Structural Sources of Intraorganizational Power: A Theoretical Synthesis
Author(s): W. Graham Astley and Paramjit S. Sachdeva
Source: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Jan., 1984), pp. 104-113
Published by: Academy of Management
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'Academy of ManagementReview, 1984, Vol. 9, No. 1, 104-113.
Structural
Power:
Intraorganizational
of
Sources
Synthesis1
A
Theoretical
W. GRAHAM ASTLEY
PARAMJIT S. SACHDEVA
University of Pennsylvania
Research on organizationalpower has become overly fragmented; a
multitudeof differentsourcesof power have beenidentified.Consequentpower relationsis difficult to
ly, an overallpicture of intraorganizational
obtain. In this paper, three structuralsources of power-hierarchical
authority, resourcecontrol, and networkcentrality-are integratedin a
power is
theoreticalsynthesis. Thecomplexnatureof intraorganizational
revealedin the interactions,tensions,and conflictsamongthe threesources
of power.
Everysocial act is an exerciseof power, everysocial
relationshipis a power equation, and every social
groupor systemis an organizationof power.Accordingly, it is possibleto transposeany systemof social
relationshipsinto termsof potentialor activepower.
(Hawley, 1963, p. 422).
As the above indicates, it is possible to interpretevery
instance of interaction and every social relationship
as involving an exercise of power, because actors
clearly affect one another all the time they are
interacting. But this very pervasivenesstends to make
the concept of power elusive and redundant, for it
begins to have no meaning apart from the ideas of
social interaction and organization. The problems
associated with defining power consequently are well
known (Wrong, 1968) and have led March (1966) to
conclude pessimistically that the concept is of little
analytical utility, because the apparent ease with
which it can be applied to multiple different types
of empirical phenomena tends to make statements
about power rather empty or tautological.
Despite this controversial ahd problematic status
of the concept of power, its use is retained in this
paper as a general orienting concept possessing at
least one basic connotation: power is viewed as a
capacity of social actors to overcome resistance on
the part of other social actors in order to achieve
desired objectives or results (Dahl, 1957). Beyond this
general notion, however, a more precise definition
of the concept is not offered here because, following Lukes (1974), power is regarded as being what
Gallie (1955-1956) has termed an "essentially contested concept." That is, power is viewed as one of
those concepts that "inevitably involves endless
disputes about (its) proper use on the part of (its)
users" (Gallie, 1955, p. 169). Part of the problem
here is that power takes on a very precise meaning
only when the analysis is applied to a particularsituation, and such application depends on the purposes
of the particularanalyst concerned. As Pfeffer (1981)
states, power is "context specific." Given this, what
the present paper hopes to offer is a context-specific
analysis of power that is particularly applicable to
social relationships within formal organizations.
With this same general aim in mind, some social
scientists have begun to focus on a number of dimensions of power that are grounded in specific social
and organizational contexts. Thus, power has been
'The preparation of this manuscript was supported by funds
from the Center for the Study of Organizational Innovation,
University of Pennsylvania. The authors would like to thank
Charles Fombrun and Andrew Van de Ven for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, which was presented at
the 41 st Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, Organization and Management Theory Division, San Diego, 1981.
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tions and have overlookedthe potentialtensionbetweendifferentfacetsof power(Bacharach& Lawler,
1980, p. 31).
To remedy this situation, this paper analyzes intraorganizational power as the joint product of three
sources of power: the official authority vested in
hierarchical positions (hierarchical authority); the
capacity for obtaining resources from the environment and controlling the supply of these resources
to others through processes of exchange (resource
control); and the centrality of location within the
organization's network of workflow linkages (network centrality). Each of these is described as a
"structural" source of power in the sense that it
reflects the properties of the organization as a social
system rather than being a product of the psychology
or social psychology of particular individuals within
the organization. Recent research is synthesized, and
tentative hypotheses regardingthe intersection of the
three power sources are examined. The objective is
to construct an overall view of intraorganizational
power that reconstitutes power as a global phenomenon and still takes into account its analytical dissection into discrete and qualitativelydifferent subtypes.
dissected into different "bases" (French & Raven,
1959; Peabody, 1962); "kinds" (Etzioni, 1961);
"types (Olsen, 1978); "sources" (Bacharach &
Lawler, 1980; Pfeffer, 1981); and so on. Although
moving in a direction that lends the concept greater
empirical precision, these authors have introduced
another problem. The proliferation of multiple subtypes of power has tended to stimulate research efforts dealing primarily with just one aspect of the
overall concept in isolation from its other aspects,
with the result that researchers, unfortunately, often
have lost sight of "power" as a global phenomenon.
For example, Weber's (1947) influential analysis
of organizational power tended to focus on its formal aspects, tying it more or less exclusively to hierarchical authority relations. More contemporary accounts, on the other hand, tend to pay rather scant
attention to the nature and source of efficacy of
hierarchical authority (Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer,
1981), or they ignore its existence altogether
(Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 1971).
Thus, power often is analyzed as if it is grounded
solely in dependence relationships (Emerson, 1962).
It is treated as an emergent phenomenon that "has
been typically formulated as a variance from formal
structure" (Clegg & Dunkerly, 1980, p. 458). Moreover, two major variants of nonformal, or emergent,
power theories have come to the fore in contemporary theory. One explains power by reference to
an actor's capacity to control the resources on which
others depend (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The other
explains power by reference to an actor's locational
centrality within a network of workflow relations
(Tichy & Fombrun, 1979). At least three major approaches to the analysis of organizational power remain. Although they deal with highly interrelated
phenomena, they have developed mostly independently of one another.
In consequence, research on intraorganizational
power has become overly fragmented. Too often the
differentiated aspects of power are analyzed as if they
are detached from each other and unrelated. Except
for a few rare exceptions-for example, Bacharach
and Aiken, (1976); Drake and Mitchell (1977); and
Grimes (1978)- little attempt has been made at specifying the conditions under which one source of power
becomes more salient than another. And little attention has been focused on the identification of interactions between sources of power.
Comparativeorganizationalstudies... have failedto
recognizethe multidirectionalnatureof powerrela-
Three Sources of Power
Hierarchical Authority
So much emphasis has been laid on Emerson's
(1962) explanation of power as a dependence-generated phenomenon that power and dependence are
treated almost as synonyms, and it has become difficult to talk of power without implying that it is
grounded in dependence. Focusing on the dependencies that are generated by task allocations in the division of labor, many contemporary theorists have
thereby emphasized "functional" sources of power
at the expense of "formal" sources of power (Peabody, 1962). However, the popularity of power-dependence theory should not allow one to overlook
the long-standing central importance of hierarchical
authority, a concept that is not based primarily on
the analysis of dependence (Blau & Schoenherr, 1971;
Fayol, 1949; Gouldner, 1954; Gulick & Urwick, 1937;
Mooney & Reiley, 1939; Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, &
Turner, 1968).
The interpretation of power in terms of authority
relations, on which all of these latter studies focus,
is grounded in the conception of power as something
that inheres in official positions. Power is viewed as
the product of formal decree. Subordinates obey superiors not so much because they are dependent on
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tion must cope; consequently,the capacityfor dealing with such uncertaintycan be regarded as a
valuableresource(Pfeffer, 1981).It is for this reason
that Pondy (1977) views the resource-dependence
perspectiveand Hicksonet al.'s (1971)"uncertainty
coping" perspectiveas basically variants on each
other. In this respect, for example, Woodward
(1965),Lawrenceand Lorsch(1967),and Hambrick
(1981)detailedhow differentindustryenvironments
presentorganizationswithdifferentsourcesof critical
uncertainty,so thatparticularsubunitsbecomedominantwithinparticularindustries,as the task of scanningthe environmenttendsto shift fromthe domain
of one functionalarea to that of another.
the latter,but becausetheybelievethatthe latterhave
a rightto exercisepowerby virtueof theirposition.
Sheer incumbency in office provides sufficient
grounds for the superiorto expect obedience. The
superior'sright to issue commandsis enactedby a
legitimized procedure that is considered by both
superiorand subordinateas correct.Thus, authority requiresa degreeof obedienceas an end in itself;
obedienceis due a superiormorebecauseof institutionalizedprivilegethanbecauseit is instrumentalin
fulfillingthe dependentsubordinate'sneeds.Formal
prerogativelies at the heart of the hierarchicaldifferentiationof power.
ResourceControl
Network Centrality
The notion that poweris derivedfrom the ability
to controlthe supplyof resourcesto othershas been
emphasizedin the work of Yuchtmanand Seashore
(1967), White (1974), Mindlinand Aldrich (1975),
and Pfeffer and Salancik(1978). Nord (1980) has
pointed out the respectsin which these "resourcedependenceperspectives"relyheavilyon underlying
"exchangetheory" concepts(Blau, 1964;Emerson,
1962;Homans,1961;Thibaut& Kelley,1959).Thus,
organizationalsubunitssupplyresourcesto othersin
exchangefor a returnof resourcesupon whichthey
are dependent;and asymmetryin the dependencies
that underliesuch exchangesexplainsasymmetryin
power betweenthe actors involved.
The perspectiveoutlinedhere links this approach
to the notion that resourcesultimatelyare derived
fromthe environment.It contendsthatorganizations
are open social systemsthat requirea supplyof resourcesfromthe environmentin orderto sustaintheir
operations.The resourcesthat areobtainedin transactions with the environmentvary in terms of how
difficult they are to secure and in terms of how
criticalthey are to the organization'sfunctioning.
Thoseorganizationalactorsthat obtainthe most critical and difficult to secureresourcesconsequently
acquirepowerbecauseof the dependenciesthat are
generated.For example,Salancikand Pfeffer (1974)
revealedthat the ability of a universitydepartment
to secureoutsidegrantsand contractswas relatedto
its power;and Aldrichand Herker(1977), Whetten
(1978),andSpekman(1979)eachhavesuggestedthat
boundaryspanningsubunitsderivepowerfromtheir
capacity to obtain information directly from the
environment.
Further,the environmentcan be viewedas a major source of uncertaintywith which the organiza-
Theworkof complexorganizationstypicallyis segmentedinto discretepositionsthat are differentiated
both verticallyby hierarchicalleveland horizontally
by divisionor department.Thesedifferentiatedpositions arereintegratedthroughinterconnecting
workflows that form a relativelystable networkof patternedinteractions.Tichyand Fombrun(1979)have
arguedthat organizationalpower relationshipscan
be analyzedprofitablyby referenceto this network
of interactions.To the extentthat actorsare located
at tightly coupled interconnectednodes in the network, they gain power becausetheir immersionin
multipleinterdependencies
makesthem functionally
indispensable(Dubin, 1957; Hickson et al., 1971;
Mechanic, 1962; Thompson, 1956; Woodward,
1965). By being centrallylocated, they act as conduitsfor integratingthe discretefunctionalcontributions of others who are not directlyinterconnected
(Freeman,1979;Freeman,Roeder, & Mulholland,
1980).
Network centralitycan be regardedas an additional sourceof intraorganizational
powerover and
above an actor's ability to generate dependencies
throughresourceexchange.Such poweris attached
to an actor's position in the network rather than
derivedfrom a control of resourceswithinany particulardyadicrelationship.Of course, it is truethat
degreeof access to multipleresourceflows will affect a subunit's ability to generate dependencies
throughdyadicresourceexchange,but this overlappingdoes not erasethe analyticaldistinctionbetween
the two sources of power. In this vein, Emerson
(1976)refersto structuralpropertiesof location,such
as networkcentrality,in termsof theircapacityfor
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of powerempiricallyinteresting.For example,Lehman's (1975) findings suggest that not only is the
"distributionof resourcecontrol" important,but
also importantis the "distributionof responsibility
for decisionmaking." Similarly,Astley (1978)and
Hambrick (1981) report that hierarchicallevelaccounts for largeproportionsof variancein decision
makingpowerafter the effects of functionalexpertise andinterdependence
areheldconstant.Gouldner
(1954)has even utilizedthe distinctionbetweenformal and expertpower to posit the existenceof two
types of bureaucracy:the "representativebureaucracy," which parallels Offe's "task-status continuous organization";and the "punishment-centered bureaucracy,"which parallelsOffe's "taskstatus discontinuousorganization."In Gouldner's
study,moreover,it is particularlyinterestingthatthe
representativebureaucracyis characterizedby an
absenceof conflict,whereasthe punishment-centered
bureaucracyis conflict-riddenbecauseof the tension
producedby a lackof correspondence
amongthe differentsourcesof power. This is the same sourceof
tension that typicallyis highlightedby analysesof
bureaucratic-professional
conflict (Benson, 1973).
creating "structural dependence" as opposed to
dependence within a two-party exchange relation.
Thuspowerderivesnot only fromresourcedependencies withinspecificexchangerelations,but also has a
structuralcomponent,namelythe positionor location
of theactorwithinthe exchangenetwork(Cook, 1977,
p. 72).
Pairwise Interactions
Hierarchical authority, resource control, and network centrality appear together in organizational
reality in interdependent configurations. Pairwise interactions among the three power sources pinpoint,
systematically, instances in which they are mutually
reinforcing, in which one dominated over another,
in which tension is produced between them, and so
on.
HierarchicalAuthorityVersusResourceControl
Although Weber (1947) recognizedthat hierarchicalpowerwas basedon formalauthority,he also
understoodthat formal authoritywas substantially
reinforced by the superior's ability to control
resourcesupon whichthe subordinatedepends.This
is reflected in what Gouldner has described as
Weber's "biforked conception of bureaucracyas
based on expertiseand on authoritariandiscipline"
(1954, p. 219). That is, Weberassertedthat bureaucracyauthoritywas basednot only on formaldecree,
Resource Control Versus Network Centrality
Because the network analysis of organizations is
still in its infancy (Fombrun, 1982; Tichy & Fom-
but also on the superior's functional contributions
of knowledge and expertise. One could say that
Weber saw two sources of power stemming from the
overall "rational-legal" legitimation of authority:
authority based on incumbency in office (its "legal"
component), and authority based on functional expertise (its "rational" component).
Unfortunately, Weber's coupling of "rational"
brun, 1979),thereis littleempiricalresearchdealing
withthe interactionof resourcecontroland network
centralityas sources of intraorganizationalpower.
Thepresentauthorsareawareof only one study,that
by Hinings,Hickson,Pennings,and Schneck(1974),
that attemptsto look at this interaction.Even this
studydid not self-consciouslyspellout the qualitative
differencebetweenresourcecontrolandnetworkcentrality;it preferred,instead,to referto both of these
simply as "strategiccontingencies."However, the
study did succeedin comparingthe relativeeffects
on subunit power of "coping with uncertainty"
(which, as has been argued earlier, as a form of
resourcecontrol)and "pervasiveness,"
definedas the
extentto whicha positionis centrallyinterconnected
to other positions.
The authorsfound that possessionof each source
of powerwas necessary,but not alone sufficient,for
a subunitto gain a control of "strategiccontingencies" and therebymakeitself the dominantsubunit
within the organization.Subunitsthat rankedhigh
with "legal" impliesthat the institutionalizationof
formalauthorityin a hierarchicaloffice alwaystends
to correspondto the importanceof its functional
role. Much of the time, however, such correspondence will be far less than perfect. Offe (1978)
characterizesthis situation as "task-statusdiscontinuous organization" in contrast to "task-status
continuous organization," in which formal authority and functional expertise do correspond; and he
contends that the former is becoming increasingly
prevalentin contemporarysociety.
A numberof studieshave, in fact, indicatedthat
formalauthorityand functionalexpertisedo not always coexist, and it is this that makesthe differentiation of hierarchicalauthorityas a discretesource
on both coping with uncertainty and pervasiveness
wereableto amassgreaterpowerthanweresubunits
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that ranked high on only one of these factors.
Moreover, a regression analysis pointed to interactive effects between the two variables, indicating that
it is important to analyze the two power sources
within a single theoretical framework.
some way by the presence or absence of the third
source of power. Consider, first, the relationship between resource control and hierarchical authority.
Parsons (1960) and Thompson (1967) have suggested
the existence of a positive relationship between these
two sources of power. Differentiating among three
organizational functions-"technical,"
"managerial," and "institutional"-Thompson (1967) states
that the technical function is mostly closed to the environment (closed off in the technical core); that the
institutional function is largely responsible for articulating the organization's rights to command outside resources and is thus mostly open to the environment; and that the managerial function, because it
procures outside resources for internal use in the
technical core, is intermediate with respect to environmental openness. At the same time, these functions are located at "three distinct levels of responsibility and control" (Thompson, 1967, p. 10), which
implies a positive relationship between hierarchical
authority and resource control.
Despite this, however, it seems clear that some control of environmental resources typically is also
available at lower hierarchical levels, in which case
the two power sources would be inverselyrelated. The
empirical appearance of such a negative association
appears best exemplified by the typical customer relations department of an industrialorganization, which
normally would have little formal authority but
would perform a great deal of boundary spanning
activity and be responsible for the control and mediation of resources in the form of information about
customers.
It is suggested here that the direction of the relationship between resource control and hierarchical
level in any particular organizational situation
typically is also related to a subunit's score for the
third source of power: network centrality. Thus, the
closer a subunit is to the apex of the hierarchy, the
more likely it will be centrally located in the organization's workflow in the sense that it typically will perform a centralized coordinating role in channeling
the flow of environmentallyderived resources to multiple other subunits. In this situation its contacts with
the environment tend to be critical, because it is
located in a key position for safeguarding the continued functioning of units throughout the organization. It therefore is necessary to match its functional
importance with formal authority to ensure that its
performance is successfully undertaken. On the other
hand, for subunits such as customer relations departments, which are not so centrally connected to multi-
Network Centrality Versus Hierarchical Authority
A major limitation of the Hinings et al. (1974)
study was that its sample of subunits was drawn from
the same level of hierarchy, so that pervasiveness, as
an operationalization of network centrality, was correspondingly allowed only to vary in a horizontal
dimension, and not vertically across levels. This
limitation, however, was overcome by Tichy and
Fombrun's (1979) analysis of interaction and influence data in three organizations. These authors
make a distinction between "prescribed" and
"emergent" networks. Prescribed networks are
operationalized as aspects of "formal structure"they were "derived from organization charts" and
were based on the hierarchical differentiation of
"formal status." In other words, Tichy and Fombrun's prescribed network is a surrogate for what is
referred to here as the hierarchy of authority. Emergent networks, on the other hand, were operationalized by sociometric measures of interaction generated by "work matters," and thus correspond to the
network of workflow interaction. Prescribed and
emergent networks were seen to be interdependent:
Metaphorically, we assume that the prescribed
organization provides the pegs upon which the
emergentnetworkshang. Variationsin these pegs,
therefore, alter the form of the emergentnetwork
(Tichy& Fombrun, 1979, p. 929).
However, with regard to this hypothesized correspondence between prescribedstructureand emergent
network, the analysis found that the three organizations studied were quite different. In two of the
organizations, which were described as "mechanistic," a reasonably high degree of "fit" existed between prescribedstructureand emergent network, indicating that hierarchicalauthority was reinforced by
network centrality. On the other hand, in the third
organization studied, described as "organic," the
degree of "fit" was zero, indicating that the two
sources of power varied independently. Again, this
indicates the possibility of tension between different
facets of organizational power, and it highlights the
need for systematic investigation of such divergences.
Three-Way Interactions
It is contended that the relationship between each
of the pairs discussed above typically is mediated in
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Figure 1
Network Centralityand Resource Control
across TechnicalCore and
BoundarySpanning Units
ple units throughout the organization, responsibility for the procurement of environmental resources
can be delegated to their lower hierarchical level
because the immediate effects of any unsuccessful
performance are restricted to a localized area.
This interpretation is consonant with Hambrick's
(1981) interpretation of the finding that "general
managers" are more powerful than "external relations executives." Both categories of managers
spanned organizational boundaries. General managers performed the organization's institutional function by "formulating and implementing overall
policy; overall goal setting; [and] reporting to the
board of trustees" (1981, p. 273). External relations
executives were concerned with "public relations,
fund raising, governmental relations, etc." (1981, p.
273). General managers naturally tended to be located at higher levels than did external relations executives, but even after controlling for hierarchical
level, the former were much more powerful than the
latter. Hambrick suggests, therefore, that "centrality" acted as an additional critical factor because
general managers, "who typically span and integrate
a variety of functions, have high centrality and,
hence, high power" (1981, p. 267); and external relations executives, who "are not directly involved in
the mainstream tasks, have low centrality and low
power" (1981, p. 267).
Consider the relationship between resource control
and network centrality. This relationship also is
mediated by the third source of power-in this case,
hierarchical authority. At lower levels, a clear differentiation typically emerges between the technical
core and boundary spanning units, which buffer the
technical core from direct contact with the environment. One consequence of this differentiation is that
boundary spanners, with direct access to the environment, exercise dominance in the form of resource
control over the technical core positions, which are
linked only indirectly to the environment. On the
other hand, because boundary spanning units are
located in a peripheral position, they typically have
less workflow connections with other units than does
the technical core, which is buffered by all of the
boundary spanning units simultaneously. Thus, at
lower hierarchical levels there is likely to be an inverse relationship between resource control and network centrality, as Figure 1 suggests. At upper levels
of the hierarchy, however, there is no similar differentiation between boundary spanning and technical core subunits; thus, the same inverse relationship
does not hold. Part of the reason for this is obvious.
Decreasing Resource
Control/
<
A,
~~Centrality
-
Boundary Spanning
Units
Fewer people are located at higher than at lower
levels, so there is less opportunity for differentiation
to emerge. However, there also are additional factors to be considered, factors that are related to the
kind of work that is performed at upper and lower
levels.
In this respect, a consideration of the differences
between administrative and nonadministrative work
is helpful. It is at the lower levels of the hierarchy
that organizations perform their directly productive
work in the "primary workflow" (Rice, 1958). This
is where organizations introduce horizontal differentiation in order to create homogeneous duties within
specialized subunits (Blau & Schoenherr, 1971). In
other words, at lower hierarchical levels, the task of
resource acquisition becomes specialized in boundary
subunits, whereas the intricate technological interdependencies that enhance efficiency become specialized in the technical core subunits, where they can
be sheltered from environmental intrusion. Specialization thus gives subunits highly specific functions
and restricts their acquisition of power to a single
source. Consequently, if a subunit controls resources
because of its location at the boundary, it does not
also gain centrality from its immersion within the
technical core, and vice versa.
This proposition is consonant with Thompson's
contention that organizational power structures are
adjusted in response to two sources of change: "internally from technological developments, and externally based on changes in task-environment elements" (1967. p. 129). Technology, in other words,
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2(a) and Figure 2(b), representedby the arrows,
would completelyalter the power situation. As the
source of all resourcesin the network, Position A
clearlywouldhavegreatestpowerin Figure2(a), but
wouldbe a dependentrecipientof resourcesin Figure
2(b) and weak becauseof this. This seems obvious,
but the importantpointis thatthe situationof Figure
2(a) would occur when Position A is located close
to the apex of the hierarchy,wherecontactwith the
environmentwouldgiveit controloverimportantorganizationalresources.The situationof Figure2(b)
would occurwhenPosition A is locatedin the heart
of the technicalcore,whereit wouldbe isolatedfrom
environmentalcontact and thus bereft of resource
control.
affects patternsof interdependencein the technical
core,andenvironmentaffectspatternsof dependence
at the organization'sboundary.Whatis significant
for Thompson is that these two sources of dependence are segmented"into self-sufficientclusters"
so that "dependencetendsto be confinedto that domain" (1967, p. 129). Moreover, it is clear that
Thompsonhereis referringto lowerhierarchicallevels, becauseit is the localizationof dependencein selfsufficient clusters that permits decentralization.
"Decentralizationdilutes the power structureby
creatingmorepowerpositionsbut limitingthe organization's dependenceon each" (1967, p. 129).
This furtherimplies that if functions cannot be
segmentedinto self-containedclusters,they will remain centralizedat the top of the hierarchy.Thus,
at higher levels of the hierarchyduties are general
ratherthanspecific,becauseadministrative
workcuts
acrossspecializedfunctions.Locatedat the centerof
allocativedecisionmaking,administratorsmust acquire and control importantresourcesbut simultaneously be centrallypositionedto achieveeffective
coordinationof the allocationprocess.Higherlevels
of the hierarchytherefore are characterizedby a
positive relationshipbetween resourcecontrol and
networkcentrality,ratherthanthe negativerelationship found at lower levels.
Finally,considerthe relationshipbetweennetwork
centralityand hierarchicallevel. The mediationof
this relationshipby resourcecontrol is particularly
interestingbecauseit seemsto qualifythe widelyaccepted conclusions of Bavelas (1950) and Leavitt
(1951)regardingcentralityin interactionnetworks.
These researchersfound that when faced with the
need to solve problemsjointly, the structureof interactionamongindividualswithingroupsinevitably
led to centrallylocated membersacting as decision
makers and peripherallylocated members acting
merelyas information-relayers.In other words, the
responsibilityfor making decisions, which can be
regardedas a progenitorto hierarchicalauthority,
was a direct consequenceof networkcentrality.
The emergenceof a positiverelationshipbetween
hierarchicalauthorityand networkcentralityis conditioned,however,by resourcecontrol.To illustrate
why this may be the case, considerFigure2. According to the Bavelasand Leavittexperiments,Position
A scores higherin termsof networkcentralitythan
do positions B, C, D, and E and thereforeshould
have more powerin decisionmaking.However,the
changein directionof resourceflows betweenFigure
Conclusion
The organizationalliteraturedealingwith power
quite rightly has differentiatedthe concept into a
numberof analyticallydistinctdimensions.Poweris
a multifacetedphenomenonand must be analyzed
as such. Unfortunately,however,a fragmentationof
theoryhas occurred.Authorstend to act as proponents for a particularperspectiveon power and
thereby forget the existence of other aspects of
power. Consequently,much of the theoreticalrichnessand complexityof the powerphenomenonwithin organizationshas been lost. Moreover,empirical
studiesof intraorganizational
powerare misleading
if they focus on only one or anotheraspectof power
in isolation from other aspects. This is so, not only
becausethereare multiplesourcesof intraorganizational power, but also because these sources are
highlyinterdependent.Futureresearcheffortstherefore shouldmakesystematicsimultaneousreference
to multiplepowersourcesratherthanfocus narrowly on singledimensionsof power.The analyticaldissectionof powerinto discretesourcesmustbe accompanied by conceptual frameworksspecifying the
complexinterdependence
betweenthesesources.Only then will the conceptof powerbe reconstitutedas
a globalphenomenonthatis bestowedwithsufficient
meaningto justify the rejectionof March's(1966)
criticismthat the concept is vacuous.
Althoughthe presentpaperadvocatesa morecomprehensivetreatmentof intraorganizationalpower
thanis typicalin the literature,it also has limitations
to which futureresearchshould pay attention.The
first limitationis its emphasison structuralsources
of power. The structuralapproachtaken heregives
a ratherstatic pictureof power configurationsand
110
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Figure 2
The Importanceof ResourceFlows for
Decision Making in Networks
(b)
(a)
A
A
D
C
B
C
B
D
E
E
portantones in the first place. And are these goals
definedin such a way that they systematicallyfavor
the interestsof somepartiesanddisadvantage
others?
An examinationof the processesby which certain
goalsareset in place,anddefinedas criticaland functional, permitsthe question:Criticaland functional
for whom? (Astley & Rosen, 1983).
Finally,sucha radicalapproachcan be linkedprofitablyto the extensionof poweranalysisin another
direction:to extraorganizational
structuresof power.
AstleyandVande Ven(1983)havearguedthatpower
relationswithin organizationscan be satisfactorily
analyzedonly by referenceto the prioritiesand interestsof powerfulstakeholdersoutsidethe organization. Intraorganizational
powerrelationscanbe seen,
in part,as "epiphenomena"of forcesthat permeate
in a broadersocial context. Thus it becomesnecessary, followingHickson,Astley, Butler,and Wilson
(1981),to linkstructuresof intraorganizational
power
to the power structureof the wider environment
itself.
does not focus on the dynamicprocessesthat produceand, overtime, changetheseconfigurations.In
this respectmuch can be gained by integratingthe
presentstructuralapproachwith the organizational
behaviorliteraturedealingwithindividualand group
processes,becausethese are relevantto poweranalysis.
Second, researchon the individualand groupdynamicsunderlyingthe productionof powerstructures
also can shed light on the dialectical processes
throughwhichparticularpowerregimesareinstituted
(Benson, 1977a, 1977b). The problem here is that
muchresearchon organizationalpoweranalysesestablishedpower regimesas being functionallynecessary ones. For instance, the resource control
perspectiveutilizedin this paperexplainsthe acquisition of powerby referenceto an individualor a unit's
functional contributions to organizationalgoals.
Unitscontrollingimportantresourcesthatarecritical
to organizationalgoals therebyacquirepower. But
the questionthat goes unansweredin such research
is why certaingoals come to be defined as the im-
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W. GrahamAstleyis AssistantProfessorof Management
in the WhartonSchool, Universityof Pennsylvania.
ParamjitS. Sachdevais a doctoralstudentin SocialSystems
Sciences in the Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania.
113
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