Manuela Espinosa
TOPIC: Amending Parties after the Limitations Period
CASE NAME:
Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.P.A.
ISSUE:
Whether relation back under Rule 15(c) depends on the amending party’s
knowledge or timeliness.
HOLDING:
No. Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows an
amended pleading to relate back to the date of the original pleading if:
(1) the claim against the new defendant involves the same conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth in the original complaint; (2) the new
defendant received notice of the lawsuit such that it would not be
prejudiced by being named; and (3) the new defendant knew or should
have known that it would have been sued but for the plaintiff’s mistake
about its identity.
RULE:
Relation back under Rule 15(c) does not depend on the amending party’s
knowledge or timeliness.
FACTS:
On February 21, 2007, Wanda Krupski (plaintiff) was injured while on
board a cruise ship operated by Costa Crociere S.p.A. (Costa Crociere)
(defendant). Krupski’s ticket listed Costa Cruise on the front of the ticket
but identified Costa Crociere as the carrier on the back of the ticket. On
February 1, 2008, Krupski brought a suit in negligence against Costa
Cruise. The statute of limitations expired three weeks later. After the
expiration of the statute of limitations, Costa Cruise alerted Krupski to
Costa Crociere’s identity as the proper defendant on several different
occasions. Costa Cruise ultimately moved for summary judgment on
grounds that it was not the proper defendant. Krupski cross-moved to
amend her complaint to add Costa Crociere. The Federal District Court
for the Southern District of Florida (District Court) denied Costa Cruise’s
motion for summary judgment and granted Krupski’s motion for leave to
amend. Krupski and Costa Cruise then stipulated to dismiss Costa Cruise
from the action. Krupski filed an amended complaint against Costa
Crociere on July 11, 2008. Costa Crociere thereafter filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that Krupski’s amended complaint did not relate back to
the date of her original complaint and that, therefore, Krupski’s suit was
Manuela Espinosa
outside the statute of limitations. The District Court granted the motion to
dismiss. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
REASONING:
Here, the Court of Appeals refused to allow relation back in part because
Krupski knew or should have known of Costa Crociere’s identity and
thus, her decision to sue Costa Cruises was deliberate and not a mistake.
However, the proper inquiry is what the new defendant knew or should
have known, not what the plaintiff knew or should have known.
Specifically, the question is whether Costa Crociere knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake, it would have been named in the lawsuit.
Costa Crociere argues that because Krupski was aware of Costa
Crociere’s existence, Krupski’s decision to name Costa Cruises was not a
mistake. However, simply being aware of two parties does not
necessarily mean that a plaintiff cannot make a mistake in naming the
wrong party. For instance, a plaintiff could be aware of the two different
parties but still be mistaken as to the specific roles played by each party.
The Court of Appeals also based its decision to deny relation back on
Krupski’s considerable delay in moving to amend. However, Rule 15(c)
does not provide for undue delay as a basis for denying relation back and,
in fact, mandates relation back once its requirements are met. Here,
Krupski’s complaint demonstrates confusion as to which company
owned and operated the cruise ship Krupski was injured on. Costa
Crociere, which had constructive notice of Krupski’s complaint, should
have known that this confusion on Krupski’s part had resulted in
Krupski’s mistakenly naming Costa Cruises as the defendant. These facts
demonstrate that Costa Crociere knew or should have known that, but for
Krupski’s mistake, it would have been named in the suit. Therefore,
relation back is mandated. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings.