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W25390
O'DESI MEALS: A SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE BRAND
Shilpee A Dasgupta wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The author does not intend to illustrate either
effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The author may have disguised certain names and other identifying
information to protect confidentiality.
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Copyright © 2021, Ivey Business School Foundation
Version: 2021-12-15
In 2019, Anubhav Dutta, the founder of O’Desi Meals (OM), was noticing a lack of authentic home-cooked
meals among the Indian food options in Dublin, Ireland. In response, Dutta decided to launch his own
subscription-based authentic Indian food venture based on the dabbawala model, which was prevalent in
Mumbai, India.1 Dutta planned to cater to the Indian diaspora’s preference for a healthier (less oily) home-cooked
version affordable Indian food meals that would be delivered to their homes. This would be a much healthier
alternative than having to eat out every day. OM conducted diaspora-based marketing and targeted people across
various occupations and ages who preferred authentic Indian home-cooked meals for lunch and dinner.
tC
In 2020, after one year in operation, OM observed a sudden boost in demand for its meal boxes (known in
India as tiffin) as a result of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent social distancing
requirements, travel restrictions, and business lockdowns. OM noticed a steep increase in monthly demand
for this product from 130 meals in September 2019, to 800 meals in October 2020, and 1,300 in March
2021. Although the pandemic was the original driver of OM’s initial business growth, Dutta sustained that
business growth through effective and accurate planning of the food’s quality and by providing interesting
varieties and accurate forecasting of the meals.
Do
No
However, maintaining on-time delivery turned out to be a strategic challenge. Dutta adopted two strategies
to address this challenge: one short-term, to ensure sustainability (i.e., revenue generation); and one longterm, to ensure growth. The first strategy was based on restructuring OM’s operating model to generate
revenue and retain its customer base through quality service. The second strategy was developed by
combining the social entrepreneurship approach with the dabbawala model. However, Dutta still had to
determine if the business environment was right for OM. Could the company successfully deliver on-time
quality and varied meals by applying this combined strategy and by establishing itself as a socially
responsible Indian tiffin brand in Dublin, Ireland?
1
The dabbawala model referred to a hot meal lunchbox delivery and return system from homes and restaurants to people at work
mainly used in Mumbai, India that focused on individualized customer care, collaborative planning, and implementation, along
with strong teamwork and strict time management; Sukhada Chaudhary, “Dabbawalas: All You Need to Know,” Culture Trip,
January 26, 2017, https://theculturetrip.com/asia/india/articles/all-you-need-to-know-about-mumbais-amazing-dabbawalas.
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ABOUT O’DESI MEALS
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In August 2019, Dutta launched OM, his long-standing dream project of catering to Dublin’s Indian
diaspora population. According to a 2016 census report, the city housed 40 per cent of the 45,000 people
from an Indian background that lived in Ireland. That segment of the population was also among the fastest
growing.2 Dutta specifically intended to cater to the Indian diaspora’s need for authentic home-cooked highquality Indian meals at affordable prices. As an immigrant from India, Dutta was keenly aware that existing
Indian restaurants and food providers served a lower quality westernized and expensive version of the
Indian food he was accustomed to, which he did not feel was a healthy option. Numerous studies had
detailed the negative aspects of high levels of fats, sugar, sodium, and other harmful ingredients found in
some processed foods.3 Recognizing a business opportunity, Dutta launched OM by applying a
differentiation strategy that primarily targeted the Indian diaspora. OM would provide food with a superior
and authentic taste, as well as compelling value for the customer’s money.
Dutta had another important driver for starting his new venture, a feeling of social responsibility toward
Ireland’s homeless people (also known as “rough sleepers”). The homeless rate had been growing
exponentially since 2014 across Ireland, with 8,313 rough sleepers reported between December 25, 2020 and
January 31, 2021, comprising both adults and children. In January 2021, 114 rough sleepers were reported as
living outdoors among Dublin’s streets. This number had increased from 90 on November 27, 2019.4
tC
The total number, however, was much higher when including people living in squats or staying with friends
(casually referred to as “sofa surfing”), or women and children residing in domestic violence shelters. In
Ireland, the total number of rough sleepers staying indoors and in the government’s accommodation was
reported as 6,906. As of April 24, 2016, Dublin accounted for 72.5 per cent (or 5,009 individuals) of this
figure.5 Children and young adults (18 to 25 years old) also formed a significant part of the homeless
population, with an 80 per cent increase since August 2017. They contributed 60 per cent of the total
homeless population in Dublin, amounting to nearly 760 individuals across Ireland. Some reasons cited for
homelessness of children and young adults included the lack of a family support network, necessary skills
to live independently, employment, and affordable rented accommodation.6
No
Dutta understood the gravity of the situation that homeless individuals faced, especially young people,
many of whom were also plagued by repercussions from substance abuse. In 2015, Dutta started a Christmas
project through which he distributed meal boxes and basic need items such as socks, gloves, and dental
health kits to rough sleepers across Dublin. These gestures helped provide some assistance for short periods,
but Dutta wanted to provide a more prolonged solution. To make a real difference, a more structured plan
was needed, which meant investing more funds. By launching OM, Dutta hoped to create jobs for homeless
young people. His goal was to fill at least 10 per cent of the catering and delivery positions in the company
by hiring and training rough sleepers by 2022. However, to achieve this objective, Dutta had to overcome
“Census 2016 Profile 8—Irish Travellers, Ethnicity and Religion,” Central Statistics Office, accessed November 8, 2021,
https://www.cso.ie/en/csolatestnews/presspages/2017/census2016profile8-irishtravellersethnicityandreligion.
3
Agnieszka Jaworowska, et al., “Nutritional Challenges and Health Implications of Takeaway and Fast Food,” Nutrition
Reviews 71, no. 5 (2013): 310–18, https://doi.org/10.1111/nure.12031; R. Rosenheck, “Fast Food Consumption and Increased
Caloric Intake: A Systematic Review of a Trajectory towards Weight Gain and Obesity Risk,” Obesity Reviews 9, no. 6 (2008):
535–47, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-789X.2008.00477.x; and Lyndal Wellard-Cole, Alyse Davies, and Margaret AllmanFarinelli, “Contribution of Foods Prepared Away from Home to Intakes of Energy and Nutrients of Public Health Concern in
Adults:
A
Systematic
Review,”
Critical
Reviews
in
Food
Science
and
Nutrition
(2021),
https://doi.org/10.1080/10408398.2021.1887075.
4
Aisling Reidy, “Homeless Figures and the Impact of COVID-19,” Focus Ireland, accessed November 20, 2021,
https://www.focusireland.ie/focus-blog/homeless-figures-and-the-impact-of-covid-19.
5
“Census 2016 Profile 8.”
6
Reidy, “Homeless Figures.”
Do
2
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the strategic challenge of forecasting monthly demand, accurately planning a weekly meals menu based on
those forecasts, and delivering the food on time to various locations across Dublin.
By 2022, Dutta was determined that he wanted OM to become the most trusted and socially-responsible
tiffin service brand in Dublin that specialized in home-cooked, authentic, and healthy Indian meals at
affordable prices and within a minimum delivery time, with the involvement of rough sleepers.
EVALUATING THE CURRENT OPERATIONAL STRATEGY
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OM was the only Indian tiffin service registered with the Food Safety Authority of Ireland that delivered
subscription-based Indian food meals across Dublin. The service featured a fixed weekly menu that varied
each week and provided to customers what Dutta referred to as “mom’s recipe” meals. Dutta used the 4P
marketing mix prism to assess OM’s operational strategy and highlight the core features that contributed to
its sustainability: product, price, place, and promotion.
Product
No
Price
tC
OM offered various weekly meals involving specialities from various regions of India to cater to the diverse
Indian population residing in Dublin. Popular street food options were featured on Sundays and Wednesdays
to keep the menu selections interesting. On the other four days, OM served complimentary basmati rice and
dal with the main dishes, which were a staple in most Indian homes. The venture also offered South Indian
delicacies some Sundays, such as idli sambhar and medu vada, finding that its customer base seemed to enjoy
this cuisine. The menu was highly influenced by North Indian food choices, which comprised the largest
presence among Dublin’s people from an Indian background. OM avoided repeating any meals within a threeweek span to provide variety, cover as many Indian recipes as possible, and capture the interest of its
consumers (see Exhibit 1). Besides tiffin services, OM also offered catering for widely attended Indian events
and festivals in Dublin (both residential and corporate), such as Diwali, Dussehra, birthdays, and
housewarming parties. Dutta was very careful to promote high food quality and guard against contamination
by following the recommendations of the Food Safety Authority of Ireland’s Health Service Executive. OM
ensured that all meals were prepared at the correct room temperature before packaging to retain the food’s
ideal taste for three days after production, the best before time stated clearly on the labels.
Do
OM operated using a subscription model for customers to receive meals either weekly or monthly. In
addition, customers who wished to try Indian cuisine on an occasional basis could purchase a one-time
meal. This option catered to the non-Indian community and aimed to attract more customers. The
subscription business was based on a recurring revenue model. It allowed OM to leverage customer
relationships to create a steady income stream, while providing customers convenient repurchases on a
weekly or monthly plan without having to place an order each day. The price for a single meal order was
€9.997 and included complimentary basmati rice and dal every Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday.
Add-on items were available at €2.99 per item. The weekly subscription price was €65.94 for six meals,
excluding add-on items and a €3 delivery fee that was charged twice per week. The monthly subscription
price was €259.74 for 26 meals, which was a considerable saving compared to typical Indian restaurant
prices in the city, which could range from €25 to €25 for a complete meal (e.g., main dish, side dish, and
dessert). OM also offered customers the convenience of delaying their remaining subscription meals over
7
€ = European euro; US$1 = €0.85 on March 31, 2021; all currency amounts are in € unless otherwise specified.
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weeks or months, in case of travel or other absence. Therefore, OM provided competitive pricing, healthy
options, high quality foods, and convenience in its subscription-based tiffin service throughout Dublin.
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The use of so-called “cloud kitchens” or incubators was rapidly increasing, especially after the financial
impact incurred by many food services from the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. These shared
kitchens allowed food and beverage ventures prepare and deliver food to the customer’s doorstep by using
telephone or online ordering systems.8 OM used cloud kitchens for two days each week to reduce
operational costs such as utilities, logistics, and full-time employee salaries, while many of its competitors
continued to use full time staff and a permanent physical facility for all their services. OM’s subscription
model, especially for monthly subscriptions, enabled Dutta and his team to lock in revenue for the entire
month. In comparison, one-time meals and even weekly subscriptions offered much less guaranteed revenue
over a shorter period.
Place
OM did not have a physical location that its customers could visit to place their orders. The venture operated
on a virtual platform, mainly over social media, and delivered orders across Dublin, which made on-time
delivery to distant faraway locations a logistical challenge. Nonetheless, Dublin provided an opportunity for
OM to thrive thanks to its large population of Indian immigrants, which was generally expected to grow
exponentially. According to Ireland’s Central Statistical Office, approximately 5,994 people from an Indian
background worked in Dublin, most of whom worked in the lower professional segment that included nurses
and midwives. This represented approximately 35.6 per cent of the total non-Irish professionals in the country.
Dutta felt that the affordable prices of OM’s subscription-based meals provided an advantage for this group.9
No
tC
Although the number of Indian immigrants in Dublin was lower than in many other UK cities, it did attract
numerous Indian professionals and students as the country’s largest city. This trend was strengthened after
the United Kingdom left the European Union (EU)—in a move known colloquially as Brexit—and Ireland
became the only remaining predominantly English-speaking country in the EU.10 Dublin boasted many
Indian fine dining restaurants and more affordable take-out food services. However, Dutta felt that many
of these places lacked the quality of home-cooked food that OM provided, with less oil and spice but a
more authentic Indian taste, rather than the Westernized Indian cuisine that catered to non-Indian customers.
OM also provided its unique subscription-based model that delivered home-cooked meals at the customer’s
doorstep at affordable prices. Therefore, Dutta was unconcerned about competition and confident that he
could grow and expand OM’s loyal customer base.
Promotion
Do
For sales promotion, OM relied mainly on its social media accounts on Facebook and Instagram, with far
less emphasis on its website. Weekly menus, Sunday specials, and Wednesday street food specials were
posted on Facebook and Instagram, targeted mainly to people from Indian and South Asian backgrounds.
In its marketing campaigns, the company emphasized its registration with the Food Safety Authority of
Ireland’s Health Service Executive as an Indian tiffin service that sold a subscription-based authentic Indian
food experience. OM’s secondary customer segment was more generally people who loved Indian food or
were interested in trying the authentic home-cooked flavours of the country’s diverse cuisine. OM’s
8
“Cloud Kitchens and New Technologies in the New Normal,” The Times of India, September 23, 2020,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/life-style/food-news/cloud-kitchen-changing-the-world-of-dining/photostory/77933564.cms.
9
“Census 2016 Profile 8.”
10
“Ireland Will Be Main US-Europe Bridge after Brexit, Ambassador Claims,” The Irish Times, June 30, 2018,
https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/ireland-will-be-main-us-europe-bridge-after-brexit-ambassador-claims-1.3549855
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marketing efforts were mainly conducted online, although Dutta was interested in investigating more
traditional options to accompany its strong word-of-mouth publicity.
CURRENT OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES AND REDRESSAL STRATEGY
Despite the many hardships caused by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, OM
benefitted from social distancing requirements and lockdowns of workplaces. The company saw a
substantial increase in its consumer base from 130 complete meals sold in September 2019 to 800 meals
sold in October 2020 (for an increase of approximately 615 per cent) and 1,300 meals sold in March 2021
(for an increase of approximately 1,000 per cent). Its annual sales for financial year 2020 (ending December
31) were €41,456, including a gross profit of €8,291 and a net profit (after taxes) of €5,960.
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Dutta’s projections for the next year were estimated at total sales of €122,537, gross profits of €24,507, and
net profits of €19,060 (see Exhibit 2). Overall, OM targeted an annual year-over-year sales growth rate of
15 per cent until 2024. However, according to a report by the Central Statistics Office, which found that
enterprises employing three to nine people earned annual revenues of €1,390 million in 2005,11 OM’s
revenue was still well below that of an average small business in the country.
tC
Dutta was confident that OM’s popularity and demand rising steadily from 2019 would ensure continued
strong growth. The considerable increase in orders required OM to rely more heavily on the cloud kitchen,
although its limited capacity could only prepare a portion of the required meals. OM also faced typical startup challenges related to logistics and meeting constantly increasing demand. Dutta soon realized that Dublin
had an shortage of commercial kitchens, which added further challenges to growing OM’s operations and
customer base. To address this issue, Dutta sought assistance from OM’s director Siddharth Patel and began
converting an industrial unit into a new commercial kitchen, after securing the required approvals from the
country’s Planning and Permission Department. The time-intensive task included meeting all safety and
utilities requirements, which Dutta hoped to complete by September 2021.
No
The new commercial kitchen project was affecting OM’s revenue and growth. Therefore, Dutta brought together
his marketing and sales team to help develop two strategies to address the challenges and ensure that OM
continued to earn revenue for the short term and ongoing growth over the long term. The short-term strategy
would restructure OM’s operating model to generate revenue and retain its customer base through quality
service. The long-term strategy would combine a social entrepreneurship approach with the dabbawala model.
Short-Term Revenue Strategy
Do
According to Dutta, OM aimed to make the entire process as easy as possible for the customer, and to offer
high-quality food and a suitable quantity in each complete meal, for a reasonable price. To meet its
objective, in 2021, OM hired skilled kitchen workers including a chef from India. OM sponsored the
employees’ work permits and trained them to prepare foods and spices and to package complete meals in
their boxes. Concerned about filling all current orders, Dutta decided to curb online advertising to avoid
attracting more customers than the staff could serve. The management team focused on maximizing revenue
with OM’s existing customer base and resources by improvements to the menu such as greater variety of
add-on items (e.g., parathas, vada pav, mango lassi, gulab jamun, and others). The additional add-on items
helped OM increase revenue through the higher cost of each meal, without requiring more employees to
prepare the items or increasing kitchen and logistics expenses.
11
Central
Statistics
Office,
Small
Business
in
Ireland:
2008
Edition,
May
https://www.cso.ie/en/media/csoie/releasespublications/documents/otherreleases/smallbusiness08ed.pdf, 11.
2008,
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Customers could place orders by telephone or online through Facebook and Instagram. OM expected to
increase its annual online marketing budget to €744 by the end of 2021 and to €2,000 by the end of 2024
to meet online ordering and customer service needs. Telephone expenses, however, were expected to remain
stable at €180 per year. Online ordering entailed additional administrative challenges for OM’s staff
members. Customers were accustomed to paying in cash or by bank transfer upon delivery, which forced
staff members to continually check with banks to ensure that payments were made in full. Eventually, OM
adopted the Google Forms automated ordering system, through a link on its website and social media pages,
which was connected to the Revolut Business payment system for debit and credit card payments. The new
secure payment service, which was welcomed by OM’s customers, helped the venture reduce administrative
challenges and improve invoice management.
Long-Term Growth Strategy
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Dutta and Patel also addressed delivery-related issues through a new online real-time tracking system for
customers to check the delivery of their meal in real time. Customer concerns about their meal delivery,
which was outsourced to a logistics provider, meant that OM staff members were constantly tracking
deliveries and addressing issues for the customer. After implementing the new tracking system, OM
provided an estimated delivery time to customers the night before the meals were scheduled for delivery.
A link was also provided that enabled the customer to track the delivery in real time. This feature
considerably reduced OM’s administrative issues and helped customers plan their meal time efficiently.
OM’s dual vision was to establish a trusted brand name through the on-time delivery of meals to every
corner of Dublin and to create jobs for the city’s less-privileged rough sleepers. To achieve both parts of
this vision, Dutta applied the combined strategy of the social entrepreneurship approach and Mumbai’s
dabbawala model as its long-term growth strategy.12
No
tC
Since his early entrepreneurial days, Dutta had been fascinated by the synergetic work process of
dabbawalas. He decided that he had to follow that same model in delivering OM’s orders seamlessly across
Dublin, catering to people working in offices or from home during COVID-19 lockdowns. Social
entrepreneurship enabled Dutta to create social value for OM by providing an innovative solution to help
address the long-standing problem of Ireland’s homeless people. This approach allowed Dutta to develop
business opportunities for OM, while offering recruitment opportunities to Dublin’s underprivileged
communities.13 This combined approach also aimed to address the challenges OM was facing due to the
increase in demand.
Assigning Territories to Delivery Staff
Do
As a small venture, OM had a limited number of staff members engaged in growth opportunities through
product development, marketing, sales, and customer service. Logistics were outsourced to save time and
to allow greater focus on the business. Although outsourcing logistics was an expensive option, it enabled
OM to expand the business in the short term, without allocating too much time to operational issues. Over
the long term, however, the plan was for OM to set up its own internal logistics. But the transition from a
third party to OM would have to be smooth and retain the high quality of delivery, ensuring that customers
did not notice any difference. To achieve this goal, Dutta planned to assign delivery workers (including
rough sleepers) to particular service areas or territories. Delivery staff would collect the OM meals in bulk
Stefan H. Thomke, “Mumbai’s Models of Service Excellence,” Harvard Business Journal, November 2012,
https://hbr.org/2012/11/mumbais-models-of-service-excellence.
13
Alejandro García-Jurado, José Javier Pérez-Barea, and Rodrigo J. Nova, “A New Approach to Social Entrepreneurship: A
Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis,” Sustainability 13, no. 5 (2021): 2754, DOI:10.3390/su13052754.
12
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and deliver them to the end customers residing in their particular assigned area or territory. The dabbawala
model inspired this approach.
Apprentice Program
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Based on the demand for OM’s services, Dutta identified small geographical pockets across the capital city
from where the bulk orders poured in. He would assign specific employees to these specific pockets, rather
than using random assignments. To ensure the approach’s success, each delivery person had to be
accountable for their territory’s food safety, packaging, and perishability. This approach would help Dutta
divert the biggest challenge of the dabbawala model—transportation. Mumbai’s dabbawalas had to depend
on the efficiency of the city’s public transportation.14 However, OM assigned delivery workers a specific
service area where they could commute to directly (at first using a third party; later using OM’s own
transportation) to seamlessly serve their customers. This approach also helped OM market its products and
services to potential customers through their familiarity with the delivery person in their area and by
distributing promotional items with the meals.
CONCLUSION
tC
Until March 2021, OM was able to use part-time employees to deliver the meal packages. However, after
monthly subscriptions rose dramatically with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, Dutta saw the boost
in demand a catalyst for growth and decided to rent a custom commercial kitchen to address the increased
demand. This would require a permanent delivery staff, which would include 10 per cent rough sleepers.
OM would use a well-developed apprentice program to guarantee the availability of a skilled delivery staff,
incorporating slack capacity to meet any surge in demand. If demand dropped, the apprentices could be
temporarily laid off to seek other employment, during slack periods. This strategy would reduce OM’s
financial liabilities, and in turn, meal subscription prices.
No
The short-term revenue generation strategy benefitted OM considerably. It addressed administrative
challenges and generated revenue. These were important market sustainability factors. They also helped
develop the brand and ensure growth. OM’s social entrepreneurship approach involved hiring rough
sleepers as permanent employees. It raised the company’s social value and provided a competitive
advantage over competing Indian restaurants and take-out food services. OM also created social value by
employing and empowering underprivileged people for meal delivery services. OM’ aspired to become the
most trusted and socially responsible tiffin brand in Dublin, specializing in home-cooked, authentic, and
healthy Indian meals at affordable prices and on time.
Do
However, before proceeding further with the combined dabbawala and social entrepreneurship approach,
OM had to analyze its external and internal capabilities, as well as its market position in relation to its
competitors. How would OM develop its competitive strength, address operational challenges, and
effectively implement its growth strategy?
The author would like to thank Mr. Anubhav Dutta and Mr. Siddharth Patel for their support in the creation of this case.
14
Stefan H. Thomke and Mona Sinha, The Dabbawala System: On-Time Delivery, Every Time (Boston, MA: Harvard Business
School, February 2010, revised January 2013).
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No
tC
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EXHIBIT 1: TWO DIFFERENT WEEKLY O’DESI MEALS MENUS
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Source: “O’Desi Meals,” Facebook, accessed November 22, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/odesi.meals; “odesi_meals,”
Instagram, accessed November 22, 2021, https://www.instagram.com/odesi_meals; reprinted with permission.
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(Draft)
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EXHIBIT 2: O’DESI MEALS CURRENT AND PROJECTED FINANCIALS, 2020 TO 2024
(YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31)
2021
2022
(Projected) (Projected)
2023
(Projected)
2024
(Projected)
41,456
122,537
140,917
162,055
186,363
Cost of sales
(33,165)
(98,029)
(112,734)
(129,644)
(149,090)
Cost of goods sold
(33,165)
(98,029)
(112,734)
(129,644)
(149,090)
8,291
24,507
28,183
32,411
37,273
20.0%
20.0%
20.0%
20.0%
20.0%
—
(744)
(1,000)
(1,500)
(2,000)
(800)
(800)
(800)
(800)
(800)
(180)
(180)
(180)
(180)
(180)
(500)
(500)
(500)
(500)
(500)
—
(500)
—
—
—
(1,480)
(2,724)
(2,480)
(2,980)
(3,480)
Profit on ordinary activities (before tax)
6,811
21,783
25,703
29,431
33,793
Tax on profit on ordinary activities (12.5%)
(851)
(2,723)
(3,213)
(3,679)
(4,224)
Profit for the year (after tax)
5,960
19,060
22,490
25,752
29,568
Gross profit
Marketing costs
Insurance
Telephone
Transportation expenses
Profit/loss on disposal of tangibles
Total expenses
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Administration expenses:
Do
No
tC
Note: Company operations beginning July 1, 2020.
Source: Company files.
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