who was present; 3.
When he first saw the said account stated, and whether the acknowledgment of a settlement and balance due was
endorsed on the account when he first saw it. To which questions the witness (Sill) replied, that all his knowledge of
the writing had been obtained by him as counsel in this cause, and that he could not answer the questions without
violating the confidence reposed in him by his client as counsel in the cause. The referees decided that the witness
should not answer the questions put to him.
Dispositive:
The referees were right in not permitting the last question to be answered: but as they were wrong in relation to the
first two questions, there must be a rehearing. Report set aside.
Doctrine:
Confidential communications between attorney and client, concerning the matter to which the retainer relates, are not
to be disclosed by the attorney in court, unless the client waives his privilege.
However, the privilege of the client does not extend to every fact which the attorney may learn in the course
of his employment.
122. DONALD DEE
v.
COURT OF APPEALS and AMELITO MUTUC
G.R. No. 77439 August 24, 1989
Facts:
Atty. Mutuc claimed that Donald Dee formally engaged his services for a fee of P100,000.00 regarding the
$1,000,000 indebtedness of his brother, Dewey Dee to Caesar’s Palace, a well-known gambling casino at Las Vegas,
Nevada, U.S.A. Atty. Mutuc, who was then a collector agent and consultant of Caesar’s Palace travelled to Las Vegas
and personally talked to its President. He was able to confer and convinced one Ramon Sy to acknowledge the
indebtedness, clearing the account of Dewey Dee. Having thus settled the account of Donald’s brother, Mutuc sent
several demand letters to petitioner demanding the balance of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees. Donald, however, ignored
said letters and denied the existence of any professional relationship of attorney and client between him and Mutuc.
He said that Atty Mutuc had volunteered his services as a friend of the family. That the P50,000.00 inceptively given
to Atty Mutuc was not in the nature of attorney's fees but merely "pocket money" solicited by the former for his trips
to Las Vegas and the said amount of P50,000.00 was already sufficient remuneration for his strictly voluntary
services.
Mutuc then filed a complaint against Donald in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, for the collection of
attorney's fees and refund of transport fare and other expenses. RTC and Court of Appeals (after reconsidering its
decision) favored Mutuc, hence now the petition seeking for writ of certiorari to overturn the latter resolution.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated February 12,1987, reinstating its
original decision of May 9, 1986 is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.
The court rendered judgment ordering herein petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of P50,000.00
with interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint on October 4, 1982 and to pay the costs. All
other claims therein of private respondent and the counterclaim of petitioner were dismissed.
Doctrine:
A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable compensation for services rendered at the special
instance and request of his client and as long as he is honestly and in good faith trying to serve and represent the
interests of his client, the latter is bound to pay his just fees.
123. In re Attorney MELCHOR E. RUSTE
A.M. No. 632
June 27, 1940
Facts:
In a pending cadastral case, the respondent, Melchor E. Ruste, appeared for and represented, as counsel,
Severa Ventura and her husband, Mateo San Juan, the herein complainant. There was no agreement as to the amount
of fees but the spouses paid Ruste his attorney fees and upon demand on different occasions the sums of P30 and
P25. After such payments, Ruste demanded for and additional fee of P25. Having no money to pay, they agreed to
the suggestion of Atty Ruste to execute in his favor a contract of lease, and a contract of sale of their share in lot No.
3764 in order to raise the sum of P25. A contract of lease was executed whereby in consideration of P100, they leased
to him their coconut and banana plantation in said lot No. 3764 for a term of five years, and also a deed of sale,
whereby in consideration of P1,000, they sold and transferred to him their undivided eleven-twentieth (11/20) share
in said lot No . 3764, although, in fact and in truth, neither of the consideration mentioned in said contracts of lease
and sale were ever receive by them.
Atty. Ruste, afterwards sold and transferred to Ong Chua for P370 the said undivided eleven-twentieth
(11/20) share in lot No. 3764 excluding the house and its lot, occupied by the spouses. The proceeds of the sale was
not turned over to the complainant and his wife. Also, on October 10, 1933, Atty Ruste notified the spouses in writing
that the said house belonged to the him, and requires said spouses to pay, the sum of P40.50, representing ten months’
rental in arrears, and thereafter a monthly rental of P1.50.
Mateo San Juan prays that disciplinary action be taken against the Ruste.
Dispositive:
For having improperly acquired the property referred to in Exhibits A and B, under the above circumstances,
which property was then subject matter of a judicial proceedings, in which he was counsel, the respondent is found
guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended for a period of one year, reserving to the complainant and his spouse
such action as may by proper for the recovery of such amount or amounts as may be due from the respondent.
Doctrine:
Causing the conveyance of property during the pendency of appeal in counsel’s favor constitute malpractice.
Code of Professional Responsibilities violated:
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Article 1459 of the Civil Code:
Chapter 2, title IV, book IV of the Spanish Civil Code, is entitled, "Capacity to Purchase or Sell." Article
1459 names the persons who cannot take by purchase either in person or through the mediation of another.
By the last paragraph of the article, the prohibition is made to include lawyers "with respect to any property
or rights involved in any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession and office."
124. SIXTO HERNANDEZ
v.
ATTORNEY FRANCISCO VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 16223
February 06, 1920
Facts:
Francisco Villanueva, an attorney admitted to practice in the Philippine Islands, was complained by one Sixto
Hernandez for disciplinary action. Some of the allegations have found to not been substantiated but one of his charge
against Atty. Villanueva for purchasing from his client Florencia Anuran, a parcel of land that was the subject-matter
of the litigation was substantiated by the evidence, likewise found by the Attorney-General, and partially admitted
by the respondent. While the case involving the property of his client was pending before the Supreme Court,
Attorney Francisco Villanueva purchased from her in consideration of P500, and the value of his professional
services, a parcel of land that was the subject-matter of the litigation which he was conducting.
Attorney Villanueva argues that when he purchased the interest of his client he did so in good faith, believing that
the last paragraph of Art 1459 of civil code was abrogated.
Dispositive:
It is the order of this Court that the license to practice law heretofore issued to Francisco Villanueva
be suspended for six months, to begin from this date. The costs shall be taxed in accordance with section 24 of the
Code of Civil Procedure A.
Doctrine:
A lawyer is not supposed to know all the law, he is supposed to take such reasonable precautions for his
professional guidance as will not make him who is expected to uphold the law, a transgressor of its precepts.
Ignorance of the law or error of judgment as to the attorneys' rights, as urged at the bar, may possibly slightly condone,
but
certainly
cannot
entirely
pardon,
the
action
of
the
attorney.
Code of Professional Responsibilities violated:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Article 1459 of the Civil Code:
Chapter 2, title IV, book IV of the Spanish Civil Code, is entitled, "Capacity to Purchase or Sell." Article
1459 names the persons who cannot take by purchase either in person or through the mediation of another.
By the last paragraph of the article, the prohibition is made to include lawyers "with respect to any property
or rights involved in any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession and office."
125. DOMINGA VELASCO ORDONIO
v.
ATTY. JOSEPHINE PALOGAN EDUARTE
A.M. No. 3216
March 16, 1992
Facts:
This is a complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. Josephine Palogan-Eduarte. Antonia Ulibari filed
with the RTC, Branch 22, Cabagan, Isabela, a case for annulment of a document against her children. The case was
handled by Atty. Henedino Eduarte, herein respondent's husband, until his appointment as RTC judge on October 26,
1984. His wife, Atty. Josephine Palogan-Eduarte, took over. On August 22, 1985, decision was rendered in favor of
Antonia Ulibari. Except for Dominga Velasco-Ordonio, one of the children of Antonia Ulibari and complainant in
the instant case, the rest of the defendants did not appeal.
On June 13, 1987, while said case was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, Antonia Ulibari conveyed
some parcels of her land to her children in the form of deeds of absolute sale, prepared and notarized by Atty Josephine
Eduarte. Significantly, on the same day, Antonia Ulibari also conveyed 20 hectares of land to Atty Josephine and her
husband as their Attorney's fees for legal services rendered. All the titles of the lands subject of the deeds of absolute
sale and the deed of conveyance however remained in the name of Antonia Ulibari.
On April 4, 1988, Dominga Velasco-Ordonio filed this complaint for disbarment against herein respondent
on the basis of an affidavit executed by her mother Antonia Ulibari on March 2, 1988 stating that affiant never
conveyed the subject parcel of land to Atty Josephine as her attorney's fees and that the deeds of absolute sale executed
in favor of her children were not known to her (and that she received no consideration therefor). On August 10, 1989,
the Investigation Commissioner submitted a report finding the charges to be true and recommending a one-year
suspension of the respondent from the practice of law.
Dispositive:
Respondent is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, and, for
having stated falsehoods in the four (4) deeds of absolute sale she prepared and notarized, in violation of the lawyer's
oath and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, respondent is also ordered suspended from the
practice or law for a period of another six (6) months, resulting in a total period on one year.
Doctrine:
Causing the conveyance of property during the pendency of appeal in counsel’s favor constitute malpractice.
Code of Professional Responsibilities violated:
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Art. 1491 of the Civil Code
-which prohibits lawyers from "acquiring by assignment property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
126. LEONILA J. LICUANAN
v.
ATTY. MANUEL L. MELO
Adm. Case No. 2361. February 9, 1989
Facts:
An affidavit-complaint, was filed by Leonila J. Licuanan with the Office of the Court Administrator
against respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, for breach of professional ethics, alleging that Atty Melo,
who was her counsel in an ejectment case filed against her tenant, failed to remit to her the rentals totaling
P5220 collected by him on different dates over a twelve-month period, much less did he report to her the receipt
of said amounts. It was only after approximately a year from actual receipt that Atty Melo turned over his
collections to her after the latter, through another counsel, acquired knowledge of the payment and had
demanded the same.
Atty Melo admitted having received the payment of rentals from Leonila’s tenant, Aida Pineda, as alleged
in the complaint, but explained that he kept this matter from the complainant for the purpose of
surprising her with his success in collecting the rentals.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, consistent with the crying need to maintain the high traditions and standards of the legal
profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR
respondent, Atty. Manuel L. Melo, from the practice of law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the
Roll of Attorneys.
Doctrine:
A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to
conduct himself with all good fidelity to his clients. He is obligated to report promptly the money of his clients
that has come into his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property or use it for his
personal purposes without his client's consent. He should maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to
private trust.
Code of Professional Ethics violated:
"11. DEALING WITH TRUST PROPERTY
"The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of
the confidence reposed in him by his client.
"Money of the client or collected for the client of other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should
be reported and accounted for promptly, and should not under any circumstance be commingled with his
own or be used by him." **
127. MAXIMO DUMADAG
v.
ERNESTO L. LUMAYA
A.C. No. 2614
May 21, 1991
Facts:
Atty. Lumaya was Dumadag’s counsel in Civil Case involving the sale of a parcel of land filed against
spouses Jose and Jesusa Avellanosa. The Civil Case was terminated via a compromise agreement which provided,
inter alia, that not later than 1 October 1979, the Avellanosas would pay Dumadag the amount of P4,644.00 and in
turn Dumadag would execute in favor of the Avellanosas a deed of reconveyance of the land. However, in case of
failure of the Avellanosas to make full payment of the P4,644.00 within the stipulated period, Dumadag would be
entitled to obtain possession of the land. The compromise agreement, prepared by Atty Lumaya, was approved by
the trial court.
The Avellanosas failed to comply with their undertaking under the compromise agreement to pay
complainant not later than 1 October 1979, which necessitated the filing by Dumadag of a motion for execution. He
then asked Atty Lumaya to prepare and file the appropriate motion for execution; however, the latter failed to do so.
Instead of serving the writ on the Avellanosas, Atty Lumaya was alleged to connived with the Avellanosas by selling
a one (1) hectare portion of the land subject of Civil Case to one Eleonora Astudillo to satisfy Dumadag’s claim out
of the proceeds of the sale, without however Dumadag’s knowledge and consent.
The Deed of Sale between the Avellanosas and Astudillo was notarized by Atty Lumaya and it expressly
stated on its face "That this Deed of Sale is executed also to satisfy finally the claim of Maximo Dumadag in pending
Civil Case. However, the said proceed amounting to P4,344.00, according to Dumanag, was not delivered to him by
Atty Lumaya, even after the former made a demand on the latter.
Dispositive:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby SUSPENDS Atty. Ernesto Lumaya INDEFINITELY from the practice
of law effective from date of his receipt of this resolution.
Doctrine:
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer
should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstance be comingled with his own or
be used by him.
Code of Professional Responsibilities violated:
Canon 16 —
"Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.
"Rule 16.02 — A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of
others kept by him.
"Rule 16.03 — A lawyer }hall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also
have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided
for in the Rules of Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
128. DOMINADOR P. BURBE
v.
Atty. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA
A.C. No. 5713. June 10, 2002
(Adm. Case No. 99-634)
Facts:
Petitioner, Burbe engaged the services of the respondent, Atty Magulta to help him recover a claim of money
against a creditor. Atty Magulta prepared demand letters which were not successful and so Burbe intimated that a
case should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and included also amounts for the filing
of
the
case.
A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the status of his case.
Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that the case has already
been filed even invited Burbe to come with him to the Justice Hall to verify the status of the case. Burbe was made
to wait for hours in the prosecutor’s office while Magulta allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the
case. Magulta went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was absent that day. Suspicious of the
acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk of court to see for himself the status of his case.
Petitioner
found
out
that
no
such
case
has
been
filed.
Burbe confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the delay was being caused
by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint
because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered
to reimburse him by issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and
P8,000.00,
respectively.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective
upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copies be furnished all courts as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which
is instructed to include a copy in respondent’s file.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Doctrine:
The entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it correlative duties not only to the client but also to the
court, to the bar, and to the public. Lawyers must exert their best efforts and ability in the prosecution or the defense
of the client’s cause. They who perform that duty with diligence and candor not only protect the interests of the client,
but also serve the ends of justice. They do honor to the bar and help maintain the respect of the community for the
legal profession. Members of the bar must do nothing that may tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the
public in the fidelity, the honesty, and integrity of the profession.
Code of Professional Responsibility violated:
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
129. HONORIO MANALANG and FLORENCIO CIRILLO
v.
ATTY. FRANCISCO F. ANGELES
A.C. No. 1558. March 10, 2003
Facts:
Manalang and Cirilo (petitioners) filed a case against their employer, Philippine Racing Club Restaurant, for
their overtime and separation pay before the NLRC and Francisco Angeles (respondent) was their counsel. They
obtained a favorable judgment and their employer was asked to pay Php 6,500. However, Atty. Angeles compromised
and was only able to collect Php 5,500 and it was allegedly obtained without the consulting his clients. OSG
conducted several hearings but respondent only appeared 3 times. It was then transferred to the Committee on Bar
Discipline of the IBP. Neither party appeared despite prior due notice. The Committee issued a resolution
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for 2 years.
Dispositive:
The Court thereby suspends Atty. Angeles from practice of law for a period of 6 months and orders the
respondent to pay the sum of (overtime and separation pay), Php 2,275.00 each to complainants Honorio Manalang
and Florencio Cirillo, with interest of 6% per annum from the time of filing this complaint until fully paid.
Doctrine:
The authority to compromise cannot be lightly presumed and must be supported by evidence.
Money claims due to workers cannot, as a rule, be the object of settlement or compromise effected by counsel
without the consent of the workers concerned .18 A client has every right to expect from his counsel that nothing will
be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law validly applied.
Code of Professional Responsibility violated:
Rule 16.03:
A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall have
a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and
executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Canon 17
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trustand confidence reposed
in him.
130. HILARIA TANHUECO
v.
JUSTINIANO G. DE DUMO
A.M. No. 1437, A.M No. 1683
April 25, 1989
Facts:
Complainant Hilaria Tanhueco alleged that she secured the legal services of respondent, Atty De Dumo to
collect indebtedness from her different debtors. Although she offered to execute a document evidencing their lawyerclient relationship, respondent told her that it was not necessary. She nonetheless offered to give him 15% of what he
may be able to collect from the debtors. One of her debtors Constancia Mañosca paid P12,500.00 to Atty De Dumo.
Informed of such payment by Mañosca herself, she confronted Atty De Dumo but he denied having received payment
from any of her debtors. Complainant then brought the matter to the attention of Malacañang which referred her to
Camp Crame. Notwithstanding subsequent demands of complainant for the money, respondent had refused to give
her the amount.
Atty. Justiniano G. de Dumo on the contrary alleged that complainant indeed secured his legal services to
collect from her debtors, with the agreement that he gets 50% of what he may be able to collect. He thus filed
collection cases against Tanhueco’s debtors (Tipace Mañosca Morena, Jr.) , and others, and was able to obtain
favorable judgment in other cases. The initial payments made by these judgment-debtors were all given to
complainant. With respect to Mañosca respondent obtained a judgment for P19,000.00 although the debt was only
P12,000.00. Ultimately, because complainant filed a complaint against him, he terminated his relationship with
complainant and demanded his attorney's fees equivalent to 50% of what he had collected. Tanhueco refused to pay
him, hence, he did not also turn over to her the P12,000.00 initial payment of Mañosca which he considered, or
applied, as part payment of his attorney's fee which he estimated in the amount of P17,000.00. He also denied having
received documentary evidence from complainant. What evidence he had were all gathered by him on his initiative.
Tanhueco filed before the Court a Petition for Disbarment.
Dispositive:
Respondent is guilty of violation of the attorneys' oath and of serious professional misconduct and shall be
SUSPENDED from the practice law for six (6) months and WARNED that repetition of the same or similar offense
will be more severely dealt with.
Doctrine:
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer
should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstance be comingled with his own or
be used by him.
Code of Professional Responsibility violated:
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others
kept by him.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However,
he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
131.
BAUTISTA v. Atty. GONZALES
A.M. No. 1625
February 12, 1990
FACTS:
Respondent Gonzales prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was signed by his clients,
Fortunados. The document assigned to respondent one-half (1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados for and in
consideration of his legal services to the Fortunados. At the time the document was executed, respondent knew that
the abovementioned properties were the subject of a civil case pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said case. Subsequently, respondent entered into a contract
with Bautista for the development of the subject land into a residential subdivision. That time, Bautista does not know
that the land was the subject of the civil case. Eventually, Bautista learnt about the subject land which was later on
subject to a public auction. As such, Bautista filed a case against respondent violating the law expressly prohibiting
a lawyer from acquiring his client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue
of his profession.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious misconduct; and, the court resolved to suspend
respondent from the practice of law for six (6) months.
DOCTRINE:
An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client's rights is
champertous in relation to Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such agreements are against public
policy especially where the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some
bargain to have part of the thing in dispute. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship
between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.
132.
JBP HOLDINGS CORP. v. US
166 F. sup. 324
September 17, 1958
FACTS:
Sometime in 1956, plaintiff JBP retained petitioner Kamerman as an attorney, to prosecute a claim for a tax
refund against the United States of America. Petitioner prior thereto had served as the accountant for JBP. By a
written agreement of retainer, JBP consented to pay petitioner 50% of the total recovery. Petitioner maintains that
solely as a result of his efforts the tax refund action was settled for the total sum of $7,822.23, consisting of $6,054.49
in refund, plus $1,767.74 interest. The United States Government issued its check for this amount to petitioner,
payable to the plaintiff, on June 19, 1958. Petitioner still has this check in his possession and claims that he is entitled
to and has a lien in the sum of $3,911.11, for which payment was demanded and no part paid. Further, petitioner
states that he has never received from plaintiff any compensation for his services in the tax refund action. He therefore
requests that this Court declare a lien on the check he is holding and permit execution for the sum requested. As a
defense to this application, JBP maintains that this written agreement was submitted on petitioner's accountant
stationery and therefore the retainer was entered into by petitioner as an accountant and not as an attorney.
Accordingly, JBP states that petitioner is not entitled to the protection of or to the rights of the Judiciary Law.
Moreover, JBP maintains that even if petitioner were entitled to 50% of the refund, it should be 50% of $6.054.49,
or $3,027.24, and not 50% of this sum plus interest. Eventually, petitioner filed an action against JBP Holding
Corporation for an order making an allowance of counsel fees to the petitioner under § 475 of the Judiciary Law of
the State of New York. A cross motion has been filed by JBP directing petitioner to pay over a check made by the
United States of America to the order of JBP for the sum of $7,822.23, together with interest from June 19, 1958.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
It therefore follows that petitioner's motion must be denied, and the cross-motion directing petitioner to turn
over the check made by the United States of America must be granted, except that there shall be no accrual of interest
on the amount of the check from June 19, 1958; and it is so ordered.
DOCTRINES:
The laws concerning champertous activity have had a long history in our jurisprudence. The basic elements
of the offense include an agreement and undertaking by one person to defray, in whole or in part, the expenses of
another's suit and by the latter person to divide with the former the fruits of the litigation in the event in proves
successful of which contracts arising from champertous activity are void.
Since an attorney's lien under § 475 of the Judiciary Law is being equitable in nature, there must be
satisfaction of the existence of the equitable right before ordering its enforcement. An action in entering into this
champertous contract precludes seeking equitable relief from any court. In which, where the agreement is unlawful,
an attorney can have no lien for services performed. However, though the contract of employment is champertous,
this does not bar recovery on a quantum meruit basis.
133.
Sps. CONCEPCION v. Atty. DELA ROSA
A.C. No. 10681
February 3, 2015
FACTS:
Respondent Dela Rosa borrowed money from Sps. Concepcion in the amount of Php2.5M, and promised to
pay such amount. After due date, despite effort of Sps. Concepcion and with the help of the new counsel of Sps.
Concepcion to demand payment from respondent, respondent failed to pay. In fact, respondent transferred the blame
to his new client who is alleged to be the real debtor. However, Sps. Concepcion brought the matter to the Office of
the Lupong Tagapamayapa in Barangay Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City. Nonetheless, the parties failed to reach a
settlement. As such, the IBP-Misamis Oriental Chapter received complainants’ letter-complaint charging respondent
with violation of Rule 16.04 of the CPR prohibiting lawyers from borrowing money from clients unless the latter’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Atty. Elmer A. dela Rosa is found guilty of violating Canon 7 and Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three
(3) years, with a stem warning that a commission of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE:
The rule against borrowing of money by a lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from
taking advantage of his influence over his client. The rule presumes that the client is disadvantaged by the lawyer’s
ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his obligation. A lawyer’s act of asking a client for a loan is
very unethical. It comes within those acts considered as abuse of client’s confidence.
134.
CANTILLER v. Atty. POTENCIANO
A.C. No. 3195
December 19, 1989
FACTS:
Complainant and her sister avail themselves of the services of respondent Potenciano of which to handle their
cases. One of which is to annul the judgment rendered against the complainant and her sister, in which complainant
and her sister are ordered to vacate the premises of the apartment that they are renting. Eventually, respondent
demanded amounts of money from complainant and her sister to handle such cases. However, at the hearing of the
preliminary injunction in one civil case, respondent, contrary to his promise that he would secure a restraining order,
withdrew his appearance as counsel for complainant. Complainant was not able to get another lawyer as replacement.
Thus, no restraining order or preliminary injunction was obtained. As a consequence, the order to vacate was
eventually enforced and executed. Because of that, complainant demanded the return of her money from respondent,
but such demand was never answered and the money was never returned. Hence, complainant lodged this
administrative complaint against respondent.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Atty. Humberto V. Potenciano is guilty of the charges against him and hereby suspends him from the practice
of law for an indefinite period until such time he can demonstrate that he has rehabilitated himself as to deserve to
resume the practice of law. Finally, respondent is hereby ordered to return to complainant herein the sum of eleven
thousand pesos (P11,000.00) with legal interest from the date of this resolution until it is actually returned.
DOCTRINES:
When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he thereby covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution
until its final conclusion. The failure to exercise due diligence or the abandonment of a client’s cause makes such
lawyer unworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on him. The acts of respondent in this case violate the most
elementary principles of professional ethics.
Even assuming that respondent had no previous knowledge that he would be asked to withdraw, the record
is quite clear that four (4) days prior to the hearing of the preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 55118 respondent
already filed a motion therein withdrawing as complainant’s counsel interposing as reason therefor his frequent
attacks of pain due to hemorrhoids. Despite this void, respondent failed to find a replacement. He did not even ask
complainant to hire another lawyer in his stead. His actuation is definitely inconsistent with his duty to protect with
utmost dedication the interest of his client and of the fidelity, trust and confidence which he owes his client. More so
in this case, whereby reason of his gross negligence complainant thereby suffered by losing all her cases.
135.
SOLATAN v. Attys. INOCENTES and CAMANO
A.C. NO. 5687
February 03, 2005
FACTS:
A judgment was rendered against the sister of the complainant to vacate the premises of an apartment rented.
Eventually, prior to the implementation of a writ to execute the judgment, complainant and his mother who were
occupying such apartment approached Atty. Inocentes to arrange the execution of a lease contract by virtue of which
complainant would be the new lessee of the apartment and thus make possible his continued stay therein. In the
meantime, Atty. Inocentes referred complainant and his mother to his associate, Atty. Camano. During the meeting
with Atty. Camano, a verbal agreement was made, in which complainant and his mother agreed to pay the entire
judgment debt of Gliceria Solatan, including fifty percent of the awarded attorney's fees and costs of suit provided
that Atty. Camano would allow complainant's continued stay at Genito Apartments. As partial compliance with the
agreement, complainant issued in the name Atty. Camano a check representing half of the attorney's fees adjudged
against complainant's sister. However, Complainant and his mother failed to make any other payment. As such, Atty.
Camano gave an advice to the adverse party. Thus, the sheriff in coordination with Atty. Camano and some
policemen, enforced the writ of execution and levied the properties found in the subject apartment. A renegotiation
took place at the insistence of complainant acting on the advice given by Atty. Camano, resulting in Atty. Camano's
acquiescence to release the levied properties and allowing complainant to remain at the apartment. When complainant
learnt that Atty. Camano gave advice to the adverse party, he filed the instant administrative case for disbarment
against Atty. Camano with his companion, Atty. Inocentes.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Atty. Jose C. Camano is hereby suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year for accepting funds from
adverse party in the process of implementing a writ borders on technical extortion, for giving unsolicited advice to
the adverse party a suggestion evidently in conflict with the interest of his own client and for casting doubts to the
procedure of the levy. Also, Atty. Inocentes is hereby admonished to monitor more closely the activities of his
associates to make sure that the same are in consonance with the Code of Professional Responsibility with the warning
that repetition of the same or similar omission will be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE:
The fidelity lawyers owe their clients is traditionally characterized as "undivided." This means that lawyers
must represent their clients and serve their needs without interference or impairment from any conflicting interest. In
which, the act of informing complainant that the levied properties would be returned to him upon showing proof of
his ownership thereof may hint at infidelity to the interest of the adverse party, but lacks the essence of double dealing
and betrayal of the latter's confidence so as to deserve outright categorization as infidelity or disloyalty to his clients'
cause.
136.
VILLAFUERTE v. Atty. CORTEZ
A. C. No. 3455
April 14, 1998
FACTS:
Sometime in January 1987, complainant Villafuerte went to the office of respondent Cortez to discuss his
case for "reconveyance". During their initial meeting, complainant tried to reconstruct the incidents of the case merely
from memory before respondent. However, the respondent ask complainant to instead return at another time with the
records of the case. Afterwards, complainant again saw respondent but still sans the records. Complainant requested
respondent to accept the case, paying to the respondent the acceptance fee and retainer fee for January 1987.
Respondent averred that he accepted the money with much reluctance and only upon the condition that complainant
would get the records of the case from, as well as secure the withdrawal of appearance of, Atty. Jose Dizon, the
former counsel of complainant. Allegedly, complainant never showed up thereafter until November 1989 when he
went to the office of respondent lawyer, but only to leave a copy of a writ of execution in a case for ejectment, which,
according to respondent, was never priorly mentioned to him by complainant. Indeed, said respondent, he had never
entered his appearance in the aforenumbered case.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Atty. Dante H. Cortez is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of one month from notice
hereof, with a warning that a repetition of similar acts and other administrative lapses will be dealt with more severely
than presently.
DOCTRINE:
A lawyer's fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful of the responsibilities that should
be expected of him. He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interests of
his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility cannot be any clearer in its dictum than when it has stated that a
"lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence," decreeing further that he "shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him”.
137.
EDQUIBAL v. Atty. FERRER, JR.
A.C. NO. 5687
February 03, 2005
FACTS:
Complainant engaged the services of respondent to assist his mother Ursula in cases she filed against his
sister Delia Edquibal-Garcia involving a certain real property in Masinloc, Zambales. His mother obtained favorable
judgments in four out of the five cases handled by respondent. However, the trial judge rendered a decision on the
remaining case adverse to his mother. Respondent then advised complainant to appeal to the Court of Appeals and
that the cost involved is P4,000.00. When complainant informed respondent that he does not have enough money,
the latter said P2,000.00 would be sufficient for the moment. After receiving the money from complainant, respondent
told him just to wait for the result. When complainant failed to hear from respondent in January 2001, he went to the
Court of Appeals to follow-up the appealed case. He then learned that the appeal was dismissed for failure of the
appellant to file the required appellant's brief.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Atty. Roberto Ferrer, Jr. is hereby found guilty of professional misconduct and neglect of duty. He is
suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely. He is further directed to return immediately to the complainant the amount
of P2,000.00.
DOCTRINES:
Diligence is "the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of negligence".
A lawyer serves his client with diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected of men of good intentions. He
thus owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warm zeal in the defense and maintenance of his rights, and the
exertion of his utmost learning, skill, and ability to ensure that nothing shall be taken or withheld from him, save by
the rules of law legally applied. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to
the cause of the client.
The practice of law does not require extraordinary diligence (exactissima diligentia) or that "extreme measure
of care and caution which persons of unusual prudence and circumspection use for securing and preserving their
rights". All that is required is ordinary diligence (diligentia) or that degree of vigilance expected of a bonus pater
familias. Yet, even by this lesser standard, respondent's failure to attend to his client's appeal is clearly wanting.
138.
NONATO v. Atty. FUDOLIN, JR.
A.C. No. 10138
June 16, 2015
FACTS:
Originally, Restituto, who is the father of the complainant, filed an ejectment case against Anselmo. Restituto
was represented by Atty. Garcia. However, at the pre-trial stage, Atty. Garcia was replaced by Atty. Fudolin, Jr.
During the pendency of the case, the respondent failed to fully inform Restituto of the status and developments in the
case. Restituto could not contact the respondent despite his continued efforts. The respondent also failed to furnish
Restituto copies of the pleadings, motions and other documents filed with the court. Thus, Restituto and the
complainant were completely left in the dark regarding the status of their case. Eventually, the case was dismissed
known to the respondent, but unknown to the complainant and his father, who later on died. Allegedly, respondent
said that his acts were due to his medical condition.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Atty. Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr. is suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years for violating
Rules 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and warned that
the commission of the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINES:
A lawyer is bound to protect his client's interests to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. He
should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent, and efficient manner; and provide the quality of service at least
equal to that which he, himself, would expect from a competent lawyer in a similar situation. By consenting to be his
client's counsel, a lawyer impliedly represents that he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of
care and skill demanded by his profession, and his client may reasonably expect him to perform his obligations
diligently. The failure to meet these standards warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.
Because a lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence, there is a need for the client to be
adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case. A client should never be left groping in the dark;
to allow this situation is to destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in the retained lawyer and in the legal
profession in general.
139.
MOTON v. Atty. CADIAO
A.C. No. 5169
November 24, 1999
FACTS:
On 1987, complainant Moton filed a case against Castillo and The Philippine Veterans Bank denominated as
Right to Use Urban Land and Damages. When the case was scheduled for pre-trial conference, the complainant’s
counsel, Atty. Cadiao, failed to appear, hence, the court dismissed the case. However, Atty. Cadiao filed with the trial
court an entry of appearance for the complainant and a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the case. After
rendering services to the complainant, respondent eventually filed with the Court of Appeals a Withdrawal of
Appearance, and contended that the main reason for the undue delay in the presentation of evidence in the case of the
complainant was the inability of the complainant to furnish him with the original copies of the evidence and that his
failure to appear during the scheduled hearing was due to a compelling need to appear in another case in Antique
which made it impossible for him to attend both hearings.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Respondent is liable for negligence in the handling of complainant’s case. Accordingly, the Court resolved
to impose on respondent Atty. Raymundo D. Cadiao a fine of P2,000.00 payable to this Court within ten (10) days
from notice, with warning that a repetition of similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE:
A practicing lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his cases. This is why a practicing lawyer
may accept only so many cases that he can efficiently handle. Otherwise, his clients will be prejudiced. Once he
agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he should do any less, then he is not
true to his lawyer’s oath.
140.
PROVIDENT INSURANCE CORPORATION v. CA
G.R. No. 110504
October 27, 1994
# For your information lang po, I’m not sure kung related ung case especially sa facts and dispositive portion, sa
code of professional responsibility, kaya pakicheck niyo na lang po
pag may time haha…
☺☺☺☺☺☺☺☺☺☺☺☺☺☺☺☺☺☺
FACTS:
Initially, Atlas asked a ship owner named Northern, to ship its fertilizer, but eventually, there was loss and
damages on Atlas’ fertilizers as it reached its destination. As such, Atlas demanded a claim from Northern, but
Northern refused, so Atlas went to the Insurer that is petitioner Provident with regard to the fertilizer insured.
Provident paid, and subrogated with such right to go against Northern. With that, Provident initiated this collection
suit for reimbursement against Northern. However, MeTC dismissed the case because of statute of limitations, and
denied the motion filed afterwards. RTC affirmed MeTC decision. When the case reached the CA, CA said that there
was an error on the part of Provident to avail itself of those modes of which to exercise one’s right to appeal in relation
to what court has jurisdiction when the case raises pure questions of law. Hence, CA dismissed such petition.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The court finds no reversible error in the Resolutions of respondent Court of Appeals which dismissed the
petition for having been expressly taken upon a pure question of law, non-certification of the annexed copy of the
RTC decision and lack of certification against forum-shopping, hence the instant petition for review is denied.
DOCTRINE:
It is incumbent upon every attorney who would seek review of a judgment or order promulgated against his
client to make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign, whether these be of fact or of law; then upon
such basis, to ascertain which court has appellate jurisdiction; and, finally, to follow scrupulously the requisites for
appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any error or imprecision in compliance may well be fatal to his client’s
cause.
141. REONTOY V. ABADLIT
AC CBD NO. 190, JANUARY 28, 1998
FACTS:
A complaint filed by Corazon T. Reontoy for the disbarment of her counsel, Atty. Liberato R. Ibadlit, for having been
negligent in handling her case. Abadlit failed to communicate with his client properly regarding the matters of the
case such as failing to notify the client regarding the status of the case and failing to file a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period. During the IBP investigation, the complainant presented her brother Proculo Tomazar to deny,
as he did, that he was authorized by her to communicate with respondent regarding the case, claiming in fact that he
had no knowledge whatsoever of subject civil case and that she had never authorized him to be her representative
either to the court or to communicate with her counsel for the reason that Proculo was unlettered. Complainant further
testified that when she went to see respondent in September 1989 to check on the status of her case the latter merely
told her that the period to appeal had already elapsed and then returned the case records to her.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Atty. Liberato R. Ibadlit, was SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON:
A lawyer owes entire devotion in protecting the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the defense of his rights. He
must use all his learning and ability to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in
accordance with the law. He must present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law in support of his
client's cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should
not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge or the general public.
A lawyer has no authority to waive his client's right to appeal. His failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed
period constitutes negligence and malpractice proscribed by Rule 18.03, Canon 18, of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable."
142. ERNESTO M. RAMOS vs. ATTY. MARIANO A. DAJOYAG, JR.
A.C. No. 5174, February 28, 2002
FACTS:
Ernesto M. Ramos was terminated from work for failure of his lawyer, Atty. Mariano Dajoyag, to file on time the
petition for certiorari, when the Supreme Court dismissed it with finality. Atty. Dajoyag moved for an extension to
file which was granted but the Resolution granting the 1st extension contained a warning that no further extension
would be given. Atty. Dajoyag, on the other hand, explained that he was not aware of this because when he filed his
motion for last extension for only 20 days, he had not yet received the copy of said resolution. He further explained
that he relied on good faith that his Motion for 1st Extension of 30 days would be granted without the warning as this
was only a first extension; and also that he requested for a second and last extension of 20 days for which he complied
with the filing of the Petition for Certiorari on the last day of the supposed extended period.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Atty. Mariano A. Dajoyag, Jr. was REPRIMANDED and admonished henceforth to exercise greater care and
diligence in the performance of his duties towards his clients and the courts and warned that repetition of the same or
similar offense will be more severely dealt with.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON:
Atty. Ramos is guilty of negligence. Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: A lawyer shall
not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting
the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so ". Motions for extension are not granted as a matter of
right but in the sound discretion of the court, and lawyers should never presume that their motions for extension or
postponement will be granted or that they will be granted the length of time they pray for. Due diligence requires that
they should conduct a timely inquiry with the division clerks of court of the action on their motions and, the lack of
notice thereof will not make them any less accountable for their omission.
143. Emilia R. Hernandez vs. Atty. Venancio B. Padilla
AC No 9387 June 20, 2012
FACTS:
The complainant and her husband were respondents in an ejectment case filed against them with the RTC of Manila.
The Judge of the RTC ordered that a Deed of Sale executed in favor of the complainant be cancelled and that they
pay Elisa Duigan damages. A Notice of Appeal was filed with the CA and they were ordered by the CA to file their
Appellant’s Brief. Atty. Venancio, their chosen lawyer, filed a Memorandum of Appeal instead of an Appellant’s
Brief. Thus, the Elisa Duigan filed a Motion to Dismiss the Appeal which the CA granted. Atty. Venancio failed to
inform his clients of the decision by their lawyer despite asking “several times” about the status of the appeal. No
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dismissing the appeal by Atty. Venancio so the resolution became final
and executory. They were only informed when the Sheriff of the RTC came to their house and informed them of the
Resolution. Complainant claims that Respondent ignored the Resolution acting with “deceit, unfaithfulness
amounting to malpractice of the law”
An investigation by the IBP was conducted and the, respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of complainant
and that he had never met her, only her husband who personally transacted with him. According to respondent, the
husband "despondently pleaded to me to prepare a Memorandum on Appeal because according to him the period
given by the CA was to lapse within two or three days." Thus, respondent claims that he filed a Memorandum on
Appeal because he honestly believed that "it is this pleading which was required."
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Atty. Venancio Padilla is suspended for six (6) months.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON:
Rule 18.02 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. If
respondent lawyer felt he did not have enough time to study the pertinent matters involved, as he was approached by
complainant's husband only two days before the expiration of the period for filing the Appellant's Brief, respondent
should have filed a motion for extension of time to file the proper pleading.
Moreover, respondent does not deny that he was given notice of the fact that he filed the wrong pleading. However,
instead of explaining his side by filing a comment, as ordered by the appellate court, he chose to ignore the CA's
Order. He claims that he was under the presumption that complainant and her husband had already settled the case,
First of all, there were several remedies that respondent could have availed himself of, from the moment he received
the Notice from the CA to the moment he received the disbarment Complaint filed against him. Second, respondent,
as counsel, had the duty to inform his clients of the status of their case. His failure to do so amounted to a violation
of Rule 18.04 of the Code.
If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent could have done was to inform
the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus explained why he was no
longer the counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and informed the court that he could no longer contact
them. 28 His failure to take this measure proves his negligence.
Lastly, the failure of respondent to file the proper pleading and a comment on Duigan's Motion to Dismiss is
negligence on his part. Under 18.03 of the Code, a lawyer is liable for negligence in handling the client's case.
Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence in fulfilling their duty would
render them liable for disciplinary action.
144. PEOPLE VS. INGCO
G.R. No. L-32994 October 29, 1971
FACTS:
Alfredo R. Barrios, a member of the Philippine Bar, who was appointed counsel de oficio for the accused in this case,
Gaudencio Ingco, sentenced to death on September 28, 1970 for the crime of rape with homicide, was required in a
resolution of this Court on September 9, 1971 to show cause within ten days why disciplinary action should not be
taken against him for having filed fifteen days late a motion for the extension of time for submitting the brief for
appellant Ingco. The explanation came in a manifestation of September 16, 1971. It was therein stated that respondent
"was then busy with the preparation of the brief of one Benjamin Apelo pending in the Court of Appeals; that while
he had made studies in preparation for the brief in this case, during such period he had to appear before courts in
Manila, Quezon City, Pasay City, Bulacan and Pampanga; and that likewise he did file, on July 27, 1971, motions
for extension in the aforesaid case of Benjamin Apelo with the Court of Appeals, which motions were duly granted.
He would impress on this Court then that he was misled into assuming that he had also likewise taken the necessary
steps to file a motion for extension of time for the submission of his brief in this case by the receipt of the resolution
from the Court of Appeals granting him such extension.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Atty. Alfredo R. Barrios is severely reprimanded.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON:
By his own confession, he was woefully negligent. Considering that the accused is fighting for his life, the least that
could be expected of a counsel de oficio is awareness of the period within which he was required to file appellant's
brief. The mere fact that according to him his practice was extensive, requiring his appearance in courts in Manila
and environs as well as the provinces of Bulacan and Pampanga, should not have lessened that degree of care
necessary for the fulfillment of his responsibility. What is worse is that by sheer inattention, he would confuse the
proceedings in a matter pending before the Court of Appeals with this present case. Such grave neglect of duty is
deserving of severe condemnation. It is clearly unworthy of membership in the Bar which requires dedication and
zeal in the defense of his client's rights, a duty even more exacting when one is counsel de oficio. On such an occasion,
the honor and respect to which the legal profession is entitled demand the strictest accountability of one called upon
to defend an impoverished litigant. He who falls in his obligation then has manifested a diminished capacity to be
enrolled in its ranks.
145. Barbuco vs. Beltran
A.C. No. 5092. August 11, 2004
Facts:
Complainant filed an administrative case against respondent Beltran for malpractice of law. Complainant, through
her son, Benito B. Sy, engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of filing an appeal before the Court of
Appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, which adverse to the complainant’s interest. On the
same day, complainant, through Benito B. Sy, gave respondent the total sum of P3,500.00 for payment of the docket
fees. However, the appeal was dismissed by the CA for failure to file Appellant's brief. The brief was only filed by
respondent 43 days after the deadline of submission of the same. When asked to comment, respondent tried to evade
liability by alleging that he met a vehicular accident, which incapacitated him for several days, thus he cannot finish
the appellants brief. Moreover, he sustained injuries in the head, which as a result respondent lost track of schedules
of
hearings
and
deadlines
for
submitting
briefs.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Atty. Raymundo N. Beltran is found guilty of negligence and malpractice and is suspended from the practice of law
for
a
period
of
six
(6)
months
effective
immediately.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON:
The SC enunciated that "Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers states: A lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. An
attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. Failure to file
brief within the reglementary period certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay of forty three
(43)
days
resulted
in
the
dismissal
of
the
appeal.
The fact that respondent was involved in a vehicular accident and suffered physical injuries as a result thereof cannot
serve to excuse him from filing his pleadings on time considering that he was a member of a law firm composed of
not just one lawyer. This is shown by the receipt he issued to complainant and the pleadings which he signed for and
on behalf of the Beltran, Beltran and Beltran Law Office. As such, respondent could have asked any of his partners
in the law office to file the Appellant’s Brief for him or, at least, to file a Motion for Extension of Time to file the
said
pleading.
Moreover, every member of the Bar should always bear in mind that every case that a lawyer accepts deserves his
full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. A lawyer’s fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful of the responsibilities that should
be expected of him. He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect the interest of his client within the bounds of
the law. The Code of Professional Responsibility dictates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence and he should not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. "
146. LEGARDA VS CA
G.R. No. 94457 June 10, 1992
FACTS:
Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the owner of a parcel of land and the improvements located at On January 11, 1985
respondent New Cathay House, Inc. filed a complaint against the petitioner for specific performance
with preliminary injunction and damages in RTC alleging that petitioner entered into a lease agreement with the
private respondent through its representative, Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., of the foretasted property of petitioner.
Respondent drew up the written contract and sent it to petitioner, that petitioner failed and refused to execute and
sign the same despite demands of respondent. Petitioner engaged the services of counsel to handle her case. Said
counsel filed his appearance with an urgent motion for extension of time to file the answer within ten (10) days from
February 26, 1985. However, said counsel failed to file the answer within the extended period prayed for. Counsel
for private respondent filed an ex-parte motion to declare petitioner in default. This was granted by the trial court on
March 25, 1985 and private respondent was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.
Thereafter, on March 25, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision, the said counsel for petitioner received a copy of
the judgment but took no steps to have the same set aside or to appeal therefrom. Thus, the judgment became final
and executory. The property of petitioner was sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment in favor of private
respondent. The property was sold to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr., representative of private respondent, and a certificate
of sale was issued in his favor. The redemption period expired after one year so a final deed of sale was issued by
the sheriff in favor of Cabrera, During all the time, the petitioner was abroad. When, upon her return, she learned, to
her great shock, what happened to her case and property, she nevertheless did not lose faith in her counsel. She still
asked Atty. Coronel to take such appropriate action possible under the circumstances. As above related, said counsel
filed a petition for annulment of judgment and its amendment in the Court of Appeals. But that was all he did. After
an adverse judgment was rendered against petitioner, of which counsel was duly notified, said counsel did not inform
the petitioner about it. He did not even ask for a reconsideration thereof, or file a petition for review before this Court.
Thus, the judgment became final. It was only upon repeated telephone inquiries of petitioner that she learned from
the secretary of her counsel of the judgment that had unfortunately become final.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Atty. Antonio P. Coronel is hereby found guilty of gross negligence and is suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this resolution.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON:
A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and defense of his
rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his
client except in accordance with the law. He should present every remedy or defense authorized by the law in support
of his client’s cause, regardless of his own personal views. In the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer
should not be afraid of the possibility that he may displease the judge or the general public.
147. SUAREZ VS. CA
G.R. No. 91133. March 22, 1993.
FACTS:
The petitioner was charged in with a criminal case. At the trial of the cases, petitioner did not appear in court despite
notices sent to her residence as appearing on the record and to her bondsmen. Her counsel de parte, Atty. Vicente San
Luis appeared in her behalf during the time the prosecution was presenting its evidence up to October 20, 1987 when
it was the turn of the defense to present its evidence. However, the hearing on said date was postponed because of
the absence of the private prosecutor and the continuation of the hearing was reset to November 19, 1987. On said
date, Atty. Buen Zamar entered a special appearance for Atty. San Luis as counsel for the accused without, however,
the consent of petitioner. From said date Atty. San Luis Did not appear in court as he had left for the United States
of America and has not returned since then, without informing petitioner or withdrawing his appearance.
On May 17, 1988, the trial court issued a notice in Criminal Case No. 7650 setting the promulgation of its decision
on May 13, 1988 and said notice was sent by registered mail to Atty. San Luis and the petitioner's bondsmen and
served by personal service by the court's process server at her address of record upon her mother who informed the
process server that petitioner had been out of the country for almost two years already. Her mother did not forward
the notice to petitioner.
For the promulgation of judgment, the trial court appointed Atty. Augusto Panlilio as counsel de oficio to represent
the absent petitioner. The judgment of conviction of petitioner was promulgated by the reading of the decision in
open court by the Branch Clerk of Court and furnishing the parties through their respective counsel present in court
with copies of the decision.
On December 31, 1988, petitioner was arrested and detained in the local jail of Angeles City.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The trial court is hereby DIRECTED to reopen Criminal Cases No. 7284-7296, 7302-7303, and 7650 for the
reception of evidence for the defense.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON:
A lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client. He owes his client full devotion to his genuine interests,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability. A lawyer
is required to exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill having reference to the character
of the business he undertakes to do Among his duties to his client is attending to the hearings of the case.
A client may reasonably expect that his counsel will make good his representations) and has the right to expect that
his lawyer will protect his interests during the trial of his case. For the general employment of an attorney to prosecute
or defend a cause or proceeding ordinarily vests in a plaintiffs attorney the implied authority to take all steps or do
all acts necessary or incidental to the regular and orderly prosecution or management of the suit, and in a defendant's
attorney the power to take such steps as he deems necessary to defend the suit and protect the interests of the defendant
Petitioner, therefore, had the right to expect that her counsel de parte, Atty. San Luis, would protect her interests
during the trial of the cases. However, as aforestated, Atty. San Luis failed to discharged his duties as counsel for
petitioner.
148. ALEX ONG vs. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO
Adm. Case No. 2417. February 6, 2002
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Alex Ong against Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, for malpractice of law and conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer. It is evident from the records that he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his
letter-demand by threatening to file various charges against the latter. When the complainant did not heed his warning,
he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative cases against the complainant. They,
however, did not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client, The records show that the respondent
offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide him any information against the complainant just so he would
have leverage in his actions against the latter.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Atty. Elpidio D. Unto is hereby declared guilty of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. He is suspended from the practice
of law for a period of five (5) months and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON:
The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It mandates lawyers to
represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule 19.01 further commands that “a lawyer shall
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate or
threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.”
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and
nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity. Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that
would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
149. TRINIDAD, ET.AL. vs. ATTY. ANGELITO VILLARIN
A.C. No. 9310 February 27, 2013
FACTS:
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint for specific performance filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) by the buyers of the lots in Don Jose Zavalla Subdivision against the subdivision's owner and
developer- Purence Realty Corporation and Roberto Bassig. The HLURB ordered the owner and the developer to
deliver the Deeds of Sale and the Transfer Certificates of Title to the winning litigants.
The Decision did not show any directive for the buyers to vacate the property. Purence Realty and Roberto Bassig
did not appeal the Decision, thus making it final and executory. Thereafter, the HLURB issued a Writ of Execution.
It was at this point that respondent Villarin entered his special appearance to represent Purence Realty. Specifically,
he filed an Omnibus Motion to set aside the Decision and to quash the Writ of Execution for being null and void on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction due to the improper service of summons on his client. This motion was not acted
upon by the HLURB. Respondent sent demand letters to herein complainants.
In all of these letters, he demanded that they immediately vacate the property and surrender it to Purence Realty
within five days from receipt. Otherwise, he would file the necessary action against them. True enough, Purence
Realty, as represented by respondent, filed a Complaint for forcible entry before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
against Trinidad, Lander, Casubuan and Mendoza.
Aggrieved, the four complainants filed an administrative case against respondent. A month after, Alojado, Villamin
and Tolentino filed a disbarment case against respondent. As found by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
and affirmed by its Board of Governors, complainants asserted in their respective verified Complaints that the demand
letters sent by Villarin had been issued with malice and intent to harass them. They insisted that the letters also
contravened the HLURB Decision ordering his client to permit the buyers to pay the balance of the purchase price of
the subdivision lots.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
Atty. Angelito Villarin is reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON:
The respondent’s action is clearly proscribed by Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states
that:
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall
not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper
advantage in any case or proceeding.
The rule requires that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives. Lawyers must not
present and offer in evidence any document that they know is false like in the case at bar.
150. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. CA
G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990
FACTS:
Petitioner Metrobank filed a petition for review on certiorari after the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner should
pay the certain amount based on the charging lien on the civil case filed against them which resulted to dismissal. In
the dismissed case, private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney’s fees, based on quantum meruit, which
precipitated an exchange of arguments between the parties. Petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private
respondent, Arturo Alafriz and Associates. Private respondent countered and attempted to arrange a compromise with
petitioner in order to avoid suit, but the negotiations were unsuccessful.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The instant petition for review is hereby granted and the decision of respondent court of appeals of February 11, 1988
affirming the order of the trial court is hereby reversed and set aside, without prejudice to such appropriate
proceedings as may be brought by private respondent to establish its right to attorney's fees and the amount thereof.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON:
A charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney’s fees, requires as a condition sine qua
non a judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney
in favor of his client. In the case at bar, the civil cases were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs “in view of
the full satisfaction of their claims.” This being so, private respondent’s supposed charging lien is without any legal
basis.
CANON 20
151: A.C. No. 528 – ANGEL ALBANO v. ATTY. PERPETUA COLOMA (Oct. 11, 1967)
FACTS:
Petitioner Albano alleged that during the Japanese occupation, he and his mother retained the services of Atty.
Coloma as counsel as plaintiffs in a civil case. Albano alleged that Atty. Coloma failed to expedite the hearing and
termination of the case, as a result of which they had themselves represented by another lawyer. Complainant claimed
that they were surprised when Atty. Coloma collect her attorney’s fees by presenting a document, which states an
agreement that they will pay respondent 1/3 of whatever could be recovered in land or damages. Complainant claimed
that said document was falsified and that Atty. Coloma is a very influential woman in the Ilocos Norte as she was
then a member of the provincial Board.
Respondent denies the petitioner’s allegation. She claimed that with the assistance of her sister Atty. Olivia Coloma,
they obtained a favorable judgment for the petitioner and his co-plaintiffs in the civil case. She was dismissed as
counsel by the petitioner in the civil case after she had won the case in the Trial Court and Court of Appeals. She
claimed that the agreement was signed by the petitioner and his mother in the presence of attesting witnesses and the
genuineness of the agreement was already proven in the trial court and Court of Appeals.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the charge against respondent Perpetua Coloma, member of the Philippine Bar, is hereby dismissed.
DOCTRINE:
Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With his capital
consisting solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure
of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt of the part of a client
to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is him to secure justice for the party
he represents, he himself would not get his due. Such an eventuality this Court is determined to avoid. It views with
disapproval any and every effort to those benefited by counsel’s services to deprive him of his hard-earned
honorarium. Such an attitude deserves condemnation.
152: GR No. L-40424 – R. MARINO CORPUS vs. COURT OF APPEALS & JUAN T. DAVID (June 30,
1980)
FACTS:
Petitioner Corpus engage the services of private respondent David after his petition for certiorari, mandamus and quo
warranto with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages against Miguel Cuaderno Sr, the Central Bank and
Mario Marcos, was dismissed for failure to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him. Petitioner was
dismissed from his office as director of Central Bank Export Department. Petitioner was reinstated and his backwages
was also paid. Respondent is now claiming for the 50% of the amount actually received by the petitioner.
Petitioner Corpus contends that Respondent David is not entitled to attorney’s fees because there was no contract to
that effect. On the other hand, respondent David contends that the absence of a formal contract for the payment of
attorney’s fees will not negate the payment thereof because the contract may be express or implied, and there was an
implied understanding between the petitioner and private respondent that the former will pay the latter attorney’s fees
when a final decision shall have been rendered in favor of the petitioner reinstating him to his former position in the
Central Bank and paying his back salaries
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, petitioner R. Marino Corpus is hereby directed to pay respondent Atty. Juan T. David the sum of
Php20,000.00 as attorney’s fees
DOCTRINE
Contingent fees depend on an express contract. Thus, “an attorney is not entitled to a percentage of the amount
recovered by his client in the absence of an express contract to that effect”
Moreover, the payment of attorney’s fees to respondent David may also be justified by virtue of innominate contract
facio ut des (I do and you give) which is based on the principle that “no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another”
CASE No. 153: GR No. 109219 – SUSANITA E. MENDOZA-PARKER vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
RODOLFO TAN NG and TERESITA RIOSA
FACTS:
Private respondents Rodolfo Tan Ng and Teresita Riosa has a pending case for collection of sum of money with
foreclosure of real estate mortgage against Demetrio Alcaras and Julieta Alcaras, which the petitioner took over as
counsel after the termination of the pre-trial. There was no full blown trial held for the defendants in said civil case
admitted their indebtedness.
Petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted in favor of the private respondents. Defendants
in said case filed a petition for relief from judgment and while the case was pending, petitioner withdraw her
appearance with a prayer for the payment of her attorney’s fees. Petitioner demands from the private respondent 15%
of the total monetary award granted by the trial court as her contingent fees. The petitioner’s motion was approved
by the trial court which was modified by the Court of Appeals and fixed petitioner’s attorney’s fees in the amount of
30,000.00 in addition to the award of 10,000.00 in the summary judgment.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied.
DOCTRINE
In the absence of an agreement as to the amount of the attorney’s fees, the courts are authorized to determine the
amount to be paid to an attorney as reasonable compensation for his professional services. Even where the parties
have agreed as to the amount of the attorney’s fees, the courts have the power to disregard the contract if the amount
fixed is unreasonable. A lawyer, being an officer of the court, is placed under judicial control with regard to the
reasonableness of the amount of the attorney’s fees demanded by him from his client.
The determination of the attorney’s fees depends on various factors like: the amount and the character of the services
rendered; the responsibility imposed; the amount of money or the value of the property involved in the controversy;
the skill and experience called for the performance of the services; the professional standing of the attorney; the result
secured; and whether or not the payment of the fees is contingents or absolute.
153. RESEARCH and SERVICES REALTY, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MANUEL FONACIER
JR.,
FACTS:
Petitioner, after filing its Answer, engaged the services of the private respondent Atty. Manuel Fonacier Jr., in an
action for rescission of the Joint Venture Agreement instituted by Jose, Fidel and Antonia Carreon, wherein the
petitioner is one of the parties. Under said Agreement, petitioner will develop, subdivide, administer and promote the
sale of the parcels of land owned by the Carreons.
In 1992, the petitioner, without the knowledge of the private respondent, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
with another land developer assigning its rights and obligations under the Joint Venture Agreement. In 1993, the
petitioner terminated the services of the private respondent. Upon knowing the existence of the MOA, the private
respondent filed an urgent motion for the payment of his attorney’s fees. The trial court then granted the said motion
and ordered the petitioner to pay private respondent the amount of 600,000.00 as attorney’s fees on the basis of
quantum meruit which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. The challenged decision of 31 March 1995 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 44839 and the Order of 11 October 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 64, in
Civil Case No. 612 are hereby set aside. The trial court is further, directed to set for further hearing the private
respondent’s Urgent Motion to Direct Payment of Attorney’s Fees and/or Register Attorney’s Charging Lien and
thereafter to fix the private respondent’s attorney’s fees in Civil Case No. 612 as of 31 March 1993 when his contract
with the petitioner was effectively terminated, taking into account Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; Rule
21.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and the jurisprudentially established guiding principles
in determining attorney’s fees on quantum meruit basis.
DOCTRINE
Quantum meruit simply means “as much as he deserves.” In no case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover
more than what is reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. – An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover
from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the
subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the
attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as ti the proper
compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge.
A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable.
This Court had earlier declared the following as circumstances to be considered in determining the reasonableness of
a claim for attorney’s fees: (1) the amount and character of the services rendered; (2) labor, time and trouble involved;
(3) the nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered; (4) the responsibility
imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy or involved in the
employment; (6) the skill and experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the professional character
and social standing of the attorney; (8) the results secured; and (9) whether the fee is absolute or contingent, it being
recognized that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent when it is not.
155: A.C. No. 5534 – JAYNE YU vs. RENATO LAZARO BONDAL (January 17, 2005)
FACTS:
Complainant Jayne Yu engaged the services of the respondent Renato Lazaro Bondal in one civil case and four
criminal cases. They executed a retainer agreement wherein the complainant agreed to pay the respondent the amount
of 200,000 as acceptance fee for the 5 cases, 1500 as appearance fee per hearing and 10% as success fee in the event
that damages are recovered.
Complainant alleged that despite her advance payment to the respondent, the latter failed to file the civil case against
Swire Realty and Development Corporation. Also due to respondent’s negligence, two of the criminal cases were
dismissed while complainant was forced to settle the other two criminal cases. Complainant by letter then demanded
the private respondent to return all the records she entrusted to him as well as the refund of the 51,716.54.
Complainant then charged respondent for gross negligence and violation of Canon 16 and Rule 16.03 of the CPR
arising from his alleged failure to attend to the 5 cases she referred to him and to return, despite demand the amount
of 51,716.54. Respondent failed to file his answer to the allegation.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the complaint is hereby dismissed. Respondent is however, hereby directed to return all the records
in his possession relative to the cases he handled for complainant.
DOCTRINE
An acceptance fee is not a contingent fee, but is an absolute fee arrangement which entitles a lawyer to get paid for
his efforts regardless of the outcome of the litigation. That complainant was dissatisfied with the outcome of the four
cases does not render void the above retainer agreement for respondent appears to have represented the interest of
complainant. Litigants need to be reminded that lawyers are not demi-gods or magicians who can always win their
cases for their clients no matter the utter lack of merit of the same of how passionate the litigants may feel about their
cause
156: GR No. 120592 – TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION – INDEPENDENT vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and EMMANUEL NOEL A. CRUZ
FACTS:
Petitioner Traders Royal Bank Employees Union and private respondent Atty. Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz, entered into
a retainer agreement whereby the former obligated itself to pay the latter a monthly retainer fee in consideration of
the law firm’s undertaking to render the services enumerated in their contract. The agreement was terminated by the
union in 1990. Prior to the termination, respondent represented the union members in a labor complaint for holiday,
mid-year and year-end bonuses against their employer. The NLRC rendered a decision in favor of the union members
which was modified by the Supreme Court by deleting the award of mid-year and year-end bonus differentials while
affirming the award of holiday pay differential.
Thereafter, private respondent filed a motion before LA Lorenzo for the determination of his attorney’s fees. The
said motion was granted and petitioner was ordered to pay private respondent the amount of 17,574.43 as his
attorney’s fees. Petitioner contends that all attorney’s fees due to the private respondent were covered by the retainer
fee which it has been regularly paying to the private respondent under their retainer agreement.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the impugned resolution of the NLRC affirming the order of the labor arbiter is modified, and
petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the amount of Php10,000.00 as attorney’s fees to private respondent for the latter’s
legal services rendered to the former.
DOCTRINE
A general retainer or retaining fee, is the fee paid to a lawyer to secure his future services as general counsel for any
ordinary legal problem that may arise in the routinary business of the client and referred to him for legal action. The
future services of the lawyer are secured and committed to the retaining client. For this, the client pays the lawyer a
fixed retainer fee which could be monthly or otherwise, depending upon their arrangement. The fees are paid whether
or not there are cases referred to the lawyer. The reason for the remuneration is that the lawyer is deprived of the
opportunity of rendering services for a fee to the opposing party or other parties. In fine, it is a compensation for lost
opportunities.
A Special retainer is a fee for a specific case handled or special service rendered by the lawyer for a client. A client
may have several cases demanding special or individual attention. If for every case there is a separate and independent
contract for attorney’s fees, each fee is considered a special retainer.
Article 111 of the Labor Code regulates the amount recoverable as attorney’s fees in the nature of damages sustained
by nd awarded to the prevailing party. It may not be used therefore, as the lone standard in fixing the exact amount
payable to the lawyer by his client for the legal services he rendered. Also while it limits the maximum amount of
attorneys fees, it does not direct the instantaneous and automatic award of attorney’s fees in such maximum limit.
The criteria found in the CPR are to be considered and not disregarded, in assessing the proper amount.
157: GR No. 73886 – JOHN QUIRANTE and DANTE CRUZ vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, MANUEL CASASOLA and ESTRELLITA CASASOLA (January 31, 1989)
FACTS:
Petitioner John Quirante is the counsel of the plaintiff Dr. Indalecio Casasola against Norman Guerrero and
PHILAMGEN, in a civil case for damages before the RTC of Manila. The RTC of Manila ruled in favor of the late
plaintiff by rescinding the contract between Casasola and Guerrero as well as ordering Guerrero and PHILAMGEN
to pay the plaintiff actual, moral, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. While an appeal was pending before the
Supreme Court, petitioner Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his attorney’s fees.
According to him, there was an oral agreement between petitioner Quirante and the late Dr. Casasola. The private
respondents Manuel Casasola and Estrillita Casasola filed their opposition, alleging that said motion for confirmation
of attorney’s fees is premature since the petition for certiorari filed by PHILAMGEN may or may not ultimately
result in the granting to the Casasola family of the total amount of damages.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing observation, the decision of the respondent Court subject of the present recourse
is hereby affirmed.
DOCTRINE
Well settled is the rule that counsel’s claim for attorney’s fees may be asserted ether in the very action in which the
services in question have been rendered or in a separate action. Since the main case from which the petitioner’s
claims for their fees may arise has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and the amount
thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure gains added validity in the light of the rule that the remedy for
recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the
client. Thus it was ruled that:
..an attorney’s fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject has
been recovered from which the fee is to be paid.
158: A.C. No. 6281 – VALENTIN MIRANDA vs. ATTY. MACARIO CARPIO (September 26, 2011)
FACTS:
Complainant Valentin Miranda engage the services of the respondent Atty. Macario Carpio in LRC Case for
registration of 1,890 square meters parcel of land, after her original counsel, met an accident. Complainant alleged
that she and respondent agreed that the former will pay the latter Php20,000.00 as acceptance fee and Php2,000.00
as appearance fee. During the last hearing, respondent demanded an additional amount of Php10,000.00 for the
preparation of a memorandum plus 20% of the total area of the subject property as additional fees for his services.
Complainant did not accede to respondent’s demand for it was contrary to their agreement.
The RTC rendered a decision granting the petition for registration. Complainant went to the RD of Las Pinas to get
the owner’s duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 only to be surprised that the said title had already been claimed and release
to respondent. Respondent refused to turn over the owner’s duplicate copy of the OCT despite repeated demands
from the complainant.
Respondent, in his defense, relied on his alleged retaining lien over the owner’s duplicate of OCT No. 0-95.
Respondent admitted that he did not return the owner’s duplicate because complainant despite repeated demands,
refuse to complete payment of his agreed professional fee consisting of the 20% of the total area of the property
covered by the title
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario Carpio is suspended from the practice of law for a period of 6 months, effective upon
receipt of this decision. He is ordered to return to the complainant the owner’s duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 immediately
upon receipt of this decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely
DOCTRINE
An attorney’s retaining lien is fully recognized if the presence of the following elements concur: (1) lawyer-client
relationship; (2) lawful possession of the client’s funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney’s
fees. Further, the attorney’s retaining lien is a general lien for the balance of the account between the attorney and his
client, and applies to the documents and funds of the client which may come into the attorney’s possession in the
course of his employment.
Canon 20 of the CPR, mandates that “a lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees”. It is highly improper for
a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon his client which were never mentioned nor agreed upon at the
time of the engagement of his services.
159: GR No. 191470 – AUGUSTO AQUINO vs. HON. ISMAEL CASABAR, as Presiding Judge Regional
Trial Court-Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 33 and MA. ALLA DOMINGO and MARGARITA IRENE
DOMINGO, substituting Heirs of the deceased ANGEL DOMINGO.
FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Augusto Aquino is the lawyer of the late Atty. Angel Domingo in Agrarian case on a contingency
basis. The case was for the determination of just compensation for the expropriation and taking of Atty. Domingo’s
ricelands by the DAR pursuant to PD 27. The DAR and the Land Bank of the Philippines initially valued Atty.
Domingo’s property at Php484,236.27 which the latter through petitioner, opposed in courts. The RTC, acting as
Special Agrarian Court (RTC/SAC) issued a decision fixing the just compensation at Php2,459,39.70 which has
become final and executor after the Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review on Certiorari and Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the Land Bank.
Private respondents Alla and Margarita Domingo hired a new lawyer for the execution of the RTC/SAC Decision.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Approval of Charging Attorney’s Lien and for the Order of Payment which was denied
by the public respondent Judge Casabar. Petitioner maintains that he filed the motion for charging attorney’s lien and
order of payment in the very same case, as an incident thereof, wherein he was the counsel during the proceedings of
the latter, and he is allowed to wait until the finality of the case to file the said motion. Private respondent, on the
other hand, counter that the motion was belatedly filed and that it was filed without payment of docket fees, thus, the
court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. Accordingly, the Courts grants the Motion for Approval of Charging
Attorney’s Lien filed by petitioner Atty. Augusto M. Aquino. Based on quantum meruit, the amount of attorney’s
fees is at the rate of fifteen percent (15%) of the amount of the increase in valuation of just compensation awarded to
the private respondent
DOCTRINE
Quantum meruit – literally meaning as much as he deserves – is used as basis for determining an attorney’s
professional fees in the absence of an express agreement. The recovery of Attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum
meruit is a device that prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal services of
counsel without paying for it and also avoids unjust enrichment of the part of attorney himself. An attorney must
show that he is entitled to reasonable compensation for the effort in pursuing the client’s cause, taking into account
certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.
The fact that practice of law is not a business and the attorney plays a vital role in the administration of justice
underscores the need to secure him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and
respectability of the legal profession. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice, imposition
or fraud on the part of his client a the client against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone
to see that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner, it is also its duy to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With
his capital consisting his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure
of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client
to escape payment of his just compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure justice
for his client he himself would not get his due.
160: GR No. 105938 – TEODORO REGALA et al., vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
GOOD GOVERNMENT and RAUL ROCO
FACTS:
Petitioners were all member of the ACCRA Law Firm in which they performed legal services for its clients, which
included, among others, the organization and acquisition of business association of business associations and/or
organizations, with the correlative and incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as
stockholders. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the law firm acquire information
relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and business circumstances.
Respondent PCGG filed a case against the Petitioners before Sandiganbayan. In their original complaint, respondent
Raul Roco is one of the defendants. Petitioners and respondent Roco admit that they assisted in the organization and
acquisition of the companies included in Civil Case No. 0033, in which they are included as defendants. PCGG then
excluded respondent Roco in the said complaint after he undertake that he will reveal the identity of the principal/s
for whom he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies involved in said case.
Petitioners then filed their Comment and/or Opposition with counter-motion that respondent PCGG similarly grants
the same treatment to them as accorded to private respondent Roco. Respondent PCGG set the following conditions
precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, (a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients; (b) submission of documents
substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and (c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed
in favor of its clients covering their respective shareholdings. Respondent Sandiganbayan denied the exclusion of
petitioners in PCGG Case No. 33 for their refusal to comply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG
Petitioners argue that they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn mandate and
fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all times the confidentially of information obtained during such lawyer-client
relationship. Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners’ contention, alleging that the revelation of
the identity of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents
it required protected, because they are evidence of nominee status.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated
on March 18, 1992 and May 21, 1992 are hereby annulled and set aside. Respondent Sandiganbayan is further ordered
to exclude petitioners Regala, Angara, Cruz, Concepcion, Lazatin, Escueta and Hayuduni as parties-defendants in SB
Civil Case No. 0033 entitled “Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., et al.
DOCTRINE
An attorney cannot, without consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him,
or his advice given thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, can attorney’s secretary,
stenographer or clerk be examined, without the consent of client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge
of which has been acquired in such capacity.
As a matter of public policy, a client’s identity should not be shrouded in mystery. The general rule in our jurisdiction
is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the name or identity of his client: (1) the court has
the right to know the client whose privileged information is sought to be protected is flesh and blood; (2) the privilege
begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been established. The attorney-client privilege does not
attach until there is a client; (3) the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship. Finally, due
process consideration requires that the opposing party should, as a general rule, know his adversary. “A party suing
or sued is entitled to know his opponent is.” He cannot be obliged to grope in dark against unknown forces”
Exception:
1. Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate
the client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
2. Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; ; his identity is privileged.
3. Where the governments’ lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client unless, by revealing the client’s
name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict
an individual of a crime, the client’s name is privileged.
161. Hilado v. David
G.R. No. L-961
September 21, 1949
FACTS:
Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled against Assad. Attorney Delgado
Dizon represented Hilado. Assad was represented by a certain Atty. Ohnick. Atty. Vicente Francisco replaced Atty.
Ohnick as counsel for Assad. Four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a motion to have Atty. Francisco be disqualified
because Atty. Dizon found out that Hilado approached Atty. Francisco to ask for additional legal opinion regarding
her case and for which Atty. Francisco sent Hilado a legal opinion letter.
Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his disqualification. In his opposition, he said that no material
information was relayed to him by Hilado. Atty. Francisco also pointed out that he was not paid for his advice; that
no confidential information was relayed because all Hilado brought was a copy of the Complaint which was already
filed in court.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification should be allowed. It is so ordered, without costs.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
An attorney is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when he
is listening to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when
he is drawing his client's pleadings, or advocating his client's cause in open court.
162. Uy Chico v. Union life
G.R. No. L-9231
January 6, 1915
FACTS:
The plaintiff seeks to recover the face value of two insurance policies upon a stock of dry goods destroyed
by fire on the business under his father’s name, Uy Layco. At the time of the fire "Uy Layco" was heavily indebted
and subsequent thereto the creditors of the estate of the plaintiff's father. During the course of these proceedings, the
plaintiff's attorney surrendered the policies of insurance to the administrator of the estate, who compromised with the
insurance company for one-half their face value . Uy Chico now brings this action and alleges that he is not bound
by the compromise effected by the administrator of his father’s estate. Nevertheless, plaintiff was asked by the court
if he had any objection to his attorney’s testifying concerning the surrendering of the policies. Plaintiff replied in the
negative. Counsel was then called for that purpose. Whereupon, counsel for the plaintiff formally withdrew the waiver
previously given by the plaintiff and objected to the testimony of the attorney on the ground that it was privileged.
Counsel, on this appeal, base their argument of the proposition that a waiver of the client's privilege may be withdrawn
at any time before acted upon.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
A lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the confidence and preserve the secrets of his client. He shall not
be permitted in any court, without the consent of his client, given in open court, to testify to any facts imparted to
him by his client in professional consultation, or for the purpose of obtaining advice upon legal matters.
XPN: A communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated
to a third person is essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation. It is plain that such a communication, after
reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a communication between the client and a third person, and
that the attorney simply occupies the role of intermediary or agent.
163. Mercadol v. Vitriolo
A.C. NO. 5108 : May 26, 2005]
FACTS:
Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for complainant in the annulment case which was dismissed.
After some time, respondent filed a criminal action against complainant for falsification of public document.
Respondent alleged that complainant made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children. More
specifically, complainant allegedly indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain
Fernandez, when in truth, she is legally married to Ruben G.Mercado. Complainant denied the accusations of
respondent against her. Complainant Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint disclosed confidential facts and
information relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled by respondent Vitriolo as her counsel. She claims
that, in filing the criminal case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential
lawyer-client relationship, and should be disbarred. Case dismissed for failure to substantiate complainant's
allegations
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the complaint against respondent Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
Legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, the
communications relating to that purpose, made in confidence by the client, are at his instance permanently protected
from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, except the protection be waived.
164. PALM v ATTY. FELIPE ILEDAN, JR.
A.C. No. 8242
October 2, 2009
FACTS:
Complainant is the President of Comtech while respondent served as Comtech’s retained corporate counsel.
Complainant personally met with respondent to review corporate matters, including potential amendments to the
corporate by-laws. However, complainant became uncomfortable with the close relationship between respondent and
Soledad a former officer and director of Comtech, who resigned and who was suspected of releasing unauthorized
disbursements of corporate funds. Thus, Comtech decided to terminate its retainer agreement with respondent.
Comtech filed a complaint for Estafa against Soledad and respondent appeared as Soledad’s counsel. Thus,
complainant filed a Complaint for disbarment against respondent. Respondent alleged that neither Soledad nor Palm
consulted him on confidential or privileged matter concerning the operations of the corporation. Respondent further
alleged that he had no access to any record of Comtech and admitted that, complainant met with him regarding the
procedure in amending the corporate by-laws to allow board members outside the Philippines to participate in board
meetings.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. for lack of merit.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The
client must intend the communication to be confidential.
165. VENTEREZ v COSME
A. C. No. 7421
October 10, 2007
FACTS:
Venterez filed a complaint against respondent Atty. Rodrigo R. Cosme, charging the latter with
Abandonment, Gross Negligence and Dereliction of Duty.
Respondent represented the complainants, who were defendants in a case for Declaration of Ownership with
Damages. The MTC ruled against the complainants. Complainants alleged that they directed the respondent to either
file a Motion for Reconsideration or a Notice of Appeal, but respondent failed or refused to do so. Complainant was
constrained to contract another lawyer to prepare the Motion for Reconsideration which was filed beyond the
reglementary period. The MR was denied. A Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution was filed regarding the civil
case but respondent never bothered to file an opposition to or any comment on the said motion despite receipt thereof.
Two months after respondent received a copy of the Decision, the respondent filed his Notice of Retirement of
Counsel.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors approving and adopting the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, ATTY. RODRIGO R.
COSME is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar wrongdoing will be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client, but once he agrees to
take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory. A lawyer is not
at liberty to abandon his client and withdraw his services without reasonable cause and only upon notice appropriate
in the circumstances. Any dereliction of duty by a counsel affects the client. This means that his client is entitled to
the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law and he may expect his lawyer to assert
every such remedy or defense.
166. ARAMBULO v CA and ENGR. DANILO G. FERRERAS
G.R. No. 105818 September 17, 1993
FACTS:
Private respondent, as the contractor, filed an action against the petitioners-spouses to claim the balance of
the contract price and the increase in the construction cost due to additional scope of work done and increase in the
cost of materials for the construction of a 4-storey dormitory building.The petitioners were represented by Atty.
Jimenez, Jr. Trial court rendered a decision in favor of the private respondent.
The Arambulos, through Atty. Jimenez, filed their notice of appeal Atty. Jimenez filed a Withdrawal of
Appearance with the express conformity of the defendants, while Atty. Pineda entered his Appearance as their new
counsel. The notice to pay the docket and other fees was served not on their new counsel, Atty. Pineda, but on Atty.
Jimenez Consequently the CA promulgated a Resolution stating that For failure to pay the docket fee, the appeal is
hereby considered ABANDONED and DISMISSED. Private respondent contends that Atty. Pineda was the original
counsel for the petitioners and that he never formally withdrew as counsel even after Atty. Jimenez, who had not
made any "formal appearance," "took over the handling of the defense for and in behalf of defendants Arambulos
Atty. Pineda, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, Reinstatement of Appeal, and Acceptance of Docket Fee
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
Since the withdrawal was with the clients' consent, no approval thereof by the trial court was required because
a court approval is indispensable only if the withdrawal is without the client's consent. The retirement is completed
once the withdrawal is filed in court. No further action thereon by the court is needed other than the mechanical act
of the clerk of court of entering the name of the new counsel in the docket and of giving written notice thereof to the
adverse party.
167. ORCINO v. GASPAR
A.C. No. 3773 September 24, 1997
FACTS:
Complainant engaged the services of respondent to prosecute a criminal case she intended to file against
several suspects in the slaying of her husband. Upon payment of the legal fees, respondent entered into his duties.
Respondent however failed to attend the hearing scheduled and Complainant became belligerent and started accusing
him of jeopardizing the case by his absence. Respondent explained that he did not receive formal notice of the hearing.
Respondent filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel without the consent of the complainant. Complainant refused to
sign her conformity to respondent's withdrawal. Meanwhile, the hearings in the criminal case continued. Respondent
did not appear at the hearings nor did he contact complainant. Complainant was thus compelled to engage the services
of another lawyer.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is admonished to exercise more prudence and judiciousness in dealing
with his clients. He is also ordered to return to complainant within fifteen (15) days from notice the amount of ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) representing a portion of his legal fees received from the latter with a warning that
failure on his part to do so will result in the imposition of stiffer disciplinary action.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at
any time with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient
cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney
who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon
it without reasonable cause. A lawyer's right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from
the client's written consent or from a good cause.
168. LAPUT v. ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F. REMOTIGUE and ATTY. FORTUNATO P. PATALINGHUG
A.M. No. 219
September 29, 1962
FACTS:
Petitioner was retained by Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera to handle her case regarding the estate of her
deceased husband. Petitioner had contemplated the closing of the said administration proceedings and prepared two
pleadings however, the administratrix de Barrera refused to countersign these two pleadings and instead advised
petitioner not to file them. Some weeks later, petitioner found in the records of said proceedings that respondent Atty.
Fortunato Patalinghug and Atty. Francisco E. F. Remotigue had filed a written appearance as the new counsel for
Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera. On February 5, 1955 petitioner voluntarily asked the court to be relieved as counsel
for Mrs. Barrera.
Petitioner filed a complaint charging respondents with unprofessional and unethical conduct in soliciting
cases and intriguing against a brother lawyer. Mrs. Barrera dismissed petitioner as her lawyer because she did not
trust him any longer, for one time she found out that some dividend checks which should have been sent to her were
sent instead to petitioner, making her feel that she was being cheated by petitioner. Moreover, she found that
withdrawals from the Philippine National Bank and Bank of the Philippine Islands have been made by petitioner
without her prior authority.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
No sufficient evidence having been submitted to sustain the charges, these are hereby dismissed and the case
closed.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
Petitioner's voluntary withdrawal as counsel for Mrs. Barrera after Atty. Patalinghug had entered his
appearance, and his (petitioner's) filing almost simultaneously of a motion for the payment of his attorney's fees,
amounted to an acquiescence to the appearance of respondent Atty. Patalinghug as counsel for the widow. This should
estop petitioner from now complaining that the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug was unprofessional.
169 . Gonzaga v. Villanueva
A.C. No. 1954
July 23, 2004
FACTS:
Gonzaga authorized Atty Villanueva to represent them in the criminal case on the murder of their parents.
while they were preparing for the requiem mass two days after their parents were brutally murdered, the respondent
presented to the complainants a document in the church Trusting that the respondent, who was the counsel of their
parents in many cases, would be true to their agreement that he was to represent them in the criminal case only, the
complainants signed the document without scrutinizing it. But it turned out that the document contained respondent's
authority to also appear in the intestate proceedings. Complainants already engaged the services of Atty. Mirano to
file the petition for the administration and settlement of the intestate estate of their parents.
To avoid embarrassing the respondent after learning of the actual content of document, the complainants
executed a document giving the former authority to appear in the intestate case until they shall have been appointed
as co-administrators of the estate of their deceased parents. But, even after the appointment of the complainants as
co-administrators and the termination by them of respondent's services, the respondent continued to appear in the
intestate proceedings.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to SUSPEND respondent Atty. Eugenio V. Villanueva, Jr., from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months effective upon service on him of a copy of this Resolution, with a
WARNING that a repetition of the same acts subject of the complaint in this case or of similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
The relation of attorney-client may be terminated by (1) the act of the client; (2) the act of the attorney; (3)
the death of the client; (4) the death of the attorney; or (5) the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was created.
Ordinarily, the attorney-client relation is ended by the completion of the specific task for which the attorney was
employed.
Notably, the difference between the revocation of the authority by the act of the client and by the act of the
attorney is that the first may be done at any time with or without cause, whereas the second can be made only with
the client's written consent or for justified cause.
170. Municipal of Pililla , Rizal v CA
G.R. No. 105909 June 28, 1994
FACTS:
A judgment was rendered ordering Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC) to pay Municipality of Pililla
business taxes and other fees. Atty. Mendiola filed a motion for reconsideration,in behalf of the municipality,
claiming that the total liability of PPC to plaintiff municipality amounted to P24,176,599.00, while the amount
received by the Mayor was only P12,718,692.He asserted that the mayor could not waive the balance of the judgment
over which judgment the law firm of Atty. Mendiola had registered two liens for alleged consultancy services.His
authority was challenged by PPC before the CA. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for having been filed
by a private counsel in violation of law and jurisprudence, but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by
the Municipality of Pililla through the proper provincial or municipal legal officer.Atty Mendiola filed a petition
before the Supreme Court to assail the decision of the CA.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED for lack of merit and the judgment of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
The client has an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer. The lawyers'
right to fees from their clients may not be invoked by the lawyers themselves as a ground for disapproving or holding
in abeyance the approval of a compromise agreement. The lawyers concerned can enforce their rights in the proper
court in an appropriate proceeding in accordance with the Rules of Court, but said rights may not be used to prevent
the approval of the compromise agreement.
171. NACURAY V. NLRC
G.R. Nos. 114924-27
March 18, 1997
FACTS:
BMC-Benguet Management Corporation (BMC for short) employed petitioners as helpers. They were assigned at
the Finishing Section of BMC's Production Department and worked as "air-grinder operators."
Later, however, their services were terminated because according to BMC, their "performance during the contractual
period did not meet the company's standards." As a consequence, several complaints for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of wages and violation of P.D. No. 851 were filed against BMC.
The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of complainants, petitioners herein. Holding that they were "regular" employees
and not "casual" employees, BMC was ordered to reinstate them.
BMC appealed to the NLRC which subsequently rendered its judgment on reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
The motion of complainants for reconsideration was denied. The resolution of NLRC having become final and
executory, was entered in the Book of Entry of Judgments on 4 March 1994.
On 26 April 1994 complainants through their new counsel Atty. Eduardo Lopez, filed a special civil action
for certiorari before this Court.
The problem actually started on 17 December 1993. A day after the motion for reconsideration was denied by the
NLRC, Atty. Francisco Ferraren, the counsel who represented herein petitioners in the earlier proceedings before
they engaged the services of their new counsel, instituted a special civil action for certiorari before this Court.
On 24 January 1994, the Third Division dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by Atty. Ferraren.
Petitioners claim that they have no knowledge whatsover that a similar petition was filed by their counsel Atty.
Ferraren with this Court. According to them they came to know of it only when they received copy of the
Manifestation of respondent BMC. According to their undertaking, they immediately filed a Counter-Manifestation
informing the Court of the existence of a similar petition before this Court; that after the favorable resolution of the
Labor Arbiter was reversed by the NLRC, petitioners terminated the services of Atty. Ferraren verbally and formally
thru a letter dated 26 November 1993 copy of which was furnished public respondent NLRC; and that the "best proof"
of Atty. Ferraren's lack of authority to file the petition was the fact that he himself verified the same instead of having
it verified by any of herein petitioners.
When required by this Court to explain why he filed the 17 December 1993 Petition for Certiorari, Atty. Ferraren
replied that he received the letter from petitioners on 21 December 1993, four (4) days after he filed his petition in
their behalf. He claimed that petitioners even urged him to file a petition as soon as they received copy of the decision
of the Commission. But after he prepared the petition, he could not any more get in touch with his clients so he was
constrained to take matters into his own hands.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
1. The right of clients terminate their relations with their counsel and make substitution or change at any stage
of the proceedings is subject to compliance with the prescribed requirements. Otherwise, no substitution can
be effective and the counsel who last appeared in the case before the substitution became effective shall still
be responsible for the conduct of the case. The rule is intended to ensure the orderly disposition of cases.
Without it there will be confusion in the service of processes, pleadings and other papers.
2. For a valid substitution of counsel the following elements must concur: (a) there must be a written request
for substitution; (b) it must be filed with the written consent of the client; (c) it must be with the written
consent of the attorney to be substituted; and, (d) in case the consent of the attorney to be substituted cannot
be obtained, there must be at least a proof of notice that the motion for substitution was served on him in the
manner prescribed by the Rules of Court.
172. DOMINGO V. AQUINO
G.R. No. L-28078
April 29, 1971
FACTS:
On August 7, 1961, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan rendered judgment approving the money claim of
respondent Pedro A. Aquino against the petitioner estate. Both parties appealed from the said judgment to the Court
of Appeals and on January 20, 1967, the appellate court found for respondent as appellant, and affirmed the lower
court's judgment with modifications in favor of respondent.
According to the present petition itself, the estate's counsel of record in the appellate court, Atty. Jose A. Unson, did
not receive the notice and copy of the appellate court's judgment sent to him by registered mail; but the estate's
attorneys in the intestate proceedings pending in the lower court, Attys. Primicias, Del Castillo and Macaraeg, were
verbally informed by respondent's counsel of the judgment rendered on appeal by the appellate court.
Pursuant to said information, petitioner caused to be filed on March 9, 1967, with the appellate court an "Appearance
with Motions for Substitution and to be served with a copy of the Judgment," stating inter alia, that the former special
administratrix, Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria had long resigned as such with the permission of the intestate court,
that the other co-special administrator, Atty. Luis Domingo, Jr. (who had caused the prosecution of the appeal) was
removed from his trust by the intestate court's order dated May 21, 1963, for having squandered cash funds of the
estate, and that as a consequence, Mrs. Consuelo Domingo de Lopez was appointed judicial administratrix and has
since been administering the estate alone; that Mrs. Lopez as judicial administratrix wished to file a motion for
reconsideration of the appellate court's judgment and that the clerk of court be directed to serve copy of said judgment
on her counsel instead of on Atty. Unson as the former special administrator's counsel "for purposes of starting of
time to move for re-hearing or reconsideration;" and praying that as present judicial administratrix, she be substituted
in lieu of the former joint administrators and that her counsel be served with copy of the appellate court's decision.
The appellate court denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
No further move was made by petitioner thereafter until almost five months later when on September 23, 1967, after
respondent had filed in the intestate court a motion for execution of the judgment, as affirmed in his favor by the
appellate court, it filed the present petition.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is ordered dismissed and petitioner's counsel shall pay treble costs. This decision shall
be noted in the personal record of the counsel for petitioner and of their associate attorney, Teodoro P. Regino, who
signed and verified the petition.
DOCTRINE RELATED TO THE CANON OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
The cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with
unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court
which provides that 'the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that
to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed
for delay and expressly admonishes that 'for a willful violation of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to
disciplinary action.