NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
PACIFIC BANKING CORP EMPLOYEES UNION vs. CA
Facts:
In 1985 Pacific Bank was placed under receivership by the Central Bank pursuant to resolution No. 699 of its
Monetary Board. A few months later it was placed under liquidation and a liquidator was appointed.
CB filed with RTC a petition for Liquidation and was approved
 Creditors filed their claims to the court, there are two separate cases.
o including Union who filed a complaint in intervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th
month pay, Christmas bonus and other benefits due to PacB employees.
o Ang Keong Lan and E.J Ang International, also seeks payment of investment in PaBC amounting
to 2.5M USD.
 RTC granted the Union’s claims and Ang Keong Lan’s claims.
Liquidator filed a motion for reconsideration (DENIED)
 He then filed a notice of appeal. (DISALLOWED BY JUDGE – filed beyond 15 days period)
o Instead judge issued writ of execution to union and Ang Keong Lan.
CA – certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
Petitioner filed 2 separate CPM, (5th division and 14th division)
5th Division: Union
 liquidation was a special proceeding - period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered
therein is 30 days.
 Since the notice of appeal was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the decision granting the Union's
claims, the appeal was brought on time.
14th Division: Stockholders
 Liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action. Therefore, the period for appealing from any decision or
final order rendered therein is 15 days.
 It is akin to an interpleader under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court where
o there are conflicting claimants or several claims upon the same subject matter,
o a person who claims no interest thereon may file an action for interpleader to compel the
claimants to "interplead" and litigate their several claims among themselves.
Issue: WON Liquidation is a special proceeding or an ordinary civil action.
Ruling:
Yes.
Rule 2 of Rules of Court
Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which the party prosecutes another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other remedy, including one to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact, shall be by special proceeding.
1|Page
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Chief Justice Moran:
action is distinguished from special proceeding in that
 Action is a formal demand of a right by one against another,
 Special proceeding is but a petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact.
A petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary
action.
 It does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong
against a party.
 It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act or omission nor state
a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.
The petition only seeks a declaration of
 the corporation's state of insolvency (Status) and
 the concomitant right of creditors (right) and the order of payment of their claims in the disposition of
the corporation's assets.
Liquidation does not resemble interpleader.
 an action for interpleader involves claims on a subject matter against a person who has no interest
therein.
o In liquidation, all of the parties are interested therein.
Liquidation resembles the special proceeding of settlement of estate of deceased persons.
 The two have a common purpose:
o the determination of all the assets and the payment of all the debts and liabilities of the
insolvent corporation or the estate.
o The Liquidator and the administrator or executor are both charged with the assets for the
benefit of the claimants.
o the liability of the corporation and the estate is not disputed.
o The court's concern is with the declaration of creditors and their rights and the determination of
their order of payment.
However, since In Stockholder’s liquidator failed to perfect the appeal by not filing appeal on record, although notice
is filed well within 30 days for special proceedings, CA decision must be affirmed.
In the Union’s case, it is affirmed.
2|Page
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
CHING vs. RODRIGUEZ
Facts:
Respondents filed a complaint titled “Disinheritance, Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Settlement, Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,” against herein petitioners.
Cause of Action:
 They are the heirs of Antonio. Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonio's and Lucina's son when in
truth and in fact, he was adopted and his birth certificate was merely simulated. Ramon allegedly
stabbed his father, there after he was still at large. Respondents concluded that Ramon can be legally
disinherited, under Art 919.
 Prior to Ramon being a suspect, he misrepresented that there were only six real estate properties left by
Antonio during his inventory. The other properties are within his possession.
 He swindled the respondents in to giving him the possession of their properties.
Respondents prayed that:




TRO be issued to prevent alienation of subject properties.
Declaring ramon to be disqualified in inheriting
Declaring null the transfer of 6 parcels of land from Antonio to Ramon
Declaring null
o Agreement and waiver,
o Transfer of share of stocks
o Affidavit of settlement of estate
o Deed of Sale
RTC Denied MTD by petitioners. (First MTD Litis Pendencia)
Respondents amended the complaint, impleading MetroBank on the CPPA issued to Antonio. They prayed that it be
released to them as rightful owners.
Petitioners filed an MTD again (This time, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter)
 Jurisdiction belongs to probate or intestate court.
o the release CPPA to the respondents,
o the declaration as heirs, and the propriety of Ramon's disinheritance,
o the suit partakes of the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action for declaration
of nullity.
RTC denied again the MTD:
 The relief of establishing the status of the plaintiffs which could have translated this action into a special
proceeding was nowhere stated in the Amended Complaint. With regard [to] the prayer to declare the
plaintiffs as the rightful owner[s] of the CPPA and that the same be immediately released to them, in
itself poses an issue of ownership which must be proved by plaintiffs by substantial evidence.
3|Page
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
CA (certiorari) – affirmed RTC.
 nothing in the said complaint shows that the action of the private respondents should be threshed out in
a special proceeding, it appearing that their allegations were substantially for the enforcement of their
rights against the alleged fraudulent acts committed by the petitioner Ramon Ching.
 no compelling reason to still subject the action of the petitioners in a special proceeding since the
nullification of the subject documents could be achieved in the civil case, the lower court should proceed
to evaluate the evidence of the parties and render a decision thereon
Issue: WON this is a special proceeding outside RTC’s jurisdiction
Ruling:
An action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action,
 whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of
property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding,
A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
 an ordinary civil action where a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.
To initiate a special proceeding, a petition and not a complaint should be filed.
DISINHERITANCE
 While the respondents in sought the disinheritance of Ramon,
o no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of Antonio's estate was ever
mentioned.
o Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance,
 The case does not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the
probate court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
CPPA RELEASE
 What the respondents prayed for was that they be declared as the rightful owners of the CPPA which
was in Mercedes' possession prior to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver.
 respondents' prayer relative to the CPPA was premised on Mercedes' prior possession of and their
alleged collective ownership of the same, and
o not on the declaration of their status as Antonio's heirs.
AGREEMENT OR WAIVER.
 Respondents were parties to the execution of the Agreement and Waiver to be nullified.
o even without the necessity of being declared as heirs of Antonio, the respondents have the
standing to seek for the nullification of the instruments
4|Page
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein. As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon
the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
almost entirely depend upon the defendant.
Dismissed.
5|Page
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
TING vs. LIRIO
Facts:
In 1976, Judge Marigomen of CFI Cebu granted the application of Sps. Liro for land registration.
 It became final and executory.
 LRC was ordered to issue title.
In 1997 Ting filed with RTC Cebu for registration of the same lot.
 Respondents herein, as heirs of lirio, argued that the decision in first registration barred the filing of
petitioner’s application on the ground of res judicata.
RTC dismissed the registration by Ting.
Petitioner argues that although the decision had become final and executory on January 29, 1977, no decree of
registration has been issued by the Land Registration Authority (LRA).
 It was only on July 26, 2003 that the "extinct" decision belatedly surfaced as basis of respondents’
motion to dismiss
 and as no action for revival of the said decision was filed by respondents after the lapse of the ten-year
prescriptive period, "the cause of action in the dormant judgment passed into extinction
Issue: WON the decision in first registration case constitutes res judicata on second registration
Ruling: Yes. SEC. 6, Rule 39
 A final and executory judgment or order may be executed
o on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry.
o 5 years from the lapse, it may be enforced by action.
This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land
registration case,
 REASON: a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the
adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the
Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party.
In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established.
After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said
ownership is necessary,
 except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party
desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a
judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession.
The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse party is in possession, becomes final without any further
action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
The judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of 30 days to be counted
from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as in
ordinary civil cases.
Petition is denied.
6|Page
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Maravilla vs. Fernandez
Facts:
Maravilla filed with CFI a petition for probate of the will of his deceased wife.
 He was named as universal heir and executor.
The brothers and sisters of the deceased opposed the probate, on the ground that it was not signed page by page by
testatrix in presence of attesting witnesses and of one another.
The court still made Maravilla the administrator by the CFI.
Eventually, the court denied probate of the will on reasons advanced by the oppositors.
 The Brothers and sisters filed a motion for appointment of Eliazar Asuncion as co-administrator to
protect their interest.
Maravillia filed with the court his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal, from the decision denying
probate of the will.
 Eventually, Eliazar was held as a special co-administrator.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA to annul the appointment of Eliazar as special coadministrator.
 Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writs (certiorari and prohibition) prayed for by
respondent, and declaring null and void the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator.
 MR was denied by CA
Petitioners claim that CA had no jurisdiction to issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent,
the same not being in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
o
on the grounds that the principal amount in controversy in this case exceeds Php200,000, and
the writs (of certiorari and prohibition) prayed for and contends that CA cannot exercise
appellate jurisdiction, since the probate case is not on appeal before it
Issue: WON it is within CA’s jurisdiction.
Ruling:
No. CA has no jurisdiction to issue C and P.
The present proceedings were for the annulment of the appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator
and to restrain the probate court from removing respondent as special administrator.
 It appearing that the value of the estate in dispute is much more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals
clearly had no original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.
Section 2. Rule 73, of the Rules of Court provides that

rules on ordinary civil actions are applicable in special proceedings where they are not inconsistent with,
or when they may serve to supplement the provisions relating to special proceedings.
 Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the same in civil actions as in special proceedings.
Sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, providing that the Supreme Court shall have exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over "all cases in which the value in controversy exceeds PHP200,000, exclusive of interests
and costs.
7|Page
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
On the question of the appointment of petitioner Eliezar Lopez as special administrator, we agree with respondent
that there was no need for it. Note that the Rules of Court contain no provision on special co-administrator, the
reason being, that the appointment of such special administrator is merely temporary and subsists only until a
regular executor or administrator is duly appointed. Thus, it would not only be unnecessary but also impractical, if
for the temporary duration of the need for a special administrator, another one is appointed aside from the
husband, in this case, upon whom the duty to liquidate the community property devolves merely to protect the
interests of petitioners who, in the event that the disputed will is allowed to probate, would even have no right to
participate in the proceedings at all.
CA decision is set aside.
8|Page
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Cuenco vs. CA
Facts:
Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and 2 minor sons, residing in
Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu.
Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the
Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with
properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI of
Quezon for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition
and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall
have acted on the probate proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or
improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
RTC = denied the opposition and motion to dismiss were denied.
CA = ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
ISSUES:
What court should the probate proceeding be instituted?
1.
Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition against Quezon City court ordering it to refrain from
proceeding with the testate proceedings.
2.
Whether or not CFI Quezon City acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance
and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly
consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings.
Ruling:
1.
Yes, SC found that CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding
with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its
admission to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish.
Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been
presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving
9|Page
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent
died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in
abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged
last will.
Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court,
then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be
false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts.
2.
No, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in
declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over
the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to
do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had
at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the
estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule
of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to probate
of the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared,
as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent’s will and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the testator’s testamentary disposition.
Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive
jurisdiction.
The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."
the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to
take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.
Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance
of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over
the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined
to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably
had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
10 | P a g e
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the
estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same
rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.
Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court undisputably
had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
***It would be unjust for the petitioner to be compelled to go to Cebu and submit the decedent's will there for
probate either in a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings be converted into a testate
proceeding — when under the Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per the facts of record and as
affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and petitioner-widow had their conjugal
domicile.
NOTE (additional info):
•
Opposition to jurisdiction of trial court in settlement proceedings should be by appeal: Under Rule 73, section
1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the basis of the will duly
presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the first choice of residence of the
decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein — with the deference in comity duly given by the Cebu
court — could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case except when want of jurisdiction
appears on the record.
•
When proceedings for settlement of estate will not be annulled even if court had improper venue: the
mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction
of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the same proceedings before another
court of the same rank in another province is too obvious to require comment. It would be an unfair imposition upon
petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance
therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend
much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important
matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.
11 | P a g e
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
RUFINA LUY LIM, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Petitioner Rufina Lim is the surviving spouse of late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is the subject of probate
proceedings. Private respondents Auto Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc.,
Active Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are local corporations which owned real properties covered under the
Torrens system.
Pastor Y. Lim died intestate, so the petitioner, as surviving spouse represented by her nephew George Luy, filed a joint
petition for the administration of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then
filed a motion or the lifting of lis pendens and motion for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the
decedent.
RTC = granted the private respondents' twin motions.
Petitioner filed an amended petition where she alleged that the deceased engaged in business with the public as
corporations, all their capital, assets and equity were however, personally owned by the late Pastor Y Lim. Hence the
alleged stockholders and officers appearing in the respective articles of incorporation of the above business entities
were mere dummies of Pastor Y. Lim, and they were listed therein only for purposes of registration with the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
Issue:
May a corporation, be the proper subject of and be included in the inventory of the estate of a deceased
person?
Ruling:
No. A corporation is clothed with personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it. It
may not generally be held liable for that of the persons composing it. It may not be held liable for the personal
indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it.
Where the parcels of land are registered in the name of private respondent corporations, the ruling in BOLISAY vs.,
ALCID is of great essence and finds applicability, thus:
The Court of First Instance acting as a probate court, exercises limited jurisdiction,
 and has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third
person adversely to the decedent,
o unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly
or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for adjudgment, or
o the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced,
 REASON: for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular matter
should be resolved by the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court (e.g. probate, and registration, etc.), is in reality not a
12 | P a g e
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
jurisdictional but in essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may
be waived, x x x
It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership. The
petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has
been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as
a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons

a property covered by Torrens title is involved,
o the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of
strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner
of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary
action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons
named in the title. . . .
A perusal of the records would reveal that no strong compelling evidence was ever presented by petitioner to bolster
her bare assertions as to the title of the deceased Pastor Y. Lim over the properties.
Sec. 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack.
It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.
The probate court was remiss in denying private respondents' motion for exclusion.
Petition dismissed.
13 | P a g e
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Garcia vs. Fule
Facts:
Facts:
Virginia G. Fule filed with the CFI of Calamba Laguna, a petition for letters of administration, (SP) alleging “that
Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the Manila, leaving real estate and personal
properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places. She moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix
over the estate. Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia and alleged that the order appointing Virginia Fule as
special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration has
been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the proceedings
for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in
the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia.
Respondent Preciosa, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule.
Preciosa B. Garcia received a “Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular Administrator ‘ filed by
Virginia G. Fule, which she opposed because it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
of which the court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition was deficient.
However, Judge Malva already issued an order, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of
May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition of May
18, 1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over
the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not
a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
CA= reversed the decision of the lower court.
Issues:
1.
The question of what the word “resides” in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, referring to the situs of
the of the estate of deceased persons, means.
2.
WON venue was proper.
Ruling:
"resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." Even where
the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense.
Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."
In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence
or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
14 | P a g e
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
2.
NO.
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue. In this case, venue
was improperly laid by the Petitioner in the CFI of Calamba, Laguna, since the last place of residence of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. Proof of
which is the presentation of parties of a copy of the death certificate for which the court deems it admissible to confirm
the residence of the decedent at the time of his death.
Issue:
WON
What does reside mean?
Ruling:
Sec. 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject
matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.
Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is another, x x x A fortiori, the place of residence of the
deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an
element of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue.
The power or authority of the court over the subject matter “existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause
began.” That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the
power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if the power is not exercised
conformably with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to
exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means
that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective
for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a
strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words,
it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties.
(2) Meaning of the term “resides”
The term “resides” in Section 1, Rule 73 on settlement of a decedent’s estate refers to his actual residence as
distinguished from his legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile.
Virginia G. Fule measely stated “(t)hat on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died
intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna,
Preciosa B. Garcia claims that based on his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba
court, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. In her
amended petition, Virginia G. Fule also alleged that Amado G. Garcia’s “last place of residence was at Calamba,
Laguna.”
15 | P a g e
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at Quezon City, and not at Calamba,
Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. As it is, the
death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa
B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from
this, the deceased’s residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death.
Hence, the administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the
long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of
Court states: “When improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived.”
Preciosa did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse.
Petition is denied.
16 | P a g e
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
QUIAZON vs. BELEN
Facts:
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented
by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. In her Petition, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived
and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other.
Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia
by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the Amelia’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico. To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father.
In the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth
₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her
appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer,
opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners
asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the
time of his death, and pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of
decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City.
In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise
to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
On March 11, 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary
bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, discrediting the claim
that Eliseo was from Tarlac as hearsay.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the November 2008 Decisionrendered by the Court
of Appeals. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and
Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5,
Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a
resident of Las Piñas City.
The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 7 August 2009.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming that Eliseo Quiazon was a resident of Las Piñas and
therefore, the petition for letters of administration was properly filed with the RTC of Las Piñas
Held:
No, the petition is bereft of merit. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at
the time of his death.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object
or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed.It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
17 | P a g e
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of
abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC
that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the
records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this
reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.
18 | P a g e
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
URIARTE vs. CFI of NEGROS
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the Negros Court a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite
(Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and
that, during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case for his compulsory acknowledgment as
such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion, the Negros Court appointed the Philippine National Bank(PNB) as special
administrator, however, for one reason the PNB never actually qualified as special administrator.
Higinio Uriarte, filed an opposition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased who had executed a Last Will and
Testament in Spain. Juan Uriarte Zamacona, commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the
probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased and on the same date he filed in Special
Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that the
deceased left a last will and (2) that petitioner Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality.
Petitioner opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of the deceased, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75,
Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
The Negros Court sustained Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending
before it.
Petitionerfiled an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to
intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the proceedings had in said special
proceeding. This motion was denied by said court.
ISSUE:
Whether Juan Uriarte Zamacona should have filed the petition for the probate of the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite
with the Negros Court or was entitled to commence the corresponding separate proceedings, as he did, in the
Manila Court.
RULING:
He should have submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, either in a separate special proceeding or in an
appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No. 6344.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines
at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which
he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any
province in which he had estate.
In the case, these Courts of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts — province and city where the
deceased left considerable properties. It has been held that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before
a CFI it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the
intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to
render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed.
This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved,
the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for
the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.
When respondent Higinio Uriarte filed an opposition to Vicente Uriarte's petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, he had already informed the Negros Court that the deceased had left a will in Spain, and when Juan
19 | P a g e
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Uriarte Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss Special Proceeding No. 6344, he had submitted to the Negros Court a
copy of the alleged will of the decedent. Respondents knew before filing the petition for probate with the Manila
Court that there was already a special proceeding pending in the Negros Court for the settlement of the estate of the
same deceased person,
The court did not accept petitioner's contention in this regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider
said petition, albeit the Court say that it was not the proper venue therefor. It is well settled in this jurisdiction that
wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect.
Petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is enough to
consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to
the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the
existence of the last will and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court.
It must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the
latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some
other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is
raised too late.
20 | P a g e
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
HEIRS OF YPON vs. RICAFORTE
FACTS:
Petitioners, with some of their cousins filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages
against respondent Gaudioso in a Civil Case alleging that Magdaleno died intestate and childless leaving behind 4 lots
which were covered by TCTs.
Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the
cancellation of the TCTs, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name to the prejudice of petitioners who are
Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest. He alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as
evidenced by his Certificate of Live Birth.
The RTC ruled in favor of Gaudioso finding that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with
Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration, this did not mean that they
could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs.
Thus, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son. The motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied. Hence, this direct recourse to the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the determination of heirship can be made in an ordinary action for reconveyance of ownership and/or
possession.
HELD:
No. Under the Rules, the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding. It precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the
same.
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper
special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property. This
must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled
that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can
only be made in a special proceeding.
Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a
specialproceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then
decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners
here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be
dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to
the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently
rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.
In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need
to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately
resulting to the dismissal of the Civil Case.
Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary
action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of the Civil Case was altogether proper. In
21 | P a g e
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein
discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding
JAO vs. CA
Facts:
Petitioner Rodolfo and Respondent Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V.
Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively.
Thereafter, Perico filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, alleging that Rodolfo was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate.
Rodolfo moved for dismissal on the ground of improper venue, contending that the decedents’ actual residence was
in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and operate a bakery. As the health of his parents
deteriorated due to old age, they stayed with him in Quezon city for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and
hospitalization.
Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfo’s house in Quezon City at the time of their
deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death certificates that their last residence before
they died was in Quezon City. Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death certificate of their
mother.The RTC denied Rodolfo’s motion to dismiss. Consequently, he filed a petition for certiorari before the CA,
which court denied said petition.
ISSUE: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga, where the decedents had their permanent
residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed before their demise?
RULING: QUEZON CITY, where they actually stayed before their demise.
SC HELD: Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted in
the proper court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death (Sec. 1,
Rule 73).
In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals, the SC held that the term "resides" connotes “actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides", like the terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature –
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Such that "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.
It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
(2)
Eusebio v. Eusebio - Inapplicable in this case
where we held that the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his permanent
residence or domicile at the time of death.
The facts in Eusebio were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent Andres Eusebio, passed away while
in the process of transferring his personal belongings to a house in Quezon City. He was then suffering from a heart
ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to purchase a Quezon City residence, which was nearer to his doctor.
Eusebio died even before he could move to QC. In said case, the Court ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile --and hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said that Eusebio changed his residence because,
strictly speaking, his physical presence in Quezon City was just temporary.
22 | P a g e
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioner’s Quezon City
residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondent’s assertion that their elderly parents stayed in his house
for some three to four years before they died in the late 1980s.
(3)
Difference between Rule 4, Section 2 - on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1 - which applies
specifically to settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue in the former understandably refers to actual
physical residence for the purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent residence of the decedent which is
significant in Rule 73, Section 1. (Petitioner insists that venue for the settlement of estates can only refer to
permanent residence or domicile because it is the place where the records of the properties are kept and where
most of the decedents’ properties are located.)
SC held that the contention of the petitioner is unmeritorious.
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a person’s properties are kept in the place where he permanently
resides. Neither can it be presumed that a person’s properties can be found mostly in the place where he establishes
his domicile.
Petitioner is just splitting straws when he differentiates between venue in ordinary civil actions and venue in special
proceedings.
In Raymond v. Court of Appeals and Bejer v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and that
for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence", in the context of venue
provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.
The venue for the settlement of the decedents’ intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City court.
Petition is denied.
23 | P a g e
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Roberts vs. Judge Leonidas
Facts:
Edward Grimm is an American resident of Manila, who died in the Makati Medical Center. He was survived by his
second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and
by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in
divorce.
Edward executed 2 wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate which he described as
conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The 2 children of the first marriage were given their
legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the will dealing with his property outside this
country, Juanita and Ethel were excluded.
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and Edward Tate in Probate of the
Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah. Juanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino, California and Mrs. Roberts
of 15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City were notified of the probate proceeding (Sub-Annex C, pp.
48-55, Rollo).
43 days after Grimm's death, his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel filed with Court of First Instance of Manila, an
intestate proceeding for the settlement of his estate. She was named special administratrix.
Later on, the second wife, Maxine filed a motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding due to the pending proceeding
for the probate of Grimm's will in Utah. The private respondents prayed that the partition approved by the intestate
court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and
Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine.
Petitioner Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit.
Issue:
WON the respondent judge not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in
denying Ethel's motion to dismiss. (NO)
whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in an intestate proceeding by
Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 .
Ruling:
No, the respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in
denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either
real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; Sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).
Numerous jurisprudence provides that “the probate of the will is mandatory.” It is illogical that the estate of a
person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding.
Hence, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate
proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.
Ethel may file within 20 days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answer to the petition
unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose.
Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other
papers in the testate case. Petition is dismissed.
24 | P a g e
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
SALUDO vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC
Facts:
Petitioner Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International,
Inc. (AMEX) and its officers with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte.
Saludo) is a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte,
Philippines." The defendant is a corporation doing business in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and
other credit facilities and allied services with office address at Makati City." The other defendants (herein
respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX, and may be served with summons and other
court processes at their office address.
This case arose due to the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary
card issued to his daughter.
1st dishonor = happened when petitioner Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit card to pay her
purchases in the United States some time in April 2000.
2nd dishonor = occurred when petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his account at the Hotel Okawa
in Tokyo, Japan while he was there to attend a Congressional Recognition together with other Fil delegates.
Petitioner claimed that the dishonor of AMEX credit cards were unjustified as they resulted from respondents'
unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance covering the period of
March 2000.
Saludo denied having received the corresponding statement of account. Further, he was allegedly wrongfully
charged for late payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards were canceled by
respondents on July 20, 2000; so, he suffered great inconvenience, and embarrassment.
Respondents denied the allegations in the complaint. Further, they raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of
action and improper venue.
AMEX claimed that the complaint should be dismissed by virtue of improper venue because none of the parties was
a resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte, and petitioner Saludo was
not a resident of Leyte, as shown by his community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the
complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. To buttress their
contention, respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a
lawyer of the said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo.
Lower Court = denied the affirmative defenses interposed by respondents. It found the allegations of the complaint
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against respondents.
CA = reversed the decision and found that venue was improperly laid.
The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo against respondents is governed by Section 2,
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
The said rule on venue of personal actions basically provides that personal actions may be commenced and tried
where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or any of the principal defendants
resides, at the election of plaintiff. **CA referred to his community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint's
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, which was issued at Pasay City.
It also pointed out that petitioner Saludo's law office, which was also representing him in the present case, is in
Pasay City.
25 | P a g e
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court, because not one of the parties was a
resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that petitioner Saludo was not a resident thereof.
The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo was actually residing in Pasay City. It faulted
him for filing his complaint with the court a quo when the said venue is inconvenient to the parties to the case. It
opined that under the rules, the possible choices of venue are Pasay City or Makati City, or any place in the National
Capital Judicial Region, at the option of petitioner Saludo.
Issue:
WON the appellate court committed reversible error in holding that venue was improperly laid.
Ruling:
Yes, the appellate court committed reversible error in holding that venue was improperly laid.
Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a personal action.
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts
Venue of personal actions. - All actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides.
For purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Residence refers to "the
personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence
in a place and actual stay thereat.
The term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and
also an intention to make it one's domicile.
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had his
residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to
have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in another manner, Southern
Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense.
This is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time."
Petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his
complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the contrary, ***he is deemed to possess the qualifications
for the said position, including that he was a resident therein. And following the definition of the term "residence"
for purposes of election law, petitioner Saludo not only had the intention to reside in Southern Leyte, but he also
had personal presence therein, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
The latter element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was sufficient for petitioner Saludo to
be considered a resident therein for purposes of venue.
(2)
Koh vs. CA is not applicable in this case.
The case of Koh has different set of facts, from the case at hand. In Koh, the complaint was filed with the Court of
First Instance in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff who admitted that he was a resident of Kamias, Quezon City.
Save for the fact that he grew up in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte and that he manifested the intent to return there after
26 | P a g e
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC
NOTES AND CASES ON SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
retirement, plaintiff had not established that he was actually a resident therein at the time of the filing of his
complaint. Neither did he establish that he had his domicile therein because although he manifested the intent to go
back there after retirement, the element of personal presence in that place was lacking.
(3) Community Tax Certificate in Pasay - doesn’t hold water.
Even if community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City, such issuance does not preclude him from having a
residence in Southern Leyte for purposes of venue.
***A man can have but 1 domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of
residence.29
That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of
the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a quo. In this connection, it consequently held that, as
such, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was the representing, could be taken judicial
notice of.
Petition is granted.
*Residence in election purposes
Significantly, for purposes of election law, the term “residence” is synonymous with “domicile,” thus: x x x [T]he
Court held that “domicile” and “residence” are synonymous. The term “residence,” as used in the election law,
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.
“Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons,
one intends to return. x x x It can be readily gleaned that the definition of “residence” for purposes of election law is
more stringent in that it is equated with the term “domicile.”
Hence, for the said purpose, the term “residence” means “not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.”
The term “residence” requires 2 elements:
(1) intention to reside in the particular place; and
(2) physical presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
“The place where a party actually or constructively has a permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law.”
27 | P a g e
Vince Joseph Ona, JD3, UBBC