Ansay et al. v. National Development Company (NDC), G.R. No. L-13667, 29 April
1960.
MAR
[PARAS, C.J.]
FACTS: Ansay et al. filed against NDC a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas
bonus for the years 1954 and 1955. The trial court dismissed the complaint
ratiocinating that a bonus is an act of liberality and the court takes it that it is not
within its judicial powers to command respondents to be liberal and that Ansay et
al. admitted that NDC is not under legal duty to give such bonus and that the court
has no power to compel a party to comply with a moral obligation (Art. 142, New
Civil Code.). Ansay et al. appealed and argued that there exists a cause of action in
their complaint because their claim rests on moral grounds or what in brief is
defined by law as a natural obligation.
ISSUE: Is the grant of Christmas bonus for the years 1954 and 1955 demandable
based on natural or moral obligation?
HELD: NO.
Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or natural. “Civil
obligations are a right of action to compel their performance. Natural obligations,
not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right
of action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the
obligor, they authorize the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by
reason thereof”. It is thus readily seen that an element of natural obligation before
it can be cognizable by the court is voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly
retention can be ordered but only after there has been voluntary performance.
But here there has been no voluntary performance. In fact, the court cannot order
the performance.
Fisher vs. Robb, 69 Phil. 101
FACTS:
Defendant John C. Robb was told by the board of directors of the Philippine Greyhound Club,
Inc. to make a business trip to Shanghai to study the operation of a dog racing course. In
Shanghai, defendant met plaintiff A.O. Fisher who was a manager of a dog racing course.
Plaintiff upon knowing defendant’s purpose of his trip, became interested in the Philippine
Greyhound Club and asked defendant if he could be one of the stockholders. Defendant
answered in affirmative which thereupon filed a blank subscription and sent Greyhound Club
Php3,000 in payment of the first installment of his subscription. Upon receiving a call from the
said club, he paid the second installment amounting to Php2,000. Due to manipulations of those
who control the said club and during defendant’s absence, the company was changed to
“Philippine Racing Club.” Defendant endeavored the investments of those who subscribed,
particularly of that of plaintiff. Defendant,. through sending a letter, assured plaintiff for any loss
which he might suffer in connection with Philippine Greyhound Club in the same that he could
not expect anyone to reimburse him for his own losses which were more than that of plaintiff.
ISSUE:
Whether a moral obligation will sustain an express executory promise
HELD:
NO. Defendant, although morally responsible because of the failure of the enterprise, is not a
consideration under Article 1261 of the Civil Code as an essential element for the legal existence
for an onerous contract which could bind the promisor to comply with his promise.
Article 1261 states, “there is no contract unless the following requisites exists: consent of the
contracting parties; definite object; consideration.” In the present case, it does not appear that
plaintiff consented to the said form of reimbursement. The first requisite of 1261 is lacking.
With regards of the third requisite, it is now a well-established rule that a mere moral obligation
arising from wholly ethical motives not connected with any legal obligation will not furnish a
consideration from an executory promise.
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) v. Adil, Confesor and Villafuerte, et al.,
G.R. No. L-48889, 11 May 1989.
[GANCAYCO, J.]
FACTS: On February 10, 1940 spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte
obtained an agricultural loan from the Agricultural and Industrial Bank (AIB), now
the Development of the Philippines (DBP), in the sum of P2,000.00, Philippine
Currency, as evidenced by a promissory note of said date whereby they bound
themselves jointly and severally to pay the account in ten (10) equal yearly
amortizations. As the obligation remained outstanding and unpaid even after the
lapse of the aforesaid ten-year period, Confesor, who was by then a member of
the Congress of the Philippines, executed a second promissory note on April 11,
1961 expressly acknowledging said loan and promising to pay the same on or
before June 15, 1961. The trial court ordered the spouses to pay the loan but this
was reversed on appeal.
ISSUE#1: Does prescription operate to discharge a debt even if it there was
acknowledgment of the debtor?
ISSUE#2: Is the conjugal partnership of Confesor and Villafuerte bound by the
execution of the second promissory note?
HELD#1: NO.
This is not a mere case of acknowledgment of a debt that has prescribed but a
new promise to pay the debt. The consideration of the new promissory note is the
pre-existing obligation under the first promissory note. The statutory limitation
bars the remedy but does not discharge the debt. A new express promise to pay a
debt barred … will take the case from the operation of the statute of limitations as
this proceeds upon the ground that as a statutory limitation merely bars the
remedy and does not discharge the debt, there is something more than a mere
moral obligation to support a promise, to wit a – pre-existing debt which is a
sufficient consideration for the new the new promise; upon this sufficient
consideration constitutes, in fact, a new cause of action.
HELD#2: YES.
Under Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the
conjugal partnership. As such administrator, all debts and obligations contracted
by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, are chargeable to the
conjugal partnership. No doubt, in this case, respondent Confesor signed the
second promissory note for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence the
conjugal partnership is liable for this obligation.
SPECIFIED CONTRACTORS v. JOSE A. POBOCAN, GR No. 212472, 2018-01-11
Facts:
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the
claims asserted therein.
In Domondon, the existence of the agreement on the transfer of car-ownership
was not in issue but rather, the entitlement of a former employee to his entire
monetary claims against a former employer, considering that the said employee
had not paid the balance of the purchase price of a company car which the
employee opted to retain.
In the present case, the existence of the alleged oral agreement, from which
would flow the right to compel performance, is in issue.
Issues:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the respondent's complaint
considering that the allegations therein invoked a right over the subject
condominium units as part of his compensation package, thus a claim arising out
of an employer-employee relationship cognizable by the labor arbiter
Ruling
Resolution of the foregoing issues calls for an examination of the allegations in the
complaint and the nature of the action instituted by respondent.
The objective of the suit is to compel petitioners to perform an act specifically, to
execute written instruments pursuant to a previous oral contract
Similarly, that the end result would be the transfer of the subject units to
respondent's name in the event that his suit is decided in his favor is "an
anticipated consequence and beyond the cause for which the action [for specific
performance with damages] was instituted."
Had respondent's action proceeded to trial, the crux of the controversy would
have been the existence or non-existence of the alleged oral contract from which
would flow respondent's alleged right to compel petitioners to execute deeds of
conveyance. The transfer of property sought by respondent is but incidental to or
an offshoot of the determination of whether or not there is indeed, to begin with,
an agreement to convey the properties in exchange for services rendered.
Even if this Court were to entertain the petitioners' belated assertion that
jurisdiction belongs to the labor arbiter as this case involves a claim arising from
an employer-employee relationship, reliance by petitioners on Domondon v.
NLRC[28] is misplaced.
As the Court has ascertained that the present suit is essentially for specific
performance - a personal action - over which the court a quo had jurisdiction,
Principles:
What determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it
are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.