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Nov 11 internet digests
Criminal Law (University of San Carlos)
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1. Pp vs Lo Ho Wing, GR No. 88017, Jan 21, 1991
FACTS
1. In July 1987, the Special Operations Group, a unit of the Criminal Investigation Service
(CIS) of the
Philippine Constabulary (PC), received a tip from one of its informers about an organized
group engaged in
the importation of illegal drugs; a project codenamed "OPLAN SHARON 887" was created
in order to bust
the suspected syndicate.
2. As part of the operations, the recruitment of confidential men and "deep penetration agents'
was carried out
to infiltrate the crime syndicate. One of those recruited was the discharged accused, Reynaldo
Tia
3. As a "deep penetration agent," Tia regularly submitted reports of his undercover activities
on the suspected
criminal syndicate.
4. On October 4, 1987, appellant and Tia left for Hongkong on board a Philippine Airlines
flight. Before they
departed, Tia was able to telephone Captain Palmera to inform him of their expected date of
return to the
Philippines as declared in his round-trip plane ticket-October 6, 1987 at two o'clock in the
afternoon.
5. The day after they arrived in Hongkong, Tia and appellant boarded a train bound for
Guangzhou, in the
People's Republic of China. Upon arriving there, they checked in at a hotel, and rested for a
few hours. That
evening, Tia went to appellant's room to talk to him. Upon entering, he saw two other men
with appellant.
One was fixing the tea bags, while the other was burning substance on a piece of aluminum
foil using a
cigarette lighter. Tia asked the latter what they would be bringing back to the Philippines. He
was informed
that their cargo consisted of Chinese drugs.
6. The next day, October 6,1987, the two returned to Manila via a China Airlines flight.
Appellant had with
him his red traveling bag with wheels. The contents of the cans were not closely examined,
and appellant was cleared along with Tia.
7. The plane landed at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), then named Manila
International
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Airport, on schedule. Lim met the newly-arrived pair at the arrival area. Lim talked to
appellant, while Tia,
upon being instructed, looked after their luggage. After Lim and appellant finished their
conversation, the
latter hailed a taxicab. Appellant and Tia boarded the taxicab after putting their luggage
inside the back
compartment of the vehicle. Lim followed in another taxi cab.
8. Meanwhile, a team composed of six operatives headed by Captain Palmera was formed to
act on the tip
given by Tia. Upon seeing appellant and Tia leave the airport, the operatives who first spotted
them
followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the car of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden
by appellant and
Tia and cut into its path forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. Meanwhile, the other
taxicab carrying
Lim sped away in an attempt to escape. The operatives disembarked from their car,
approached the taxicab,
and asked the driver to open the baggage compartment.
9. Three pieces of luggage were retrieved from the back compartment of the vehicle. The
operatives requested
from the suspects permission to search their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of the red
traveling bag
owned by appellant. Sgt. Roberto Cayabyab, one of the operatives, pried the lid open, pulled
out a paper tea
bag from the can and pressed it in the middle to feel its contents. Some crystalline white
powder resembling
crushed alum came out of the bag. The sergeant then opened the tea bag and examined its
contents more
closely. Suspecting the crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug, he had the three traveling
bags opened
for inspection. From the red traveling bag, a total of six (6) tin cans were found, including the
one
previously opened. Nothing else of consequence was recovered from the other bags. Tia and
appellant were
taken to the CIS Headquarters in Quezon City for questioning.
10. The tea bag opened by Sgt. Cayabyab during the search and seizure was sent to the PCINP Crime
Laboratory for preliminary examination. Tests conducted on a sample of the crystalline
powder inside the
tea bag yielded a positive result that the specimen submitted was metamphetamine.
ISSUE
WON THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE ON THE ACCUSED
AS ILLEGAL.
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HELD
No. The contentions are without merit. As correctly averred by appellee, that search and
seizure must be supported
by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. There are at least three (3) well-recognized
exceptions thereto. These are:
[1] a search incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of
evidence in plain view. The
circumstances of the case clearly show that the search in question was made as regards a
moving vehicle. Therefore,
a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the search on appellant and his co-accused.
In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that
the authorities had
reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in contraband and
transport it within the country.
The belief was based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the
suspected syndicate, of
which appellant was touted to be a member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the
expected date and time
of arrival of the accused from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable
them to fulfill the
requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is that
there was probable cause
to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in such a case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is
thereby DISMISSED.
No costs.
PACIS
2. Pp vs Tang Wai Lan, GR Nos 118736-37, July 23, 1997
3. Pp vs Dichoso, GR No. 101216-18, June 4, 1993
Facts:
Redentor Dichoso y Dagdag , the accused, appealed from June 11, 1991 of the RTC of San
Pablo City where he has been convicted of the crime violating Sec. 15, Art. II and Sec. 4, Art. II
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
with all its accessory penalties, to pay fine of P20, 000 and the cost of suit.
Likewise, Jaime Pagtakhan, was also charged with illegal possession of regulated drug violating
Sec.16 , Art. III of the Dangerous Drug Act .
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However, Sonia Dichoso y Vinerable could not be arrested because as for the words of the trial
court she cannot be located. The three cases were consolidated for a joint trial. In Branch 30 of
the RTC San Pablo City.
According to the accused-appellant Redentor Dichoso, the said accusation of illegal possession
of dangerous has been framed up or planted evidence. Aside from that, he contends that the
search warrant is a general warrant which does not satisfy the particular offense which he
violated, and the search conducted was unconstitutional and the items obtained inadmissible.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the evidence obtained is inadmissible?
2. Whether or not the search warrant against them is valid?
3. Whether or not the accused-appellant was guilty beyond reasonable doubt in violating the
Dangerous Drugs Act?
Rulings:
In the first issue, no, because the search warrant cannot be assailed as a general warrant, it
particularizes the place to be searched and the things to be seized and specifies the offense
involved. Items seized are admissible.
For the second one, the search warrant has been examined and found out that it was valid.
Lastly, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City is hereby modified
that Redentor Dichoso y Dagdag was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec.
16, Art. III of the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is
hereby sentenced in each case to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight years as
minimum to twelve years as maximum, and to pay a fine of P12,000.
4. San Juan vs Pp, GR No. 1771191, May 30, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner, together with Pineda and Coderes (accused), was charged with the crime of
Transporting Illegal Drugs in an Information dated December 16, 2003, which reads:
That on or about the 15th day of December 2003, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another,
without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously transport a
total of 978.7 grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) a dangerous drug[s].
Contrary to law.
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When arraigned on February 17, 2004, the three accused entered separate pleas of not
guilty to the offense charged. During the pre-trial, the three accused did not enter into
any stipulation or admission of facts with the prosecution. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued. In the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.
Issue/s:
Whether or not mere presence constitute conspiracy
Ruling:
NO. In this case, the prosecution, other than its bare assertions that petitioner and
accused conspired in transporting the shabu, failed to establish that there was indeed a
conscious criminal design existing between and among petitioner and accused to
commit the said offense. True, petitioner was in the driver’s seat of the parked car on
that fateful day of December 15, 2003, but it could not be deduced that he was even
aware that Pineda had with him two plastic containers containing shabu, nor did he
accord any form of assistance to Pineda. According to PO2 Jovenir, these plastic
containers were placed inside a bag and Pineda tried to conceal these under his
seat.39 These facts, standing alone, cannot give rise to a presumption of conspiracy.
Certainly, conspiracy must be proven through clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, it
is possible that petitioner was telling the truth when he said that he merely met with
accused in order to offer the car for sale, as that was his part-time business.40
It bears stressing that conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required to
establish the crime — proof beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, mere presence at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission without proof of cooperation or
agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy.41 In fine, the
prosecution failed to discharge its burden to prove and establish conspiracy. Necessarily,
petitioner should be held accountable only for his alleged respective participation in the
commission of the offense.
5. Pp vs Delmonte, GR No. 179940, April 23, 2008
FACTS:
Norberto del Monte was charged with violation 5.3 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The prosecution presented as its lone witness PO1 Gaudencio M. Tolentino, Jr., the poseur-buyer in
the buy-bust operation conducted against appellant.
On 10 December 2002, at around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, an informant together with
Tolentino went to buy shabu to del Monte. Tolentino gave appellant P300.00 consisting of three
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marked P100 bills. Upon receiving the P300.00, del Monte took out a plastic sachet from his pocket
and handed it over to Tolentino. As a pre-arranged signal, Tolentino lit a cigarette signifying that the
sale had been consummated. PO1 Antonio Barreras arrived, arrested del Monte and recovered the
marked money. A lab report confirms that the substance traded was indeed shabu.
For the defense, the del Monte took the witness stand, together with his common-law wife, Amelia
Mendoza; and nephew, Alejandro Lim.
Del Monte said that on that day a commotion woke him up. Mendoza, Lim, and a niece was being
assaulted by Tolentino and Barreras. Both policemen, then, tried to bribe them for their liberty.
The trial court sentenced del Monte life imprisonment and P5,000,000.00 fine. The trial court found
the lone testimony of PO1 Gaudencio M. Tolentino, Jr. to be credible and straightforward and was
not convinced by appellant’s defense of frame-up and denial.
Del Monte filed a petition on the Court of Appeals which was also denied but the fine was slashed to
P500,000.00.
Del Monte filed another appeal that was forwarded to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Norberto del Monte was guilty of violating 5.3 Article II of Republic Act No.
9165.
RULING:
YES. Del Monte argued that the officers failed to comply with Section 21 OF RA 9165. He claims that
pictures of him together with the alleged confiscated shabu were not taken immediately upon his
arrest and they did not conduct a physical inventory of the same in his presence as shown by their
joint affidavit of arrest, thus casting doubt on both his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence
adduced against him.
The Court said that del Monte cannot raise that argument anymore as he is too late. The Court also
said that the non-compliance will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. What is material to
the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually
took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
Thus, the petition of Norberto del Monte was denied.
6. Mallilin vs. Pp, GR No. 172953, April 30, 2008
Facts:
Police officers raided the residence of Junie Malillin y Lopez (petitioner).
The search allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu and five (5)
empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said substance.
Petitioner was charged with violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA No. 9165
(The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
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Petitioner entered a negative plea. At the ensuing trial, the prosecution
presented P/Insp Bolanos, Arroyo (forensic chemist) and PO3 Esternon as
witnesses.
The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and
seizure conducted by the police operatives. Petitioner testified that PO3
Esternon began the search of the bedroom with Licup and petitioner
himself inside. Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store.
Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was summoned
by Esternon to the bedroom and once inside, the officer closed the door
and asked him to lift the mattress on the bed. And as he was doing as
told, Esternon stopped him and ordered him to lift the portion of the
headboard. In that instant, Esternon showed him "sachet of shabu" which
according to him came from a pillow on the bed. Petitioner's account in its
entirety was corroborated in its material respects by Norma (petitioner's
mother), barangay kagawad Licup and Sheila (petitioner’s wife) in their
testimonies. Norma and Sheila positively declared that petitioner was not
in the house for the entire duration of the search because at one point he
was sent by Esternon to the store to buy cigarettes while Sheila was being
searched by the lady officer. Licup for his part testified on the
circumstances surrounding the discovery of the plastic
sachets. He recounted that after the five empty sachets were found, he
went out of the bedroom and into the living room and after about three
minutes, Esternon, who was left inside the bedroom, exclaimed that he
had just found two filled sachets.
The trial court declared petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged. The trial court reasoned that the fact
that shabu was found in the house of petitioner was prima facie evidence
of petitioner's animus possidendi sufficient to convict him of
the charge inasmuch as things which a person possesses or over which he
exercises acts of ownership are presumptively owned by
him. It also noted petitioner's failure to ascribe ill motives to the police
officers to fabricate charges against him.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA, calling the attention of the
court to certain irregularities in the manner by which the
search of his house was conducted. The OSG advanced that on the
contrary, the prosecution evidence sufficed for petitioner's
conviction and that the defense never advanced any proof to show that
the members of the raiding team was improperly motivated to
hurl false charges against him and hence the presumption that they had
regularly performed their duties should prevail.
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The CA affirmed the judgment of
the trial court.
Issue: Whether petitioner's bare denial cannot defeat the positive
assertions of the prosecution and that the same does not suffice to
overcome the prima facie existence of animus possidendi.
Held: Yes, petitioner may defeat the positive assertions through proving
the failure to follow the chain of custody rule.
• The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the
offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of
conviction.
o Essential therefore in these cases is that the identity of the prohibited
drug be established beyond doubt.
o Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not
suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral
certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of
possession, the fact that the substance illegally
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possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit
must also be established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.
o The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity
of the evidence are removed.
• As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that
the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be.
o It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
item was picked up to the time it is offered
into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession,
the condition in which it was received
and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain.
o These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of
the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of
the same.
• An unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the
item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not
readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical,
or when a witness has failed to observe its
uniqueness.
o The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to
alteration, tampering, contamination and even
substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to
fungibility, alteration or tampering—
without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not—dictates the
level of strictness in the application of the
chain of custody rule.
• A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily
identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific
analysis to determine their composition and nature.
o Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that
applied to cases involving objects which are
readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a
chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either
been exchanged with another or been
contaminated or tampered with.
• A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the
identity of the sachets of shabu allegedly seized
from petitioner. Of the people who came into direct contact with the seized
objects, only Esternon and Arroyo testified for the
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specific purpose of establishing the identity of the evidence.
o SPO2 Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly handed over the confiscated
sachets for recording and marking, as well
as Garcia, the person to whom Esternon directly handed over the seized items
for chemical analysis at the crime
laboratory, were not presented in court to establish the circumstances under
which they handled the subject items.
o Any reasonable mind might then ask the question: Are the sachets of shabu
allegedly seized from petitioner the very
same objects laboratory tested and offered in court as evidence?
• The prosecution's evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer.
o Considering that it was Gallinera who recorded and marked the seized items,
his testimony in court is crucial to affirm
whether the exhibits were the same items handed over to him by Esternon at
the place of seizure and acknowledge the
initials marked thereon as his own.
o The same is true of Garcia who could have, but nevertheless failed, to testify
on the circumstances under which she
received the items from Esternon, what she did with them during the time they
were in her possession until before she
delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis.
• The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its burden of establishing
the identity of the seized items because it failed to
offer not only the testimony of Gallinera and Garcia but also any sufficient
explanation for such failure.
o In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to the integrity of the exhibits
inasmuch as it failed to rule out the possibility
of substitution of the exhibits, which cannot but inure to its own detriment.
• Also the records disclose a series of irregularities committed by the police
officers from the commencement of the search of
petitioner's house until the submission of the seized items to the laboratory for
analysis.
o The Court takes note of the unrebutted testimony of petitioner, corroborated
by that of his wife, that prior to the discovery
of the two filled sachets petitioner was sent out of his house to buy cigarettes at
a nearby store.
o Equally telling is the testimony of Bolanos that he posted some of the
members of the raiding team at the door of
petitioner's house in order to forestall the likelihood of petitioner fleeing the
scene.
o By no stretch of logic can it be conclusively explained why petitioner was sent
out of his house on an errand when in the
first place the police officers were in fact apprehensive that he would flee to
evade arrest.
o This fact assumes prime importance because the two filled sachets were
allegedly discovered by Esternon immediately
after petitioner returned to his house from the errand, such that he was not able
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to witness the conduct of the search
during the brief but crucial interlude that he was away.
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• It is also strange that, as claimed by Esternon, it was petitioner himself who
handed to him the items to be searched including the
pillow from which the two filled sachets allegedly fell. Indeed, it is contrary to
ordinary human behavior that petitioner would hand
over the said pillow to Esternon knowing fully well that illegal drugs are
concealed therein.
• Moreover, Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No.
9165 clearly outlines the post-seizure procedure in
taking custody of seized drugs.
o It mandates that the officer acquiring initial custody of drugs under a search
warrant must conduct the photographing and
the physical inventory of the item at the place where the warrant has been
served.
o Esternon deviated from this procedure. It was elicited from him that at the
close of the search of petitioner's house, he
brought the seized items immediately to the police station for the alleged
purpose of making a "true inventory" thereof, but
there appears to be no reason why a true inventory could not be made in
petitioner's house when in fact the
apprehending team was able to record and mark the seized items and there and
then prepare a seizure receipt therefor.
o Lest it be forgotten, the raiding team has had enough opportunity to cause the
issuance of the warrant which means that it
has had as much time to prepare for its implementation.
o While the final proviso in Section 21 of the rules would appear to excuse noncompliance therewith, the same cannot
benefit the prosecution as it failed to offer any acceptable justification for
Esternon's course of action.
• Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and
normal procedure in the implementation of the
warrant and in taking post-seizure custody of the evidence, the blind reliance by
the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the
presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is manifestly misplaced.
o The presumption of regularity is merely just that—a mere presumption
disputable by contrary proof and which when
challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.
o Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the
presumption of innocence that prevails if not
overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
o In the present case the lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs
allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with
the irregularity in the manner by which the same were placed under police
custody before offered in court, strongly
militates a finding of guilt.
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WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27
January 2006 affirming with modification the judgment of
conviction of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City, Branch 52, and its
Resolution dated 30 May 2006 denying reconsideration
thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Junie Malillin y Lopez
isACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is accordingly
ordered immediately released from custody unless he is being lawfully
held for another offense.
7. Bondad vs. Pp, GR No. 173804, Dec. 10, 2008
FACTS:
Elpidio Bondad, Jr was caught in a buy-bust operation selling shabu. The illegal drugs were
inside a Vicks container. PO2 Dano placed the markings “EBB-ED BUYBUST 01/29/04” on the
substance-filled sachet sold to him, and “EBB-ED, POS 1 and 2, 01/29/04” on the sachets that
remained inside the “Vicks” container. Bondad was brought to the station and was asked for a
drug test. The drugs were sent to the laboratory and was confirmed as shabu. Bondad’s claims
that he was forced to come with PO2 Brubio. When Brubio saw his son inside the billiard hall,
he was made to board a police car. The RTC found appellant guilty of violating Sec. 5 Art II of
RA9165. He then filed a petition and subsequently affirmed the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
RULING:
NO. The SC found out that the police violated Sec. 21 of RA 9165. The police did not take
photographs of the illegal drugs on the scene and there was no representative from the media or a
public officer to sign the copy of the inventory of the seized items. The Court reasoned that what
is important is the integrity of the illegal drugs, if it was the same drugs from the start. Hence, the
RTC’s decision was reversed and petitioner was acquitted.
8. Estipona vs Lobrigo, GR No. 226679, August 15, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 (Possession) of RA
9165.
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea
Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead, to enter a
plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should have been Section 15?) of the
same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and
the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.
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Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all
violations of said law violates:
1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;
2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the
government.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon
the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.
2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being violative of
the Constitutional right to equal protection of the law.
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: YES
The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and
Legislative departments.
The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches
of our government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate
rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The
other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that
effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.
Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous attempts on the part of
the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court
(Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman
in an administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of Appeals
under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative,
Inc. – The Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on
summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from
Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market Vendors MultiPurpose
Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In Re:
Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of
Filing/Docket Fees; and Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. –
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Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not
exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) – The first
paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the
Supreme Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman,
is unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its
discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of procedure, to the exclusion of
the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority
to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the
safeguards of Our institutional independence.
SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED
The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is
contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to preempt
any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165.
Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a
qualified version thereof, the Court deemed it proper to declare as invalid the
prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the
rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING:
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive
or procedural in nature.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the
test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested
right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates
substantive rights. By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts that the rules on
plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement of
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the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an “important,” “essential,” “highly
desirable,” and “legitimate” component of the administration of justice.
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby the accused
and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to
court approval.” There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The
essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions
to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged
because the chief virtues of the system – speed, economy, and finality – can benefit the
accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court.
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea
bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it
operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
No constitutional right to plea bargain
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed
by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not do so if he
prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty
is not a demandable right but depends on the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that
is necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor
has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can
sustain.
Plea bargaining, when allowed
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point
when the prosecution already rested its case.
As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court’s exercise of
discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing
or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the
prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged.
The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing
change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the
evidence on record. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of
the prosecution’s evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand,
the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea is improper and irregular.
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9. AAA vs BBB GR No. 212448, Jan. 11, 2018
BBB ground of lack of jurisdiction and thereby dismissing the case, the
trial court
G.R. No. 21244 January 11, 2018 reasoned:
DOCTRINE: RA. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se
but the Here, while the Court maintains its 28 October 2011 ruling that
probable cause
psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the wife.
Otherwise exists in this case and that [BBB] is probably guilty of the crime
charged,
stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the
law seeks to considering, however, his subsequent clear showing that the
acts complained of him
outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts
by which had occurred in Singapore, dismissal of this case is proper since
the Court enjoys no
psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the
jurisdiction over the offense charged, it having transpired outside the
territorial
circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit
relationship may jurisdiction of this Court.
or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife.
Thus, the
mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct
element in the Aggrieved by the denial of the prosecution's motion for
reconsideration of the
commission of the offense. dismissal of the case, AAA sought direct
recourse to this Court via the instant
petition on a pure question of law. AAA posits that R.A. No. 9262 is in
danger of
FACTS: becoming transmogrified into a weak, wobbly, and worthless law
because with the
Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City.
Their court a quo's ruling, it is as if husbands of Filipino women have been
given license
union produced two children: to enter into extra-marital affairs without
fear of any consequence, as long as they
are carried out abroad. In the main, AAA argues that mental and
emotional anguish
In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he
acquired is an essential element of the offense charged against BBB,
which is experienced by
permanent resident status in September of 2008. This petition
nonetheless indicates her wherever she goes, and not only in Singapore
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where the extra-marital affair
his address to be in Quezon City where his parents reside and where AAA
also takes place; thus, the RTC of Pasig City where she resides can take
cognizance of
resided from the time they were married until March of 2010, when AAA
and their the case.
children moved back to her parents' house in Pasig City. 7
ISSUE: WON our court can assume jurisdiction where a psychological
violence
AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to
no consisting of marital infidelity punishable under RA No. 9262 is
committed in a
financial support, and only sporadically. This allegedly compelled her to fly
extra foreign land but the psychological effect occured in the Philippines
since the wife
hours and take on additional jobs to augment her income as a flight
attendant. There and the children of the respondent, who suffered mental
anguish, are residing in the
were also allegations of virtual abandonment, mistreatment of her and
their son Philippines.
CCC, and physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse, BBB
supposedly
started having an affair with a Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with
whom he RATIO: Yes, PH court have jurisdiction. Contrary to the
interpretation of the RTC,
allegedly has been living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19,
2011 what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se
but the
when AAA and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore
during psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on
the wife. Otherwise
her visit with their kids.8 As can be gathered from the earlier cited
Information, stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said
circumstances that the law seeks to
despite the claims of varied forms of abuses, the investigating prosecutor
found outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the
various acts by which
sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and emotional
anguish psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending
on the
through his alleged marital infidelity.9 circumstances of the spouses and
for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may
or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish on the wife.
Thus, the
The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was issued against
BBB. mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and
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distinct element in the
AAA was also able to secure a Hold-Departure Order against BBB who
continued to commission of the offense.
evade the warrant of arrest. Consequently, the case was archived. 10
In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Trenas v. People,33 the
Court
On November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused
With explained that:The place where the crime was committed
determines not only the
Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold Departure
Order and venue of the action but is an essential element of
jurisdiction.1âwphi1 It is a
Warrant of Arrest11 was filed on behalf of BBB. Granting the motion to
quash on the fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by
courts in criminal cases, the
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offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
should jurisdiction over the husband. What this case concerns itself is simply
whether or not
have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial a
complaint for psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may even be filed within
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to
take the Philippines if the illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that
even if the
cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused.
Thus, it alleged extra-marital affair causing the offended wife mental and
emotional anguish
cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under
R.A. No. 9262
outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the
absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.
criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.
And
once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However,
if IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions
the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed
dated February 24, 2014 and May 2, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City,
somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of Branch 158, in
Criminal Case No. 146468 are SET ASIDE.Accordingly, the
jurisdiction.34 (Emphasis in the original) Information filed in Criminal Case No.
146468 is ordered REINSTATED.
In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262,
venue undoubtedly pertains to
jurisdiction. As
correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be filed
where
the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant.
Which the psychological violence as the means employed by the perpetrator is
certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally essential also is the
element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant.
The
resulting mental or emotional anguish is analogous to the indispensable element
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of
damage in a prosecution for estafa, viz:
What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law
contemplates
that acts of violence against women and their children may manifest as
transitory or
continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material and essential thereto
and
requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory,
while some
occur in another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's
essential and
material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case;
it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes
the other.
Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be
validly tried in
any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. 36
It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive
conduct
or act of violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section
3(a),
Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim
be a
resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of the anguish
suffered
being a material element of the offense. In the present scenario, the
offended wife
and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig City since
March of 2010.
Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.
Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the
information
relates to BBB's marital infidelity must be proven by probable cause for
the purpose
of formally charging the husband, and to establish the same beyond
reasonable
doubt for purposes of conviction. It likewise remains imperative to acquire
10. Jacaban vs Pp, GR No. 184355, March 23, 2015
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Facts
On July 16, 1999, at about 12:45 in the morning, the police implemented a
search warrant, along
with three barangay tanods to conduct a search on the house of the
accused, Arnold Jacaban, who were
present along with his wife and other ladies.
The police proceeded with the search. When one of the police search the
room and found a .45
calibre in the ceiling, the accused rushed in the room and grappled with
the police officer. After an
exhaustive search, other firearms and ammunitions were also recovered.
The firearms were inventoried and was confiscated by the police and
brought the accused to
their office.
Based on the records, the accused is not licensed to possess any kind of
firearm and
ammunition.
For the defense, a witness, the sister of the accused was presented
claiming that it was their
uncle’s house that was searched and not his brother’s.
Issues
Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime, Illegal Possession of
Firearms and
Ammunitions.
Ruling
The RTC ruled that the accused guilty of PD 1866, as amended by RA
8294.
In so ruling, the RTC found that all the elements of the crime charged
were present. The accused
was in possession of the firearm, ammunitions and other items with the
intent to possess the same
without any license or permit from any competent authority.
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The RTC did not give credence to the claim of the defense that it was not
the house of the
accused because the petitioner did not protest his arrest, the alleged
owner did not testify and the
accused had control of the house during the search. Moreover, ownership
of the house where the
search was conducted was not an essential element of the crime.
Thus the CA affirmed in toto.
The Supreme Court ruled that the accused guilty affirming the decision of
the CA with
modification. The petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging
from 6 years of prision correccional in its maximum period, as minimum to
6 years, 8 months and 1 day
of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
P30,000.00.
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