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Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec, G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

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Constitutional Law
Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec
G.R. No. 119976: September 18, 1995
FACTS:
On March 8, 1995, Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of the Representative of the First District of Leyte, providing the
following information on item no. 8:
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years
and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a
“Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification” with the Comelec on the ground of
petitioner’s alleged failure to comply with the minimum one-year residency constitutional
requirement.
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry “seven” months to “since childhood.” The Comelec denied her certificate
on the ground that it was filed out of time.
Petitioner then filed the certificate to Comelec’s head office, averring that the prior
entry of “seven” was the result of an “honest misinterpretation.” The Comelec Second
Division struck down her application and ruled in favor of Montejo, thus disqualifying her
from running for the Representative of the First District of Leyte. The Second Division ruled
that petitioner’s claim of having lived in the first district of Leyte “since childhood” is
untruthful because she in fact lived much of her life in the San Juan City in Metro Manila.
The Comelec en banc also denied her motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner garnered the most votes in her district. However, the Comelec issued a
Resolution suspending the proclamation of petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of May 9, 1995 elections
RULING:
Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte for a period of at least one
year at the time of May 9, 1995 elections. In election law, the concepts of “domicile” and
“residence” are synonymous, hence the common mistake to substitute “domicile” for “actual
residence.” Although Imelda has actually resided in many other places, Tacloban is still her
domicile, as she has never had the intention of abandoning it. She has even kept on going
back there all these years for important events in her life.
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Constitutional Law
It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of
law because of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand Marcos in 1952. A wife does not
automatically gain the husband’s domicile. What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
Concepts of “domicile” and “residence”; elements of domicile
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual
to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or
country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence
involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode
ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person’s
intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is
established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different
residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for
various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of
choice.
Domicile includes the twin elements of:
a) “the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place” and
b) animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Domicile of origin v. domicile of choice
Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law
attributes to every individual a domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of
the head of his family, or of the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his
birth. While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is born or reared, it
maybe elsewhere. Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has
elected and chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or
foundation the intention of the person. In order to hold that a person has abandoned his
domicile and acquired a new one called domicile of choice, the following requisites must
concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (b) intention to remain
there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile or animus non
revertendi. A third classification is domicile by operation of law which attributes to a person
a domicile independent of his own intention or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from
legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent
and a child.
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