Gonzales III v. Office of the President
G.R. No. 196231: January 28, 2014
FACTS:
The Office of the President filed a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s
September 4, 2012 Decision which ruled on the petition filed by Deputy Ombudsman Emilio
Gonzales III. His petition challenged the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of Republic Act (RA) No.
6770.
In the challenged Decision, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 and ruled that the President has disciplinary jurisdiction over a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor. The Court, however, reversed the OP ruling that: (i) found Gonzales guilty of
Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust; and (ii) imposed on
him the penalty of dismissal.
On motion for reconsideration by the OP through the Office of the Solicitor General and
further reflection, the Court votes to grant Gonzales’ petition and to declare Section 8(2) of RA No.
6770 unconstitutional with respect to the Office of the Ombudsman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 8(2) of RA 6770 vesting disciplinary authority in the President over
the Deputy Ombudsman violates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman and is, thus,
unconstitutional
RULING:
NO. Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is
envisioned to be the “protector of the people” against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the
Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. This constitutional vision of a
Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and
guard against the ills, abuses and excesses of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13(8), Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the
Constitution.
The Ombudsman’s broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all public officials, including Members of the Cabinet
and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these broad powers, the Constitution saw it
fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of officialdom and
partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an “independent” office.
Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own
alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary
authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself.
The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of
them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon
the constitutionally-granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so
doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the
Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of
an Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize.
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who
act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be
expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as she is,
if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for
complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines
where graft and corruption is still a major problem for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2)
of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared
void.