NEGLIGENCE
CASE LIST
DONOGHUE v. STEVENSON, where the defendant went to a restaurant with a
friend and ordered some ginger beer. They drank some of it and then the
defendant poured out the rest. When he emptied the bottle, a decomposed snail
fell out of it. Mrs. Donoghue fell ill and sued the manufacturer. The House of Lords
agreed that the manufacturer of goods and services owed a duty of care to the
end consumers of their products, and Lord Atkin stated, “You must take
reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee
would be likely to injure your neighbour”. This was termed as ‘the neighbour
principle’. The test of foreseeability here is objective as the courts ask not what the
defendant actually foresaw, but what a reasonable person could be expected to
have foreseen.
CAPARO INDUSTRIES plc v. DICKMAN, where the courts stated that a duty of
care is owed when the following conditions are met:
● The damage caused is reasonably foreseeable
● There is a relationship of proximity between the defendant and the
claimant
● It is just and reasonable to impose a duty
This principle is usually used to establish duty of care in cases
concerning physical injury or damage to property, or those which do not fall into
any of the special categories.
Langley v. Dray
The claimant was a police officer, who was chasing the defendant while he was
driving a stolen car. The car crashed and injured the claimant. It was held that the
defendant had a duty to not cause such risks as he was aware that the claimant
was pursuing him and ought to have known that increasing his speed would risk
injury to the claimant. He was held in breach of duty.
Haley v. London Electricity Board
The claimant, who was blind, was walking on a pavement when he tripped over a
hammer placed there by the defendant and got injured to such an extent that he
almost became totally deaf. It was held that while working on the road, the
defendant’s duty of care extended to people walking on the side pavement, and
this included blind pedestrians.
Muirhead v. Industrial Tank Specialties
Proximity does not necessarily mean that the defendant and claimant know each
other, but have such a relationship that one person could have reasonably
foreseen that their actions could cause any kind of harm or damage to the other
party.
Sutradhar v. Natural Environment Research Council
The claimant was a resident of Bangladesh, who fell ill after drinking contaminated
water from the local supply. He argued that the defendant had a duty to make this
information public to avoid misleading people into a false sense of security. There
was held to be no breach due to lack of adequate proximity
MacFarlane v. Tayside Health Board
The claimant had become pregnant after her partner’s vasectomy failed, and
claimed for compensation to bring up the child. The court rejected her claim,
stating that it would not be just and reasonable to award compensation for the
birth of a healthy child.
Mitchell v. Glasgow City Council
The claimants were the wife and daughter of a man who was killed by their
neighbours. In the past, the neighbour had abused the claimants and the council
had threatened to evict him if he did not cease to do so. After this he attacked his
neighbour. The claimants argued that the council knew about this and had a duty
to warn them about the meeting. However, the courts held that it was not just and
reasonable to impose such a duty on the defendants as they had already taken
steps to resolve the problem.
SPARTAN STEEL v. MARTIN illustrates the differences between types of losses,
including pure economic loss. In this case, the defendant had negligently cut a
power cable, causing a power cut that lasted 14 hours. Without the electricity to
heat the claimants’ furnace, the metal in the furnace solidified and the claimants
had to shut the factory down temporarily. They claimed damages for three types of
losses:
1. Damage to metal that was in the furnace and got solidified. (physical
damage to property).
2. Loss of profit that could have been made from the sale of that
metal.(economic loss arising from physical damage).
3. Loss of profit from the sale of metal which could have been processed
during the time the factory was shut down.(pure economic loss).
CANDLER v. CRANE, CHRISTMASTIME AND CO. , where the COA held that
the accountant owed no duty for economic loss to the third party, as their
responsibility was only contractual.
HEDLEY BYRNE V. HELLER Here, the claimants were advertising agencies and
were asked to buy amounts of advertising space on a firm’s behalf. To ensure
creditworthiness, the bank was supposed to keep a check on them. The National
Province bank contacted Heller twice and each time he gave favourable
references, but included a disclaimer that the information was being supplied
without responsibility on the bank’s part. The second enquiry asked whether the
firm was trustworthy, and Heller responded that it was respectably considered
good for ordinary business arrangements. Hedley Byrne relied on this advice and
entered into a contract with a firm called Easipower. The firm later went into
liquidation and asked Hedley Byrne to pay the 17000 pounds, who claimed this
amount from Heller.
The HOL held that no duty of care was accepted by Heller and none arose so the
claim failed
JUNIOR BOOKS v. VEITCHI, where it was possible to make out negligence on
the part of the builders due to the defective floor despite the damage being solely
an economic loss
ESSO PETROLEUM CO. v. MARDON
The claimant had leased a petrol station after gaining from Esso’s that it would sell
almost 200000 gallons of petrol a year. However, he was only able to sell 78000
gallons, and sued Esso. The COA held that in making the prediction, the petrol
company had undertaken a responsibility to Mardon, and so owed a duty of care
when Mardon relied on their skill in the petrol market, and so the claim was
allowed.
LENNON v. COMMISSIONER OF THE METROPOLIS
The claimant was changing jobs in the police force to go work in Ireland. He was
previously receiving a housing allowance and wanted to know whether this would
remain once he switched jobs. They told him that it would, but later refused to pay
the allowance. The COA held that although the person telling him this was not a
professional in the field, she had a managerial job and had led the claimant into
believing that he could rely on her promise, instead of telling him that the enquiry
was outside her area of influence, and so the claim succeeded
DEAN v. ALLIN & WATTS
The defendant was a solicitor who had acted for some clients borrowing money
but had also assumed responsibility for the person lending the money. He was
approached by two borrowers and agreed to lend them 20000 pounds against
some property to be put up as security. The solicitor advised that security could be
provided as a deposit of deeds, although it did not give him any right over the
property. Later, the borrowers became bankrupt and a mistake was discovered.
He sued the solicitor and the COA held that he was not taking independent
advice. The defendant knew that he was being relied upon to ensure effective
security of the loan, and so by continuing to act, he was assuming responsibility
for the advice.
CALVERT v. WILLIAM HILL CREDIT LTD.
The claimant was a gambler who had been making a lot of money but was now in
loss. Realising this, he asked the bookmaker to close his gambling account. The
bookmaker assured him that he would do so but later failed, and bets were made
from the claimant’s account. The claimant argued that the bookmaker owed a duty
of care in two ways. First was due to a social responsibility and secondly, because
the bookmaker had agreed to include the self exclusion agreement and by doing
so, had taken up a responsibility for carrying out the arrangement properly. The
first claim failed, on the grounds that the bookmaker could not possibly identify all
problem gamblers. However, the second claim succeeded, as the bookmaker had,
in fact, identified the claimant as a problem gambler.
GOODWILL v. BRITISH PREGNANCY ADVISORY SERVICE
The claimant had become pregnant by her boyfriend after he had a vasectomy
and the doctors advised him that it was successful. She sued for negligence, but
the COA held that in order to claim successfully for reliance on advice given by the
defendants, the claimant had to show that the defendants knew that the advice
being given was to be relied upon by the claimant.
REEMAN v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT
Reeman was the owner of a fishing boat that required a certificate of
seaworthiness by the department of transport to be eligible for usage at sea. The
boat was covered by the certificate and it was later found out that the surveyor
was negligent and the certificate should not have been issued in the first place. As
a result, it could not now be renewed, making the boat worthless. Reeman sued
for economic loss, but the COA rejected his claim, stating that information
provided for one purpose would not impose duty on the defendant for some other
reason.
LAW SOCIETY v. KPMG
The defendants were accountants to a firm of solicitors, and had been asked to
prepare the firm’s financial accounts by the law society. The accountants did so
but failed to report on one of the senior solicitors who had been defrauding
clientele. The accountants argued that they only owed a duty to the solicitors’ firm,
but the law society held that they also owed a duty to them by virtue of the law
society’s reliance on their reports. The COA upheld this claim.
WHITE v. JONES
Two daughters had a quarrel with their father and he cut them off of his will. Some
time later, they reconciled and the father asked his solicitor to bequeath 9000
pounds to each of the daughters. The solicitor was reminded again after a month
to do so, but he failed. As a result, when the father died, the daughters were
unable to inherit the money and sued the solicitor. The HOL allowed the claim,
even though the loss was purely economic and the result of negligence rather
than negligent misstatement.
GORHAM v. BRITISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS plc.
The COA held that the position of intended beneficiaries of an insurance policy
was comparable to that of the intended beneficiaries to a will and that the advisors
had therefore undertaken a responsibility towards the family.
WHITE AND OTHERS v. CHIEF CONSTABLE OF YORKSHIRE, where the court
identified three types of people that could be related to a shocking incident.
1. Those who are physically injured in the event which the defendant has
caused, in addition to suffering a psychiatric injury. These are the
primary victims
2. Those who are put in danger of physical harm, but only suffer
psychiatric injury. These are also the primary victims
3. Those who are put in danger of physical harm, but suffer psychiatric
injury by witnessing physical harm to other people related to the event.
DULIEU v. WHITE & SONS
The claimant was serving in a pub when one of the defendant’s employees drove
into the pub in his van. The claimant thought that the van would harm her and the
shock caused her to have a miscarriage. The defendants were held liable for
physical damage as well as nervous shock as they could have foreseen that such
a stunt could shock anyone in the pub.
SIMMONS v. BRITISH STEEL plc
The claimant had been injured at his workplace, and as a result of the shock and
anger, he developed a skin condition, due to which he was unable to work, and
suffered depression as a result. The employers were held liable for the original
injury, the skin condition, as well as the depressive illness. They had exposed the
claimant to a very real and foreseeable risk of physical injury, and were therefore
liable for all illnesses that resulted from that injury.
ROTHWELL v. CHEMICAL AND INSULATING CO, Ltd.
The claimants were a group of workers who had been exposed to asbestos at
work. Asbestos, when enters the lungs, can lead to a range of fatal diseases.
When they brought the claim, none of the claimants had these diseases, but they
did have pleural plaques, which are a sign of asbestos in the lungs. Naturally, this
could be a cause of anxiety, which could not be the basis for a claim as it is not a
recognized mental illness, however, one of the claimants developed clinical
depression from the anxiety, which is a recognized psychiatric illness. Still, the
HOL ruled that there was no duty of care and the question should only be decided
on the usual principles applicable to psychiatric illness at work.
McLOUGHLIN v. O’BRIAN
The claimant’s husband and children were involved in a car accident caused by
the defendant’s negligence. One of her daughters died in the accident. The
claimant had not been present at the scene of the accident, but was at a hospital
and was shocked when she saw her family in such a condition. As a result, she
suffered psychiatric injury, and the HOL allowed her claim.
ALCOCK v. CHIEF CONSTABLE OF YORKSHIRE
The case arose from the accident caused in the Hillsborough football stadium in
1989. The play had to be stopped because people were dying and getting injured
due to overcrowding. The South Yorkshire police had been responsible for
regulating the area and so the accident was widely believed to be the result of
negligence on their part, by allowing too many people in the ground. The claims
for primary victims were duly settled by the police. However, as for the friends and
relatives of those injured or dead, it was argued that whether they were owed a
duty would depend on the reasonable foreseeability of the damage as suggested
in McLoughlin.
The HOL held that, while it was reasonable to foresee that such a damage to a
person could cause a psychiatric injury to those close to the injured, or dead, it
was not common law policy to compensate third parties affected by an incident.
So the court held that, once reasonable foreseeability was established, a series of
further tests had to be carried out to establish duty of care:
1. The nature and cause of psychiatric injury.
2. The class of person into which the claimant falls, depending on their
relationship to the primary victims.
3. The claimant’s proximity to the shocking incident, in terms of both time
and place.
SION v. HAMPSTEAD HEALTH AUTHORITY
The claimant had developed a stress related illness due to watching his son slowly
die as a result of a disease caused by the negligence of the defendants. The
courts rejected his claim as his psychiatric illness was not the result of a sudden
shock, but was a gradual development.
NORTH GLAMORGAN NHS TRUST v. WALTERS
The claimant was the mother of a baby boy who had died after receiving negligent
mistreatment on the authority of the defendants. The boy was also ill, and
unknown to the mother, his illness was misdiagnosed. She woke up to find him
coughing up blood. Later that day, he was transferred to another hospital and
suffered severe brain damage. As a result of this, the mother suffered severe
psychiatric illnesses. The hospital argued that they could not be liable as the
illnesses were not the result of a nervous shock. However, the COA allowed the
claim, stating that such events were horrifying on their own and had their own
impact.
Chadwick v. British Railways Board
French and others v. Chief Constable of Sussex
Dolley v. Cammell Laird
TAN v. EAST LONDON AND CITY HEALTH AUTHORITY
The claimant had been informed through telephone by the hospital staff that his
baby had died in his mother’s womb. He went on to the hospital and watched the
birth of the stillborn baby. Later, he sued the hospital for the psychiatric injury
caused by watching the birth. However, his claim was rejected by the court, on the
basis that the psychiatric injury had been caused by shock received on hearing
about the death on telephone rather than watching the birth of the child.
W v. ESSEX COUNTY COUNCIL
The defendant negligently placed an orphan, who had a history of abusing
children, in a family with four children. He then abused those children, and both
the parents suffered psychiatric injury as a result. Here, there was no sudden
shock, and so the parents had difficulty making their claim.
VELLINO v. CHIEF CONSTABLE, Vellino was a career criminal and was well
known to the local police. They went to his house to arrest him, and in an attempt
to escape, he jumped from the second floor window. Due to the fall, he seriously
injured himself, and ended up with brain damage and paralysis, depending on
others for his needs. He sued the police, under the duty to prevent him from
escaping, arguing that it was foreseeable that he would try to escape and get
injured. The Court of Appeal rejected the argument, stating that this would also
mean that the police had to hold prisoners in the lightest possible grip, just in case
they wrench a shoulder in trying to break free. In any case, it was held that Vellino
was not actually under the control of the police as he was trying to escape the
police, which is a crime and so the defence of illegality applied.
COSTELLO v. CHIEF CONSTABLE OF NORTHUMBRIA POLICE, where the
Court of Appeal held that by being a police officer, the defendant had assumed
responsibility to help fellow officers, and so where a police member’s failure to act
would result in a fellow officer being exposed to unnecessary risk, there is a
positive duty to act.
CAPITAL AND COUNTIES plc v. HAMPSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL, the
question arose of whether the fire brigade had a duty of care towards people
whose property was on fire. The court concluded that in general, they did not, but
said that where a fire brigade had actually done something which either created a
danger or made existing danger worse, they then had a positive duty to take
reasonable steps to deal with that danger.
P PERL (Exporters) v. CAMDEN LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL, the
defendants owned two adjoining buildings, one of which was rented by the
claimant. The defendants had not locked the other building and some burglars got
in through to the claimant’s premises and robbed it. The court held that the
defendants could not be liable for negligence, even though they could have
foreseen a burglary with an open building, as they could not be held responsible
for the actions of others.
Relationship of proximity essentially refers to circumstances between the
defendant and the claimant that make it reasonable for them to owe a duty of
care. The relationship can often stem from the existence of a contract between the
parties (STANSBIE v. TROMAN).
SWINNEY v. CHIEF CONSTABLE OF NORTHUMBRIA POLICE, where the
police were held to owe a duty of care to a particular claimant because she had
supplied them with information regarding a criminal and had stressed for it to be
confidential, and it was clear that if they did not do so, there was a serious risk of
the criminal deciding to take revenge and harming the claimant.
HOME OFFICE v. DORSET YACHT Co. ,The prison officers were in charge of
controlling a youth custody centre, a Borstal, situated on an island. Due to their
negligence, some boys escaped and took boats belonging to the claimant to try to
get off the island. The House of Lords held that the home office was liable for the
acts of the boys because they had control over them, but they would not be
responsible for any damage caused by the boys, other than that at particular risk
to the owners of the boats, because it was obvious that the boys would try to
escape by stealing the boats.
TOPP v. LONDON COUNTRY BUS, where a bus was left unattended by one of
the defendant’s employees, with the key still in the ignition. Somebody took the
bus, and there was evidence of erratic and careless driving throughout town
without headlights. However, the Court of Appeal held that the defendant leaving a
bus as he did would not amount to creating any special risk that could give rise to
duty of care.
SMITH v. LITTLEWOODS ORGANIZATION, the defendants owned a disused
cinema. While it sat empty, some vandals got into the cinema and set it on fire,
which then spread to the neighbouring areas. The House of Lords held that an
occupier of a land could owe a duty to prevent risks created on the land by third
parties, although the littlewoods were not held negligent as they were not aware of
the vandals and the precautions they had taken were reasonable.
RIGBY v. CHIEF CONSTABLE OF NORTHAMPTONSHIRE, is a useful guide for
distinction between operational matters and policy reasons. Here, a building
owner sued the police for fire damage to his property, after a police officer used
CS gas, which is inflammable to try to eject a dangerous psychopath with a gun
from the building. The court held that the police could not be held liable for using
CS gas, even though an non-inflammable option was available, because that was
a policy decision, however, they could be held liable for negligence in failing to
bring fire fighting equipment with them, which was an operational matter.
BROOKS v. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE FOR THE METROPOLIS, Brooks
had suffered PTSD after watching his friend get murdered in a racist attack.
However, he brought a claim against the police, arguing that the situation had
been aggravated by how the police had treated him afterwards. The basis of his
claim was that the police owed him a duty of care to:
1. Take reasonable steps to work out whether he was a victim, and if he was,
to treat him appropriately,
2. Take reasonable steps to give him appropriate support and protection for a
witness to a serious crime,
3. Give reasonable weight to his account of what happened and act
accordingly.
The House of Lords was unanimous in deciding that the police owed no such duty
of care.
SWINNEY v. CHIEF CONSTABLE OF NORTHUMBRIA POLICE, the claimant
was a pub lady who had given information regarding a hit and run criminal who
had killed a police officer. She told the police to remain confidential, but later
received threats of violence due to the police’s negligence. As a result, she
suffered severe psychiatric illness and was unable to return to work. She tried to
sue the police for negligence, but the police argued that they owed no duty of care
as there was no relationship of proximity, or policy reasons. The Court of Appeal
disagreed, stating that it was clear that the claimant was in particular danger, and
in recognising the danger and agreeing to the need of confidentiality, the police
had taken up a responsibility. As far as the policy reasons were concerned, the
Court of Appeal held that such arguments were indeed relevant, but in this case
favoured the claimant, so the police did owe a duty of care, but had not breached
it.
SMITH v. CHIEF CONSTABLE OF SUSSEX, now seems to suggest that as far as
ordinary members of the public were concerned, cases will have to be very
exceptional before the police can be held liable for failing to protect an individual.
CAPITAL AND COUNTRIES plc v. HAMPSHIRE, the damage was said to be the
result of the fire brigade’s negligence, because they had turned off the sprinkler.
JOHN MUNROE v. LONDON FIRE, The claimant’s building was set alight by
smouldering debris from a fire in the nearby building, the officers had been
negligent to check the claimant’s building when they found the debris.
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST v. WEST YORKSHIRE, the fire brigade was
unable to act because of the insufficiency of water, and the case arose from the
fire brigade’s failure to inspect the hydrants.
KENT v. GRIFFITHS AND OTHERS, the case concerned the London ambulance
service’s failure to respond promptly to a call from the claimant’s doctor. As a
result, the claimant stopped breathing and lost her baby. The ambulance service
argued that they did not owe a duty of care, but the court disagreed, stating that
the nature of the services provided by ambulance was quite different from the fire
brigade or the police, and so a duty of care was owed
MULCAHY v. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
The Court of Appeal considered whether a member of the armed forces, injured
by the negligent behaviour of a colleague during battle could sue for injuries. It
was held that there was no duty of care between fellow soldiers engaged in battle
conditions.
BICI v. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
The claimants were two Kosovan Albanians who were shot by British soldiers
during peacekeeping operations in Kosovo. The court held that the soldiers were
negligent in shooting the men when they were not threatened by them, and had
no reason to believe so. The Ministry of Defence argued that the soldiers were
covered by combat immunity, but the court held that this was an incident of street
disorder and not a combat situation.
STOVIN v. WISE, the claimant had been injured when the motorbike he was riding
was hit by a car driven by the defendant. The defendant argued that the accident
was partly due to the fault of the local authority, because he had been unable to
see the motorbike due to an overhanging bank of earth, and the authority had a
statutory duty to remove such obstructions. The court upheld his claim.
X v. BEDFORDSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL, where the House of Lords combined
five different cases, which all raised the issue to local authorities in negligence. In
each case the local authorities had applied to have the claim struck out, arguing
that there was no cause of action. The authorities had acted negligently regarding
their powers to prevent child abuse, and the other three cases concerned local
authorities’ powers with regard to providing education for children with special
needs.
W v. ESSEX COUNTY COUNCIL
The claimants were foster parents for the council. They had children of their own
and, accepting their first foster child, they had told the council that they would not
take any child who was a known or suspected child abuser. The council had
agreed to this, and later placed a 15 year old boy with them who the council knew
had once assaulted his sister, but they did not tell this to the foster parents. Later
the boy sexually abused the claimant’s children, and they sued the council for
negligence on their children’s behalf.
D v. EAST BERKSHIRE COMMUNITY NHS TRUST, was brought by a mother
who had been wrongly suspected of harming her daughter. In the second.
MAK v. DEWSBURY HEALTHCARE TRUST, a father and daughter sued the
council for taking the daughter into care under incorrect suspicion that she was
being abused by her father.
RK v. OLDHAM NHS TRUST, were a mother and father whose daughter was
taken into care by the council for a year after they were wrongly accused of abuse.
LAWRENCE v. PEMBROKESHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL
An attempt was made to use the HRA 1998 to defeat the decision in D v. EAST
BERKSHIRE, but the Court of Appeal rejected this approach.
X v. HOUNSLOW LONDON BOROUGH COUNCIL
The Court of Appeal addressed a new and slightly different issue; what duty of
care, if any, did local authorities owe to vulnerable adults. The Court of Appeal
said that local authority does not owe duty of care to vulnerable adults, unless
circumstances show that they had assumed responsibility.
NETTLESHIP v. WESTON, the claimant was a driving instructor and on her third
lesson, the defendant hit a lamppost, injuring the claimant. The court held that she
was required to come up to the standard of the average competent driver, and
anything less amounted to negligence.
SIMMONDS v. ISLE OF WIGHT COUNCIL
The claimant was a five year old boy who got injured while playing unsupervised
in a park. His mother had sent him to some supervised swings but, unknown to
her, he headed to the nearby swings. He was playing alone and fell down,
breaking his arm. However the court rejected the mother’s claim that the school
had a duty of care to prevent such accidents, as it was not possible for the school
to make a playing field completely free of hazards in an already well supervised
function
HOLT v. EDGE
The claimant’s case against the doctor failed, as the symptoms she had told him
about were unusual for that condition, and so the doctor had not fallen below any
standard of care in failing to diagnose it.
MULLIN v. RICHARDS
The defendant and claimant were two 15 year old girls who were playing with
rulers, and one of the girls went blind when a ruler went into her eye. The court
stated that the correct test would be of whether an ordinarily careful and
reasonable 15 year old girl would have foreseen a risk of injury.
ORCHARD v. LEE
The Court of Appeal stressed that where the defendant was a child, their
behaviour would have to be ‘careless to a very high degree’ before they should be
considered liable for negligence. In this case, that did not apply where a 13 year
old child was playing within a playing area and was not breaking any rules.
ROBERT v. RAMSBOTTOM
The defendant had a stroke while driving and lost control of his car, hence hitting
the claimant. The court held that he should nevertheless be judged according to
the standard of a reasonably competent driver.
MANSFIELD v. WEETABIX
In this case the Court of Appeal took a different approach. Here, the driver of a
lorry was suffering from a disease which on the day in question caused a
hypoglycemic state (a condition in which the blood sugar falls so low that the
brain’s efficiency becomes temporarily impaired). The Court of Appeal said that
the standard of care which applied to him should be that of a reasonably
competent driver who was unaware that he suffered from a condition that impaired
his ability to drive. On this basis, he was not held to be negligent.
HORTON v. EVANS
A pharmacist was held liable for the side effects suffered by a customer whose GP
had mistakenly prescribed drugs eight times stronger than her usual dose, on the
grounds that a reasonably competent GP would have noticed the increased
dosage and queried about it.
BOLAM v. FRIERN BARNET HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
The case was brought by a patient who had had electric shock treatment for
psychiatric problems and suffered broken bones as a result of the relaxant drugs
given before the treatment. These drugs were not always given to patients but the
doctors had only given this to the claimant due to the risk of fractures. The House
of Lords stated that so long as a doctor could find an medical expert prepare to
state that the actions complained of were in keeping with a reasonable body of
medical opinion, there would be no liability.
BOLITHO v. CITY AND HACKNEY HEALTH AUTHORITY
The court held that the opinion of medical experts was reasonable, but a doctor
could not escape liability simply because an expert rendered their actions
reasonable.
MARRIOTT v. WEST MIDLANDS REGIONAL HEALTH AUTHORITY
The claimant suffered a head injury and was admitted into the hospital for a night,
to be discharged the next day. He fell ill again and the GP (general practitioner)
found nothing wrong but advised his wife to call if anything was wrong. Four days
later, the claimant was paralysed and this was held to be the result of the original
injury. He claimed that the GP had been negligent in not referring him back to the
hospital, given that he did not have the resources to test for the particular
condition that the claimant was later diagnosed with. The GP brought expert
evidence to suggest that although this would have been the reasonable course of
action, keeping a patient at home for review was equally reasonable in the
circumstance. As a result the defendant was not held liable.
ADAMS AND ANOTHER v. RHYMNEY VALLEY DISTRICT COUNCIL
The claimants were a family whose children were killed when fire broke out in the
house. The house had double glazed windows which could be opened with a key,
and they claimed that the council had been negligent in providing this type of
window, and the question arose as to whether it was correct to decide this by
applying the BOLAM test, given that the council were not professional window
designers, and the court held that it was.
DJEMAL v. BEXLEY HEALTH AUTHORITY
The standard required was held to be that of a reasonable senior houseman,
acting as a casualty officer, regardless of how long the defendant had actually
been doing that particular job at that level.
BALAMOAN v. HOLDEN AND CO.
The defendant was a solicitor and the only lawyer in the town. The claimant
consulted him for a nuisance claim, although he only had contact with the
solicitor’s staff. He was advised that the claim was for 3000 pounds, when it was
actually for 25000 pounds. He sued the solicitor for negligent misstatement, but
the court held that the solicitor could only be judged to the standard of a
reasonable lawyer in a small country town, and so the claim failed.
CHESTER v. AFSHAR
The House of Lords held that a professional in a field had a duty to not only take
reasonable steps to ensure the advice given was right, but to also explain that
advice.
MOY v. PETTIMAN SMITH
The defendant was a barrister who was sued by a client. The case arose from
another case where the claimant had sued a health authority for medical
negligence. The parties were negotiating on a settlement of 1500000 pounds
outside of court and the barrister advised the claimant not to accept it. The
claimant did so, but it actually weakened her case, and so she sued the barrister
for negligent advice and the question arose regarding negligence. The House of
Lords held that the barrister was not negligent, as the advice she had given was
within the range of what was reasonable for a barrister, and it was not necessary
to spell out all the reasoning behind the advice as long as it was clear and
understandable.
ROE v. MINISTER OF HEALTH
The claimant had been left paralyzed after surgery, because a disinfectant in
which anesthetics were kept leaked. It was invisible and therefore the defendant
was not liable as he had already followed the safety procedure correctly.
MAGUIRE v. HARLAND AND WOLFF plc
The claimant contracted the fatal disease mesothelioma after being exposed to
asbestos from her husband’s work clothes.the court found that at the time Mr.
Maguire had been working at the shipyard, there had been no information from
specialists on workplace safety, or from the medical profession to suggest that it
was necessary to protect family members from exposure, and so the defendants
were not liable.
N v. UK MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
Failure to look into a possible risk can amount to negligence.
PARIS v. STEPNEY BOROUGH COUNCIL
The claimant was an employee of the defendants who only had the sight of one
eye, and had been given the job of welding. While doing so, a metal piece fell into
his eye as he had not been provided with goggles. The House of Lords held that
failing to provide goggles would not make the defendants liable to a worker with
no eyesight problems.
BARRETT v. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
The court held that there is no duty to stop someone from drinking, but once the
claimant was drunk, it was assumed that the defendant had assumed some kind
of responsibility for the consequences of intoxication.
GRIFFITHS v. BROWN
The claimant was drunk and asked the defendant, a taxi driver, to take him to a
cashpoint, and got injured there. He sued the driver, and argued that the
defendant owed him a duty as he knew he was drunk, but the court held that duty
of care would not increase simply because the claimant was drunk.
BOLTON v. STONE
The claimant was standing in front of her house when she was hit by a ball from a
nearby cricket stadium. This had happened rarely in the past and the defendants
had erected a 17 foot fence around the fence to prevent such a situation. The
House of Lords held that the chances of such a situation occurring were so slight
that the defendants could not be liable for negligence, or to take any more
precaution.
LATIMER v. AEC Ltd.
Flooding had occurred in the factory due to an unusually heavy spell of rain. The
defendants had covered most of the area with saw dust but not all, as they didn’t
have enough. An employee slipped on a wet floor and got injured. He sued the
factory for not taking reasonable precautions, but the House of Lords rejected this
argument as the defendants could not be expected to take such onerous
measures.
WILSON v. GOVERNORS OF SACRED HEART ROMAN PRIMARY SCHOOL
A nine year old boy was injured by a fellow pupil, when he was crossing the
school playground to go back home. The court held that schools usually did not
supervise students at this time, and so the defendants had not fallen below any
standard of care.
THOMPSON v. SMITH SHIPREPAIRERS
Companies whose industrial practices showed serious disregard for workers’
health and safety would not evade liability simply by showing that such behaviour
was common practice in the industry.
COLE v. DAVIS GILBERT
The care arose after Cole was walking across a village green and stepped into a
hole, breaking her leg. The hole had been used to hold a maypole for a village
fete, and was dug by the local british legion which had organised the fete. After
the pole had been removed, they had filled the pole but it had been left open
again, causing the accident. The court assumed it had been done by children
while playing, and held that the legion was not in breach of duty, as they had taken
reasonable steps to fill the hole
HUNTER v. CANARY WHARF ltd. The case arose from the construction of a
tower, an action concerning the effects of the construction was brought by the
local residents, and one of the issues that arose from the case was whether
excess dust could constitute damage under negligence. The court held that it did
not, as it was an inevitable result of urban life.