The Lebanese Identity
Author(s): Kamal S. Salibi
Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 6, No. 1, Nationalism and Separatism (1971), pp.
76-81+83-86
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/259624
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The
Lebanese
Identity
Kamal S. Salibi
The earliestevidenceof a sense of Lebaneseidentityis to be found
in the writingsof some Lebanesehistoriansof the first half of the
nineteenthcentury. By that time the Shihabs,a Sunnite Moslem
family from the southern Anti-Lebanon who had inherited the
emirateover the Druzes and Christiansof the southernLebanon
in 1697, and had become convertedto Christianityaccordingto
the Maronite (Uniate Catholic) rite in the second half of the
eighteenth century, had succeeded in extending their sway, de
facto, overthe wholeof Mount Lebanon,fromthe mainlyChristian
hinterlandof Tripoli in the north to the Druze-Christianhinterland of Sidon in the south. A Lebaneseentity had thus emerged,
separateanddistinctfromthe rest of Syria,bringingthe Maronites
and Druzes of the country, along with its other Christian and
Moslem sects, under one government.
The emirateinheritedand expandedby the Shihabshad a long
history behind it. It had developed in earlier Ottoman times
out of feudal privileges enjoyed by the Druze chieftains of the
southern Lebanon since the thirteenthand fourteenthcenturies,
when the Mamlukrulersof Egypt and Syria,to securethe loyalty
of the warlikeDruzes, recognizedhereditaryfeudal tenure in the
Druze mountain(feudalismin the Islamicstateswas not, as a rule,
hereditary).The Ottomans,who conqueredSyriafrom the Mamluks in I5I6, permitted the Druze chieftains to maintain their
privilegesunder a paramountemir (firstrecognizedin 1591) who
was chargedwith the maintenanceof order, the dispensationof
justice,and the collectionand remittanceof the revenue.This gave
the southernLebanona relativesecurity;and, in time, Christians
(mainly Maronites) from the northern Lebanon came to settle
thereunderthe protectionof the Druze emirs. In the courseof the
seventeenthand eighteenthcenturiesthe emirateof the southern
Lebanon, while it continued to enjoy its political privileges,
became furtherdifferentiatedfrom its surroundingsas a result of
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THE LEBANESE
IDENTITY
its peculiareconomicand social development.The silk production
which its emirs encouraged and protected provided a regular
(though modest) basis for its economy, enabling its thrifty and
industrious peasants, particularlythe Christiannewcomers who
were the main silk producers,to buy land and become peasant
smallholdersof a kind almost unknown elsewherein the region.
Silk brokers and other entrepreneurs,again mostly Christians,
gradually emerged in the larger villages and towns as a small
middle class which grewin size, wealth,and influenceas commercial relationswith Europe developed, and as Christianmerchant
familiesleft the troubledSyrianinteriorfor the less troubledrealm
of the emirate.Backedby the growingChristianmiddle class and
by the peasantsmallholders,the Shihabemirs,in the courseof the
eighteenthcentury,trespassedon the traditionalprivilegesof the
mainly Druze feudal chiefs to extend their own power.The destructionof feudal privilegesreachedits climaxunder the forceful
and ambitious emir Bashir II (1788-1840), who succeeded in
establishinga firm control over an expanded Shihab realm and
ruled it in the mannerof an enlighteneddespot.
The involvementof BashirII in the strugglebetween Muhammad Ali Pashaof Egypt (backedby the French),and the Ottomans
(backedby the British),broughtabouthis downfallin 1840. In the
following year, a co-ordinatedoppositionof Druze and Christian
feudalchiefs,encouragedby the Ottomansandthe British,brought
an end to the Lebaneseemirate.The idea of a separateand distinct
Lebanese entity, however, remained alive among the Christian
middle class and freeholdingpeasantry- more particularlyamong
the Maronites who enjoyed French protection. It was, indeed,
duringthe periodof divisionand anarchyfollowingthe end of the
emirate that a Maronite scholar, Tannus al-Shidyaq (d. I86I),
wrote the first coherenthistoryof Mount Lebanon,depictingthe
country as a feudal associationof Maronites,Druzes, Melchites,
Sunnites, and Shiites under the leadershipof the Shihabemirs.
Shidyaq began his careeras a clerk and political agent in the
service of the Shihabs, then turned to commerce and teaching
after their downfall.The mere publicationof his history (entitled
Akhbaral-a yan fi Jabal Lubnan,or History of the Notables of
Mount Lebanon)in I859 shows how the idea of Lebanonsurvived
the emirate. By the time the book appeared,however, its feudal
conception of Lebanon, reflectingthe brief but dramaticresur77
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CONTEMPORARY HISTORY
gence of feudal power in the country after I84I, was becoming
outmoded.In I86I, followingtwo decadesof intermittentcivil war
between peasantsand feudal chiefs, and between Maronitesand
Druzes, a new settlementwas workedout for the country,giving it
the dejurestatus of a Mutesarrifate(autonomousprovince)within
the OttomanEmpire. The arrangementwas made as a result of
French militaryintervention,and it was guaranteedby the European Powers: France, Russia, Austria, Prussia (later Germany),
and Sardinia(later Italy). The Mutesarrifatecomprised Mount
Lebanon to the exclusion of Tripoli, Beirut, and Sidon and the
valley of the Biqa (the fertile alluvialplain between the Lebanon
and the Anti-Lebanon).It was to be governedby a non-Lebanese
OttomanChristianmutesarrifassistedby an electedadministrative
council and a locally recruitedcivil service and gendarmerie.No
feudal prerogativeswere to be recognized.The Mutesarrifatewas
to have its own budget derivedfrom local taxationand subsidized,
when necessary,by the Ottomanstate. Only revenuein excess of
the Lebanesebudget was to be returnedto the Ottomantreasury.
Citizensof the Mutesarrifatewere exempt from Ottomanmilitary
service.
The establishmentof the Mutesarrifateof Mount Lebanon gave
the Lebaneseidentity, for the first time, a legal definition.To be
Lebanese was to enjoy citizenshipin the Mutesarrifate,and the
various privileges that went with it. The rapid development of
Mount Lebanonafter I86I, moreover,gave the Lebanesea pride
in their identity and a sense of nationalachievement.Under the
enlightened government of the mutesarrifs,Lebanese initiative
flourishedin an atmosphereof relativefreedom;so did the educational and cultural activities of Roman Catholic and Protestant
missionaries,whichwerea majorfactorin the generaldevelopment.
The countryappearedas a model Ottomanprovince- a fact which
was reflected by the common saying, still remembered and
repeated:'Happyis he who has a shed to keep one goat in Mount
Lebanon'.
It was amongthe Maronites,by far the largestcommunityin the
Mutesarrifate,that the sense of Lebaneseidentity developedmost
strongly. While the majorityof the Maronitessaw in the Mutesarrifatea Maronitenationalhomeland,an imaginativeminority
among them, composed mostly of leaders associated with the
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THE LEBANESE
IDENTITY
government,saw in it a free associationof communitieswhich the
Maronites,as the majorcommunity,were called upon to lead. To
these Maroniteleaders,the Mutesarrifatewas not an end in itself,
but a step towardsfull Lebanesestatehood.While admittingthat
the arrangementsmadein I86I werein keepingwith the Lebanese
social and economic developmentas it then stood, they insisted
that these arrangementswere seriously restrictive of further
development.The territoriallimits of the Mutesarrifate,which
deprivedthe countryof ports for its commerceand suitableland
for its agriculture, were to them particularly unsatisfactory.
Lebanon,they maintained,could not develop to its full potential
unless its territorywas enlarged to include the coastal cities of
Tripoli, Beirut,Sidon, and Tyre, alongwith the Biqaand the plain
of Akkar,to the north of Tripoli. In a book publishedin Paris in
I902 under the title La Question du Liban, a Maronite lawyer
associated with the government of the Mutesarrifate, Bulus
Nujaym (pseudonymM. Jouplain),eloquentlyput forth the arguments for the expansion of Lebanon and called upon France,
traditional friend of the Lebanese, to help them achieve full
statehood and, ultimately, independence. The arguments of
Nujaym were repeatedand developedin the years that followed
by a number of other Christian Lebanese nationalists who
organizedthemselvesin committeesand, from the safetyof Egypt
or France,solicitedinternationalsupportfor their cause.
A greatopportunityfor the fulfilmentof the Lebanesenationalist
demandscame in I918, with the victory of the Allies in the first
world war and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. By special
agreementbetweenthe Allies, the FrenchoccupiedBeirutand the
coastalzone, then receivedfrom the Leagueof Nations a Mandate
over the territory of present-day Lebanon and Syria. On I
SeptemberI920, the French High Commissioner,GeneralHenri
Gouraud,proclaimedin Beirutthe State of GreaterLebanonwith
its present boundaries. On 23 May I926, with the promulgation
of the Lebanese Constitution, this state became the Lebanese
Republic.
The establishmentof Greater Lebanon certainly satisfied the
demandsof the ChristianLebanesenationalists,but it alsobrought
with it a seriousproblem.Under the Mutesarrifate,the Maronites,
with their keen sense of Lebaneseidentity,were an overwhelming
majority,and their sense of nationalidentityappearsto have been
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CONTEMPORARY HISTORY
more or less shared by the Druzes and the Christianminority
groups. In Greater Lebanon, however, the Maronites became
the largest single community, and the Christian communities
togetherformed only a small majority.In the coastalcities which
were incorporatedin the new state, the majority was Sunnite
Moslem. Tyre and its hinterland were predominantly Shiite
Moslem; and Sunnite and Shiite Moslems also predominatedin
the Biqa and other annexedterritories.Of these two communities,
whichnow rankedsecondandthirdin numberafterthe Maronites,
the Sunnites had pronounced pan-Arab sympathies, and their
leadersclamouredfor union with Syria,which was predominantly
Sunnite. The Shiites, who had hardlyany co-religionistsin Syria,
were happy enough to be included in Lebanon; their traditional
warinessof the Sunnites,however,made them hesitantto declare
their Lebanese sympathiesopenly, and some among them even
professeda dissimulatingpan-Arabism.The Druzes, also anxious
to keep the goodwill of the Sunnites, remainedreserved.It soon
became clear that the ChristianLebanese had to face the panArabism of the Sunnites with little active help from either the
Shiites or the Druzes. Even the Christianrankswere soon divided
over the issue. While most of the Greek Orthodoxsupportedthe
Lebanese idea, some among them saw in the conflict between
Lebanese nationalism and pan-Arabism an opportunity to
challengethe establishedMaroniteleadershipby professingpanArabism,or the intermediarypositionof Syriannationalism- in a
Greater Syria, they felt, the Greek Orthodox rather than the
Maroniteswouldbe the majorChristiancommunitysharingpower
with the Sunnites, as there were hardly any Maronites outside
Lebanon.With the Greek Orthodoxthus divided, the Maronites
and other Catholiccommunitiesremainedthe only solid Lebanese
nationalistblock. It was largelyleft to them to developa workable
formulafor the country.
The initial formula for Lebanon was worked out by a group of
leaders among whom the most prominent was the banker and
intellectual Michel Chiha (d. I954), a Roman Catholic and a
second generationLebanese of Assyrianextractionwhose family
came originally from Iraq. Chiha (writing in French) depicted
Lebanonas an associationof Christianand Moslem communities
living togetherin a spirit of co-operationand mutualrespect.The
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THE LEBANESE
IDENTITY
country, he maintained, had a character all its own, recognizable
in all the stages of its history. It was, in essence, a Mediterranean
country, whose people had been active in the Mediterranean world
since ancient times. The Phoenicians, with whom the history of
the country begins, were traders who established a commercial
empire in the Mediterranean, bringing wealth to their cities from
overseas. The modern Lebanese, like them, were destined for
trade; their country, situated at the cross-roads between East and
West, was ideally suited for the purpose. In addition to being
traders, the Phoenicians had been cultural intermediaries in the
ancient world; among other things, they had developed the modern
alphabet from older Oriental scripts and transmitted it to the
Greeks, who in turn passed it on to the Romans. Like their
Phoenician forefathers, the modern Lebanese were called upon to
play the role of cultural intermediaries, explaining to the West the
heritage of the East, and introducing the East to the modern
material and spiritual civilization of the West. The Lebanese,
according to Chiha, were well-prepared for this role, as they alone
had a complete understanding of both the East and the West.
To Chiha, the viability of the Lebanese system depended on the
maintenance of traditional relationships. The Constitution which
he helped to draft (he was, in 1926, the secretary of the drafting
committee) established a legal framework for these traditional
relationships but did not fix them permanently, leaving them to
develop by spontaneous give-and-take; and develop they did. In
1926, the Sunnite Moslems were still clamouring for union with
Syria, and few Sunnite leaders dared defy their co-religionists by
participating in Lebanese politics. The choice of a Maronite for
first President would have confirmed their worst suspicions that
Lebanon was meant to be a Maronite national homeland. Hence a
Greek Orthodox, Charles Dabbas, was chosen as first President.
With no Moslems available to form the first cabinets, the premiership was assigned to Maronites. The first Sunnite Moslem to show
readiness to share in the management of affairs, Muhammad
al-Jisr, was elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. Later,
when more Moslems became eager to share in Lebanese politics,
the Presidency of the Republic was reserved for the Maronites
(starting in I934) and the Premiership for the Sunnite Moslems
(I937). Still later, the Presidency of the Chamber of Deputies
was reserved for the Shiites (I947). Shortly before the political
8I
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THE LEBANESE
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independenceof Lebanon from the French Mandate in I943, a
gentleman'sagreementwas workedout betweenthe Christianand
Moslem leaders establishinga fixed ratio of six Christiansto five
Moslems in the membershipof the Chamberof Deputies, which
is hence alwaysa multiple of eleven. It was also agreedthen that
key securitypositions(likethe Armycommandandthe Directorate
of General Security) would be reserved for Christians. The
Moslems promised loyalty to Lebanon as an independent state,
and agreedto cease their demandsfor the dissolutionof Lebanon
in a largerArabentity; the Christianspromisedto regardLebanon
as a memberof the Arabfamilyof nationsand to follow a national
policy that does not run contraryto the generalArabinterest.The
gentleman's agreement of I943 is known in Lebanon as the
National Pact, and it remainsunwritten.After the crisis of 1958,
the National Pact was supplementedby anotheragreement,again
unwritten,to divide administrativeposts equally between Christians and Moslems, and as equitablyas possible among the sects,
in order to ensure the maintenanceof the national unity of the
Lebanesepeople. The formularemainsopen for furtherdevelopment; so far, it has not been seriouslychallenged.As the term of
the MaronitePresident of the Republic nears its end, Sunnites,
Shiites, and Druzes join the Greek Orthodox and others in
searchingfor a suitableMaroniteto succeedhim. Membersof the
Chamberof Deputiesdividealongpoliticallines,withlittleregardto
sect, to elect a Shiite Presidentfor the Chamber,or to choose a
SunnitePremierto form the Cabinet.Leadingarmyofficersof all
sects accept a Maroniteas their commander.Any defianceof the
system is regardedas sedition.
While the Chiha formulafor government,as supplementedby
subsequent conventions, has proved eminently workable, the
Chiha image of Lebanese identity has proved less so. Most
ChristianLebanese,anxiousto dissociatethemselvesfromArabism
and its Islamic connections, were pleased to be told that their
country was the legitimate heir to the Phoenician tradition.
Christianwriterslike the poets CharlesCorm (writingin French,
d. 1963) and Said Aql (writingin Arabic),tried hard to build up
the Phoenicianistimage of Lebanon. Lebanon, they maintained,
had become culturallyconnectedwith Arabismby sheer accident,
and it was time to set thingsright by pickingup wherethe Phoenicians had left off and forgettingthe unfortunateinterval.Said Aql
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CONTEMPORARY HISTORY
was particularlyvocal in preaching a Phoenician Renaissance.
Although himself a master of classicalArabicstyle, he urged the
abandonmentof classicalArabic,togetherwith the Arabicscript,
and proceeded,with little success,to write proseand poetryin the
Lebanesevernacular,using an adaptedLatin script. In additionto
providing grounds for dissociatingLebanon from Arabism, the
Phoenicianistidea appealedto the predominantlyChristianmiddle
class by promotingthe image of the Lebanese as traders.It also
presented the Lebanese emigrant as a Phoenician adventurer
setting out for the unknown, thereby consoling the Christians,
somewhat, for the fact that their numbers were being steadily
reduced in the country by emigrationto North America, South
America,and more recentlyAustralia.However,while the general
run of Christiansgave their enthusiasticsupportto Phoenicianism,
most Moslems dismissedit as nonsenseand ridiculedthe extravagant claimsof Corm, Aql, and their followers.The Sunniteswere
particularlyvehementin theirrejectionof the Phoenicianistformula, which they denouncedoutrightas part of a French imperialist
conspiracyagainst Arab nationalism.Even when they agreed to
acceptLebanonas a separateentityunderthe termsof the National
Pact, the country remained to them Arab and its people not a
separateLebanesenation,but partof a largerArabnation. Sunnite
writerslike MuhammadJamilBayhum(a Beirutnotablewho was
associatedwith SharifFaysal'sArabmovementin I9I8) and Umar
Farrukh(a professorof Islamics at a leading Moslem college in
Beirut), insisted that Lebanon, in its history and culture, was
inseparablefrom the maincurrentof Arabism.They admittedthat
the modernLebanesecould legitimatelytakepride in the achievement of their Phoenicianpredecessors.But the Phoenicians,they
insisted, were Canaaniteswho came originallyfrom the Arabian
peninsula:they could hence be claimed,in a way, as Arabs.While
this last claim was clearlyuntenable,it could not be denied that
there was much truth in the Sunnite position. Lebanon was
undoubtedlyArabicin speech and traditionalculture. Its history
in Islamic times, until certainlythe seventeenthcentury,could be
clearlyseparatedfrom the history of Syria (if not from Arab and
Islamic history in general) only by lame artifice. No theory of
Lebanesenationalitycouldbe validif it did not takeinto consideration the fundamentalhistoricaland culturalconnection between
Lebanon and Arabism. The fact remained, however, that Arab
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THE LEBANESE
IDENTITY
nationalism had a distinct Islamic (more particularlySunnite)
flavour,which made it in generalunacceptableto the Christians.
Moreover, the Arab nationalistformula for Lebanon which the
Sunnites urged, if carriedto its logical conclusion, could hardly
be counted upon as a guaranteefor the continued existence and
safety of Lebanonas a separateentity. In 1958, when Egypt and
Syria joined to form the short-lived United Arab Republic (the
name has since been maintainedby Egypt), Lebanonwas thrown
into a crisisvergingon civil war as its Arabnationalistsclamoured
for the country to join the union. Since the Arab-Israeliwar of
June I967, LebaneseArab nationalistshave urged permissionfor
Palestinianguerrillaorganizationsto operate freely in Lebanon,
therebycompromisingthe sovereigntyof the countryand exposing
it to Israeliretaliation.If the Phoenicianistformulafor Lebanon,
intellectually untenable because it ignores the country's Arab
heritage, has proved unworkablebecause it is rejected by the
Moslems, the Arab nationalist formula, apart from being unacceptable to most Christians, has proved dangerous to the
sovereigntyof the countryby calling it in questionat intervalsof
alarmingfrequency.
As an alternativeto Phoenicianism,Lebanese nationalistshave
tried to promotethe imageof Lebanonas a refugeand a havenfor
freedom. This image had first emergedas a distinct thesis in the
early years of the French Mandate, in the work of the Jesuit
missionaryand OrientalistHenri Lammens (d. 1937) who lived
and taught in Beirut. In his classic La Syrie; precis historique
(BeirutI92I), LammensdepictedLebanon,historically,as a haven
for the persecuted and oppressed of Syria: 'a tous ceux que
revoltela tyranniedes pachas,la Montagnes'ouvrait'(ibid.,II, 63).
The Lammens image of what he called l'asile du Liban was a
powerfulone, and certainlymore suitablethan Phoenicianismas
justificationfor a Lebanesenationalidentity. It was acceptablenot
only to the Christians,but also to the Shiitesand Druzes who were
historicallyacquaintedwith persecution.It was hardlycomplimentary, however, to the Sunnite Moslems who were presumed to
have been, historically,the persecutorsand oppressors.In recent
years, as many Sunnites and others leave Syria and Iraq to seek
politicalrefuge in Lebanon,the idea of l'asile du Libanis gaining
recognition and becoming more widely accepted. Lebanese
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CONTEMPORARY HISTORY
Sunnites, nevertheless,remain disinclinedto subscribeto it as an
acceptabletheoreticalbasis for a Lebanesenationalism.
Despite its historicalvalidity and broad appeal, the l'asile du
Liban formula fails as a foundation for a theory of Lebanese
nationality;and its failure,like that of Phoenicianism,driveshome
the fact that no intellectualjustificationfor a separateand distinct
Lebaneseidentity can be successfulif it leaves out the Moslems,
more particularlythe Sunnites. There remains, however, the
question: is any such justificationnecessary? During the fifty
years that have elapsed since the establishmentof the State of
Greater Lebanon, the practice of Lebanese nationalityhas been
clearly ahead of the theory. The Lebanese, despite persisting
differenceswhich often seem grave, have actuallybecome more
and more of a distinctpeople, recognizingthemselvesas such and
being recognizedby othersas such, simplyby the processof living
togetherand sharingin a commonnationallife. The steadygrowth
of the Lebanese middle class, which has come to include an increasingproportionof Moslems and Druzes, has broadenedthe
meeting-groundfor the variousLebanesecommunities,all of which
have developed vested interests in the country. The recurring
internal and regional crises which, on the surface, have so frequently made the Lebanese system seem precarious and its
continued existence questionable,have, at a deeper level, served
to sharpen the sense of Lebanese nationality by forcing the
Lebanese, time and again, to redefinetheir internaland external
relationships,thereby gaining a deeper understandingof their
nationallife. Developments in the region have also helped. The
contrastbetweenthe democracyandliberalismof Lebanon(which
the sectarian division of the country helps to secure) and the
authoritarianismwhich continues to gain ground in the Arab
world, is makingthe image of Lebanonas a separateentity more
and more distinct; so is the relativeprosperityand stabilityof the
countryin contrastto its neighbours.While the searchfor a historicaland philosophicalbasis for Lebanesenationalitycontinues,
it is, in the main,by the day-to-dayprocessof being Lebanesethat
the people of Lebanon are becomingmore and more of a nation.
Considering the increasing facility with which fundamental
problemsare being handled,and in spite of the dangerswhich so
frequentlythreatenthe Lebanesesystem,one wouldnot expectthe
process to be easily reversed.
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